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On the Use and Abuse of Nietzsche for Marketing Communication: Examining Consumer Suspicion toward Advertising

Daniel Ulf Assmus

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ON THE USE AND ABUSE OF NIETZSCHE
FOR MARKETING COMMUNICATION:
EXAMINING CONSUMER SUSPICION TOWARD ADVERTISING

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the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

By
Daniel Ulf Assmus

March 2008
ON THE USE AND ABUSE OF NIETZSCHE
FOR MARKETING COMMUNICATION:
EXAMINING CONSUMER SUSPICION TOWARD ADVERTISING

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March 12, 2008

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ABSTRACT

ON THE USE AND ABUSE OF NIETZSCHE FOR MARKETING COMMUNICATION:
EXAMINING CONSUMER SUSPICION TOWARD ADVERTISING

By

Daniel Ulf Assmus

March 2008

Dissertation Supervised by Dr. Pat Arneson

This study examines increasing consumer suspicion in light of contemporary marketing praxis. Immanuel Kant’s concept of “self-inflicted intellectual immaturity” is traced throughout 20th century marketing literature. A review of the public relations practices of Edward Bernays reveals a close similarity to recent concepts of integrated marketing communication (Schultz). This project contrasts marketing communication approaches grounded in mass psychology with the rational choice model of consumer behavior.

These dualistic viewpoints are often regarded as mutually exclusive; however, this author proposes an “integrated dualism” of marketing communication to provide consumers with ways to redeem rhetorical “tokens” (Mayhew) that constitute the managerial rhetoric (Sproule) of advertising. “Integrated dualism” constitutes an economic as well as ethical response to the multiplicity of the postmodern marketplace.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

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This project would not have been possible without the generous funding I received from the Center for International Regulatory Assistance. The continuous financial and moral support my parents and sister have given me over the years was truly exceptional. Most importantly, I wish to thank my best friend and soul mate Andrea who showed incredible patience during my four-year absence. Her pragmatism always challenges my philosophical ideas in the most refreshing way.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS

For in-text citations, this project utilizes the following, commonly accepted abbreviations for the works by Friedrich Nietzsche. Common English translations of these titles are also listed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>German Title</th>
<th>English Translation</th>
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<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>“Der Antichrist”</td>
<td>The Antichrist</td>
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<td>GD</td>
<td>“Götzen-Dämmerung”</td>
<td>Twilight of the Idols</td>
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<td>GT</td>
<td>“Die Geburt der Tragödie”</td>
<td>The Birth of Tragedy</td>
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<tr>
<td>JGB</td>
<td>“Jenseits von Gut und Böse”</td>
<td>Beyond Good and Evil</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAM</td>
<td>Menschliches, Allzumenschliches</td>
<td>Human, All Too Human</td>
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<tr>
<td>UBHL</td>
<td>“Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben”</td>
<td>On the Use and Abuse of History for Life</td>
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<td>Z</td>
<td>Also Sprach Zarathustra</td>
<td>Thus Spoke Zarathustra</td>
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Chapter 1:
The Need for Alternatives in Marketing Communication

“When the word is present and the action rings hollow, we open the door to routine cynicism and to a distrust of language.” (Arnett and Arneson 18)

This dissertation responds to a contemporary problem in marketing communication. Customer wants and needs have diversified in step with the growing competition of media channels and product and service offerings. Market transparency has reached an unparalleled high with the help of information technology. Consequently, market forces have first shifted from manufacturers to retailers and subsequently to consumers. Frequent disappointment in the claims of advertising has led consumers to an extreme level of distrust in most forms of mediated marketing communication. As a result, less effective advertising encourages companies and agencies to increase message volume only to create an amount of clutter that leaves a majority of consumers frustrated and disinterested.

Public disinterestedness is central to concept for this inquiry. Through a survey of social observations reveals a tradition of intentional passiveness of at least part of society in recent history. Liberal communicative action is not disabled, yet often discouraged even in free societies in the West. People might feel intimidated by those in power, question their own abilities, grow accustomed to and take comfort in a routine delegation
of decision-making to others, or they might be overwhelmed by the number of issues and commercial messages that reach them on a daily basis and require their attention.

Simplifying decisions, i.e., making life easy for consumers, is a driving force in contemporary marketing communication. Attempting to lift the burden of cumbersome evaluation and decision-making off the consumer is a service that marketers are eager to provide. Car insurance companies will contrast their own rates against those of competitors and boxes of software applications carry charts of side-by-side feature comparisons with a competitive product. These decision-making aids are designed to communicate to consumers that they are saving time, effort, and money while still making an informed decision. In many places, marketers seem to prefer consumers making decisions without getting actively involved in reasoning as a rational process. To influence rather than to persuade may save a company time, thus money. Therefore, marketers often rely on practices grounded in interpretations of the Nietzschean world views allegedly promoting the necessary and justified manipulation of the public. In the first three chapters of this work, these interpretations shall be dismantled as modern, i.e., “wrong” in a Nietzschean understanding of modern concepts (“AC” 171).

In order to manipulate rather than persuade, marketers have to assume stable and predictable consumer audiences. However, the image of the homogeneous consumer mass is outdated; the metaphor of the consumer as herd animal is inappropriate in a postmodern society characterized by fragmentation and diversity. Along with mass media came the myth of a hypodermic needle or the idea of a magic bullet of message transmission that bypasses cognitive evaluation and directly influences the action of uniform members of society. This dissertation shows why consumer conditioning
ultimately cannot be effective in a postmodern society which includes unstable groups of informed consumers; i.e., small publics or communities, demanding entire arguments rather than hollow claims. This dissertation includes a review of attempts to present “Integrated Marketing Communication” (IMC) as the new “magic bullet” (Reilly ix), fit for a pluralistic market environment. IMC as a magic bullet is possible even and especially when considered within a narrative framework, but may create serious ethical concerns. This work seeks to reveal some of these ethical concerns and provide practical guidelines for practitioners to responsibly utilize an integrated approach to marketing communication.

Despite informed consumer clusters, the passiveness of a portion or even majority of consumers (depending on the industry) is a real phenomenon. The works of Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Nietzsche, Walter Lippmann, Jürgen Habermas, and Gerard Hauser, in this historical progression, confirm a widespread public disinterestedness. The importance for engaging discourse in public, including the marketplace, emerges between these texts.

Friedrich Nietzsche provided the key ideas that constitute the foundation of this dissertation project. These concepts are three-fold. First, Nietzsche defined the mass public as a herd of animals (“AC”; “JGB”; “UBHL”) and described the associated loss of free will. Second, Nietzsche adopted a somewhat Platonic philosophy\(^1\) of Truth, attainable only by the most gifted thinkers and therefore commonly replaced by rhetorically constructed and historically internalized convention (“WL”). Plato’s \textit{Symposium}, for instance describes both Socrates’s revelation-like access to Truth as a

\(^{1}\) However, to call Nietzsche purely Platonic would be a mistake since on several occasions, Nietzsche critiqued Plato’s treatment of his master, Socrates (“JGB” 111), and even Socrates himself (“GT”).
Philosopher King in isolation—which Nietzsche picks up in Zarathustra—as well as the conventional understandings of a topic admitted into the dialectic. Third, Nietzsche’s philosophical work provided a connection of the above ideas to the marketplace, both metaphorically and literally (Z): the town’s physical marketplace can also be understood as a “marketplace of ideas” in which Zarathustra’s ideas are rejected and sensationalist entertainment is preferred. Jürgen Habermas’s work continues Nietzsche’s criticism of traditional social norms acting as Truth and the resulting barriers to communication (Habermas, Erkenntnis).

As indicated above, marketers tend to want to exploit public disinterestedness. Even for larger expenses, sellers often demand—and consumers are willing to provide—ad-hoc decisions. First-time home owners might perceive insurance against fire and floods as another cumbersome piece in the puzzling process of ownership whereas fire victims are likely to evaluate choices in future insurance more carefully. Relevance and interest determine the level of engagement in marketing communication. The prior group is reluctant to actively engage in extensive argumentation and a comprehensive collection of evidence. Instead, its members will be happy to choose the path of convenience and accept prefabricated claims and conclusions. Low faith in consumer audiences’ cognitive abilities and interests helped shape particular modern rhetorical practices. These practices have become conventional techniques. Contemporary approaches to marketing communication fail to address postmodern socio-cultural change despite the explicit commitment to a relational paradigm of integrated marketing communication. At least a partial return to rationality is necessary to overcome the emotional and unreflective
modern communicative barriers that have formed over time between consumers and advertisers.

Over time, consumers need to be able to identify a tradition of advertising consistent with their product and service experiences. Style cannot continue to frequently triumph over substance. Friedrich Nietzsche called the human inability to forget the past a blessing and a curse. Marketers need to precede their actions with golden words and still consistently deliver more than they promise (Nietzsche, Z 17-18) if they want to destroy the current suspicion and achieve a sustained change in consumer perceptions. If consumers could begin to see manipulation as the exception rather than the rule, an important step toward a trusting relationship, one that promotes bidirectional loyalty, would be made.

This chapter focuses on the status quo of marketing communication. Consumers frequently distrust advertising and other forms of mediated marketing communication. Since quantitative evaluations of consumer responses to marketing communication texts are often limited in scope, they do not provide a satisfying picture of the overall social acceptance of marketing as a discipline and practice. The lack of trust among consumers in the marketplace leads to less effective communication which is evidenced by rapidly rising advertising expenditures and decreasing returns on investment in marketing communication campaigns. Increasing message volume creates clutter which further discourages audiences to actively engage in marketing communication, given their limitations in time and effort. Texts from social philosophy, communication, and marketing reveal that marketing communication requires an adjustment to its postmodern
environment. To regain communicative effectiveness The goal must be to overcome the prevalence of consumer suspicion in the marketplace.

**Consumer Suspicion toward Advertising**

In his 1959 article in the *Journal of Marketing*, William Borton observed about marketing that “opinion surveys generally reveal that it is condemned . . . for its objectives and ethics, or lack of them” (48). He lists “several indications that marketing will mature socially” and become a valuable and respected profession (49). While some of Borton’s indicators hold true—for example the increasingly behaviorist approach to marketing (see subsection “Limitations of a Quantitative Understanding of Consumer Reactions to Advertising” of this chapter)—marketers and their messages are not generally perceived as being as socially responsible as Borton may have hoped and predicted. Nowhere in the literature is consumer suspicion toward marketing communication more prevalent than in advertising. Studies on the topics of social acceptance of agency-driven consumer advertising and marketing as a profession throughout the last decade of the 20th century show that “quite negative public attitudes to advertising apparently prevail in the USA” (O'Donohoe 92).

Jaques Ellul and other social critics of advertising call marketing communication’s general nature propagandistic (*Propaganda* 121), i.e., manipulative, and consequently its claims are “more or less distant from the truth” (Andrén 26). Given the controversial character and visibility of seemingly misleading advertising, consumer advertising deserves special attention as a function of integrated marketing communication. Richard Pollay points out that “because virtually all citizens seem to recognize this tendency of ad language to distort, advertising seems to turn us into a
community of cynics, and we doubt advertisers, the media, and authority in all its forms” (29). Even in the strict moral views of Immanuel Kant, who regarded truthfulness as an “ethical duty towards others” (Lectures 200), embroidery of messages was acceptable as long as others were aware of the exaggeration of truths (Lectures 427). However, since legislation largely ensures the absence of false-to-fact advertising (Kottman), advertisers now frequently present subjective value statements by spokespersons instead of making objective claims about their products and services. This creates an environment “where style frequently triumphs over substance” (Arnett and Arneson 11), promoting “irrationality in consumption” (DiPietro 72). Irrational purchasing decisions are triggered by impulse and lead to consumption without reflection. In situations in which consumers act differently on impulse than if they had deliberated the transaction, buyer’s remorse often sets in after the purchase is reevaluated. Consumers that attribute their own misjudgments to superficial meanings in marketing communication are likely to develop suspicion toward future advertising messages. In fact, consumer suspicion stemming from superficial meanings has peaked with the members of “Generation X”:

Skeptical viewers [of television advertising] have grown wary about ‘what’s real and what’s not,’ while belligerent viewers refuse to participate in the interpretation process or willfully undermine it. The constant process of simulation on TV eventually contributes to widespread doubts about the credibility or sincerity of media representations. (Goldman and Papson 56) This habitual reservation toward mediated marketing communication in general and business to consumer (B2C) advertising in particular constitutes “a philosophical loss of trust” (Arnett and Arneson 13) brought about by the fear of disappointment through
“lies.” Friedrich Nietzsche described the act of lying as a violation of rhetorically constructed conventions (in the absence of absolute Truth). If this abuse of conventional language is intentional, self-serving, and causes the audience economic damage, people may lose trust in the communicator and exclude him or her from their community (Nietzsche, “WL” 877-78).

To a certain extent, abuse of rhetorical proofs in advertising is a violation of conventional language. For instance, inductive reasoning by example aims at establishing laws on the basis of a single or few representative experiences. Thus, reasoning by example follows the communicative convention of repeated demonstration to establish patterns. Common advertising disclaimers such as “individual results will vary” defeat the purpose of proving such a pattern. Similarly, expert testimony relies on the credibility of the unbiased expert. Indication that the expert has been compensated for his or her statement undermines objectivity that would lend credibility to the expert (See the discussion regarding labeling of advertising in chapter 3). Such deliberate rhetorical imprecision has the potential of “setting unattainable expectations”—the basis for “routine cynicism” (Arnett and Arneson 14). Extreme cynicism, derived from communication in the absence of trust, threatens community and “social cohesion” (Pollay 29). Communication and trade rely on social interactions which thrive in community. A threat to community constitutes a threat to effective communication and successful commercial transactions.

This project examines the rhetorical dynamics of consumer perceptions of advertising. In a digital age of great market transparency, historically closest to the economic models of “perfect information” and “perfect competition,” it may surprise that
marketers employ communicative techniques that consumers commonly deem misleading and can easily identify as such. In an integrated marketing communication environment which pronounces the management of customer relationships and the creation of brand loyalty as paradigmatic, why do “marketers commonly fail to be loyal to their customers” (Schultz 11)?

This question regarding communicative actions in the marketplace warrants a close examination of the historical foundation and evolution of marketers’ perceptions of their audiences. This project demonstrates that today’s conventional views of the public are grounded in a modern philosophy, developed before marketing formally existed as a discipline and before techniques of promotion and advertising were systematically created. The goal of marketing professionals is to create “value for customers . . . and society at large” (“Marketing Terms Dictionary” online entry on marketing). A postmodern re-evaluation of marketers’ communicative relationships with their consumer audiences is necessary to develop the rhetorical means for acquiring ethical change in consumer attitudes toward advertising. A philosophical inquiry into postmodern communicative consumer relationships is warranted as quantitative research in this area tends to be very case-specific and deliver great tactical rather than fundamental insights into communicative dynamics in the marketplace.

Limitations of a Quantitative Understanding of Consumer Reactions to Advertising

Quantitative measurements of consumer attitudes toward marketing communication campaigns cannot deliver a comprehensive picture of consumer sentiments. Such research data has immense value for tactical marketing communication decisions but due to its very short half-life in a dynamic marketplace and its narrow focus
on particular communicative actions, it does not provide much strategic value. Based on the example of price semantics, these limitations are examined below.

Quantitative analyses of consumer reactions to advertising seem to repeatedly miss the “big picture” of a strategic integrated marketing approach, focusing only on specific economic transactions. Richard Pollay fears that academics too often “are servants to marketing practice rather than scholars of it” (34). For instance, a study in the Journal of Marketing Research suggests that consumers subjected to “partitioned pricing” in advertising tend to recall a price lower than the actual total cost, thereby increasing demand for the advertised product (Morwitz, Greenleaf, and Johnson 453). In a partitioned pricing strategy, the advertised price is exclusive of taxes, shipping and handling costs, or other mandatory fees and surcharges associated with the purchase, making comparisons of final prices difficult for the consumer. Consumers often recalled a lower total price. Depending on price elasticity, i.e., the strength of the correlation between price and demand for a given product, a recalled price that is lower than the total price will yield higher sales volumes. Thus, communicating “multidimensional prices” (Estelami 324) as a form of price semantics is an apparently effective strategy in terms of immediate sales: “partitioned prices typically result in decreased price sensitivity and higher levels of consumer spending” (325). However, this practice has three drawbacks. First, it is ethically and legally questionable because consumers’ cognitive limitations are exploited. Second, if detected by consumers, it has the potential of being economically impractical in the long term. Third, it violates fundamental contemporary presuppositions of the role of marketing communication. These three drawbacks are discussed in detail below.
The communication of prices has come to the attention of legislators both in the United States of America and the European Union (EU). Through its legislation, the EU attempts “to improve consumer information and to facilitate comparison of prices” (“Prices of Products Directive” Article 1) by mandating display of “the final price for a unit of the product, or a given quantity of the product, including VAT [Value-Added Tax] and all other taxes” (Article 2 (a)). Failure to advertise the final price may “materially distort the economic behaviour of consumers” and would constitute a “misleading business-to-consumer commercial practice” (European Parliament, “Unfair Commercial Practices Directive”). The effectiveness of communicating partitioned prices is the reason it is banned in the EU, where it is prohibited to employ “a commercial practice to appreciably impair the consumer’s ability to make an informed decision, thereby causing the consumer to take a transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise” (Article 2 (e)).

Similarly, the United States Federal Trade Commission (FTC) declares deceptive acts unlawful in accordance with section 5 of the FTC Act (“Federal Trade Commission; Promotion of Export Trade and Prevention of Unfair Methods of Competition”). The FTC considers advertising as deceptive “if there is a representation . . . that is likely to mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumer's detriment” (“FTC Policy Statement on Deception” 1). Deceptive representations include bait advertising, for instance. It is important to note that the European regulations are much more invasive into the marketplace while FTC rules resemble the Printer’s Ink
statute later adopted by many state legislations and which critics say “was in no way armed to confront the problem of psychological manipulation” (Ewen, Captains 71). Consumers who become aware of their recollection error based on partitioned pricing show negative reactions which Yih Lee and Cheng Han claim “may adversely affect their attitude towards the brand” (37). Similarly, Hooman Estelami states that “excessive use of complex multi-dimensional prices may potentially be considered by some consumers as deceptive and my therefore cause negative attributions to be made about the seller” (328). Gerald Bell explored “persuability” in consumer behavior, i.e., consumers’ ability and willingness to be persuaded to change their minds on a given subject in response to marketing communication. He observed in 1966 that consumers’ awareness of discrepancies between the advertisement and actual offer were the basis “for the intensive training salesmen received in trying to get a customer to close a deal before he leaves the dealership” (98), usually resulting in high levels of buyer remorse. As explained above, buyer remorse based on irrational purchasing decisions yields consumer suspicion. Buyer remorse and suspicion endanger future economic transactions. Consumers may characterize the brand as untrustworthy after negative experiences with multidimensional pricing (Ayres; Romani) and, thus, view advertising as manipulative rather than rhetorical.

The distinction between manipulation and rhetoric is important for this project and is a recurring theme throughout the chapters. In this dissertation, rhetoric shall be understood as persuasion in absence of perfect information in such a way that audiences

\(^2\) However, several but not all U.S. states are enforcing legislation on unit pricing with the intent to aid consumers in comparison and decision-making processes. This limits the price-communication flexibility of manufacturers and retailers.
may arrive at the same conclusion as they would if perfect information were available. In opposition, manipulation shall be understood as the deliberate attempt to mislead audiences into making decisions that they likely would not have made in a situation of perfect information. This definition does not imply cognitive approaches to learning to be inherently ethical and behaviorist learning processes to be inherently unethical. Instead, this project will review a tradition of popular resistance to reasoning (see chapter 2 on public disinterestedness) and the potential for abuse in conditioning.

Contemporary marketing focuses on customer relationships. Marketing is about identifying consumer benefits, i.e., “something the consumer wants and needs” (Schultz, Tannenbaum, and Lauterborn 78), so that the consumer has a reason to believe a message. Typically, consumers want to receive messages that are easy to process. According to Hooman Estelami, “evidence from consumer surveys suggest that consumers generally prefer simpler price communications to more elaborate ones” (328). Thus, one-dimensional, non-partitioned pricing constitutes a consumer benefit that marketers should seriously consider making available to their customers.

Behaviorist consumer research not only provides insights into buyer’s remorse or post-purchase/cognitive dissonance as described above, but also explains customer loyalty as “heavily influenced by experiences with the previous purchase” (Hansen 329) which reinforces the concept of continuity in trust-relationships, referred to as “sequential effect” (Soetens, Melis, and Notebaert 124) in social behaviorism. Regarding the trust-building process, George Homans wrote: “Repeated interactions between particular persons are the very guts and marrow of social life, and we cannot understand repeated interactions unless we consider the sequence of actions—that is, the effect of past actions
on present ones” (57). Contemporary concepts of relationship marketing, including customer relationship management (CRM) or customer lifetime value (CLV), take repeated interactions into account, but are still fundamentally reliant on the discipline’s principal models for stimuli-response connections (Tucker) and instrumental conditioning (Ray). The drawback of investigating isolated stimuli-response connections became apparent in the example of partitioned pricing above.

In behaviorist research the relationship between brand and consumer is often viewed as unidirectional and companies are considered incapable or unwilling of loyalty (Duska). Don Schulz claims this is most obvious in the phenomenon of marketers “making promises about the brand that the organization can’t or won’t support in the actual brand experience” (11), which leads to unmet expectations, cynicism, and consumer suspicion. While consumer suspicion is established as a reality through extant marketing research, this phenomenon needs to be classified as a problem worth closer examination and requiring a constructive solution. Two problems are associated with consumer suspicion toward advertising. First, communicating with consumer audiences who are taking a suspicious or cynical approach to advertising messages creates an environment of decreased message effectiveness through low “persuability.” Second, consumers’ suspicion toward advertising transfers to marketers as message senders, keeping the discipline of marketing from reaching its self-proclaimed goal of social acceptance and value. The following section addresses the latter problem.

The Strive for Social Acceptance of Advertising

A certain level of reservation toward marketing communication has existed all throughout the 20th century and up to today. In this section I locate the reasons for public
suspicion of. I also trace marketers’ efforts to remedy the practice’s bad reputation through three distinct epochs.

Neil Postman suggested that television commercials reduce society’s ability to carry on rational discourse (Amusing) and that advertising cannibalizes serious and sacred words and images, deteriorating our use of language (Technopoly 167-71). Jacques Ellul refers to advertising as “a striking phenomenon of involuntary psychological collectivization” (Technological Society 406). Not all scholars view advertising as a technological driver of social decay; however, a consensus exists among most scholars that advertising does or could influence society and culture. As a consequence, demands for a socially responsible discipline of marketing appear throughout the history of the study of advertising.

