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BETWEEN JOHANNESBURG AND JERUSALEM: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
OF NON-VIOLENCE AS A STRATEGY FOR POLITICAL CHANGE; THE CASE OF
APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OF
PALESTINE/ISRAEL

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By

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Abstract

Non-violence as a mechanism of political change has been applied with differing degrees of success. While such struggles have born fruit in some instances, they have faltered in others. Using *Most Similar Systems Design*, this study examines factors underpinning the variability in outcomes with the aim of establishing possible constant(s) that are necessary for a successful non-violent campaign, through the application of Schock's analytical framework of unarmed insurrections and Sharp's theoretical requirements for non-violence. Aspects of comparison include: political, economic and systemic factors affecting apartheid South Africa and the Occupied Territories of Israel/Palestine and how their interplay accounted for the differential nature of their outcomes. Results reveal that interdependence-referring to a dynamic of being mutually responsible to and dependent on others in local, national, and systemic spheres was necessary but not a sufficient variable. It is the degree to which the interplay of the national and systemic variables was able to affect the cost of contention that determined policy actions of the parties.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Background

At the end of the twentieth century, a wave of non-violent insurrections swept across the globe, whereby mass protests, demonstrations, strikes, boycotts, civil disobedience and other methods of non-violent action were implemented to promote political transformations around the world. The *people power* movement in the Philippines, the solidarity movement in Poland, the fall of the Berlin wall in Germany and the collapse of the apartheid system in South Africa captured the popular imagination and motivated challengers in their struggles against oppression throughout the world. Yet these jubilant scenes were contrasted with the brutal suppression of non-violent protests in Niger, Palestine, Tibet, East Timor, Burma, China and elsewhere. Is it possible to account for these varied outcomes? While case studies of particular struggles abound, there is a lack of comparative and analytical examinations on why this trajectory has resulted in varied outcomes in otherwise similar contexts. This study attempted to address this gap by exploring the conditions that made non-violence methods relatively successful in certain cases while not in others. The cases selected in this study were: apartheid South Africa and the Occupied Territories of Israel/ Palestine. Results show a relationship between a state's level of dependence or interdependence on both its national and international challengers and the likelihood of success or failure. However, the ultimate determinant of the outcomes in both cases was not interdependence per se, but the extent to which this affected the cost of contention, with perceived higher costs

yielding more concessions by imposing constraints on the parties' options and exposing their vulnerabilities.

Justification of Cases

The choice of the above cases arises from certain distinct but shared similarities that are important to our analysis on the efficacy of non-violence. First, internally, both systems were characterized by political exclusion and economic dominance of the occupied subjects. Second, the struggles in both cases had armed elements that do not necessarily share the non-violent approach, the African National Congress (ANC) in the former and the Palestinian Liberation Organization in the later that were never military threats to the South African and Israeli regimes respectively but did have a “symbolic importance and boosted the morale of unarmed activists through their activities” (Schock, 2005, p.159). Third, in both cases, discriminatory and colonial codes formed the edifice of their legal infrastructure. Fourth, in both cases there was a precedence of national/racial origins over class issues. Indeed, Dajani (1994) notes that even though labor was traditionally the “vanguard” of the resistance movement in South Africa and became increasingly so in the Palestinian case, especially after the *intifada*, “the struggle was distinctly anti colonial in each case” (p. 102). Fifth, in both cases, methods of nonviolent action were taken up for pragmatic reasons rather than due to any moral revulsion against violence (Shock, 2005).

Finally, ideologically, Zionism sought a land without a people while South African apartheid sought a land with a people. However, the 1967 war altered the demographic reality of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. In contrast to the situation in the

1948 war, the majority of Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza Strip did not flee in 1967. Israel's response to the challenges posed by the 1967 war was to foster its claims over the occupied land, rather than facilitate its separation from it. The Palestinian population continued to grow by more than (2.3%) per annum ever since creating a demographic problem (Farsakh, 1998). The way Israel dealt with the Palestinian demographic reality proved to be a key additional similarity between the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and apartheid South Africa, despite the initial differences between the Zionist and the South African colonial trajectories. The implication of Israeli policies was to lay the foundation for an apartheid system, by default if not by design. This is largely because Israel pursued an elaborate policy of territorial integration combined with societal separation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip with the Israeli military government allowing the transfer of settlers to the Occupied Territories in contravention of the Geneva Convention (Geneva, 1949).

Externally, both cases are based within a hostile neighborhood environment in which they make frequent military incursions while boasting of capitalist economies that are heavily tied to the industrial West.

Period

This analysis compared two slightly distinct periods in the history of non-violence struggle in South Africa and Palestine. In South Africa, our period of analysis begins in 1983, when the antiapartheid movement with the exception of the ANC armed wing, committed themselves to non-violent resistance (Zunes, 1999). At the same time a Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) was formed, which included the informal alliance of the ANC, Congress of South African Trade Union (COSATU) and United Democratic Front

(UDF), made up of 700 organizations that included civil associations, trade unions, and churches calling for non racial democracy. Our analysis ends with the enactment of a new democratic constitution in 1993.

In Palestine, our analysis concentrated on the first phase of the *intifada* which broke out in the late 1987 initially non-violent but gradually turning semi violent in the period preceding the Oslo Accords in 1993. The uprising comprised of various actors but for the purpose of this study we will concentrate on three main groupings. These included: Popular Committees that dealt with specific issues such as food, health care, security, education and protest activities, the Unified National Command for the Uprising, these contained instructions and advice for sustaining the uprising, schedules for strike activities, business hours, and slogans and themes, and the last group composing of professors, journalists and familiar political personalities who mediated between the clandestine UNLU and the PLO, and the International and Israeli media.

The modest goal of this study is to shed some light on the cross national variation in trajectories of non-violent struggles through the application of Schock's framework of analysis as shall be discussed in this enterprise. Shock (2005) analyzes six different struggles for political democratization in authoritarian contexts in the last quarter of the last century. The central question he addresses is why and how the movements in some contexts like the Philippines won the democratic breakthrough they were seeking, while those in places like Burma were brutally squelched with no regime softening. His explanation takes account of state and civil society dynamics and highlights the importance of both *structure* and *strategy*. Building on Schock's work that touched on six different struggles that included China, Burma, South Africa, Thailand and the

Philippines, this study tried to investigate the underlying factors in both apartheid South Africa and the Occupied Territories of Israel/Palestine and how these factors constrained or enabled the success of these protests. In particular I domestically focused on the state-society dynamics, and systemically, at the state-international system dynamics and how the interplay influenced outcomes in both cases. I view this study as a draft of an explanatory sketch. I hope this study will to motivate others to undertake comparative analyses of the dynamics of non-violent action either by elaborating on or criticizing my findings with the view of improving on both theory and practice of non-violence as strategy for political change.

I.2 *Defining Non-violence*

Non-violent action can be defined as “conflict behavior consisting of unconventional acts implemented for purposive change without intentional damage to persons or property” (Zunes, 1999, p.138). Nonviolent actions include “strikes, boycotts, sit-ins, occupations, demonstrations, refusal to pay taxes, creation of alternative parallel institutions and other forms of civil disobedience” (p.138). Or “those methods of resistance and direct action without physical violence in which the members of a non-violent group commit either *acts of omission* in which they refuse to perform acts which they usually perform and are expected by custom or required by law to perform or *acts of commission* in which they insist on performing acts which they usually do not perform, are not expected by custom to perform or are forbidden by law to perform. Often, these methods are extra constitutional” (Sharp, 1959, p. 44).

Intifada as a Non-violent Struggle

It is difficult from face value to conceive of *intifada* as a non-violent struggle. Many analysts expect a non-violent movement to be modeled along the US civil rights movement or Gandhi’s independence movement. Clearly, the *intifada* diverges from this type of non-violence due to its semi-violent nature that it later became. However, as Abu Nimer notes, “rather than discarding the possibility that it is a movement of non-violence, we need to ask whether the Gandhi-King model is the only form of nonviolent resistance...” (Abu Nimer, 2003, p. 139). He further opines that we can understand the nature of nonviolence in the uprising only if we adjust for cultural specificity and stages of historical development, free ourselves from the prejudgment of Palestinian actions that

permeates most discourses in the West and avoid imposing expectations on what nonviolent revolution should be (p.139).

The basis of his argument is predicated upon Sharp's work *The Politics of Non-violent Action* (1973), which analyses principles, methods and dynamics of nonviolent resistance. His classification of 198 different methods on non-violent action provides the broad sweep of tactics that would help us understand the "multifaceted nature of resistance in the *intifada*" (Abu Nimer, 2003, p. 140). Many Palestinians for instance embraced civil disobedience as the primary thrust and symbol of the *intifada* (p. 138). Stone throwing at Israeli tanks in this case should be interpreted not as a deliberate act aimed at causing injury and damage but as symbol of their resistance and a deliberate restraint in the use of force, since as some of the protesters argued, they had a choice of more lethal weapons (p.141). However they recognized that the use of stones against automatic weapons is an unfair fight, and the massive Israeli retaliation against stone throwers would and did upset the status quo by damaging morale in the Israeli army and increasing public sympathy for the Palestinians; some of the key motivations in using non-violence (p.142). To further appreciate its nonviolent character, it is also important that the *intifada* "is seen not a sudden violent phenomenon but as a movement that grew out of historical experience and which represented a stage of social maturation" (p. 133).

It is not possible to discuss the non-violence aspects of the *intifada* without first addressing the question of whether the activities carried out by Palestinians in the first two years of the uprising could be termed non-violent. To understand the role of non-violence and to see what distinguishes this from a violent revolution, "one must examine tactics that are questionable or clearly violent" (Abu Nimer, 2003, p. 141). One of the

primary activities of the *intifada* was stone throwing, something that was both a tact and a symbol. These were used in demonstrations and against Israeli soldiers “to provoke them into retaliation and keep them at a distance” (p.141).

Stone throwing appears to be a violent tactic to some Palestinians as well as Israelis (Abu Nimer, 2003). But as one Palestinian argued, “The stones are just to tell the soldiers what we want. You cannot talk to machine guns....stones are not violence” (p. 141). This brings in an element of *perception*. Stone throwing is portrayed here as a deliberate restraint in the use of force. The argument is that the Israeli military would make the use of weapons counterproductive. Indeed, successful reliance on stone throwing had an important effect on the Palestinians’ self image. They no longer feared Israel’s superior weapons because they had discovered the “power of numbers, solidarity and non-lethal weapons” (p. 142).

But is stone throwing really necessary? Could Palestinians have achieved their objectives with absolute non-violence? This brings us to the question of pragmatism and utility of non-violence. Can nonviolence equally succeed in all cases or are there certain prerequisites for its success? As one Palestinian observed, “I wish that my people would use no violence. Let us all sit down in the street; let the Israelis arrest all of us. We will choke their jails and the world will be appalled” (Abu Nimer, 2003, p. 143). This assessment based on King and Gandhian nonviolence fails to take account of the different context of the *intifada*.

First, the demands that Gandhi’s movement made and the threat it posed bear some resemblance to the Palestinian situation, but Gandhi had advantages that Palestinians lacked. He was a western educated Indian who was able and willing to speak

the language of Christianity, appeal to the ideals of English civilization, and thus command international recognition and moral standing. Second, Gandhi had distance, numbers and space. Britain was far away and their occupying force was small in comparison to the vast indigenous population. They could not control the population when significant numbers decided to resist. They were quite willing to fill the jails and keep them full (Abu Nimer, 2003). Thirdly, the British did not perceive the movement as an *existential* threat nor did India have the same sentimental value to the British that Palestine has to Israel. Most importantly, the analysis of the *intifada* as primarily and intrinsically violent is fallacious in that it does not take into account the first two years in which strikes, boycotts, and refusal to pay taxes, demonstrations, creation of alternative institutions and other forms of civil disobedience formed the bulk of the resistance. Finally, it is important that the *intifada* or antiapartheid movement is not analyzed in monolithic terms as an *organized whole*. As Shock notes in *Unarmed Insurrections*, no liberation movement can be purely nonviolent (Shock, 2005). Hence incidents of violence in the larger group should not obscure the nonviolent character and purpose of the movement.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

A study of nonviolent struggles reveals an avalanche of scholarly work on various frameworks which determine success or failure of non-violent struggles. Schock (2005) discusses these frameworks in detail some of which are highlighted in this chapter. These include *inter alia*; structural and perceived opportunities, national and international opportunities, violence and radical flank effects and clear and limited goals.

