Transcending Private Friendships to Public Hearts: Implications of Interracial Friendships for Public Life

Danielle L. Blackburn

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TRANSCENDING PRIVATE FRIENDSHIPS TO PUBLIC HEARTS:
IMPLICATIONS OF INTERRACIAL FRIENDSHIPS FOR PUBLIC LIFE

A Dissertation
Submitted to the McAnulty College and
Graduate School of Liberal Arts

Duquesne University

In Partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

By
Danielle Blackburn

May 2010
TRANSCENDING PRIVATE FRIENDSHIPS TO PUBLIC HEARTS:
IMPLICATIONS OF INTERRACIAL FRIENDSHIPS FOR PUBLIC LIFE

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Approved March 31, 2010

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ABSTRACT

TRANSCENDING PRIVATE FRIENDSHIPS TO PUBLIC HEARTS:
IMPLICATIONS OF INTERRACIAL FRIENDSHIPS FOR PUBLIC LIFE

By

Danielle Blackburn

May 2010

Dissertation supervised by Janie Harden Fritz, Ph.D.

An increasingly multicultural society presents both challenges and opportunities to the public sphere. These challenges are frequently answered with calls for diversity and inclusion. However, this project suggests that interracial friendship overcomes the inherent limitations of diversity and inclusion and is therefore a more desirable alternative with which to enter the public sphere. This project explores the phenomenon of friendship and the particular notion that interracial friendship is critical to developing and disciplining our public hearts.

While long standing philosophical conceptions and more recent social science perspective of friendship are examined, friendship is conceptualized here using Emerson’s notion of “truth” and “tenderness.”
ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I owe a tremendous amount of gratitude to Janie Harden Fritz, who directed my dissertation. Her unwavering commitment and enthusiasm for this project were more than I hoped for, but not more than I needed.

I also want to thank Elijah Blackburn who patiently waited for me to finish “one more thing.” The answer to your question, “Are you done yet” is finally yes.

Finally, I want to thank my grandmother, Mary Blackburn, who didn’t make it to the end. I’ll miss her for the rest of my life, but I will always be grateful for the faith, character, and inspiration that she left with me.
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Chapter One

Friendship, Race, and Public Hearts

This project will explore the notion that interracial friendships, both their existence and lack thereof, can present implications into our public lives. What this thesis hopes to provide is a general understanding of how friendships impact our daily lives and more specifically the possibility that cross-race friendships while providing texture to our personal lives can also inspire, inform, and transcend to our public hearts.

This paper does not pretend to achieve the goal of a grand theory. The project does, however, draw upon a number of theorists, scholars, and philosophers to sketch out a framework of how friendship is constituted within our daily lives and how those friendships influence our actions as we negotiate the public sphere. Inherent in this exploration is the role of communication first in creating or deterring the private friendships and then in how we use these relationships publicly.

This project will attempt to address one of the challenges we face in discussions of friendship, which is how to think of it in terms that allow us to appreciate both the personal significance of our social engagement with our friends and the morally significant dimension of that engagement. Some commentators have suggested that recent moral philosophy makes this task difficult, since it focuses on distinctions between activity in the personal sphere of life and the impersonal demands of morality. The central question of this thesis then is can the moral challenges of interracial relations be addressed through the support of our private friendships.
Friendship is an appealing model for the moral life, perhaps because it honors our experience (Lynch, 2005). So much of our life is a history of our friendships. Still we are not accustomed to think of the moral life as friendship—we are not even accustomed to think about friendship as moral (Wadell, 1989). But maybe we should. If so much of who we are is the handiwork of our friends, and if the good in which we need to be transfigured is one we do not grasp for but receive in relationships with others, then we need to give careful attention to how friendships figure in the moral life.

The first chapter of this project will introduce some foundational material related to the overriding themes. First it is necessary to consider with an increasingly diverse population why it is significant to concentrate primarily on black/white relations. A review of some significant communication research validates that this emphasis is warranted and rich with potential.

The chapter will proceed by considering the concept of friendship within a historical and philosophical context. Here a brief introduction to relevant scholarship centered on friendship will lay the groundwork for future chapters that will explore the subject matter with more breadth and depth. Finally, this chapter will provide a summary of upcoming chapters as well as the reasoning for the order and content of each chapter.

**Studying Interracial Communication**

Existing research and discussions of interracial communication has given a hyper visibility to white American/black American relationships (Wilson, 1996). This project, too, will primarily examine issues relevant to black/white friendships. While insights on Latino, Asian American, and Native Americans are important, the relationship between blacks and whites in our culture is, because of the far-reaching economic effects of
slavery and century-long legal constraints of segregation, by far the association with the oldest and fullest history.

Also research has found that racial distinctions are most clearly pronounced during black/white associations; Quinllian and Campbell (2001) find that “race is less of a barrier to friendships between whites, Asian, and Hispanics than it is among whites and blacks.” Even young children (ages 5-12) express same-race bias for friends (Graham and Cohen, 1997), and the propensity to select same-race friends increases with age (Hallinan and Teixeira, 1987).

Additionally, to some interpersonal scholars, interracial and interpersonal communication are separate and distinct communicative events; they argue that interracial interaction occurs only when race is a salient characteristic for the participants in the encounter and suggest that in many close personal relationships race ceases to matter (Orbe & Harris, 2001).

Houston takes a less idealistic view. She suggests that because racial ideologies are central to the organization of the U.S. American social order at this historical moment, every face-to-face encounter involving individuals from groups socially defined as “racially” different is an interracial encounter; some are mutually satisfying (i.e., productive, confirming, supportive, loving); others are not (i.e., unproductive, disconfirming, etc.) (Houston, 2002).

Like Houston, this paper will understand interracial interaction as cojoined and inherent in interpersonal communication. Less clear is the definition of friendship. Because interracial friendship is the central theme, it is crucial to have both a consistent and agreeable definition for what is meant by the term friendship.
This project does not propose “friendly” relationships, but friendships in which the depth and breadth of feelings are genuine and mutual. Bacon, perhaps, best illustrates how friendship is conceived for the purpose of this essay.

In his essay “Of Friendship,” Bacon describes three great benefits or “fruits” of friendship. First, friends are necessary to the health of the soul. In opening one’s heart to a friend, one finds an alleviation of sorrows and a magnification of joys. Second, friends help one to judge and act wisely. In conversation with a friend, one can sort out one’s own thoughts better than one can in solitude, and one can receive the good counsel of another who combines the perspective of an outsider with the goodwill and tact of a friend. Third friends can act on one another’s behalves in ways that they cannot act for themselves, bringing one another honor, pleading one another’s causes, and bringing to completion projects and purposes that are cut short by death (Bacon, 1861).

The possible danger of understanding friendship as Bacon outlined it is what Bellah, et al (1985) called “therapeutic attitude”, which they explain is a common manifestation of contemporary friendships. However, what should become clear later as we explore some of the barriers to interracial friendships and consider ways that this interpersonal dilemma can function as a foundation for public engagement is a recognition that the premise of this project is one intended for the good of the community—not the individual.

Emerging from the process of defining friendship are questions related to the intrinsic value of friendship. Presupposing that there is a fundamental usefulness of friendship, aside from the benefits of social, economic, and political privilege (i.e., networking) is who we choose to be our friend of significant or inconsequent import? In
the context of this project, that question goes beyond the idiomatic “birds of a feather…” In this case, it gets at the heart of the question that ultimately inspires this project. Do our private friendships prepare us for public engagement?

This project posits that the everyday practice of friendship provides all citizens with an awareness and understanding that can be carried into the public realm with good effect. This is not an argument that we should all just be friends—in the spirits, say, of Hollywood’s popular interracial buddy movies. Nor is it an argument that each of us should seek some human commonality that binds us even to strangers, and base our relationships to them on that. Danielle Allen (2004) writes that “Friendship is not easy, nor is democracy. Friendship begins in the recognition that friends have a shared life—not a common nor an identical life—only one with common events, climates, built-environments, fixations of the imagination, and social structures” (Allen, 2004).

Friendship is theoretically important because of what our experience of it teaches us. Aristotle argued that friendship is the bond of the city. Since most people spend more time practicing friendship than any other activity, getting better at it as they grow older, many of us have a rich intuitive knowledge of what maintains consensual relationships (Allen, 2004). But how can the techniques and expertise of friendship be conveyed into the realm of public engagement?

In The Four Loves C.S. Lewis offers a vision of friendship as one of the highest achievements of the individual. The value of friendship, like that of philosophy or art, Lewis argues, is mostly a “civilization value,” enabling us not to live, but to live well. Friendship, according to Lewis, begins in shared interests, in companionship, and becomes friendship when the companions discover that they “see the same truth.”
Yet, it is in Lewis’s view that in every friendship there is a danger of it degenerating into a mutual admiration society, indifferent or deaf to the views and needs of “outsiders,” that this project will explore the value of interracial friendships. Lewis’s unusual but provocative suggestion that there may be something inherently bad in forging friendships based on common viewpoints and shared vision allows to take root at least the notion that our private friendships have the potential to influence our public hearts.

In essence this project will consider that the dynamics that limit our interracial friendships parallel the dynamics that limit public engagement that is unencumbered by preference, prejudice, and ignorance.

For Aristotle and those who followed him, it was precisely the moral component of friendship that made it the indispensable basis of a good society (Pangle, 2003). For it is one of the main duties of friends to help one another to be better persons: one must hold up a standard for one’s friend and be able to count on a true friend to do likewise. This project will build on this concept and propose that particular friendships—specifically interracial friendships—are critical to developing and sustaining a good and just society in this historical moment.

**Defining Friendship**

It might be suggested that the topic of friendship is self-evident; that everyone knows what a friend is and is not. Yet, the complexity of friendship makes it a difficult phenomenon to analyze. It is clearly one of the most important contexts of interpersonal communication. Blosser (1997) suggests that friendship is one of those subjects that is so close to us, so much a part of our everyday lives, that we hardly ever take notice of it.
“Like Heidegger’s ‘being’ or Augustine’s ‘time,’ it is something that is so close at hand that we rarely give it a thought” (Blosser, 1997).

In ancient times the subject of friendship had a dignified and distinguished place. Treatises, dialogues, essays—entire books—were devoted to the subject by philosophers and other classical writers. Plato devoted an entire dialogue, Lysis, to the subject. Aristotle devoted two of the ten books of his Nicomachean Ethics to a discussion of friendship and its role in a good human life.

Nicomachean Ethics is by far the most probing classical study of friendship as a bridge between the moral virtues and the highest life of philosophy (Pangle, 2003). It is the contention of Aristotle and all of the classical authors who follow him that precisely in the friendships of mature and virtuous individuals do we see human love not only at its most revealing but also at its richest and highest (Badhwar, 1993).

Aristotle observed that a person would not choose to live without friends although he had all other goods (Nicomachean Ethics). It is clear that Aristotle took friendship to contribute in an enormous way to an individual’s flourishing, including his moral flourishing. From an Aristotelian point of view friendship creates a context or arena for the expression of virtue, and ultimately for happiness (Pangle, 2003).

According to Aristotle, “Friends enhance our ability to think and to act” (Nicomachean Ethics). Aristotle suggests that we need friends in all circumstances and times of life: in times of prosperity as beneficiaries, in times of hardship as refuge, in our youth as tutors, in our old age for care and support, and in our prime for doing fine actions (Nicomachean Ethics).
While Aristotle, his contemporaries and his successors explored virtually every aspect of friendship, the circumstance of interracial friendships, for the obvious reasons, was not considered. This doesn’t mean that their insights are less valuable for this project. Indeed, the opposite is true. Certainly, if one is to consider and agree with the expansive and boundless treaties, essays and musings that proclaim the inherent value of friendship, then it stands to reason that in this historical moment interracial friendships are both fruitful and essential. The question for this project is should interracial friendships be considered more valuable to the good of society. Supposing this to be the case, how do we overcome the barriers to interracial friendship?

Friendships provide clarity about people. For Aristotle, it was precisely the moral component of friendship that made it the indispensable basis of a good society (Stern-Gillet, 1995). For it is one of the main duties of friends to help one another to be better persons: one must hold up a standard for one’s friend and be able to count on a true friend to do likewise (Vernon, 2005). If we understand this to be an important component of friendship, how do we fulfill these duties when most of us limit our friendships to those who are strikingly similar to us?

**The Significance of Interracial Friendships**

According to human communication literature, interpersonal relationships are essential for healthy emotional and intellectual development (Orbe & Harris, 2001). Friendships provide a landscape for developing effective interpersonal relationships.

It has been demonstrated that despite varying racial attitudes across individuals, an overwhelming majority of whites reportedly agree that it is socially undesirable to
express racial bias publicly; reflecting this trend, their political views tend to be more egalitarian when expressed in public than in private (Krysan, 1998).

Everything involving race, class, and nationality is inherently politicized. Taylor (2005) pointed out in his discussion of multiculturalism, “we learn these modes of expression through exchanges with each other.” This means that all social actors form opinions and behaviors regarding others based on the historical experience of their society, the larger structures of that society today, and their own experience. People in U.S. society negotiate present understandings of the “other” based on these complex relationships (Taylor, 2005).

Both attitudes and structures need to change in order to foster a more just and harmonious society (Goode & Schneider, 1994). Change comes from the cumulative effect of many small actions. Interracial friendships are one of those small actions that can change attitudes of people by providing experiences that broaden the horizon of those who engage in it.

On the whole, blacks seem more guarded regarding the value of and interracial friendship than whites, reflecting the habits of those more powerful and less powerful at large (Houston, 2002).

In a paper on women’s interracial friendships, presented by African American psychologist Althea Smith and white psychologist Stephanie Nickerson the authors asked, “How pervasive is racism in interracial friendships today?” Their short answer was “very.”

Sociologists Mary Jackman and Marie Crane, using an interview sample of nearly 2,000 adults, 70 percent of whom were white, studied whether interpersonal contacts with
blacks actually changed a white person’s racial attitudes. The survey asked questions about the racial makeup of the respondents’ friends and acquaintances, along with questions assessing racial prejudice, such as beliefs about personality trait differences between blacks and whites. Jackman and Crane found that only 9.4 percent of whites could even name one “good friend” who was black, although 21.4 percent of whites said that they had at least one black “acquaintance.” The authors’ primary discovery, though, was that for whites, having a black friend did little to change their prejudices. That is, the good black friend was simply sub typed as “exceptional,” and traditional racial prejudices remained intact.

**The issues and Boundaries of Interracial Friendship**

“In private, we were often like sisters, laughing and chatting and enjoying one another’s company...But whenever other people were around, the barrier of color went up automatically. Without acknowledging that we were doing so, we became more distant to one another. She became the rich, white lady author, and I became quiet, reserved, and slipped into her shadow, the perfect maid.” (Tucker, 1988).

Factors involved in influencing the (non)initiation, maintenance, and dissolution of interracial friendships will be examined at length in chapter six, but it is important to acknowledge and examine in this chapter some of the formidable barriers that interracial friendships face. By examining the current state and perceptions of interracial friendships, this section attempts to provide a knowledge base for understanding how critical our interpersonal relationships are in improving race relations. Because interpersonal relationships are touted as the most effective means for improving race
relations (Collier, 1998), it is important for us to understand what perceptual and communicative barriers are preventing these relationships from occurring.

Interracial relationships in Western society have historically been disproportionate and hostile (Orbe & Harris, 2001). In the United States whites were typically at the top of the racial hierarchy that was historically created to maintain an unequal power distribution (Houston, 1997). Because of this hierarchy, intermingling between the races was outlawed and/or strongly discouraged. After the abolition of slavery, racial segregation remained a driving force behind the racial dynamics in the U.S. According to the Jim Crow laws (Wilson & Russell, 1996), whites and other racial groups were separated from one another both in public and private spheres. Clearly, the political ramifications of racial segregation permeated both the public and social aspects of life in the United States.

Reasons abound that give insight into the chasm between whites and blacks that limit the propensity for and the depth of interracial friendships. Among those reasons and undeniably the most frequently researched and studied is the matter of communication (Duncan, 1998). Despite a shared sense of friendship around other factors, different communication practices can complicate friendships more than we realize (Rich, 1974).

Two other factors that consistently surface when considering the barriers to interracial friendships are stereotypes and the issue of segregation. Each of these obstacles is powerful in its own right. In combination they create an almost insurmountable challenge. Clearly it is necessary to discuss the implications of each. Though, this project intends only a limited examination of communication, stereotypes, and segregation because at the heart of each is the issue of trust, and trust is critical both
conceptually and practically in the connection of interracial friendships and public engagement.

This project will explore the idea that interracial friendships will help us recognize what we share with the people who live around us.

If we forfeit our willingness to open ourselves to potential good in others, much of what is most attractive and sustaining in interaction and community life will be lost forever.

**Friendship and Public Engagement**

In *Where Do We Go From Here: Chaos or Community* (1967) Martin Luther King Jr. suggested that the solution to the problem of the “color line” was essentially spiritual, and would be undergirded by a commitment to moral knowledge and action: “The ultimate solution to the race problem lies in the willingness of men to obey the unenforceable. Desegregation will break down the legal barriers and bring men together physically, but something must touch the hearts and souls of men…”

If race distorts individual relations, it also magnifies most major social and policy issues facing the American public. “Where race enters the realms of politics, health care, economic injustice, and occasionally foreign policy, the debates are charged with an additional layer of emotion” (Schaefer, 1996). Despite the upheavals brought by the Supreme Court’s 1954 ruling against segregated schools in Brown vs. Board of Education by the civil rights movement, and by the resulting 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act, Allen (2004) writes, “race is still central to the American psychological experience, as it has been for more than 200 years.”
There is scarcely a consequential interaction between a black and white in the United States in which race is not a factor. Even as it goes unmentioned, race is rarely a neutral event in the equation. It can be mitigated or it can be worsened by a lot of other factors; social class, culture, education (Shipler, 1998).

If citizenship is conceived in largely instrumental terms, there is no obvious justification for citizens to model their conduct toward one another on the norms of friendship (Allen, 2004). Fellow citizens may reasonably demand from each other basic respect and toleration, as well as some assurance of social welfare commensurate with the requirements of human dignity. But they may not demand that others love them, treat them as friends, or “abandon self-determined projects for their sake” (Allen, 2004).

It is not surprising, therefore, that the practice of friendship (and its norms) tends to be relegated to the private sphere, where citizens as private persons are free to establish amicable relations with whomever they choose. As a rule friendship is not thought to serve as a normative model for the practice of citizenship (Scorza, 2004).

Contrarily, this project will examine the conception of friendship and citizenship as values connected by responsiveness and receptivity to others, and expressed through membership in a community of equals based on openness and empathy, rather than merely on contractual obligations.

Christopher Heath Wellman (2001) argues that relationships among fellow citizens are disanalogous to those among friends, for at least three cogent reasons. First, friendships are based to some degree on consent, whereas consent is missing from citizenship. Second, the strong emotional bonds found in genuine friendship are absent from relationships between citizens as such. And, third, whereas friendship is commonly
judged to be intrinsically, rather than instrumentally, valuable, the same cannot be said for friendship (Wellman, 2001).

These objections would appear to dismiss the ethics of friendship to irrelevance where the practice of citizenship is concerned. Wellman argues that the relationship of friendship has intrinsic value, and is properly valued for its own sake, whereas citizenship can only ever have instrumental value (Wellman, 2001)

Ralph Waldo Emerson suggests in his 1844 essay “Politics,” that citizens might someday “exercise towards each other the grandest and simplest sentiments, as well as a knot of friends, or a pair of lovers.” This project will explore Emerson’s conception of friendship and consider how its two crucial communicative norms (which he calls truth and tenderness) could help to enrich the contemporary practice of citizenship.

This project will consider public engagement as a process by which the society communicates to itself about its need, problems, and creative ideas for how to solve them. The moral force of the processes of public communication and its relation to policy, then, rests in part on a requirement that such communication be both inclusive and critically self-conscious (Young, 2000). Public engagement is changing society through society. The environmental movement is an example of this. Environmentalist persuaded many consumers to reuse and recycle used consumer items, and developed informal voluntary civic recycling systems, long before municipalities, private companies, and states entered the business of recycling. In this case, habits and attitudes first significantly changed in society, where ideas and practices spread through public discussion. Only after significant social change had taken place did governments and private businesses
extend the influence of those changes by means of law, government, and corporate organization (Young, 2000).

When friendships successfully endure over time, it is because friends have “developed heightened capacities for attending to what each is giving to the relationship and where each needs to repay a gift. Citizens, too, need to cultivate such habits of attention in respect to their fellow citizens” (Allen, 2004). It is important for us to remember that friends are people to whom we are willing to be in debt while also knowing that we must acknowledge and repay our debts.

**The Approach**

Chapter one has created the ground from which the rest of this thesis will flower. A theoretical perspective of interpersonal relationships and a brief introduction to some of the historical philosophy behind friendship have been carved out. Communication across racial groups has emerged as the critical component hindering and limiting successful interracial interaction and by extension compromising a soundly actualized public engagement. This thesis suggests that the solution to this communication issue can be found in friendship. Going forward in this project one will gather that friendship offers a theoretic and practical versatility that perhaps allows us to reach a resolution and draw conclusions.