Describing marketing in the first three decades of the 20th century, Stuart Ewen points to a “basic distrust of ‘commercial truth’” (Captains 72). He observed marketers developed a “widespread program to shape a culture which responded to and communicated through advertising” (Captains 74). By making marketing communication more commonplace, marketing professionals attempted to overcome the hurdle of distrust in order to achieve social acceptance of their messages and practices. At the same, Edward Bernays included advertising in the “methods which are being used to mold [the public’s] opinions and habits;” he also noted these methods would have to be adjusted if the public became too cynical, intelligent, and “weary of the old methods used to persuade it” (Propaganda 168).

In the post World War II era, mass communication and mass markets were at a pinnacle. A small number of television stations guaranteed marketers high exposure of
their messages. Theories of mass media’s power to manipulate audiences were developed (see hypodermic needle and magic bullet theory in chapter 3), grounded partially in the effects of the Orson Welles’s Mercury Theatre broadcast of *War of the Worlds* (Wells) in 1938. When the fear of manipulation through mass mediated messages was the greatest, William Borton wrote about marketing’s socially responsible future and its impact on human welfare. He envisioned approval of the discipline “comparable to that accorded any occupation or profession” (50).

The 1970’s brought the great “divide” (Drucker 7-8) in the sense that the media landscape became more diversified, market structures changed significantly toward surplus production, consumer wants and needs grew more fragmented, and message senders were no longer believed to bear the sole responsibility for consumer audiences’ actions arising out of marketing communication. Instead, the idea grew that consumer audiences were full-well capable of discerning truth from lie and right from wrong (Fisher). Individual consumers rather than society as a whole moved toward the center of marketers’ attention. Consumer empowerment, financial accountability of marketing communication, and dialogue became the central to the “New Marketing Paradigm” (Schultz, Tannenbaum, and Lauterborn). Literature of the 1990’s recognized that there was not only an ethical dilemma at hand in the way that advertising audiences were traditionally addressed, but also that conventional marketing techniques were failing and advertising was becoming decreasingly cost effective. The chapters of this dissertation treat the reputation of marketing communication as a form of ethos. They provide possible routes for overcoming consumer suspicion, thus, potentially improving
marketing/brand ethos and regaining higher levels of cost effectiveness in marketing communication.

Decrease in Effectiveness of Advertising Messages

Decreased effectiveness of mediated marketing messages has become a major economic concern for marketers, especially with growing financial accountability of marketing as a strategic business function. The predominant response to ineffective marketing communication is an increase in the quantity of messages. This approach is historically anachronistic and needs to be updated by appropriately responding to changed postmodern social and market environments. This section presents the key questions that must precede the responses developed in the following chapters.

There remain few communicative environments in which advertising audiences are truly captive. Due to consumer suspicion, voluntary exposure to advertising messages is low. Selective exposure, along with selective attention, causes individual advertising messages to become decreasingly effective (Elliott and Speck). Marketers compensate for low response rates with high message volume in order to achieve their desired, measurable advertising goals (such as brand recognition or sales levels). Over the past 50 years, advertising expenditures in the United States of America have risen from $9.9 billion to $285.1 billion. Even considering inflation, this is still an increase of nearly 400%. Furthermore, the share of voice (percentage of total advertising budget) of the 100 leading spenders has grown disproportionately (Johnson 5). The resulting “message clutter” leads to further audience frustration (Elliott and Speck 29).

In addition to marketers’ proclaimed desire for social acceptance and respect (Borton), they now face a strong economic incentive to regain consumer trust. Ironically,
studies suggest that advertising can promote trust in a brand even in the absence of consumers’ experiences with the company or its products (Li and Miniard). With consumer suspicion grounded in repeated disappointment caused by unmet expectations, a public relations (PR) campaign designed to create a positive image of commercial advertising promises very limited success. Richard Pollay and Banwari Mittal note “changes in practice, not just efforts to change public perceptions, are called for” (112). However, the authors do not offer a constructive solution. The purpose of this dissertation is a constructive continuation of their critical view of advertising by providing an alternative postmodern philosophy and practice of marketing communication.

Since the problem of consumer suspicion toward advertising is presumably located in the underlying philosophy of marketing communication, i.e., marketers’ worldview and related perceptions of their audiences, this dissertation shall contribute to the discipline of communication from a theoretical/philosophical as well as from a rhetorical/applied perspective. As contemporary marketing communication is apparently unresponsive to the historical moment, the following questions will have to be addressed: What would a postmodern philosophy of marketing communication look like? What rhetorical consequences would this philosophy bring? What is needed is a revised praxis for mediated marketing communication. The following pages introduce the research approach to the question through a constructive hermeneutic of Nietzschean literature, aimed at an Aristotelian “phronesis” (Aristotle, “Ethica Nicomachea”) and characterized by a responsiveness to postmodernity.
Constructive Hermeneutics and Postmodern Interpretation

This dissertation approaches the development of a revised philosophy and rhetoric of marketing communication through constructive hermeneutics. Extant quantitative studies are used extensively as secondary evidence to support key economic trends and to verify suppositions regarding quantifiable dimensions of consumer attitudes. While founded in ancient rhetorical theory and, in the broadest sense, contemporary social philosophy, this research aims at developing an Aristotelian phronesis to identify moral actions for marketing communicators that may help them overcome consumers’ suspicion toward advertising messages. The rhetorical situation which forms the framework for this constructive hermeneutics is characterized by a postmodern historical moment.

The research presented in this project follows the interpretive approach from Steven Mailloux’s *Rhetorical Power*: texts from various disciplines and epochs are interpreted out of a contemporary, postmodern historical moment. This rhetorical hermeneutics does not consider author, text, or reader in isolation but takes into account the entire rhetorical situation. Acknowledging historicity, i.e., that time has an impact on the interpretation of texts in the absence of a static environment, eliminates the possibility for permanent Truth and emphasizes the interpreter’s situatedness. Mailloux points to “shared assumptions and strategies, not autonomous texts” (6) for proper interpretations. The assumptions that reader and author share depend on the rhetorical situation as influenced by the historical moment: “any specific interpretation is best understood in relation to particular historical contexts of institutional and cultural debates” (Mailloux 57). This work follows Mailloux’s call to “stop doing Theory” (14) but to turn to
rhetorical hermeneutics which is “composed of therapeutic theory and rhetorical histories” (18).

Through a constructive hermeneutic, i.e., by recognizing the “importance of a diversity of representations, dialogues, and viewpoints” (Parker 187), meaning emerges between texts when viewed within the rhetorical and historical context of this author. In accordance, the texts by Friedrich Nietzsche and others that are part of this inquiry will not be subjected to speculations regarding authorial intent or the historical moment at the time of their publication.

Considering Friedrich Nietzsche in a constructive work may come as a surprise; he was, after all, a self-proclaimed pessimist and a philosopher most prominently associated with nihilism. However, Nietzsche pointed out that all work—and by extension this work—must be vitalizing and promote action rather than being just an academic exercise (Nietzsche, “UBHL” 245). Nietzsche’s texts provide the elements for a “Pessimismus der Stärke” ‘pessimism of strength3’ (Nietzsche, “GT” 12), an attitude for learning and renewing on the basis of critique: marketing must not vanish permanently but rid itself of its old self and rise like the phoenix from the ashes—better and adjusted to its postmodern environment.

Meaning in its original context is secondary to this study or irrelevant altogether. Instead, this project suggests an interpretation based on contemporary grounds that shall be defined through the following metaphors and concepts: postmodernity, capitalism, advertising praxis, trust, and intellectual immaturity. Postmodern society is characterized by fragmentation and pluralism. Meta-narrative structures or “grand narratives” (Lyotard

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3 Nietzsche’s “pessimism of strength” will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 2 of this dissertation.
have been replaced by competing narratives and contested truths (Fisher 126-27). Affiliations and associations of individuals with publics (communities, families, and formal or informal groups) are largely voluntary, flexible, inconsistent, and coexistent. Most often, these group affiliations are centered around particular social interests rather than universal and institutionalized predispositions (Hauser 32). Postmodernity is reflected in the fragmentation of the marketplace and acknowledged in marketing by the process of market segmentation. Marketing is traditionally separated into pricing policy, product policy, distribution policy, and communication policy. With growing price transparency, increasingly similar products, and convergent distribution channels, marketing communication is used to suggest difference in price, product characteristics, or convenience in distribution and to avoid perfect competition.

This research has a strong Western bias. In this project, capitalism is accepted as a reality in the West. Liberal market structures reflective of democratic political structures in a postmodern society are not called into question in the search for ethical and effective advertising. Free market enterprise encourages marketplace competition for goods and services—the metaphor of “the marketplace of ideas” mirrors this competition in discourse, including advertising. Competition is one of the main drivers of excellence, because “it focuses on the maximum result, and the net effect is the benefit . . . of all” (Simmel, “Conflict” 59). Of all possible marketplace scenarios, capitalism provides the greatest opportunity for niches and growth. Thus, capitalism is not only an acceptable, but also a desirable form of market structure in the context of this inquiry.

The praxis approach taken in this project is grounded in Aristotle’s phronesis, a form of practical wisdom. Various scholars have discussed and developed the idea of
praxis: Paolo Freire refined the theme as a unique combination of “action” and “reflection” or the “word” and “work” (87). Jaques Ellul also pointed to the traditional ideal connection between the word and act (Humiliation 50). Karl Marx demanded attention to the practical implications of philosophical thought (41-42). This project aims at providing such a theory-informed practice of marketing communication in general and advertising specifically.

Trust is a key factor in making marketing communication effective. According to Milan Zafirovski, the key assumption in rational choice sociology is that “exchange actors are utility/profit maximizers” which “implies that trust has no relevance in exchange transactions” (115). But the “sequential effect” in social behaviorism, which equals the “loyalty effect” in marketing (Collinger 18), basically indicates the value of trust in repeated interactions. Companies have realized that repeat sales to an existing customer are more profitable than the recurring effort of transforming prospects into customers by continuous solicitation. Companies calculate their return on marketing investment over the “customer lifetime value,” the cumulative transaction revenues over the span of a long-term customer relationship. Nurturing this relationship with customers is a key objective of firms implementing an integrated marketing communication strategy.

Companies have a vested economic interest in creating long-term relationships with their customers. They have created a number of customer loyalty programs that offer benefits to consumers that engage in repeat purchases. This is because marketers find it difficult to achieve consumer brand loyalty solely based on brand personality. This may be partially attributed to a general disinterestedness of consumers in particular purchase
decisions and their established suspicion toward the forms of communication that are
designed to help the consumer shape brand personality (brand ethos).

In his work on the Enlightenment, Immanuel Kant described a strong potential for
self-inflicted intellectual immaturity ("Aufklärung"). In essence, Kant believed humans
had the ability to act reasonably through discourse, but were not always interested in
applying their reason to all issues. From different philosophical perspectives, a tradition
of public disinterestedness developed throughout the 20th century. The next chapter traces
these observations and provides insight into the rhetorical tensions of public discourse
which includes trade and communication in the marketplace.
Chapter 2:
A History of Public Disinterestedness

“My head is a box full of nothing and that’s the way I like it.”
(Ben Lee, singer/songwriter)

This chapter traces a tradition of public disinterestedness as evidenced in modern and postmodern philosophical and rhetorical scholarship. Despite a historical understanding of human beings as political animals—Aristotle described humans as community-seekers (“Politika” 1128-29)—several scholars have identified a certain reluctance in people to engage their publics in a holistic and constructive fashion. This chapter examines the work of Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Nietzsche, Walter Lippmann, Jürgen Habermas, and Gerard Hauser, in this order. Despite fundamental philosophical differences among these scholars, the following comparative reading demonstrates a somewhat consistent understanding over time: there exists an imbalance in number between active and passive members of society.

Postmodern social observations indicate the formation of publics with competing interests, differing interest levels, and a fluctuation of members into and out of these publics. People’s group affiliations are subject to constant changes, which makes predictions about their future actions difficult. Consequently, traditional market and public opinion research data has a very short-half life in a postmodern environment. Prediction of voter choice and consumer behavior loses accuracy when social interaction
becomes too multifaceted to be expressed in even complex mathematical models. Discursive models may provide an alternative approach at assessing those changes in values and perceptions commonly referred to as public opinion.

Observing people’s public discourse, or lack thereof, can be helpful in understanding social structures in general: roles, hierarchies, and nonverbal interactions. While the scholarship reviewed in this chapter focuses on political public discourse, its implications are substantial for communicative actions in the marketplace. Notions and models of society and its members guide worldviews in marketing approaches. Political campaigning is not much different from service and social cause marketing, which in turn shares the basic principles of traditional product marketing (see chapter 3 for application to the marketplace).

**Immanuel Kant’s Concept of Self-Inflicted Intellectual Immaturity**

In December 1784, Immanuel Kant joined a discussion that had been going on in the *Berlinische Monatschrift* for over a year. Scholars from different academic backgrounds submitted essays in which they attempted to provide a definition of the concept of Enlightenment. Only three months before Kant’s essay appeared, Moses Mendelssohn defined Enlightenment as a theoretical component of education—as a form of reasonable reflection that complements cultural developments (194). Kant took a different approach and equated Enlightenment with the process of overcoming one’s “selbstverschuldete Unmündigkeit” ‘self-inflicted intellectual immaturity’4 (“Aufklärung” 481).

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4 All translations in this work are the interpretations of this author; sometimes others translate selbstverschuldete Unmündigkeit as self-incurred tutelage or self-imposed immaturity (Minnich 125)
Maturity, i.e., coming-of-age, implies accepting legal responsibility for one’s own actions. Transition into maturity means third parties, such as parents or guardians, must no longer be held accountable for their former ward’s deeds. In a free Western society, achieving lawful maturity is a legally prescribed and automatic process. Entering maturity is automatic in the sense that it is unavoidable unless an adult individual shows significant developmental reasons to justify that personal liability be withheld or withdrawn and assigned to a legal guardian. While legislators typically set a specific age that marks the transition from adolescence to maturity, mental development remains a key determinant for legal maturity.

Intellectual maturity means that a person holds the potential for particular cognitive and communicative acts. This potentiality manifests itself in the capability to apply one’s reason without the guidance of others and to do so publicly, i.e. to communicate one’s ideas to society or one’s community in a larger sense. Immanuel Kant distinguished between the public and private use of one’s reason. Public use of reason is communication (usually through writing) by educated people, members of a community, and world citizens with large audiences in society. This form of public engagement must not be limited in an enlightened society. Kant demanded that the use of reason should only be restricted for people in a passive role in government and administration (private use of reason). Here, obedience is justified and key for effective leadership. Thus, regardless of the political environment, intellectual maturity is a person’s potential to actively participate, as contributor or audience member, in public discourse regarding issues of social welfare.
Conversely, intellectual immaturity refers to the inability to think independently. Intellectual immaturity is a state of passiveness that people began to recognize as disadvantageous to society in the age of Enlightenment, according to Immanuel Kant. He demanded that people seek to overcome their fear of independence and that members of an enlightened society, by definition, must be intellectually mature. One characteristic of a society in the process of Enlightenment is the slow lifting of political restrictions to free speech and public discourse.

Yet, Immanuel Kant observed examples of intellectual immaturity in a number of contexts such as the military, civic life, or religion (“Aufklärung” 484). He claimed that this intellectual immaturity was self-inflicted. Kant regarded achieving intellectual maturity in the form of independence from external guidance as a natural process (“Aufklärung” 483), paralleling that of attaining legal maturity described above. He investigated the reasons as to why people often remain in a state of dependence on community leaders even after nature has long since set them and their minds free. Independent thinking requires effort and Kant claimed that “Faulheit und Feigheit” ‘laziness and cowardice’ (“Aufklärung” 481) were the two most popular hindrances of the Enlightenment for a majority of the people during his time.

In Immanuel Kant’s essay, laziness takes on the character of unwillingness to break with a familiar routine. People have grown accustomed their state of dependence (Kant, “Aufklärung” 483) and find it hard to let go of the comfort of experts (e.g., doctors, authors, pastors, and other community leaders) making decisions for them (“Aufklärung” 482). Kant accused these leaders of not only making a transition into
intellectual maturity cumbersome, thus invoking laziness, but also seemingly dangerous, thus invoking cowardice.

Enlightenment in this context should be understood as free-spirited thinking rather than the scientism often associated with modernity. In his essay, Immanuel Kant considered all rules and formulations “mechanistic tools” and shackles of eternal immaturity (Kant, “Aufklärung” 483). Kant believed that Enlightenment of society as a whole was likely, but that individuals might be too intimidated to actively participate by the perceived dangers of independent thinking.

Immanuel Kant attempted to counter fear of intellectual maturity with his basic teachings of morality. He declared that the comfort of social conformity was secondary to the rewards of ethical public communication in honesty (Lectures). While he recognized that individuals felt a real danger in exiting their intellectual immaturity, he also felt this fear was overrated. Within an environment of newly gained freedom for public discourse, people should be able to build confidence in their abilities after initially stumbling along the path to independent thinking. Kant even warned that too much freedom at once was dangerous.

Daher kann ein Publikum nur langsam zur Aufklärung gelangen. Durch eine Revolution wird vielleicht wohl ein Abfall von persönlichem Despotism und gewinnsüchtiger oder herrschsüchtiger Bedrückung, aber niemals wahre Reform der Denkungsart zustande kommen; sondern neue Vorurteile werden, ebensowohl als die alten, zum Leitbande des gedankenlosen großen Haufens dienen. Therefore, a public can reach enlightenment only slowly. A revolution may bring the abandonment of personal despotism and profit or power-driven suppression,
but never a true reform of thought; instead new prejudices, just like the old ones, will act as the guiderail of the mindless great mass. (Kant, “Aufklärung” 484)

Kant claimed a sudden and complete enlightenment of a society was impossible because its members would neither cherish their new-found freedom nor abandon their old routines. According to Kant, people were better off when they had to fight for their right to engage in public discourse and achieve this liberty gradually:

Ein größerer Grad bürgerlicher Freiheit scheint der Freiheit des Geistes des Volks vortheilhaft und setzt ihr doch unübersteigliche Schranken; ein Grad weniger von jener verschafft hingegen diesem Raum, sich nach allem seinem Vermögen auszubreiten. Wenn denn die Natur unter dieser harten Hülle den Keim, für den sie am zärtlichsten sorgt, nämlich den Hang und Beruf zum freien Denken, ausgewickelt hat: so wirkt dieser allmählig zurück auf die Sinnesart des Volks (wodurch dieses der Freiheit zu handeln nach und nach fähiger wird) und endlich auch sogar auf die Grundsätze der Regierung, die es ihr selbst zuträglich findet, den Menschen, der nun mehr als Maschine ist, seiner Würde gemäß zu behandeln.

A greater degree of public liberty seems to be advantageous for the freedom of the mind of the populace and still creates insurmountable barriers for it; however, a degree less of it creates the space, to expand according to one’s full ability. If nature has fully developed under this hard shell the sprout that it cares for most passionately, namely that of the tendency and calling to free thinking: then it will slowly affect the mind of the people (which become increasingly able to act on their freedom) and eventually even the foundations of government, which sees its
own benefit in treating the human, who has become more than machine, according to his dignity. (Kant, “Aufklärung” 493-94)

While Immanuel Kant acknowledged that the smallest obstacles could be perceived as large and cause major insecurities, he also saw the importance of a gradual liberation of the mind. The occasional stumbling was important to remind people of the significance of their goal and to keep them motivated. Friedrich Nietzsche described the threat of stumbling as much more severe than Kant, namely fatal. However, Nietzsche also understood following the path to independent thinking to be a civic duty. Nietzsche continued the ideas of Kant and realized that society was further from a state of enlightenment than Kant had expected.

**Friedrich Nietzsche on the Struggle for Autonomous Self-Determination**

In *Also Sprach Zarathustra*, Friedrich Nietzsche’s protagonist tries to explain the human condition as an incomplete development and, thus, as imperfect. Zarathustra describes the transition from animal to Overman as a balancing act across a dangerous abyss:

Der Mensch ist ein Seil, geknüpft zwischen Thier und Übermensch,—ein Seil über einem Abgrunde. Ein gefährliches Hinüber, ein gefährliches Auf-dem-Wege, ein gefährliches Zurückblicken, ein gefährliches Schaudern und Stehenbleiben. Man is a rope, strung between animal and Overman,—a rope across an abyss. A dangerous crossing, a dangerous journey, a dangerous glance back, a dangerous shiver and standstill. (Nietzsche, Z 16)

Nietzsche’s placement of humans between animal and a higher state of being is significant: he understood the human condition as state in the evolutionary process that
constituted a link between a purely reactive, i.e., mindless animal, and a fully enlightened super-human being. The difference between the two extremes lies in cognitive ability which is expressed in a sense of history or tradition and self.

This sense of history, according to Friedrich Nietzsche, is a painful reminder of the flawed human existence which takes on the character of a never-ending “imperfectum” (“UBHL” 249). In Nietzsche’s perception, human beings are characterized by their inability to forget. This often creates an uncomfortable (self)consciousness: humans find themselves situated in their own traditions. Yet, Nietzsche critiqued that a majority of the people do not acknowledge and act on this valuable characteristic. Instead, humans often envy and imitate the carefree existence (enabled by a lack of memory) of ahistorical herd animals by denying their roots among their peers. According to Nietzsche, humans mourn their loss of innocence by ignorance as if they remembered a vanished paradise (“UBHL” 248-49).

The above quote clearly demonstrates the danger Friedrich Nietzsche associated with the transition of an individual from a dwelling in the comfort of adhering to traditional codes to a self-determined, unrestricted existence. Nietzsche used the metaphor of the herd instinct to describe people’s alignment with pre-existing norms:

‘Heerden-Existenz’, so nennt Nietzsche mit dem Abstand des selbst Freigekommenen eine Lebensweise, die sich durch die unbedingte Bindung an das Herkömmliche und immer schon Geltende auszeichnet.

‘Herd-existence,’ this is what Nietzsche, from the vantage point/distance of the one himself liberated, calls a way of life characterized by the unconditional
commitment to the conventional and all-time valid. (Himmelmann, “Kant, Nietzsche und die Aufklärung” 35)

Nietzsche and Immanuel Kant shared the urgency of the liberation of the mind and, to an extent, the associated risks. However, Nietzsche would have objected to being placed in an intellectual tradition with Kant and agreeing on substantial philosophical presuppositions. Especially in his later texts, Nietzsche called himself an immoralist. In “Versuch einer Selbstkritik” ‘attempt at a self-critique,’ Nietzsche wrote on Die Geburt der Tragödie:

Wie sehr bedauere ich es jetzt, . . . dass ich mühselig mit Schopenhauerischen und Kantischen Formeln fremde und neue Werthschätzungen auszudrücken suchte, welche dem Geiste Kantens und Schopenhauers, ebenso wie ihrem Geschmacke, von Grund aus entgegen giengen!

