
Kristine Michelle Liebner

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The Political Process Model:
A Case Study of the Alaskan Native Land Rights Movement
1959-1971

Thesis
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by
Kristine Michelle Liebner
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Acknowledgements:

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Chapter One: Introduction

On October 28\textsuperscript{th}, 1966, the headlines blared “Statewide Native Unity Achieved at Conference” (\textit{Tundra Times} Oct 28, 1966: 1). It was a meeting of over three hundred Alaskan natives from every region in the state. On stage stood a native man by the name of Nick Grey, who had one desire for his people that he had voiced through the native newsletter the \textit{Tundra Times} earlier in the year. It stated “the opportunity is here. The time is now wherein all our people [the Alaskan natives] can experience a cooperative effort [for legislation] which directly affects our health and welfare” (\textit{Tundra Times} July 29, 1966 V4 N31: 8). His desire for the Alaskan native people to join in cooperation for resolving economic and social issues, such as unemployment and illness, facing the native population had come to the forefront on this day. It was Grey’s dream to see such a cooperative unified native movement form within the Alaskan native community and he was able to witness the formation of the Unified Alaska Federation of Natives from center stage shortly before his death. His individual effort as a leader in developing regional associations among the native communities was essential in the emergence of the Alaska Federation of Natives (AFN). It was not until October 1966, when the native leaders converged in the 4\textsuperscript{th} Avenue building of Anchorage that unity and cooperation reached the point of which Grey and other native leaders had dreamt. Together the whole community of Alaskan natives would, at this conference, stand united and take a stand for the right to continue living their subsistence way of life and simultaneously become a part of the growing economic structure of the newly created state of Alaska.

This moment was the culmination of many events that created a day in which the native people from all over the state could stand united on the issue of aboriginal land
rights. Unity was not a simple task for the Alaskan native people, historical animosity between groups had to be overcome. Even with such a profound demonstration of strength and unity there was much work to do in the years between 1966 and 1971 when native dreams for a resolution to their land claims would culminate in the Alaskan Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA). ANCSA was a legislative act that included compensation for lands that the state and federal government desired to purchase, compensation for the needs of the native people, and the development of business corporations for each ethnic native region as a means for retaining native control over their lands and resources. This culmination was reported by the *Anchorage Daily News* when they wrote that ANCSA was passed providing the Alaskan native people with 40 million acres and a $962.5 million land compensation as resolution to the 102 year old land claims dispute (Mitchell 2001: 492-493; ANCSA 1971: 5-6; ). This was and remains the largest monetary compensation and land settlement of aboriginal claims in the history of the United States. Never before had 55,000 indigenous people received monetary compensation, lands, funds for corporate development, mineral rights, and a legislative resolution to their land claims. Land claims, or the assertion of aboriginal land rights, had been achieved through a united organization of Alaskan natives called the Alaska Federation of Natives (AFN). Attaining ANCSA was a momentous occasion.

The success of the AFN is measured by its ability to obtain land rights and to create sustainable arrangements to meet the needs of the native people. Obtaining land rights is an essential element of the AFN’s success, since the primary desire for the native peoples was to retain their traditional land use as the development of Alaska was unfolding. The 40 million acres received after the Alaskan Native Claims Settlement Act
(ANCSA) were far fewer than asked for in the original land claims. These claims had been filed by regional associations which overlapped across regions and ethnic boundaries claiming more land than the state of Alaska could offer. Nevertheless like land rights, the issue of sustaining arrangements is an important element of the AFN’s success. ‘Sustaining arrangements’ are those that supply a strong economic foothold, such as the development of business corporations which assists in meeting the needs of the Alaskan natives’ healthcare, employment, and retaining their culture. Without providing for the economic and social future of the native people the legislation would have been insufficient for meeting the needs of the native community. Support for sustainable arrangements was supplied through the $962.5 million provided to the original twelve native regional corporations formed by ANCSA. Eventually monies were provided to support the acquisition of an additional thirteenth region.1

What makes the Alaskan Native Land Rights Movement (ANLRM) an important study in the examination of social movements is the means by which the AFN emerged and the success provided through the ANCSA. The emergence of the AFN culminated after a series of important events that will be discussed in sections four or chapter four, which affected the native communities forcing them to recognize the social and economic conditions within their individual regions. The different regional leadership began to discuss issues, and culminated the formation of the AFN. Recognizing what elements help create unity of such diverse and economically depressed groups is important to

1 ANCSA 1971: Regional Associations: Arctic Slope Native Association, Bering Straits Association, Northwest Alaska Native Association, Association of Village Council Presidents, Tanana Chief’s Conference, Cook Inlet Association, Bristol Bay Native Association, Aleut League, Chugach Native Association, Tlingit-Haida Central Council, Kodiak Area Native Association, and Copper River Native Association. The thirteenth native association was formed in the mid-70’s to assist the native population in the lower forty-eight states, named the Thirteenth Regional Association.
understanding how other future indigenous movements could emerge. The success of the AFN also helps us understand why social movements succeed or fail. For instance, the Alaskan natives’ was unusual in comparison to the development of reservations, U.S. Court of Claims cases, and violence by various indigenous groups in their efforts for land rights. This outcome achieved by the Alaskan natives’ needs to be understood in order to understand other movements around the United States and in other democratic countries.

This study will focus on the Alaska Federation of Natives, and will briefly discuss two other land rights attempts made by Alaskan native groups: the Tlingit and Haida people of the southeast and the Tyonek people of Cook Inlet. The Alaskan native case study will allow contemporary Native Americans to learn from the AFN’s emergence and success in order understand how they can create movements that may meet the needs of today’s indigenous people.

The fundamental question in this study is what factors were critical in the emergence of the AFN and success of Alaskan natives during the 1960’s campaign for land rights? To explain the cause of emergence and success of the Alaska Federation of Natives (AFN) these following questions will be analyzed in this study.

- How did other attempts for land rights by the Alaskan natives outside of the AFN affect the AFN’s capabilities to emerge and be successful in their effort?
- What opportunities from outside the AFN’s influence affected the AFN’s capabilities to emerge and be successful in its efforts?
- How was the AFN able to mobilize its leadership and outside supporters successfully once it was formed?
• What assisted in the Alaskan native people’s ability to unite and create the AFN?

These questions cover a variety of terms and issues that are defined and outlined further in the literature review.

All four of these questions will be assessed in this study for their significance to the Alaskan Native Land Rights Movement’s emergence and success. The study concludes by assessing what elements of these questions are most significant to movement emergence and to the success of the AFN.

Chapter Two: Methodology

The fundamental question in this study is what factors were critical in the emergence of the AFN and success of Alaskan natives during the 1960’s campaign for land rights? To explain the causes of emergence and success of the Alaska Federation of Natives (AFN) I asked four specific questions

• How did other attempts for land rights by the Alaskan natives outside of the AFN affect the AFN’s capabilities to emerge and be successful in their effort?

• What opportunities from outside the AFN’s influence affected the AFN’s capabilities to emerge and be successful in its efforts?

• How was the AFN able to mobilize its leadership and outside supporters successfully once it was formed?

• What assisted in the Alaskan native people’s ability to unite and create the AFN?

The decision of how to go about doing research in this study is guided by these questions. The questions are derived from the theory literature which is describes in chapter three.
Each question is covered separately in the sections of the analysis chapter. Section one covers the other attempts for land rights by Alaskan natives, section two covers the outside opportunities, section three covers the organizational development of the AFN, and section four covers the development of a unified native effort that assisted in creating the AFN.

There are two elements of data collection which took place in this study. These are secondary and primary analysis. Together the data represents a wealth of information spanning from early Alaskan native life through current issues facing the Alaskan native population. Each source provides different levels of analysis for the questions that are posed in this study. In order to grasp protest history, I asked questions in the interviews related to other movements, or attempts at obtaining land rights, as well as retaining secondary sources that discuss this issue. To understand which political opportunities were relevant, I researched secondary sources on the situation facing America and Alaska between 1958 and 1971. These sources are backed up by first-hand accounts in media as well as from Senate hearings at the time. In addition, interviewees were asked about what they recalled being important for the ability of the Alaskan natives to successfully organize. Similarly, to understand the AFN organization’s mobilization after its formation I studied historical texts and records and included interview questions that explored issues of organizational strength. The final question asks: how the Alaskan native people saw the changes that were occurring?; what made them recognize that it was time to mobilize?; and how their culture affected the development of a unified identity? This was assessed through the examination of secondary sources such as
editorials by Alaskan natives, Senate hearing records, and the *Tundra Times*, a native run paper at the time, as well as through interviews.

The secondary sources for this study were collected through reviewing books, theses, and articles related to the topic. These data were found by using: internet sites, journal sites, and libraries. Additional resources were provided by the Cook Inlet Native Inc., Sealaska Inc., the First Alaskans Institute, and the Anchorage Museum of History and Art. These resources allowed me to collect data from media archives, books, Senate hearings, and articles. Once this secondary data were compiled, they were analyzed based on the primary questions of this study, and the levels of causality discussed in this methodology.

Primary analysis entailed interviewing individuals in four categories: ‘activists’, ‘professionals’, ‘researchers’, and ‘current native leaders’. Each type of respondent gave a different perspective on the native land rights movement. Activists provide and direct accounts of the AFN organization, movement emergence, lobbying, and the native perspective on the issue of land at the time. Professionals include lawyers who were active in the land rights cause and politicians who dealt with the issue first hand. Each gave a unique perspective on the issue, which was the interpretation of a non-native working with the natives for their land rights. Researchers that were chosen for interviews were knowledgable in the history and policy that affects the Alaskan native population. These individuals provided a critical perspective of the movement. The final, category of interviewees is the current native leaders, which provided the best analysis of how successful the movement was, since they are those who benefited from the results of the Alaskan Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA). The interviews were collected
through ‘educated snowball sampling’: in which all thirteen Alaskan Native Regional Corporations formed by ANCSA, the University of Alaska Anchorage Alaskan Native Studies Program, and the First Alaskans Institute were contacted. I requested information pertaining to possible interviews and contact information of native leadership, researchers, current leaders, or professionals at the time of the movement. Additionally, after each interview, the interviewee was asked if there were other possible contacts they would suggest for this study.

The twenty interviews took place between June 2005 and September 2005. These interviewees fit into one of four categories of involvement in the movement: activists (N=7), professionals such as lawyers or politicians (N=4), researcher (N=5), or current native leader (N=4). There were 15 face-to-face interviews, 1 mailed response, and 4 phone interviews. The final study population included 17 males and 3 females as well as 11 people of indigenous descent and 9 who were not of indigenous descent. By contacting all of the regional corporations, I made an effort to obtain a sample that included people from all regions of the state in order to get a more ethnically varied sample of leaders in the AFN. This was achieved to a degree, since I spoke with individuals of nearly every indigenous background from the Inupiat Eskimos of the north to the Tlingit Indians in the southeast.

In the process each interviewee was read a prepared consent form and told the purposes of this research prior to voice recording the interview. Interviews were done through a pre-designed questionnaire that was manipulated to meet the knowledge of the particular interviewees. Interviews were then transcribed and analyzed. Each interview
was analyzed based on the primary questions in this study and the causal relationships discussed in the introduction.

The levels of causality are ‘sufficient’, ‘necessary not sufficient’, and ‘not necessary’. In order to make these concepts simpler I will refer to them as sufficient, necessary, and not necessary respectively. The term sufficient means that the cause is in and of itself sufficient to create emergence or success of the AFN. Necessary means that it was an important element that affected the movement’s emergence or success, but unlike a sufficient cause it was dependant on other causal elements. Finally, not necessary means that it was present, but had no effect on the emergence or the success of the AFN. These causal categories will be used throughout the analysis and conclusions.

Limitations of this study include memory of the interviewees and the time that has passed. Since the movement occurred over thirty years ago, many accounts of events may have been affected by the passing years. I compensated for this by looking at archives and literature from the time period, thus providing a context for the interviewees’ reports. The problem of locating key people and of important members deaths since the movement is significant. Due to the limited amount of time for interviewing and the low numbers of those directly involved in the movement that are still alive, it was difficult to achieve a large sample of the movement’s leadership. Thus, this study will focus on the views of those interviewed. The activists and professionals in this study all fit in the elite population category since each of them were heavily involved in essential aspects of the AFN and the land rights issue during the 1958-1971 time period.
Chapter Three: Literature Review

The fundamental question in this study is what factors were critical in the emergence of the AFN and success of Alaskan natives during the 1960’s campaign for land rights? This research uses the ‘political process model’ of movement emergence in the Alaskan Native Land Rights Movement. Although political process is the primary tool in this study, there remains to be the possibility that elements from other theories may also assist in explaining important factors in mobilization. Thus, I will describe the factors from other theories to assess those theories that provide explanations beyond the political process model for how movement emergence and success occur and what ‘success’ means.

Political Process Model

The political process model provides a useful theory for exploring the critical factors which assisted in the mobilization of the Alaskan natives. This model states that three factors are needed for a rights movement to arise: environmental conditions or ‘political opportunities,’ preexisting organizations or ‘organizational strength,’ and ‘cognitive liberation’ or social-psychological shift (McAdam 1982). Political opportunities are described by McAdam as a cumulative, less dramatic restructuring of the power relations between excluded groups and their opposition. This change in power increases the political leverage that the excluded groups hold, thus “render[ing] it a more formidable opponent” (McAdam 1982: 43). Some examples of political opportunities include changes in the economic and political environment, i.e. the imminent national oil
crisis in the late 1960’s in which the U.S. government feared dependence on the Middle East, thus becoming eager to gain access to oil lands in Alaskan native claims areas. As for organizational strength, McAdam argues that preexisting groups can help launch a movement, providing the following resources are present: options for type of membership, established ‘structure of solidarity incentives’ or promoting involvement through incentives like monetary gains, communication network, and leadership. The latter two factors create conducive conditions for movements to emerge, but a third factor, cognitive liberation, is needed to take advantage of this potential to achieve an effective social movement. Cognitive liberation refers to the social-psychological change that creates an insurgent mindset within the population. This entails three aspects: First there needs to be a change in people’s perceptions of the legitimacy of the ruling order, reframing it as unjust and insufficient. Second, there is the assertion of rights by those who would ordinarily not have done so. Third there are feelings of empowerment and the recognition of the population’s ability to change the situation (McAdam 1982). The three components of the political process model together generate the conditions that enable a social movement to emerge.

This model and its underlying assumptions have been applied by numerous researchers in a variety of forms, be it directly to one case of mobilization or as a theoretical analysis of its practicality in application to case studies. Christian Smith applied this model to the United States Central American Peace Movement of the 1980’s. In his application of this model he notes numerous points that are important in the analysis of the Alaskan Native Land Rights Movement. For instance, he discusses the importance of the United States federal government being willing to ‘consider the cause
important enough to look into’ or recognize (Smith 1996: 371). This is a point referenced by McAdam through the concept of repression.

A second point that Smith notes is the importance of recognizing the connection between a leader’s involvement in different movements and the effect it has on latter movements the become involved with (Smith 1996: 373). Again, Smith is reiterating an important point from McAdam, which is not directly defined in the general discussion of the political process model. This point is the leader's involvement in outside movements and how they influence the leadership skills as they move to the next movement. Although McAdam does not name this as a primary element within political opportunities he does discuss this to a smaller extent. Outside movements are important for the decision making of the Alaskan Native Land Rights Movement and it extends beyond that of leadership skills gained from the other movements to funding and knowledge.