Structural and perceived opportunities

This framework assumes that there is a close connection between structural and perceived opportunities. Contrary to these assumptions however, there may be instances where structural and perceived opportunities are mismatched. Charles Kuzman argues in the case of Iranian revolution in 1979, there was a mismatch between the two, as challengers' perceived opportunities despite the absence of objective structural opportunities (Kuzman, 1996). Although the Shah's regime remained strong and its capacities for repression were not diminished, the challenger's calculations about political opportunities and constraints were based on the growth of the opposition rather than on the objective strength of the state. People feared repression and the consequences of engaging in collective action, but they perceived that constraints on participation were decreasing as the challenge grew more widespread. Thus Kuzman concludes that perceived opportunities may affect the mobilization and outcomes of social movements independent of structural opportunities. In China however, the mismatch between perceived and structural opportunities contributed to the challenge's demise. "Perceptions of structural elite divisions within the communist party gave people false hope thereby

encouraging their futile struggle” (Zhao, 2001, p. 320). Thus perceived elite divisions lowered the perceived risk of mobilization and promoted the escalation of demands. The result was a tragic failure (Schock, 2005).

National and International opportunities

The international context may influence political contention directly by shaping the balance of power within countries or indirectly through its impact on national political structures (Jenkins & Schock, 1992). The degree and nature of external influence are shaped by the types of a country’s interdependencies with transnational actors (Schock, 2005) namely: the extent to which a country is integrated with or isolated from the international system, the extent to which a country is dependent upon another country, the nature of economic relations with other countries. First, Schock (2005) is of the opinion that the more integrated a state is into the international system of states, the more likely it will be that foreign states and transnational social movements will be in a position to provide support for a challenge or effectively pressure a state for change. Second, states that are more dependent on external support are more susceptible to foreign influence in their domestic politics. The opposite is also true. Third, he argues that the nature of economic ties to the international system has consequences for political contention within countries. Countries whose economies are characterized by export oriented industrialization, for example, are more susceptible to pressures for economic and political liberalization than are countries whose economies are oriented toward providing natural resources to other countries. Apartheid South Africa with its heavy dependence on the capitalist West for its economic survival therefore made it susceptible to external pressures. Lowenberg and Kaempfers’ public choice analysis of the effects of disinvestment

campaigns on the politics of apartheid supports this observation (Lowenberg & Kaempfer, 2001).

In supporting this view, Schock (2005) comparing Burma and Thailand, two contiguous countries where unarmed insurrections had opposite outcomes illustrates the contrasting effects of three dimensions. First, he notes Burma was much less integrated into the international system both politically and economically than Thailand, so Burma was less susceptible to international pressures for political liberalization. Since 1962, Burma had pursued autarkic economic policies that had not only had negative consequences for its economic development, but had also shielded the state from pressures to conform to international norms and inhibited society from developing ties to transnational social movement organizations (Shock, 2005).

Second, Schock (2005) adds that the historical dependence of the Thai military-bureaucratic elite on the United States contrasts with Burma's lack of dependence on a foreign country. While Thailand was supported by the US during the Cold War, Burma maintained a neutral position; hence foreign power influence in Burmese politics remained minimal.

Third, he notes that Thailand's, export-oriented industrialization contrasted with Burmese autarkic policies before 1988 and its increased role as a supplier of natural raw materials to other countries after 1988. Thailand's export oriented economic growth during the 1980s had facilitated the development of internationally oriented capitalists and members of the middle classes who had developed a degree of interdependence from the state and supported economic and political liberalization. Prior to the 1990's, Burma's relative isolation inhibited the ability of foreign actors to influence political contention

within Burma. Countries that did have some leverage such as Japan which held substantial investments in Burma, did not exert effective pressure against the military regime. In the 1990s, Burma opened up its economy to investments from Malaysia, South Korea, Thailand and Singapore. Companies invested in timberland and oil deposits. These relations proved profitable for the countries and corporations involved and their economic interests would be threatened by a democratic Burma since environmentalists and indigenous people would exploitation of timberlands and relocation of people for oil exploration (Schock, 2005).

Violence and radical flank effects

According to Schock (2005), a positive radical flank effect occurs when the leverage of moderate challengers is strengthened by the presence of the so called radical wing that has more extreme goals or incorporates violent strategies. The presence of a radical wing makes the moderate's strategies or demands appear more reasonable, and a radical flank may create crises that are resolved to the moderates' advantage. A negative radical flank occurs when activities of a radical wing undermines the leverage of moderates, as the existence of radicals threaten the ability of moderates to invoke third party support and discredits the entire movement's activities and goals.

In the Philippines, Schock (2005) observes that the radical flank effect did seem to occur as the growing armed insurgency in the countryside promoted regime defection and increased the willingness of the United States to break with Marcos and support the democratic opposition when it became apparent in late 1987 that his regime was collapsing. Although the New People's Army was unable to topple the state through violence, it did promote a context that increased democratic opposition. In the South

African case however, the ANC armed attacks on state military installations and acts of *armed propaganda* had a symbolic importance and boosted the morale of anti-apartheid activists. Thus although the armed wing was never a significant threat to the apartheid regime, “it did play a significant role in promoting the mobilization of unarmed insurrection” (Schock, 2005, p.157) Violence by itself was incapable of overturning the apartheid regime, and the anti-apartheid struggle could not have succeeded without broad based campaigns of nonviolent action.

In shedding further light on the role of violence that accompanies *unarmed insurrection*, Schock (2005) compares the South African struggle and the Palestinian *intifada* 1987-90. He notes that in both cases, methods of non-violent action were taken up for pragmatic reasons rather than due to any moral revulsion against violence. In each case, there existed a separate armed wing-the ANC and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) that were never threats to the South African and Israeli regimes, respectively but as demonstrated, did have a symbolic importance and boosted the morale of unarmed activists through their activities.

Despite these similarities however, the outcomes of the two unarmed struggles differed. Schock attributes this difference to dependency relationship. He argues that the antiapartheid movement exploited the state’s dependence on the people to exert leverage whereas the *intifada* failed to do the same. He notes that nonviolent action was possible in South Africa since its proponents were able to exploit the regime’s dependence on black labor and upon the acceptance of political reforms by nonwhites to pressure the regime for political change. By contrast, the Israeli state was not dependent upon Palestinians in the occupied territories except for security, and the *intifada* failed to

mobilize the third party support especially from the United States that would have been necessary to alter the policies of the Israeli regime (Schock, 2005, p.159). Zunes and Lieberfeld (1999) supports Schock's thesis by attributing the movement's greater latitude for manipulation through non-violent means in the South African case to the "high degree of interdependence between blacks and the apartheid regime" (Zunes, 1999, p.162; Lieberfeld, 1999, p. 67).

Schock (2005) posits further that the leverage of the Palestinians who worked in Israel was weak especially when compared to the leverage of black laborers in South Africa. Moreover, the leverage of Palestinian workers decreased in the late 1980s as an influx of Jewish immigrants from the Soviet Union decreased the number of jobs available in Israel. Thus, "the dependence relations that were so adroitly exploited by the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa were absent for Palestinian" (Schock, 2005, p.159). And in fact, the Palestinians were to a large extent dependent on Israel for jobs, goods and services. Moreover, the economic base of the Palestinian society was underdeveloped by the Israeli occupation, and the Israelis created obstacle to prevent the development of indigenous sources of employment in the occupied territories. This limited the impact of any efforts to boycott Israeli-produced goods within the occupied territories since Israel was the only source of many of the basic necessities of life within the occupied territories. "Thus the probability that non-violence would end Israeli occupation and oppression was and still is unlikely to the extent that the occupied territories remain economically dependent on Israel and lack the indigenous economic base necessary to sustain such a struggle"(p.160)

Given these structural relations, Schock proposes that the political fates of unarmed insurrections such as the *intifada*, depend crucially upon the challengers' ability to mobilize the support of third parties with leverage against the target state. One way for the Palestinians to increase their indirect leverage against Israel is to promote political divisions within Israel and cultivate support of Israeli citizens for the Palestinian cause. Another way is to mobilize pressure from abroad particularly from the United States which has a leverage to vitally affect the options open to Israel. However, the *intifada* "failed to mobilize the support of crucial third parties, such as Israeli citizens and other third parties" (Schock, 2005, p.161)

Clear and limited goals

According to Ackerman & Kruegler, one of the principles of strategic nonviolent conflict is "to formulate functional objectives" (Kruegler & Ackerman, 1994, p.26). That is, the goals of the movement should be well chosen, clearly defined and understood by all parties to the conflict. The goals should be compelling and vital to the interests of the challenging group and they should attract the widest possible support, both within society and externally. Ackerman & Kruegler (1994) argue that the concept of freedom is inspiring to millions. As an ultimate strategic objective though, it is not highly functional because it lacks specificity. "The legalization of independent trade unions (as in Poland in 1980), on the other hand is the very model of a clear and functional objective" (p. 26). Precise goals give direction to the power activated by a movement and inhibit the dispersion of mobilized energies and resources. Moreover, clear goals enable a movement to accurately gauge the extent to which its action are bringing about the desired change, thus permitting an alteration in its actions if necessary.

All the successful movements in Thailand, South Africa, Philippines and Nepal, he notes, had clear goals. By contrast, the goals of the movement in China were ambiguous and shifting and there was no clear consensus among the students as to what the goals of the movement were. Goals ranged from the recognition of autonomous student unions to the elimination of government censorship, to ending corruption to the implementation of student system. However, Akerman & Kruegler (1994) add that clear goals by themselves do not ensure success as the pro-change movement in Burma illustrates. Despite having a clear goal of a return to multiparty, lack of organization as well as the political context limited its ability to attain its goal.

The above are some of the arguments advanced as explanatory variables whose presence or absence determines a movement's ability in realizing its objectives. The objective of this research is to investigate the reason for varied outcomes from what analytically can be considered to be similar situations. Hence, by rigorously applying these "models" to apartheid South Africa and the Occupied Territories in Israel/Palestine, this research hopes to establish the explanatory variable(s) accounting for varied outcomes in these two cases.

Significance of this Research

As aforementioned, the goal of this study is to shed some light on the cross national variation in trajectories of non-violent struggles by comparatively examining apartheid South Africa and the Occupied Territories of Israel/ Palestine through the application of Schock's "framework of analysis" above. In summary, Shock (2005) analyses six different struggles for political democratization in authoritarian contexts in the last quarter of the last century. The central question he addresses is why and how the

movements in some contexts like the Philippines won the democratic breakthrough they were seeking, while those in places like Burma were brutally squelched with no regime softening. His explanation takes account of state and civil society dynamics at both the domestic and international levels, and highlights the importance of both structure and strategy. Building on Schock's works that touched on six different struggles that included China, Burma South Africa, Thailand and the Philippines, I intend to investigate the "constants" in both apartheid South Africa and the occupied territories of Israel/Palestine and how these constants affected the outcome in both cases.

The purposes for this study *inter alia* include: (i) establishing those factors whose existence is central to successful nonviolent campaigns. (ii) Helping conflict practitioners understand the limits of non-violence especially in intractable conflicts thereby adopting appropriate intervention models in both national as well as international diplomacy. (iii) Seeking a *theory* that account for variations in outcomes with the aim of improving on both theory and practice of non-violence.

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY, THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

3.1 Theoretical framework

Two approaches are used in this study; the political process model and the non-violent action model. The general purpose of these models is to provide a theoretical guide of both the operational milieu and the methodological parameters of nonviolence. Specifically, the political process model helps us understand how the type and nature of government (the politics) affect the dynamics of non-violence. The non-violence approach on the other hand sheds light on the dynamics of dependency/interdependence and its implications on the efficacy of nonviolence.

