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Political Violence in South Africa: A Case Study of "Necklacing" in Colesberg

Sipho Mbuqe

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POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA: A CASE STUDY OF
“NECKLACING” IN COLESBERG

A Dissertation

Submitted to the McAnulty College
and Graduate School of Liberal Arts

Duquesne University

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Clinical Psychology

By

Sipho Mbuqe

August 2010

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Sipho Mbuqe

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POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA: A CASE STUDY OF
“NECKLACING” IN COLESBERG

By

Sipho Mbuqe

Approved: May 6, 2010

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ABSTRACT

POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA: A CASE STUDY OF “NECKLACING” IN COLESBERG

By

Sipho Mbuqe

August 2010

Dissertation Supervised by Dr. Leswin Laubscher

This dissertation examines certain psychological dimensions and implications of political violence in general by means of a specific violent incident that took place in Colesberg, South Africa in 1985. Ms. Nokwakha Dilato was murdered by a group of people who poured gasoline over her body, placed a car tire, filled with gasoline, around her neck and shoulders, and set her alight – a practice known as “necklacing”, and which became widespread during that time as a way of killing suspected or confirmed collaborators with the Apartheid regime. Three sources of data about this event were analyzed for this dissertation. First, I conducted a series of interviews with three of the perpetrators; second, I analyzed the court transcripts of the trial and sentencing of the perpetrators, and thirdly, I examined a report of the incident, presented to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and related by the author and poet, Antjie Krog, in a book

about the Commission's proceedings. These texts were subjected to a qualitative hermeneutic semiology, as articulated by Hugh Silverman (1994). In brief, the texts were interrogated as to how it made meaning of the event. From this analysis, it transpired that – on the one hand – the psychological theories of violence, focusing as it does on the individual, misses the crucial mediating and situated importance of context, while contextual theories (such as those of sociology and anthropology), neglect the agency and subjectivity of the individual. Moreover, analysis reveals a particular ethical and moral component to political violence, and violence in general, which is explicated on the basis of the African philosophical notion of Ubuntu, and the Levinasian sense of the face.

DEDICATION/UKUZINIKEZELA

*To my grandfather Makhwenkwe Mbuqe whose death taught about life and to my son
Siyolo Mbuqe whose birth taught me about mortality.
Esi sipho sisuka kuSponono*

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Introduction

South African, and Nobel Peace prize laureate, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, remarks that “We are bound up in a delicate network of interdependence because, as we say in our African idiom, a person is a person through other persons [*Ubuntu*]. To dehumanize another inexorably means that one is dehumanized as well” (Tutu, 1999, p35). Does harming another person indeed mean that you are harming yourself? And, what if you are yourself already “harmed,” such that harming another conceivably has less salience in terms of harming or hurting oneself? Might harming another human being imply that the delicate network of interdependence was struck before the other was? What does it mean for one to violate – as in violence – a fellow human being? And how does this view of Archbishop Tutu’s correlate with a psychological view of violence that imputes motivation and volition to a singular and individual actor? All these questions are ones this dissertation will grapple with as, indeed, the South African populace have, and continues to, as it re-members its past.

Gobodo-Madikizela (2003, p.6) described the South African past as one in which “every black South African, have lived a life shaped by violence and the memories of Apartheid.” One wonders, given the notion of a period post-Apartheid, whether the Apartheid past is gone, or is it embedded in our psychic being? Can we really draw a line to mark where the Apartheid past ends and the post-Apartheid begins? What marks the start of the present or the popularly named and oft-referenced post-Apartheid? Alternatively, is the present and the past an embodied synergy?

Nelson Mandela, referring to South African history marred by racial, gender and class oppression and violence, comments that “the purpose of studying history is not to deride human action, nor to weep over it or to hate it, but to understand it and then learn from it as we contemplate the future” (1998, p.51). However, a popular and admittedly formulaic understanding about history repeating itself cautions against a cursory examination of the past, and too eager a desire to “put it behind us,” as it were. In this dissertation I will largely use the term “past” instead of “history” for I want to remain within the domain of human experience and when I use the term history, it feels distant, suggesting reference to events that happened centuries ago, with little or no resonance to my life or the lives of those I know. Furthermore, the goal is to take what we “put behind us” and precisely put it before us – how else can we “learn” from history, as it were, than to let it come back to us from the future, inasmuch as we imagine that future on history’s anvil. Hence, whereas history often suggests that the event is gone, past brings the event and experience somewhat closer; that is, it also carries an affective weight, rather than something that could be grasped (only) through thought.

In responding to the questions posed before, and by doing so in a way that also takes a historical event, or rather an event from the recent past, as its focal point, this dissertation grapples more specifically with political violence and a particular incident of violence, occurring in the Colesberg region of South Africa in October, 1985.

The Violent Incident

In brief, and as a preliminary introduction (much more information is provided in later chapters), the violent incident that constitutes this dissertation’s focus, took place at the height of anti-Apartheid protests, and during a period of considerable unrest within

the country as a whole. In fact, the government of the day had declared a state of emergency, giving the police and military sweeping powers, including detentions without trial, presidential rule by decree, and impositions of curfews, for example. Anti-Apartheid protests seemed almost to respond in escalating kind, ratcheting up public displays of defiance, violent protests and acts of sabotage and violence aimed at government institutions, personnel, and “collaborators.” One such manner of violence, aimed at “government collaborators,” “traitors,” or people otherwise considered in cahoots with the Apartheid government, or at least not aligned with anti-Apartheid aims and ideals, was a public (almost always) form of execution, called necklacing. In necklacing, a rubber tire is placed over the alleged collaborator’s (or *impimpi*’s) chest and arms, gasoline is poured all over the body (and/or poured into the inside of the rubber tire as well) and set alight. The victim suffers severe burns, and almost always succumbs to this gruesome death. Unheard of in South Africa before 1985, the necklacing incident in Colesberg was one of the earliest incidents of this form of lethal lynching, whereafter it became more and more common in the Black southern African townships as a means of meting out punishment to suspected *impimpi*, and as a supposed warning or deterrent to others not to cross the rule and expectation of the particular anti-Apartheid organization or their representatives that held sway in the specific township. In the incident in question, a young woman, Mrs. Dilato, was alleged to have ignored a consumer boycott, aimed at white businesses in Colesberg. Ostensibly, this was the main reason for her execution. As we will see, however, there is considerably more to the event. For now, suffice it to note that political violence in general, necklacing as a specific form thereof,

and a particular incident of necklacing, occurring in Colesberg in 1980, serves as the analytic and interpretative data node and departure point for this dissertation.

Discourse, History, and Context

Having staked out the area of interest, and the specific incident of interest, it is also necessary to introduce the fact of a particular theoretical and epistemological positioning as another border or limit of sorts. Again, whereas a comprehensive explication of some of the assumptions and implications of a discursive approach is provided later, its introduction here serves to paint a broad background against which the unfolding dissertation will come into more specific relief. To this end, suffice it to note that a discursive approach assumes, fundamentally, that language is constitutive of meaning and experience. Discourse is treated as playing a primary role in structuring human experience, meaningfulness or lack thereof. However, as will become clearer later, discourse as used in discourse analysis does not necessarily refer to language only, but in fact to an institutionalized way of thinking, manifested as it is through, and in, language.

Discourse

It is difficult to define discourse because the definition seems to be contingent on its use. Discourse analysis is a central component of this dissertation. Attempts to define discourse brings a realization that a definition, which is to say a universally agreed upon, or unitary usage, is hard to come by – perhaps even impossible. However, this does not absolve this project from staking out a definition, rather, it becomes even more pressing. To that end, definitions of discourse appear to be shaped by how and what the person wants to use a narrative for, or understands its usage as (Foucault, 1972; Polkinghorne,

1988). So, for example, one could think of the narrative as composed of tropes (White 1978), as a channel of domination (van Dijk, 2008), including ideological domination, or as a means of social constructionism (Burr, 2003). Hence, and to complicate matters further, the very definition of discourse is its usage; that is, while discourse is defined by its usage it also defines the usage. This dissertation will draw heavily from Burr's (2003) description and application of discourse as it finds expression - but not confining expression - in the field of psychology.

Staking out a position even more precisely, Polkinghorne (1988) approaches a segment of discourse as narrative. In its elementary form, discourse "is not a mere collection of words and sentences" (Polkinghorne, 1988, p.31), yet a word is where it starts. According to Polkinghorne (1988) discourse is

a unit of utterances: it is something written or spoken that is larger than a sentence. A discourse is an integration of sentences that produces a global meaning that is more than that contained in the sentences viewed independently. There are various kinds of discourses, each kind links the sentence that compose it according to distinct patterns (p.31).

Discourse is an expression of something that is achieved by integration of sentences. The meaning is expressed both in the integration of sentences and in the meaning of the product. Further, each sentence is only meaningful in relations to others – never independently. Each sentence points to another and creates a context for understanding.

If there are various kinds of discourse, then it is not only something written or spoken, it is also action, gestures, and rituals - to name a few. These are the ways people pronounce their existence or relate to one another, which is at the "center-stage [of] the everyday interactions" (Burr, 2003, p.8). Therefore, discourse rests on attempting to

provide meaning to daily events; it mediates subjectivity and intersubjectivity. According to Burr (2003),

Discourse refers to a set of meanings, metaphors, representations, images, stories, statements and so on that in some way together produce a particular version of events. It refers to a particular picture that is painted of an event, person or class of persons, particular way of representing it in a certain light. [That means] a multitude of alternative versions are potentially available through language, this means that, surrounding any one object, event, person, etc. there may be a variety of discourses, each with a different story to tell about the object in question, a different way of representing it to the world(p.64).”

Here now we see an extension of discourse beyond sentences to include tropes. Again, language figures importantly in discourse, and the very dynamic manner of language (for example by the quote above) assumes that one event can be represented in various ways, and by extension, the way language is used to represent an event to render it meaningful. So, by introductory example, this dissertation looks at the event of Ms. Dilato’s necklacing from three different sources, and also in three different ways. Even though one event took place on October 2, 1985, it generated at least three vastly different representations thereof. Therefore, it is understood in a variety of ways. But, it is not just that different discursive ways of organization render the event meaningful in a particular way in representation, but in fact precisely as well that particular discursive constellations gave birth to the event.

Yet, lest one imagines discourse in too abstract and systemic a manner, Burr (2003) also notes that discourse is not only an expression of an object and event, but also a person, which introduces subjectivity and intersubjectivity. Describing the permeability between identity and discourse, Burr (2003) states that

identity is constructed out of the discourses culturally available to us and which we draw upon in our communications with other people. A person's identity is achieved by a subtle interweaving of many different threads. There is a thread of age, ...class; ...ethnicity; gender; sexual orientation. All these, and many more, are woven together to produce the fabric of a person's identity (p. 7).

Discourse is not only central in the expression of the person's identity but also constructs identity. Therefore, identity and discourse are intertwined. The "ways of understanding the world do not come from objective reality but from other people, both past and present. We are born into a world where the conceptual frameworks and categories used by people in our culture already exist" (Burr, 2003, p.7). In South Africa, for example, people were born into racial categories that existed before they were born. In most cases these categories are "innocently" referred to as demographics. Race as a demographic category, however, unimaginably frames the experience that a person would have in South Africa. There is therefore a sensitivity to the importance of historical and cultural background to the context of an object, event and a person. Context not only carries historical and cultural traces, and refers to the environment, but also situates the circumstance that contributes to our understanding of an object, event, and a person. As such, Burr (2003) states that

Ways of understanding are historically and culturally relative. Not only are they specific to particular cultures and periods of history, they are seen as products of that culture and history, and are dependent upon the particular social and economic arrangements prevailing in that culture at that time (p. 4)."

Discourse analysis pays special attention not only to how the event is represented, but also how the cultural, the historical, the economic and political forces are all interwoven in the representation, and how these forces converge and diverge.

Context and History

Crucial to a discursive analysis, consequently, is an examination of context. Necklacing has to be seen against a broader contextual background. This entails an examination of aspects of the South African past; its history. Inasmuch as a context is thus presented, one also represents the social which is discursive in that it is constructed through articulations, which are the alignment of roles, identities, actions and meaning with the intent to re-store contemporaneousness to them. Clearly, in this view *things* do not have an inherent static meaning; they participate in an open field of meaning making and remaking. In complex form articulatory practices demonstrate the relationship between experience, discourse and the possible relational horizons.

Even though I expressed reservations about the word history earlier, there is a sense in which this particular incident of necklacing was as historic an event in Colesberg, as it became a historic phenomenon in South Africa, broadly – and perhaps even a signature of the 1980s’ resistance against Apartheid. Yet, it is also true that there are various ways in which history can be told or described and events regarded as consequential or noteworthy to history (or not). Hayden White, in *Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism*, is similarly sensitive to the various ways in which history can be told, and by his recommendation, history as a discipline and endeavor “... can serve to humanize experience only if it remains sensitive to the more general world of thought and action from which it proceeds and to which it returns” (White, 1978, p.50). Hence, an approach to necklacing and history of Apartheid must not be an abstraction of, or from, human experience, and a narrative thereof should strive to disclose as wide a range of possibilities of such experiences as possible.

Clearly, the stereotypical and intuitive approach to the historical narrative is to present it in a linear way, as a sequential chronology of events and facts. White (1978) proposes that we should no longer naively expect that statements about a given epoch or complex of events in the past “correspond to some preexisting body of raw facts” (p.47). In fact, another way of presenting history is through a discursive writing/reading of history, where the gesture is an interpretative one, and where the historical text can be regarded as a literary artifact.

Inasmuch as the discursive stance with regards to the historic text is an interpretative one, it is a clear legatee to hermeneutic and phenomenological traditions, among others. In this case history is experienced as a meaningful moment in human relations. An event is historic because it carries a particular meaningfulness or meaninglessness. White (1978) notes:

Surely the historian[/researcher] does not bring with him a notion of the “story” that lies embedded within the “facts” given by the record. For in fact there are an infinite number of such stories contained therein, all different in their details, each unlike the other. What the historian [researcher] must bring to his consideration of the record are general notions of the kinds of stories that might be found there, just as he must bring to consideration of the problem of narrative representation some notion of the pre-generic plot structure. (p.60)

The above quotation is particularly salient to this project, and well at a number of levels. First, by proposing a discursive widening of the seemingly isolated act of violence, and by inserting necklacing into sociopolitical and historical articulation and practices, the quote sensitizes one to the abundance of stories and destinations the interpretation can journey to; secondly, the above quote is relevant to methodology, which – as I will explicate later - is a particular combination of hermeneutic semiology as

advocated by Silverman (1994). Thirdly, the quotation challenges the notion of an ultimate, fundamental, essential, or timeless truth to the historical event to be unearthed or discovered by the diligent and talented researcher. Instead, and already by the data points used in this dissertation – three accounts of the same event – it becomes clear that there are multiple truths to be found in the seemingly same, and singular event.

The three different recordings of the event I use in this dissertation are not just “raw facts”, but also stories, that is, narrative representations. Moreover, as stories these records—data sources—are not just plain accounts of necklacing, but they carry processes and conventions for the very telling of the story. White (1978) says

Historical narratives are not only models of the past events and processes, but also metaphorical statements which suggests a relations of similitude between such events and processes and the story types that we conventionally use to endow the events of our lives with culturally sanctioned meanings... historical narrative is not only a reproduction of the events reported in it, but also a complex of symbols which gives direction for finding an icon of the structure of those events (p.88).

Hence, one can now ask: if necklacing, Colesberg and violence are symbols and signify, what and how do they symbolize and signify? If the discursive complex is precisely that – a complex and interrelated system of signification and symbolization – how is one to read such signification? The challenge is for an approach that is able to respect such a rich, complex, and symbolic meaning - both methodologically and theoretically.

Within psychology, White’s (1978) representation of the past as history and – story, is echoed some by Harré’s discursive psychology. Harré (1995) suggests that psychology approaches the social as a discursive act as “experience... is created by semiotics, ritual and discursive acts which are effective only in relation to specific

cultural-symbolic and socio-structural contexts' (p.5). For the purposes of this dissertation, consequently, the psychological literature on violence in general, and political violence in particular, will be examined for the manner in which it illumines this cultural-symbolic and socio-structural relationship to psyche, which is perhaps also to say, psychology.

Violence and Political Violence in the Apartheid State

It is entirely possible that someone may take issue with the title of this section, arguing that violence in the Apartheid state, by definition, is political violence, or that the distinction, even if it existed, is impossible to make. Of course one could also argue that inasmuch as Apartheid, by its very nature, was intrinsically violent, on the one hand, and that every single aspect of life was regulated by Apartheid, on the other, every action – from domestic violence to a mugging for example – is informed by a political regulation, and hence every act of violence is also political violence. These difficulties of definition and description notwithstanding, it may also be that necklacing poses a particular difference – is beating one's spouse in any way similar to publicly putting a petrol-filled tire on someone's shoulder, and setting it alight?

I am deferring the questions of what constitutes political violence, and the ambiguities and difficulties attendant on that description, for later, but wish to proceed in this introductory staking out of the issues, to draw on an almost intuitive and commonsense understanding of violence under oppression. In situating the dissertation, and developing its central questions, methods, and theoretical placement, I start by arguing that political violence in South Africa of the 1980s (the period this study will focus on) had evolved progressively, and had its precursive prelude in the preceding

decades during the height of formalized and entrenched Apartheid policy. Indeed, political violence was evident from the moment of Apartheid's inception, in 1948, albeit manifested differently, and with varied force.

I enter political violence through political discourse, which is fundamentally around which identities were constituted and articulated. An examination of political violence through discourse appreciates the complexities of human action and experiences – a point made articulately by Rumi (1997) for the comprehensive relationship between discourse and human being:

Human beings are discourse. That flowing moves through you whether you say anything or not. Everything that happens is filled with pleasure and warmth because of the delight of the discourse that's always going on. (Rumi, 1997, p.76).

Human being and discourse are inseparable, just as meaning and actions are. Human beings and discourse are the social, which is also the place for the constitution of violence. The study of political violence is primarily the study of human conduct; a violation of (a) person/s by (an) other/s. It is an examination of the relations between self and others; a relation of difference and alterity. In a startling manner, then, violence is quite human, and from the outset, the notion of violence as a mechanical cost-benefit equation, or some or other similar mechanical conception that dehumanizes it, is not one this dissertation subscribes to. Of course this is not to condone or endorse it, but rather to say and admit that as action in context, as action in discourse, there may well be a rather human meaningfulness to it.

This is, admittedly, not altogether how violence is talked about in general, and in the psychological literature in particular. To be sure there are several ways violence is

talked about, theorized, and studied, with some ways carrying greater legitimizing authority than others. Moreover, these ways define and shape our views and commonsense understanding on the subject, as it does the academic. I will argue that dominant theories of violence have de-humanized violence and by doing so, separated it from the sphere of everyday and general human activity and possibility. In my view (as I will argue in greater detail later), violence is always and already in the realm of humanity and therefore a human affair. Violence, whether in the extremes of war, or in the everyday banality of political barbs and insults, is an interpersonal phenomenon. And, when regarded as such, opens up an ethical dimension. Of course it is always so that violence invokes questions of right or wrong, of the violation of rights or not, but I will argue that such an approach involves ethics and not the ethical. That is, inasmuch as violence is dehumanized and considered an abject aberration, occurring among “sick” or “disturbed” individuals, and in “rare” cases, a perversion of humanity, rather than part and parcel of it, violence becomes a matter of law, to be regulated and managed as a transgression of what is “right” or “wrong” vis a vis ethics rules. On the other hand, however, if violence is considered part and parcel of what it is to be human, arising as it does from the interpersonal, or the possibility of its manifestation being located in the interpersonal, then its occurrence is a matter of the ethical, before law, that is, of what it is to be with others by the very fact of being with others – a metaphysical first concern, as it were. Asking the question of what it means then to be human, is perhaps not altogether a strange and distancing move within the African context: reconsider the quote that started this chapter – Archbishop Tutu’s “delicate network of interdependence” that is

also a fundamental organizing cultural trope for what it is to be an African, that is Ubuntu.

CHAPTER ONE

The Historical Context

This chapter places political violence and necklacing in Colesberg, South Africa, during the 1980s within a discursive historical context. First, I examine apartheid discourse, and how it worked to create “us” and “them” social divisions. Additionally, I argue that even as this discourse resulted in enforced segregation and domination, the very seeds of its demise were already present, from the beginning. Put differently, alongside a discourse that serves to entrench and legitimize Apartheid, a process and dynamic ran parallel, the aim of which was to overthrow and destroy Apartheid.

Norval’s work, *Deconstructing Apartheid Discourse* (1996), provides a helpful description of the emergence and development of Apartheid discourse. Drawing on the work of Laclau and Mouffe (1985/2001), Norval (1996) notes that the key descriptive trope for South Africa in the 1980s (both in the everyday and the academic), was “crisis” (Norval, 1996). The hegemony of the Apartheid state was in crisis, and its regulatory practices started to fail visibly. It could no longer contain and manage daily social relations, and the social in general. Again, and Norval makes this point powerfully as well, amongst everything Apartheid was or aimed to be, at heart it strove to organize the social and social relations. The social is “not an entity separable from actual people and the activities in which we find it [rather it is] the ongoing concerting and coordinating of individuals’ activities” (Smith, 1998, p.6). That is to say, the social is the activities, interactions and relations between people which include both the everyday mundane (yet meaningful) activities, as well as the uncommon activities of everydayness. The social

incorporates both social organization and social relations (Smith, 1998). Despite its painfulness, or perhaps because of its painfulness, Apartheid is inconceivable outside human relations; in fact it is its painfulness that brings up the social in it. The social is the complex web of relations from the institutional and organizational to the personal and individual.

Many scholars of the social, including Laclau and Mouffe (2001), Norval (1996) and Smith (1998), agree that the social is a discursively constituted phenomenon– “the real force which contributes to the molding and constitution of social relations” (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p.110). As “the multifarious practices and rituals, verbal and non-verbal, through which a certain sense of reality and understanding of the nature of the society were constituted and maintained” (Norval, 1996, p.2), discourse provides a meaningful sense of reality and understanding in thought and in everyday/everynight activities.

Apartheid and Discourse

As a South African one often wonders why Apartheid kept going for so long when today there is almost unanimous agreement that it was wrong and an illegitimate system of governance? What kept the National Party in power for so long, and what did the party promise the White electorate that returned it to power with every election cycle prior to 1994? In other words, what was the “Apartheid promised land” and to whom was the promise pledged?

Traditionally, Apartheid scholars tended to provide explanations through one of three perspectives: liberal, Marxist, and Afrikaner Nationalist (Louw, 2004). As valuable

as the insights derived from those perspectives are, the fact of the matter is still that they are all thoroughly rooted in a modernist academic ethic and assumptive frame. So, for example, whether it is the progressive emergence of the individual in liberalism, the election of a people by a divine god in Afrikaner nationalism, or the inevitable class struggle and conflict of Marxism, each of these propose an inexorable and essential component to history, society, and/or individuals – an essence almost outside of and independent of the very people it affects and effects. In contrast, a discursive approach is much less amenable to such essential truths and extra-subjective dynamics, and has much more of a kinship to the so called postmodern and post structural approaches and positions. Here, truth is contested and plurivocal, meaning that the truth of Apartheid, as it were, is contested, multivoiced, and complex. Indeed, there may not be a single truth for all times, but many truths, from many positions.

Political discourse, then, is also fluid, even as there are constant attempts and jockeying to fix the meaning of things. Discourse conjugates and serves as the conjuncture for what was otherwise loose and particular to create what is “commonsense.” Best and Kellner (1991) note that the poststructuralist take on discourse is that “meaning is not simply given, but socially constructed across a number of institutional sites and practices” (p.26). It is through discourse that the different tributaries of human experience are channeled and charged to be a current of collective experience. Discourse is an open field which opens the possibilities of articulation, movements and struggles - “a site and object of struggle where different groups strive for hegemony and the production of meaning and ideology” (Best and Kellner, 1991, p 26). Discourse is the central tool in defining and constituting frontiers. Where Apartheid is

concerned, similarly, the horizon of what could be thought, practiced, imagined, promised was constructed over time, and as a result of this discursive struggle and “frontier-fixing.”

Several historical events are often offered by many of those historians referenced earlier as reasons or motivations for Apartheid’s emergence. Yet, as Laubscher (2005) notes with respect to Afrikaner identity making, the same can be said for historical Apartheid motivation, namely, that “consensus in identifying historical events notwithstanding, no agreement exists about any one, or any particular combination, of these experiences functioning as definitive identity crucible” (Laubscher, 2005, p. 309). Hence some historians identify the Anglo-Boer war, or the South African war as it is known now, as crucial to Apartheid’s emergence. In this telling, Afrikaners were a people who bore the scars of the war, having been defeated on the battle field, and seeing their dreams of an independent country being dashed. Just before the war, the Boers had two promising and prosperous independent states; after the war they were a small minority under British rule. Taking into account that the war was particularly brutal – it included, for example, the incarceration of Afrikaner women and children in concentration camps and a horrific British “scorched earth” policy that decimated Afrikaner farms and livelihood - the stage was supposedly set for a lasting resentment and wound. Afrikaner nationalism and Apartheid promised to be the salve, the healing for this trauma. As such, Apartheid was not discontinuous with the battle between Afrikaner and English post the Anglo-Boer war, but a confident assertion of a new security, and a new assurance in apartness, in Apartheid.

Similarly, for example, other authors offer different reasons or motivations for Apartheid. Moodie (1975), for example, argues that a particular brand of Kuyperian Calvinism authorized a sense of a people elected by God to fulfill a special shepherding mission in Africa, the reward for which was the deliverance of the land as home. Hence Apartheid is a manifestation of God's word, sanctioning apartness – in fact, commanding it. Yet, perhaps the reason why there are so many varied and carrying reasons, motivations, and theories as to “why Apartheid”, is that this search for an essence, a singular motivational truth to Apartheid, is a futile exercise. Instead, all and none of these factors can be seen as playing a role for the manner in which they were all articulated or interpellated in a discursive horizon and organization. As such, and by that organization, two discursive signifiers and tropes are of particular note, namely the “*volkseie*”, and the fear of “*gelykstelling*”.

The Volkseie, and the Fear of Gelykstelling

Both Norval (1996) and Giliomee (2003) agree that Apartheid was not primarily concerned with racial segregation, but rather with the survival of the Afrikaner as group. Apartheid as system promised nothing less than the survival of the group, premised on a clear delineation of what is particular to the group (the “*volkseie*”) which, of course, implies and marks what (and whom) is not part of the group by the same measure (the “*volksvreemde*,” what is “alien to the people”). Laubscher (2005, p. 305, italics in original) writes that *volk* is “a thorny term to translate, as it includes notions of *nation*, but self-contained in the sense of a uniquely delimited *people*”.

Giliomee (2003) translates *gelykstelling* (Afrikaans) as “social leveling.” Less attractively, but more precisely, *gelykstelling* translates to “setting or making equal”, from *gelyk* meaning equal, even and/or similar, and *stelling*, which is to set, put, arrange in place, or to assert. The comparative sense of whom one is equal, superior, or inferior to, has particular salience, right from the moment of contact between colonists and indigenous peoples, and later between warring colonial peoples. One may even extend the argument of difference and measurement of worth between the colonial power (Britain, for example), and the now “fallen” Afrikaner who had “gone native”, claiming South Africa as theirs, and becoming more and more “uncouth” as they removed themselves from allegiance to the civilized European centers; or, on the other hand, from the Afrikaner’s point of view, the measurement of worth with themselves as a band of God’s chosen elect., higher than the heathen natives to be sure, but also morally higher than the British colonial master, who has lost God, and become corrupt. Throughout South Africa’s history, this sense of whom one is equal to, and by which measure, would be a recurrent and framing motif. From those introductory encounters between the Khoikhoi to the period post the South African war, where Afrikaners faced socio-economic and political circumstances under British rule not altogether dissimilar from Blacks, Giliomee (2003) argues strongly for the persistent and dynamic frame that is *gelykstelling*. In fact, Giliomee (2003) argues for the dynamic dread of *gelykstelling* not as a chapter, episode, or phase, but as the very spine of Apartheid. As such, it pervaded every sphere of life, reaching beyond the confines of church to the political, cultural and economical as well.

Where race and caste is concerned, Giliomee (2003) writes that

The burghers [Later Afrikaners] who lived in isolation in the interior beyond the first mountain ranges went to great lengths to maintain their link with the established Dutch Reformed Church with its Calvinist creed, but were largely self-sufficient administratively and politically. In the absence of the standing police force or army outside Cape Town, they had to assert their authority as masters. They guarded against any form of *gelykstelling* or social leveling with their slaves and servants and restricted their church largely to Europeans (Giliomee, 2003, p. xiv).

Hence, anxiety regarding *gelykstelling* takes different forms over the years – from Cape slavery, through British subjugation and oppressive rule, to the establishment of independent Boer republics, through a series of wars with both the British and various indigenous peoples, to Apartheid. Inherent to the comparison and fear around *gelykstelling* is the sense of mastery, “exclusivity and superiority” (Giliomee, 2003, p.44).

This sense of mastery comes to expression in a particularly powerful and common word, *baas*, and the derivative *baasskap*. From the Dutch, *baas* is translated as master or boss (in fact, *baas* is the etymological root for boss), and *baasskap* is the position of being a boss, of being in control. Giliomee (2003) quotes Hendrik Verwoerd, prime minister, and one of the primary architects of Apartheid, referring to South Africa as “a white man’s country where he must remain the master.” It is, then, a desire for mastery in separation, in apartness, which demands a delineation of what is one’s own (the *volkseie*), or particular to the group in Afrikaner nationalism, and over which one not only consequently has dominion or *baasskap*, but which one then is authorized to protect and care for.

The desire for mastery and for a unified “us” need also be placed against the rapid transformations of the early twentieth century, wrought by urbanization and industrialization, as well as the later economic worldwide depression and Second World War (WWII). It was the challenge posed by urbanization, depression and WWII in the 1930s and 1940s, especially, that solidified the nascent discourse of mastery in apartness. According to Norval (1996), these situations were experienced as dislocations by Afrikaners.

Urbanization, ...came to mean much more than a simple population movement to the city. It was characterized as a process which marked both urban and rural populations and which could lead to a loss of the *volkseie*, a loss of one’s own religion, spiritual, moral and social values, and even one’s own language (Norval, 1996, p.20).

In the face of such dislocations, questions of identity emerge quite powerfully, and the recurring question as to the *volkseie* emerged with particular force. It is a question of boundaries, and what belongs and does not belong to the *volk*. The premise of the *volkseie* was rooted in the notion that there is a group or an entity called the Afrikaner *volk*, which “was given in so far as it could be distinguished from and against a series of ‘others’” (Norval, 1996, p.70). This vision of *volkseie* would be articulated from different religious, cultural, economical and later political frontiers, which also meant to mark it. The notion of the *volkseie* did not have racism as its primary focus; rather segregation became part of the whole that accrued from mastery, and one’s definitional “own” in apartness.

As the discursive borders solidified, I already intimated that several spheres of life were interpellated into fixing borders and meaning making. The church – specifically the Dutch Reformed Church, or NGK (*Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk*) - was one such

institutional actor, playing a crucial role in the articulation of the *volkseie* and providing a sacred history of, and for, the Afrikaners (Giliomee, 2003; Kuperus, 1999; Norval, 1996). In the years leading to 1948 and the formal institution of Apartheid, “NGK leaders had become distinctly aware of the social, material and religious needs of Afrikaners and [was] instrumental in promoting those needs collectively to the government and political parties” (Kuperus, 1999, p.6).

The church would focus on channeling all the resources to the Afrikaner’s cause in order to address whatever it saw as ailing within the Afrikaner community. According to Norval (1996) the NGK embarked on delineating what was “true” in the *volk* and married the need of the *volk* with the divine. What would be particular to the Afrikaner was articulated as divine and therefore, worth pursuing. Social stratification would be godly and serve the interest of morality. In fact, post the 1948 election the

Church and state both pursued the interest of economic security and Afrikaners ethnic purity. In 1948, soon after the national elections, the NGK’s *Kerkboek* editorial of September 22 declared that apartheid was a church policy, pointing to the long NGK tradition of race separation in the church (Kuperus, 1999, p.87).

During the 1950s, the NGK church welcomed the laws that confirmed the maintenance of racial separation laws such as the Mixed Marriage Act, Immorality Act, and Group Areas Act (Kuperus, 1999; Norval, 1996). In fact, the NGK lobbied for these laws in the 1930s and 1940s (Kuperus, 1999; Norval, 1996).

Yet, as was mentioned before – no one institution on its own defines the discursive totality for meaning making; for it to be successful and all-encompassing, other spheres of life needs to line up and qualify, slightly modify, or otherwise supplement the emerging trope such that it assumes hegemonic status and comes to fix

meaning across all spheres of life. The church, powerful as it was, was consequently linked by economic and cultural institutions in setting discursive limits. However, inasmuch as the NGK provided a spiritual sense that “the needs of the *volk* were greater than those of the individual or any of the other bonds” (Norval, 1966, p.74), the economic needs of the Afrikaners were seen as divine and provided an unparalleled collective economic investment and mission. Similarly, with respect to the cultural, the Afrikaans language was appropriated and reified into the sacrosanct vehicle for all of the cultural, social, economic, and political.

Yet, for all of its success in solidifying a sense of group and providing a desired promise of survival and identity, the fact of the matter is – and is consciously so – that the very definition of the *volkseie* is premised on its definitional other and social division. Again, the very fundamental conceptual departure point for Apartheid, is “apartness” or social divisions around an “us” against “them.” This Manichean articulatory practice “constitute(d) and organize(d) social relations” (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, p.25) in the sense that articulatory practices shape common sense and truth. What might otherwise be distant and ideological, for example, is made common and applicable in articulatory practise, which is a common sense tying of events far into individuals’ narratives near, thereby making it personal and personally true. In this way, the grand philosophical or ideological sense is made common, in the very etymological sense of the word, such that it not only carries the mission in some passive reflective way, but also dispenses it and perpetuates it actively. Norval (1996) examined how roles like being a daughter, a wife, and a husband, for example, were sites of dispensing the common mission of the *volkseie*. Articulatory practices frame and create forms of identification and identities because

“identities are not forged merely in positive terms, but are also relational in character, and thus gain their specificity in their difference from other identities (Norval, 1996, p.34).”

In South Africa identities were constituted in black and white. Furthermore, they were presented as antagonistic to each other.

“Apartheid is a recipe for permanent conflict”

(P.W. Botha)

It is appropriate to open this section with the unlikely words from one of the most ardent Apartheid protagonists, former Prime Minister and State president P.W. Botha. This statement admits that Apartheid was premised on antagonistic interests, and that the construction of reality within “apartheid discourse proceeded, from the very start, by creating a representation of the nature of the society and thus, of its unity, that had as its precondition the exclusion of ‘a series of others’” (Norval, 1996, p70). Apartheid was about configuring human relations in South Africa, and by its reliance on binary opposites such as white versus black, inside(r) versus outside(r), friends versus enemies, these oppositions came to “function as the very figure for signification and the mechanisms of meaning production” (Fuss, 1991, p.1). Apartheid had “everything to do with the structure of alienation, splitting, and identification which together produce a self and an other, as a subject and an object, unconscious and a conscious, an interiority and exteriority” (Fuss, 1991, p. 1).