How much I regret now, . . . that I laboriously tried to express strange and new valuations with Schopenhauerian and Kantian formulas, which fundamentally opposed Kant and Schopenhauer’s spirit as well as their taste. (“GT” 19)

Nietzsche called Kant an idiot who turned German decadence into philosophy (“AC” 177-78).

However, connecting Friedrich Nietzsche’s ideas to those of Immanuel Kant is not a novel approach. Georg Simmel pointed to parallels in Nietzsche’s and Kant’s morality at the beginning of the 20th century (“Nietzsche und Kant”) and a joint symposium of the Kant and Nietzsche societies held at the beginning of the 21st century designed to explore the two philosophers’ dispute also unearthed a number of similarities (Himmelmann, Kant und Nietzsche im Widerstreit).
Georg Simmel understood the differences between Kant’s and Nietzsche’s perception of morality as based in approach and not substance. He claimed Nietzsche was merely taking into account a different historical moment and rhetorical situation (Simmel “Nietzsche und Kant”). Simmel claimed that Kant—the cosmopolitan—attempted to emphasize single, seemingly insignificant actions by applying them universally through space. Nietzsche on the other hand attempted a similar kind of emphasis, but through recurrences over time. Nietzsche essentially offered a re-interpretation of Kant’s morality that encompassed a critique of modern values. The striking similarity Simmel found in Kant’s and Nietzsche’s philosophies—in spite of Nietzsche’s expressed condemnation of Kantian morality—warrants closer examination and evaluation.

In the Frankfurter Zeitung und Handelsblatt (Frankfurt News and Trade Paper), Georg Simmel explained Immanuel Kant’s “Categorical Imperative” as placing the tension between value and suffering outside the individual soul. Rather, Kant located this tension in the collective of humanity (“Nietzsche und Kant” 2). The “Categorical Imperative” magnifies seemingly trivial interpersonal actions, communicative and other, to a scale of global importance. Friedrich Nietzsche disagreed with this disembodiment of morality. He could not accept an abstraction and general applicability of morals. Therefore, he called this impersonality and universality “Hirngespinste, in denen sich der Niedergang, die letzte Entkräftung des Lebens, das Königsberger Chinesenthum ausdrückt ‘Chimera expressing the decline, the debilitation of life, the Chinesedom of Königsberg’ (Nietzsche, “AC” 177). Nietzsche claimed Kant’s impersonal generalities should never be the basis for moral teachings.
Still, Georg Simmel discovered a very similar universality in Friedrich Nietzsche’s concept of perpetual recurrence. Simmel dismissed Nietzsche’s logic which assumed that a finite amount of mass and material consequently leads to perpetual recurrence in order to fill an eternity. Simmel recognized the moral implications of a theoretical construct which does not allow easy dismissal of seemingly insignificant actions due to the endless repetition of each act:


An action that appears circumstantial when restricted to the moment, and—with the sentiment: over is over—would be carelessly removed from conscience, gains a horrible weight, an accent impossible to ignore, as soon as it is preceded by an eternally recurring ‘again’ and ‘again.’ (Simmel, “Nietzsche und Kant” 1)

Nietzsche owed this concept to Dionysus and saw in it the ultimate affirmation of life (Nietzsche, “GD” 159). Out of this understanding of the connection between past and future, Nietzsche the immoralist developed a morality that, at its core, is not very different from Immanuel Kant’s. Nietzsche used the dimension of time to lend significance to small acts while Kant used the dimension of space to achieve the same result.

Friedrich Nietzsche’s attention to history based on the principle of eternal recurrence also explains his motivation for continuous self-betterment. In Also Sprach
Zarathustra, recurrence appears from the beginning through the metaphor of the ever-returning sun. Zarathustra wants his audiences to see possibilities that lie in battling the ghost of their past. He demands that people relegate their first nature (inherited from animals) to a second nature—in order to develop the human potential into the existence of the Overman. The concepts of first and second nature indicate that Nietzsche did not believe that anyone could completely ignore his or her past—that we are permanently influenced by our traditions. These concepts also create the space for renewal and modification: Nietzsche allowed traditions to become secondary, to move to the background and he insisted that before this background new orientations were possible.

At this point, it is necessary to review how Friedrich Nietzsche himself could not escape his own intellectual traditions. He could not deny Immanuel Kant’s impact on his own thinking, but only enter into an intellectual dispute with him. In an attempt to explain how human traditions will at least remain second nature to the individual, he wrote:

> Denn da wir nun einmal die Resultate früherer Geschlechter sind, sind wir auch die Resultate ihrer Verirrungen, Leidenschaften und Irrtümer, ja Verbrechen; es ist nicht möglich sich ganz von dieser Kette zu lösen. Wenn wir jene Verirrungen verurtheilen und uns ihrer für enthoben erachten, so ist die Thatsache nicht beseitigt, dass wir aus ihnen heraussommen. Wir bringen es im besten Falle zu einem Widerstreite der ererbten, angestammten Natur und unserer Erkenntnis . . . .

Since we are the results of earlier generations, we are also the results of their aberrations, passions, and mistakes, even crimes; it is impossible to completely separate oneself from this chain. If we condemn these aberrations and perceive
ourselves as absolved from them, then the fact that we are descended from them is not remedied. At best, we can achieve a dispute with the inherited nature . . . .

(Nietzsche, “UBHL” 270)

The number of explicit references Nietzsche makes to Kant (174 in his complete works) indicates how much Nietzsche’s philosophy utilizes Kant’s legacy. Kant’s influence is obvious, even if Nietzsche responds mostly critical and in disagreement. Yet, both shared the desire to develop a “programmatischen Entwurf eines selbstverantwortlichen Individuums, in Auseinandersetzung mit den restriktiven Vorstellungen ihrer jeweiligen Zeit” ‘programmatic design of an autonomous individual, through examination of the restrictive beliefs of their respective ages’ (Bloch 162). For Kant, this was the intellectually mature individual, for Nietzsche this was the Overman.

Furthermore, both Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Nietzsche supported an epistemological critique of pure reason. Kant sought to resolve the apparent conflict between rationalism and empiricism, allowing sensory perception as well as logical evaluation to become part of epistemological activity (Kritik der Reinen Vernunft). He introduced metaphysical elements into purely rational processes, accounting for human communal needs. Nietzsche first observed the separation of good instincts (intuition) and rational actions in Greek antiquity. He blamed Socrates for making “ratio nicht mehr kritische Kontrollinstanz, sondern schaffendes Prinzip” ‘ratio no longer a critical supervisory body, but a productive principle” (Langbehn 58): with Socrates, an overemphasis of the Apollonian arts occurred.

In Die Geburt der Tragödie, Nietzsche discussed the concept of a Dionysian and Apollonian dialectic. The prior refers to a trance-like unity with nature, the latter to
established rules that allow us to make sense of the Dionysian sensory experiences. For instance, sound and harmony could be called Dionysian while rhythm Apollonian components of a musical experience (Bolten-Kölbl 55). Thus, the described dialectic does not constitute a true a dichotomy, but rather two complementing elements of the same whole. Science is Apollonian in nature and, according to Nietzsche, has been given too much emphasis in a post Renaissance, modern understanding of Enlightenment. One element alone (here Apollonian) is of little epistemological value. The Apollonian by itself leads to the illusion of knowledge, just like the concept of progress only leads to the illusion of advancement: the reality that Nietzsche observed was far from his ideals. His contemporary society celebrated itself, praising progress as an indication of human development. Nietzsche disagreed. He claimed that progress was only a modern idea, which he equated with a wrong idea, because “Fortentwicklung ist schlechterdings nicht mit irgendwelcher Nothwendigkeit Erhöhung, Steigerung, Verstärkung” ‘Development is absolutely not with any necessity advancement, enhancement, amplification’ (Nietzsche, “AC” 171). Much to the dismay of his peers, Nietzsche observed decadence in modernity instead of an advancement of humanity—a turn back to humans’ animalistic roots:

Es wird beinahe als Schuld uns angerechnet werden, dass wir gerade in Bezug auf die Menschen der ‘modernen Ideen’ beständig die Ausdrücke ‘Heerde,’ und ‘Heerden-Instinkte’ und dergleichen gebrauchen. . . . Was hier zu wissen glaubt, was hier mit seinem Loben und Tadeln sich selbst verherrlicht, sich selbst gut heisst, ist der Instinkt des Heerdenthiers Mensch: als welcher zum Durchbruch, zum Übergewicht, zur Vorherrschaft über andere Instinkte gekommen ist und immer mehr kommt
We will be almost blamed that we are persistently using terms such as ‘herd’ and ‘herd-instincts’ to describe the man of ‘modern ideas.’ . . . What believes to know here is the instinct of the human herd animal: which has and increasingly will become excess weight, will gain dominance over other instincts (Nietzsche “JGB” 124)

The recurring metaphor of the herd and its role in the area of marketing communication are addressed in the following chapter. At this point, it is important to recognize that Nietzsche understood the human condition in the late 19th century to be caught in a momentum of backward development far below the heights humanity had previously reached—during the Renaissance, for instance (“AC” 171).

People following their herd instincts are caught in intellectual immaturity, because they do not really possess knowledge but only believe they do. They see their advancement in formalized and standardized education which makes them believe they are better human beings than people without formal education. According to Friedrich Nietzsche, education fills people with a false sense of pride in a questionable achievement (Z 19). The achievement of education is questionable when it promotes sameness. Once everyone wants the same and everyone is the same, those that are different are ready to declare themselves insane (Z 20). Nietzsche observed and openly criticized this environment of sameness. He called influential members of society who consider themselves good and just to be nothing but shepherds and robbers (Nietzsche, Z 26).

People’s task is to free themselves from the shackles of their herd instincts to become full and valuable members of society. In the process, the individual may stumble,
fall, and die. Unlike Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Nietzsche did not think that individuals easily recover from a fall during their journey to autonomous self-determination. Nietzsche demanded the attitude of a martyr. He praised people that were willing to sacrifice themselves to advance humanity as a whole:

> Ich liebe Die, die nicht zu leben wissen, es sei den als Untergehende, denn es sind die Hinübergehenden . . . Ich liebe Die, welche nicht erst hinter den Sternen einen Grund suchen, unterzugehen und Opfer zu sein: sondern die sich der Erde opfern, dass die Erde einst des Übermenschen werde.

I love those who know not how to live other than as the descending, because they are those who are crossing . . . I love those who do not seek beyond the stars for a reason to descend and to be a victim: but who sacrifice themselves to the earth so that the earth may once become that of the overman. (Nietzsche, Z 17)

Nietzsche had much in common with his character Zarathustra—an isolated life in the mountains, the belief of having found a remedy for the world’s troubles, and most importantly, the realization that society as a whole was unwilling to make radical changes even when urgent issues were argued before the people. Therefore, it would take courageous individuals to reveal the human potential. However, Nietzsche also realized that generally these courageous individuals go unnoticed by the writers of history.

In his inquiry on the advantages and disadvantages of history for life, Friedrich Nietzsche determined that too often people looked to the masses for approval. According to Nietzsche, popular approval, i.e., public opinion that is measured quantitatively, processed statistically, and expressed reductively, overemphasizes the role of the lowest strata of society. He identified three aspects in which the masses deserved our attention:
first, the masses were characterized by being mere and additionally poor copies of great individuals of the past. Second, the masses acted in resistance against great individuals. Third, the masses became tools of great individuals (Nietzsche, “UBHL” 319-20). This understanding of the role of the masses is of particular importance to the understanding of Edward Bernays’s world view discussed in chapter 3.

Friedrich Nietzsche’s pessimism arising out of the disappointment in his fellow men did not lead to nor was it derived from complete resignation. He was fully committed to a Dionysian pessimism and he distanced himself from what he called romantic pessimism—the pessimism of the weak and suffering. His commitment to the tragic was deliberate and a self-proclaimed sign of strength (Nietzsche, MAM 376-77) Nietzsche’s nihilism was a reconstructive effort. Learning from past mistakes and trying to remedy them is one of the key values Nietzsche saw in the study of history. He demanded to act on the awareness of bad tradition:

Wenn hinter dem historischen Trieb kein Bautrieb wirkt, wenn nicht zerstört und aufgeräumt wird, damit eine bereits in der Hoffnung lebendige Zukunft auf dem befreiten Boden ihr Haus baue, wenn die Gerechtigkeit allein waltet, dann wird der schaffende Instinct entkräftet und entmutigt.

If there is no constructive drive behind the historical drive, if we do not destroy and clean up so that a future which is already alive in hope may settle on the clearing, if justice alone reigns, then the constructive instinct will be debilitated and discouraged. (Nietzsche, “UBHL” 295-96)

Nietzsche envisioned the future of the Overman, a future already alive in his hope. Thus, he had to demand a breakdown of herd-instincts and argue against modern concepts of
progress and uniform popular public opinion. He believed in humans’ ability to think for
themselves, with their own traditions providing them with valuable frames of reference.
Friedrich Nietzsche, in a general fashion, condemns the mass public. Others, such as
Walter Lippmann, pointed to the communicative limitations of members of the public,
making the public a mere phantom and public opinion a mere statistical construct.

The Issue of a Passive Public According to Walter Lippmann

In the early 20th century, Walter Lippmann critiqued the concept of a public and
declared public opinion a myth. He observed society as a number of disinterested
individuals rather than an active, policy-making public. Public opinion then is not
generated by the public, but merely an average attitude of individuals toward or against
policy made by politicians. According to Lippmann, even the election process is a farce.
Values are created and propagated by insiders (e.g., politicians, members of the media).
Lippmann demanded a “democracy” based on the input of experts rather than the
common person, who is blinded by stereotypes and lacks objectivity.

Walter Lippmann’s ideas are applicable to the marketplace as well. In fact, he saw
“the field of economic activity [as] the source of many problems” (Phantom 82). Both
political campaigns and market research use similar techniques to determine
voter/consumer attitudes, opinions, and preferences. Especially in the early 20th century,
when the public was expected to act and think much more homogeneously, Lippmann’s
phantom public was analogous to a phantom consumer mass. As Lippmann pointed out,
most everything depends on a point of view, on “needs and hopes and habits” (Phantom
23) and there are no absolute rights or wrongs: “There is nothing universal or eternal or
unchangeable about our expectations. For rhetorical effect we often say there is”
(Phantom 23). Many of the modern concepts of a mass public and a mass market that Lippmann critiqued remain as underlying presuppositions in today’s society.

Much of Walter Lippmann’s accounts could be used to describe the political environment of today (McClay xiv): low voter turn-out at elections, yet a strong reliance on statistical extrapolation of survey data to determine the opinion of the public, i.e., one opinion in form of an average that is stable enough to allow predictions about future public actions:

Since the general opinion of large numbers of persons are almost certain to be a vague and confusing medley, action cannot be taken until these opinions have been factored down, canalized, compressed and made uniform. . . . The process, therefore, by which general opinions are brought to cooperation consists of an intensification of feeling and a degradation of significance. (Lippmann, Phantom 37-38)

However, Lippmann described the process but questioned the value of determining public opinion because, he said, it was merely a ghost or a shadow of people’s attitudes. Similar to Friedrich Nietzsche’s assessment of the uselessness of the masses except for being tool and enemy of those great people that can actually move something, Lippmann sees the significance of the individual within the public as marginal.

According to Walter Lippmann, the primary reason why individuals play a minor role in public life is that they are overwhelmed by the amount of issues and the number of decisions required of a ‘good citizen.’ Lippmann stated that “the voter, the citizen, the sovereign, is apparently expected to yield an unlimited quantity of public spirit, interest, curiosity, and effort” (Lippmann, Phantom 14). City, state, and global problems must
seem distant and irrelevant to a person who is concerned with feeding a family and increasing his or her own quality of life.

The common good is abstracted beyond recognition to the regular person by the amount of expert knowledge each individual would need to participate effectively and make informed decisions:

The individual man does not have opinions on all public affairs. He does not know how to direct public affairs. He does not know what is happening, why it is happening, what ought to happen. I cannot imagine how he could know, and there is not the least reason for thinking, as mystical democrats have thought, that the compounding of individual ignorances in masses of people can produce a continuing directing force in public affairs. (Lippmann, Phantom 29)

Lippmann clearly defines cognitive limitations in terms of the number of issues a person can become actively involved in.

What separates Lippmann from Immanuel Kant or Friedrich Nietzsche is his understanding of the individual’s cognitive capabilities. Kant established that many people shy away from their civic duty of meaningful public discourse out of routine or habit that allows them become accustomed to others making decisions for them. Nietzsche believed only a select few to be truly capable of leaving behind their herd-instincts to separate themselves from the masses and make a constructive contribution that opens up a new path for humanity. Lipmann might have shared this elitist view in some of his earlier work (such as Public Opinion) but in The Phantom Public he acknowledged a diversity in society that goes against basic preconceptions of modernity:

“Modern society is not visible to anybody, nor intelligible continuously and as a whole.
One section is visible to another section, one series of acts is intelligible to this group and another to that” (Phantom 32). With this assessment, Lippmann paved the way to a postmodern understanding of society: fragmented, heterogeneous, and complex in its multiplicity.

In Walter Lippmann’s world, publics emerged out of the public and an opinion “is dated, is localized, is relative. It applies only to some men at some time in some place under some circumstances” (Lippmann, Phantom 87). There were agents and bystanders—those with a vested interest in an issue and those that merely observed what the interested and involved few decided to do (Lippmann, Phantom 36). He claimed “the membership in the public is not fixed. It changes with the issue: the actors in one affair are the spectator of another” (Lippmann, Phantom 100).

Walter Lippmann claimed that our attention was focused rather than universal in all aspects of society, such as in the jobs we choose or the grains we plant. No one person claims to be able to take on all of the tasks of society, yet to Lippmann the democratic process, mass media, and marketing seemed to treat all voters, readers/listeners, and consumers as if they did, i.e., all people having the same interests and the same stake in political decisions, news, and products.

According to Walter Lippmann, the true involvement of the majority of the people, on any given subject, lay in punishment or reward of the actors or executives. Approval in the form of the length of the applause after a theater performance, the vote during the next election, or the purchase of a product is the communicative response that Lippmann felt most of society was restricted to (Lippmann, Phantom 46-47). A limited capacity to process information and understand complex, distant, and usually improperly
mediated issues on the one hand, and a deliberate, general disinterestedness in a number topics on the other, create these barriers to public action.

Walter Lippmann concluded *The Phantom Public* by stating that he had no solution to the frustrating state of public opinion research he described. He critiqued and left the development of a response to those who “have learned to think of public opinion as it is, and not as the fictitious power we have assumed it to be” (Lippmann, *Phantom* 190). Jürgen Habermas sees the people of a free society collectively equipped with the ability to engage in public discourse. His scholarship points to a fully enlightened society with universal pragmatics enabling communicative actions. The following section examines to which extent Habermas’s concept of “understanding” may be a response to Lippmann’s dilemma.

**Jürgen Habermas’s “Understanding” as Civic Duty**

Jürgen Habermas’s pragmatic approach to communication highlights intersubjectivity as the engine behind a thriving society that concludes its evolution toward Enlightenment (*Lifeworld*). The transformed public sphere he describes is a society with such liberties that allow its members to fully develop self-consciousness and thus enables them to communicate their private deliberations publicly (Habermas, *Transformation*) just as Immanuel Kant originally demanded and predicted. However, Habermas is not satisfied with a society that only reasons publicly, but insists on tangible social consequences of communication (*Evolution*).

As early as in his Habilitationsschrift, Jürgen Habermas addresses changes in “Öffentlichkeit” ‘the public sphere’ since Immanuel Kant (Habermas, *Transformation*). Following this transformation, Habermas believes that members of his contemporary
society have the means to carry their private thought into the public realm. Later, in fact, he considers the inability to fully develop self-consciousness and communicate one’s thoughts to the public a mental barrier worthy of Freudian psychoanalysis (Alford 755). This barrier is not necessarily self-inflicted, but a consequence of “umgangssprachliche Kommunikation” ‘colloquial communication’ and its social norms (Habermas, Erkenntnis 273). In Habermas’s interpretation, psychoanalysis aims at letting the patient become conscious of this barrier, “die Erfahrung des Widerstandes, eben jener blockierenden Kraft, die der freien und öffentlichen Kommunikation ... entgegensteht” ‘the experience of the resistance, precisely that blocking force which opposes free and public communication’ (Erkenntnis 281). This is a process of self-reflection in which the analyst functions merely as instructor, as catalyst, but not as an objective, scientific interpreter.

Declaring the inability to overcome social norms of communication to be a mental illness implies that the natural development of the mind culminates in a form of “Mündigkeit” ‘maturity’ that includes the skills to reason and communicate. “Selbst verschuldete Unmündigkeit” ‘self-inflicted intellectual maturity’ in that sense must be a crime against society. For Jürgen Habermas, human society strives in inter-subjectivity: a person cannot discern for himself whether or not his actions are in line with general interests (the Kantian Categorical Imperative); “this can only be done in common with everyone else involved” (Habermas, Lifeworld 95).

Jürgen Habermas sees society in a late stage of Enlightenment or, given his critique of the social sciences, even post-Enlightenment (versus Immanuel Kant who, as discussed above, saw society at the onset of Enlightenment). Therefore, Habermas cannot
be satisfied with society members’ ability to reason or even to communicate their thoughts publicly. Instead, he must demand a social consequence of communication—communicative action. Habermas is interested in “specific speech actions” (Habermas, Evolution 1) when presenting his universal pragmatics, a trust-based, consensus-oriented disposition that comes with “Mündigkeit” and leads to “Verständigung” ‘Understanding,’ the act of reaching a consensus as well as the consensus itself.

The task of universal pragmatics is to identify and reconstruct universal conditions of possible understanding [Verständnis]. In other contexts one also speaks of ‘general presuppositions of communication’, but I prefer to speak of general presuppositions of communicative actions because I take the type of action aimed at reaching understanding to be fundamental. (Habermas, Evolution 1)

Habermas believes that, for a free society to function properly, this mutual understanding is imperative and universal pragmatics must be applied in order to test or contest social action. Social conflict, according to Habermas, is a product and indicator of efforts to reach understanding.

Unfortunately, Jürgen Habermas is faced with the same problem that Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Walter Lippmann observed: people generally seem to lack motivation—they become easily satisfied with the “status quo,” accepting the popular view as the only truth and underestimating the impact of their own actions. Passiveness as evidenced by the absence of social conflict is an indicator of the absence of a commitment to “Verständigung.” If ignorance alleviates responsibility and suppresses the conscience, then rhetoric must be most powerful in times of crisis and social disorder.
Communicative actions during those times would indicate a society’s commitment to reach an understanding. The question remains whether communicative action can, as Habermas thinks, induce social change, or if it is merely indicative of social transformation. The sudden introduction of social liberties have proven problematic in various historical moments. Examples include the rapid implementation and failure of democracy in the Weimar Republic after World War I, social and economic insecurities in Russia after the end of the Cold War, and the ongoing violence in Iraq after the removal of the regime of Saddam Hussein. The effects shown seem to be exactly what Immanuel Kant had predicted: the immediate personal betterment of some formerly suppressed members of society without a fundamental change in thinking and little success in the medium term. People in a free society have the civic duty to seek “Verständigung” in order not to fall back into a totalitarian mode of thinking.

