Civic-ness in the Caribbean: Civic Society and Governance in Barbados and Jamaica

Liam Carstens

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Civic-ness in the Caribbean: Civic Society and Governance

in Barbados and Jamaica

A Thesis

Presented to the

McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts

Duquesne University

in partial fulfillment of

the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

By

Liam Zachary Kivlin Carstens

April 2, 2007
Thesis Signature Page

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Civic-ness in the Caribbean: Civic Society and Governance in Barbados and Jamaica

Master of Arts

Thesis

April 2, 2007

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Abstract

This study tests the hypothesis of Robert Putnam (*Making Democracy Work*) which posits that ‘civic-ness’ explains why democracy works better in some cases than in others. This paper seeks to determine whether this variable explains ‘good governance’ in the Caribbean as well as it does for the Mediterranean.

In order to establish whether or not ‘civic-ness’ determines ‘good governance,’ two extreme cases in the Caribbean are examined. Barbados and Jamaica are case studies of variance in economic performance, government, and the social situation. The two are compared in terms of their levels of ‘civic-ness,’ an independent variable resembling Putnam’s but altered for the Caribbean context. The dependent variable ‘good governance’ is defined by both social and political dimensions. The research utilizes statistics from the United Nations, the World Bank, and other organizations, as well as secondary data from newspapers and scholars in the field to compare the two cases.

This paper concludes that an adjusted version of Putnam’s ‘civic-ness’ correlates with ‘good governance’ in these two cases. There is, however, further study suggested for potential confounding variables such as size, topography, levels of economic development, and external pressure from foreign lenders.
Acknowledgements

I have had many teachers throughout my life, the two best remain my mother and father, Noreen and Ronald Carstens, who instilled in me a sincere love of knowledge and a deep appreciation of learning. Additionally, I would like to thank Dr. Clifford Bob who tirelessly worked with me to shape and edit this project. It is a testament to his abilities that this thesis was completed as well and efficiently as it was. I also wish to acknowledge Dr. Anibal Perez-Linan who introduced me both to the work of Putnam as well as to comparative methodology. His course on the canons, theories, and techniques of comparative politics was as invaluable to this paper as it was illuminating. Indeed, any insight in this paper is surely attributable to these fine educators, while any errors are solely my own.

Furthermore, I would like to thank my friends and family for tolerating me during this process and helping me design the paper through various discussions. Finn, Mark, Fariz, Navruz, and Jillian all supplied a kind ear for my ramblings. In addition, an untold number of friends were critical for the diversion and distraction that they provided during this process. Thank you all.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Does ‘civic-ness’ determine ‘good governance?’ In his book *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, Robert Putnam posits that ‘civic-ness’ (hereafter defined in terms of popular participation in elections, the presence or absence of patron-client relationships, and news consumption) is a variable that can be used to explain why democracy works better in some cases than in others. He does this by examining regions in Italy during the latter part of the 20th Century. This study seeks to determine if this independent variable can explain the outcome in the Caribbean as well as it does for the Mediterranean.

Putnam’s dependent variable is ‘institutional performance.’ He is essentially measuring how well the democratic institutions of each region perform their duties to the people. To examine this he gauges various indicators such as policy outputs, policy innovativeness, and institutional responsiveness. Since he is studying the ability of institutions to fulfill their democratic duties, the dependent variable ‘good governance’ (defined in terms of political and social realities of the state) was constructed for this study. In order to establish whether or not ‘civic-ness’ determines ‘good governance,’ two extreme cases in the Caribbean are examined. Barbados and Jamaica are case studies of variance in economic performance, government, and the social situation. Using indices from the United Nations Human Development Report (UN HDR) and the World Bank, as well as other secondary sources of qualitative and quantitative data, significant variation between the two cases is demonstrated.
Cases

Barbados

Barbados is a small nation and is the easternmost island in the Caribbean. It has a total area of 432 square meters, which means that it is roughly two and a half times the size of the District of Columbia, and there are 279,912 inhabitants on the island (CIA World Factbook). The nation achieved its independence from England in 1966 and is widely acknowledged as the most successful democracy in the Caribbean. The island has suffered little from inflation over the years and the inhabitants enjoy a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita of 18,200 USD (CIA World Factbook). Furthermore, the topography of the nation is such that it is basically a plateau with a gradual rise in the center of the island. While still having some remaining descendants of European colonialists, the island is essentially racially homogenous and comprised of descendants of African slaves.

Jamaica

Jamaica is located south of Cuba in the Caribbean Sea. It is an island with roughly 25 times the size of Barbados at 10,831 square meters, which is slightly smaller than Connecticut (CIA World Factbook). The island is the third largest English-speaking nation in the Western Hemisphere, and has a population nearly ten times the size of Barbados, 2,758,124 (CIA World Factbook). Jamaica attained independence from England in 1962, and since then the nation has experienced periods of high inflation and economic stagnation. The GDP per capita is 4,600 USD (CIA World Factbook). Unlike Barbados, the terrain is predominantly mountainous but

---

1 Additional information can be found about these two nations in the charts of Appendix II.
spotted with noncontiguous flatland. Jamaica is more ethnically diverse than Barbados, but the predominant ethnic group is comprised of descendants of slaves brought from Africa.

**Contribution of Research**

This research builds upon the existing scholarship of civic communities and civic traditions that includes authors ranging from Robert Putnam to Alexis de Tocqueville. The paper, however, makes the unique contribution of testing a modified version of an established independent variable in a new region of the world, the Caribbean. The empirical and theoretical contributions of the work are the answer to the question, does ‘civic-ness’ cause ‘good governance’ in the Caribbean?

**Theoretical Formulation and Research Hypothesis**

The theoretical approach utilized is taken from Putnam’s *Making Democracy Work*, as well as works by other authors who posit the positive relationship between ‘civic-ness’ and ‘good governance.’ Therefore, the hypothesis being tested is primarily Putnam’s: ‘civic-ness’ determines government performance. There is a forthcoming explanation of the variables, but ‘civic-ness’ is based on Putnam’s independent variable, while ‘good governance’ is an amalgamation of Putnam’s dependent variable and information from other sources.

**Research Design**

**Putnam’s Design**

The variables used in this study are largely taken from concepts in Putnam’s book, *Making Democracy Work*, which describes a study that he and two other social scientists undertook that examined the devolution of power in Italy during the latter part of the twentieth
century. In the 1970s, political reforms in Italy enacted a long ignored provision of the Italian Constitution that granted some autonomy to regional governments. Putnam saw this as a great opportunity for what he termed a ‘regional experiment.’ He presents ‘institutional performance’ as his dependent variable and finds significant differences between the regional governments. His book is an attempt to explain why some regional governments have good ‘institutional performance’ while others do not. This has theoretical importance beyond simply Italian regional governments in that it poses the question of why some democratic governments succeed while others fail.

As a result of his two-decades of research and his long and medium term analysis, Putnam concludes that it is levels of ‘civic-ness’ that can explain why the regional governments of the north have better ‘institutional performances,’ in other words better government institutions, than their counterparts in the south; levels of ‘civic-ness’ are really what are driving ‘institutional performance.’ Here it may be useful to include his four indicators of a civic community, or a region with a high level of ‘civic-ness.’ These are: the vibrancy of associational life, the readership and circulation of daily papers, high voter turnout for referendums, and a low instance of particularistic, preference voting (Putnam 1993).

The Design of This Project

The purpose of this project is exploratory and evaluative. It explores the variable ‘civic-ness’ in Barbados and Jamaica and evaluates if this has an effect on ‘good governance’ in either case. The research question is: does ‘civic-ness’ cause ‘good governance’ in the Caribbean? Various social and political indicators are examined and show that Barbados has better ‘governance’ than Jamaica in all regards. These indicators consist of indices and measurements
from the World Bank and the United Nations as well as primary and secondary accounts of the two countries.

Variables and Indicators

Figure 1: The Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civic-ness</th>
<th>Good Governance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>Political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Political Effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News Consumption</td>
<td>Public Health Spending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sanitation and Water</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable, instead of ‘institutional performance,’ is ‘good governance,’ which has been constructed out of various sources. This variable is used instead of ‘institutional performance’ primarily because Putnam’s variable has various indicators, particularly of policy outputs, that are specific to his ‘Italian experiment.’ Additionally, creating a variable for ‘good governance’ permits the utilization of secondary sources and allows the research to bypass some of the obstacles caused by Putnam’s case specific indicators. ‘Good governance’ is also a suitable substitute because Putnam’s use of ‘institutional performance’ is really an attempt to measure why some democratic governments succeed whiles others fail.

The dependent variable ‘good governance’ consists of a dimension for both political and social aspects. The political dimension has indicators that measure government effectiveness and the rule of law. The social dimension includes indicators for spending on education, public health spending, sanitation services, and water infrastructure. These indicators measure ‘good governance’ because they represent basic needs of the people (education, health, water, sewage).
Independent Variable

The independent variable ‘civic-ness’ is constructed from data for voter turnout in general elections, the presence or absence of clientelism, the frequency of news consumption by citizens, and the amount of corruption in the public sector.

These are distinct from Putnam’s due to the case specific nature of his indicators in the ‘Italian experiment.’ For example, he includes preferential voting, which is primarily a Western European phenomenon. All attempts have been made, however, to measure similar aspects of the variable ‘civic-ness.’

Limitations

Even though this is a carefully planned research study, there are some potential limitations that come to the fore during the research and writing of this thesis. One is the inability to control for other variables. I have attempted to control for as many factors as possible with the selection of the two cases. This is why I have chosen two islands in the same region with similar colonial histories but with different trajectories since independence. There are, however, other variables that may influence ‘good governance.’ One such variable could be the size of the country, which some researchers posit but others discredit. Donald C. Peters suggests that ‘civic-ness’ may be more prevalent in smaller nations. He asserts that “communal spirit is predominant in the small” nations in the Eastern Caribbean, “and with the help of church organizations, people provide an informal social network for meeting some of the socioeconomic problems that inevitably confront the poor” (Peters 1992, 164). Therefore, this research concludes with the recommendation that further study be aimed at variations in country size and ‘good governance.’
Another potential limitation may come from the validity and reliability of the data. This has been addressed by drawing from as many sources available in an attempt to gain the clearest picture possible. This will be somewhat hampered by the limited number of available data-sets for the two islands, but a degree of triangulation is certainly possible. Also, this project has been limited in scope by the realities of being a full-time graduate student in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania with limited resources and time. Although there was neither funding nor time to travel to the Caribbean, this research has utilized the data available for such a study.

There are also limitations to the cases. Barbados and Jamaica are two cases that were selected due to the disparities between them. Early in the research process such differences were deemed necessary, but as the project progressed and the design changed they have become limitations. For example, in the original research design economics was to be examined along with social and political dimensions of the dependent variable. Because of this, one of the most developed states in the Caribbean was contrasted with one of the least developed. As the research evolved and economic considerations were removed, this became a limitation of the study, as Barbados is far more developed than Jamaica.