These opposites - as artificial as they might be, perhaps precisely because they are so constructed - remained tenuous and required constant vigilance and enforcement

against violation. They constituted and streamlined both the individual and collective identities of South Africans of all kinds. Binary opposites “encapsulate[d] the structure of language, repression, and subjectivity, [and] designate[d] the structure of exclusion, oppression, and repudiation” (Fuss, 1991, p. 2). Apartheid was a relational structure and/or pattern, which permeated every social fiber; drawing lines of inclusion and exclusion, which, according to Norval (1996), were “more complicated until [the 1980s when] it, finally, was no longer capable of maintaining and controlling the terms of social divisions (p.10).” The maintenance of such lines of opposition was proving to be an impossible project.

Of course one of the seismic fault lines of these binary opposites was race and racial categorization. Although racial segregation existed in South Africa before 1948, when the National Party (NP) won the 1948 general election, its formal institution as a government policy then saw an unparalleled sophistication and refinement of the organic and individual into the sanctioned and frighteningly encompassing systematic.

According to Thompson (2001), four ideas constituted the pillars of Apartheid;

Firstly, the population of South Africa comprised four racial groups – Whites, Colored, Indians and Africans – each with its own inherent culture. Secondly, Whites, as the civilized race, were entitled to have the absolute control over the state. Thirdly, white interests should prevail over black interests; the state was not obliged to provide equal facilities for the subordinate races. Fourthly, the white racial group formed a single nation, with Afrikaans and English speaking components, while Africans belonged to several (eventually ten) distinct nations or potential nations – a formula that made the white nation the largest nation in the country (p. 190).

These ideas were disseminated and enforced in all corners of the country, and at all levels of life, from state department policies, to business and religious sectors.

Legislative tools such as the Group Areas Act, and Pass laws, which aimed at “influx

control,” were designed to maintain apartness and segregate each group from another. Keeping the groups apart was maintained through representing them as antagonistic; there was constant “threat” from the outside group, the enemy. As a result of Apartheid policies, Blacks (whom I take to include Indians, Colored and Africans) had little political power or sway in and over the affairs of the country.

This policy also mediated the distribution of, and access to, resources. For example, in the late 70’s when there were as many as five times African students in school than Whites, the government spent ten times more on white students (Thompson, 2001). The disparate spending ratios also continued in higher education. The uneven distribution of resources did not end with education; racial segregation was also rife with respect to employment conditions. Whites were by and large given managerial positions while Blacks were largely occupying unskilled labor positions. In 1956, the Apartheid government passed the Industrial Conciliation Act, which allowed industries to reserve managerial and skilled labor jobs to be reserved for Whites (TRC report, 1999). Furthermore, remuneration levels saw Whites earn substantially higher wages than Blacks. According to Thompson (2001), white manufacturing and construction workers earned six times as much as African workers, while the mining industry compensated white workers twenty one times as much as African mineworkers (Thompson, 2001).

Despite the complete and almost total control over daily life by government agencies and state organs, Blacks continued to resist and defy such control. According to Thompson (2001), just a year after the National Party came into power, a new generation took control of the African National Congress (ANC) – including Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu and Oliver Tambo. Thompson (2001) continues to state that black people

were transcending their ethnic, regional and class divisions, mobilizing the masses to actively confront the Apartheid regime.

Of note, here, is that whereas Apartheid discourse had now fixed material reality, there were always marginal discourses – always resistance discourses, trying to find a structural and meaning-making unity. Meli (1988) makes a similar point, stating that in the late 50's, the Congress of the People, which marked the beginning of the alliance between the ANC, the South African Indian Congress (SAIC), the Colored People's Congress, the Congress of Democrats and the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), adopted the Freedom Charter. The unity between these various organizations against Apartheid meant that the state was encountering a formidable force from Blacks from all parts of the country. According to Laclau and Mouffe (2001) "Equivalence [does]not simply establish[es] 'alliance' between given interests, but modifies the very identity of the forces engaging in that in that alliance" (p. 184). Hence, by this Congress of the People, and the continuing protests and demonstrations over the years, the racial categories of the Apartheid state (all twelve or so of them), were now recast discursively into a single identificatory label, Black. At least in terms of a common political goal and aim, the resistance discourse was similarly modifying diverse identities into a unitary term.

The field of "us" and "them" is always open for articulation and re-articulation. However, "this takes place, not on a level playing field, but in a terrain that is itself the result of prior hegemonic articulations (Thomassen, 2005, p295)." What is articulated by the liberation movements, was a reaction and related to the articulation of Apartheid

hegemony. The ANC projected itself as espousing democratic principles and equality, and became the

national liberation movement of the African, Colored, and Indian...[equality and Freedom for all] became the most fundamental and essential tenets for building of a revolutionary united front of all democratic anti-racist and anti-fascist forces in South Africa. The ANC made it clear that nobody is excluded by reason of race or color. It therefore rejected the totally all racist ideas; expressed the consistency of the ANC in its non-racial and anti-racist approach and offered an alternative to the reactionary philosophy of apartheid. (Meli, 1988, p.125)

Political Violence in the Apartheid State

A freedom fighter learns the hard way that it is the oppressor who defines the nature of the struggle, and the oppressed is often left no recourse but to use methods that mirror those of the oppressor. At a certain point, one can only fight fire with fire. (Mandela, 1994, p.166)

This above quotation from Mandela demonstrates the attitude of the liberation movement in the 1960's as their peaceful marches and demonstrations were met with violence from the Apartheid state. As noted before, there were always instances of resistance to Apartheid, right from its inception; during the 1950's there were riots, marches and demonstration against Apartheid laws. For example, towards the end of the 1950s there were several demonstrations and marches against pass laws, led by the ANC as single day-strikes (Worden, 2007). It is in the 1960s, however, that resistance expressly moved from a peaceful tenure to a measured adoption of violence as means to confront the Apartheid state. At first glance, there seems to have been an increasing escalation of political violence, with each passing decade, reaching an apparent height in the 1980s, a period Thompson (2001) described as Apartheid in crisis, and James Barker (1985, p. 129) as "a society at war with itself." There seems to have been a certain

lockstep between the escalation of violence on the part of the Apartheid government and the forces of resistance. Similarly, the concepts and rhetoric of both these parties reflect the level and intensity of resistance and oppression. So, for example, the Apartheid governors referred to “a ‘total onslaught’ against the state”, while, for the ANC, “the ‘total onslaught’ was to be countered by a ‘total strategy’” (Van Kassel, 2000. p. 49). All these descriptions speak to the intensity, breadth and the depth of violence in South Africa. In fact, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) report (1999) indicates that

A large number of violations in connection with killings, attempted killings and severe ill treatment (resulted) from necklacing and burning – primarily related to incidents during 1985-87. In the first two of the review periods (1960-82 and 1990-94), the majority of reported fire-related attacks were arson attacks on building. In the current review period (1983-1989), the majority of such violations related to attacks on people. (vol. 3, p. 108)

Violence progressed from being directed to buildings and state property such as cars and infrastructure, to be directed at people. People were caught in the cross fire, both literally and figuratively. There was a seeming change in the nature, breadth, and intensity of violence.

Frantz Fanon (1963, p.64) highlights firstly that the colonization process (and Apartheid) is not only inherently violent, but that violence sustains it; is its lifeline. But, secondly, Fanon also states that “national liberation... is always a violent phenomenon.” There are, in a very real sense, “two protagonists” because the colonial world is divided into the “native and settlers,” “us and them” (Manganyi, 1973, p.25). There is, consequently, a constant interplay between “violences”, in a manner of speaking, even as the shape, form, and intensity changes. Again the discourse of “us” and “them”

permeated and sedimented everyday life and were constitutive of the meaning people gave to their lives.

It became evident to many Blacks in the 1960's that their interest would not be met by the government; on the contrary, the government was becoming increasingly brutal (Thompson, 2001). On March 21, 1960, the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) organized a march to protest pass laws and deliberately gathered in police stations for arrest because they were not carrying their passes (Thompson 2001, Worden, 2007). However, in what was to become known as the Sharpeville massacre, the police responded to a peaceful protest march in Sharpeville by opening fire, killing 67 Africans and wounding 186. Most of the people killed and wounded were shot in the back, which suggests that they were dispersing and not confronting the police. The massacre did not deter opposition against Apartheid policies; on the contrary, it stirred countrywide unrest. Throughout the country, people mourned and showed solidarity with those who died and were wounded. During the ensuing days, violent unrest, demonstrations, and public burning of passes clearly challenged the Apartheid government. According to Mandela (1994), the shooting at Sharpeville created a national turmoil and a crisis for the government. The government responded by instituting more repressive laws, prohibiting any act of political organizing within black communities. Additionally, a state of emergency was declared, and the ANC and the PAC were banned (Thompson, 2001). The Apartheid state made it seemingly impossible for these organizations to operate and further their resistance agenda. According to Thompson (2001), the banning of the ANC and PAC deprived Africans of their last chance to organize lawfully, and peaceably, forcing ANC leaders to reconsider their strategy and goals.

Black political organizations, especially the ANC, had hitherto adopted nonviolent ways of resisting the Apartheid state, even as the government responded with violent repression. Nonviolent methods, it seemed to some within the ANC, had achieved nothing except defeats and violence from the state. Consequently, the ANC and PAC decided to form military wings to counter the violence from the state. This marked a pivotal moment in the history of the Apartheid struggle. In 1961, the ANC formed a military wing, called *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (Spear of the Nation), and abbreviated to MK (Mandela, 1994; Meli, 1988; Thompson, 2001). This marked the adoption of the armed struggle and in a way, violence appeared to be both the means with which to overthrow Apartheid and the means to maintain it.

After an initial period of seeming quietude at the start of the 1970s, the decade came to a crashing and decisive end. Although the country was experiencing rapid economic growth in the late 60s and into the 70s, Black people did not feel a positive impact and did not share the fruits of this development. Although the economy was growing at a rapid rate, increasing the number of Black workers, they had no bargaining powers because of the exclusion of, and bans on, black labor unions (Thompson, 2001). Therefore, there was also discontent from Black workers about their remuneration and working conditions. A growing Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) emerged as a formidable force opposing Apartheid. It comes as little surprise that when the leader and spokesperson for this movement, an immensely charismatic, forceful, and popular leader named Steve Biko, was killed at the hands of South African security forces, a groundswell of resentment and resistance resulted.

Black Consciousness (BC) presented an ideology unlike that of the ANC and PAC, in that it placed enormous emphasis on the psychological ramifications of oppression. Biko (1978) contended that the ANC and PAC were concentrating on one form of liberation, which is physical, to the detriment and neglect of psychological oppression. This is echoed by Van Kassel (2000), who writes that BC was a movement, not an organization, and its major focus was on psychological self-liberation as the prerequisite for liberation. Another task that BC saw itself engaging in was to make people aware of their social conditions and encourage them to work towards changing their social and political conditions. Defining *conscientization*, Biko (1978), states that:

Conscientization is a process whereby individuals or groups living within a given social and political setting are made aware of their situation ... [it is] their ability to assess and improve their own influence over themselves and their environment. Thus in the South African setting, for instance, it is not enough to be aware that one is living in a situation of oppression or residing in a segregated and probably inferior educational institutions. One must if conscious be committed to the idea of getting himself out of the morass. (p. 141)

It is this consciousness that, among many other things, led to the student uprising of 1976. According to Thompson (2001), the ideology of black consciousness penetrated the urban schools. Coinciding with this was the introduction of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in black schools, creating a situation rife with confrontative potential. In 1976, the Minister of Bantu Education instructed that half the subjects in schools be taught in Afrikaans; a move that, from the moment of its announcement, was met with vehement resistance from Black communities (Meli, 1988). However, the government was determined to go ahead with the plan and, on June 16, 1976, about 20 000 Black schoolchildren in Soweto converged to march in protest against these teaching policies. The police responded by shooting at the students and, among others, killing a thirteen-

year old boy named Hector Peterson whose dead body would become iconic of the brutality of the Apartheid regime (Meli, 1988; Pohlandt-McCormick, 2000, Thompson, 2001). It was not just the mere fact of introducing Afrikaans as medium of instruction that provided the affective saliency to the protest, but also the fact that Afrikaans was commonly seen as the “language of the oppressor.” The shootings sparked a nationwide uprising, which continued into 1977. The government responded with increasingly repressive methods, and by early 1977, the death toll stood at 575 and to increase by year’s end to 700 people (Meli, 1988; Thompson, 2001).

The 1976 Soweto uprising marked a turning point in the struggle against Apartheid in that the youth took upon themselves the task of liberating the country. Violence spread all over the country and “the vehemence of the students rebellion, together with the speed with which it spread across the country was striking and caught everybody off guard” (Pohlandt-McCormick, 2000, p. 28). The intensity of the violence and the determination young people showed would influence the subsequent years of struggle against Apartheid. Both liberation movements and the government underestimated the power and the role young people played in the liberation of the country. Up until this period the government perceived its enemies – the ANC and PAC – as located outside the country’s borders and therefore the focus was to secure the borders from them.

Not unlike the 60s, the governmental response in the 70s was to ban BC, the South African Student Organization (SASO), and a number of other organizations that were aligned with these movements. Scores of black leaders were arrested, including Steve Biko (Thompson, 2001), who, as noted above, would later die at the hands of the

police. Another consequence of the 1976 uprising was to swell the ranks of the exiled resistance organizations as scores of young people left the country to join the liberation movement in exile and to receive military training abroad. Those who were jailed and stayed in South Africa seemed to be determined to defy the Apartheid government and the defiance reached its crescendo in the 80s (Mandela, 1994; Meli, 1988; Thompson, 2001).

As demonstrated in the previous decades, political discourse played a central role in the demise of Apartheid. This is political discourse conceived of broadly: not only the words spoken, but the actions understood as discursive signifiers on a large social text. Political discourse is a battlefield on its own (Posel, 1989). This battle intensified in the 1980s from both the Apartheid government and the anti-Apartheid movements. Following Gramsci (1971), we see that for an oppressive political regime to function, the ruling hegemony must be able to reform itself to incorporate the aspiration of the ruled class. As he says in his *Prison Notebooks* (1971), failure to incorporate the aspirations of the ruled will lead to hegemonic crisis. During a hegemonic crisis, those in a ruled class recognize that their aspirations are not only thwarted, but also that their aspirations are antithetical to those of the ruling class. Each class or bloc vies for the control and dominance of the political space,

The problem of the political is the problem of the institution of the social, that is, of the definition and articulation of social relations in a field criss-crossed with antagonisms (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, p.153).

A successful colonializing power must make the colonized feel that their ability to achieve authentic being lies with the maintenance of the status quo. Their identity rests on the success of the system staying in status quo. Crisis emerges when this is no longer

so. When the social relations are shifted, and when “the Other [which] prevents me from being totally myself” (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, p.125) shifts to being those in power, this will lead to political crisis.

The crisis that besieged South Africa in the 1980s is the result of, and the continuation of, articulation and re-articulation of the social. The open field rested on constructing antagonistic relations; pointing to the other as the limit. For example, in the 1950s, Apartheid was offered as a way the Afrikaners could feel empowered and apart from the Anglo power structure, separated from Blacks, while still remaining disenfranchised by the Anglo dominance of major industry. Whiteness aligned the social to the political demands of the time. However, by the 1980s Apartheid could no longer reform or rearticulate a discourse to sustain it. This is because anti-Apartheid discourse (understood broadly as both action and rhetoric) began to flood the field with alternative possibilities that asserted Apartheid’s impossibilities. For example, Apartheid was set on hierarchical racial division and the state regulating social interaction. However, anti-Apartheid discourse espoused a non-racial democratic South Africa. This would be a “South Africa that belongs to all who live in it Black and White.” As Norval (1996) says, it became “ever more complicated” for the Apartheid government to maintain clear and consistent “lines of inclusion and exclusion” (p.10). Meanwhile, anti-Apartheid discourse constructed and flooded the field with various signifiers such as “black,” “the people,” “the masses,” “democracy,” “freedom,” “non-racialism” against racism and Apartheid. The promise of non-racialism was a continuation of the Freedom Charter discourse. All these signifiers were represented as constituting a frontier against Apartheid, and coalesced under the “United” “Democratic” “Front.” It was the success

of this discourse in creating a new “unified” entity that held the promises of a group of people, now understood as one, which challenged the Apartheid regime and sent it into crisis.

Against this backdrop, Gramsci (1971) argues, that “when the crisis occurs, the immediate situation becomes delicate and dangerous, because the field is open for violent solutions, for the activities of unknown forces” (p. 210). These social shifts—shifts in symbolization—create new “negative” spaces where violence emerges both within new social entities, and between the colonizer and colonized.

Equivalence and Ukuthungelana

So far, I have explained the conceptualization of a hegemonic crisis as a general mass challenge of the dominant bloc. In order for the crisis to happen, the dominant imaginary has to be weakened, and a new imaginary must be formed (Norval, 1996). In other words, the dominant bloc’s grip on the social must slip away. However, how does this happen? Laclau and Mouffe’s (2001) notion of equivalence, and the Xhosa concept of *ukuthungelana* provide some clues on how it happened in South Africa.

In the 1950s we witnessed an alliance between those constituted by Apartheid as not white, which at a discourse level is presented as Blacks; a common demarcation from Whites. Furthermore, in the 1960s, “the ANC underwent transformation from an organization oriented to the tiny African middle class, and working within the severe restrictions of the South African legal order, into a mass organization dedicated to militant collective actions” (Price, 1991, p.17). The transformation of the ANC into a

mass-based organization meant a shift in subjectivity. Laclau and Mouffe (2001) describe the process by which multitudes become a united group as: “differences cancel one another out... to express something identical underlying them all” (p.127). They call this process of identification, “equivalence.” They go further to say that “the problem is to identify the content of that ‘identical something’” (p. 127) such that masses have a common “identical something” to identify with. The identification of the content of the identical something is also a definition of the political frontier. In fact, the “identical something” is the lack, the fulfillment of which is the promised reward. Political frontiers are the forebears of political fronts.

The way into equivalence is through antagonism. According to Laclau and Mouffe (2001), “in the case of antagonism ... the presence of the Other prevents me from being totally myself. [This] relation arises not from full totalities but from the impossibility of their constitution” (p.125). In other words, antagonistic relations are two poles “with clear division between outside and inside” (Thomassen, 2005, p. 297). In fact, it is both the inside and the outside that constitute the totality. In the case of South Africa, there would be no Blacks without Whites; each side is constituted by the existence of the other. In a similar fashion, both the colonized and the colonizer constitute an antagonistic relation, which form “a broader totality in relation to which the poles constitute” (Thomassen, 2005, p.297). However, this does not preclude difference from and within each constellation. The question is then: how are those differences subverted to create a “unified” front?

Norval (1996) explains: “The resistance discourse in the early 1980s already succeeded in constructing a set of equivalences between workers, trade unionist, the

people, local community-based organizations and so forth” (Norval, 1996, p.251). On the other hand, the Apartheid “government’s [response] tried to disaggregate by differential inclusion of ‘moderate’ Africans, workers and township people” (p. 251). The battle between the Apartheid government and the anti-Apartheid movement attempted to define each side as an opposing force. In doing so, each side prevented and tried to disrupt internal equivalences with the opposing side. Therefore, equivalence did not disrupt antagonism; on the contrary, it consolidated around the existing fronts.

In explicating what happened in South Africa in 1980s, it is helpful to look at a Xhosa word which was used frequently during this period to describe the situation and the events: *ukuthungelana*. This concept is relevant for both theoretical and practical reasons. In fact, people used this term to describe what was happening in the 1980s. *Ukuthungelana* is a homonym, different meanings of which accrue from the stem of the word, *thunga*. McLaren (1963), notes that *thunga* means sew, or fasten with stitches. Secondly it means to pour out, to strain out. The second translation of pouring something out is incomplete without context, which differentiates it from *galela* (pour out). The context of *ukuthunga* is not only to “pour out” but to do so towards an equal distribution of a beverage. The purpose is to make sure that everybody present, and at times not present, gets their share. Usually, at an event/party where people are gathered together there will be a person who is designated to go around the circle¹ pouring an equal amount of whatever beverage is available for everyone convened there.

¹ Historically Africans sit in a circle when gathering in meetings or events

Thus far *ukuthunga* means first to sew, to join together, as well as to go around pouring and distributing beverage equitably. When the suffix *ana*, is added now, a mode of reciprocity and mutual exchange is denoted. *Ukuthungelana* means not only that something affects the other, but also that it is equally affected by that which it affects. That is to say there is an exchange that involves a sewing together - *ukuthungelana* is keeping things together by a thread , but there is yet another meaning to the word; the smoke generated by starting a fire (*ithungo*), and then spreading it (*ukuthungelana*). In sum, *ukuthungelana* means spreading and sharing something, equitably, and with due regard that all the parties are involved and affected. Indeed, it also means bringing the parties together to form something new without completely dissolving what previously existed.

Building on Laclau and Mouffe’s concept of equivalence, *ukuthungelana* provides a way to explain how political discourse worked on the ground, no least of which because it was how people themselves made sense of what was happening. In fact, the sewing together of a united democratic front against Apartheid was not only an intuitive, organic and spontaneous occurrence or feeling, but was formalized into an organization, movement, and institution.

The formation, in the 1980s, of the United Democratic Front (UDF) became the culminating moment of *ukuthungelana*, just as it promised to be.. The launching of the UDF in the 1980s was not discontinuous with the political landscape of the 1960s and 1970s. After the banning of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM), and the 1976 Soweto uprising liberation movements, the ANC saw an increase in recruits. In fact, it was “black anger during and after the uprising [that] convinced the ANC of the existence

inside South Africa of general possibilities... for the construction of an organized popular revolutionary political base” (Barrell, 1992, p.74, my emphasis). The ANC had come to believe that military strategy alone was not going to bring Apartheid down. Therefore, “revolution could succeed only through the united strength of the “masses” of the people expressing itself in organized political activity [under] a broadest possible national front” (Barrell, 1992, p.81). The purpose of the broad political front was to concentrate and mobilize people under an anti-Apartheid coalition. At this stage the ANC was already using the populist discourse of the “masses” and the “people,” which also had moral impetus.

Typical of antagonistic relations, the Apartheid government was also reviewing its strategies. Not unlike the liberation movements, the Apartheid government embarked on political changes as the result of the later 1970s uprising. In addition to the repressive acts, the state sought ways to normalize the relations in South African citizenry. In the early 1980s the Apartheid government embarked on “reforming” Apartheid to encounter the threat of revolution. For example, two (among many) government reforms introduced in the early 1980s were the constitutional reforms and the introduction of Black Local Authorities (BLA). Yet, inasmuch as those constitutional reforms and the introduction of BLA seemed a survivalist response to threat, they also announced precisely the falling apart of Apartheid hegemony and seeming inviolability.

In 1983 the Apartheid government introduced a new constitution, according to which three “parliaments” would be created; for Whites, Coloreds and Indians (Houston, 1999; Norval, 1996; Price, 1991). The astute reader will have noticed already that this constitutional reform did not include a “parliament” for Blacks. They were to be

“accommodated” by a Black Local Authorities Act (1982), which aimed at shifting the governance of urban Africans from the government to the black population itself (Price, 1991). These initiatives were meant to deal with the exclusion of these groups from the polity while making sure that *gelykstelling* did not take place. As reaction to growing unity of Africans, Indians and Coloreds in the 1970s, the government saw “a need to offset” such resistance by creating a tri-cameral parliament (Houston, 1999, p.60), and in so doing engineer an obstacle to a growing united front against Apartheid by refashioning the segmenting social in the divide and rule manner of its past. Furthermore, whereas Africans were excluded, they were offered some political expression through the BLA.

The creation of BLA’s would ostensibly allow Blacks to control their own affairs and would “reduce the political costs to the state of exercising ... control” (Price, 1991, p.133) over black communities. However, the political costs were not the only thing the state reduced, for financial costs were also deferred. According to Houston (1999), BLAs were made to finance themselves and had to increase rent and service charges. The increase of rent would become a lightning rod (as we shall see in case of Colesberg) for protest and revolt. The BLA’s were to present a buffer for the state and provide a sense of autonomy for urban Blacks. Therefore, both “the Constitutional Act and the Black Local Authorities Act, were attempts to legitimize the Apartheid system by incorporating certain strata from the dominated majority” (Houston, 1999, p. 61).

The launching of the UDF was both a pursuit and declaration of a “united” front against the attempts of the above mentioned reforms to disunite the forces building against Apartheid oppressions. The UDF was a political organization that was launched to maintain and enhance the antagonistic relations where lines between enemies and

friends were sharply drawn. This would be achieved through a political discourse that created and maintained binary opposites. It was precisely in reaction to both Constitutional Reforms and the introduction of BLAs that the UDF was launched. Norval (1996) states that “the UDF, formed to organize resistance to the tri-cameral Parliament and to reforms aimed at urban Africans ... quickly became a national force [however], articulating local township grievances into broader anti-Apartheid discourse” (p. 238). Therefore, the goal of the UDF was *ukuthunga* (to sew together) different grievances and building a common thread—to a common threat. The UDF would demonstrate, but also construct *ukuthungelana* within and among all those who were opposing Apartheid. That is to say, the various “sets of struggles condensed around the UDF” (Norval, p.239). The condensation was also a campaign for a “united” “democratic” “front,” which was discursively constructed as a frontier. The battle lines were “clearly” drawn between those who were against Apartheid and those supporting it. Norval (1996) notes that

not only did the UDF work against any division within the urban African community, but its opposition was predicated upon the discourse aiming to construct a form of unity which cut across all racial divisions, thus having the potential to undermine the very logic upon which the social division of apartheid was based (p. 239).

Apartheid hegemony rested on racial and ethnic division, a logic that from its inception saw difference as a threat to the wellbeing of all Whites and Afrikaners in particular. Indeed, the constitutional reforms were exposing cracks in the logic. These cracks were articulated by anti-Apartheid movements on different social positions and the UDF was “to take the ideological initiatives out of the hand of the state” (Houston, 1999, p.65). By delegitimizing Apartheid in every aspect of the social, the political, economic

and moral landscapes, it was creating new beliefs and horizons of democracy and possibility, which fueled defiance of the state in collective action.

So far I have demonstrated a political movement as a work of discourse; as operating in a discursive space even as it operates on the discursive space itself, and in turn. With respect to of the signifiers “unity” or a “united front”, it is so that, as with any discursive act, unity is not given but produced through political frontiers and articulations. In fact, inasmuch as political frontiers are a pursuit, drawing the lines of who is inside and outside, unity as an act (of sewing together) involves the translation of the political objective or principle. For example, one of the UDF’s principles was “an adherence to the need for unity in struggle through which all democrats, regardless of race, religion or color, shall take part together” (Houston, 1999, p. 64). The UDF principle of unity also became a strategic objective “to unite our people across class, color, ethnic and organizational lines to oppose the Apartheid reforms” (Houston, 1999, p.65). The name of the UDF was both a discursive destination and destiny, which is to say, a goal and a desire. Furthermore, unity was created as an action against the Apartheid government. In the 1980s everybody was talking about unity, for instance, *Umanyano Ngamandla* (Xhosa for unity is strength) was chanted in anti-Apartheid circles to the same extent that *eendrag maak mag* (Afrikaans for unity is strength) was litanised by Apartheid defenders and the state.

Again, as was argued in the discursive acceptance of Apartheid at the level of the everyday, so the UDF brought new forms of liberatory and anti-Apartheid identifications to personal narrative by “link[ing] politics to day to day experience of [the] people”

(Houston, 1999, p.65). This was done through a populist discourse which “simplified the political space, replacing a complex set of differences and determinations by a stark dichotomy whose two poles are necessarily imprecise” (Laclau, 2005, p.18). In fact, Laclau (2005) argues that the logical simplification and imprecision of the terms is “the very condition of political action ... [and] political identities” (p.18).

The “People” and the “Masses”

It is important to understand how populist terms are used in political action. Populist discourse contributed in helping the anti-Apartheid movement achieve its aims. Up until the 1980s, the anti-Apartheid movement had been working on bringing masses into the fold of the struggle against Apartheid (Burrell, 1992). By the 1980s “the people” and “the masses” were common descriptions of those who were opposing Apartheid ideology. These terms inscribe a collective action, reaction, and will but they also constitute and delimit the individual identity. Populist discourse is aimed at galvanizing people for action, providing a moral impetus for such actions, and in effect dispersing the individual’s will into a universal and common will.

Antagonistic relations are set up as two fronts against each other, which mean violence is always and already present. Violence seemed to be inscribed in human relations in South Africa. Drawing from Frantz Fanon, Bulhan’s (1985) comment is apropos:

A situation of oppression is essentially a cauldron of violence. It is brought into existence and is maintained by dint of violence. This violence gradually permeates the social order to affect the everyday living. In time, the violence takes on different guises and becomes less blatant and more integral to institutional as well as to interpersonal reality. It even invades the deeper recesses of the individual psyche, permeating

fantasies, and dreams. Thus to study oppression is, in the final analysis, to delve into the problems of violence in both its subtle and crude manifestations. (p.131)

Moreover, not only was the state experiencing defiance from Blacks, but some Afrikaners were beginning to add their voices, tentative as it were, to questioning the government's policies in the economic, moral, and political arenas. This meant that the Apartheid state was being challenged not only by Blacks but also increasingly by the very people it sought to protect in the past. Many Whites, especially English speakers, started leaving the country, fearful of an apparently apocalyptic future (Thompson, 2001). Furthermore, Blacks were gaining economic power in areas within South Africa and outside of the Homelands, creating a problem for the grand homeland policy of separation (Thompson, 2001). Apartheid was not as strong as it seemed in the preceding decades, and resistance was gathering momentum like never before. Unlike the 60s and 70s, there was a wide spread resistance from labor unions, civic organizations as well as the youth. There were innumerable violent encounters between the state and Blacks. In the 80s, townships across South Africa saw an upsurge in violence directed toward governmental institutions, its forces, and those who were perceived as collaborating with the government. The latter group mostly tended to be Blacks and some were the victims of a peculiar, and novel form of violence, that of necklacing. Thus, within the context of an increase in violence both from the state and the resisting populace, new forms of violence, such as necklacing, entered the resistance repertoire.

CHAPTER TWO

Political Violence

Definition of Violence

Defining violence is as contentious as violence itself, even as social and human scientists have spent enormous amounts of time and energy trying to do just that.

Degenaar (1990) states that “violence is a complex and contested concept which has to be explored at different levels and in variety of contexts” (p. 70). Furthermore, definitional problems arise from the fact that violence also refers to many different actions, processes and conditions (Bulhan, 1985). I argue that like many other social phenomena, the meaning of violence and its conceptualization shifts depending on the context and times.

Perhaps a departure definition provided by The Oxford English Dictionary (1990), where violence is defined as “violent conduct or treatment, outrage, injury”, could serve as spur to further discussion. The astute observer may notice, already, that violence is defined by the very terms it seeks to define – violence is violent conduct ... - the assumption perhaps being that we must know, commonsensically, what violence is. However, inasmuch as the task of a dictionary is definition, the Oxford Dictionary may be excused as there seem to be consensus among social and human scientists, on the other hand, that aiming for a clear, precise and all-encompassing definition of violence is fruitless. Nonetheless, social and human scientists have tried to explain and understand violence, and have certainly theorized it. I review some of the psychological theories of violence more particularly, given this dissertation’s disciplinary focus and home, but

there are philosophical, theological, and sociological theories of violence, for example, that – for the most part - fall outside this dissertation’s review.

Psychological Theories of Political Violence

Whereas psychology *has* examined and theorized violence, it has not specifically done so for political violence. As a consequence, it may be difficult to translate a psychological understanding of violence to political violence with a fair measure of confidence. However, even though violence has been theorized, it remains largely rooted in individual premises, and the sense of an essential, interior, Platonic self and personality. Even in “mob violence”, or when psychology theorizes the power of the group on behavior as in conformity and obedience, for example, it is still a question of an individual “giving up” an individual moral compass, conscience or otherwise usual, fundamental, and essential manner to the group dynamic. In the introduction to his book, Toch (1992) states that he tries to understand violent men as individuals and then sort them into groups. The premise here is that the group is but a reflection and mirror of the individual psyche – one is an individual before one is a part of the group, or one’s being an individual determines the group one is part of. Such an approach already portends difficulties when there is a palpable sense of violence emanating from a state or institution, such as the Apartheid state, and the individual, if one is even able to point to a manifest individual, is but a vehicle and conduit for a political violence with origins elsewhere. Therefore, it may be necessary to supplement psychological theories of violence to more fully account for both violence in general and political violence in particular; perhaps this dissertation will go some way towards developing an approach, or

a sensitivity at the very least, that focuses on understanding violence from multiple perspectives while demonstrating the intersection of these forms of violence.

Violence and Aggression: Genetic Approaches

Psychological theories of violence often proceed from the examination of violence as a reflection of, or result of, aggression. Psychologists seemingly prefer to use the concept of aggression when referring to violence (Toch, 1992). There is, however, no consensus regarding both the term aggression, and its relation to violence. For example, some psychologists and researchers view aggression as a behavior [for example, Renfrew (1997, p. 6), who defines aggression to be “a behavior that is directed by an organism towards a target, resulting in damage”], while others understand it to be a personality trait, temperament, propensity, or attitude. Consequently, as well, whereas psychology seem particularly drawn to measurement of aggression, such attempts differ widely by virtue of it being considered an action or an internal disposition, or both. Of course, an oft-mentioned pitfall is also that aggression is inferred from violent acts, which is then, in a circular manner, explained on the basis of aggression: hence he is aggressive because he gets into fights all the time and he gets into fights all the time because he is aggressive.

Sometimes, however, seeming differences about trait or behavior notwithstanding, there is occasional agreement as to a genetic or “internal” origin for aggression (and violence, as extension or expression thereof). Renfrew’s (1997) approach, for example, places an explanatory premium on the genetic, hormonal, and neurological basis of aggression. Extensive neuropsychological research, cognitive

science- and neurotransmitter mapping, drug intervention research, and several other such biological research emphases all speak to the assumptive sense of aggression and violence as something internal and essential to the individual, part of his or her make-up, as it were.

In the context of political violence in South Africa - a national phenomenon - employing the term aggression in the manner of these referenced theories falls short of an adequate understanding of the situation and the people involved. Patently absent are contextual factors. I am not arguing against the case that neural make up plays a role in violence, however, this approach cannot help us understand collective violence because it overlooks the role played by the social environment in such forms of violence, nor does it adequately account for thinking through institutional or state violence.

