The Rhetorical Turn in United States Diplomacy Praxis: Public Diplomacy 2.0

Randy Edward Cole
THE RHETORICAL TURN IN UNITED STATES DIPLOMACY PRAXIS:
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 2.0

A Dissertation
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By
Randy Edward Cole, Jr.

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By

Randy Edward Cole, Jr.

Approved March 22, 2013

Pat Arneson, Ph.D.
Associate Professor, Department of Communication & Rhetorical Studies (Committee Chair)

Richard H. Thames, Ph.D.
Associate Professor, Department of Communication & Rhetorical Studies (Committee Member)

Janie Harden Fritz, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Communication & Rhetorical Studies (Committee Member)

James C. Swindal, Ph.D.
Dean, McAnulty College & Graduate School of Liberal Arts

Ronald C. Arnett, Ph.D.
Chair, Communication & Rhetorical Studies
ABSTRACT

THE RHETORICAL TURN IN UNITED STATES DIPLOMACY PRAXIS:
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By
Randy Edward Cole, Jr.
May 2013

Dissertation supervised by Dr. Pat Arneson

While discourse and rhetoric has always been a part of traditional diplomacy, rhetoric and communication theory has not enjoyed an active voice in the scholarship of foreign relations, and more specifically, public diplomacy. This project argues that a postmodern turn in public diplomacy was formalized in the State Department’s 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) and that two specific directives laid out therein—to expand and strengthen relationships between individuals and steer the narrative—can find theoretical ground in communication scholarship. After examining the mid-to-late 20th century shift from specialized modern policy training to a rhetorical public diplomacy that views diplomats as generalists engaging members of varied, local publics, Pearce and Cronen’s Coordinated Management of Meaning and the narrative work of Ricoeur, MacIntyre, Fisher, Arnett, and Arneson carve out a place for
communication scholarship in the academic study of diplomacy and foreign relations. A case study of the State Department’s community diplomacy initiatives in Northern Ireland are examined as a core tactic of what I call “public diplomacy 2.0”—postmodern public diplomacy attentive to rhetoric and communication. This work rests on the premise that philosophy of communication and rhetorical scholarship is central to good public diplomacy praxis in a postmodern world.
DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to the memory of my grandfather, Richard Wallace, who spent his life’s work in giving his family the American dream, and who was unflinchingly proud of us all.

Ar dheis Dé go raibh a anam dílis.
May his faithful soul be at God's side.

To my parents, Randy and Lorrie Cole.
Thank you for reading to us every night as children, and by doing so, teaching us to love books and making us unafraid of the world.

And, to my niece and nephew, Addie and Max.
Your smiles and wonder are proof enough that this way of life is worth understanding and preserving.
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I owe a debt to many for the investment of time and love in my life. Without them, this project, among many other things, would not be possible. First, I would like to acknowledge the Word: “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God” (John 1:1). To my sister, Sarah: thank you for your perspective and for being bold enough to do things differently when it is best for you and your children. They have a remarkable mother. To my grandmothers: thank you for your sense of family and duty—and for feeding me, without fail, every time I walk through either of your front doors.

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INSCRIPTION

But often, in the world’s most crowded streets,
But often, in the din of strife,
There rises an unspeakable desire
After the knowledge of our buried life;
A thirst to spend our fire and restless force
In tracking out our true, original course;
A longing to inquire
Into the mystery of this heart which beats
So wild, so deep in us—to know
Whence our lives come and where they go. (Matthew Arnold, The Buried Life)

________________________

Lord, make me an instrument of your peace.

Where there is hatred, let me sow love;
Where there is injury, pardon;
Where there is doubt, faith;
Where there is darkness, light;
And where there is sadness, joy.

O Divine Master, grant that I may not so much seek
To be consoled as to console;
To be understood as to understand;
To be loved as to love! (St. Francis of Assisi)
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Prior to the end of World War II, diplomacy in the United States and in the West generally, occupied a space close to power politics, whereby a nation’s interests were largely achieved by policy makers and diplomats dealing directly with members of a foreign government. With the rise of radio, television, and the relative ease of travel, direct communication from members of the diplomatic establishment, such as the Department of State, to members of foreign publics began to take a more prominent place.

The term “public diplomacy” was coined in 1965 by Dean Edmund Gullion at Tufts University’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and marked a rhetorical turn in diplomacy to engage a postmodern world. Public diplomacy can be defined as communication from policy makers in a government directly to members of foreign publics, including media relations, cultural education programs and cultural exchange programs. Public diplomacy, however, still engaged increasingly postmodern publics in a largely modern model, mostly assuming a homogenous foreign public sphere and engaging members of that singular public with mass communications. Traditional diplomacy, on the other hand, is formal communication between people representing governments, including policy negotiation.

While discourse and rhetoric has always been a part of traditional diplomacy, rhetoric and communication theory has not enjoyed an active voice in the scholarship of foreign relations, and more specifically, public diplomacy. This project argues that a postmodern turn in public diplomacy was formalized in the State Department’s 2010
Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) and that two specific directives laid out therein—to expand interpersonal relationships and steer the narrative—can find theoretical ground in communication scholarship (United States Department of State and United States Agency on International Development). This project rests on the premise that a first rhetorical turn in American diplomacy praxis was made in the 1960s with the rise of public diplomacy and its formalization as an element of American diplomacy. Hillary Rodham Clinton’s tenure as Secretary of State marked a second rhetorical turn in American diplomacy toward postmodern public diplomacy. Her work called for increasing person-to-person engagement as well as taking part in shaping foreign narratives. While these efforts were implicit in the public diplomacy practice in the 20th century, Rodham Clinton recognized the need to narrowcast to particular vernacular publics in a postmodern world instead of by way of modern policy communications media like radio broadcasts and large national cultural programs. Her public diplomacy included an expanded new level: the direct rhetorical engagement of public diplomacy professionals with members of particular, situated petite postmodern publics.

Rodham Clinton saw foreign publics in a postmodern light. Against a modernist, monolithic conception of the public sphere, by which public diplomacy would engage via mass media broadcasts and other nationwide forms of communication in foreign countries, Rodham Clinton recognized a need to engage multiple publics in a postmodern moment. The issuing of the inaugural QDDR called for more attention on the behalf of diplomats interacting directly with members of foreign publics. Public diplomacy 2.0, as this project terms Rodham Clinton’s advance, calls for direct interaction between
diplomats and members of local foreign publics, both informally and in community diplomacy programs as a specific tactic of public diplomacy 2.0.

This trend in the American diplomacy establishment as formulated by Rodham Clinton moves away from the modern conception of public, to a Hauserian conception of “vernacular voices,” those localized and emergent publics in a given rhetorical situation as a new rhetorical iteration in the history of American diplomacy. From an early Greek conception of the public sphere through medieval courts and fiefdoms, to the Enlightenment bourgeois public sphere as a result of the printing press and growth of the modern monolithic nation-state, to a postmodern rendering of localized, vernacular publics in a postmodern state, the idea of public(s) has undergone great rhetorical maintenance and change. Engaging a postmodern conception of the public sphere, the QDDR will greatly benefit from a communicative theoretical approach to American diplomacy overseas, and in particular, public diplomacy.

This chapter will trace the philosophical roots and evolution of the state in the West, the public(s), diplomacy and public diplomacy by examining each of the four terms in antiquity, the medieval period, the Enlightenment, and modernity. Engaging the work of Aristotle, Thucydides, Niccolo Machiavelli, Jürgen Habermas, John Dewey, and others, this chapter will situate the major terms of this project for a postmodern engagement of public diplomacy.

The Western Nation-State

The federal nation-state as it exists in the West today has undergone significant rhetorical changes since its earliest form, resulting in what most westerners today would recognize as a nation with defined boundaries, large land masses, and relatively uniform
language and cultural customs. The construction of a political state in the West has its roots in ancient Greece. According to J.K. Davies in *Democracy and Classical Greece*, constitutional forms of communal government existed in Greece by 478 B.C.E. “Such authoritarian or non-accountable governments as had existed had by now been generally repudiated in favour of constitutional forms, however rudimentary and oligarchic” (13). These constitutional forms consisted of fixed, if not written, codes of law, as well as a sovereign governmental unit—the city-state. The city-state was defined, according to Davies, “not in terms of an area or a set of people unified simply by being ruled over by a monarch through dynastic inheritance or amalgamation or force of arms, but in terms partly of geographical unity and partly of the participation of all the citizens in some real or fictional kinship—or descent-group structure” (13). Two structures defined the early city-state: geographical unity and kinship structure.

While the city-state had been established and remained consistent in antiquity, Oswyn Murray in *Early Greece* offers that “the powers apportioned to the different elements and the criteria for membership … varied in different periods. In early Greece an assembly of all adult male members of the community (the agora or gathering) was subordinate to the boule (council) of the elders” (56). As Greek political rationale continued to develop, and as a sense of community developed based on reason and justice, early democracy appeared in classical Greece.

Murray notes that the polis “is a conceptual entity, a specific type of political and social organization … [and] the polis is also a process of urbanization” (63). As political rationality and urban communal life emerged, the city-state became an increasingly complex form of political organization in early western liberal democracy. At this point,
Greek philosophers begin to deal with political organization as a topic of social concern for human life together.

Aristotle offered a starting point for conceptualizing the state from a rhetorical framework. Aristotle defined three branches of science, organized by their outcomes: contemplative, practical, and productive science. Politics and the ordering of the state belong to the practical sciences and had as its end the governance and happiness of those in the city-state (Miller). Like rhetoric, politics had a practical use for Aristotle. Against the Platonic philosopher-king, Aristotle advocated for rule through rhetorical decision—the power of the better argument (Aristotle, The Rhetoric). The Greek conception of the state remained intact in iterations, including in the Platonic medieval court on the European continent, for centuries.

As antiquity gave way to the medieval period on the European continent, the way in which the political form of the state was constructed began to change from the classical Greek conception. In his discussion of the medieval state, Joseph Strayer identified key elements of the medieval state that are recognizable in today’s western liberal democracies. These include persistence in time; fixation in space; permanent, impersonal institutions; agreement on the need for an authority with power to make final decisions; and acceptance of the idea that subjects should give loyalty to that authority. Acknowledging the political structure of the Greek polis in antiquity, as well as the Roman Empire, medieval Europe produced the first and most influential models of political organization in this pre-modern mode. Moreover, according to Gerard Hauser, “The church was an alternative institution autonomous of the state whose dogma led the faithful to organize their individual lives around a different set of principles and ideals
than political ones” (21). As the state’s power and prominence in life grew in the Enlightenment and modernity, the church’s power waned.

“Medieval Christian society, at least in theory, was universal in extent. On the political side, the Holy Roman Empire proclaimed its own universality, ignoring local and dynastic particularism” (Cantor, Civilization of the Middle Ages 487). Medieval political organization was not based on the nation-state, but on local fiefdoms and dynasties, which had relatively little political power in comparison to the political hegemony of the Catholic Church. Whereas the papacy had enjoyed relatively unchallenged political power on the European continent for centuries, the emerging monarchies in the late Middle Ages began to reorganize the conventional political landscape. “In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the growth of national states dwarfed the power of the papacy, and the popes often became tools of royal policy instead of the reverse. The power of the papacy was one of the first casualties of the growth of national monarchies” (Cantor, Civilization of the Middle Ages 488). As print technology began to take hold on the continent around this time, the Church saw centuries of unchallenged doctrine falter as the printing press remade patterns of political conversation among a growing literate class.

In History of Western Civilization, John L. Beatty and Oliver A. Johnson note that in late medievalism, “demands of national power … were given precedence over religious convictions” (3). As Europe witnessed the rise of the modern, more secularized nation-state out of the medieval courts and church, nation-states consolidated, centralizing power, and this power increasingly became personalized in the head of the government—the monarch. Mercantilism as an economic force “deployed the economic
activities of the country to enhance the power of the state, particularly in rivalry with the other states of Europe” (4). As European colonialism provided an engine for mercantilist economics, the rise of the capitalism and industrialism in the 18th century gave rise to the modern nation-state in the west.

By 1500, Europe was gaining visibility in both internal connectedness and world importance. Strayer argues that a decisive shift toward the northwest occurred around 1500 where the French and English monarchies were growing in power. With the advent of the printing press and its prominence in that part of Europe, the structure of the state began to change as uniform political ideas, language, and cultural texts began to be spread over larger distances (Eisenstein). Literacy rates grew and books became common in late medieval Europe. At this point, the medieval state was largely governed by kings and courts as the alternative to the Catholic Church, and structured around smaller geographical areas. Medieval fiefdoms and dynasties gave way to the larger nation-states of modernity.

Jurgen Habermas argues that the Enlightenment concept of state marked a change from the Greek conception of the public sphere. As towns took over the functions of the medieval court, the institutions of the coffee house and salon strengthened the role of towns. Common people, because of economic and political change, were now franchised in the public function of life. The coffee houses and salons were centers of literary and political criticism where rational-critical debate was engaged (Structural Transformation).

Habermas notes that the political public sphere developed in Britain at the turn of the 18th century when the landed gentry formed the Parliament (House of Lords). The
literary public sphere became political on the continent when capitalism entered an advanced state. Because of the presupposition that capitalism could operate free from the government and that it was self-regulating (an idea championed by the Scottish Enlightenment and Adam Smith in his *Wealth of Nations*), the bourgeois public sphere believed in abolishing domination by the government. Instead, they believed that the role of the state should be to make laws to protect the public sphere and economy, as well as personal freedom, *à la* John Locke’s *Second Treatise on Civil Government (Structural Transformation)*. The profound effects of the Enlightenment on the conception of the nation-state became evident, as well as the nation-state’s relation to the realm of economics and the public. The idea of personal freedom also significantly influenced western liberal democracy and brought it closer to how the public conceives of democracy in the United States today.

In his chapter, “The Social-Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere,” Habermas argues that the public sphere began to decline in the modernity of the 19th century. Gerard Hauser explains, “Habermas finds the size and scope of the late modern states problematic for the viability of the public sphere” (48). The industrial revolution separated family from production (people left home to work on factories rather than working on the farm) at the same time Europe was witnessing a move toward protectionism as opposed to free trade. The state stepped in to alleviate poverty (a private, not public, function in the Greek *oikos*) and create fair chances for the citizenry to thrive in society. Consumption began to trump the rational-critical debate of the literary public sphere of the 1800’s, and society had to adapt to a less-educated public. Habermas is concerned with the state in late modernity and its focus on consumption of goods over
educated debate in the citizenry. John Dewey, however, sees the modern nation-state differently.

The state in late modernity is a rhetorical, practical, and dynamic entity. Dewey defines the state as “the organization of the public effected through officials for the protection of the interests shared by its members” (The Public and Its Problems 33). The state serves a practical purpose for the public. “The problem of discovering the state is not a problem for theoretical inquirers engaged solely in surveying institutions which already exist. It is a practical problem of human beings living in association with one another, of mankind generically” (Dewey, The Public and Its Problems 32). As human beings live in association with one another, they decide together through rhetoric and deliberation the best course of action for their shared interests and common protection. Dewey’s practical and rhetorical definition of the modern state is based in the Aristotelian notion of government. Aristotle defines government as a practical and rhetorical construction in his Politics:

Since we see that every city-state is a sort of community and that every community is established for the sake of some good (for everyone does everything for the sake of what they believe to be good), it is clear that every community aims at some good, and the community which has the most authority of all and includes all the others aims highest, that is, at the good with the most authority. This is what is called the city-state or political community (I.1.1252a1–7).

The purpose of a government for Aristotle, like Dewey, was to protect the common good. Deliberating over what the common good ought to be lies in the domain of rhetoric.
The state and the public that constitutes it, because of its rhetorical nature, is dynamic. Dewey holds that “there is no a priori rule which can be laid down and by which when it is followed a good state will be brought into existence. In no two ages or places is there the same public. Conditions make the consequences of associated action and the knowledge of them different” (33). The state is legitimized and given its power in the West by the public and is by extension rhetorical, dynamic, and practical. The public is engaged in the ongoing negotiation of what constitutes the good life for its situated citizens living together in a particular society formed as political states (Aristotle, *Politics*).

Dewey goes on to qualify the modern state as “the organization of the public effected through officials for the protection of the interests shared by its members” (33). Popular government, then, is unique to western modernity. Enlightenment individualism gave rise to universal suffrage as in the United States today. Dewey argues that democratic forms of government are a natural extension of Enlightenment philosophy:

The identification of democratic forms of government with this individualism was easy. The right of suffrage represented for the mass a release of hitherto dormant capacity and also, in appearance at least, a power to shape social relations on the basis of individual volition. Popular franchise and majority rule afforded the imagination a picture of individuals in their untrammeled individual sovereignty making the state. To adherents and opponents alike it presented the spectacle of a pulverizing of established associations into the desires and intentions of atomic individuals (101).
 Liberal democracy has its modern roots in Enlightenment philosophy and the rise of industry. With the rise of mercantilism and colonialism as economic and political structures, and Enlightenment philosophy and the Industrial Revolution as cool, rational movers, the modern nation-state’s government with its impersonal, monolithic regulatory body, is born.

With the Enlightenment also came the valorization of science and positivism as a way of knowing the world. Francis Beer and Robert Hariman argue that the rise of science and its effects on the conception and rhetorical construction of the modern nation-state gave rise how members of a government effect international relations in modernity:

This systematic inattention to the role of words in foreign affairs is the result of a specific intellectual history that emphasized the material bases of international politics as it “really” was. Political realism, historically known as reason of state … was linked to the modern valorization of the scientific method, the doctrine of political realism became the dominant theory within the contemporary discipline of international relations (Realism and Rhetoric 1).

Political realism, as the modern way nation-states engaged other sovereign nation-states, is textured by an understanding of how the modern, western nation-state and liberal democracy developed as part of a 2000-year history of western political and rhetorical thought. As the idea of a rational-critical public grew out of the Enlightenment, the western nation-state changed in new ways.

The evolution of the nation-state in the West has undergone marked philosophical and structural changes as it contends with the particular needs of a people and their
philosophical and political concerns. From the early democratic structures in the city-states of Greece, through the fiefdoms of medieval Europe and the salons of Enlightenment Europe, the modern nation-state emerged as the dominant form of political structure in the West. In tandem with the development of the modern nation-state, the modern public is an invention that has deep philosophical roots in the Western tradition, giving the public many of the characteristics that make a group of people recognizable as a public to most westerners.

Public(s)

To understand “public” across philosophical time periods in the West, Larry Grossberg, et al. frame a historical definition of the concept:

In ordinary language, we think of public in a variety of ways. Among the most common are the following: Public as the not-private, that which goes on in the open, observable by and accessible to others, as in “open to the public”; Public as general, pertaining to or emanating from all citizens, as in public interest or public opinion; Public as communal, or governmentally owned or regulated, as in public television or public utilities. Public implies openness, community, citizenship, discussion, debate. (378)

This three-part definition provides a contemporary rendering of the term “public” by which to understand the history and evolution of the idea into the form commonly thought of in the liberal democracies of the West today.

The idea of public is not a natural one discovered by the Greeks. Instead, public is a rhetorical idea, created, maintained, and changed to order how people act together as a whole in a given society. As Grossberg et al. note, “Publics have to be created, they do
not just arise, and what it means to be a public will change as historical circumstances change” (379). Dating from the golden age of Greece, its contemporary manifestation dates from the Enlightenment philosophy of the 1700s in Britain, Holland, and France. Prior to 18th century Enlightenment, the contemporary conception of the public as a body politic capable of expressing public opinion is virtually absent. Much as in ancient Greece, medieval Europe was ruled as small kingdoms by coalitions of kings, feudal lords, and the authority of the church (Ginsberg).

In ancient Greece, the public realm of the polis, state, city, or republic was the site where people consent to or contest the laws, contracts, covenants, or principles of community that govern personal and social conduct. For Aristotle, man is by nature an animal intended to live in a polis, but the public sphere encapsulated very little of what scholars in the contemporary West conceive of as public. For Aristotle, the public excluded both economics (a private function in Greek life, from the Greek oikos, meaning “home,” and nomos) and individual identity (Politics). The public as recognized in the West today—as political enfranchisement for all, or at least more—was born in the salons and coffee shops of Paris and brought to fruition in the Enlightenment ideal of individualism and the modern idea of progress.

Moreover, the political sphere in ancient Greece was not an entity apart from public discussion. The ancient Greek tradition emphasized the role of the individual as a public person. As Hauser notes, “Without a buffer between social and political life—since the political organized the social—Athenians had no need to conceptualize a public sphere as a discursive arena apart from that of the legislative assembly” (19). Public life
in ancient Greece was not bifurcated from political life until later time periods, as a result of the invention of the printing press and the evolution of democracy as a concept.

In medieval Europe, prior to the rise of the printing press and the Renaissance, political structures in Europe looked scarcely as they do today. Marketplaces, and with them the marketplaces of ideas, remained local and in vernacular languages. Small kingdoms and feudal societies provided the political life of Europe. Prior to the printing press, a robust public life in which an emergent, literate class discussed common ideas and the news of the day in print, was unable to exist (Eisenstein).

Evolving social structures also provided an alternative to the Greek conception of the political citizen:

Both the church and the estates provided a sense of social identity apart from citizenship. They provided a mode of social organization apart from the state in which members could engage in discourse unregulated by the state. They also caused great instability to states, which eventually provided support for the doctrine of absolute monarchy as the only viable mode of governance. An absolute monarch could raise money and armies independently, thereby dispensing with the need to convene the estates in order to be militarily effective (Hauser 21).

The medieval understanding of society was undermined by an Enlightenment conception of the state.

In tracing the medieval public sphere into the Enlightenment and modernity, Habermas, notes that the public sphere in the West has its roots in the Aristotelian notion of phronesis or practical wisdom (Theory and Practice). Phronesis, or “prudence, or
practical wisdom, is the preeminent political virtue in the Aristotelian lexicon” (Farrell 146). Farrell goes on to extend the notion of Aristotelian phronesis for the public sphere by arguing that “the deliberative practice of rhetoric might go so far as to cultivate practical wisdom as a relational good for those membership groups and collectivities that are called to decide and act on civic matters” (146).

In the medieval period, the idea of a critical public sphere undergoes a marked changed at the hands of political figures Niccolo Machiavelli of Italy and Thomas More of England. The two men fundamentally altered the concept of the public when they substituted phronesis for techne in terms of a practical reason (Habermas, *Theory and Practice*). For Machiavelli, “the skill of acquiring and preserving power does indeed result from a transferring of workmanlike techne to a domain of praxis till then reserved for phronesis” (59-60). In line with the Machiavellian maxim that the “ends justify the means,” for political leaders the public in the late Middle Ages became a matter of technique to accomplish an end instead of the Greek conception of practical wisdom.

After the medieval period, the critical rationality of Enlightenment Europe underwent a change (Habermas, *Theory and Practice*). “Enlightenment thinkers such as Locke, Montesquieu, and Rousseau, had reintroduced the idea that humankind forms a community of sorts constituted under natural law and in existence prior to society, which is itself prior to the government” (Hauser 21). As towns took over the functions of the medieval court, the institutions of the coffee house and the salon were centers of literary and political criticism. An emergent, literate class, because of economic and political change, was now franchised in the public function of life. Habermas argues:
The bourgeois public sphere may be conceived above all as the sphere of private people come together as a public; they soon claimed the public sphere regulated from above against the public authorities themselves, to engage them in a debate over the general rules governing relations in the basically privatized but publicly relevant sphere of commodity exchange and social labor (*Structural Transformation* 27).

He also discusses the process by which the public sphere, which had been to that point governed by the state, was taken over by groups of private people. Using their reason, private individuals established public authority through the institutions that were already in place, like universities and salons, which acted as forums for discussion.

After Habermas lays out what the public sphere *is*, he lays out its intellectual foundations, stemming from Locke and Immanuel Kant, among others. Habermas cites Kant’s idea that publicity is a mechanism to unite morality and politics, but the public itself must learn to use collective reason. Kant's discussion of the Enlightenment centered on people emerging from self-incurred intellectual infancy to think for themselves. Kant’s project sought to reconcile the phenomenal and metaphysical in a world of Newtonian science and Cartesian rationalism. Kant argued that people could only know what was phenomenal—metaphysics, as it has no evidence, could not be known. Morality then becomes an issue. Whereas one could not know for certain that God exists, they still must believe that God exists in order to act morally. Belief is justified, then, both on a moral and practical basis (Tarnas). Kant distinguished clearly between faith and certifiable knowledge. For Kant, what is right lies beyond scientific verifiability. Rightness is a matter of belief or opinion—the idea that lies at the root of the bourgeois
conception of public opinion in Habermas’ account. “The self-interpretation of the function of the bourgeois public sphere crystallized in the idea of ‘public opinion’” (Structural Transformation 89). Habermas’ argument is that the public sphere, the Enlightenment, and capitalism share the same philosophical roots in the Kantian doctrine of the right.

In political philosophy, social contract theory originated during the Enlightenment and typically addresses the questions of the origin of society and the legitimacy of the authority of the state over the individual. Social contract arguments typically posit that individuals have consented, either explicitly or tacitly, to surrender some of their freedoms and submit to the authority of the ruler (or to the decision of a majority) in exchange for protection of their remaining rights (Gough). The question of the relation between natural and legal rights, therefore, is often an aspect of social contract theory from the Enlightenment onward.

In Locke’s Second Treatise on Government, he argued that the natural rights of humankind—personal liberty chief among them—are inalienable and that the government has no authority over those areas. Habermas’s conception was that the literate public sphere used rational-critical debate as a mechanism to hold government’s power in check from intervening in personal freedom and natural rights.

The concept of an Enlightenment public sphere was problematic for the government, as Charles Taylor has noted:

[public opinion] developed outside the channels and public spaces of any authority whatever, since it is also independent of that second focus of European societies, the church. Governments were used to facing the independent power of
religious opinion, articulated by churches. What was new was opinion, presented as that of society, elaborated through no official, established hierarchical organs of definition (Philosophical Arguments 217).

The Enlightenment marked a third shift in the conception of the public sphere: in ancient Greece there was no public sphere because political life was a public exercise, and in medieval Europe, the estates and the church formed the basis of opinion. In the Enlightenment, however, the shift that took place in the public sphere was that of a civil society—a new kind of cultural form independent from the old cultural forms. The public sphere was not only separate from the church, but the public sphere was also separate from the state. The public introduced a shift in political power from the exclusive authority of aristocrats and educated humanists to ever-larger sectors of society.

Moreover, the independence of the public sphere allowed a more contemporary idea of democracy to develop. “The autonomy of civil society from state and institutional control signals more than the newly emergent inability of the state to organize society. It also attests to the importance modernity ascribes to public knowledge and informed opinion for legitimating state action and regulating social relations” (Hauser 40). Liberal democracy and the concept of unbiased fairness for all began to develop. As Taylor notes, “The principle of a public sphere disengaged from power raises the theoretical possibility of its being impartial, so that alternative views may be tolerated and agreements may be reached on their merits” (264). The public sphere, by the late Enlightenment, became a tool for the democratization of society at-large.