Finally, this study will have limited generalizability. Testing Putnam’s hypothesis in these two countries will determine whether or not it explains ‘good governance’ in both cases, but a larger survey with more cases will be needed to unequivocally state that ‘civic-ness’ is or is not a necessary and/or sufficient cause of ‘good governance.’ Also, this study is not able to refute or uphold Putnam’s theory due to the fact that both variables are original creations for this project, although they do resemble his concepts. Despite these limitations, this research has created hypotheses that should be tested in the future. This study will be an excellent foundation for further study on civic-ness and the Caribbean region.

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2 For charts on the economic disparities between the two cases see Appendix II.
Findings

It is evident from the research that there is a correlation between ‘good governance’ and ‘civic-ness.’ Indeed, Barbados registered a much higher value for the independent variable than did Jamaica. Additionally, Barbados also performed much better in the examined indicators of ‘good governance.’ This indicates that there is a relationship between the two variables, but there are other confounding variables that may also explain certain aspects of ‘good governance.’ Geography is one such variable. Some authors have posited that the sheer size of a nation determines the success of its governing institutions. The logic here is that smaller nations or geographic entities are rife with higher levels of ‘civic-ness.’ Also, this research suggests that topography may have an effect on the amount of infrastructure that a state has, with flatter countries having an easier time building and maintaining such amenities. Furthermore, the aforementioned economic differences between the two nations likely play a large part in how ‘good’ the ‘governance’ of each nation is. This is best seen in the fact that more developed nations are able to spend more money on social services and less on development. Finally, the pressure exerted upon a nation by external lenders also appears to affect ‘good governance.’ It is undeniable that the forced reduction in social and other-governmental spending causes much harm, such cuts have caused an increase in crime as well as a decrease in the ability of the Jamaican state to handle crime.
Chapter 2: Literature Review

In his book *Democracy in America*, Alexis de Tocqueville wrote of his travels throughout young America in the early 19th century. He sought what distinguished America from other democracies, particularly from his native France. He asserts that it is the respect for both the individual and the community that characterizes the American type of democracy. He also claims that there is a link between the large number of community groups and organizations that are present in the United States and the success of its government (Cited in Putnam 1993, Chapter 4). He stresses the importance of voluntary association in a free democracy:

> In democratic countries, the knowledge of how to form associations is the mother of all knowledge since the success of all the others depends upon it. Among the laws governing human societies, one in particular seems more precise and clearer than all the others. In order to ensure that men remain or become civilized, the skill of association must develop and improve among them at the same speed as the spread of the equality of social conditions (Tocqueville [1840] 2003, 600).

This is a ringing endorsement for the benefits of voluntary associations. He also writes that the rate of newspaper readership is important as it is the best way to disseminate information to the masses, or at least those who can read. Countless writers have been influenced by Tocqueville, who many hold to be the first writer to stress the importance of civic culture and social capital (Forse 2004, 273). In his journey across young America, Tocqueville was embarking on an age old quest of Political Science, the search for an explanation of democracy.

Other social scientists have posited alternative factors that affect successful democracies. In his seminal work of historical sociology *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Modern World*, Barrington Moore attempts to address a question that is ubiquitous in the social sciences: why do some societies modernize into dictatorships with command economies while others develop into capitalist democracies? By addressing this
uncertainty, Moore rejects a popular movement within social sciences at the time that held that societies develop along a similar trajectory and that unrepresentative government types are simply part of the progression towards democracy. One such theory that espoused these ideals was modernization theory, which held that as societies become more developed and wealthy, democracy becomes increasingly viable (Perez-Linan, class notes, 9/7/06). Moore examined individual historical cases and theorized about why some modernization processes ended with democracy, as in England, France, and the United States, while others resulted in fascism, in Germany and Japan, and others in dictatorial communism, like China and Russia. In doing this, Moore was embarking the same quest as Tocqueville, although with different results.

Moore’s historical research sheds light on certain constants, which are found in the examination of the cases. One of the most interesting, if not surprising, factors that Moore discovers is that bourgeois violence is necessary for the establishment of democracy. In England this took the more subtle form of the enclosure movement and then was manifested in the Puritan Revolution. This process is seen in France in the French Revolution, and in the United States in the Civil War. Tied to this is what Theda Skocpol calls the ‘bourgeois impulse’ of the country (Skocpol 1973, 10). This essentially means the strength of the bourgeois class and their leanings toward the way of life of the aristocracy. England, France, and the United States are characterized by high levels of ‘bourgeois impulse’ towards the aristocracy, while the rest of these cases either do not have a bourgeoisie, or the class has weak aristocratic leanings (Skocpol 1973). Moore’s work highlights two important facts about the literature. First, like Tocqueville before him and countless others since, Moore’s work shows that it is not a new phenomenon that political scientists are grappling with questions about the foundations of democracy and non-
democratic governance. Secondly, those engaged in this study have often brought in history in attempts to explain this process, this can also be seen in Putnam’s *Making Democracy Work*.

In *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Hannah Arendt illustrates the influence of Tocqueville on generations of scholars. Indeed, this is evident when she stresses that “the fall of community increases the risk of totalitarianism” (Forse 2004, 273). Inherent in this statement are the concepts of Tocqueville that democracy is maintained by successful communities with group values that are reinforced by membership in associations, newspaper readership, and the absence of vertical relationships of power.

The construction of Putnam’s variable ‘civic-ness’ is also clearly influenced by Tocqueville. Not only does he make references to the great French writer throughout *Making Democracy Work*, but his independent variable also has indicators to measure the number of associations in the different Italian regions and to gauge the newspaper readership in each district (Putnam 1993, 92-93). Throughout the book, it is clear that Putnam is a student of Tocqueville, as when he asserts that “[t]he norms and values of the civic community are embedded in, and reinforced by, distinctive social structures and practices. The most relevant social theorist here remains Alexis de Tocqueville” (Putnam 1993, 89). It is a testament to enduring legacy of the scholarship of Tocqueville that he is cited so heavily by one of the most prominent scholars in the field of ‘civic-ness’ and civil society today.

In fact, the article and book for which Putnam is most famous is based largely on the findings of Tocqueville. In *Bowling Alone*, published two years after *Making Democracy Work*, Putnam points out that there is a serious decline in social capital (‘civic-ness’) in the United States during the last quarter century. “‘[S]ocial capital’ refers to features of social organizations such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual...
benefit” (Putnam 1995, 67). To show this decline, Putnam points to drops in voter participation in elections, as well as a slide in direct popular participation in the political process. Most importantly for Putnam, the fact that Americans are loosing their ‘civic-ness’ can be illustrated best by examining the decrease in membership rates for voluntary associations. Putnam shows that this drop in group membership across the all strata of the population has accompanied a similar decline in ‘civic-ness’ in the United States. Again, we can see how strongly Putnam is influenced by Tocqueville, it is also evident that Bowling Alone is next in a professional progression for Putnam that includes Making Democracy Work.

In contrast to Putnam and others, there are also those who believe that too much emphasis is placed on ‘civic-ness’ and political culture in explaining ‘governance’ outcomes. Stephen Whitefield and Geoffrey Evans posit that “there has been considerable disagreement among political scientists over the relative merits of political culture versus rational choice explanations of democratic and liberal norms and commitments. However, empirical tests of their relative explanatory power using quantitative evidence have been in short supply” (Witefield and Evans 1999). The authors found that rational choice theory was better equipped to explain the reasons for the separation of the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

The previous quote highlights two important themes in the literature. First, the role of ‘civic-ness’ in political outcomes is disputed among scholars. There are many who emphasize the role that ‘civic-ness’ plays in ‘good governance,’ like Putnam, Arendt, and Tocqueville, while others feel that alternative variables better describe this phenomenon. Secondly, it shows there are too few studies that seek to test empirically the hypothesis that ‘civic-ness’ determines ‘good governance. This is a significant gap in the literature, particularly in the literature of the
Caribbean region. Many scholars simply accept Putnam’s hypothesis, although it has not been shown to universally explain why some governments succeed while others fail.

Some do, however, contest Putnam’s hypothesis. There have been outright criticisms of Putnam as well as empirical tests of his theory. Shortly after the publication of *Making Democracy Work*, Sidney Tarrow wrote a critical review of the book. Tarrow expresses myriad concerns with the study. First, he sees a problem with the indicators used. He states that there is not the connection between preferential voting and a lack of ‘civic-ness’ that Putnam posits. Next, he brings up recent developments that challenge Putnam’s theory. While Putnam’s book was being printed, the ‘civic’ north was being rocked by revelations of a far reaching corruption scandal. All the while, Carlo Trigilia was showing that the ‘uncivic’ south was witnessing a period of growth in “associational activity” (Tarrow 1996, 392). Certainly, Putnam’s book would have been different had he completed it just a year or two later, for he would have had to take these factors into consideration.

Tarrow also reveals a problem with Putnam’s historical research. Putnam stresses that the pattern of ‘civic-ness’ found in the north is rooted eight hundred years ago in the Northern Italian city-states. Tarrow correctly points out that these city-states were only in existence for a short period of time before they degenerated into “oligarchies” that “fought constantly over territory and markets, and left the urban poor vertically compromised” (Tarrow 1996, 393). This leads the reader to wonder, what happened to this ‘civic-ness’ between this time and that of Italian unification in 1860? Additionally, how were these norms of civic engagement passed down over centuries during times of oligarchy and vertical relationships of power?

Finally, Tarrow provides an alternative explanation: it is the political situation that is paramount. He writes that “[t]he operative cause of the performance of the regional institutions
in both North and South is neither cultural nor associational but political” (Tarrow 1996, 394).

He says this because he finds that both civics and politics were weaker in the south. This may indicate tautological or spurious reasoning in Putnam’s theory. As evidence, Tarrow explains the process of state (first the northern city-states, then the Italian centralized government) intervention in the politics and economics of the south over centuries. This leads him to assert that there can be no ‘civic-ness’ “in which the state has played no role” (Tarrow 1996, 395). This notion that Putnam needed to place more emphasis on politics and the state is picked up by writers after Tarrow.

One such scholar is Martin Aberg, who stresses the role of politics in “Putnam’s Social Capital Theory Goes East: A Case Study of Western Ukraine and L’viv.” In this study, Aberg examines “negative or non-communitarian social capital of post-socialist societies” (Aberg 2000, 295). Aberg is critical of Putnam for being too vague and for treating culture as a-historical, indeed citizens of the civic north did support the Italian Fascists. He also cites a study by Thomas R. Cusack, which shows that the importance of institutional design is overlooked by Putnam (Aberg 2000, 298). For Aberg, “[p]olitical culture and historical legacies, institutions, state agency and structural factors, such as level of socioeconomic development, do, as most people would agree, mutually intervene to produce specific outcomes in terms of politics and without following the deterministic pattern suggested by Putnam’s theory” (Aberg 2000, 299).

With this mindset, he studies the case of western Ukraine shortly after achieving independence from the Soviet Union. He concludes that, contrary to Putnam, in societies with low levels of ‘civic-ness,’ “lack of trust in formal institutions is not due primarily to difficulties in implementing sanctions in the particularistic and often vertical networks from which non-communitarian social capital is built” (Aberg 2000, 313). Instead, it is the types of exchanges
that are important to study. Like Tarrow, this study shows the importance of political culture, which comprises the ‘environmental conditions’ in which new institutions “compete with each other to become dominant political traits” along with civic culture, “structural factors and the nature of the state” (Aberg 2000, 314). The environment, in other words, is more than just ‘civic-ness.’