A third point that Smith refers to is the importance of ‘spillover effects’ (Smith 1996: 373), or prior life experiences that assist in a leader’s subjective interest of involving themselves in activism (Smith 1996: 382). The final factor that Smith assesses from his study of the United States Central American Peace Movement is that of the ‘moral conviction,’ which according to him persuades membership involvement within a movement. Moral conviction is evident in the desire of movement members to make right the past wrongs done to the Native Americans. Each factor is relevant in the mobilization of the Alaskan natives to some degree.

Sydney Tarrow also discusses the political process model in his research of movement power. A point that he raises that is not assessed by Smith concerns the effects of autonomous supporters on social movements. The definition of an ‘autonomous
supporter’ in this case study is the autonomy of the different member organizations. Tarrow explains that autonomous supporters can either have a positive or negative effect. Positive effects include assisting the movement to “mount a collective action without possessing the resources that would be necessary to internalize a support base” (Tarrow 1998: 23) or in simpler terms, providing material support for the movement, i.e. finances, publicity, facilities, etc. Autonomous groups or member organizations can also have a negative effect by bringing about fractionalized power, defection, competition, or repression between the autonomous groups (Tarrow 1998: 23).

Like Smith and Tarrow, Aldon Morris in his discussion of social movement theory critiques the political process model. He claims that McAdam’s model is overly structural, limiting its ability to assess key factors in mobilization such as cultural dynamics and protest history (Morris 2000: 446). The political process model, according to Morris, overlooks these points since it focuses on external factors of the movement and not on the cultural and emotional processes that are present in movements. James Jasper expands on the critique suggesting that the political process model does not consider the elements of cultural dynamics and personal biography. In this case ‘cultural dynamics’ is defined as shared understandings within a group and personal biography is the subjective understanding by an individual (Jasper 1997: 43-44). For Jasper and Morris, culture and psychology are an essential factor for movement mobilization. In the case of the Alaskan Natives this is precisely the case, since their cultures played into many of these topics, as did the personal choices of leaders.

To summarize Smith stresses elites’ willingness to support movements, connecting with other movements, leaders’ prior experience, and moral conviction.
Tarrow adds to these elements the issues of supporter autonomy being either helpful or hurtful to a movement and the need to supply a remedy when acknowledging an unjust situation. Morris points out that the political process model lacks a way to examine cultural dynamics and protest history of the group. Lastly, Jasper expands on cultural dynamics by adding the element of personal biography.

Each of these elements of the political process model are important in the analysis of the Alaskan Native Land Rights Movement. By assessing these points of dissension and clarification brought up by Smith, Tarrow, and Morris we have been able to assess elements within the political process model that have been developed since McAdam’s model was designed.

**Grievance Theory**

‘Grievance theory’ highlights the discrimination perceived by a particular disadvantaged group. The types of discrimination that are noted by Ted Robert Gurr that are not present in the political process model are ‘economic discrimination’ and ‘political discrimination.’ Economic discrimination is defined as the exclusion from economic goods, desirable economic conditions, and positions (Gurr 1993: 43). Political discrimination is the limit of political rights or access to political positions within a given society (Gurr 1993: 46). For Gurr, mobilization is the product of the desire for political autonomy, political rights, economic rights, and social or cultural rights (Gurr 1993: 71-72). According to the grievance theory, without these elements mobilization could not occur.
Gurr assists in describing how grievances need to be present in order for the people to believe that they can change the way things are. For McAdam these grievances are wrapped up in the idea of recognizing the need for a change to occur. For the case of the Alaskan Natives grievance issues and cognitive liberation are aligned, with awareness of grievances preceding the recognition of the need to make changes to correct such grievances. By assessing grievances I will analyze if the grievances alone were important to the emergence or success of the AFN.

Resource Mobilization Theory

‘Resource mobilization theory’ finds that the grievance theory underemphasizes the structural components of a movement. These include elements such as the ability of a movement to gain power, organize, recruit membership, create networks, tactical choices, mobilize media or public support (Kerbo 1982: 646-652; McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1217). These are all elements within the political process model’s discussion of organizational strength, but there are some points that need to be discussed from this theory, which include the discussion of bloc recruitment and conscious constituents.

Craig Jenkins notes that the potential for mobilization in the resource mobilization theory is dependent upon pooling resources and preexisting group organization. He also notes that bloc recruitment from these preexisting organizations is “the most efficient form of recruitment and appears to be typical of large-scale institutional change movements” (Jenkins 1983: 538-540). This style of recruitment is used by the Alaska Federation of Natives and thus Jenkins’ discussion of bloc recruitment is important to the analysis of membership within the political process model.
‘Conscious constituents’ are a second important factor from resource mobilization theory that is not noted in the political process model. This concept suggests that third party supporters who do not benefit from the success of the movement are, in fact, an important and often essential resource in mobilization (McCarthy and Zald 1979). For the Alaskan natives, conscious constituents were an important source of resources and support. These factors of bloc recruitment and that of conscious constituents assist in the analysis of the organizational strength element in the political process model.

Thus far we can see that the political process model can be expanded upon by considering grievance theory and resource mobilization theory. Elements that are important in this assessment are recognition of discrimination, recruitment tactics for membership, and conscious constituents. Other analyses note that elite willingness to support movements, connecting with other movements, leaders’ prior experiences, moral conviction, supporter autonomy, cultural dynamics, and personal biography are additional elements effecting movement emergence. When analyzing the Alaskan Native Land Rights Movement’s emergence and success I will reference which of the factors involved in the movement coincided with these theoretical elements. This will allow me to recognize what theoretical components both within the political process model and outside of the model assisted the ANLRM.

Development and Ethnic Competition Theories

The element of political opportunity in the political process model can be associated with the literature on ‘development and ethnic competition theories.’ Each of these theories discusses the element of competition between groups within society, which
is relevant to the ANLRM. This literature explains where grievances based on political and economic forces lead to mobilization, expanding on grievance theory by noting direct causes of grievances.

Development theory is focused on urbanization and industrialization as key factors in the mobilization of the masses (Marquette 1974: 1059). These elements lead to an increase in literacy, education, and media exposure, which change the value expectations of a given group and leads to the mobilization of groups (Huntington 1968: 47). Ethnic competition theory expands on development theory to include ethnicity. It focuses on organization around a particular ethnic identity. This model, like development theory notes that with competition between ethnic groups in the same labor market, ethnic mobilization will occur (Olzak 1983: 362). The modernization of regions assists in increasing this competition between culturally different indigenous ethnic groups in Alaska, which in turn is suggested to specifically increase the ethnic identity of groups along a large-scale ethnic line and not small kinship or village groups (Olzak 1983: 632; Belenger and Pinard 1991: 446). In the case of indigenous peoples in Alaska this identity transferred to a collective identity of Alaskan natives instead of remaining divided among regional ethnicities. The processes that are part of modernization are urbanization, industrialization, expansion of the political sector, and independence from controlling power (Olzak 1983: 363).

Together these theories provide a means to note the power of modernization within the element of political opportunities and grievances. Modernization aspects discussed above are elements which can assist in propelling grievance issues and competition and thus can create ripe conditions for mobilization. This is relevant to the
ANLRM with the direct modernization changes that were present during the 1960’s after Alaska became a state and development of a state proliferated.

**Cultural and Identity Theories**

These ethnic competition theories highlight the importance of ethnicity and identity in movement development through their focus on the effects of ethnicity on movement development based on modernization. Cultural and collective identity aspects of movements are the fundamental missing elements in the political process model that are likely to play a role in the Alaskan Native Land Rights Movement due to its cultural connection of movement development around a conflict over land rights between non-native and native peoples. These elements are noted briefly in the ethnic competition model, Morris, and Jasper in earlier discussions.

Collective identity has recently been attractive to mobilization researchers. There are five elements of collective identity according to Kolakowski. First is national identity, which requires a historical memory or awareness of the past. This element is structured around an identity with history, symbols, idioms, and cultural sites. Second is national culture, which is described as a connection through language. Third is anticipation, or ability to think in terms of the future interests of a culture. This is important in being able to see what can be done to bring about positive changes for particular cultures within a given society. Fourth is landscape and territory as being important to collective identity. Finally there is the awareness of the cultural origins or an identifiable beginning (Kolakowski 2003: 8-9).
Culture has become the element, which scholars repeatedly note as the missing element in the models (Morris 2000; Jasper 1997; Nepstad 2004). The variety of elements that a collective identity and cultural analysis adds to movement theory is immense. Elements include historical memory, connection through language, anticipation or connection with the future of a group, territorial connections, and cultural origins. The ANLRM initially began through the recognition of certain cultural connection to the land. There was also an overarching need by the different indigenous groups to work together to protect their subsistence lifestyle and their economic future.

Measuring Achievement

Achievement in this study must look at both emergence and success. In relation to emergence movements have been measured in a variety of ways. One style of emergence measurement from grievance theory is to base achievement on the intensity of grievances within a mobilized group (Gurr 1970: 60). More grievances produce stronger mobilization within a group and thus achieve emergence. In the political process model emergence of a movement is connected to meeting the tenets of the model (McAdam 1982). For this study emergence will be measured by the elements that seem necessary or sufficient to the emergence of the AFN.

Achievement for the measurement of success is also measured in a variety of ways. In resource mobilization, it is linked to the ability to obtain adequate resources (McCarthy and Zald 1979: 167) or by the tangible benefits that meet stated movement goals, or in the formal acceptance of the organization by its antagonist (Jenkins 1983: 540). Smith bases success on the activist perspective of whether the movement was
successful or not (Smith 1996: 386). The theory of measuring success that links most closely with how it will be measured in this study is that of William Gamson. His theory notes that success is measured by attainment of one’s goals or gaining recognition from the government as a legitimate group (Gamson 1990). This study will measure the achievement of success by the ability to obtain land rights and create sustainable arrangements for the needs of the native people. Obtaining land rights is an essential element of success since the primary desire for the native peoples was to retain their lands. Unlike land rights, the issue of sustaining arrangements is an important element of success since without providing for the future of the native people then the ability to improve the circumstances that created the need for mobilization in the first place could resurface.

This literature review suggests that there are a variety of possible mobilization factors outside of the political process model that may be relevant in the emergence of the Alaskan Native Land Rights Movement. These elements extend from the discussion of the political process model, grievance theory, resource mobilization theory, development theory, ethnic competition theory, and collective identity theory. I will analyze the relevance of these theories in the case of the ANLRM by linking elements involved in the emergence and success of the ANLRM to their theoretical counterparts.

To summarize how these additional elements provide the possibility of a new model that encompasses each of these theories I will overview the theories in a chart. The chart compares assumptions, usefulness, limitations, and relevance to the ANLRM. The chart suggests that each of the additional theories adds causes of emergence and success
that are not present in the political process model. Each theory has a particular usefulness in the discussion of the Alaskan Native Land Rights Movement, in addition to limitations as a form of analysis. When comparing the assumptions, usefulness, limitations, and relevance of these theories we can see that they each provide a unique perspective on analyzing movement emergence and success. The chart provides a more concise means to analyze what has been discussed in this literature review.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assumptions</th>
<th>Movements emerge when political opportunities, organizational strength, and cognitive liberation exist.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Movements emerge when those who are discriminated against recognize their grievances as a problem.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movements emerge through various organizational elements; also notes the importance of conscious constituents.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movements emerge through industrialization, urbanization, and competition between ethnic groups.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movements emerge through historical memory, language connection, anticipation of the future of the group, territorial connections, and cultural origins.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Usefulness For this Study</th>
<th>This model provides a means to assess the AFN based on political opportunities and cognitive liberation, not noted in the other theories.</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provides the understanding of discrimination and recognizing it to the development of the movement.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The most essential element from this theory for the AFN is the concept of conscious constituents.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>This suggests for the AFN that changes in the environment and new competition due to statehood may be important to the movement emerging.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provides a means to consider identity formation and culture within the movement’s development.</td>
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<th>The model misses points of culture, identity, discrimination, and conscious constituency; as well as simplifying movements too much.</th>
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<td>Does not extend beyond recognizing discrimination to elements of how organizing takes place.</td>
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<td>Limits its analysis to the movement organization and their supporters.</td>
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<td>Focuses on outside factors and misses issues of developing the organization.</td>
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<td>Does not consider issues of organizational development or outside influences that may have made a difference in movement emergence.</td>
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<th>Relevance to the AFN</th>
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(Harper 2006)
Chapter Four: Analysis

Section One: Protest History

The Alaskan natives have had numerous gains in their land rights over the past century. They have fought long hard battles to attain their aboriginal rights as separate regional ethnic groups and as a united Alaskan native group. This section will assess the land rights protest history of the Alaskan natives prior to and during the formation of the Alaska Federation of Natives (AFN). The purpose of this analysis of protest history is to illustrate how the attempts for land rights by the Tlingit, Haida, Tyonek, and other regional ethnic native groups affected the emergence and success of the AFN.

There are three specific groups that asserted their land rights through separate means outside of the AFN. These include 1) the Tlingit and Haida of Southeastern Alaska by means of the United States Court of Claims, 2) the various associations that formed in the early and middle 1960’s filing land claims through the Bureau of Land Management, and 3) the Tyonek Indians of the Moquawkie Reserve through threatened litigation against the Department of the Interior. The U.S.Court of Claims deals with Native American claims against the United States Government for compensation of lands that were taken. In the following section I will describe how each of these efforts retained some positive successes for their respective native groups and assisted the AFN in the united effort towards retaining aboriginal land rights.
Court of Claims Effort: Tlingit and Haida

One native leader in the 1964 Senate hearings stated that, “there is nothing new about natives claiming land in Alaska, Southeastern Alaskan native groups have run the court gauntlet off and on for over thirty years” (S. 1964/2690/2020 Feb 8, 9, 10, 1968: 118). This statement exemplifies the long standing tradition of protests by natives around land rights since the issue of aboriginal land rights had existed for nearly 100 years in 1966 when the AFN formed.

The Tlingit and Haida peoples of Southeastern Alaska were some of the first Natives to come into contact with outside societies. Be it the Russian fur traders or the Americans searching for gold, these Alaskan natives were some of the first to be intruded upon by outsiders coming into Alaska. The Treaty of Cession in 1867 brought into the region the United States government and thus a new order of law. With new order came significant change to the native way of life (Hensley 1966: 3).

Change for the Tlingit and Haida included a recognition that they to must change in order to survive within the new society. In 1912 the first Alaskan native organization was formed, the Alaskan Native Brotherhood (ANB), which was quickly followed by the formation of the Alaskan Native Sisterhood (ANS) in 1914 (Land is Ours 1996). Land rights had already become an issue at this point within the Tlingit and Haida populations, since the earliest record of an application for an allotment in Southeast Alaska is June 30, 1911 (S. 1964/2690/2020 Feb 8, 9, 10, 1968: 346). The native people recognized that the land had been sold out from under them to the Americans from the Russians who had barely held power in the territory. “The seven and a half million dollars [should have] been paid to them [the Alaskan natives] instead of the Russians” (Hensley 1966). These
recognitions of injustice coincided with the development of the ANB and ANS, which were according to one current native leader “organized to advocate for the…native people of the Southeast” (Current Leader One). These organizations together took on efforts to obtain citizenship for native people (Researcher Four), issues of land with fox farmers moving into traditional hunting grounds (Researcher Five), and of course the general land rights of the Southeastern Tlingit and Haida peoples.