Walter Lippmann observed that the public sphere in late modernity is, and necessarily has to be, a thing apart from those who are making decisions. Not only is he
asserting that the two are and have to be separate, but he notes that publics affect policy “only if they influence an actor in the affair” (45). He is skeptical of the modern democratic notion of the public:

The democratic ideal has never defined the function of the public. It has treated the public as an immature, shadowy executive of all things … “The people” were regarded as a person; their wills as a will; their ideas as a mind their mass as an organism with an organic unity of which the individual was a cell. Thus the voter identified himself with the officials. … Democracy, therefore, has never developed an education for the public. It has merely given it a smattering of the kind of knowledge which the responsible man requires. It has, in fact, aimed not at making good citizens but at making a mass of amateur executives (137-138).

Writing on the cusp on postmodernity, Lippmann spoke to Hannah Arendt’s idea of the failure of modernity’s focus on monolithic institutions and a mass conception of the public.

In the mid-20th century, Hannah Arendt theorized about the shortcomings of a modernist conception of human life together in the form of the public sphere. For Arendt, modernity is characterized by the loss of the world, by which she means the restriction or elimination of the public sphere of action and speech in favor of the private world of introspection and the private pursuit of economic interests. Modernity was the age of mass society, of the rise of the social out of a previous distinction between the public and the private, and of the victory of animal laborans, or the animal that labors over homo faber, or the human who thinks and the classical conception of man as zoon politikon, or the political animal (The Human Condition).
Modernity, Arendt held, was the age of bureaucratic administration and anonymous labor, rather than politics and action, of elite domination and the manipulation of public opinion. It was the age where history as a “natural process” has replaced history as a fabric of actions and events, where homogeneity and conformity have replaced plurality and freedom, and where isolation and loneliness have eroded human solidarity and all spontaneous forms of living together. Modernity was the age where the past no longer carries any certainty of evaluation, where individuals, having lost their traditional standards and values, must search for new grounds of human community. Arendt’s argument that modernity creates society as a monolithic mass and not as a collection of human beings and human relationships is shared by other philosophers, perhaps most notably Lippmann.

Lippmann’s assessment of the modern public is that it is fundamentally mistaken in its assumptions about the human relationships that comprise a public:

We have been taught to think of society as a body, with a mind, a soul and a purpose, not as a collection of men, women and children whose minds, souls and purposes are variously related. Instead of being allowed to think realistically of a complex of social relations, we have had foisted upon us by various great prerogative movements the notion of a mythical entity, called Society, the Nation, the Community (146).

Instead, Lippmann saw the public rhetorically, as an ongoing negotiation of ideas, beliefs, and values that rise and recede given the individual people in the relationship and other outside rhetorical factors like history, current events, and the economy.
While Lippmann argued that the public, conceived rhetorically, is a thing apart from the government or state—the entity whose people make decisions and change outcomes—Dewey in his work *The Public and Its Problems* addressed the public as having a slightly different rhetorical relationship to the state and government. Dewey held that the modern state and government are different entities and that the state cannot exist without the public. The public is organized into a state through its government and has a responsibility to be watchful of the government.

Lippmann and Dewey agreed, however, that the public is not a reified modern giant, but is rather a dynamic rhetorical public undergoing constant negotiation. Dewey noted that American political life grew up “out of general community life, that is, association in local and small centers” (111). The public before modernity was an amalgamation of local publics.

Hauser’s work in rhetorical theory lends itself well to the discussion of postmodern rhetorical publics. Calling emergent publics in postmodernity “vernacular voices,” Hauser’s work argues for a rhetorical conception of public. He views a national public as combinations of emerging and receding local publics—vernacular voices—that change and gain and lose relevance based on a Bitzerian conception of “the rhetorical situation” (Bitzer 217). Dewey and Lippmann pointed to postmodernity in their work, which is important for a postmodern rendering of public diplomacy.

**Diplomacy**

An historical overview of diplomacy aids in understanding how public diplomacy works and how a postmodern conception of the public influences foreign policy. This section will discuss the history of Western diplomacy from ancient Greece to modern
America. The thought of Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hugo Grotius provides an historical underpinning of the philosophy of American diplomacy through the mid-20th century.

The history of diplomacy is long. Thucydides may be the first thinker to have offered a power-situated definition of diplomacy to influence foreign publics to abide by a given policy. In his *Melian Dialogue*, Thucydides explicated the conversations between the Athenian leaders and Melos, a small, neutral state during the Peloponnesian War. While the Melians wished to respect the interests of all states, the Athenians were perhaps the first to advocate for what the modern West called political realism, or power politics, saying:

> Of the gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a necessary law of their nature they rule wherever they can. And it is not as if we were the first to make this law, or to act upon it when made: we found it existing before us, and will leave it to exist for ever after us; all we do is to make use of it‖ (Thucydides 334-335).

Arguing a God-given right and the convention of law, the Athenians advocated a foreign policy that promoted specific objectives. The diplomacy that flowed from that policy is one not of engaged rhetoric with members of foreign publics, but one of advocating for a specific objective in a unilateral, power-situated way.

Thucydides wrote at the time of the Peloponnesian War from 431 to 404 BCE. While his writing does not concern itself formally with diplomacy, he does provide insight into the political realism that dominated Greek political life. J.K. Davies explains, “Athenian superiority had been broken, Persia entered the war, and Sparta became a sea-

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power. Thereafter the new configuration of international politics remained stable for a generation” (117). The international stage was set through power politics, not diplomatic initiatives that sought to stave off war.

While the political and diplomatic climate in ancient Greece was based in power politics, the first ancient Greeks who may have thought differently about foreign relations were the Sophists. While different types of Sophists existed in ancient Greece, this project uses the terms Sophists in a general sense as itinerant, traveling teachers who taught rhetoric. Perhaps the first group of people in the West who engaged a postmodern conception of the world, the Sophists’ worldview was informed greatly by exposure to groups of people who rhetorically conceived of the world in very different ways (Herrick). In Democracy and Classical Greece, Davies argues that the Sophists had two roles: to teach and to subvert the world of myth for reason. Having been exposed to other rhetorical worlds, the Sophists’ worldview had necessarily changed to accommodate that plurality. Thus were born the first postmodern diplomats—a group of people who spread Athenian knowledge and influenced members of foreign publics who held varied worldviews.

Machiavelli is the first major diplomatic thinker and figure in medieval Europe. Machiavelli viewed diplomacy as only the advocacy of national interests. Machiavelli’s focus was the state—especially the republican state—and sustaining the requirements for its stability. Born in 1469 in Florence, Machiavelli reached adulthood “in the very years in which diplomacy was being transformed by the invention and spread of the resident embassy among the turbulent states of Italy” (Berridge 539). Friedrich Meinecke explains that Machiavelli was the first to discover the real nature of raison d’état, or state reason,
and he argues that it has had considerable implications for ambassadors and diplomats since then. Moreover, “[The] state system came into existence in the sixteenth century, making use of the kind of secular and realistic political theory propounded by the Italian humanists like Machiavelli and of the experience of international diplomacy … that had been worked out in the Italian city-states in the fifteenth century” (Cantor, Meaning of the Middle Ages 289). The historical moment opened the opportunity for Machiavelli to influence world diplomacy theory for the next 500 years, but his particular circumstances also served to inform his thought.

Machiavelli came from a family that, though modest in means, had been a key player in the politics of Florence for more than 200 years. In 1498, at the age of only 29, he was appointed second chancellor of the republic (Mattingly; Skinner). Those experiences led Machiavelli in a vein of thinking commonly referred to by the phrase “the ends justify the means.” Certainly, Machiavelli viewed public diplomacy as only the advocacy of national interests.

Hugo Grotius is another thinker important to the rhetoric of diplomacy before the Enlightenment. He was a philosopher, theologian, Christian apologist, playwright, and poet (Dumbauld). A relative contemporary of Machiavelli, he was a jurist in the Dutch Republic. With Francisco de Vitoria and Alberico Gentili, he laid the foundations for international law, based on natural law.

Born in 1583, Grotius was one of the first political and diplomatic thinkers to bridge the ancient and medieval worlds with the Enlightenment. Grotius was a proponent of humanism and the Aristotelian conception of natural law. Historian Andrew Dickson White notes:
Into the very midst of all this welter of evil, at a point in time to all appearance hopeless, at a point in space apparently defenseless, in a nation of which every man, woman, and child was under sentence of death from its sovereign, was born a man who wrought as no other has ever done for a redemption of civilization from the main cause of all that misery; who thought out for Europe the precepts of right reason in international law; who made them heard; who gave a noble change to the course of human affairs; whose thoughts, reasonings, suggestions, and appeals produced an environment in which came an evolution of humanity that still continues (5).

Unlike Machiavelli, who was writing in Italy 100 years before, Grotius operated in the historical moment at the end of the medieval period and the early dawn of the Enlightenment in the Netherlands—much closer in both space and time to the ideas of humanism and the birth of the Enlightenment in northern Europe.

Grotius answered the sceptics’ claim that there can be no lowest common denominator of human behavior. Grotius held that all men would agree that every person has a fundamental right to protect and preserve themselves and also that unnecessary harm to another person is unjustifiable. For Grotius, no social life as a civilized society was possible if the citizens denied either of these two points. Moreover, no other principles but these two were necessary for basic societal structures. Grotius’ understanding of diplomacy was centered on the same tenet: nation-states were under no obligation to come to the aid of another, but they were obliged not to harm one another (Tuck). Grotius’ work revises Machiavelli’s ideas and textures an understanding of diplomacy as advocacy of national interests by members of a government and members
of a society in a way that Machiavelli’s does not. Grotius situated his ethic in the context of international law and draws a fine distinction between a nation’s fundamental rights versus any obligation beyond that to help other nations.

Grotius’ currency in defining diplomacy as the advocacy of national interests is his emphasis on diplomatic goals and their relationship to Aristotelian natural law (Brett). Unlike Machiavelli, Grotius looked to Aristotle for a means through which to vet human nature and diplomacy goals beyond a grand scheme of Aristotelian virtues. He found that structure in civil philosophy, in the conception of the city. Annabel Brett holds that “This conviction is distinct from, even if related to, the position which all post-Machiavellian civil philosophers hold, that the city must accommodate [human] nature” (33). In his nature-management conception of civil society, Grotius provided a late medieval advancement in his understanding of diplomacy as the advocacy of national interests. In a strong and stable government, the work of Grotius helped to codify constitutionalism instead of absolutism as the way of achieving national sovereignty (Randall). As medieval Europe underwent the changes ushered in by the Enlightenment, Grotius’ ideas retain their importance.

The idea of civil law and natural rights takes on even greater currency in the Enlightenment and modern conceptions of diplomacy and had a profound influence on thinkers like Hobbes and Locke. The Enlightenment ideas of Hobbes and Locke found traction in the early years of the American colonies in the 16th and 17th centuries and were instrumental in the formalization of the United States as a nation in the 18th century.

American diplomacy, since the founding of the United States more than 230 years ago, has relied on democracy and a robust public sphere to guide its work. “Since the
time when Thomas Jefferson insisted upon a ‘decent respect’ to the opinions of mankind,’ public opinion has controlled foreign policy in all democracies” (Bailey 1). American diplomacy—and American government at-large—has its roots in the European humanism of the Enlightenment. Norman Melchert offers, “Locke’s influence extends far beyond his epistemology. In fact, he may be best known in America for his political thought, which had a decisive impact on Thomas Jefferson and the other founders of the United States” (386). Indeed, the American ideal of the natural right to personal liberty and happiness comes to American national thought from Locke.

Also from Locke by way of St. Thomas Aquinas comes the impulse in American diplomacy to respect the natural rights and dignity of the human person while pursuing American interests. “Locke follows Thomas Aquinas in thinking that even before government is instituted, human beings, through their reason, have access to natural law. … In a natural state, humans have a sense for justice and injustice, right and wrong, independently of any law declared by a sovereign” (Melchert 386). The American diplomacy establishment is often challenged with the competing interests of respecting the natural rights of foreigners while implementing and furthering the policy of the government as developed from the public opinion of the American populace and strategic goals. Traditionally, the business of American diplomacy lies in understanding the opinions of the American public and translating that into foreign policy objectives that provided for national aspirations: “peace, security, neutrality, justice, freedom, humanitarianism, territorial elbow room, commercial prosperity, and opportunity for investment and trade abroad” (Bailey 2). Since the inception of the United States Constitution, the guarantee of those rights has fallen under the purview of the State
Department. In its 2011 refreshed mission statement, the State Department articulated its mission: “Shape and sustain a peaceful, prosperous, just, and democratic world, and foster conditions for stability and progress for the benefit of the American people and people everywhere” (United States Department of State, Fiscal Year 2011 6).

One of the original three Cabinet-level departments, the State Department was founded in 1789 with an original six employees. Throughout the formative years of the American nation and the 19th century, American diplomacy centered on formal government-to-government relations led by diplomats. Public diplomacy initiatives like cultural exchange programs, foreign press relationships, and an active approach to directly influencing foreign publics were not a major factor in State Department diplomacy until the 20th century when the nation had to contend with its preeminence on the world stage as result of leadership in the World Wars (Bailey).

Power politics has been the dominant paradigm of international relations in the United States since World War II (Kraig; Beer & Hariman, Realism and Rhetoric). Power politics is synonymous with political realism, which holds that the reality of political situations is best mitigated by national power. Beer and Hariman define realism in international relations as “state power” (What Would be Prudent? 299). They argue that for most of the 20th century, realism was the dominant form of foreign affairs, “where giving priority to material and especially military capabilities and being suspicious of verbal intentions and agreements, one could objectively determine the best possible course of action for survival in a world of force and fraud” (299).

Moreover, through the early part of the 20th century, the United States diplomacy establishment combined the Enlightenment conception of engaging the American
peoples’ political hopes, dreams, needs, and interests, and executing those interests though political realism or power politics. “The systematic inattention to the role of words in foreign affairs is the result of a specific intellectual history that emphasized the material bases of international politics as it ‘really’ was” (Beer and Hariman, *Rhetoric and Realism* 1). Until recently, American diplomacy engaged the world through an Enlightenment rendering of the public sphere in a modernist, scientific model that conceived of the public as a reified modern monolith. Policy and power politics was the method of practicing diplomacy.

The latter half of the 20th century saw a shift in American foreign policy away from classical government-to-government power politics and an increasing emphasis in both the State Department and the Executive branch on attentiveness to sharing the American culture abroad and directly influencing the hearts and minds of foreign publics. By the 1970s, the Carter Administration had shifted the momentum of American foreign diplomacy on the fundamental premise that “it is in our national interest to encourage sharing of ideas and cultural activities among the people of the United States and the peoples of other nations” (Tuch 32). Likewise, in his search for the best organizational arrangement for both policy and cultural communication in American foreign relations, Gifford D. Malone notes an “increasing call to dialogue” and a need to “develop mutual understanding, to learn as well as teach” as postmodernity and competing national and international interests came to the fore in the latter half of the 20th century (26-27).

While persuasive discourse has always had its part in the practice of international relations, rhetoric had taken a philosophical back seat to Enlightenment and modernist conceptions of the world. “One of the most important tenets of realist theory is the
assertion that realism expresses without distortion the permanent essence of politics between nations … most important, it escapes the influences of its own historical moment. Thus, realism exemplifies the theoretical norms of scientific positivism” (Beer and Hariman, What Would be Prudent? 5). With the occurrence of the horrors of the first half of the 20th century, including two major world wars and a global economic depression in the interim, the modern metanarrative, built solidly on science and positivism, collapsed. As narratives began to contend for legitimacy, diplomats and the foreign policy establishment began to recognize the importance of rhetoric and persuasion for governments in the space created by the absence of assumptions of certainty about the way the world was constructed. Nancy Snow argues that a rhetorical engagement that focuses on two-way diplomacy geared toward understanding specific cultures as opposed to one-way communication of foreign policy objectives is necessary in the 21st century:

The shift from the diplomatic emphasis [or modern] to the public emphasis [or postmodern] has resulted in the rise of two different philosophies about public diplomacy’s utility:

1. Those who view public diplomacy as a necessary evil, a mere ancillary tactic that supports conventional … diplomacy efforts; and

2. Those who view public diplomacy as a context or milieu for how nations interact with each other, from public affairs in the field to the citizen diplomat and student exchanges at the grassroots (6).

Snow’s call is for a move away from the modern conception of the bureaucrat and into a rhetorically focused diplomatic praxis.
Diplomacy in modernity functioned much as Snow and Arendt describe—diplomacy’s job was one of communicating the official policy of a bureaucratic entity in an effort to influence, or in worse cases manipulate, public opinion. Traditional diplomacy assumed a homogeneous public. Instead, Arendt revived Aristotle’s concept of praxis. A postmodern rhetoric of public diplomacy engages praxis.

Calvin Schrag in *Communicative Praxis and the Space of Subjectivity* offers a definition of praxis similar to Arendt’s *vita activa*: “The Greek term ‘praxis,’ because of its rather widespread current adoption, is seldom translated when it is used in the scholarly literature of philosophy and the human sciences. If indeed it is translated, it is usually rendered as ‘practice.’ It could also, however, be translated as ‘action,’ ‘performance,’ or ‘accomplishment’” (18-19).

A postmodern rendering of praxis is at the intersection of discourse and action (Schrag). Modernity, as we have noted, proved the failure of one-way policy communication over engagement in discourse with publics. It failed because it viewed the public as a reified monolith, not as a dynamic engagement with people who are constantly renegotiating their opinions as a public. Rodham Clinton called for more engagement in the communities in which American diplomats work. Schrag discusses the concept as dialogic encounter:

Indeed, within the density of the dialogic encounter the thoughts that are mine and the thoughts that are yours codevelop in a consummate reciprocity. I lend you a thought-experiment, a possible way of seeing things, and you respond. Your response is one of incorporating what I have said, by either acceptance, rejection, or modification … Such is the ongoing dialectics of dialogue (125).
The QDDR itself called for—and furthered—the rhetorical turn in international relations. In their book, *Post-Realism: The Rhetorical Turn in International Relations*, Francis Beer and Robert Hariman echo both Schrag and Rodham Clinton: “This focus on discourse ultimately involves consideration not merely of terms and habits of usage, but of the institutions, social structure, and history of the people who have lived with them” (168).

In postmodern diplomacy, public diplomacy ascends to a place of strategic importance in the diplomatic strategy of the United States, through a deep understanding of the culture, educational programs, cultural exchange programs, community enrichment programs, and media engagement of the local, vernacular publics.

**Public Diplomacy**

Public diplomacy assumes that public opinion is a function apart from the state and that it can influence agents of the state. Public diplomacy, according to Snow, “has been about governments talking to global publics, and includes all those efforts to inform, influence, and engage those publics in support of national objectives and foreign policies” (6). This project understands Snow to mean *members* of a government talk to *members* of global publics. Public diplomacy and traditional policy-maker-to-policy-maker diplomacy differ in that there exists the assumption in the American foreign policy establishment that foreign publics and public opinion are not only a thing apart from their governments, but that foreign public opinion can wield significant influence over a foreign government’s policies toward the United States government. This section will discuss the historical evolution of public diplomacy as a field within traditional diplomacy. This iteration of public diplomacy emerged as a result of increasing calls for
direct engagement from members of the government to members of foreign publics. The concept of public diplomacy as “soft power” by Joseph Nye is also discussed.

The term “public diplomacy” came into common usage in the 1960s after it was developed by Gullion at Tufts University (USIA Alumni Association). Public diplomacy is communication from a government official directly to foreign publics, including media relations, cultural education programs, and cultural exchange programs. Moving into a postmodern historical moment and the advent of the Cold War, Gifford D. Malone notes that public diplomacy during the 1960s centered around achieving the United States’ foreign policy objectives by influencing public attitudes in other nations, by advising the President, his representatives, and the various departments and agencies on the implications of foreign opinion regarding American policies and programs. Malone also notes that the 1970s brought with it “increasing calls for putting an emphasis on ‘dialogue’ with foreign publics” (26-27). Thus is born the first rhetorical turn in American diplomacy in the 1960s and ‘70s.

By the 1990s, it had become clear that there was a place for public diplomacy in the formal responsibilities of the State Department. Snow defines the difference between traditional diplomacy and public diplomacy. For Snow, traditional diplomacy is government-to-government relations and traditional public diplomacy is government-to-global publics. This method of public diplomacy engages members of entire national publics in efforts to inform, influence and engage them in support of American priorities. “More recently, public diplomacy involves the way in which both government and private individuals and groups influence directly and indirectly those public attitudes and opinions that bear directly on another government’s foreign policy decisions (Snow 6).
This project understands Snow to mean members of a government talking to members of global publics. Increased emphasis on direct government communication to varied publics led to the absorption of the United States Information Association (USIA) by the State Department in 1999 to bring public diplomacy more in line with policy making (Rugh). In 2010, the State Department under Rodham Clinton’s oversight issued the inaugural QDDR, which called for even more attention to diplomats interacting directly with foreign publics.

Until 1999, USIA was the body responsible for much of the nation’s public diplomacy, including mass communications like Voice of America radio broadcasts. USIA and its emphasis on public diplomacy was absorbed into the State Department in 1999 and officially disbanded on October 1 of that year (Cull, “Public Diplomacy Before Gullion”). Ten years later, when Rodham Clinton assumed leadership of the organization, the world had seen al-Qaeda stage major terrorist attacks around the world, two American-led wars that were unpopular on the world stage and the emergence of the global dominance of the Internet. The importance—and possibility—of persuasion through public diplomacy had never been greater.

Rodham Clinton took the reins of the State Department a decade after USIA was folded into the work of the State Department in an effort to minimize redundancy and better align the objectives of traditional diplomacy and public diplomacy (Rugh). Shortly after assuming leadership of the department, Rodham Clinton commissioned the QDDR, which calls for a more engaged public diplomacy. Her recommendations go beyond formal foreign public diplomacy programs aimed at influencing various publics and call for more personal interaction—diplomats meeting local opinion leaders and learning the
local culture as a way of understanding it and interacting with it, what Snow terms P2P “public diplomacy.”

In the 2010 *QDDR*, Rodham Clinton’s State Department revised and extended the call for personal engagement from public diplomacy professionals in the field. In the July/August 2012 issue of *Foreign Policy*, Susan Glasser refers to Rodham Clinton’s brand of diplomacy as “people to people” diplomacy, noting the primacy of individual diplomats living and working in the field, attempting to understand the various publics in a given state (77). A more personal model of public diplomacy whereby one shares his or her culture with another can also be thought about as cultural attraction.

Cultural attraction in public diplomacy has been theorized about is as “soft power” (Nye 1). According to Snow, this “is arguably the most referenced term in the public diplomacy lexicon” (3). Nye’s term “soft power” is theoretically contrasted to hard power—the ability to coerce—and grows not out of a country’s military or economic might, but arises from a nation’s culture, political ideals, and policies. Nye argues that while hard power remains crucial in a world of states trying to guard their independence and of non-state groups willing to turn to violence, he emphasizes nurturing the soft power of the United States to augment our ability to deal with critical global issues that require multilateral cooperation:

More than four centuries ago, Niccolo Machiavelli advised princes in Italy that it was more important to be feared than to be loved. But in today’s world, it is best to be both. Winning hearts and minds has always been important, but it is even more so in a global information age. Information is power, and modern information technology is spreading information more widely than ever before in
history. Yet political leaders have spent little time thinking about how the nature of power has changed and, more specifically, about how to incorporate the soft dimensions into their strategies for wielding power. (1)

For Nye, when hard power and soft power are used in tandem, the result is “smart power.”

Nye works on the premise that soft power, defined as influencing by attraction, not coercion, is routinely used in interpersonal communication and organizational communication. “At the personal level, we are all familiar with the power of seduction and attraction. … And in the business world, smart executives know that leadership … involves attracting others to do what you want” (5). In refining his definition of soft power, Nye offers that, “Soft power is more than just persuasion or the ability to move people by argument, though that is an important part of it. It is also the ability to attract, and attraction often leads to acquiescence” (6). For Nye, democratic societies already use soft power to some extent, but a nation’s ability to attract in a globalized and technological public sphere where language and national borders are more permeable than ever, is necessary for success on today’s world political stage. Public diplomacy is central to Nye’s work on power as an indispensable part of the rhetoric of diplomacy, politics, and persuasion.

Since the term public diplomacy was first coined in 1965, it has been practiced, revised, and theorized about, in many ways standing just on the fringe of the discipline of rhetoric and communication. From the early history of diplomacy and state power politics, diplomacy has emerged in the contemporary age as a nuanced rhetorical art that not only advances national interests, but attempts to build mutually beneficial
relationships with the various publics in—and governments of—foreign nations. Today’s diplomat is, more than ever before and consciously so, a rhetor.

Conclusion

The QDDR calls for several specific public diplomacy recommendations. The document outlines a revised approach: “The framework sets forth five strategic objectives to inform, inspire, and persuade foreign publics: [1] Shape the narrative, [2] Expand and strengthen people-to-people relationships, [3] Counter violent extremism, [4] Better inform policymaking, and [5] Deploy resources in line with current priorities” (United States Department of State and United States Agency on International Development 60-63). The first two strategic objectives are the focus of this research. Diplomats are called to “inform, inspire, and persuade” by “shaping the narrative and expanding and strengthening people-to-people relationships”—both points of postmodern public diplomacy. Chapter 2 will examine the postmodern assumptions of the world in which Rodham Clinton operated. The following chapters will then more fully flesh out how diplomats can philosophically engage the two explicitly public diplomacy-based strategic objectives in the QDDR.
CHAPTER 2
Public Diplomacy in the Modern and Postmodern Eras

The 20th century bore witness to a major philosophical shift from modernity, with its emphasis on homogeneity and efficiency, to postmodernity, with its decline of traditional structures that had historically given meaning to human life together. Through two World Wars and a global economic depression, to a global push for democracy and gender and race rights, modernity gave way to postmodernity as human community renegotiated its value structure. In a postmodern era characterized by narrative contention, how scholars and practitioners conceive of the public sphere takes on currency, both for this project and for everyday life in a democratic society.