Another author who stresses the importance of studying the interaction of social and political culture is John Harriss, who notes the rise in scholarship that utilizes the ‘buzz words’ of ‘civil society’ and ‘social capital’ in his article “Public Action and the Dialectics of Decentralisation: Against the Myth of Social Capital as ‘The Missing Link in Development.” He writes that the merits of these concepts are often taken to be fact. He is particularly troubled by one paper from the World Bank that refers to social capital as ‘the missing link in development’ (Harriss 2001, 25). He illustrates this by first outlining the assumptions of those who hold the benefits of civic society as gospel. Next he shows that the civic society approach to development is one that rejects a top-down model, in other words, development works its way up from the bottom.

This brings him to his primary critique of the civic society model of development; the concept of civic society, in his view, ignores government action, which he calls “‘public action’ … a label for the interplay of state and non-state action in the public arena” (Harriss 2001, 27). He brings this up to criticize Putnam for the emphasis that he places on ‘voluntary civic associations’ such as choral clubs, church organizations, sports associations, and the like. Harriss also chastises Putnam for ignoring the fact that his more civic regions in Italy also had a strong correlation with those regions run by the Italian Communist Party (PCI) (Harriss 2001, 29). This is a fact that Putnam notes but overlooks in Making Democracy Work. He first
dismisses the PCI factor by saying that “[c]ommunists had come to power in unusually civic regions,” but then notes that “this might not be the whole story” (Putnam 1993, 119-120). Unfortunately for the analysis, Putnam does not devote more than two pages to the topic. Harris also cites Theda Skocpol’s criticism of Putnam, that he assumes “that social capital is something that arises or declines in a realm apart from politics and government” (Cited in Harriss 2001, 29). This highlights a trend in the criticisms which holds that Putnam’s study of civic society ignores political realities.

Harriss concludes that there is an overemphasis on the themes of social capital and of civic society in the field of development. This is problematic for him because of the stress placed on grassroots development while ignoring the role of the ‘political society’ (Harriss 2001, 39). As with Tarrow and Aberg, Harriss finds that it is important to study the political society of a state in addition to the civil society.

Writing at the same time as Harriss, Kenneth Newton examines the relationship between social capital and political capital. He finds that, at the individual level, there is not a significant correlation between the two variables. Additionally, he claims that there are four problems with the study of trust. A problem of a vague concept that has no clear accepted definition, a problem of interpreting responses to surveys, a problem of correlation between “social trust and voluntary associations,” and the idea that “social and political trust tend to be expressed by different kinds of people for different sorts of reasons” (Newton 2001, 204). Pertinent to Putnam is Newton’s findings about trust and voluntary associations. He finds that, while there may be a slightly higher than average amount of social capital or trust within voluntary associations, this relationship can be viewed as “reciprocal” (Newton 2001, 207). That is, rather than memberships in organizations causing an increase in ‘civic-ness,’ more civic minded people are
inclined to join groups in the first place; membership in groups do not make people more likely to participate in society and politics, it is the inclination towards this participation that makes citizens join associations. This represents a reverse of the thinking of Tocqueville and Putnam, that the drive to participate in civic culture causes people to join associations, not vice versa.

Newton, however, does not completely reject the importance of social and political capital. He writes that these two variables are better viewed when seen from a national perspective rather than an individual one; “social and political capital refer to the aggregate properties of societies and polities, not to their individual members” (Newton 2001, 212). This is an important fact, which allows Newton to stress that the theories of social and political capital are not incorrect, they are simply in need of revision. Indeed it is this revelation that leads him to state that “[p]oorly developed civil societies are unlikely to sustain developed democracies” (Newton 2001, 212). This statement, which Putnam would no doubt agree with, has important ramifications for this study. This thesis will test this very concept, that ‘good governance’ requires well developed civil societies, or ones in which there is an abundance of ‘civic-ness.’

Although there have been studies and critiques of Putnam, these have been relatively few when compared to the increased scholarship in the field of civil society, which many attribute to his scholarship in Making Democracy Work and Bowling Alone. This gap in the literature is the reason why there is a need for this proposed study. To my knowledge, there has been no such study that asks if ‘civic-ness’ can explain ‘good governance’ in the Caribbean. This dearth of information and literature on the whole region is reason enough to undertake this research. Additionally, there are not many studies that test such a hypothesis in any region, so this study will contribute to the general debate. It is these gaps in the literature of the region and in the theory that provided the primary justification for undertaking this project.
Chapter 3: ‘Civic-ness’ in the Cases

Introduction

This chapter shows that there is a difference in the levels of ‘civic-ness’ of Barbados and Jamaica. Barbados has a higher overall aggregate of the values for corruption, political participation, and news consumption. Overall, this illustrates that Barbados is much stronger in terms of the independent variable of ‘civic-ness,’ which, according to Putnam, would mean that Barbados should display better ‘governance’ than Jamaica.

‘Civic-ness’

For Putnam, the ‘civic-ness’ of a community is seen in its politics and society; a culture with a high level of ‘civic-ness’ is one characterized by “active participation in public affairs,” “equal rights and obligations for all,” adversaries “tolerant of their opponents,” and “social structures of cooperation” (Putnam 1993, 87, 88, 89).

Citizens who are active in public affairs are those who participate in public activity with more than their own self-interest in mind. While political participation motivated by ‘civic-ness’ need not be entirely selfless, it is also not particularly individualistic. Putnam states that “[c]itizens in a civic community, though not selfless saints, regard the public domain as more than a battle-ground for pursuing personal interest” (Putnam 1993, 88). A society with citizens who keep the public interest ahead of their own would not be plagued by political tribalism.

A state with high levels of ‘civic-ness’ (a ‘civic community’) is also characterized by political equality. “Citizens interact as equals, not as patrons and clients nor as governors and petitioners… The more that politics approximates the ideal of political equality among citizens
following norms of reciprocity and engaged in self-government, the more civic that community may be said to be” (Putnam 1993, 88). Thus, patron-client relationships do not exist in such a society. These ‘vertical’ relationships of clientelism are replaced by ‘horizontal relations of reciprocity and cooperation’ (Putnam 1993, 88).

A ‘civic community’ is also one in which trust and tolerance flourish. “Virtuous citizens are helpful, respectful, and trustful toward one another, even when they differ on matters of substance… they are tolerant of their opponents” (Putnam 1993, 88-89). Citizens in such a society respect the political opposition as well as the electoral process. A community racked with political violence, therefore, is not one that is rich in ‘civic-ness.’

Without accessible detailed census data for the two cases, there is some difficulty in measuring the ‘civic-ness’ of these two Caribbean nations. Certain indicators, however, have been utilized to gauge the ‘civic-ness’ of each state. These are: perceived levels of corruption, turnout in general elections, and news consumption (newspaper circulation, television and radio ownership, and internet use).

\[\text{Figure 2: ‘Civic-ness’}\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civicness</th>
<th>Good Governance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>Political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government Effectiveness</td>
</tr>
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<td>Rule of Law</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Participation</td>
<td>Education Spending</td>
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<tr>
<td>News Consumption</td>
<td>Social</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public Health Spending</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sanitation and Water</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Corruption and Government Trust**

The perceived level of public corruption is a very valuable indicator. Indeed, Putnam reminds us that “[t]he least civic regions are the most subject to the ancient plague of political corruption” (Putnam 1993, 111). Due to the secretive and underhanded nature of corruption, it is impossible to measure actual levels, there are, however, two good indices that measure popular perceptions of public corruption. These serves not only as a measurement of citizens’
assessment of government corruption, but they also indicate public trust in government; a polity that believes its government to be corrupt does not have much trust in it.

The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is maintained by Transparency International.³ Corruption is defined “as the abuse of public office for private gain…for example bribery of public officers, kickbacks in public procurement, embezzlement of public funds” (Transparency International 2006b). Countries are ranked in terms of the perceived level of corruption in them, which is based on a score between one and ten.

In 2006, Barbados received a CPI score of 6.7, which placed it twenty-fourth in the country rankings. That same year Jamaica received a 3.7, ranking it sixty-first. It is helpful to examine these results with some perspective. Barbados finished twenty-fourth with a 6.7 CPI score, just behind Spain (6.8, twenty-third) and the United States (7.3, tied twentieth). Jamaica finished sixty-first with a 3.7 CPI score, tied with Poland and just behind Turkey (3.8, sixtieth) and Colombia (3.9, fifty-ninth). Notable countries that were perceived to be more corrupt than Barbados but with less corruption than Jamaica include: Portugal (6.6, twenty-sixth), Israel (5.9, thirty-fourth), Taiwan (5.9, thirty-fourth), Hungary (5.2, forty-first), South Korea (5.1, forty-second) Putnam’s Italy (4.9, forty-fifth), and Greece (4.4, fifty-fourth) (Transparency International 2006a).

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³ The CPI is generated from at least three surveys per country that measure citizens’ attitudes about the amount of corruption in the public sector.
The World Bank also provides an index that measures the control of corruption by the government. ‘Control of corruption’ is defined as “the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests” (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2006, 4).

Examining the percentiles of the two nations, we again see that Barbados far exceeds Jamaica in the perception of control of corruption. Barbados is ranked in nearly the eighty-fifth percentile, while Jamaica lags behind in just below the fortieth percentile (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2006). The black line on this chart represents the statistically likely range of the true value for control of corruption. At a 90 percent confidence level, the worst that Barbados can rank is around the seventieth percentile, while the best that Jamaica can rank is only slightly lower.
above the fiftieth percentile. In other words, even accounting for errors, Jamaica is perceived to be plagued by significantly more corruption than Barbados.

**Figure 4: Control of Corruption**

Source: The World Bank, Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2006

Generally, it seems that Barbadian believe their government to be far less corrupt than Jamaicans. This indicates that they place more trust in their governing institutions, which has important ramifications for the issue of ‘good governance.’

**Political Participation**

Political turnout for national elections is the second indicator of the independent variable. Like most statistics, however, these figures must be considered along with qualitative data to avoid misreading the facts. For example, it is tempting for the researcher to posit that high instances of voter turnout alone are indicative of correspondingly high levels of ‘civic-ness.’ While this may be the case, it is also possible that these high turnouts are driven by patron-client relationships and political tribalism. Since no quantitative data is available about such topics, qualitative sources will also be consulted in this section. Generally, the assumption about a high level of ‘civic-ness’ is that it will lead to high levels of informed voter turnout. There are, however, myriad ulterior motives for the disinterested voter. Turnout patterns are, nevertheless, still a good point of reference for this research.
In the elections before independence, voter participation in Barbados was generally around or above two thirds of the registered voters. In the 1970s and 1980s, following independence, turnout was slightly higher, ranging between the seventy one percent and eighty one percent. The numbers have declined to pre-independence levels of slightly below two thirds in the last decade and a half (Barrow-Giles and Joseph 2006, 35-36). For Barrow-Giles and Joseph, the presence of rates of participation of more than sixty percent of the registered voters is “a reflection of the level of civic mindedness of the Barbadian public and a pattern consistent with past elections” (Barrow-Giles and Joseph 2006, 34). This is true because it is accepted that there are not extensive patron-client networks or a system of political tribalism in Barbados. Therefore, there is not the prevalence of extra-democratic motivation to vote. Generally, it appears that Barbadians vote as a democratic end rather than as a means.