During the early part of the twentieth century the Southeastern Alaskan natives had one means to retain their land rights, the Court of Claims. In November of 1935, ANB delegates met at their traditional annual meeting called Grand Camp and voted to file suit (Paul 1986). The Court of Claims was a long and tedious process including: legislation to allow the suit into the Court of Claims (Activist Six) and amendment delays until 1947 (Tundra Times Dec 17, 1971). In 1956 the courts determined they needed to try the case once for whether there was legal right to the land and the second time for amount of compensation if necessary (Tundra Times Dec 17, 1971). This was by no means an end to the process for the Tlingit and Haida people.

The next step was to receive a judgment as to whether or not the Tlingit and Haida were entitled to the lands to which they had made claims. It was not until October 17, 1958 that the Court of Claims made their decision on entitlement to the lands of Southeastern Alaska. It was determined that the “U.S. Government failed to protect the property rights of the Tlingit and Haida Indians in Southeastern Alaska when various federal agencies created Glacier Bay National Monument, Tongass National Forest, and [the Annette Island Reserve]” (Anchorage Daily Times Oct 19, 1958). In essence this means that the Treaty of Cession in 1967 did not extinguish the rights of the Tlingit and
Haida to the land (Ray 1962; Paul), but even so land rights were extinguished by federal agencies creating federal lands. Lands extinguished by the federal government include the elimination of aboriginal rights to the land through the allotment of the lands for other uses such as national parks. This is stated best by one activist, who said, “you have used and occupied these lands from time immemorial, but, this is a big but, when the United States Federal Government set aside lands [they]…nullified, they extinguished your Indian title” (Activist Six). What this meant for the Alaskan natives of the Southeast is that they were only entitled to compensation based on the time of taking by the federal government, thus even though it was 1958 they could only receive compensation as of the date the tracts of land were taken by the government.

Once they had a verdict from the Court of Claims that recognized their rights to the land they had occupied for generations there was still a second step to wait for, the determination of appropriate compensation for the lands. Once again, it was a long wait. Finally on January 19, 1968, the decision of the compensation amount was made; ten years after the decision of entitlement, and over thirty years after the original suit was filed by the ANB. The result of over thirty years of waiting the Tlingit and Haida were awarded 7.5 million dollars in compensation and the recognition that they retained 2.3 million acres of land for their use in southeast, Alaska (S. 1964/2690/2020 Feb 8, 9, 10, 1968: 569). This settlement was a great success for the Tlingit and Haida people, but even so, the results did not meet their desire to regain their ownership of the lands they once occupied. This unhappiness with the judgment is noted by a state leader at the time. He states that, “the courts awarded them [the Tlingit and Haida approximately] 43 cents an acre. Now we do not feel that that was a fair evaluation by any stretch of the
imagination” (S.1964/2690/2020/3586 July 12, 1968: 558). This note of unfairness is linked with the failure of the Court of Claims to meet the original demand of the Tlingit and Haida people, that is the demand for land. As one activist noted, “when the Tlingit and Haidas first prepared to get into the courts they were concerned about land, they wanted land, they preferred land, this had been their land and they wanted it, the rights to it restored, they wanted it back” (Activist Six).

If you look at the history of the Tlingit [and Haida] as a group they were at least a generation perhaps even two generations…ahead of every other native group in Alaska in terms of having a cadre of leadership, who could if not defend their interests certainly participate in…communicating their interests to the larger economic and political system (Researcher Five).

For the Alaskan Federation of Natives the previous experience of the Tlingit and Haidas was a lesson from history that would assist their choices and efforts. One fundamental lesson that was learned was the direction in which to pursue the Statewide Claims effort and how to do so. After the long process of the Court of Claims with the Tlingit and Haida it became evident that in order to get a “quicker and fairer [settlement]…[it would be best] for Congress simply to decide the amount of compensation Alaska natives would be paid” (Mitchell 2001: 166). Congress was an alternative to the lengthy Court of Claims option (Arnold 1978: 106-107). This decision was not only made on the issue of how much time it would take though the Court of Claims, but what land could be granted to the Alaskan natives. For example, “the jurisdiction of the court is very clear, it couldn’t address the question of title to lands unless…aboriginal title had been extinguished” (Activist Six).

The situation of aboriginal title for the majority of Alaskan natives was that it had not been extinguished by government designation of land use, thus the Court of Claims
would not be effective for most Alaskan natives. Their desire for land use rights, mineral rights, as well as compensation for lands that they had occupied for generations was their primary desire and the Court of Claims jurisdiction would not take care of their needs.

The Tlingit and Haida learned this and passed on that knowledge to the AFN. With this knowledge leaders of the AFN could say, “we Alaskan natives have clear rights to claim aboriginal title, we have just had it upheld in a unanimous decision for the Tlingit and Haidas in the Court of Claims” (Activist Six). So what we see here is that the Tlingit and Haida provided lessons about organizing protest, time constraints in using the Court of Claims, and directed the AFN away from the Court of Claims so that they could obtain land. The lessons about organizing protests spanned from the knowledge that leaders among the Tlingit and Haida had obtained over time. The AFN learned from the experience of the ANB in the Court of Claims, recognizing the time constraints of taking that direction in compensation, as well as learning that the Court of Claims could not provide for the AFN’s goal of obtaining lands. These elements were necessary for the AFN’s success so as not to repeat the past error of placing claims in the Court of Claims that the Tlingit and Haida had made in their quest for land title.

In addition to the lessons that the Tlingit and Haida provided in the statewide effort, there was also the factor of funds from their compensation that assisted in the continued efforts of the AFN in their own search for land and compensation. This funding assistance included the guaranteed loan provided by the Tlingit and Haida to the AFN of one hundred thousand dollars (Activist Six). Funding such as this was helpful to the AFN, which struggled financially. This funding provided for necessary costs, but for the Tlingit and Haidas the most significant element that they provided the AFN with was
the jurisdictional knowledge about the Court of Claims as a non-viable option for obtaining land.

_Alaskan Native Regional Associations_

In the early and middle 1960’s there was a drastic increase in the number of regional native associations around the state. Many situations, described in detail during section four, confronted the native people that stirred the desire for organizing within separate regions of the state. The Inupiat Eskimos of the northern region began an organization called Inupiat Paitot in 1961. The _Fairbanks Daily Miner_ newspaper noted that the Inupiat Paitot discussed of aboriginal hunting, land claims, and social and economic development (Fairbanks Daily Miner Nov 17, 1961: V39 N267). The Northern Eskimos were not the only natives forming associations at this time. One Athabaskan leader Al Ketzler stated that “since early in 1962 quite a lot of my time has been spent in helping to get the native people of my own area and the Yukon Valley organized to work together to try and save our land” (S,1964/2690/2020 Feb 8, 9, 10 1968: 181). The organization that developed in the Athabaskan dominated interior of Alaska was the Dena Nena Henash. This development of regional associations created a method for dialoguing about issues between the regions, which was important in the eventual emergence of the AFN.

At this point the Alaska Native Brotherhood, the Inupiat Paitot, and the Dena Nena Henash were beginning to learn of the land rights issues facing the regions throughout Alaska. Then on June 17, 1963 the _Tundra Times_ announced on page one that the “Native Groups Unite: Inupiat Paitot, Dena Nena Henash, ANB to affiliate” (_Tundra Times_ June 17, 1963: 1). Numerous other conferences were held in the years to come
with funding through the Association on American Indian Affairs (*Tundra Times* June 8, 1964: 1). Regional native associations began to pop up throughout the state as a result of this dialogue and actions taken on behalf of the regional leaders like Nick Grey to assist in creating regional associations. These included the Cook Inlet Native Association and the Kotzebue Native Association among others. The Cook Inlet Native Association leadership recalls that “we had the vision of what should be and we sent Nick Grey [around the state]..., we paid his way to organize around the state from top to the bottom, statewide. And he organized a lot of local groups” (Activist One).

Efforts such as these that brought the word of the emerging associations out into the villages were a significant help in the formation of the AFN, since it was these efforts that would eventually join together and unite the Alaskan native community. Each association made claims, via written land claim protests, with the Bureau of Land Management for lands that they had occupied and continued to occupy. This claims map illustrates the effect that these protests had on the state. The issue of land claims was considered a form of protest among the Alaskan natives and thus this map is referred to as the protest map by the Alaskan community.

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2 *Alaska Native and the Land*

14 Regional Assoc. in 1968: Arctic Slope Native Assoc, Copper River Indian Assoc, Chugach Native Assoc, Village Council President Assoc, Tanana Chiefs Assoc, ANB, T-H Central Council, Kodiak Area native Assoc, Northwest Alaska Native Assoc, Arctic Native Brotherhood, AK Peninsula Native Assoc, Bristol Bay NA, Aleut League, Lower Kenai NA; 7 community Orgs in 1968: Cook Inlet Native Assoc, Kuskokwim Valley native Assoc, Five Chiefs of Yakutat, Kenaitze Indian Assoc, and Native Village of Tyonek. (27)
As evident from the vast acreage that the protests spanned they had created a discussion amongst Alaskans as to the validity of these claims. What these associations provided to the AFN was a developed leadership and membership network that had been formed prior to the inception of the AFN in 1966. Even more significant was the addition of a protest mentality that the associations provided through their efforts in filing land protests such as in the map. A protest mentality in this case is recognition of the importance of land claims to the natives as a whole and desire to make economic and social changes for their people. These protests made it difficult for the state and federal governments to overlook the natives’ quest for recognition of their aboriginal land rights. This was highlighted by the Tundra Times in its April 15, 1966 issue when it quoted Senator Gruening of Alaska stating that “a crucial factor in the slow program in the state in land
selections…is the existence of protests that have been filed” (*Tundra Times* April 15, 1966: 6), which reiterated the importance of these protests for the State of Alaska. The elements of regional association formation and the protest maps were necessary for the AFN to emerge in 1966, since they provided the leaders from the associations, previously existing associations for a membership base, and the filing of land claims which provided a sense of the vast amounts of lands under claim by the Alaskan natives.

*Litigation for Land Rights: Tyonek*

The Tyonek Indians were a unique case within Alaska. Their jurisdiction was that of an Indian Reserve, which only existed in a few small places throughout Alaska. Located across the inlet from the populated city of Anchorage, the Moquawkie Reserve was formed in the early twentieth century (Smith 1998: 9). As a reserve, the Tyonek Indians had legal right to “lease their lands and use the profit for their benefit as a community” (S. 1964/2690/2020 Feb 8, 9, 10 1968: 127). The land of the Moquawkie Reserve included oil reserves, thus providing the means for leasing the land for oil drilling. Although their jurisdiction is clear it took the efforts of the village and their lawyer Stanley McCutcheon to thwart the Department of the Interior’s efforts to bid out the reserve for departmental rather than community benefit (Paul). The *Anchorage Daily Times* headlines read on May 7, 1964 that the “Tyonek Indians Balk Over Oil Leasing Terms.” The article explained the efforts being made on behalf of the Tyonek Indians by their lawyer in respect to the negotiations with the Interior Secretary (*Anchorage Daily Times* May 7, 1964). A settlement was declared by the oil companies who had drilled on the lands of the Tyonek Indians in which several million dollars was provided to the
natives (Researcher One). “It is with these monies paid to the Tyonek Indians from the oil activity that the tribe…[was] able to rebuild their community and invest in enterprises in Alaska which produce local income and employment” (Hensley 1966: 7). Although the option of threatening suits against the Department of the Interior over rights to Reserve lands is a limited option for a very small minority of Alaskan Natives, their efforts are not overlooked.

“The success of the Tyoneks had an electric effect on the native peoples of Alaska” (Gallagher 1974: 130). Thanks to the oil lease monies that they received the AFN was assisted in their efforts to organize and begin making protest claims (Mitchell 2001: 281). The Tyonek people’s assistance financially is irreplaceable for the AFN. They assisted in the first organizing meeting of the then unnamed AFN with an estimated 150,000 dollars including airfare, hotels, and a meeting place in Anchorage for the October 1966 meeting (Mitchell 2001: 78; Tundra Times Oct 21, 1966 V4 N43: 1). In the words of an activist leader, “Tyonek owned the building downtown called the Audio Cam building where we held the AFN meeting… [they] chartered DC-3’s, paid for hotels, paid people’s way into Anchorage, paid for meals. Without their help, AFN would not have gotten off to the great start that it did” (ANSCA Lecture Series 4: 1). In addition to this assistance during the organizational phase, the Tyoneks also supplied a loan of 100,000 dollars, which was termed timely by the Tundra Times (Tundra Times May 3, 1968: 2). This financial assistance was the most significant element that the Tyonek Indians provided the AFN.
The protest history as demonstrates numerous points that suggest the essential nature of such early efforts for the development of the Alaska Federation of Natives. First, the Tlingit and Haida presented the AFN with a means to recognize the importance of organizing and the limitations that the Court of Claims offers the Alaskan native people as a whole. The Tlingit and Haida are a necessary cause of the AFN’s success, since the knowledge that they supplied the AFN about the Court of Claims was important, as was their financial contribution. Second, the Tyonek situation funded the emergence of the AFN as well as later efforts in lobbying and expenses. The Tyonek oil reserve deal was a necessary cause for the emergence of the AFN since without their financial assistance the AFN would not have had such a successful first conference. Tyonek was also a necessary cause of the success of the AFN since they too provided some important funding in the efforts leading to the ANCSA. Third, the development of associations assisted in creating the atmosphere of protest throughout the state. Associations were a necessary cause of the AFN’s emergence since they provided the initial claims and dialogue between regions that created the AFN. A final point, which will be explained later in this analysis that follows from all of these past protests is the ability to create various degrees of funding, leadership, and membership for the AFN.

Figure Three: Policy History, Causes of Movement Emergence and Success

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<th>Necessary, But Not Sufficient</th>
<th>Emergence</th>
<th>Success</th>
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<td>- Tlingit and Haida</td>
<td>Association Formation, Tyonek</td>
<td>Tyonek</td>
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<td>- Tyonek</td>
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Section Two: Political Opportunities

One researcher commented that “a number of things came together, a confluence of things that had influences, from the past, it was ripe. The thing could not be held down much longer…And basically this allowed… [the Alaskan natives] to say- NOW!” (Researcher One) The essence of the concept of political opportunities is encompassed in this quote, it is these influences from the political sphere that assist in allowing the native people to say now it is time for us to make change. These influences provided a means and a situation that contributed to change that is ripe for the taking. For the AFN there were five political opportunities that assisted in the ability of the AFN to achieve success. In many cases these influences were the reason that the movement flourished as well as it did. The five opportunities include: 1) policy history and statehood for Alaska, 3) mood of the country, 4) effects of the 1964 earthquake, and 5) federal support for the cause.