This chapter will examine the mid-to-late 20th century shift from modern policy that viewed the public of a nation as a monolith and public diplomacy as mostly mass communication, toward a rhetorical public diplomacy that views diplomats as generalists engaging members of varied, local publics within a nation in a more specific and face-to-face manner. This chapter will lay out a 20th century modern conception of the public based on the work of John Dewey, Walter Lippmann, Richard Weaver, and Hannah Arendt. Moreover, the chapter will discuss three modern examples of American public diplomacy: Voice of America (VOA), the American Participants (AmParts) program, and cultural and information centers. The discussion of modern publics will culminate in an engagement of Arendt’s work on, and critique of, the modern bureaucrat as a way of showing the mid-20th century shift toward postmodernity. Looking then toward postmodernity, the second half of the chapter will engage a 21st century postmodern
iteration of publics as put forth in the *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review* (*QDDR*; United States Department of State and United States Agency on International Development). Engaging a Hauserian conception of a montage of public spheres as the idea of diplomatic generalists will be explored through the work of Weaver as a postmodern way of considering the problem of the modern bureaucrat as articulated by Arendt. The chapter will discuss a postmodern rendering of the public sphere through the work of Weaver and theorize about how public diplomacy professionals can engage multiple, localized publics in international public diplomacy as communication generalists.

As Hauser notes, “Our public deliberations occur in multiple forums not exclusive to those of the official political realm, and they lead to opinions which, when widely shared, set expectations for their consequences on official policies. We refer to this montage of discursive arenas as public spheres” (20). Considering a modern versus postmodern conception of public has significant implications for how diplomats—and in particular, public diplomacy professionals—view their role. The *QDDR* recognizes that a diplomat engaging his or her work as a modern bureaucrat is no longer viable in the job of American diplomat. Rethinking the diplomat as a postmodern communication generalist draws clear distinctions between the modern and postmodern conceptions of the public sphere and public diplomacy.

**Public Diplomacy in the Modern Public Sphere**

The modern public sphere was conceived of as a national monolith whose opinions could be gauged and changed by mass communications. Philosophers like Dewey and Lippmann were among the first to theorize about the nature of the public
sphere in the 20th century and its attendant implications and problems. Dewey was an American philosopher whose ideas have been influential across a variety of sectors, including education and social reform. Dewey was an important early developer of American pragmatism as a system of philosophy. He asserted that complete democracy was to be obtained not just by extending voting rights but also by ensuring that there exists a fully formed public opinion, accomplished by effective communication among citizens, experts, and politicians, with the latter being accountable for the policies they adopt (Ryan).

In the 1920s Lippmann’s *Public Opinion* commented on the challenge of informed public opinion in modernity to guide policy. The reason, he claimed, is that the average citizen is bewildered by the degree of information needed to be intelligent regarding a given issue. Much like Plato in antiquity, his solution was that an elite sector of informed society—the press—would speak for the people. Later, when Dewey published *The Public and its Problems*, like Lippmann, he noted that modernity is a problem for a robust public sphere. The rapid expanse of electric and mass communication channeled a surplus of information that rendered people unable to understand how the state’s leaders’ decisions affect their lives. (For Dewey, the state was an outgrowth of the public.) Decisions, argued Dewey, were made by people in special interest groups and mass production of communication was the rule of the day in late modernity. The public as a whole was eclipsed by the modern state (*The Public and Its Problems*).  

A pragmatist philosopher of American democracy, Dewey was particularly concerned with the ideas of public, state, and government as practical entities. He
asserted the value of these rhetorical constructs are best evaluated by their consequences. “There is no more an inherent sanctity in a church, trade-union, business corporation, or family institution than there is in the state. Their value is also to be measured by their consequences” (*The Public and Its Problems* 74). Conceiving of the public as a practical rhetorical construct based on its consequences, Dewey spent the majority of his book discussing the public, state, and government as practical problems to be addressed as the result of late modernity in the early 20th century. He defined the public as:

> Those indirectly and seriously affected for good or for evil form a group distinctive enough to require recognition and a name. The name selected is The Public. This public is organized and made effective by means of representatives who as guardians of custom, as legislators, as executives, judges, etc., care for its special interests by methods intended to regulate the conjoint actions of individuals and groups. Then and in so far, association adds to itself political organization, and something which may be government comes into being: the public is a political state. (*The Public and Its Problems* 35)

In Dewey’s conception, a public was a political entity that organizes itself into a state that institutes a government to carry out its laws—the public is a political state, and also quite literally, the forerunner of the state. In this modern rendering the problem for Dewey was that the state is no longer localized, but in modernity becomes a continent-wide nation-state in the United States in the 20th century. Again, Dewey made clear that his problem is a pragmatic one in modernity: “[the public] is a practical problem of human beings living in association with one another, of mankind generally. It is a complex problem” (*The Public and Its Problems* 32). For Dewey, the practical problem was the form the
public takes in modernity as a continent-wide state and not a political group of people who are organized on the basis of relative location to one another or similar concerns. The public became a reified monolith. For Dewey, the public was necessarily tied to the conception of state and government, and was not something apart from the state.

Dewey outlined several reasons why the state in modernity became a massive monolithic public instead of a public that is closer to more traditional forms of community, centered on specific, localized concerns (like Rodham Clinton’s postmodern rendering of publics). Dewey offered, “American democratic polity was developed out of genuine community life, that is, association in local and small centers where industry was mainly agricultural and where production was carried on mainly with hand tools. It took form when English political habits and legal institutions worked under pioneer conditions” (The Public and Its Problems 111). Dewey cited the rise of technology, in particular the telegraph, telephone, and the railways as part of the reason this shift to a modern monolithic conception of public occurred. He also cited migratory patterns from rural to urban areas as a consequence of the Industrial Revolution. In Dewey’s work the modern public was necessarily conceptually tied to a state, so as the nation-state grows, the public becomes a non-localized, non-vernacular entity rather than small, localized entities set apart from the state.

Dewey cited an interesting example of the modern American state to assimilate its 19th century and early 20th century immigrants into a homogenous public sphere in a way that would have “disrupted any semblance of unity as surely as the migratory invasion of alien hordes once upset the social equilibrium of the European continent” (The Public and Its Problems 115). Dewey noted that at the same time hundreds of thousands of
foreign immigrants came to America, the public sphere did not become more heterogeneous, it became more homogenous as a process of modernity. Dewey said:

Mechanical forces have operated, and it is no cause for surprise if the effect is more mechanical than vital. The reception of new elements of population in large number from heterogeneous peoples, often hostile to one another at home, and welding them into even an outward show of unity is an extraordinary feat. In many respects, the consolidation has occurred so rapidly and ruthlessly that much of value has been lost which different peoples might have contributed. The creation of political unity has also promoted social and intellectual uniformity, a standardization favorable to mediocrity. Opinion has been regimented as well as outward behavior. (*The Public and Its Problems* 115)

The melting pot is a modern conception, and modern anonymity is a product of the modern public. In Dewey’s rendering, the form that modern diplomacy took looks much different than Rodham Clinton’s postmodern public diplomacy.

Like all modern institutions, diplomacy was a uniform process of policy formulation and implementation, and while rhetoric and discourse have always had a part in diplomacy, the modern zeitgeists of progress and uniformity carried over into how diplomacy was conducted and into the modern conception of the diplomat as a modern bureaucrat. When Gullion coined the phrase “public diplomacy” in 1965, he noted a rhetorical turn in the American diplomacy establishment. As Nicholas J. Cull notes, “The reason that the term public diplomacy took off in 1965 was that there was a real need for such a concept in Washington, DC. A dozen years into its life, the United States Information Agency needed an alternative to the anodyne term information or the
malignant term propaganda” (“Public Diplomacy Before Gullion” 21). With a move away from formal government-to-government diplomacy, Gullion highlighted the emerging trend of engaging the public (as a whole, not members of a public) in discourse and effecting opinion change through rhetorical means.

In *Communicating with the World: U.S. Public Diplomacy Overseas*, Hans Tuch notes that the development of public diplomacy was made possible, in large part, by the technological advances of modernity. “First, the communications revolution, which began shortly after the Second World War and continues today, makes possible the instantaneous transmission of information of all kinds across oceans and over mountains to the remotest areas of the world” (4). Tuch notes that mass dissemination of information to foreign publics (conceiving of, for example, all Russians as members of a homogenous public) made possible by the advances of the 19th and 20th centuries was indispensable to the development of public diplomacy as the first rhetorical turn in American diplomacy.

Tuch goes on to note that radio, television, and satellites had profound effects on the abilities of members of a government (in this case, the American government) to communicate with members of the foreign public. He says, “Thus, public opinion has become an important factor in international affairs, exerting influence on the decisions and actions of governments” (4). Tuch’s conception, however, is characterized by a modern, single, national public. “The framework for the modern mass media, radio, and television … was the nation state: a state whose institutions constituted both the core and the boundary of the society in question” (Bentele and Nothhaft 97). And, as Hauser notes, “Since the presidency of Franklin Roosevelt, for example, political leaders in the United
States have relied almost exclusively on mass media for disseminating information and presenting persuasive appeals” (26).

As the world became increasingly globalized in the mid-20th century, the United States government began to engage in public diplomacy, though at the time, the term had not yet been coined by Gullion. Mass communications efforts like VOA, speaker programs like AmParts, and cultural and information centers were three early forays into public diplomacy in late modern America. All three, however, while making a rhetorical turn to engaging members of foreign publics in a formal way, relied heavily on the use of mass media and a public-as-audience orientation to relay messages. W. Phillips Davison puts early public diplomacy efforts in the mid-20th century this way:

Public diplomacy combines the skills of the traditional diplomat with those of the specialist in mass communications and the social researcher. The diplomat formulates the ideas that he would like to have communicated to a foreign public, the social researcher studies the intended audience, and the communications specialist chooses the most appropriate media and composes the messages. (399, emphasis added)

Davison’s public diplomacy is a modern concept for three reasons. First, there is an assumption of a mass communications specialist. The idea of a specialist is antithetical to the call in the QDDR, and while it may mark a rhetorical turn in diplomacy toward persuading members of a foreign public, it achieves that by means of a removed, bureaucratic specialist engaging a reified, homogenous public. Second, the emphasis is on the social researcher—a detached, scientistic engagement is a hallmark of modernity. Conceiving the public as a body to be studied as opposed to people to be understood is a
major difference in the QDDR, and third, Davison’s emphasis on audience and composition of messages. Implicit in this approach is a cool, detached actor regarding a foreign public as a homogenous group, as if in a theater, to which the actor is composing and communicating carefully crafted, persuasive messages. Against this conception of public diplomacy, the QDDR calls for person-to-person engagement and general knowledge of localized, vernacular cultures.

In the rational, disinterested model of modern public diplomacy, the public becomes reified. According to Hauser, a theory of publics situated in discourse, however, must widen its purview to include discourse in petite public spheres as well as institutional actors like diplomatic specialists. Modern forms of public diplomacy, however, remained intact throughout the 20th century. When VOA was launched in 1942, the radio station quickly became one of the most well-known tools of American public diplomacy. Tuch notes that VOA operates from Washington, not in the field. Tuch also observes that VOA “is the only medium that can transmit a message directly from the sender to the receiver without having to pass through any intermediary, human or physical, that might be able to affect the tone or content of the message” (91). Tuch calls this VOA’s “special value.” Clearly, in the early years of public diplomacy, the form of radio as a medium necessarily excluded two-way communication and person-to-person interaction. Whereas postmodern public diplomacy valorizes efforts at personal nuance and discourse, Tuch holds that it is detrimental to the objectivity and rationality of the message.

Certainly, VOA has its place as a tool in the arsenal of American public diplomacy initiatives. VOA is sometimes the only medium of communication available to
American public diplomacy when political turmoil abroad eliminates all other ways of communicating. “The American media rediscovered this fact in 1979, after the taking of the American hostages in Tehran, and again in the spring of 1989, after the brutal suppression of the pro-democratic demonstrations in China” (Tuch 93). In certain places around the world, or at certain times of political upheaval, VOA and other mass broadcasting options have proved invaluable sources of wielding American influence. While mass forms of communication can be very valuable in persuading members of foreign audiences toward democracy and pro-American views on a range of issues, radio cannot narrowcast to petite public spheres or interact with them in the person-to-person manner Rodham Clinton called for in a postmodern moment.

More than just a way to communicate foreign policy, Gary D. Rawnsley notes that radio broadcasting came into its own in the early years of the Cold War as “both an instrument and determinant of foreign policy” (5). The growth of electronic forms of communication like the radio, coupled with the mid-20th century emphasis on public opinion as a viable consideration in policy formation compelled governments to revise traditional channels of diplomacy. Radio helped to determine foreign policy because, while still a modern implement of mass communication broadcasting, diplomats could gauge broad-based national reaction to given policy, thereby helping them to analyze, at least very generally, how a certain policy was received by a very general, national public.

Similar to VOA, but more targeted to specific audiences, the AmParts program, which brought American speakers to host countries to lecture on a variety of topics, marked a complementary component to the United States government’s early public diplomacy initiatives. Closer to a postmodern rendering of public diplomacy in that it
narrowcasts its efforts to particular groups, the AmParts program consisted of Americans who were “invited by public affairs officers to appear before selected audiences to discuss subjects of importance to public diplomacy” (Tuch 72) and were often able to speak to a particular audience with more authority on a given subject than a diplomat at the embassy.

Before USIA was folded into the State Department in 1999, the AmParts program boasted a slate of 600 speakers each year on a variety of topics from medicine, law, and politics to entertainment, music, and art (Bissell). Tuch notes the strategic importance of AmParts speakers in two ways:

First, when it comes to developing a broad understanding of the American society and institutions, they make significant contributions by demonstrating the diversity of responsible views in a democracy and, by their presence, give evidence of the openness of the American society. Second, in a foreign policy context, AmPart speakers are invited for the specific purpose of enabling [the government] to address an issue that a post has determined to be of importance in its country plan. (Tuch 74)

The American presence in West Germany at the end of World War II had a profound effect on the democratization of the public sphere in that region in the 1960s. American influence, in large part because of programs like AmParts and cultural centers and libraries, played a large part in the development of a democratic sensibility in post-war Germany (von Hodenberg).

Similar to cultural exchanges like the Fulbright program, which probably comes closest to postmodern public diplomacy in connecting people individually and immersing
citizens from both the United States and foreign countries in each other’s cultures, the AmParts program is a more targeted approach to public diplomacy and helps to shape national attitudes toward pro-American sentiments and democracy. AmParts is, perhaps, a step forward in the evolution of public diplomacy in late modernity that sought to engage members of foreign publics in an effort to persuade and create affinity for American values. The AmParts program still, however, engages as “audience” in the modern sense of the word, as a homogenous group instead of engaging person-to-person in the field.

Third, cultural and information centers provided members of a foreign public with an invaluable resource to learn about American culture and values. “The idea of cultural and information centers as the focus of U.S. public diplomacy activities emerged in large measure from the occupation of Germany” (Tuch 65). In fact, within six years of the end of World War II, there were 27 cultural centers (Amerika Hauser) throughout Germany (Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany). These cultural centers, also common in Austria and Japan after World War II, provided a major public diplomacy advantage in that they openly and visibly represented American society and its culture, and they provided a natural meeting place for person-to-person interaction between American diplomats and members of a foreign public.

Tuch, however, notes some drawbacks to this method of public diplomacy, questioning whether this type of cultural public diplomacy might better if modeled on the premise of outreach, where diplomats go into the community and meet people rather than wait for a random member of the “public” to come into an American cultural center. He notes, “In times of political tension, local citizens may not want to be seen entering a U.S.
information center; they might be more comfortable meeting with an American visitor in a private home” (Tuch 67). He also notes the liability and potential for these centers to become targets in times of political tension. Similarly, R.S. Zaharna calls cultural centers “second tier relationship-building initiatives” in public diplomacy because the participation required is “expanded from individual-specific initiatives to programs that encompass social groupings” (94).

While much of the 20th century’s methods of public diplomacy continue today, like media relations and educational exchanges like the Fulbright program, Tuch stops short of calling for direct person-to-person engagement in programs like AmParts and cultural centers, perhaps because public diplomacy—at least as theorized in the QDDR—was ahead of its time when Tuch wrote in the 1980s. Giles Scott-Smith notes the “human factor” of exchange programs in public diplomacy. He says, “The interpersonal nature of the exchange experience, coupled with its inherently private character, have caused this field to be largely written out of the documentation of diplomacy and its conduct in the public realm” (51). The QDDR’s call for public diplomacy in a postmodern era is for exactly these kinds of personal engagements, intended to co-create meaning between the diplomat and specific individuals in a particular public. Public diplomacy in the 20th century made a rhetorical turn in the 1960s and was attempting to do rhetorical and discursive work in a model that was still largely modern and bureaucratic, though no one readily noticed the incongruence between the modern bureaucratic form and the rhetorical content of public diplomacy until recently with Rodham Clinton’s postmodern public diplomacy.
Arendt was perhaps one of the first scholars to note the incongruence between the bureaucratic structures of the modern world and authentic communicative life. Arendt’s conception of a new form of political life necessitated a shift in public diplomacy thinking. In *The Human Condition*, she set out to correct the ways in which modernity had gone wrong. Writing about Arendt, Sheldon S. Wolin articulates:

“The political” was the ideal. The intention behind it was to combat a different version of the masses than the one which had figured in her analysis of totalitarianism. Although “mass society” remained the danger, the analysis was focused on the phenomenon of “work” and on the transformation of society and politics effected by the modern emphasis upon productivity and economic growth.

These and other notions were assembled under the idea of “the social.” (6)

Diplomacy in modernity functioned much as Wolin and Arendt describe—as communicating the official policy of a bureaucratic entity to an anonymous mass public. Modern diplomacy assumed a homogenous public and an attempt at efficient governance in the modern spirit of “work.” The creation of a consensus in the modern public sphere was also paramount. The first rhetorical turn in public diplomacy during the mid-20th century marks perhaps one of the most interesting phenomena in American diplomacy—the practice of discursive, postmodern models of public diplomacy attempting to carve out a place in a largely modern, bureaucratic structure.

In postmodernity, “Consensus has become an outmoded and suspect value” (Lyotard 66). Alasdair MacIntyre, in *After Virtue*, argues that emotivism—the basis of decision-making as lying in personal preference—is dangerous to the public life of the community. Postmodern public diplomacy looks to solve these problems by building, not
national consensus in postmodernity, but unity of decision-making, rhetorically among and within a given vernacular public sphere.

**Public Diplomacy in the Postmodern Public Sphere**

The postmodern public sphere may be best conceived of as an amalgam of competing and complementary public spheres, situated in vernacular communities and attentive to local, particular concerns. Against a modern conception of the public sphere, which viewed the public as a modern, monolithic and homogenous national public, public diplomacy professionals in postmodernity should be attentive to the fracturing of modernity into smaller, localized and diverse public spheres. This section of the chapter will argue that the QDDR works on the assumption of a postmodern rendering of public spheres and that for public diplomacy to be successful in the 21st century, diplomats ought to conceive of the public sphere in postmodern terms.

Hauser highlights the centrality of postmodernity to a new conception of the public sphere in *Vernacular Voices*:

An emphasis on consensus hearkens to premodern conditions of communication, which were weak in diversity and placed a strong emphasis on shared traditions for resolving differences. In the late-modern or postmodern context, continual encounter with difference strips the productiveness of consensus as the test of communication for the pluralistic conditions of actually existing democracy. (55) Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* argues that the purpose of rhetorical deliberation is for informed judgment, not consensus or efficient governance. The strength of the rhetor’s position should not be the achievement of consensus in postmodernity, but instead should be that
it can be understood across particular spheres to provide a basis for working together among interdependent people (McKeon).

The postmodern public sphere is comprised of multiple, petite public spheres that render judgment on the best way to move forward in the particularity of the specific public sphere’s time, place, and exigencies. Hauser notes that, “Discursive practices provide the evidentiary basis for studying and interpreting the constitution of social will. … As a social practice, discourse involves symbolic transactions that affect people’s shared sense of the world” (13). As the latter half of the 20th century saw a shift in American foreign policy away from classical government-to-government power politics and an increasing emphasis in both the State Department and the Executive branch on attentiveness to sharing the American culture abroad, discursive practices became increasingly important.

Beginning in the 1970s, the Carter Administration shifted the momentum of American foreign diplomacy on the fundamental premise that “it is in our national interest to encourage sharing of ideas and cultural activities among the people of the United States and the peoples of other nations” (Tuch 32). Likewise, in his search for the best organizational arrangement for both policy and cultural communication in American foreign relations, Malone notes an “increasing call to dialogue” and a need to “develop mutual understanding, to learn as well as teach” as postmodernity and competing national and international interests came to the fore in the latter half of the 20th century (26-27). In the late 1970s and ‘80s, scholars also called for a theory of postmodern public spheres situated in rhetoric and argumentation, arguing that in a postmodern era of narrative
contention, the only sure way forward in the absence of Habermasian modern consensus is through rhetorical decision-making (McGee; McGee and Martin).

Rodham Clinton took the reins of the State Department in 2009, and in her four-year tenure as Secretary of State, she helped the State Department make a second rhetorical turn in public diplomacy toward a distinctly postmodern engagement of localized, situated foreign publics. The *QDDR* is grounded in understanding diplomats as generalists and focusing public diplomacy on specific person-to-person engagement. Public diplomacy in postmodernity calls for direct engagement from diplomats to influence the narratives within local foreign publics and expand and strengthen people-to-people relationships. In a postmodern world, the State Department’s model under the leadership of Rodham Clinton assumes multiple, local, and vernacular publics.

The *QDDR* calls for a rethinking of public diplomacy praxis. Underscoring the complexity of publics and opinions, as well as the global interconnectedness of the 21st century, the *QDDR* calls for increased emphasis on public diplomacy, including direct diplomat interaction with members of foreign publics and community/cultural programming—what I advance later in this project as public diplomacy 2.0. A rhetorical environment is necessary for the functioning of these public spheres. Calling them “rhetorical forums,” Farrell notes, “a symbolic environment … within which issues, interests, positions, constituencies, and messages are advanced, shaped, and provisionally judged” (282) are central to the postmodern functioning of publics. The *QDDR* details the current work of the department and provides specific directives and recommendations for the continued preeminence of American foreign policy abroad.
Similar to Hauser, Herbert Blumer understands developed societies as montages of publics, each public activated when members feel issues intersect their experience of the world and their larger society in ways that require attention. This exigency has led Hauser to define a public as “the interdependent members of society who hold different opinions about a mutual problem and who seek to influence its resolution through discourse” (32).

In conjunction with the issuing of the QDDR by the State Department, Rodham Clinton explained in a November 2010 article she authored in Foreign Affairs why public diplomacy needs to be central to the work of the State Department:

[I]ncreasing global interconnectedness now necessitates reaching beyond governments to citizens directly and broadening the U.S. foreign policy portfolio to include issues once confined to the domestic. … The QDDR endorses a new public diplomacy strategy that makes public engagement every diplomat’s duty, through town-hall meetings and interviews with the media, organized outreach, events in provincial towns and smaller communities, student exchange programs, and virtual connections that bring together citizens and civic organizations. (15-16)

Rodham Clinton’s call is one of engagement, not by American diplomats to members of foreign governments, but by American diplomats to individuals in localized, vernacular publics, in an effort to understand the grassroots opinions that shape foreign attitudes and opinions about American foreign policy. Developed Western societies are characteristically pluralistic, with diverse and often competing interests that engender
fragmentation and its accompanying dangers (Hauser). Effective public diplomacy attends to this postmodern condition.

The QDDR calls for several specific public diplomacy recommendations. The report states that, “The framework sets forth five strategic objectives to inform, inspire, and persuade foreign publics” (United States Department of State and United States Agency on International Development 60). They are to shape the narrative, expand and strengthen people-to-people relationships, counter violent extremism, better inform policymaking, and deploy resources in line with current priorities (United States Department of State and United States Agency on International Development). The remainder of this project will concern itself with the first two enumerated points. Diplomats are called to “inform, inspire, and persuade” by “expanding and strengthening people-to-people relationships and shaping the narrative” (United States Department of State and United States Agency on International Development 60-61). Rodham Clinton, through the QDDR was asking American diplomats to undertake a complex and nuanced postmodern rhetorical process.

Members of postmodern petite publics co-create meaning rhetorically. Hauser holds that, “Rhetoric’s invention character bears significantly on how we experience the possibilities of political, social, and cultural choice, and rhetoric’s experiential nature contributes greatly to the dynamic possibilities of publics” (33). Moreover, as James Boyd White argues, members of a public must be receptive to different ways members might express themselves, actively interpret those meanings in order to understand how what being communicated relates to them” (9). White’s rendering of communication in postmodern petite publics is an issue of praxis.
In ancient Greek the word *praxis* referred to activity engaged in by free men. Aristotle held that there are three basic activities of man: theoria, poiesis, and praxis. There corresponded to these kinds of activity three types of knowledge: theoretical, to which the end goal was truth; poietical, to which the end goal was production; and practical, to which the end goal was action. Aristotle further divided practical knowledge into ethics, economics, and politics (*Poetics*). Politics for Aristotle was the practical knowledge of praxis action, and thus, the concept of praxis informs a postmodern understanding of public diplomacy practice as a rhetorical and communicative function.

Arendt argued that modernity traded praxis for the contemplative life. Arendt called “praxis” the highest and most important level of the active life. Thus, she argued that more philosophers need to engage in everyday political action or praxis, which she saw as the true realization of human freedom, furthering Aristotle’s concept of the “free man” engaging in praxis. Like Aristotle, Arendt believed that the capacity to analyze ideas, wrestle with them, and engage in active praxis is what makes one uniquely human. Her unique contribution came when she offered it as an alternative to modern ways of being in the world. “By viewing action as a mode of human togetherness, Arendt was able to develop a conception of participatory democracy which stands in direct contrast to the bureaucratized and elitist forms of politics so characteristic of the modern epoch” (d’Entreves). For Arendt, human togetherness represented an alternative to modernity’s bureaucrat.

Moreover, for Arendt, praxis was useful in a postmodern world of plurality—a model of the world Rodham Clinton engaged for postmodern public diplomacy. Arendt defined plurality as “the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world,”
(7) and says that it is the condition of human action “because we are all the same, that is, human, in such a way that nobody is ever the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives, or will live ” (8). Moreover, an active public is emergent. Hauser argues, “rather than anticipating publics as already existing, we should seek them through actual discursive engagements on the issues raised in civil society as emergences of society’s active members” (33).

In postmodern plurality, for Arendt, each individual member is capable of acting and relating to others in distinct ways, and consequently, of contributing to a network of actions and relationships that is infinitely complex and unpredictable (d’Entreves). This network of actions makes up the realm of human affairs, that space where individuals relate directly without the intermediary of things or matter — that is, through language. For Arendt, action is in language, and for a postmodern rendering of philosophical public diplomacy, its currency to shape narratives is in person-to-person discourse.

Arendt stressed repeatedly that action is primarily symbolic in character and that the web of human relationships is sustained by communicative interaction (178-79, 184-86, 199–200). As Hauser holds, “Publics do not exist as entities, but as processes; their collective reasoning is not defined by abstract reflection but by practical judgment; their awareness of issues is not philosophical but eventful” (64).