Violence as a Socially Learned Phenomenon

Although social learning theories are somewhat sensitive to an environmental role in violence and aggression, it nonetheless still places primary motivating understanding for it in the individual. That is, the approach is to demonstrate how the environment teaches people (actively and/or passively) either to be more or less aggressive. Hence, not unlike the genetic approach, the premise is still that aggression is innate, but that the environment modifies its expression. So, for example, Renfrew (1997) offers that

an aggressive response to the appearance of the police officer might be because of past aggressive interactions with the police. Although many more factors are involved, perhaps classical conditioning contributes to the production of aggression in these situations (p.124).

Although I agree that the environment influences how people handle conflict, clearly (and by Renfrew's own admission in the quote above), social learning theory does

not provide a comprehensive explanation for violence in general, let alone political violence in particular. There are too many exceptions to the principles of extinction, observation, respondent or classical learning for it to provide a satisfactory account of the complex interplay between the violence of the state or institution, and its populace, let alone explain the selection, incidence, and forms of collective violence. Perhaps more importantly, these theories do not provide a sufficiently affective explanation for violence that is so patently and profoundly suffused by affect and passion. Put another way, the symbolic meaning of events, people, and behaviors are not quite taken into account in social learning theories. That is, taking the example of the police person quoted above, in the South African context, what this person represents, the symbolic meaning of their presence, has to be taken into account beyond past reinforcement for the reaction to make any sense. The role of the environment is infinitely more complex and pervasive than the rather formulaic manner in which it is reduced by these theories to learning laws. Complex conditions and factors of oppression as in racism, poor education, poverty, and indeed the historical times all militate against a simple reductionism.

Violence Results from a Poorly Functioning Ego

Freud, according to Toch (1992), contributed in three ways to an understanding of violence. Firstly, humans struggle against primitive aggression, and a basic tendency to be aggressive. Indeed, Freud saw humans as having an instinct for destruction, often directed to the outside world (Whitmer, 1997). Secondly, traumatic experiences may form the vengeful thrust for violence, directed at past aggressors, specifically, or their substitutes. Lastly, inasmuch as the ego is the centerpiece for controlling and mediating human drives, including the aggressive drive, violence needs to take the functioning of

the ego into serious consideration (Toch, 1992). The environment, or context, is brought to bear by Aichhorn, in Toch's summary as follows:

Destructive child-rearing practices ... (builds) ... reservoirs of aggressiveness and ... (creates) ... unconscious assumptions about a hostile or uncaring world.... [S]uch bitterness translates into violence, but ... it can be "disconfirmed" through love and reassurance in a nonretaliatory institutional environment (Toch, 1992. p.3).

One cannot help but be reminded of the Apartheid state media and experts opining that the 'chaos' created by the youth in the Black townships was a reflection of poor parenting. Black parents, it was argued, lost control of their children and needed the South African Defense Force and police to step in and restore discipline and control. The hypothesis of delinquent egos, and poor mediation of instinctual urges and drives is also shared by Muslin and Pieper (1971), for whom violence is the result of a "severely and selectively impaired [ego], [so] that instinctual derivatives are discharged without the filters or restraints" (p.129). An impaired ego, or a failing one inasmuch as reality – testing and restraint does not occur, is conceivably the application to those who perpetrate violence. Since necklacing and political violence were widespread in South Africa, the ego hypothesis would imply a dysfunctional ego of epidemic proportions, at best, or a racial predisposition towards dysfunctional egos, at worst. This hypothesis also assumes and places the focus on an individual act, while a group ostensibly executed acts like necklacing.

But even if one is to excuse Freud the specifics of a poorly functioning ego, and generously proceed from a broad and generalizing sense of violence and aggression as instinctual human nature, problems remain. In the now famous correspondence of Freud's with Albert Einstein (entitled "Why War?" 1932), Freud is sensitive to the

complexities of violence, and notes that it often does not serve a clear or simple unidirectional purpose. For example, beyond its intent to settle a conflict of interest, it is also instrumental to existence of community, which implies a union of individuals with emotional ties. There is an intersection between community and individual, such that community is used to ward off individual violence on the one hand, but at the violent price of the individual's instinctual satisfaction.

Yet, even in Freud's general assertion and in the admittedly sophisticated and nuanced extension of the instinctual to the societal via defenses and complex psychic processes, the fact of the matter remains that psychological theories, inclusive of Freud's, are largely inadequate as explanatory touchstone for political violence because it:

... has focused above all on 'the individual,' but without much appreciation of the extent to which this is a cultural and historical entity. Individuals are not natural, they are changing products of culture: artifacts, always already embedded in webs of relationships (Packer, 2005, p.3).

Therefore, it may behoove us to explore – albeit briefly and superficially – some of the disciplines such as sociology and political science, where the cultural constitution of the individual, and relational webs, sometimes imply a more critical stance towards violence, “in which the importance, and the difficulties of attending to power and inequality [are] recognized” (Packer, 2005. p.3).

Contextual Theories

Having argued that psychology, for the most part, does not pay sufficient attention to context, and that context seem pivotal to an understanding of political violence, contextual theories of violence from disciplines such as the political sciences,

anthropology and sociology may enrich our understanding of political violence.

Inasmuch as these theories “reveal that larger social actors such as state, international organizations, and the global media, as well as transnational finances and people are all implicated in the actualization of the violence that transforms everyday life of local people” (Das and Kleinman, 2000, p. 2), examining violence at group level, or what the literature terms “collective violence,” becomes important.

However, it is also true that discovering the role played by state institutions is often difficult – as is true for the necklacing incident in Colesburg – because it is sometimes clandestine, hidden from sight, or otherwise indirect. Moreover, although one should take into account the condition and context in which violence emerges, “they also are not simply reducible to them” (Bozarslan, 2004, p. 16) as that will negate the role played by individual agency and or will. .

Therefore at the outset already contextual theories of violence and theories of collective violence are as challenged with respect to etiology, definition, and definitive explanation. That said, Tilly (2003) states that although collective violence is a complicated, changing, and unpredictable phenomenon, at least three commonalities of collective violence can be articulated. Firstly, collective violence inflicts physical damage on a person or objects. Secondly, it involves at least two perpetrators, and thirdly, it results from coordination among persons who perpetrate it (Tilly, 2003). Certainly, by these characteristics, necklacing qualifies as collective violence. Tilly (2003) emphasizes “collective violence [as] not simply individual aggression writ large [there are] social ties structures, and processes [that] significantly affect its character” (p.

4). One of the contributors is poverty, for example, which goes along with exploitation and lack of opportunities.

Structural Violence

Many social theories on collective violence have attributed an upsurge of violence to the role and effects of social structures. Hence, one could – from this departure point – argue that Apartheid, structurally, is a violent system that gives rise to, or contributes to, the creation of a violent culture (Marks & Andersson, 1990). Bulhan (1985) describes structural violence as “inherent in the established modes of social relations, distribution of goods and services, and legal practices of fairness and justice” (p. 136). Similarly, Degenaar (1990) explains structural violence as a set of relationships, which can be analyzed at political, economic, social, bureaucratic, ethnic and cultural levels. Structural violence is a type of violence that is dispensed throughout the social structures and it becomes its *modus operandi*. Woven into everyday life, “structural violence enjoys sanctions of the ruling authorities” (Bulhan, 1985, p.136), and is interconnected with other social structures. To this end, and taking labor practices as an exemplary point, Marks and Andersson (1990) state

Stresses of the labor market have been multiplied by a network of [Apartheid] laws which has perpetuated migrant labor and excluded blacks, especially Africans, not only from the central decision-making bodies of the state, but also from effective control over their lives...because of the stress and tension it generates in the daily lives of millions of people, the destruction of social system of the family and the community it causes through mass uprooting and the migrant labor system, and the pervasive insecurity, harassment and violence it leads to in the psycho-social environment (p.30).

In that Apartheid affected every domain of black people's lives, the characterization thereof as violent and unjust is to argue, by extension, that every domain of life was violently impacted in the constriction, and restriction of Apartheid laws, if not its overtly violent expression thereof. A plethora of laws — including the pass laws, the group areas acts, separate amenities acts, and a complicated systemic network between the labor market, police services and the justice system — serve as examples of structural enforcement, articulation, and coordination of Apartheid violence. Marks and Andersson (1990) note that “racist institutions and practices that make up Apartheid with all their adverse effects on the health of the black populations, have been created by design and guaranteed by legislation” (p.30).

“No student of collective violence,” notes Tilly, “can afford to exclude the actions of governmental authorities or interactions between governmental agents and non-governmental agents” (Tilly, 2003, p. 28) because these conditions create the backdrop, and some may argue are the fundamental reasons, for the collective violence and resistance. According to Du Toit (1990),

Collective violence is more likely the more people are discontented; people tend to be discontented when there is a discrepancy between what they want and what they believe to be entitled to and are capable of achieving; men are quick to aspire beyond their social means and quick to anger when those means prove inadequate (p. 99).

The police and defense force, which constitute the state apparatus, met Blacks' discontent with fierce force. It also led to the disruption of communities, families and interpersonal relationships. As Blacks aimed at rendering the country ungovernable, police intervention also disrupted life in Black communities – in a sense they, too,

became ungovernable either by the rule of the Apartheid state or the dictate and civility of “normal” relations. Chikane (1986) succinctly captures the situation:

The world of the township child is extremely violent. It is a world made up of teargas, bullets, whippings, detention, and death on the streets. It is an experience of military operations and night raids, of roadblocks and body searches. It is a world where parents and friends get carried in the night to be interrogated. It is a world where people simply disappear, where parents are assassinated and homes are petrol bombed. Such is the environment of the township child today (p. 342-3).

It was within this context that collective violence was fuelled. Yet, even as contextual theories in sociology and political science highlight the role of a repressive context to explain and understand the violence of reaction, Bienart (1992) states that “contextual analyses do not seem sufficient in themselves to explain forms of violence within [black] communities” (p. 469). Neither does it explain the particular form violence takes, and why this “new” form of necklacing appeared. And what about violence before Apartheid and colonialism – conceivably in societies or communities that are not repressed or do not operate under regimes that are structurally unjust or violent.

The Meaning and the Context of Violence

In my critique both of psychological theories and a linear historiography, I have alluded to a discursive position as constitutive of the meaning of violence. I have also argued that violence is a contested terrain, in the first place because the concept evokes divergent and varying theoretical positions. Furthermore, it is situated within a particular time and moment that may well be pivotal to its understanding. For example, in the Apartheid moment of its occurrence, the same politically violent incident may mean something very different than say thirty years later, in the post-Apartheid

retrospectively. Of course, there is a methodological pitfall here as well (which will be revisited in the methods section), in that the question arises as to what the researcher documents twenty or so years after the fact: the act as it was then, or the act as it is remembered, in iteration.

Again, a possible way out of this tricky situation is a sensitivity to discourse, as opposed to the search for an essential truth located in the event itself. In this vein, for example, political slogans could well be read as a discursive text that functions as both rhetoric and action. For example, the South African Youth Congress (SAYCO) motto *Life or Death: Victory is certain*, is a pithy and axiomatic encapsulation of Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu description of the 1980s' as:

During the days of our struggle our people were magnificently altruistic. We had a noble cause and almost everyone involved was inspired by high and noble ideals. When you told even young people that they might be tear-gassed, hit with quirts, or have vicious dogs set on them, that they might be detained and tortured and even killed, there was a spirit of bravado as they said, "So what?" "I do not care what happens to me as long as it advances our cause." They spoke of their blood watering the tree of our freedom. It was breathtaking stuff – yes they really meant it, that the cause was the be all and end all and they were ready to sacrifice anything, even pay the supreme sacrifice for this noble cause (Tutu, 2006, p.3).

For Tutu, this anecdote serves not only as an illustration of integrity, altruism, and selflessness but also fundamentally what life and death meant. The anti-Apartheid discourse *yathunga* (sewed together) the meaning of life and death, in the hopes for *ukuthunga*, some new event or possibility to be born and realized. In fact, what is born is *Ukuthungelana*, wherein connection and interdependence is demonstrated. The connection is not just around something common, equivalence as proposed by Laclau and Mouffe (2001), but also around a profound need of, and for, each other.

In psychology, collective action is equated to irrationality, and possibly symptomatic of deindividuation (Parker, 2007). However, in *ziyathungelana*, the collective and individual interest is framed not as irreconcilable antagonism, but as the assignation of individual roles in the interest of the collective. Again, a political slogan provides an example: the Congress of South Trade Unions (COSATU)' slogan, chanted over and over at mass demonstrations and rallies was - "*An injury to one is an injury to all.*" In this slogan a violation of one member is a violation of all members.

Even proverbs and idioms reflect and mirror this collective and individual roles and responsibilities. One stands out for its rearticulation and reappropriation. The Xhosa idiom or proverb *Igazi liyajiya kunamanzi* (blood is thicker than water) originally referenced that one would be moved to act in defense or solidarity when his or her "blood" family member was under attack or being assaulted. In fact, the blood of the family is one's own, so that the assault on the relative is also an assault on oneself. In the 1980s, however, this proverb was used to reference expanding family circles beyond the nuclear or clan, to variously be inclusive of the whole of one's ethnic group, race, or even the whole anti-Apartheid family. One thus comes to defend anyone within the anti-Apartheid family as opposed to the Apartheid family. Dying for the family, as it were, was therefore a noble, and heroic death, for the good of the collective (family) even as, in the same instance, it was for a cause – a promise.

It becomes clearer, now, that a white person who actively opposes Apartheid may be considered "blood" by the foregoing analysis whereas a Black person who may actually be of one's clan, but who collaborated with the Apartheid government as a spy or informer, for example, may not have been considered family and worthy of regard or

defense. In the black communities those who were collaborating with the Apartheid system, directly and indirectly, were often labeled as collaborating with the enemy, and assigned a devastatingly noxious (and dangerous to be branded thus) term, that of *impimpi* (an informer). Gobodo-Madikizela (2000) correctly points out that the translation of *impimpi* as informer “does not fully capture some of the subtle meanings of the word” (p.125). For example, she notes that the prefix “i-” confers “a non-personal status; [i]t depersonifies an individual and casts him/her into something abstract, into a dehumanized other” (Gobodo-Madikizela, 2000, p.125). And, of course, beyond the grammatical and linguistic, the translation does not quite get to capture the affective tone of the word’s use, similar to the way in which calling an African American an “Uncle Tom” or a “house nigger” cannot be translated into a different language and context with the same emotional valency. There were also words other than *impimpi*, such as *Umthengisi* (The sell out) or *Umngcatshi* (the betrayer), used to brand or mark “fallen” family members, as it were. The biblical story of Judas is the obvious reference point for someone who puts money above trust and loyalty, and sells out one of his own to the enemy. In sum, political discourse in the 1980’s drew sharp lines around who was the enemy.

Of course, it goes without saying that the government of the day maintained, propagated, and cultivated a distinctly opposing discourse. It, for example, saw its actions as maintaining the rule of law while facing a revolutionary onslaught masterminded by communists (Norval, 1996; Posel, 1989 and Price, 1991), and the violence was – at base – not political at all, but criminal. That is, protesters were

presented as unruly mobs, agitators and intimidators of “normal”, “law abiding” citizens who consequently needed the protection of the police and defense force.

Necklacing

This study aims to understand political violence in South Africa broadly, and the particular form thereof, known as necklacing. Common throughout the 80s, necklacing has since disappeared from the South African landscape. The practice of necklacing involves placing a car tire, filled with gasoline, around the victim’s neck, and lighting it. It became a form of execution in the townships from 1984 onwards “usually an act of an incensed crowd of people rather than an individual” (Schärf and Ngcokoto, 1990, p. 371), and was used by both pro- and anti-government groups. As a phenomenon, necklacing has drawn the attention of scholars, politicians and journalists, usually as an example of either “black-on-black violence” or as signifying excessive violence (Krog, 2000; Manganyi and du Toit, 1990; Van Kessel, 2000). When described in the literature, the word necklacing is accompanied by verbs such as “notorious” (van Kassel, 2000), “horrific” (Manganyi and du Toit, 1990), and according to Posel (1990), the South African media described it as barbaric and an unspeakable savagery. Necklacing is cited as an example of the escalation of violence and lawlessness, and it is presented as an example of how political movements lost control of their followers. Necklacing seem to reflect the political and social conditions of the 1980s, laying bare a strange tension between, on the one hand, a brutal and violent regime (Degenaar, 1990; du Toit, 1990; Manganyi & du Toit, 1990), and on the other, a brutal and heinous form of resisting the

oppressive regime. I am approaching this work with due appreciation of that curious ambivalence.

According to the TRC Report (1999), necklacing originated in 1985 in the Eastern Cape region, in KwaNobuhle township in Uitenhage. This was in retaliation after police shot and killed 21 people, and the black residents killed a councilor along with his three sons. The TRC Report provides many examples of necklacing, and describes it as a “new concept that was added to the vocabulary of the resistance....from the mid-1980s” (vol. 2, p.388). Hitherto, this method of burning people alive did not exist. The TRC Report (1999) provides statistics on deaths related to burning and necklacing; from 1984 to 1989, seven hundred (700) cases of necklacing and 191 cases of burning were reported. In addition, the commission reported 5, 707 deaths related to political violence. Narratives of what took place and who was involved accompany these figures. The victims of necklacing were usually considered ‘sell-outs,’ collaborators and/ or informers (*impimpi*). The TRC Report traces the vulnerability to attacks of those classified as sell-outs in the 1970s, particularly during the 1976 student uprising. On the other hand, the police also adopted the method of burning political activists to cover their actions and casts blame elsewhere (TRC Report, 1999, vol. 2). Therefore, necklacing was not only perpetrated by those who opposed the state but also by the state forces.

Colesburg, and the Dilato Necklacing Incident

For this research, Colesburg is not just a locale in which the drama of necklacing takes place. Rather, it is a “thick place,” in the anthropological sense; an inhabited space,

an embodied physical space, a place of dwelling, a community. I consequently take some descriptive care presenting the town. For the purposes of the dissertation, phenomenologists such as Bachelard (1964), Benschwanger (1979), and Merleau-Ponty (1962) have all commented on the phenomenological importance of space, and I provide an overview of their contributions. In addition, though, I place particular emphasis on the way in which the black body and community is mediated, inflected, and even modified by the raced mark and context, drawing for this overview on Bulhan (1985), Fanon (1963), and Manganyi (1973). I argue that the lived space and the lived body takes on a particular salience within Apartheid South Africa, and that it will be crucial to an understanding of the necklaced black body

Benschwanger (1979) states that the “phenomenology of space is a description of space as lived by human subject. Places are experienced in terms of human meaning and not merely as ideas, property, or qualities” (p.112). The concept of a lived space focuses on how people experience their environment and the meanings derived therein and thereof. However, even as Colesburg presents a space that both Blacks and Whites inhabited, Fanon (1963) and Manganyi (1973) clue us to the fact that the Black experiences of Colesburg would be vastly different from those of Whites.

A small Karoo town, almost halfway between Cape Town and Johannesburg, Colesburg is bisected by the national road, the N1. Business activities such as restaurants, hotels and guesthouses, gas stations, and automobile services have grown around this national through-traffic, and these remains a major source of employment in the area. Additionally, Colesburg is largely surrounded by farms, and is known to be one of the national hubs for lamb meat. It has a meat-distributing center, which largely

services metropolitan cities such as Johannesburg, Pretoria, Durban and Cape Town. These are business activities that provide jobs for mostly Blacks. Sources of employment for women include being maids (cooking and cleaning houses) for Whites. Colesburg's Black population is five times larger than the White population, who largely speak Afrikaans, alongside a handful of English-speaking Whites. The official language of the town was, and still is, Afrikaans.

Sandwiched between hills and mountains called "*koppies*" (literally, "little heads"), Colesburg is a dry and cold town, even a harsh town. And perhaps more so for its Black citizens who depended on White owned businesses for employment, or migrated to the former Transvaal province to work in the mines. In truth, Colesburg was, and remains, a hub for migrant laborers. But migration was not confined to those who were looking for better paying jobs, and also included those in search of high school education, and who would migrate to former homelands like the Transkei, Ciskei and the Eastern part of the former Cape Province. Both of these groups - high school students and migrant workers - would later form the vanguard of and provide the muscle for resistance to Apartheid in Colesburg.

Until the mid 80s, there was no high school in Colesburg, and students had to leave town upon completion of grade eight. The primary school building was unable to house the large and growing number of black pupils, and consequently church buildings were used as classrooms throughout the black township. I attended my first three years of schooling in these run down buildings with broken windows, and cold concrete floors, floors on which we needed to smear cow dung every Friday to maintain them. These church buildings (converted to classrooms during the week) had no desks except one

table for the teacher. Pupils used large wooden benches, at which we would kneel and on which we would place the book to write on. Winter was the hardest time as the cold wind blew freely into the building through the broken windows. The schooling conditions were not an anomaly and reflected those of the larger Black community in and outside Colesburg.

I have always felt that no one could describe my town like Fanon. There was a visceral reaction to his description of the black and white town of the colony, such that quoting it at length seems proper.

The settlers town is a strongly-built town, all made of stone and steel. It is a brightly-lit town; the streets are covered with asphalt, and the garbage-cans swallow all leavings, unseen, unknown and hardly thought about. [While] the town belonging to the [black] people,... is a place of ill fame, peopled by men of evil repute. They are born there, it matters little where or how; they die there, it matters not where nor how. It is a world without spaciousness; men live there on top of each other (Fanon, 1963, p. 30).

As with Fanon's town, so with Colesburg: there is a glaring difference between white Colesburg and black Colesburg. The white world is bright, clean, quiet, and spacious despite the few people who inhabit it. The black world is dark, noisy, dirty, and overcrowded, with effluence running in the streets. In the white world, there was not much difference between night and day, while for the black, the difference was unmistakable because the sun was the only source of light. During the uprising, while police searchlights provided light, it was neither comfortable nor comforting, representing instead the piercing means with which to isolate comrades on the run or in hiding. Within the Black town, candles, paraffin, wood and coal provided light and warmth. Twenty liter-size paraffin cans, the top cut off, and holes pierced into the sides

(*amathina* in Xhosa), provided warmth, poisonous carbon monoxide emissions (the *Isitim* or “steam”) notwithstanding.

For a description of the houses and particular living conditions of the people of Colesburg, Fanon’s observations are poignant yet again:

The [White man’s] feet are never visible, except perhaps in the sea; but there you’re never close enough to see them. His feet are protected by strong shoes although the streets of his town are clean and even, with no holes or stones. The [White man’s] is a well-fed town, an easy-going town; its belly is always full of good things. [While the Black] town is a hungry town, starved of bread, of meat, of shoes, of coal, of light...is a crouching village, a town on its knees, [It is] a town wallowing in mire (Fanon, 1963, p.30).

Fanon’s description captures the lives that Blacks in Colesburg led. Seeing a black child’s feet was very common, whether in cold, a rainy spring day, or on an extremely hot and scalding summer’s day. Within this overwhelming material poverty, some moments of light shine through. I remember Sunday lunch, for example, as the one time to have a decent meal (decent is a relative term here). For the most part, people depended on buying sheep’s insides – lungs, intestines, the stomach, and if lucky, the delicacy of the livers and kidneys. Locals called these insides *binnegoed and afval* (*Afrikaans words which translate to “inside stuff” and “that which ‘falls down/out’”*). Selling these *binnegoed* to the community was a way of supplementing the poor payment workers received. Houses had big rocks on the roof to prevent the wind from taking the shanty houses’ roof away, yet people had to pay rent, which never matched the value of the houses. Inside the houses at night, people slept from the kitchen floor to the bedroom, because extended family members lived under the same roof, irrespective of the number of occupants. As Ramphele (1993) states, Blacks have learnt to fit the space.

In such living conditions, the concept of privacy was totally foreign. Not unlike slavery and the poor African American experience, “there were no bathtub, water had to be heated, carried, and poured into huge tin tubs. Bathing took place in the kitchen” (hooks, 2000, p. 11). For the people, poverty or class was not an issue as they “concentrated on survival, on making do” (hooks, 2000. p. 25).

As indicated earlier, the Apartheid government passed the Black Local Authorities Act in 1982, which allowed black townships to elect town councilors (van Kassel, 2000). Colesburg, too, was to participate in such elections. From its inception, however, the idea of Black Local Authorities (BLA’s) met with fierce resistance from the United Democratic Front (UDF) and civic associations were formed in protest (Carter, 1992; Seekings, 1992; Van Kassel, 2000). BLA’s were seen as tokens of the Apartheid government and an extension of separate development policies which were meant to exclude Blacks from making significant decisions about their lives. Consequently, throughout the country, Black communities asked these elected councilors to resign from their positions. According to Van Kassel (2000), by 1983, 240 councilors resigned, the majority of them in the Eastern Cape. One of the main issues that confronted people and led to confrontation with councilors was the rent increment. The rent increment was coupled with the election of BLA’s, and opposition to the rent increase became a central feature of civic black resistance in the 1980’s (Seekings, 1992; TRC Report, 1999; van Kassel, 2000). It is probably worth noting that the first victim of necklacing was a community councilor and his family in KwaNobuhle, Uitenhage (van Kassel, 2000; TRC Report, 1999). The rent increase was also the initial site and issue around which resistance in Colesburg would be organized.

Meetings in Black communities were called to address the rent increase, and BLA's were mandated to go to the White local authorities and inform them of the demand to decrease the rent. BLA's presented this demand in an ineffective manner that produced no satisfaction, and in fact revealed them to be little more than puppets of the regime; hence they were referred to as *Oo-hulle sê* ("they sayers") and also asked to resign. The community organized themselves outside of the BLA's, and ordered a rent boycott. According to the TRC Report (1999), the first recorded rent boycott took place in the Vaal Triangle, and then spread to the entire country. In addition, the presence of the South African Defense Force (SADF) in the community led to numerous clashes with Colesburg youth, known as *Amaqabane* (comrades). Like many black townships, Colesburg had a youth organization, the Colesburg Youth Organization (COYO). The TRC Report (1999) mentions a series of events that took place between June and October 1985.

According to the report, "from June to October local organization took up a campaign around the lack of facilities" (TRC Report, 1999, p.431). In June, and prior to that, there were many students who came back for winter break and others came because their schools were closed due to political unrest. The TRC Report (1999) continues that on July 2nd a clash broke out between the SADF soldiers and youth, after the SADF set up camp outside the residential area. Consequently, on July 3rd there were arrests and cars were set on fire. That evening, four people were shot and killed by police - three of the victims were 17 years and one was 23 years old. Hereafter, trenches were dug throughout the township, and around the entire city to block the police and SADF entrance to the black communities. The clouds of smoke were not only from coal fires

but also from car tires set ablaze as the youth were fighting to regain control of their community. These car tire fires also kept them warm. Young people left their homes and hid in the surrounding hills. According to the TRC Report (1999), seventy nine people were arrested and tortured, sixty of whom were children. Nineteen days later, reports indicate another conflict erupted with the police, injuring fourteen people, including a prominent local figure, the Reverend Mcoyana (TRC Report, 1999).

From the period of June to October and beyond there were a series of boycotts that were called, including rent, consumer, and stay away from work protests. For Colesburg these were means with which to hit and apply pressure to the White community. Blacks knew they had a strong buying power, and were flexing their economic muscle. Moreover, if all people, including women working as maids and nannies, stayed away from work, the smooth flow of events in the White communities would be disrupted, as a means to put pressure on that community. These events also led to clashes within the Black community with those who were breaking these boycotts, either by going to work or buying in stores that were not designated by the community leadership. Comrades (*Amaqabane*) enforced these boycotts. The case of necklacing in Colesburg, according to the TRC Report (1999), arose because “boycott-breakers were severely dealt with by those who volunteered to monitor the boycott” (vol. 2, p. 390).

Here are the recorded details of the necklacing case from the TRC Report

Ms Nombulelo Julia Delato [CT 00390/KAR] was seen by a group of youth buying meat during a consumer boycott in Colesburg. She was confronted and her meat was trampled on. She laid charges with the police who began searching for those responsible. Ms Delato was a supporter of community organizations, but was seen as an informer after the incident. As she was married to a former Prison Department employee, Mr. Stanford Thembile Delato, who became a community policeman in 1983, the Delato family were increasingly labeled as *impimpi* (sell-outs). Delato’s home was stoned and police began

guarding it and escorted her publicly. When, after few weeks the police guard relaxed, Ms Delato was caught by a group of youth and set alight. She died in hospital. The Delato family could not bury her in Colesburg because of community hostility. A number of people charged with the murder including Mr. Tembile Falati, Mr. Zolile Silwane [*incorrectly spelled, it is Silwanyane*] Mr. Thabo Gusha, Mr. Pingdyaan Kelem, Mr. Tisha Mhlakulo, and Mr Tefo Paul Setlaba. Setlaba was sentenced to death while others received long prison sentence. (TRC Report, 1999. p. 390, my correction in italics)

Alongside the TRC Report, the noted journalist and poet, Antjie Krog (2000), reported on the same incident.

As noted earlier Schärf and Ngcokoto (1990) described necklacing as “usually an act of an incensed crowd of people rather than an individual act” (p. 371). These authors propose that the role of an individual should not be considered, but that the group and its behavior takes precedence over the individuals who constitute the group. Closer to how the TRC Report takes it, “necklace killings can be attributed to a number of individuals and groups. The nature of the responsibility ranges from failure to condemn, to verbal encouragement to the commission of the act itself” (TRC Report, 1999, vol.2, p.390). These two approaches to necklacing place more emphasis on the group will and action even as, especially in the case of the TRC, it is not entirely dismissive of individual action and role.

Herein lies a central tensive fault line, as has perhaps become evident by now: whereas psychologists tend to focus on the individual’s internal make-up as the source of violence, other disciplines such as sociology and political science focus on the group phenomenon, and the role an individual plays is minimized. The TRC report seems similarly caught in this tension, struggling to find a place for responsibility. It is also a

central tension for this dissertation, and is perhaps the defining question from which all of the others accrue.

CHAPTER THREE

The Present Study, Method, and Procedure

The Present Study

This dissertation aims to examine political violence in South Africa during the 1980's, and particularly necklacing, as it played out in the small farming town of Colesberg, South Africa. There are various forms of violence, but this study focuses on political violence, paying particular attention to the ways in which “political” qualifies violence, or perhaps even the other way around – that is, the extent to which violence may qualify the political. To complicate matters further, it may well be argued that there are various forms of political violence, and by the focus on necklacing, these forms may be brought into sharper relief.

The literature review has highlighted decided lacunae in the psychological understanding of political violence, as well as the group based theories of political violence prevalent in the disciplines of sociology, political science, and anthropology. Fundamentally, and perhaps simplistically, there seem to be an explanatory emphasis either on the individual or the collective, neither of which is entirely satisfactory. It is in this gap or tension that this dissertation steps, hoping to offer some insights as to a possible synthesis or at least an outline and vision for such integration with a more fulfilling theory of political violence.

Method

The manner and procedure by which I aim to investigate the incidence of necklacing in Colesberg (the study's methodology, in other words), has to hold a particular tension: First, it needs to be able to access dynamics and processes specific to Colesberg and the particular case or "happening" of necklacing there, and second, to risk a reading of a broader generality, inclusive of how necklacing and political violence worked in the political semiotics of anti-Apartheid action during the 1980s in South Africa. This tension between the specific and the general was also demonstrated in the literature review, alongside those of the individual and the collective, Apartheid and anti-Apartheid, black and white, enemy and friend, outside and inside. It is, therefore, a desired aim that the research methodology for this study is able to hold on to, tolerate, or even straddle between these different positions. Additionally, and arising from the literature review as well, it is important that an appropriate research methodology achieves three – but not confined to these three – framing goals. In short, it needs to 1) rest on human action and experience, 2) respect the role played by language in the constitution of such experience, 3) be able to tack between individual and collective experiences, without privileging one over the other.

I examine the event of necklacing from various data sources. Each source provides a different point of view on the same event. First, I was aware of a particular incidence of necklacing which occurred in my small town, Colesberg, and had a colloquial and circumstantial understanding of the event, as is generated in small town conversation, dialogue, and gossip. This piqued my interest, and I decided to interview those people supposedly involved in the event – all of whom I knew to varying degrees of

familiarity, or knew someone who could introduce me or vouch for me. In the end I interviewed three, all but one accused perpetrators in this event. I sought to interview a fourth person implicated in the event, but that person declined participation.

The necklacing of Nokwakha² has been something that continues to linger over Colesberg. From the day it happened, there was both shock and also an attempt, I venture, to flee from the event. People did not talk about it openly, which can be attributed to the gruesome nature of the event or the fear of reprisal. A Xhosa phrase — *into engathethekiyo*—comes to mind, which references something that is unspeakable. According to this phrase, necklacing is both something that people cannot bear to talk about, as well as what available language cannot bear. However, the circumstances surrounding this event never escaped our community. Not only are the children and husband of Nokwakha still in Colesburg, but so too are the perpetrators³.

The first data sources for this dissertation are interviews conducted with three of the perpetrators of the necklacing incident. Participant 1 was sentenced to death, which – on successful appeal - was commuted to 20 years in jail. Participant 2 was also found guilty of murder, and sentenced to 17 years and an additional 3 years for public violence. Both P1 and P2 were released in the 1990's —during the release of all political

² The reader will note, at varying times, and depending on the account considered, that the victim is referred to either as Mrs. Delato, Julia Delato, or Nokwakha. They all refer to the same person, but – as I will illustrate in the discussion section – there is particular salience in the way she is named, and in the fact that the perpetrators and the court, for example, refer to her in different ways.

³ It is maybe telling that another event, the shooting of four youths by the police (known as the Colesburg 4) has been integrated in the community's story, whereas the necklacing of Nokwakha is surrounded by silence. Maybe it is easier to attribute a certain barbarism to the othered enemy without, than to acknowledge a moral and behavioral challenge from within.

prisoners—and were given amnesty, negotiated and settled by the African National Congress and the Apartheid government. When they came back to Colesberg, both received a heroes' welcome as freedom fighters from the community. Currently both P1 and P2 command respect from the community and carry on as productive citizens. Participant 3 was the state's witness, and in exchange for his testimony on behalf of the state, he was not prosecuted. For a long time, I lived one block away from Nokwakha's house and later on, three blocks away. I had seen her in the community, and know her children, especially her son who is approximately eight years younger than me. Similarly, growing up in the same community as the perpetrators, I knew them as well to varying degrees. P2, for example, served his prison sentence with a friend and acquaintance that was nothing less than a mentor to me. In addition one of P2's aunts lives across my house. P3 and I were in the same Primary School (K-7 grade), and sang in the same school choir for many years. In fact, we stood next to each other often, singing and dancing together in the choir. Additionally, there were friends of friends in that six degrees of separation manner, such that the perpetrators' names would come up from time to time. Hence, although we were not friends or intimately knew each other, we knew of each other in the sense that a small and close community allows.