Policy History and the Statehood Act

A controversy of immense proportions is rapidly coming to a head in Alaska. It is a situation which has lain dormant (except for sporadic outbursts) since Alaska was purchased from Russia in 1867. This problem has been skirted by Congress, alternately grappled with by the Department of Interior then dropped to allow the furor to settle, kept Alaskan political leaders frustrated, and the courts have ruled time and again- but never with finality or clarity. The problem is simply this: What are the rights of the Alaskan natives to the property and resources upon which they have lived since time immemorial? (Hensley 1966: 2)

William Hensley stated the issue of policy history well. In summary he notes that the issue of aboriginal land rights related to the Alaskan native people had repeatedly been avoided when making policy decisions in Alaska. It all began with the Treaty of Cession in 1867 when the United States government first wrote that
The inhabitants of the ceded territory… if they should prefer to remain in the ceded territory, they, with the exception of uncivilized native tribes shall be admitted to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of citizens of the United States and shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion. The uncivilized tribes will be subject to such laws and regulations as the United States may, from time to time, adopt in regard to aboriginal tribes of that country (Hensley 1966: 3).

This excerpt from the 1867 treaty does not discuss native lands except to place most the Alaskan native people at this time in limbo, characterizing them as uncivilized and making them subject to future laws and regulations. The federal government continued to skirt the issue on Alaskan native land rights throughout the next century.

Section eight of the Organic Act of 1884 asserted that

Indians or other persons in said district shall not be disturbed in the possession of any lands actually in their use or occupation or now claimed by them, but the terms under which such persons may acquire title to such lands is reserved for future legislation by Congress (Hensley 1966: 4).

Similarly in the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act the issue of jurisdiction was assessed

[native lands have] been heretofore reserved under any executive order and placed under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior or any bureau thereof, together with additional public lands adjacent thereto or any other public lands which were actually occupied by Indians or Eskimos (Hensley 1966: 7).

By leaving the decision up to Congress and the Department of the Interior in these acts the federal government created an interesting dilemma that would face the newly forming State of Alaska in the 1958 Constitutional Convention (Professional Two; Researcher Three; Activist Six). That question is ‘where do the rights of the state lie in regards to the question of what rights do the Alaskan natives have to the lands and resources?’ In answering this question the policy history outlines that the jurisdiction of Alaskan native
land rights was placed in the hands of the federal government. This became important for
the AFN as Alaska became a state in January 1959.

The Constitutional Convention in 1955-56 was the one and only chance that the
State had to assert its desire to settle the lingering land issue of the Alaskan natives. The
issue of native land rights became an increasingly complex and controversial issue
among the convention members as they debated over it. An amendment to the
Constitution had been suggested in which the convention would give lands to the Alaskan
natives. It was hoped by some that the Statehood Act would put an end to issue of Alaskan
natives land entitlement. For some of the delegates, this was a moral obligation that they
had to the aboriginal people of Alaska. Other delegates disagreed. Thus, the Statehood
Act ended like other policies had without settling the question of native land rights
(Fisher 1975: 137-138). The Statehood Act in article 12, section 12 states

The State and its people forever disclaim… all right or title in or to any property,
including fishing rights, the right or title to which may be held by or for any
Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut, or community thereof, as that right or title is defined in
the act of admission. The State and its people agree that, unless otherwise
provided by Congress, the property… shall remain subject to the absolute
disposition of the United States (Fisher 1975: 227).

Through giving up any and all rights that the State of Alaska had in relation to the
Alaskan native lands, the Statehood Act became a precedent for legislation that the
Alaskan native people used as they began to fight for their land rights. The power over
their land rights was placed in the hands, not of the state, but of the United States
government. The history of policy and the newly enacted Statehood Act defined a legal
jurisdiction for assessing the land rights of the Alaskan natives on the federal level.
The Statehood Act not only had refrained from taking care of the Alaskan native land rights issue, but determined that lands should be given to the State for development (Fisher 1975: 130).

Concern over native land rights culminated in blanket claims covering most of the state in 1966-67…[,] which is demonstrated by the Protest Map in Section One of this study.] Native leaders say these filings resulted from the section of the 1958 Statehood Act which granted Alaska the authority to select 103 million acres from vacant, unappropriated, unreserved lands (S.1964/2690/2020 Feb 8, 9, 10, 1968: 19).

The claims were a response to the long ignored issue of the Alaskan native land rights as well as the sudden takings of land by the state due to the transfer of lands from federal to state jurisdiction. Policy’s from the Treaty of Cession through the Statehood Act had left the decision of Alaskan native land rights up to the federal government and not up to the State of Alaska.

In passing the Statehood Act the State of Alaska was provided with 103 million acres in which they could acquire from within Alaska to develop their economic infrastructure.

And so with the authority granted to the state by the United States Congress the state started to select lands, lands throughout the state of Alaska. And in some cases the communities were the villages, um, the land where the communities are located was all [useful] land (Current One).

Claims developed around the state as the associations formed in response to the taking of lands in and around native villages and communities. As one activist recalled, “I grew up in the Alaska when there, you had total freedom and there was no competition for land and the state started selecting the land that caused competition and concern” (Activist One). The State of Alaska and the native associations disagreed as to how the land should be divided. Each side believed that their rights superseded those of the other. Thus, the
state felt they should be allowed to pick the lands first, while the natives believed they had that primary right to the land (Activist Six). One issue ended this debate, which according to the policy history as well as the Statehood Act, stated that the jurisdiction for native land rights resided with the federal government and the State of Alaska could do nothing about it.

In a 1968 Congressional hearing, a statement was made that encompasses how one Alaskan native leader felt about the long wait for their land rights to be asserted.

After a hundred years the federal government found this problem was too tough to handle so they tossed it to the State and the State found it was too tough to handle and they tossed it to the natives (S.1964/2690/2020 Feb 8, 9, and 10, 1968: 94).

After years of policy dictating that federal government held jurisdiction over the affairs of the Alaskan natives, it was the Alaskan natives turn to make policy move in their direction. Getting policy to move in their direction would not be simple, it would take the efforts of outside political forces, leadership, and creating unity among diverse ethnic cultures. Each of these elements will be elaborated on in the organizational strength section of this analysis.

*Political Mood of the Country*

The State of Alaska was in an uproar with natives filing land protests and the new State of Alaska attempting to take lands for development. Alaska was not the only place that was making changes. The rest of the United States in the 1960’s was in a decade of change as well. As one researcher commented, the “climate of the country at the time was one where…there was a lot of change, it was a time for change” (Researcher Two). Not only was the issue of the country’s political mood a factor that was an outside influence
on the Alaskan native movement, but also the country’s worry over an imminent oil crisis also influenced the movement.

And in the same way the Alaskan native effort to bring it’s grievance attention was happening…at the same time… the tail of the civil rights movement a bunch of Native Americans said hey it was working for Blacks, maybe it will work for us. So all of that started 68 – 69 with AIM [ or American Indian Movement] and everything else, with the invasion of Alcatraz …that actually worked very much to the advantage of the Alaskan native community (Researcher Five).

This sentiment was repeated over and over in my interviews spanning across numerous levels of involvement (Activist One; Researcher One; Researcher Two). The actions of other minority based movements at the time were a symbol of social change within the United States. The Alaskan Native Land Rights Movement was part of that bandwagon of minorities searching for change. “We had youth speaking out, as well as minorities, who were opposed to the Vietnam War. There was an essential element nationally for the assertion of voices that previously had been silenced and did not have a voice” (ANCSA LS4: 1-2). The atmosphere in America was highly supportive of creating change in the lower forty-eight states through protests, rallies, or through the political process of legislation.

Alaskan natives were not the only American Indians at this time who were pushing for change. In fact Time magazine February 9, 1970 cover and report on ‘The Angry Indian: starting down the protest trail,’ which stated that

after more than a century of patience and passivity, the nation’s most neglected and isolated minority is astir, seeking the means and the muscle for protest and redress. Sometimes highly educated, sometimes with an artful articulateness forged of desperation, always angry, the new American Indian is fed up with the destitution and public sanctioned abuse of his long-divided people. He is raising his voice and he intends to be heard (Paul 1986).
The American Indian Movement (AIM) was also astir, as well as a large conglomerate of organizations of Indians around the United States. These efforts spanned from ‘fish-ins’ which took place in Washington State to the Trail of Broken Treaties, a march resembling the March on Washington with Martin Luther King, Junior, and extreme actions such as the Alcatraz Island episode in which a number of American Indians took over the island. (Deloria 1974) One leader of the Alaska Federation of Natives noted that we [we]re aware of AIM and it’s method for seeking to achieve its objectives and we certainly did not take to be judgmental about how they were proceeding. But rather as we watched AIM proceed we were aware that this was an option in terms of how [we could approach land rights]… we recognized… what they were seeking to achieve. And our…[way] was to work through the Congress and to influence shape and nature of a settlement legislative package (Activist Six).

The AFN took a different route than some of the other American Indian organizations. They chose to work within the system, while others did not. For instance the AFN took a legislative approach to changing their social and economic conditions rather than more drastic approaches such as in the case of the AIM on Alcatraz Island. The mood of the country had little to no impact on the AFN’s emergence, but was a necessary cause in their success. The mood was circumstantial since it had impacted some of the Senators’ constituency tipping votes towards the resolution of minority issues. These examples are evident in the comments made by Senators throughout the United States about meeting the needs of the Alaskan native minority and righting the wrongs of past actions against the Native American people.

There was an imminent international crisis facing America during the 1960’s, which was interlaced with the Middle East’s oil supply. “The world was facing imminent energy crisis: between 1967 and 1973, America switched from being a net exporter of oil to a net importer; the 1960’s saw the nationalization of several oil companies in the
Middle East; and the 1967 Six Day War between Israel and Egypt had caused the first oil embargo” (*S.1964/2690/2020/3586 July 12 1968: 47*). These world issues were bearing down on the United States. One current native leader noted that “it was important for [the United States to]...solve the energy needs of this nation” (Current One). Something profound had happened on July 23, 1957…The *Anchorage Daily Times* headline screamed “RICHFIELD HITS OIL…the rush to obtain oil leases overwhelmed the federal land office in Anchorage” (*S.1964/2690/2020/3586 July 12 1968: 31*), which when overlapped with this imminent oil crisis created a stir among politicians. Alaska was a possible answer to the nation’s worry about an imminent oil crisis. According to Fredrick Paul, a Tlingit lawyer

> [With] the world’s oil producing nations… in the process of forming OPEC… many Americans believed that oil from Alaska was the obvious and only practicable means of maintaining national security in the face of this unprecedented threat (Paul 1986).

America was not yet ready to face the possibility of dependence on Middle Eastern oil supplies (Groh 1976), so with an oil crisis facing the United States, an unlikely remedy surfaces, the recently discovered Alaskan oil. Alongside the crisis, the land rights movement was beginning to take hold with the development of land claims by regions to the Bureau of Land Management.

*Effects of the 1964 Earthquake:*

With statehood achieved and a general desire for change within America and Alaska it would not be long until the desire for social and economic change among the Alaskan natives and the state land selections would conflict. Even so, there were some significant events that created an atmosphere in Alaska that was helpful for the AFN in
their efforts. These include 1) the earthquake of 1964, 2) the formation of the Federal Field Committee, and 3) oil lease sales by the State.

In 1964 an earthquake hit south central Alaska creating damage beyond comprehension. The federal government responded to this natural disaster by forming the Federal Field Committee. Originally this committee focused its efforts on developing strategies between the federal and state government for responding to the crisis (S.1964/2690/2020/3586 July 12 1968: 54; Researcher One; Researcher Three; Activist Five). The next significant project that the Federal Field Committee worked on was entitled ‘Alaskan Natives and Federal Hire,’ which demonstrated the discrimination against Alaskan natives in hiring practices (Researcher Three). This study led to the use of the Federal Field Committee as the research team in the study of the Alaskan native land issue. This research culminated in the development of the book, ‘Alaskan Natives and the Land,’ which as one researcher suggested, allowed the Senators to “put their hand on the book and say Gentlemen we have the facts” (Researcher Three). With the facts about the social and economic conditions of the Alaskan natives in place congressional staff could show their respective congressmen and women that the natives of Alaska were in fact in need of social and economic change in order to better their living circumstances. The question of whether the Alaskan native people were in the dire circumstances that they had expressed in Senate hearings could not be questioned any longer, since the Congress had the facts (Activist Five). With the facts in their hands the Congress was prepared to learn and assess the Alaskan native land rights.

The state leaders, on the other hand, had other issues on their mind after the earthquake’s vast damage, which required a significant amount of funding from the state
to rebuild. Since Alaska was only five years old at the time of the earthquake, they were
dependant on the federal government and desired to create economic autonomy as a state.
This desire was pressured by the funding needed to rebuild many small towns and cities
along the Pacific coast. The oil crisis that was facing the nation seemed an obvious means
for creating an autonomous economic state, no longer fully dependant on the federal
government.

March 27, 1964, when an earthquake that measured 8.5 on the Richter scale
struck in south central Alaska… ‘new money had to be found to help solve the
problems created by the earthquake as almost the entire state’s economy came
momentarily to a standstill…[Governor] Egan began looking more closely at
possible North Slope oil lease monies as a partial answer to the state’s financial

This oil lease money was where the state could obtain its funding to rebuild the damaged
segments of Alaska, but also to build an economic infrastructure based on oil leases to
companies. They perceived that these funds would be their chance for economic stability,
but the federal government would eliminate that dream, as we will see later in this section
when Secretary Udall’s land freeze is discussed.

The state was selling leases by the thousands which brought in money. By 1969
the State of Alaska was creating the autonomy it desired from the beginning. On
September 10th of this year, they decided to lease the lands on the ‘North Slope,’ a region
in the far north bordering the Arctic Ocean that was laden with oil reserves. The protests
against the sale were minimal including only a few native youth and the activist Charlie
Edwardsen with signs shouting to the public “Two Billion Dollar Native Land Robbery”
and “Bad Deal at Tom Kelly’s Trading Post,” along with chants of “economic genocide
on the native minority” (Tundra Times September 12, 1969). These few protesters had
little impact on the occasion. Most of Alaska was stirring with excitement as the numbers
received from the leases totaled 900 million dollars. This was not a small lease sale. In fact the amount that the state received from these oil leases was a stronger argument for the natives to say “we are asking for compensation for our lands and our lands are valuable as evident from the recent sales of only a small segment” (Mitchell 2001: 350). Yes, the state had created a strong economy, but soon policy stating that the discussion of Alaskan native issues could only be discussed with the federal government would come to haunt them.

**Federal Support for the Cause**

In the 1960’s it was a different political climate of America, reflected in the Congress, Congress did not want to go the tribal route because it regards tribal reservations, that whole model [as] an expander of dependency culture of permanent welfare culture of poverty, depression, alcohol and all kinds of things (Researcher One).

The federal government was trying to eliminate social problems that had become the basis foe activism within the reservations in the lower forty-eight states. There was a view in the federal government that “we’ve created a monstrosity here and we’re not going to do that again in Alaska” (Researcher One). Alaskan Senator Nick Begich stated the issue of justice for the Indians well in his comment in the Congressional Hearing Committee in 1968,

Let me just say that Helen M. Jackson wrote the book, ‘The Century of Dishonor,’ when she wrote about the terrible plight of the American Indian, giving example after example of what we did… you know we are trying to rewrite that book. We want to make certain that this century is not also a century of dishonor, so that there is not a second book written (S.1964/2690/2020 Feb 8, 9, 10, 1968: 447).
This sentiment is echoed in the actions of the federal government on behalf of the Alaskan natives. These efforts included Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall’s land freeze and the Nixon Administration’s declaration to assist the American Indians, which are explained in the following paragraphs.