Arendt moved on to discuss the connection between speech and power, that which springs up between people when they act “in concert,” and which is actualized “only where word and deed have not parted company, where words are not empty and deeds not brutal, where words are not used to veil intentions but to disclose realities, and deeds are not used to violate and destroy but to establish relations and create new realities”
This is the work of public diplomacy in postmodernity: to co-create realities and manage worlds by rhetorical practical reason. This is a marked difference from the bureaucrat of modernity and mass communication as the main form of 20th century public diplomacy. For Aristotle, rhetorical knowledge, which is particular and situated, is not part of his theoria, but instead exists in the activity of praxis. Praxis is practical reason, the process whereby we come to determine courses of action and render judgment (Rhetoric).

Schrag offers a definition of praxis similar to Arendt’s, but moves it forward another step from Aristotle’s action and Arendt’s speech and power in plurality, to discourse and dialogue in a space of subjectivity between communicative partners in an exchange. What allows for shared meaning in a world of plurality where participants may not share the same ideas or even the same language, Schrag puts forth a space of subjectivity in which praxis takes place and speech can create shared meaning. Schrag’s discussion of hermeneutical self-implicature also textures an understanding of the rhetorical turn in diplomacy in postmodernity:

Indeed, within the density of the dialogic encounter the thoughts that are mine and the thoughts that are yours codevelop in a consummate reciprocity. I lend you a thought-experiment, a possible way of seeing things, and you respond. Your response is one of incorporating what I have said, by either acceptance, rejection, or modification … Such is the ongoing dialectics of dialogue.” (125)

Schrag’s self-implicature as entrance to a public sphere is paramount to the co-creation of shared meaning in a plural, postmodern world.
In their book, *Post-Realism: The Rhetorical Turn in International Relations*, Beer and Hariman echo both Schrag and Rodham Clinton: “This focus on discourse ultimately involves consideration not merely of terms and habits of usage, but of the institutions, social structure, and history of the people who have lived with them” (168). In a postmodern understanding of public diplomacy, Schrag’s work allows for a space of subjectivity that is attentive to the historicity of a particular vernacular public sphere. Borrowing the term “rub” from Mikhail Bakhtin’s *The Dialogic Imagination*, Hauser notes this historicity:

Public opinions are embedded in the ongoing dialogue in which classes, races, religions, genders, generations, regions, and a host of other significant discriminators rub against each other, problematize one another’s assumptions about meaning, create discursive spaces in which new interpretations may emerge, and lead, even if tentatively, to intersections that provide collective expressions of shared sentiments. (110)

Implicit in Rodham Clinton’s postmodern conception of public spheres was a call for an understanding of historicity. Hauser says of petite publics: “We must acquire its vernacular language in order to share its rhetorically salient meanings” (67). Members of a public must share in a web of meanings that define a world of commonality. This includes common cultural actions, festivals, emotions (Taylor “Interpretation and the Sciences of Man”).

In postmodern plurality, diplomats will need the cultural, language, and communication skills to engage any number of situated vernacular publics. Because of the plurality of these publics and their complex interests, being well-briefed on policy
goals and speaking the native language is not enough for public diplomacy in postmodernity. Creating a mindset of, and educating, the next generation of public diplomacy professionals as generalists, with a broad understanding of rhetoric, philosophy, and the humanities is essential in effectively navigating the tricky diplomatic waters of the 21st century. Diplomats as postmodern generalists, not modern bureaucrats, are essential to the success of public diplomacy, and another way Rodham Clinton’s work marked a distinct philosophical move from a modern engagement of “public.”

As modernity’s zeitgeist of progress and industry undermined traditional community life in favor of anonymity in a reified monolithic public sphere, and an active life was exchanged for introspection and labor, a rhetorical way of living together as a body politic—or as multiple body politics in a nation—began to disintegrate. Weaver, a southern agrarian academic, offered a solution for life against the problems of modernity, and by extension, posits a way forward for public diplomacy praxis in postmodernity.

Weaver’s answer to the “problem which disintegration places in the lap of practical men” (Ideas Have Consequences 92) lies in being a generalist, not a specialist. Against a modern conception of technique in which a public diplomacy professional masters a specific communication technology or policy area, Weaver’s work has import for postmodern public diplomacy praxis in its call for a general philosophical education and a rhetoric of action. He offered, “In this way disintegration has placed labor in a position in which it must compete against other groups in a manner which cannot bring ultimate advantage to any of those involved” (Ideas Have Consequences 75).

For Weaver, statesmanship and philosophy, which are tied to a generalist’s education, were sacrificed for egotism and labor in modernity’s progress and
specialization. “The object is not to say that labor is more or less to blame than other groups of society; it is rather to show that when egotism becomes dominant and men are applauded for looking to their own interest first, statesmanship and philosophy must leave the picture” (Ideas Have Consequences 74-75). Weaver identified clearly and unequivocally the thesis of his project: that modern man’s philosophical ills are the result of modern specialization. Public diplomacy in postmodernity calls for a generalist conception of public diplomacy work in the field.

Generalists offer a philosophical engagement of diplomacy and public diplomacy as opposed to a strictly technical orientation to diplomacy as the modern conception of work suggests. To illustrate, a June 14, 2011, New York Times article discussing the diplomatic contributions of Briton Patrick Leigh Fermor on the occasion of his death, called for less specialized policy wonks and more generally educated diplomats like Fermor in postmodernity:

…he combined the traits of a solider, linguist and humanist, and he appreciated history and culture for their own sake even as he used that wisdom to defend civilization. In today’s world of over specialized foreign-policy knowledge, in which military men, politicians and academics inhabit disconnected intellectual universes, we need more generalists like Fermor. … Because America’s own security will rest in a world where tribes matter as much as Twitter, Fermor is an icon of the kind of soldier, diplomat or intelligence expert we will need: someone who can seamlessly move from any one of these jobs to another, who is equally at home reading a terrain map as he is reciting the poetry of the people with whom he is dealing. The more depth and rarity of knowledge we can implant in our
officials, the less likely they are to serve up the wrong options in a crisis …

Fermor and his friends refused to reduce the world to questions of strategy and national interest: they were more taken by culture and landscape, which in fact made them more valuable than most intelligence agents. (Kaplan)

Kaplan provides an endorsement of Weaverian concepts and a Rodham Clintonian conception of public diplomacy for postmodernity in calling for a breadth and generality in education to help the diplomat achieve what Weaver called that “intuitive feeling about the immanent nature of reality” (Ideas Have Consequences 18).

A Weaverian generalist education provides many points for public diplomacy praxis application. Several distinct practices emerge in approaching the world through a postmodern generalist rhetorical lens. Diplomats who are generally trained have at their disposal myriad experiences and a wealth of knowledge. They are better equipped with a broad understanding of how others live in the world and are able to negotiate multiple, vernacular, petite public spheres as Rodham Clinton charged them to do. This is diplomacy by affinity and understanding, what Harvard international relations scholar and theorist Nye calls “soft power” (5). Soft power in public diplomacy is particularly powerful because public diplomacy seeks to influence public spheres within a given nation with the expectation that a foreign nation’s own publics are better equipped to persuade their government than the United States government. This is achieved by public diplomacy professionals being on the ground, engaging directly with members of foreign publics as generalists, learning and appreciating local cultures, languages, and histories in order to build relationships with groups and among groups in a foreign country for the expansion of peace, prosperity, and Western democratic ideals.
Walter H. Beale’s article on Weaver discusses the approach that Weaver takes to rhetorical education: “Rhetorical education is an attempt to shape a certain kind of character capable of using language effectively to carry on the practical and moral business of a polity” (626). Through the use of soft power—a practice that grows out of approaching the rhetorical world as Weaver did—diplomats are best equipped to carry out the recommendations in the QDDR. Weaver himself spoke to language in the shaping of character and his belief that the world is intelligible and able to be apprehended through language as the result of a broad liberal arts education. Weaver offered that “It is impossible to talk about rhetoric as effective expression without having a term giving intelligibility to the whole discourse, the Good” (The Ethics of Rhetoric 23). Like Weaver, postmodern public diplomacy asserts that the world is intelligible through rhetoric.

A postmodern public sphere is characterized by myriad public spheres whose voices emerge and recede based on given exigencies. Recognizing this postmodern trend, the QDDR and Rodham Clinton’s State Department called for more person-to-person engagement. To be effective in any given number of specific situations, postmodern public diplomacy requires more than mass communication and specialized foreign policy professionals. The work of Weaver offers a generalist conception of the educated person in the liberal arts in order to gauge a world of competing narratives and meanings.

Conclusion

This chapter has drawn distinctions between a modernist public sphere and public diplomacy policy implementation and a postmodern rendering of multiple, situated, vernacular public spheres and public diplomacy generalists engaging members of those
spheres personally on the ground. This conception of postmodern public spheres and public diplomacy generalists situates postmodern public diplomacy and the QDDR in a philosophy of communication from which to engage postmodern foreign relations. Specifically, this chapter overviewed a modern understanding of the public as a reified modern monolith and pointed out some of the critiques made by 20th-century philosophers like Arendt, Dewey, and Lippmann, who theorized about communicative life in a modern world characterized by bureaucracy and monolithic communications institutions. The second half of the chapter argued that inherent in the QDDR is an assumption of publics as postmodern entities—situated, vernacular, local, and emergent. This section touched on the work of Schrag, Hauser, and Weaver to buttress an argument for a philosopher-generalist diplomat in postmodern public diplomacy.

Public diplomacy in a postmodern 21st century requires diplomats to carry out the work outlined in the QDDR. In the last 50 years since public diplomacy was coined as a term, marking the first rhetorical turn in diplomacy, much has changed in the world—from how public spheres are rhetorically created, maintained, and changed, to how lack of metanarrative agreement has replaced progress, labor and a modern, singular public sphere as the zeitgeist of political life together in the 21st century. Chapter 3 will explore Pearce and Cronen’s Coordinated Management of Meaning theory to provide philosophical texture for the first communicative diplomacy directive in the QDDR: building person-to-person relationships.
CHAPTER 3

_Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review_ Directive 1:
“Expanding and Strengthening People-to-People Relationships”:
Coordinated Management of Meaning

The _Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review_ (QDDR; United States Department of State and United States Agency on International Development) “sets forth five strategic objectives to inform, inspire, and persuade foreign publics” (United States Department of State and United States Agency on International Development 60). The first of two of those objectives explicitly concerned with communication is to “expand and strengthen people-to-people relationships” (60). Against a modern, mass communications model of public diplomacy, postmodern public diplomacy extends into the realm of interpersonal communication by calling for diplomats to engage individuals in a relationship as they work toward the promotion of democracy and Western values across the world. Public diplomacy in a postmodern moment creates social worlds by engaging petite, localized, and vernacular public spheres in order to bring a particular reality into conversation with the reality of American foreign policy goals, creating a new social world from the two. Postmodern public diplomacy calls for interpersonal engagement to accomplish the creation of new social worlds.

Public diplomacy in postmodernity, by its nature, is an interpersonal and intercultural engagement. A cornerstone of the inaugural QDDR under Rodham Clinton’s leadership is that diplomats need to develop a deep understanding of individuals engaged and living in any number of postmodern, localized vernacular publics. With local and personal knowledge of thought leaders in a foreign public, diplomats can also understand
what shapes, changes, and manages the socially constructed realities from which those publics build the rhetorics of culture.

Chapter 3 recognizes the contribution of W. Barnett Pearce’s and Vernon Cronen’s Coordinated Management of Meaning (CMM) theory to inform and provide tools for diplomats charged with the call to create new social worlds and carry out the directive of the QDDR. CMM provides a bridge for connecting scholarly work in the fields of diplomacy and communication relative to building person-to-person relationships. Concerned specifically with positing a theory of mediation between persons and coordinating meaning between often vastly differing conceptions of the world, CMM offers a way to think about diplomatic engagement at the personal level that provides for contingencies of conflict, managing intercultural misunderstanding, and accounting for differing participant meaning. Concerned with how people coordinate action and rhetorically manage social worlds together, CMM provides the most appropriate entrance for communication scholarship into the discussion about postmodern public diplomacy.

First, this chapter will lay out an overview of CMM. Second, the chapter will show how CMM creates social worlds by engaging the major metaphors of “coordinating social construction,” “managing pluralism,” and “participant meaning,” adapted from Pearce’s *Interpersonal Communication: Making Social Worlds*. Finally, the chapter will connect foundational ideas in CMM to the practice of community diplomacy as a core initiative of what I term public diplomacy 2.0 in Chapter 5.
Coordinated Management of Meaning: An Overview of the Theory

In the late 1970s when Pearce and Cronen first started theorizing otherwise than the 20th century conventional wisdom of the behavioral sciences, they began to think about communication from the vantage point of philosophy and language as a way of thinking about how human beings interact to create reality as opposed to the use of communication to discover some already-given reality in the world. According to Pearce and Cronen’s work, individuals engaged in social interaction construct their reality. Their definition of CMM puts forth a model of communication as:

a form of action by which persons collectively create and manage social reality.

This definition implies a mutual causal relationship between the forms of communication that occur and the content and structure of social reality, necessitating a theory that locates communicators within larger social groups.

(Pearce and Cronen, Communication, Action and Meaning 119)

Several unique features of CMM are illustrated here. First, CMM is a theory of communicative action. Pearce and Cronen are concerned from a philosophy of communication standpoint to understand the communicative act itself as constitutive of human being together in the world.

Second, the type of communication that occurs and the content and structure of the social reality created are mutually causal and rules-based, given the specific social setting (Cronen, Pearce, and Harris). In essence, while communicative practice in coordinating meaning with others produces content and structure for a negotiated reality, that negotiated reality then acts back on communicators in ways that shape subsequent communicative action by the construction of rules (Pearce and Cronen, “The Coordinated
Management of Meaning: A Theory of Communication”). As well, Pearce and Cronen advance communication scholarship in their thinking of communicators as “enmeshed” as a characterization of the human condition. Human communicators are “variably enmeshed in multiple systems, each with its own logic of meaning and action. The theory presented here focuses on communicators as enduring entities, acting in the nexus of many systems” (Pearce and Cronen, Communication, Action and Meaning 119-20). From a postmodern, humanities understanding of situatedness in human communication, Pearce and Cronen understand communicators as co-creating meaning in particular systems where no universal logic of meaning exists, but is particular to its own system or culture. For public diplomacy in postmodernity, the currency of Pearce and Cronen’s work is in understanding the particular person-to-person relationship in terms of the vernacular logic of the non-American communicator.

Against a model of communication that understands a culture from observing it outside the system, Pearce and Cronen adopt the idea of persons-in-conversation to orient communicators inside the process and action of communication (Harre Personal Being). Not only is the idea of “persons-in-conversation” central to CMM, Em Griffin argues that it is the “primary social process of human life” (66). Conversation is how people come to know one another interpersonally, and it is also the process whereby mediation and problem-solving happen. The reflexive discursiveness of the social process of mediation and problem-solving is a major tenet of CMM.

Reflexivity of communication is central to CMM. Communication is simply not one-way with subsequent unaffected response, but instead, as persons-in-conversation engage in discourse, their actions influence subsequent actions in an ongoing dialectical
discourse. Pearce says, “When we communicate, we are not just talking about the world, we are literally participating in the creation of the social universe” (*Interpersonal Communication: Making Social Worlds* 75). Creation of a social universe is important to CMM as the theory’s authors develop the ideas of coherence, coordination, and mystery.

Coherence, coordination, and cosmopolitan mystery are all ways that Pearce situate the issue of storytelling in CMM (*Communication and the Human Condition*). Coherence refers to how the story one is engaged in makes sense. “According to CCM, this speech act only makes sense within the multiple contexts of the specific episode, our relationship, my self-identity, and my culture—four frames that shape and are shaped by what I said” (Griffin 69). Coordination, for Pearce, refers to how persons-in-conversation plan their future actions according to this hierarchy. According to Pearce it is “the process whereby persons collaborate in an attempt to bring into being their vision of what is necessary, noble, and good and to preclude the enactment of what they fear, hate, or despise” (*Communication and the Human Condition* 32-33). Communicators coordinate future courses of action by and through this collaboration. Third, cosmopolitan mystery in CMM stands against any attempt at reducing life to mere fact. According to Pearce, mystery is “the essence of a ‘cosmopolitan’ attitude” (*Communication and the Human Condition* 23) that views life as part of something greater than the particular culture or meaning that a communicator brings to a conversation.

Mystery, put another way:

For *coordination*, it is only necessary that those who interact with each other draw the lines at the same place—this allows them to “dance” with each other. For *coherence* it is only necessary that there be some lines drawn somewhere—this
allows us to tame the terrors of history and impose meaning and order on the world. Buy *mystery* is the reminder that such lines are ultimately arbitrary distortion … Without such reminders, hard-eyed men and women forget that [a word] is the basis for coordination and coherence, not a map of “reality.” (Pearce, *Communication and the Human Condition* 81)

Words as an arbitrary basis for creating a world together as communicators calls for a cosmopolitan understanding of meaning-making as not already-given, but as injecting humility into communication. A continual process of rhetorical, negotiated meaning between individuals engaged from different petite, vernacular cultures serves to socially construct a world together.

Moreover, CMM puts forth a hierarchy of meaning to theorize about how human beings create social life together. The seven-layer hierarchy is raw sensory data, content, speech acts, episodes, contracts, life script, and cultural patterns (Trenholm). The hierarchy explains how people build worlds out of data they receive from the physical world, formulate that experience into content through speech acts, which create episodes and contractual relationships with others in the world. Those contracts then form a person’s life script and the larger cultural patterns.

In the first level of the hierarchy of meaning, individuals take raw sensory data from the world and derive content from it. Content, according to Barnett, Pearce, and Forrest Conklin is what is actually said or done. From there, the speech act is committed, carrying with it specific intent communicated in an utterance. The speech act answers the question, “What is the communicator attempting to do?” Fourth, after raw sensory data, content, and speech act, is the episode. The episode is the larger contextual situation in
which the interaction occurs. The episode addresses the activity that communicators are engaged in. Fifth in the hierarchy is the relationship between the interlocutors, which gives context to the specific relationship of the participants in the speech act and episode. Above the relationship in the hierarchy is what Barnett, Pearce, and Conklin refer to as life script. The life script addresses the self-image of the individual participants and essentially answers the question, “What is the worldview of each of the communicators?” Ultimately in the CMM hierarchy is the cultural pattern. Beyond the episode the actors find themselves in, their relationship to one another, and their individual life script comes the sociocultural norms by which interlocutors abide. It asks, “What group do I identify with?” (Barnett, Pearce, and Conklin, “On What to Look at When Analyzing Communication: A Hierarchical Model of Actors’ Meanings”). Each level of the CMM hierarchy adds texture and meaning to the levels above and below. Communication between persons makes sense only in a contextualized world. The importance for postmodern public diplomacy will be discussed later in the chapter.

Additional to the CMM hierarchy, two types of rules govern meaning-making between people. Constitutive rules dictate how meaning at one level dictates meaning at a subsequent level, whereas regulative rules specify that in the context of certain social actions, if given a certain antecedent then there exists some degree of force for or against subsequent actions (Trenholm). In other words, constitutive rules tell one how to recognize speech acts, while regulative rules identify, in a given context, appropriate and inappropriate responses or speech acts. In CMM, social worlds are rhetorically created, maintained, and changed through social interaction in a hierarchy mitigated by sets of socially accepted rules. The rhetorical creation of social worlds in CMM’s hierarchy and
rules yields three metaphors central to public diplomacy praxis in a postmodern era: coordinating social construction, managing pluralism, and participant meaning. These three metaphors engage a discussion of the various models and loops in CMM.

**Coordinating Social Construction**

Social constructionism stands in stark contrast to objective, scientific views of reality. It views communication not as a means to uncover the objective truth about the world, but instead it views communication as “a symbolic process whereby reality is produced, maintained, repaired, and transformed” (Carey 17). Reality as a symbolic and ongoing process is at the heart of CMM. Pearce Associates argues:

CMM focuses on the patterns of communication in which we participate. It attempts to describe them, explain how they are co-constructed, and intervene to create “better” patterns of communication. CMM focuses on communication because communication is the primary social reality. Communication processes constitute our knowledge of ourselves and of the world in which we live; patterns of communication shape the persons that we are and the quality of our lives. In a CMM perspective, the events and objects of our social worlds are “made” in social processes of naming, calling, and interacting. (10)

Pearce and Cronen’s CMM theory concerns itself with the practice of communication, that is, how human beings together comprise and live in a pluralistic world. Specifically about the processes by which people communicate in a pluralistic world and only secondarily about the products of that world (culture, self, et cetera), CMM offers a practical theoretical ground for those charged with the process of strengthening interpersonal relationships in postmodern public diplomacy.
In engaging the metaphor from Pearce and Cronen, the orientation is different than that of Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann’s social constructionism and other scholars in the same vein. Social constructionists concern themselves from a sociological framework to examine the processes and products of communicative action such as culture. Berger and Luckmann hold that, “our purpose in this treatise is a sociological analysis of everyday life. … It should be evident, then, that our purpose is not to engage in philosophy” (19). Concerning themselves instead with the communicative production of social reality and not its sociological products per se, Pearce and Cronen are concerned explicitly with the ongoing discursive activity of constructing social worlds together as a philosophy of communication. CMM’s focus on communicative action as social construction highlights at least two aspects of a social constructionist communicative philosophy: the world is rhetorically constructed and social in nature.

Discussing the “social” of social construction, William Wilmot and Joyce Hocker highlight the concept of reframing as a proactive method to recast a particular problem “with the goal of changing perceptions and positions from negative and fixed to more positive and flexible” (259). Concerned with interpersonal conflict, their work posits a way forward when active listening is difficult because of cultural differences that lead to misunderstanding. Reframing the issue allows the communicator access to a postmodern hermeneutic entrance into the discourse. By reconceiving the issue and entering the residence of discourse through a familiar door as opposed to an unfamiliar door, the communicator may be more able to engage and rhetorically shape the social and linguistic reality constantly being negotiated in the intercultural discursive exchange.
In theorizing about CMM through the metaphor of social construction, the role of language as central to the concept that meaning—and its extension, culture—is social. Larry A. Samovar and Richard E. Porter discuss the role of language in culture not as a carrier of meanings or ideas, but as constitutive of them. They say that language’s role is formative because the action that builds a culture is found in language. “This view draws on the seminal ideas of George Herbert Mead, whose thinking early in the [20th] century provided the foundation for what was to become the symbolic interactionism perspective in social theory” (Samovar and Porter 186-87). They go on to note that Mead’s theories about human social constructionism flew in the face of radical behaviorism, which was enjoying its zenith in the United States at the time. Mead’s view, according to Samovar and Porter, was that the external world does not impinge on human behavior, but that human behavior grows out of the situations people create through language. Mead’s symbolic interactionism and Pearce and Cronen’s CMM have in common the understanding that language, as a social living out of human being between people, constitutes rhetorical reality. After all, Harre argued that language “is our medium for being as persons” (Language-games 23). Human beings exercise their full humanity in and through language.

In his seminal work, Mind, Self, and Society, Mead says, “Language does not simply symbolize a situation or object that is already there in advance; it makes possible the existence or the appearance of that situation or object, for it is a part of the mechanism whereby the situation or object is created” (78). The communicative process whereby two individuals engage in the ongoing discourse and dialectic of getting to know
one another is more than just the exchange of information, but is instead constitutive of a new rhetoric, a new reality for both individuals and both cultures.

In their work on CMM, Kimberly A. Pearce and Pearce underscore the concept of wonder in the social and linguistic aspect of CMM. They call for a genuine interest in the ongoing social processes of all participants in the discourse through active listening, holding that “in its absence most people are unwilling or unable to participate in rich conversation” (113). In the case of intercultural listening in order to participate in conversation, the problem may be more the inability to actively listen in a particular public sphere with which the listener is unfamiliar, as opposed to unwillingness.

Recognizing the construction of the rhetorical world as grounded in the social entity of the communities that legitimate particular stories, John Shotter foregrounds the inherent sociality of language as the building block of a social constructionist approach to strengthening person-to-person relationships. He offers, “In everyday life, words do not in themselves have a meaning, but a use, and furthermore, a use only in a context; they are best thought of, not as having already determined meanings, but as means, as tools, or as instruments for use in the ‘making’ of meanings” (54). Shotter understands the malleability of language across contexts for how communicators create social meaning. His discussion of context underscores the social component of meaning-making in that the ongoing rhetorical negotiation of meaning varies across engagement with particular, situated, vernacular public spheres. Moreover, Shotter highlights the action aspect of CMM, that language achieves some end as persons-in-conversation socially engage it as a pragmatic tool for person-to-person understanding.
Underscoring the issue of understanding and the rhetorical creation of reality, Berger offers insight in his book, *The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion*. There, Berger calls attention to the connection between CMM’s focus on the communicative activity and processes of rhetorical creation of reality through person-to-person interaction and the products of that action—society, religion, and myriad other institutions. Underpinning the practical as well as the semantic connection between social and society, Berger says:

Society is a dialectic phenomenon in that it is a human product, and nothing but a human product, that yet continually acts back upon its producer. Society is a product of man. It has no other being except that which is bestowed upon it by human activity and consciousness. There can be no social reality apart from man. Yet it may also be stated that man is a product of society … Society was there before the individual was born and it will be there after he has died. What is more, it is within society, and as a result of social processes, that the individual becomes a person. (3)

A sociologist, Berger recognizes the communicative and social aspect of meaning-making on a societal scale. As public diplomacy engages actors as persons-in-conversation in a postmodern moment, Berger calls for a contextualizing of those interpersonal coordinated management of meanings in the larger web of social construction. The particular society and/or public sphere creates the individual-as-person even as that person participates in the ongoing renegotiation of the society as he or she enters into meaning-making with another.
Also central to the coordination of social construction is that meaning-making is always rhetorical and always situated within a particular ethical system. Rhetoric is persuasive: beyond simply a didactic and descriptive metaphor of communicative action, social construction is also persuasive. As people engage in building rhetorical reality together, actors engage socially to determine and persuade as to the best courses of action. Declining metanarratives do not indicate the death of ethics or of using rhetoric to determine best courses of action together. “Postmodernity does not deny the notion of the good; this era is more like a juncture, a reminder that we cannot agree on a single defining view of the good” (Arnett, Bell and Fritz 102). In fact, this project would argue that in an era characterized by metanarrative decline, rhetoric and persuasion take on enhanced currency in negotiating culture. Public spheres constructed as petite, local, and situated vernaculars in postmodernity in conjunction with a more homogenous national public sphere, require a posture of social construction of reality in order to be attentive to the issue of making ethical choices together through rhetoric. The notion of ethics and rhetorical decision-making by members of vernacular foreign publics moves communicative life out of the realm of one-way communication, placing postmodern communication and culture squarely in the realm of social construction and CMM as an ongoing rhetorical process.