A second data source is the court proceedings, documenting the trial of the perpetrators. While there are many people who were arrested (including state witnesses) regarding the necklacing of Nokwakha, five stood trial for the case. The case was referred to the Supreme Court of South Africa division in Graaff-Reinet. The court sat for the case in December 1986, more than a year after the event. The trial was presided over by Justice Kannemeyer, and the prosecutors were Advocates Kingsley and Tyler,

with Advocate Jappie as the defense attorney⁴. Of the five accused of murder in this case, three were found guilty, and two were acquitted. It should be mentioned here, although I come back to it later, that the names of the five accused are in the public record, and that whereas I identify the perpetrators I interviewed only as Participant 1, 2, or 3, it is possible to compare references in the interviews to the court transcripts in order to identify the participants. I cannot, therefore, promise complete confidentiality, a fact of which participants were thoroughly apprised of.

A third data source is a book on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, authored by the respected and well known poet and journalist, Antjie Krog (Krog, 1999). In this book, Krog makes particular mention of the Colesberg incident, and spends some time recounting how it was presented before the TRC. However, the book is not only a work of reportage in the journalistic vein, but also a work of literature (and occasional poetry). As such, it is also an artistic, aesthetic, creative, and ultimately interpretative rendering of the event as well.

Each of these accounts provide different perspective on the same event. The purpose is to treat each source of data as a text but also allow that they – individually and/or collectively - exist within a larger con-text, and in relation to other texts. I decided

⁴ The South African legal system is based, in large part, on an amalgam of English common law and Roman-Dutch civil law. There are, consequently, some marked differences from American law. For example, certain offenses, like murder, cannot be heard in lower courts, and only advocates (as opposed to lawyers) can argue and defend cases in the higher, supreme court (which is not, as is the case in the USA, primarily a constitutional court. A separate constitutional court in South Africa operates similar to the Supreme Court in the USA). Moreover, a judge or a judge assisted by two others delivers both verdict and sentence, as opposed to a jury in the United States.

to take a method that would allow me to *oscillate between* each data point, namely hermeneutic semiology.

What is Hermeneutic Semiology?

The method for this research is highly influenced by the work of Hugh Silverman, and particularly as elucidated in his book, *Textualities* (1994). Silverman advocates and theorizes an oscillation between hermeneutics and semiotics, in what he (Silverman, 1994, 1997) calls “hermeneutic semiology,” which “can be formulated as the understanding of a set of signs ordered into a coherent textual complex.” (Silverman, 1994, p. 2) He continues: “Such understanding will disclose the aspects of a particular text or textualization but always in relation to (or in the context of) alternative texts and textualizations” (Silverman, 1994, p.2). Applied to my project, hermeneutic semiology aims at exploring not only the “what” of a particular event of necklacing, but also the “how” – that is, how it is brought into meaning. What necklacing means and *how it means what it means* is the subject of hermeneutic semiology.

Hermeneutic semiology as developed by Silverman (1994) is both a philosophical and methodological approach to text. Silverman draws from the major thinkers in the tradition of phenomenological hermeneutics such as Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Ricoeur. This is juxtaposed with semiology and deconstruction. Silverman draws from each philosophical tradition, and argues that whereas there are differences between them, they can be taken together and enrich the other. For example, on one account there is a world of difference between the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty and the deconstruction of Jacques Derrida, but Silverman (1994) takes Merleau-Ponty’s notion of

interrogation, and demonstrates how it can be related to, even open up and pave the way, for deconstruction such that there need not be an absolute and irreconcilable antagonism.

In my own appropriation of hermeneutic semiology, it was, however, two Xhosa proverbs that served as both a methodological anchoring and an opening. They are:

“*Umntu yincwadi ebaliweyo*” (a person is a written text).

“*Umntu ubonakala ngezenzo*” (a person is seen through their actions).

In its cultural context, the proverb - *Umntu yincwadi ebaliweyo* - is taken to mean that a person is both written and open: that is, to write is to read, and to write is to share publicly. If there is no private language, in a way that is perhaps not as evident in the West, so the proverb suggests there is no private writing. This also, and maybe even especially, because the very mark or inscription is a sending, and a severing – a movement out and away into the realm of an other. Even a coded writing, the key of which may only be known to the writer, is still sent, still circulates in re-appropriation and the new ownership of the other’s reading, or attempts at reading. In a sense, a person is a public text. In fact, who writes is also in question – to what extent has the public contributed to the writing as opposed to a singular, private, or individual self. But, the tense of the proverb’s verb calls our attention to something more. The past tense or past participle suggests that a person is always and already an inscription, he or she is engraved, carved and/or marked at the origin. The arising question, of course, if indeed a person is a written text, is how do we read this text? It is in response to this question that the second proverb is invoked: *umntu-ubonakala-ngezenzo* (a person is seen through their actions).

Uku-bonakala means ‘appearance,’ ‘to be visible,’ or to be noticeable. It also means to ‘be seen,’ and to ‘be intelligible.’ The root of the word is *bona*, which means see, behold, perceive and find. Further, *Ndiya-bona* (I see or I understand) and *Uku-bona* means to see. According to this proverb, our daily performances, actions and interactions announce our being; outside these, we disappear. We are always engaged, even when common vernacular may state we are doing “nothing.” In addition, this proverb implies that actions are traces or prints left behind to be viewed/seen. They point or refer back to the actors. Human actions bespeak humans. It was not uncommon – in Colesberg – for parents and teachers to remind children that their actions bespoke their background/homes or family. Here, of course, I am including speech as action, speech acts that puts paid to the dichotomy of the English proverb - actions speak louder than words. Moreover, is it not that actions speak, in speaking write, in writing marks, and in marking can be read, and in reading, meaning is circulated. Perhaps, too, it strikes me, the closeness of speaking and writing, or speaking and marking (as opposed to the West, where it is writing and marking) could be traced to, or is traced by, the orality of the culture in memory and naming in the present.

The essence of these proverbs is that human actions are texts that can be read, interpreted and comprehended, though not *in toto*. It is also understood that actions are accessed by reading, and through this reading of actions we can come to know, recognize and sense the person. The relevance of these proverbs is not only to the culture of the participants, which I am from as well, but also to the method of this research. In his paper, *The model of the Text: Meaningful action considered as a text*, Paul Ricoeur (1991), captures the spirit of these proverbs when he proposes human action be treated as

an open work—a text. Silverman (1994) asserts that “the text is located and operates at the intersection of semiotics and hermeneutics” (1994, p.28). Echoing the Xhosa proverbs, Ricoeur (1991), states that human action is open to anyone who can read. One might add that hermeneutics is an important methodological way of reading human action.

Hermeneutics.

The definition of hermeneutics is a contested terrain, for it is also a philosophical endeavor. However, the etymology of hermeneutics might be a good starting point. According to Palmer (1969) the origins of the “word hermeneutics lie in the Greek verb *hermeneuein*, generally translated ‘to interpret’ and the noun *hermeneia*, [translated] ‘interpretation’” (p.12). However, both of these words are traced back to Hermes, the mythological messenger to the Greek gods (Packer and Addison, 1989; Palmer, 1969). Even in today’s world of instant messages, or text messages, misunderstandings still occur such that an explanation or interpretation is called for, the assumption being that there is a truth or meaning to the message, to be clarified, explained, and/or interpreted. This happens within language as well as across different languages. In Ancient Greece, Hermes was the one who decoded the messages. Therefore, Hermes was not just a messenger between the gods and humans but also responsible for rendering the messages understandable (Packer and Addison, 1989; Palmer, 1969). In a sense, what Hermes does is to bridge worlds and render each side accessible to the other. Hermeneutics is in honor of his name and his role, and therefore, refers to the process or business of interpreting (Packer, 2007, Packer and Addison, 1989; Palmer, 1969). Echoing this understanding,

the Oxford Dictionary (1991) defines hermeneutics as “to explain the meaning of something foreign, to bring out the meaning of work” (p 621).

Necklacing will be held up to the hermeneutic hammer — borrowing the Heideggerian analogy. The goal is to craft an understanding that, in a sense, makes the unfamiliar, familiar and vice-versa. The fact that necklacing attracted my attention also speaks of its *prima facie* foreignness. As Silverman (1994) says, a successful interpretation produces understanding or a meaning, and meanings are conceptual backbones of interpretative research. Alluding to the importance and contribution of a hermeneutic approach to research in psychology, Parker (1985) states that hermeneutics “provides a way of understanding and studying human action that is grounded in considering such action as having a semantic rather than logical or causal organization” (p. 1081).

Hermeneutics, however, is but one leg of the methodology. Indeed, when questions of con-text emerge, it is my belief that hermeneutics as an approach begins to falter. Inasmuch as a traditional hermeneutics concerns itself with revealing the meaning of what appears in the text, the fact of intertextuality, of the text always and already participating in meaning proliferation, is less accessible, and points to semiology.

Semiology.

Silverman (1994) defines semiology as “the general science of signs” (p. 16), while Chandler (2007) is more specific: “[semiotics] is a science that studies the role of signs as part of social life” (p. 16). Semiology examines what and how things are woven to form the fabric of life or reality. Both Chandler (2007) and Silverman (1994) adopt

the Saussurean (1998) definition of a sign as constitutive of both the signifier and the signified, that the connection between the two is arbitrary, and that the relationship between the signifier and the signified is signification (Chandler, 2007; Silverman, 1994). A signifier takes the form of a word, or sound-image while the signified is a concept. Signs are not just part of our everyday life; they also constitute, map, frame, shape and direct our everyday lives in varying degrees. As Chandler (2007) suggests, “signs can take a form of words, images, sounds, flavors, acts, or objects and become signs only when we invest them with meaning” (p.12). Signs are signs because they are meaningful; however, as Silverman says with respect to language, “a sign has no signification in isolation from other signs in the same language system” (Silverman, 1994, p.16). Corroborating Silverman, Chandler (2007) asserts that a sign is a sign because it is “part of the semiotic sign system” (Chandler 2007, p.17). Therefore, signification is an interweave, a web of signs which “have signification because they participate in a signifying chain” (Chandler, 2007, p.17). The sign system or signifying chain is the vehicle for the construction of meaning.

This project is not primarily concerned with finding an underlying, essential meaning to necklacing, but is also interested in how it is made meaningful. This often necessitates finding gaps and holes in assertions of meaning, being sensitive to surpluses and reserves of meaning, and following those new prospects and horizons within the social text. To do this, my project incorporates two other approaches discussed by Silverman: Interrogation and Deconstruction.

Interrogation is an interpretive approach, which is interested in the interstices of meaning. It was developed by Merleau-Ponty in his later work, *The Visible and the*

Invisible (1969). In drawing the parallel between interpretation and interrogation, Silverman (1994) say they both

happen in the space of difference where the production of discursive meaning is decentered and “praxical.” Their task is to raise questions rather than answer them, to ask about rather than to conclude for, to make a place where positions can occur rather than speak from positions. (Silverman, 1994, p. 31)

Interrogation opens the field. Interrogation looks beyond what is seen by seeing through and questioning it. Unlike hermeneutics, the task of which is to establish a meaning, interrogation does not come to rest on meaning. In fact, the supposed meaning is the point of departure, in a quest for further questioning. Again, quoting Silverman (1994) in length will demonstrate the point that

Interrogation animates all the question of cognition, but is of another sort than they”. This means that by seeking the meaning and origin of questions, interrogation distinguishes itself from the visible world. Interrogation operates in what Heidegger calls the Open. An intertwining of the visible and invisible, of what sees, touches, hears, says, understands and the seen, touched, heard, said, understood, sets up the chiasmatic space in which interrogation occurs. Here, then, interrogation provides the life of cognition. It is not itself cognition. Interrogation is also not interpretation cum cognition; rather it is the questioning that makes interpretation possible. (Silverman, 1994, p.35)

Therefore, when one questions what is visible – seen, touched, heard, said, and understood – one opens the possibility of the invisible which would otherwise be out-of-reach. It is when we reach out of the visible and manifest to the invisible that deconstruction shows up.

Deconstruction, on Silverman’s (1994) account, “is concerned with texts and their inscribed interrelations”, and “requires a text to be examined for its differences (from other texts) and its defferals (into other texts)” (Silverman, 1994, p.44). Deconstruction

acknowledges that the frame and the boundaries of the text might actually be its beginning. The text is never complete, it goes beyond what meets the eye (I). Another way to present this aspect of deconstruction, is through the notion of supplementarity, which, in juxtaposing the visible and the invisible, Silverman claims that “visibility is a sort of phenomenological supplementarity and supplementarity is sort of textual visibility” (Silverman, 1994, p.41). Supplementarity “suggests that there is always the ‘further’ that one can go but at the same time that is a limit to where one has gone” (Silverman, 1994, p.43). This means that the bounds of the text points to its unboundedness. Each data point can be interrogated further, “for something more lies at the edge[s] of the text” (Silverman, 1994, p.43), which are the other texts. Signification makes signs visible for further interrogation, and as we go further into the text, deconstruction moves one even further to what the text defers and how the text is different from other texts. This can be clarified with an example: While reading the court documents about the necklacing incident, I was struck by the fact that there was no mention of Apartheid anywhere in the court document. One could use all the tools of hermeneutic analysis, and come to an articulation of the meaning of the text, for example, without any mention of Apartheid. Semiology, now, could bring into account the politico-symbolic work that necklacing does, and points to, while interrogation and deconstruction opens up the text for questioning the omission of certain signifiers from the court document (and the placement of others), for intertextuality, and for what the document suppresses and represses.

Hermeneutic semiology, it becomes clear, is not just a willy nilly throwing together of hermeneutics and semiology; rather, it is a pulling together of different

strands and trends into a working or operational purpose. If hermeneutics focuses on the 'final product' which is meaning, then semiology studies the 'production line', that is, meaning-making. In addition, and allied to this process, interrogation and deconstructive strategies "opens up the field" (Silverman, 1994). Hermeneutic semiology lies between text and con- text, inside and outside, a position Silverman calls the third position and I call the mediative position. Herewith, the interpretative aim is a particular kind of understanding and explanation that is not all that separable from the act of interpretation, in the manner that people's understanding of their everyday activities is also an explanation. This is not an altogether novel insight, as Paul Ricoeur, in his essay on *Explanation and Understanding*, (1991) clearly notes the fallacy of separating explanation from understanding. He argues that the two are inseparable, and are in fact "relative moments in a complex process that could be termed interpretation" (Ricoeur, 1991, p. 126). The interpretation occurs, therefore, not only by the articulation of understanding or explanation in the manifest narration, but also when there are ruptures, and discontinuities in the narration. Furthermore, interpretation is situated within the social world, also demonstrating the dialogical nature of explanation and understanding, stated by Ricoeur (1991) as follows:

Understanding calls for explanation when the dialogical situation ceases to exist, when the play of questions and answers no longer permits us to verify our interpretation as the dialogue unfolds. In a simple situation of dialogue, explaining and understanding just about overlap with one another. (p.129)

This process renders the phenomenon more visible to those who are involved, and in a way, an intersubjective meaning is constructed. However, it does not render the

phenomenon complete and therefore, one is in the circle of interpretation – one that inevitably involves the researcher him or herself. My familiarity with the history of violence and resistance against Apartheid in South Africa, particularly Colesburg, will be used as interpretive tool as well. Parker (2005) proposes that the researcher's involvement in the research must be acknowledged. That is, there is an intersubjective world that exists during the whole research process, from the interview process, to transcription and analysis.

Narrative.

Having positioned myself within the epistemological and methodological framework of hermeneutic semiology, it is also necessary to examine narrative and narrative analysis. This is so because I approach the text as a story, as a narrative. Much has been written about narratives and stories, and especially given the discursive affinities expressed in this dissertation, stories and story-structures are of particular note and importance. In fact, the researcher enters an already existing story, which he or she both wants to tell and modifies in the telling. So, for example, with respect to Apartheid, Ross (2003) notes that the TRC institutionalised both a way of telling a story of Apartheid as it storied Apartheid. It becomes a nationally acclaimed channel of having a voice, speaking and being heard. Tutu even goes as far as to venture that

Storytelling is central, not only to many religious practices in this country [South Africa] but also to the African tradition of which we are part. Ellen Kuzwayo is quoted ... as saying: 'Africa is a place a storytelling. We need more stories, never mind how painful the exercise may be ... Stories help us to understand, to forgive and to see things through someone else's eyes. (quoted in Ross, 2003, p. 328)

Bruner (1991), not unlike Tutu above, states that people “organize experience[s] and memory of human happenings mainly in a form of a narrative” (p. 4). People organize their experience in narrative so as they can make sense, or be communicated with other human beings. Hence Polkinghorne (1988) notes that narrative refers to “the kind of organizational scheme expressed in story form” (p.13). Similarly, researchers like Bruner (1991), Ricoeur (1980), Riessman (1993), and Scholes (1980) focus on what constitutes narrative and its role. In addition to providing a structure for individual experience and meaning, narrative is also a means with which people engage one another, a distinctly human act.

It is true, as Riessman (1993) notes, that researchers “do not have direct access to one another’s experience. We deal with ambiguous representation of [such experiences by the participants]” (p.8). The participants will be providing the “image”, not the actual experience; they will be making a story. Of course, the descriptions of experiences happen within linguistic and cultural bounds. Bruner (1991) states that narrative is “transmitted culturally and constrained by each individual’s level of mastery and by his conglomerate of prosthetic devices” (p. 4). These “devices” include a particular culture’s narrative tools, such as clichés, phrases, shared myths, etc., which provide a shorthand means of structuring human experience. Therefore, narrative is how we are *attending to* and *telling about* our experience; an act of interpretation.

Employing a hermeneutic semiology within the cader of the narrative therefore seeks to capture both aspects of narrative: its content, and its structure. Participants have an understanding of necklacing, for example, which is “the activity of synthesizing all the various (cultural) elements together into an organic functional whole” (Wright, 1988, p.

43). However, this understanding, expressed or not, takes place within a cultural, historical, and linguistic context. This understanding informs and connects subjectivities, which are grounded in common language, customs, institutions and practices. Clearly, people interact with each other and their interaction is infused through with interpretations, which mediate and permeate their actions inasmuch as participants are attuned to their world.

But narrative is also related to time, both with respect to its telling at a point in time, so to speak, and for the manner in which the narrative is organized in temporal terms. Ricoeur, in an article entitled *Narrative Time* (1980), argues that “narrativity and temporality are closely related” (p.169). For him, when one moves beyond the “illusion of sequence,” to a dialectical approach toward narrative and time, grounded in existence in the world, we find temporality as “that of existence that reaches language in narrativity and narrativity to be the language structure that has temporality as its ultimate referent” (p.169). In this case narrative and time cannot be viewed as separate entities moving towards different or same directions. Interviewees bring the past to the present by enunciating the events; by “retrieving” them. Ricoeur further argues there is a unity in temporality; a unity of the future, past, and present. Explicating his idea further, Ricoeur (1980) states that “narrative time is, from the outset, time of being-with-others” (p.188). Therefore, narratives about Apartheid are always and already about the treatment of the Other.

Ricoeur’s theory of time and narrative comes to be clearly evident in the notion of “plot” as a narrative structure. In this case plot refers to “the intelligible whole that governs a succession of events in any story.” (Ricoeur, 1980 p.171) In other words, “a

story is made out of events to the extent that plot makes events into a story” (Ricoeur, 1980, p.171). Therefore, a plot is the intersection between temporality and narrativity. It is crucial to bear in mind that in our everydayness, in the making of stories, we plot events into a story. In effect, I asked participants to recollect the events that constituted necklacing and plot them into a story. Similarly (and differently!), the court wanted to plot a story, as did Antjie Krog. According to Ricoeur (1980), “a plot establishes human actions not only in time, but [also] within memory” (p.180).

When people tell their stories, it is not a random or unintentional process of organizing experience. As Polkinghorne (1995) states, “narrative is the type of discourse composition that draws together diverse events, happenings, and actions of human lives into thematically goal-directed processes” (p.5). Narrative is a frame which organizes human experiences in a languaged manner. Narrative is also a languaging of experiences. Here narrative is used to “refer specifically to texts that are thematically organized by plots” (Polkinghorne, 1995, p. 5). There is an internal coherence that plots and, therefore narrative, supposes – a process that Polkinghorne (1995) has theorized as emplotment, which is an outcome of plotting: a chaining together of plots. For Polkinghorne (1988, 1995, 2006), emplotment is an operation of integrating plots to generate a story. Although we treat stories as transparent, unequivocal, and clearly representing the real, the notion of emplotment suggests otherwise.

Although necklacing took place, it remains unfinished, incomplete until it is brought to language. How it is told hinges on its languaging. Narrative plots configure lived actions into meaningful wholes and thereby unveil the order and coherence that did not previously appear in life as lived (Polkinghorne, 2006, p. 43). The order created

relationship between events and how they unfolded. According to Ricoeur (1983), narrative emplotment first transforms diverse events and or incidents into a whole, which is a meaningful story. Like a puzzle, it is brought to whole/life by the combination of the different pieces. The second mediative way is that “emplotment brings together factors as heterogeneous as agents, goals, means, interactions, circumstances, unexpected results” (Ricoeur, 1983, p. 65). Inherent in a meaningful story is not only an intelligible organization of events but also such entities as protagonists, antagonists, goals and means to achieve the results. Consequently, emplotment “allows an even greater extension [which includes] pitiable and fearful incidents, sudden reversals, recognitions and violent effects within the complex plot” (Ricoeur, 1983, p. 65). The story takes different angles: some expected and others not. There are surprises and shocking moments. Finally, the plot mediates the temporal characteristics and therefore, generalizes as a plot. Compacted with diverse aspects, factors, and meanderings and historicity, a narrative is configured.

Polkinghorne (2006) suggests three elements of narrative construction. The first, is memory as reconstruction. Narrative construction rests on memorized events, while their memorization speaks to their signification. Therefore, “narrative construction is a retrospective, interpretative composition that displays past events in the light of current understanding and evaluation of their significance” (Polkinghorne, 2006, p. 44). The fact that retrospection and interpretation are influenced by current events suggests that the construction of a narrative is not fixed nor permanent; rather situated and dynamic. The second element is narrative smoothing, which is the production of a coherent whole. Narrative smoothing departs from life as lived because the latter “is more diverse and

disjointed than the stories we tell about it” (Polkinghorne, 2006, p. 45). Life is not smooth and chronological as stories would like us to believe. Finally, narrative construction is also built up by culturally available plots. In this level, “meaning-giving interpretative plots are adapted from the repertoire of stories made available in one’s culture” (Polkinghorne, 2006, p. 45). Stories about Apartheid South Africa take their meaning in the current milieu, and with time they too would undergo transformation.

In other words, people live stories, and live to tell their stories. Personal narrative informs human actions; their roles. Emplotment creates a pretext, it re-orientates the individuals to play out the role they configured. Using Ricoeur (1983), told stories emerge from living imbrication, which is the background as well. Narrative mediates between background and the horizons of our experiences. Therefore, narrative constructs reality (Bruner, 1991). If we would recall in the previous pages, we already established that narrative is always and already referring to “time of being-with-others” (Ricoeur, 1980), time as lived in the everyday. However, there is an element that not only instructs the actors but also woos, seduces, appeals to those who are the audience. In constructing a reality, narrative plays on both rhetorical and discursive aspects. Narrative has function, it normalizes events or human activities, while demonstrating their strangeness. That is, while things might seem strange within the narrative, they are constituted as eventualities, foregone conclusions, which they suspend. In a narrative emplotment even surprises are constituted as such. If one takes Ricoeur’s argument that stories emerge from ‘living imbrication’ then narratives are dense, multilayered, and are themselves imbrication. Therefore, a one-dimensional approach to narrative would be violent, pinning it down to one thing a banality. Narrative is a text, an intersection between

hermeneutics and semiology, the space between the background and the horizon, between the spoken and the non-spoken, private and the public. It is the action mediated by language. It is a text rich and dense, broad and deep, between surface and depth. Narrative does not only produce meaning, but preserves it as well. It calls one to be here and there at the same time and hence staying between as in hermeneutic semiology.

This theory will be helpful as we approach necklacing in Colesberg. I enter the scene through hermeneutics and exit through semiotic deconstruction, mindful that the scene is narrative. That is, as the hermeneutic semiosis is attuned to both the what and the how of the narrative, the narrative itself provides – as narrative – a structure for what and how. Hence, I will divine a hermeneutic meaning, but present it in deferral and in relation to the deconstructive sense of meaning as supplement, as difference and deferral, outside of the text, and in intertextual others.

Procedure and Data Analysis

As mentioned before, three primary data points are used in this research. Firstly, interviews were conducted with three persons who were all involved in one way or the other in this incident. Participant 1 was arrested by the police and charged with the murder of Nokwakha, and with public violence. As mentioned, he was found guilty, sentenced to death and released in the 1990s under amnesty provisions. Participant 2 was also arrested by the police and charged with the murder of Nokwakha, was found guilty and sentenced to 17 years for murder and 3 years for public violence. P2 was also released in 1990 under amnesty provisions. Participant 3 was arrested and turned state

witness: it is not clear if charges were even brought against him. A fourth person who was also involved by the record of his arrest and conviction, was approached, and initially agreed to participate, but when the time came to sit down for the interviews, he did not show up. Interviews were rescheduled, but he missed those as well, and the researcher concluded that the person had changed his mind about participating in the study.

Participants were recruited through word of mouth and directly by the researcher. Interviews were conducted in a face-to-face conversation with the participants. Semi-structured and exploratory guiding questions were used throughout the interview process. (These are provided as Appendix A). Each participant was interviewed at least once, and one participant was interviewed twice. Again, additional or follow-up interviews were scheduled and did not take place due to the unavailability of the participants. One interview was conducted in Xhosa and translated into English. The other two interviews were in English even as the participants were offered to be interviewed in Xhosa. However, during the interviews, these two participants had moments when they reverted to their 'first language', Xhosa.

Although I had arranged to conduct all the interviews at the local school to avoid disturbances, this did not quite pan out as intended. Only one interview was conducted at the school, on a Sunday. The other two participants' workplaces are not in Colesberg. Therefore, they either visit on weekends or when they are off work. That is the reason why one participant was interviewed at my house and both times in the evenings. We sat down in a separate room to avoid being distracted. The last interview was conducted at the local library; again we used a private or separate room. The interviews were recorded

using a digital voice recorder, but I took occasional notes as well. The purpose was to record non-verbal activities that were beyond voice recording. Hereafter, I transcribed the interviews for the purposes of analysis (see Appendices B, C and D)

The second primary data source is the transcript of the court proceedings. These are the records of the entire Supreme Court session on this case. Five people were arrested and stood trial for the Necklacing of Nokwakha. The case was referred to the Supreme Court of South Africa, division of Graaff-Reinet. The court sat for two days, from the 10th to 11th of December 1986, more than a year after the incident. As mentioned earlier, the trial was presided over by Justice Kannemeyer, the prosecutors were Advocates Kingsley and Tyler, and the defense attorney was Advocate Jappie. The five accused of murder in this case were Messrs. Setlaba, Gusha, Maliti, Kelem, and Skoen. At the trial's conclusion, Simphiwe Maliti and Tommy Skoen were acquitted. Accused number 1 (Setlaba) was convicted and sentenced to death; he appealed his sentence successfully to 20 years in prison, and was released in 1992 under the amnesty provisions for political prisoners. Thabo Gusha and Pienkjan Kelem were both sentenced to seventeen years and were also released in 1991 as political prisoners. All those who were convicted were granted amnesty as part of the transitional negotiations with the outgoing Apartheid government. It is important to reiterate, in order to avoid confusion, that whereas amnesty was granted by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to all manner of people who committed politically motivated atrocities (on both sides of the spectrum, Apartheid and anti-Apartheid forces), provided they "came clean" and told all, the perpetrators in this case were not granted amnesty under these conditions. In fact, they were part of an earlier group, before the TRC even existed, who were granted

amnesty as a result of good faith negotiations between a still sitting Apartheid government, and liberation organizations readying to take up office pending democratic elections. Hence, they never told their stories in public, never got to face the relatives of their victim, nor did they hear firsthand how the relatives and friends of the victim were affected by their actions, as was the format and manner of the TRC, held later in the 90s. One could still appear before the TRC to tell one's story of suffering and pain, and the incident in question – Ms. Delato's murder – was related before the TRC, as is evidenced in the next section, but this was done without the perpetrators being present; there was no way to compel the perpetrators to appear and in fact they were not even asked or invited (especially as at least one of the three, as we will see later, dearly wanted such an opportunity to face the surviving victims).

Thirdly, and with respect to the last comment above, a very influential book by Antjie Krog, *Country of my skull* (2000), provides a journalistic account of the Truth and Reconciliation Committee. When this book was originally published, it shook the Colesberg community to the bone. It was the first time attention was brought to the case of Nokhwakha Delato, and in fact introduced the case to the world. Krog's contribution is important in many ways. Herself an established Afrikaans poet, Krog is able to not only provide a journalistic account, but to then delve further into the various semiotic impacts that Apartheid and reconciliation afford. The subtitle of her book, "Guilt, Sorrow and the Limits of Forgiveness in the New South Africa" provide a glimpse into the "extra-textual" issues her book addresses. I reflect on these throughout my analysis, because of Krog's ability to articulate some of the complex cultural issues enshrined in

the larger cultural sphere that were not available through a simple reflection on the state sanctioned “facts.”

From here onwards, these data sources will be referred to as “data points”. They are points in so far as they are positions, intentions, purposes, meanings, and/or arguments which provide a line of reasoning. Furthermore, they are points as they are features or aspects; indeed points of viewing this incident.

There are two questions that I ask the texts: (a) how is the incident told; how is it plotted into a story? This involves its organization and presentation. The second question is: (b) how is the story constructed discursively. In this section, I examined the ideological purposes; the projected belief system and values, and how these shape acts and understanding. This is examined through the tropes that organize the narrative. The discursive construction also examines how the narrative carries an implicit message about the way the world is organized. First I analyze participants’ narratives, followed with the court proceedings and then Krog’s book.

Analysis of the Data

Hopefully the methodology and theoretical research placement as elucidated earlier in this chapter is clear, precise, and perhaps even suggestive of procedural “steps” in data analysis. This, unfortunately, is not the case – cannot be the case, at least not in any linear or “cookbook” – manner. Yet, whereas there was no “step by step” analysis, the analysis was systematic.

In its broadest outlines, I approached the text as a story. At the beginning of the analysis I read the story with an open mind, simply asking myself “what is happening here?” During the reading and thereafter, I asked myself what struck me; what piqued my interest and why? What did I take away from this story? Then, I might go back to the story, this time observing how each account was organized as a whole unit, a narrative. I noted how the story was presented, what themes stitched it together, how the plot was developed and unfolded. Or, for example, inasmuch as each narrative presents characters, I asked who was involved, what roles they played, to what extent, and to what end vis-à-vis the plot. I observed the sequence of actions, and related events, which does not have to be sequential – that is, whereas the events unfolded in a certain sequence in reality, its telling need not be organized in like manner, and often was not. Additionally, I was sensitive to what the characters did, or was told to have done, as opposed to what was attributed to them in motivational or “intrapsychic” terms.

In short, this systematic reading aimed at meaning, at how the story was presented and constructed as a meaningful whole. Yet, I emphasize again, this process involved a continuing back and forth process; a progressive and regressive process. The material presented here is ambiguous and therefore required that I went back and forth in my analysis. I allowed my curiosity to be as influential as the procedure was. Sometimes I was struck by a discursive theme as I read, sometimes something struck me days later, and I went back to the story, or sometimes something was said in an other interview or data source that sent me back to a rereading and engagement with the first source.

If, thus far, the procedural sense was meaning from a reading of the text itself, the next movement (or phase, if one likes), which does not exclude the prior, nor was it

really this discrete, was to question what was said, presented, and therefore, appeared. I actively assumed a semiotic position that every theme is a sign, which can be understood in relation to other signs. As such, whereas each story appeared meaningful by itself, I now related it to other stories, and to what was missing or incomplete, given that intertextual relation and con-text. This is the process of interrogating this visible and thereby inviting the invisible to appear. The goal is to arrive at what is absent through the present. Hence I observed interruptions, ruptures, repetition and how strange things become familiar and how the familiar things become strange. I asked myself what question does the data raise and which ones are silenced by the very nature or expectations of the questions. For example, the court spent many hours trying to “understand” the act, yet never mentions Apartheid. The fact that it is not mentioned, that it is absent from the text, has meaning, and it is to that (hidden) meaning that this second movement is oriented.

CHAPTER FOUR

Results and Analysis

The Interviews

The results of the interviews are presented in two parts. I offer, first, how the event is presented by the participants. Here, the focus is on how this event is plotted into a meaningful whole act. I also provide interrogative questions spurred by the text and the manifest narrative meaning. Hereafter, I examine the narratives alongside each other, and provide a sense of what ties the stories together, and how they differ.

Participant 1: I Do Not Know (What Happened)

The P1 narrative is plotted around knowing and not knowing (see Appendix B). P1 relates his experience of this incident around not being present when the burning took place, and that he consequently “does not know anything.” For P1, knowing is specific to being present at the event; the burning of Nokwakha. In fact, P1 seemed to be present at all the events that led to the burning except the burning itself. He was with the people on October 2nd and was part of the decision that action be taken against Nokwakha.

According to him, “it was a 2nd of October if I am not mistaken we were meeting down there and we said to ourselves ‘people! let us get rid of this lady.’”

P1 reports that he was among the people gathered to “take action” against Nokwakha, and “sent one guy who was ... on a bicycle and said to him ‘go and check if this lady will be coming down here to her work,’ it was like that. The guy came back to us and reported that to us that the lady was coming.” Until this point in his narrative, P1

knew of the plans and was part of their creation (demonstrated by his use of such pronouns as “we,” and “us.”). The breach or the gap of knowing comes right after he and others were informed that the lady was “coming down.” *While we were standing there on the rock, some of the masses went to Kataarstraat and found the lady.*” (my emphasis).

I did not see (hearsay).

Along the lines of not knowing what happened, P1 elaborates by saying that he did not see what happened. Here is an exchange towards the end of the interview,

Sipho: When this happened, did you see it happening or were you there or what?

P1: I would say as I stated before, we were on the rock we didn't see the action that happened there [at the scene], but we went there after receiving the information that this lady has been burnt there.

Sipho: Okay

P1: That was the cause of our arrest.

Sipho: So you have no idea as to what happened? Who was there? Who said what and how did it unfold?

P1: No. but what happened is that there were people on the scene who said so-and-so poured petrol and so-and-so lit the matches. That is the guy I am saying is Thamin but who is nowhere to be found today and the guy who lit the matches is AA, that is the information we got from the people who were on the scene; that's the hearsay to us.

P1 suggests that what he knows about the event is hearsay, that he was not involved. Here, P1 has distanced himself from the event, “They [the masses] poured petrol ... on her in fact and they set her alight. When we moved from the rock to the scene now where whole issue happened.” The use of the pronoun “they” seems to effect distance as opposed to the “we” and “us” of the planning stages. When P1 references “the cause for our arrest” it is not altogether clear if he suggest that the cause of his arrest

was that he went to the scene after she was burned, or that he was arrested because he was among the people who decided that they should “get rid of the lady”. This takes us to the next narrative development,

Where is fairness?