The first federal government actions that assisted the AFN were the mini and maxi land freezes by Secretary Udall. The first hint of a possible land freeze came in 1963 when “1,000 signers ask[ed] for [a]‘Land Freeze’ around [their] villages” (Tundra Times Mar 4 1963:1). The petition was sent to Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall. Although this was the first attempt, there had been worries that the issue of native land rights would come to the forefront and that the state land selections provided by the Statehood Act would be halted (Mitchell 2001: 90). The importance of this petition cannot be overestimated, in fact one attorney for the Alaskan natives stated in 1963 that “the plain truth of the matter is that unless state [land] selections are blocked in substantially, all areas claimed by the natives, those claims never will be heard and determined, at least while any land is left” (Mitchell 2001: 104). This was the premise behind asking Secretary Udall for a land freeze that would stop state land selections until the Alaskan natives could determine their land rights.

On December 1, 1966, the Interior Secretary responded to this petition by signing an order that suspended all leasing within the Point Hope region pending a determination of the protests by the native peoples (Mitchell 2001: 132), an action that was later termed the mini-freeze. Secretary Udall recognized that the land freeze was for him “a moral question of how [he] interpret[s] and discharge[s] [his] duty as trustee for the American Indians” (Mitchell: 151). This was no minor policy decision that Secretary Udall was
making. The state administration was in an uproar over the federal government stepping in and halting the leasing of lands in Point Hope. Governor Walter Hickel was furious at the actions that Secretary Udall had taken, but his power was limited since the Federal Government had control over any and all issues of native land rights thanks to the policy records. The only option he had was to plead through letters, Senate hearings, and the courts to allow the state to continue to select lands, and he did. His letters urged the Secretary to lift the land freeze.

I brought to your attention the urgent need of substantial lift of the ‘freeze’ on public lands disposals imposed by your Department on the State of Alaska which, in our earnest view, poses a serious threat to the economy and integrity of the State (Paul Summarized: 113).

His comments at the Senate hearings did the same: “I would be remiss in my duties as Governor of Alaska if I did not once again urge the prompt lifting of the unnecessary, arbitrary and costly land freeze which has hampered Alaska’s development” (Paul Summarized: 134). Finally, the Governor’s court case State of Alaska v. Udall, which had been in and out of district courts for a few years, was overturned on December 19, 1969 (Mitchell 2001: 267; Anchorage Daily News Feb 11, 1967 V20 N268:3). It seemed that the state could do little to assist in avoiding their economic peril. The state was just getting on its feet and the mini-freeze had halted much of the development.

More was to come that would affect the state in even more detrimental ways. In December of 1968, after the announcement of Hickel as Secretary Udall’s successor by President Nixon, Udall “withdrew all unreserved federal land in Alaska in order to safeguard native land rights” (Mitchell 2001: 188). Udall recognized that Hickel’s determination to undo the land freeze could jeopardize the native’s land rights. This effort by Udall culminated in Hickel being forced to abide by the freeze that Udall had created
if he wanted to become the next Secretary of the Interior. The freeze was extended at this time to the entirety of Alaska. It was essential for the Alaska Federation of Natives to retain the freeze and it was Stewart Udall who provided that possibility.

The super land freeze assisted in creating an environment where those who opposed providing land and compensations to the AFN such as the State of Alaska and various organizations within the state were forcefully persuaded to work towards Alaskan native land claims. Udall’s super freeze provided the leverage the AFN needed in order to push their version of legislation (Activist Two; S.1964/2690/2020/3586 July 12 1968: 555; *Tundra Times* Jan 3 1969 V6 N156: 6). The freeze made “the necessity for a solution become more crucial for parties other than the natives” (Erin 1974: 221). These other parties included the state, who as noted earlier, desired to choose the lands provided to them by the Statehood Act. The other critical party that desired land use in Alaska was the oil companies.

After the discovery of oil in 1957 the oil companies and the Trans Alaska Pipeline Service company (TAPS) had “pipeline stockpiled in Valdez [Alaska]” as well as having “construction equipment leased and sent across the Yukon [River] [in the] winter” (Mitchell 2001: 267). The oil companies and TAPS had a huge investment in Alaska and they were eager to get the Alaskan native land claims settled. One professional at the time commented on this by stating that, “they wanted to get it settled they didn’t care how much money [the Alaskan natives] got, they didn’t care how much land [the Alaskan natives] got, what they cared about was getting the pipeline built” (Professional Four). These fundamentally non-native entities were persuaded by the federal government’s freeze to recognize the rights of the Alaskan natives. As Udall later commented, “if we
had not held everyone’s feet to the fire or perhaps we should say to the ice, with the 
freeze” it might not have ever happened (Arnold 1978: 124). The freeze was a sufficient 
cause of the AFN’s success since it persuaded the opposition to seek a resolution.

A final influence on the Alaskan Native Land Rights Movement by the federal 
government came directly from the Nixon Administration. The administration used the 
issue of Indian self determination as a platform during the Nixon campaign of 1968 
(S.1964/2690/2020/3586 July 12 1968: 47). For Nixon the issue of Indian self-
determination was not purely political, but also personal. In a speech after the passing of 
the land bill for the American Indians of Blue Lake, Nixon stated

I have often spoken of the fact that one of the men that influenced me the most in 
my college career happened to be my football coach, who was an American 
Indian…he had character, strong, indomitable character…today on this occasion 
shows us that our Indian people, who are a small part of America in numbers, 
have made an enormous contribution because they have given great character to 
so many parts of our country (Mitchell 2001: 397).

Nixon’s personal experiences and desire to meet the needs of the American Indians was 
reflected in his policy decisions. In reference to the Alaskan natives, Nixon is quoted as 
stating

Native citizens of Alaska deserve full compensation for the injustice that has 
resulted from the neglect of their claims. This neglect, as you know, was clearly 
recognized in our Party’s National platform and a pledge made to promote 
policies responsive to the needs and desires of the Indian and Eskimo people. 
Solution to the land claims problem is an intricate part of this pledge - a promise I 

The additional elements influencing Nixon’s support of the Alaskan natives are the 
His support culminated in the decision of the Federal Administration to support a 40 
million-acre land claims bill (Mitchell 2001: 396). The support of the Administration in
relation to the acres of land in the land claims bill was important to the ability for the Alaskan natives to obtain the acreage they desired, as opposed to the smaller versions suggested by some members of Congress.

Not everyone in the federal government supported the Alaskan natives’ position. In fact some congressmen worried about the effect a large land claims bill for the Alaskan natives would have on other American Indians’ desire for further claims on their part (*Anchorage Daily News* April 8 1971). This dissention was limited and the other federal supports: oil companies desire for the pipeline and the State of Alaska’s want of economic security overrode those oppositional congressmen to the benefit of the Alaskan natives. Some supportive congressmen felt that “the decision we make on this legislation will profoundly affect the lives of Alaskan natives for generations, and will reflect on the honor of our nation for centuries” (*S.35/835/1571 April 29 1971: 542*). It is this mindset that assisted the Alaskan natives in their journey towards the Alaskan Native Claims Settlement Act.

One activist is quoted as saying, “[the federal government] could have done nothing, they could have said you don’t have any rights and then it would be over” (Activist One), but the federal government did not. Overall, the federal government supported the Alaskan Natives through Johnson’s War on Poverty program discussed in the organizational strength section, the Department of the Interior via Secretary Udall and the Nixon Administration.

Senator Edmund Muskie of Maine commented that
The Eskimos, Indians, and Aleuts of Alaska have been patient long enough. The time for settlement is here: Settlement on the basis that permits the people of the North to live their own lives free at last from dependency on hand outs; free to make their own future, with tools that will permit them to build for themselves and their children the kind of opportunity all men seek and deserve (S.35/835/1571, April 29 1971: 511).

This was a time of change in America. Supported by the policy history, the Statehood Act, the mood of the country, the programs spawned by the 1964 earthquake, and the federal government the Alaskan natives were prime for organizing a successful campaign.

The element of policy history is a necessary cause for the success of the Alaska Federation of Natives, because of the influence it had on who controlled the outcome of the Alaskan Native Land Claims. Had the state held control, the result would likely have been smaller compensation, due to the lack of monetary resources that the state had at the time. The development of corporate control of native lands would have likely been overlooked since the state would have pushed for small land parcels instead of larger tracts of land as well as limited mineral rights, eliminating much of what the corporations control today.

As for Alaska obtaining statehood, the Act is aligned with the earlier discussion of the policy history. The fact that the Statehood Act provided lands to the newly formed state and the state in return choose lands in and around the Native villages is sufficient in the emergence of the AFN. It was the pressure that these takings by the state placed on the native people that assisted in the development of organizing within the various regions. If the state had not selected the lands the Alaskan natives in and around the regions may never have organized to protect their aboriginal land use.
The mood of America at the time following the Civil Rights Movement and the liberal constituency affecting the Congressional delegation is necessary for being a cause of movement emergence in the case of the Alaskan natives. It seems that it did indeed affect some Senators as well as affecting the AFN in their understanding of the national climate surrounding general minority issues. Even so, the movements in the lower forty eight states seem to have had little direct impact on the development of the AFN or any of the associations around the state. This provided no evidence for causing the emergence of the AFN, but mood was necessary for the success of the AFN.

The earthquake was a necessary cause of the success of the AFN. Had the earthquake never occurred the State of Alaska would have not needed the funding to the same degree that they did in order to repair the damages not covered by the federal government. Even though there was some assistance provided through the need of the state to obtain money for repairing the damage from the earthquake the AFN’s successes would have still been substantial without it, since the state had limited power over the land as a result of policy dictating that native issues were resolved on the federal level.

As for the Federal Field Committee, it was helpful for the congressional staff to have the document so that they could refer to the social and economic issues facing the native people, but there is no evidence that the success of the AFN would have been upset over not having the document or committee. The oil lease sale by the state was a necessary cause of the AFN’s success. The sale demonstrated the worth of the oil rich lands claimed by the Alaskan natives creating a tipping factor towards the higher end of compensation to the Alaskan natives. Had the oil lease sale not occurred they still would have received compensation, but it is possible it may have been less.
As for the elements of federal support, the land freeze was a sufficient cause of the success the AFN. This freeze forced the competitors of the land in Alaska to resolve native land protests before they could proceed with their own endeavors. Had this not happened the natives would have likely found themselves fighting for land that had been selected by the state, the oil companies, or the Trans Alaska Pipeline Company, which would have made it much more difficult to receive the land and mineral rights that they were able to obtain in the Alaskan Native Claim Settlement Act. The Nixon Administration’s support of Native American issues was a necessary cause for the success of the AFN. Their primary assistance came from the decision to support a 40 million acre settlement. Numerous bills were being circled throughout Congress that included varying numbers of acreage. Had the administration not supported this element the AFN could have received less acreage then they did.

**Figure Four: Political Opportunities, Causes of Movement Emergence and Success**

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<th>Emergence</th>
<th>Success</th>
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<td><strong>Sufficient</strong></td>
<td>- State Land Selections</td>
<td>- Policy History</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Land Freeze</td>
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<td>- US Oil Crisis</td>
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<td>- Mood of the Country</td>
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<td><strong>Necessary, But Not</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Sufficient</strong></td>
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<td><strong>No Evidence</strong></td>
<td>- Mood of the Country</td>
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**Section Three: Organizational Strength**

This section is based on the concepts of organizational strength from McAdam’s political process model and the resource mobilization theory of McCarthy and Zald. Both
theoretical models emphasize the importance of developing a strong movement organization in order to emerge as a successful movement. The elements that will be discussed in this section are: 1) the leadership of the associations and the AFN, 2) member organizations of the AFN, 3) networking outside of the general membership, 4) solidarity incentives, and 5) communications between the native membership and the AFN. Their relationship to the case study of the Alaskan native land rights is explained in detail below.

Leadership

The leadership of the AFN developed from the early associations like the Alaskan Native Brotherhood (ANB). Some of the association leadership was assisted by the federal program Grassroots, which supplied leadership building opportunities and education within the native villages. While other leaders developed skills and knowledge through educating themselves on the issues of land rights. The four points that are discussed in this section on leadership are 1) the development of the leaders, 2) the knowledge of the leadership, 3) working through various organizational issues, and 4) personal biographies of individual leaders.

The Alaska Native Brotherhood was the first core of native leaders in the state. Their knowledge and skills about leading movements were passed down to the generations of Tlingit and Haida involved in the Alaska Federation of Natives. The other leaders of the AFN learned their skills and knowledge by other means such as through government programs. One activist noted that “[the federal government] went into the ‘War on Poverty,’ trying to create empowerment for communities that were basically
disadvantaged and disposed” (ANCSA LS4:1-2). These communities included many small native villages within Alaska. The federal program went by the name of Grassroots and was run by the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) (Gallagher 1974). “The Office of Economic Opportunity had its impact up in Alaska. Many of he nonprofit organizations were beneficiaries of the OEO grants that helped subsidize some of the activities” (ANCSA LS4: 1-2). Not only did this organization assist with the formation of associations, but also it was fundamental in the development of leaders in the different regions of the state (Professional Two).

The natives of different regions “discovered that they had a great deal in common with one another” (Activist Six) in relation to their desire to retain their subsistence lifestyle and the lands they had used for generations. These programs opened up opportunities for potential leaders to advance the development of associations within the regions in order to discuss and act on issues facing the native people within the region. Grassroots was a necessary cause for the development of the eventual AFN, since without it, other leaders would have emerged through other means. Even so without those leaders who were involved in the Grassroots program the development of associations could have been slightly affected. Thus this program created some leaders that were essential in the ANLRM, but the general leadership included many leaders that were created through other means. This means that Grassroots was important, but relied on other modes of leadership development, which makes it a necessary, but not sufficient cause.

One leader is quoted saying,

In spite of poverty, in spite of a lack of development among Alaska’s natives I sincerely believe and I submit that Alaska natives have arrived at a point where we are ready to become the leaders in the achievement of our own destiny. Over the years there had developed a nucleus of leadership which I feel that the native
people have arrived at the point where we can pick up the reins, as it were, and move forward and make these corporate provisions (S.1964/2690/2020 Feb 8, 9, 10, 196852).

This quote demonstrates the development of leadership over time within the Alaskan native population. The leadership developed around the state by a variety of means, be it the experience of the Tlingit and Haida or through the Grassroots, which included Alaskan natives from all over the state (Professional Four; S.35/835/1571 Feb 18 Mar 16 Apr 29 1971: 214). These leaders were primarily urban elite and higher educated than the typical native (Ervn 1974: 171). One activist noted that “the young leaders, young and inexperienced leaders, who came to D.C. lacked resources, but they had courage and they were bright and they were great politicians in and of themselves, and they held their own” (ANCSA LS4: 1). The leadership included ages ranging from young inexperienced leaders to older experienced leaders. There were native leaders who were millionaires and those with only the money in their pockets (Professional Four).

The leaders demonstrated their capabilities through numerous actions. One example is the knowledge that they presented in Senate hearings, getting the story of the Alaskan native’s social and economic plight across to the Congressmen. One activist commented that the leadership “had to be able to testify, had to learn how to be prepared with respect to these various aspects of our land rights when we met with members of the Congress” (Activist Six). They needed to be prepared, but they needed to have the right attitude. An AFN secretary noted the positive example that the leadership presented.