Lois Self also underscores the rhetorical aspect of socially constructed worlds and adds to it the notion of phronesis:

Rhetoric is an art, phronesis an intellectual virtue; both are special “reasoned capacities” which properly function in the world of probability; both are normative processes in that they involve rational principles of choice-making;
both have general applicability but always require careful analysis of particulars in determining the best response to each specific situation; both ideally take into account the wholeness of human nature (rhetoric in its three appeals, phronesis in its balance of desire and reason); and finally, both have social utility and responsibility in that both treat matters of the public good. (135)

Rhetoric and phronesis in response to the particular exigencies of a postmodern communication situation take on special currency as they relate to foreign relations in a moment of postmodern lack of agreement about the meaning of the world. Employing wisdom, prudence, and practical reason takes on even more salience in vernacular public spheres where agreement on issues in a postmodern pluralistic world cannot be taken for granted.

Managing Pluralism

In a pluralistic world, Pearce argues, “good communication occurs when you and others are able to coordinate your actions sufficiently well that your conversations comprise social worlds in which you and they can live well—that is, with dignity, honor, joy and love” (Interpersonal Communication: Making Social Worlds 366). Managing pluralism can be engaged through a discussion of meaning coordination (the ways in which actions come together to produce patterns) and meaning coherence (the stories that one tells that make life meaningful). CMM offers a praxis touch point for engaging pluralism in public diplomacy, which will be discussed shortly.

For CMM, communication constitutes what it means to be human. Cronen suggests, “If communication is the primary social process, it is not something external to us that we are able to do as a consequence of what human beings are. Rather, it is
intrinsic to our constitution as distinctively human creatures” (19). Both Dewey (
*Democracy and Education*) and Mead (*Mind, Self, and Society*) recognized the tendency
of the Western mind to assume the Cartesian dualism in terms of communicative thought
and communicative action. CMM, however, does not assume the ascendency of thought
over action. “The primary form of action is the ‘conjoint activity’ of two or more persons.
This claim … has been central to the development of CMM from the start” (Cronen 35).
In communicative action the coordination of stories and the coherence of stories are
rhetorically managed in the ongoing discourse between diverse people engaging in a
pluralistic world of oftentimes competing commitments. Vivien Burr notes the
importance of discourse to story coordination in postmodern plurality. “Discourses,
through what is said, written or otherwise represented, serve to construct the phenomena
of our world for us, and different discourses construct these things in different ways”
(49).

In their book, *The Homeless Mind: Modernization and Consciousness*, Berger,
Brigitte Berger, and Hansfried Kellner explain that for most of history human beings
lived in small communities where differences could be managed easily. That is to say in
CMM terms that stories could be easily coordinated on the basis of shared meaning.
“[T]he typical situation of individuals in a modern [contemporary] society is very
different. Different sectors of their everyday life relate them to vastly different and often
severely discrepant worlds of meaning and experience” (Berger, Berger, and Kellner 64).
Story coordination in CMM theorizes that as actors in a situation communicate, they
coordinate the ongoing discourse in real-time, as it unfolds between them as they manage
their competing commitments in a pluralistic situation.
Meaning coordination in CMM has particular relevance for postmodern communication. As Griffin notes, “coordination is difficult when two people have a separate sense of what is necessary, noble, and good” (73). Certainly, those engaging vernacular voices abroad will find not only a language barrier, but a moral and ethical barrier as to what is conceived of as the best way forward. Calling them “different logics of meaning and action,” Pearce and Cronen offer a pragmatic way forward (Communication, Action and Meaning 33). CMM holds that parties or communicators can coordinate future action rhetorically without sharing a common interpretation of reality. Stephen Littlejohn, Jonathan Shailor, and Pearce analyzed mediation and discovered that a deep sense of reality surfaces in conversation against a backdrop of plurality. CMM, however, holds that despite an individual’s “logical force”—that is, the moral obligation with which they feel to act in a particular way—coordination can be achieved if the rhetorical meaning both parties ascribe to yields a given plan for future action that does not hinder the effectiveness of the rhetorical agreement (Cronen and Pearce, “Logical Force in Interpersonal Communication: A New Concept of the ‘Necessity’ in Social Behaviors”).

Meaning coherence is another concept central to a discussion of CMM in managing plurality. Plurality creates unique problems of misunderstanding in postmodernity for the coherence of meanings. According to CMM, a speech act makes sense within layers of context: the particular episode, the relationship between communicators, the actors’ self-identities, and the actors’ particular cultures. These four layers of context are what Ludwig Wittgenstein calls “frames of life,” those particular lenses which provide the background and historicity to communication (5-6).
While CMM puts forth a stable hierarchy and system of coherence and coordination, the theory recognizes that misunderstandings occur. With its concept of strange loops, charmed loops, and subversive loops, CMM theorizes about how communicators engage contradictory meaning, perceptions, and actions. Multiple contexts may hold equivalent importance at the same time or may swap back and forth between levels. This leads to a strange loop. Essentially, a strange loop is a repetitive interaction between interlocutors that alternates between contradictory meanings that may cause confusion or frustration between parties. Another iteration is the charmed loop. In this interaction, each communicator’s perceptions and actions help to reinforce the other participant’s perceptions and actions. Third, is a subversive loop. Texts and contexts within a subversive loop invalidate one another and can prevent coherence and coordination. Subversive loops are so called because they subvert the intent of the communication and may result in refusal to recognize the possibility that the outsider to the context of the episode or culture can understand the situation of the insider, thereby subverting any impact the communicative act may have. CMM’s concept of loops allows for the ongoing management of conflict, misunderstanding, and misperceptions as they relate to the meanings of participants in the communicative exchange.

Participant Meaning

The metaphor of “participant meaning” engages a discussion of the various communication models in CMM that public diplomacy professionals may look to in order to understand their role as a participant in a pluralistic, socially constructed reality. Specifically, the metaphor of “participant” looks at how communicators are situated and implicated in the following CMM models: the hierarchy model, the serpentine model, the
daisy model, and the LUUUTT model (Pearce, “The Coordinated Management of Meaning”) in order to provide specific practical application points for understanding the process of strengthening people-to-people relationships for postmodern public diplomacy.

The hierarchy, serpentine, and daisy models are all examined through an example from Pearce’s chapter, “The Coordinated Management of Meaning” in William Gudykunst’s Theorizing About Intercultural Communication. Pearce analyzed the courtroom discourse between Ramzi Yousef, the man convicted of bombing the World Trade Center in 1993, and Kevin Duffy, the federal judge who heard his trial. According to Pearce, Yousef's pre-sentencing statement criticizes the United States for its hypocrisy, and he levies the charge that the United States is the world’s foremost terrorist. Moreover, he reiterates his commitment in the fight against America. At the sentencing, Duffy calls Yousef evil, claiming that Yousef perverts the principles of Islam and is interested only in hatred, destruction, and death. According to Pearce, both men talk at each other, not to each other (“The Coordinated Management of Meaning” 50-54).

Pearce’s example is particularly valuable for a discussion of the metaphor of “participant meaning” as it provides an intercultural rendering of CMM by the theorist himself. Moreover, as public diplomacy professionals engage radically different worldviews and rhetorical realities, the ability to appropriate each of these models as a participant in the discourse will prove valuable for building person-to-person relationships in postmodernity, and in countering violent extremism, one of the State Department’s other mandates in the QDDR.
The hierarchy model of CMM as communicative action allows one to look at the multitude of perspectives of their co-communicator while providing an opportunity to reflect more thoroughly on their own perspectives. The hierarchy model of CMM can also be appropriated to analyze a completed conversation for the purposes of teaching, training, or analysis of one’s own discourse as a person-in-conversation. Following is Pearce’s example as conceived in the CMM hierarchy, or in the Wittgensteinian frames detailed earlier in the chapter.

For Ramzi Yousef, the frame of culture is a powerful “logical force” (Pearce and Cronen, Communication, Action and Meaning 153-54) of a story situated in an ethic of radical Islam and oppressive foreign relations by the United States. His duty to culture, understood as a particularly situated vernacular culture within the larger culture of Islam, is to rout the United States from the Middle East. For the frame of episode, Yousef views himself as wrongfully being tried as a terrorist by the very country who he claims to be world’s largest terrorist, hypocritically accusing others of terrorism. Regarding the frame of self, Yousef’s identity is rooted in a view of self as fulfilling his duty as a freedom fighter against the great oppressors of the West: The United States, Europe, and Israel. Lastly, in the frame of relationship, his is one of opposing the United States. His relationship to the victims of the attack is an untold story.

Judge Kevin Duffy’s frames take on a different nuance. For the cultural frame, Duffy’s “logical force” (Pearce and Cronen, Communication, Action and Meaning 153-54) is grounded in Western morality and belief in the rule of law and a Western humanistic ethic. His episode is that of a fair trial of a criminal murderer and terrorist, who was given due process in accordance with American and Western belief in trail by
law, even for the most heinous of criminals and terrorists. Duffy’s frame of self is rooted in his role as judge and as the facilitator of fairness, due process, and trial by jury. Duffy’s relationship frame is fundamentally opposed to Yousef’s ethics of killing for religion and violation of fundamental and internationally held principles of terrorism. Duffy also views Yousef as betraying the religious principles of the larger public sphere of Islam for the small, vernacular, radical public sphere of extremist and conservative fundamental Islam and terrorism (Pearce, “The Coordinated Management of Meaning” 43-54). This exercise of CMM’s four frames in story coherence lends itself well in understanding one’s role in a co-created enmeshed web of meaning.

The hierarchy model is structured in such a way as to show how the message is embedded in the relationship, the relationship as situated in the individual's concept of self, which backgrounds the specific episode occurring in a larger culture. The hierarchy model is CMM’s rendering of historicity. Pearce takes the hierarchy model another step in his reinforcement of the importance of interaction and by adding a temporal element. The serpentine model of communication in CMM is attentive to the element of time (“The Coordinated Management of Meaning” 43). Pearce notes that one cannot engage in discourse alone, and as dialectic, discourse happens before or after another’s communication action. Therefore, understanding communication activity both as-happened and may-happen is central to a dialectic-discourse understanding of rhetoric and communication.

The serpentine model visually demonstrates communication as a sequential-temporal exchange between participants as opposed to a transmission of information outside the temporality of human experience and communication. Understanding that
communication is more than just one-way transmission of information, CMM’s concept of the serpentine model adds the dimension of time to extend the hierarchy model. Pearce stresses that communication cannot be done alone ("The Coordinated Management of Meaning"). Furthermore, he notes that communication occurs before or after another’s communication, implicating communication in the contextual milieu of other communicative acts. The serpentine model considers the time and sequence of a particular context in the communicative situation.

The daisy model further engages the context of a participant in communication. The daisy model, so called because of its shape, examines secondary and oftentimes less noticed communication actions that take place at the same time, sometimes in concert with, the main discourse of a conversation. In Pearce’s example of Yousef and Duffy, the discourse of trial is the main discourse. However, each is participating in multiple concurrent communication events. Yousef is communicating with his family, potential would-be jihadists, and Muslims at-large, according to Pearce’s analysis. On the other hand, Duffy is communicating with his family, the legal community or his peers, and the American voting public (Pearce “The Coordinated Management of Meaning”). The daisy model of CMM calls communicators-as-participants to be engaged in the sub-discourses that are happening outside, but related to, their own conversations for a more robust understanding of reality.

The LUUUTT model fronts the centrality of story for the diplomat-as-participant. LUUUTT stands for stories Lived, Untold stories, Unheard stories, Unknown stories, stories Told, and story Telling (Kearney “Glossary”). This model may be useful during the actual communication process as a communicator begins to learn about individuals,
and by extension, the vernacular cultures shared by a group of individuals. The focus on story and the process of storytelling is also helpful in understanding the larger cultural knowledge of a group of people. Engaging CMM through the metaphor of participant meaning foregrounds the issue of story in building person-to-person relationships, creating a natural tie to narrative and story, which will be engaged in Chapter 4.

Stories lived and stories told are distinct categories in the LUUUTT model of communication because how one constructs their identity from their stories differs from the stories they actually live and the communication activities in which they actually engage. For Pearce, stories lived and stories told may actually help individuals come to terms with their realities. “Understanding that these differences exist and paying attention to them can be important to understanding the nuances within a communication event” (Pearce Associates 58). In the diplomatic exchange, a discrepancy in the story told and the reality of the action happening may appear as lack of sincerity in the partnership, but may be a more salient way of managing self-identity in a given culture where circumstances prevent told stories from becoming lived stories.

Unheard stories are told stories, but for one reason or another, the other participant in the conversation does not hear the story. Reasons for not hearing the story may include an unwillingness to hear the story, lack of attentiveness to the story, physical or social prevention from hearing the story such as not being able to get to the location the story is being told, or the message is being communicated in an unfamiliar or unknown fashion, including language barriers (Kearney “Glossary” 8-9). Communicators may not hear a story for any number of reasons, including travel, safety, or language. In a given situation, myriad stories may be lost that could inform the person-
to-person engagement, making active participation more difficult in a foreign exchange than may be the case in a more familiar situation.

Untold stories are ones that are known but not shared for any number of reasons. Unknown stories are unknown because the persons-in-conversation may not know the stories exist or understand the story. Last in the LUUUTT model is story Telling. Jeremy Kearney describes the process of storytelling as “when and where a person tells a story, their mannerisms, tone of voice, word choice, and subject matter all contribute to the overall story being told” (Kearney “Glossary” 9). In CMM, the telling of a story is layered with cultural significance, particular to the vernacular the story belongs to. Communicators engaged in postmodern vernacular public spheres should understand told stories as heavy with the layers of a culture as postmodern communication calls for increased attentiveness to and engagement with petite and localized public spheres.

Coordinated Management of Meaning’s Importance for Community Diplomacy in Postmodern Public Diplomacy

CMM creates social worlds in postmodern public diplomacy through an interpersonal interaction between people living in a vernacular, situated culture and American diplomats. Community diplomacy is a core initiative of Chapter 5’s development of public diplomacy 2.0 and is attentive to the particular vernacular public sphere of a given community. According to the QDDR:

Community diplomacy is a new approach to identifying and developing networks of contacts through specific on-the-ground projects, programs, or events and then helping those networks evolve into consistent centers of action on areas of common interest—from non-proliferation to climate change to expanding
opportunities for women and girls. The purpose of community diplomacy is twofold: first, building networks of contacts that can operate on their own to advance objectives consistent with our interests; and second, showcasing through particular events our commitment to common interests and universal values. Moreover, community diplomacy draws on one of the great assets and comparative advantages of our Foreign Service personnel, namely the deep knowledge of the culture, language, and political landscape in a foreign country. (United States Department of State and United States Agency on International Development 63)

Community diplomacy as an outgrowth of public diplomacy shifts the focus of public diplomacy from traditional forms of modernist public diplomacy like mass media and is conceived here as a core competency of public diplomacy in postmodernity. Community diplomacy initiatives also understand communities as situated vernaculars within a larger nation. For example, in both Guangzhou, China, and Monterrey, Mexico, the American diplomatic posts there organized community walks and races to support local organizations and showcase “America’s commitment to helping those in need while forging relationships with local government representatives and NGOs” (United States Department of State and United States Agency on International Development 64). The events provided an opportunity for diplomats to expand and strengthen interpersonal relationships through the community diplomacy events and programs.

Moreover, according to the QDDR, diplomats around the world are “connecting directly with communities across the globe to showcase America’s values and build relationships” (64). An understanding of CMM can lend philosophical texture to these
direct engagements with members of vernacular public spheres: the QDDR cites efforts to liaise with future thought leaders in New Zealand through the American ambassador to New Zealand “organizing meetings with student leaders at New Zealand universities to share ideas and discuss current issues” (64). Tactically, community diplomacy should look to build person-to-person relationships with opinion leaders in order to both understand a culture and to shape narratives from the top of public opinion formation down to others in the community.

Engaging community interaction as consciously rhetorical co-creators of meaning, diplomats who understand CMM’s core metaphors of coordinating social construction, managing pluralism, and participant meaning are embedded in enmeshed action whereby diplomacy, and indeed communication at-large, is not thought of as simply sharing of ideas, but as building person-to-person relationships and creating and shaping ideas to influence the narrative, which Chapter 4 will address.

For postmodern public diplomacy, understanding a culture and knowing its people, as well as mediating conflict and promoting American interests lies in the centrality of CMM’s conception of “persons-in-conversation.” A central aspect of postmodern public diplomacy is on-the-ground interaction with citizens in local, situated publics and conversing in Embassy-sponsored town hall meetings to get to know local citizens and to troubleshoot problems and explain American interests in the area. An important texture for public diplomacy in creating person-to-person relationships is a call to understand that as diplomats engage in a world, they alter the reality of that world by their ongoing participation in the social discourse. By understanding communicative acts through CMM—specifically, its hierarchy, its constitutive and regulative rules, its
various models, and its loops that account for misunderstanding and subversion of coherence and coordination—diplomats engaging in postmodern public diplomacy in any variety of situations in which they are called to “expand and strengthen people-to-people relationships” in the QDDR can benefit from the interpersonal communication insight offered in CMM (United States Department of State and United States Agency on International Development 60).

To be sure, encountering members of a foreign public is an exercise in alterity. In a postmodern moment as diplomats engage with various publics advancing different ethical structures within a single nation, the situatedness of the vernacular public sphere that requires attention at a given time within the larger national public sphere takes on importance. Understanding CMM through the metaphor of coordinating social construction allows the diplomatic professional to see his or her work as social, rhetorical, and situated within a vernacular ethical system requiring phronesis, or practical wisdom. Important in a world where a given metanarrative is in decline or is contested, the call in the QDDR is one of engaging and managing pluralism, where meaning’s construction takes on importance as a rhetorical practice situated in a local public sphere. Diplomats carrying out the QDDR’s maxim to engage their work through building interpersonal relationships should take care to approach the stories they tell and the stories they want to co-create with members of a foreign public in a manner of thinking that is explicitly aware of the particularly hierarchy of content, speech act, episode, relationship, life script, and culture. Engaging the work of community diplomacy as a generalist takes on currency here. Public diplomacy in a postmodern moment should open a space for diplomats to be attentive to a CMM model of coherence
by learning the literature, poetry, music, and customs of a vernacular foreign culture for
the sake of interpersonal relationship building—in addition to policy briefings, country
plans, and instrumental language training. For the diplomat to learn the canon of a
culture, they must not be a disinterested modernist communicator, but instead an active
participant in a culture. That CMM is an active, ongoing management of meaning
coordinated by interlocutors in a discourse requires the diplomat to view his or her work
in the field as a participant in the ongoing construction of culture and narrative for both
the understanding of that culture and for the promotion of peace, stability, and Western
political ideas.

Conclusion

The State Department’s maxim in the *QDDR* that to be effective public diplomacy
practitioners in a postmodern moment diplomats need to build people-to-people
relationships is well-taken. Outside of that mandate, however, the *QDDR* does not give a
theoretical or philosophical framework for how that should be done. In a postmodern
world characterized by lack of metanarrative and shared values, and one in which
American diplomats understand themselves in a cosmopolitan manner as situated in a
multiplicity of public spheres within a nation’s boundaries, the call for interpersonal
engagement to understand the particular vernacular public sphere is of critical
importance.

Pearce and Cronen’s CMM broke with convention 30 years ago when it posited a
communicative, humanities-based understanding of reality as socially constructed
through communicative action, particularly as their work related to mediation. Their
understanding of communicators as active participants enmeshed in a pluralistic world of
varying rhetorically constructed, changed, and maintained realities marked a turn in thinking from a scientistic conception of reality as “out there” to be apprehended by language to a reality created by and through language.

Moreover, CMM carves a space in front of the social constructionists who, concerned with the products of communication, do not think philosophically with regard to communication-as-action as a socially constructive process first and one that creates cultural products second. CMM’s ideas of persons-in-conversation, coherence, coordination, and cosmopolitan mystery speak directly to postmodern public diplomacy’s central concept of building relationships as a hermeneutic entrance by which to understand public spheres in their postmodern rendering as petite, situated, and vernacular. To engage effectively in shaping the narrative of a public sphere, public diplomacy professionals need a philosophically textured understanding of a theory of communication that builds a praxis approach for carrying out the interpersonal mandate in the QDDR as a prerequisite for shaping vernacular narratives.

Once a philosophical groundwork has been laid for building interpersonal communication and meaning management between individuals, diplomats will need to shape both individual and community narratives toward American policy goals. Chapter 4 will survey narrative theory and apply each scholar’s work to public diplomacy in postmodernity to build a philosophy of communication for narrative formation in American foreign diplomacy.
Writing in the early-to-mid twentieth century, Robert T. Oliver may be one of the first thinkers to bring communication scholarship to bear on international relations and diplomacy. He fronted the notion of culture as central to effective communication with his understanding that diplomacy and intercultural communication were not things apart (Oliver). His work contributes one of the first voices in the field of communication and rhetoric that called for an intersection between scholarship on communication and diplomacy. Robert Shutter argues that:

Moreover, he turned his culturally informed mindset on the world’s most serious social problems—tackling tenaciously the rhetorics of war and peace, poverty and abundance—but always steadfast in the belief that without a deep understanding of national cultures, communicators—albeit, nations—will continue seriously to misunderstand one another. (31)

Oliver’s work provides a historical and modernist background metaphor for this chapter. His work recast for a postmodern moment might consider how diplomats speak effectively to others, that is, how diplomats understand, in order to shape, the personal and collective narratives of members of petite publics within a nation.

Citing the importance of the narrative ground from which one speaks, Janie M. Harden Fritz notes that Oliver’s work “implies a three-dimensional understanding of persons as individual, social, and narrative beings” (72). Oliver pointed to a turn toward recognizing the importance of narrative in diplomacy on the cusp of postmodernity.
Looking at philosophy of communication in postmodernity that fronts narrative as central to understanding human communicative activity underpins the *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review*’s (QDDR; United States Department of State and United States Agency on International Development) second communicative mandate: that diplomats should actively participate in shaping foreign narratives.

In a postmodern era characterized by lack of metanarrative agreement, narratives take on new importance to shape and give meaning to vernacular groups’ particular and situated stories. As public diplomacy professionals engage postmodern local publics in postmodern public diplomacy initiatives like community diplomacy programs and town hall meetings, a philosophical and rhetorical understanding of narrative will allow diplomats to shape the narratives of the publics with which they interact. Those co-created narratives will not only further American policy goals, but will also empower the members of vernacular foreign publics to shape their political self-will in a narrative that remains true to experience and history within democracy:

> If we wish to understand the deepest and most universal of human experiences, if we wish our work to be faithful to the lived experiences of people, if we wish for a union between poetics and science, or if we wish to use our privileges and skills to empower the people we study, then we *should* value the narrative. (Richardson 117)

Clearly, narrative is fundamental to human life together. Chapter 4 considers how narrative theory can help the diplomatic practitioner shape the narratives of members of foreign publics and the narratives of foreign publics at-large to effectively carry out the task charged by the *QDDR* to “shape the narrative” (60).
Moreover, this chapter will, in turn, examine the work of Paul Ricoeur, Alasdair MacIntyre, Walter Fisher, Ronald Arnett, and Pat Arneson and apply each to postmodern public diplomacy praxis. Within the corpus of communication and rhetorical scholarship, much work has been done on the issue of narrative. This project selects these five scholars because of the unique contribution each makes to the specific intersection of communication scholarship and diplomacy. Ricoeur’s work addresses identity, selfhood, and time, the conceptions of each influencing the effectiveness of the intercultural exchange to achieve persuasive foreign policy goals. MacIntyre’s work is engaged for its unique attention to ethics and engages a discussion important to diplomacy: what can the diplomat conceive of as a minimal set of ethical goods between two vastly different communicators in a postmodern world. Fisher’s name is perhaps the most synonymous with narrative scholarship and offers a way of understanding stories, not in the rational-world modernist paradigm, but rhetorically and philosophically for a postmodern diplomatic moment. Arnett’s work engages narrative from the metaphor of community. Because this project is concerned with building genuine rhetorical community between American diplomats and individuals in emergent, vernacular public spheres, Arnett’s work offers insight for the diplomat. Finally, Arneson’s work discusses narrative from poiesis. Her attention to the poetic and inherently creative nature of human communication and its contribution to how narratives are built, maintained, and changed, offers insight for a generation of diplomats called to interface with local customs, stories, and culture as an entrance into already existing narratives.
The Philosophy of Narrative

Ricoeur’s work provides philosophical ground for understanding how stories form the basis of humans’ understanding of themselves, others, and their place in a given world. A particular value that Ricoeur adds to the conversation about shaping narratives in a postmodern moment is that his work approaches stories and human understanding from an intercultural philosophy of communication. His narrative theory will be engaged from three main metaphors: time, identity, and selfhood.

Using the terms temporality, narrative identity, and entanglement of personal incidents in stories, Ricoeur offers that:

to translate a foreign culture into the categories peculiar to one’s own presupposes … is a difference of memory, precisely at the level of the customs, rules, norms, beliefs and convictions which constitute the identity of a culture. But to speak of memory is not only to evoke a psycho-physiological faculty which has something to do with the preservation and recollection of traces of the past; it is to put forward the ‘narrative’ function through which this primary capacity of preservation and recollection is exercised at the public level of language. Even at the individual level, it is through stories revolving around others and around ourselves that we articulate and shape our own temporality. Two noteworthy phenomena concern us here. … The first is the ‘narrative identity’ of the characters of the story … [and] the entanglement of personal incidents in stories. (“Reflections on a New Ethos for Europe” 5-6)

Ricoeur’s work understands culture not as reified, but as an ongoing re-creation with the telling of stories. Memory here takes on an active function in the telling of the stories of a
culture. Ricoeur also sees the communicator, whether the diplomat or a member of a foreign culture, as understanding the notion of time through the construct of the narrative that makes up both the communicator’s narrative identity and, by extension, his or her sense of selfhood in relation to myriad other stories he or she is entangled in.

In his later work, *Time and Narrative*, Ricoeur argues that time and narrative cannot be understood apart from one another. He argues that, “time becomes human to the extent that it is articulated through a narrative mode, and narrative attains its full meaning when it becomes a condition of temporal existence” (52). For Ricoeur, the claim of truth central to any narrative is always situated in human experience, which, by its nature, is temporal. Put another way, Ricoeur says, “The world unfolded by every narrative work is always a temporal world. Or, as will often be repeated in the course of this study: time becomes human time to the extent that it is organized after the manner of a narrative; narrative, in turn, is meaningful to the extent that it portrays the features of temporal experience” (*Time and Narrative* 3). For Ricoeur, temporality and narrativity reinforce one another. Time is more than a taken-for-granted element of a story—that a story obviously takes place in time. Ricoeur’s concern for narrative is how the narrative structure humanizes time and brings time into human experience and language, while understanding how time affects human narratives and humans’ experience of those stories.