In chapter two the history of the relationship that we call friendship will be examined and summarized. Scholars appear to be divided on where friendship currently stands as a matter of philosophical inquiry. Clearly, friendship was a great subject of philosophical reflection in classical antiquity, but its place in the world of philosophy centuries later is at best sketchy. Still there is a tremendous amount of relevance in
finding historical context for the conception of friendship. Also we learn that while conceptions of friendship differ from each other, they all, nevertheless, possess a similar structure that is essential in understanding their resemblances and differences.

The first aim of chapter three is to deepen the understanding of and engagement with the philosophical study of friendship, giving central place to Aristotle’s treatment of the subject. This chapter will introduce the first significant exploration of Aristotle’s conception of friendship. To provide further illumination on the issues of this project, chapter three has interwoven some analysis and consideration of two other scholars, Hannah Arendt and Paulo Freire. While the inclusion of Aristotle follows any philosophical discussion of friendship, the reasons to include the work of Arendt and Freire are less obvious. While these thinkers do not constitute a single tradition in the sense that they are engaged in a single conversation about the same problems in friendship, each provides significant contributions and important discoveries about human nature and our own hearts in such a way that they create relevance for this project. The remainder of this chapter sets the stage for chapter four by acknowledging a shift in the way that friendship is studied.

Chapter four will consider approaches to friendship outside of the realm of philosophy. While friendship traditionally resided within the domain of philosophy, more recent scholarship on the topic has been undertaken by scholars in different disciplines. In demonstrating how a social science perspective can add to our understanding of friendship, this chapter will draw on a wide set of contextualizing factors to examine the structuring of these relationships and to account for the different forms they take.
Chapter five will explore the variables involved in creating a definitional approach to friendship. One should understand to this point that aspects of the concept can be enriched by what tradition has taught us, but that the concept is—to adopt Cicero’s terminology—a kaleidoscopic and complicated thing. The analysis of the various uses of the term reveals no one sense as ideal or definitive of its usage. To understand the term we must consider how it is used within various contexts.

Chapter six will address more directly the barriers to interracial friendships. It would stand to reason that when difference is introduced as a potential friendship characteristic or quality, the relationship is perceived as less desirable or more difficult (Orbe & Harris, 2001). Although only a small amount of research has been completed about interracial friendships (Wright & Littleford, 2002), this chapter illustrates how complex the barriers to these relationships can be.

This chapter should bear out the hypothesis that the problematic nature of these relationships parallels the issues that present themselves in the course of public engagement. It will be essential to weave these concepts together in this chapter. This examination will involve historical, practical, and theoretical concerns surrounding the challenges to interracial friendships.

While previous chapters lay the groundwork for the overarching question, do our private friendships prepare us for public engagement, chapter six will address the question directly. Here, the link between friendship and public engagement should crystallize.

The final chapter will summarize and discuss the implications of this research. Additional questions that can be explored later will be introduces. Also the contribution
that this project can make to both interpersonal (friendship) and ethics (public engagement) will be suggested.
Chapter Two

The History of the Philosophy of Friendship

This chapter is an attempt to deepen our understanding of and engagement with the philosophical study of friendship. This chapter seeks to engage the arguments of each thinker on their own terms. It moves forward on the working hypothesis that the project of philosophy as these authors undertook it is indeed possible—that behind the different conventions and experiences and habits of mind of fourth-century Athenians, Renaissance Frenchman, and modern men and women are permanent human problems that we can make progress in answering.

The plan of this chapter is broadly chronological. Though, the organization by epoch is not intended to suggest an evolution in the nature of friendship from an early to mature form, or to a form more closely approximating modern ideas. Instead, the functions of friendship would seem to respond to historical exigencies and possibilities, but it is not assumed that social changes condition a development, as opposed to inflections, in the notion of friendship.

Additionally, there do not appear to be any guarantees of uniformity among the conceptions of friendship disseminated in a single era (Kostan, 1997). Despite vast social changes, commonplaces persist for a thousand years. While new emphases emerge over time, it is not necessarily the case that they conform synchronically to a reigning spirit of the times.

Indeed one theme that persists throughout time is the abiding image of friendship as an intimate relationship predicated on mutual affection and commitment (Golden,
In other words, while friendship is not uniform over various cultures or even within a single culture at any given moment, the core of the relationship may be characterized as a mutually intimate, loyal, and loving bond (Kostan, 1997).

The writings and scholarship reviewed in this chapter are both central and critical to the study of friendship, but hardly exhaustive. Necessarily some key philosophers are left out of this discussion as a matter of prudence. Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to explore the history of friendship for the purpose of background as well as to establish a foundation that helps to build a narrative that informs the overall themes of this project.

The phenomenon of friendship, with its richness and complexity, its ability to support but also at times to undercut virtue, and the promise it holds out of bringing together in one happy union so much of what is highest and so much of what is sweetest in life, formed a fruitful topic of philosophic inquiry for the ancients (Konstan, 1997). Plato and Cicero both wrote dialogues about friendship, and a number of others, including Plutarch and Theophrasus, wrote treatises on it, most of which have now been lost. Epicurus devoted much of his life to cultivating friendship and counted it as one of life’s chief goods; he and Seneca both expounded their teachings on friendship in epistles to friends (Badhwar, 1993). But by far the fullest and most probing classical study of friendship is to be found in Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*, which devotes more space to it than to any of the moral virtues and which presents friendship as a bridge between the moral virtues and the highest life of philosophy (Schollmeier, 1994).

The study of friendship in the classical authors is in many ways a study of human love altogether, and the Greek word philia can cover all bonds of affection, from the closest erotic and familial ties to political loyalties, humanitarian sympathies, business
partnerships, and even love for inanimate things (Pangle, 2003). But philia means first and foremost friendship, and it is the contention of Aristotle and all of the classical authors who follow him that precisely in the friendships of mature and virtuous individuals do we see human love not only at its most revealing but also at its richest and highest (Vernon, 2005).

With the coming of the Christian world, however, friendship fell into “eclipse” (Badhwar, 1993). One theologian, the twelfth-century Aelred of Rievaulx, did write a dialogue on friendship somewhat in the spirit of Cicero’s; and Augustine, as , Thomas Aquinas, and others acknowledged a certain place for friendship as a special form of love in the Christian life (Badhwar, 1993). Yet Christianity’s call to devote one’s heart as completely as possible to God, and to regard all men as brothers, made the existence of private, exclusive, and passionate attachments to individual human beings seem inherently questionable (Badhwar, 1993). Moreover, Christianity’s emphasis on humility, chastity, and a childlike trust in God gave grounds for regarding with particular suspicion the fierce, proudly republican, and sometimes homosexual attachments that characterized the celebrated friendships of antiquity (Badhwar, 1993).

It would be wrong to suggest, however, that the coming of Christianity resulted in a widespread weakening of particular human bonds and the replacing of them with the broadly diffused “gentle glow of charity.” Rather, the chief effect of Christianity upon personal relations was to elevate one particular human bond, that of family, which had received special sanction in the Scriptures. Along with the elevation of the family came the relative elevation of women, who enjoyed in Christian aristocratic Europe more
liberty, education, and influence than they had had in Greece and Rome, and whose central concerns were not politics or friendship but love and family (Pangle, 2003).

It is not surprising then that with the Renaissance there was a certain revival of philosophic interest in friendship (Pangle, 2003). In the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, Michel de Montaigne and Francis Bacon both wrote essays in a rather classical vein in praise of friendship (Pakaluk, 1991), both arguing that not erotic or familial love (or, by silent implication, Christian charity) but, rather, friendship between mature, equal, and good men is the human bond par excellence (Pangle, 2003).

In the four centuries since Bacon and Montaigne wrote, however friendship has virtually disappeared as a theme of philosophical discourse (Vernon, 2005). Kant treats it briefly as a matter of minor philosophic interest; Nietzsche mentions it as a potentially valuable but potentially enervating force, and likens the good friend to a good enemy; Emerson offers a hazily glowing tribute to friendship that some scholars suggest scarcely rises to the level of philosophy; and Kierkegaard, “with bold intransigence, rejects friendship as unchristian”; but nowhere do we find another thinker who takes friendship as seriously or explores it as searchingly as do those of the classical tradition (Badhwar, 1993).

According to Pangle (2003), this apparent devaluation of friendship is the result of a decisive new turn in philosophy that occurred in the years immediately after the publications of Montaigne’s and Bacon’s essays, the first editions of which appeared in 1580 and 1597, respectively. For it was early in the next century that Thomas Hobbes began to develop his powerful reinterpretation of human nature as directed neither to friendship nor to virtue, his argument that man is by nature solitary, and his analysis of
our true condition as one of serious, always potentially deadly competition with other human beings for all that we most need and want (Pangle, 2003).

Ever since the time of Hobbes, modern moral philosophy, when it has not followed his teaching about the state of nature, has conceived of men’s most important claims upon one another to lie outside the realm of friendship (Lynch, 2005). Hobbes and Locke, understanding each individual’s relations to his fellows to be rooted in self-interest, taught that these relations could be regulated by sensible laws and appeals to rational self-interest (Stern-Gillet, 1995). Vernon writes that Rousseau, fearing that the modern liberal project was resulting in the “impoverishment and isolation of the individual soul,” sought to counterbalance liberalism’s spirit of cold calculation with a new emphasis on erotic love, now broadened to comprise a freely chosen friendship of two kindred spirits and pointed firmly toward the family as its natural fulfillment. “Taking their lifeblood from this root, the great modern stories have almost invariably been love stories” (Vernon, 2005).

Yet increasingly, the ideas of rights and of altruism have both come under serious questioning (Vernon, 2005). Do rights really exist? Is altruism really possible? If it is possible, how are our altruistic motives related to our self-interested motives? Is it possible to subordinate self-interest to altruism, such that all one’s activities and associations are chosen only because they ultimately accrue to the good of humanity? Or if this is not possible—if we normally act with a view to our own good but sometimes choose actions that have nothing to do with our own good or even oppose it—is there any higher, unifying principle or faculty of the soul that decides between these contrary
principles of action, judging them by a common standard? Or do we simply lurch inexplicably between unrelated, incommensurable principles of action?

If, on the other hand, the idea of altruism is a chimerical one, are we indeed at root the solitary and selfish beings that Hobbes claimed we are? Or are there altogether different ways of understanding individuals’ evident ability to transcend their narrowly selfish concerns? Perhaps this ability can be better understood in terms not of universal laws but of virtues that grow out of and give natural perfection to passions of the soul, and in terms not of egoism and altruism but of friendship, again rooted in the natural passion of human affection and so bridging the concern with self and the concern with others. It is considerations such as these that seem to have prompted a remarkable contemporary resurgence of philosophic interest in Aristotle’s moral philosophy, and in particular, his treatment of friendship (Vernon, 2005). In particular, it is these concerns that prompt and drive the theme of this project.

When we approach the classical studies of friendship with an eye to the modern reasons for rejecting it as a theme of central philosophic importance, we see that the classics and especially Aristotle address the concerns at the root of the modern demotion of friendship in the most direct and forthright way (Pangle, 2003). Annas (1977) writes that Aristotle does not assume the natural sociability of man but searchingly questions it. In friendship, he and Plato both suggest, we can best see the true character and extent of our desire to live with others when that desire is shorn of all considerations of necessity and utility (Annas, 1977). Likewise, Aristotle assumes neither the possibility nor the impossibility of what we would call altruism, but instead offers a sustained and sympathetic exploration of what is really at work in the human heart when an individual
seems to disregard his own good to pursue the good of others. Aristotle does not assume that the concern for a friend is necessarily tainted by partiality; he argues that friendship can be rooted in a true assessment of the friend’s worth and, as such can give the noblest expression to our sociability (Pangle, 2003).

These three sets of issues, concerning the naturalness of friendship, the possibility of selflessness in friendship, and the relationship of friendship to justice, constitute indeed the central themes of all the major philosophical studies of friendship, and hence will form the main topics of inquiry for this thesis. To what extent is the desire for affection and friendship reducible to other causes, to our defects and vulnerabilities and needs for things in themselves altogether extraneous to friendship, and to what extent is friendship itself a necessary or central component of the happiness of the healthiest human beings? How truly can and do human beings care for others for their own sakes and promote the good of others as an end in itself? Do they do this at all? To what extent can friendship answer the longing for a just community with others that political life invariably fails to answer perfectly? And what light does an examination of the problems of justice within friendship shed on the problem of justice as a whole?

With all of these questions in mind, the remainder of this chapter will proceed to review briefly the thoughts of key thinkers, philosophers and scholars through history. It is appropriate to trace the development and interpretation of friendship before proceeding to examine the dynamics of friendship that are particular to this thesis. These summaries are not intended to answer any questions that have been put forth, but instead should position readers with a more textured depth of knowledge of the various conceptions of friendship.
**Friendship in the Classical World**

The predominant view concerning the classical Greek vocabulary of friendship is that it did not distinguish between friends in the modern sense and a wide range of relationships from family ties to those between fellow-citizens. For example, Paul Millett (1991) writes: “It is true that from the viewpoint of comparative sociology, to say nothing of our own experience, the all-inclusive quality of Greek friendship is anomalous.” Millett cites the article on “Friendship” by Odd Ramsoy in the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (1968) for the generalization that “most other important social relationships exclude friendship,” which “tends to be incompatible with such relationships as those of mother and child, lovers, and employer and employee.” Millett goes on to observe that Greek usage, as illustrated for example by Aristotle, admits of the term philos or “friend” in respect to “parents, brothers, benefactors, fellow-tribesman and fellow-citizens,” as well as to “husbands and wives, fellow-voyagers, comrades-in-arms, gust-friends, and cousins,” and he adds that “perhaps the clearest extension of philia both inside and outside the family circle.”

*Aristotle*

Although it is relatively easy to come up with definitions that account for part of friendship, it is much harder to find one that does not exclude any of its facets. Aristotle, whose writing on friendship still sets the philosophical agenda to this day, found as much 2,500 years ago. Friendship, he proposed, is at the very least a relationship of goodwill between individuals who reciprocate that goodwill.

Aristotle looked around him and saw three broad groupings of relationships people called friendship. The first group are friends primarily because they are useful to
each other – like the friendship between an employee and a boss, or a doctor and a patient, or a politician and an ally; they share goodwill because they get something out of the relationship.

The second group are friends primarily because some pleasure is enjoyed by being together; it may be the football, the shopping, the gossip or sexual intimacy, but the friendship thrives insofar, and possibly only insofar, as the thing that gives the pleasure continues to exist between them. Aristotle noted that these first two groups are therefore like each other because if you take the utility or the pleasure away, then the chances are the friendship will fade. This, though, is not true of the third group.

These are people who love each other because of who they are in themselves. It may be their depth of character, their innate goodness, their intensity of passion or their simple *joie de vivre*, but once established on such a basis these friendships are ones that tend to last. Undoubtedly much will be given and much taken too but the friendship itself is independent of external factors and immensely more valuable than the friendships that fall into the first two groups. That there are better or higher friendships – different people may call them soul friends, close or old friends, or best friends – as opposed to instrumental and casual friendships, or mere friendliness, is surely right. But to say that great friendship is defined solely by its goodwill seems to miss its essence. Goodwill exists in these best kinds of friendship, but, unlike the lesser types, best friendship – arguably the quintessential sort – is based on something far more profound. Aristotle recognized as much, and whilst his discussion of friendship contains many important and illuminating insights – that this project will make much of here – he knew, perhaps, that ultimately a definitional approach to friendship has its limits (Price, 1989).
This philosophical ambiguity as to what friendship is reflects, then, the ambiguity that appears to be part and parcel of friendship in life. According to Aristotle, the best kind of friendship, the friendship of people who are alike in virtue and love each other as the persons they are, is necessary for full virtue and eudaimonia, for a truly self-sufficient life.

In her book *The Fabric of Character*, Nancy Sherman explains how the intimacy and shared activities of such a friendship—“character friendship”—make it the privileged context in which to know ourselves as beings both emotional and rational, and to realize virtue and achieve happiness.¹ In Essay 5, excerpted from that book, Sherman discusses the way in which Aristotle takes character friendship to provide both the necessary means to virtue and happiness, in the sense in which money or political influence does, and “the very form and mode” of an especially praiseworthy life.

For only in a life shared with friends do we have an opportunity for adequate self-knowledge and the continuous moral and intellectual activity that is the major part of happiness. Sherman argues that Aristotle’s picture of a friend is not simply the picture of another self, but of a separate self. Character friends must be alike in having all the virtues, but the “pattern of unified virtues might…be different in different persons,” and both the similarities and the differences play a role in self-knowledge and moral growth.

Sherman notes that Aristotle’s view of self-sufficiency as relational, as involving friends, marks a decisive break with the ascetic ideal found in Plato’s writings, in which happiness is immune to the vagaries of fortune. It also marks a decisive break with Plato’s notion of love. In the *Symposium* and the *Lysis* there is a view, revived through the ages in varying guises by other writers, of love, as the expression need or deficiency.

Insofar as we are virtuous and wise we are above the contingencies of this world and do not need friends or lovers.

Friendship can help one overcome lacks, but it’s very success spells its demise (Badhwar, 1993). According to this line of thought, our need for friendship bespeaks our moral and psychological deficiencies, not our strengths or virtues. This argument, however, assumes that the self is essentially nonsocial. It is only by virtue of this assumption that friendship can be relegated to the role of a mere means to the achievement of self-sufficiency, rather than acknowledged as an essential constituent of a self-sufficient life.

Aristotle argues that the motive for friendship is an object of mental pleasure. We act for the sake of the happiness of another person because we find that the happiness of another is an object of pleasant apperception. He argues that the happiness of another is a good belonging to us.

Plato

Aristotle’s is not the only considered account of friendship in antiquity. Plato provides another, in the shape of his dialogue, the *Lysis*. According to Vernon (2005) *Lysis* is overlooked by philosophers for a number of reasons. First, Vernon writes, it is not so much an account of friendship as a portrayal of friendship, and as such may be less appealing to the contemporary analytical frame of mind. Second, in the same way that it is a portrayal not an account, it is also a philosophical drama and not a philosophical treatise. In other words, the actions of the characters and the cultural and social inferences within the dialogue may count as much for its meaning as anything the participants actually say. This, again, means that it can be taken to be less definitive.
Further, the *Lysis* is often grouped with the *Charmides, Laches, Euthyphro*, and *Hippias Major* as a “definitional” dialogue, that is, one that attempts to find what it is that all things called by a certain term have in common (Pakaluk, 1991). Yet the focus of the *Lysis* seems to be just as much on human action and causation. The question that seems to dominate the dialogue is: How does one become the friend of another?

In the *Lysis*, Socrates’ dialogue with two young friends about friendship, Socrates pursues the unsettling idea that all friendship is rooted in human neediness and defectiveness and is treasured only because and only to the extent that we hope to get from others things that we are unable to provide for ourselves (Pangle, 2003).

Moreover, the *Lysis* explores the possibility that the most important needs that cause us to love are not needs for the pleasures and activities of friendship as such, but are directed to other things that act as remedies for our defects in the way that medicine does for the defects of the body, and to which the human beings we call our friends are merely the means (Pangle, 2003).

In his analysis of the *Lysis*, Vernon concludes that the *Lysis* offers a portrayal of friendship as a way of life in which, at its best, Socratic philosophy and becoming friends are one and the same thing. Moreover, he suggests that it does not face the problems Aristotle does. In Socrates’ scheme of things, there is no such thing as the self-sufficient person who can happily contemplate truth free of doubt. Additionally, attempts to conclusively define friendship fail too (Vernon, 2005).

This last point is the topic of significant debate among scholars who cannot seem to agree on the true significance of Plato’s *Lysis*. Yet most appear to agree that Plato leaves it to Aristotle to provide the most explicit discussion of the aspects of friendship,
and to show what strength the mutual cherishing of two excellent souls might have, when
shorn of the fervency that our defectiveness, acknowledged or unacknowledged,
ordinarily brings to human love.

**Middle Ages**

Friendships may always have been part of Aristotle’s world, but it has not always
been comfortably at home in the Christian world (Wadell, 1989). Though this seems odd
to people who count their life blessed in their friends, friendship has had a difficult time
justifying itself as Christian love. As Gilbert C. Meilaender says, “Within Christian
thought agape (Christian love) displaced philia, and it is impossible to think theologically
about love without giving that simple fact careful consideration” (Meilaender, ).

Agape puts friendship on the fringe because friendship is preferential love. To
have a friend is to prefer one over others, a selective love based on an attraction we feel
for some but do not feel for all (Wadell, 1989). Agape is not preferential, but universal. It
is a love restricted to no one and open to everyone. Meilaender (1991) writes, “Philia is,
in addition, a mutual bond, marked by the inner reciprocities of love; agape is to be
shown even to the enemy, who, of course, cannot be expected to return such love. Philia
is recognized to be subject to change; agape is to be characterized by the same fidelity
which God shows to his covenant.”