P1 observes the absence of fairness, and even his innocence, when he mentioned in a more emphatic manner, and in response to a challenging question from me that he was arrested, and wasn't even on the scene, while Thami who poured the petrol “is nowhere to be found today”, and AA, “the guy who lit the matches” were never even arrested. Indeed, P1's observation of the lack of fairness seems to be largely directed at the police and the justice system. The police tortured him even though he told them he did not know anything. P1 described his interaction with the police,

They [the police] arrived in the afternoon. When they arrived they said to me Maliti himself “P1 tell me who burned that lady.” I said, “no I do not know anything.” And they said to me “would you have liked if that was your sister who have passed away, should have been killed in that manner?” and I said, “no! I don't know anything.” So they started torturing us there. [after torturing] the guy came to me and ... said to me “P1 tell us the truth.” And I said I do not know anything.

For P1, it seems unfair that the police continued to torture him, even though he told them he knew nothing. Again here P1 seem to base the “truth” or knowing something on being at the scene – on seeing or witnessing what took place.

The sense of unfairness does not end with his arrest and treatment at the hands of the police, but continued when P1 was on trial. Notwithstanding the fact he was part of the group of people who decided they should “get rid of this mama,” he was not on the scene, which somehow exonerates him in his recounting of the story. In fact, his

conviction is perceived as unfair and the whole trial was flawed and contributes to the organization of his story around unfairness. For example:

[P1]you see I am little bit puzzled because before the case itself we were in the waiting trial there came a guy called Kinsely. [He] asked if we needed a legal representative and if we needed a bail and we said yes. Then he met with our parents aside and told them we won't get bail because of *the* gruesomeness of this case and at the end of the day, [to his surprise] this Kinsley who was said [introduced] to be our lawyer, was the prosecutor. So now, *where is the* fairness because he knows exactly how our case goes?

The prosecutor obtained *privileged information* because he posed as their lawyer, an unfair occurrence which mystifies P1 because it contributed to his being sentenced to death. Even the fact that he had recourse to a successful appeal, is painted with a sense of having been treated unfairly - P1 states he was "puzzled" again because

Justice Kannemeyer ... was the president Judge of the Eastern Cape when I was given the stay of execution, and instead sentenced to 20 years. Then he (Justice Kannemeyer) said "it will be a mistake to be your judge because I sentenced this guy accordingly and if they ever release him I will resign" and he definitely said that. If you can look at the 1998 *Bleed* you will get that statement. It was January or February, you will get that statement.

Justice Kannemeyer was the person who issued the death sentence and when P1 successfully appealed the sentence, the judge threatened to resign, claiming that he sentenced P1 fairly. P1, on the other hand, held himself not culpable because he was not at the scene. P1 tells his own experience of being tortured, being given electric shocks and on being put on death row, which were all "unfair" because he was not at the scene of the crime.

Interrogative

As indicated in the method section, there is a hermeneutic aspect of the analysis which interprets what is visible, seen or perceived. This is what I did in the previous sections. Now I interrogate the narrative, asking questions of it in order to open it up both for further interpretation and deconstruction beyond what is seen or present.

P1's narrative opens up questions regarding knowing or not knowing; to see or not to see; and to be present at the scene or be absent. And, what the implication may be for culpability and responsibility in the light of what it means to be a witness or not. Other questions stirred by P1's narrative regard (un)fairness, a central organizing theme for his story. What does fairness mean for P1, especially if I asked the same question he asked ("where is the fairness in this case?") to include Nokwakha Dilato and her surviving children and husband?

Further, P1 seems absent and distant from his own story. Why is that? P1 described the events surrounding both the necklacing and the subsequent trial as "puzzling," "unfortunate," and almost as if he had no agency in these events. At what point, and how does he relinquish a sense of an "I" to "the community", "the people", or "the masses"? Yet, furthermore, just as P1 is absent from the story, so is Nokwakha in his narrative. Like himself, Nokwakha hardly appears in the description of the events and she is never really acknowledged by P1. Why is this? What is happening here? There is a moment when P1 begrudgingly points out that "it is her deeds that led to her death", without any acknowledgement of his decision and part that led to her death as well.

It strikes me that P1's story is one of victimization or victimhood. As a victim, P1 is also searching for fairness; equality or justice. In a strange twist, he presents himself as a victim of violence perpetrated by Nokwakha. Upon hearing of the incident by the marshals that Nokwakha violated the boycott, he along with other leaders "went to her to try and resolve the matter" but she threatened them with prison. "So we tried to negotiate with her but unfortunately all our negotiation were in vain." P1's peaceful intention were met with violence, which "was unfortunate for us because when we arrive there—she was staying in Bongweni—a lot of people came out of her house with pangas" (a kind of machete). Furthermore, Nokwakha misread his intentions; "our intention was to talk to the lady as we stated before, unfortunately we were confronted with violence and resorted to violence and it went a long way." That "long way" was October 2 when Nokwakha was necklaced.

P1 is also a victim of violence perpetrated by the state through its agencies; the police and the court. P1 was tortured by the police "for no reason" - he was not even at the scene. P1 was also a victim of the court that sentenced him to death even though the people who were responsible for Nokwakha's death were not even arrested. Yet, he is also a victim of – in his telling – a larger, nobler cause in that "we did what we did because of politics, we did not want our people to suffer. There was a cause for us to do all those things."

In the end, the narrative organization, style and tone of his story, all portray him as a victim of circumstance.

P2's Narrative

Betrayal.

P2's narration figures around betrayal as an overarching organizational theme and plot (See Appendix C). For P2, betrayal runs deep and in various ways: self, his community, political comrades, family, and even the Truth and Reconciliation commission (TRC). As a person who says he "tends[s] to look deeper into things", P2 examines the depths of his senses of betrayal. Furthermore, there seem to be a breadth and depth to how P2 has examined this incident that distinguishes him from the other participants. He states that, "well while I was in prison, I kept reflecting... on this incident, thinking about it; trying to think critically"

Self-betrayal.

Self-betrayal seems to be used in a sense that P2 acted in a way that is contrary to a belief, value, and/or a position that he holds or held. The following excerpts serve to demonstrate:

But I still believe, you know, hurting another person, or killing, for that matter, killing a person... I don't think its something that people should do amongst each other or against each other.

Eyi! Okay, I know the circumstances that led to that thing [necklacing], but still, as a human being, you think... as a human being, or perhaps a perpetrator who's got a heart [chuckles], when you see your victims you will always think, eyi! you know? Especially when you see them in a shameful manner, you know, in a sad situation, you'll... you'll feel pity... you'll ask yourself questions, like I said, you know? When I saw this *Grootman* ["big man", Ms. Delato's husband] drunk and he's not the gentle and clean person I used to know, I would start wondering, what if, you know, his wife was still around... he would definitely not be like this.

In spite of his participation in necklacing Julia Delato, P2 "still" does not believe in killing. Before, but especially after, and notably in the reminding faces and

circumstances of the surviving children and husband of Nokhwaka Delato, P2 is brought to an acknowledgment of the event having taken place, and his role in it (he refers to them as “his” victims, inasmuch as they are victims by his doing). P2 narrates himself as a person with a heart; someone who does not believe in killing, who is compassionate, and affectionate. He feels pity, sadness, and sympathy and he “wonders [is/are?] the kids of the deceased” well cared for. On another occasion, P2 notes

[I] sort of sympathize with him in the situation I see now. This *Grootman*, you know, maybe [I] think that... maybe he is in this situation because, maybe the wife is no longer here, or... you know, it also traumatic to him as well as it is traumatic to us as perpetrators, you know?

The narration suggests a continuing trauma, or wound, for the victim and the perpetrator, although P2 does not elaborate on the nature or quality of the trauma. It seems, though, that “the circumstances that led to that thing” somehow worked to deny, subvert, or suppress what and whom he considered himself “to be” – a betrayal of his sense of self which he now has to deal with, particularly in the reminders that the victim was not only the person who died, but the living children and husband as well, whose fate P2 had so particularly a hand in.

Relational betrayal.

In addition to a betrayal of self, others are also implicated in a consistent pattern of betrayal. First, P2 indicts his father and his lawyer. After the incident, P2 went to his father and he expressed a desire to go into exile. However, his father convinced him otherwise

I was trying to get out of the country, like many youths at that time, but while I was in Bloemfontein where my father is, he felt like, “ey! don’t go away; you know, your mother has just passed away; you’ve got your siblings behind you...

blah blah,” you know. And he compelled me, you know, to go to his lawyer, and I told him, “Hey look! [chuckles] the lawyer, he might be a lawyer and a friend of yours, but maybe he is not acquainted with things like this,” and all that. But he insisted that we do that, and apparently the lawyer phoned the police in Colesberg [and] said, “are you looking for this person?” And they asked, “where is this person at?” “Okay, he is a son of my friend and he is around” and they said, “no, call him into your office.” And I was called into his office. I was arrested [chuckles] in that office. I was arrested by Bloemfontein police there and later on, Colesberg police came to fetch me.

In addition, P2 notes betrayal by fellow comrades. After the incident,

I believe, or perhaps we believe, that the police only arrested us, you know, started to be looking for us, for this incident of the burning of Nokwakwa because P1 made a confession. ---Okay--- and out of that confession, then they found witnesses [including P3].

The betrayal continued during the hearing of the case. Many fellow comrades and community members testified against P2. Discussing the court proceedings, P2 says,

in court the way it happened was most disturbing [was that] people whom you thought you know, you’ve got no grudges against them. People whom you regard as friends, they were to testify against you, and they will come up with the testimony which is totally not what really happened; that is disturbing. --- So, I mean, this guy, [P3] shame though, “well, he cannot live with that [being a state witness] for the rest of his life, so he better spill the beans and say, what has led to his testimony; [his] fabricated testimony in court”

P2 was aggrieved by the testimonies, which according to him did not even present what happened. He considered those who testified against him as friends. He struggles to reconcile the motivation for such betrayal and he examines his relationship – grudges – with those who testified against him. On the other hand, P2 recognizes that P3 (who testified as the key state witness) rectified his testimony when P1 was appealing the death sentence. In fact, the word shame is the expression of the sympathy towards P3. It is a

demonstration of his heart as he feels pity for perhaps the “shame” P3 went through for having made consequential statements. It is worth noting that P2 does not seem to be betrayed by the court proceedings as an institution. It seems that he did not *expect* justice or fairness. Nor did he feel betrayed by the way police handled him or the case. However, this cannot be said for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

Institutional betrayal.

P2 reacts to the TRC, and the publication of *Country of my skull*, as having betrayed him and the cause of reconciliation. Here he examines the purpose of the TRC

The idea of the TRC was good to bring the perpetrator together [with the victim] and to tell what happened. I hoped to have a chance to make peace with them, and I think the TRC failed to [let me do] that. I would like to know if they [the victim’s family] made peace with this. I would like to face the victims. I have to tell this because my children, too, will ask me questions and wonder what kind of a person their father is. So, to tell this [event] will also provide them [children] with the right information.

P2 was hoping that the TRC would bring him and the victims of his actions together. The TRC was meant to bring together two sides, the victim and the perpetrator. For P2, the TRC would bring together these two sides in him as well; the perpetrator and the person with a heart. Therefore, the sense that the TRC let him down runs deep, especially since the TRC was a post-Apartheid, national institution.

Nokwakha’s betrayal.

The community had spoken – had made a decision, and Nokwakha Delato chose to ignore that decision. Furthermore,

We also had people within the system the South African Police who were giving information to us. Like, they will indicate certain people who were selling people

out; giving information to the security branch, it was discovered that the deceased was also one of those people who were who was giving information to the security branch. Her husband was also an official of the then --- Bantu Administration Board, Bantu Administration something I can recall what is the proper name. So it was easy for the security branch to approach her since the husband was---also working there that is our thinking, so we thought perhaps she agreed to cooperate with the special branch because her husband was working for the then Apartheid government and maybe she thought if she doesn't cooperate with the security her husband might lose his jobs all that.

Setting the record straight.

Related to the sense of betrayal by the TRC, and really every other actor in the story, is the desire to “Set the record straight”. In fact, P2 notes that he consented to participate in this research as a means by which he may reconcile with himself, his victims and those who betrayed him.

It has been my wish, you know, to set the record straight because I even tried to secure the records of our trial. Charles helped me to get them through the lawyers for human rights, and my intention was that we were going to set the record straight. I even thought, when the TRC came into being, that maybe I would get a chance to put our story straight. We were approached by the investigators but they never really called us in when the TRC came to Colesberg.

Furthermore, setting the record straight involves clearing the names of “all those people who are wrongly implicated there [in TRC proceedings], you know that I am prepared we can sit down and help, and write our [own] book.” In addition to the TRC records, P2 also wants to set the court record straight. He states that it was “difficult for us, you know, we couldn't set the record straight then in court. Because we were denying that we took part in the necklacing of the deceased, we couldn't set the record straight.”

In sum, P2's narrative is plotted around the motifs of betrayal on the one hand, and the desire to “set the record straight”, on the other. P2 desires to tell his story to

achieve reconciliation and clear those who are wrongfully implicated or accused, including P1. According to P2,

[A]lthough P1, initially, before we necklaced Nokwakha, when we decided that, “okay let us necklace her,” he was part of that, but in the actual act he was never there. However, he was sentenced to death because of [the] distorted evidence which was given in court.

Interrogative

This interview strikes me as elaborate, deliberate, and committed. P2 struck me as attempting to “reflect” “critically” on his actions and the consequences thereof. I wonder, given his presentation of himself as a compassionate person, how this incident questions his *compassion* or perhaps also reveals a certain passion - an intensity and heat that may lead to acts like necklacing. Is (com)passion involved in the act itself? How Does compassion relate to P2’s avowed desire to clear those who were wrongfully implicated?

Throughout the interview, there were moments when P2 chuckled, as here where he describes his reaction witnessing Nokwakha’s burning.

although I was...we, you know, have been angry at the Apartheid regime, [at] their police, soldiers and even informants, but she was lying there crying... screaming, you know... flames all over her body... [pauses] I was scared [chuckles, shifts his seating]. I was scared; you know why I was scared?

Or,

I must also mention that I [was] quite young; [chuckles] I think I was sixteen years old. And that is also the reason I didn’t get the death sentence, because [at] the time [of] the offence, I was underage, according to the high court or Supreme Court.

And also, you know, [chuckles] there is my inner self you know, I think it will [be] a healing process also, you know. I ... I don't have anything to hide, as I told you. It is not because I am proud of I what I've done or whatever. No! I regret that we went to that extent, you know, to kill a person.

Eyi! Okay, I know the circumstances that led to that thing, but still, as a human being, you think... as a human being, or perhaps a perpetrator who's got a heart [chuckles], when you see your victims you will always think, eyi! you know? Especially when you see them in a shameful manner, you know, in a sad situation, you'll... you'll feel pity.

Chuckling seems to occur when P2 is moved, touched or unsettled; in the first excerpt he actually shifts his seating. And most of the times when he chuckled he would tilt his head down a bit. What might this mean or signify?

In his story, P2 describes sympathy with Nokwakha's children, and links to his wanting to tell this story because he is a father as well. Is there more to this "setting the record straight" because he is a father, as well? What is it, to set the record/s straight? What record? By whose account? By whose reckoning? How is this dissertation a record? Is P2 asking about how the event will be archived, which is also to say how it will be remembered? Why is this important to him?

Beyond setting the record straight, the other pivotal leg of P2's narrative is plotted around betrayal. But it seems as if part of the betrayal he describes also invokes loss. Is there a linkage? Perhaps with respect to mourning as well? Indeed, thinking about it this way opens up a realization of the story as one of loss, grief and even tragedy. There is, for example, the portrayal of a noble person, but with as glaring a flaw in his character, or as damning an implication in a heinous act, the tragic error committed against nature; there are the elements that propel one, and that is bigger than one in the mandate and the sense of fighting a just war, and having been part of something bigger than him, whose

will he had to satisfy, but which causes him to no conflictual end; and there is the tragic hero's *anagnorisis*, or new recognition from ignorance to the Aristotelian awareness of the bonds of love and hate. P2 also lost something the day Nokwakha was necklaced, and ever since then, he may be searching, or yearning for, or mourning what he lost. The chuckles often appear when P2 doubts what he knows and what he thinks about himself, whether "a person with heart" can be a person who took a mother away from her kids. The words "eyi" become pertinent, as an indication of weariness, and he knows he can never walk away, that his act will always be on his path, by the way, a reminder – *kanene* – all the political and historical reasons and justifications and circumstances notwithstanding ("this crosses my mind and it does not make [me] feel good; *kanene*, I took a parent away from her children, never mind the circumstances; the children, you know?").

Eyi! Okay, I know the circumstances that led to that thing, but still, as a human being, you think... as a human being, or perhaps a perpetrator who's got a heart [chuckles], when you see your victims you will always think, eyi! you know? Especially when you see them in a shameful manner, you know, in a sad situation, you'll... you'll feel pity.

Is this why P2 wishes to face Nokwakha's children? What does he want from them?

What is it to reconcile?

P2: But one would ask what I have done [chuckles] so far? Absolutely nothing. You know, I'm also a hectic person... Okay, maybe that is an excuse. [chuckles] Whether [it] is valid or not, is another question. I didn't do that, you know, also, with mixed feeling, I... ay!... should I approach them? How would they see it? Should they be angry? You know, that's the other thing; one of the things that delayed me to approach them... you know, I don't know, how would they take it? [Heavy sigh]

Sipho: Mhm; Okay.

P2: But you should really... maybe... maybe if you could help me with that... I would appreciate that.

Sipho: Okay, mhh.

P2: To meet them, talk, you know, I mean; that's what I think the TRC failed to do. I mean, the whole TRC process. I think it was about reconciliation...

P2: What if they hate me; I mean they still hate me, you know? Because the TRC never did anything, and if we, we really want true reconciliation, I think we should start with ourselves you know? You start with yourself, reconcile with yourself with certain things, then go to others. [clears throat] And as far as I am concerned, we never reconciled to them. Okay, I might say, you know, within me, I would like to talk to them, and all that, but, who knows... how do they feel about me? Nobody knows.

P3's Narrative

I witnessed.

P3's story is organized around that of the witness; a person who was present both to the event that led to the incident and the incident itself (See Appendix D). In addition, he took the stand as a state witness, by his account because he was tortured by the police.

I [eye] witness as a participant.

P3 admits that he was part of the entire event that led to the burning of Nokwakha Delato. As a marshal, P3 was among the people who witnessed Nokwakha purchasing food from a boycotted butchery, and who trampled on her meat. As marshal, he was a witness for the community, the eyes of the people: "I was present. --- (Okay) I'm saying by the time she was caught for buying meat.---Yes, I was present, because we were marshals." P3 monitored adherence to the boycott, and was tasked with ensuring it took place.

There was a consumer boycott you see. So people were not buying at certain places and they were compelled to buy at certain places (*stores*). So what happened there was Sisi Nokwakha Delato whom we warned not to buy from (the white) butchery. It becomes clear that she was not listening (*to our warnings*) and she continued buying from this butchery. So the first day we confiscated her

things (*groceries*) from her and trampled on it. Despite of this she kept on doing this. We then went to her house and there was no one in the house, we entered the house through the window.

Destroying Nokwakha's groceries was intended as a warning, as was going to her house and breaking in. For P3 "A community meeting was called and everybody was told where to buy from and where not to buy from. So every resident knew about this – where to buy and where not to buy." However, for P3 what made things worse was that the deceased brought the police into this: "she laid charges against us with the police because we took her groceries." Again, P3 offers a sense of a community decision to which people should be bound; "we decided at the meeting that if a person buys from boycotted shops, his or her groceries will be destroyed."

Inasmuch as to witness is to observe, to participate, and ultimately to take a stand, P3 was delegated to this role by the community as a marshal. However, in a parallel sense, he was to become a delegate for the state as well, to become a witness against the very people that were his political comrades. Explaining how and why he became a state witness, P3 says:

It become clear that no, I could not stand the torturing. So I told them what happened. Then they told me not to tell it as it had happened and that I should tell it their way. They then made me a state witness. So we went to Graaff-Reinet for the hearings of the case where I gave false statement. The statement I gave in court was the statement that I was told by them.

P3 goes into graphic details about the torture, which led to his confession and agreement to take the stand as state witness.

They found and arrested us one by one and locking us in cells. They took us one by one and did whatever they wanted to do when interrogating you. So they beat you, and they did not play with you; put tube on your face. There was a bag that they put over your face. The police took your testicles, put them in the drawer

(desk drawer), and put your penis on the desk. They then close drawer with you testicles inside it. They then beat you and there is nothing you could do. They tie you to the tree naked. They tie your feet and arms (stretched). Beneath you on the ground they made fire and they made braai [barbeque]. Then what burned you was the heat that comes from the braai [barbeque] fire. Even in the cells, they shot us with teargas whilst we were inside the cell. We end up with bleeding nose. You see?

It was these extreme measures of torture or “enhanced interrogation” that P3 endured and could not stand. He then became a state witness, professing a version of events on behalf of the state. However, “The statement I gave in court was the statement that I was told by them,” which was “false that they said she was lit by P1.” The narrative suggests that in court P3 was following the orders of the police and in necklacing Ms. Delato, he was following the orders of the community. As a marshal he followed and enforced community orders; he marshaled people into the *community cause*.

What I am saying that this was happening at the time of the Apartheid government, which was oppressive. So we wanted our people to unite, act in unison or as one. So that there would not be a person who does his or her own thing even though they see that this [Apartheid government] is oppressing us.

Nokwakha Delato “did her own thing”; she would not follow the community line, even though she knew or saw that the Apartheid government was oppressive. P3 takes it as a given that Nokwakha knew, and witnessed the oppressive nature of the government and therefore, should act in unison with the rest of the community. The boycott had a purpose

Because the reason that we should boycott their shops ... because we wanted these whites to feel the hardship, so that they can turn against their government. So it was like that.

P3 sees boycott as a weapon against Whites and also an assault on the government. It was intended or directed at the Apartheid government, and with Nokwakha doing her

own thing, including soliciting the aid of Apartheid agents like the police and laying charges against the comrades, she was effectively aiding the enemy and betraying her community and the anti-Apartheid cause.

I could not do anything/otherwise.

P3 does not only present himself as a witness, but also as a witness who “could not do anything” because he “had to” abide by the community decisions, or the demands of the police (or he would be tortured more); similarly it is as if Nokwakha brought the burning upon herself because she was warned several times and did not listen.

when I just about think it, eyi man. Yes things were horrible, painful... Yes, they were horrible but we could not do otherwise because, eyi, it is indeed true that the government treated us badly, you see. Therefore, we were against the government of that era. Those were ways of freeing us. So no, it was indeed during those painful times.

This incident was just as horrible and painful as the way things were under the Apartheid government. So, P3 was forced to play the hand he was dealt; a hand that he played.

Being unable to do anything different goes in two directions; not having an array of choices to choose from and also having chosen already. On the one hand, an action is taken because there were no alternative actions to choose from. On the other hand, the choice was made from an array of alternatives, as the best one available. For example, a consumer boycott was chosen as the “best” way to hurt Whites (economically) and force recognition of their demands and agenda.

No there was nothing that I felt, only that I felt it was *amasikizi* (*Xhosa*) scary (gruesome). Although we were doing it, it was *amasikizi* scary (gruesome); it was *amasikizi* gruesome scary because it was a killing of a person. Only that I could do nothing because it was a decision that was taken and *moet* (Afrikaans for must, or had to) we had to do this thing because we had warned her several times ... I was [I had *amasikizi*] scared, because you know this thing; in fact it was the first

time such a thing happened at Colesberg. It was the first time it happened. When we you are an informer (*impimpi*) you knew that you would end up being burnt. You'll be burned if there was no other way of killing but be burnt.

As a witness, P3 is faithful to the word or command from the community.

Nokwakha was warned several times and did not heed to the warnings, which left P3 with no options...

We warned her. If I remember well we warned her three times. She kept on buying and we kept on warning her. Until we *took the decision*.... We *decided* to burn her once and all because she persistently kept on buying from places that were boycotted. Another thing she had laid charges against us with the police, because we took her shoppings from her and destroyed them. So we *decided* that we would do what we did. A community meeting was called and everybody was told where to buy from and where not to buy from. So every resident knew about this –where to buy and where not to buy.

[When she was burning] we told her ... you are burning now because you are an informer. If you had listened, you would not be in this situation now. Moreover, you turned us in to the police for trampling on your belongings. And we talked to you several times and you would not listen ... remember you said we would do nothing (to you). (Italics my emphasis)

P3 engages with this incident from a witness position, which is, even though P3 did not take the decision alone, or by himself, he was part of the decision, and bore responsibility for its enforcement. P3 does not contest culpability, but suggests that it is not his alone. There are many participants, and culpability is spread around – he is just the agent or means, which in fact implies that he sets aside his “own” sense of horror and recognition of the gruesomeness of his act.

Interrogative

Throughout his story P3 describe his roles as a witness, and his narrative raises questions regarding the meaning of witnessing. What does it mean to be a witness;

presence versus absence; participation versus observation; culpability versus guilt?

Another question raised by P3's narrative is the distinction between an individual decision versus a community decision. For example the boycott was meant to hurt the white community by hurting individual white businesses. And an individual act of buying from a boycotted store is understood to have hurt the entire black community. Pushing the line of questioning further, now, did the burning of Nokwakha —an attempt to remove the cancerous threat to the “unity” of the community – actually “heal” and achieve its desired aim, or did it end up hurting? Whom did it hurt, if it did – a community? An individual perpetrator? Surviving family members, who are nonetheless also “community”?

Not unlike P1, P3's story struck me as a story crafted around being a victim of circumstances. As a victim of Nokwakha's decision to buy at a butchery that she knew was boycotted, his hands are forced to take the meat and destroy it. Furthermore, Nokwakha exacerbated the situation by laying charges against him, as though he was the one who decided on the boycott when in fact he was but an agent for the community whom he served dutifully. As he states “I could do nothing because it was a decision that was taken and *moet* (Afrikaans for must, or had to) *we* had to do this thing because we had warned her several times.” Hereafter P3 becomes a victim of police brutality, and then a victim of the justice system, which abused him. What does all of this mean in relation to Nokwakha, herself a victim? This especially because he relates the freedom songs sung on the day of Nokwakha's necklacing. One song says *Igazi labazali bethu limpompoza ezitalatweni thabath'uAkha Gerila* (Xhosa translation: For the blood of our parents is gashing into the streets; take up an AK (AK-47) guerrilla) and another,

safik'eSanlam kugcwele ngamabhulu, sathi masingena saka kuvaliwe, sathi masakroba safika kuphalal'igazi lomnt'omnyama (Xhosa translation: We arrived at Sanlam⁵, it was full of Whites. We attempted to go it was locked; when we peered in we saw black people's blood spilling.). Nokwakha is both a parent and black. Is there not an irony here? Where is Nokwakha as victim in this story of the perpetrator as victim?

Cross Narrative Analysis – Similarity and Difference

There are similarities and particularities across each participant's story. At the outset, the very story is premised on the similarity of them all having had a role in the death of Nokwakha Delato. This, after all, is the departure point for their involvement, and the central concern of this dissertation. And, whereas the whole story in a sense relates to the event, the moment the event is of particular salience.

“The Moment”

Some of the ways in which the participants recount this moment include:

She was crying now saying we must forgive her, this and that. We were telling her we would not forgive her because we warned you several times and you would not listen, you did it deliberately and then you go reported us to the police for destroying your goods. ---We beat her with hand and stones, you see---we poured her with petrol and lit her ... after he lit her, we did not give her a chance of getting inside the house. We kept on beating her until people screamed “here comes the police”. So we ran away leaving her burning. No only that we told her to burn, you are burning now because you are an informer. If you had listened, you would not be in this situation now. Moreover, you turned us to the police for trampling on your belongings. And we talked to you several times and you would

⁵ Sanlam center was a Police Headquarters in Port Elizabeth.

not listen. Rather, remember what you said we would do nothing. Now we've found you. (P3)

No there was nothing that I felt, only that I felt it was *amasikizi* (Xhosa for scary gruesome). Although we were doing it [burning her], it was scary (gruesome); it was scary because it was killing of a person, do you see ... I could do nothing because it was a decision that was taken and (*Moet*) we had to do this thing because we had warned her several times ... [when this was happening] I was scared, because this thing in fact it was the first time such a thing happened at Colesberg. It was the first time it happened [burning] and when we say you are an informer (impimpi). You knew that you would end up burnt. You'll be burned there is no other way of killing but be burnt. (P 3)

You know out of that anger and frustration we decided at the spur-of-the-moment that we were going to do that. I don't know how the petrol came in but I recall that some of us took even petrol from the petrol bombs because there was no petrol at hand ready you know to necklace her, there were also no tires to necklace her you know it was not a premeditated thing you know but we eventually managed to get hold of the tire. Although we were angry—I would talk for myself—I don't know how the other people felt. I can only imagine how they felt but, you know, although I was, we you know have been angry for the Apartheid regime their police, soldiers, and even informants, but [when] she was lying there crying, screaming you know flames all over her body, (paused). I was scared (chuckles re-shift his seating), I was scared, you know why I was scared? I never hurt anyone in the past. But you know, now I could see here is the person, she is burning, screaming. I sometimes, you know, I felt I could have gone again try to help her but at the back of my mind, again, Ag! We had comrades who passed away because of these informants, perhaps this is also her time too to go. I must also mention that I was quite young (chuckles) I think I was sixteen years old and that is also the reason I didn't get the death sentence, because by the time the offence I was under age according to the high court or Supreme Court. (P 2)

What struck me about the description of the event, in various ways across interviews, was the persistence and recurrence of the word scary, or *amasikizi*, which may be roughly translated as “fear”, but signifies so much more. This will be examined in greater detail in the next chapter. Secondly, *amasikizi* is conjured up because it was “a person” that was burning, that was being murdered. The moment of the offense is one that involves a recognition of a “person” and of what is happening as *amasikizi*.

Community Proxies / Leadership

The participants present themselves as acting on behalf of the community. For example, P1 and P2 were members of Colesberg Youth Organization (COYO), and P3 was a marshal, enforcing the consumer boycott. In fact, the participants present themselves as part of the collective, by their use of words like “the masses,” “the people,” “the community,” and “we.” For example, the excerpts from P1 and P2:

...what happened is that some of our marshals[including P3], I will term them as marshals found out that this lady bought meat there and [they] took the meat and trampled on it and they gave it to the dogs. Okay, we as leadership of the youth organization—Colesberg Youth Organization (COYO)—went to her to try and resolve the matter...

P1 demonstrated that “we” means the leadership but also the people who were at the helm of power in the running of the community affairs. P2 reinforces what P1 said, but also sheds light to the fact the COYO worked “in conjunction with civic organizations”:

[P2] I was the chairman of the youths’ organization called COYO, Colesberg Youth Organization. I was also the active member of the civic organization in Colesberg. I can’t recall the name of this civic organization in conjunction with [the] youth organization.

The participants were all part of the community as well as its leaders; they led the community to decisions, and were bound by them – which meant, as leaders, that they were also responsible for implementing the community’s decisions. They presented their actions as part of the community’s will, and, in fact, suggested that their “own”, individual will or selves were placed second to that of the community. The actions of the

participants were not just as a part of the collective, but also in the interest of the collective.

The Importance of Background/Grounding Back

All three participants relate the burning of Nokwakha as having a background, a “back story”, as it were, that reaches and traces to the boycott, which has, in turn, roots in the poor living conditions of the black community of Colesberg, and which is attributable to the long and sorry history of Apartheid. It is meaningful that all the participants place their stories, as P2 stated “well, first, perhaps, it will be good to give you a little bit of a background as to that fateful day.” Both P1 and P3 provide the consumer boycott as the background, while P2 even supplies the background to the consumer boycott. The background is the environment, milieu, a setting, and condition that led to the burning of Nokwakha. The suggestion to me was that I cannot understand the incident without understanding the information characterized as the background. For example: P2 notes that a meeting was called to reject the rent increase on the deplorable general living conditions. The community demanded a sewage system to replace the current bucket system and these demands were presented to the Superintendent responsible for the black township. The government was “given 14 days” to “respond to the community demands.”

[P2] And when these 14 days lapsed, we were told, in no uncertain terms, by the authorities, that look, they are not going to talk to us. They will do things as they wish. I mean, the bucket system was there to stay with us. So, that led to the dissatisfaction amongst the people. It was decided by the Colesberg community that, well, they [the authorities] didn’t meet our demands and they didn’t give a satisfactory solution, so we don’t [didn’t] have [an] alternative. The only thing that we can [could] do which might be effective was the consumer boycott, seeing that most of the businesses were owned by white people, and we were doing our

businesses in town. So, we decided, “look, we are not going to buy from the whites,” though we were buying from certain white shops people who sympathize with our cause.

Clarifying the Enemy, Fighting the Enemy

The clash between the “people/masses/community” and an enemy, variously presented as Whites, White businesses, Boers, police, the State, the Apartheid government, and later informers and impimpi from within the community, is also presented as an event that led up to the burning of Nokwakha. The police, for example, was quite a visible and accessible representative of the White Apartheid government, and came to embody its atrocities, as it defended it:

[P3] we were going down towards town and the Whites (Boers) had already entered. They were now shooting us with pellets and rubber bullets. So we then threw stones at them with slingers ... We (were not) sleeping in our homes because they were hunting us. So we ended up sleeping in church building and in the houses we knew had no occupants.

[P2] Well, there was this incident also, in July of killing of OoKakra. I think that has also made especially the youth very angry; people were arrested before and after that incident. They were beaten up by the police, brutally beaten up. There were even civil claims launched against the minister of police, the then minister of police. I know a few people who were brutally beaten by the police then. All that police brutality, you know, led or contributed to the anger that we had as citizens. You know, this didn't happen once and the police would go, you know? It happened continuously. People would be detained without a trial, and whilst being detained, they would be beaten up, come back, you know... they would share their experience while they were detained. All that, you know, creates anger.

Both P2 and P3 allude to the clash between the “people” and the police which seem to have created a vicious circle between the two camps – a battle for control of black townships. On July, 3 1985 four youths were killed - Ookraka Maciki, Funeka

Siyonzana, December Morumo and Juda Mongezi - commonly referred to as the

“Colesberg Four.” P1 points to this as the cause of anger:

[P1] You see after the death of these 4 children, they were youths who should have made a change in our community but unfortunately the forces of the previous government felt that these are not human beings so they should die. [Be]cause on that particular day on the 2nd we went to the late Mfengwana’s place and the late Tata Maliti was staying in front, wherefore the 4 comrades *fallen*. And because of anger we felt that we have to go door to door in these [black] police houses we started with Chris Labane’s house, where we took his car out of the yard and set alight.

[P1] I can say after we burnt Chris’s car a lot of people were arrested. A lot of people were arrested and whenever you are arrested you had to explain to them; who set the car alight. And we felt *intokuba* (that) “Asiwafuni Amapolisa” (we do not want the police living in the community).