Jürgen Habermas’s belief in universally applicable principles lets him appear more modernist than Walter Lippmann. Gerard Hauser on the other hand, is a communication scholar that shares Lippmann’s assessment of a fragmented public, calls traditional public opinion into question, and offers a postmodern approach to understanding Lippmann’s actors/executives by listening to their vernacular voices.

Gerard Hauser’s Postmodern Attention to Vernacular Voices

Gerard Hauser is not willing to accept that public issues, such as the topic of the economy during the 1992 presidential elections, are generally too complex for people to understand (2). He declares that while there might be a disinterested majority on a given subject, there are also Walter Lippmann’s actors. They are those individuals who have a vested interest in a given topic and who are full-well capable, in a Habermasian sense, of
following a public debate on such a topic. In turn, they may prove to be at least as much of an influencing factor on their disinterested peers—because of the ethos attributed to them—as such non-substantial factors as the color of a presenter’s tie, the size of his smile, or her ability to show emotion. Finding out what those immersed and influential publics’ opinions are, suggests Hauser, has the potential to lead to significant public actions.

What for Walter Lippmann was a phantom public, Gerard Hauser refers to as a “faceless, anonymous body whose members are reduced to the percentage having selected predetermined choices” (4). Thus, Hauser identifies the following limitations of polling data: while potentially informative, “taken at face value, they can be deceiving; weighed alone they offer a limited and sometime superficial understanding of publics” (4). The problem arises out of the artificiality of the event of opinion polling. In order to be processed statistically and expressed in simple visualizations such as pie charts, respondents’ answers have to be reduced to single variables. In the process of consolidation, valuable nuances of an answer may be lost. Likert scale surveys such as, “on a scale from one to ten how likely are you to purchase an advertised product?” require a respondent to accurately predict his or her own future actions, presuppose consistency and continuity of opinions, and finally reveal nothing about the conditions which may cause a respondent to shift from a 7 to an 8. Hauser proposes to consider elements other than polling data to determine changes of sentiments and attitudes in the public.

“The public” is a generic reference to a body of disinterested members of a society or polity and is not more informative to an understanding of social knowledge and
social action than an undefined reference to “they.” It fails to capture the activities of the working part of society engaged in creating cultural awareness, social knowledge, and public policies and in evaluating deeds. These activities are often local, are often in venues other than institutional forums, are always issue specific, and seldom involve the entire populace. (Hauser 32)

Hauser suggests a discursive mode be used to consider these activities that are local, fragmented, and informal.

The discursive mode of assessing public opinion proposed by Gerard Hauser is modeled after how individuals, without polling tools, may “determine the tenor and direction of prevailing values and beliefs” (4), namely a form of observation of speech acts, which he compares to Elizabeth Noelle-Neumann’s concept of a “social skin.” According to Hauser, individuals are able to detect tendencies of change and persistence in their immediate social environments, their local communities, their relevant publics. Hauser provides an answer to “how actual members of actual publics respond to appeals, how they themselves actually engage in discourse that allows us to infer their opinion, and the rhetorical conditions that color their interactions” (12). His suggestion is to observe local discourse to listen to these vernacular voices without forcing people to choose from a predefined set of opinions.

Discourse, according to Gerard Hauser, has taken on a great significance in a number of social disciplines in the 20th century, especially in debates between modernism and postmodernism (13). This discourse is identifiable and has the potential to produce real insights into existing value-systems:
When we conceptualize publics in rhetorical terms they are locatable as that portion of society actively engaged by issues. They are activated by both the discourse of leaders or the media and among themselves, making the wisdom with which they exercise their judging function contingent upon the character and quality of the rhetorical engagements they share. (Hauser 271)

However, Hauser also recognizes that in a democracy, ideally everyone is involved in the process of creating public action. Not only those that are well-informed and engaged by an issue are asked to cast a vote, but also those with very limited or no interest or with only personal gain rather than the common good in mind (272). Indirectly, Hauser acknowledges that not only is meaningful public debate that reaches relevant publics important when all of a democratic society is encouraged to form a decision, so too is the color of the tie of the presenter, the size of his smile, or her ability to show emotion. The low voter turnouts that Walter Lippmann observed and that still occur today may be an indication that primarily relevant publics participate in public action, but it would be a fundamentally undemocratic idea to bar those from participating that have not performed their share of research and community discourse prior to the political act.

In Gerard Hauser’s world, just as in Walter Lippmann’s, there are spectators and actors. There are those with vested interests in certain topics who act on these interests and those that take on a passive role. In a sense Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Jürgen Habermas identified active and passive members of society as well. Of the three, none observed the same kind of postmodern shift of people from one group to another depending on the issue at hand. Even Nietzsche, who argued fiercely against modern ideals, was still entrenched in his modern environment and saw people as either active or
part of the passive masses. All five scholars share an understanding that different modes of communication offer different degrees of success on active and passive publics. There are always some members of the public that are demanding and willing to engage meaningful public discourse while others might be afraid, incapable or, in most cases, simply disinterested in doing so.

**Marketplace Implications**

The capitalistic marketplace is basically a democratic forum. Analogous to the political decision-making process, consumer audiences as publics tend to be knowledgeable and interested in certain products and services, and thus demand and engage in elaborate discourse about these goods. Others have low interest in these same goods because they do not fit their needs or lifestyles, or they are regarded a basic necessity whereby brand loyalty and investment size are negligible to them. Marginal price difference, availability, packaging design or a spokesperson may easily sway these disinterested consumers toward one brand or the other or none at all. For some people, selecting a hair stylist is an important decision. These people will likely know available choices, their reputations, and prices. These interested consumers will engage in discourse with other like-minded consumers, closely follow scene publications, and negotiate service options with the stylist. Others may see a hair cut as a mere necessity and simply visit the salon that offers a discount coupon in a newspaper.

To communicate effectively with consumers, companies need to design messages that appeal to not only one type of consumer audience. The constant fluctuation of consumers in and out of interested publics makes the targeting of specific messages
difficult. On the other hand, standard messaging to all consumers without discrimination regarding their engagement levels seems inappropriate in a postmodern marketplace.

Chapter 3 examines the development of marketing communication in the 20th century and explores if, when, and how issues of market diversity, plurality of consumer needs and wants, and variation in consumer interestedness have been addressed. While there is a tendency to presuppose interestedness in people as citizens, consumer marketing communication practices seems to presuppose disinterestedness. Integrated Marketing Communication, a heavily researched and implemented approach from the past two decades is of particular interest.
Chapter 3:

Modern Traditions in the Marketplace

“The practice of integrated marketing communication is emerging as one of the most valuable “magic bullets” companies can use to gain competitive advantage.”

(Reilly ix)

The 20th century brought about the first major changes in the media landscape since the invention of the printing press. Mass communication through radio and television increased the speed and reach of consumer advertising. In step, a democratization of the marketplace took place: consumers demanded to be informed and consulted about the policy decisions of major corporations that were often regarded as semi-public entities.

Sharing Friedrich Nietzsche’s observations about the mass public as basically a herd of instinct-driven animals, Edward Bernays helped develop the practice of public relations (PR). Regretful yet with conviction, Bernays accepted the mass public as sole judge and jury in public matters. He devised tools to influence the emotions and opinions of society’s new—and in his view cognitively challenged—approval body in all economic and political issues.

Edward Bernays proposed an integrated approach of communicating with the consumer masses and created a corresponding public relations practice. Bernays sought to align messages across media and to incorporate novel forms of publicity into the
communication mix. While events and editorial content of newspaper were considered valuable publicity before, Bernays wanted to incorporate these elements strategically into a company’s communication efforts. Only if companies planned and controlled all communication channels with their customers and prospects would they be able to successfully manipulate the dreadfully static yet malleable consumer mass. Later, some scholars adopted a “magic bullet” theory of mass communication which suggested that mass audiences were defenseless puppets in reaction to mass mediated messages.

This chapter introduces a postmodern shift to audience responsibility grounded in a narrative paradigm. Basically, consumer audiences are able to measure marketing communication against their preexisting narrative experiences. Thus, they possess a tool to verify the probability and fidelity of advertising messages and discern right from wrong and good from bad marketing communication. This narrative paradigm also opens the door for a new magic bullet: Integrated Marketing Communication.

Integrated Marketing Communication (IMC) takes into consideration the postmodern fragmentation of the marketplace and the diversity of consumers. Following Edward Bernays’s model of integration of media channels and alignment of messages, IMC also inherits the potentiality for creating narrative façades rather than sound narrative structures for consumers to rely on.

The managerial rhetoric of the 20th century is characterized, among other things, by stunted arguments that are intended to facilitate efficiency in marketing communication. These “rhetorical tokens” substitute for more complete arguments that consumer audiences are often denied access to in the marketplace. While rhetorical
tokens prove effective in an environment of a largely disinterested consumer public, redemption of these tokens is important for its interested members.

Throughout this chapter, Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy appears in the practices of marketing communication. His theories provide valuable insights into the instinctive behavior of mass publics that can be used in marketing communication. The application Nietzsche’s theory finds in marketing communication often constitutes abuse as it denies some of the principal demands Nietzsche had for human welfare.

Edward Bernays and the Herd Metaphor

Edward Bernays was a nephew to Sigmund Freud and is commonly regarded as the father of public relations (PR). Indeed, he introduced the title of the new profession as “counsel on public relations” (Bernays, Chrystallizing 11) and provided an elaborate job description in the first chapter of Chrystallizing Public Opinion. Before taking a closer look at the role of the PR counsel in marketing communication, it is necessary to explore Bernays’s observations about his society that led to the necessity for creating the PR counsel.

Edward Bernays claimed that a major prerequisite for the development of the practice of public relations was companies’ realizing the importance of public approval for their bottom line.

Perhaps the most significant social, political and industrial fact about the present century is the increased attention which is paid to public opinion . . . by men and organizations which until very recently stood aloof from the general public and were able to say, ‘The public be damned.’ (Chrystallizing 34)
Bernays experienced a true social shift and claimed that “the public to-day demands information and expects also to be accepted as judge and jury in matters that have wide public import” (Chrystallizing 34). Almost regretfully, Bernays pointed out that the people of his time wanted to play a role in politics and the marketplace. They had the audacity to demand information about what was at stake for them. This demand had to be addressed in some way, because the public’s power as citizens and customers grew if only because of the sheer size in number. In that, Bernays’s observations are similar to those of Friedrich Nietzsche. Chapter 2 established Nietzsche’s attitude toward the mass public and his criticism that too often the masses were consulted for approval. In his evaluation of the study of history, Nietzsche wrote: ‘Gross’ wird dann alles genannt, was eine längere Zeit eine solche Masse bewegt hat und, wie man sagt, eine ‘historische Macht’ gewesen ist. Heisst das aber nicht recht absichtlich Quantität und Qualität verwechseln?
‘Great’ then is called everything which has moved the masses for a longer period of time and has been, as they say, a ‘historical force.’ Does this not mean quite deliberately confusing quantity and quality? (Nietzsche, “UBHL” 320)
Bernays did not attribute his ideas about the public to Nietzsche and only casually mentions “Nietzschean Philosophy” (Bernays, Propaganda 164); however, certain similarities are striking. This applies not just to the paralleled observations as indicated above, but also the abuse of their works by the German National Socialist party, for example. However, as this and the next chapter reveal, the propositions for the marketplace that can be derived from the two texts are significantly different.
In the quote above, Edward Bernays used judicial metaphors. Bernays recognized that not only written law and the courts were important in securing stable business, but also public approval. He compared the work of the PR counsel to that of a lawyer (Bernays, Propaganda 64). His understanding of the role of the PR counsel is best captured in his following analogy: “The business of the public relations counsel is somewhat like the business of the attorney—to advise his client and to litigate his causes for him” (Chrystallizing 50). The PR counsel does not only advise his client on possible alternative actions but he also relates the client’s actions to the public, like the attorney does to the court: “he is becoming to-day as much of an adviser on actions as he is the communicator of these actions to the public” (Bernays, Chrystallizing 56); and as the PR counsel is pleading before the “court of public opinion,” he is also trying to “affect that court’s judgment and actions” (Bernays, Propaganda 70). In addition to this strong analogy of the PR counsel to an attorney who litigates and advises, Bernays added the dimension of mediator. He considered the public relations counsel “the pleader to the public point of view. He acts in this capacity as consultant both in interpreting the public to his client and in helping to interpret his client to the public” (Bernays, Chrystallizing 57, 14).

However, Edward Bernays also recognized some differences between the work of an attorney and that of the PR counsel, putting certain limitations on his analogy. Instead of a formal hearing, the PR counsel and his client are faced with “mob psychology [and] the intolerance of human society for a dissenting point of view” in the court of public opinion (Bernays, Chrystallizing 50). In consequence, Bernays believed that while
the lawyer can tell what argument will appeal to the court or jury . . . the ability to estimate group reactions on a large scale over a wide geographical area is a specialized ability which must be developed with the same painstaking self-criticism and with the same dependence on experience that are required for the development of the clinical sense in the doctor or surgeon. (Chrystallizing 53-55)

In addition, Bernays believed in the possibility of consolidating the individual opinions of many and reducing them to generalities. This is indicative of thinkers in a modern school of economics. The modern economists’ concept of self-regulating market processes, i.e., Adam Smith’s reference to the “invisible hand” (542) or Max Weber’s demand for “the absence of irrational limitations” (38), required uniformity and stability in order for its participants not to merely negotiate “over isolated transactions in a public gathering place” (Lowry 43). According to Bernays, it was the PR counsel’s task to detect, create, and communicate those stable patterns within public opinion.

Public relations is practiced not only in the marketplace, but also the political arena. However, Edward Bernays (as opposed to most of the philosophers discussed in the previous chapter) was a pragmatist and a marketer. Bernays attributed the new public demand for information and influence to modern sales practices, among other things, which created “keen competition for public favor” (Chrystallizing 35). Contemporary marketing seeks to employ the power of the consumer mass to put pressure on middle men such as retailers to carry certain items in their product portfolio, for instance. Delivering product information straight to consumers in order to create demand at the retail outlet is referred to as pull-marketing.
Michael Sproule places Bernays (along with Ivy Lee) at the onset of commercial public relations employing a new form of managerial rhetoric. Sproule identifies the “new dimensions of public persuasion” which significantly “contrast pre-twentieth century rhetoric from the new managerial rhetoric” (“Managerial Rhetoric” 486). According to Sproule, these new dimensions are twofold. They are comprised of first, institutional rather than individual persuasion and second, mass media as a vehicle to reach a mass audience. Technological advancements such as the telephone, motion picture, and radio made it possible to reach larger audiences quicker.

These new means of mass communication brought about a reversal of communicative direction in the social hierarchy: “The eyes of managerial communicators are ever focused on the mass audience; this may be contrasted to the tendency of the old rhetoric to move society by first focusing on the socio-political elite” (p. 470). Analogous to Bernays, Sproule gives special historic privilege to corporate PR practices. Regarding PR as primarily a commercial effort, he writes, “the modern trend to reach elites through the masses first manifested itself clearly in the world of commerce” (“Managerial Rhetoric” 470). The following paragraphs explore Bernays’s approach to PR and how it is tied to advertising and other forms of marketing communication.

Edward Bernays developed his approach to public relations which attempted to covertly influence public opinion through the appeal to emotion rather than reason under the presupposition that the average member of the public is stupid. According to Bernays, common members of the public were unable to utilize reason on a number of subjects. In an interview with Stuart Ewen, Bernays pointed out that “the average IQ of the American public is 100” (PR! A Social History of Spin 10). Bernays claimed that, consequently, the
public acted instinctively and followed more intelligent members of the community like a
herd follows a lead animal. Hence, Bernays considered persuasive appeals to the
individuals of society, for instance through the written word alone, as relatively
ineffective. Instead, he recommended “dealing with men in the mass through their group
formations, to set up psychological and emotional currents which will work for [the
marketer]” (Propaganda 77). Bernays proposed a subtle form of influencing the public.
“Instead of assaulting sales resistance by direct attack, [the marketer] is interested in
removing sales resistance. He creates circumstances which will swing emotional currents
so as to make for purchaser demand” (Bernays, Propaganda 77). Bernays proposed public
opinion was to be shaped in the dissemination of ideas through “various publicity
channels” counting on the reaction to basic human instincts and imitation of “what is
done by the men whom [average people] consider masters of their profession”
(Propaganda 78)—this, again, was very similar to Friedrich Nietzsche’s observation
regarding the quality of imitation found in the masses (Nietzsche, “UBHL” 320).

Edward Bernays would argue that his mass-psychological approach to public
relations essentially achieved the same effect as individually convincing members of the
public through persuasion (if that were even possible), but with fewer resources, and
therefore more efficiently. Modern mass media has increased the ability of reaching
critical masses, but the number of choices presented and the related public
disinterestedness made managerial rhetoric a necessity in Bernays’s view. Thus,
Bernays’s took a utilitarian approach—the mass public, unaware of what’s best for their
personal and social welfare, needed to be subtly influenced into agreement with the plan
that others devise. He rejected the commonly accepted negative connotation of the word
propaganda and points to the “merit of the cause urged” (Bernays, Propaganda 48). Bernays disregarded human beings’ ability to choose and therefore deprived them of their right to choose, only without them noticing. The approach included that persons should think they have recognized their own needs and wants, transform these into demand in the marketplace, and never realize the orchestrating work of the PR counsel.

Edward Bernays knew that such manipulation of the public could only work if the messages its members received through different channels were consistent. Bernays’s declared goal was to undermine the presuppositions that persons held because of their own traditions. Bernays was quite frank about this aim of public relations: his intention was to offset the influence of those who traditionally shape the framework or grounding of a person’s biases—parents, teachers, church, and socio-political leadership (Bernays, Chrystallizing 62). His strategy was an attempt at integrating marketing communication.

Edward Bernays’s Integrated Approach to Marketing Communication Versus a “Magic Bullet” Theory of Message Transmission

Edward Bernays was one of the first to realize that an advertisement alone could have little influence on the attitudes of the public. Audiences’ values were shaped from too many influences. He claimed

A middle ground exists between the hypothesis that the public is stubborn and the hypothesis that it is malleable. To a large degree the press, the schools, the churches, motion pictures, advertising, the lecture platform and radio all conform to the demands of the public. But to an equally large degree the public responds to the influence of these very same mediums of communication. (Bernays, Chrystallizing 87)
Bernays believed that crowd psychology would provide a means of exerting influence on the public.

Edward Bernays adopted two Freudian concepts from Everett Martin’s *The Behavior of Crowds: A Psychological Study*. First, Bernays agreed that crowd behavior occurred regardless the level of education throughout all strata of society. Second, Bernays accepted that even individuals in isolation act in accordance with their group affiliations, i.e., no physical presence of others was required to cause the individual to behave within socially accepted norms. Bernays wrote: “The crowd is a state of mind which permeates society and its individuals at almost all times” (Chrystallizing 104).

Making the transition to the herd metaphor, he continued

the tendency the group has to standardize the habits of individuals and to assign logical reasons for them is an important factor in the work of the public relations counsel. (Chrystallizing 105)

These group affiliations are not homogeneous for all of society, though.

As Bernays pointed out, in accord with Walter Lippmann, “populations have increased. In this country geographical areas have increased. Heterogeneity has also increased” (Chrystallizing 125-26). Consequently, reach to these diverse audiences changed and communication channels had to be adjusted. Bernays observed “it is extremely difficult to realize how many and diverse are these cleavages in our society. They may be social, political, economical, racial, religious or ethical, with hundreds of subdivisions in each” (Propaganda 41). Furthermore, these groups “interlace” (Propaganda 44) and no one person is member of only one group.
Edward Bernays called the “utilization of the group formation of modern society” (Propaganda 79) one of the most effective methods to spread ideas. This utilization took the form of complementing traditional print appeals in advertising with events, editorial content, and a number of indirect or emotional influences to the group members in order to slowly but steadily modify their stereotypes. In Propaganda and Chrystallizing Public Opinion, Bernays provided countless examples of how this was to be done: people would have to be exposed to a brand (Bernays speaks of companies, products, and services) at different places throughout their daily routines. Samples, celebrity endorsements, news reports, special events, and so forth would have to be coupled with traditional forms of advertising to create somewhat of an omnipresence of the brand. For instance, a person’s familiarity with a car—because it was featured in a motion picture, discussed on a television talk show, and utilized in a local parade—could increase interest in advertisements for the vehicle and vice versa. The key is consistency across brand experiences. In this approach, advertising is reduced to a reminder and information function, a supplement in the opinion-building process, instead of the traditional frontal attack on consumer resistance.

Edward Bernays wanted to create an environment in which consumers invited product information and deliberately exposed themselves to the appeals of the marketer. In fact, Bernays did not subscribe to the possibility of individual conditioning through the media. He declared this theory obsolete:

The old propagandist based his work on the mechanistic reaction psychology then in vogue in our colleges. This assumed that the human mind was merely an individual machine, a system of nerves and nerve centers, reacting with
mechanical regularity to stimuli, like helpless, will-less automation. It was the special pleader’s function to provide the stimulus which would cause the desired reaction in the individual purchaser. It was one of the doctrines of the reaction psychology that a certain stimulus often repeated would create a habit, or that the mere reiteration of an idea would create a conviction. (Bernays, Propaganda 76) Bernays’s focus was on shaping the individual’s group environment and influencing the group’s stereotypes through emotional appeals.

Television technology, especially national networks, did not fully develop until either of Edward Bernays’s works discussed here were published. With the advent television appeared new theories of mass persuasion that oppose Bernays’s earlier intuitions. In modernity, a time of limited communication channels in form of mass media providing large audiences with uniform messages, a “mechanistic ‘magic bullet’ theory of message effects” (Smith and Hunsaker 24) was widely subscribed to and it was “assumed that the injection of persuasive messages into susceptible audiences would trigger a specific desired response” (25). This “Hypodermic Needle” or “Magic Bullet” theory presupposed that it was possible to inject messages straight into individuals through mass media, bypassing any cognitive processes, thus changing the beliefs and actions of an unreflective consumer audience. “If one could create the right message with the right media mix, one could get the masses to follow heedlessly” (Hiebert and Gibbons 126). Popular examples of the magic bullet effects are the mass hysteria following the 1938 broadcast of War of the Worlds (Wells) or Woodrow Wilson’s World War I propaganda campaign. The Frankfurt School closely examined the influence of mass media on people’s behavior in Germany under the National Socialists’ regime. While the
fear of mass media’s ability to manipulate its consumer audiences into any possible action was real, it was also overrated according to Michael Sproule (“Progressive Propaganda”). Sproule claims that the “Magic Bullet” theory of message transmission was never scientifically proven, but rather reflected some theorists observations and reflections of public reactions to mass media during the 1920’s and 1930’s.