With that said, there was indeed a second age of writing on friendship, which
occurs in the middle ages. Vernon (2005) writes that friendship carried a degree of social
impact as a result of two factors during the middle ages. First, certain activities like
eating and sleeping that are today carried out in private then had a distinctly public
dimension, notably in relation to the household. This leant a corresponding degree of
social importance to the friendships that could accrue around doing these things together. Second, a strain of religious piety that put a high value on friendship developed during the Middle Ages which when coupled to the flexibility that existed with the institution of the household also contributed a significant social dimension to friendship. “This religious piety never quite gained the status of religious orthodoxy, though it got close in the work of Thomas Aquinas” (Vernon, 2005).

During the medieval period, a number of Christian writers had reflected upon the importance of friendship in the monastic setting. One theologian, the twelfth-century Aelred of Rievaulx, did write a dialogue on friendship somewhat in the spirit of Cicero’s; and Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and others acknowledged a certain place for friendship as a special form of love in the Christian life. Yet Christianity’s call to devote one’s heart as completely as possible to God, and to regard all men as brothers, made the existence of private, exclusive, and passionate attachments to individual human beings seem inherently questionable (Pangle, 2003). Moreover, Christianity’s emphasis on humility, chastity, and a childlike trust in God gave grounds for regarding with particular suspicion the “fierce, proudly republican, and sometimes homosexual attachments that characterized the celebrated friendships of antiquity” (Pagle, 2003).

All of this is not to suggest that the coming of Christianity resulted in a widespread weakening of particular human bonds and the replacing of them with the broadly diffused gentle glow of charity. Seeing friendship within the Christian setting adds a dimension to the practice of friendship that builds on the advantages afforded it by the social convention of pre-modern society (Vernon, 2005). Friendship could not only become attached to various public demonstrations of connection, and so gain some public
standing. It could achieve a semi-institutionalized status that far from being exceptional was part of a wider social order that many people understood and warmed to (Pangle, 2003), whether or not they were sworn friends themselves. Again then: in the sense that the Middle Ages provided a social space within which friendships could be nurtured, we can see that it too was more open to friendship and indeed that friendship was constitutive of society (Blosser, 1997).

**Aelred of Rievaulx**

Aelred appears to be inspired by Cicero: if Cicero had written an account of friendship to the late Roman republic, Aelred wanted to do the same for a Christian society (Vernon, 2005). He is innovative in doing so and several things stand out.

First he argues that friends should be willing to die for each other. His model in this respect is the life of Jesus: ‘A man can have no greater love than to lay down his life for his friends’, as the writer of John’s Gospel has it. This saying has been co-opted today to express the sacrifice made by soldiers in war but in John’s Gospel it means something rather different. It is actually a comment on the demands of discipleship (Blosser, 1997). In other words, the friends of Jesus both understand who he is and are prepared to pay the price of living by that conviction—even to the point of death. It is for this reason that “friend” was almost a synonym for “Christian” in the early, persecuted Church (Vernon, 2005). Aelred implies the same should be true in his time (Pakaluk, 1991).

Other things that Aelred thinks should be typical of friends follow from this. The love between friends should be undying in the sense that “he that is a friend loves at all times.” Even if someone is unjustly accused, injured, cast into flames or crucified in ways
that implicate their friends (as was the case with Jesus), the friendship should not cease or else it was “never true friendship” (Pakaluk, 1991).

Third, Aelred thinks that friends should share all things in common. According to Vernon’s interpretation, this was a pattern of behavior that was established in the very earliest days of the Church and is recorded in the Bible in Acts of the Apostles. In Aelred’s vision of friendship, sharing things in common comes to represent how friends are other selves to each other (Vernon, 2005).

While the various innovations that Aelred introduces are consequences of his world view, they also underlie many modern ideas about friendship. There seems to be no doubt for Aelred that friendship is a great good, perhaps life’s supreme good; certainly, like Aristotle and Cicero, he cannot imagine life without friends.

*Thomas Aquinas*

Thomas Aquinas has been called one of the greatest interpreters of Aristotle, which might be an indication that he thought highly of friendship. He is important because his thought led to a distinction that is critical if modern, secular attitudes towards friendship are to be revivified—the distinction between egoistic and altruistic love.

Aquinas discusses friendship twice in his *Summa Theologiae*, which is modeled, in part after *Nichomachean Ethics* (Pakaluk, 1991). The first discussion is part of an extended treatment of love. Here he treats love as a ‘passion’ or emotion, along with hatred, hope despair, fear, daring, and anger. Further, he suggests that although friendship can be for oneself or for another, which does not mean that it is not of benefit to both parties in both cases. For example, friendship based on utility or pleasure is primarily for oneself but can also contain elements that the friend benefits from too. This kind of
friendship, says Aquinas, may not be especially virtuous but neither is it necessarily evil; in essence it is no better or worse than the desire to eat or to own. Friendship that is explicitly for another is a love that although primarily for the other person and their sake also benefits the individual giving the friendship. It is a friendship that is disinterested in what can be gained from the relationship but which gains nonetheless.

The second is found in his detailed investigation of theological virtue of charity. Here he construes charity with friendship of God and with neighbor for God’s sake; hence, in explaining charity, he discusses the nature and characteristics of friendship. Given that friendship always benefits both parties, if to varying degrees, the real offence to God’s love is to be found in the extent to which on offer is possessive or not. The thing that determines whether love is godly is the extent to which it is focused on the good of the other person or the good of the individual: love that tends to the former is what we now call altruistic love, love that is for the other but benefits both; love that tends to the latter is what we now call egoistic love, love that is for oneself but benefits the other if only as a by-product (Elders, 1990).

Friendship reveals itself as either altruistic or egoistic in several ways. For example, an altruistic friendship is one in which if something happens to one friend or something is said against them, the other person in the relationship feels it as if they were themselves being hurt or maligned; they will oppose anything that might harm their friend as if it were harming themselves. In egoistic friendship, however, someone will only go out on a limb when they are directly threatened themselves (Lynch, 2005).

Pakaluk (1991) explains that for Aquinas, it would be his discussion of love that would more closely correspond to the accounts of friendship proposed by non-Christian
philosophers before him. He understands charity to be a new and supernatural friendship, unique to Christianity. Strictly speaking, then his discussion of charity is a work in theology, rather than philosophy. Lynch (2005) also comments that nevertheless, like many of Aquinas’s theological writings, the work has a great philosophical interest, because of the philosophical arguments and insight that he articulates in the course of the discussion.

**Early Modern**

*Montaigne*

Montaigne portrays friendship as not merely the finest form of love but the finest thing in life altogether, answering the deepest longings of the soul and providing the noblest use of human capacities (Pangle, 2003). He maintained that, in contrast to friendship, every other human bond is more limited and more constrained, either by fortune or by low necessity, and hence is less reflective of and supportive of what is best in us (Pakaluk, 1991).

Montaigne lived during a period of social and political upheaval, and the notion of friendship as a civic or political bond seems to have been unacceptable to him. Before Montaigne was thirty, the religious civil wars between French Protestants and Roman Catholics had broken out. As a Catholic mayor of Bordeaux between 1581 and 1585, Montaigne acted as advisor to Henry of Navarre and helped keep communication open between Protestant Navarre and Catholic France (Frame, 1965). His experiences seemed to confirm the distinctions he drew between noble friends and citizens—and between the sovereign friendships of virtuous men and the more common and often pragmatic friendship of ordinary men (Grunebaum, 2003).
True friendship Montaigne says, is not, indeed within the grasp of most people: He claims that a friendship such as his with La Boetie\(^2\) is a thing “so entire and so perfect that certainly you will hardly read of the like…So many coincidences are needed to build up such a friendship that it is a lot if fortune can do it once in three centuries” (Frame, 1958).

According to varied scholars, Montaigne intends his Essays to be a self-portrait, in which we might discern Montaigne. “I am myself the matter of the book,” Montaigne declares in the preface to the first volume of essays. He writes them, he tells us, “for his friends and relatives,” so that “they may recover here some features of my habits and temperament, and by this means keep the knowledge the have had of me more complete and alive.”

By implication then, one might surmise from the opening of the twenty-eighth essay that Montaigne believes that a friend is another self, because he features his friend in the central position of what is meant to be a portrait of himself (Pakaluk, 1991).

The essay describes the “sovereign and masterful” type of friendship Montaigne had with La Boetie. Montaigne knows Aristotle and Cicero thoroughly (Burke, 1981), but he complains that “the very discourses that antiquity has left us on this subject seem to me weak compared with the feeling I have.” He goes on to describe instead a kind of friendship in which friends are not merely united but rather become one. Aware that such assertions will be taken as exaggerations and metaphors by his readers (Pakaluk, 1991), Montaigne warns that only those “who have experienced what I tell” are fit judges.

Montaigne’s account of friendship is interesting because he shows what one would have to maintain to argue that friendship is simply the peak of human life. Like

\(^2\) Etienne de La Boetie was the deceased friend of Montaigne.
Aristotle, he says that virtue in both parties is a prerequisite of perfect friendship (Pangle, 2003). For such a friendship, “in which we act from the very bottom of our hearts, which hold nothing back, truly it is necessary that all the springs of action be perfectly clean and true”. But Montaigne seems to suggest that virtue is only a condition of perfect friendship and not the whole, perhaps not even the chief reason for the friends’ love (Pangle, 2003).

_Bacon_

Francis Bacon makes a strong case for the centrality of utility or (what is not quite the same thing) of mutual benefits in all serious friendships. In his essay *Of Friendship*, Bacon describes three great benefits or “fruits” of friendship, which appear to go beyond the low-level utility of friendships of profit or convenience (Pakaluk, 1991). Most commentators consider Bacon’s advice about friendship to be shrewd and practical.

First, according to Bacon, friends are necessary to the health of the soul. In opening one’s heart to a friend, one finds an alleviation of sorrows and a magnification of joys. Second, friends help one to judge and act wisely. In conversation with a friend, one can sort out one’s own thoughts better than one can in solitude, and one can receive the good counsel of another who combines the perspective of an outsider with the goodwill and tact of a friend. Third, friends can act on one another’s behalves in ways that they cannot act for themselves, bringing to completion projects and purposes that are cut short by death (Bacon, 1982).

In her analysis of Bacon’s essay, Pangle suggests that in all of these ways we may say that friends are useful to each other, and yet their capacity to benefit each other depends on their being more than friends of utility or convenience. Even a friendship whose only goal is profit requires a minimal amount of goodwill and fairness to function,
but the richer benefits Bacon speaks of require genuine affection. Opening one’s heart to another can lighten sorrows and magnify joys only if the other is a friend who fully shares them. Only counsel of a true friend is trustworthy: “It is a rare thing, except it be from a perfect and entire friend, to have counsel given, but such as shall be bowed and crooked to some ends which he hath that giveth it” (Bacon, 1982).”

Pakaluk highlights some of the darker elements of Bacon’s presentation of friendship. The need people have for companions to whom they can unburden their hearts is so strong says Bacon, that it causes many to trust others to their own detriment. Though, his essay gives significant testimony to the human need to have a friend, but it does not explain what, in human nature, disposes one to be a friend (Pakaluk, 1991).

**Contemporary**

C. S. Lewis’s wide-ranging discussion of friendship in *The Four Loves* is one of the most notable literary celebrations of friendship in recent times. Lewis offers a vision of friendship as one of the highest achievements of the individual. The value of friendship, like that of philosophy or art, Lewis argues, is mostly a “civilization value,” enabling us not to live, but to live well. Affection for others, and especially for one’s children and parents, is a natural, necessary for survival, and largely unselective in that it is independent of the fundamental qualities of the objects of our affection.

Friendship on the other hand, is the most spiritual, “the least natural of loves,” unnecessary from the biological point of view, and highly selective. It begins in shared interest, in companionship, and becomes friendship when the companions discover that they “see the same truth.” Friendship is also “the least jealous of loves,” shunning the exclusivity of eros. For no one person can bring out all the facets of a person’s character:
to see my friend (who may or may not also be my lover) in all his complexity, I need to see him through other friends as well (Badhwar, 1993).

Despite his paean to friendship, Lewis is alive to its hazards. Every friendship, he tells us, harbors a danger: the danger of degenerating into a mutual admiration society, indifferent or deaf to the view and needs of “outsiders” (Lewis, 1993). This danger is not limited to friendships of the self-absorbed or conceited, but is inherent in the appreciation or admiration that is a necessary feature of all friendships.

This is a provocative idea, for it suggests that there might be similar hazards in other desirable qualities as well: cowardice in gentleness; harshness in frankness; sloth in amiability. Equally provocative is Lewis’s view that the shared vision or common viewpoint that forges a friendship may be inherently bad. For this challenges a view held by a long line of thinkers—Aristotle, Cicero, Aquinas, Montaigne—that a “true” friendship can exist only between good people. This will be discussed further in a future chapter.

Lewis’s view of friendship love as the least natural of loves is in stark contrast to the not uncommon view that all loves, including that of friendship are entirely an expression of natural preferences and inclination (Lewis, 1993). An undeniable truth exists in this latter claim, namely, that natural preferences and inclinations play a role in our attractions, even in a “spiritual” a relationship as friendship. On the other hand, the “natural inclination” view overlooks the fact that our attractions are expressive, in part, of our values and past choices, the choices that make us the persons we are. It also overlooks the fact that when values conflict with natural inclinations, the former may ultimately prevail over the latter and extinguish or undermine the attraction.
In any case, Lewis’s conception of friendship resembles Aristotle’s character friendship based on virtue. Their two conceptions also are similar, because the common quest, for Lewis, according to Grunebaum, expands and augments each friend’s abilities to engage in shared interest in much the same way that Aristotle believes character friends help each other become virtuous.

Friendship, as Lewis describes it, involves neither reciprocal good will nor reciprocal intimacy. The nature of friendship, for Lewis, is a bond of common interest, goal, or quest. As he says, friendship must be about something beyond the friends themselves (Lewis, 1993). Lewis’s friendship resembles Aristotle’s insofar as friends desire to spend time together engaged in activities that express their mutual interests. However, it is the interests, not the persons or their virtue that are the basis of any shared activities (Grunebaum, 2003).

**Summary**

Clearly, a wide range exists in how friendship is conceived. While there are many similarities in the conceptions, for otherwise they would not all be recognizable as friendship, the various conceptions differ from each other along several different variables.

Because of its diversity, definition of the concept of friendship is not easy. Historically, benevolence and loyalty between friends seem to have been assumed (Schollmeier, 1994). Though, there was a question about the degree of loyalty demanded. The relation of agape to eros in some such meaning has even occupied the attention of modern theologians (Firth, 1999). For early Christians the secular idea of personal
friendship was in possible conflict with the religious injunction to love thy neighbor as
thyself.

Given all this, there is a practical side to all study of friendship. Comprehending
the similarities and differences of such a rich abundance of diverse friendship
conceptions requires an adequate set of concepts. Three different aspects of friendship
must be untangled and separated from each other; the basis of friendship, the object of
friendship, and the nature of friendship. They must be distinguished if different
conceptions of friendship are to be adequately understood.

The basis of friendship is the reason friends have for their relationship. Aristotle
mentions three different bases: pleasure, utility, and virtue. The object of friendship is
what friends do together as constitutive of their friendship. It is within the object of
friendship that moral issues of preferring friends to nonfriends primarily arise, because
the object of friendship establishes how friends are expected to treat each other insofar as
they are friends (Grunebaum, 2003).

The nature of friendship is a characterization of the relationship that distinguishes
friendship from other relationships between people. Aristotle believes that a reciprocal
goodwill is essential to friendship, and that it is found in friendships grounded on each of
his three bases (Pangle 2003).

This chapter has attempted to draw threads through key concepts in the
philosophical exploration of friendship; bridging themes through time and clearing a way
to settle on a definition of friendship for future chapters.
Chapter Three

Re-imagining the Possibility of Friendship

In order for this project to move toward some agreement of whether our private friendships really can affect our public hearts, consideration must be given to a number of variables. To this point, the boundaries for public and private haven’t been determined. Necessarily, this must be addressed. If left vague, the terms can obscure important distinctions. More specifically, what is to be considered when we refer to our “public hearts?”

Furthermore the aim of this chapter is to identify some key concepts and principals that can be taken into account and provide basic building blocks for the argument that friendship is indeed part of the solution to the overall concerns of this project. In developing this argument three important thinkers will be brought into conversation. The historical review of friendship literature places Aristotle at the forefront of philosophical reflections on friendship. As discussed, his is the fullest and most probing classical study of friendship and is a critical thread throughout this essay. Yet, Aristotle alone does not capture in its entirety the essence of this project.

Two modern thinkers whose works do not immediately or obviously stimulate conversation about friendship will be pulled into the conversation for reasons that should become clearer as this chapter progresses. Neither Hannah Arendt nor Paulo Freire wrote at length on the subject of friendship. Still the philosophical contributions of both are essential for mapping the premise of this dissertation.
This chapter will purport that elements of Aristotle, Arendt, and Freire taken in the context of the overriding theme of interracial friendship can add substance and breadth to the exploration of the topic. Necessarily, an overview of particular aspects of their philosophies is included here.

We will begin with some consideration of the private and public. Our public hearts are what propel us to find morally defensible and politically viable answers to the challenges facing democracy.

**Defining the Private and Public Sphere**

Questions of the origins and scope of the public sphere have been framed in various ways by scholars in communication and other disciplines over the past two decades. Burke (1984), Habermas (1989, 1993), and Sennett (1977) center their discussions on issues regarding the origins and historical transformation of the public sphere, suggesting that it developed as a result of historical, economic, political, or religious changes. Some others focus on the unique characteristics that define rhetoric in the public sphere. These scholars identify the specific forms of discourse that occupy the realm of the public and how this discourse differs from discourse that occurs in the private sphere. Still there are more who seek to discover how rhetoric calls publics into being, arguing that discourse creates distinct publics as situations or exigencies shift and change (Martin, 1983). They also argue that, as a result of these shifting exigencies, the existence of the public is an ideologically framed illusion. Fraser (1993), and Lyotard (1984) add their voices to the discussion, raising the question of whether the public sphere continues to exist in any meaningful way and offering postmodern assessments of this sphere in contemporary North American culture.
Habermas (1989, 1993), Sennett (1977), Biter (1978, 1987), Goodnight (1982, 1987), Hauser (1987), and Hauser and Blair (1982) all suggest that the public sphere is a place, a location to which individuals must go in order to have their discourse heard. The public sphere, however, is more than a place. Griffin (1996) writes, “It also is as an ideology--a reified pattern of explanations, a hierarchical ordering of locations--that functions to manage access to this realm.” The place of the public sphere does not only mean that it is a place where individuals take a position at the podium, or enter a ground of purposeful deliberation in order to arrive at the place of the public sphere (Griffin, 1996).

A general notion of "the public" relies on a contrast with its opposite, the private realm. The public is, in a sense, merely opposite of what is private: not enclosed, not hidden, not exclusive (Abowitz, 2008). Within the traditions of democratic political life, the public realm is a symbolic and a material space for persons as citizens to share in making political life (Walton, 2007). It is a space that promises inclusion of various sorts of people who all share stakes in a common issue or problem.

The struggle of the public sphere in democratic societies is historically and issue because different groups and individuals, more and less powerful, endeavor to shape political life and common ground (Abowitz, 2008). Because this common ground might be "thin" in terms of what all groups can agree upon, according to Abowitz (2008) “public spheres are thought to be more neutral on metaphysical and religious questions, allowing space for various kinds of lifestyles and belief systems within the society.” While this space for difference was narrow in early democracies, it has widened over centuries of liberal movements: "The idea of a public sphere is therefore in a sense
normative; even in its fledgling beginning where few take part, the idea it represents is one of universal access” (Kumar, 2008). The public sphere, since its best-known ancient realization in the Greek city-state of Athens, has been an ideal imperfectly realized (Abowitz, 2008). Our abilities to consider fellow citizens and to deliberate with them are coarse and uneven. The ability of citizens to consider themselves part of larger societies, communities nested within larger communities formed as the result of a historic and evolving democratic experiment (Kumar, 2008).