The Political Process Model

The central argument of the political process model is that activists do not choose goals, strategies and tactics in a vacuum. Rather, the political context conceptualized fairly broadly, sets the grievances around which activists mobilize, advantaging some claims and disadvantaging others. Furthermore, “the organization of the polity and positioning of various actors within it makes some strategies of influence more attractive and potentially efficacious than others” (Meyer, 1999, p. 82). Hence the outcome of activists’ choices can only be understood and evaluated by looking at the political context. It is important to note that political context in this study is conceptualized both in national and systemic terms. The political environment “provides incentives in terms of

“opportunities” for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectation for success or failure” (Morris, 2000, p. 446).

The emphasis on the political context, that is; the way the state deals with its challengers at a given time is central to our understanding of movement outcomes. For instance, if a government appears less likely to respond to less disruptive means of participation, it will generally be hard to convince many people to take on the risks and difficulties of protesting. If government makes protest less attractive through repression, protest mobilization becomes less likely and may take a violent form if it occurs. This fits well in explaining the shift in tactics in apartheid South Africa after the Sharpeville massacre of 1960. The repression that followed the massacre convinced the antiapartheid movement against the “futility” of non-violence methods even though the resultant armed struggle proved to be equally futile in military terms (Zunes, 1999), even though the later day *responsive* political context are seen both as a *function* and *consequent* of non-violence (p.140). We see the same in the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip after the outbreak of the first *intifada* in 1987. After months of largely peaceful protests by Palestinians, the disproportionate use of force by the Israel military against their “civil resistance” convinced more radical elements like Hamas and Islamic Jihad on the need for alternative means of redress thereby adopting more violent means of resistance.

Non-violent Approach to political change

I borrow this model from Sharp’s “theory of power” (Martin, 1989, p.16). Drawing on the works of Etienne de la Boetie, and the political sociology of Max Weber, Sharp maintains that a government’s power over its subjects is based on their obedience and

cooperation. This relational view of power suggests that power is derived from sources within society, in contrast to a, monolithic theory of power that assumes that power is imposed on people by the state from above due to the state's ability to enforce sanctions and apply repression. According to this school, the most important quality of any government without which it would not exist, must be obedience and submission of its subjects "obedience is the heart of political power" (Sharp, 1973, p. 16).

Thus Sharp's theory is based on the assumption that power of the government is ultimately based *not* on violence, but rather on *obedience* and *cooperation*. If a sufficient number of people disobey or do not cooperate for a sufficient amount of time therefore, the government will be unable to rule, regardless of its coerciveness or brutality. The target of nonviolent action in this case is not the pinnacle of state power or where the state is usually the strongest; that is, its military and security apparatuses, but rather its social roots. Rather than challenging the state on its own terms, that is; with violence, social movements implementing nonviolent action challenge the state using methods that are designed to operate to their advantage. This can be done by denying the regime its sources of support or severing the regime from its sources of support. Thus in calculating the chances of success in campaigns of nonviolent action, the fundamental variable is not the material or military strength of the state, but rather the withdrawal of public support from the regime (Sharp, 1973; Zunes, 1999).

The structural condition of society namely, the nature of its dependency is therefore highly important in determining the general capacity of society to control its leaders (Sharp, 1989). This structural condition refers to the existence of various institutions. These are bodies in society where power is located; this could be through the civil

society, governmental and non-governmental agencies. Relating this theory to South African case, Zunes (1999) supports this in his argument that although the apartheid regime was extraordinarily powerful, it was fundamentally vulnerable in that it depended upon the submission of 80 per cent non-white majority to reinforce its power resources especially in the labor sector. He writes; “it is this paradoxical position of being very powerful but in a vulnerable situation that gave non-violence resistance its power” (p.138).

3.2. *Research Question/ Hypothesis/Variables and Concepts*

Research question

What are the “constants” for success in non-violent strategy?

Hypothesis

The degree of interdependence between a state and its non-violent challengers is central to successful collective nonviolent action.

Variables

Independent variable

Interdependence; defined here as a dynamic of being mutually responsible to and dependent on others.

Dependent variable

Success; defined here as an event that accomplishes its *intended* purpose/objective.

Conceptualizing interdependence

Borrowing from international politics theory, interdependence as defined in this research refers to “sensitivity” and “vulnerability”, “sensitivity to the extent to which one entity is affected by the actions of another, whereas vulnerability is the extent to which an

entity can insulate itself from the costly effects of events that occur elsewhere” (Keohane & Nye, 1977, p. 9). Interdependence therefore means mutual dependence: a condition in which entities are both highly sensitive and highly vulnerable to each other. The basic underlying idea is that interdependent entities are likely to take one another’s’ interests in to consideration thereby diminishing the harmful consequences and hostile outcomes that may result from conflicting interests. As economic and political structures become more intertwined, interests are increasingly affected if a peaceful solution to the conflict is not found. The assumption of this concept is that the higher the degree of interdependence, the higher the stakes and therefore the more positive the response is to non-violent methods. In this study, primary areas of analyzing interdependence would involve the economic, political and the nature of external relations.

Conceptualizing dependency

Dependency in this context is used to imply reliance on those aspects of society, social, political, or economic from which the state or the entity derives its power. For instance, if an entity’s legitimacy and economic sustenance is dependent upon cooperation and obedience of its subjects, then withdrawal of this cooperation through nonviolent methods would result in capitulation of the entity. This is because the power of the elites depends on the obedience and cooperation offered by subjects of domination. As Sharp notes, with a clear strategy and commitment to non cooperation success is likely even with the threat of sanctions, since the coercive power of the elites is limited (Burrows, 1996). Gandhi too (as cited in Burrows, 1996) asserts that “government of the people is only possible so long as they consent either consciously or unconsciously to be governed” (p. 87)

Conceptualizing success

Success in this enterprise is used to imply the degree at which the movements were able to realize their *stated objective(s)* through the application of unarmed methods of political contention. For instance, pictures of peaceful protesters—including white, members of the clergy, and other “upstanding citizens”—broadcast on television worldwide lent legitimacy to anti-apartheid forces and undermined the South African government in a way that the armed rebellion was unable to do. As nonviolent resistance within the country escalated, external pressure in the form of economic sanctions and other solidarity tactics by the international community raised the costs of maintaining the apartheid system. Its 13 billion dollar annual trade with the west and thirty billion worth of foreign investment in the 80s was severely affected by sanctions regime (Zunes et al., 1999). The government would eventually agree to a negotiated settlement that paved way for a multiracial democracy.

3.3. Methodology

In this study, I used a system know as “Most Similar Systems Design” in comparing the two cases. In this method, a range of countries that appear to be “similar in as many ways as possible are chosen in order to control for concomitant variation” (Peters, 1998, p.37). Cases are chosen because they are “similar in most respects and differ on only one or a few independent variables” (Druckman, 2005, p.210). This method is also called “method of difference” (Van Evera, 1997, p. 57). Here, cases with similar general characteristics are chosen with different values on the study variable. Since in this study I sought to establish *effects* of the study variable and not causes, I tried

to identify whether values *correspond* across the two cases with values on the variable that define the possible outcome. My comparative analysis involved identifying independent variables that differ between cases of non-violent struggles with “parallel characteristics” with the aim of explaining the differences in the dependent variable; in this case, I compared the environment of the antiapartheid movement in South Africa in the period after 1983 and that the first *Intifada* in the Occupied Territories of Israel/Palestine in late 1987 with the view of unearthing the variables under girding the different political outcomes. Aspects of my comparison comprised the economic substructure, the political superstructure and the nature of external relations and how these bear in to the individual States’ respective responses to non-violent struggles. The economic substructure in this study concentrated on the nature of economic relations between the state and its non-violent opponents both internally and internationally. Political superstructure is used here to denote the nature, composition and ideology of the government. External relations refer to a country’s international relations in economic, political and diplomatic spheres (Vries, 1996), as well as the movements’ relations to the outside world. Is it isolated or included, dependent or interdependent, powerful or weak?

My assumption in this study is that most aspects of economic and political structures are similar but not necessarily identical. For instance, there exists a mutual disenfranchisement of the local populations, a systematic creation of dependent economies in the occupied territories, an ideology of separate development based on race. Diplomatically, the two countries for a long time enjoyed great power backing while at the same time running economies that were and still are highly tied to the industrial West. The validity of my arguments shall be measured by the extent to which differing

independent variables are able or unable to account for the variability in my comparative study

Data collection

Owing to the difficulty in obtaining sufficient primary data for this kind of study and the time constraints, study was based largely on secondary sources. Among the sources, these included: published books, scholarly journal articles on conflict, nonviolence, social movements, apartheid, intifada, quantitative data on the different factors inherent in both systems, written and electronic media excerpts from interviews, speeches and Israeli/Palestinian and South African official sources.

Limitations

- Since this study is based almost entirely on secondary data, heavy reliance on secondary data may raise questions of representativeness, completeness and bias, verification, validity and integrity of the data collected. To reduce this, this research will employ a variety of eclectic sources.
- This study is based on the assumption that existing theory of nonviolence is inadequate in explaining the cross national variations based on the information available to the author.
- Only known variables are explored in this paper, It is instructive to point out that often, there may exist certain intervening variables that current research may not have established yet since classified information such as secret elite -pacting, role of the military or that involving internal security apparatuses, such information is not always readily available in public discourse.

- This study approaches the state system from national and sub national levels without much regard to the role of idiosyncratic variables in political decision making. For instance, how a given leaders temperament and character may have influenced certain decisions.
- The variations in periods of this analysis may affect the comparative quality of the conclusions. In South Africa the study begins in 1983, while that in the Occupied Territories begins in 1987 with the outbreak of the Palestinian uprising.

CHAPTER FOUR

PRESENTATION AND DATA ANALYSIS

An Analysis of Internal Dynamics

4.1 The Occupied Territories

The political economy of the Intifada

In order to establish the reasons underlying the intifada's inability to end the occupation, it is vital to understand the political and economic environment that underpinned the cause of and course of the uprising. At the beginning of the intifada, its main goals included *inter alia*; "disengagement from Israel, greater self reliance, and end to occupation and national independence. By 1991, this had been reduced to a mere reestablishment of a Palestinian agenda internationally and reaffirmation of Palestinian identity" (Roy, 1991, p. 67). Dajani (1994) writing on the nature of economic relations between Israel and the occupied territories notes that West Bank and Gaza Strip in to virtual peripheries that served the Israeli core economy. He notes that land expropriation and settlement provided Israel with the best farmlands. These same processes transformed Palestinians into "a proletariat of the Israeli economy" (p. 14).

The Occupied Territories, Dajani (1994) notes they became markets of Israeli products. As indigenous productive activities atrophied, unequal taxation and strict regulations governing imports and exports reinforced this trend. This trend was replicated in other spheres like water and electricity. Also, severe restrictions on the functions and authority of local councils inhibited indigenous development by limiting municipalities and using them for patronage. It is such constraints and other restrictive policies that came to inspire the first *intifada* as highlighted in the foregoing analysis.

Explaining the intifada

Since the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, Israel had outlawed all forms of political activity by Arab inhabitants. It was therefore not uncommon for Palestinians protesting various aspects of occupation to be met with violent responses from the Israeli troops. Hitherto, such protests would be silenced with Israeli fire. In December 1987 however, the crowds did not disperse and instead expanded attracting larger crowds that overwhelmed Israeli units (Lustick, 1993). The question here is why?

An attempt to account for the outbreak of this phenomenon attributes it to several factors: Lustick (1993) points to despair and humiliation of Palestinians, PLO's strategic extension for national liberation, a result of grassroots organization, and a reflection of changes in Israeli politics toward the territories. Specifically, Schif & Ya'ari (1990) emphasize the *cumulative rage* of Palestinian refugees, workers and farmers. In particular, they stress the "unbearable conditions in Gaza refugee camps, the frightening new threats to divert water resources to Israeli settlers and the bitterness of Palestinian employed in Israel from routine humiliations inflicted upon them by soldiers" (Schif and Ya'ari as cited in Lustick, 1993, p. 568).