A key consequence of accepting a “Magic Bullet” theory would be to acknowledge that all responsibility for a consumer audience’s actions lies with the message sender. This theory catapults society back into a state of intellectual immaturity. If it were possible to easily condition people into accepting certain truths, marketing would face an ethical dilemma which this work cannot even begin to explore. While there is consensus that media influences social behavior, postmodern thinkers fortunately also replace the ability to discern right from wrong, good from bad, just and unjust with people again. With his narrative paradigm, Walter Fisher has established the categories of narrative fidelity and narrative probability (105) to illustrate how narrative structures and traditions provide a framework for people to make sound decisions, thus re-enabling intellectual maturity.

Audience Responsibility in Walter Fisher’s Narrative Paradigm and Integrated Marketing Communication as the New “Magic Bullet”

In ethical discussions about advertising and other forms of marketing communication, matters of truth seem to be at the focus of attention (Andrén). However, even Immanuel Kant who regarded truthfulness as an “ethical duty towards others” (Lectures 200) recognized that a message which is “more or less overstated and therefore more or less distant from the exact truth” (Andrén 74) may still be considered ethical “if
the judgment of others about the content of their truth cannot be in doubt” (Kant Lectures 427).

John Kottman argues that advertising audiences make value judgments that are related to agreement with the source of the message, not reality. He stresses, however, that “agreeing or not agreeing has nothing to do with truth or falsity” (Kottman 83). In reference to Chaïm Perelman, Walter Fisher also denies that “special privilege can be assigned to assertions about absolute standards for truth, knowledge and reality because those matters have to be argued before and assented to by audiences, else they have no public significance” (18). Fisher suggests the level of agreement is based on narrative rationality. “Rationality from this perspective involves . . . the principles of narrative probability and narrative fidelity” (8), a matter of coherence within the narrative and its proper alignment with past experiences. These past experiences form the people’s narratives which in turn and through comparison help them “judge the stories that are told for and about them” (67). In other words, people have the skills to apply their backgrounds to any narrative to assess how feasible (probability) and how coherent (fidelity) the narrative is in a particular context.

Walter Fisher calls people’s ability to make judgments about narratives “narrative rationality” (138). Natural instincts play a major role in narrative rationality (comparable to the ideas of Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Nietzsche in the previous chapter).

Similarly, Aristotle already claimed:

The true and the approximately true are apprehended by the same faculty; it may also be noted that men have a sufficient natural instinct for what is true, and
usually do arrive at the truth. Hence the man who makes a good guess at truth is likely to make a good guess at probabilities. (“Rhetorica” 1327)

Fisher supports this view, stating that people “have a natural tendency to prefer what they perceive as the true and just” (67). Applied to marketing communication, some theorists even propose that the narrative paradigm could help determine unethical advertising before it is presented to its target audience:

The fact that potentially unethical ads are reaching the market place suggests that current methods of ad evaluation may be inadequate for some of today’s controversial or innovative campaigns. The authors introduce the narrative paradigm as a possible solution or tool for discerning potentially unethical aspects of advertisements. (Bush and Bush 31)

Using the narrative paradigm for message evaluation is only natural when consumer audiences are found to reject messages for their unethical lack of both narrative fidelity and probability. In this situation, marketers attempt to maximize agreement.

If society must agree on what it considers true, then the public and its opinions should constitute the highest measure of truth. Friedrich Nietzsche grudgingly accepted this circumstance in his evaluation of the influence of the masses. Edward Bernays made this a key presupposition in his development of a practice of public relations which encompassed all forms of marketing communication. The main change from these modernist thinkers to Walter Fisher and other postmodern thinkers is the varying degree of stability and homogeneity observed in the public.

Contemporary marketing practitioners can seldom hope for unified support of their brands. Instead, they address market segments and attempt to convince relevant
publics with their messages. Integrated Marketing Communication (IMC) is an approach developed in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s out of Northwestern University. According to the IMC scholars at Northwestern University, IMC is “a new way of looking at the whole, where once we only saw parts such as advertising, public relations, sales promotion, purchasing, employee communications, and so forth” (Schultz, Tannenbaum, and Lauterborn xvii). IMC is supposed to replace old attitudes and beliefs in the industry. Not all of these concepts are as new as they might appear. Some of them were simply dormant during a time when mass communication was regarded as the ultimate weapon of marketers.

Edward Bernays’s idea of using multiple communication channels and aligning events with advertising, editorial contents with celebrity spokespersons, and other means of message dissemination is at the core of today’s concept of IMC. Bernays used the term public relations to refer to what is seen as a holistic approach to marketing communication advocated by Northwestern University. Each of these channels and tools generates a potential brand contact, which is defined as “as any information-bearing experience that a customer or prospect has with the brand” (Schultz, Tannenbaum, and Lauterborn 51). Certainly, Northwestern University has advanced the use of database systems and the integration of new media into the processes of communicating with the market through agencies, but the concept of IMC still revolves around sending cohesive messages to all “fronts.”

As long as terminology such as ‘creating a brand image’ remain in the vocabulary of marketers, they are effectively considering the possibility of shaping public opinion or, as Edward Bernays put it, “the conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized
habits of the masses” (Propaganda 37), regardless of the efforts at segmentation or
dialogue marketing. Especially the concepts of brand experience and personality can be
traced back through Bernays to a Nietzschean understanding of how people (re)act in
groups. In that sense, Friedrich Nietzsche contributed to IMC, or in accord with the title
of this dissertation, finds use in contemporary marketing communication.

Similar to Edward Bernays, IMC scholars accept that “there are hundreds if not
thousands of ways in which a person can come in contact with a brand” (Schultz,
Tannenbaum, and Lauterborn 51) to help shape the brand image. Image advertising
clearly takes on an important or even dominant role in the branding process; however,
image advertising is complemented with brand contacts such as product experience, news
coverage, interpersonal communication, and sales representation. The brand image is not
formed in advertisements but in the consumers’ heads and therefore standard advertising
messages do not necessarily produce a standard brand image. Rather, personal values
promote “non-sequitur or contradiction” of the “intended interpretation” of the
advertising message with regard to brand image; this suggests that “successful
standardized global advertising campaigns will remain the exception rather than the rule”
(Rustogi, Hensel, and Burgers 75). The same critique applies to the sub-culture level and
IMC has responded to this phenomenon.

Customer Relationship Management (CRM) is a database-driven communication
approach that intends to make customized consumer interactions possible. However,
CRM must go beyond the implementation of joint databases for sales or customer
service. Andrew Razeghi and Bobby Calder critique that other than “the general notion of
personalizing and customizing interactions with consumers and using CRM systems to
facilitate this, the concept of relationship marketing can be very fuzzy” (52). Unfortunately they, too, only offer another process-driven technique, namely that of interaction maps, to address the problem of “fuzziness” in CRM. Kellogg on Integrated Marketing lists three primary goals of this new approach to marketing. Contemporary marketing should be “more strategic in creating strong brand concepts,” be able to create “a total consumer experience that is aligned with a strong brand concept,” and finally it must “customize consumer experiences in a way that still allows for marketing to large numbers of consumers” (Calder and Malthouse 15). How can marketing achieve customization in market segmentation, yet maintain sending messages to large audiences; and how can brand concepts be communicated strategically if there are “thousands” of brand contact points (Schultz, Tannenbaum, and Lauterborn 51) that need to be aligned? Some have viewed IMC as the new “Magic Bullet” capable of achieving such a complex task.

The opening sentence in the foreword to The New Marketing Paradigm (generated by scholars from Northwestern University in 1994) reads: “The practice of integrated marketing communication is emerging as one of the most valuable ‘magic bullets’ companies can use to gain competitive advantage” (Reilly ix). IMC as a magic bullet that could resolve all of marketers’ problems was later declared a myth. Even scholars at Northwestern University critique the magic bullet attitude nine years later: “It must be said, however, that tailoring has been reduced by some to a magic bullet approach to marketing” (Calder and Malthouse 7). Applying Walter Fisher’s “Narrative Paradigm” to postmodern marketing, IMC may be the “next best thing” to the magic bullet effects of mass mediated communication observed in modern age?
Aristotle believed people were naturally smart enough to judge messages. Immanuel Kant saw the potential in his contemporaries to become intellectually mature. Friedrich Nietzsche thought that if people only freed themselves from their group affiliations, they could become smart individuals. However, in Walter Fisher’s narrative paradigm these group affiliations shape the narrative framework that allows people to make judgments based on narrative fidelity and probability. Accepting the narrative paradigm, it seems impossible that any one form of communication could bypass the Aristotelian instinct, Habermasian universal pragmatics, or the “checks and balances” of Fisher’s narrative paradigm. Given the above perceptions of human ability, it appears unlikely that any messages could sustainably motivate actions against people’s better judgment.

Still, there is a way, perhaps the declared objective of IMC, to achieve just that by modifying the judging criteria. The narrative paradigm presupposes that all humans are situated in their own traditions and communities. These provide the individual with the necessary narrative framework to evaluate incoming messages. IMC attempts to control, as far as possible, all contacts that consumers have with a given brand. If marketers truly adopt an IMC approach, they will attempt to create brand experiences all around the consumer—at work, at school, at home, and in between; on television, in the mail, on the phone, and on the internet; through personal selling, billboards, commercials, and product and service usage.

If consumers are surrounded by artificial or fabricated pseudo brand contacts, their perceptions of the brand might significantly change. This change constitutes a modification of the narrative framework that serves as guide in the narrative paradigm to
evaluate messages. The category of probability is especially affected: a consumer can quickly decide if a particular commercial advertisement is in line with his or her other brand contacts and fits the overall brand experience. As long as the message is coherent (complies with the criterion of fidelity) and matches the pre-existing narrative structures surrounding consumers, they may be tempted to quickly accept a message without much further deliberation. After all, consumers for the most part seek to efficiently handle the incoming message volume, especially regarding decisions in which they have little interest.

Creating a narrative façade rather than a true narrative structure is an ambitious endeavor. A narrative façade would require integrated messaging through various channels on the one hand, and, if the aim were to get consumers to behave in ways they would not if they had all the information and reviewed it critically (i.e., manipulation), these messages would have to be delivered as hollow shells without much substance. In fact, authenticity of brand experiences would have to be simulated. This practice is not only possibility, but reality: in this practice dubbed “stealth marketing” (Goodman 84), commercial messages are introduced covertly into editorial and similar media content desired by the consumer. The advertiser commonly attempts to conceal the source’s identity and the persuasive intent of the message. Common examples include product placements or sponsored journalism. While clear guidelines exist for traditional mass media to disclose sponsorship, Ellen Goodman critiques that no such rules are enforced on a number of new media platforms. While this issue is heavily debated in the United States, the European Union has addressed it in the aforementioned directive regarding unfair commercial practices:
Commercial practices which are in all circumstances considered unfair:

Misleading commercial practices: . . . 22. Falsely claiming or creating the impression that the trader is not acting for purposes relating to his trade, business, craft or profession, or falsely representing oneself as a consumer. (European Parliament, “Unfair Commercial Practices Directive” 35-36)

This legal framework encompasses activities from product placement to an author’s own, undisclosed book review on virtual storefronts such as Amazon.com.

While these covert advertisements might be true-to-fact, well-researched, and socially valuable, the possibility and risk remain that they might not be, and consumers are deprived of their ability to discern credibility on the basis of the source. In fact, a confusion of medium/publication ethos with product ethos (brand personality) is possible and probable. Willing to accept this mix-up, Eric Goldman wrote in a response to Ellen Goodman’s article that many consumers already suffer from information overload. Yet, noisy disclosures consume more of their already-strapped attention. Some consumers will feel that the disclosed information is valuable enough that they will not mind the ‘cost’ of having their attention consumed, but others will resent the imposition. For the latter consumers, the mandated disclosure becomes another form of spam (unwanted content). (Goldman 14)

In order to reach consumers through the message clutter, marketers often have to resort to abbreviated arguments. These are claims without all the proper evidence for support that warrant agreement. These argumentative shortcuts are necessary whenever advertising space and time is at a premium and consumers are disinterested in elaborate persuasion.
The following segment explores how the resulting managerial rhetoric is a characteristic of the 20th and 21st centuries and how rhetorical tokens appear in most forms of commercial marketing communication.

**Managerial Rhetoric and Leon Mayhew’s Concept of Rhetorical Tokens**

Shortly before Edward Bernays’s time, a significant shift in rhetoric occurred in accord with a socio-technological change. Michael Sproule identifies managerial rhetoric as a response to this change. Mirroring the observations in this dissertation so far, Sproule criticizes that managerial rhetoric’s “controlling concepts are ideology, entertainment, and professionalized channels” (“Managerial Rhetoric” 474) which are not addressing informed and active audiences, but those that make hurried and impulse-driven decisions. However, presenting a postmodern understanding of the status quo, Sproule acknowledges that neither old nor modern rhetoric are monolithic (“Managerial Rhetoric” 475); instead, both forms of rhetoric currently coexist in various facets. Old rhetoric does take a backseat to managerial forms of persuasion, though. This factor may contribute to the overall negative perceptions of marketing communication described above: while Jaques Ellul argues that average members of the public are in need of propagandistic influence and even enjoy it (Propaganda 121), there are still those that are too concerned with particular issues to be satisfied with superficial argumentation.

With these interested members of various publics in mind, Michael Sproule points in a direction that may lead marketing communication away from the cynicism its propaganda has created. Despite the dominance of managerial rhetoric, which often times provides “packaged ideology” (Sproule, “Managerial Rhetoric” 472), “Americans continue to search for a recognized community interest” and
since a community interest cannot emerge through projection of packaged ideologies to segmented audiences, the body of the old rhetoric represents a repository of concepts and practices that constitute genetic material of great social value to Western democracies. The new managerial rhetoric makes inevitable an increased attention by educators to the professional techniques of the public relations expert and advertiser. (Sproule, “Managerial Rhetoric” 483)

In other words, pre-modern persuasive approaches may have merit in modern commercial communication, in spite of changed communication channels and technology, when they address fundamental social values.

According to Seyla Benhabib, a mass culture is based on “superficiality, homogeneity, reproducibility, lack of durability, and lack of originality”—it is “mere entertainment” (3). This definition parallels the justification of managerial rhetoric. Mass culture has little to do with today’s concept of culture, which has “become a ubiquitous synonym for identity, an identity marker and differentiator” (Benhabib 2). Ignoring social distinction by assuming and promoting a shared culture is ethically deeply problematic if it strips communities of their identity and tries to impose new narrative structures. The question addressed first is how managerial rhetoric works and when it is problematic. Clearly, it appears to provide the efficiency a highly communicative market requires.

Leon Mayhew describes the “New Public” as a place in which “communication is dominated by professional specialists” whose manipulative techniques “furnish evidence for critics who proclaim the decline of the public” (4-5). In 1923, Edward Bernays described the public’s understanding of public relations as that “vaguely defined evil, ‘propaganda’” (Crystallizing 12). And now more than ever, current professional
communicators in the marketplace are met with distrust and cynicism. Marvin Olasky observes that PR as a marketing practice “is sinking deeper into ethical and political quicksand” (ix). Mayhew introduces the concept of rhetorical “tokens” and critiques that too often these “brief bits of symbolic information” (14) that are provided to the consumer audiences are non-redeemable. He defines redemption of a rhetorical token as follows:

To redeem a rhetorical claim is to respond to demands for clarification, specification, and evidence to the satisfaction of an audience that shares many of the speaker’s values and presuppositions and relies on these common meanings to fill in the blanks. (Mayhew 13)

When interested audiences attempt to retrieve additional information, question the evidence provided, or critically evaluate the message sender’s ethos, they are often disappointed.

Tokens are rhetorical because they are part of a persuasive effort in an environment of uncertainty. Redeeming rhetorical tokens cannot mean providing indisputable proof leading to absolute certainty, but it must include revealing sources, supplementing evidence, and otherwise completing the argument. Leon Mayhew recognizes time and effort as the “most inescapable constraints on every-day communication” (48). This applies not only to the members of the audience, but also professional marketing communicators. Since many consumers, even interested ones, tend to appreciate means of making communication more efficient, they readily accept “symbolic tokens of more extended arguments that the speaker purports to be able to expound if necessary” (Mayhew 48). If the marketer is unable or unwilling to provide the
extended argument upon request, consumer audiences are bound to become cynical towards managerial rhetoric because they recognize the lack of probability in the narrative façade presented to them.

Especially since the 1980’s, a commonly researched and practiced approach to bypass consumers’ rational involvement in marketing communication messages has been to focus on emotional appeals (Mitchell and Olson). Especially in situations of low elaboration likelihood (high disinterestedness in the marketing message and the associated choices), emotional appeals have proved to be very effective. In the introduction to his paradigmatic book Emotional Branding, Marc Gobé writes:

I believe that it is the emotional aspect of products and their distribution systems that will be the key difference between consumers’ ultimate choice and the price they will pay. By emotional I mean how a brand engages consumers on the level of the senses and emotions . . . . This means that understanding people’s emotional needs and desires is really, now more than ever, the key to success.

(xiv)

In situations of low elaboration likelihood, when there is little at stake for the consumer and differences among brands are minimal, consumers tend to favor the brand they simply like better. Emotional branding attempts to create these likes toward a brand to simplify the decision process for disinterested consumers.

Accommodating disinterested consumers by depriving them of even the chance to make an informed decision may have proven to be successful, but it cannot be what Friedrich Nietzsche had intended when he critiqued the phenomenon of a mass public.
The use of Nietzsche’s theory for marketing communication has already been identified in this chapter. It is now necessary to describe its abuse in marketing communication.

**On the Use and Abuse of Nietzsche’s Ideology for Marketing Communication**

If, through the use of modern mass media, emotional appeals are made with the intention to shape what the public feels, not knows, as just and moral behavior, the approach is based in modern thought. According to Friedrich Nietzsche this approach is wrong. Chapter 2 introduced his major critique of modernity which was that people lived with the illusion of possessing knowledge when, in reality, they only fell prey to their feelings. A case is not presented to the public on its own terms, but rather appeals are made to their herd instincts. Assuming to know psychological needs of the consumer means taking a therapeutic approach to marketing, giving people the option of silently tranquilizing their suffering rather than actively searching for solutions. Edward Bernays’s observations about society are very similar to Nietzsche’s. The question is whether or not both would agree on the consequences for professional communicators’ behavior toward the masses. This chapter provides an answer in the negative.

Friedrich Nietzsche claimed that humans envied the animal that can follow its instincts alone and need not worry about a conscious reality (“UBHL” 249). In a way, people want to be manipulated instead of thinking for themselves. Therefore, most of the intellectual immaturity present in communities is self-inflicted. Jaques Ellul confirmed this by stating “the propagandee is by no means just an innocent victim. He provokes the psychological action of propaganda, and not merely lends himself to it, but even derives satisfaction from it” (*Propaganda* 121). At the same time, humans like to display their humanness, their superiority to the animal. They cannot and will not remain at the
animals’ level of ignorance. There are those people who transcend their passive level of existence and develop an interest in the subjects presented to them; they consider the past and begin thinking about their future. Different members of society have varying subjects they develop an interest in so that they desire more than mere manipulation to form their opinions. If society’s active members do not find public evidence that confirms the value judgments and emotional appeals presented to them, their unmet expectations potentially lead to the cynicism and the suspicion that dominates marketing communication today.

Friedrich Nietzsche supported those who tried to make the transition to intellectual maturity. Propositions to minimize arguments to accommodate busy individuals cannot be what Nietzsche would have wanted, despite his disdain for the mass public. Rhetorical tokens provide “suggestive clues” but avoid confrontations that necessitate their redemption (Mayhew 48). Jürgen Habermas believes that dispute is essentially an attempt at “Verständnis” ‘understanding’ while Nietzsche regarded discomfort as an initiative to improve the human condition.

Friedrich Nietzsche heavily opposed the idea of making the mass public judge over greatness. Edward Bernays on the other hand accepted this situation as a fact of his time and saw the need to cater to the masses by utilizing their instinctive behavior. Since Bernays did not trust people’s cognitive abilities, he proposed to manipulate their opinions. This is traditionally an ethically questionable approach. In his Rhetoric Aristotle claims that any manipulation of a judge (the members of the court of public

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5 “weil er seines Menschenthums sich vor dem Thiere brüstet [. . .] weil er es nicht will wie das Thier [because he gloats over his humanness before the animal [. . .] because he does not want it like the animal” (Nietzsche “UBHL” 248)
6 “interested spectators of action” (Lippmann Phantom 187) or “society’s active members” (Hauser 35)
opinion, in Bernays’s terms) with means other than reasonable persuasion, including emotional appeals, is unethical:

The arousing of prejudice, pity, anger, and similar emotions has nothing to do with the essential facts, but is merely a personal appeal to the man who is judging . . . It is not right to pervert the judge\(^7\) by moving him to anger or envy or pity . . . As to whether a thing is important or unimportant, just or unjust, the judge must surely refuse to take his instructions from the litigants: he must decide for himself (Aristotle, “Rhetorica” 1325-26)

Bernays did not share this ethical attitude.

Friedrich Nietzsche promoted a kind of individualism also characteristic of modernity. Zarathustra, in disgust, separates himself from the townspeople and the Nietzschean concept of eternal recurrence focuses on the individual. Democracy and equality, for Nietzsche were problematic simply because not everyone had an equal stake in all issues and the same motivation to participate. Alexis de Tocqueville commented on democracy as follows:

Not only does democracy make every man forget his ancestors, but it hides his descendants and separates his contemporaries from him; it throws him back forever upon himself alone and threatens in the end to confine him entirely within the solitude of his own heart. (Tocqueville 206-07)

The major difference between Nietzsche and Edward Bernays lay in the acceptance of individuals or the lack thereof. While they shared the perception of the public as herd, Nietzsche did not embrace this status quo; instead he demanded an orientation toward

\(^7\) Original footnote in translation: “Here, and in what follows, the English reader should understand ‘judge’ in a broad sense, including ‘jurymen’ and others who ‘judge’.”
what he called the “Overman.” However, Bernays developed his practices of mass
manipulation on the basis of the instinctive behavior he observed in many of his peers.
His work also drew on research from the fields of psychoanalysis and mass psychology
such as his uncle Sigmund Freud’s research (Massenpsychologie). Freud shared with his
nephew his research on psychoanalysis (Psychoanalysis):

[Edward Bernays] took out of the book the idea that humans were fundamentally
emotional and irrational creatures. He immediately recognised that the corollary,
of significance for anyone involved in public life, was that it was pointless to
appeal to the masses rationally if you wanted to get them to support something.