As in Barbados, the national elections after universal suffrage and before independence were characterized by voter turnout rates of around two thirds of the total registered voters. After independence in 1962, the turnout percentages for the late 1960s and early 1970s increased to around 80 percent on average, with many exceeding this mark (Barrow-Giles and Joseph 2006, 46). The election of 1980, however, was plagued by political violence carried out by

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4 Examining the chart adapted from Cynthia Barrow-Giles and Tennyson S.D. Joseph, it is evident that in the fifteen years before achieving independence in 1966, just under two-thirds of registered Barbadian participated in the elections. The first election in Barbados with universal adult suffrage was held in 1951 and a voter participation rate of 64.6 percent was recorded. There was a turnout of 60.3 percent in 1956, and 61.3 percent in 1961 (Barrow-Giles and Joseph 2006, 35). The election held in 1966, less than a month before independence, saw a staggering 79.3 percent turnout. High levels were maintained throughout the 1970s and 1980s, with 81.6 percent in 1971, 74.1 percent in 1976, 71.6 percent in 1981, 76.7 percent in 1986 (Barrow-Giles and Joseph 2006, 35). The last decade and a half has witnessed a return to the pre-independence standard of nearly two-thirds, with 63.7 percent in 1991, 60.9 percent in 1994, 63.4 percent in 1999, and 61.4 percent in 2003 (Barrow-Giles and Joseph 2006, 35-36).

5 Beginning with the first Jamaican election with universal adult suffrage in 1944 around two-thirds of registered Jamaican voters could be expected to vote in elections leading up to independence. 58.7 percent of registered voters came out in 1944, 65.2 percent in 1949, 65.1 percent in 1955, and 66.1 percent in 1959 (Barrow-Giles and Joseph 2006, 46). As in Barbados, voter participation jumped in the year of independence; a national election held just a few months prior to gaining independence in 1962 garnered a 72.9 percent voter turnout rate (Barrow-Giles and Joseph 2006, 46). This began a trend that continued in Jamaican national elections until 1980; the 1967 election had a voter turnout of 82.2 percent, there was a turnout of 78.9 percent in 1972, 85.2 percent in 1976, and 86.9 percent in
gangs supported by both major political parties. The fighting by both sides caused nearly 800 deaths in the months leading up the election (Usborne 2002). This fighting was caused by political affiliations that were directly related to the clientelistic policies of both parties.

The 1983 election was characterized by nearly non-existent levels of turnout because the People’s National Party (PNP), one of the two major political parties, boycotted the election. Only six seats were contested against the Jamaican Labour Party (JLP) (Latin America Regional Reports 1984). This led to only 26,543 voters out of 990,586 total registered, or a 2.7 percent level of participation (Barrow-Giles and Joseph 2006, 46).

On November 25 of 1983, Prime Minister Edward Seaga called for new elections. This announcement came on the heels of a “77 percent devaluation of the Jamaican currency” (AP 1983). Along with the diminished value of the dollar, Jamaica had experienced skyrocketing increases to the cost of living on the island (Latin America Regional Reports 1984). With the economy in trouble, Seaga, who also served as the Minister of Finance and Natural resources, sought a confirmation of support from the Jamaican people for the continuation of his party’s economic policies. Additionally, he was responding to calls from the opposition PNP for him to step down from his ministerial position (AP 1983). Seaga called this election confident in the fact that his party would win and that he would have an electoral mandate to continue his policies. Part of this optimism was, no doubt, from the fact that his JLP had won 51 out of 60 seats in the turbulent election of 1980 (Barrow-Giles and Joseph 2006, 115). This self-assurance can be seen in a quote from his radio address announcing the early elections, “[t]he Cabinet

1980 (Barrow-Giles and Joseph 2006, 46). The 1980 election had terribly low participation rates due to the PNP boycott. The following election in 1989 saw a return to normalcy with a 78.4 percent participation rate, and the last decade and a half has shown decent levels comparable to the 1940s and 1950s. There was a turnout of 66.7 percent in 1993, 65.2 percent in 1997, and 59.1 percent in 2002 (Barrow-Giles and Joseph 2006, 47).

6 Due to the PNP boycott, only six seats were opposed, while 54 JLP candidates won unopposed elections. Some scholars examine the participation rate of the 1983 election in terms of registered voters and turnout in only these six seats. This means that 26,543 citizens voted out of 90,019 registered voters in the six parishes, or a turnout rate of 29.5 percent (Barrow-Giles and Joseph 2006, 46).
agreed that the overriding concern of the country at this time must be *continued confidence* which the people of Jamaica place in the Government and its Prime Minister” (AP 1983, emphasis added); he was already planning on winning and receiving reassurance of the people’s ‘continued confidence’ in him and his cabinet.

Just four days later, on November 29, the PNP announced that it would boycott the upcoming election “unless electoral changes, including the updating of voter lists, were made” (Reuters 1983a). The demands of the PNP were not met so they did not run a single candidate in the 1983 general election. After the election on December 15, there were calls by many to hold another election, since parliament was now controlled by a single party for the first time in Jamaican history (Reuters 1983b). Prime Minister Seaga responded to such calls by stating, “[w]e won’t react to acts of petulance on the part of other political groups. Those that locked themselves out will have to wait for the doors to open” (Reuters 1983b). This proved to be true when no early election was called, and the PNP could not run for seats until the 1989 election. The former Prime Minister and opposition leader Michael Manley simply called the vote ‘bogus’ (Reuters 1983b).

The boycott of the 1983 elections in Jamaica by the opposition PNP reflects a lack of ‘civic-ness’ in the politics of Jamaica. Certainly, in a democratic society with higher levels, one would expect a party to work within the system to achieve desired changes, not resort to threats and a boycott. This event also shows a lack of trust in the government and the political process. It is also highly problematic that a political party chose to resort to extra-political attempts to influence the political process, although, this was neither the first nor the last attempt by either party at extra-electoral influence.
In 1989, the turnout rate returned to pre-boycott levels. Voter participation has declined, however, since 1989, with an average dropping to around 65 percent, with 2002 displaying 59.1 percent (Barrow-Giles and Joseph 2006, 47) One cited reason for the drop in voter turnout in the 2002 election were the “torrential rains” that Former President Jimmy Carter noted in his report for the Carter Center (Carter 2002).

Examining the countries, there is very little difference between the levels of voter participation between Barbados and Jamaica. Indeed, both display fairly similar patterns of electoral turnout, although, it is helpful to consider Jamaican turnout in terms of clientelism and political tribalism.

Figure 5: Electoral Turnout per Half Decade in General Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year Range</th>
<th>Barbados</th>
<th>Jamaica</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1941-1945</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>58.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-1950</td>
<td>60.3</td>
<td>65.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951-1955</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>65.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956-1960</td>
<td>79.3</td>
<td>66.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-1965</td>
<td>81.6</td>
<td>72.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-1970</td>
<td>74.1</td>
<td>82.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-1975</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>78.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-1980</td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td>86.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-1985</td>
<td>62.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-1990</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>78.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-1995</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>66.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-2000</td>
<td></td>
<td>65.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2005</td>
<td></td>
<td>59.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Barrow-Giles and Joseph
Clientelism

In Jamaica, politics is rife with clientelism, which is defined as “a more or less personalised relationship between actors or sets of actors, commanding unequal wealth, status or influence, based on conditional loyalties, and involving mutually beneficial transactions” (Peter Flynn quoted in Sives 2002, 67). In fact, Carline Edie states that “[p]arty politics works in the Jamaican milieu primarily through the mechanism of clientelism” (Edie 1994b, 29). In the Jamaican system the ‘mutually beneficial transaction’ occurs when the citizens exchange party loyalty and votes for scarce resources which are distributed by the party in power. Furthermore, clientelism serves to eliminate class warfare, as both parties “emerged with and continue to maintain multiple class constituencies” (Edie 1994b, 29). These vertical relationships of power also maintain the status quo while dividing the lower classes and pitting them against one another. Essentially, clientelism has provided the Jamaican state with relative stability as there has not been any widespread class oriented fighting. This stability, however, comes at the cost of the manipulation of the democratic system into vertical relationships of power in which politicians distribute the scarce resources unequally of the nation to their supporters. Not only does this process alienate the opposing partisans, it is also the antithesis of ‘civic-ness.’ For Putnam, a ‘civic-community’ is one characterized by horizontal relationships of reciprocity, not vertical ones.

One of the dangerous aspects of Jamaica’s rampant clientelism is the presence of political gangs that are ostensibly controlled by the PNP and JLP. These gangs have been around for decades and occasionally politicians call for their eradication. In February of 2004, seemingly disenchanted Prime Minister PJ Patterson told newspaper reporters that he had ordered the police to bring in political gang leaders. Although he feigned shock that that they had not been
apprehended, he said that he refused “to accept…that there is political protection for any criminals” (Latin American Weekly Report 2004). This statement should be taken with some cautiousness, as political gangs have been a reality in Jamaica for decades. In fact, just two years earlier in a campaign in which Patterson won reelection, both sides consistently urged their factions to avoid provocation. As a story in The Gleaner stated:

It was really interesting to watch the politicians respond to the shootings and other forms of violence during the election campaign. Their supporters were never the instigators. Don’t allow yourselves to be provoked, they were told. Don’t retaliate. The supporters were always the victims. But the guns barked and both sides had casualties (The Gleaner 2002).

When they engage in such rhetoric, politicians like Patterson are tacitly accepting and protecting the political gangs. When Patterson said that he did not believe in any political protection for the criminals, he should have investigated the oratory of both parties during the election.

Jamaican clientelism is so entrenched that it has taken the form of garrison communities, or what Jamaicans refer to as political tribalism. This form extreme clientelism involves an area that uniformly supports the PNP or JLP, with whole neighborhoods that vote en bloc for their patron party. The first garrison community was created in the early 1960s when the JLP came to power and completed Tivoli Gardens, a housing complex in West Kingston, in which the housing units were allocated solely to JLP partisans. “In building Tivoli Gardens the JLP had created a base of support in West Kingston, establishing a group of hard-core supporters who were ready to fight to defend their political enclave and ensure, through the use of collective clientelism, that West Kingston would remain a safe seat for the JLP” (Sives 2002, 75). The situation escalated when the PNP returned to power in 1972 and built its own garrisons, the most famous of which is Concrete Jungle. This created a situation in which threats and violence were
utilized to maintain single party voting and one in which the two factions clashed frequently. Former US President Jimmy Carter, on a monitoring trip to Jamaica with the Carter Center, commented that it is “a disgrace…to the essence of democracy to have a certain neighborhood within which freedom of speech is impossible; and freedom of assembly is impossible; and the expression of one’s purpose in choosing one’s own leaders is impossible; and where intimidation and violence are prevalent” (Jackson-Miller 2002).