Some writers associate the intifada with PLO's failure to cope with the real needs of the people under occupation, failure to produce a plan capable of halting Israel's de facto incorporation of their territory and its inability to maintain unity among the factions. As such, unintended consequence of these failures was the Palestinian development of their own organized resistance to the occupation that was more effective than what the Palestinian external leadership of the PLO would provide (Lustick, 1993). In the same

vein, to some analysts, the secret of the uprising lies in the *frustration* with and weakening of PLO's direct influence over events in the territories. These analysts emphasize the crystallization of grassroots organizations that began forming in the late 1970s. These provided needed services within a national context without external financial assistance (Lustick, 1993).

Hilterman (1992) identifies *resource scarcity* and the intense competition among rival factions as conditions that helped to lay groundwork for the intifada by increasing the number of Palestinians mobilized by the unions and women's organizations. He notes that lack of outside funding and fear of being overshadowed by rivals made factions to work desperately to mobilize groups that were previously politically inactive (Hilterman, as cited in Lustick, 1993).

Lederman (1988) conceives of the *intifada* as an "outward manifestation of a social revolution that had been underway on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip for more than a decade, *disillusionment* in authority capability to change the conditions of the youth and a rejection of traditional authority" (p. 230). Farson and Landis lend credence to this gradualism when they explain intifada as cumulative effects of two decades of Israeli colonialism in the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza. They note that the threat of dispossession, dispersion and loss of identity was not lost to Palestinians (Farson and Landis as cited in Nassar and Heacock, 1990).

Beitler (2004) explains the intifada from the Israeli settlement policy. He argues that the Likud government which assumed power in 1977 pursued political policies that were based on the ideology of greater Israel although this had started immediately after the occupation. The so called *new facts* policy of getting strategic settlements on the

ground before any peace agreement increased tensions with the local population and incited resentment among the Arabs. He adds that so many settlements were established that no Arab village was distant from a Jewish area, a policy which “fueled the fire”. The soldiers who remained to protect settlers became more visible increasing the discord between the Palestinians and Israelis. This policy sought to deliberately under develop the Palestinian economy (Robinson, 2003).

It is also important to note that soon after 1967, the Israeli government sought to implement counterinsurgency measures by restoring normal life patterns and increasing people’s material well being and restoring essential services. However, Israel also implemented a number of punitive measures to establish order and security and to isolate insurgents. Less discriminate use of force and collective punishments after 1977 win by the Likud government increased Palestinian resentment contributing to the 1987 intifada (Freedman, 1991).

The downturn of Arab oil economy was another factor that undermined the economic wellbeing of Palestinians under occupation. This closed off opportunities for many energetic young men who had little to provide for their families. The resultant degradation of labor manifested itself politically in increased civil disobedience. The relegation of the Palestinian problem in the Amman Arab conference outraged many Palestinians under occupation and in exile. In the context of charged political climate and high social and economic discontent, Arson and Landis note “the emergence of a united organic leadership and the bonding of the vast majority of people in a web of popular sovereignties, cemented together by a collectivist and nationalist ideology, were sufficient to mobilize Palestinians for action .All that was needed was “a precipitous

event to launch it” (Arson & Landis, as cited in Nasser & Peacock, 1990, p. 31). From the preceding debate, it is apparent that several factors were at play before the outbreak. But the existence of these factors alone was not enough to galvanize Palestinian collective action. The following section looks at some of the processes that enabled the popular uprising. In particular, I look at mobilization and politicization, growing perceptions of relative deprivation resulting from dependency and economic subservience, and what Kuzman refers to as perceived political opportunities.

(i) Mobilization and Politicization

Lesch (1990) discussing the political environment before the intifada, notes that Gaza experienced a significant increase in both organizational activities and violent confrontations. She notes for instance that despite the ban on elections, the affiliates of the Palestine Labor Organization held them in 1987. The Union of Construction Workers conducted elections in February followed by Union of Workers in Commerce. This was held in spite of Israeli security forces’ harassment.

At the same time, the Palestinian National Council Session held in Algiers formerly ended the rifts in the PLO. The Popular Front and Democratic Front resumed their seats after a four year boycott. Popular Committees and radical Islamic groups won more adherents. Student strikes were followed by government crackdown and political deportations that heightened tensions even further. The deaths of the workers in a van on December 8, has been noted as the *proximate* cause that sparked off the uprising. This was followed by massive demonstrations in the Gaza Strip despite lengthy curfews and deaths. The intifada soon acquired the structure through the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU). Other groups, namely; Fateh, the Popular Front, and the

Communist Party shared the leadership of the movement. In 1988, Hamas was created by the Muslim Brotherhood as an alternative to the nationalists with a call to increased militarization and islamization of the intifada that rejected any political settlement with Israel (Lesch, 1990).

Tamari (1990) notes that the problems were reinforced by erosion of village agriculture and integration of rural youth as an underclass of commuting workers in Israeli industries. Israeli subordination of the West Bank and Gazan economies for two decades had undermined local elites and caused major dislocations in the regional distinctiveness of local community. The extraction of rural and refugee labor from their districts into Israeli labor had created a commonality of collective experience that was bound to register itself in the political consciousness..." (Tamari as cited in Lesch, 1990, p. 6).

At the same time, Lesch (1990) notes that social activist groups became more prominent during 1987 and made concerted efforts to bring together the diverse political forces. In February, the Federation of Charitable Societies initiated a campaign to collect donations for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. The Working Women's Committees in Gaza held unified meetings as a model for national unity and cosponsored a medical day with Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees. Increased activism by union groups, students and activities of Islamic groups led to widespread curfews, deportations and repression by the military. Defense minister Yitzhak Rabin confirms the policy environment: "We will not lift the iron fist policy imposed on the Gaza strip. We are involved in the climax of a continuing war against "terrorism" in Lebanon and in Judea

and Samaria. It is an endless war and we have to take measures to reduce military attacks to the minimum” (p. 16).

In response to this, underground grassroots Palestinian activism proliferated that in turn attracted collective punishments like home demolitions and arbitrary arrests. It is estimated that between 1985 and 1987, an estimated 200 thousand Palestinians had been arrested at some point (Nassar and Heacock, 1990). The preceding statement reflected the difficulties presented by the contours that facilitated the birth of the uprising, namely; mobilization and politicization of Palestinian national consciousness that had developed over the years of occupation. Robinson (1993) adds that “such mobilization was necessary in order to overcome , at least in part, the class, kin, and regional cleavages that had long fragmented the Palestinian society and had been used by occupying powers to undermine collective national action” (Robinson, 1993, p. 301).

(ii)Economic dependency and subservience

Nassar and Heacock (1990) note that although officially considered independent economic unites, the Gaza strip and the West Bank have been forced through post 1967 war policies into dependency on the physical integration into Israel’s economic system. Over the course of occupation, they note, Israel took over the service infrastructure of the West Bank and Gaza, confiscated land in the occupied territories and controlled water resources reducing these territories to source of labor and as a market for its manufactured goods while at the same time restricting the territories external trade. The physical infrastructure and transportation and communication systems including electric generation units have been linked and controlled by the Israeli grid. Between 1982 and

1985 for instance, “90 percent of imports in the Occupied Territories came from Israel” (P. 47).

Financially, the Occupied Territories were denied means for capital accumulation. Soon after occupation, Israeli authorities closed down Arab banks in the West Bank and Gaza with negative effects of the Palestinian economy. These were replaced by branches of Israeli banks. This combined with prohibition of all foreign exchange transactions and a requirement to do all business in Israeli shekels further increased Palestinian reliance on Israel with an economy that remained a weak appendage of the Israeli economy (Nassar & Heacock, 1990).

(iii) Growing perceptions of political opportunity and failure of armed struggle

Lesch (1990) notes that while political and professional groups were strengthening their structures that would later provide an underpinning for the *intifada*, Shimon Peres, the Israeli Foreign minister had been deeply concerned about the situation that a few days before the *intifada*, he had proposed to the Knesset that Israel pull out of the Gaza strip, demilitarize it and leave residents to their own devices. He had argued that Jewish settlements in the strip did not provide any security or benefits for Israel. Although this infuriated the two thousand settlers in the Strip, Gazans interpreted this as a “fruit of their long resistance and an indication that Israel could be forced to yield” (p. 2).

Freedman (1991) accounting for the non-violent strategy notes “the physical environment for guerilla attacks was no more favorable than before. The PLO had recognized the limits of people’s willingness to sacrifice themselves because of their economic dependence on Israel. He concludes therefore that “the Palestinian situation

provided an environment more conducive to civil disobedience than to armed struggle” (p.64).

On the regional front, like their counterparts in South Africa, non-violent strategy was taken up for pragmatic reasons; the Arab countries had failed to defeat Israel militarily. After 1982 Lebanon war, the PLO found itself excluded from the peace process and ejected from their bases in the Middle East (Freedman, 1991). In South Africa, there too was little promise of an organized force of African nations launching a successful invasion of South Africa. African countries with the largest armies like Ethiopia and Nigeria required their armies for internal control, and yet even if they were to mobilize, the apartheid region had unparalleled military machine capable of containing any regional threats and yet even at the international level, like in the Occupied Territories, opposition from the United States would have prevented any form of United Nations or other multinational force being deployed in the area (Zunes, 1999).

The above discussion attempted to highlight the nature of societal relations on economic and political levels between the Israeli state and the people in the Occupied Territories. Economically, there existed interdependence that was largely skewed in favor of Israel and in extreme cases clearly bordered colonial practice. Politically, the Occupied Territories’ structures of governance were subordinate to Israeli control. Mobilization and politicization, perceptions of political opportunity and increasing sense of deprivation resulting from occupation policies laid the foundation of the uprising.

*Nonviolent Action: The Occupied Territories (1987-88)**Methods*

Dajani (1994) notes that the methods of resistance employed by Palestinians fall into three main categories as defined by Sharp and others. These comprise protests, non-cooperation including civil disobedience, and efforts to establish alternative institutions. As highlighted in the previous discussion, these methods became attractive only after the recognition of the futility of armed struggle by the armed wings of respective movements, of the PLO and the ANC in Palestine and South Africa respectively.

(a)Protests

In the West Bank and Gaza, Palestinians experimented with a variety of tactics; these ranged from non-violent demonstrations, sit-ins, and marches displaying the Palestinian flag occasioned by some stone throwing. These acts helped to highlight their plight and generate international sympathy in this asymmetrical struggle (Dajani, 1994). The deliberate selection of nonviolent methods was corroborated by the findings of a survey of the communiqués that were issued during the first year and a half of the intifada, conducted by the Palestinian center for the Study of Nonviolence. The Palestinian protests even managed to recruit some allies from Israel.

Kaviner (1996) details how both moderates and militants began to notice that the new struggle was a unique one. It was not a familiar “terror” story but a non-violent one, a full scale civilian uprising. He writes; “by mid February 1988, there were at least thirty different organizations which were active in Israel protesting the repression of the intifada” (p.48). Some of these organizations such as Peace now, and Yesh Gvul left a lasting impression of the protest scene and Israeli political life. This however did not

translate into mass public action in support of the uprising leaving the proponents of non-violent action in the Occupied Territories to their own devices, isolated and weak.

(b) Non-cooperation

Dajani, (1994) points out a variety of non-cooperation methods employed by Palestinians such as general strikes, resignations from the occupation regime's institutions, and withdrawal of labor from Israel, boycotting Israeli goods and products, violating curfews and refusing to pay taxes. One such example at non-cooperation involved the Beit Sahour tax revolt. This was meant to highlight the illegitimacy of tax regulations in the occupied territories. However, the Israeli authorities countered this by "instituting particularly harsh measures in which travel permits, car permits and businesses were required to have identity cards issued upon proof of tax payment, making this option less viable" (p. 71).

Even more dramatic was the withdrawal of Palestinian labor from Israel. However, the expected impact would soon be offset by the arrival of new Soviet Jewish immigrants who replaced Palestinians as a source of cheap labor. Since Palestinians lacked a viable indigenous economy of their own, they were unable to totally forgo their jobs and sources on income in Israel. "They became vulnerable to Israeli countermeasures as they soon discovered they were not in a position to choose whether or not to work in Israel" (Dajani, 1994, p. 71).