Enlightenment-based conceptions of political life have strongly influenced conceptions of the public life in U.S. society today (Abowitz, 2008). Two primary traditions of political thinking have dominated the theorizing of "the public sphere" and questions related to citizenship (Abowitz, 2008). The first of these, the civic republican tradition, respects the individual rights traditions in liberal democracy (Kumar, 2008). “A civic republican public is one in which government is a prominent but not exclusive institutional leader in promoting a common democratic life, in which there exist a number of different ethnic, racial, and ideological groups in civil society whose liberties are constitutionally protected and who struggle for recognition and inclusion” (Abowitz, 2008). The suggestion in this thesis is that friendships can help build the civic capacities and a wider sense of common good among different individuals. The second of these dominant Enlightenment-inspired philosophical frameworks, the liberal tradition, is one that “prioritizes individual rights to freedom of conscience and association, while attempting to balance the interests of the state, the family, and the individual” (Abowitz, 2008).
Review of Aristotle, Freire, and Arendt

Aristotle

Lynch (2005) wrote that “Aristotle presents the Greek polis as an arena of like-minded citizens who agree about their interest, adopt the same policy and act of their common resolutions.” This is a model of friendship or philia based on likeness and confirmation of the existing order (Lynch, 2005). The idea that all citizens were friends demanded an equality of rights, a harmony of interest, idea and activities, which we today would regard as impossible, but which was instantiated for Aristotle in the relations among the citizens of the Athenian polis (Lynch, 2005). Aristotle depicts friendship as the public bond that unites the virtuous and exclusively male citizens of the polis in a shared conception of the good and in shared practices. Thus friendship is a kind of “socio-political” cement and the goal of politics is its development. (Lynch, 2005). Civic friendship becomes a political relationship, since it creates unity among virtuous men of like mind and interests who share a conception of the good. Thus these friends indentify with one another on the basis of their joint citizenship, their virtue and shared conception of the good (Stern-Gillet, 1995).

According to Lynch, this view of friendship is one that commentators find problematic. Given present-day concerns with distinctions between the private and public spheres of life and between self and other, Aristotle’s definition of friendship can appear unfamiliar to modern sensibilities (Lynch, 2005). The philosophical literature is not consistently in agreement about the extent to which Aristotle’s ideas are relevant to contemporary notions of political community; and yet there is still some appeal to his ideas (Lynch, 2005). The title of Jacques Derrida’s book, Politics of Friendship suggests
an affinity with the Aristotelian ideal of politics as the business of friends, and indeed, Derrida sees in modern friendship something of what Aristotle saw in the fourth century BC (Lynch, 2005).

Lynch (2005) in an exhaustive analysis of Aristotle’s conception of friendship, suggests that Aristotle is deeply interested in both the political and private dimensions of relations between friends, in the moral aspects of those relationships and in the contribution of friendship to the good life. Lynch posits that for Aristotle the “political and the ethical intersect; the sociopolitical structures of the polis are aligned with its ethical prescriptions so that the raison d’etre of the polis is living well. Aristotle’s account appears to shift uneasily between a public and a private conception of friendship.”

In Aristotle’s conception, a true friend comes to your defense in the public square. Indeed, advocacy is an essential component of virtuous public relationships (Waldron, 2007).

Freire

Paulo Freire is a theorist and educator widely known for his influence on critical pedagogy. Freire did significant work in literacy during the decolonization process of several South American and African countries. He is also recognized for his 1970 book, Pedagogy of the Oppressed.

Research for this project has found that Freire's philosophy is “heavily laden with Marxist dialectical process, existentialism, and Freudian ideas of awareness and consciousness, but Catholic liberation theology dominates as the theme throughout this method” (Palmer, 1982).
According to Palmer, (1982), Freire believed that a radical reordering of society could take place if there were cooperative dialogue between the haves and the have-nots. He believed that the silent oppressed could not live active, free, and intelligent lives because of their natural and social environments. In this way, he uses Marx's conceptualization of the dialectical process, the oppressor and the oppressed, and incorporates the idea of unity of practice and theory in his methodology (Palmer, 1982). As he postulates, "knowledge must grow out of experiences that are genuine transactions with reality." The difficulties stimulate real thinking and good and true ideas are those solutions that work in practice. This learning method or consciousness-raising technique (conscientizacao) is to be used so that people might take action to alter or change their socioeconomic position. This cannot occur unless the newly acquired knowledge is tested (Palmer, 1982).

According to Freire’s own writing, the pedagogy of the oppressed consists of two stages. These are “(1) the oppressed unveil the world of oppression and through the praxis commit themselves to its transformation, and (2) In the second stage, in which the reality of oppression has already been transformed, this pedagogy ceases to belong to the oppressed and becomes a pedagogy of all people in the process of permanent liberation” (Freire, 1968). Therefore, freedom from the oppression, defined as the restriction of the voice of the oppressed, is overcome via praxis, “the act of reflection that dilutes the hierarchical and predefined student–teacher relationship into one of coproducer” (Srinivasan, 2006). As the extent of oppression is realized, the oppressed may begin to articulate their own voices and participate in the pedagogical process (Srinivasan, 2006). Freedom entails rejecting the image of the oppressor and instead embracing the autonomy
and collective responsibility common to all human beings. The dialectical relationship is enhanced as only the oppressed can free their oppressor and vice versa. The oppressor is freed from the power struggle of “dehumanization, which limits meanings, and from a materialistic belief that to be is to have” (Freire, 1968). Symmetrically, the oppressor can help free the oppressed from the trauma of hegemony, and the self-degradation that accompanies it (Srinivasan, 2006).

The banking model is described as information transfer, and parallels international information development initiatives that presume that access to externally authored information is the only means by which the global progress of the “information society” may be achieved (Webster, 2003). In Freire’s model, the problematic here is not one of information transfer, but the directionality of it, and the means by which this information is constructed and imparted. He argues: “Liberating education consists in acts of cognition, not transferals of information. It is a learning situation in which the cognizable object intermediates the cognitive actors-teacher on the one hand and students on the other” (Freire, 1968, p. 79).

According to Leeman (2004), banking education ensures the maintenance of an domineering society by:

- Mythologizing reality—“something to which people, as mere spectators, must adapt.”
- Resisting dialogue.
- Treating students as objects of assistance.
- Inhibiting creativity.
- Failing to acknowledge humans as historical beings.
Freire therefore advocates a system of liberating education that treats oppressors and oppressed as equals within the learning process (Leeman, 2004). “Through dialogue, the teacher of the students and student of the teacher cease to exist and a new term emerges: teacher-student and student-teacher. The teacher is . . . one who is himself taught in dialogue with the students, who in turn while being taught also teach” (Freire, 1968/2002). Problem-posed education suggests that the teacher and student enter a partnership that is a partnership between teacher and student that “democratizes content, how it is produced and valued, and focuses the education and learning around the here and now” (Srinivasan, 2006). In other words, instead of subscribing to an unfamiliar and historical requirement, education is centered in knowledge of the environments, peoples, epoch, and so on. In this sense, any of the participants may be more educated based on their own individual experiences, and the pedagogical process does not carry with it a historical model of power that suppresses the indigenous voice (Srinivasan, 2006). Freire’s model of thematic education extends this by conceiving of students as co-investigators with the teacher, and that together cross-cutting teams of students and teachers lead thematic investigations that they can present to the entire community. This process is reflexive, as throughout all must reexamine their roles, motivations, and principles, and therefore authentically commit themselves to the people. This commitment is the essence of the moral and emotional fabric that Freire concludes is consistent with his approach, and treats “people” as “us” rather than “other.”

While the theoretical grounding and implications of Freire's practices are profound, at the foundation of such work is the conviction that a critical, multicultural
democracy should be the driving force of the struggle for freedom. For Freire, conscientization, a sense of history, praxis, and dialogue are central to such a struggle.

Conscientization (i.e., “critical consciousness”) is the ability to analyze, problematize (pose questions), and affect the sociopolitical, economic, and cultural realities that shape our lives. Such a level of consciousness, according to Freire, requires that people place themselves in history, the assumption being that we are never independent of the social and historical forces that surround us. That is, we all inherit beliefs, values, and thus ideologies that need to be critically understood and transformed if necessary (Pepi, 2004). For Freire, this process of transformation requires praxis and dialogue (Coben, 1998). According to Pepi (2004), “Praxis refers to the ongoing relationship between theoretical understanding and critique of society and action that seeks to transform individuals and their environments.” Freire contends that awareness of a situation despite the best intentions does not by itself change the situation. Nor will unguided action make a difference. Instead, Freire argues that we, as actors, must constantly “move from action to reflection and from reflection upon action to a new action” (Pepi, 2004).

Freire conceived dialogue as a “horizontal relationship fed by love, humility, faith, and confidence” (Mayo, 2004). He referred to the experience of the dialogue when insisting that democracy should be practiced in public schools: “It’s necessary to have the courage to make democratic experiments (Freire, 1983).

The type of liberatory, dialogical pedagogical praxis that Freire advocated constituted an act of love:
“Dialogue cannot exist . . . in the absence of a profound love for the world and for [human beings] . . . . Because love is an act of courage, not of fear, love is commitment to other [people]. No matter where the oppressed are found, the act of love is commitment to their cause—the cause of liberation. And this commitment, because it is [a] loving [one], is dialogical. . . . Only by abolishing the situation of oppression is it possible to restore the love which that situation made impossible. If I do not love the world—if I do not love life—if I do not love [human beings] I cannot enter into dialogue” (Freire, 1996).

Freire defined dialogue as "the encounter between [humans], mediated by the world, in order to name the world." At its broadest, the concept of dialogue represents, for the Catholic Marxist Freire, the dialectical process of moving from thesis to antithesis to synthesis. At times, Freire uses the term interchangeably with another key term, "praxis," or "reflection and action upon the world to transform it (Freire, 1968).

_Arendt_

In 1957 Philosopher Hannah Arendt wrote an article critiquing the attempt to desegregate schools in Little Rock, Arkansas. The article is relevant in this thesis because it demonstrates some of the basic tenets of Arendt’s conceptions of distinctions that need to be made between the private and the public, Danielle Allen (2004) provides a critical analysis of Arendt’s article. At the time of Arendt’s article, the city of Little Rock was in tumult at the prospect of nine African American students attending a previously whites only high school. As Allen explains, Arendt’s article, “Reflections on Little Rock,” criticized the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the parents of the Little Rock Nine for “using political institutions like the courts and the public sphere generally to effect what she considered not a political program but self-
interested social advancement” (Allen, 2004). Allen explains that Arendt was moved by the disturbing news photographs of the young black girl, which showed her being threatened by a malicious throng as she attempted to enter the school alone. In her article, Arendt argued further that the parents, in pursuing social advancement, were exploiting their children. Allen (2004) recounts what Arendt wrote, “The girl obviously was asked to be a hero,” Arendt wrote, “which is something neither her absent father nor the equally absent representatives of the NAACP felt called upon to be.”

Arendt objected to any strategy that drew children, white or black, into a political fray, but according to Allen (2004), when she accused the African American parents of a lack of heroism, she also more specifically charged the desegregation movement with a failure to rise to the level of political action. Bohman (1997) suggests that Arendt’s position appears to depend heavily on an argument she published almost simultaneously in the *Human Condition* of 1958 that politics, properly understood, is a heroic activity; Achilles, the Greek hero of the Trojan War, is her paradigmatic political actor (Bohman, 1997).

Allen asserts that in Arendt’s analysis, the parents mistook a “social issue” for legitimate political battleground. This contention that school desegregation was not an appropriate object of political action rested on her strong distinctions among private, social, and political spheres. To the private realm she assigned intimacy and activities like marriage, love, and parenting; in the social world we secure our economic livelihood and also, importantly, discriminate against others by choosing friends who are like ourselves for ourselves and our children (Allen, 2004). Finally, in the political realm, in Arendt’s account, “we secure political rights, like the rights to vote and hold office, and
also private rights, like the right to marry whom we please” (Allen, 2004). The public sphere is also the arena for conversations with strangers and for epic action that brings glory to the actors (Bohman, 1997).

In her reading of Arendt, Allen (2004) states that Arendt’s central concern in *The Human Condition* was to translate an epic approach to politics into a democratic context. Democratic political agents must construct a common world out of difference and speak to one another qua men and not qua members of society. In a democracy, the ability to “fight a full-fledged political battle” consists of articulating “one’s own ideas about the possibilities of democratic government under modern conditions,” and of “proposing a transformation of political institutions (Arendt, 1958). Most important, political action in a democracy is the opposite of what we do as members of society, which is merely to “defend economic interests,” ask for “due consideration of vital interest, and function as “interest parties” (Arendt, 1958). In Arendt’s view, only nonheroic economic and “vital” interests were at stake in Little Rock (Allen, 2004).

In short, if we hold to Allen’s view, Arendt criticizes the actions of the African Americans involved in Little Rock as failures of citizenship. Their “nonpolitical” actions in Little Rock caused a crisis that could be solved, she argued, only by converting the public to “new citizenly practices of tact and restraint.” According to Allen’s interpretation of Arendt in this case, if the U.S. democracy were to succeed at its new post-1957 constitution, developing enough trust and stability to preserve democracy, its citizens would heroically have to surrender their concern with social issues. Only this “genteel mode of citizenship,” Arendt believed, could convert long-standing divisions into stuff of public debate and also preserves the public sphere (Allen, 2004).
The Conversation

The beginning of this chapter has purposely provided brief and selective examinations relevant (to this project) philosophical themes of Aristotle, Arendt and Freire. Here the chapter will consider how these themes can be appropriated to support the overarching theme of this project.

In his extended dialogue of friendship and equality, Aristotle has revealed much self-interest at work in even the most virtuous friendships. But even if each man does love his own good “most of all”, Aristotle has nowhere retracted his assertion that true friends also love one another for their own sakes (Pangle, 2003).

Aristotle’s philosophy of friendship comes to bare on this project when we consider a contemporary world in which piety has receded and the cultivation of virtue seems like an old-fashioned pursuit, what seems to matter most in life is the depth and quality of our connections with people we love. Aristotle believes that friendship is one of the most important ingredients in the happy life.

These thoughts on Aristotle are purposely succinct. While Aristotle’s contributions cannot be ignored or left unstated, in this case, they do not completely satisfy the argument being put forth in this essay. Here we will turn toward Freire to flesh out some unique ideas that this thesis proposes.

Paulo Freire (1970) stated that “a commitment to social justice requires a moral and ethical attitude toward equality and a belief in the capacity of people as agents who can transform their world.” Furthermore, he stated that “to create social change and to promote social justice, we must begin this process with ourselves-through a self-reflective process that examines the contradictions between our espoused values and our
lived experience.” In other words, we must believe that all people, both from privileged and beleaguered groups, have a critical role in eliminating oppression and generating a vision for a socially just future. For if only people from oppressed groups take on this responsibility, there is little hope that we will ever achieve the goal to eliminate oppression.

Adams, Bell, and Griffin (2007) defined an ally as an individual from an agent group who rejects the dominant ideology and takes action out of a belief that eliminating oppression will benefit both agents and targets of oppression. These authors describe several different characteristics of an ally, including “taking responsibility for one's own learning, acknowledging unearned privilege, and being willing to be confronted, to consider change, and to commit to action.” The authors also describe allies as “those who are willing to take risks and try new behaviors, despite their fear.”

Here I suggest that we substitute ally for friend. Friendship is stronger, more textured and substantive. While allies by definition stand by our side in battle, our friends are likely to take up our cause without reservation or condition. Using Freirean logic, we should be able to count on our friends to do what we may not be able to, whether it’s because of social position, limited resources or some other malady. In an interracial friendship there must be a mutual relinquishing of those traditional roles, oppressor and oppressed, and then we must still be willing to explore the remnants of those roles.

We are, Freire reminded us, beings of history and culture, influenced in ways we often cannot recognize by the traditions, practices, and beliefs of our past. We are, importantly, never fully determined by dominant structures, ideas and practices, past or present. It is perhaps more productive to consider whether the Freirean notion of
liberation is merely the process of struggling against oppression. We might accept, with Freire, that the world as it is currently structured is oppressive, in multiple ways, with different consequences for different oppressed groups. It might also be acknowledged that any robust theory of liberation must at the very least take into account the reality of oppression - in its myriad different forms (Abowitz, 2008). This does not compel us to make the struggle against oppression the defining feature of such a theory. In Freire's case, clearly this struggle is a key theme, but it is arguably not the only element in his theory of liberation.

From his earliest writings, Freire has emphasized the importance of human virtues such as love, hope, trust, faith, and critical thinking (Freire, 1972). In later works, including Pedagogy of Indignation, these virtues occupy a more prominent place in Freire's discussion of education, ethics, and politics. There is, as has been discussed elsewhere (Roberts, 2003), a complex relationship between universals and particulars in Freire's work. Freire's support for a position of unity in diversity (Freire, 1994, 1996, 1997), in which differences would become a source of strength rather than fragmentation and divisiveness. This is, in part, recognition of the contexts in which Freire's ideas emerged for this project.

One can draw a number of critical thoughts from Freire in the context of our examination of interracial friendships as it relates to our public hearts. There is a tendency in our society for the marginalized, disenfranchised and perpetually underserved to disengage from public life and the larger society. These voices go unheard, which I would argue weakens the community. Friendship, however, can fill this
void. Through friendship, we discover those human virtues that Freire emphasized, love, hope, trust and faith.

Freire doesn’t fully satisfy the argument for friendship as an answer to the disposition of our public hearts. Here, I draw on an unlikely source, the political thought of Hannah Arendt, to challenge the idea of public reason as a normative standard for the conduct of political discourse in pluralistic liberal democracies and to outline the beginnings of an alternative to it (Button, 2005). I refer to Arendt as an unlikely source for help in these matters because, as most readers of Arendt are aware, she makes some rather stern distinctions between what are for her properly public/political activities and what must be kept private (Button, 2005). Yet it would be a mistake to presume that Arendt's demarcations between the public and private participates in or can be grafted onto the secular-religious distinction that is such a prominent feature of the debates surrounding contemporary political liberalism (Button, 2005). Indeed, it is precisely because Arendt's political thinking cannot be mapped out in relation to the ongoing theoretical-political dispute between liberalism and religion that her political thought can provide important new insights into the contemporary controversy that surrounds the idea of public reason (Bader, 1998).

While Arendt's conception of politics is in its own unique way bound up with a series of seemingly rigid demarcations (between the political and the social or economic, for example), her approach to the self and political action, as well as her understanding of the stakes of sustaining an open political realm more generally, create a critical space in which to challenge the basic conceit of liberal public reason: that participation in the grammar of public reason is the sign of one's moral standing as a good and reasonable
democratic citizen (Button, 2005). Yet the purpose of this project is not critical, but constructive. This thesis will argue that by turning to Arendt's appreciation for the role of self-disclosure in political speech and action, we are provided with a model of political dialogue that can expand in powerful ways the meaning and significance of our “public hearts.”

Within the extensive scholarship dedicated to Hannah Arendt's political thought, there is significant disagreement concerning both how her theory of action and the public sphere should be understood, and what political consequences (if any) might follow from adopting one or another privileged interpretive reading of Arendt's theory (Guttman, 1996). There are many excellent analyses of these interpretive battles and the issues at stake within them (Villa, 1996). It appears that the one thing that nearly all of Arendt's interpreters have been able to agree upon is that there are significant tensions within her theory of action and the public sphere (Button, 20005). These tensions (for some, contradictions) have been explored along a number of different axes: the expressive and the communicative models of action (d'Entreves, 1985) the communicative and the instrumental-strategic (Habermas, 1977), the agonal versus the narrative (Benhabib,) and elitist/heroic versus democratic/participatory (Parekh, 1981). Doubtless these and many other interpretive divisions will continue to mark the study of Arendt's political thought for the foreseeable future, and some of this (at least where scholars recognize that the tensions in Arendt's thinking are themselves a partial reflection upon the very conditions of contemporary democratic political life, requiring exploration, not resolution) is all to the good (Villa, 1996). Yet my aim in what follows is not to engage Arendt's critics, but rather to consider what consequences and what alternative possibilities Arendt's political
theory might hold for us when focused upon the question of the relationship between private friendship and our public hearts.

According to Arendt, the “raison d’être of public words and deeds” is self-disclosure, the disclosure of one's unique humanitas to others in a plural, political context. "In acting and speaking, men show who they are, reveal actively their unique personal identities and thus make their appearance in the human world" (Arendt, 1958). This is, to be sure, a complicated and difficult way of thinking about political speech, for while it does not deny the importance of common decision-making, such a view takes the essential significance of politics out of the domain of the strictly instrumental mode of interest articulation/acquisition, means-ends rationality, or consensus formation (Bader, 1998). Instead, Arendt's vision of politics emphasizes the intangible "web" of human inter-relationships that are created between people when they enter a public political space (Button, 2005). Public words and deeds are always, of course, about some objective, material concern or reality, but what is of equal importance for Arendt are the immaterial webs of relationships that form whenever people gather in a public political context (Button, 2005). As the metaphor of the "web" suggests, this quality of the political is somewhat intangible and exceedingly fragile and perishable (Bader, 1998).

What Arendt compels us to ask of political liberalism and of the idea of public reason is how mutual respect, let alone friendship, could ever be thought to arise between people who see it as an incumbent feature of that relationship to withhold, avoid, detach, or transfigure what may well be the most significant thing about them—their faith, their conception of the good, their sense of values and the source of those values.
The appeal of Arendt in this thesis is that by repeatedly stressing the interconnections between friendship, political discourse, and humanitas, Arendt helps us to see that there is something essentially self-defeating about any model of respect or civic friendship that depends on a "method of avoidance" to come about. It is self-defeating because it overlooks or denies the inevitable role of disclosure and humanitas in our political relationships—a factor that must be accounted for in our political lives even when those associations are concentrated upon "reaching an altogether worldly, material object" (Arendt, 1958). Hence, friendship-political friendship for Arendt-consists in addressing what stands between people, in the sense of what both unites and separates people (Bader, 1998). The idea here is not that in doing so everyone will necessarily come to like everybody else, nor of course that everyone will come to some kind of agreement about a particular conception of the good, but rather that in "talking about what is between them, it becomes ever more common to them" (Arendt, 1990).