In addition to garrisons being an affront to democracy, they certainly do not embody ‘civic-ness.’ Furthermore, for all of the political rhetoric that condemns such ‘collective clientelism,’ this issue has not been addressed. Recently the policy commission of the PNP noted in a report that, “[d]espite all the words against tribalism, critical sections of party leaderships and followships have hitherto been convinced that from a party electoral point of view, the benefits from tribalism, in terms of votes, outweigh the costs to the party and to national development” (Latin American Weekly Report 2004). Basically, the garrisons are tacitly approved by the politicians, despite the manipulation of the political system and the violence that they cause.

**News Consumption**

The next indicator is one taken directly from Tocqueville by way of Putnam: newspaper readership. Putnam cites Tocqueville emphasizing the connection between “civic vitality” and local newspapers, “hardly any democratic association can carry on without a newspaper” (Cited in Putnam 1993, 92). Additionally, Putnam asserts that “[n]ewspaper readers are better informed than nonreaders and thus better equipped to participate in civic deliberations. Similarly, newspaper readership is a mark of citizen interest in community affairs” (Putnam 1993, 92). In other words, a polity with a high level of ‘civic-ness’ is one that reads the newspaper to keep up
with civic events. Furthermore, Tocqueville asserts that newspapers not only “guarantee freedom,” they “sustain civilization” (Tocqueville [1840] 2003, 601). Since there has been a proliferation of news sources since the time of Tocqueville, this indicator can be updated to include other media. While this does present the possibility of an economic bias in news consumption, even newspaper readership is affected by economic conditions.

Newspaper readership statistics are difficult to find for most of the Caribbean island nations; it took some searching to find numbers for these two cases. One source was Reach Caribbean, which is a firm that connects advertisers with newspapers. These numbers were triangulated with the results of a systematic survey on newspaper readership in Barbados and the daily numbers were very similar when not exactly the same in the two reports. For the Jamaican newspapers, an average of the two reported numbers was used in an attempt to avoid exaggeration as well as underestimation.

The combined readership statistics for the Barbadian daily papers show an average island-wide daily readership of 188,614. That is equivalent to 67.38 percent of the total population. While in Jamaica, the average daily readership is 478,571, or merely 17.35 percent of the total population. These statistics highlight a dearth in newspaper readership in Jamaica, an indicator that Putnam holds to be a critical component of ‘civic-ness.’ It is these facts that prompted Freedom House to comment that in Jamaica “newspaper readership is generally low” (Freedom House, Jamaica 2006).

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These numbers may be overestimations due to the nature of the source, but there is control in the fact that statistic from both countries have come from the same source, so if there is any exaggeration, it is assumed to be relatively uniform across the two cases.

No distinction is made in this analysis between different types of newspapers, all are assumed to have equal value in terms of ‘civic-ness.’

This average is taken from Reach Caribbean and the Nation Newspaper (2005), while the population statistic is derived from the CIA World Factbook.

This average is taken from Reach Caribbean and an article from December 3, 2000 in the Gleaner, the figures for the Gleaner represent an average of the two sources. The population is derived from the CIA World Factbook.
Figure 6: Daily Readership as Percentage of Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Daily Readership</th>
<th>Barbados</th>
<th>Jamaica</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>67.38%</td>
<td>17.35%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Adapted from Reach Caribbean, “Market Demographics,” The Nation (Systematic Survey on Newspaper Readership November 2005), and The Gleaner (Dec. 3, 2000).

Another aspect of newspapers considered was newspaper circulation per one thousand people. This statistic actually only tells the number of copies published, which can be much less than the actual readership due to sharing and reusing of editions. While this may not show newspaper readership levels, it is illuminating when considered under the assumption that circulation to readership statistics will be relative in both countries.\(^{11}\) In other words, if the ratio of papers published to papers read is assumed to be similar, then this figure will provide information with which to compare the two nations; even though it does not show exact readership, it allows us to compare the cases, which is the point of this research. In Barbados, an

\(^{11}\) There is the possibility that levels of economic development may have an effect on this statistic, as citizens of poorer nations may share the newspaper more. Regardless, this paper will assume that citizens in both nations share at a similar rate, especially since Jamaicans would have to share the newspaper more than twice as much as Barbadians to account for the disparity in circulation.
average of 199 newspapers are published a day for each one thousand people (World Desk Reference 2004). In Jamaica, this statistic is smaller, 75 newspapers are published per one thousand people (World Desk Reference 2004). This reinforces that both newspaper readership and publication is much more prevalent in Barbados.

Figure 7: Newspaper Circulation per One Thousand People

Source: World Desk Reference

Related to newspaper readership, Putnam concedes that in “the contemporary world, other mass media also serve the function of town crier” (Putnam 1993, 92), although he asserts that this was not the case in Italy in the early 1990s. Among the increasingly interconnected inhabitants of the world in the early twenty-first century, however, radios, televisions, and the internet play important roles in the dissemination of information. While it is a generalization to assume that users of these media are consuming relevant news about civic issues, it is clear that the indicator ‘newspaper readership’ of Putnam needs to be altered since readership is declining
worldwide and being replaced by alternate media. Additionally, presuming that these uses are
done in civic pursuits does not seem to be any more of an assumption than one that posits that
newspapers are read solely for civic news (and not the comics or sports pages). In other words, it
is no more of a stretch to say that someone is listening to the radio for news and information that
it is to say that he is reading the newspaper for the same purpose. For this comparison, the real
function of bringing in other media was to see if those citizens who are not reading the newspaper
are utilizing another source for news consumption in any greater number in one of the cases.

Since there are no accessible current statistics on radio listeners or television viewers in
these two countries, the figures of number of radios and television sets per one thousand people
will be utilized. While not indicating the actual number of listeners or viewers, these statistics
provide grounds for comparison under the assumption that Barbadians and Jamaicans are sharing
radios and televisions in the same proportions.\footnote{Again, there is the risk that citizens in poorer Jamaica are sharing televisions and radios more than Barbadians, but this assumption allows valuable points of comparison.}
Figure 8 shows that Barbados has more radios and televisions per capita than Jamaica.

The ratios for radio ownership are fairly close; there are 771 radios per one thousand Barbadians and 766 per one thousand Jamaicans (Encarta). The disparity is much greater in terms of televisions. In Barbados, there are 320 television sets for every one thousand people as opposed to 187 for the same number of Jamaicans (Encarta).\(^{13}\)

\(^{13}\) While it is impossible to control entirely for economic development, examining many media sources with this broad approach is an attempt to limit the development bias as much as possible. Furthermore, the more expensive sources such as television, radio, and the internet are examined to show that Jamaicans are not making up for their lack of newspaper readership with any other media.
Examining this chart, it is clear that the number of internet users is on the rise in both countries. There have been sizable increases in the amount of users particularly since 2000. It appears as if Barbados has recently taken the lead in terms of internet users.

The internet, specifically, and these three figures, generally, could not be used as the only indicators for ‘civic-ness,’ due to their increased availability in more developed countries. These indicators do, however, work with newspaper readership and circulation to paint a more complete picture. There is certainly the possibility that Barbados has an edge in these categories due to its higher level of economic development, which is why newspaper readership remains the best indicator as it is the most affordable. While television ownership, radio ownership, and internet usage do not alone explain levels of ‘civic-ness,’ they do say something about the
shortage of newspaper readers in Jamaica; those Jamaicans who are not reading the newspaper are also not getting their news from the television, radio, or internet in any greater proportion than Barbadians.

**Conclusions: ‘Civic-ness’ in Barbados and Jamaica**

Examining the various indicators for ‘civic-ness,’ Barbados is much stronger in terms of the independent variable. Barbadian citizens perceive a lower level of corruption in their government than their Jamaican counterparts, which corresponds to a higher degree of government trust. Barbadians have also demonstrated themselves to be greater consumers of newspapers, and televisions, in addition to using the internet in higher proportions. Jamaicans, on the other hand, displayed lower newspaper readership numbers, and the statistics for other media show that they are not getting their news from these sources in any larger numbers than Barbadians. Both countries have similar rates of ownership of radios, indicating that Jamaicans are not staying ‘civicly’ aware by consuming news at any greater rate from this source either.

Barbadians have historically shown high levels of voter turnout in nationwide general elections, without the prevalence of additional motivations that drive Jamaicans to present similar numbers.

A closer examination shows that, in Jamaica, there are myriad forces, including patron-client relationships, and political tribalism, other than ‘civic-ness’ that cause the high turnout numbers. This political violence and the presence of political gangs contradicts the conditions of ‘civic-ness’ that Putnam puts forth. In Jamaica there are neither “social structures of cooperation” nor adversaries “tolerant of their opponents” (Putnam 1993, 88-89). Additionally, the presence of such networks of patronage and clientelism indicates that there is something other than ‘civic-ness’ that is driving “active participation in public affairs” (Putnam 1993, 87). In Jamaica, citizens do not interact as equals due to these networks.
These facts all point to the fact the Jamaica is not a state endowed with high levels of ‘civic-ness.’ Recognizing the caveats discussed above, Jamaica is certainly less civic than Barbados based on this comparison.
Chapter 4: Government and ‘Good Governance’

Introduction

The indicators of this dimension all come from the World Bank are part of a governance project that was begun in the 1990s and involves ‘worldwide governance indicators.’ This project ranks 213 countries and territories by their percentile with values determined by the survey responses of citizens and experts throughout the world. These indicators are similar to Putnam’s variable of institutional performance, which similarly is “founded on… indicators, covering internal processes, policy pronouncements, and policy implementation” (Putnam 1993, 66). Like ‘civic-ness,’ Putnam’s dependent variable of institutional performance is modified into ‘good governance’ in order to fit the Caribbean context. Many of the indicators for Putnam’s variable are specific to his ‘Italian experiment,’ including those that examine how the regional governments spent their money from the central government. This chapter shows that, collectively, the indicators of government effectiveness and the rule of law are an amalgamation that is similar to the political aspects of Putnam’s dependent variable.

As seen in figure 10, Barbados is ranked much higher than Jamaica in both indicators. In order to suggest that there may be more variables at play than simply ‘civic-ness,’ confounding variables are suggested.
Figure 10: Percentiles in Governance Indicators for 2004

Source: The World Bank

The Political Dimension of ‘Good Governance’

One gauge of the political aspect of ‘good governance’ is government effectiveness. This comes from a World Bank indicator of the same name which is defined as “the quality of public services, the quality of civil services and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s
commitment to such policies” (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2006, 4). This figure represents many values that Putnam tests in *Making Democracy Work*. The quality of public and civil services is important to Putnam as he has an indicator for government responsiveness. Additionally, the policy formulation and implementation by the government is also a major point in his dependent variable. He emphasizes the importance of policy formulation by saying that “studying the performance of governments means studying policies and programs as well. Are the governments prompt to identify social needs and propose innovative solutions? Does legislation enacted by the governments reflect a capacity to react comprehensively, coherently, and creatively to the issue at hand?” (Putnam 1993, 65). This indicator from the World Bank closely resembles what Putnam tests in Italy.