(c) Alternative Institutions

The creation of alternative institutions was another important milestone during the *intifada*. This ranged from creation of specialized committees in the towns, villages, camps and neighborhoods in the Occupied Territories, establishment and expansion of

Medical Relief Committees, Voluntary Work Committees, to Popular Education Committees. The areas in which these institutions were created were called “liberated areas”, in anticipation of and hope for de-facto independence in these places (Dajani, 1994, p.71).

However, Dajani (1994) notes that in their attempts at parallel institutions, Palestinians soon discovered that breaking away from Israel would not be complete and that the creation of alternative institutions had faltered. Dissonance increased between the high morale and a sense of empowerment they had experienced through protest actions and the reality on the ground. “The Israeli authorities were able to impose severe economic and military reprisals. Tax raids forced Palestinians to resume paying taxes. Thousands went back to their jobs in Israel when they found no alternatives in their communities. Others rejoined the civil administration in a variety of functions...” (p.72).

The above methods of nonviolence (protests, noncooperation and establishment of alternative institutions) were applied with short term *symbolic* successes. These achievements however could not withstand the Israeli countermeasures to contain the uprising due to structural vulnerabilities of the Palestinian society.

4.2. *The Case of Apartheid South Africa*

The political economy of apartheid

Describing the nature of apartheid economy, Lowenberg & Kaempfer (2001) note that the apartheid system represented a comprehensive set of regulations affecting all aspects of economic, social and political life arising essentially as a response on the part of the white working class to the threat of black labor market competition. In what they call *classical apartheid*, racial segregation was motivated by white employer concerns to secure land and draw up cheap agricultural and mine labor from the rural African sector. “the existence of a viable and flourishing and viable black peasant agricultural sector raised the opportunity cost of black labor to white farmers, who were consequently induced to rely on coercive political instruments to separate blacks from the land and to create a pool of wage labor, These were later joined by miners in seeking the state’s help in lowering the supply price of black workers” (p. 33).

The production of market regulations that followed were meant to facilitate wealth redistributions away from blacks and white mining and industrial capital owners in favor of white workers and agricultural capital owners. After 1948, the National Party embarked on an ambitious project of planning-some kind of “ethnic socialism”, This comprised of the establishment of what the authors call “grand apartheid”-rigid geographical separation in which separate sovereign national entities of would hold citizenship together with thoroughgoing regulation of economic and social interactions between blacks and white in the “white” parts of the country and where black workers supposedly “sojourned temporarily” (Lowenberg & Kaempfer, 2001, p. 40).

However, continuous modernization and expansion of the industrial sector of the South African economy increased the demand for highly skilled labor well beyond the capacity of the white population alone to supply it, so that some significant concessions had to be made to the need for a stable, educated black labor force. These reforms, the authors note, were a reflection of the shifting structures of economic interest within the white electorate. The adaptations of apartheid policy in the face of changing constraints leads the authors to conclude that “racial dogma and jingoistic nationalism were not the underlying causes or motives driving apartheid,- they were merely invoked when convenient to justify state interventions in the market economy that were intended to bring about wealth redistribution of the politically dominant group...hence apartheid can be seen as an endogenous policy, the level or intensity of which was determined primarily by economic interests and external constraints affecting interest groups” (Lowenberg & Kaempfer , 2001, p. 41).

Zunes (1999) points out a number of advantages about the political economy of South Africa that would indeed have made challenge to it very difficult. For instance, he notes “the ruling party controlled some of the world’s richest mineral deposits, including one third of the world known reserves. A modern military machine stood ready in the area which lacked any other conventional force. Its internal security system was elaborate and repressive. ...a modern industrialized state in and underdeveloped region, it created a degree of economic hegemony despite almost universal non-recognition of their legitimacy. It was a pariah in international diplomacy yet economically and strategically integrated in to the Western system” (p. 138). It is perhaps out the recognition of this

asymmetrical reality that the antiapartheid movement adopted their strategy as we shall see the proceeding section.

Rationale for non-violence

As mentioned earlier, the non-violent struggle in South Africa was taken up for same pragmatic reasons like that of the Occupied Territories, the armed struggle had failed to yield desired results. Zunes (1999) commenting on the choice of this strategy notes a number of factors that had made armed struggle unpalatable. Like Israel, South Africa was a major industrial and military power capable of defeating any combination of its immediate enemies let alone the poorly organized and comparatively few ANC insurgents. He notes; “black townships outside South African cities were designed so that they could easily be cordoned off and subjected to air strikes making it easy to suppress any armed uprising... in the Bantustans, because of their geographical fragmentation and handpicked elites, they were not ideal bases for guerrilla warfare” (p.144). Being highly urbanized, without jungles in a largely savanna terrain there were no sanctuaries in which to retreat to. Guerilla raids from neighboring countries became impossible as South African Defense Forces made raids against alleged ANC homes and offices in Mozambique, Botswana, Lesotho and Zambia which were largely dependent on South Africa economically. The neighbors later signed a Peace Treaty with South Africa in 1984.

Zunes (1999); Marais (2001) inform us that it was in the light of this that the ANC and other resistance organizations began to question the efficacy of armed struggle as they would later admit. In addition, the ANC’s benefactor, the Soviet Union “had doubts about ANC's military capability against the regime and had joined western

countries in support of a negotiated settlement” (Zunes, 1999, p.145). While they maintained their “commitment” to armed struggle as a strategy for disrupting normal operations, it had become merely a public relations exercise and by the early 1980s the South African opposition reached a clear consensus that liberation had to be pursued through nonviolent means.

Methods

(a) Non cooperation

The South African antiapartheid movement employed similar methods of nonviolence like the ones discussed above. In early 80s, a Mass Democratic Movement was formed which included the informal alliance of the ANC, COSATU, UDF and affiliates calling for a non-racial democracy under the leadership of the ANC. The formation of the UDF in 1983 was significant in that it was a coalition of nearly 700 organizations, including civil associations, trade unions, churches, women’s organization and religious groups committed to ending all forms of exploitation. They were able to help coordinate nonviolent resistance campaigns such as boycotts, and strike support. Zunes (1999) notes that the of 500,000 in 1985 in one federation, Congress of South Africa Trade Unions(COSATU) and its commitment to address matters beyond bread and butter marked a turning point that brought apartheid to its knees. For instance, in 1987, over 20, 000 railway workers struck for over two months, 340, 000 mine workers struck the Chamber of miners for three weeks, in 1989, over 3 million person days were lost from labor disputes in South Africa (Zunes as cited in Zunes et al., 1999).

The nationwide two day strike in 1984 terrified the government, “as many as 800 thousand people refused to go to work and 400,000 students’ boycotted classes” (Zunes,

1999, p. 155). In response, the government imposed a state of emergency in 1985 to curb the dissent, yet this did not halt the nonviolent movement, charges of treason against UDF leaders were dropped in December. The imposition of this state of emergency was not only a disastrously unsuccessful effort to control the mass uprising, it also galvanized European and American elites into pushing for economic sanctions. “A three day general strike in June 1988 of more than 3 million workers paralyzed industry. Another one in August 1989 shut down commerce in Pretoria, Johannesburg, Durban and East London severely crippling industry in the Western Cape” (Zunes, 1999, p. 156). Widespread rent boycotts in Soweto and other townships led forced the government to negotiate in 1989. (Smuts and Westcott as cited in Zunes, 1999a). Overall, the unions emerging in the 1980s displayed the militancy to be expected of a new movement and particularly of one attempting to establish itself in an entrenched system. Working in close co-operation with shop stewards, they took up every issue affecting their members. Strike frequency increased from 101 strikes in 1979 to 1148 in 1987 (Bendix, 2004).

(b) Alternative institutions

Zunes (1999) notes that there was an impressive development of alternative institutions effectively creating a situation of dual power in South Africa where institutions affecting the daily lives of black South Africans came increasingly to be managed by black South Africans themselves. Community clinics, cooperatives, legal resource centers, offered places to go when existing institutions were inadequate. Zunes attributes the growth of these institutions to the fact that official institutions were no longer recognized as legitimate. Non-cooperation became so severe that by the mid 1980s, “officially sanctioned local governments collapsed” (p.157). The United

Democratic Front was formed in 1983 in response to the government's new proposal to give limited representations to Indians and Coloreds in a tricameral Parliament from which Africans were excluded. In 1987, COSATU, the UDF and sixteen other organizations joined to form Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) that organized its base for collective bargaining and self help (Ottaway, 1992).

(c)Protests

In the early 1980s, churches became increasingly outspoken. They organized in defiance of apartheid and engaged in non-violent resistance led by Archbishop Desmond Tutu who headed the South African Council of churches(SACC), representing 22 of the nations leading denominations. In 1987, SACC adopted a resolution that questioned the legitimacy of the white minority government and called on member churches to question their moral obligation to obey apartheid laws. They supported rent boycott, tax resistance, and conscientious objection to military service for instance, "25-40 percent of whites conscripted did not report to duty" (Eades, 1999, p. 94). The clergy had also begun to marry mixed raced couples in defiance of the Prevention of Mixed Marriages Act later abolished in 1985. These protests culminated in the New Defiance Campaign of 1989, with waves of multiracial peace marches encompassing hundreds of thousands of demonstrators in major cities effectively neutralizing the state of emergency. By November of that year, the government capitulated to pressure and allowed an ANC rally of 70, 000 to take place in a stadium to welcome some of the released political prisoners (Zunes, 1999). The interplay of these activities with international pressure had wide ranging repercussions for the political and economic environment of the apartheid system

culminating into negotiations that would later lead to the first multiracial elections in the early 90s.

4.3. *Impact Non-violent Movements in Palestine and South Africa*

It is not possible to understand the outcome of collective action in the above cases without understanding the impact that these movements had on both the national and international levels. As we shall see, *political activity* in both cases was both a function of and a response to the interplay between the national and systemic actions.

1. *The Occupied Territories.*

(a) Intifada and Israeli politics

- Opinion, politics and policy

A survey of the effect of the intifada on the Israeli polity reveals a profound impact. Arian et al. (1992) survey of 1, 116 respondents interviewed between December 9, 1987 and January 4, 1988, and again in Oct 1988, revealed that public opinion had responded to the intifada, it showed to be sensitive to external and internal political developments. “The intifada seemed to force the Israeli public and political leadership to think about the future of the territories in a more concrete and realistic manner than they had in the past. It spotlighted for Israelis anomalies which were evident and even written about but largely ignored. The implication of making no decision about the future of the territories and their inhabitants was brought home more powerfully than it had been in the previous twenty years. A protracted situation of a low level, constant violence forced Israelis to confront issues which many of them had conveniently pushed aside. This was brought to a head as much of the world’s media treated Israel’s policy in dealing with the intifada in a very negative manner” (p. 318).

The *intifada* affected the political process in three ways based on the public threat perception. Arian et al. (1992) notes that on long term goals, there seemed to be a tendency towards greater moderation and compromise, yet in terms of short term concerns, Israelis remained hawkish as ever and supported a strong hand, and a growing polarization of attitude and political power between the more conciliatory left and the more hard-line right. For instance, there was a growing moderation regarding the future of the territories in the survey, while Jewish polls showed they wanted more stern measures although the national samples indicated they were willing to return territories and to consider an eventual Palestinian state and to enter in to negotiations with the PLO, on condition it recognized Israel and denounced terrorism.

However, support for immediate negotiations with the PLO plummeted, this exemplifies attitudinal hardening with short term implications while in the opposite direction, “support for a comprehensive agreement and return of territory in the long run however grew” (Arian, as cited in Freedman, 1992, p. 281).