Black police officers were driven out of the community and battle lines were clearly drawn as to who belonged to the anti-Apartheid family and who belonged to the enemy.

[P2] we would fight by perhaps burning his/her [their] property or [by] forcing them out [of] the township like all the police or people who had the close ties with the Apartheid regime. They were chased away from the township; their houses were burnt, cars [were] also damaged and burnt, you will recall Chris Labane’s incident So, there was still that anger amongst the people, [clears throat] including myself, of course. So we wanted to do anything just to revenge [avenge] you know -- cause some harm to the Apartheid regime.

The Court Proceedings

The second data point is the court proceedings of the trial, in which five people were charged with the necklacing incident (all three of the participants above were charged).

The case was heard at the Supreme Court in Graaf-Reinet, during December 1986, more than a year after the incident took place.

The Court's Narrative or Representation

One of the first things to note about the court's telling of the story, is that it positions itself first. That is, before it even attempts the story, it situated itself in terms of apportioning a societal role to itself, which is perhaps not only to situate the manner of the story's telling, but also a warning or a caution that the telling has consequences.

Judge Kannemeyer says:

The [Court's] paramount consideration in any application, ... is that the Court should see that the process of justice is in no way hampered or hindered, weighing this always against the interest of the liberty of the individual.

As such, the violation to be responded to is listed and characterized by the court as murder, a killing and therefore a most egregious violation of the law. In the name, now, of that very justice the court protects and aspires to, the goal is to establish the facts of the case, as it were, inclusive of the intent to kill – but not “only” to kill or to take life, but, in the words of the judge, having done so “... in one of the most cruel manners one can imagine” (Supreme Court of South Africa, Case CC755/86, p.182⁶). The “onus is on the State to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused each of them participated to some degree in one or either or both offenses covered by two accounts” (p.167), those accounts being “murder” and “public violence”.

The way in which the court works, and tells its story, is to chart an almost linear backwards arc, by tracing actions that led (causes) to the murder. Hence it is as if the death of Nokwakha serves as the story's starting point, and it becomes imperative to be very clear about this starting point, and to rule out anything that might cause doubt as to

⁶ For all the court proceedings and references, I will cite from The Supreme Court of South Africa: Graaff-Reinet Circuit Local Division. Case number CC755/86 presided on the day of December 10, 1986; pages 1-213. Hereafter, I will only provide page numbers referencing this document.

what caused Nokwakha's death. This is achieved, in the first instance, via a biological and bodily attestation, by establishing numerous aspects of Nokwakha's health or bodily functioning before and after the burning.

Having established the cause of death in biological terms, the court now turns to the supposed agents of death, the actors responsible for the biological state of death. This is a rather peculiar way to divine intent (as it is on occasion referenced to be), not as some or other reason or motive in the heads of the actors or in the surround, but as a simple, clear, and empirical action leading to a demonstrable result. The accused stand under a clear charge: a "wrongful and intentional assault, caus(ing) certain injuries from the effect of which Mrs. D. died." (p. 1)

Nokwakha died from burn injuries. To establish the material/biological and the behavioral/intent, state and expert witnesses are called to testify, to confirm and bear witness. Hence, the expert medical practitioners and pathologists provide lengthy explication as to precisely the course and cause of death, while the state witness is presumed to provide as detailed and particular a behavioral account of who did what and when. The role of the witnesses is to corroborate the material evidence and the events which led to the death of Nokwakha in such a way for it to be incontrovertible and, in fact, to become part of the *Summary of Substantial Facts*, as stated for example:

1. On Saturday the 21st of September 1985 an incident took place which was to lead to the death of the deceased. The deceased had purchased meat in Colesberg which she was taking home. She was accosted and the meat was destroyed and the deceased then laid a complaint to the local police station. From that time onwards she was hounded by the said accused and their friends. On the 24th of September 1985, for example, the home of the deceased's husband was attacked by the accused and their friends. Stones thrown by these persons caused a certain amount of damage.

2. Later, on the 2nd of October 1985, the deceased was going to work when she was set upon by the accused. Petrol was poured over her and she was set alight. She fled the scene and was treated nearby with raw eggs being rubbed upon her wounds. She was removed to the hospital in Bloemfontein where she later died. All this because she was regarded as '*impimpi*'.
3. The deceased suffered burns to approximately 60 % of her body - these turned septic. The cause of death was '*septiese brandwonde met lewer, nier, en longversaking.*' (Afrikaans for septic burn wounds with liver, kidney, and lung failure).

The court aimed at demonstrating how each event led to another, resulting in the eventual burning and death of Nokwakha. In relating this narrative, the court focuses on materiality and the observable as constitutive of the fact, and in a circular sense, they are facts (and true) because they have been observed and shown to be true. Indeed, it is even—on various occasions—the case that the observable evidence provides a broader, contextual background, as opposed to a broader, contextual background providing a situating of the observable evidence. This “background that has emerged from the evidence,” (Judge, p. 164) is also the background for the judgment and therefore sentencing, summarized by the judge as:

- It appears, and it is common cause, that in September 1985 there was a consumer boycott being observed by the black community in Colesberg and it appears that on or about 21 of September the deceased, in defiance of this boycott, bought meat from a certain butchery known as “Try Me Butchery”
- When she took her meat to the township, she was stopped by those people who were enforcing the boycott. The meat was thrown to the ground, stamped upon and made useless.
- Being indignant because of this, she reported the incident to the police. Thereupon as far as those in favour of and enforcing the boycott was concerned, she was considered an *impimpi*, informer, or a traitor to the cause which they purportedly espoused.

- From then until the 24 September groups of young men stood outside the house that she and her husband occupied and eventually on 24 September a large group of young men and boys attacked the house and chased the deceased, who ran into the house to escape injury. The house was then stoned, windowpanes were broken and damage, amounting to approximately R50.
- On the 2nd of October at about 7:30 in the morning, the deceased left her home, on her way to work. While she was on her way and still in the township, she was set upon by a group of people. Petrol was poured on her and set her on fire.
- The deceased was found by Sergeant van Rensburg of the police, who took her to the Colesberg Hospital where she was seen by a local doctor, Dr. de Jongh, who, having applied emergency treatment to her, then arranged for her to be transferred to Pelonomi Hospital for specialist treatment. She died on 9 October 1985.

Assigning Identity and Identification of the body

The first segment of the court proceedings aimed to ascertain and demonstrate that death took place, and the cause(s) of death. Additionally, of course, “who” died has to be established, that is, a proper name is to be associated with the particular death and the cause of death. The manner in which this is achieved, at least in terms of the court relying on the state pathologist to testify to the deceased’s identity, is a bureaucratic matter of associating paperwork and identificatory tags to match the name Julia Dilato⁷ to the body the pathologist is to testify about. Having made the identification, the proper name is no longer needed or used, and the court now refers to “the deceased”.

[Prosecutor] My lord, call a first witness for the state and just before I do that, I may intimate that it may have appeared from My Learned Friend’s plea already that there is no problem with the identity of the deceased. (p.8)

[Court] Record that the Defense admits that the identity of the deceased mentioned in the charge-sheet, known as Julia Dilato and admits it was on her body that the post-mortem examination was conducted, concerning which there will be evidence in this

⁷ Julia Dilato is the same person as Nokwakha, or as Ms. Delato, spelled with an “e”.

case and also admits that from the time of the incident referred to the charge-sheet on 2 October second 1985 until the time of the post-mortem she received no further injuries (p. 8).

Having matched a body with a name, the name is soon to be dropped in favor of the amorphous and generalized (dead) body, and the court now sets out to confirm that the cause of death was burning, which also involves demonstrating that “the deceased” was healthy or had no injuries before the attack. It is a matter of identifying the historical functioning of the injured body, in a sense.

[Prosecutor] Now what did the deceased do when you ran away?

[J. Dilato (brother-in-law of Nokwakha)] She ran away and they chased her and caught up with her.

[Prosecutor] Now did the deceased have any injuries before they caught up with her?

[J. Dilato] No. (p. 17)

The deceased was a person who could run and therefore, active enough to assume the body was functioning well, and that there were no “deviations” in the functioning of the body. Of course the reference is to the mechanical functioning of the body and its organs. The pathologist testified that:

[Pathologist] Except the burn wounds and its consequence, there were no deviations in the skull. The content of the skull show no deviations. The eyes, the nose, the ears, the mouth, the tongue and the structures of the neck showed no deviations. (p. 63)

Hence, without any prior “deviations” of bodily functioning, and all indications of generally effective functioning, what caused death?

The Cause of Death

The second task, and also the second segmentary narrative of the court proceedings, pertains to establishing cause of death. In establishing (proving), ultimately, that the burn wounds were the cause of death, the court again focuses on the material and the wholly observable, the particularized and scientifically quantifiable, given voice by the state pathologist. For example, as:

[State Pathologist] There were extensive septic burn wounds around approximately sixty percent of the body surface. The examination noted further signs of kidney, liver, and lung failure. It was my opinion that death occurred approximately 126 hours before my examination and as the result of septic burn wounds with liver, kidney and lung failure. (p. 62)

The deceased is dead, therefore, and ultimately, because her internal organs failed. But now the link needs to be made between the failure of those internal organs as the end of the causal chain, back, as it were – and to do so in as clear and unambiguous a manner as possible, clearing up any or all “complicating” factors in drawing the chain of causality. Hence, the prosecutor moves from the internal to the external, gradually to the body substrate, as he questions the pathologist:

[Prosecutor] Do I understand the [your] report correctly, please excuse me if I don't follow as quickly? Do I understand the report correctly if I should say that burn wounds were septic on the outside and as consequence, as it were, went inside and affected the internal organs?

[State Pathologist] That is totally correct, the sepsis in the burn wounds led to the internal kidney, lung and liver failure.

[Prosecutor] I would like you to speculate and in a way pull on your experience to what extent it could be expected from someone with 60 percent burn wounds on his or her body that the consequences as you noticed would be the case?

[State Pathologist] Unfortunately, it is a very common complication; all three of these are very common.

[Prosecutor] With burn wounds?

[State Pathologist] Yes with burn wounds and we find that clinicians already early in the treatment try to prevent and to fight this condition or possibility, but unfortunately in our experience throughout the years a person with wounds 60 percent extent with sepsis the chances are really very small to recover (p. 66).

The exchange presumably does not yield as clear an answer to realize the link between outside burns and the internal organ failure, leading the prosecutor to press for more,

[Prosecutor] But I do not know if you understand me correctly, the appearance as it were of sepsis, to which extent is it be expected that it would happen after such burn wounds.

[State Pathologist] I don't follow your question?

[Prosecutor] Let me put to you this way, if you have someone, a person with 60 percent of burn wounds over his body moments after it happens, what is your prediction or expectations, what are the chances that sepsis will occur with such a person?

[State Pathologist] Unfortunately quite large, because it is also burn wounds is after all a damaging of the skin, a protective skin is taken away, there is a loss of liquid by the wound and the chances of sepsis is almost 100 percent

[Prosecutor] This sepsis can it occur?

[State Pathologist] Yes.

[Prosecutor] Can it occur in clinical conditions, in a hospital for example?

[State Pathologist] Unfortunately, in our experience it occurs even in the best of intensive care units. (p. 66-67)

What is established is not only that the internal organs failed because the protective skin was damaged, but also that the hospital could not have been the cause of the sepsis. Once it was established that the death was the result of the failure of internal organs, the pathologist describes in detail all the organs involved: the liver, lungs, heart and the kidneys. The descriptions focused on the material condition of each organ, which demonstrated their deviated conditions; their compromised state.

Who Caused Death?

Thus established that death was caused by burning, the court then sought to assign culpability to an agent(s) responsible for the burning – the next link in the causal chain,

working backwards from the fact of someone's death. Establishing now who did what and when, the state relies on witnesses, and particularly those it deems "friendly" to the state, to wit, "state witnesses." In keeping, though, with the theme of the directed material and observable emphasis, the court guides the witnesses through a series of questions that aim to provide and establish precisely who was where and what they were doing. The very ability to testify truthfully, that is, the veracity of the witness' tale, is dependent precisely on where they were with respect to the various scenes and moments of the incident. The state witness consequently verified that he was on the scene in his exchange with the prosecutor;

[Prosecutor] Are you sixteen years old and do you live in the black township of Colesberg?

[X. S Bonase] Yes.

[Prosecutor] Are you now in standard 4?

[X.S. Bonase] Yes.

[Prosecutor] Now the deceased in this case had the name of Nokwakha, did you know her, this is Julia Dilato?

[X.S. Bonase] Yes.

[Prosecutor] On the 2nd October last year approximately quarter before 8 o'clock in the morning, it is correct that you were on your way to your uncle in New Location?

[X.S. Bonase] Yes.

[Prosecutor] As you were walking did you notice that a number of people at the certain scene that looked out of their homes and that gathered together in the street? Is that correct?

[X.S. Bonase] Yes.

[Prosecutor] Now what did you notice as you approached this place?

[X. S. Bonase] I saw Nokwakha being taken out of the house (p. 101-102).

Not only must the witness be placed at the scene, though; he or she must also be able to make sense of the scene and what's happening, both in terms of his mental capacities and his ability to identify others at the scene, inclusive of both the deceased and the accused. Having thus established the witness at the scene, the witness' ability to

identify the actors at the scene, the witness is now to relay the action - what he saw, what he noticed, what struck him, what was unusual, what happened?

[Prosecutor] Now how is she taken out of the house?

[X.S. Bonase] The one pushed her and the other pulled her.

[Prosecutor] Now who is the person that pushed and who is the one that pulled her?

[X.S. Bonase] Tefo pushed, Tommy pulled her.

[Prosecutor] Is that accused 1 and 5?

[X.S. Bonase] Yes.

[Prosecutor] Now what did they do then that you noticed?

[X.S. Bonase] They took her and Spyker poured a liter of petrol over her.

[Prosecutor] Now which one is Spyker, could he stand up?

[X.S. Bonase] Accused number 3.

[Prosecutor] Is it him, do you see they have numbers on?

[X.S. Bonase] Yes.

[Prosecutor] You said he poured a litter of petrol over her, is that correct?

[X.S. Bonase] Yes.

[Prosecutor] Now where were you at this stage when number 3 poured the petrol over her?

[X.S. Bonase] I am in the back yard.

[Prosecutor] Is it where it happened? (p. 102)

Again the event is divided into discrete stages and the witness has to verify the part he played in each stage (hence, for example, “where were you at this stage?”), as well as the parts played by the other people he witnessed. The stage is both the arena and the phases of the event. As the witness identifies the phases of the event he also identifies the actors. In the following excerpt the witness identified those who participated in the act and what each of them did.

[X.S. Bonase] That is correct.

[Prosecutor] How is it that you got to be there?

[X.S. Bonase] Spyker invited me?

[Prosecutor] Now did you know Spyker at that stage?

[X.S. Bonase] That is correct.

[Prosecutor] Were the two of you good friends?

[X.S. Bonase] That is correct.

[Prosecutor] And did you also know accused 1 and 5?

[X.S. Bonase] Number 5 yes.
[Prosecutor] And number 1?
[X.S. Bonase] That is correct.
[Prosecutor] Now you were invited to come to the backyard by accused number 3, and what did you do further in that backyard?
[X.S. Bonase] I threw sand at the deceased.
[Prosecutor] Now when did you do this? At what stage was it?
[X.S. Bonase] When she started to burn.
[Prosecutor] When she?
[X.S. Bonase] Started to burn.
[Prosecutor] Why did you do that?
[X.S. Bonase] Spyker told me to throw the sand so that she does not burn in her face.
[Prosecutor] So did you throw the sand in her face?
[X.S. Bonase] That is correct. (p. 102-103)

The witness was able to point at the participants, including himself. He stated what each person did and said to whom. The witness takes the court through various stages of this incident. However, it is now also asked of the witness to offer a motivation, a possible reason for the action;

[Prosecutor] Now do you know why she burned? –
[X.S. Bonase/State Witness] I know.
[Prosecutor] Excuse me?
[X.S. Bonase] I know.
[Prosecutor] Could you tell the court why?
[X.S. Bonase] It was told that she was an *impimpi*.
[Prosecutor] Who said so?
[X.S. Bonase] Many of them there in the township.
[Prosecutor] Now accused number 4, Pienkjan, do you know him?
[X.S. Bonase] Yes.
[Prosecutor] Now did you notice him in the vicinity on that day?
[X.S. Bonase] I saw him.
[Prosecutor] What was he doing?
[X.S. Bonase] He stood at the gate with the knife in his hand and he chased people away.
[Prosecutor] People that wanted to come and help, that wanted to come and help the deceased?
[X.S. Bonase] That is correct,
[Prosecutor] Did you hear accused number 4 say anything to anyone there?
[X.S. Bonase] He said she should be burned because she is *impimpi*.

[Prosecutor] You said accused number 3 poured petrol over her...now did accused number...let me just ask you this first, do you know accused number 2 Thabo Gusha in this case?

[X.S. Bonase] Yes.

[Prosecutor] Did you see him there that day?

[X.S. Bonase] Yes.

[Prosecutor] Did he do anything to the deceased?

[X.S. Bonase] He threw her with a “dumpy” petrol.

[Prosecutor] Is that a small bottle?

[X.S. Bonase] Yes.

[Prosecutor] Now who threw first number 3 or 2?

[X.S. Bonase] number 3.

[Prosecutor] After that she was put alight?

[X.S. Bonase] That is correct?

[Prosecutor] Now who is the person that lit her?

[X.S. Bonase] Tamsanqa T.a.m.s.a.n.q.a. (p. 103)

From accused number 1 to accused number 5, the witness can locate each person and what they did. The witness also provided the reason for the action, namely that Nokwakha was *impimpi* and that is why she was burned.

The court has established what led to the death of Nokwakha: septic burn wounds with resultant liver, kidney and lung failure. The court also established how Nokwakha incurred the burn wounds and who were responsible for inflicting those wounds.

The Verdict

The court now determines that the burning of Nokwakha was unjustifiable. It contravened the laws of the society. The accused are found guilty.

Mitigating or Extenuating Circumstances

The following segment of the court narrative, having determined guilt, is to determine extenuating or mitigating circumstances, in order to determine a “just” punishment. The judge defined extenuating circumstances “as circumstances which morally, although not legal, reduce the enormity of the offence.” (p. 181). The court continues to list some mitigating circumstance such as: age, education, and mental functioning. As a result, the judge considered age, and decided against the death penalty for the accused who committed the offense when they were under the age of 18 years. Additionally, the judge considered education for accused number 1—who was sentenced to death— and notes that he “has enjoyed education; he passed standard 10 [grade 12],” meaning high school education. Hence, there was no mitigating circumstance inasmuch as he should have known better, by his education. Similarly, adding education to mental functioning and/or capacity, the judge said of accused number 2, “he is the person of full age who had enjoyed an education. He had time to think about what was taking place” (p. 182). The Judge’s deliberations were as follows;

[Judge] In our view there is no justification for a crime such as this, morally or otherwise. This woman was killed because she had done no more than to go and buy meat, when certain self-appointed persons had determined that she should not and because she had done what she was perfectly entitled to do, she was set upon and killed in one of the most cruel manners one can imagine. (p.182)... It is our unhappy experience, sitting in this Division [of Law], that it is youths of this age who frequently are responsible for acts of this type of terrorism against their own people. When they act as adults and behave as adults and try and enforce their will on others, this removes the extenuation that age would normally give them. It shows an inherent wickedness when they act this way (p. 183).

The judgment makes it clear that there are no moral justifications for such a crime. This was an act of terrorism by people self-appointed to uphold false and

illegitimate rules. The accused had no jurisdiction over where Nokwakha could or could not buy. So there was no moral impetus or justification for the perpetration of the crime. Rather, the accused were fully functioning people who, even though they were under age of 18, acted like adults and therefore should be treated as such.

The influence of the times.

The defense attorney argued that the times should be considered as mitigating factor. However, in both the defense attorney's plea, and the judge's response to it, there appears a reluctance or even an avoidance of considering the possibility of the times (the context) as bearing any mitigating influence. One might even ascribe a misunderstanding of the times to both the defense attorney and the judge. In fact, the judge mentioned time as factor only in relation to Nokwakha's family inasmuch as "it must be borne in mind that Joseph [Dilato] was living in unusual times in his township when violence and unrest was the order of the day. He had been subjected to one attack already" (p. 169). As it pertains specifically to the defense attorney's request, and the application to the accused, the judge responded that,

It has been suggested that he is a young man and could have been influenced by the *time* and the circumstances in which he lives and that he was doing what he did in furtherance *of a cause*, even if that cause is not one easily justified. It is said he did this not for personal gain (p. 182).

The judge continues to reject his own summary as having had an influence on this event and that there was nothing about and with these individuals' actions that is of any extenuating consequence. Rather, he expressed his belief in "an *inherent* wickedness when they act this way" (p. 183).

Therefore there is something above and beyond the times and the context: there is, within the actors, something inherently evil. Hence, the equation is rather straightforward: because there is something inherently evil within the accused, it was expressed in an evil and barbarous act.

The Sentence

Having considered extenuating and mitigating possibilities, and fundamentally finding none, the next step is sentencing: the judge says that the sentence must make it “clear to young men of your age in the township that savage conduct of this sort can never be tolerated in any civilized community” (p. 187). The court proved the burning was a murder, committed “in a most cruel manner” and therefore an “ultimate crime” calling for ultimate sentences, including death. Hence one of the accused is sentenced to death, two others are sentenced to twenty years each, and two are acquitted, one of whom is the state witness who, while he was there and participated in the burning of Ms. Dilato, goes free presumably because of his “assistance” and testimony for the state.

Interrogative

For all its insistence on the facts, on empirical evidence in order to get the story straight, the ultimate irony is that the very person sentenced to die, is the one that was not present at the event. The fabrication of the state witness as to who was where and did

what puts paid to the notion of this impartial and objective justice meted out with regard only to the truth of the action.

Moreover, I am struck by the absence of Apartheid in the court. There is no mention of Apartheid as having any influence on the event or on the trial, or being considered in any way as impacting an understanding of the event. The Judge and the prosecutor are following “strict” professional codes or duties of impartiality and supposed objectivity. The court, in that it considers “paramount ... that the ... process of justice is in no way hampered or hindered, weighing this always against the interest of the liberty of the individual” (p. 161), wholly overlooks and ignores Apartheid in meting out justice. The question is: can it do so justly? This when Apartheid permeates the room – for example what does the judge mean when he said the accused were committing acts of “terrorism against *their own people*”—including Nokwakha? (my emphasis). Are the perpetrators and Nokwakha not the judge’s people? Indeed, the questions of what qualifies as extenuating circumstances, whether there are any moral justifications for a crime of this sort, or not, or what the judge means when he says this crime “shows inherent wickedness” are not examined or struggled with, even as they seem to bear so deliberately and profoundly on the case.

The court’s narrative is a formulaic one, a linear one with a rule-bound protocol as to its telling that seems wholly out of step with how life is lived. Everybody involved seemed distant, mechanical, or robotically rational. There are no grey areas, no or very little affect; it is a story of experiences without experience; of pain without pain, of fact without affect. Mr Dilato is not asked to describe the last moments with Nokwakha, his sister-in-law, but he is asked to relate the chronological unfolding of the events placing

people in the scene and their possible role. Beyond giving facts, witnesses are required to either confirm or deny the Judge or the Prosecutor's scenario with "yes" or "no" confirming or denying answers seemingly the most valued. The quest to prove guilt or innocence beyond a reasonable doubt seems to show a fear of doubt. A strange thing indeed if one considers that doubt is crucial to reason.

Country of My Skull by Antjie Krog

The third data source is a book on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, authored by the respected and well-known poet and journalist, Antjie Krog (Krog, 1999). In this book, Krog makes particular mention of the Colesberg incident, and spends some time recounting how it was presented before the TRC. The book covers the cases over the lifespan of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, as extensive as it is. While the Colesburg incident takes up a very small portion of the whole, its importance is less in the number of pages or the extensiveness of the description, than in how this case is reported, and what it is made to signify.

On one level, the book is an account of the TRC hearings – Krog, after all, was a journalist covering the hearings as it happened. But, Krog is also an accomplished poet, and the book becomes much more than a journalistic account. It also explores political and moral philosophy, on the one broad level, and by means of an intensely honest, open, and reflexive biographical account, brings it all to intimate, individual, and personal aspects of identity, feeling, responsibility. Indeed, the subtitle of the book is "Guilt, sorrow, and the limits of forgiveness in the New South Africa" (at least for the international release of the book. It is interpretatively telling that the South African

edition does not have the subtitle; could it be that the subtitle is all too tautologically evident to the audience there?).

Each of the book's twenty three chapters are tellingly and poetically titled. After presenting, in the first two chapters of the book, the background to the creation of the TRC, the third chapter actually reports on the TRC hearings for the first time. It is here, very early in this chapter, that the Colesberg case is presented.

"Bereaved and Dumb, the High Southern Air Succumbs"

The title above is also the title to the chapter in Krog's book, where she notes the Dilato case. Indeed, out of the many cases that Krog covered as a journalist reporting on the TRC, one gets the impression that she regarded the Dilato case as exceptional and exemplary. That is, while the other stories were clearly all unique in some way or other, there was something about this incident that prompted Krog to provide it as a distilled example for all the others, or at least that it spoke to her, and us maybe, in a particular voice and tone. In the TRC proceedings excerpt of this case, the disturbing sentiment is shared by one of the commissioners, and it is as if the Colesburg incident comes to stand in not only for other necklacing incidents, but in fact is presented as an inaugurative moment. That is, even though it was not the first such incident, it seems that it represented a turning moment from which it spread in prevalence and frequency throughout the country. Although there were smoldering sparks already, this was the moment of "catching fire".

Not altogether separate from the manner in which the Colesburg incident comes to stand in for others, Antjie Krog's book itself comes to be a trope and metonym for the

TRC, the metonymy being about disturbance and rupture—a rupture with the past, the TRC, and herself. Structured around excerpts from the TRC proceedings, annotated by the author’s commentary, Krog offers her reactions, tries to capture the TRC atmosphere or mood, or otherwise draws incisive links across history, cases, or events. With respect to the Colesburg incident, Krog leads into the case with a commentary about the Eastern Cape.

On the Heels of the Eastern Cape

Why the Eastern Cape – why start at this scalp of green silence? (p. 46)

It has to be this part of the country [the Eastern Cape] that turns us inside out, that renders us: bare lips. It has to be this region of fierce opposites—meadows and plains, waterfalls and *dongas*, ferns and aloes—that sparks from a speechless darkness the voices of the past. And at long last, we can weep in the certainty of this April, in the assurance of the testimony of fellow South Africa. (p. 47)

At one level, starting her story of the Dilato case somewhere else, in the Eastern Cape, acknowledges a real, material, and close link between Colesberg and the Eastern Cape in that most Colesberg residents migrated from the Eastern Cape, share a language, and maintain family and ancestral ties with places and spaces in the Province of the Eastern Cape. The fierce opposites of this region, its “meadows and plains, waterfalls and *dongas*, ferns and aloes,” are also contrasted to the barren desolation and semi-desert starkness of the Klein Karoo, where Colesberg is located. And as people migrate(d) to Colesburg, so did the violence of necklacing, from its first occurrence in the Eastern Cape, to Colesburg, from where it would spread all over the country.

But there is another reason, Krog seems to suggest, for prefacing the Dilato case with a poetic description of the Eastern Cape, an elsewhere of the event, namely that “this part of Africa was the first frontier between black and white, between the terrestrial

endeavour of Africa and the maritime endeavour of Europe” (p. 46). The Dilato case, it seems, was to be seen in these terms of difference and relational enmity.

Voices from the Speechless Darkness of the Past

It is as if this case, for Krog, comes to epitomize and come to spark “from a speechless darkness the voice of the past.” Without speech, without writing, it conveys all the qualities of being stunned, shocked, in horror, or otherwise wordless, silent, unable to speak, or just difficult to express. In fact, Krog inserts here, for the first time in the book, a little poem – without commentary or warning:

dare I sit in this grape dark
during this return journey where my body is overcome
by grief my heart coagulate resigned

write I – a blue slit against this all ... (p. 53)

Citing one of the TRC commissioners, Krog seems to suggest for him, too, this Colesburg case in some way represents a voice from a speechless darkness:

Adv. Ntsebenza: this is a unique case from all the cases we have heard. We’ve been listening to cases where our people were being killed by police and the government, but now this is unique because our people are being killed by our own people at the same time. (p. 49)

This case is unique – and it is unique precisely in that it becomes the iterative moment when the precedent of the Eastern Cape is marked or installed to be brought back, to be repeated. The case breaks with the pattern and expectation of killing or injury

in clear racial and political terms – between oppressed Blacks and White oppressors. Instead, this killing occurs within the very ranks of the oppressed, within the Apartheid-ravaged communities themselves, and by the very people who live and share within those communities. Indeed, it seems to the TRC that there is also a lack of political motive, or at the least not sufficient a political motivation for the action. The killing is out of proportion to the motivation. This is especially salient for the TRC as its very charge is to manage a truth premised on amnesty and reconciliation for the manner in which the offense was politically charged. That is, under “usual” circumstances, there would be no possible justification for the action undertaken. However, during those political times, and the ways in which people were pressured to subscribe to certain political views, or seemingly freely adopted them, the circumstance might be presumably different. But still ... political motives consequently had to be demonstrated for the commission to reconcile their actions with politics, and the reconciliation such truth would fashion. In this case the commission found a decided difficulty – if not inability – to publicly and clearly reconcile the action and the motives, making it all the more shocking. Here is the TRC proceeding exchange between a witness, Mrs. Maliti who claimed to be a relative of Nokwakha, and the commissioner,

Adv. Potgieter: Was there any truth in this allegation that she was an *impimpi*, an informer?

Mrs. Maliti: That’s how they got her, but the reason why they burnt her is because my uncle is a policeman.

Adv. Ntsebenza: You said while this happened there was a boycott of the shops at that time. Your mother’s main offense was that she went to buy meat from the butchery—you will correct me if I am wrong... she tried to clear her name?

Mrs. Maliti: Yes.

Adv. Ntsebenza: According to the report that you gave to the people who were taking the statement earlier, she paid 100 rand?

Mrs. Maliti: Yes.

Adv. Ntsebenza: where did she send this 100 rand?

Mrs. Maliti: She sent it to the comrades and the comrades announced it, that she paid this R100 trying to ask for forgiveness for buying the meat during the consumer boycott. They said they forgive her. Now she took the letter to the township.

Adv. Ntsebenza: When she came back to the township, she was under the impression that she was forgiven?

Mrs. Maliti: Yes.

Adv. Ntsebenza: In other words...she was killed while she was still under the impression that she was safe, knowing that she was safe, knowing that she was forgiven?

Mrs. Maliti: Yes, that's so.

Adv. Ntsebenza: When did the police come in? (p. 48-49)

The exchange demonstrates the commissioner's attempt to establish not only how the incident occurred but also why it occurred. It is an attempt to establish the political context of this incident, an attempt made all the more difficult by the seeming inability to find precisely that political hook on which could be hung the justification for reconciliation, that is, the truth.

Truth Unspeakable

The case of Nokwakha seemed to stir what is unspeakable: the Truth. For Krog the word "Truth" is a crucial organizer of her narrative, as it was for the Commission – it was the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, after all. Truth is the beginning or the first step toward reconciliation, if not forgiveness. But where is it to be found? Krog's technical assistant tells her to "repeat it twenty times so that you become familiar with it. *Truth is mos jou job!*" ("Truth is your job, after all") (p. 50). After all is said and done truth is a job; the purpose of her vocation. They were commissioned to speak the unspeakable truth of Apartheid violence, or violence in the Apartheid state.

Many aspects of this case, however, prove discomfoting for the TRC and Krog, who notes that it “makes me uncomfortable”, and that this discomfort is especially salient given the assumption and search of the TRC, the country and perhaps Krog herself, for:

The word “truth” makes me uncomfortable.
The word “truth” still trips the tongue.
“Your voice tightens up when you approach the word ‘truth,’ ” the technical assistant says, irritated. “Repeat it twenty times so that you became familiar with it. *Truth is mos jou job!*” truth is your job, after all!”).
I hesitate at the word; I am not used to using it. Even when I type it, it ends up as either turth or trth. I have never bedded that word in a poem. I prefer the word “lie.” The moment the lie raises its head, I smell blood. Because it is there...where the truth is closest. (Krog, 1999, p. 50)

The word truth became difficult to approach; it led to both mental and physical discomfort. The tongue cannot say it, the hands cannot type it. “The word truth trips the tongue;” the language, speech. The job of the TRC, which includes truth, became something that is not easily articulated; unfamiliar, resembling this case to the TRC. The burning of Nokwakha disturbed the TRC’s job. This unusual case makes truth unfamiliar to the extent that it has to be repeated twenty times. Maybe on the twentieth time it will be more familiar.

Reconciliation as Sustenance

While Krog stumbles when encountering the word truth, she is comfortable with reconciliation. In fact, the word reconciliation is her “daily bread” (p. 50). Reconciliation is another organizer for Krog’s narrative. It is a daily bread, a sustenance or livelihood. Krog (1999), provides words that are related to reconciliation; “compromise, accommodate, provide, make space for. Understand. Tolerate. Empathize. Endure...

without it, no relationship, no work, no progress is possible” (p. 50). What is striking in Krog’s description of the word reconciliation is the inherent reference to the other. There is an assumption of two or more different positions which through reconciliation and compromise form a relationship. The two sides tolerate and endure each other so as a relationship can be forged, work can be done, and progress can be made. This is no less easier than truth, and “piece by piece we die into reconciliation” (p. 54).

And from here, even reconciliation falters. The lofty ideals of both Truth and Reconciliation are clearly what Krog knows is needed at the level of the country, at the level of “progress”, “guilt”, “mourning”, and the promise of a “new” South Africa, but as she listens to the testimonies, to the stories, to the fate of Nokwakha Dilato (whom, it seems, Krog comes to give voice to, and perhaps even identifies with profoundly, providing a presence in writing to Nokwakha’s absence), to the terrible violence recounted again, and again, what it means to her, personally, individually, in terms of her own psyche, becomes more and more difficult.

However – neither truth nor reconciliation is part of my graphite when sitting in front of a blank page ... Truth and reconciliation do not enter my anarchy. They choke on betrayal and rage, they fall off my refusal to be moral. (p. 50)

The months that have passed have proved my premonition right – the commission ... leaves most of us physically exhausted and mentally frayed. ... I stammer. I freeze. I am without language. ... the next morning the Truth Commission sends one of its own counselors to address the journalists. ‘You will experience the same symptoms as the victims. You will find yourself powerless – without help, without words. (p. 51)

I can talk about nothing but the Truth Commission. Yet I don’t talk about it at all.” (p. 63)

We tell stories not to die of life. (p. 64)

Responsibility Disturbed

The subtitle of Krog's book indicates guilt and sorrow are pertinent in her story. This narrative struck me as a narrative about culpability, guilt, and responsibility as the disturbing factor. Although Krog has no known connection with Colesberg, this case moved her to the extent that her tongue (language) and fingers (pointing) are disturbed. Her motor coordination is disturbed. Krog (1999) states that "I write the broken line (p. 50). I stammer. I freeze. I am without language" (p. 51). There is something about the reporting on the Truth Commission that disturbed Krog's language; the ability to express things.