Putnam asserts that that a high level of ‘civic-ness’ results in a responsive and effective government, ‘good governance.’ “A good democratic government not only considers the demands of its citizenry (that is, is responsive), but also acts efficaciously upon these demands (that is effective)” (Putnam 1993, 63). He also has an indicator that measures government responsiveness to the demands of its citizenry. This too is incorporated into government effectiveness by the examination of the “quality of the civil service” (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2006, 4).

In terms of the indicator government effectiveness, Barbados has ranked much higher than Jamaica. The World Bank did not rank Barbados before 2002 in this category, but Jamaica remained in the lower half for the four year span (42.9 in 1996, 24.4 in 1998, and 45.5 in 2000). Since 2000, Jamaica has seen a slight increase in their world ranking, but the nation still trails Barbados in government effectiveness. During this time span Barbados consistently ranked in the top twentieth percentile, while Jamaica remained just above the halfway mark. This indicates
that, among other things, Barbados has a higher quality of public services and civil services than Jamaica and that the Barbadian government is more committed to formulating and implementing responsive policies.

Figure 12: Government Effectiveness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Barbados</th>
<th>Jamaica</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>45.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>59.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>86.6</td>
<td>86.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>83.7</td>
<td>83.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>85.6</td>
<td>51.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>85.6</td>
<td>51.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The World Bank

**Governance and the Rule of Law**

The other indicator of the political dimension of ‘good governance’ is the popular perception of the rule of law. This factor is a combination of “the likelihood of crime and violence” and “the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society,” which encompasses the “quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts” (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2006, 4). Putnam asserts that a society with high levels of ‘civic-ness’ is one in which the citizens follow the rules and obey the laws.
Honesty, trust, and law-abidingness are prominent on most philosophical accounts of civic-virtue. Citizens in the civic community, it is said, deal fairly with one another and expect fair dealing in return. They expect their government to follow high standards, and they willingly obey the rules that they have imposed on themselves… In a less civic community, by contrast, life is riskier, citizens are warier, and the laws, made by higher-ups, are made to be broken (Putnam 1993, 111).

For Putnam, citizens in places with more ‘civic-ness’ follow the rules, due to some sense of civic commitment to society, which is enhanced by the belief that there will be few free riders who benefit by breaking the rules. “Collective life in the civic regions is eased by the expectation that others will probably follow the rules. Knowing that others will, you are more likely to go along, too, thus fulfilling their expectations” (Putnam 1993, 111, emphasis in original). Thus, the cycle of law abidingness and peace is self-perpetuating.

In societies without the benefit of much ‘civic-ness,’ on the other hand, citizens are suspicious of each other. In such a system, people break the laws because they believe it will be detrimental not to do so. This too, is self-perpetuating. “In the less civic regions nearly everyone expects everyone else to violate the rules. It seems foolish to obey the traffic laws or the tax code or the welfare rules, if you expect everyone else to cheat. … So you cheat, too, and in the end everyone’s dolorous, cynical expectations are confirmed” (Putnam 1993, 111). Putnam paints a picture of a situation in which obeying or breaking the law are self-perpetuating cycles that would be difficult to quickly alter. The data for Barbados and Jamaica, however, shows something quite different.

In 1996, both Barbados and Jamaica were extremely similar in percentiles of the rule of law, with Jamaica even having a slight edge. But in the past decade, the ranking of Barbados has nearly doubled while that of Jamaica has declined. Barbados has drastically improved in the perception of the rule of law, going from the forty-fifth percentile in 1996 up to nearly the
ninetieth in 2005. During the same time, Jamaica dropped down from above the forty-seventh percentile to the thirty-seventh. If the relationship between ‘civic-ness’ and the rule of law is largely based on perceptions of citizens about one another, as Putnam claims, how could such a perpetuating cycle be changed in such a short time? \(^1\)\(^4\) There might be a confounding variable that better explains such a drastic change.

**Figure 13: Rule of Law**

\[
\text{Rule of Law}
\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Barbados</th>
<th>Jamaica</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>47.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>46.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>86.5</td>
<td>49.5</td>
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<td>2002</td>
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<td>36.1</td>
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<tr>
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<td>31.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>39.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>88.4</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The World Bank

One potential variable that may better explain this phenomenon is economics. Examining figure 14 which represents the Gross Domestic Product per capita in each country, a similar trend line is visible for the Barbados line in figure 13. In fact, the GDP per capita in Barbados had its sharpest increase between 1995 and 2000 at the same time that the nation was

\(^1\)\(^4\) While it is conceivable that some of this change could be attributed to measurement errors, it is difficult to believe that researches would make such egregious errors that would double the ranking of a state in such a short time.
seeing a dramatic rise in the perception of the rule of law. This, at least, suggests that the two may be more closely related in the Caribbean than Putnam says they are in Italy.  

Figure 14: Gross Domestic Product per Capita in US Dollars

![Graph showing Gross Domestic Product per Capita in US Dollars for Barbados and Jamaica from 1975 to 2004.](image)

Source: UN HDR 1 and Globalis (UN Common Database/World Bank)

There are many problems with the justice system in Jamaica which cause the terrible rankings for the rule of law of the nation. A high incidence of police violence and corruption, as well as long incarceration times between imprisonment and trial are factors that contribute to the popular perception that the rule of law in Jamaica is atrocious. A 2002 poll commissioned by *The Gleaner* illustrated that crime and violence were the biggest sources of anxiety for Jamaicans (*The Gleaner* 2002). But the citizens of Jamaica also have cause for concern because of the actions of the police. Trevor Munroe shows that 107 people were killed by the police in the first three quarters of 1992, while on thirty-three police officers were charged for murder during that

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15 Putnam says that “Wealth and economic development cannot be the entire story” (Putnam 1993, 86). He also asserts that “economics does not predict civics, but civics does predict economics, better indeed than economic itself” (Putnam 1993, 157).
same time period (Munroe 1996, 110). He also goes on to remark that prisons in Jamaica have been described as “abysmal” and that Jamaica is the extreme case in the Caribbean of police violations of human rights. This dismal state of the Jamaican Constabulary Force (JCF) may be partially attributed to widespread corruption in the force. In fact, in 1991, an investigation confirmed that there was rampant corruption in the JCF (Munroe 1996, 111).

Another problem with the justice system in Jamaica is the long delay between arrest and trial that occurs in most cases. Indeed, there are common instances when “excessive or inordinate delays between the time of arrest and the final disposition” have “extended into several years” (Griffith and Sedoc-Dahlberg 1997, 252). This means that many suspects are held by the judicial system for months or even years before they are determined to be guilty or innocent. Again, this aspect seems to be closely related to economics; the judicial system is housed in dilapidated buildings while the skyrocketing crime rate causes a strain on the limited resources of the system. With the limitation of resources comes “worsening work conditions and declining salaries in real terms [which] diminish ability to attract and keep qualified professionals” (USAID report cited by Munroe 1996, 111). Essentially, this is a downward spiral of worsening conditions and wages for workers, which detracts good employees from the justice system, while the crime rate is increasing, which puts an additional strain on the under funded facilities. This, however, is not entirely caused by a lack of ‘civic-ness.’ Jamaica is experiencing one of the highest murder rates in the world in addition to other astronomical crime statistics, yet the police and judges tasked to address the situation are poorly funded and inadequately supplied. Like the rule of law in Barbados, this phenomenon is also explained by the confounding variables of economics and level of development in addition to simply ‘civic-ness.’
Conclusion: ‘Civic-ness’ and ‘Good Governance’ in Barbados and Jamaica

In terms of government effectiveness and rule of law, Barbados has outperformed Jamaica. While Barbados has also been shown to have higher levels of ‘civic-ness,’ there is some relationship between economics and the rule of law that may an alternate explanation for the differences in this political indicator of ‘good governance.’ Although Putnam may be correct in illustrating the reinforcing nature of obeying or disobeying the law, this is not the whole story. In a society with such a self-perpetuating cycle of civic obedience or uncivic disobedience of the law, the score for this index would not drastically change in a decade. Surely something other than pure ‘civic-ness’ had some effect on this index during this time. Even with the confounding variables, it is still clear that ‘civic-ness’ is related to ‘good governance.’ This can be seen best in the indicator for government effectiveness, which signifies that the government of Barbados, the nation with more ‘civic-ness,’ is more effective.
Chapter 5: Society and ‘Good Governance’

Introduction

The social dimension of ‘good governance’ includes indicators for public spending on education and health, as well as ones for the percentage of people in each state who have sustainable access to improved water and sewage facilities. Inspecting these indicators, it is clear that Barbados has much better governance than Jamaica. Not only does the Barbadian government spend comparably more on education and public health, it also has done its part to ensure that nearly one hundred percent of its citizens have access to safe drinking water and some form of sanitation. There are confounding variables that may also explain this outcome. These include the pressure exerted by external lenders as well as geographic features. Jamaican spending has been altered significantly more than that of Barbados by structural adjustment and stabilization programs that have caused drastic cutbacks in social spending in the nation. Additionally, Barbados has a terrain and size that if far more conducive to building infrastructure than that of Jamaica.

![Figure 15: The Social Dimension of ‘Good Governance’](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civic-ness</th>
<th>Good Governance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>Government Effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Participation</td>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News Consumption</td>
<td>Public Health Spending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sanitation and Water</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Social Dimension of ‘Good Governance’

Governance and Education: Public Spending and Policies

Government spending on education is used because it is a reflection of the financial commitment to developing an informed citizenry. Striving for better educated citizens is an
indication of ‘good governance’ because it is a responsibility of a government to educate its
denizens and because a better educated populace provides better leaders and services.
Additionally, both states are signatories to the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which recognizes education as a fundamental human right. The
document states that “education shall enable all persons to participate effectively in a free
society” (Steiner and Alston 2000, 1399); actual expenditures on education show the resolve of
each government to fund what they recognize as a right of all peoples. As will be shown,
education indicators show that the population of Barbados is better educated than that of Jamaica
and has access to a superior education system. The UN HDR as well as the United Nations
Common Database provides figures for governmental expenditures on education in terms of both
the percentage of the GDP and the percentage of total government spending. The two together
provide a more complete picture than any one because using percentages of both GDP and
budget provides a controlling effect. ¹⁶

Both figures 16 and 17 represent the most recent available data, any gaps in the years
reflect breaks in the available numbers for both countries. In 1980, the government of Barbados
spent 6.46 percent of the country’s total GDP on education. This percentage rose in 1990, when
the government put the equivalent of 7.87 percent towards schooling, this percentage remained
constant the next year, with 7.8 percent being allocated. This same year, total government
expenditures on education accounted for 22.2 percent of the budget in Barbados. By 2000, the
percentage of the GDP had dipped down to the 7.2 level, and the following year it went below 7
percent (6.7 percent). The number was on the increase, however, between 2002 and 2004, when

¹⁶ There may be a slight bias towards more developed nations in this methodology. The hope is that this can be
diminished by examining both the percentage of GDP and the percentage of total budget. As a percentage of the
GDP, this indicator illuminates how much the country spends in terms of the value of all their goods and services.
While shown as a percentage of total government outlays, this indicator shows government priorities in spending.
the government spent an average of 7.3 percent of the nation’s GDP on education. During this same three year span, this amounted to 17.3 percent of the total spending of the government of Barbados going towards schooling (UN HDR 11 and Globalis (UN Common Database).