What is important for Arendt is that this idea of making things common between plural selves, and forming bonds of civic friendship in turn, requires a space of critical publicity in which one's "truths" can be disclosed and engaged by others (Bader, 1998). "The political element in friendship is that in the truthful dialogue each of the friends can understand the truth inherent in the other's opinion ... This kind of understanding-seeing the world from the other fellow's point of view-is the political kind of insight par excellence" (Arendt, 1990). From an Arendtian perspective, values like mutual respect and the norms of reciprocity are not violated or harmed by citizens invoking their comprehensive religious or philosophic views in public; to the contrary, the conditions for mutual respect and civic friendship are provided by individuals honestly speaking, as
far as they are able, their "truths" as they see them (Button, 2005). According to Button, this is not a sufficient condition for the endurance of a common public world, but it is a necessary one. Whereas the criterion of reciprocity is ultimately constrained by a particular form of reason-giving in political liberalism, reciprocity for Arendt is a cultivated sentiment that is ultimately concerned with sustaining an open, common world between plural subjects (Button, 2005).

For Arendt, no humanly meaningful political in-between or commons can take shape between citizens, and no civic friendship can arise, without speech and action that is able-as far as speech can-to reveal the "who" of each person in his unique plurality (Button, 2005).

**Summary**

This chapter has attempted to construct the argument that allows us to consider how we can reconcile our private interracial friendships with our public hearts. Understanding that public hearts is intended to mean our responsibility as citizens to find morally defensible and politically viable answers to the issues that present the greatest challenges facing democracy today, this chapter engages a new approach.

A point of clarification that needed to be made is the distinction of public and private. The boundaries between public and private are, as almost everyone has insisted (see, e.g., Weintraub 1997), shifting, porous, and unstable. In the history of Western societies we can observe, at different times and in different places, a variety of ways in which what we have come to think of as "private" and "public" behavior and practices were both linked and separated (Aries and Duby 1987-1991). Not only do these
boundaries change over time but also at any one time different groups can read them differently.

The obvious inclusion of Aristotle’s conception of friendship provided an opportunity to consider how the naturalness of friendship, the possibility of selflessness in friendship, and the relationship of friendship to justice could sustain relevance from antiquity to present day. Necessarily more time was spent delving into the particulars of Paulo Freire and Hannah Arendt. The inclusion of their voices is less apparent on the surface, but clearly they contribute to the overriding theme of this thesis.

In Freire, I would argue, we find equality in friendship. Friendship provides those elements of human character that when examined within the context of this thesis offer the best outcome for our public hearts—hope, trust, and love. Arendt, on the other hand, offers space and truthful dialogue. In terms relevant to the issue of interracial friendships, Arendt would not allow dialogue to be a barrier. Instead it would be a necessity as a means to know “who” we are.

In this chapter I’ve introduced the possibility that there is a basis to use friendship as a tool to make us culturally responsive. Yet there is a need to examine friendship on its own terms. The complexity of defining what friendship is and who is a friend will be considered in the upcoming chapters along with the implications of race as a variable in friendship phenomenon.
Chapter Four

Meaning and Uses of Friendship

The whistle-stop tour in Chapter 2 through the historical discourse on friendship was intended, in part, to indicate the difficulty of distilling essential criteria definitive of friendship from consideration of relations between those regarded as friends. In fact consideration of etymology and philosophical literature only indicates the complexity of the concept (Lynch, 2005).

This chapter will work itself out in three parts. First I will consider the term and its origins as well as its various uses in both ancient and contemporary times. For many, the term encompasses a wide range of individuals. Yet others are far more selective in their usage of the term. Secondly the chapter will consider a particular contemporary social science perspective. Research suggests that much of the contemporary work on friendship and its complexities is done in the social science and social psychology fields. Lastly, the chapter will consider the implications for this thesis. How do we present friendship as a possible solution to the issues facing democracy, if we can’t define what friendship is?

It is relevant to examine both the ancient and modern conceptions of friendship because despite the apparent continuities between classical and modern idea of friendship as a mutual, voluntary, loving, and unselfish relationship, there are deep differences between them that reflect various values and assumptions (Konstan, 1997). For example, one aspect of friendship commonly emphasized in modern considerations is the need for self-disclosure as the basis for intimacy and trust between friends (Konstan, 1997). Steve
Duck (1983) writes: “The main feature that stabilizes, establishes and develops relationships of all types is proper and dexterous control of self-disclosure; that is, the revelation of personal layers of one’s self, personal thoughts, or even one’s body.” Bell (1981) also writes that acquaintanceship falls short of friendship precisely because it “is not a relationship of intimacy or exchange of confidences,” even though “a great amount of information may be passed between those who are acquaintances.”

Modern discussions often suppose that the basis of attraction between friends resides in their individual or personal qualities: “The person who is a friend must be appreciated as a unique self rather than simply a particular instance of a general class” (Suttles, 1970). In a survey of modern views on friendship, Jacqueline Wiseman (1986) writes that, however they may “describe characteristics they believe are integral to their friends’ make-up, respondents often imply a uniqueness in their combination.” Ancient writers, on the contrary, tend to emphasize traits that are good (or some definition of good) rather than singular; while excellence may be rare, it is always of a kind (Konstan, 1995).

In antiquity, frankness or candor among friends is a value, although according to Konstan, it becomes prominent in discussions of friendship only in the Hellenistic and Roman periods. Konstan (1997) also suggests that, honesty is prized in antiquity because it discriminates the true friend from the “toady.” In addition, it is recognized that the people require criticism, provided it is constructive, in order to recognize their faults (Konstan, 1997).

Uniqueness and self-disclosure are related: one reveals what is peculiar to oneself (Lynch, 2005). Because each person is distinctive, a special value attaches to the
possibility of communicating. In a study of friendship in the United States, Brenton (1974) writes: “All of us, regardless of our capacity for intimacy, want to be understood.” Friendship then can be imagined as opening a special window onto an interior self that is ordinarily opaque or hidden (Bell and Coleman, 1999).

The themes of individuality, separateness, confession and communion are dimensions of a sense of self that is characteristic of contemporary sensibility (Konstan, 1997). William Sadler (1970) writes that “when we sense that a friend really understands us and truly communicates with us, then we know that cynicism and despair are unnecessary because loneliness is not revelatory of the ultimate character of human life…When interpreted from within the perspective of love, the experience of loneliness is transformed into an awareness of our singular identity. This identity is accepted and affirmed by a true friend.”

At any time, including today, sundry conceptions of friendship coexist, and not all conform to the dominant fashion (Fehr, 1996). Konstan (1997) posits that it appears that many writers have perceived a decline in the quality of friendship in modern society as a consequence of alienation and the commodification of personal relations; Miller (1983) lists the market economy, Protestantism, philosophical monadism, individualism, technology, rationalism, professionalism, and mobility as “all tending to destroy intimacy.” In contrast to the psychologizing tendency of recent literature on friendship, other voices continue to stress virtue or utility or the mere passing of time together (Konstan, 1997).

This chapter examines some facets of the kaleidoscope that is friendship. It considers the etymological history of the term, its various uses and misuses, drawing
example from the philosophy of the ancient Greeks as well as from current usage. Aristotle, of course, provides a set of standards to which many of the ideas throughout this thesis respond.

The Etymology

The word friend is derived from the Old English words Freon—which meant free—and freo, which meant love. It is also derived from the Old Teutonic frijojan and Dutch vriend—both of which originally meant love (Lynch, 2005). Two important aspects of the modern English term are captured by these denotations. First, friendship involves an emotional bond; a friend is one for whom we have a depth of feeling. The emotional attachment between friends is a mutual and reciprocal one: friends feel deeply towards each other and know that this feeling is reciprocated (Lynch, 2005). A friend is probably aware that her friend also recognizes this. Thus friendship involves not friendship, but knowledge (Lynch, 2005).

This knowledge is not simply of each other’s liking, but also of character, personality and general affairs. Friends have—or at least aspire to—an intimate knowledge of one another (Lynch, 2005). The depth of feeling between friends and the intimacy of their knowledge puts them in a potentially vulnerable position in relation to one another (Lynch, 2005). This vulnerability draws attention to the role of trust between friends. As Cicero argues, trust is “the foundation of that steadfastness and loyalty for which we a looking in friendship (Cicero, 1991). The kind of confident expectation that explains trust implies a commitment that cannot be adequately characterized in terms of its purposes—at least not in a narrowly instrumental way (Lynch, 2005). As such, it is a commitment that delivers participant in a friendship both rewards and challenges.
According to Lynch (2005) the second aspect that the etymology of the word friend reveals is that friendship is a voluntary relationship: it is freely entered into and can be freely given up. This element of choice is crucial in friendship (Lynch, 2005). We cannot make a friend simply on the grounds that we find that person appealing. Similarly, I cannot be forced to become a friend. However, volition also brings a certain vulnerability and fragility to the relationship (Lynch, 2005). From an etymological perspective, the emotional bond between friends and the voluntary nature of the relationship are central characteristics of friendship, but they are not sufficient to explain the genesis and cultivation of friendship.

**Its Uses**

It is not outside the realm of possibility to encounter relationships in which the participants are considered to be friends, but in which some of the characteristic criteria or assumptions are absent. Within ancient Greek conceptions of friendship, “guest-friendships” fall into this category (Lynch, 2005). Guest friendships might have a relationship by virtue of an obligation inherited as a result of family history. Lynch (2005) explains that affective considerations and the concept of choice in friendship are not applicable to these relationships, since the guest-friends “might not even know one another.” The relationships can be imposed upon individuals as duties and may be maintained purely out of self-interest (Lynch, 2005). These friends may not even like one another.

Within a contemporary context we encounter similar relationships. Individuals referred to a “family friends” may in fact be people with whom we have little in common and may not particularly like. The relationship we share with them has perhaps been
inherited from another family member or is a function of being a member of a particular family. Consequently, we acknowledge and participate—at least to some degree—in a relationship we refer to as friendship, despite the qualifications that apply to it.

With regard to the development of notions of friendship, we refer to the relationships in which young children engage as friendship (Gross, 2002). According to Gross (2002), this is despite the recognition that young children initially take a procedural approach to friendship, in which they engage in some of the outward manifestations of friendship. As they mature they move into the later stages of development and to more substantive notions of friendship; they begin to appreciate the perspective of the other, to develop an appreciation of the “otherness of the friend” and to recognize “demands for reciprocity and the potential for intimacy” (Gross, 2002). Thus children move from a view of friendship as a relationship focused on self, which is perhaps pleasant and advantageous to the self, to gradually less self-centered conceptions (Gross, 2002). However, the early stages are none the less referred to as friendship.

The preceding examples illustrate variety in the usage of the term friendship, but are peripheral uses of the term. However, we do engage with others whom we are not hesitant to describe as friends, despite certain misgivings about the nature of our relationship; friendships in which we have misgivings about the quality or degree of mutual affection or the quality of reciprocity are examples (Lynch, 2005). One might be disturbed by what appears to be an imbalance of affection or wonder about the level of my friend’s commitment to our relationship. One might be puzzled to find that a friendship which appeared to be fading is suddenly reignited, or upset to find that a friend appears to have lost interest in the friendship. As a consequence of a change of
circumstance or of conflict, one might suspect that a friend differs in her understanding of
the ground of the friendship (Adams and Allan, 1998). Simmel (1950) argues that these
kinds of difficulties are likely to emerge in modern society, given the nature of the
differentiated friendships that are typical of modern life. Such friendships might connect
us with others on the basis of a variety of shared features: our common intellectual
interest, common religious impulses, shared place of employment, similar social roles, or
joint participation is sport. There is much that is not revealed to us—and as Simmel
suggests, perhaps even concealed from us—in differentiated friendships. Pressures from
spheres of life that friends do not share can undermine a relationship; changes in
employment, social role or place of residence can also affect such friendships (Simmel,
1950). From an Aristotelian perspective, these could well prove to be relationships that
would fit into the category of friendships of utility or pleasure and hence be regarded a
qualified friendship (Lynch, 2005). But modern friendships in which the friends regard
their liking and care for one another in themselves as the focus of the relationship can
also be undermined or attenuated by changes in the circumstances of the friends, such as
the imposition of distance (Fehr, 1996).

So much of our lives is a history of friendship. Broadly speaking, there are few
experiences so universally shared as the experience of being a friend. In a study of
friendship in the United States, Myron Brenton (1974) writes: “All of us, regardless of
our capacity for intimacy, want to be understood.” Friendship is thus imagined as
opening a special window onto an interior self that is ordinarily opaque or hidden
(Konstan, 1997). Acquaintances, by contrast, know “of the other only what he is toward
the outside” (Simmel, 1959).
Ronald Sharp (1986) attributes “the recent plight of friendship” to “those elements of modernity that have been variously associated with existential angst, narcissism, rootlessness, nihilism, alienation, the breakdown of community, and general estrangement,” and he concludes that “in the face of that painful loneliness, friendship seems to have reemerged as something both highly valued and intensely desired.

Within our culture, friendship is normally seen as a freely chosen voluntary relationship (Fehr, 1996). Who friends are, what they do together, how the relationship develops is taken to be of concern only to the friends themselves. Yet on reflection it is clear that friendship is not just a personal tie. The point here is that friendships are not just freely chosen. They are developed and sustained within the wider framework of people’s lives.

Every person in the world, just by reason of being the unique persons we are, experiences the universe and human life in it from our own unique perspective. Further, each one of us sees it in terms of our own background and history. By sharing their conscious lives, each friend in some measure experiences life from the friend’s unique perspective. Each friend, therefore, to some extent takes on the other’s ways of perceiving, understanding, and affectively responding to the world they live in. They grow toward having one mind and one heart as much as may be without being unfaithful to the truth as they see it or to themselves.

Many of those who write on friendship do not touch on the types of friendship outside of Aristotle’s schema, which was examined in Chapter three. His is the classic one, more widely known and more widely followed than any other (Stern-Gillet, 1995). Some may differ from him in certain details but do not radically revise the main lines of
what he has provided. Hunt (1991) wrote that Aristotle’s model of friendship is “the prime philosophical referent for most theological treatments of friendship.” It can be safely stated that Aristotle’s model is also the prime referent for philosophical treatments of friendship (Toner, 2003). This fact suggests both the value of Aristotle’s treatise as well as the scarcity of original philosophical reflection on the nature of friendship during the centuries since he wrote.

Reisman is one of the rare authors who attempted to produce a schema independent of Aristotle’s (Lynch, 2005). He suggests a different principle of division than that of Aristotle, though one of his three kinds of friendships includes Aristotle’s three types (Reisman, 1979).

Reisman’s (1979) principle for distinguishing his three main types of friendship is “the balance of affection and loyalty” found in each of them. He sums up his discussion of these types in this way: “We have been emphasizing that there are three kinds of friendship, not just one. A major distinction among them is the balance of affection and loyalty. When both parties give their love and loyalty to one another, the friendship is reciprocal. If one person gives love and loyalty to another who does not similarly return it, the friendship is receptive. If neither party feels loyalty or deep fondness for the other the friendship is associative.”

In Reisman’s reciprocal friendship, the friends see each other as equals. Their mutual affection and loyalty makes possible a healthy frankness between them, their mutual honesty never experienced as cruel or threatening. This kind of friendship, Reisman says, has been and is regarded both by authorities on the subject and by people in general as the most desirable form of human association. Reciprocal friends, he
observes, are commonly called “real” or “true,” “ideal” or “perfect” friends, as though other friendships were false or less valuable (Reisman, 1979).

Reisman’s second type of friendship, which he calls receptive friendship, is characterized by imbalance, inequality, by a superior-inferior relationship. For instance, one teaches or bestows favors from a position of wealth and power while the other gives appreciation and loyalty in return. Sometimes the difference in status is so unequal that the receptive friend would be presumptuous to think of any other return to the giving friend. It could be argued says Reisman, that the satisfaction or pleasure the giver finds in the very giving and in being appreciated is sufficient compensation (Reisman, 1979). He also points out, however, that where there is in fact a difference in status between reciprocal friends, the friends act to eliminate it, just as where there is in fact no difference in status to begin with, a receptive friendship tends in the very nature of such friendship to bring about a status differential.

It is important to be aware that Reisman is not a philosopher, but a social scientist. Unlike philosophers who he believes are only interested in what they see as the ideal form of friendship, Reisman’s friendship of reciprocity, scientific studies are mostly concerned with what he names associative friendships, his third type. Scientific study of the first type, he says, is very hard or impossible, while the latter is well suited for such study. Indeed the primary concern of his book is understanding and showing the value of associative friendship for social life (Reisman, 1979).

A person in such a relationship, he says, is what is most commonly meant by the word “friend” and this type of friendship is the one most commonly experienced (Reisman, 1979). While reciprocal friendship is relatively rare, everyone has many
associative friends: neighbors, classmates, members of a church congregation, fraternity or sorority members, office staff, teaching faculty, and so on. Although some of these relationships can develop into reciprocal or receptive friendship, for the most part they never involve any deep fondness or loyalty and people are content to leave them that way. They do not expect or seek anything more. It is enough that these relationships make life more pleasant and our work more effective (Reisman, 1979).

There are two “variations on this theme of associative friendship,” according to Reisman. First there are those who are forced to be with one another and to interact because of their work, their roles, their social positions, their engagement in some common project. The friendship is primarily based on these factors. The other type of associative friendship is that established by preference and choice. External factors do not force these relationships. Those who enter into this second type of associative friendship do, of course, have reasons, sometimes compelling needs. Reisman thinks these reasons “can be reduced to Aristotle’s three reasons: pleasure, utility, virtue” (Reisman, 1979).

**The Implications**

While Aristotle’s is the preeminent position on friendship and Reisman offers a provocative and reasonable alternative, neither schemata completely satisfies how it is necessary to understand friendship in the context of this thesis. Certainly, that is not to say that either lacks value or significance. This is not an attempt to undo or critique. However, the working definition for this thesis requires terms that are less elastic. One must be able to say definitively that “she is a friend,” “he is not a friend.” Ours is a world in which work has become dominant, and we identify ourselves in terms of what we do (for pay), not who our friends are (Allan, 1996). Friend often means little more
than “acquaintance,” and frequently friend must be preceded by various modifiers (business friend, bridge friend). This thesis requires that personal friendship be clearly distinguished from other kinds of friendship and that its essential features be brought to light. This thesis will suggest that the concept of friendship as interpreted by Ralph Waldo Emerson could serve to promote the concept of the public heart enriched rather than strained by the multicultural realities of most modern societies.

Emerson suggests, in his 1844 essay “Politics,” that citizens might someday “exercise toward each other there grandest and simplest sentiments, as well as a knot of friends, or a pair of lovers.” What he appears to suggest is that citizens should model their conduct toward one another on the norms of friendship. What then are the norms of friendship?

It seems that the ties uniting citizens have been fractured by special interest groups and public opinion influenced by powerful media forces, which leaves fewer connections between citizens other than on the concrete level of the state, where individuals share the status of taxpayers and clients, and at the abstract level of the nation, where citizens often love their country, if not necessarily their countrymen (Scorza, 2004). Emerson wonders, “Could not a nation of friends even devise better ways” (Emerson, 1983)? This project would extend that thought to suggest that a nation of interracial friendships could devise better ways.

Emerson had two crucial communicative norms, which he called truth and tenderness (Scorza, 2004). Scorza (2004) gives a brief accounting of these concepts: “The norm of truth is a posture of candor and directness in political speech, and a willingness to listen to such speech from others, while the norm of tenderness is an attitude of gentle
respect toward others and a responsiveness or openness to others (particularly, those who are different from oneself.” While the characteristics of friendship may take on myriad forms, for the purpose of this project truth and tenderness will encompass the essence of friendship.

Relations of friendship, constrained by the norm of tenderness, are enriched with an element of civility, which is a quality that is no less essential for our public hearts than it is for friendship. The norm of truth, conversely, holds the possibility for significant incivility. Scorza (2004) provides some insights that are critical to understanding Emerson in relation to this project. Scorza (2004) points out that Emerson emphasizes communicative norms, rather than more demanding civic obligations. In other words, citizens could not reasonably be expected to engage in “communal care, general responsibility for the welfare of compatiriots, or fully active political participation without first being taught the intrinsic value of these practices” (Scorza, 2004). On the other hand, they could begin to practice the communicative norms integral to Emerson’s conception of friendship in public life for purely instrumental reasons.

Let’s then consider the implications of Emerson’s conception of friendship on this project. The main strength of his conception of friendship as it relates here is that it promotes solid relationships where disagreements are possible but not explosive. Friends, after all, disagree all the time but make reserving and strengthening the bonds of friendship a priority and winning a particular argument a secondary consideration (Scorza, 2004). Briefly in the first chapter of this thesis and more extensively in chapter six this project identifies communication as a significant barrier to interracial friendships. It would seem that by practicing truth and tenderness, the two crucial norms of
friendship, relationship between fellow citizens—regardless of race—can slowly develop, and can gradually come to be characterized by a more open form of deliberation, a more stable form of disagreement, and a more fully actualized sense of the public heart.