The disturbance is the result of hearing and seeing sorrows. Of witnessing. And, having witnessed, "one cannot get rid of it. Ever." Indeed, one is called to respond, to responsibility. One is called to respond to the question of one's responsibility, and one's culpability, especially against the backdrop of the individual and the collective.

Humanity

What is it, though, that calls one to responsibility? It seems as if this answer has something to do with humanity, with the relationship to the other. Throughout *Country of my Skull* and the section pertinent to this research, the question of humanity is posed; "how could we lose our humanity like that?" (p. 59 "The victims ask the hardest questions: how is it possible that the person I loved so much lit no spark of humanity on you?" (p. 61). This may well be the question of this dissertation, as well.

CHAPTER 5

Discussion and Conclusion

To recapitulate: this dissertation examines political violence, arising as it does from my interest in a particular incident of violence in the town of Colesburg, South Africa, where I grew up. In the service of this interest and academic study, I proceeded to provide a historical overview of the South African political context, framing it within a discursive theoretical limit. I also provided a survey of the psychological literature with respect to political violence. It transpired, firstly, that psychology had very little to say about political violence, in particular, even as it did theorize violence in general. Extrapolating from such theories of violence, it was evident that psychology viewed violence largely as emanating from an internal disposition, structure, or psychic trait, with little to no credence paid to the contextual – at least not in any primary or determinative manner. Even those psychologists and researchers who theorize the power of the group and the context (for example the Zimbardo prison experiments, and his continued writing thereafter) nonetheless struggle to unsettle the primacy of some fundamental intrapsychic essence that ultimately trumps any other influence (if only one could strengthen it such that it comes into play in times of immoral conformity and obedience pressure, for example). Indeed, political violence proves to be a particularly thorny issue for psychology as the very conjunction of the political with violence seems to imply some externality, or at least some influence of a contextual surround on the expression of an ostensibly internal aggression. Moreover, the very sense of a context or a structure that incites, harbors, or facilitates violence, as in so called structural violence proves even

more of a conundrum for psychology beyond the reductionistic manner of observational learning, peer pressure, or learning principles, for example.

Proceeding, then, to those disciplines and fields of study that did examine political violence particularly (for example sociology and political science), the opposite trend seemed true – that whereas much attention was paid to the contextual and the situational, very little to no attention was paid to the intrapsychic or “psychological.” Focusing very deliberately on structures and ideologies, and on the political, there was very little of agency or subjectivity in these theories. It seemed to me that both theoretical ends missed important components of political violence, even as I was not quite sure yet what that might be.

Hence, this study aims to examine political violence, keeping in mind that particular theoretical tension between the contextual and the individual. To that end, I propose a discursive positioning vis a vis theory, as well as a methodological approach that is able to hold complex tensions, and that is not reductionistic, but mindful of the difficulty, if not impossibility, of divining absolute and enduring truths or essences. A hermeneutic semiology is proposed.

In the previous section, I consequently provided a narrative hermeneutic of each of the three data sources used in this study, as well as provided interrogative questions emanating from a reading of the text for the semiotic intertextual and deferral of meaning. These “data points” (and they are that for the manner in which they are positions, intentions, purposes, meanings, and/or arguments which provide a semantic reasoning) provide the basis for the discussion here. Of course, by this method it is not

entirely possible to separate results and discussion as is often the case in more “traditional” or “natural scientific” protocols or dissertations. Much discussion and interpretation already took place in the previous chapter, which was not just about a dispassionate presentation of results. The reader is reminded of Ricoeur’s (1991) assertion that separating explanation from understanding is a fallacy in that they are “relative moments in a complex process that could be termed interpretation” (Ricoeur, 1991, p. 126).

Each data point, firstly, was a narrative that organized the murder of Nombulelo⁸ Julia⁹ Nokwakha¹⁰ Dilato into an understandable, meaningful, and coherent whole. This meaningful story provides the first departure point for discussion.

Making Political Violence Mean

Political violence takes on different meanings depending, in part, on the social position(ing) of the person. The participants, the court and Krog all used different discursive tools and means to describe the same event, and to make meaning thereof.

Where the *perpetrators* are concerned, it is immediately apparent that political violence occurred, had meaning, or was the expression of a political end and aspiration, agreed upon by a larger collective, that is, by community grievances. In this formulation, the “political” in “political violence” has clear precedence, qualifies and mediates

⁸ A Xhosa name which means “one with gratitude or thankfulness”

⁹ Africans were also given Christian names, which were all English names. These names were usually given during or before baptism, and may or may not have been included on the birth certificate. Julia would be such a Christian name. The dynamics of colonization is clearly to be read in this practise.

¹⁰ Nokwakha was the name she was given by her in-laws. According to Xhosa tradition, when a woman gets married, her in-laws give her a new name that they will use when referring to her. Hence, Nombulelo became Nokwakha

“violence,” and in fact gives it being or meaning. As such the act is not an expression of any individual, of particularized malice or passion, or some other individual benefit, but the expression of a larger will, desire, and context. In fact, the perpetrators all suggested, in various ways, that they had to subordinate themselves, their selves, their senses of individual agency to the will and demands of a community that took precedence. The participants’ narratives point out that they were extensions of the collective – individuals only inasmuch as they are the connected fingers of the hand, community proxies and willing agents of a higher authority.

As an expression of the political, now, the violence visited upon Nokwakha Dilato can only have meaning against an Apartheid backdrop, against the story of centuries long oppression, discontent, and racial oppression towards black South Africans. To that end, the burning of Nokwakha was not an isolated individual act, rather a connected communal act. Particularly, and materially, participants pointed at deplorable “living conditions” and the lack of civil services to which they responded. Every single participant/perpetrator responded by providing “background”, and “context”; by listing how they were, in fact, victims of violence perpetrated by the apartheid state. When they provide a “background” to the burning, they list and elaborate their action to have been part of the environment of “dissatisfaction,” and “anger.”

At least at first glance, then, the contextual theories of sociology, anthropology, and the political sciences seem validated and borne out. The theories of structural violence that proposes violence in terms of violent systems or structures that create violent cultures and behaviors certainly find resonance in the stories of the participants.

A more difficult response, however, is to Archbishop Tutu's and African culture in general's proposition of the role of Ubuntu. To be sure, Tutu's assertion that Ubuntu involves the interdependent acknowledgment of one's humanity in the other could quite simply and somewhat banally be slotted into the formulaic extension of the arguments above – namely that the Apartheid regime had so dehumanized these young Black men that they could not be humane to others. But could it not be argued that, inasmuch as Ubuntu involves precisely the subordination of an individual self to that of the interdependent collective, to the good of the group and the collective, that the perpetrators *were* expressing Ubuntu, or a sense thereof? If a counterargument holds that that is not the case, that the murder of another person reflects a corruption of Ubuntu, of that much prized and valorized communal “African self”, even if and as that other person represents a threat to the well being of the group (as Ms. Dilato was to have been), then how is that? Or is it the extent of the response, that is, would “roughing her up”, or burning down her house, have been different in the terms of Ubuntu or this interdependent humanity than killing her? Ubuntu, it seems to me, needs to be theorized in greater depth and needs something more than the expression of interdependence or the axiomatic “a person is a person through other people.” I respond to this challenge later in the chapter.

The Court's response to political violence, to its meaning, takes a different tack, at first glance again, than that of the participants. Whereas it proceeds from a communal authority as well (recall that “the community” had authorized and “blessed” the murder

of Nokwakha Dilato¹¹), the difference is in the power the court musters to speak on behalf of a seemingly timeless lawfulness, a generalized precedent, and the longstanding truths of the nomological. Violence contravenes the law, and murder egregiously so. This, the court states rather explicitly because it is about protecting "... individual liberties" (p.161).

Unlike the valorization of "political" in "political violence," the court takes just the opposite view – "violence" is privileged, and prioritized with little to no acknowledgment or concern for "political" in the compound word, "political violence". Context, background, or "politics" have very little to do with the fundamental assertion of the extent to which a law regarding violence was transgressed, or individual liberties were violated. And, to the extent that it ascertains the extent of the transgression, or the intent and motivation of the actors implicated, the court – like psychology – turns its gaze on the individual.

Not unlike many psychological theories, the court ascribes motivation to "an inherent evil," a breakdown of parenting, or rationality, or some such individual ability to make moral adjudications — to know what is right and wrong, and to act accordingly. In this equation, there are no contexts or backgrounds or qualifying considerations beyond the indisputable fact that murder is wrong, and for the good of the society, the (deficient) member who murders, needs to be removed from that society and/or appropriately

¹¹ Is it mere coincidence that even as *benedicere* (to praise or worship) is the Latin departure for bless and blessing, the passage into English is through proto-Germanic *blotham* (blood), from the pagan practice of sprinkling sacrificial blood on the worship altar?

punished. Even an act like Necklacing, which is committed in a group situation, is carefully dissected to ascertain the role each individual played.

Krog's response, even in the form of its telling, differs markedly from the preceding two responses in the way in which meaning is made. In fact, very literally, meaning is made in the poetic, the cryptic, the personal and secretive, all alongside the descriptive and the journalistic report. For Krog, there is no truth, or meaning, to violence, at least in the sense of a law, or a hermeneutic essence. In fact, if there is a truth to violence, it is that it disturbs all truth, unsettles language, and points at the unspeakable, the unknowable, the uncanny, and the elsewhere of an other and an otherwise. As such, it calls for a singular response, and responsibility.

And now, now, all the first glances of the preceding analyses open up to reveal other meanings, or possibilities of meaning.

Making Political Violence Mean Redux

Each data point revealed or told a story in presence, plotted a meaning with characters, action, setting, conflict and the like; each organized themes, time, and the meaningfulness of an event into narrative. However, for each of these presences, I've also argued that there is an absence, a margin, or an unsaying to each of these data points' said. I've already demonstrated this notion of an interrogative that allows for a deconstruction of presence, and for a sensitivity to the places in the story where the story falters, is interrupted, is made "strange," is silent, or is otherwise discontinuous. By this

kind of reading, the stories offer a linkage of violence, and this particular incident of violence with aspects of witnessing, responsibility, ethics, and ultimately the relation to the other in Ubuntu.

Witnessing, firstly, is a central element of each of the stories, even as it is rarely (and in some cases never) mentioned as such. In some cases it is like an invisible structure that gives the visible form, like an out of sight, secret foundation that nonetheless is what holds the building together, gives it form, and forms it. The participants organized their narratives on what they saw or did not see. The court depended on statements of those who saw, and what was seen for all steps leading to the death of Nokwakha, and even thereafter. Krog's story is not only about witnessing of victims and perpetrators alike, but also about witnessing the witnesses, and witnessing the self witnessing the witnesses. In a real sense, so am I, and so is the reader – witnessing, attending, paying attention, “doing hermeneutics or deconstruction” which is to be present to the present, as well as those ghosts – like Nokwakha Dilato - whose absence haunts the present in presence.

Initially, one may be wont to think that witnessing or witness is a rather straightforward word, even ready-to-hand and requiring little thought. Is it not, after all, simply “to see, or to observe”. In this case it is to watch something happening, and is clearly related to its Latin roots, *videre* – “to see”. But in giving us witness, *videre* was also inextricably linked to the Sanskrit *veda* – “to know, or knowledge”. Hence, and to wit, to know was to see, and to see was also to know. And here we see the notion of an action as well – it is not only to see something happening, but sometimes also to see to it that it happens. In this latter, shall we say active sense, it is to assert, to attest, to act, to

give evidence: to testify. In fact, and in a somewhat circular motion, to testify – the Latin *testificare* – is nothing but “to bear witness”. And the etymological plot thickens even more – as a verb, in the active sense, witness is directly translated in the Christian literature of the medieval period from “*martys*” – martyr. To bear witness, is to be martyred; is to be troubled and to care, and to be troubled by care.

To witness is to be called to response, to responsibility. Whom, or what, is the witness responsible to? Whom or what calls for a response?

Even in the heat of the event, of the violence, the perpetrators do something seemingly puzzling: they throw sand on Nokwakha’s face so that it does not burn. The judge, employing the linear logic of the rational, also finds this act strange – it escapes the discursive order of the court’s narrative; he notes that: “Number 3 accused ... ordered him [State Witness] to throw sand over the head of the deceased to prevent that portion of her body from burning. This he did, though is not clear what the purpose of this operation was” (Judge, 170).

Interpreting this “strange” act, bearing witness to it, which is to say to attest to it, is to invoke Emmanuel Levinas (and, as I will show, later, Ubuntu). Indeed, this strange interruption or discontinuity (among others which I highlight later) may well be the interruption of the saying into the said, which is another way perhaps of noting that as a “*saying* must bear a *said* ... the *saying* is the fact that before the face I do not remain there contemplating it, I respond to it. The *saying* is a way of greeting the Other, but to greet the Other is already to answer for him” (Levinas, 1982, p. 88). For Levinas, the face is the opening of an entire first philosophy of ethics and the ethical. A philosophy

that is also of the other and subjectivity. The face commands ethical relations between humans; it mediates the encounter with the Other (Levinas, 1985).

[S]ignification of the face makes it escape from being, as a correlate of knowing ... the relation of the face is straightforward ethical. The face is what one cannot kill, or at least is that whose meaning consists in saying: “thou shall not kill.” Murder, it is true, is a banal fact; one can kill the Other; the ethical exigency is not an ontological necessity. (p. 87)

Indeed, the very meaning of subjectivity, of an “I” for Levinas is subjection to the other – the subject is never ‘for itself,’ but always ‘for another.’ The other is the source of all signification. It is, even, that the very ability to say I, that subjectivity itself, is given by the other; by the I’s responsibility for, and to, the other (Levinas, 1985).

Subjectivity cannot be in hostility to the other, but is rather in welcoming the other “as hospitality; in it the idea of infinity is consummated” (Levinas, 1961, p. xv). The other appears – says, “here I am” (a Biblical reference), and I am called to respond to that claim, to being claimed thus. It is a responsibility I can never be absolved from, and to see the face is already to hear thou shalt not kill. The other is what enables me to be myself and to recognize myself for the first time. My response is my responsibility. My responsibility is my martyred attestation, my witnessing. For Levinas, if something has no face, it has no call on me, and I have no responsibility towards it (1982). Morality is a response to the face. And to respond is “the essential, primary and fundamental structure of subjectivity” (Levinas, 1982, p. 95). The tie with the other is “knotted only as responsibility” (97), and “I am I in the sole measure that I am responsible ... responsibility is what is incumbent on me and what, humanly, I cannot refuse” (Levinas, 1982, p. 101).

Now it is true that the face of the other breaks through and threatens being-at-home with oneself, and does so asymmetrically. The other comes from on high – it demands things of myself which I cannot demand of the other. Yet, it is also a “destitute” master: “there is a commandment in the appearance of the face, as if a master spoke to me. However, at the same time, the face of the Other is destitute; it is the poor for whom I can do all and to whom I owe all” (Levinas, 1982, p.89). “The face is exposed, menaced, as if inviting us to an act of violence. At the same time, the face is what forbids us to kill” (EI, 86). The possibility of violence, therefore, is also announced in the appearance of the face.

But violent action “does not consist in being in a relationship with the other; it is in fact an action where one is as though one were alone” (Lingis, 1987, p, 18). Violence is an attempt to eradicate relation, it is to renege on responsibility, by ambush, and to “take hold of the substance of the other, what is strong and absolute in him, through what is weak in him” (Lingis, 1987, p. 19). The other cannot be mastered, and it is precisely the absolute defenseless face, the nakedness of the face that says no, that - even in killing - cannot be killed. The face affects us outside of all categories, and not in the indicative, but in the imperative.

Is it any wonder, then, that the participants described the moment of assault in terms of *izikizi*, this unspeakable Xhosa word for the unspeakable, for what cannot be worded, for what is outside of experience, and the material?

[P3]No [hayi] yayingekho into ndandiyifila, qha ke net into endandiyifila njena yayingamasikizi nangona siyenza lento but yayingamasikizi because ukubulawa komntu yabona?

[P3] No there was nothing that I felt, only that I felt it was scary (gruesome). Although we were doing it, it was scary (gruesome); it was scary because it was a killing of *a person* you see?

Izikizi is not really “gruesome,” but here translation fails, as it must – language as a whole fails here inasmuch as it attempts to describe the indescribable. It is not that “there was nothing that I felt,” but that what I felt was nothing of this world, nothing that lends itself to this world and this word.

[P2] [A]lthough I was, we have been angry at the Apartheid regime, [at] their police, soldiers, and even informants, but she was lying there crying, screaming, you know; flames all over her body [pauses] I was scared [chuckles, shifts his seating]. I was scared; you know why I was scared? I never hurt anyone in the past. But, now I could see: *here is a person*, I also participated; she is burning, screaming. I sometimes, you know, I felt I could have gone again [to] try to help her

Amasikizi is a reaction to what comes from elsewhere, from witnessing something gruesome, or expecting something dreadful to happen not to you but to someone who is connected to you in one way or the other. It is the moment when you see your child, whom you love more than yourself, running to the edge of the curb as the truck races down the road and you see the terrifying possibility of what could happen next – *amasikizi* is that fear, that dread, that gruesome possibility that is not for oneself, but for, and from, the other. *Isikizi*, read thus, is then never and not for P2 and P3, it is not that *they* were scared, but that they were scared for Nokwakha. Not only that, but *into engajongekiyo* (something that you cannot bear witness to, that you cannot bear to bear witness to, that cannot be looked at or observed). It is, Krog reminds us, what causes the skies to fall, the high southern skies to succumb, bereaved and dumb.

Is it any wonder that P2, and all those perpetrators of the Truth Commission “breaks down” in their desire to “face” the victims of their actions in this hope and yearning to reconcile with them, to “set the record straight,” which is, of course, an impossibility in itself. There is no way, in the words of the court or the amnesty and pardon of the politicians, that one could have paid one’s debt to society, that the perpetrators could now be “productive citizens.” To be sure, the court can adjudicate culpability, and assign a sentence, but culpability is not responsibility. Culpability chains the person to an act, a behavior, and an activity; responsibility, on the [O]ther hand, chains the person to an [O]ther.

Ubuntu Redux

I started this dissertation with the words of Archbishop Desmond Mpilo Tutu, that “we are bound up in a delicate network of interdependence because as we say in our African idiom a person is a person through other persons,” which is a translation of a Xhosa proverb *umntu ngumntu ngabantu* which has been passed on through generations. Tutu (1999) goes further to say in accordance with this idiom that to dehumanize another person means you are inexorably dehumanizing yourself. It is, the assumption holds, a violation of Ubuntu, a corruption of *Umntu ngumntu ngabantu*, this distilled statement of what it is to be human, and of humanity.

Umntu ngumntu ngabantu, where *ngu-* means “it is,” and adding *-mntu* changes it to be “he or she is”. Both the fact of “is-ness” as it is, as it were, and that *one* is, the is-ness of a person is attested to, is to be announced, by *nga-*, a preposition which means

“by means of, through, with, by, about, and concerning.” Ngabantu — by means of an other person, through an other person, by an other person. It is through the other that one becomes a person; each person depends on another for their humanity to be fulfilled. It is straightaway ethical, an ethical obligation that is asymmetrical inasmuch as it is the other person who takes precedence. And, to be an individual is to be always and already in a relationship with other person. One’s very subjectivity is given by an/other person.

The similarities between this seemingly ageless, ancient African sense+ability – Ubuntu – and the philosophy of Levinas is apparent and deliberate. That a person depends on an/other person for their humanity and personhood is what Tutu (1999) references and Levinas theorizes. It is a claim on all of us, all of us who have now witnessed, and are called to testify, to respond and bear responsibility.

In Conclusion

In the end, this dissertation is lodged in a psychology department, and serves as a credentialed passage to work as a psychologist. What, then, does it offer or promise psychology, in particular?

Firstly, this dissertation demonstrates that the psychological literature on violence in general, and political violence in particular, has serious and devastating shortcomings and lacunae. Much, much more research and theory is needed in this area. Hopefully, as well, it is clearly not just the fact of more and more research that is questioned here, but

also the manner thereof. This dissertation serves as a warning for reductionistic and simplistic explanatory attempts, as psychology is so wont to do.

It is important that psychology takes context into serious account (as sociology and anthropology, for example, needs to take agency and subjectivity into account), and wrestle with the implications of such an accounting, if it is to provide a fuller sense of the phenomenon. How can one understand violence in Colesberg if one is to start and end with the singular event of 1985? Or the merely material and empirical? Or the strictly individual and internal? Violence, as relation, constituted the very way of people's life. Apartheid, in the end, was nothing less than relation, and its violence, structural and particular, was all about relation. We need a psychology, in the first instance, that can theorise and tolerate the violence of the structure and the relation. I alluded to the promise of discourse and a discursive psychology in this regard. It certainly is one way to go.

There are some theorists and arenas where psychology has started to play new kinds of roles. For example, the burgeoning area of peace psychology is very new and offers much promise and potential for the incorporation therein of context, history, and the specificity of culture. However, for it to deliver on that promise it needs to be sensitive to a reductionistic caution – already this emerging movement is starting to look like just another variable driven social psychology, applied to aspects of war and peace. If psychology in general, and these specific applications and areas in particular, are to offer anything new, it needs to rethink the very manner of its epistemology. There have been authors that have paved the way – I've already referenced discursive psychology. Other authors like Bulhan's (1985) work on Fanon and psychology of oppression remain

largely unrecognized within psychology. Hopefully this dissertation, as well, could be considered an opening for such a psychology.

Inasmuch as a human science psychology calls on the reader or the researcher to respond to human experience, it

... recognize(s) human characteristics that are not particularly amenable to the traditional methods of the natural sciences. These characteristics include humans' simultaneous shaping of their environments even as they are shaped by them, behaving in accordance with their experience rather than just responding to external determinants, and being purposive...its purpose is to integrate those achievements with others that emerge from recognition that humans are at once physical, biological, and psychological — related to their environments through consciousness, actions, and goals, as well as through history and unconscious behavior (Fischer, 1994, p.5).

But beyond the emphasis on a descriptive, qualitative, discursive, experiential, or otherwise nuanced, complex, and human scientific charge to the study of violence, what this research has also shown, is that there is an unspeakable, an ineffable, and infinite aspect to violence and the relational which perhaps amounts to the same thing, an ethical dimension through and through. We need a psychology for the other, as it were, that can also take these aspects into account. It is heartening that some such work has begun, for example, Gantt & Williams (2002) and Kunz (1998), but much more is needed. Their work suggests a pursuit of psychology as a science of the ethical, which is influenced by Levinas's work. Perhaps, as well, African scholars and scholars from Africa, particularly, could explore a psychology of Ubuntu, or from Ubuntu, which may or may not be a very similar project to a Levinasian psychology. This dissertation may be a beginning note to that exploration.

It is true that Apartheid has insinuated itself in every aspect of our lives as South Africans, and for many of us, will continue to do so for generations to come. It is true, too, that the particularly violent character of Apartheid tore at that delicate network of interconnectedness, for so long so ably expressed and directed by Ubuntu. But even then, even for its tearing, there remains, and remained, the imperative that is beyond the power and authority of the structure - the “you, yourself (*nguwe, wena*),” my grandfather would insistently point out “who holds that mantle, it is you who allows humanity to appear” (*ufunek’ubonakalis’ubuntu*) – his way of reminding me of a responsibility before any politics, ideology, or structure. A responsibility that comes from, in Levinas’ words, an “Otherwise than Being, or beyond essence”, and that declares one *unobuntu* (*a person who has humanity*). This declaration, this *unobuntu*, it is equally telling, is never something one can bestow on oneself – it is only the other who can gift one the status of *unobuntu*, a person who has humanity – who is a person.

In the end, and as ending, this (that) “beloved country of grief and grace” inspires a poem

because of you
this country no longer lies
between us but within

it breathes becalmed
after being wounded
in its wondrous throat

in the cradle of my skull

it sings, it ignites
my tongue, my inner ear, the cavity of heart
shudders towards the outline
new in soft intimate clicks and gutturals

of my soul the retina learns to expand
daily because of a thousand stories
I was scorched

a new skin.

I am changed forever. I want to say:

forgive me

forgive me

forgive me

You whom I have wronged, please
take me
with you. (Krog, 1998, 364)

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Appendix A: INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD MATERIAL

English Consent form

CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH STUDY

TITLE: Political violence in South Africa: A study of Necklacing in
Colesburg

INVESTIGATOR: Siphon Mbuqe, M.A.
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Bongweni
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9795, South Africa
Tel: 051 753 0243

ADVISOR: Leswin Laubscher, Ph. D.
Department of Psychology
Duquesne University
Tel: 412 396 1843

PURPOSE: This study is being performed as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the doctoral degree in Clinical Psychology at Duquesne University. You are asked to participate in a research project that seeks to investigate the occurrence of necklacing in Colesburg. The purpose of this study is to better understand necklacing, and provide you a platform to express your experiences, thoughts, and opinions on the issue.

DESCRIPTION OF PROCEDURE: A qualitative research method will be used.

The data will be the descriptions of the participants' experience. In order to access your experience we will conduct one or two interviews. Each interview will take 60-90 minutes. In the first interview, you will be asked to describe in as much detail as possible your experiences of the necklacing event, including experiences thereafter as it relates to the event. This interview will be tape recorded and transcribed. The purpose of the second interview will be to allow clarification and elaboration of what was said in the first interview, if necessary. All identifying information will be eliminated from the written document. These interviews will be conducted at a place chosen by both of us.

RISKS AND BENEFITS: There is a risk that the interview may bring up painful feelings about the events of, and surrounding, necklacing. However, people often benefit from discussing their experiences in detail with a non-judgmental and informed listener. The experiences you share may be helpful in understanding what you and other participant dealt with, how you felt and acted, and how you made sense of your experiences since that day. This information will help psychologists, other mental health professionals, and scholars to understand your experiences.

COMPENSATION: you will not be compensated for your participation. Likewise, there will be no fee for participating.

CONFIDENTIALITY: Your name and other identifying information will be deleted and will not appear in the published dissertation. Every attempt will be made to maintain your confidentiality and anonymity, as well as that of other people you reference. All written materials and consent forms will be stored in a locked file a researcher's home. All recorded tapes material will be destroyed at the completion of the research. However, it is also true that your name is in the public record as far as certain documents are concerned (the court documents, the transcripts of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and Antjie Krog's book, *Country of my Skull*). Inasmuch as this dissertation references those documents, it may be possible to align the events described in the dissertation with that described in the documents listed, and in that manner come to an identification.

RIGHT TO WITHDRAW: You are under no obligation to participate in this study. You are free to withdraw your consent to participate at any time.

SUMMARY OF RESULTS: A summary of the results of this research will be supplied to you, at no cost, upon request.

VOLUNTARY CONSENT: I have read the above statements and understand what is being requested of me. I also understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw my consent at any time, for any reason. On these terms, I certify that I am willing to participate in this research project.

Participant's Signature Date

Researcher's Signature Date

Xhosa Consent Form

IFOMU YOKUVUMA UKUTHATHA INXAXHEBA KUFUNDO-PHANDO

ISIHLOKO: Political violence in South Africa: A study of
Necklacing in Colesburg

UMPHANDI-FUNDI: Sipho Mbuqe, M.A.
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INJONGO: Olufundo-phando luyinxalenye lweemfunekosesidanga sombuqgirha kwicandelo lwe-Clinical Psychology e-Duquesne University. Uyacelwa ukuba uthathe inxaxheba kolufundo-phando. Injongo yoluphando kukuqonda izimvo zakho, ngentsingiselo yesehlo ekuthiwa kuku-Neklesa. Enye yenjongo kukuqonda ndzulu lento kethiwa yiNekles, kwaye sinike wena mnt'uthath'inxaxheba ithuba lukuba ucacise izimvo zakho ngophangaleleyo. Eli lithuba lokuba usihlephulele kumava wakho ngalo mcimbi ungentla.

Kusisela ngonya ka 1995 emva kokuba kulungwe iKomishoni yeNyani noXolelwaniso, abantu baseMzantsi Afrika bakwiphulo lokwakha isizwe esitsha. Yiyo ke lento bathethe isigqibo sokuphanda ngokutyeshelwa kamalungelo abantu, ngexhesha lengcinezelo phantsi korhulumente wocalucalulo.

Naxa bebeninzi abenze ufundo-phando ngokutyeshelwa kwamalungelo abantu, ulwazi ngesigaba seNeklase lusemfiliba. Ngako ke yiyo lento singanuwuyeka urhone, sithi make siwuyekele kumathamb'engqondo awetyise. Ukuzwe uthi thaa kutsho kubhents' ubunzima balo mcimbi. Injongo kukuqanqulula sibon'ekumithwe yiNeklasi. Uyakuba ngomnye wabantu abathathu abazakuthath'inxaxheba kolufundo-phando.

INGCACISO YENDLELA

OLUPHANDO

LUZAKUHAMBA NGAYO: Injongo zam kukuhlalutya, ndiphicothe, izimvo zenu ngaphandle kukusenbenzisa izibalo namanani. Ndizakuphonononga ekumithwe

zizimvo nentetho zenu. Ndizimisele ukuba sihlale phantsi ixesha elinga nge yure (1hr) ukuya kwiyure ezimbini (2hrs). Mandigxininise ukuba injongo kukufumana uluvo, namave wenu ngalomba. Emva kwendibano yokuqala siyakuphinda sidibane ukuze undicacisela ngimiba engeka khanyi kum. Yonke into oyithethayo ndiyakuyishicilela nge-tape recorder, kwaye ndibhala kuxwebhu endakuba ndiliphethe. Ndiyathembisa ukuba ndiyakutshabalalisa yonke into eyakuthi idize amagama abantu ukuba undithi mandeze njalo. Intlanganiso siyakuzibambela kwendaw' ekhethwe ndim nawe mbandanyekwa.

UBUZAZA/NOBUNGOZI

KUNYE INDZUZO

YOKUTHETHIXHAXHEBA

KOLUPHANDO: Olufundo lunzima ngoba lunokuvuselela imizwa nenkumbulo zeziganeko ezenzeka kudala, ezinye zazo sele niziphose kwelokulibala.

Ngamany'amazwi ukuthunik'izilond'esezibuphola. Kodwa ukuba kukhu' ukunqulunganya nombuzaza ngesisihlo, uthetha ngaso kungaba liyeza nako. Ugalelo lwakho ngaloba luyakuhlangabezana nemfuno zabo banjong' ikusembeza nokuphanda sesimo nangengqond' omntu i-psychologist. Mandigxininise kwakhona ukuba injongo yam ayiyokuba ngugwebi okany ijaji. Hayi, ndizimisel'ukuqonda nje kuphela.

INTLAWULO: Akukho ntlawulo iyakuzuzwa ngokutheth'inxaxheba kolu lufundo-phando. Kwaye kungekho ntlawulo uyakuyenza ngokuthath'inxaxheba.

UBUMFIHLELO: Kwakhona ndiyakuqinisekisa ukuba igama lakho lakuhlala liyimfihlelo. Ngokunjalo amagama abantu ababandekanyenayo akayakubhengezwa nokubhengezwa kolufundo-phando. Kwakhona mandithembise ukuba ndiyakutshabalalisa zonke inzinto endixishicilele ngethuba ndidibene nani.

ILUNGELO LOKURHOXA: Awunyanzelekanga ukuba uthath'inxaxheba kolufundo-phando. Okwesibini ikwalilungelo lwakho ukuba urhoxa nangaliphina ithuba.

IZIPHUMO: Ndizakukubonisa iziphumo and nekuqulathwe loluphand.

ISIVUMELWANO

SOKUTHATH' INXAXHEBA: Ndilufindile olu xwebhu ndiyathemda ukuba lento ibhalwe apha iyavakala. Kwaye ndiyaqond'ukuba andinyazelwanga ukuba uthath'inxaxheba, ndikwenza ngokuphuma kum.

Participant's Signature

Date

Researcher's Signature

Date

APPENDIX B: PARTICIPANT 1 INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT

Interview with Mr. P1

Sipho: One, as I stated before thatthe subject of this interview, I am interested in understanding the case that happened here in Colesburg that involve Usis Nokwakha, and you are free to say no if you are not comfortable with some of the questions, but I will appreciate it if you can be detailed as much as you can and if I have if need more clarity in certain points I will ask you to say more.

The first question is—it is not necessarily a question—but I wonder if you would describe what happened?

P1: okay thank you, Mr. Interviewer, I, P1, I think it was on Tuesday in the morning. There was an uprising in Colesberg and we said we boycott each an every shop in town. And what happened, the said lady went and bought something from the butchery: it was Persie's butchery at that time, but now today it have been renovated to N1. So what happened is that some of our marshals, I will term them as marshals, found out that this lady bought meat there and took the meat and trampled on it and they gave it to the dogs. Okay, we as leadership of the youth organization - Colesberg Youth Organization (COYO), went to her to try and resolve the matter but she said “you see, you P1, you Thabo, will sleep in prison today and your hair will be cut.” And we started thereafter to think that this lady has got a mission against us. Knowing well her husband is a police officer, already we know that. So we tried to negotiate with her, but unfortunately, all our

negotiation were in vain. It was, I forget the dates, we went to her house when the people said “No! this lady always has a Walkie-Talkie” and we went to this lady It was unfortunate for us because when we arrived there - she was staying in Bongweni, a lot of people came out of her house, with pangas and all those things and the police from Slagkor area to rescue her and we run away.

Sipho: So you said you went to the house but before you went to the house people told you that she has a Walkie-talkie and then you went to the house and said there was....and when you got to the house what happened?

P1: When we got there was lot of people who are familiar to her because weour intention was to talk to the lady as we stated before, unfortunately we were confronted with violence and we resorted to violence, and it went a long way. It was the 2nd of October, if I am not mistaken. We were meeting down there and we said to ourselves, “people! Let us get rid of this lady.”

Sipho: What do you mean? You said you met down there.

P1: It was in, you see, our house where I stay presently, no not presently my mama’s house, there were rocks there in front of the church there were stones. We sat there, and we said “People! We get the information that this Mama always has a Walkie-talkie and she is the one who’s calling the police whenever we want to do something. It was okay and we sent one guy

Sipho: So you said, let me just backtrack a little bit.

P1: Okay

Sipho: You said you sat on the rock and people decided that she must ... I didn't get the other part.

P1: No we said.....As we stood there at the rock we said okay; we've got the information that this lady has a Walkie-talkie and is ...she is the one who's calling the police now and then whenever there is anything that is happening.

Sipho: Okay, happening in the community?