(Tyrrell and Curtis 24)

Nietzsche was not a rationalist; his dedication to Dionysus described earlier is an
example of the importance of art and basic natural instincts in Nietzsche’s philosophy.
Nietzsche opposed the deliberate dehumanization that that manifested itself in treating
people like cattle.

Edward Bernays’s ideas have resurfaced in contemporary marketing
communication and are used as a weapon against fragmented and informed publics.
Emotional branding and integration of marketing communication may not be a magic
bullet, but they seek to shape public opinion and they do so by creating pseudo brand
experiences. Marketing comprises all activity that creates value for customers by
providing products and services. Marketing includes a number of functions, ideally
integrated. Advertising is probably the most visible form of marketing communication
and it is usually associated with the promotion and sales of goods and services. This
dissertation does not seek to condemn marketing communication in general or advertising
in particular as it is an integral component of business in a capitalistic society. Instead, this project asserts that ethical concerns must be taken into consideration if advertising messages are to become more effective, namely through a more trusting relationship between marketers and consumer audiences.

Chapter 4 constitutes an attempt to address the marketers’ interests and the consumers’ concerns by providing an approach to marketing communication that meets established ethical standards, allows for efficiency, and promotes effectiveness among both interested and disinterested consumer audiences. A response is provided to the need for a marketing communication practice that is responsive the postmodern rhetorical moment. This response is grounded in the acknowledgement of modern remnants in the postmodern marketplace as well as the postmodern ideas of competing narrative structures.

Emotional and rational appeals are the two primary approaches which are still presumably mutually exclusive. While the contemporary marketplace might not be ready for a holistic form of marketing communication, such as the rhetoric advocated by the ancients, marketers may at least try to integrate the three modes of persuasion. Business to Consumer marketing focuses primarily on pathos, making emotional appeals to consumer audiences. Business to Business marketing focuses primarily on logos, making rational appeals to its audiences of buying teams.

Through branding, companies attempt to influence corporate ethos, the way people perceive the message sender. This ethos suffers when consumers become suspicious about the brand’s messages. For successful branding, consumer trust in
advertising messages must be regained. The following chapter provides an alternative to IMC to reach this objective.
Chapter 4:
Integrated Dualism

“Ich liebe Den, welcher goldene Worte seinen Thaten voraus wirft und immer noch mehr hält als er verspricht.”
‘I love him who scattereth golden words before his deeds, and always doeth more than he promiseth.’
(Nietzsche, Z 17-18)

Among social critics of advertising, modern mass communication has created a special dilemma. Even disregarding “magic bullet” or “hypodermic needle” theories of message effects, the advent of mass communication enabled an environment of ethical quandary. The fundamental change that occurred was the greater reach of messages created by a limited number of authors. Media productions, instead of reaching a few hundred or thousand people, would suddenly reach millions. By the late 1950’s competition in daily newspaper ownership had been reduced to only 6% in major U.S. cities and four radio networks and three giant television networks dominated their markets (Schramm 4-5).

Media oligopolies, as in any other context of centralized power over scarce resources that put social welfare at stake, require a great deal of responsibility from their owners and editors. In light of large consumer audiences, Wilbur Schramm poses a key ethical question in mass communication in his book Responsibility in Mass Communication: “Should the public be given ‘what it wants’ or ‘what it needs’” (8)? In
order to answer this question, marketers have to assess their view of consumers. To give the public what it wants presupposes intellectually mature audiences. In order to give the public what it needs, one must reject the idea that audiences can make reasonable decisions—they cannot demand the information crucial to them and their decision process and, therefore, need to be manipulated into the “right” direction following a very utilitarian ethic, if any ethic at all.

The discussions in the preceding chapters have illustrated that there existed a general tendency to view consumers as instinct-driven, irrational human beings unable to know what they truly wanted or needed. In this view consumers were seeking entertainment and followed their instincts in fulfilling basic emotional and physiological needs. As explained before, this worldview has changed a bit with the transition into a postmodern society characterized by fragmentation, unstable group affiliations, and nearly perfect access to information. As a consequence, many marketers have adopted a view of their audiences as increasingly sophisticated, informed, and selective. In fact, the postmodern sophistication of mass audiences—mass communication in a traditional sense still exists in certain circumstances such as major televised sporting events—has been used as a defense against a German law for consumer protection. The corresponding campaign and effects of this case are discussed in chapter 5.

Regardless of whether marketers see consumer audiences as intellectually mature or not, to achieve the objectives of an increased effectiveness in marketing communication and the recognition of marketing as a socially valuable practice, trust needs to be restored between marketers and their consumer audiences. Patrick Murphy et al. consider trust an “essential ingredient” in company-consumer marketing relationships
and conclude that absent a certain level of faith in marketing communication, “market transactions lead to distortions in the level of welfare generated by the market” (4-5).

Independent of the kind of appeal made to consumer audiences, trust is important to facilitate repeat transactions and long customer relationships.

Caveat emptor, or “buyer beware!” is a warning often cited to caution consumers to use their minds when evaluating product offerings due to a lack of proper warranty protection. This maxim also indicates consumer responsibility in communicative interactions in the marketplace. According to Wilbur Schramm, marketers need to ask themselves whether or not their adult consumer audiences have the intellectual maturity to evaluate commercial messages. Do they really? This chapter explores if there really is a need for picking a side of this dualism and offers an integrated approach in response.

In this chapter, the Cartesian dichotomy of mind and body is reviewed with regard to its influence on marketing practices. Dualistic characterizations of human beings’ sensory and cognitive reactions have derived from René Descartes’s work and dominate contemporary economic thought, including models of individualistic and selfish rationalism and instinctive behaviorism. However, there have been attempts in various disciplines absent marketing to rejoin these and similar polar opposites.

This chapter includes a survey of prior attempts to integrate dualisms, some of which revolve around the Cartesian mind-body dichotomy. The “integrated dualism” in marketing communication proposed in this dissertation shares certain aspects of these other approaches but is very distinct at the same time. Thus, a conceptual delimitation is necessary and offered below.
As I offer the term “integrated dualism,” I suggest that it refers to simultaneously addressing intellectually mature and immature audiences in marketing communication. The aim is to preserve the efficiency of managerial rhetoric and rhetorical tokens while allowing consumers deeply engaged in marketing communication to receive comprehensive arguments by redeeming those rhetorical tokens previously dispensed in advertising and other mediated commercial communication. Integration then is to be understood as strategic communication and message alignment across media addressing audiences of different interest levels. The term dualism reflects the separate yet parallel communication to consumer audiences, making separate emotional and rational appeals. This “integrated dualism” is deliberately not a holistic approach because modern remnants exist in this postmodern marketplace that must be addressed separately. Rather, “integrated dualism” offers marketing communication a chance at transitioning out of its modern frameworks into a practice attentive to consumer plurality.

On the basis of “integrated dualism” and with input of Friedrich Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, a concept of an “ideal marketer” is presented: The “golden rule” of under-promising and over-delivering is joined with the two fundamentally disparate consumer behavior models of utility maximization and unreflective reaction to herd animal instincts. Offering consumer audiences real and honest options to redeem rhetorical tokens has the potential to restore faith in marketing messages in the long run even if this practice may seem counterintuitive and self-destructive for marketing in the short term. In an international context, “attitudes of various publics about advertising are severely polarized” (Willis and Ryans 128) and a sustainable change from consumer suspicion to
consumer trust can only be achieved by providing public evidence (i.e., the identification of publicly accessible sources that confirm the claims made through managerial rhetoric).

The Cartesian Mind-Body Dichotomy in Modern Marketing Communication

The marketing communication and philosophical literature introduced thus far falls on either side of the Cartesian mind-body dichotomy (Descartes, Discourse and Meditations).

Writers on Marketing seem to divide into supporters of Pascal (1623-1662)—‘The heart has reasons that reason does not know’—and Descartes (1596-1650), who used only the method of mathematics and non-contradiction to establish truth. In other words, it is common to find writers in marketing focusing exclusively either on the rational or the emotional. (O'Shaughnessy and O'Shaughnessy 4)

The view of Blaise Pascal expressed in the quote above is not very different from René Descartes’s position.

René Descartes, too, clearly separated body and soul/mind and also granted that humans may demonstrate a passionate reaction to their environment without consultation of the mind: “we must believe that . . . all the movements present in us, in so far as they do not depend on thought, belong solely to the body” (“Passions” 329). Descartes divided the human being into mind and body and assigned specific attributes to each of these substances. “Thus we can easily have two clear and distinct notions or ideas, one of created thinking substance, and the other of corporeal substance, provided we are careful to distinguish all the attributes of thought from the attributes of extension” (Descartes, “Principles of Philosophy” 211). Even though Pascal and Descartes both view the rational and the emotional as discrete entities, O'Shaughnessy and O'Shaughnessy’s
assessment in *The Marketing Power of Emotion* is accurate that marketing literature tends to explore appeals to one or the other substance exclusively.

Modern rationalists view the economic human being as a utility maximizing and selfish individual. Consumer models in macro economics commonly presume that individuals have perfect knowledge of the marketplace in which they participate. According to rational choice theory, individuals are presumably aware of product alternatives and prices, have access to all distribution channels, and, most importantly, are conscious of their own needs in order to make a rational choice on which product at which price produces the highest utility. For instance, in *The World of Goods* Mary Douglas and Baron Isherwood discover that utility theory and the theory of consumption are too mathematical (since based in the theory of rational choice) to be helpful in their inquiry into collective choice and mutual influence (xxv).

Economics is a theoretical discipline. Mathematical models of the marketplace are helpful and accepted in this environment. Marketing on the other hand is a discipline with a much more practical orientation. Its research frequently revolves around immediate and measurable effects. Polling and observing provide the basis for statistical extrapolation in order to determine patterns in consumer behavior. As evidenced in the previous chapter, from Edward Bernays at the beginning of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century to Marc Gobé at its end, marketers have paid increasing attention to the power of emotional appeals and the conditioning of instinctive behavior. In his *Principles of Philosophy*, René Descartes addressed the epistemological role of emotions in human beings. He determined that people believe they are deriving actual knowledge emotions while they are really usually simply falling for an illusion of knowledge:
There remains sensations, emotions and appetites. These may be clearly perceived provided we take great care in our judgements concerning them to include no more than what is strictly contained in our perception - no more than that of which we have inner awareness. But this is a very difficult rule to observe, at least with regard to sensations. For all of us have, from our early childhood, judged that all the objects of our sense-perception are things existing outside our minds and closely resembling our sensations, i.e. the perceptions that we had of them. Thus, on seeing a colour, for example, we supposed we were seeing a thing located outside us which closely resembled the idea of colour that we experienced within us at the time. And this was something that, because of our habit of making such judgements, we thought we saw clearly and distinctly - so much so that we took it for something certain and indubitable. (Descartes, “Principles of Philosophy” 216)

The relationship between sensation and knowledge is evidenced in Descartes’s understanding of people’s God-given nature of a mind-body dichotomy. Frederick van de Pitte explains that this nature “teaches me correctly to avoid those things which cause pain, to seek out those things which provide pleasure, etc.” in form of an instinctive reaction to sensation, “but one must not use such perceptions to form conclusions about things outside us without having first examined them mentally with great care” (109). Friedrich Nietzsche admired Descartes’s conception of animals as machines. They are purely mechanistic in their reactions to their environments. Nietzsche supported this bold proposition and added intellectually immature human beings to the same group because of their loss of will power (“AC” 180). According to Nietzsche, a person’s will has been
reduced to an inevitable reaction to stimuli without any powers remaining to deliberate and come to reasonable conclusions.

These modern concepts of rationalism and behaviorism present a particular problem in postmodern society with its diverse consumer audiences. Some consumers apply rational choice while others react strongly and unreflectively to emotional appeals. These reactions may vary across brands and products or services. Marketers who privilege one approach over the other and pursue one practice of marketing communication exclusively are likely not to attract the other group of prospects and customers. Of course, marketers can attempt to determine elaboration likelihood of their particular target audiences based on product characteristics of demographics, but they are still limiting the potential of their communicative message reach. Driven by targets in return on investment (ROI) regarding marketing communication, reaching larger audiences and achieving greater response must be considered desirable. Thus, an “integrated dualism” approach of marketing communication which simultaneously addresses members of both types of consumers could increase effectiveness of commercial messages in terms of ROI. Concepts of “integrated dualism” have been developed in several contexts and disciplines. The following section provides an overview and conceptually frames and delimits the “integrated dualism” proposed in this dissertation.

**Integrating Concepts of Dualism**

In this dissertation, I propose an integrated approach of dualistic marketing communication. Before defining this concept of “integrated dualism,” it is necessary to introduce and discuss other works that have made an attempt at integrating dualism from
a number of perspectives and in various disciplines. This discussion will help frame the concept in regard to marketing communication and also distinguish it sufficiently from similar and very dissimilar theories.

What unites all the ideas behind the different “integrated dualisms” is the desire to unify, de-separate, combine, or make whole, two concepts traditionally perceived as diametrically opposed or mutually exclusive. Several, not all, of these dualisms refer to a Cartesian dichotomy of mind and body. The major positions of “integrated dualism” are discussed below. Forms of dualism occur in the disciplines of geography, fine arts, ethics and religion, and social economics. This section acknowledges each, in the order stated, and indicated how the dualistic phenomena are integrated.

Richard Hartshorne’s 1939 article on *The Nature of Geography* identified two distinct practices of geography. Hartshorne observed a continued controversy over systematic and regional approaches in the discipline. Systematic geography concerned itself with principles, generic concepts, and the construction of laws while regional geography focused on the study of unique cases and regional particularities. Both practices were usually present at any time in the history of geography; however, they were assigned varying significance and alternately privilege was given to one over the other (Hartshorne 633).

The last chapter of Richard Hartshorne’s work, entitled “Integrated Dualism” points to the necessity for the consideration of both approaches for the purpose of a higher aim of the discipline of geography. He regarded research from both areas as important contributions to the discipline in their own right; however, neither one was
inherently better than the other because neither was equivalent to the grand purpose of geography in itself:

In any case, neither construction of laws nor the description of the unique represents the purpose of geography, or of any other science. The purpose of geography is the same in both branches, the comprehension of the areal differentiation of the earth, and this purpose cannot be solved either by systematic studies alone nor by regional studies alone, but requires both approaches. . . . The mutual dependence of the two interconnected points of view in geography has been consistently maintained . . . to the present time. (Hartshorne 633-34)

Hartshorne’s view of a greater principle that joins two seeming opposites is similar to René Descartes’s treatment of the contribution of sensation and intuition to epistemology—separately, both substances support the same grander cause. In geography, difference in approach is most likely linked to personal interest of the researcher (Hartshorne 635). The “integrated dualism” in the area of consumer advertising that is the subject of this dissertation is a comparable attempt at identifying a common objective for two fundamentally different approaches to marketing communication. This common objective is the substantive truths communicated about a brand, product, or service.

In Presenting Women Philosophers, Cecile Tougas and Sara Ebenrech discuss Edna Dow Cheney’s “American Aesthetics.” They attribute Cheney’s unique approach at art to her familial situation. Her husband was an artist and her daughter a scientist which gave her insights into both substances of the Cartesian body-soul dichotomy. The authors
describe Cheney’s philosophy of fine art as a form of “integrated dualism” in which she has a “double vision” combining intuitive and scientific modes of analysis:

Cheney’s analytical method is necessitated by her conception of art as “twofold”:

Art is at once material and spiritual, ideal and real, subjective and objective, of thought and of feeling. Its unity is not oneness but “integrated dualism.” The whole is most important to Cheney . . . as an Hegelian whole that considers integration and differentiation at once. (Tougas and Ebenreck 45)

This separation of the artistic/intuitive and the scientific is similar to the Apollonian and Dionysian distinction Ruth Bolten-Köbl made in her Nietzschean analysis of music.

Cecile Tougas and Sara Ebenreck’s concept of an “integrated dualism” in Edna Cheney’s philosophy is basically stereophonic: two discrete channels communicate distinct content. Successful interpretation relies on the simultaneous acknowledgement of both information streams. Cheney attributes to science a narrow focus on isolated parts of any reality. Art’s method, on the other hand, “examines the parts of any reality not in themselves but in relation to a whole: ‘art must never forget the Unity in the difference’” (Tougas and Ebenreck 45). Even though more concerned with a Cartesian dualism, Cheney’s philosophy also parallels Richard Hartshorne’s distinction of geographical inquiry in applying the measure of specificity.

Paul Copan is concerned about ethics and describes Body and Soul: Human Nature and the Crisis in Ethics as having the potential to “make an excellent text book for classes in applied or medical ethics and certain metaphysical courses” (151). Copan claims the authors do not follow a Cartesian dualism of strict body and soul separation,
but rather take an integrated substance dualist position that is commonly found in the Thomist tradition:

Moreland and Rae are not Cartesian dualists, but Thomistic substance dualists. This more integrated dualism better supports the kind of *functional holism* familiar to us all—a deeply unified body-soul/mind interaction which eludes us in Descartes’s argumentation. (152)

Copan supports the notion that the existence of God as creator is a sufficient-enough indicator that interaction of the mind is possible with physical bodies outside one’s own.

The Thomist Tradition is characterized by this kind of integrative approach. Regarding the relationship of faith and reason, Brian Shanley writes: “Thomists can thus find something significant with in both sides of the evidentialist-fideist debate without occupying either position” (28). This indicates that in dualistic quandaries, it is not always necessary to align oneself fully with one side or the other. Indeed, one may adopt a position that recognizes both opposites simultaneously. I recommend a similar form of parallelism for marketing communication.

Charles Taliaferro observes elements of Cartesian dualism in Greek philosophy and in religion since early Judaism (226-27). He discusses post-dualist perspectives and arrives at an “integrative dualism” in a “postdualist theology of human nature” (Taliaferro 231).

Based on what he calls an “integrative dualism,” Taliaferro’s view of persons is a holistic one that emphasizes the integral wholeness of the embodiment of the mental in the physical. While metaphysically dualistic, integrated dualism denies
the extremes of that dualism, particularly the extreme privacy and metaphysical
independence of the mental. (Harris 103)

Taliaferro does not subscribe to the mutual exclusiveness of either side of the dualist
approach. Instead, he advocates a moderate position that allows for mind-body
interaction in theology. The view Taliaferro calls “integrative” almost eliminates the
element of dualism, though.

The final theory of “integrated dualism” addressed here appeared in the
*International Journal of Social Economics*. Bernard Reilly and Myron Kyj maintain that
in economics the perspective persists that “moral or social commitments are essentially
‘irrational’ behaviours” (3). The authors challenge the rationalist viewpoint of economists
that places self-interest not only at the top of motivators in the marketplace, but as the
only driving force. They claim loyalty, a sense of community, trust, and respect were
concepts largely disregarded in economics. This is against the nature of the individual,
who “requires social dependence” (Reilly and Kyj 4) because human beings are not self-
sufficient. Thus, the authors debunk the myth of the self-seeking, utility-maximizing
individual in postmodernity and consider efficiency as an accepted imperative ethically
problematic:

> The assumption that “rationality” must be identified with efficiency and
> maximization, must be challenged as morally and ethically bankrupt since it
> defines people and morals as small, isolated and independent of the environment,
> the community and the civilization. (Reilly and Kyj 8)

A completely efficient society would necessarily abandon its poor, unintelligent,
physically challenged or in any other way “inefficient” members. This must not happen
and does not reflect social reality, the authors claim. The complex individual pursues self-interest, but also acts responsibly toward others, such as his family and friends as an immediate community and also society on a larger scale. The authors subscribe to a social contract theory that emphasizes individual freedom and the maximization of the benefits of all its members.

The problem with dualism as described in Bernard Reilly and Myron Kyj’s article is that “in creating the dichotomy between the two elements, one side of the dichotomy becomes primary, and the other side becomes secondary or unimportant for the purpose of serious analysis” (10). The postmodern reality the authors observe requires an integration of the individual and community. Both are equally drivers of economic behavior of human beings. Self and others are determinants of economic activity and should be seriously considered by economists. According to the article, the concept of mutual exclusion is obsolete in the marketplace.

All forms of “integrated dualism” discussed in this section—except the one on geographical inquiry—address separate aspects and actions of single human beings that the authors attempt to integrate. The bridging of dualism occurs within the individual to address a more holistic human being. However, the problem of marketing communication as described above is not a lack of message plurality to single consumers, but the ignorance of groups of intellectually mature and immature consumers coexisting and engaging in osmotic group re-affiliation.

“Integrated Dualism” in Marketing Communication

John O'Shaughnessy and Nicholas O'Shaughnessy recognize the mind-body dichotomy that dominates contemporary marketing communication but they insist that
“when it comes to buying, neither can be ignored” (4). The essential proposition of this project is that widely effective marketing communication needs to align rational and emotional appeals, i.e., advertising following cognitive and behaviorist approaches. This alignment is not to be confused with a creation of holistic marketing communication in an Aristotelian sense that would combine appeals of logos, pathos, and ethos. Instead it is a parallel communication with diverse audiences that have varying elaboration likelihood and consequently respond strongly to different appeals.

According the Ronald C. Arnett and Pat Arneson, Martin Buber’s work “point[s] to the danger of extremes;” which he addressed in concept known as the “unity of contraries” (Arnett and Arneson 142). The objective of this section is to identify a way to unite such contraries as the following three: first, the standardization and adaptation of messages to diverse consumers; second, cost savings and an ethical recognition of audience plurality; and third, the Kantian universal ethical maxim and a fragmented marketplace through an approach of “integrated dualism” to marketing communication. In the spirit of the Chinese Yin and Yang, a marketing communication campaign is only truly complete if consumers are considered that behave either emotionally or rationally in a given purchase situation.

René Descartes can help us understand how this integration of marketing communication may be epistemologically understood:

A modal distinction can be taken in two ways: firstly, as a distinction between a mode, properly so called, and the substance of which it is a mode; and secondly, as a distinction between two modes of the same substance. The first kind of modal distinction can be recognized from the fact that we can clearly perceive a
substance apart from the mode which we say differs from it, whereas we cannot, conversely, understand the mode apart from the substance. Thus there is a modal distinction between shape or motion and the corporeal substance in which they inhere; and similarly, there is a modal distinction between affirmation or recollection and the mind. The second kind of modal distinction is recognized from the fact that we are able to arrive at knowledge of one mode apart from another, and vice versa, whereas we cannot know either mode apart from the substance in which they both inhere. For example, if a stone is in motion and is square-shaped, I can understand the square shape without the motion and, conversely, the motion without the square shape; but I can understand neither the motion nor the shape apart from the substance of the stone. (Descartes, “Principles of Philosophy” 213)

The application of this passage to an “integrated dualism” of marketing communication is metaphorical.