Aristotle’s concept of plot is one way in which Ricoeur gets at the temporality of narrative. He says, “By means of the plot, goals, causes, and chance are brought together within the temporal unity of a whole and complete action” (*Time and Narrative* ix). Ricoeur offers three iterations of mimesis, which is “a figure of speech, whereby the
words or actions of another are imitated” and “the deliberate imitation of the behavior of one group of people by another as a factor in social change” (“Mimesis”) that produces a narrative. In other words, narrative is the “what” or product of mimetic activity. Ricoeur says of emplotment and its relation to time and narrative, “My chief concern in this analysis is to discover how the act of raconter, of telling a story, can transmute natural time into a specifically human time, irreducible to mathematical, chronological ‘clock time’” (Kearney, Dialogues With Contemporary Continental Thinkers 17). Ricoeur’s fascination with time is not only in how time affects narrative, but in how time is humanized by narrative, that is to say how time moves from an explicitly Enlightenment, mathematical, and scientific delineation of time to human time where plot and action give human time shape and meaning. Ricoeur is concerned with how narrativity allows for new ways of expressing human time.

Ricoeur goes on to say that “narrativity is the mode of discourse through which the mode of being which we call temporality, or temporal being, is brought to language” (A Ricoeur Reader 99). A human’s temporal being and their experience of time, for Ricoeur, is bound up not in clock time, but in time as experienced in human action and the narrativity of life as life is lived and communicated through stories. Ricoeur’s concept of narrative identity is the identity a person has based on the stories that give their life meaning. David Wood says, “Ricoeur suggests we think of the examined life as a narrated life, characterized by a struggle between concordance and discordance, the aim of which is to discover, not to impose on oneself, a narrative identity” (11). Ricoeur’s sense of narrative identity is that identity which one discovers as subject, which makes up their life and is not an identity laid upon oneself by choice.
Radical individualism has no place in Ricoeur. Standing outside of narrative time, which provides situatedness for one’s identity, is not an option for Ricoeur. He says, “Our life, when embraced in a single glance, appears to us as the field of a constructive activity, borrowed from narrative understanding, by which we attempt to discover and not simply impose from outside the narrative identity which constitutes us” (“Life in Quest of Narrative” 32). Ricoeur conceives of narrative identity as human subjectivity within a narrative that gives one a sense of belonging to history and community.

For Ricoeur, narrative identity situated in narrative time bridges the gap between scientific, clock time and phenomenological time. In other words, narrative time and the subjectivity of narrative identity reconcile the two. Henry Isaac Venema offers that narrative identity in Ricoeur is a “resolution to the problems of the dialectic of narrative and temporal experience” (97). The individual’s identity within a narrative structure points to a reconciliation of time and narrative in Ricoeur as does emplotment, which “transforms the many incidents into one story” (Ricoeur “Life in Quest of Narrative” 21).

Fadoua Loudiy argues:

Narrative identity has the following implications: First, the self understands itself via interpretation; second, interpretation is mediated primarily through narrative and other signs, myths, and symbols; and third, narration combines history and fiction for the construction of a life story. One’s identity is negotiated through various mediums and genres and understood within a hermeneutic circle. But this hermeneutic circle is an open one; it evolves with life experiences and encounters with others. (441)
Ricoeurian narrative hermeneutic is one of subjectivity: individuals are implicated in a life of narratives that gives life fluid meaning, that is, meanings can and do change as narratives are introduced throughout a life and as other narratives disappear. If individuals are enmeshed in myriad stories that give their lives meaning, the issue of agency and conscious choice-making about stories arises. Ricoeur answers this call in his discussion of selfhood.

Ricoeur’s concept of selfhood is the third major point of his narrative theory that carries import for the diplomat. He distinguishes between two kinds of selfhood, “identity as sameness … and identity as selfhood” (“Narrative Identity” 189). This project understands Ricoeur’s selfhood as agency. Venema offers, “To each objectification—linguistic, practical, narrative, and ethical—the question ‘who?’ is addressed, and in each case Ricoeur asserts that ‘the self’ is the only appropriate response” (125). Furthermore, Ricoeur himself engages the question of agency when he says, “Who is speaking? Who is acting? Who is recounting about himself or herself? Who is the moral subject of imputation?” (Oneself as Another 16). Whereas narrative identity provides the “what” for a person, that is, a man or woman, an American or Briton, selfhood in Ricoeur provides personal agency for a narrative.

For Ricoeur, narrative identity engages both concepts of the self: identity as sameness and identity in narrative, but fronts identity in narrative. Mara Rainwater offers that “attention to discursive language has … led Ricoeur to develop a model of selfhood that privileges a narrative (ipse) identity … always mediated by others” (100). A person’s identity, for Ricoeur, is unique and constant, as well as changing in relation to others. The self’s identity as same gives one temporal stability (“I am always me.”) while identity-as-
agency gives the self the ability to change in relation to others and other narratives (“I hold a different set of political commitments than I used to.”).

Ricoeur’s contribution to the conversation on narrative is in his approach to placing the individual in relation to oneself, the other, and the larger world. Against an understanding of narrative that views the commitments of individuals and cultures as reified, his work understands narrative as an ongoing hermeneutic negotiation. Moreover, his work contributes that individuals live in myriad relationships—with oneself, with other people, and with the larger world and time. Ricoeur’s work grows out of an understanding that stories with oneself, other people, and the larger tradition undergo regular rhetorical negotiation. His insight calls for a minimal set of ethical goods for a postmodern philosophical moment through which individuals can operate in order to engage a world that in constantly changing, even as the individual is changed by his or her implication in the narrative.

Postmodern Narrative Ethics

MacIntyre is one of the foremost scholars of ethics in postmodernity. His *After Virtue* concerns itself with answering the problem of lack of agreement on basic grounds from which to make ethical decisions in postmodernity. His work brings communication scholarship into conversation with the academic field of international relations and diplomacy by offering a way of rhetorically conceiving of a minimalist set of ethics to guide the navigation of contrasting narratives in postmodernity and the shaping of foreign narratives toward American policy goals. This project’s discussion of MacIntyre’s theory will center on his conception of postmodern ethics through the metaphors of practices, traditions, and the narrative self from his work, *After Virtue*. 
It is in *After Virtue* that MacIntyre turns to communication and narrative to lay out a theory of how people should live life together. Jason Hannan says of MacIntyre’s turn to communication and narrative:

MacIntyre rejects the abstract formalism characteristic of Enlightenment-style moral theory, the kind of formalism that seeks to transcend the particularities of history, language, and culture so as to derive final, authoritative, and universal judgments. It is precisely this attempt at transcendence that explains the gap between theory and practice, as well as the lack of rhetorical force in the judgments derived through such abstraction. MacIntyre contends that the only viable basis for public discourse is the social and practical circumstances of everyday life. (394)

MacIntyre makes a move away from formal logic and Enlightenment renderings that look to explain human nature outside of a specific narrative. MacIntyre understands the human agent as embedded in an already-given social construction of the world in which the agent has to search for what they *should* do and not simply make decisions outside of the constructs of their already-given social experience.

In *After Virtue*, MacIntyre argues that:

man is in his actions and practice, as well as in his fictions, essentially a storytelling animal. … I can only answer the question ‘What am I to do?’ if I can answer the prior question ‘Of what story or stories do I find myself a part?’ We enter human society, that is, with one or more imputed characters—roles into which we have been drafted.” (201)
For MacIntyre, the answer to the question of what one is supposed to do is contingent on practices and, more largely, tradition. MacIntyre’s metaphors of practices, traditions, and the narrative self form a narrative theory in response to ethics and the problem of virtue (*After Virtue*).

MacIntyre’s conception of narrative speaks directly to trying to shape a given narrative in a postmodern moment, and MacIntyre offers that “to think of a human life as a narrative unity is to think in a way alien to the dominant individualistic and bureaucratic modes of modern culture” (*After Virtue* 227). For MacIntyre, a narrative begins with a set of practices whose goods are internal to it. MacIntyre defines practice as “any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realised in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence” (“The Claims of After Virtue” 71). For example, farming for MacIntyre would be a practice because the goods yielded are internal to that form of activity. He argues that this was the basis for narrative life together before the Enlightenment separated practice and work. Thus, to be a morally good farmer would be to farm well in the construct of what it means to yield a good crop. Being a good farmer is not simply what one deems a good farmer to be, but is situated in the practice of good farming, based on communally accepted standards.

Moreover, MacIntyre addresses the change that modernity made to work and its subsequent effect on narrative in the West. He holds that:

the kind of work done by the vast majority of the inhabitants of the modern world cannot be understood in terms of the nature of a practice with goods internal to itself, and for very good reason. One of the key moments in the creation of
modernity occurs when production moves outside the household. So long as productive work occurs within the structure of households, it is easy and right to understand that work as part of the sustaining of the community of the household and of those wider forms of community which the household in turn sustains. 

(*After Virtue* 227)

For MacIntyre, the bureaucratizing of modern work and the historical process whereby narrative and practice were expelled are the same process. MacIntyre’s call is for a return to classical conceptions of humankind—the person as derived from his or her role in a practice whereby activity yields a product internal to that practice. Modern work divorced practices from community, and as MacIntyre argues, shattered any common conception of narrative.

MacIntyre offers that “The unity of a human life is the unity of a narrative quest” (*After Virtue* 203). Human life together, for MacIntyre, is a return to understanding the self as socially constructed, that is to say, against the liberal notion that “emphasizes our status as choosing and deciding beings” (Horton and Mendus 9). Deciding what to do, for MacIntyre is set against the backdrop of discovering who we are in relation to already-given roles and in relation to others. Through practices, individuals can situate themselves in the wider context of tradition.

Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift offer an account of tradition in MacIntyre that argues, “A tradition is constituted by a set of practices and is a mode of understanding their importance and worth; it is the medium by which such practices are shaped and transmitted across generations” (90). They go on to note that traditions can have their basis in religion or morality, economics, aesthetics, or geopolitical structures. Tradition,
for MacIntyre, is the larger scheme of practices in which people engage that provide a narrative for their life.

Self as nested in practices and traditions, MacIntyre’s narrative models offers that the narrative of a person’s life is backgrounded by the already-given social context in which the individual finds him or herself. That already-given social context is made up of myriad practices that define virtue. Those practices, then, sustain and are situated within a tradition that provides the support by which the individual person may embark on his or her narrative quest. Horton and Mendus offer that, “It is traditions which are the repositories of standards of rationality and which are crucial to moral deliberation and action” (12). Traditions give the individual agent a framework within which to act, but MacIntyre’s concept of tradition is not a conservative, reified tradition.

In *After Virtue*, MacIntyre avoids reifying tradition. He offers that “a living tradition is an historically extended, socially embodied argument, and an argument precisely in part about the goods which constitute that tradition” (207). This makes sense in considering that tradition is an ongoing recasting of narratives. If one conceives of tradition as a set of narratives, then as new narratives and ideas come into conversation with the already-existing tradition, and as certain narratives fall into disrepair within a tradition, the tradition becomes an ongoing rhetorical negotiation with itself and the community that is rhetorically creating the tradition.

MacIntyre’s third narrative metaphor is self. For MacIntyre, self must be understood against the backdrop of community. Paul Kelly suggests that, “MacIntyre introduces the idea that communities constitute the self by providing the resources from which the self’s narratives must be constructed” (134). This is not to say that MacIntyre
takes the thesis that the individual is completely constructed by the community.

MacIntyre says that:

I inherit from the past of my family, my city, my tribe, my nation, a variety of
debts, inheritances, rightful expectations and obligations. These constitute the
given of my life, my moral starting point … [but] the fact that the self has to find
its moral identity in and through its membership in communities such as those of
the family, the neighbourhood, the city and the tribe does not entail that the self
has to accept the moral limitations of the particularity of those forms of
community. (*After Virtue* 220-21)

MacIntyre recognizes the self as situated, but still autonomous. The self is implicated in
and obligated to the community for its understanding of itself, but the self is not limited
by the community in that a person can make a willful choice to act out of accordance
with the community. MacIntyre’s theory of self narrative allows for the individual to
exist without individualism.

In any case, MacIntyre provides a three-part model for how narratives work in
relation to virtue. To understand the particular morality of a culture and the set of virtues
that members of that culture hold dear, one should look to the products of the practices
members of the public engage in. For example, if a cultural practice is an attentiveness to
particular female dress or hairstyle, diplomats should attend to that practice as a carrier of
narrative meaning for the culture. In what tradition is that practice embedded? How might
an American misunderstand that practice, and subsequently the tradition and the
community narrative? For MacIntyre, to understand practices is to understand the larger
context of tradition, and by extension, to understand whereby individuals forge their self
narratives out of a communal narrative. His work posits that individuals should engage all three—practices, tradition, and self narrative—as necessarily causal of one another in an ongoing rhetorical circle.

**The Narrative Paradigm**

Fisher introduced narrative theory to the field of rhetoric and communication, formalizing Kenneth Burke’s concept of dramatism. Fisher entered the conversation at a time when the field of communication and rhetorical studies was beginning to think otherwise than verifiable, scientific data to understand human phenomena. His work offers fresh insight for postmodern public diplomacy with its orientation toward the idea that stories are more than formally rational. The texture he offers allows diplomats to engage a postmodern world from a rhetorical perspective as opposed to engaging a modern world from a data-driven policy perspective. This discussion will center on an overview of Fisher’s narrative paradigm as well as his concepts of narrative coherence and narrative fidelity as they relate to engaging a postmodern moment in the world.

In their article about social, humanistic approaches to understanding communication, Arthur P. Bochner and Carolyn Ellis offer that “sooner or later most of us recognize that the social phenomena of communication are different in important ways from the phenomena of nature. Atoms cannot comprehend the terms by which they are described theoretically; humans can” (165). Fisher’s seminal work on narrative, *Human Communication as Narration: Toward a Philosophy of Reason, Value, and Action*, argues that narrative theory offers a rhetorical way to conceive of the nature of human beings and how communicate, as opposed to a conception based in a formally rational model.
What Fisher identifies as the rational-world paradigm had been the accepted model of communication in the field until Fisher introduced narrative paradigm (*Human Communication as Narration: Toward a Philosophy of Reason, Value, and Action*). Hearkening back to the classics over Enlightenment renderings of scientific logic, Fisher contrasts the tenets of the rational-world paradigm and the narrative paradigm, arguing that storytelling and narrative are the cornerstones of human existence and logic. A decade before *Human Communication as Narration*, Fisher pointed to an alternative to logic in human communication when he offered that, “Humans as rhetorical beings are as much valuing as they are reasoning animals” (“Toward a Logic of Good Reasons” 376). Fisher’s logic of good reasons unchained reasoning from argumentative, formally logical communication and moved reason into the arena of symbolic action. In other words, rationality can be found in the human capacity to tell a story as much as rationality can be found in Enlightenment and modernist logic.

Fisher provides a major insight for a postmodern diplomatic moment. His concept of “the logic of good reasons” is a rhetorical way to assess and participate (in order to shape) a narrative (*Human Communication as Narration* 47). Fisher argues that the classical conception of logos “meant story, reason, rationale, conception, discourse, thought” (*Human Communication as Narration* 5). He argues that with the rise of Greek classical philosophy, the idea of logos was transformed into a technical logic and away from storytelling. That distinction, Fisher argues, still remains in Western thinking today, and he calls for a return to a pre-Socratic ideation of logos as the narrative co-creation of human worlds (*Human Communication as Narration*). In a public diplomacy context, Fisher’s advocacy for a narrative paradigm where logic is situated and particular to the
stories of a petite public sphere is opposed to a rational-world paradigm that would encourage diplomats to understand—and attempt to shape—narratives on an assumption of technical, formal logic, where the logic is not in and of the story, but is external to the story and evaluates the story as valid or invalid.

Fisher lists five “essential postulates” of the narrative paradigm:

1. Humans are storytellers; 2. Humans make decisions and communicate based on “good reasons;” 3. How good reasons are produced and practiced is ruled by history, biography and culture; 4. Rationality is determined by people as essential narrative beings who have inherent awareness of narrative probability (what constitutes a good story), and the testing of narrative fidelity (whether or not stories ring true to with the experiences and stories they know to be true; and 5. The world as people understand it is a collection of stories that must be chosen among in order to live human life together in a process of continual re-creation (Human Communication as Narration 5).

A narrative, for Fisher, whether personal or communal, is characterized by a set of agreed-upon stories that both make sense and ring true in the particular culture and history of a given people. This is what, holistically, Fisher calls “narrative rationality” (“Narration as Human Communication Paradigm” 2; “Narrative Rationality and the Logic of Scientific Discourse” 23), and narrative rationality is his project’s response to the scientific conception of logic that had ruled communication studies through modernity.

Making a sharp distinction between scientific, formal logics and rhetorical, story-based logics, Fisher is careful not exclude issues of fact, consequence, or consistency in
the narrative paradigm. He offers, “In other words, narrative rationality does not deny that discourse often contains structures of reason that can be identified as specific forms of argument and assessed as such” (Human Communication as Narration 48). Fisher takes issue with technical logic and its sharp ascendency in modernity to dominate human life together by mathematical formulas, as though human life together were a machine of causal parts. He says, “By the twentieth century, technical logic had reified reason to mathematical symbolic forms, and rhetorical logic had continued its tradition of conceiving of reason as a form of argumentative proof” (Human Communication as Narration 49). Reclaiming logos in a classical rhetorical sense, Fisher moves the concept into a postmodern notion of contingency—what is logical is a matter human agreement on what makes sense and what rings true.

Narrative coherence is the way in which a story fits together. Coherence evaluates how the people and events of a story seem to be parts of an organic whole. Fisher, not discounting the logic of the rational-world paradigm argues that the story must be consistent. Em Griffin offers that, “Fisher regards the internal consistency of a narrative as similar to lines of argument in a rational-world paradigm. In that sense, his narrative paradigm doesn’t discount or replace logic. Instead, Fisher lists the test of reason as one, but only one of the factors that affect narrative coherence” (300). Fisher’s central question is whether or not one can count on the characters in a story to act in a reliable way. Fisher notes that narrative coherence (or narrative probability) and narrative fidelity are subsumed in the narrative paradigm (Human Communication as Narration). For Fisher, the narrative paradigm does not replace formal logic, but is the umbrella under which logic and other tests of coherence and fidelity reside. Stories for Fisher are too
complex and rich to be reduced to only formal logic. “Stories are enactments of the whole mind in concert with itself” (Fisher, *Human Communication as Narration* 68). Coherence for Fisher, then, is not simply fact and logic, but also value.

Coherence tests whether a given narrative seems logically in line with the values of the culture at-large and the culture’s history. Fisher holds that for a story to be coherent or probable, the story has to be reasonable as well as reflect the logic of values of that culture:

Obviously some stories are better stories than others, more coherent, more “true” to the way people and the world are—in perceived fact and value. In other words, some stories better satisfy the criteria of the logic of good reasons, which is attentive to reason and values … the paradigm is a ground for resolving the dualisms of modernism: fact-value, intellect-imagination, reason-emotion, and so on. (*Human Communication as Narration* 68)

Narrative coherence is postmodernity’s answer to modernity’s scientific, formal logic. Shaping the narrative, then, becomes not only a matter of reasoning with members of a foreign public, but of telling stories that take into account their values, histories, and collective imaginations to shape the narrative from a place of coherence and fidelity.

Narrative fidelity is the second component of Fisher’s narrative paradigm. “The principle of coherence brings into focus the integrity of a story as a whole, but the principle of fidelity pertains to the individuated components of stories—whether they represent accurate assertions about social reality and thereby constitute good reasons for belief or action” (*Human Communication as Narration* 105). Narrative fidelity, for
Fisher, is the way a story rings true in answering the ethical question, “How ought a given value affect the way human life together moves forward?” Fisher says:

The definition I offer says that a good reason is a warrant for a belief, attitude, or action and the value of a value lies in its relevance, consistency, and consequence, and the extent to which it is grounded on the highest possible values. Put another way, a value is valuable not because it is tied to a reason or is expressed by a reasonable person per se, but because it makes a pragmatic difference in one’s life and in one’s community. (Human Communication as Narration 111)

Fisher moves the idea of value away from a tie to reason or the person expressing the value and instead places value and narrative fidelity at the heart of rhetoric— in praxis decisions about the best course forward for a community.

Fisher’s narrative paradigm marked an important turn in the field of communication and rhetoric. Moving away from a rational-world paradigm, his narrative theory is a standard for understanding human communication as rhetorical narrative, not as formal logic. Moreover, his contributions of narrative coherence and fidelity open the study of narrative to local, vernacular understandings of logic and rationale, positioning the individual participant in the narrative differently, requiring their implication in the stories in order to understand in a more nuanced way than a removed, modern treatment of logic and rationale would offer.

Narrative in Community

Arnett also deals with narrative in his work. Arnett’s scholarship situates narrative as essential to human life together in a postmodern moment and as the cornerstone for postmodern community life generally. Arnett’s work offers fresh perspective for
scholarship on postmodern public diplomacy and foreign relations by introducing a voice for philosophy of communication through the metaphor of community as diplomats engage situated, local community narratives in their public diplomacy work. Arnett’s ideas are engaged here through two concepts: narrative as tied to community and narrative rationality as rooted in tradition.

Recognizing the importance of postmodernity to narrative and its place in community life, Arnett offers that, “To recognize the importance of story does not require embracing a hegemonic metanarrative; an emphasis on story acknowledges the presence of both good and bad stories, in which embedded agents meet the given and offer change in the public arena” (Dialogic Confession 37). In a postmodern world characterized by narrative contention, Arnett’s work understands narratives as particular and situated within petite, local public spheres, not a modern monolithic public sphere.

Moreover, Arnett and Arneson hold that, “Metanarrative assumes a uniform virtue system, which the project of postmodernity has revealed as impossible” (52). For Arnett, while no metanarrative can exist in postmodernity, particular narratives are tied to public community, which provides a philosophical center for stories and practices after the collapse of universal virtue systems. Arnett argues that, “A narrative, a story of a people or an organization, can provide a common center that can pull people of difference together” (Dialogic Education 20-1). Furthermore, the concept of public is necessarily linked to narrative in Arnett to the point that he argues that the quality of narrative is causal of the quality of public life:

In short, the richness of our public life in an age of diversity may depend on the quality of our narrative life. It is this insight that guides Bellah et al. in The Good
Society. They discuss rhetoric as the key to rediscovering the notion of the “good society,” a narrative in the midst of a complex world. Rhetoric becomes the vehicle for making good arguments and holding organizations together by ideas. ("Communication and Community" 44)

Arnett does not advocate for a notion of narrative that reifies and codifies life. Instead, his notion is a rhetorical one, recognizing that some narratives are good and some are bad, and he argues that the praxis of rhetoric helps a community decide which narratives to allow to guide human life together as they engage in the ongoing rhetorical process of building, maintaining, and changing their narrative.

Moreover, for Arnett, the idea of community is counter to the Enlightenment idea of individualism similar to that of Bellah et al., when they say in Habits of the Heart:

We described a language of individualistic achievement and self-fulfillment that often seems to make it difficult for people to sustain their commitments to others, either in intimate relationships or in the public sphere. We held up older traditions, biblical and civic republican, that had a better grasp on the truth that the individual is realized in and through community; but we show that contemporary Americans have difficulty understanding those traditions today or seeing how they apply to their lives. We called for a deeper understanding of the moral ecology that sustains the lives of us all. (5)

Arnett argues that a radically individualistic culture that does not attend to—or cannot attend to—issues of community and tradition will collapse human communicative life.

The idea of community in postmodern narratives takes on further currency for Arnett in that postmodernity understands public spheres as petite, localized, and
vernacular. By their nature, petite public spheres cannot include everyone, and such is the view of community for Arnett. Against cosmopolitanism where a given narrative would suit everyone, Arnett says, “Community is better comprehended as a double-bladed knife, cutting simultaneously in the directions of inclusion and exclusion” (“Communication and Community” 36). For Arnett, communities that meet the needs of all people are an unrealistic fiction.

Narrative is necessarily tied to the notion of community in Arnett’s work. In communities individuals find an alternative to an individualistic narrative. The health of public communities is a direct effect of the health of the narratives. The narratives that guide communities are not hegemonic or reified, but in postmodernity are more like petite narratives that give life to localized, vernacular public spheres.

Arnett’s work, like the work of other narrative scholars, also introduces the idea of tradition. Arnett makes explicit that narrative rationality is located in and of the tradition. Like Hans-Georg Gadamer, the issue of foregrounding one’s present horizon is reciprocal in that it necessarily elucidates the past from which it is foregrounded. Tradition and history are not fixed ideas for Gadamer from which the present is set apart from, but instead are experienced as a tension between the text of the tradition and the present (304-305). Against an Enlightenment concept of rationality as a formulaic, out-there-to-be-grasped, uniform way of knowing the world, Arnett holds that rationality is particular to a given tradition within a community based on a present rationality situated in all the historicity of tradition. He says, “Without a story-laden tradition there is no rationality. Rationality is a modern construct assuming universal agreement on basic presuppositions that situate and provide background for interpretation (“Hannah Arendt”
For Arnett, the self is only understood through a return to tradition in postmodernity and the turning away from Enlightenment individualism. Whether traditions are religious, ethnic, or social, individuals find themselves enmeshed in myriad narratives after modernity.

Arnett holds that with the ascendancy of progress to the zenith of modern ideals, “The movement from tradition to modernity’s confidence in progress made the ground under one’s feet—tradition—irrelevant. Tradition became irrelevant and the self became the focus of attention” (―Hannah Arendt‖ 73). In modernity, the idea of tradition stood in the way of progress and mobility, and in postmodernity, tradition reemerges as plural traditions, or “petite narratives” (Lyotard 60). Traditions, as Arnett appropriates them for postmodernity, are petite, localized narratives that situate one in community. Arnett’s voice contributes to thinking on narrative by offering that in a postmodern moment characterized by lack of metanarrative hegemony, local community is essential to the health of narratives. Moreover, like Gadamer, he suggests that traditions should be understood as living, rhetorically managed, maintained, and changed cultural and narrative goods that allow for a petite anchor in a postmodern world.

Poiesis and Creativity in Narrative

The QDDR calls for narrative shaping from a deep and involved understanding and engagement of culture through human relationships. Arneson’s work provides an opening through which to understand narrative as poetics. Her ideas about poiesis and creativity open an entrance for postmodern public diplomacy that positions narrative in the creativity of language. This posture calls diplomats to engage individuals in postmodern public spheres by understanding the richness of the particular canon of the
culture—its stories, art, music, and other linguistic constructs that guide the story of a particular public life. The discussion of her work here centers on the metaphor of poiesis.

Arneson offers that “Poiesis is a way of creatively ‘making,’ participating in the world. The ambiguity, questions, and gaps in a poetic narrative supply hermeneutical potential for understanding” (208). Discussing the implications of Martin Buber’s Hasidic tales as poetic narratives to illustrate Jean Gebser’s integral consciousness, Arneson places poiesis at the gap in understanding between two people, thereby offering a way, through poetic narrative, to understand a culture or tradition. Arneson further suggests that poetic narratives draw people toward “existential experience of human relationships. They focus on individual characters and how the characters are transformed through the event(s)” (207). The inherently creative nature of human language for Arneson suggests that poiesis can be one of the best ways to understand a group’s narratives. Moreover, the poetic nature of the telling of human stories opens the door to understanding cultural narratives in music, the visual arts, and literature.