The dignity and dedication exhibited by our native leaders in facing this issue is an example of the initiative, integrity, and strength of a people who have had to be strong to survive the elements in our beloved but harsh land where the summers are short and the long hard cold winters a test of ingenuity and endurance. Their unselfish ‘give and take’ attitude in resolving questions among themselves has
been demonstrated again and again (S.35/835/1571 Feb 18, Mar 16, Apr 29, 1971 207).

The leaders were able to work out serious organizational issues such as developing the AFN constitution and the 1970 secession of the Arctic Slope Native Association (ASNA) in which there was an argument over the means for which compensation would be divided between the ethnic regions (Ervin 1974: 166-168). The importance of resolving these issues can be described through the secession of the ASNA. The AFN president at the time Don Wright and native leader Charlie Edwardsen made a deal that they would not protest each others legislative actions and ASNA would according to one activist, continue their “support by coming back into the AFN. It just doesn’t look good to have a break away region” (Activist Five). If these leaders had not worked together the AFN’s efforts towards success could have faltered, creating less success. Since by breaking away from the AFN, ASNA’s oil rich region would have weakened their leverage in Congress.

Below is a chart of the officers in 1969, it demonstrates that they included many regional backgrounds.
These leaders worked well together, but part of why that happened results from their personal biographies. A summary of a few elements of personal biography is illustrative of the importance of personal biography to the AFN. Such elements include 1) organizing ability, 2) prior experiences in lobbying, 3) commitment to the cause of native rights, 4) ability to bridge the gap between cultures, and 5) researching abilities.

As discussed previously in the introduction Nick Grey was an important leader in the movement. Grey’s experience of organizing was important to the development of associations throughout Alaska.

[The native leadership] sent Nick Grey before he got too sick. We paid his way to organize around the state from top to the bottom, statewide. And he organized a lot of local groups: Kuskokwim Native Association, Prince William Sound, Chugach Natives, he had friends at ANB and Arctic Native Brotherhood, he organized Fairbanks Native Association prior to CINA (Cook Inlet Native Association). He went to Kodiak and organized Kodiak Area Native Association,
so those two things, his organizing ability and the region CINA had being central to the [vision] (Activist One).

Like Nick Grey, John Borbridge’s personal biography played a role in his involvement in the AFN as well. A researcher commented that “John Borbridge from Southeast was a little bit older than the others and was kind [of] like an elder statesman in the lobbying and was very important” (Researcher Two). His knowledge of lobbying and attending Senate hearings was essential to the younger leaders who had never experienced the political world. Charlie Edwardsen was much younger and more brash than Borbridge. Edwardsen stood out among the leaders due to his abrasiveness and outrageous. This made the other leadership look more reasonable in the eyes of the Congress (Researcher Two; Activist Two).

Charlie epitomized the native spirit in all of the meanings of the word. The deep commitment to land. The deep commitment to history. The deep commitment to tribal orientation. The deep emotionalism. At the same time Charlie personified the bridge from the traditional native community to the modern Native community because of his background and his dress and his facility with language, which sometimes bordered on being brilliant and sometimes on being incoherent (Mitchell 2001: 481).

His life experiences had created a personality that was powerful and honest.

Howard Rock had a much different background. According to some researchers, “Rock’s ability to inhabit more than one identity and to have more than one home would stand him in good stead as he would use the… [experiences] to help Alaska natives negotiate a pan-native land movement through the Tundra Times” (Daley and James: 101). This background included a number of years in the Army Air Corps in which he traveled and was educated. These experiences assisted him when he started and edited the Tundra Times newsletter.
William Hensley was also a well educated man and came into the movement through his revolutionary paper. As a student Hensley wrote a paper that revolutionized his ideas about the land claims. This paper outlined the policy history of the Alaskan natives and made Hensley recognize that his people had to act quickly if they wanted to keep their aboriginal lands. His paper caused him to work with other leaders in his home of Kotzebue to start a regional association.

All of the personal biographies of the leaders provide a different understanding of the skills and knowledge that the individual leaders brought to the movement. The leaders’ knowledge is a necessary cause of the emergence and success of the AFN, because without the leadership the associations would not have formed and thus the AFN would not have formed, leading to a different resolution for land claims. Even so the leadership is dependant on other variables such as Grassroots and the Tlingit and Haida, thus making it necessary, but not sufficient for the emergence and success of the ANLRM. Being able to work through organizational issues together was necessary to the success of the AFN. If the leaders had allowed the AFN to break apart the result of ANCSA may have been different. The personal biographies of the leaders were necessary causes of both the movement emergence and success. Their determination, skills, and knowledge were essential to the results of the formation of the AFN and ANCSA.

According to the Tundra Times the leaders of the Indians, Aleuts and Eskimos of this northern land, we can say without reservations, on the whole have some of the ablest leaders that can be assembled at this time. They are the products of severe and dire backgrounds. They have blossomed from the mire of great afflictions and despair to lead their people (Tundra Times Editorial).
Member Organizations

At one Senate hearing a native leader is quoted saying, “the Alaska Federation of Natives represents a coming together of all the regions in order to unite [their] efforts and secure a just and equitable settlement of [their] land claims” (S.35/ S.835 Feb 18 and March 16 1971: 305). When the AFN formed it decided to take advantage of the previously formed associations by creating membership based on these organizations. This concept is called bloc membership, in which previously developed organizations are used as members in order to pool their resources. The member organizations of the AFN were the individual regional associations. Representation within the associations was dependant upon the number of enrolled members in a given region (Alaskan Natives and the Land: 29). For instance, the Village Council of Presidents region claimed membership of 20,000 people in 57 villages (Ervin 1974: 156) and Tanana Chiefs region included 30 Athabaskan Villages (Ervin 1974: 157). Determining the number of actual members within the AFN was difficult since each region reported different numbers of members and included different requirements for persons who are allowed to join the individual associations. For instance, CINA and ANB allowed sympathetic whites, while other organizations such as ASNA, Kuskokwim Valley Native Association, and Tanana Chiefs limited membership to only those with one quarter ethnic native blood (Ervin 1974: 157). The list below is of all the regional associations and thus the member organizations of the AFN.
The needs of the various regions were substantially different (S.35/ S.835 Feb 18 and March 16 1971: 305). Because of this difference the membership organizations retained autonomy to lobby the Congress and take actions on their own. For instance, John Borbridge asserted the rights of his region outside of the AFN in his statement to the Senate Interior Committee that the “bill discriminates against the Tlingit and Haida Indians of Southeast Alaska in ways that make it unacceptable to us...[not providing additional lands to his people] about one-tenth as much land as villages elsewhere” (S.35/835/1571 April 29 1971: 498). It was not only the Tlingit and Haida that asserted their regional rights beyond the AFN, but so did the Arctic Slope Regional Association. Charlie Edwardsen took actions that were unapproved by the AFN on behalf of the ASNA such as the protest mentioned earlier at the oil lease sale. Each membership organization had this option of acting on its own to meet its particular needs.
Autonomy of the membership organizations was a necessary cause for the success of the AFN. Since the autonomy and ability to work as a leadership team of the AFN assisted in the success of the Alaskan natives. In the case of measuring success the importance of the political opportunities such as the land freeze, overshadowed the ability of the AFN to stay together. For example, the desire of the federal government to avoid an oil crisis, along with the desire to eliminate the land freeze would have culminated in some type of legislation with or without the strength of the AFN membership. Even so, the result would not have been as successful at meeting the goals of the AFN had the AFN broken apart.

**Networking**

Networking with people outside of the Alaskan native community was a powerful tool for creating strength for the AFN. There were four elements of networking that were evident in the AFN. They include: 1) help from professionals, 2) support from outside groups, 3) turning opponents into supporters, and 4) funding. Each of these elements were a part of the AFN’s networking scheme. Each will be assessed in this section as to their causal effect on movement emergence and success.

Connecting with professionals who could assist the AFN in areas that the leaders could use guidance was one means of networking. These contacts included lawyers, consultants, former Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg, and researcher Adrian Parameter. In each of these cases the professionals were of assistance to the AFN in some way or another. One professional commented that

In my sense it’s hard to imagine what might have happened without all the lawyers, …because they needed lawyers to put together the deal, they couldn’t
have done it without lawyers so… you could say is what the political, social, and economic background of these lawyers brought to the table that made a difference (Professional One).

The lawyers who assisted the AFN and the various regional associations were essential to the development of a native draft of legislation, which presented to the Congress the Alaskan native’s desired outcome of the legislation. According to one researcher it was helpful for the AFN that “there was just a lot of pro bono help there was attorneys or other kinds of expertise, a lot of people just through in their wood for free” (Researcher One; Professional One).

Not all of these individuals who helped out with their expertise were lawyers. For instance, some consultants would help through the associated organization, the AFN Foundation. Consultants of the AFN Foundation used grants to do essential research such as economic analyses to justify legislation and “provide rationale to the arguments for settling land claims” (Professional Two). Such research was important to the AFN since it validated its arguments in the Senate hearings.

The AFN decided at two points during the movement to bring in outside assistance from specific individuals. The first case was with former Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg and the second was with researcher Adrian Parameter. “The AFN needed…a spokesperson whose presence on Capitol Hill would communicate …that native land claims were legitimate and that the need to settle them was a matter of worthy attention” (Mitchell 2001: 202). In 1969 Arthur Goldberg was the choice for this spokesperson position (Mitchell 2011: 204). He was replaced later by lawyer Ramsey Clark (Mitchell 2001: 216). The choice of Goldberg was debated consistently within the AFN. His assistance to the AFN was primarily putting a well-known face to the
movement, while at the same time both he and Ramsey Clark brought in essential legal expertise (Activist Six).

Just with getting hooked up with Arthur Goldberg and Ramsey Clark and then later at the end with Don Wright getting Adrian Parameter mixed up in. They learned I think, through trial and error, and just being in the system how to manipulate people that were running the government (Researcher Five).

Legislative researcher and lobbyist, Adrian Parameter had many connections on Capitol Hill and was “well networked amongst those in D.C. like the Kennedy’s and Hubert Humphrey…[as well as having] spent three years on Indian issues on Capital Hill” (Mitchell 2001: 365; Activist Five). He joined the efforts of the AFN in 1970. These professional assistants for the AFN provided important networks of people who were a necessary cause of the AFN’s success. Without their expertise and backgrounds the AFN’s legislation would very likely have been less successful since they provided important input with drafting legislation and working within the political arena.

Developing a support system with outside organizations was part of the AFN’s public relations campaign. The leadership was essential to bringing together the vast number of supporters from all over the United States. Below is a list of many of the supporting organizations of the AFN. Supporting organizations are those which supply either funding or verbal support for the ANLRM.
**Figure Seven: Supporting Organizations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Friends of the Alaskan Natives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association on American Indian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFL-CIO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporters of Settlement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teamsters Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Auto Workers</td>
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<tr>
<td>American Friends Service Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Council of Churches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Episcopal Church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presbyterian Church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Congress of American Indians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yakima Nation in Washington State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington State AFN Chapter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supportive Services in D.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Tribes of Western Washington</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Company Lobbyists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alaska Conservation Society</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Opposing Organizations that turned into Supporting Organizations**

- Chamber of Commerce
- Alaska Miners Association


These organizations offered a variety of types of support for the AFN. Some brought in essential funding, while other supported the AFN through alternative means. Such as additional lobbying assistance by the Friends of the Alaskan Natives (Civil Rights Digest V2 N3 1969: 6-13), organizing of public relations campaigning by the Association on American Indian Affairs (Mitchell 2001: 261), and verbal statements of support by the AFN Washington chapter (S.35/835/1571 April 29 1971: 557). Many of these supporters would not gain anything from the success of the AFN. These type of supporters are discussed in the literature of social movements as ‘conscious constituents.’

The funding that was supplied through these conscious constituent organizations is outlines in the next figure. From this figure we can see that funding came from a variety of supporting organizations, supplying assistance to the AFN.
As discussed earlier, other funding was supplied through the Tyonek Indians and the Alaskan Native Brotherhood. Alaskan based organizations like these, provided funding that was as large as the $150,000 supplied by the Tyonek (Mitchell 2001: 78; *Tundra Times* Oct 21, 1966 V4 N43: 1) to the small amounts collected through salmon bakes and bake sales in the communities (Researcher One; Activist Five). These efforts for funding, by both conscious constituents and those Alaskan natives who could gain from the success of the AFN, kept the AFN afloat through its public relations campaigning, lobbying, and paying professionals to draw up drafts of bills.

The support that these multiple organizations assisted the AFN in convincing congressmen of the importance of the land claims to the Alaskan natives, expanding the knowledge of the land issue to the general public, and supplying funds for lobbying and public relations campaigns. These supporters also included the oil company lobbyists. One researcher noted how the oil companies came to support the AFN

The lawyers for the oil companies researched it and they said… We can’t have a pipeline unless…[the] Congress, Interior Department, White House, [and] State of Alaska. You want the oil you’re going to have to settle it, otherwise their right [to land] will be tied up in litigation [for years] (Researcher One).

It is important to understand why the oil companies, who had extreme political leverage with some important congressmen, were supportive of the land claims. Their support was
essential for turning certain Senators in oil rich states such as Texas towards agreeing with the claims. It was a strange coalition of support for the native cause when the shared fates of the oil companies and the natives came together (Arnold: 139-140). The support from this odd team of natives and oil executives assisted both the AFN and the oil companies in achieving their individual goals. This was important because the natives were able to retain lands and obtain compensation, while at the same time the oil companies were able to build their desired pipeline and drill for oil. As one activist noted, “We helped them get their pipeline permits… and they helped us get our land claims bill passed” (Activist Five).

Getting this support system of professionals, conscious constituents, supporting organizations, and oil companies was by no means a simple task. The funding from the original supporting organizations like the Association on American Indian Affairs assisted the AFN leaders in their public relations campaigning, which in turn brought in additional bits of funds to continue their campaigning. These public relations campaigns included appearances on the a KTVF channel 11 series on land claims history and the AFN, Johnny Carson Show, Good Morning America, and the Today Show (Activist Two; Tundra Times Mar 28 1969 V6 N168: 1). In addition to these appearances, leaders were doing speaking tours in which they addressed colleges, churches, and organizations around Alaska and other states (Gallagher: 154; Tundra Times Dec 12 1969 V7 N238: 4). The leaders were essential in developing support for the land claims issues. As one activist noted “one of our guys took the churches and [one] took the unions and the heavy construction people and…we… hit anything and everything that could influence congress to pass our act” (Activist Five).
Finding support among conscious constituents for the AFN is one means of building a strong network structure. Another more difficult task is to gain the support from those who may lose out with the success of the AFN, such as having their lands be transferred to native controlled areas. One professional noted that the AFN leadership “took the position that [they] should seek out other stakeholders in the lands and offer them accommodations meeting their needs” (Professional Four). One such organization was the Alaska Miners Association, which was originally opposed to the land claims when it felt its rights were being ignored. The AFN explained that the rights of the Alaskan miners to their mining land claims would not be ignored (Professional Four; Tundra Times Oct 19 1969 V23 N157:1). Even the Chamber of Commerce in Fairbanks, who had originally opposed any settlement, endorsed a settlement bill (Professional Four). It recognized that without a settlement the claims could harm it more than having a settlement, since the claims could keep lands in Alaska frozen for economic development for years. Even with this opposition becoming supporters of the AFN, one activist commented that “some of the so-called supporters were very tight fisted with the amount of land and the amount of compensation they were willing to support” (Activist Six). Thus their support was in some cases merely quelling significant opposition, and was not sufficient for obtaining success in legislation.