Jamaica boasts slighter numbers in terms of the fraction of GDP but significantly smaller percentages in terms of the total budget. In 1980, the Jamaican government spent the equivalent of 6.96 percent of the total GDP on education. Ten years later, that percentage had dropped to 5.37 percent. The next year saw an even greater dip to 4.5 percent of the total GDP being spent by the government on education, which was equal to 12.8 percent of the total government expenditures for that year. In 2000, the percentage of the GDP being publicly spent on education had risen to 6.6, and the next year saw even higher levels at 6.8 percent. Between 2002 and 2004, however, the average amount spent on education was only comparable to 4.9 percent of the nation’s GDP. This represented a scant average of 9.5 percent of the total government expenditures for this time (UN HDR 11 and Globalis (UN Common Database)).
Figure 16: Government Expenditures on Education as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product

Government Expenditures on Education as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product

Barbados 6.46% 7.87% 7.80% 7.20% 6.70% 7.30%
Jamaica 6.96% 5.37% 4.50% 6.60% 6.80% 4.90%

Source: UN HDR 11 and Globalis (UN Common Database)

Figure 17: Government Expenditures on Education as Percentage of Total Government Spending

Government Expenditures on Education as a Percentage of Total Government Spending

Barbados 22.2% 17.3%
Jamaica 12.8% 9.5%

Source: UN HDR 11
From these statistics, it is clear that the Barbadian government places more of an emphasis on public education than their Jamaican counterparts in terms of public spending. This can be seen in the fact that approximately one-fifth of the total budget of Barbados has been devoted to education, over at least the past fifteen years. Meanwhile, during this same time, one-tenth of the Jamaican budget has been earmarked for the same purpose.

Additionally, this emphasis on education seen in the public spending patterns is also visible in other statistics. For example, as of 2003, Barbadian students were required to complete secondary school by attending 11 years of compulsory education and there was a primary school student to teacher ratio of 16 to 1 (Encarta). Jamaican students, as of 2003, faced six years of compulsory education and a primary school student to teacher ratio of 30 to 1 (Encarta). This means that Barbadians were required to attend nearly two times the amount of schooling that Jamaicans were. Once in school, Barbadian students had a better learning environment with nearly half the amount of students for each teacher.

Also, public money for education is distributed among pre-primary/primary, secondary and tertiary institutions in very different percentages in the two countries. Between 2002 and 2004, the Barbadian government averaged a fairly even distribution of funds, with around a third of education expenditures going to each category and tertiary schooling receiving the largest chunk (31.9 percent to pre-primary/primary, 31.0 percent to secondary, and 34.4 percent to the tertiary level of education) (UN HDR 11). While in the case of Jamaica, the percentages of spending more heavily favored primary and secondary levels (36.9 percent to pre-primary/primary, 42.6 percent to secondary, and 19.5 percent to tertiary) (UN HDR 11). These statistics say much about the state of education in the two states when examined collectively.
They also explain how, as Franklin W. Knight asserts, Barbados is “acknowledged as having the best system of public education anywhere in the Caribbean” (Knight 1993, 35).17

**Governance and Health: Public Spending and Policies**

Another indicator of the social dimension of ‘good governance’ is public spending on public health. Again, this is true not only because of the ICESCR, which both states signed, but primarily because providing an adequate health system is a basic component of ‘good governance.’ The ICESCR recognizes the “right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health” (Steiner and Alston 2000, 1398). Furthermore, the signatories agree to strive to reduce the infant mortality rate, improve “environmental and industrial hygiene,” prevent epidemics, and commit to “the creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and medical attention in the event of sickness” (Steiner and Alston 2000, 1398). Surely public funding in the field of health is necessary to fulfill these obligations; it is a requirement of ‘good governance’ to provide an adequate system of health to citizens. Otherwise such treaties and obligations are merely rhetorical tools of the government, rather than an indicator of ‘good governance’ brought about by high levels of ‘civic-ness.’ As was the case with public spending on education, the amount spent will be considered in terms of the ratios of spending both to total GDP and to the total government budget. This is done in the belief that these together show more than either could separately.

Examining the government expenditures on public health as a percentage of GDP, it is clear that the government of Barbados has also prioritized this form of spending more than that

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17 Figure 29 in Appendix II shows an education index prepared by the UN. Both countries are shown along with regional and world averages. Barbados exceeds both the world and Latin American and Caribbean averages, while Jamaica is around the world average and below the regional average.
of Jamaica has. Figures 18 and 19 both represent the most accurate and available data, as similar information is not available for previous years in both countries. In 2003, the equivalent of 4.8 percent of the gross domestic product of Barbados was spent by the government of public health, this is nearly twice the percentage of the Jamaican GDP, 2.7 percent (UN HDR 6). In terms of total government spending, this type represents 11.4 percent of the Barbadian budget, more than twice the 5.2 percent that the Jamaican government committed to such ends. These levels of spending mean that, on the individual level, the equivalent of 1,050 dollars (US) is spent per capital in Barbados, while the same amount for Jamaica is merely 216 dollars (UN HDR 6).

Figure 18: Government Expenditure on Public Health as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product

Source: UN HDR 6
The results of these levels of spending can be seen in the ratio of physicians to people, the percentage of births attended by a skilled professional, and the percentage of one-year-olds fully immunized against measles. Between 1990 and 2004, there was an average of 121 physicians per one hundred thousand citizens in Barbados, while in Jamaica this figure was only 85 (UN HDR 6). Barbados and Jamaica did, however, both display a similar percentage of births being attended by a skilled professional between 1996 and 2004; 98 percent of newborn Barbadians are brought into this world with a skilled professional present, which is very close to the 97 percent in Jamaica (UN HDR 6). Finally, it is illuminating to examine immunization against measles in light of the ICESCR, which clearly states that prevention of epidemic and providing conditions conducive to good health are a necessary function of a government. In 2004, 98

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18 This is an interesting fact that may have more to do with the definition of ‘skilled professional’ than anything else.
percent of Barbadian one-years-olds were fully immunized against measles, while only 80 percent of one-year-old Jamaicans had been vaccinated (UN HDR 6).

**Governance and Plumbing: Sanitation and Safe Drinking Water**

Access to established sanitation facilities and safe drinking water are also examined in this study. It could be argued that such statistics are tied to levels of development, indeed the more industrialized and developed nations have better sanitation and water facilities. Although these amenities may be better in industrialized countries, filling these needs should be one of the top priorities of any government. Not only do these services provide a cleaner environment in which to develop, these are also tied to issue of public health. Improved sanitation handles human waste that can cause diseases and the presence of safe drinking water prevents many waterborne illnesses. In this respect, sanitation and water access are more closely tied to ‘good governance’ than to development. Moreover, the concepts “improved sanitation” and an “improved water source” are intentionally defined vaguely so as to limit the bias against less developed states.

‘Improved sanitation’ is defined as any “adequate sanitation facilities, such as a connection to a sewer or septic tank system, a pour-flush latrine, a simple pit latrine or a ventilated improved pit latrine. An excreta disposal system is considered adequate if it is private or shared (but not public) and if it hygienically separates human excreta from human contact” (Globalis). By using a definition that encompasses so many types of ‘adequate sanitation facilities,’ the bias towards developed nations is diminished.19 In 1990, 99 percent of urban dwellers in Barbados had access to improved sanitation, and 100 percent of those in rural environs had this service (UN HDR 6). In Jamaica, however, only 85 percent of the population

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19 While this factor can never be controlled, these broad definitions reflect an attempt to limit the development bias.
in cities and 64 percent of rural Jamaicans had access to improved sanitation (UN HDR 6).

Twelve years later, the numbers remained the same for Barbados, mostly because they had little room for improvement, while there was some growth in Jamaica. In 2002, 99 percent of urban and 100 percent of rural Barbadians had access to improved sanitation (UN HDR 6). That same year, 90 percent of Jamaican city dwellers and 68 percent of those in the country-side had such access (UN HDR 6).

Figure 20: Percentage of Population with Access to Improved Sanitation

Source: Globalis (UN Common Database)

‘Improved water source’ is also very loosely defined to include many different types of water supply: “piped water, a public tap, a borehole with a pump, a protected well, a protected spring or rainwater” (Globalis). Again, this wide definition reflects an effort to limit aspects that might over-emphasize more developed sources of water and, thus, show a bias towards more developed states. In 1990, one hundred percent of all Barbadians both urban and rural had
access to an improved water source, these percentages remained perfect twelve years later in 2002 (UN HDR 6). In 1990, 97 percent of all urban Jamaicans and 86 percent of those in the countryside had such access (UN HDR 6). These numbers only slightly improved twelve years later; 98 percent of urban inhabitants and 87 percent of the rural population had sustainable access to an improved water source (UN HDR 6).

Figure 21: Percentage of Population with Sustainable Access to Improved Water Source

![Percentage of Population with Sustainable Access to Improved Water Source](chart.png)

Source: Globalis (UN Common Database)

Fay and Yepes use similar definitions for access to sanitation and water, with only slight changes to the definition of safe water. “In urban areas [safe water] may be public fountain or standpipe located no more than 200m from the dwelling. In rural areas, the definition implies that members of the household do not have to spend a disproportionate part of the day fetching water” (Fay and Yepes 2003). Additionally, they looked at the percentages for the total population, without splitting it along an urban-rural divide. They posit that one hundred percent
58

of Barbadians have access to both safe drinking water and improved sanitation (Fay and Yepes 2003). Meanwhile, 71 percent of Jamaicans can reasonably attain safe drinking water, and 84 percent have contact with improved sanitation facilities (Fay and Yepes 2003).

Examining the three charts, it is evident that the Barbadian government places a higher priority on providing access to safe sanitation and water services. Indeed, these statistics show that Barbados has better structures than Jamaica for the two services. This means that, by comparison with Jamaicans, Barbadians can be said to enjoy better ‘governance’ in regards to water and sewage infrastructure.

Figure 22: Percentage of Total Population 2000 with Improved Water and Sewage

Percentage of Total Population 2000 with Improved Water and Sewage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Safe Drinking Water</th>
<th>Improved Sanitation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fay and Yepes
Confounding Variables: External Lenders and Geographic Features

Considering the levels of public spending on education and public health, one possible confounding influence comes to mind: Jamaica has been required to undertake structural adjustment and stabilization programs by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank due to the debt of the Jamaican government. This debt was augmented during the turn to the left in Jamaica, in the administration of Prime Minister Michael Manley between 1972-1980 (Munroe 1996, 104). After increased social spending in the 1970s, the politics of Jamaica moved to the right and foreign borrowing drastically increased, which brought about the influence of foreign lenders on the public spending of the nation. These structural adjustments caused a decline in public spending across the board in Jamaica, which brought less social services provided by the state. R. DeLisle Worrell attributes this “deterioration of social services” to the “inadequacy of the IMF and World Bank orthodoxy in the 1980s” (Worrell 1993, 201). Indeed, as Worrell notes, the structural adjustment program undertaken in Jamaica was characterized by “repeated attempts to contain the fiscal deficit by means of expenditure cuts, tax reform, and the sale of public assets” among other measures (Worrell 1993, 200). In addition to reducing the amount of public spending, these structural adjustment policies reduced the amount of resources available across the island. The increase in expectation of social spending and the decreases in available resources for such spending led to a rise in crime, particularly in drug trafficking activities and violence that continue to besiege to the population (Sives 2002, 85).