Here, substance refers to content such as truths about a brand, product, or service. Consumers can get to know these truths through either rational or emotional appeals (two modes of the same substance). The truths are the grander concept that unites both modes. Consumer audiences can never satisfactorily learn about the brand by appeals that lack substance. Therefore, consistent truths fundamentally connect the two modes of persuasion. As elaborated on previously, one mode of persuasion appears as an abbreviation of the other in modern managerial rhetoric. Ideally, either mode allows consumers to acquire the same knowledge about the brand.
For two reasons problems arise when these two modes do not correspond such as suspicion toward a company’s overall communicative actions. First, in most cases, consumer audiences initially encounter the abbreviated, emotional mode in form of rhetorical tokens. Some consumers seek to redeem these rhetorical tokens and demand evidence in the rational mode. Any inconsistency between the two modes or the complete absence of the rational mode is easily identified by well-informed and mature consumer audiences. Second, a company’s inability to offer a rational mode of persuasion consistent with the emotional indicates a probable disconnect between the truths communicated and the truths consumers will experience through other brand contact points such as actual product or service usage. In other words, they will discover that their purchase or other economic decision is inconsistent with what they later determine would have been a good (i.e., rational) choice. In this situation, buyer remorse sets in and the consumer potentially loses faith in the brand. Consumers may perceive such communication as deceptive, unethical, and sometimes illegal. Lack of ethics leads not only to reduced trust in the brand, but also in the marketing profession—the two symptoms of the ill of contemporary marketing communication that were explored at the onset of this dissertation and to which this chapter attempts to respond.

Immanuel Kant recognized the close relationship between ethics and law, as both present a form of obligation. Their difference lies in the source of the obligations’ motivations. While the obligation to comply with the law is generated, assessed, and judged externally, ethical obligations are motivated internally and evaluated individually (Kant, Lectures 63-65). Ethics then is “the imputability of free actions before the inner tribunal” (Lectures 8). Ethics is not based on common practice, or even best practice for
that matter, but an inner awareness of the social consequences of one’s actions and the acceptance of such responsibility. Kant’s rubric for assessment of one’s actions in regard to their ethicality is his Categorical Imperative. This objective principle states: “Act so that you can will that the maxims of your actions might become a universal law” (Lectures 299). Even though this law-like imperative is not coercive, in the marketplace its application will be judged not only internally as Kant suggested. Instead, consumer audiences or “the public” act as judge and jury as Edward Bernays pointed out. A discussion of ethics presupposes law-obeidience: in order to achieve the freedom to act on ethical duty, one needs to first fulfill one’s legal obligations (Kant, Lectures 76). John Kottman established that indeed most advertising is in compliance with legal provisions. Only seldom do companies deliberately communicate in violation of existing laws. Kantian ethics could produce “universal laws” that are lenient and adjusted to each company’s, but they must not be. The concept of the universal requires additional attention as it may appear contradictory to diversity presupposed in a postmodern marketplace.

Immanuel Kant’s Categorical Imperative aims at equality, not sameness: the universality Kant demanded was limited to the maxims of one’s actions, not the actions themselves. What was supposedly shared among all mankind were certain underlying principles such as respect for the other (equality), free choice (freedom), reason, and a common striving for happiness (the sum of all inclinations); Kant called the latter “the springs of morality” (Lectures 93). The key concept for marketing is that of equality, though. The Categorical Imperative suggests one person should not act against another in a way that would be unacceptable behavior (in terms of basic rights) against anyone else,
including the actor him-/herself. A basic application to advertising could read: if you do not want to be manipulated by inappropriate appeals or you are aware that an appeal is inappropriate to one particular consumer group, do not employ such manipulative technique against another group. Both intellectually mature and immature consumer audiences have an equal right to fair treatment in the marketplace.

In line with Edward Bernays integrative approach to public relations and IMC’s basic “desire to achieve better coordination, consistency, and synergy between the various tactical, external communication activities” (Schultz and Schultz 23), a practice of “integrated dualism” in marketing communication requires strategic alignment of messages along a significant substance. This “integrated dualism” is a possible alternative approach for advertisers who are aware of four things: first, a multiplicity of consumer audience cultures; second, the effects their commercial messages could have on these various cultures; third, their responsibility aiding in the preservation of this multiplicity of cultures; and fourth, their task to promote a brand, product, or service through cost and time saving messages. Don Schultz and Heidi Schultz emphasize the increasing financial responsibility that marketing communicators have. In order to facilitate trust and customer loyalty, this financial accountability to the corporation is complemented with an ethical responsibility to the consumer.

Marketers do not have the responsibility to actively promote or even just facilitate the intellectual maturation process of their consumer audiences. However, to be truly responsive to consumer needs, marketing communication should not exclude those that have demonstrated a vested interest and a request to redeem rhetorical tokens. Ethical marketing communication in postmodernity does not respond to consumer demands of
information and democratic participation in the marketplace with attempts to silence the requests by offering a pseudo-consensus. Instead, dialogue marketing should actually invite dialogue. Consumer dissent with company positions and brand, product, and service information that is communicated to the market should be welcomed as a way to engage suspicious consumers in a Habermasian attempt at “understanding”.

Providing consumers with abbreviated arguments can be considered a marketing service in a high-paced, multi-message environment. Managerial rhetoric allows consumers with low elaboration likelihood to quickly evaluate message relevance. In the spirit of equality, the corresponding service to consumers with high elaboration likelihood is the redeeming of rhetorical tokens and providing of arguments for the rational choice consumer. Redeeming rhetorical tokens makes both modes of persuasion (rational and emotional) ethical, because the arguments are consistent and supported by public evidence.

Chapter 1 examined a trend toward value judgments in advertising to avoid the issues of truth. Increasingly, spokespersons give their personal opinions about brands, products, and services. Consider, for instance, an actress that promotes a mattress with the claim that she knows she is more energetic during the day because of the better sleep she gets in her new bed. Such advertising seeks to suggest causal relationships between a product or service and a particular benefit without any means of verification for the consumer. In the example, nearly therapeutic claims are made that would require clinical studies if they were not a spokesperson’s opinion. Even if such a causal relationship is factually disproven, the advertisement could not be classified as false-to-fact because it only featured personal claims of opinion. Companies that seek communicatively active
consumers, those that are engaging brand, product, or service, need to offer verifiable public evidence with which consumers can consent or dissent. In the example above audiences cannot enter into a dialogue with the brand and confirm or challenge the brand’s advertising message. Since consumers that interact with a product or service they have purchased, interest, attention, and elaboration likelihood increase so that accessible public evidence can also help overcoming buyer’s remorse because the unreflective purchasing decision can be confirmed ex-post as a good (i.e., rational) one.

The task of a responsible campaign is to offer clear access points to public evidence for interested audiences. Unreadable small print qualifying claims in television advertisements to protect the company against consumers’ legal action does not count the same as any other form of concealed evidence. In order to be considered public evidence, additional information has to be publicly available. Other functional units of corporations have long since embraced an attitude of transparency for their stakeholders. Ethical marketing needs to follow suit. Friedrich Nietzsche has made several observations about the marketplace. These observations lead to the concept of an “ideal marketer” who could possibly turn the discipline around to increase effectiveness by decreasing consumer suspicion; thus, promoting marketing as a respected business function with visible social value.

The “Ideal Marketer” Based on Friedrich Nietzsche’s Zarathustra

Friedrich Nietzsche was no marketing professional; he was neither public relations counsel nor advertising agent. He was not even a philosopher of communication. One might wonder of what value his philosophical writings could possibly be to a project attempting to present a constructive alternative to contemporary
marketing communication. I.e., Marketing communication characterized by a modern commitment to either purely rational or emotional appeals, an alternative responsive to the postmodern historical moment and acknowledging marketers’ need for effectiveness of their messages and recognition of their trade. Returning to the thought of Nietzsche for answers to questions regarding postmodern social dynamics and consumer perceptions is warranted because there are significant differences between his work and that of Edward Bernays, whose modern theories have been established to linger at the core of contemporary marketing communication.

Friedrich Nietzsche’s own work established him as a fierce critic of modernity and modern ideals. Nietzsche critiqued the modern paradigm of progress as problematic. He viewed new developments as not necessarily elevation, improvement, or amplification (Nietzsche, “AC” 171). Rather, he complained that his contemporary writers foolishly equated new and modern (Nietzsche, “UBDS” 223). While writing out of a modern framework, his critical work lends itself to a postmodern interpretation because of his critical disposition.

Zarathustra’s experiences of the marketplace reinforce the dualistic view Friedrich Nietzsche held and whose integration is the subject of this chapter. After unsuccessfully attempting to reason with the people in the marketplace, Zarathustra observed what consumers really responded to: the buffoon that jokingly and recklessly entertained them by diminishing the skill of others without any substantiation (Nietzsche, Z 21). Later Nietzsche refers to this individual, whose primitive entertainment captured the attention of the masses in the marketplace and cost a decent person’s life, in an almost derogatory way as “menschlich” ‘human’ (Z 23). Zarathustra represents the rationalist approach, the
buffoon the emotional. Zarathustra’s frustration leads to his total renunciation of those that are merely human. Zarathustra failed to recognize that his appeals were not appropriate for all audiences.

Furthermore, Friedrich Nietzsche stated that an ideal marketing communication concept would enable consumers to develop trust in advertising messages: “Ich liebe Den, welcher goldene Worte seinen Thaten voraus wirft und immer noch mehr halt, als er verspricht” ‘I love him who scattereth golden words before his deeds, and always doeth more than he promiseth’ (Nietzsche, Z 17-18). Why is such an approach desirable? First, it legitimizes the practice of marketing communication as a promotional undertaking. Nietzsche encouraged promising to consumers, but demanded that brands deliver on these promises or even exceed them. Such an approach of under-promising and over-delivering cannot lead to unmet high expectations that cause the cynicism and suspicion with which many consumers approach contemporary marketing communication.

Second, Nietzsche continued, it is because someone (the marketer) who acts on this premise wanted his own downfall. However, this downfall is not to be understood in a deconstructive or rather destructive way. Instead, it is in line with Nietzsche’s “pessimism of strength” (“GT” 12) which seeks to replace obsolete structures of convention. Chapter 2 demonstrated how, according to Nietzsche, implementing new ideas requires tearing down the old ones to make room for visions to form into concrete and actionable realities. The same is true for marketing communication if the discipline wanted to overcome its stigmas of deception, manipulation, and untruthfulness and regain consumer trust and respect in the long term.
Es gibt einen Willen zum Tragischen und zum Pessimismus, der Zeichen ebenso sehr der Strenge als der Stärke des Intellekts (Geschmacks, Gefühls, Gewissens) ist. Man fürchtet, mit diesem Willen in der Brust, nicht das Furchtbare und Fragwürdige, das allem Dasein eignet; man sucht es selbst auf. Hinter einem solchen Willen steht der Muth, der Stolz, das Verlangen nach einem grossen Feinde.

A will to the tragic and to pessimism exists which is a sign of the intellect’s (taste’s, emotion’s, conscience’s) sternness and strength. With this will in one’s chest, one does not fear the horrible and questionable which is part of everything; one even seeks it out. Behind such will stand the courage, the pride, the desire for a great enemy. [Nietzsche, MAM 376-77]

No doubt, a change of marketing communication practices and a resulting change from consumer suspicion to consumer trust is a bold endeavor that takes courage in the face of potential failure. Nietzsche would demand from marketers who truly wanted to change their profession a commitment to ethical marketing communication, no matter how devastating the consequences might be. In the same way some companies are committed to the quality of their products, marketers should be committed to the quality of their messages.

Despite altruistic and philanthropic engagement of companies to serve the common good and despite a general move toward sustainability, corporate social responsibility and corporate citizenship, companies are usually not regarded as mortal members of society—not by consumers, owners, management, or employees. The idea of a company sacrificing itself for the overall advancement of others seems a strange
concept. Without the courage to walk marketing across the rope strung between past and future marketers will never know if they are crossing Nietzsche’s ravine or they could easily recover and improve from a Kantian stumble.

Marketing communicators have everything to lose in the short term by abandoning a manipulative managerial rhetoric consisting of unredeemable rhetorical tokens. Emotional differentiation of brands, products, and services is important in a time of converging characteristics of such goods. They have everything to gain in the long run by establishing enduring relationships with trusting customers. The following chapter combines the theory established in this and previous chapters with tangible action items for marketers. For this purpose, a particular campaign is reviewed to demonstrate how “integrated dualism” in marketing communication is implementable and distinct from current approaches to integrated marketing communication.
Chapter 5:
A Postmodern Praxis of Marketing Communication

“This final chapter provides a summary of the problems contemporary marketing communication is facing, namely consumer suspicion, disregard for marketing as a discipline, and decreasingly effective advertising messages. The particular case of Krombacher’s rainforest campaign exemplifies the implications of the dualistic approaches to consumer marketing communication. I offer “integrated dualism” as an alternative, postmodern praxis of marketing communication. This chapter closes with conclusions drawn from the interpretative inquiry to demonstrate the significance to the marketplace.

The Current Condition of Marketing Communication

Throughout the 20th century, observations of consumer suspicion toward marketing communication—and particularly advertising—have appeared consistently in various literatures (Borton 48; Ewen Captains 72; Kottman; O'Donohoe 92). This general distrust has rendered conventional marketing communication techniques increasingly ineffective (Elliott and Speck; Johnson). The economic consequences are rising costs
prompted by increased message volume and decreased consumer response. Socially, this clutter adds to consumers’ frustration with marketing communication as a discipline already burdened with a bad public reputation.

The change in the media landscape over the past century, such as the increase of choices in traditional mass media and the increase in public use of the internet, has offered consumers new information and entertainment choices. Today, consumers are seldom captive audiences due to a lack of alternative programming; instead selective exposure and selective attention are common given the abundance of available information. In fact, the internet has created an environment close to the model of “perfect information” that economists have worked with for years. Such market transparency makes product differentiation on the bases of distribution channels, pricing, or product features difficult for manufacturers and retailers of consumer goods. Marketing communication has become the primary area of differentiation.

The aim of marketing communicators has often been to compensate for converging product characteristics with a complicated communication of features, prices, and availability. This has happened to the extent that United States and European legislators have begun to regulate some aspects of marketing communication. Practices of price communication are a prime example of marketers’ attempts to cloud market transparency: the highly successful policy of “partitioned pricing” (Estelami 324; Morwitz, Greenleaf, and Johnson 453), which breaks down the final price into segments not all of which are properly disclosed to the consumer, leads to increased consumer spending to individuals’ computational errors (i.e., unwarranted differences in consumer price perception).
Such practice is not only illegal in the European Union as an unfair commercial practice (European Parliament, “Prices of Products Directive”; “Unfair Commercial Practices Directive”), but upon recognizing their false price perception consumers tend to make negative attributions toward the brand and the marketing profession (Ayres; Estelami 328; Lee and Han 37; Romani). Similarly, several states in the U. S. have passed laws on unit pricing to increase transparency at the point of purchase. Legal compliance is required to be able to discuss ethical actions (Kant, Lectures 76) that may help consumers to develop a different, more positive perception of marketing communication to allow a more trusting relationship between a brand and its customers and prospects.

There is an economic impact of consumer suspicion in terms of reduced loyalty and repeat purchase as well as hesitant responses to initial consumer marketing messages. Some even view advertising as the cannibalization of language (Postman, Technopoly 167-71) and psychological abuse of consumers (Ellul, Technological Society 406; Ewen, Captains 71). Consumers feeling manipulated, coupled with disappointed in their experience (Schultz 11) with the brand due to unmet expectations (Arnett and Arneson 14), are bound to become cynical, suspicious and distrusting of marketing communication. This loss of trust requires “changes in practice, not just efforts to change public perceptions” (Pollay and Mittal 112) to sustainably restore marketing communication effectiveness. A public relations campaign to create trust in communicative interactions in the marketplace (Li and Miniard) is insufficient.

Contemporary marketing communication needs to be responsive to demands of financial accountability. “More and more, advertising is perceived as an investment and
as such is held accountable for specific results” (Schultz, Tannenbaum, and Lauterborn 13). Companies place economic demands on marketing as a business function that did not use to be under strict financial scrutiny after a budget had been determined based on revenues or competitor spending and allocated cyclically or anti-cyclically.

In addition to economic accountability, marketing communication needs to answer calls for social responsibility. Consumers have become the “judge and jury” of corporate actions (Bernays, Chrystallizing 34) including marketing communication practices with the democratization of the marketplace. This democratization occurred in two steps. First, the affordability of printed communication coupled with the dismantling of fixed aristocratic social structures created a marketplace in which corporate decisions began to require public approval. This initial move toward consumer empowerment was not received well by many authors writing on public participation at the turn of the last century (Bernays, Chrystallizing 34; Lippmann, Public Opinion; Nietzsche, “UBHL” 320). This reservation was a result of marketers’ lack of faith in consumers’ ability to make good decisions, where good has been traditionally equated with rational. However, modernity has also produced the model of rational choice consumers. The dualistic nature of both viewpoints warrants closer examination.

A Dualistic View of Intellectual Maturity in the Marketplace

In an enlightened world view, consumers know what they need. They can express their needs in the form of wants. Integrated marketing communication presupposes such enlightened customers (Schultz, Tannenbaum, and Lauterborn 78). However, if consumers were entirely aware of their needs, would Wilbur Schramm have posed the ethical question of whether mass communication should address consumer wants or
needs (8)? Indeed, there exists a long history of what Immanuel Kant called “selbstverschuldete Unmündigkeit” ‘self-inflicted intellectual immaturity’ (“Aufklärung” 481), which indicates that not all people show the same level of sophistication at all times when it comes to engaging in public discourse such as marketing communication.

The concept of self-inflicted intellectual immaturity appeared in Immanuel Kant’s article developing an understanding of early Enlightenment. Intellectual immaturity is the dependence on others in situations that require public engagement of social issues and decision-making. While initially a matter of biological development of the brain, intellectual immaturity becomes self-inflicted once a person has achieved the capacity to reason yet refuses to do so out of habit/laziness or fear/cowardice (Kant “Aufklärung” 483). Achieving intellectual maturity then is a natural process toward a potentiality of reasonable interaction with others. Kant predicted that members of society who were previously intellectually suppressed could overcome their fears and habits to recognize their potential and act on their capabilities.

Enlightenment for Immanuel Kant was intellectual independence, not modern scientism or the formulaic application of “mechanistic tools” (“Aufklärung” 483). Kant appealed to public engagement as civic duty and denounced existing social power structures as a mere excuse for intellectual immaturity. According to Kant, the transition to intellectual maturity (the process of Enlightenment) had to be a slow and organic growth of society. Kant claimed revolutionary change would not result in a betterment for all (“Aufklärung” 484). Kant decided that people perceived the risk associated with intellectual maturity to be greater than it really was. He claimed that if people made
serious attempts at overcoming their habits and fears, Enlightenment was inevitable to society.

Friedrich Nietzsche’s character Zarathustra initially shared Immanuel Kant’s confidence in the intellectual maturity of a marketplace audience. Zarathustra quickly resigned from his hopes of dealing with an enlightened public. This resignation also Nietzsche’s other writings and both he and his character Zarathustra called into question the raison d’être of the public (Z 20; “UBHL” 319). Nietzsche regarded the intellectually mature individual as an “Übermensch” ‘overman’ and the path to maturity as much more dangerous than Kant declared (Z 16). According to Nietzsche, the transition from human to overman required martyr-like commitment (Z 17). Most members of the mass public did not possess the necessary dedication to the betterment of humanity, but were falsely consulted on their opinions (“UBHL” 320). Nietzsche observed with disgust that the mass public acted on herd instincts (Himmelmann, “Kant, Nietzsche und die Aufklärung” 35; Nietzsche, Z 16, 26; “JGB” 124; “UBHL” 319). While Kant saw the greatest chance for intellectual maturity in the mutual support of the group, Nietzsche believed only a select few could oppose the mainstream and become independent thinkers.

The difference between group and individual also becomes apparent in the variances in the ethics of Friedrich Nietzsche and Immanuel Kant. While Nietzsche called himself an immoralist (“GT” 17-19) and condemned Kant’s universal ethics as generalist nonsense (“AC” 177), both men shared a deep morality of amplification: Kant asks us to consider our seemingly insignificant actions globally, i.e., repeated geographically, and Nietzsche created relevance through his concept of eternal recurrence, i.e., temporal repetition (Simmel, “Nietzsche und Kant”). Nietzsche critiqued
Kant out of his specific historical moment and recognized that he could not completely
dissociate his thoughts and actions from his intellectual predecessor. He pointed out that
we may disagree with our traditions, but we cannot entirely divorce our heritage
(“UBHL” 270). What Nietzsche and Kant share is a critique of the public restrictions
specific to their times and the desire for intellectually mature, socially responsible
individuals (Bloch 162).

Friedrich Nietzsche’s pessimistic account of the mass public served as a critique
demanding constructive consequences to rectify this situation. Nietzsche was committed
to tragedy and through it saw his “pessimism of strength” as a chance for renewal of
anything lacking perfection (“GT” 12; MAM 376-77; “UBHL” 295-96). Edward Bernays
shared Nietzsche’s observations about the mass public as a passive group. However,
Bernays’s practical approach to marketing communication and public relations
constitutes an abuse of Nietzsche in the sense that he sought to take advantage of public
disinterestedness rather than offering a path out of widespread intellectual immaturity.

Edward Bernays noticed an increased attention to public opinion that had recently
developed when he wrote on public relations early in the 20th century (Chrystallizing 34).
For Bernays, responding to public participatory demands was a mere necessity to
accommodate continued sales. Bernays believed consumers were incapable of making
reasonable decisions (Ewen PR! A Social History of Spin 100) and as a consequence,
making people believe they were in agreement with the solutions that companies offered
through their marketing messages was the only objective. His proposed public relations
practice involved strategically integrating multiple message channels by aligning
messages across media in form of a “managerial rhetoric” (Sproule, “Managerial Rhetoric”).

Michael Sproule understands managerial rhetoric to transmit “packaged ideology” (“Managerial Rhetoric” 472); in fact he claims its “controlling concepts are ideology, entertainment, and professionalized channels” (“Managerial Rhetoric” 474). Managerial rhetoricians presuppose a mass culture characterized by “superficiality, homogeneity, reproducibility, lack of durability, and lack of originality” (Benhabib 3) in order for their appeals—grounded in entertainment and emotions of group affiliation—to work. Walter Lippmann and Gerard Hauser’s critiques of public opinion polling suggest that consumer perceptions are too faceted to be easily homogenized statistically (Hauser 32; Lippmann, Phantom 23).

Managerial rhetoric is highly enthymematic. This form of rhetoric relies on shared understanding in the marketplace and requires consumers to use “common meanings to fill in the blanks” (Mayhew 13). Leon Mayhew calls the “brief bits of information” (14) that marketers often provide rhetorical “tokens” (48). These argumentative fragments suggest that a logical syllogism exists, or at least the evidence to further support the claims made in advertisements and other forms of marketing communication. Too often, however, companies do not redeem their rhetorical tokens and disappoint interested consumers. Such tokens are hollow words and promote consumer cynicism toward marketing messages.