The networks that were developed both within the Alaskan natives and through conscious constituents were necessary causes in keeping the AFN moving towards success. Without the necessary support and funding the AFN would never have been able to succeed in its campaigning and lobbying. Although networking was important it is
dependant upon other variables such as leadership in order to have been causal for the success of the AFN.

**Solidarity Incentives**

Solidarity incentives are the tools for convincing those who are going to gain from the success of the movement to become involved (McCarthy and Zald: 1977). For the AFN, the difficulties of obtaining assistance from the membership organizations and those corresponding members within the membership organizations are linked to the low economic status of the Alaskan native community in the 1960’s and the communication issues discussed in the next section. Much of the involvement from the general membership was based on fundraising for sending leaders to Anchorage, Fairbanks, and D.C. (Activist One). There were minimal funding capabilities on the part of the native community beyond that of these fundraisers. There is no evidence in this study that suggests the AFN’s emergence or success was affected by any solidarity incentives among the membership organizations or the general membership. Had the AFN not received this small amount of funds from the membership organizations and fundraisers it would not have jeopardized their ability to emerge and succeed. In fact the AFN, based on earlier discussion of supporters, would have been able to obtain the necessary funds for their emergence and success through the conscious constituent supporters and the Tyonek Indians.

The leadership was the core membership that involved themselves in the efforts of the movement and the general population was not involved in the direct decisions of the AFN. This was mostly due to the communication barriers between the villages that existed in Alaska during the 1960’s.
Communications

Alaska is the largest state in the United States totaling more than 365,000,000 acres (Chugach 2001), which is over three times the size of Texas. This distance is connected by only few roads in the eastern region of the state. Most of the native villages, even today, lie outside of these roadways and are only physically accessible by flying, snowmobiling, four-wheeling, walking, or dog sledding (S.1964/2690/2020/3586 July 12 1968: 558-559). Figure Nine is a representation of the size of the state of Alaska overlaid onto the continental United States.

Figure Nine: Alaska Overlay onto the Continental United States (Google 2004)

Communication was not only limited by physical distance, but also by the means of indirect communication in the 1960’s. The primary means of indirect communication with the villages were word of mouth and air mail (Current One; Activist Six; Activist Seven). Telephones were limited in many villages. In fact, most villages did not have any means of telephone or radio communication in the 1960’s (Activist Four). Communication with the villages was not easy and took time since air mail requires time to get a message through to the village. Communications with these villages was assisted
through the *Tundra Times* newspaper, which was started in October of 1962 in order to keep the general native population informed on matters of interest to all native peoples (*Tundra Times* Oct 1 1962 V1N1: 1-2). This newspaper was the primary means for communicating with the general native population, while the member organizations located far from the roadways focused on mail and occasional phone calls from the AFN as their means of communication.

The AFN was primarily centered out of the urban cities of Anchorage and Fairbanks. These cities had the capabilities for communication by phone, mail, and major airports for travel throughout the United States. Most of the primary leaders of the AFN were found near these communication centers in Alaska, allowing for constant communication between leadership in D.C and in Alaska. The AFN leadership was able to take part in conference calls in order to keep the flow of the public relations campaign and the lobbying constant (Activist Five). The problems with communication were primarily between the federal government and the villages, as well as between the AFN and the villages.

Since the villages were not actively involved with the leadership is evident from the discussion of solidarity incentives and communications, their lack of communication did not sufficiently affect the success of the AFN. However, village communication was a serious negative issue for the emergence of the AFN, since at that point the formation of associations and eventually the AFN required communication with the villages. Communication problems threatened the emergence of the AFN, but the leaders were able to find a means to get the message out to the native people about the original meeting that formed the AFN through the *Tundra Times*. This newspaper was the only
necessary cause within the discussion of communication that existed in relation to the emergence of the AFN. The Tundra Times was important since it not only supplied a means for communication with the villages, but also created a means for unity which is discussed in section four in the analysis.

The suggested elements that assist in movement emergence and success are leadership, member organizations, networking, solidarity incentives, and communications. The elements that were necessary causes of the emergence of the AFN are leadership, the *Tundra Times*, leadership, networking, handling organizational issues by the leadership, and autonomy. The remainder of the elements including communication and solidarity incentives did not have evidence for being the cause of emergence or success.

**Figure Ten: Organizational Strength, Causes of Movement Emergence and Success**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Necessary, But Not Sufficient</th>
<th>Emergence</th>
<th>Success</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tyonek (funding)</td>
<td>-Leadership (biographies, demographics, and knowledge)</td>
<td>-Leadership (biographies, demographics, and knowledge)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Tundra Times</td>
<td>-Networking (Professionals and Conscious Constituents)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Tlingit and Haida (funds)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Tyonek (funds)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Organizational Issues Worked Out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Evidence</td>
<td>-Communications</td>
<td>-Solidarity Incentives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Communications</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Section Four: Culture and Social / Psychological Changes**

This final section of the analysis asks how the native people came to recognize the economic and social discrimination against them, how they came to act on that knowledge in order to create associations, and, finally, how their very different regional
ethnic cultures worked through those differences to unite under one Alaskan native organization. This section focuses on cultural and psychological elements of the Alaskan Native Land Rights Movement.

The earlier discussion of the essential role of the *Tundra Times* newspaper is important to analyzing how the native people increased their knowledge about their economic and social situation within Alaska. Along with advocating the native people’s rights, the *Tundra Times* provided information about issues facing the natives throughout the state. Such issues covered in the *Tundra Times* that will be discussed here include: 1) the State of Alaska land selections affect on the native people, 2) the Atomic Energy Commission’s proposed explosion of a large region to create a bay in the state, 3) the Rampart Dam proposal that would eliminate vast hunting lands, 4) human rights violations in the Pribilof Islands, 5) eider duck hunting violations, and 6) some reports of situations facing the Canadian aboriginal populations (Fogarino 1981: 20, 74, 77, 80; *Tundra Times* Oct 1, 1962 V1 N1: 13; *Ervin, Alexander 1974*: 118). Each of these events were editorialized in the *Tundra Times*, which allowed the general population of natives to see and understand the numerous issues facing native regions throughout Alaska.

Many of these events were extreme and demonstrated the power that the natives could wield. For instance, in one issue the *Tundra Times* read “Indian Charged with Hunting Eider Ducks” (*Tundra Times* Dec 3 1962: 8), which refers to the incident of May 31st 1961 that has come to be called the ‘Barrow Duck-in.’ This incident began with the arrest by the US Fish and Wildlife of two prominent natives in Barrow for hunting eider ducks. In response, 138 natives shot one duck each and walked to the hotel in which the officials were housed. They admitted their civil disobedience and demonstrated the power
of the community (Mitchell 2001: 127; Arnold: 95). The evidence that they presented to
the officials “filled nine sacks and totaled six-hundred pounds” (Daley and James: 94).
Events such as these are illustrations of the potential power that the native people
possessed.

A second example of how the above events affected the native people is the tale
of Minto, Alaska. The story begins at the 1964 New York World’s Fair where a young
Athabaskan man came upon a booth that was run by the State of Alaska. In this booth
were small slips of paper that could be purchased which basically said that you are the
proud new owner of one square inch of Alaska. This marketing scheme by the State of
Alaska was by no means a farce; very small pieces of Alaska were in fact being
purchased. The young man inquired from where these square inches came. He was
informed that they were from the Minto Lakes region, his home (Ervin 1974: 117). The
Athabaskan people were astounded when they heard that the lands they had lived on from
time immemorial were being sold out from under them by the square inch to people who
might never use or even see the lands. This issue was discussed in the June 1962 regional
association of Dena Nena Henash (the land speaks in Athabaskan) and discussed again in
the Tanana Chiefs Conference of 1963 (Daley and James: 104; Arnold: 100). One activist
noted in reference to Minto that “we started to fight for our lives and for the lives of our
children” (S.1964/2690/2020 Feb 8, 9, and 10, 196: 386).

These events may have seemed trivial to the non-natives of Alaska, but to the
natives, the issue of land and hunting rights were linked to their livelihood. This is
evident in a statement made by one native in reference to the Rampart Dam proposal
which stated “The project will ruin our hunting, trapping and fishing on which we have
lived for so many years...what are we supposed to do, drown or something?” (Arnold 1978: 100). The natives were recognizing that their livelihood was being trumped by the changes that were occurring in Alaska. The primary change was from prominently federal control to state control of lands and resources. Retaining the control of resources within the native region was essential to retaining the subsistence lifestyle that the natives had practiced for centuries (Activist Four). Change in the social, political, and economic environment was imminent in Alaska. The recognition by the native people that these environmental changes effecting the native communities around Alaska was partially due to the work of the *Tundra Times* in their editorials and news reports.

According to the document *Alaskan Natives and the Land* the natives’ economic and social situation at the time was in dire need of change (Alaskan Natives and the Land). One way to understand the native peoples’ status at this time is to note comments made by activists in the Senate hearings such as

[Alaska had] about 55,000 natives in Alaska who live in scattered villages...About 70 percent of the native population live in about 178 villages. We have a subsistence economy of hunting and fishing supplemented by cash incomes earned on various jobs during the short summer season. Seven out of ten adult natives have only an elementary education...[and] the death rate is twice that of white Alaskans (*S.1964/2690/2020/3586 July 12 1968*: 561).

This statement suggests that Alaskan natives are living primarily off of the land throughout the year and reiterates the generally poor economic situation of the native people, as well as the low educational achievement. Another activist commented on a 1967 visit by the director of the Office of Economic Opportunity to Alaska, in which he commented

most of the houses are ramshackle, falling down places. But even this city has a slum that is worse than the rest of the town (King Island Village) where 500 Natives live on the most abject poverty that I’ve ever seen anywhere- including
The native people, as evident from the formation of the regional associations recognized their dire circumstances economically and socially, since these associations grew from the social, political, and economic changes noted above and the hope of improving these circumstances (S.1964/2690/2020/3586 July 12 196: 561). The native people had recognized that these events were changing their way of life and knew that they were also in need of change for the sake of their future economic and social livelihood. Educated natives began to see that the changes throughout the state and the welfare of the people required that actions such as land claims being filed and in some cases direct civil disobedience be taken by the natives to assure that their future welfare and their lands be preserved.

One particular element that assisted the educated natives in understanding the policy history behind aboriginal land rights was a paper written by activist and native leader William Hensley, while attending a law course at the University of Alaska Fairbanks in mid-1966. This paper outlined the policies such as the Treaty of Cession and the Statehood Act discussed earlier in the political opportunities section of this study (Hensley 2001: 1). Upon completion of this paper, Hensley realized that the Alaskan native people still held legal aboriginal title to the land and if action was not taken soon by the native people they could lose their chance to retain their aboriginal lands (ANCSA LS4: 11). Hensley’s paper was read by those educated natives and soon these natives were recognizing the importance of taking actions beyond regional land claims (Professional Four). As one activist noted, “the more we got into it the more we learned
that we did have rights to the land, so we pushed as hard as we could” (Activist One). It was not merely among educated natives that the knowledge was spreading, but among the general population as they witnessed social, political, and economic changes all around them.

There is a growing feeling of desperation and anger in the villages as it became clear that they will lose their land. Their way of life will be lost, the development will come, and further, that they will not participate in that development (Notti Feb 7 1970)

The native people were beginning to see that these changes were inevitable and as one activist noted “we were about to get screwed, like the Indians got screwed all over the country” (Activist Three). This fear of losing their way of life created a feeling of urgency amongst the native people. The editorial of the Tundra Times in September of 1966 entitled “The Awakening” read

There’s been a lot said about ‘the awakening of the Alaskan native.’ Despite the flowery language, there’s a lot of blunt truth behind this. The Alaskan Native – from every trap-line cabin, fish-camp tent and dormitory of higher-education institutions – is waking up to the fact that he can swing a lot of weight when he wants to (Tundra Times Sept 16, 1966: 2).

Recognition, on the part of the natives, was not the only step to creating a movement. Actions like creating a unified native organization also had to be taken. Hence, the native leadership called a conference in October of 1966 prior to the elections for the purpose of discussing social, political, and economic changes throughout the state, the social and economic conditions of their people, and their land rights (S.1964/2690/2020 Feb 8, 9, 10, 1968: 119). It was here that the AFN was first formed.

The native people had had a social and psychological shift, as one activist recalled
And I recall that when some of the elders spoke who could not speak English, but they testified with interpreters at their right hand, and that in some instances they chastised the congressmen, they said it is we who own the land and it is you who should be talking to us. Pretty powerful (Activist Six)

They understood their rights as aboriginal occupants of the land and made their demands known to Congress through the AFN leadership. This is exemplified in this statement made by one native leader, “we are not asking for anything. We are offering the US Government, 84 percent of our property. We are offering them 300 million acres” (S.35/835/1571: 475.) The native people now recognized that they, as a united organization, could create their own changes for the betterment of the native community.

Until the AFN was created, the term Alaskan native had little meaning to the native people. It had been a term formed by the non-native population to categorize the native people (Professional One). For centuries the many ethnic natives were enemies including the Athabaskan Indians and the Eskimos, the Indians of Central Alaska and the Chugach tribes, village against village, region against region (Gallagher: 74). The general term ‘Alaskan native’ actually includes at least seven distinct ethnic groups with approximately 22 separate dialects (S.35/835/1571 Feb 18 Mar 16, Apr 29, 1971: 17; AFN 2005). These differences between ethnic groups were and remain extreme. The Inupiat north of the Arctic Circle and the Athabaskan of central Alaska differ in tradition, livelihood, and culture, as do the other ethnic groups within Alaska (Researcher Three; Researcher One). These differences had been the reason for battle and hatred for centuries, but with the growing need to work as a united native community, the differences had to be overlooked for the betterment of all natives. The need to work together instead of separate was important because with the number of Alaskan native
groups filing land claims and the small population these native communities the leverage was very limited. As a united group on the other hand the Alaskan natives could compile their political contacts, create a team of well-educated leadership, and bring together the limited resources of the different regions. This would not be a simple task, as Howard Rock editorialized

> In the past, differences among Indian tribes have been almost as destructive to their survival as the US Calvary. American Indians of the lower 48 often could have saved their lands, had they but united their forces [as the Alaskan natives had]. Instead, they allowed petty personal rivalries, economic competition and long standing tribal animosities to divide them. The men who desire our lands have learned from history. They will no longer drive us from our homes at gunpoint, but they surly might attempt to divide and weaken us by fanning over whatever sparks of differences they can find (Fogarino 1981: 85).

It was essential that the native people find a common ground for unity if they wanted to create a successful movement for their land rights. The need for unity extended from the recognition that the native groups within Alaska had similar issues with the state land selections. This was recognized early in the 1960’s by the Inupiat and the Athabaskan regions. One episode of this recognition was at the June 1962 meeting of Dena Nena Henash when the Athabaskan leadership noted that their problems were one in the same with their enemy’s problems, the Inupiat Eskimos (Mitchell 2001: 27). These two regions united their efforts at this time, through conferences discussing issues facing both Inupiat Eskimos and Athabaskan Indians. One such action of unity that spawned from these conferences was the petition for the land freeze that was discussed in section two.