Indeed, if the norms cultivated within friendship are transferable to our public hearts, then people who understand what it means to be a good friend also will know something about what it means to be a good citizen. Further if we challenge ourselves to open our friendships outside of the norm of sameness, the benefits will be twofold.

Summary

This chapter has demonstrated that although friendship as a term has a specific and meaningful origin, there is still much to be decided about how we choose to define it. Even classical philosophers do not appear to agree on how friendship should be conceptualized.

Yet the significance of friendships should not be minimized even if we may have a very thin understanding of what friendship entails. For example, Bellah et. al. (1996), drawing upon Aristotle, suggest that the traditional idea of friendship has three components: “Friends must enjoy each other's company, they must be useful to one another, and they must share a common commitment to the good”. In contemporary western societies, it is suggested, we tend to define friendship in terms of the first component, and find the notion of utility a difficult to place within friendship (Allan, 1996).

What we least understand is the third component, shared commitment to the good, which seems quite extraneous to the idea of friendship (Allan, 1996). In a culture dominated by expressive and utilitarian individualism, it is easy for us to understand the
components of pleasure and usefulness, but we have difficulty seeing the point of considering friendship in terms of common moral commitments (Fehr, 1996).

Additionally, with the understanding that so much contemporary scholarship related to friendship and its complexity is done in the realm of social science, this chapter reviewed the concepts of Reisman. Reisman appears to conclude that the most common friendships are “association” friendships. In other words, most of our friends are acquaintances with whom we are friendly. That conclusion falls short, as it relates to this project, of providing any significant contribution to the process of defining the kind of substantive friendship needed to support this thesis.

While Reisman’s theory is singled out here, mainly because it offers some alternative to the Aristotelian notions that so many contemporary scholars mirror, it does not stand alone in its shortcomings for this project. The difficulty in finding a notion of friendship that is not generalized is perhaps the most significant concern of the project.

However, the necessity to settle on a workable conception for this thesis landed with considerable deliberation within the framework of Emerson’s conception of friendship as a model for liberal citizenship. Foremost among the norms of friendship identified by Emerson are two communicative constraints, which he calls truth and tenderness. According to Emerson, the bonds of friendship, “like the muscles of the human body, must be exercised regularly” if they are to grow stronger, over time, rather than degenerate (Scorza, 2004). Truth saying and truth hearing are practices that test and develop the muscularity of a friendship. Emerson explains, “The great gains, not to shine, not to conquer your companion,—then you learn nothing but conceit,—but to find a
companion who knows what you do not; to tilt with him and be overthrown, horse and foot, with utter destructions of all your logic and learning” (Emerson, 1903-04).

On the other hand, the meaning of tenderness is something like “kindness” or “affection.” I believe however, that Emerson intended a richer meaning. He understands giving to be both a “posture of giving and a posture of receiving” (Scorza, 2004). In other words, one of talking and one of listening. Tenderness for the purpose of this thesis is understood to be a gentle but respectful manner of handling others who are, presumably, one’s equals and deserve to be treated as such.

The use of Emerson’s conception of friendship is neither obvious nor unproblematic. Wilson Carey McWilliams wrote that Emerson’s conception of friendship is premised upon a radical individualism that, in spite of Emerson’s own intentions, could swerve to “moralize disloyalty and self-seeking” (McWilliams, 1973). Nonetheless, Emerson’s conception of friendship, with its twin practices of truth and tenderness, represents a compelling partnership for this project.

Finally, the component of race is considered. Specifically, why isn’t friendship enough? How do interracial friendships add significance to this thesis? What we have learned is that sameness might not necessarily be requisite for friendship and equality. Friendship might function as a way to imagine connection without hierarchy, fostering egalitarian relationships across differences of sex, race, and circumstance.

We will learn in chapter six that the difficulties of fostering these relationships is significant. In the United States individuals are most likely to marry, live near, and become friends with others who are similar to themselves (Orbe and Harris, 2001). Among the social boundaries that separate adults and children, race and ethnicity are
among the most formidable (Antonio, 2004). Although most intimate relationships are formed with others from similar racial and ethnic backgrounds, interracial and interethnic relationships do occur. However, it is unknown whether these friendships are less intimate because of the persistence of racial and ethnic differentiation and segregation that permeates through the daily lives of individuals in the United States (Allan, 1996).

The contention in this project is that the practice of friendship is dynamic. Individuals do not as a general rule begin their relationship at the most intense level of mutual regard. Instead, friendships grow and evolve over time, propelled by an inner momentum of which we are not always fully aware (Scorza, 2004). The norms of friendship, it seems, derive from an almost universal practice that cuts across religious, cultural, and racial divides. Each of us has experienced friendship and know its norms very well, even if we haven’t been perfect in our practice. The suggestion here is that the norms of friendship are available and familiar to anyone who has, or has been, a friend. This is not to say that beyond some basic norms there are not also significant differences between the attitudes toward friendship in different traditions (Goodman, 1996).

Finally, a friend can introduce us to new perspectives and viewpoints, share with us a new experience or way of life, or even increase our awareness of the variousness and possibility of human life itself by shaking us from our doldrums, depressions, and dogmas. It is through this process of developing or awakening friendship that the concept of transcending private friendships to public hearts is realized.

While this chapter has established a theoretical ground for defining friendship, the next will examine the processes and practical applications of friendship.
Chapter 5

Approaching the Kaleidoscope of Friendship

Chapter two of this project explored how friendship is conceptualized within a philosophical framework. In that chapter this thesis established a historical framework from which one should be able to contextualize the genesis for most modern day philosophies of friendship. In the last chapter we learned that no one conception is exactly like the other. This chapter will attempt to discover what friendship is or what it is that is typical of relations between friends. Specifically, the question of “what is friendship,” and “who is a friend” will be examined. Research for this chapter would seem to indicate two things—agreement on a definition of friendship is not standard and most of the contemporary exploration into the topic is firmly rooted in the social sciences.

Already established is the suggestion that a definitional approach to friendship is both problematic and highly unlikely. Yet this thesis is cemented in the claim that ultimately our public dispositions are not just connected, but are largely influenced by our private friendships. Therefore, it is relevant and essential to come to some understanding of who we are talking about when we talk about a friend.

A variety of different conceptions of friendship exists and has exerted influence, some stronger and others weaker, on philosophical discussions. Clearly no single dominant conception captures something that might be considered the essence of friendship. Although there are similarities and overlaps, important differences exist that have significant moral and non-moral implications. At the extreme, there is no agreement
whether friends should always treat each other better than nonfriends. Friends, according to John Hardwig (1989), are expected to tolerate immoral behavior toward each other to a greater extent than they should tolerate immorality from nonfriends, while in contrast, Badhwar (1991) argues that friends should act with ideal justice and benevolence toward each other. Additional disagreement arises about whether friends should be more or less forgiving of each other when harm is caused.

Questions remain to be answered about assessing the adequacy to one’s experience of these diverse conceptions of friendship. Take Montaigne’s ideal, that friends create so complete a union that all differences between them vanish. Modern feminist understandings of friendship, such as Marilyn Friedman’s, contend that friends must maintain their own individuality within friendship and not lose it (Friedman, 1993). As another illustration of the wide range of differences, consider Aristotle’s ideal equal virtue friendship in contrast to the Indian ideal friendship, which believes that inequality is needed to avoid the competition and envy inherent within friendship (Parekh 1994).

The extent to which friendship requires any minimal morality that friends must fulfill toward each other remains unsettled (Grunebaum, 2003). While Aristotle maintains that virtue friends have to be good (at least on some minimal level), he does not say that pleasure or utility friends must be good as well (Stern-Gillet, 1995). C.S. Lewis appears to be silent on the goodness issue as well. Dean Cocking and Jeanette Kennett (2000) contend that a “true and good” friendship permits friends to engage in significantly immoral acts to benefit friends.

Other variations exist between conceptions of friendship that complicate assessment by comparison of ideals of friendship to one’s actual experiences. While
many philosophers who analyze friendship believe that ideal friendship only occurs between equals, these philosophers do not agree with each other about what constitutes equality between friends (Blum, 1980). How to compare experiences of actual friendships with conceptions about equality in friendship is difficult to determine.

Conceptions of friendship also differ regarding the number of friends it is possible to have at any given time (Grunebaum, 2003). As Grunebaum notes, Montaigne believes only one friend, Aristotle believes a few friends, and Lewis believes that many friends are not only possible but also desirable.

In addition to these disagreements, other controversial issues exist. Some believe that true friendships—whatever they are—last forever, and that true friends never break or abandon their friendship. Aelred turns true friendship’s permanence into a definition by agreeing with St. Jerome, who claims, “A friendship which can cease to be was never true friendship” (Pakaluk, 1991).

It is clear that criteria other than moral principles may be applied to evaluate or assess conceptions of friendship. Aristotle uses as his principal criterion stability and potential for permanence in friendships (Stern-Gillet, 1995). He judges virtue or character friendship as being better, for the simple reason that it is more likely to permanently endure than a utility or pleasure friendship (Vernon, 2003). Montaigne’s fusion friendship is likely to be permanent, because each gives himself so completely to the other that there is nothing left by which to destabilize the friendship. Montaigne, however, seems to value fusion friendship more highly than other relationships, not only because of its potential permanence but because of the intrinsic value of completely fusing with another. Grunebaum suggest that Montaigne would likely consider Lewis’s
shared interest friendships shallow, because their value is derivative from external shared interests. Lewis’s shared interest friendships also might possess a high degree of stability if shared external interest remained unchanged (Grunbaum, 2003).

Conceptions of friendship also differ according to whether it is possible to predict who will become friends. Assuming that only one friend, or at most two friends, could be possible at a time, then Montaigne’s fusion friendship will have more relevance than would Lewis’s. Research for this project did not find any evidence supporting the possibility of predicting who will become friends. Empirically testing whether friendships can be predicted or whether more than one friend or a few friends could be possible is difficult, because people use the concept “friendship” in so many different ways (Grunbaum, 2003). Too many diverse relations might be counted as friendships, so that no clear-cut results would emerge, either for the question regarding the number of friends or the possibility of predicting friendships.

Also as mentioned earlier, permanence stands out as a plausible, nonmoral criterion to evaluate friendships. Since most people value their friends and find value in friendships, they naturally have reasons to keep their friendships alive. For some forms of friendships, such as Aristotle’s virtue friendship, maintaining friendship has its costs. Thus friendships that fail to survive might be considered “squandering” these costs (Fehr, 1996). When affection develops between friends, friends come to like each other and to feel pleasure in each other’s company. Ending an affection-based friendship thus becomes a source of sadness and pain. Nevertheless, some friendships should end if the bases of the friendship change, or if the friends’ situation or character is altered. It might be a mistake to use permanence as the overriding value of friendship (Grunbaum, 2003).
The remainder of this chapter will address the second point made earlier. The social science perspective will provide a backdrop within which the contemporary study of friendship can be better appreciated. The complexities of this concept will be unraveled by exploring the meaning of friendship, theories of friendship, the formation of friendships and the maintenance of friendships.

**The Meaning of Friendship**

Everyone knows what friendship is—until asked to define it. Then, it seems, no one knows. There are virtually as many definitions of friendship as there are social scientists studying the topic (Fehr, 1996). The diversity of definitions raises the question: Is it possible to meaningfully study a concept for which there is no agreed-on definition? The answer, it seems, depends largely on one’s theoretical position concerning the nature of concepts. According to the classical view, knowledgeable people should be able to reach a consensus on definitions. Once the set of necessary and sufficient criteria features is determined, categorization decisions are based on whether the instance in question possesses the defining features. Thus from this perspective, it should be relatively easy to decide whether or not a particular relationship is friendship—one simply examines whether it possesses each of the defining attributes of friendship. The problem is that so far social scientists have not been able to agree on a precise set of defining features. As Allan (1989) observed, it is difficult, if not impossible, to generate the defining features of friendship because “friend is not just a categorical label, like colleague or cousin indicating the social position of each individual relative to the other. Rather it is a relational term which signifies something about the quality and character of the relationship involved”.

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Hinde (1979) defines an interpersonal relationship as “a series of interactions between two individual know to each other” (p. 15). He, as well as many other social scientists, view relationship as comprising behavioral, cognitive, and affective components. By conceptualizing relationships as a series of interactions, Hinde implies that relationships involve a longer time period than a single encounter and that each interaction is influenced by other interactions in the relationship.

However, moving away from the generic conceptions of relationships, social scientists also have offered specific definitions of friendship. Typical definitions of friendship seem to portray the concept as a voluntary, personal relationship, typically providing intimacy and assistance, in which the two parties like one another and seek each other’s company (Fehr, 1996). Similarly, Rawlins (1992) conceptualizes friendship as voluntary, personal, implying affective ties, and characterized by equality and mutual involvement.

Davis and Todd (1985) identified such attributes of friendship as affection, confiding, receiving assistance, trust, and shared activity—themes also generally emphasized in the definitions of friendship. However, they focused on three additional properties: authenticity, self-respect, and conflict.

Besides description, another way of understanding the nature of a relationship is through comparison. In comparing friendships with other relationships, some researchers have searched for the general dimensions underlying interpersonal relationships, whereas others have concentrated on comparing types of relationships (Allan, 1989). Just as the larger world of personal relationships can be divided into friendship versus other kinds of relationships, so can friendships be partitioned into subcategories (Fehr, 1996). Indeed,
we need only go back to Aristotle, who delineated three kinds of friendship to see that there is a long history of attempts to create taxonomies of friendship. Friendship can be classified in a variety of ways. The two most common ways are along demographic lines (age, gender) and in terms of the level of intimacy or closeness (Fehr, 1996).

Theories of Friendship

Based on the research done for this project, it appears that it is actually more accurate to speak of theories of attraction, or theories of relationships, given that theories of friendship per se were not identifiable as such. Thus the focus here is on the theories of attraction or relationships that can, or have been, applied to friendship. Specifically, the theories identified by Perlman and Fehr (1986) as important in understanding friendship will be reviewed: reinforcement, exchange and equity, cognitive consistency, and developmental.

Aristotle seemed to capture the essence of reinforcement theories when stated that “we feel friendly to those who have treated us well.” From a contemporary perspective, the application of reinforcement theory was spearheaded primarily by Byrne and Clore (1970) who, in short, said that we are attracted to people who provide us with rewards. These theorists also imported principles of classical conditioning and further predicted that we like people who are merely associated with our experience of receiving rewards. In other words, if another person happens to be present when something good happens to us, we are likely to be attracted to him.

Like reinforcement theories, social exchange and equity theories emphasize the role of reward in attraction. However, these theories go beyond reinforcement models in a number of ways. For example, they seek to explain behavior in ongoing relationships,
rather than focusing only on initial attraction. Another difference is that these theories invoke a number of constructs, in addition to rewards, to account for satisfaction and commitment in relationships (Rusbult, 1980).

A basic premise of exchange theories, including interdependence theory, is that for people to be satisfied in a relationship, the rewards must outweigh the costs (Fehr, 1996). This is much like the basic assumption of equity theory, which also states that we try to maximize our outcomes in relationships (Hatfield & Traupmann, 1981). Equity theorist also posit that people feel satisfied only in equitable relationships—relationships in which they believe that their outcomes are comparable to the outcomes of their partner. Inequitable relationships result in distress (Hatfield, 1981).

The basic assumption underlying cognitive consistency (or balance) theories is that we have a need for consistency or balance in our lives. Usually, balance is conceptualized in terms of attitudes (positive or negative) between people or objects in a triadic relation (Fehr, 1986). The idea of balance is captured in Aristotle’s observation that we feel friendly “to our friends’ friends, and to those who like, or aer liked by, those who we like ourselves. And also to those who are enemies to those whose enemies we are, and dislike, or are disliked by, those whom we dislike.”

Cognitive consistency theorists differ somewhat in what they consider to be a balance relationship. However, they agree on a fundamental premise, namely, that human beings are motivated to maintain balance or consistency, because balanced relations are stable and unbalanced relations are not (Fehr, 1996).
Developmental theories are concerned with changes in relationships over time. Thus, these theories have the potential to answer questions such as: Do the determinants of attraction change over the course of a friendship?

Again, these four major classes of theories that were developed to explain relationships in general can be applicable specifically to friendships. Reinforcement theorists maintain that we like people who reward us, as well as people whom we associate with the receipt of rewards. Social exchange and equity theories also emphasize the importance of rewards. In exchange theories, it is predicted that rewards determine the level of satisfaction in a relationship. Additional constructs such as availability of alternatives and investments are imported to account for the level of commitment. In explaining relationship satisfaction and commitment, equity theories emphasize the importance of perceptions of one’s partner’s level of rewards relative to one’s own. Cognitive consistency theories regard the need for balance as a fundamental human motivation and therefore postulate that we will be attracted to people whose attitudes are consistent with ours. Finally, developmental theories seek to explain the unfolding of relationships by charting a sequence of stages.

**Forming Friendships**

“You can make more friends in two months by becoming interest in other people than you can in two years by trying to get other people interested in you.”

--Dale Carnegie

The basic question to be considered in this section of this chapter is how do friendships get started? Most research focuses on four variables that must happen in order
for a friendship to begin. The factors are environmental (being in the same place at the same time), individual, situational, and dyadic (Fehr, 1993). Each set of factors will be discussed in turn.

A first step in the formation of most friendships is that two individuals are brought into contact with one another through physical proximity or propinquity (Ebbeson, 1976). In other words, people who inhabit the same physical environment are more likely to become friends than those who do not. The effects of propinquity on friendship formation have been shown for the location of one’s residence, as well as the environment in which one spends one’s day. Factors such as the population density of one’s environment and the kind of social network in which one is embedded also can influence friendship development (Menne & Sinnett, 1971).

Thus proximity is one of the standard predictors of friendship formation. Obviously, to become friends with someone, you have to come in contact with him or her—though recent developments in computer-mediated communication are opening up whole new worlds of friendship possibilities. As Lea and Spear (1995) comment: “One of the effects of the connectivity afforded by computer networks is that it vastly increases the field of available for forming relationships far beyond the limits set by physical proximity.”

Obviously friendships are not pursued with every person we meet. According to Rodin (1982), exclusion judgments precede inclusion judgments; we decide whom we don’t want to be friends with before we decide whom we do want as friend. In other words, we begin by “writing off” people and then we decide whom we would like to
include in our friendship network. In Rodin’s view, there are two kinds of exclusion criteria: dislike and disregard.

Rodin (1982) points out that “we never like people who meet our dislike criteria regardless of what likable qualities they may also possess”. In her view, the characteristics that cause us to dislike or reject others play a key role in the early stages of relationship formation. Once someone meets our dislike criteria, we immediately discard that person from our pool of possible friends.

Rodin’s second kind of exclusion judgment is the disregard criteria. In this case, we eliminate people from our pool of potential friends not because we dislike them, but rather because they seem unsuitable candidates for friendship. We may disregard people because of their race, educational background, physical attractiveness, age, the way they dress, and so on. The purpose of disregard criteria, according to Rodin (1982), is that they “enable us to operate on actuarial or ‘best guess’ strategies so that our energy and attention are not expended fruitlessly on people we are unlikely to like”. In other words, people do not want to spend time cultivating a relationship with someone who strikes them as an unlikely friendship choice.

Rodin’s hypothesis provides an interesting perspective when examined in the context of this project. The next chapter will examine the barriers that limit the development of interracial friendships. This thought is at least worth revisiting.

Research shows that there are characteristics of other people that make it more or less likely that we will want to pursue a friendship with them. These include physical attractiveness, social skill, responsiveness, shyness, and similarity (Fehr, 1986). While it seems more plausible that physical attractiveness would play a role in romantic
relationships, research shows that physical appearance also affects the development of same—and other—sex friendships (Patzer, 1985).

According to Cook (1977), making friends is a skilled performance much like playing tennis or driving a car. Some people have difficulty developing relationships because they lack social skill such as responding appropriately to what the other person says. Social skills are important even in the formation of children’s friendships (Gottman, 1975).

We also are attracted to potential friends who are responsive to us (Fehr, 1986), which means that those who suffer from shyness and in turn lack responsiveness are less likely to develop friendships (Jones, 1986). In terms of similarity, Aristotle observed that “those, then, are friends to whom the same things are good and evil; and those who are moreover, friendly or unfriendly to the same people.” There is a large body of research that supports Aristotle’s observation: We tend to form friendships with people who are similar to us. In fact, this “rule of homogamy” has been described as “one of the most basic principles that has come from the study of interpersonal attraction” (Brehm, 1985).