Hermeneutic potential and individual transformation through events are two touch points Arneson offers for understanding narratives and how they shape the lives of the individuals involved. If one considers hermeneutics as the interpretation of a text, Arneson’s work offers that the formal imperfections in human narratives open a space for potential understanding. Working from the premise that human stories—as well as systems of human stories—are inherently riddled with Arneson calls ambiguity and gaps, an outsider looking to understand and participate in a narrative may find entrance points into narratives not only through the poetic structure of the narrative, but because of it. Arneson’s work calls attention to the concept that because narratives are based in poiesis
and creativity, they live outside formal structures and instead undulate and move with imperfection, gaps, and misunderstandings. Those points of ambiguity and imperfections of human creativity make it possible for entrance into participation with and influence of narratives.

Moreover, Arneson’s work argues that poetic narratives compel people to understand life existentially. More than understanding a narrative formally, based on an austere, removed modern analysis of a narrative, Arneson suggests that the nature of narratives as a form of poiesis requires people to be implicated in personal, human relationships in order to understand a narrative. Arneson’s contribution to narrative theory is that the very nature of human relationships that make up narratives should be understood as having their basis in poiesis with all the human gaps, misunderstandings, and imperfections that a strictly rational or formal understanding of narratives would prohibit.

**Narrative’s Importance for Community Diplomacy in Postmodern Public Diplomacy**

This chapter considered the QDDR’s call to shape the narrative from a philosophy of communication perspective. Understanding that call as important for 21st century postmodern public diplomacy, the diplomat must understand that shaping the narrative is an essentially rhetorical call. Beyond understanding narrative as rhetorical, the diplomat must be able to engage in communicative praxis with a philosophically textured understanding of the concept of narrative. Considering the work of Ricoeur, MacIntyre, Fisher, Arnett, and Arneson, this chapter drew specific metaphors for engagement from each of these scholars’ work.
Ricoeur’s work on narrative attends to three metaphors pertinent for public diplomacy in postmodernity: time, narrative identity, and selfhood. Ricoeur argues that through narrative, time is reconfigured from the Enlightenment, scientific concept of clock time back to human time. As human beings tell and retell stories, time becomes wrapped up in narrative. Understanding history and human experience in this mode of time, diplomats are discouraged from the temptation to view the history of a culture as reified and not implicated in the daily life of the community. Narrative identity, for Ricoeur, is the idea that a person’s identity is discovered through narrative. In other words, for Ricoeur an examined life is a narrated life.

Selfhood, then, for Ricoeur, is only possible in and through community. As individuals are called into self from birth, their selfhood is enmeshed in myriad narratives that give their lives meaning. While avoiding a deterministic approach to self-as-given, Ricoeur offers that the choices an individual makes that dictate selfhood are given from the traditions and narratives they are implicated in beyond their choice. As diplomats understand the centrality of reclaiming narrative in postmodernity as an alternative to Enlightenment rationality, and as they engage the centrality of narrative to time in Ricoeur’s argument, diplomats should also understand individuals through their place in a narrative and selfhood as a product or outgrowth of narrative.

Ricoeur offers much to the diplomat charged with shaping the narrative. His work on time, narrative identity, and selfhood provides a depth and richness to diplomatic engagement that has not yet been recognized by the diplomatic establishment. Ricoeur’s conception of time calls the public diplomacy practitioner to engage in history differently: not as a rehashing of dates in a disembodied linear fashion, but as narratives
whereby the members of a given public experience time and history as lived stories. As stories affect the human conception of time, diplomats would be wise to engage in understanding (in order to shape) a narrative as Ricoeur would: by understanding that one’s experience of time and being is bound up in a set of stories, not that stories are set in a reified time and space.

When a diplomat understands a narrative not as a reified story set against a backdrop of scientific time, narrative identity comes to the fore. To shape the narrative, public diplomacy professionals should understand that shaping the narrative through the lens of identity is tied to that narrative. Members of a culture are not disassociated from the stories that give their lives meaning, but are implicated deeply in those stories understood through the constant ongoing re-creation of culture in lived, experienced, human time. Kearney notes that, “Narrative identity operates at the level of both individual and communal identity” (“Narrative Imagination” 182). Ricoeur’s work calls the postmodern public diplomacy professional to attend to both individual and community identity as inextricably linked.

Narrative identity also offers ethical implications for the public diplomacy practitioner. Narrative identity implores diplomats to understand both themselves and the members of a foreign culture, whose narrative they are trying to shape, as subjects whose self-knowledge lies not in a narcissistic ego or dogma, but instead lies situated in the narratives of the culture. To shape a narrative, diplomats need to understand how identity is tied to narrative and not assume an individualistic self that understands itself outside the narrative. To shape the narrative is to shape people’s identities and their experience of the world.
Moreover, Ricoeur offers a praxis, action-oriented touch point for those charged with shaping narratives in his concept of self-as-agent. To shape a given narrative, diplomats should understand the two-fold nature of selfhood. Ricoeur is concerned not with the self-same, but instead with the self as constructed consciously by members of a public by participation in, and creation of, narratives. To understand how best to shape a narrative, diplomats should be attentive to how shaping the narrative will affect members’ sense of self. David D. Brown offers, “One experiences ‘belonging’ to the extent that one is able to interweave interpretations of the self with the interpretations of others through narrative discourse. Such a notion of belonging sheds light on the phenomena of political consciousness and social movements” (109). For Ricoeur, narrative discourse is how people come to adopt political commitments and form their political and social selves. Practitioners of postmodern public diplomacy should understand the fundamental tie between a narrative and one’s conception of self. To do so will help diplomats be attentive to the ethics of self implicated in shaping a given narrative and will allow them to consider ways to shape a narrative that are generous and attentive to the idea of narrative self as they seek to shape both the narratives of members of foreign publics as well as the narratives of foreign publics at-large.

MacIntyre’s work on narrative is central to public diplomacy in a postmodern world. First, his work, like the State Department’s QDDR, is a response to modernity and its attendant bureaucracy and relegation of the self and narrative to the fringes. MacIntyre’s call is also one for attentiveness to narrative in postmodernity. He lays out a nested conception of narrative of the self as situated in practices and practices as given currency in tradition. Tradition provides the means for the individual to discover their
narrative self. The self is implicated in and given birth in tradition, but the ongoing renegotiation of the tradition is in the practices the individual engages in in search of their narrative self. The self is, above all, a rhetorical process attendant to the situatedness of the story.

Practitioners of postmodern public diplomacy can texture their understanding of how to shape the narrative by understanding the nature of story MacIntyre puts forth. In many cultures where American diplomats work, Enlightenment individualism does not enjoy the philosophical throne it does in the West, particularly in America. Understanding that in many places across the globe, people live with a much stronger sense that who they are is tied to their role. This is what MacIntyre conceives of as practices—action tied to excellence bound up in the notion of the fulfillment of purpose or function, reminiscent of the classical Greek conception of *arête* (Liddell and Scott). In many cultures where the diplomat may be attempting to shape the narrative, understanding narrative as the self situated in practices may offer a hermeneutic entrance into understanding a given narrative.

Moreover, understanding tradition not as a set of reified cultural practices like Thanksgiving dinner or the giving of Christmas gifts, but understanding traditions as living rhetorical safeguards of a community allows a second entrance into how the self may be conceived of. When looking to understand and shape narratives, diplomats should be attentive to tradition as the locus of understanding one’s personal narrative in the grander scheme of community narrative. After having strengthened person-to-person relations in a petite and vernacular public sphere, diplomats should be trained to see those individuals with whom they have forged relationship as having identities situated in the
larger framework of living cultural traditions that are undergoing ongoing rhetorical maintenance, change, and negotiation.

Fisher’s work opens up the conversation for postmodern public diplomacy by situating narrative theory against the rational-world paradigm of the Enlightenment and modernity. Calling attention to rationality as situated within the two-fold paradigm of how a story hangs together and whether or not a story rings true to the community, Fisher’s work moves rhetorical decision-making and understanding the lived reality of people together in the world from a formal, rational model to a narrative model. Specifically, Fisher’s work is important for understanding a postmodern call in the QDDR to shape the narrative because he thinks otherwise than modernist, data-driven scientific methods for measuring communication and instead thinks in terms of stories to understand human life. Postmodern public diplomacy fronts narrative as central to policy decisions in an age where socio-political data is no longer enough to craft effective foreign policy for a world where the public sphere is not characterized by a monolithic conception of the public as an entire nation-state.

Moreover, in order to shape the narrative, public diplomacy professionals should evaluate the narrative based on a rhetorical understanding of logos, not a technical one. Having strengthened people-to-people relationships, diplomats can engage particular, vernacular stories through those relationships to shape the narrative from a narrative paradigm, as participant, as opposed to a detached observer in the rational-world paradigm. Postmodern public diplomacy views narrative the same way—to shape narrative effectively, diplomats can no longer rely on formulaic and bureaucratic means
as a way to think about persuasion, but must instead understand both the coherence and fidelity of a given narrative.

To properly execute the QDDR’s mandate to shape the narrative, diplomats need to be attentive to narrative coherence in the stories of a culture in order to understand them well enough to shape the narrative by telling stories that have narrative fidelity. Public diplomacy praxis in a postmodern moment would be well-served by diplomats who, having built strong people-to-people relationships, spend time inside a public, listening to the narratives that make up that public’s culture. While fact and logical consistency make up a good deal of the narrative coherence, Fisher’s work calls diplomatic professionals to not only be attentive to those elements that also exist in the rational-world paradigm, but also to the rhetorical logic particular to the narratives of a given culture. Fisher essentially democratizes communication by arguing that common sense in story-making lies with everyone because storytelling is the central tenet of human being. Public diplomacy professionals, then, should not look strictly to opinion leaders, but also to the common and vernacular stories of a culture that give value to everyday life.

The QDDR’s directive to shape the narrative is a postmodern call. Postmodern public diplomacy is consistent with Fisher’s narrative paradigm in its attentiveness to particular and situated rhetorics and cultures as products of human communication, and postmodern public diplomacy does not seek to understand them only on the basis of scientific ways of knowing the world. Public diplomacy professionals can look to Fisher’s work for guidance in understanding human life’s cultures, institutions, and
practices as essentially the products of human beings who understand and build their world through storytelling.

Being attentive to both how the stories of a culture make sense and ring true will allow the diplomat to implicate him or herself in the stories in order to understand and influence those narratives that make up a culture. Similarly, in shaping the narrative, being attentive to the particular values, emotions, and cultural imagination at work in narratives, public diplomacy practitioners enter a humanistic, rhetorical understanding of culture that assesses narratives and shapes the narratives of petite, vernacular public spheres not from a place of policy crafted on a formulaic, sociological understanding of a culture, but on a rhetorical understanding of the stories that shape a public. Attending to the QDDR directive to shape the narrative is a rhetorically rich turn that sets postmodern public diplomacy apart from earlier 20th century iterations of public diplomacy.

Arnett understands narrative as tied to community and rationality as situated in tradition. Arnett provides a philosophical treatment of communication for the diplomat to understand narrative as tied to community and against an individualistic rendering of the term. Moreover, Arnett offers a rationality that, like Ricoeur, MacIntyre, and Fisher, is situated within the narrative. Understanding the logic is a narrative matter. Public community is not conceived of in modernist terms as a monolithic public of a nation-state, but instead as situated in particular traditions that give a vernacular community shape. These are the kinds of postmodern communities diplomats will engage as they look to understand and shape narratives.

Over and against Bellah’s conception of American “rational, technical, utilitarian, ideology” (xiv) frames that yield a wealth of information, tradition instead centers the
diplomat otherwise. Understanding of tradition in cultural contexts alien to a diplomat’s own is bound to be more effective when the frames of reference through which the diplomat is seeking to understand the tradition are commensurate with the tradition. This is what Arnett means when he argues that rationality is within the tradition. To understand a tradition, one must think with the tradition. To shape a narrative in a public community, that is to say, to change the direction of a narrative in a public sphere, diplomats need to engage from inside the tradition they wish to change (inasmuch as possible). This requires deep understanding of language and culture, but not only that: person-to-person relationships as the QDDR has called for, allow an entrance into self-implication within a tradition.

Arneson encourages diplomats charged with shaping the narrative to approach the poetic narratives of a culture as offering spaces of engagement to understand and shape narratives. As diplomats strengthen person-to-person relationships, taking heed of the poetic narratives of a culture—those ambiguous stories that open space for interpretation and encounter—is paramount. To shape the narrative, a diplomat must understand the narrative, to the greatest extent possible, from with inside the tradition, and by paying close attention to what Arneson calls poetic narrative, ask questions and propose ideas that might shape the larger community narrative toward policy goals. The goal of public diplomacy in shaping the narrative in postmodernity is to engage the voices of all stakeholders in shaping the larger community narrative toward American foreign policy goals.
Conclusion

Narrative theory across all the philosophers of communication discussed in Chapter 4 offers consistent ideas and themes for the diplomat working in the field to shape the narrative of a given public. First, diplomats’ work in this area should be informed by an understanding that in postmodernity, metanarratives no longer enjoy the same centrality they once did. Therefore, diplomats should be attentive to the localized, petite narratives they engage. Moreover, understanding people is a matter of understanding the community in which they live and build their lives. History, story, and self in postmodern narratives are tied to the notion of community. No longer (at least in most cases) is history, story, and self tied to large monolithic institutions like the Church or the nation-state. Instead, people operate and find their identities in the narratives of communities and vernacular, local public spheres. Public diplomacy policy should be formulated around this understanding of narrative.

Practitioners of postmodern public diplomacy should also shift their thinking about rationality to rationality-in-tradition, that is to say that rationality becomes rationalities particular to narratives. While a minimal reasonableness as human beings exists, gone is the era of conceiving of rationality as a given universal. Understanding rationalities as particular to their narrative or tradition, diplomats can avoid the Enlightenment impulse to evaluate the merit of a narrative on an assumed universal rationality that lies outside of the given narrative.

In Chapter 5, I introduce the term public diplomacy 2.0 to describe the particular iteration of postmodern public diplomacy being practiced by American diplomats around the world today as a result of the second rhetorical turn in American diplomacy.
championed by the State Department under Rodham Clinton’s tenure. The chapter will engage a case study of a State Department community diplomacy initiative that is highlighted as a particular success of postmodern public diplomacy in the QDDR. The program brought together members of different vernacular public spheres on either side of the Catholic-Protestant sectarian divide in Northern Ireland for mutual benefit of both groups as well as American policy goals. The case study will incorporate the theoretical work of Chapters 3 and 4 to show how State Department programs can be buttressed by diplomats with fluency not only in foreign languages and policy briefings, but in how philosophy of communication relates to strengthening people-to-people relationships and shaping the narrative.
CHAPTER 5

Public Diplomacy 2.0 at Work: Community Diplomacy in Northern Ireland

The 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR; United States Department of State and United States Agency on International Development) cites several examples of community diplomacy success stories, which this project counts as a central element of postmodern public diplomacy. Community diplomacy as part of postmodern public diplomacy outreach to strengthen personal relationships across cultures and shape narratives showcases the unique approach of the efforts of the Rodham Clinton State Department. The approach is a public diplomacy iteration that combines 20th century public diplomacy, or “simply the conduct of foreign policy by engaging with a foreign public” (Cull 3) and track two diplomacy, which is “unofficial, informal action between members of adversary groups or nations that aim to develop strategies, to influence public opinion, organize human and material resources in ways that might help to resolve the conflict” (Montville 162). Whereas the focus in track two diplomacy lies more with the decision-makers and leaders of public spheres (Cull), postmodern public diplomacy’s community diplomacy programs offer an area of synthesis between public diplomacy and track two diplomacy. Like postmodern public diplomacy tactics, community diplomacy starts at the grassroots—by building person-to-person relationships with common individuals in the public sphere to influence the narrative from the ground up—instead of the leaders of policy. Like track two diplomacy, community diplomacy programs organize human and material resources to better human life and resolve a particular conflict in a postmodern moment.
This project’s contribution to the conversation taking place at the intersection of communication scholarship and diplomacy research is the identification and definition of what I call “public diplomacy 2.0.” The idea of public diplomacy 2.0 emerged as a specific core competency of the State Department in the second rhetorical turn in American diplomacy under the tenure of Rodham Clinton, but has yet to be formally identified. Public diplomacy 2.0 is a particular postmodern iteration of public diplomacy that is attentive the cacophony of voices and variety of emergent public spheres. Because public diplomacy 2.0 recognizes that there are many competing narratives in a given nation in postmodernity, its practice is centered on the QDDR’s specific call for public diplomacy officers to engage the world as practitioners of rhetoric. Moreover, its tactics are new: through public diplomacy initiatives like town hall meetings and community diplomacy programs, public diplomacy 2.0 engages locally, recognizing that understanding vernacular publics and local narratives is increasingly important for American diplomats to effectively promote American policy objectives, secure peace, and spread democratic ideals in a postmodern moment.

This chapter will look at community diplomacy as a tactic of public diplomacy 2.0 in Northern Ireland that sought to carry out the QDDR’s directives to strengthen person-to-person relationships between individuals on either side of the sectarian divide, and by extension, to shape the narrative in a way that promoted women’s empowerment and economic development in areas of the country historically underserved as a result of the Troubles. First, the chapter will explore public diplomacy 2.0 and its community diplomacy programs in Northern Ireland in terms of promoting women’s empowerment and fostering economic growth. Next, the chapter will sketch an overview of the history
of Northern Ireland, both before and during the Troubles that lasted from the late 1960s to the late 1990s, as well as discuss American involvement in the Good Friday Peace Treaty of 1998. Last, the chapter will apply the theoretical work on Coordinated Management of Meaning and narrative to build a praxis example of how rhetorical theory and philosophy of communication can provide theoretical ground from which to practice in the new field of public diplomacy 2.0.

Public Diplomacy 2.0: Community Diplomacy in Northern Ireland

The QDDR offers that, “Our diplomatic and consular posts are on the front lines of community diplomacy—connecting directly with communities across the globe to showcase America’s values and build relationships with people and governments with whom we share common interests” (United States Department of State and United States Agency on International Development 64). Particularly, the community diplomacy initiatives undertaken by the American foreign policy establishment in Northern Ireland have focused on economic development, educational attainment, and equal opportunities for marginalized groups like women.

Community diplomacy programs are central to public diplomacy 2.0, especially in their ability to give practical, real-world traction to strengthening people-to-people relationships and shaping the narrative. Specifically, community diplomacy programs are efforts by the American diplomatic establishment to engage locally by creating and managing programs that help the particular community in which they are based. As an extension of such programs, ideals like prosperity and equality are promoted in the service of American foreign policy goals. Moreover, community diplomacy programs carve out a space for praxis application of rhetorical theory and philosophy of
communication. The case study here will apply CMM and narrative theory to the specific community diplomacy programs undertaken in Northern Ireland after the Troubles. Focusing on two central themes in the State Department’s initiatives, this section will discuss how American community diplomacy programs have benefited economic growth in a part of Ireland disadvantaged by the Troubles. Second, this section of the chapter will discuss how the involvement of the State Department has helped to bolster the fight for equal opportunity for women in Northern Ireland.

Economic woes have been central to Northern Ireland since the beginning of the Troubles. As the strife wore on through the late 1970s and 1980s, much of an entire generation of Irish young people lacked the requisite education necessary to create a viable economy with sustained growth, and several programs were put into effect near the end of the Troubles to combat the problem:

The Clinton administration also pledged to expand transatlantic partnerships between mid-level companies and to support community regeneration at the micro level through assistance to small businesses. … Later, the Clinton administration played an important role in the passage and implementation of the Walsh Visa Program, which gives young, unemployed Irish people three-year US work visas. The primary objective is for participants to acquire skills in growth industries that would bring economic regeneration to their communities when they returned home. (Wilson 23)

These efforts to engage young people in the revitalization of their own communities was part of a larger economic package, including grants and direct financial aid to the government of Northern Ireland.
After the administration of President Bill Clinton, the 2000s saw the continuation of efforts to revitalize the economy of Northern Ireland come under the purview of diplomacy initiatives. In his article, “An Economistic Interpretation of the Northern Ireland Conflict,” Colin C. Jennings argues that diplomacy has to be as much political as economic, citing that economic disenfranchisement among various groups of people in a given political climate contributes greatly to violence and unrest, even when a cease-fire is in place. Economic woes and their attendant violence necessitated the continued work of development through American diplomacy in Northern Ireland.

The QDDR cites its development successes in Northern Ireland:

our Consulate in Belfast is building a network of local citizens who have participated in programs sponsored by the United States. Connections forged by the Consulate have already had an impact across the province…two groups of alumni have established a Northern Ireland public service mentoring partnership [to help develop skills in the youth population for the revitalization of the economy]. (United States Department of State and United States Agency on International Development 64)

Mentorship programs and job skills training programs through American cooperation are the community diplomacy tactics the QDDR cites to underscore the State Department’s commitment to economic viability in Northern Ireland.

As Rodham Clinton marked the end of her tenure as Secretary of State, she continued to underscore the importance of public diplomacy initiatives to the continued growth and viability of the Northern Irish economy:
Mrs Clinton … plans to discuss the trilateral US-Ireland Research and Development Partnership and economic opportunities for Northern Ireland. Later Mrs Clinton will take part in an event hosted by The Ireland Funds—a global fundraising network supporting programmes of peace and reconciliation, arts and culture, education, and community development in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. (BBC News Northern Ireland)

Rodham Clinton’s commitment to the economic growth and viability of Northern Ireland is a dual-track diplomacy. In addition to formal diplomacy mentioned by the BBC News Northern Ireland, above, Rodham Clinton’s approach to the question of economic growth and sustainability in Northern Ireland is also advanced by public diplomacy 2.0 initiatives in local, mentoring programs. Building and strengthening people-to-people relationships between diplomats and locals, as well as between Protestant and Catholic locals, helps shape the narrative that guides economic development in that area of the country.

Rodham Clinton’s posture of engaging a postmodern turn in public diplomacy in the development of economic community diplomacy programs in Northern Ireland has aligned with traditional diplomacy there:

These jobs are not just numbers. They represent opportunities for people, particularly young people, to be able to feel a strong connection with and make a stake in the future that we’re all so supportive of seeing. … The Envoy’s office also launched the U.S.-Northern Ireland mentorship program, placing young people from Northern Ireland in American companies for one-year internships. … And finally, I want to thank everyone at the U.S. Consulate General in Belfast. I see our Consul General there. Your team has done a great job in supporting the
Envoy’s office and driving economic development as one of our key commitments. … And through conferences like these and the conversations and collaborations that they lead to, people understand the economic potential of Northern Ireland. (Clinton “Remarks at the U.S.-Northern Ireland Economic Conference)

American diplomats’ focus on community diplomacy programs as a central feature of public diplomacy 2.0 add another, more nuanced, vernacular layer to traditional economic diplomacy. Community diplomacy programs that result in job training and mentorship programs offer a local, postmodern tactic to strengthen people-to-people relationships and shape the narrative to bolster traditional diplomacy.

Community diplomacy initiatives in Northern Ireland also focused on women’s empowerment as a distinct but related issue to economic development in Northern Ireland. The QDDR cites that, “in one case, women who had participated in different U.S. programs have organized a community of female activists” (United States Department of State and United States Agency on International Development 64). Women’s empowerment, both economically and politically, has been a salient priority for Northern Ireland officials as the area moves on from the Troubles, as well as for Rodham Clinton, as First Lady, as Senator, and as Secretary of State.

In their book, Women, the State, and War, Joyce P. Kaufman and Kristen P. Williams note that during the Troubles, “Increasing unemployment and poverty rose for women in Northern Ireland; it was that degradation of life coupled with the generally harsher conditions exacerbated by the troubles that contributed to the growth of women’s political activism” (158). During the Troubles, women’s issues became so salient—in
terms of economic empowerment, educational attainment, and political activism—that
their importance trumped sectarian issues and women’s groups began to connect across
the religious divide. A 2006 article in *The Economist* noted that women in the working
class in Northern Ireland tend to have the lowest paid unskilled jobs, regardless of
whether they are Catholic or Protestant (“Northern Ireland: Still Troubled”). This means
that working-class women often have more in common with each other, even if of a
different ethno-religious background, than they do with women of their same background
in a higher social stratum, thereby giving them a basis on which to build a new narrative.

Women’s political issues have largely been grassroots and community-based in
Northern Ireland. “Women have been described as ‘the mainstay of community groups,’
whose activities have helped to hold the society together through years of great
adversity” (McCoy 3). The main channel for women’s political activism during the early
years of the Troubles in the late 1960s and through the 1970s was through engagement in
community groups, not in official political capacities. Kaufman and Williams note:

One of the characteristics that sets Northern Ireland apart is that regardless of how
active women might be in their respective communities, which is often their base
for political involvement, on the whole, most did not and do not see their work as
“political” per se. … Further, in general, they did not identify their work as a
“feminist” response to their situation. Rather, they saw themselves in more
traditional roles, as wives/mothers/sisters, and used those roles as the rationale for
their activism, based on the need to do something or “protect” their community.

(157)
Women, viewing their roles not as political, but based on their social roles in the community, “recognizes the reality that women have generally been excluded from the formal political process and the fact that they have been able to be effective political actors nonetheless” (157). Indeed, the political climate as it stood in the 1960s and 1970s prevented women from taking an active role in politics.

Kaufman and Williams note, “As we have seen, Northern Ireland tends to be a fairly traditional society where women’s roles are found predominantly in the realm of the private sphere (i.e., as wives and mothers)” (178). Northern Ireland was not immune from the effects of 20th century philosophical modernity on the conflation of the public and private spheres or the emergence of postmodernity and increased opportunities for women’s petite narratives to come to the fore. “The breakdown between public and private was foisted on the women when the private space was ‘invaded’ and co-opted for political purposes” (Rooney 171). Common factors among women on both sides of the sectarian divide—poverty, violence, and disenfranchisement—allowed women to find a way into the political process through community activism. As formal political enfranchisement became more accepted in the later years of the Troubles through groups like Women Into Politics and Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition, women were empowered to make a change formally with the “eruption of women’s issues into the [political] arena” (Cockburn 78). The State Department recognized this postmodern, vernacular exigency in Northern Ireland, and the community diplomacy programs there have sought to invite more women into the formal political process in Northern Ireland.