Howard Rock’s *Tundra Times* was an original proponent of unity and this was reiterated in editorials and headlines claiming unity as a goal of the newspaper. One article in October of 1962 echoed the headline “Let’s Do Things Ourselves” which
focused on the need for unity between Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts throughout Alaska in their efforts to understand the problems they all faced (*Tundra Times* Oct 1 1962 V1 N1: 3). The associations helped to bridge the gap between ethnic groups as they formed alliances through the *Tundra Times* and conferences to discuss the issues of land rights as well as social and economic conditions.

The specific condition which assisted in creating a connection between the different ethnic groups is the overarching connection of the native people with the land that they use and the threat of state land selections. One activist made a statement that exemplifies the connection of the natives to their lands.

The Alaskan native is … an intimate part of his land. Our lands may seem cruel, harsh, and desolate to those who have not lived there… Through countless centuries we have learned to live with the harshness of the Alaska climate. We have learned to tame the wilderness, to make it ours and to live off the land… The land is our life. To take almost all of it away from us… is to deprive us of life itself (S.35/S.835 Feb 18 and March 16 1971: 304).

The land for the Alaskan natives as a whole is not something to be bought and sold, but their livelihood and culture is dependant upon it. As one activist quoted, the “land and the Indians are bound together by ties of kinship and nature rather than by an understanding of property ownership. This conception is the very essence of native life” (S.1964/2690/2020/3586 July 12 1968: 603). For the native people the significance of the land was essential and it is due to this connection to the land that the land rights issue was able to connect historical enemies together, allowing them to unite as a single political force.

Without the formation of a unified effort there would have been little chance of the Alaskan natives achieving the results that they were able to attain when unified. The many regional claims noted in the protest map in figure three would have been difficult to
push through legislation or the Court of Claims individually. Native leaders recognized that Congress would not be willing to deal with each claim separately and also recognized that after the Tlingit and Haida situation the Court of Claims was not an option either (ANCSA LS4: 11). The limited resources of the individual associations would have been difficult for individual villages and regions to create lobbying and public relations campaigns that the AFN was able to mobilize as a unified organization. In a 1966 letter between two native leaders, a statement was made that “nothing strikes me more than the realization that we must stick together...We need to avoid the plague of factions if we are to reach our objectives” (Letter from William Hensley to Sam Taalak June 14, 1966). Unity was an important element for the emergence of the AFN (Activist One; Current One). One lawyer summarized this by stating, “the recognition that this was an issue that applied to all of them, and that it is something that they had to do, they had to do it jointly, that it is not something that they could pursue separately or individually” (Professional Two).

Creating a collective identity around the issue of land rights was not simple task for the Alaskan native people who had been divided enemies for generations (Activist Two). In 1966, the Tundra Times made a call for native leaders to meet at a conference in Anchorage where a native activist wrote, “there are certain things that are of concern to all of us, regardless of what parts of the state we live in” (Tundra Times Sept 9 1966 V4 N37:1). They were able to achieve this success when the AFN was formed in October of 1966 creating a “statewide voice to the concerns of the Alaskan natives” (Activist Six). On October 28th, 1966 the headline of the Tundra Times read “Statewide Native Unity Achieved at Conference” (Tundra Times Oct 28 1966: 1).
The time was ripe for the native people to join as one unified group. Understanding their social and economic condition and in essence their grievances was a necessary cause in the movement’s emergence since it helped to bring about recognition of changes, but was not in and of itself the most a sufficient cause. Recognizing the changes around them also was necessary cause for movement emergence since it to could not have created the movement alone. The unity that was achieved by the ethnic native groups was a necessary cause of movement emergence since without it the AFN could have never formed, but it remained to be dependant partially on state land selections. Unity was necessary cause for the success of the AFN, since it was a factor, but could not create successes alone.

Figure Eleven: Culture and Social –Psychological Change, Causes of Movement Emergence and Success

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Necessary, But Not Sufficient</th>
<th>Emergence</th>
<th>Success</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Unity (Collective Identity)</td>
<td>-Unity (Collective Identity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Social and Economic Conditions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Recognizing Changes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Tundra Times</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chapter Five: Conclusion

To conclude this study, I will briefly summarize what has been discussed in relation to the causes of the emergence and the success of the AFN. Followed by an analysis of the theoretical implications for social movement theory that extend from this study. The chart below summarizes the causes of the AFN’s emergence and success. The terms of sufficient, necessary, and not necessary are defined in chapter two.
The terms of emergence and success in the top row are defined as the original emergence of the Alaska Federation of Natives in 1966, while success is defined as the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. This chart summarizes each of the main points in the analysis and where they lie on the scale of causing emergence and success.

**Figure Twelve: Summarized Causes of Movement Emergence and Success**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Emergence</th>
<th>Success</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sufficient</strong></td>
<td>State Land Selections</td>
<td>Land Freeze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Necessary, But Not Sufficient</strong></td>
<td>Leadership (biographies, demographics, and knowledge)</td>
<td>US Oil Crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unity</td>
<td>Leadership (biographies, demographics, and knowledge)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social and Economic Conditions</td>
<td>Tlingit and Haida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recognizing Changes - Tundra Times</td>
<td>Nixon Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Association Formation</td>
<td>Networking (Professionals and Conscious ----- Constituents)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tyonek</td>
<td>Earthquake</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grassroots</td>
<td>Oil Lease Sale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Organizational Issues Worked Out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mood of the Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Policy History</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No Evidence</strong></td>
<td>Mood of the Country</td>
<td>Federal Field Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>Solidarity Incentives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Communications</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I will briefly explain these causal elements first in relation to emergence and then in relation to success.

First in relation to emergence there is one sufficient category, state land selections. State land selections is a sufficient cause of movement emergence since it created many of the necessary causes and is not dependant on the other causes to have
occurred. As discussed in depth earlier the necessary causes of social and economic grievances, recognizing social, political, and economic changes, the *Tundra Times*, association formation, and unity are all dependant upon the state land selections variable. Land selections by the State of Alaska was a catalyst for each of these necessary causes and a sufficient cause for the emergence of the AFN.

The necessary causes for the emergence of the AFN included: 1) leadership, 2) the Grassroots program, 3) the Tyonek Indians funds, 4) social and economic grievances, 5) recognizing social, political, and economic changes, 6) the *Tundra Times*, 7) association formation, and 8) unity. Each of these variables are dependant upon each other or on the sufficient cause of state land selections. Leadership for instance is dependant upon the Grassroots program for certain important leaders. Similarly the funding by the Tyonek Indians was dependant upon the leadership requesting such assistance. The other necessary causes span from the sufficient cause.

Those elements that were expected to have some relationship to emergence that did not, include: communications and the political mood of the country, which are present in the political process model literature. These elements were not causal to movement emergence since communications was a disadvantage rather than an advantage and the mood of the country effected success of the ANLRM and not emergence of the AFN.

Next I will discuss the causal categories related to the ANLRM success in obtaining the ANCSA. The sufficient cause for the success of the ANLRM is the land freeze. The reason that the land freeze is a sufficient cause relates to the fact that it is not dependant upon the other categories that were necessary for the success of the ANLRM.
The land freeze put into place by Secretary of the Interior Udall would have, in and of itself created a resolution for the Alaskan natives. The leverage that it created in relation to requiring that a resolution to Alaskan native land rights be established before any lands in Alaska could be bought or sold would have, with or without the necessary causes created some form of a resolution. Even so, it was the necessary causes that provided the means for the Alaskan natives to receive a settlement that corresponded with their goals.

The necessary causes of movement success included: 1) policy history, 2) the impending U.S. oil crisis, 3) leadership, 4) the Tlingit and Haida, 5) the Tyonek funding, 6) the Nixon administration, 7) Networking with professionals and conscious constituents, 8) the 1964 Earthquake, 9) the oil lease sale, 10) organizational issues worked out within the AFN, 11) autonomy of the member organizations, 12) unity, and 13) the political mood of the country. These variables are either dependent upon each other or had a minimal, but necessary effect on the ANLRM. Leadership for instance is dependent upon the Tlingit and Haida’s past leadership development. Similarly working out organizational issues in the AFN and autonomy of member organizations are dependent upon leadership. One example of those variables with a minimal, but necessary effect on the ANLRM is the Nixon administration who requested that the 40 million acre bill be passed in Congress and not the bills with less acreage. Similarly in the case of the oil lease sale the impact was that it provided a means for the native people to say this land is worth more money than we are being offered, since the oil lease sale of the north slope of Alaska was a small area of land in Alaska. These necessary elements also created a more significant impact of the sufficient cause, the land freeze. For instance, the impending U.S. oil crisis provided more incentive for the federal
government to pass legislation and the 1964 earthquake persuaded the State of Alaska that dealing with the native land issue would benefit their economic ability to repair the vast damages created by the earthquake.

Those elements that were expected to have some relationship to success that did not, include: the federal field committee, solidarity incentives, and communications, which are present in the political process model literature. These elements were not causal to movement success emergence since the federal field committee’s report shows no evidence of impacting the actual legislation, solidarity incentives were irrelevant to the ANLRM since it was difficult to communicate with the general native population for their involvement, and communications was a disadvantage rather than an advantage for the ANLRM.

The next step is to refer to the theory and what elements from other theories beyond the political process model were causal in the analysis. This chart links the theoretical concepts to those variables previously discussed.
The chart above provides an illustration of the theories beyond the political process model that assisted in the ANLRM’s emergence and success. First I will discuss the theoretical elements that assisted the emergence and then I will discuss the theoretical elements that assisted in success.

Emergence was assisted by the political process model, grievance theory, development and ethnic competition theories, and collective identity theory. Grievance, development, and ethnic competition theories were involved in the sufficient cause of state land selections. Thus for the ANLRM these were the most essential theories for explaining emergence. The political process model and collection identity theory were also important for success, but they were factors that were dependant upon each other or on the sufficient theories of grievance, development, and ethnic competition.
Success was assisted by the political process model, development and ethnic competition theories, resource mobilization theory, and collective identity theory. In the case of success the sufficient variable correlates with the theories of political process model, development, and ethnic competition. Thus for the ANLRM there were the most essential theories for explaining success. Other relevant theories include: resource mobilization theory and collective identity theory.

The political process can not describe the complexities of the emergence and success of the ANLRM alone. In order to truly grasp this movement other theories were essential. It is in these other theories that many sufficient and necessary variables are derived. Thus from this analysis of the ANLRM I can conclude that in order to analyze indigenous land rights movements a conglomerate of theories is the most effective means to measure emergence and success.

**Chapter Six: Policy Recommendations**

The Alaskan natives had created a unified movement through the formation of the Alaska Federation of Natives that was the most successful indigenous land rights effort in the United States. With approximately 55,000 Alaskan natives, the AFN achieved, through their efforts, the Alaskan Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA). This provided 40 million acres of land, $962.5 million in compensation, and an Act that provided the natives with the ability to create and control their future without assistance through the development of native corporations. These corporations’ stockholders are Alaskan native as well as many of their employees. Having a legislative act as the foundation of the native’s success is a success in and of itself since it is a living document. This provides
the opportunity to make changes to the ANCSA as times change and the needs of the 
native community change. Efforts to make such changes have been part of the Alaska 
National Interest Land Claims Act (ANILCA) and numerous amendments to ANCSA.

The Alaska Federation of Natives continues to exist today. In the 2005 report their 
current mission is “to enhance and promote the cultural, economic, and political voice of 
the Alaskan native community” (AFN 2005). Important issues that the AFN are 
concentrating on in 2005 include: federal funding issues for projects, Indian health care, 
transportation, subsistence living arrangements, subsistence of marine mammals, tribal 
self-governance, energy costs in rural Alaska, and rural law enforcement jurisdictions 
(AFN 2005). The Alaskan community can learn much from this analysis in creating 
movement that could determine future policy to resolve these issues. There are four 
primary things that can be learned from this study.

The first is the importance of considering policy and movement history. The 
importance of Tlingit and Haida history and policy history to the land rights movement 
demonstrates that by paying attention to past experiences of movements and the policy 
definitions one can avoid jumping hurdles that are impossible or inappropriate for the 
needs of the movement. Such as using the knowledge from the Tlingit and Haida 
experience, the AFN knew that the desired goal of land could not be achieved through the U.S. Court f Claims. Historical analysis was an important tool for the Alaskan Native 
Land Rights Movement and may assist in today’s efforts for expanded rights and policies 
for the Alaskan natives. By assessing how past movements succeeded in meeting their 
goals and how policy defines the issue under question current native movements can have 
a stronger analytical understanding of the particular situation they are working on.
A second policy recommendation that extends from this study is that paying attention to political opportunities can create the ability to act on moments that are beyond the movement’s control. For instance, the Alaskan natives knew that the elections were coming up in 1966 and that due to their population, if they had a conference at that time the politicians and newspapers would be present, creating a free public relations campaign. Similarly, understanding the situation of the opposition can assist in creating a successful movement. For example, the State of Alaska was forced by the land freeze into resolving native land claims before they could continue with their land selections or development of the state. Recognizing the effect of political opportunities can create for current day movements a means to increase leverage of an issue or to choose appropriate times to push legislation or protest.

The third issue that is important for current leaders is how networking with professionals like lawyers, researchers, or politicians and conscious constituents can create a strong support base of knowledge and funding. These supports can be a means for funding otherwise financially weak populations such as the Alaskan native communities, who have had gains economically, but continue to lack necessary finances. Even with the current corporations, many native organizations of non-profit and for-profit status search for funds to meet the needs of the native community, making funding and pro bono assistance still important for movements.

A final subject that current Alaskan native leaders can learn from is the importance of unity between ethnic groups within the state. This is still important, since the corporations retained the ethnic division in their formation and the unity of these corporations will assist the native people in keeping the thirteen corporations running and
meeting the needs of the native communities around the state. Recent development of the ANCSA CEO group is a step in the right direction, but further work is needed to protect the native corporations from outside dissent that question the effectiveness of the corporations at meeting the needs of the native community.

The AFN continues to work towards its goals, but now it is not the only statewide organization with significant funding. After the ANCSA passed the corporations and non-profit organizations began their own efforts. Today the Alaskan native community has a large conglomerate of native run organizations. There continues to be many obstacles that the Alaskan native community must face in their efforts. The native movements of today remain to work on creating stronger cultural ties and better socio-economic conditions for their people. These movements can be assisted by creating stronger unity between the corporations, looking at political opportunities, and forming knowledge bases such as provided by looking into past movements in the state, policy definitions, working with professionals, and reaching out to conscious constituents.
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Activist Four on 7/26/2005 by phone
Activist Five on 7/28/2005 by phone
Activist Six on 8/31/2005 by phone
Activist Seven on 10/15/2005 by mail

Current Leader One on 6/15/2005 in Anchorage
Current Leader Two on 7/11/2005 in Anchorage
Current Leader Three on 7/14/2005 in Anchorage
Current Leader Four on 7/19/2005 in Anchorage

Professional One on 6/30/2005 in Anchorage
Professional Two on 7/20/2005 in Anchorage
Professional Three on 7/29/2005 in Anchorage
Professional Four on 7/31/2005 by phone

Researcher One on 6/14/2005 in Anchorage
Researcher Two on 6/16/2005 in Anchorage
Researcher Three on 7/13/2005 in Anchorage
Researcher Four on 7/14/2005 in Anchorage
Researcher Five on 7/26/2005 in Anchorage