In short, we are most likely to pursue a friendship with someone who is good looking, socially skilled, responsive, not shy, and similar to us in a variety of ways. Still, a number of situational factors influence whether or not a friendship is likely to develop. Initially, factors such as how often we are likely to see the person and whether we a dependent on the person for something we want are important. Another consideration is whether we are able to accommodate another relationship, given our other commitments (Fehr, 1986). Research on these factors suggests that two people are more likely to
develop a friendship if they anticipate ongoing interactions, if they are dependent on one another, and if they have time for one another.

**Friendship Maintenance**

There are a number of dilemmas involved in maintaining any relationship, and friendship is no exception. We have to juggle our need for dependence with our need to be independent; wanting to be completely open versus wanting to protect ourselves by not revealing everything; wanting to have a lot in common, but not so much that the relationship feels boring and predictable (Fehr, 1986). Communication researchers in particular have made progress in identifying the major dialectics inherent in close relationship. Unfortunately, to date, little research has been conducted on these dynamics, particularly in friendship relationships.

However, management of these issues may be especially important in friendships. Unlike other kinds of relationships, there are few external structures to promote continuance of friendships. Brenton (1974) among others, has noted that kin, romantic, and marital relationships operate within fairly clearly defined bounds. In contrast, friendships are not highly organized, institutionalized relationships. In Brenton’s view, this freedom is one of the great attractions of friendship, but it is also a double-edged sword.

Similarly, Wiseman (1986) commented that friendship is an anomalous relationship in our society because it is an intimate relationship that operates voluntarily, without societal or contractual regulation. The dynamic of stable intimacy versus freedom identified by Wiseman is related to the dialectics of integration-separation (Baxter, 1994), closeness versus distance (Brenton, 1974), and dependence-independence. In fact,
Rawlins (1992) has argued that the successful resolution of the dynamic of independence and dependence is a fundamental requirement for maintaining a friendship. Each person must feel free to pursue his or her own individual interest separate from the other. At the same time, each must feel that the other can be relied on for help and support regardless of the circumstances.

Rawlins (1983) also identified several other dynamics, centering on the issue of openness that come into play when maintaining friendships. For example, for a friendship to be close, it is necessary to reveal personal information. However, there is the risk of being hurt because of the vulnerability that accompanies self-disclosure. Thus, expressiveness and openness must be balance with self-protectiveness. Rawlins (1992) posited that the development of trust in a friendship is contingent on the successful management of this dialectic.

Another dilemma pertaining to openness is the dialectic of candor versus restraint (Rawlins, 1983). This dialectic is regarded as another exemplar of the expression-privacy dialect (Baxter, 1994). In order for a friendship to become intimate and close, it is important for friends to be honest with each other. Other kinds of dilemmas or dialectics that must be managed to maintain a friendship include the tension between constancy and change (Brenton, 1974). The reality is that people change and our friends will not necessarily be the same person over time.

As is apparent, there are a number of complex, competing tensions to be managed in friendship relationships. Friends must strike a balance between independence and dependence, closeness and distance, and openness and self-protection, to name a few. Wiseman (1986) commented that “friendship is a unique and fragile relationship
containing the seeds of its own destruction in the cross-pressures of freedom and stable intimacy.” These words underline the difficulties inherent in dealing with these kinds of tensions. Dialectics by definition involve change and flux between competing forces. Thus, these issues cannot be settled but instead must be continually apprehended and negotiated. Moreover, to maintain a friendship, these tensions must be resolved to the satisfaction of each person.

Thus far, this chapter has focused on key concepts situated primarily in the social science field. These points will come into play again in the next chapter when we examine the issues relevant to establishing and maintaining an interracial friendship. There is a necessity here though to visit some of the more recent philosophical considerations that have been developed with regard to understanding the kaleidoscope that is friendship. While the social science views support the efforts of this project with much needed empirical evidence, the philosophical perspectives would seem to lend themselves more readily to thoughtful interpretations of the nuances permeating the rhetoric of friendship.

Elizabeth Telfer identifies a set of necessary conditions which she argues are jointly sufficient as an analysis of friendship. She argues that what she identifies as the ‘shared activity’ condition and the ‘passions’ of friendship are two features that constitute necessary condition of friendship (Telfer, 1991). Shared activity takes the form of reciprocal services, mutual contact and joint pursuits, which are necessary to relations between friends, but on their own are not sufficient to identify the relationship as one of friendship. Neighbors, business associates and members of sporting teams can be involved in such activity without regarding themselves as friends or being regarded as
friends by others. Telfer argues that friends must also display the passions of friendship, that is, they must have affection for, be fond of and like one another; they must have a “desire for another’s welfare distinguished both from a sense of duty and from benevolence”.

Duty and benevolence are motives that lead us to display concern for others in general; whereas affection differs in that it is an attitude in which we wish the best for a particular person, take that person seriously, engage with her and desire her company as a particular individual (Lynch, 2005).

Lynch (2005) suggests that to give the passions of friendship, affection and liking, the status of necessary conditions, as Telfer does, might appear to be incompatible with the other elements that emerged from the etymological analysis which were reviewed in the previous chapter: the fact that it involves choice and commitment. According to Lynch, if we claim that we can choose our friends, but we hold that we cannot choose our feelings, then we might want to say that affection and liking are reasons for friendship, rather than necessary conditions.

Telfer appears to answer this objection by explaining that friendship is not like marriage, in the sense that we normally enter into marriage on the basis of certain feelings but that a marriage has a formal or legal status whether or not the feelings obtain. Her argument is that affection and liking as necessary conditions are compatible with choice in friendship, since the right passions are necessary in friendship, but they are not by themselves sufficient; “the friends must exercise choice in acting on their feelings” (Telfer, 1991). There is also more to it according to Telfer who acknowledges that the process by which a friendship develops between two people must be a mutual one and
may well be gradual. Friendship, unlike marriage, may develop over time or just spring up, so that it might be difficult to identify a formal beginning (Lynch, 2005). For Telfer, the two features she identifies as shared activity and the passions of friendship, along with the friends acknowledgement of these two conditions, constitute three conditions that when satisfied are jointly sufficient for friendship (Lynch 2005).

Susanne Stern-Gillet (1995) notes that the modern view that friendship involves loving one’s friends in and for themselves makes both a fairly straightforward normative claim and a more problematic descriptive claim. The normative claim is that to love someone for their own sake is to love the person for herself, rather than for what she possesses or what she could do for us.

Stern-Gillet (1995) suggests that the descriptive claim made by the modern view is that friends are loved for what it is that makes them unique. She argues that this gives pride of place to the uniqueness—what she refers to as the unicity—of friends, and thus to their individual irreplaceability. But the concept of unicity is vague in modern conceptions of friendship. The vagueness lies in the fact that we want to be able to say that friends are loved uniquely, but also that they are loved for their good qualities. These two requirements are not easily combined (Lynch, 2005). When we attempt to characterize a friend’s uniqueness, we are torn between a focus on a set of features, qualities or traits possessed by the friend and a conception of the friend as a unique instantiation of that set. In articulating that uniqueness we have no choice but to attempt to enumerate her particular qualities or traits or to abandon ourselves to expressions of sentiment (Stern-Gillet, 1995). These considerations lead Stern-Gillet to suggest that
modern friendship is fundamentally non-rational and perhaps not a fit matter for close analytical scrutiny.

Telfer (1991) acknowledges that liking in friendship is a difficult phenomenon to analyze and that the degree of rationality it involves is limited. She argues that liking seems to be a “quasi-aesthetic attitude”, roughly specifiable as “finding someone to one’s taste”, and depends partly on such things as his physical appearance, mannerisms, voice and speech, and style of life; partly on his traits of character, moral and other. The relative importance of these features depends on the liker, on Telfer’s view. She draws an analogy between friendship and art, arguing that our reaction to a friend is to the whole personality as a unified thing, much like our reaction to a work of art. Nonetheless, the difficulties to which Stern-Gillet’s comments draw attention remain.

With regard to the question of enjoyment in friendship, modern friends do not necessarily develop friendships with those whose goodness they admire or esteem. Such admiration and esteem are not sufficient on their own to ensure the development of a friendship. We enjoy our friends’ company in the sense of feeling at ease with them, but we are left with the question of what it is that explains our ease. We do identify with friends in that we share and appreciate their interest, sense of humor, qualities of mind and attitude to life, but—as we have seen—the relationship between these features and our concern for a friend for her own sake is problematic for modern friends. Modern friends do not necessarily equate one another’s essence with their goodness and relate to one another on the basis of that goodness. We may well engage with a friend motivated by what we see as love and concern for the friends for the friend’s own sake. But what
that engagement entails will be difficult to predict, since it will depend on a variety of factors that influence our interaction with the friend.

Finally, there are conceptions of friendship in the literature that eschew both idealization and pessimism with regard to the possibility of friendship to focus on otherness, individual need and the toleration of difference as the key concepts underlying relation between friends (Lynch, 2005). Difference is celebrated as the most crucial element in friendship. Shared activity, similarity of interest and of values and reciprocal services are seen as necessary conditions and pleasures of friendship. But within these conceptions, these necessary conditions emerge as superficial to the extent that they conceal the role of the recognition of difference in friendship, and the challenge that recognition presents to relation between friends (Lynch, 2005).

In his epigraph to Maurice Blanchot’s book *Friendship*, the words of George Bataille indicate his insistence that the relationship is founded on a recognition of the profound separateness between self and other. He speaks of friendship, apparently contradictorily, as a state of profound detachment from others; ‘friendship until that state of profound friendship where a man abandoned, abandoned by all his friends, encounters in life the one who will accompany him beyond life, himself without life, capable of free friendship, detached from all ties’ (Bataille, 1971).

These sentiments appear curious in the context of an analysis of friendship. Bataille’s reference to “free friendship” suggests a notion that seems to have nothing to do with the familiar claim that friendship is a relationship in which we freely choose to engage; that its ties are not predicated on formal or biological ties between participants. In fact the notion of “free friendship” flies in the face of the sense of attachment and
affection that friendship is characteristically taken to imply, given Bataille’s emphasis on
detachment rather than attachment. “Free friendship” is a state of profound friendship in
which we glimpse ourselves beyond life and therefore beyond our connection with others.
The concept of an encounter with ourselves beyond life, profoundly alone and detached
from all ties, and in a sense beyond selfhood, opens us to the capacity for free and
profound friendship. That encounter suggests the pervasive inevitability of separation as
well as the preciousness of connection, and as such it appears to have something in
common with Buber’s notion of the I-Thou relation. The difference is that “free
friendship” is predicated upon the notion that all connection between human beings
entails a recognition of their separateness (Lynch, 2005).

On face value, the idea that what separates us puts us into authentic relation with
one another might be regarded as a simply logical point: talk of relationship between
entities entails that we recognize the separateness of those entities, since relation is
defined as a two or more.

Models of friendship based on similarity seek to identify criteria upon which our
union or affinity with others is established (Lynch, 2005). However, the difficulty of
explaining our connection with friends is only complicated by claims that the relationship
is non-rational; that any sense of complete union or fusion is based on an illusory ideal;
and that the modern concept of friendship is indistinct (Fehr, 1996). By comparison, a
conception of friendship which takes account of difference changes the focus of our
attention. It provides a context within which change, disagreement and conflict are more
likely to act as catalysts to reflection on the nature of our connection with others, on our
own behavior and on that of our friends.
What this chapter has revealed is that the analysis of various uses of the term friendship has provided no one ideal or definitive use. To understand the term we must understand how it is used in various contexts. Going forward, this thesis will grasp the defense that Lawrence Blum offers to friendship’s moral worth. Blum’s view is that since we have a special capacity to help others who are friends, we also have special duties to them. The strength and intimacy of the tie between us enable us to do for a friend what we could not do for a stranger—and hence what we could not be expected to do for a stranger (Blum, 1980).

If we accept that the personal sphere of life is included within the arena of morally relevant behavior, then we can begin to examine those aspects of our interaction with friends that raise moral question or moral dilemmas in the public sphere.
Chapter Six

Friendship and Diversity—Forging Friendships

Previous chapters have explored a number of critical conceptualizations of friendship as well as more contemporary theories regarding the development and maintenance of friendships. Ralph Waldo Emerson’s conception of friendship has been deemed sufficient from a theoretical approach to the connection of friendship and the public sphere, which is critical for this thesis. However, the necessity exists to consider the practical implications of the premise of this project.

A critical component of this thesis is race, which provides additional weight to the supposition held here. In other words, if we are to assume Emerson’s notion of truth and tenderness, by extension we must embrace the notion of difference. In this case, difference is represented within the context of race. Therefore, some understanding of the complexities and limitations of interracial friendships is required.

While it is understood through previous chapters that the study and philosophy of friendship as a principle in and of itself presents a tremendous challenge, the introduction of race as an additional dynamic can be problematic. However, it is essential to this project that the concerns and benefits of interracial friendships be considered.

In today’s lexicon diversity has become a moniker for difference. The word diversity has a presence in almost every walk of life. Typically, where “diversity” is missing, “inclusion” is found. Unfortunately, anecdotal accounts from my own experience would seem to suggest that diversity has fallen into the vacuum of political
correctness. In other words, being diverse takes on more significance than the value of the concept of diversity.

This chapter will suggest that diversity, as it is currently conceived and operationalized is problematic and not in step with the notion that interracial friendships can transcend to public hearts with good effect.

This chapter will progress in three parts. First the problematic nature of diversity will be considered. Secondly, the chapter will consider why friendship is the answer and not diversity. Finally, if we are to position interracial friendship as a solution, we need to understand what the barriers to this strategy are. The third section of this chapter will consider the road blocks that deter us from forging these relationships more routinely.

**The Problematic Nature of Diversity**

During the twenty-first century, the United States will become increasingly heterogeneous with respect to the ethnic composition of its population. Census reports predicted that by the year 2050 the majority of the population will be persons of color (U.S. Bureau of Census, 1992). This prediction highlights the importance of understanding factors that promote positive interethnic group relationships.

Pless and Maak (2004) indicated their belief that diversity is good for business because it “can become a competitive advantage.” They conclude that “diversity is, first and foremost, a cultural question and thus a question of norms, values, beliefs and expectations. As such, it is an ethical question and determined by some very essential founding principles of human coexistence.”

Yet this chapter will contend that friendship, not diversity can answer the need for difference in the public sphere. The contention here is that there are three significant
shortcomings of diversity that make it a less viable option (on its own) than friendship. First, I would argue that there is no intrinsic value to diversity. Secondly, I suggest that diversity lacks the element of knowing another that exists with friendship. Finally, diverse voices may fall flat without the presence of Emerson’s truth and tenderness.

This project contends that an essential source of the problem of diversity is that it has become politicized, with people first deciding if they like it and then looking for rationalizations for or against it. Paraphrasing Bradley, one may say that diversity is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe intuitively. The merits of an argument then come more from its capacity to support a pre-established conclusion than from its logical validity. As Nietzsche wrote, “convictions are more dangerous enemies of truth than lies.”

With that said, the chapter will move forward with an attempt to define diversity. For practical purposes, we need to know exactly what one means by diversity. As well, we need to know what kind of diversity we are talking about. For instance, if diversity is defined very broadly, everybody contributes to it, everybody is different from the majority in at least one way, so that it is impossible to rely upon it to choose between people (for instance when hiring). If we do not have agreement on the definition, but we all say “diversity is good,” we then have what Bouville (2007) calls a “semantic illusion,” meaning that we’ve used the same word to refer to different things.

Diversity is frequently understood to be an intrinsic good, which means that it is good all by itself (Shin, 2009). In essence, by declaring that diversity is intrinsically good makes a statement about what is good. Conversely, in the case of instrumental good, the good is independent of diversity: one can agree on what is good without making any
claim related to diversity (Shin, 2009). There are then two separate questions: what is good? and does diversity contribute to it?

According to Killenbeck (2004), “one of the most significant and persistent problems in this area [affirmative action] has been a dogged insistence by the higher education establishment that the intrinsic importance and positive impact of diversity should be taken as an article of faith.”

The issue as it relates to this project is that more and more frequently, diversity has come to be represented as a helping hand for groups and individuals who have been traditionally and historically marginalized. Diversity’s presence at times, appears to represent difference in the most superficial ways. In almost every article researched for this project, diversity is inferred to be a matter of race or sex. This is problematic in as much as it has become a way to include, though it appears that in many cases it doesn’t address the matter of participation or ideas about how we are to understand diverse voices.

The second concern that diversity presents within the context of this thesis is the matter of depth—or lack thereof. Simply by reading the titles of the abundant research and scholarship in the Pro Quest database, diversity appears to be proposed more often than not as the solution to some of the complications inherent in an increasingly multicultural society. Health care, schools, and the workplace are just a sampling of the institutions in which diversity has become fertile ground for scholars and pundits alike.

Again, this thesis argues that there are short comings here. A crucial difference between friendship and diversity is the voluntary nature of friendship, which I would argue is mostly absent in diversity. This is not to say that individuals never seek out
diversity or conversely never move to avoid it. However, there are enough instances throughout our daily lives where diversity is placed upon us without a conscious decision to be part of it. This thesis argues that friendship always involves a conscious decision to be a friend. To choose a friend then is to know her in a way that is different than knowing a person who you have come into contact with by circumstance.

Moreover, diversity lacks the condition of equality that exists with friendship. While friends may not be equal in all matters, they come to all matters as equals. This is a part of what Emerson would have called “elective affinity.” Emerson claims that conversation “is the practice and consummation of friendship” and that great conversation “requires an absolute running of two souls into one…Yet it is affinity that determines which two shall converse” (Emerson, 1991).

On the other hand, I would suggest that there is no guarantee that diverse voices will hear each other as equals. They are not inherently predisposed to affinity. It stands to reason, as this third contention is made, that the notion of truth and tenderness loses potency when coupled with diversity by itself. I would argue that the analogies of civility and incivility, which were used earlier in relation to truth and tenderness become marked by extremes and disingenuousness. In other words, I would posit that the nature of diversity encompasses the potential to be overly polite (political correctness) or overly aggressive (defensive). Diversity by itself, I would suggest, lacks the empathy as well as the corrective quality of friendship. The next section of this chapter will consider how friendship is a more dignified way to enter the public sphere.
Friendship as a Solution

A tremendous amount of literature has been deposited within the first five chapters of this project. We’ve considered and reviewed context, concepts, meanings, theories and philosophies on the topic. While Emerson’s conception of friendship has emerged as the thought that is most in concert with this project, this next section should demonstrate that even a generalized conception of friendship is more desirable as an entrance into the public sphere than diversity in and of itself.

Keeping in mind that the overarching premise for this project is that interracial friendship is the ideal means in which to transcend friendship to the public sphere, this section should demonstrate first how we arrived at friendship and secondly why the factor of race is also important. These ideas should effectively lead to the transition into the dynamics of interracial friendship and the barriers that impede the relationships.

The first argument against diversity settled on the arguable supposition that there is not an intrinsic value to diversity, while ignoring the centuries-long debate of friendship as an intrinsic or extrinsic value. In *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle provides a complicated account of the necessity of friendship in the good life. According to Pangle (2003), his justification of the turn to friendship is regarded as both necessary and noble. Pangle quotes Aristotle as such, “Without friends no one would choose to live, though he possessed all the other goods.” In all of my reading of Aristotle, it seems that friendship is rooted in our existence. In this respect, I would argue that friendship is intrinsically good.

Cicero (1991) wrote, “If we do find some individuals who would think it shameful to put money ahead of friendship, where shall we find those who would not put
honours, public office, military command, civil authority, or wealth ahead of friendship—the sort who, if these things were placed on one side of the scales and the laws of friendship on the other would show a definite leaning toward the latter.” This quote appears to suggest that Cicero believed that friendship has as much potential for creating conflict within the political sphere as it does for fostering harmony. At first glance, this philosophy would seem to take the air out of any argument for friendship as an introduction into the public sphere. While it may seem contrary, Cicero’s quote opens the door to address critics who may disagree with the notion that friendship can provide benefit outside of the private sphere.

First is the issue of definition. Cicero’s political friendships are not the same as the conception of Emerson’s truth and tenderness. Keeping in mind that this thesis still allows the application of the socially accepted characteristics of friendship such as liking, commonality, shared experience, etc., we can discount issues that turn one friend against another for power or money because the conception of friendship developed for this thesis presupposes that truth and tenderness trump all other considerations within the public sphere. The idea may appear impractical when considered against the realities of human nature, which is exactly why we land on friendship as our entrance into the public sphere. Research done by Klinger (1977) reported that friendship was most often reported as that which made one’s life meaningful. According to Fehr (1988), friendship love is viewed most often as capturing the meaning of love more than any other relationship—including romantic love. Friendship offers a commitment to the other, that diversity does not.
Furthermore, friendship in the sense that it has been constructed for this thesis is not subject to quotas or time constraints. Aristotle, Montaigne and Lewis had differing ideas with regard to how many friends one can have. In this conception, the development of friendship is slow, as suggested by Emerson, and requires a level of comfort and knowing that permits truth and tenderness. As a consequence, it stands to reason that these friendships would be few. Friendship, therefore, would be representative of quality not quantity. Conversely, diversity is often driven to mirror a group’s make up with some other predetermined group (Bouville (2007).