These obtrusive economic policies imposed by an external lender have little to do with the ‘civic-ness’ of a population. Additionally, one would also have difficulty attributing the need to borrow as a characteristic of a polity that lacks ‘civic-ness.’ It appears, then, that these structural readjustment and stabilization programs, which had myriad consequences in terms of
public spending levels, produce a confounding effect on the social dimension of ‘good governance;’ it may not be a lack of ‘civic-ness’ in Jamaica that is causing the limited social spending of the state.

It is important to note that as late as 2004 Jamaica was spending the equivalent of 9.4 percent of its total GDP to service its debts (UN HDR 19). This figure is more than three times that of Barbados, which spent 3.1 percent the same year (UN HDR 19). This represents a great deal of money, particularly in a developing country.

In terms of sewage and water, another potential confounding variable that may also explain certain infrastructure is the geography of each country; features such as size and topography may help to clarify some of these statistics about improved sanitation and water sources. Barbados is a small island of about 431 square meters, or roughly two and a half times the size of the District of Columbia (CIA World Factbook). Meanwhile, the area of Jamaica is approximately 25 times that of Barbados, or just smaller than Connecticut (CIA World Factbook). This means that Jamaica is responsible for providing services to a nation more than 25 times the size of Barbados, with only a population and tax base that is about 10 times that of Barbados. In addition to the size of the two nations, there are certainly topographical differences. Barbados is “relatively flat” with a plateau that “rises gently to central highland region,” while Jamaica is “mostly mountains, with a narrow, discontinuous coastal plain” (CIA World Factbook). This means that Barbados has easier terrain to manage in addition to having much more dense population, while Jamaicans must deal with the mountainous landscape when building water or sewage infrastructure.

This, however, should not be accepted as a complete explanation. For it stands to reason that a state with more ‘civic-ness’ would not allow geographic constraints to prevent the
availability of basic human services such as safe drinking water and sewage facilities. In other words, simply because Jamaica has a more rugged landscape, which may hinder the creation and maintenance of certain infrastructure, does not logically mean that they would provide the sanitation and water services of Barbados if these terrain restraints were absent. But it certainly does give Barbados a conspicuous advantage in providing certain services like water and sewage.

**Conclusion: ‘Civic-ness’ and ‘Good Governance’ in Barbados and Jamaica**

Considering all of the indicators of the social dimension of ‘good governance,’ it is clear that Barbados is better off in terms of this aspect of the dependent variable. Barbados outspends Jamaica in the fields of education and health in terms of percentages of both GDP and total government budget. Additionally, Barbadians have better access to improved sanitation and sustained water sources. Although levels of ‘civic-ness’ correspond to these levels for the two cases, there may be other confounding variables that better explain these outcomes. Pressure exercised by foreign lenders for Jamaica to cut its domestic social spending affects the budgeting realities, while size and geography may also have an effect on the development of water and sewage infrastructure.


Chapter 6: Conclusion

The findings of this research indicate that Putnam’s theory is indeed related to ‘good governance’ in the Caribbean. While there are certain caveats mentioned in the paper, collectively there is a relationship between ‘civic-ness’ and ‘good governance’ in Barbados and Jamaica. This means that levels of corruption, political participation, and news consumption are connected with government effectiveness, the prevalence of the rule of law, public spending on education and health, as well as water and sanitation infrastructure. In other words, a modified variable based on Putnam’s ‘civic-ness’ concept correlates with political and social aspects of the variable ‘good governance,’ which is also based on the concept of his dependent variable in Making Democracy Work. This is true in the cases of Barbados and Jamaica, but does indicate that further study is to unequivocally prove that ‘civic-ness’ does explain ‘good governance’ in the region. As was stated in earlier, this research is done with the intent to generate more hypotheses about the Caribbean that should be tested in further study by providing a solid foundation.

Figure 23: 'Civic-ness' and 'Good Governance'

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civic-ness</th>
<th>→</th>
<th>Good Governance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td></td>
<td>Political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Government Effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Participation</td>
<td></td>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Public Health Spending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News Consumption</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sanitation and Water</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Confounding Variables

While ‘civic-ness’ values for the two countries do correlate closely to the values for ‘good governance,’ there are many aspects of the indicators for the dependent variable which indicate that ‘civic-ness’ may not be the whole story. As mentioned before, these include
geographic size and topography, pressure exerted by external lenders, as well as levels of development.

**Further Study**

This thesis has highlighted the need for further study in many areas. First, a study should be conducted with a larger sample size of cases. This larger $n$ study would be helpful in determining how closely ‘civic-ness’ and ‘good governance’ are related. Also it would demonstrate the relative importance of the confounding variables of size, topography, foreign intervention, and economic development.

In addition to a larger $n$ study, a more detailed one is also in order. While research for this project utilized the best available data, interviews and surveys on the islands should be exploited in further studies to determine some causality among the various variables. Temporal and monetary concerns prevented the utilization of such methods for this paper.

If additional study would be carried out with a similar small $n$, then a comparison of two nations more closely related in the confounding variables would be warranted. Although Haiti is larger and more populous than Jamaica, the gaps are not as considerable as those between Barbados and Jamaica. Haiti also has a terrain that is similar to that of Jamaica. A study with Barbados could utilize another of the Leeward Islands in the eastern Caribbean, as these islands are relatively similar in size, topography, and population.

Additionally, there is the concern that these two variables may be related by more than simply one way causation. There is the possibility that these two variables may be interconnected to the point that there is a circularity between them, therefore there may not be one true independent and one true dependent variable. This potential inter-causality must be examined in further study.
**Policy Recommendations**

In addition to encouraging further study on this and similar Caribbean topics, there are some policy recommendations that flow from this research. While it is impossible to address some of the confounding variables, such as size and topography, attempts should be made towards fostering a better sense of ‘civic-ness’ in Jamaica. This can be done through education, addressing corruption, and eliminating garrisons and political tribalism.

Education serves an important role in a developing state. A more educated populous is more likely to participate in civic affairs. Increased attention and funding for education, particularly in government and civics courses, would benefit the nation because it would produce a better educated population. Education about political issues could serve to undermine the garrison communities as it would produce more citizens who would think beyond political tribalism. In addition, a better informed population will be more interested in civic matters and foster a situation in which politicians are more accountable to the public. Here, Jamaicans could learn from the experience of Barbadians who, as was previously shown, place a greater emphasis on education in terms of policies and spending.

The government of Jamaica must address the pervasive problem of corruption, which has been shown to be linked to many of the negative aspects of life in Jamaica. Corruption in Jamaica is manifest in the garrison communities, the endemic political violence, the perceived lack of electoral fairness, as well as in the police and the judicial system. The government of Jamaica should institute a bipartisan investigation into the causes and effects of corruption in the public sector. Asking for assistance from an international, non-partisan group such as Transparency International would add to the legitimacy of these efforts. In addition to publicizing the report, the government should act on the recommendations provided. Taking
effective public steps to curb the bane of corruption would reinvigorate public trust in the
government as well as increase the ability of the institutions to provide ‘good governance.’

A third way to nurture a better sense of ‘civic-ness’ in Jamaica is by addressing the issue
of political tribalism. There have been countless reports and studies by both parties as well as
calls from both sides of the aisle to eliminate this practice. There remains, however, an
advantage to the politicians to ignore garrisons and allow tribalism to persist. This benefit is the
political power that these assured votes provide. Therefore, in order for a policy addressing
garrisons to work, it must be bipartisan and undertaken throughout the island. This way,
politicians can be sure that both sides are surrendering their political advantages. This is a very
difficult policy recommendation but also one of the most important tasks that the government
can undertake in order to assure that it is providing its citizens with ‘good governance.’
Appendix A: Maps

Map of Barbados

Source: The CIA World Factbook

Map of Jamaica

Source: The CIA World Factbook
Map of Caribbean

Source: www.mytravelguide.com
Appendix B: Additional Charts

Figure 24: Gross Domestic Product per Capita in US Dollars

Gross Domestic Product per Capita in US Dollars

Sources: UN HDR 1 and Globalis (UN Common Database/World Bank)
Figure 25: Gross Domestic Product per Capita in US Dollars

![GDP Per Capita Chart]

**Gross Domestic Product per Capita in US Dollars**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Barbados</th>
<th>Jamaica</th>
<th>Latin America Average</th>
<th>Developing Countries Average</th>
<th>World Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>$3,710</td>
<td>$1,420</td>
<td>$7,964</td>
<td>$4,775</td>
<td>$8,833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>$6,670</td>
<td>$1,790</td>
<td>$10,760</td>
<td>$3,980</td>
<td>$15,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>$7,960</td>
<td>$2,250</td>
<td>$11,970</td>
<td>$3,470</td>
<td>$15,290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>$10,760</td>
<td>$3,140</td>
<td>$15,350</td>
<td>$3,840</td>
<td>$15,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>$11,970</td>
<td>$3,670</td>
<td>$15,290</td>
<td>$4,163</td>
<td>$15,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>$15,350</td>
<td>$3,980</td>
<td>$15,290</td>
<td>$4,163</td>
<td>$15,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>$15,290</td>
<td>$4,163</td>
<td>$15,290</td>
<td>$4,163</td>
<td>$15,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>$15,720</td>
<td>$4,163</td>
<td>$15,720</td>
<td>$4,163</td>
<td>$15,720</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: UN HDR 1 and Globalis (UN Common Database/World Bank)

Figure 26: Gross Domestic Product per Capita Annual Growth Rate

![GDP Growth Rate Chart]

**Gross Domestic Product per Capita Annual Growth Rate**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Barbados</th>
<th>Jamaica</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975-2001</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-2001</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>-0.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Globalis (Human Development Report (UNDP))
Figure 27: Average Annual Change in Consumer Price Index (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UN HDR 14
Figure 28: Inflation Rate (1990=100)

Inflation Rate (1990=100)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Barbados</th>
<th>Jamaica</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>15.22</td>
<td>4.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>57.53</td>
<td>25.25</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>116.91</td>
<td>529.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>132.46</td>
<td>914.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>136.41</td>
<td>1,047.18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Globalis (UN Common Database (ILO))
Figure 29: Education Index

Source: UN HDR 1

Figure 30: Human Development Index

Sources: UN HDR 1 and Globalis (Human Development Report (UNDP))
Figure 31: Human Poverty Index

Sources: UNDP Barbados and Jamaica
(http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/statistics/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_BRB.html
Figure 32: Adult Literacy (15+) as Percentage of Total Population

Adult Literacy as Percentage of Total Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>98.6%</td>
<td>99.1%</td>
<td>99.4%</td>
<td>99.5%</td>
<td>99.7%</td>
<td>99.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>76.3%</td>
<td>79.7%</td>
<td>82.2%</td>
<td>84.8%</td>
<td>86.9%</td>
<td>88.0%</td>
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Sources: UN HDR 12 and Globalis (UN Common Database (UNESCO estimates))
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