Table 1.1

The Distribution of Scores on the Policy Position Scale, 1987 and 1988

Policy 1987

		Dove	Middle	Hawk	Total
	Dove	19.3	7.0	5.1	31.3
Policy 1988	Middle	7.5	11.0	8.7	27.2
	Hawk	5.8	16.1	19.5	41.4
	Total	32.5	34.2	33.3	100

The above table presents the 1987 array of responses, used as the base for dividing the respondents into three groups of roughly equal size. The movement favored the hawkish end of the scale. The center depleted by a fifth between two time periods, from 34 to 27 percent while the hawk pole grew from a third to 41 percent while the dove retained its third of the sample (Arian et al., 1992).

Table 1.2: A survey of Israeli public opinion
Change of Scale of Policy Positions by Vote

	1987 score	1988 score	N	t-value
Vote				
Likud vote	3.42	3.67	110	2.78
Labor vote	2.73	2.79	111	0.76
Likud vote	3.34	3.73	137	5.24
Labor vote	2.74	2.50	106	-3.08

According to this survey the tendency for political polarization was evident when perceived effect of the *intifada* was compared with answers of respondents to policy questions. Those who said that the *intifada* had hardened their attitudes were likely to have held hard-line views before the uprising. The opposite was true with those with dovish views. The shifts in either way were statistically insignificant although the overall shift favored the right (Arian et al., 1992).

Another poll conducted by Ma'ariv, a moderately right wing paper however showed a significant swing to the right. "The Labor Alignment which won 45 seats in

November 1987 polls dropped by March 1988 to 39, while Likud moved from 38 to 39 with significant minorities tending to vote for smaller parties on the extreme sides of the political spectrum” (Bar-On, 1988, p. 54).

(b) *Between territorial maximalism and territorial compromise*

Tessler (1990) writing of the effect of the *intifada* on Israeli politics, notes the *intifada* reinforced and deepened political divisions as the uprising seemed to confirm the analysis of each camp thereby rendering their prescriptions more persuasive. On the one hand, territorial maximalists argued that the uprising was an expression of Palestinian and Arabs in general to the Jewish state despite the hitherto improved living standards of Palestinians under the occupation. To the left, advocates of territorial compromise raised the democratic issue and “articulated it with the urgency that was infrequent in the past” (p.52). They argued that trends in demographic patterns favored Palestinians; hence in the near future Israel could not preserve its Jewish and democratic character with continued occupation.

The solution to this quagmire was as opposite as was the perception of opposing camps in Israel about the uprising itself. To the right, the solution could well have lied in the “transfer”, where Palestinians are removed in significant numbers from the West Bank and Gaza. To the left, they saw the uprising in terms of costs Israel will have to bear by continued occupation hence they were determined to save their country from this mess (Tessler, 1990). From this dilemma, Tessler notes “it follows that the *intifada* added an important measure of realism to the thinking of both the left and the right... It is this realism that drives both the advocates of territorial maximalism and territorial compromise to embrace prescriptions that were so marginal to political thinking in Israel

before the intifada” (P. 60). Despite the polarization, Tessler (1990) notes that this did not fundamentally change the political balance in Israel. The question is why? The final chapter (5) attempts to address this.

(c) Intifada and the Israeli economy

The effect of the uprising on the Israeli in the first two years was about \$1 billion. These were concentrated in certain areas of the Israeli economy and the West Bank and Gaza. It “cost the Israeli economy 2.5 percent of its GDP” (Rosen as cited in Freedman, 1991, p. 370). The effects were concentrated in agriculture, construction and tourism. The larger effects were however overshadowed by long term adjustment and stabilization efforts in the Israeli economy. Strong economic performance in the intifada years shielded the Israeli economy from the consequences of the intifada although economic performance in Gaza and the West Bank continued to decline. This was in contrast to South Africa where her exclusion from international capital markets, disinvestment, arms embargoes, declining Growth Domestic Product (GDP) and high inflation against the backdrop of a shrinking white population were harder to deal with (Eades, 1999).

(d) Intifada and the international world

In the United States, there developed a new emphasis on direct political talks between Israelis and Palestinians. However, “momentous changes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union continued to push the Israeli-Palestinian issue into the background of global policy discussions in Washington” (Pollock as cited in Freedman, 1991, p.130), unlike in South Africa, where they led a massive disinvestment campaigns against the apartheid regime.

On the Soviet Union, Freedman (1991) draws two conclusions from his analysis of the Soviet policy toward *the intifada*; (1) that despite USSR's criticism of Israel's handling of the *intifada*, the Soviet-Israeli relations continued to improve in large number of areas from people to people diplomacy to Soviet Jewish immigration although Moscow continued to rebuff Israeli efforts to restore full diplomatic relations, and (2) that Soviet support for the PLO remained limited, and while USSR stepped up its contacts after the US-PLO dialogue in December 1988, the fact that it was simultaneously improving its ties with Israel, weakened the Soviet-PLO relationship" (p. 176).

Alin (1994) adds that Palestinian resistance in the territories heightened the regional status of the PLO, increased international sympathy for Palestinians and prompted the United States to assume a lead role in initiating a diplomatic process that aimed at convening some form of negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. It reoriented the Arab-Israeli conflict back to its historic Israeli-Palestinian core. Jordan severed ties with the West Bank giving up the central role of determining the final political status to Palestinians. Subsequent US dialogue with PLO presented important prospects for the national movement. Perhaps the biggest achievement was the eventual mutual recognition between PLO and Israel and the subsequent Declaration of Principles for an interim self government, yet this can not solely be attributed to the "nonviolent" phase of the *intifada* as it became increasingly militarized and "Islamized" abdicating its earlier commitment to nonviolence.

In analyzing the nonviolent phase of the *intifada*, we can say that perhaps its greatest success lied in creating *cognitive dissonance* about the Israeli collective identity in a large

segment of the Israeli public. Sucharov (2005) writing on the psychoanalysis of the Israeli Palestinian peace notes that the existential threat of politicide that Israel historically faced had created a consensus of the need to unite for self defense to prevent national annihilation. The Israeli experience in the 80s and the early 1990 as an aggressor therefore clashed with their defensive warrior identity. The Lebanon's "war of choice" was an anathema to Israelis' role identity. During the intifada, Palestinian actions whereby their mostly civil protests pitted guns against Palestinian youth prompted Israelis to realize that their government's policy of occupation clashed with the country's own identity of fighting only "wars of no alternative". This resulted in "a painful dissonance for large segments of Israeli policy resulting in an olive branch to the PLO" (p. 159). It is important to note that this gesture however, was not followed any fundamental shift in policy over the Occupied Territories as was the case in South Africa where the National Party leaders began to negotiate themselves out of power when the political and economic situation became untenable.

2. South Africa

(a) *The Effect the Antiapartheid Movement on the Apartheid Regime*

The antiapartheid movement in South Africa had a profound effect on the policy of the apartheid regime. Zunes (1999) accounting for this impact, he notes that the high degree of interdependence albeit in unfair terms imposed by the ruling white minority, allowed greater latitude for manipulation through non-violent means than is possible in classically polarized societies. Since the daily lives of white minority was dependent on blacks, he argues that non-violent action constituted a more direct challenge to the apartheid system than violence. He further points to the existence of black South Africa's overwhelming majority as having made the use of nonviolent action particularly effective when they mobilized in larger numbers.

He adds "the shift to largely nonviolent orientation lured white popular opinion away from those seeking continued white domination as it made the prospects of living under majority rule less frightening..... it was seen as indicative of tolerant attitudes by the black majority that was not likely to lead to previously anticipated reprisals upon seizing power" (Zunes, 1999, p. 163).

It also attracted previously unsympathetic whites to actively support a for instance, a number of squatter settlements near Cape Town which created a climate of divisiveness within the authorities (Zunes, 1999) besides, it allowed far greater potential for creating cleavages among the privileged white minority , such as how to respond to the resistance.

(b) External world and the antiapartheid struggle

Internationally, by mid to later 80s, world opinion had led industrialized countries to impose sanctions on the apartheid regime. Labor unions, churches, students and leftist organizations in these countries made business as usual, with the apartheid government very difficult. This upsurge in solidarity is attributed to the antiapartheid movement's use of nonviolent struggle (Zunes, 1999).

Aside from the above, the contribution of the external world to the fall of apartheid ranged from sports boycotts and sanction regimes to disinvestment and divestment campaigns. The last two were perhaps the most effective of all the influences the external world had on apartheid. Lowenberg and Kaempfer (2001) using a public choice model, analyze the political effects of disinvestment on apartheid South Africa. They note that financial sanctions, depending on how broadly they are applied, might be an immediate closing of the target's access to important sources of foreign exchange. They thus argue that the announcement of major foreign banks in 1985 that they would no longer roll over South African debt when it became due was potentially the most the most effective of the sanctions measures imposed against South Africa. As a result, they note that the South Africa government temporarily suspended dealings in foreign exchange and then announced a moratorium on repayment of \$12 billion of outstanding debt. Subsequently, a rescheduling agreement was negotiated between South Africa and the foreign banks.

The result of withdrawal of foreign debt was that South Africa was forced to maintain a large enough surplus of export earnings over import payments to offset the

large capital account deficits, thereby enabling it to repay its creditors. That the need to maintain trade surpluses, already made difficult by the presence of sanctions on South Africa's exports, placed a constraint on growth of the South African economy, because "any increase in economic activity would have increased import demand and therefore had to be contained by means of contractionary monetary and fiscal policy" (Lowenberg & Kaempfer, 2001, p.138). The authors however argue that falling asset prices due to disinvestment were actually a boon to the South African government. In their analysis, South African wealth holders were able to sell their foreign assets in order to put domestic assets that were offered for sale at below market prices by disinvesting foreigners. As a result, "South African earned higher rates of return to their wealth. Since their incomes were subject to taxation, it provided an expanded tax base from which the government could extract more revenue to finance the apartheid policies" (p.139), and that "divestment might actually have harmed blacks by reducing their incomes" (p.140). In 1985 however, South Africa under pressure from the antiapartheid movement imposed a state of emergency. According to Zunes (1999) this had an effect of galvanizing European and American elites in to pushing for economic sanctions.

(c) Impact on the economy

On the impact of sanctions on apartheid, Lowenberg & Kaempfer (2001) use a time series analysis of sanctions on South Africa in which they conclude that "sanctions were endogenous in that they were influenced by changes in political and economic conditions in South Africa" (p.191). They note that perceived increases in the intensity of liberation struggle inevitably brought forth more sanctions. Their time series analysis also shows a relationship between sanctions and strike activity. They note "there was an

immediate effect on the number of black workers on strike, thus there is evidence to say that in the short term, it helped domestic opposition groups organize collective action among their members” (p.192). “Increases in sanctions tended to follow on the heels of increases in domestic black political dissent, and the sanctions then produced feedback effects on black dissent” (p.193). They however acknowledge that despite their endogeneity, sanctions might have had an important impact on policy formation in South Africa by changing the political effectiveness of opposition interest groups in that country “. . .sanctions had a positive short term effect on black political activism as measured by strikes, but in the longer run, the negative effects of sanctions on black employment and earnings reduced black worker’s ability to participate in strikes” (p.193) .


In explaining the failure of apartheid therefore, they point to the “intrinsic weaknesses embedded in the apartheid system” (Lowenberg and Kaempfer, 2001, p.194). They argue that these weaknesses would have destroyed apartheid even without sanctions. They note; “many of the economic and political difficulties encountered by South Africa under were intrinsic to the system itself, of which they attribute to “self inflicted wounds” (p. 195). They argue that the policies implemented by the regime became unaffordable thereby planting the seeds of its failure. As such, they attribute political and economic reform primarily *to internal dynamics* to which external dynamics responded as captured in the following: “in many cases, South Africa’s vulnerability to external influences was enhanced by domestic policies. In the same vein, those domestic policies exposed South Africa to damage from international sanctions. To the extent that sanctions were a proximate cause of the collapse of apartheid, this was largely due to self imposed vulnerability of South Africa’s economy. They note; “sanctions were applied by

foreign interest groups precisely because these groups perceived that the economic and political weaknesses of the South African apartheid offered fertile ground for sanctions to work” (p. 195). As a result, they conclude that the South African government abdicated power because of after recognizing that apartheid policies “had become too expensive to maintain as a result of misguided development policies of the National party” (p.218).