At its core, women’s enfranchisement that has flowed out of community diplomacy programs in Northern Ireland is a shaping of the narrative away from only
traditional women’s roles and political spaces. The website of the American Consulate in Belfast lists a link for “Women’s Rights” under its “Key Reports” heading. The page includes a document titled “Women of Influence.” This November 2006 collection chronicles how 21 notable American women broke new ground, some by championing equal rights for all and others by their accomplishments in fields such as government, literature, and even in war” (U.S. Consulate Belfast). Public diplomacy initiatives like this publication and programs that teach women job skills, as well as skills that allow them to organize politically, have all been part of the American effort in Northern Ireland to guarantee disenfranchised women the right to the political process.

Many of these programs are developed and implemented apart from one another, with diverging tactics of how to achieve their goals. As will be discussed, communication theory offers a philosophically informed praxis approach by which to cohere these initiatives in a way that allows them to work in tandem with one another to both foster economic growth and promote women’s rights. Moreover, communication theory allows the public diplomacy practitioner to more fully engage their call in the QDDR by working to strengthen people-to-people relationships and shape the narrative in real, programmatic initiatives like the ones being undertaken by the United States mission in Belfast.

**Historically Situating Northern Ireland**

In the early 17th century the English throne initiated the policy of planting its own capitalist farms in Ulster (one of the four Irish provinces and roughly one quarter of the land mass of the island), effectively instituting British rule over that part of Ireland. As a result, landed gentry from Britain, mostly Scots, moved into the Ulster counties, claimed ownership on the land, and built estates as gentleman farmers in Ireland. This movement
became known as the Plantation of Ulster (Foster). The influx the British influence brought with it Protestant Christianity in the form of Presbyterians from Scotland and members of the Church of England from Britain. After the Williamite wars in the late 17th century, the Catholic aristocracy of the Gaelic clans left Ireland for mainland Europe, effectively ceding economic and political power over the whole of the island to the Protestant minority landlords (Foster). This historical point is important in understanding the genesis of the deep sectarian divide that exists in parts of Northern Ireland today.

In the early part of the 20th century, Britain enjoyed rule over the whole of Ireland. Several rebel uprisings were quelled by the Black and Tans—the British military, so dubbed for the color of their uniforms—before the fighting that led Britain to grant independence to 26 of Ireland’s 32 counties, with the exception of six of the nine Ulster counties that make up the British province of Northern Ireland today (claiming historical precedence and a majority population). The history of Northern Ireland leading up to the Troubles was a tumultuous one, even after the signing of the treaty that gave Ireland its independence in 1921:

The decade between 1912 and 1922 was a momentous one for Ireland. Civil conflict between north and south, where private armies were openly drilling, was averted by the outbreak of the First World War; the Easter 1916 rising in Dublin and the subsequent guerrilla campaign shifted the spotlight southward; the signing in 1921 of a treaty between the British government and Sinn Fein, the political wing of the Irish Republic Army, established a state from which Northern Ireland opted out. These events and the first years of both new states were accompanied by civil disorder. Belfast experienced a guerrilla campaign and sectarian conflicts.
The new state was created in the midst of the troubles and divisions which were to characterize its history. (Darby 19)

Civil disorder and division were common characteristics of Irish—and especially Northern Irish—history in the years leading up to the period of unrest in Northern Ireland known as the Troubles.

McKittrick and McVea in *Making Sense of the Troubles* offer that even before open violence broke out in the late 1960s with the shift of elected power in Northern Ireland, the area was less than peaceful. “In what are today assumed to be quiet and uneventful periods, even a cursory glance at the records of the time reveals a most unsettled society” (1). In the 1960s, existing animosities that had been latent for decades boiled over in the unresolved issues of nationality, religion, power, and territorial rivalry in Northern Ireland.

The period commonly referred to as the Troubles, began in 1969 when The Apprentice Boys of Derry, a political organization, wanted to stage a march in Derry (the British refer to Derry as Londonderry). After some debate, the march was allowed, and the tinderbox of political animosity erupted with skirmishes between Catholic republicans and Protestant loyalists. The skirmishes escalated into a nearly full-scale uprising, known today as the Battle of the Bogside, named for the Catholic enclave in the Bogside neighborhood of Derry (McKittrick and McVea). Much like the start of World War I, a politically tense situation erupted into full battle with one incident in a parade. After that eruption, London decided that British military troops would be deployed to Belfast and Derry as a safeguard. The Irish republicans viewed the British presence as foreign military occupation and the Troubles were born.
Moving forward from the violence of August 1969, McKittrick and McVea note that, “Belfast had a long history of sectarian clashes; now it was permanently and physically scarred by ugly barricades across many of its mean streets … as years passed and violence continued…larger and more substantial permanent brick and metal structures were erected” (56). Those barriers lasted even after the Good Friday Peace Treaty in 1998 and can still be seen in some of the more economically and socio-politically disadvantaged areas in Belfast city where Protestant loyalists and Catholic republicans still live with an uneasy tension.

In the 30 years of violence that ensued, several major milestones should be noted before a discussion of American involvement (in large part due to President and First Lady Clinton) in the peace process. Bloody Sunday of 1972 and the H-Blocks Hunger Strikers in Long Kesh Prison in 1981 are two watershed moments of the Troubles that reinforced the Irish call for an end to British involvement in Northern Ireland.

On January 30, 1972, British military personnel, in an effort to break up an Irish republican demonstration in Derry that was turning violent, opened fire on the demonstrators, killing 13—mostly unarmed teenagers—and fatally wounding another who would die months later. A few days after the Bloody Sunday incident in Derry, demonstrators marched on the British Embassy in Dublin, burning it down (Arthur and Jeffrey). Diplomacy between the British and Irish was at a low point as the Bloody Sunday events hardened the opinion of the Catholic public sphere across Ireland.

The crystallization of opinion as a result of Bloody Sunday could be seen readily in the vernacular public sphere of young, disenfranchised Irish boys and men, whose attitudes toward what they saw as British occupation turned so sour that the Irish
Republican Army (IRA) saw a drastic rise in recruitment. Father Daly, who was made famous on Bloody Sunday by a photograph depicting him waving a white handkerchief while Catholics carried the body of a boy who had been shot by the British, is quoted as saying:

A lot of the younger people in Derry who may have been more pacifist became quite militant as a result of it. People who were there on that day and who saw what happened were absolutely enraged by it and just wanted to seek some kind of revenge for it. In later years many young people I visited in prison told me quite explicitly that they would never have become involved in the IRA but for what they witnessed, and heard of happening, on Bloody Sunday. (McKittrick and McVea 77)

McKittrick and McVea go on to comment that, “The incident had enormous ramifications, taking a place in Irish history as a formative moment which not only claimed fourteen lives but also hardened attitudes, increased paramilitary recruitment, helped generate more violence, and convulsed Anglo-Irish relations” (77). During the decade of the 1970s, the IRA became a household name around the world as the organization gained more prominence as a result of Bloody Sunday and similar outbreaks of violence, which the IRA and its sympathizers viewed as hostile acts of an occupying foreign military.

As IRA recruitment increased, so did the arrest and jailing of members of the paramilitary group. At times, IRA members were subject to internment without trial. When they were offered political status, they were housed in the H-Blocks at Long Kesh Prison, but because they were separated from the general criminal prison population,
accommodation space and quality was lacking, and “in many respects resembled a World War Two prisoner-of-war camp” (McKittrick and McVea 137). The internment and poor accommodations further enraged the IRA and their likeminded counterparts, and prisoners began a series of hunger strikes.

The hunger strikes were intended to win demands from the British government that included “the right to wear their own clothes; no prison-dictated work; free association; weekly letters visits and parcels, and the restoration of all remission lost as a result of the [earlier] protests” (McKittrick and McVea 141). The second series of hunger strikes began on March 1, 1981, with Bobby Sands, an IRA member who would go on to become a martyr of the republican movement in Ireland. After more than two months on hunger strike, Sands died on May 5, 1981, but not before being elected to Parliament as MP (Member of Parliament) for the Fermanagh-South Tyrone Westminster constituency after the sudden death of the MP in that seat. “It was a propaganda victory of huge proportions for the IRA. … Since Sands’ victory was one of the key events in the development of Sinn Fein as an electoral force, some observers regard it as the genesis of what would eventually become the peace process” (McKittrick and McVea 143). The ensuing two decades would see continued violence and repeated attempts to institute some semblance of peace in Northern Ireland. American diplomacy would play a crucial role in establishing the Good Friday Peace Treaty of 1998.

Then-President Bill Clinton and First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton played a key part in American-Northern Ireland relations during the latter years of the Troubles, and the Clintons planned to visit Northern Ireland in December 2012 as part of Rodham Clinton’s farewell tour as Secretary of State:
If the trip runs to plan, it will be a nostalgic occasion for Mrs Clinton and her husband. The couple visited the province three times while he held the Presidency between 1993 and 2001. Both took a close interest in the peace process and she was well-known to open doors for Northern Ireland politicians, especially women, in Washington. … In 1995 the two of them stood behind a bullet-proof screen to turn on the Christmas lights in Belfast just a year after the IRA ceasefire. (Clarke)

The Clintons were very involved in Northern Ireland in the 1990s, so it should not be surprising that the State Department’s community diplomacy programs showcase an initiative in Northern Ireland under Rodham Clinton’s leadership; moreover one that looks to improve the economic situation and the lives of women in the area.

Clinton was the first American president during the latter years of the Troubles to highlight the situation by increased Executive and diplomatic involvement. Francis M. Carroll says that, “by the mid-1990s, the new American president, Bill Clinton, saw an opportunity to intervene on the edge of events, as a neutral party, with the hope of pushing the peace process forward” (211). As Clinton’s involvement in Northern Ireland grew, his presidency became more central to the peace process. Between 1993 and 1995, Gerry Adams, the leader of Northern Ireland’s Sinn Fein party (the political party of the IRA) was granted a visa and traveled to the United States at least three times to meet with Senator Edward Kennedy, and his sister, Jean Kennedy Smith, then-U.S. Ambassador to Ireland (Carroll). Adams’ visits were controversial because the British government officially recognized Adams as a terrorist, and in an effort to not strain relations with the Crown, the State Department advised Clinton against endearing himself so quickly to Adams. In March 1995, Adams attended both the Speaker of the House’s and the
President’s St. Patrick’s Day parties in Washington, where he met Clinton and shook his hand (Carroll). As Sinn Fein became more legitimized on the world stage, resorting to guerilla tactics on the part of the IRA would become harder to justify.

Clinton’s 1995 Christmas trip to Belfast marks a watershed moment in the American involvement in the peace process. Carroll offers:

The president’s visit to Northern Ireland was more than a courtesy call. It represented a commitment to an actual Irish policy that no other administration had been willing to attempt. Clinton had worked with all the major parties, had met all the major leaders, and had publicly committed himself to the peace process. (Carroll 232)

After the cease-fire in 1996, Clinton would play a major part in the intervening years to help build the Good Friday Peace Treaty of 1998.

On April 10, 1998, a peace treaty was signed that is commonly referred to as the Good Friday Peace Treaty, or formally, the Belfast Agreement. The agreement formally ushered in an end to the Troubles, if not practically, then formally between the British government and Sinn Fein. The 35-page document outlines political processes and obligations, as well as human, social, and economic rights. Among them is “the right to equal opportunity in all social and economic activity, regardless of class, creed, disability, gender or ethnicity” (Belfast Agreement 20). Community diplomacy programs like the ones highlighted in the QDDR can front any number of issues salient to a particular, situated, vernacular community. The community diplomacy programs the State Department undertook in Northern Ireland highlight many of the same human and social
rights as are guaranteed in the Good Friday Peace Agreement. The QDDR highlights the community diplomacy program in Northern Ireland this way:

As Northern Ireland continues to move beyond its troubles, our Consulate in Belfast is building a network of local citizens who have participated in programs sponsored by the United States. Connections forged by the Consulate have already had an impact across the province: in one case, women who had participated in different U.S. programs have organized a community of female activists; in another two groups of alumni have established a Northern Ireland public service mentoring partnership. (United States Department of State and United States Agency on International Development 64)

After more than 30 years of violence during the Troubles, and generations of tension and intermittent violence before the 1960s, basic rights of access to education and political and economic empowerment are needed in many communities throughout Northern Ireland. The State Department’s community diplomacy programs in Northern Ireland address the most salient residual social issues from the Troubles.

The Rhetoric of Public Diplomacy 2.0 for Northern Ireland

Public diplomacy 2.0 is a powerful tool for American diplomats. Rendering clear that public diplomacy 2.0 is a specific, new iteration in postmodern public diplomacy—and by bringing communication scholarship to bear on its practice—is critical for success. Specifically, in heeding the State Department’s directives to build interpersonal relationships and influence the narrative toward American policy objectives, this section will address those maxims in light of economic empowerment and women’s equality in Northern Ireland. Through the engagement of the three coordinated management of
meaning metaphors—coordinating social construction, managing pluralism, and participant meaning—the remainder of this project will undertake an examination of, and make recommendations for improvement of, economic viability and women’s empowerment. Similarly, through the metaphors or history, story, and self, this section will examine economic and women’s empowerment, making recommendations for public diplomacy practitioners working on shaping the narrative toward peace, prosperity, and democracy in Northern Ireland. Moreover, a philosophy of communication that is attentive to interpersonal and narrative communication can bolster the work of public diplomacy 2.0 as American diplomats engage with a postmodern world.

CMM lays out three major metaphors from which diplomats can approach their work: coordinating social construction, managing pluralism, and participant meaning. The theory is concerned with the social, communicative processes whereby human relationships and organizations are formed, making Pearce and Cronen’s work a good entrance from which to engage the QDDR’s directive to strengthen people-to-people relationships. Concerned more about the communicative and active processes that make up human communication and less about the products of that communication—like culture, religion, et cetera—CMM offers praxis recommendations on how public diplomacy practitioners can strengthen people-to-people relationships from a rhetorical posture for the goal of building the economy in Northern Ireland.

The community diplomacy program in Northern Ireland brought together groups of people across the sectarian divide for the purpose of job skills training in order to strengthen the local economy in the border counties between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. Approaching that work through the lens of social construction as a
key component of coordinating and managing meaning, this project recommends that community diplomacy programs take socially constructed difference seriously. Against fronting the sectarian issues as something to be pushed aside for the sake of working together to strengthen relationships through a concerted effort to strengthen the economy, diplomats should look to strengthen people-to-people relationships by looking at the issues of social construction, providing a space for a real and honest discussion of socially constructed difference between Catholic republicans and Protestant loyalists. Those identities of nationalism and religion are the products of a socially constructed rhetoric, and as such, should be given proper place in community diplomacy programs that look to use communicative theory and processes to strengthen people-to-people relationships.

Mentorship programs should develop ways in which to engage participants in communicative practices and action to build a new socially constructed paradigm—one that builds from existing meaning and tradition while underscoring the importance of a coordinated management of meaning that is attentive to difference in order to solve the problems tradition and sectarianism has caused. Coordinated management of meaning applied to community diplomacy programs in Northern Ireland should socially construct a new hybrid reality of economic hope and reconciliation for mentorship groups and for women. As the programs work to bring together economically disadvantaged people from both sides of the issue, they should use CMM to mediate and engage difference, which is a major driver of identity in Northern Ireland, by offering a new meaning, coordinated and managed toward the idea of economic revitalization and sustainability. For women, particularly, CMM offers a new communication action paradigm, by which women can
see themselves not as Protestant or Catholic, but as women, who are working to socially construct a reality of political enfranchisement through both community groups and in formal political affiliation within the government.

Community diplomacy programs should promote specific communicative tactics by which to strengthen people-to-people relationships through working toward the goal of economic growth and women’s enfranchisement. Knowing that the products of nationality and religion have been the major socially constructed paradigms that contributed to the Troubles, diplomats should be attentive to them, but should be ultimately concerned with developing a philosophy of communication that manages and coordinates a socially constructed meaning that privileges the hope of economic advancement and political enfranchisement and that has the power to offer a new paradigm of what it means to be Northern Irish—on either side of the sectarian and/or gender divide.

Pluralism in Northern Ireland is a matter of individuals understanding themselves as Protestant, ethnically distinct Anglo-Saxons, British loyalists; or as Catholic, ethnically Celtic/Irish, and culturally and nationally distinct from British law, culture, and in many cases, language. In a pluralistic world, Pearce offers, “good communication occurs when you and others are able to coordinate your actions sufficiently well that your conversations comprise social worlds in which you and they can live well—that is, with dignity, honor, joy and love” (Interpersonal Communication: Making Social Worlds 366). Important in a world where a given metanarrative is in decline or is contested (as in the case of Northern Ireland), the call in the QDDR is one of engaging pluralism, where
meaning’s construction takes on importance as a rhetorical, social practice situated in the ethical system of a local public sphere to promote dignity, respect, and peace.

Community diplomacy programs in Northern Ireland should be coordinated on the basis of shared common ground through the stories of economic hope or women’s rights. “Different sectors of [people’s] everyday life relate them to vastly different and often severely discrepant worlds of meaning and experience” (Berger, Berger, and Kellner 64). Engaging pluralism in a CMM approach to community diplomacy in Northern Ireland should focus on strengthening people-to-people relationships through coordinating the stories of individual’s minimally shared goods, like their role as women or their economic situation. Story coordination in CMM theorizes that as actors in a situation communicate, they coordinate the ongoing discourse in real-time, as discourse unfolds between them and as they manage their competing commitments in a pluralistic situation.

Story coordination in being attentive to pluralism in Northern Irish community diplomacy programs has particular relevance for public diplomacy 2.0. As Griffin notes, “coordination is difficult when two people have a separate sense of what is necessary, noble, and good” (73). For practitioners of public diplomacy 2.0 in Northern Irish community diplomacy programs, individuals will certainly have a separate sense of the good. CMM would recommend that to strengthen those people-to-people relationships, diplomats build their community programs around the minimal commonly accepted notion of the good—that is, economic viability in Northern Ireland or that women, whether Protestant or Catholic, share a common good in the goal of political activity.
The third metaphor CMM offered to strengthen people-to-people relationships is participant meaning. A common feature of all the Northern Irish community diplomacy programs is that they engage individuals who have historically not been participants in the life of Northern Ireland, whether politically or economically. Community mentorship programs were developed to help those on the economic margins, particularly young men. Women’s programs were intended to provide a path for community organization and local activism for women, who had historically not enjoyed as many opportunities for political activism as their counterparts in other Western countries.

CMM’s metaphor of participant meaning prompts diplomats to build and develop their programs not just to help members, but to be structured to empower women and those on the economic margins to develop meaning as active participants in the co-creation and management of their new realities of economic opportunity and equal suffrage. The concept of participant meaning was approached through several different CMM models. Particularly, this project’s work on coordinating and managing meaning fronted the idea of diplomat-as-participant—that the public diplomacy 2.0 practitioner has a responsibility to attend to the myriad stories at work in constructing the current reality. In Northern Ireland, this means that to strengthen people-to-people relationships effectively through community diplomacy programs, diplomats have to become part of the community to understand the stories of that community. The metaphor of participant meaning in CMM theoretically buttresses Rodham Clinton’s 2010 charge in Foreign Affairs:

The QDDR endorses a new public diplomacy strategy that makes public engagement every diplomat’s duty, through town-hall meetings and interviews
with the media, organized outreach, events in provincial towns and smaller communities, student exchange programs, and virtual connections that bring together citizens and civic organizations. (―Leading Through Civilian Power‖ 15-16)

To strengthen people-to-people relationships, diplomats cannot be removed, disinterested policy bureaucrats, but must be in the community, understanding the socially constructed realities of people’s lives in order to offer solutions to problems. They need to be participants, encouraging members of local, vernacular communities to participate in and shape the narrative as well.

Moreover, the participant metaphor in CMM offers a space in community diplomacy programs for individuals to take an active communicative role in coordinating and managing the meaning of their lives. Community diplomacy in Northern Ireland should be developed in a way that empowers people to solve their problems and implicates them in the ongoing work of communicatively constructing a new paradigm through which to engage in a renewed a viable economic and political life. Community diplomacy mentorship programs and women’s activism programs in Northern Ireland should approach their work by offering tools for communicative action to the people they are intended to help, that is to say, skills that allow the strengthening of people-to-people relationships by equipping them to engage together. In her work The Human Condition, Arendt calls this the vita activa, which is a life of action in the community, through communication, to philosophically address and solve problems.

Narrative theory was also engaged to examine how public diplomacy practitioners might philosophically engage in the directive to shape the narrative. Through a discussion
of the narrative theory work of major thinkers in the discipline, three metaphors emerge that can inform the community diplomacy programs in Northern Ireland: history, story, and self. Diplomats’ work in shaping the narrative should be informed by an understanding that in postmodernity, metanarratives no longer enjoy the same centrality they once did. Therefore, diplomats should be attentive to the localized, petite narratives they engage. Moreover, understanding people is a matter of understanding the community in which they live and build their lives. History, story, and self in postmodern narratives are tied to the notion of community. No longer (at least in most cases) is history, story, and self tied to large monolithic institutions like the Church or the nation-state. Instead, people operate and find their identities in the narratives of communities and vernacular, local public spheres in a postmodern moment. Public diplomacy policy should be formulated around this understanding of narrative.

History has a central place in public diplomacy practices that look to shape the narrative. Practitioners of public diplomacy 2.0 developing and implementing community diplomacy initiatives should shift their thinking about rationality to rationality-in-tradition, that is to say that rationality becomes rationalities particular to histories. While a minimal reasonableness as human beings exists, gone is the era of conceiving of rationality as a given universal. Understanding rationalities as particular to the history in which the narrative is grounded, diplomats can avoid the Enlightenment impulse to evaluate the merit of a narrative on an assumed universal rationality that lies outside of it.

In the case of both mentorships and economic development programs, calling on members of localized, sectarian publics to set aside difference for the sake of a common cause like economic growth will not work. Diplomats need to understand that the
rationality of the particular situation in Northern Ireland during the Troubles was born out of a long and painful history. Moreover, as philosophers of communication would offer, the narrative that emerged out of that particular history, and is embedded in it, is a narrative that makes sense and finds emotional buy-in that particular history.

In the case of women’s narratives, understanding identity as identity-in-narrative offers agency based in story. A person’s identity, or their self, is both unique and constant as well as changing in relation to others. The self’s identity as same gives the self temporal stability (“I am always me”) while identity-as-agency gives the self the ability to change in relation to others and other narratives (“I hold a different set of political commitments than I used to”). To encourage women’s equality this project recommends a Ricoeurian approach to shaping the narrative that offers agency to women by grounding their identity in discursive practices that bring women together, not in spite of their gender, but because of their gender. A Ricoeurian approach may help to build a narrative around empowerment because of women’s unique roles in Northern Irish life, regardless of their place on either side of the sectarian divide.

MacIntyre and Arnett are also attentive to the particularities of history, story, and self as situating the narrative. Both understand the human agent as embedded in an already-given social construction of the world in which the agent has to search for what they should do particular to their narrative and history. Community diplomacy programs should retain and reinforce the particularity of each stakeholder’s narrative standpoint in relation to history and their community. Against changing paradigms of what groups should value (e.g., “economic growth” over “religious and ethnic identity”), a philosophy of communication should encourage ownership of and pride in particular public spheres
and shape the narrative in a way that opens the narrative to encompass new ideas. For example, the self might be recast in a narrative that values economic growth as a good that flows out of Irish Catholic or British Protestant pride in the health and viability of one’s community. If economic growth and prosperity for Northern Ireland is the good to be promoted and protected, diplomats can shape a cooperative narrative between the two groups based on that minimal, particular, vernacular rationality.

Shaping the narrative in community diplomacy programs is best served by being attentive to the rationality of particular histories, stories, and selves. Effective community diplomacy does not emerge as a result of devaluing old narratives in an effort to create and shape new ones, but instead builds new ethical goods identified from minimal commitments each side holds. These minimal ethical goods are based in pride and ownership of difference that make Northern Ireland a unique place. Good narrative shaping in Northern Ireland comes from commitment to understanding the histories, stories, and selves forged from very particular circumstances, including socio-economic situation, physical location within Northern Ireland, and gender. Public diplomacy 2.0 practitioners who implicate themselves in the myriad public spheres can yield good community diplomacy initiatives that actively and effectively shape the narrative based on those differences and by identifying minimal ethical commitments common across narratives.

Conclusion

This project considered how diplomats can employ communication scholarship in carrying out the work of diplomacy 2.0—a new iteration of postmodern public diplomacy that is attentive to rhetoric and communication. This project has argued that the State
Department’s conception of public diplomacy under Rodham Clinton leadership marked a second, and explicitly postmodern, rhetorical turn in American diplomacy out of which my term “public diplomacy 2.0” grows. Moreover, an overview of American diplomacy history, a consideration of major differences between modernity and postmodernity, as well as theoretical work in the field of rhetoric and communication laid the groundwork for this intersection of scholarship between rhetoric and diplomacy.

In chapter 1, four terms were historically central to situating the argument that the Rodham Clinton State Department marked a second, postmodern rhetorical turn in American diplomacy with their 2010 QDDR. The terms “state,” “public,” “diplomacy,” and “public diplomacy,” provided a background for understanding the call to attend to interpersonal and narrative communication theory. By juxtaposing Rodham Clinton’s work against conceptions of the public, the state, and diplomacy in the early-to-mid 20th century, she was established as a postmodern diplomat in Chapter 2. Moreover, the State Department’s mandate in the QDDR to strengthen people-to-people relationships and shape the narrative marks an explicit communicative and rhetorical component in contemporary American diplomacy. Chapter 3 brought interpersonal communication theory to bear on the QDDR’s maxim to strengthen interpersonal relationships. By applying Pearce and Cronen’s CMM theory and identifying major metaphors, this chapter offered a praxis application for the public diplomacy 2.0 practitioner. Similarly, Chapter 4 introduced narrative theory work across the communication and rhetoric discipline to inform how public diplomacy professionals can philosophically engage with their work.

Community diplomacy programs in Northern Ireland were highlighted in the QDDR. They sought to bring together people across the sectarian divide for the
strengthening of the local and regional economy, and for promoting women’s rights.
Specifically, Chapter 5 introduced the field of public diplomacy 2.0 as a new iteration of
postmodern public diplomacy whose ground is in the scholarship of rhetoric and
communication. The chapter then applied the philosophical work undertaken in Chapters
3 and 4 and offered recommendations that public diplomacy practitioners—as
philosophic generalists—can use to engage their work in strengthening people-to-people
relationships and shaping the narrative.

Rhetorical theory and philosophy of communication are important to international
relations and diplomacy, and central to public diplomacy 2.0. This project works on the
assumption that diplomacy and international relations are essentially rhetorical and
communicative ways of building a world, and as such, the study of diplomacy can benefit
from rhetorical scholarship. The work undertaken in this project to develop public
diplomacy 2.0 promotes peace, human rights, and a more democratic world. Those
qualities—peace, human rights, and democracy—can find a source of hope for their
postmodern fulfillment through public diplomacy 2.0’s anchor in the field of
communication and rhetoric.
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