At this point, it should be clear why friendship and not diversity has been offered as a solution to the communication issues facing the public sphere. Yet it is necessary to revisit the theory that interracial friendships can provide the most desirable outcomes in the public sphere. First, though, it is necessary to examine why race matters in this context.

Research suggests that race is among the most salient factors upon which friendships are based (Gouldner and Strong, 1987). In the United States, race seems to be the one factor that makes a difference (Blumbaugh and Pennington 1976). Even in a time when the president of the United States is black, blacks have won Oscar awards in major categories the last couple of years, the top players in men’s golf and women’s tennis (sports in which blacks were traditionally underrepresented) also happen to be black, race still matters. The reality is that America is still a residentially segregated society (Massey and Denton, 1993).

According to Gordon Allport (1954), one of the primary traits that distinguish “prejudice” from ordinary prejudgment is its resistance to change in the light of
contradictory evidence. “Prejudgment becomes prejudices only if they are not reversible when exposed to new knowledge...A prejudice, unlike a simple misconception, is resistant to all evidence that would unseat it” (Allport, 1954). As Saenger (1953) suggests, “Prejudices, like all attitudes, may motivate us to act in a friendly or hostile way toward the objects of our prejudice, depending upon the nature and intensity of our feelings.”

Since the need to consider race as a variable has been demonstrated, the remainder of this chapter will consider the primary factors that present barriers to interracial friendship. Sparse philosophical literature exists that specifically addresses the dynamic of race within friendship relations. By and large the traditional philosophical scholarship measures differences in the form of social, economic and intellectual diversities. Therefore, this chapter necessarily turns to the social sciences to explore race within the context of friendship. More specifically, what barriers exist to interracial friendships?

**Communication**

Martin, Hecht, and Larkey (1994) identified differences in communication patterns between blacks and whites. According to Martin et al. (1994), the African American culture values sharing, uniqueness, positivity, realism, and assertiveness, whereas the European American culture values the individual, the right to choose, self, traditional social roles, honesty, sharing, and communication.

Research also suggests that African Americans and whites use different conversational strategies to improve problematic conversations (Houston, 2000). Specifically, these strategies differ in locus of responsibility (in whether responsibility for
strategy lies with self, other, or a combined effort of the two) and in level of activity (whether active or passive) (Smith, 1973).

Rules for interethnic interactions differ from those for intraethnic interactions (Collier, Ribeau, & Hecht, 1986). Blacks in interactions with whites value politeness toward the individual and assertiveness (Collier, 1988). Whites in such settings value social politeness and open-mindedness (Collier, 1988).

Houston (1994) discussed the difficulty and richness of talk between white and black women, while McCullough (1998) documents the tensions that remain in cross-race friendships from the legacy of slavery.

**Stereotypes**

Walter Lippman introduced the construct of stereotyping in 1922. Lippman’s description of stereotypes was that they were classes of “pictures in our heads” that are basically negative toward individuals of other groups and that these pictures are essentially incorrect (Lippman, 1922).

Since 1922 the term has been used, abused, modified, and revised. Still there is confusion associated with the term. The view of stereotypes as essentially inaccurate perceptions is not universally held by scholars researching the phenomenon of stereotyping. While most agree that some stereotypes do involve gross error, many researchers stress that not all stereotypes are contrary to fact (Rich, 1974).

We must rely to a certain degree upon our past experiences to predict future behavior. We rely upon assumptions because we cannot start each new situation as if we had no previous experience (Houston, 1997). We can make positive and/or negative assumptions. Some of our assumptions prove to be true and others false (Rich, 1974).
The problem arises in interracial communication when we make assumptions about individual of other racial groups on the basis of hearsay, inaccurate information, or without fully understanding the history of causes for a particular behavior (Gonzalas, 2000).

**Trust**

Bellah and his colleagues (1992) acknowledge the indispensability of trust in human community. Without the requisite level of trust, human interactions that constitute social life would not be possible. Researchers sometimes disagree about the meaning of trust, but they all seem to agree that it has important consequences for the functioning of society (Cook, 2001). Researchers also agree that it is in and through social networks that people learn the “social virtues” of reciprocity, honesty, obligation, cooperation, reliability, and altruism (Hardin 2002; Hearn 1997).

Trust brings us closer to people and provides the starting point for meaningful relationships. Coleman (1988) argues that the presence of trust among people increases opportunities for mutual aid, reciprocity, and solidarity. In his judgment, people learn to trust in micro-level relationships formed with family member and friends, and then transfer the ability to secondary groups (Hearn, 1997). In this sense trust can be considered as a building block of social solidarity and its absence as a sign of social breakdown.

One construct that may be useful in operationalizing the influence of social inequity on motivational beliefs has been described a cultural mistrust (Irving, 2005), or the tendency for blacks to distrust whites in institutional, personal, or social contexts. Such distrust, fueled by the pervasive influence of racism, saps black’s confidence in
trust in whites (Irving, 2005). Cultural mistrust is an attitudinal response to years of racial and economic oppression. Blacks with high levels of cultural mistrust will therefore expect that members or institutions of the dominant culture will not treat them in a fair manner (Ogbu, 1991). Brehm and Rahn present an insightful representation of how interpersonal trust and civic engagement are interconnected. They argue that interpersonal trust has important consequences for levels of civic engagement (Brehm and Rahn, 1997).

Interracial distrust is a problem not only for its own sake—that is raising the question of whether ethnic minorities and majorities can overcome their pasts (Welch et. al, 2005). Allen posits that it also has significant implications for our political culture. Allen reports that since the 1960s there are several studies that indicate that confidence and trust in the U.S. government and other public agencies has been in decline. A telling fact is that blacks are even less trusting than other citizens. In fact, writes Allen, “Blacks have been cultural leaders and anticipators in respect to distrust’s increase.” Unsurprisingly, this group’s distrust comes back again and again to interracial questions. “Could that be true for whites as well? After all, interracial distrust powerfully distorts the implementation of all policies aimed at issues coded as “race problems (welfare, employment, crime, drugs, gangs) and also any that require implementation across race lines (health care, abortion, housing and real estate, city planning, public education) suggests that these distortions result in “racially disparate” effects for the policies, which then feed narratives of distrust and so extend its reach and power. Is it possible that interracial distrust has been a catalyst of more general distrust?
Still it would appear, according to Allen that a great deal of interracial distrust now is a product more of retrospection than of immediate person experience and “prevails along fossilized boundaries of difference.” We still have economic policies and social patterns to frustrate (Allen, 2002). Yet, continually this frustration—with unemployment, crime, and public education—is understood in racial terms. It takes time to build up a record of experiences and narrative to justify distrust, and our repeated fallback upon race as an explanation exposes history’s gravity. Within democracies, such congealed distrust indicates political failure (Allen, 2002). The answer to this distrust—friendship.

Summary

This chapter has taken into account the challenges of using diversity as entry into the public sphere. This project posits that diversity lacks intrinsic value, knowing and unencumbered participation. Friendship, on the other hand, presents an option enforced by Emerson’s notions of truth and tenderness. More specifically, interracial friendships are the most desirable ways in which friendship can transcend to the public sphere. However, there are a number of factors such as residential segregation, prejudice and communication, among others, which challenge the development and maintenance of these relationships. The questions then become, what do we do with this information? We’ve established friendship as voluntary activity. How do we make certain that this concept doesn’t go the way of diversity? Does the meaning of interracial friendship change, if we seek them out? Finally, do these relationships grow organically or do we need to be intentional in pursuit?
Chapter Seven

The Public Sphere and Modern Friendships

The last chapter guided us through the difficulties involved in developing and sustaining interracial friendships, but ended with the suggestion that it is an imperative to continue to forge these relationships as a contingency to personal growth as well as mode for unbiased and fruitful public discourse. However, there has not been a substantial amount of space dedicated to understanding the place of the public sphere within the context of this thesis. If the premise of this project were to be actualized as imagined, the ideals of a democratic society should flourish as well.

According to Walton (2007), democracy represents the ideal of a government legitimated by the will of the people. In theory, “well-informed voters, with unhindered access to public information and the right of free speech, rationally discuss the advantages and disadvantages of various alternatives and cast their votes for politicians who will represent their constituency’s interests.” A central concept of democracy is the attempt to achieve a more or less rational discourse between the government and citizens.

Besides providing an arena for forging the public will, the public sphere also enables citizens to monitor the affairs of government and to ensure that their interests are being served (Habermas, 1989). By having the right to monitor the affairs of government, citizens have the opportunity to mitigate the power of the state (Walton, 2007). In theory, citizens can conclude if elected officials and other government entities are serving their needs. If not, citizens can take action through a variety of channels.
The public sphere includes much of the discourse of civil society, including how citizens communicate with each other and with government. Bennett and Entman (2001) emphasize “the distinction between politics as it occurs between citizens and governing institutions like legislators or courts and politics as it concerns power and values in informal social relationship”.

While original formulations of the public sphere were premised upon small, relatively homogenous societies within which literacy and citizenship were accorded to privileged classes alone, effective representation in large modern societies characterized by multiculturalism and pronounced social and economic stratification poses a significant theoretical challenge (Walton, 2007). Many critics view the "public spheres" that do emerge in these contexts as reinforcing concentrations of political power, rather than encouraging critical debate (Walton, 2007). In response, theorists have identified several potential remedies (Walton, 2007). The first is characterized as the "role-playing approach," whereby civic minded participants present the views and perspectives of other public interests that—because of a lack of power, pragmatic limits on group size or communicative deficits—are not able to participate (Goodnight 1992), including small children, future generations, other species, or the natural world.

Alternatively, proponents of the "common good approach" suggest that most sites of civic engagement amount to interest group politics, and are counterproductive to deliberation (Walton, 2007). According to Walton, in an effort to accommodate diverse interests, the search for a common good is lost in a cacophony of mutually exclusive claims and rights-based rhetoric. Any possibility of dialogue is lost as interests are set against one another in a zero-sum game among "fixed identity" groups (Elshtain 1995).
Some studies have supported this perspective, showing that higher levels of discourse are achieved when issue polarization is low (Steiner, 2004). When the issues are complex and membership diverse, the deliberative processes can easily degenerate into bargaining or negotiation, and frequently come to a grinding halt (Walton, 2007). Proponents of the common good approach would limit discursive involvement to participants who possess a generalized set of interests, and are thus capable of giving balanced consideration to diverse perspectives (Steiner, 2004).

As a third strategy, several authors advocate the "interest-based approach." Instead of detracting from democratic ends, interests that are anchored within distinct social spheres characterized by differing knowledge and levels of political power are seen as an essential resource for the development and functioning of democracy (Young, 2000). Public interests being represented by a distant other (role-playing) or absorbed into aggregations of generalized public interest (common good) according to Young (2000) are viewed as grossly idealistic. Instead, the cultural embeddedness of specific actors is crucial to the deliberative process (Young 2000). Young (2000) states that, “a strong communicative democracy ... needs to draw on social differentiation, as a resource. A democratic process is inclusive not simply by formally including all potentially affected individuals in the same way, but by attending to the social relations that differently position people and condition their experiences, opportunities, and knowledge of the society.

While each of these strategies offers its own benefits and suffers particular consequences, this project suggests another alternative—friendship. White (1998) argues that self-respecting citizens intent on cultivating a democratic community cannot ignore
the mutual values of trust, confidence, care, openness, sharing, loyalty and support
towards one another—all constitutive features of friendship. For this project we inter the
public sphere with relevant understandings from our private friendships.

Summary

This project has been developed with the overarching supposition that interracial
friendships can affectively transcend to our public hearts. There is a lot to be considered
with this supposition, which has faced many challenges throughout this analysis.
Foremost among the challenges is the interminable struggle to settle on a usable
definition of friendship. Even in its heyday of philosophical inquiry, antiquity, friendship
has taken the form of various conceptions and definitions. While philosophers throughout
history have volleyed about the notion of friendship as an intrinsic and/or extrinsic value,
social scientists have grappled with questions of what exactly is a friend.

By situating the conceptualization of friendship within an historical context,
chapter two examines the thoughts of a number of philosophers from antiquity through
contemporary epochs. This was done to allow a robust and textured understanding of the
phenomena of friendship as it relates to philosophical inquiry.

When we look at the long philosophical history of friendship as well as the
tremendous amount of social science scholarship on the subject, it becomes strikingly
obvious that the complexities of friendship is one of the few concepts that theorist,
scholars and researchers apply to the term without fail and in equal measure. Friendship
figures prominently in Aristotle’s ethical writings. His philosophy of friendship is the
fulcrum for much of the philosophy that follows. Though, a significant number of
scholars do not subscribe to Aristotle’s conception.
Some portions of Aristotle’s conception of friendship have been appropriated for this thesis. However, by itself, Aristotle’s philosophy is insufficient for the purpose of this project. Necessarily, other significant philosophers and scholars were pulled into conversation to support the supposition of the thesis in important ways. Hannah Arendt provides a compelling case for creating public space that allows for difference. Paulo Freire and his message of equality lends itself to the ideas that propel this project as well. A synthesis of these three voices is examined in chapter three, which also establishes how public hearts is envisioned as a concept for this thesis.

Public Hearts is conceptualized as our responsibility as citizens to find morally defensible and politically viable answers to the issues that present the greatest challenges facing democracy today. As a consequence of this definition, it was important to understand the public sphere as it works in consort with our private friendships.

Repeatedly the issue of defining friendship pushed to the surface in an attempt to derail any consideration of friendship as a solution to the problematic nature of our current public discourse. However, for the purpose of this project Ralph Waldo Emerson’s conception of friendship and the practice of “truth” and “tenderness” emerged as the conception that most exemplified the themes of this project.

Chapter four allows that we can reach any matter of conclusions on the relevance, generalized nature or specific endeavor of friendship. However, this project required a working understanding of the term friendship that could capture its essence without excluding some of the fluidity of its characteristics. In other words, two individuals can be friends in the sense that all of the supposed criteria are met. They share activities, common interests, confidences’, etc. Yet, if their interaction lacks “truth” and
“tenderness,” as conceived by Emerson, then they haven’t truly captured the essence of friendship.

By theorizing about citizenship in terms of friendship, Emerson contributes to an understanding of civic life that is thicker than conventional liberal conceptions, but more individualistic than typical communitarian views (Scorza, 2004). Emerson calls us to a “radical democratic vision” in which the nation-state fades into the background, and primary relationship between citizens as such emerge as the focus of civic identity and activity, and of personal striving and transcendence (Galston, 1991). In this project it is suggested that understanding friendship using Emerson’s two crucial communicative norms, truth and tenderness can help to enrich the contemporary practice of citizenship.

Turning from the theoretical to the practical, there are some important ways in which the dynamics of actual public life in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries defy any attempt to establish norms of friendship as norms of citizenship. In particular, inequalities of power; hierarchies of class, race, and gender; and the relative powerlessness of ordinary people in many contemporary societies seem to make the idea of genuine friendship between citizens laughable. Wellman (2001) points out that using friendship as a model or analogy for citizenship is potentially misguided because it “lends credence to the dangerous idea that others have standing only if they stand in some relation to us.” Wellman suggest that this idea sustains, or at least fails to deter, ethnic conflict, violation of human rights, and indifference to such violations (Wellman, 2001).

However, it is not the contention of this project, nor do I believe it was ever Emerson’s, that true friendship represents, in general, a good basis for politics. Rather, the point here is that certain communicative norms based on the norms of friendship may
also serve, effectively as constraints on disagreements between members of modern societies who often have different values, competing interest, and conflicting understanding of the good. At the very least, they may provide a critical vantage point with broad cultural and intercultural appeal from which to assail manipulative and/or coercive communicative strategies.

In some respects, the premise of this project follows the aims of discourse ethics. According to Mahoney (2002), the communicative constraints typically set by discourse ethics, including mutual recognition of the equality of all participants and a number of constraints of rationality, work to promote justice by constraining dialogue and provide critical leverage against manipulative and coercive discourse. Unfortunately, it appears that these ideal conditions arrive from nowhere, relate to no common practice, and are connected to no cultural, much less multicultural, norms. Moreover, they seem to take no account of religious, cultural, racial, territorial, and socioeconomic divides among participants, (Scorza, 2004).

Conversely, as stated in chapter four, the norms of friendship derive from an almost universal practice that cuts across religious, cultural, racial, territorial, and socioeconomic divides. Despite some of the significant differences that we’ve discovered about the attitudes toward friendship in different traditions (Goodman, 1996), there are enough underlying similarities between conceptions of friendship to provide a basis for interracial discussion and cross-cultural understanding. Many traditions, for instance, suggest that friendship must involve a significant measure of frankness or truth-telling, in addition to the expected kindness or gentleness (Parekh, 1994). If common norms, such
as these, can be transferred to the practice of liberal citizenship, then its practice may be enhanced.

Although drawn by thoughts of ideal friendships, Emerson also frequently emphasized their frustrating reality. Among his chief concerns is the vulnerability of friendship to degeneration and disintegration. Emerson explains, “Our friendships hurry to short and poor conclusions, because we have made them a texture of wine and dreams, instead of the tough fibre of the human heart” (Emerson, 1983). By his own analysis, friendship cannot begin n the clouds. He writes, “I wish that friendship should have feet, as well as eyes and eloquence. It must plant itself on the ground, before it vaults over the moon” (Emerson, 1983). Consequently, according to Scorza (2004), much of Emerson’s theorizing about friendship is concerned with norms by which its bonds may, slowly and over time, be developed. This is important as we relate it to the considerations of interracial friendships. As is explored at length in chapter six, there are myriad obstacles to the formation of interracial friendships. Entering into to such a relationship, as with most interpersonal relationships, should be done slowly and through time.

Importantly, for Emerson, friendship does not entail a perfect harmony or unanimity between persons (Turner, 2008). Rather, he views friendship as a turbulent union, characterized almost as much by incivility as by civility, and almost as much by separateness as by unity or harmony (Scorza, 2004). Again, therefore, his conception of friendship is uniquely suited for this project. The public sphere is often characterized by deep asymmetries of power and resources, by enduring ethnic, racial, and religious antagonisms, and, most importantly, by moral and cultural pluralism (Grayling, 2001).
By using Emerson’s conception of friendship this thesis was able to demonstrate that interracial friendships could quite possibly have significant positive implications on our public hearts. The issue then becomes, how do these relationships form? While chapter five considers the context—from the social science realm—of how friendships are formed and maintained, Chapter six considers the barrier to interracial friendship. Although there is limited information specifically exploring the influence of race on friendship, the implications can be vast.

**Conclusion**

According to Lynch (2005), the fragmented and differentiated nature of modern friendships and their indistinctness of the concept in general make the demands of the philosophical tradition difficult to apply to modern friendships. In contemporary literature, the term friendship is often used to refer to relationships that are freely chosen; that are characterized by mutual liking, affection and enjoyment; and that flourish in shared and reciprocal activity and in steady, free and mutual cultivation (Lynch, 2005). Friendship is taken to be a relationship in which the participants like and show concern for one another for their own sakes rather than out of any narrow self-interest or ulterior motive (Lynch, 2005). This last criterion is one that Aristotle takes to be definitive of relations between friends of the best kind, and modern friendships in which the friends exhibit this attitude are highly esteemed (Pangle, 2003). It is a criterion that must have some application to forms of friendship that Aristotle would have described as inferior (Schollmeir, 1994). If friendships which Aristotle would have regarded as friendships of utility are able to be distinguished from thoroughly instrumental relationships—such as purely “commercial” relationships, business alliances, or relationships between
individuals who find themselves as joint members of a team—then friends of utility must demonstrate some degree of liking, care and concern for one another for the others’ own sakes (Pangle, 2003).

This project has shown that it is possible to find relationships in which the participants are referred to as friends, but in which some of the typical criteria or assumptions are absent. Modern friends might regard some of their friendships as primary friendships by analogy with Aristotelian friendships of the best kind (Pangle, 2003). Examples of friendship that we admire and to which we may aspire are provided by relationships that are relatively permanent, and in which friends appear to exhibit liking, care and concern for one another in themselves; by relationships in which the friends are not self-interested, and in which they prove themselves to be trustworthy and commendable characters (Lynch, 2005). The appeal in these forms of friendship lies not in any sense that these are archetypical cases of friendship, but in their ethical implications and in the value of their achievements. Within the context of interracial friendship, the achievements are by products of genuine engagement that may allow us to develop deeper understanding of ourselves and of others, or find that we are happier as a consequence of the friendship.

However, the differentiated nature of modern friendship only exacerbates the difficulty of satisfying a definitional approach to friendship as it relates to this project. Emerson provided a solution that supported the notion that private friendships can transcend to our public hearts.

A model of friendship which emphasizes difference, rather than similarity, opens the relationship to possibility, and of course to the vulnerability inherent in possibility,
since the relationship may not survive the strain that difference can impose on it.

However, the experience of interracial friendships can provide us with a sense of accompaniment in life, with different perspectives on life, and hence it can broaden our own experience vicariously and widen our moral horizons both privately and as we enter the public sphere. It can challenge us to think differently about life and about ourselves, and perhaps to act differently in the world.
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