They observe that given the National Party’s superior military and police apparatus, they could have clung to power indefinitely. But the cost of doing this would have eroded the living standard of whites and that the cost of protecting apartheid exceeded the cost of redistribution that would come with power transfer. Having said that, they add that the ultimate blow to apartheid “was not so much the overall macroeconomic performance or the aggregate welfare of society as it was the effects of racial discrimination and reform of the incomes of politically powerful white groups” (Lowenberg and Kaempfer, 2001, p. 225). They point to the fact that unlike in 1948, an Afrikaner capital owning class had been created that had some interests as English speaking capital owners. This created a division between these and the middle class some who defected to the conservative party. At the same time, “the ideological dominance of the ruling bloc was at its lowest ebb and was being challenged by crystallizing visions on an alternative order” (Morais, 2001, p. 57). This pushed the National Party to the political center inducing it to adopt reformist policies. With dwindling disciples of apartheid therefore, apartheid came to be seen as intolerable hence it had to be dismantled (Lowenberg & Kaempfer, 2001).

Fig. 1.1

Y- No. of sanctions (private and public)




X-Year

Figure 1.1 shows sanctions against South Africa 1946-1988. This data include actual sanctions imposed, boycotts, disinvestment, divestment, isolation by foreign governments, banks, educational institutions, regional and international organization. Data from Schoeman (1988) as cited in Schock (2005).

Fig 1.2

Y- No. of sanctions



X-Year

Notice escalation of sanctions after 1985 following the declaration of a state of emergency. By 1989, the US alone had withdrawn over 160 companies from South Africa (Wolpe, 1989).

CHAPTER FIVE

5.1. Discussion and Analysis

In my methodology section, I indicated that this study will be based on Most Similar Systems Design. The cases were selected based on their high comparative quality relative to other cases. This study used South Africa and the Occupied Territories of Israel/Palestine for case analysis. Aspects of comparison involved the nature of relations between the state and its subjects in economic and political terms, and the nature of external relations of these countries in terms of their dependence on or interdependence with the external world for their economic and political survival. Using structural and perceived opportunities, national and international opportunities, radical flank effects and clear and limited goals as bases for understanding the dynamics that affect the practice of nonviolence, this study established that *cost* is the *constant* variable in explaining cross-national variations in outcomes of nonviolent struggles as presented in the foregoing.

From the analysis of non-violence in the two cases, it is apparent that both movements used similar methods of nonviolence as articulated by Sharp. Of particular relevance to our analysis are the three main categories. These involved protests, non-cooperation and establishment of alternative institutions. While both movements vigorously applied these methods, the results were dramatically different. Whereas in South Africa, the struggle survived to witness the collapse of apartheid, the intifada except for cosmetic political changes of mutual *recognition* and the later day establishment of Palestinian Authority with limited territorial and political jurisdiction,

they did not succeed to end the occupation. Using the conceptual and theoretical framework in chapter two and three this discussion explains the different outcomes.

On structural and perceived opportunities, I argue that while both movements *perceived* the existence of opportunities for political action, the Occupied Territories of Palestine public's judgments were based on the perceived willingness of the Israeli government to yield to pressure as illustrated in the literature by Peres' and Labor party's desire to address the Palestinian problem through his suggestion to withdraw from the Occupied Territories. This was a misperception. While the Lebanon war and continued occupation had been costly, it was not enough to lead to significant policy shifts in the territories under Israeli occupation. Whereas by the late 80s, it was apparent even to the National party's ruling elite that the apartheid project was becoming dysfunctional, elite divisions were growing and the National Party, the architect of apartheid was fast losing popularity as illustrated by the following excerpt from notes of a special cabinet meeting in March 1986:

Internal violence and foreign pressure was on the increase, and President Botha wanted to know whether the NP should implement more dramatic things in the country, in place of the program of gradual adaptation which apparently was not taken to heart by anybody. Mr Heunis (Minister of Constitutional Planning and Development) responded by saying (a) the NP did not know where it was going, and (b) the government was not in position to deal with the circumstances in the country. Mr. De Klerk was of the opinion that (a) negotiations with people who counted were on the rocks, (b) he was almost powerless because qualifications which accompanied change were often allowed to lapse, (c) there were

fundamental differences over where the NP and the country was heading, and (d) measures of the present did not meet the demands of the time (Marais, 2001, p. 65).

At the same time, there were two developments that combined to create a favorable balance of forces within the National party; the weight of the white working class and petite bourgeoisie had been supplanted by the white middle classes. This was costly to the proponents of apartheid as the new group which was reformist in orientation demanded an end to apartheid policies (Marais, 2002). Indeed, the power of this reformist group was highlighted in the 1992 referendum in which they overwhelmingly voted for an end to apartheid (Ottaway, 1993).

With regard to national and international opportunities, nationally, the capitalist class had emerged as a core social base of the National Party and power had been centralized within the party (Marais, 2001). Schock (2005) observes that the international context may influence political contention directly by shaping the balance of power within countries or indirectly through its impact on national political structures. The degree and nature of external influence are shaped by the type of a country's interdependencies. South Africa and Israel were capitalist economies that were heavily tied to the industrial West for their capital and investment. As such, they are highly vulnerable to external actions. However, while external pressure in the form of divestment, disinvestment, and sanctions threatened the foundations of apartheid as a result of loss of support for the National Party following the economic downturn, international pressure on Israel was more muted and subtle. Except for widespread condemnations of Israeli counterinsurgency strategy, it did not amount to any serious

measures that would threaten the economic and political survival of the Jewish state. As a matter of fact, the economy performed better two years into the intifada (as highlighted in chapter four). Also, nationally, the Palestinians were more dependent on Israeli than Israel was on them for their economic survival making them highly vulnerable to Israeli sanctions. The inverse is true in South Africa the over reliance on cheap black labor for made the apartheid government vulnerable to labor strikes from the antiapartheid movement.

Part of the answer to this paradox lies in Lowenberg & Kaempfers' (2001) public choice analysis of sanctions. Since sanctions from a source country are often determined by interest groups in those countries, we can argue, that the Palestinians unlike their counterparts in South Africa, did not have a big enough, good enough domestic constituency well organized in the source country to push for their agenda. Indeed, the *intifada's* relatively late entry in to the crowded pool of world politics might have limited their ability to mobilize foreign constituencies.

Concerning the radical flank effects on Israeli policy, it is worth restating that there are two types; a positive radical flank effect which happens when the leverage of a moderate is strengthened by the presence of a radical with that makes moderate demands appear reasonable and a negative flank effect which tends to undermine the leverage of the moderates. The findings in this study reveal mixed fortunes. From our analysis, the adoption of non-violence strategy was largely due to the failure of armed struggle. However, in South Africa, while the adoption of a nonviolent strategy in the 80s was largely influenced by the failure of armed struggle. The armed struggle had previously not had a significant effect on the policy shifts of the South African government anyway.

Marais (2001) aptly captures this in the following statement, “it was not so much the prospect of a revolution that jolted apartheid managers, it was the likelihood that the state and the opposition would become entangled in a death embrace that would destroy South Africa’s integrity as a national state and viable zone for capital accumulation” (Marais, 2001, p. 65). Armed struggle had however been a huge morale booster, as mentioned in chapter two, that inspired other efforts gradually declining with the rise of non-violence (Zunes, 1999). Similarly, there is no evidence that the intifada had *positive* radical flank effect on Israel policy. In fact, as illustrated in the opinion polls in this study, as the intifada became militarized, it further polarized Israeli public opinion to more extreme positions as the center shrank considerably on short term goals like negotiating with the PLO while softening only on long term issues for instance, the possibility of a two state solution for the Occupied Territories. The radical flank effect was therefore *negative* in the short run as the infusion of violence reduced the leverage of “the moderates” committed to nonviolence.

Another important requirement for successful nonviolent collective action according Kruegler and Ackerman should be *clear and limited goals*. Movement’s goals should be clearly defined, limited in scope and compelling enough to attract the widest possible support and must be understood by all parties. The goals for the antiapartheid movement had been widely recognized as ending apartheid and transfer of political power to the black majority in South Africa, the goals of the intifada was to end occupation and pave way for self determination. However, there were fundamental differences; unlike the PLO, the ANC carried clandestine activities and inspired political action within the blacks in South Africa, the PLO had almost become detached from

situation in the territories and had been reduced to a weak *external agitator*. Lack of goal coordination between the internal organizations and the PLO resulted in to absence of a clear strategy that would mobilize internal and external forces. Their initial goal of reclaiming the whole of historic Palestine lacked support and widespread international support. Also, unlike in the Occupied Territories, South Africa's movement had matured over time and had long established structures which through unionized labor under the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Council of Churches led by Desmond Tutu, had formed a Mass Democratic Movement during at a time when ANC was banned (Ottaway, 1993). These were relatively well coordinated in political mobilization and mass actions with an objective of ending apartheid that found support in Western pressure groups that together helped in paving the way for a democratic South Africa. The *intifada*, as we have seen in this study was a sudden explosion which developed the hitherto infant resistance structures only in the course of the uprising. In the ensuing *chaos* therefore, it was difficult for it to develop clear and limited objects within the environment of such cataclysm. It also had fewer dependable allies outside the Occupied Territories.

5.2. Findings

The objective of this research was to examine factors that enable nonviolent movements to realize their objectives while constraining them in others. In my comparative analysis of the Occupied Territories and apartheid South Africa, I found a number of what I will call here “differential factors” that accounted for the variability in the outcomes in these highly comparable environments of political contention. These included; economics, nature of interdependence, threat perception, resilience and alliances.

Economics

As we have seen in Lowenberg and Kaempfer’s analysis, apartheid was build to promote white economic preeminence, a form of “white socialism” with a capitalist economy. Therefore, political entrepreneurs whipped up as their mission, the perpetuation of white privilege not only for their personal aggrandizement but as also to justify the maintenance of a police state (Shearing, 1986). When the economy began crumbling following massive disinvestment and divestment campaigns therefore, the regime lost its base support within the National Party as result of the deteriorating economic conditions of the white middle class. Threatened at their political survival, the ruling elite reluctantly made concessions that led negotiations with the antiapartheid movement.

This misfortune however did not befall Israel in its struggle against the *intifada*. As this study shows, the Israel economy was only temporarily disturbed by the *intifada*. As illustrated in this enterprise, the economy recovered and boomed three years in to the *intifada*. While we can’t tell how the Israeli government would have reacted had the

intifada had a huge negative effect on their economy, we can conclude as illustrated in this project, that the fact that there was already a debate going on about the cost of occupation especially following the Lebanon war, a similar campaign of disinvestment and sanctions would have led to significant policy changes although it may have had an initial impact of hardening positions to the right as opinion polls have revealed above.

Nature of interdependence

As discussed in the literature review, the structural conditions of society namely, the nature of its economic and political dependency determines the general capacity of society to control its leaders (Sharp, 1973). Since the assumption of nonviolence is that a government's power is based on obedience and cooperation and therefore sufficient withdrawal of cooperation and obedience would bring about change in government, as indicated in here, the structural conditions in South Africa were more favorable to a nonviolent direct action. An overwhelming majority of white South Africans relied on black labor for their daily living. Zunes (1999) notes, "the high degree of interdependence albeit on unfair terms allowed greater latitude for manipulation though non-violent means than is possible in classically polarized societies" (p. 162).

Withdrawal of this support therefore had a strong impact to the general performance of the economy and the individual welfare of their white minority. At the height on the movement, millions of working class people were mobilized. In the Occupied Territories however, although Israel relied on Palestinians for cheap labor and deepened Palestinian dependency, the Israeli economy was not build primarily around its dependency on Palestinian labor. Consequently, the impact of Palestinian resistance on the economy was negligible (1 \$billion or 2.5 it's GDP, reaching \$1.8 billion by 1990) and which quickly

recovered afterwards (Lustick, 1993). Azmi Bishara adds that although the intifada made “the occupation a losing economic proposition for Israel...the uprising can not defeat Israel economically. . .Because of the polarization of Israeli politics on the issue of the disposition of the territories, the transformation of occupation into an economic liability is necessary but hardly sufficient for Israeli withdrawal....it will require more Israeli casualties, strong external pressure and an alliance between Israeli antiannexationists and Palestinians to overcome the political power of the Israeli right wing and make the irrationality of the occupation politically decisive”(Bishara as cited in Lustick, 1993). The cost of strikes and boycotts amid disinvestment campaigns on the other hand threatened to stability of the political structure of apartheid paving the way for its eventual dismantlement(Frankel et al., 1988; Lowenberg & Kaempfer, 2001).