On the other hand, rhetorical tokens fulfill an important function in the high-paced multi-message environment in the information age that may easily overwhelm consumers (Hauser 2; Lippmann, Phantom 14, 29). Mayhew supports the idea of
communicative efficiency when time is one of the most significant “constraints on everyday communication” (48). Not all economic transactions warrant high levels of rhetorical elaboration. Determining which purchase decisions are may rely only on rhetorical tokens and which ones require a more complete argument depends on the brand, the product, the consumer, and token, i.e., the overall rhetorical situation of the purchase. Elaboration likelihood changes just as easily as these constituents of the rhetorical situation can change.

Walter Lippmann distinguished between spectators and actors, claiming that membership in either group was not fixed (Phantom 100). People may have higher interest in one issue, in which they actively think about the issue, participate in public discourse about it, and have a relevant opinion on the topic. However, they may also have low interest on another issue, give the issue little thought, and make ad-hoc decisions if they had to present their opinions. Thus, depending on the rhetorical situation, the same person can be intellectually mature and rational in one purchase decision and intellectually immature and impulsive in another.

John Shaughnessy and Nicholas O’Shaughnessy (4) as well as Bernard Reilly and Myron Kyj (4) point out that most of the marketing literature has yet to recognize this dualism. Typically, economic research and marketing research in particular falls on either side of the Cartesian mind-body dichotomy and concentrates exclusively on either rational or reactive consumer behavior. In essence, contemporary positions in marketing are not dualistic, but rather constitute competing monistic views.

Postmodern society is characterized by competing narratives regarding rational and instinctive human beings. A postmodern praxis of marketing communication needs to
take into account these existing narrative structures and recognize advertising audiences as individuals grounded in traditions. The postmodern era is not monolithic; people are not homogeneous masses or individuals living in isolation from each other and their heritage. To effectively communicate with their consumer audiences, marketers need to acknowledge the parallel existence not only of both theoretical approaches to communicating with these respective audiences, but also the unpredictability of their audience members’ intellectual maturity.

I propose sending parallel messages with different appeals to audiences of different levels of intellectual maturity. This approach may not work for all forms of marketing communication, but should be considered for the kind of consumer advertising that is most cost intensive and produces most consumer distrust and suspicion: low-involvement, high investment purchases that can easily create buyer’s remorse or post-purchase dissonance when the consumer later considers the purchasing decision as irrational. A consumer with initially low elaboration likelihood becomes intellectually mature at that moment and searches for rational justifications of the previous purchase decision. This is why the parallel messages need to be integrated in terms of content.

One of the basic stages of integrated marketing communication is a coordination of message content (Schultz and Schultz 23). Consumers can learn about a brand, product, or service through a number of contact points (Schultz, Tannenbaum, and Lauterborn 51). The less contradictory consumers’ experiences are, the clearer their images of the brand, product, or service will become. Brand contacts include word-of-mouth or actual product experiences; in terms of strategic communication, coordination
should not just occur across media, but across target audiences of varying levels of intellectual maturity.

In a practice of integrated dualism, advertisements as valuable rhetorical tokens should be backed by easily accessible, complete arguments. These complete arguments probably have to be delivered through other media due to the constraints of time and cost advertisers are faced with in traditional broadcast media. Some examples already exist: manufacturers of pharmaceuticals or cosmetics refer the viewer of television commercials to an ad in a particular magazine or newspaper, car commercials refer to the company website, or radio ads provide telephone hotlines. The importance, however, is not simply cross-media consistency. Rather, the consumer who is not able or willing to make a purchasing decision based on the argumentative fragments available in form of a rhetorical token needs to be able to find information substantially more involved and supported.

Intellectually mature consumers will only attribute positive ethos to marketing and brands if they can obtain public evidence in support of the initial advertising claims. Since consumers can move between the roles of actors and spectators in marketplace communication and economic interaction, marketers must pay close attention to the consistency and coherence of messages. Database technology can support such efforts but cannot replace the content of genuine messages.

Integrated dualism allows marketers to invite wider audiences into the commercial conversation. In the long run, in integrated dualistic approach may reinstate consumer trust in redeemable rhetorical tokens making advertising more cost effective.
At the same time, integrated dualism could get intellectually mature consumer audiences more even more engaged in the brand.

Unfortunately, as the following case demonstrates, marketing and legislation are still in an either-or dualistic division. The advertising campaign of German brewing company Krombacher illustrates the continued clash of rationalist and behaviorist worldviews both among marketers and government branches. I assert that better integrating these dualistic positions could have reduced the brewers some legal and ethical difficulties with their campaign.

**Krombacher’s Rainforest Campaign**

In 2002, the German brewing company Krombacher launched its economically most successful advertising campaign in company history. However, its cause marketing campaign was almost stopped completely because of accusations of moral coercion. These sections present the campaign and its economic and environmental impact, the competitors’ objections, immediate and negative judicial responses, and the final absolution by Germany’s highest court. This case is a prime example of the ongoing dispute over rationalism versus behaviorism in the marketplace and the intellectual maturity of consumers.

The brewery’s message in the advertisements was simple: buying one case of Krombacher beer would save one square meter of rainforest. Yet, the commercial argument and its implications turned out to be more complex. What follows is an overview of the marketing communication strategy and implementation in the year 2002.

The soccer World Cup is traditionally a time of increased beer consumption among television audiences in Germany. Brewing companies compete fiercely for market
share during this time. Since even non-sports fans regularly watch the games, these
telecasts are highly attractive for advertisers. The media landscape nearly resembles that
of the mid 20th century, when television entertainment choices were few. Thus,
advertisers can reach large consumer audiences with each commercial slotted before,
during, or after the games and related broadcasts. And since these international soccer
matches are shown in most households, restaurants, bars, clubs, and other venues,
consumers become even more captive audiences. For the duration of the soccer world
cup, it is almost impossible to consistently avoid television coverage and the commercials
tied to it.

The approach Krombacher chose was one of classical cause marketing. In cause
marketing, the purchase of a product is directly tied to the support of a good cause,
typically in form of financial sponsorship. In this case Krombacher promised to forward a
portion of its profits from beer sales during the campaign period to charitable
organizations supporting the African rainforest. The proclaimed goal was to protect one
million square meters of rainforest with the donations; one case of beer would generate
enough contributions for the preservation of one square meter of wildlife and vegetation
of the endangered region.

In order to present its message, Krombacher hired television personality Günther
Jauch, a renowned sportscaster and talk show host. As a spokesperson, Jauch combined
investigative sincerity with a passion for sports, an ideal recipe for a campaign that
sought to address a serious topic during a major sporting event. The campaign was
presented under the motto “act and enjoy” (Barcikowski and Brinkmann 94) to suggest
that people may do good while taking pleasure in sports and drink. As this case shows,
the close connection between consumption and support would become problematic for Krombacher during the course of the campaign.

Overall the marketing campaign was very successful. With an annual marketing budget of 50 million Euros, Krombacher achieved the largest sales volume in company history. Output went up by more than eight percent and Kromacher attributed this success largely to the rainforest campaign (Weihrauch, “Ausstoß”). Indeed the campaign proved so successful that it was repeated in 2003 and, slightly modified, in 2006.

The World Wildlife Fund as central benefactor of the rainforest donations regarded the anticipated one million Euros from Krombacher to be an important contribution to their mission to preserve vegetation and wildlife in the African rainforest. Throughout the campaign period, the goal of sales tied to the protection of ten million square meters was easily reached and donations were made accordingly. However, not everyone was thrilled with Krombacher’s rainforest campaign and its economic and ecological success.

Inside, a magazine for the beverage industry, suspected that the campaign might have been too successful for some of Krombacher’s competitors. Krombacher’s PR department also interpreted legal actions against its campaign as motivated by competitor envy of its success (Weihrauch, “Einstweilige Verfügung”). When about three quarters of the project goal were reached, competition surveillance groups filed complaints against Krombacher in a local court, making a motion to stop the campaign (Barcikowski and Brinkmann 95; Taron). Krombacher’s opposition cited unfair commercial practices/competition and claimed that the campaign violated two major stipulations of the law: first, advertising has to be transparent as to its commercial nature. The accusers claimed
that Krombacher’s commercial advertisements did not make sufficiently clear to consumers what percentage of the purchase price of a case of beer would go to charity and how this money would actually be used. Second, and more importantly, Krombacher was accused of putting moral purchasing pressure on consumers. In theory, consumers were forced to purchase the particular brand of beer, because Krombacher failed to clearly explain alternative ways to support the good cause. Following this line of thinking, purchasing a competitor’s product would make consumers feel like they were hurting the rainforest.

Moral Coercion—Legal and Ethical Objections to Cause Marketing

The then valid version of Germany’s law against unfair competition stated that companies acting indecently to gain a competitive advantage could be faced with injunctive relief—restoring the prior status quo—or even payment of damages (§1 “UWG”). Exerting force on consumers to buy a product constitutes such indecent action. Krombacher’s accusers argued that the television spots placed unacceptable moral sales pressure on consumers. The primary point of contention was that Krombacher did not sufficiently highlight alternatives to support the African rainforest other than purchasing the particular brand of beer. Supposedly, consumers saw the only way to make a contribution to support the rainforest was in buying beer from Krombacher.

Furthermore, selecting a competitor’s brand—which did not announce a contribution to a good cause tied to the purchase of its product—could be effectively considered boycotting Krombacher’s good cause. Consumers might feel obligated to purchase the Krombacher brand in order not to be viewed as anti-environmentalist or to calm their conscience as having made a contribution without making a separate donation.
Krombacher customers could convince themselves that they did not have to donate 10 € to a charitable organization, but they could spend the money on beer and still show support or, as Krombacher phrased it: “handeln und genießen” ‘act and enjoy’ (Weihrauch, “Projekt 2003”) at the same time.

The local courts agreed and interpreted the law as prohibiting “any combination of selling goods with promoting good causes if the way of support is not transparent to the consumer and/or the purchase is the only possibility to support the project” (Barcikowski and Brinkmann). This is similar to laws on sweepstakes, for instance. In most countries, tying an entry in the contest to a purchase constitutes an illegal form of lottery because people might be forced into buying the product when they really only want the prize. The courts viewed the rainforest case as a similar situation and ruled that Krombacher was indeed imposing moral purchase constraints on consumers.

As a result certain television spots previously aired could no longer be used. The campaign was allowed to continue under the condition that Krombacher would clearly identify alternative ways to support the cause. While complying with the court’s ruling, Krombacher challenged the decision all the way up to Germany’s Federal Court. Krombacher’s main argument was that the law was outdated and that consumer audiences had intellectually matured to the point where they were too smart to be forced into any purchase decision. In a comment, Krombacher wrote:

Was die Sache selbst angeht, so beziehen sich die Anträge gegen das Krombacher Regenwald-Projekt auf eine mehr als zehn Jahre alte Rechtssprechung. Mittlerweile hat die Rechtssprechung sich geöffnet und gesteht auch Firmen ein wesentlich größeres Recht auf freie Meinungsäußerung, auch im Sinne der

Concerning the issue at hand, the motion against the Krombacher rainforest project refers to legislation more than ten years old. In the meantime, legislation has become more liberal and also grants companies a significantly greater right to free speech, including advertising. Also, the image of consumers has changed in legislature. The consumer today is enlightened, intellectually mature, and independent in his judgment. In his purchase decision he can very well analyze advertising messages and based on this analysis make a rational purchase decision. And here, the Krombacher brewery has always argued openly and honestly. “Sure, they want to sell beer,” says Günther Jauch in one of his television spots, “but why not? If this does something for the environment, then I really like it.” Correspondingly, Günther Jauch commented on the motions: “The protection of the rainforest is an important topic to all. Protective measures should
not fail because of objections that move the essential out of sight.” (emphasis added, Weihrauch, “Einstweilige Verfügung”)

Only two years after the injunction, German law on unfair commercial practice was revised to reflect the corresponding European Union directive. In 2006, the previous two rulings against Krombacher were overturned and the campaign was declared lawful by the German Federal Court (Janke). This dissertation is not an attempt at determining whether or not cause marketing is ethical or should be legally permitted. However, this lawsuit and the two diametrically opposed positions clearly indicate the continued dualism in marketing communication based on modern conceptions of consumers’ intellectual maturity.

**Dualism in Light of the Krombacher Campaign**

In the Krombacher case, competition surveillance authorities and regional courts subscribed to a consumer image that emphasized intellectual immaturity. They viewed consumers as easily susceptible to messages containing emotional appeals—as though Krombacher’s advertisements were “magic bullets” (Smith and Hunsaker 24; Sproule, “Progressive Propaganda”), consumers must have felt pressured into purchase decisions over which they had no rational control.

Krombacher on the other hand presupposes enlightened consumers—at least in responding to the above accusations—who act completely rationally and do not easily fall for emotional appeals in advertising. The brewers point to free speech in advertising and maintain that their good cause had been sufficiently transparent through the company and partner websites and that support alternatives were indeed available through a hotline and wire transfers to the World Wildlife Fund (WWF).
Basically, this is a discussion over the redemption of rhetorical tokens. Krombacher argues it could at any time back up its claims about protecting one square meter of rainforest with the proceeds from one case of beer (transparency) and that informed consumers could easily find another way to donate. According to Krombacher, no consumer had to rely on the advertisements alone. However, the competition surveillance groups argued that because the way to redeem the rhetorical tokens that were the television advertisements was not clearly announced, consumers had no rational choice in the matter and had to respond to the emotional appeal established with the good cause.

Both positions seem to have some merit. Throughout this chapter, theory has been presented that supports the view of consumers as impressionable, instinctive, and weak (Bernays, Chrystallizing; Nietzsche, Z) or the view that consumers are rational and well-informed decision-makers (Habermas, Evolution; Smith; Weihrauch, “Einstweilige Verfügung”). In one worldview, consumers are in need of protection from companies by the legislator. In the other, their cognitive capabilities allow them to easily identify lie and fraud and benefit from interaction with companies through free marketing communication.

In most cases, court rulings suggest a black-and-white environment. Even with multi-faceted viewpoints in the courtroom and minority dissents among judges, what is communicated and reported are decisions such as guilty or not guilty, lie or truth, sentence or pardon. I have been suggesting a need for an integrated dualism in marketing communication. Here, Krombacher is guilty and not guilty at the same time: in a
postmodern society you will find both intellectually mature and immature consumers and affiliation with these groups is not permanent.

Environmentally conscious consumers that are aware of the condition of the rainforest and want to find ways to support it may make the effort to see how Krombacher donates the money it collects through the campaign. They might decide that the kind of support Krombacher promises warrants the purchase Krombacher in addition to or in lieu of continuing to donate through wire transfers directly to the WWF or other organizations. There are also beer connoisseurs who would only switch brands for a really significant reason, if at all. They may look for reasons to rationalize a switch of brands against their better taste and find Krombacher’s commitment is worth the switch, or not.

For a number of consumers, purchasing beer does not warrant a process of high elaboration. In the beverage industry, choices are often made on the basis of price or other small promotional incentives. Even the WWF project manager Dirk Barth agreed:

Ich kann nicht verstehen, wie man etwas dagegen haben kann, wenn durch eine Werbekampagne zusätzliche Gelder in den Naturschutz fließen. Sonst wäre die Summe wie bei anderen Brauereien wahrscheinlich für irgendwelche Schlüsselanhänger oder ähnlichen Werbeschnickschnack verpulvert worden.

I cannot understand how people can oppose additional funds flowing to environmental protection because of an advertising campaign. Otherwise the sum would have probably been wasted on key chains and other promotional bric-à-brac like with the other brewing companies. (Weihrauch, “Einstweilige Verfügung”)
These consumers make a decision based on tokens provided in the television commercials. Providing a reference to an easily accessible host of public evidence in support of the claims made could have helped those who felt indeed morally pressured into buying the product. Legally as well as ethically, this could have kept the brewing company out of arguments. The fact that the courts did not object to cause marketing in general but only to the way the messages were presented was a clear indicator that this case is a matter of marketing communication rather than other functions of marketing (i.e., cause marketing as such was not called into question).

**Conclusions and Implications**

The Krombacher case demonstrated dualistic viewpoints in the marketplace and illustrated the theoretical conversations from chapters two through four of this dissertation. The moral of this story is manifold.

First, change in the philosophy of marketing communication is vital to the discipline. The problems in marketing communication are genuine—consumer suspicion and message saturation are linked to communicative ineffectiveness in the marketplace. A new philosophy of marketing communication needs to be responsive to a postmodern historical moment. Audiences are too diverse, not just demographically but also in terms of their intellectual maturity, to blindly accept any fabricated consensus that marketers may try to impose on them through means of managerial rhetoric.

Second, ethical and economic interests overlap for marketing communication. By following the revised praxis of marketing communication suggested, marketers would be able to do the “right” thing and the “profitable” thing which are otherwise often seen as mutually exclusive. A long-standing desire for public recognition of marketing as a
socially beneficial discipline has been established as has the economic advantage of customer loyalty, expressed through repeat purchases and grounded in consumer trust in a brand. Companies hold marketing communication financially accountable and consumers demand social responsibility of the business function. No longer do these two goals seem to be incommensurate with each other. When consumers first insisted on becoming active members of marketplace, marketers only knew to resist and manipulate consumers into pseudo consensus. Today, participants of the marketplace working together on a Habermasian “understanding” (Habermas, Evolution 1) bears the potential economic advantage of long-term consumer-brand relationships through consumer confidence.

Third, the modern marketplace may not have been as homogeneous as it first appears from a distance. While Immanuel Kant worked in universal categories and envisioned the enlightenment of entire societies, Friedrich Nietzsche, Edward Bernays, and Walter Lippmann struggled with the diversity they observed at turn of the last century. For the first time, postmodern thought allows acknowledging the coexistence of two diametrically opposed interpretations of the marketplace and its consumers. The rational choice consumer models on the one hand and instinct-driven consumers in a behaviorist model could not be more different. However, they both exist and they both make significant contributions to marketing. Marketers should not feel forced to choose sides, but rather should embrace the dualism of these models. The immediate goal is not to reconcile positions or to identify who is right or wrong. The current historical moment warrants working with both.
Fourth, authors of marketing literature have developed and proven successful a set of marketing communication tools corresponding to the side of the Cartesian mind-body dichotomy with which they agree. Their successful practices need to be combined in an integrated dualism. Marketing communication needs to produce appeals to consumer actors and spectators in the marketplace with consistent messages. Rational and emotional appeals should be coordinated because affiliation with either consumer group is not permanent. Rhetorical tokens are truncated ways of communicating with the potential to expedite message transmission, but companies need to provide their interested customers the opportunity to redeem them in order not to create unmet high expectations resulting in buyer’s remorse, consumer suspicion, and cynicism.

The praxis of integrated dualism in marketing communication is quite dissimilar from an Aristotelian rhetoric which sought to combine appeals of logos, pathos, and ethos in a holistic fashion. Postmodern in nature, this praxis recognizes fundamental modern remnants in the contemporary marketplace. Predicting in which direction society will develop from here is impossible. It is not directionless but rather pulling in different directions. Which one, if any, will prevail may only be assessed ex-post, i.e., in retrospect of the developments of this age.

However, there are several things marketers can do to respond to current communicative needs. First and foremost, attempts to use marketing communication in a deceptive manner to suggest product and service difference promise only short-term success. Partitioned pricing, paid subjective testimonials, and inconsistent reasoning by example have been identified as communicative practices violating rhetorical conventions. Nietzsche called such violation of convention “lying” (“WL” 877-78). Even
if companies tell the truth by legal standards—which they usually do to avoid penalty (Kottman)—this truth is too often grounded in personal opinions or claims are qualified in small print on the television screen. Rhetorical tokens are highly enthymematic and rely on consumers to fill in the gaps. An omission that leads consumers to misinterpret a message is lying in the Nietzschean sense, and is likely to be condemned by consumers as an unethical act when they discover that they have been manipulated to act under false pretenses. In order to avoid suspicion, communicators in the marketplace need to use rhetorical tokens ethically.

Rhetoric is concerned with persuasion in situations where decisions need to be made without absolute certainty. For consumers, these are often decisions made about future purchases. Consumers cannot be sure which product among competitors will serve them best in the end. They cannot be sure that any product will meet their wants and fully satisfy their needs. Even the most interested consumers cannot know all there is to know about marketplace offerings and their personal futures. Since consumers are faced with many purchasing decisions daily—consider a trip to the grocery store and how often a consumer has to make the decision not to buy products on display—advertisements can constitute a true service to consumers. Advertisements can compress the arguments for one or against another product. If consumers reflect on their purchase because of their product experience or for any other reason, they will attempt to determine if the arguments presented in form of rhetorical tokens prove true. If they do not or if no public evidence is available to support the sketchy argument, consumer disappointment may set in.
Fifth, integrated dualism is not the same as integrated marketing communication (IMC). Both approaches share the element of message coordination. However, IMC has developed a strong database focus and seeks functional and financial integration. Integrated dualism in marketing communication is not concerned with customer relationship management—even though customer relationships are its objective. IMC and integrated dualism are not mutually exclusive but they are not codependent either. Integrated dualism is not practice but praxis that requires a grounding in the philosophy of marketing communication, allowing for parallel rhetorics in the marketplace.

Friedrich Nietzsche wrote: “Wo die Einsamkeit aufhört, da beginnt der Markt; und wo der Markt beginnt, da beginnt auch der Lärm der grossen Schauspieler und das Geschwirr der giftigen Fliegen” ‘Where solitude ends, there begins the market; and where the market begins, there also begins the noise of the great actors and the buzzing of the poisonous flies’ (Z 65). Nietzsche believed that all that the public could respond to were great acts, not actual greatness. Contemporary consumers have the tools of the information age and often the intellectual maturity to defraud those actors that present only bells and whistles. Marketers need to continue to scatter golden words, but they also need to deliver even more (Nietzsche, Z 17-18). Perhaps, over time, consumers will stop viewing marketers as poisonous flies and begin to view the service that marketing communication can provide in an age of product and information overload.

Significant change can only be achieved if marketers are willing to cross the ravine of complete marketing failure on the high rope of humanity (Nietzsche, Z 16) and risk the survival of discipline in order to emerge victoriously. The required commitment could produce renewal, not incremental change. Sustainable improvement both in the
area of economic effectiveness as well as recognition of marketing as a socially valuable discipline is only possible if consumers can identify manipulative advertising as the exception to the norm of ethical marketing communication.

The ideal marketing communication environment is difficult to attain, but the discipline must set “big hairy audacious goals” (Collins and Porras 91) for itself in order to motivate changes noticeable to consumers. An image campaign for advertising will not be sufficient: a substantial and visible change in marketing communication philosophy and practice is required.
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