Threat perception

This study also revealed the fundamental role of threat perception and the publics’ willingness to support or oppose government policy. It is important to mention that by threats, I mean either *existential* as was the case in Palestine/Israeli public sphere or *economic* as was the case in apartheid South Africa (both aspects existed in some degree in both cases). As indicated in this research, while the outbreak of intifada on a whole increased a sense of existential threat in the Israeli public thereby tilting the public slightly to a more hawkish direction, the intensification of the antiapartheid activities managed to divide the white minorities to a more reformist direction over the fate of their country. The answer to this lies in the internal dynamics of the two struggles.

Zunes (1999) notes that this was possible in South Africa because the movement managed to win allies in the white community who were becoming increasingly less

frightened at the prospect of living under a majority rule. The financial costs however had become unbearable helping to ripen conflict for resolution (read Lieberfeld, 1999). The opposite was true in the Occupied Territories. Given Arab-Israeli hostile history, the uprising appeared to confirm the fears that the Arabs forever posed an existential threat to them. Even the doves in Israel feared and still do, that incorporating Palestinian demands will erase the “Jewishness” of the state of Israel they have worked so hard to build (Barak, 2007), even though initially the emerging national and international threats influenced the political elites’ willingness to negotiate (Lieberfeld, 1999).

Resilience

The resilience of nonviolent resistance is important in the face of coercive measures that are often employed to counter perceived challenges to the state. Yet persistence requires some level of independence, in the sense that the movement has alternative means of survival. This study has established that although both cases were characterized by asymmetrical dependencies, whereas the Bantustans relied heavily on subsidies and remittances from Pretoria, they enjoyed a relatively fair subsistence economy (Becker, 1987), and possessed a crucial leverage through labor to Pretoria which in the later years allowed their unionized labor to survive possible government countermeasures. The government policy of creating “Bantu homelands” though economically dependent on South Africa, had an effect not only of reinforcing national identities and creating an economic subsistence (albeit weak) and political consciousness that would lay the foundation for a sustained political activism (Deegan, 2001). On the other side however, the Palestinian uprising lacked a local subsistence economy that would sustain the uprising long enough, yet their labor was equally dispensable by Israel.

This forced many Palestinians back to return to their jobs in Israel abandoning collective action and thereby reducing its efficacy.

Alliance with base

One of the distinguishing features between the nonviolent movement in South Africa and the intifada was the formers' ability to win over the base of the National party, the middle class and the capitalists. The subsequent alliance posed an *existential* blow to the very survival of the National Party. With widening rifts among the party elites, the party found itself increasingly isolated and vulnerable to pressures emanating from the antiapartheid movement (Eades, 1999). As illustrated in the survey of the Israeli public opinion, the opposite was true. As the *intifada* intensified, so was the hardening of Israeli public opinion towards the right on *short term* issues like negotiations with the PLO, although the opinion moderated on *long term* goals for instance concerning the future of the Occupied Territories (Arian et al., 1992). This further reduced the pro-peace constituency in Israel in the meantime. Also, although the public in general became more polarized, there is no evidence of serious divisions within the political elite over the question of Palestine that would threaten the viability of the Israeli political system as happened in South Africa. The reason for this is beyond the scope of this study. However, if we can draw from the South African experience, we can argue that it is probably because the *intifada* did not threaten the economic life of the wider public and neither did it threaten the survival of the political class.

5.3. Conclusions

In analyzing cross national variations in outcomes of non-violent struggles, this study set out to investigate a possible ‘constant’ variable(s), whose degree of presence or lack of it is central in explaining movement outcomes. In my hypothesis, I asserted that interdependence at various levels of the political and economic spectrum is the central variable in determining outcomes of collective action. Drawing on the political process and nonviolence theories, I compared apartheid South Africa and the Occupied Territories of Israel/Palestine; environment of the struggle, the actors and their interrelationships using Schock’s framework of analysis of unarmed insurrections.

Whereas initial results may indicate that a high degree of interdependence contributed to partial relative success of for instance, strikes on the economy in both cases, the deciding factor in the South African case was an *alliance* of local and international interest groups such as the World Council of Churches private companies, Congressional Black Caucus in the US and International Organizations such as the Commonwealth, International Olympic Committee, the United Nations and others that resulted in massive disinvestment and divestment campaigns that changed the political equation in South Africa. In the Occupied Territories, the skewed interdependence in favor of Israel had a net negative impact on the movement as it contributed to the vulnerability of the *intifada* to Israeli sanctions.

External support and mobilization of powerful third parties as proposed by Schock while they appear to have influenced and still can influence events in places like South Africa and Israel (and did so in the former more than the later), these may have less influence in ‘big’ places like China which may be immune to external pressures or

countries where they (third parties) have less influence based on the nature of their economic and political relationships, indeed, where the target countries are not easily vulnerable hence can not be generalized.

In my findings, the four differential factors in the two cases explaining their varied outcomes are; economics, nature of interdependence, threat perception, movement resilience and alliances point to one overarching denominator; ‘cost’. I argue that the cost real or perceived, of economic and political, of collective or individual implications within or without, to movements and political elites were responsible for actions or inactions that were undertaken by the parties in both Jerusalem and Johannesburg. Threat perception, dependency, resilience and alliances can be viewed from the perspective of ‘identity’ costs, ‘economic’ costs, or political costs of prolonged struggles respectively either by reducing or increasing *this* cost. This leads me to conclude that both the political class and the nonviolent interest groups are inspired or constrained by this perceived *cost* in their decision to persist on or capitulate to pressures from the opposing side. This is based on my assumption of the *rationality* of groups, collectivities, and polities’ goal seeking behavior. Deutsch (1978) a proponent of this thinking opines that organized “systems try out different kinds of behavior toward their environment and enter into different situations in relation to it; and they could then stay with those types and stay in those situations in which their own internal disequilibria or tensions would be smallest through a feedback system” (p.91).

In relation to South Africa, Marais aptly captures this in his analysis of the existing dilemma of the apartheid government in 1986. He notes, that by the late 1980s, the former South African president P.W. Botha had warned that whites had to “adapt or

die”, yet it was clear that adaptation within the apartheid paradigm offered no escape (Marais, 2001). We are also told that the adoption and persistence of this strategy was largely informed by these calculations, namely, the relative *impotence* of armed struggle. The political changes witnessed in South Africa and the Occupied Territories therefore were a reflection of individual group’s or person’s assessment of long-term costs of continued engagement or disengagement as opposed solely to the high degree of interdependence. While the interplay of local, national and international factors is important in analyzing the effectiveness of non-violence, it is the extent to which this interplay affect the cost of the parties that determines the contours and outcome of nonviolence. The cost should be such that it is unattractive enough to deny the challenged group or persons the ability to determine the outcome in a nonviolent bargaining. In a “Force more Powerful”, Ackerman & Duval eloquently capture this in their writing; “nonviolent resistance becomes a force more powerful than the hand of an oppressor to the extent that it takes away his capacity for control. Embracing nonviolence for its own sake does not produce this force. A strategy for action is needed, and that strategy has to involve attainable goals, movement unity, and robust sanctions that restrict the opponent...When the regime realizes it can no longer dictate the outcome, the premise and means of its power implode. Then the end is only a matter of time” (Ackerman & Duval as cited in McCarthy, 2001) Based on this study, I conclude that the perceived *cost* in economic, political and other dimensions therefore becomes the *key* variable in determining success or failure of nonviolent collective action.

5.4. *Implications for policy and proposals for practice*

Since *cost* is the determining variable in policy shifts by political elites in a non-violent movements. Social movements espousing this strategy should adopt those methods that will have the potential for high long term costs both to the ruling elite and in the court of public opinion. Only then can they manage to divide the dominant group likely to be thrown off balance by this strategy through isolation. It is possible to perceive a nonviolent strategy that could potentially be successful for Palestinians. As the weaker actor, Al-Khatib et al. (2004) support the contention that Palestinians need to find a more effective tactic of mass resistance than force. The purpose would be to draw Israeli and international attention to Israeli injustices, such as the settlements and bypass roads and the roadblocks they engender. The protest would be confined to the territories, and no Israeli lives or property would be threatened. The backdrop would be a total absence of violent attacks against Israelis by militant Palestinian groups like Hamas and the Aqsa Martyrs Brigades as well as of stone throwing and Molotov cocktail attacks, which are potentially lethal. However, the media would have to be heavily involved in covering such protest.

Infusion of violence in the course of a non-violent struggle tends to harden the opponents' positions as illustrated by Israel's public opinion on short term issues after the outbreak of the *intifada*. At the same time, it isolates potential allies from the dominant group who are vital in creating a necessary *critical mass* from within that often has potential to directly threaten the survival of the political elite for instance, like the alliance created between the nonviolent movement in South Africa and the increasingly moderated Afrikaner middle class so much so that delegates of the National Party's

congresses in 1990 proposed opening up the party to all races as survival of the NP under universal suffrage hinged on its ability to form alliances with black moderate political organization (Ottaway, 1993). It is noteworthy that the Israeli response to Palestinian protests in the first and even the second intifada convinced some groups within the Palestinian community that only the use of arms and suicide attacks to “balance the terror” against Palestinians would be effective in making the occupation as costly as possible to the Israeli public. This, however, “combined with the lack of a clear strategy and a clear vision to mobilize the Palestinian population in nonviolent forms of resistance, emboldened the Israeli government to take full advantage of the change in the rules of engagement for instance after September 11, 2001 and attempt to de-legitimize the entire Palestinian liberation movement, linking its goals with the means used to achieve them. The Palestinian armed resistance, labeled as "terrorism" by Israel, was portrayed as the goal of the Palestinian liberation movement rather than a means” (Al Khatib et al., 2004). This has further weakened the Palestinian case.

In order for nonviolent methods to be effective, the movement needs to build local capacity of subsistence to be able to sustain methods such as strikes and boycotts for instance. Lacking a reasonable subsistence economy affects the ability of movements to sustain non-violent campaigns. This was reflected in the Palestinian inability to sustain their campaign in the wake of economic restrictions. The inherent structural vulnerabilities left them susceptible to Israeli reprisals. Future campaigns should strive to establish an economic base that is fairly independent of the main state.

One of the priorities for a nonviolent movement should be to seek alliances with the wider public internally and strive to sell their cause to the international public through

active nonviolence in order to enhance their power vis-à-vis their opponents in an often an asymmetrical struggle. Yet one of the limitations of the intifada was its inability to mobilize the international public opinion. Its nonviolent aspects were often overshadowed by periodic violent extremist attacks against Israeli targets. The Arab, Muslim, international streets as well as the Israeli peace camp must also be mobilized to support a nonviolent Palestinian movement. “Sustained and significant popular protests against Israel will eventually pressure the Israeli government to take the necessary steps towards peace” (Al-Khatib et al., 2004).

Mobilizing powerful third parties although insufficient in making policy shifts in the target country can have significant consequences especially when the interests of the non-violent movement resonates with that of the general public in the target country. South Africa managed to win the support of significant constituencies in western countries who in turn pressed their governments to take action against South Africa.

Nonviolent movements should have clear and coherent objectives, organized and identifiable leadership, and avoid temptations of violence by isolating violent elements amongst them in order to maintain their credibility. Sami Awad (as cited in Khatib et al., 2004) suggests that a strong leadership committed to the principles of nonviolent resistance and community building must be established. In the Palestinian case, the initial focus will be on the need to unify Palestinian communities and reestablish trust between the leadership and the people. This should be followed by the development of a long-term internal strategy to build a nonviolent resistance movement on a massive scale.

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