P1: Yes, yes

Sipho: Mh

P1: Then we sent one guy who was moving on the cycle, a bicycle, and said to him, "you go and check if this lady will be coming down to her work," And it was like that. And the guy came back to us and reported to us that the lady is coming down while we were still standing there on the rock. Some of the masses went to Kartaarstraat and they find this lady... after finding this lady

Sipho: Kartaarstraat as in Kartaar street (gesturing)?

P1: Yes Kartaar Street. They poured petrol above her on her in fact and they set her alight. When we moved from the rock, the scene now where whole issue happened. We were there and Toto Mayaba come to us ask us, "People what happened?" No one should have.....no one could say Toto this is one, this is two, this three, because the rest of us were so much annoyed about the whole thing that happened.

Sipho: You said when you say the rest of you guys were annoyed about the whole thing, which is what is the whole thing?

P1: The thing of the burning of the lady.

Sipho: Okay okay I see

P1: And we managed to run away because people said, “There are the police,” and we ran away. There is an old lady whom they called Mama [mother] Siliya Dikeni. She is the one who came to the rescue of this lady by pouring unboiled eggs. You see unboiled eggs help to keep the burns from being too much and we run away.

On the second, no on the third, I was on my way to take my children to school. I went to school, this school, this one, it was still SS and I left my children, I met Mama NK and she said to me “Man as you, as comrades, you know whenever we have problems we have to report to you so now I am having a problem.” We were discussing this mama’s case until we reached the end of the hall where there was a building, you see at the hall. We saw school children running all over and we questioned them, “what is happening?” And they said, “They are in, the police.” Okay; I run away, T run away, O run away. Next to the small principal’s house—the—grey house in front of the hall, I got at the next house, P2 got in the principal’s house. Toto and I slept there; I hid myself under the bed. Toto was on top of the bed and the police arrived and they said they “need this P1,” but they were talking on radios. But they said no man this P1 man is not here. We were always wearing overalls, blue overalls, but the guy who is always talking to Walkie-talkie insisted that P1 is in that house and that guy was Becker who’s an inspector today and th... Maliti who have passed away not Maliti from Middleburg there one was who was here – the old man the one who had passed away recently.

Sipho : the old Fezile

P1: Fezile Maliti, those are the people who said to them P1 is there. The Hippo arrived. When the hippo arrived, they went in to make a search. They searched, and searched and searched at the ultimate end they got me, and they beat me up. I even forgot a knife I had. I was telling myself that, “Whenever I am arrested, the first policeman, I will stab him,” but it was unfortunate I forgot all those things because they were a lot. They beat me up. We were taken to police station Toto and I. When we arrived, they called the special branch from Middleburg. It is one of the Malitis, Leeman Maliti; we always called like that and Botha. They arrived in the afternoon. When they arrived they said to me Maliti himself, “P1 tell me who burned that lady.” I said, “no I do not know anything.” And they said to me, “would you have liked if that was your sister who have passed away should have been killed in that manner?” and I said, “no, I don’t know anything.” So they started torturing us. There is a what is this thing... executive case... executive case they called it “die swartman” [Afrikaans for “the black man”].

Sipho: The executive.....case what is it?

P1: This onelike this okay

Sipho: Briefcase

P1: Yes the briefcase

Sipho: Okay.

P1: So seemingly they were having these machines of them to torture me. And they tortured me to such an extent that I said I am sick and tired of this now. And they took me out of the police station. They went with me to a road to Phillipstown/ Petrusville.

They put my legs in something like a dam you see it's not a dam actually but whenever there is rain then water stops there. They put me there, they put something on my fingers these finger the big fingers and then they put a cloak on my head.

Sipho: Something in your toes?

P1: Yes in my toes, these two toes the big one

Sipho: Something like what?

P1: Like a clamp, you see a clamp, a battery clamp.

Sipho: And then?

P1: They put a cloak above me then I didn't see anything. The only thing that I heard I don't know whether a generator or what you see but what I felt my feet were running like this* (shaking)..... In the water and I was already handcuffed at the back and the guy came to me, Maliti, and said to me, "P1 tell us the truth." And I said to him I don't know anything. The rain was coming down and I said to him you see if I die today you will die also that was the words that I said to him. They took me put on the van and we went back to Colesberg. From Colesberg I was in awaiting trial with the same Toto because P2 was already arrested in Gauteng.

Sipho: You said you were awaiting trial

P1: Yes, when we were here, me and Toto sat down and said you don't know Toto, Thabo and I do not know him. If ever P2 can say who burn the lady it will be honest. But we manage to get the information, there was a guy from Graaf Reinet, but I won't remember his surname but the name is uThamsanqa who poured petrol on this lady and a

guy from Colesberg who set this lady alight, that is AA from Colesberg and none of these people were even arrested.

Sipho: You said a guy from Colesberg.

P1: Yes, I went to the regional court for cases like public violence, arson which I won the cases and there was this only case that was outstanding of murder. I went to the Circuit court of the..... it was the Eastern Cape whilst at that time in Graaf Reinet, It was me, J, P2, E and Y the rest of us we were five.

Sipho: So it's you, J, P2, E and Y.

P1: And Y. Our case started on the 10th of December, on the 11th the rest of us were found guilty by the presiding Judge Kannemeyer, who was the President judge in that time for the Eastern Cape. And there was a senior advocate Kingsley, who was assisting them as a prosecutor. On the 12th E and Y were acquitted.

Sipho: You said all of you guys were found guilty.

P1: But on the 12th, the day of the sentence E and Y were not found... were acquitted, our lawyer it was Mr. Jappie from Durban who questioned that and they said because of their age they are not going to be charged.

Sipho: How old were they?

P1: They were 15 yrs,17 yrs. E was 15 and Y17.

Sipho: So because of their age they were not going to be charged?

P1: Yesand we went on the sentence came down, P... got 17 yrs for murder, 3 yrs for public violence. P2 got the same sentence. I got the death penalty with 3 yrs for public violence. Thereafter I will go over now to the question of Pretoria. I was givenit was on February if I am not mistaken I forget the dates now a notice of execution 199...1986, 1981,..... 1987, 1989 I got a notice of execution. I appealed on that but we manage to win the case. In 1988 when the former state President got a stroke and the late Oliver Tambo got a stroke after these negotiations of Groote Schuur and Pretoria minutes we manage to win the late....I don't know whether he is still alive now ...Heunis. He was a guy for foreign affairs in the former government.... Chris Heunis he was acting in that place. He is the one who reprieved me from death row and I was given 20yrs imprisonment. I went to a lower prison in Pretoria from there I was removed from Pretoria to Gauteng in Sandtone in Leeukop Prison where after these whole negotiations, the late Chris Hani was there and old lady mama Sisulu was there who came to us. We were on a hunger strike; it lasted for 21 days and is when the government started to hear our case as political prisoners because they said in most cases we are not political prisoners. But we knew very well that what we did was because of politics, we did not want our people to suffer. There was a cause for us to do all those things. So the former government managed, I can say, he managed because of the pressure that came to them. They decided that "Let us release these people whereas we say they are not political prisoners," because there was no ...hmm... what can I say a term to say who are political prisoner who are not, because the cause is one. Because even the old man himself, was not regarded as a political prisoner. So we felt that we have to do this for the sake of ourselves and sake of our people.

Sipho: You mean the hunger strike

P1: Yes, because if we would have sat there and done nothing, we would have been in a problem. So I was released on the 25th of September 2002, and came to this community.

Sipho: So you were released on the 25th September 2002?

P1: No no no man not 2002, 1992 (laugh). So there was jubilation, people were happy. People said, “We are happy because you are back because we heard that you are going to hang and all those things. We are listening on radios but your gods...they assisted you.” and I said to them “I agree with you my gods have assisted me, but you have to make thanks to the organization because the organization are the people who fought for me.” They bought me lawyers and lawyers and lawyers and lawyers, you see, so that I can manage to win this case and I manage that, that’s all tata.

Sipho: I have few questions, I will start where we started. So you said 1) is that there was a consumer boycott?

P1: Definitely

Sipho: So this ... the lady went to buy something from Persie’s butcher store and Marshal caught her and you guys were informed that she bought something and went to negotiate...did you say you went to confront her or.....?

P1: No! What actually happened after we received the message that the lady have bought meat from Persie’s slaghuis we went to the lady to try and negotiate the whole issue, but the lady never listened to us. That was the issue.

Sipho: Who is we, because you said we?

P1: It was me, and P2, and L, and S I don't know his surname now, he was with us in the BEC.

Sipho: Is that S?

P1: Yes.

Sipho: Hmm...you went to you said you went to resolve the matter?

P1: The matter...

Sipho: Mhh...

P1: and what happened there is that the lady didn't want to talk to us and started insulting us and she said "ons sat maar gaan slap met kort hare, *niyakulala nichetyiwe*"

Sipho: Julle gaan slaap.....?

P1: "Ons gaan slaap met die geskeerde kop geskeerde koppe" that is what made I, [the] community to be *ibenomsindo* (*angry*) I can say that to be angry because we went to the community and reported ba [that] one there is this thing now.

Sipho: So after she said this you went to the community to report...?

P1: Yes yes yes ...because we were puzzled P2 was not there, I was not there, and J was there but the marshals were there. So our names came in now. She felt that you as leadership you know the whole issue by naming our names.

Sipho: So you guys were not there when they tramped on her meat?

P1: No, no, no, we were not there.

Sipho: You said she felt that you as leadership were

BreakBreak.....

Sipho: So you said then you went back and reported and then...?

P1: After the community realized that there this question of i- [a] walkie-talkie that this lady was always having, and what happened into [was that] why should this lady have a walkie-talkie so there was suspicions already that this lady is an informer, and that brought to a conclusion that we have to do our utmost best to monitor her. And that led to this unfortunate...this unfaithful day of her burning.

Sipho: Unfaithful?

P1: Yes, it was unfaithful because she was on her way to work and there were already people waiting for her; for her own inter....for her own deeds that causes that caused the death of her.

Sipho: There were people waiting for her?

P1: Yes...and that happened like that as I elaborated before, that so and so came to her rescue and all of those things

Sipho: Mhh.

P1: Yes.

Sipho: When this happened, did you see it happening or were you there or what?

P1: I would say as I stated before, we were on the rock. We didn't see the action that happened there [at the scene], but we went there after receiving the information that this lady has been burnt there.

Sipho: Okay.

P1: That was cause of our arrest.

Sipho: Mhh.

Sipho: So you have no idea as to what people did? Who was there? Who said what and how did it unfold?

P1: No! But what happened is that there were people in the scene who said so and so poured petrol, and so and so lit the matches. That is the guy I am saying is Thami, but who is nowhere to be found today, and the guy who lit the matches is AA, that is the information we got from the people who were on the scene. That's the hearsay to us.

Sipho: So what did the communit....the decision was taken by community is to just monitor her?

P1: Yes.

Sipho: Okay.

P1: And not set her alight.

Sipho: Okay.

P1: You know what? There were people whenever there is this boycotts who did their own things. But we, as the community, the community always reported to us as

leadership. There was not a standing order that says if you P1 made this, you should burn this but the only thing is that what they said as the community is that you go to P1 and reprimand him. But on that particular day it was unfortunate; without the blessing of the leadership. Injalo ke tata.

Sipho: Okay.

Sipho: When you said somebody went to check whether she was going to work or not, can you tell me more about that?

P1: What we did is, she was working at what this garage, Coleskop somewhere there at the top next to International. Yes, what we said is that you have to check that if she going to work because usually there was a transport that was fetching her. But she felt that I should go on foot and if you know this location next to mama Rosa's place down there in Kartaar street there was a street behind that house, it is were J found her because we sent J on a bicycle to go and check and J came back to us and reported that the people started beating her up and she was sent to Bloemfontein where she passed away. This same community said you are not going to bury this lady in this cemetery of ours. And we, as leadership the later Siyonzana Bhabhana, we can't do it like that. But the community said our children have died after the 4th of... shooting of the four children of Colesberg and they said we are not going to allow that... and was the standing order from the community. We as leaders, we just accepted what the community demanded because we do not lead ourselves.

Sipho: When? Did you said the 4th of?

P1: The 4th of July.

Sipho: When they killed 4 people?

P1: No no no it on the 3rd.

Sipho: Mh...

P1: After that people started an uprising.

Sipho: Mh...

P1: You see after the death of these 4 children, they were youth who should have made a change in our community, but unfortunately the forces of the previous government felt that these are not human beings so they should die. ...Cause on that particular day on the second, we went to the late Mfengwana's place and the late Tata Maliti was staying in front, wherefore the 4 comrades fell [died]...and because of anger we felt that we have to go door to door in these police houses. We started with Chris Labane's house, where we took his car out of the yard and set it alight. Because the reason for us to set his car alight was because ba (of) he doesn't have a place and the next to him it was three room place. So we feared that if we set Chris Labane's house alight then other person will also suffer...and that was the start of this arrest.

Sipho: The start of arrest?

P1: Yes.

Sipho: Of who?

P1: I can say after the we burnt Chris's car, a lot of people were arresteda lot of people and they should have explained to them whenever you are arrested you have to

say who set the car alight, as from in the old township [at] Vuka but whilst the whole issue happened in Bongweni but you have to know the person. And we felt *intokuba* (that) “Asiwafuni Amapolisa!” (We do not want or hate the police.) That was our term. Thereafter I went back to Ciskei whilst having a branch on COSAS, but I never I stayed long, there I had to run away because Amagreen Barete (the green berets) were looking after me.

Sipho: Amagreen Barete (the green berets)?

P1: Yha we always called them like that; the soldiers. So I felt instead of being arrested by the Ciskei government, I rather be arrested at home, Colesberg.

Sipho: So, what happened to her body? You said the community did not allow her to be buried in Colesberg. Did the decision go that way or it was changed?

P1: Father/Tata it was during the time after our arrest and they said she won't buried here in Colesberg. We heard that from our visitors since we were in jail for our trial. No! She was not buried in Colesberg she was cremated in Bloemfontein.

Sipho: Anything that you want to share about this process or anything?

P1: No tata (father) I won't say a lot about this, you see, I will say I am little bit puzzled because before the case itself we were in the waiting trial there came guy called Kingsely and asked if we need a representative? If we wanted bail and we said yes. He met with our parents aside and told them we won't get bail. We we won't get bail because of *the* gruesomeness of this case. And at the end of the day, the same Kingsley whom we told is our lawyer was actually the prosecutor on the case. So now, *where is the* fairness in this

case? Because he knows exactly how our case went. And to go on that I will quote u- Justice Kannemeyer; he was the president Judge of the Eastern Cape xa ndinikwa (when I was given) i-stay of execution ndinikwa (sentenced) le 20 years. Then he said it will be a mistake to be your judge because I sentence this guy accordingly and if ever they released him I will resign and he did that definitely. If you can look to the Bleed ka 98 you will get that statement. It was January or February issue you will get his statement.

Sipho: The 1998 Bleed?

P1: Either 98 or 99 between these two years.

Sipho: Is it February?

P1: Yes.

Sipho: Okay.

P1: That is how it is father.

Sipho: Okay, thank you.

P1: Okay.

APPENDIX C: PARTICIPANT 2 INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS

Interview with Mr. P2

Sipho: I think by now you have an idea about the purpose of this meeting?

P2: Mhhh.

Sipho: and my first question; it's not necessarily a question, I just would like you to describe that day or what happened in that incident. Tell me what you know.

P2: Well, first, perhaps, it will be good to give you a little bit of a background as to that fateful day, or whatever you might call it. About [a] few months, I would say four to five months, before the necklacing of the late Nokwakha, there were some problems, you know, with the local community authorities in Colesberg, because of living conditions that were prevailing then. Some of those conditions, they still prevail (clears throat). I was the chairman of the youths' organization called COYO, Colesberg Youth Organization. I was also the active member of the civic organization in Colesberg. I can't recall the name of this civic organization in conjunction with [the] youth organization. We had, eh... eh... ehh.... several demands that we made to the local government authorities, like the ending of the bucket... eh... system, like better housing, amongst others. While, okay, the regional Superintendent in those days... eh... for the black townships... there [are] some regional superintendents who were responsible for [a] certain township or a certain area of black people, [clears throat] and they will run their affairs, like housing, tarring of roads, you know, all those civil matters. They made

an undertaking at the meeting which was held at the Colesberg... ehh... primary school. It was... ah... a public meeting, so this regional superintendent made an undertaking that they will [would] look into the problems of the bucket system, the building of proper houses for the houseless, etcetera. And they were given 14 days to respond to that, however, some few days before the lapse of this 14-day period, what the people saw instead was [clears throat] a lot of soldiers in town, riot police gathering. And when these 14 days lapsed, we were told, in no uncertain terms, by the authorities, that, look... ehm... they are not going to talk to us. They will do things as they wish; I mean, the bucket system was there to stay with us. So, that led to the dissatisfaction amongst the people. It was decided by the Colesberg community that, well, they [the authorities] didn't meet our demands and they didn't give a satisfactory solution, so we don't [didn't] have [an] alternative. The only thing that we can [could] do which might be effective was the consumer boycott, seeing that most of the businesses were owned by white people, and we were doing our businesses in town. So, we decided, "look, we are going to buy from the white," though we were buying from certain white... ah... shops people who sympathize with our cause. The deceased, I must mention, she was a very active person in the civic organization, she was one of the people who would talk and, you know, many elder people, you know, would follow suit; listen to her. We even included her in one of those committees, you know, where we will [would] be negotiating with one of the local authorities. In the long run, people were victimized, some political activists. They were victimized, detained, beaten up, people were also killed. We also had people within the system, the South African Police, who were giving information to us. Like, they will [would] indicate certain people who were selling people out, giving information to the

security branch, it was discovered that the deceased was also one [of] those people who was [were] giving information to the security branch. Her husband was also an official of the then... ahh... Bantu Administration Board, Bantu Administration something; I can [not] recall the proper name. So, it was easy for the security branch to approach her, since the husband was... was... was... also working there; that is our thinking. So, we thought perhaps she agreed to cooperate with the special branch because her husband was working for the then Apartheid government, and maybe she thought if she doesn't [didn't] cooperate with the security, her husband might lose his jobs [and] all that. Okay. By that time, there were some uprisings throughout South Africa. The youth, especially, were fighting the authorities and with all those people who were coop... ah... collaborating with Apartheid regime agents. They were regarded by the people as enemies; their houses were burnt out, not only their houses, almost the all of their property, including themselves, like the Kinikini saga in Uitenhage, there was one in Gauteng, the then Transvaal. I can't remember where, but this one of Nokwakha happened just shortly after those incidents. Okay, as youth activists, we decided, well, since we have received the information that the deceased was selling out; we thought, "okay, we would fight by perhaps burning his/her [their] property or [by] forcing them out [of] the township like all the police or people who had the close ties with the apartheid regime." They were chased away from the township; their houses were burnt, cars [were] also damaged and burnt, you will recall Chris Labane's incident... Mfengwane were people... ah... burnt their properties and... as a result, four people were shot dead. So, there was still that anger amongst the people, [clears throat] including myself, of course. So we wanted to do anything just to revenge [avenge] you know...

cause some harm to the apartheid regime. And you would also perhaps recall that [in the] year 1985, the ANC... the then ANC president, Oliver Tambo, made a call that the people inside South Africa must render South Africa ungovernable, and that... we interpreted it as not abiding [by] any repressive laws, including persecuting those we... we... we... we... we deemed Apartheid agents, Apartheid regime agents. Attempts were made to burn the house of the deceased about a few weeks or [a] few days before she was necklaced. However, that didn't succeed because there [were] police in her house. And we didn't want to go while there were police inside because we didn't have guns; we only had petrol bombs, and we couldn't stand against R1s with petrol bombs. The necklacing: we never planned that, "okay today we [are] going [to] necklace Nokwakha, or what." No, that just happened, while the previous night, I recall, we were fighting the police with stones and all that. In the morning, they went to town because they also were working throughout the night. And she was... you know... was very bold, the deceased. She was talkative, you know; she was saying whatever she wanted to say at any given time, because she knew that she was backed by the security branch, should anything happen to her. But, okay, that morning, unfortunately, she met us, and we decided then that, "okay we are going to necklace her," seeing that we wanted to burn her property but we couldn't, because there were police there. You know, out of that anger and frustration, we decided, at the spur-of-the-moment, that we going to do that. I don't know how the petrol came in, but I recall that some of us even took petrol from the petrol bombs because there was no petrol at hand ready, you know, to necklace her. There were also no tires to necklace her, you know. It was not a premeditated thing, you know, but we... we... we... we eventually managed to get hold of the tire.

Sipho: so when this was happening can describe how you felt? I mean.....

P2: Although we were angry, I... I would... I would [will] talk for myself; I don't know how the other people felt. I could... I can only imagine how they felt, but, you know, although I was...we, you know, have been angry at the Apartheid regime, [at] their police, soldiers, and even informants, but she was lying there crying... screaming, you know... flames all over her body... [pauses] I was scared [chuckles, shifts his seating]. I was scared; you know why I was scared? I never hurt anyone in the past. But, you know, now I could see: here is the person, I also participated; she is burning, screaming. I sometimes, you know, I felt I could have gone again [to] try to help her, but at the back of my mind again: "Ag! We had comrades who passed away because of these informants; perhaps this is also her time too to go." I must also mention that I [was] quite young; [chuckles] I think I was sixteen years old. And that is also the reason I didn't get the death sentence, because [at] the time [of] the offence, I was under age, according to the high court or Supreme Court.

Sipho: Hmm.

P2: So what was disturbing was [that] the events that led to the necklacing of sis Nokwakha was [were] so distorted in court by the state witnesses. So what [was] so difficult for us, you know, [was that] we couldn't set the record straight then in court. Because we were denying that we took part in the... the... in the necklacing of the deceased, we couldn't set the record straight. Okay, although P1, initially, before we necklaced Nokwakha, when we... we... we decided that, "okay let us necklace her," he was part of that, but in the actual act he was never there. However, he was sentenced to

death because of [the] distorted evidence which was given in court. It was alleged that he also participated; he brought the tire. But when he came with the tire, I mean, she was already burnt, you know, lying there. And when he saw it, he dropped it. I can remember: he dropped the tire and ran away.

Sipho: Hmm.

P2: But we served our time; I was sentenced to 17 years for the murder and 2 years for public violence. Well, while I was in prison, I kept on reflecting, you know, on this incident, thinking about it, trying to think critically: “but what if this didn’t happen?” But I will always... always, you know, console myself by saying, “Ag! Ah... many of our people died; not [because] maybe they were fighting like the people in Sharpsville; they died because they protested peacefully. Some of our leaders, they died mysteriously; some disappeared because of informants.” But on the other hand, I was also thinking, “Eyi, [low-tone sigh] what about those children who are left without a mother?” Because I recall that the deceased [had] children; she had some of the children. They were very young; I think they were toddlers, if I am not mistaken. I’ve had pity, but also justified it by saying that, “Ag! the same happened to our comrades. There are so many orphans because the parents of those orphans were killed by the Apartheid agents...”

P2: Well, there was political change in our country [when] we got out of prison. It has been my wish, you know, to set the record straight because... I even tried to secure the records of our trial. Charles helped me to get them through the lawyers for human rights, and my intention was that we were going to set the record straight. I even thought, when the TRC came into being, that maybe I would get a chance to put our story straight. We

were approached by the investigators but they never really... ahh... called us in when the TRC came to Colesberg. I recall Lucky Njozela was the investigator; he just phoned me and asked, "am I prepared to go to the TRC?" and [I] said "ja" [yes]. I said, "I don't have any problems; I would like to do that," because I wanted to, you know, set the record straight because the evidence which was given in court was immensely distorted. But we were never called, to my surprise! I heard somebody, whom I think was not even there that day, not even in Colesberg, who gave a version, a totally wrong version, which was worse than the version that was given during our trial [chuckles]. It was a totally new version. She alleges [alleged] that... ahh... that the deceased was necklaced only because she bought from the boycotted butchery, and that was not the case.

Sipho: Hmm.

P2: Okay, mna... I saw it that way. Okay, *The Skull of my Country*, [*Country of my Skull*]. I partially put the blame on the author [Antjie Krog]. Why I am saying so? It is the TRC which failed, you know, to come up with the right... to get all, you know, both sides' versions. I still fail to understand why... maybe we were never called because the TRC only had one side of the story and never bothered to call us and I am also asking, you know, eh... what was really the purpose of that exercise, only hearing one side of the story, because the Truth and Reconciliation... ehh... Commission was really about trying to make peace, you know, between the perpetrators and the victims.

Sipho: Mhh.

P2: And, I mean, that was how it happened; the perpetrators would be called and even the victims would also come and relate their experience. But we were never called; I don't

know why, and the author then of that book, Antjie Krog, never bothered to verify, you know, certain things. Even to her, she was surprised even, ehh... she is... is quoting advocate Dumisa Ntsebenza, saying, you know, she had heard a lot of stories, but he has never come across a story like that one. So, the story is not balanced because they... they left us out. They couldn't come and verify this whole... but they took that version from only one witness at the TRC, and they never bothered to ask any questions or anything about what has been alleged. I think that [is] all.

Sipho: I have one or two questions. Ah... during the incident itself, do you remember anything that other people said or any song that was sung at that moment? Do you recall any...

P2: Yhoo no! Not specific, I... I cannot recall specifically which songs were being sung. But, you know, generally, in those days, people would sing about... eh... a perceived informer; you know, like, ah... Nokwakha even whether you are making a toyi-toyi or you are singingah.... any song you will mention that person, for instance, we would necklace you, or so and so; we would necklace you, and all that, but I can't recall specifically what was the song which was sung there; but there were songs, there toyi-toyis, there were everything I can't remember specifically

Sipho: Anything that other people said? or.....

P2: Spectators... wow. People were [chuckles] you know, people... it was the first time that happened in Colesberg. People were... were shocked, and although we were also doing that, we were scared, you know, that maybe the police might come while we were doing that. I couldn't really weigh the feelings of the... you know, of the people... no, I

couldn't; I would be lying. I couldn't really... look, it happened so fast, we were also scared... fearing that the police might come, and lot of things, you know, ah... were running in one's mind.

Sipho: Anything that you want to add or you think could be left out?

P2: Oh no! You know, this happened quite some time ago; I might be leaving out some detail or something. Should I recall anything, I will write it down; I will write it down and bring it to your attention. But what I would add... I also advise you, maybe for interest's sake, but I think I would be valuable to get the records. I am not sure what the proper... ahh... procedure to... to... to get such records is, but in this South Africa of ours, I don't think it will be difficult for you to get the records of our trial. And I would also try, from my side, to get them, I think it should be easier for me to get them, you know, maybe I would recall lots of other things, you know. I was going, maybe, just to ask our legal representative advocate, Jappie; he is now a judge. Mhh... I do not know if he still has many records, but I will talk to him... okay... the instructing... eh... attorney was Lala, Mr. Lala; I don't also know whether he still practicing as a lawyer? Or attorney? Or maybe he is, but the last time I heard, he was practicing, but advocate Juppie is a judge now, in Kwazulu Natal.

Sipho: So far I would say... brah... I think you have exhausted my questions.

P2: Okay, you can... you can, sometime, ask me if something... ah... comes to your mind; but I think you can get those... ahh... I think that he even encourages...

Sipho: Records...?

P2: I even sometimes encourage *abo* [the likes of] Charles because he was not even there that day, but he is mentioned in Antjie Krog, because he was... she was mentioned at the TRC seating; but I told that lady, “but that is blue lie it is an and utterly distorted story;” the women just maybe saw a chance of making a quick market and she thought she will lie.

P2: But the necklacing, it is not something that I’m proud of. I will walk tall and say “*ja* [yes], we did it.” Although, I mentioned to you that, well, I used to reflect to this and say and justify my deeds, by saying, well, many of our activists [and] many of our leaders disappeared and were killed by the Apartheid agents, but I still believe, you know, hurting another person, or killing, for that matter, killing a person... I don’t think its something that people should do amongst each other or against each other, but, ok, then, the situation was difficult and was also volatile.

Sipho: Mhh.

P2: But under normal circumstances, I wouldn’t do such a thing.

Sipho: Ok, I’m Ok.

P2: Ok.

Sipho: As I indicated, I will write this up and if I have any questions, I will come to you. I am planning to do a first draft, or a preliminary analysis, and if funds permit, then I’ll come back and say, “this is what I have,” and get all the participants’ feedback and then go and do the final report; I will also make a copy available to all the participants. And then, your with your permission, then I can maybe make it available to our local

institutions. But at this point, I think we'll keep it this way and maintain the confidentiality section of our agreement.

P2: You know, I'm honest with you because... mna... I am not concerned about the confidentiality of this. Why [chuckles]?

Sipho: Mh.

P2: Why? The TRC was a public institution, and most of the... the sessions were open to the public. There was that distorted version in public, it was made in public [in] Antjie Krog's book, [which] is still available now in bookstores, you know, its openly available uyabona [you see]. To me, this would be perhaps... be an opportunity. I don't know in what, in which way... I think maybe it would be an opportunity I have been waiting for... for quite sometime, in order, perhaps, to put things into perspective.

Sipho: That's the thing... I am also...

P2: And also, you know, [chuckles] there is my inner self you know, I think it will [be] a healing process also, you know. I ... I don't have anything to hide, as I told you. It is not because I am proud of I what I've done or whatever. No! I regret that we went to that extent, you know, to kill a person, but it was... I ... I... I also take into consideration that the circumstances then, you know... ah... compelled me to take part in such an act. But normally, I wouldn't really do any thing, for whatever reason; I wouldn't kill a person. To me, confidentiality, as far as this is concerned, is not really a concern or... a... matter. You don't have to worry.

Sipho: I am raising [this issue] because it's also the concern of the people who are supervising me....

P2: Okay.

Sipho: They... well, they are very...it was even hard for me to get the University to approve me to go and conduct the study, "you might be risking people's lives." The few people who know the South African history and have followed the TRC said, "you know, it would have been much better if you could use their real names," but for the institutional purposes, I think I should maintain a certain level of confidentiality just to guarantee people's... eh...

P2: Well being. Yha.

Sipho: But I am...

P2: But I don't think... because this matter was handled, people could have, if there [are] any people who could have been angry, and maybe thought of doing anything...

Sipho: Mhh.

P2: They could have done so during that time of the TRC, you know,

Sipho: Mhh.

P2: Because that time, I think it opened some healed wounds.

Sipho: Mhh.

P2: You would recall that there was an incident of the perpetrator after he said his story at the TRC; [he] went to the victim's house; he was attacked by the son of... of... the victims. Things like that, you know that... that never happened here.

Sipho: Mhh.

P2: You know, ah... you know, ja [yes]... I... I, for one, don't think... maybe... maybe I'm... downplaying it... I don't know... [chuckles]...

Sipho: No, it's not like... ah...

P2: I don't say... eh... you know, "what [is] good, what is right, you can do it," but from my side, I don't... I don't... have any problem you know...

Sipho: mh...

P2: My name is already in the... book; it's in that TRC. I cannot erase it; I cannot save it and say, "don't do this," I mean, it happened and... But there was also a reason why it happened and all that, you know... Unfortunately, it happened, but it is not something I wish it should happen.

Sipho: I will like... I...think with the... ehh... The thing is, American Universities have their own laws...

P2: And, yha, they see things in their own way only...

Sipho: I think once that section is done, I can release it, I can put it in a different form for South African citizens, but for them, they would require that. They said if I want to put in people's names, I have to make a Release of Information form, which they have to

approve, and you guys sign it, and then I can use that... so, I can look into that, definitely, when I get back in the US and see...

P2: Ag!.. to me, you know, it doesn't matter. I understand... I understand the point to this... but this was... I mean, this [is] in the TRC, at the TRC, openly, publicly, so...

Sipho: Mh.

P2: The TRC report was released...

Sipho: Mh...

P2: It's... it's there for public scrutiny.

Sipho: Mh.

P2: Antjie Krog wrote her book, which is based on that TRC report, which is open to the public, and our names are mentioned there; everything is mentioned, and that is why I also refer you to... you know, so that you can see this from a different perspective...

Sipho: Mhh... mhh...

P2: Also, see how these allegations were related in court.

Sipho: In court... okay... and...

P2: Mhhh... I even said... mna [me] you know; I said even to abo [the likes of] T. O and bo bhut' Zet ; all those people who are wrongly implicated there, you know that I am prepared; we can sit down and help, and write our [chuckles] book.

Sipho: Mhhh.

P2: But I am not of the view that we should point fingers to Antjie Krog, really.

Sipho: Mhhh.

P2: Okay, she failed to research further, you know, maybe she saw a quick part in the book and she did what she wanted to do. But I think she should have gone an extra mile. You... where there are still questions, there are a lot of questions in the TRC report, many... there are many flaws, but then, if you would like... people should see certain things, and... you will go an extra mile you do some research, you know, in order to close certain loop holes certain gaps... information gaps... but I won't really blame her. [chuckles] You know, it was a report and most... you know, her book is based on that report.

Sipho: Yha.....

P2: [Be]cause some of the people who are quoted, they're mentioned in the book; really, they are innocent, innocent they were never even near the scene. They didn't even go there after, you know, the necklacing, but they are mentioned. I think in some quarters, it reflected, you know, it reflected bad... bad on them, you know?

Sipho: Mhhh ... hayi ...mhh. I would thank you again for participating in this research. How are you feeling now?

P2: No problem; to me, I take this as opportune time to tell my story and, you know, I after my release, I talked to the husband of the deceased and he said, you know, "P2, I understand... the... situation, and I am not angry at you." Or something like that.

Sipho: So you talked to the husband...?

P2: I owe [it to him] to explain what happened; I get scared. I love kids and have kids of my own. I want to tell... the kids of the deceased what happened. This crosses my mind and it does not make [me] feel good; kanene, I took a parent away from her children, never mind the circumstances... the children, you know? Sometimes I wonder what are these children [are] saying when they are asked, “what happened to your mother?”

Sipho: Mhh.

P2: The idea of the TRC was good to bring the perpetrator together [with the victim] and to tell what happened. I hope to have a chance to make peace with them, and I think the TRC failed to [let me do] that. I would like to know if they [the victim’s family] made peace with this. I would like to face the victims and tell them what happened. I have to tell this because my children, too, will ask me questions and wonder what kind of a person their father is. So, to tell this will also provide them with the right information, you know, I... as I mentioned, I think about this sometimes...

Sipho: Okay.

P2: And, [chuckles] you know, my aunt stays at her [deceased’s] house now, and every time I ask myself these questions about the... this thing, and, you know, we went to the deceased’s house. We did not burn the house because there were children in the house. We did not plan to necklace her; it was a spur-of-the-moment [decision]. I don’t recall anyone planning.

Second or follow up interview

Sipho: Thanks for availing yourself again; I have a few questions; some are related to what you said in the previous interview, and others I thought of later. Among other things that I would like further clarification on, there are two things come to my mind, like when you said... ah... sometimes, when you think about... ah... this whole situation, ah... when, you know, you said there is one level... where you said, when you think about it... you said, "at some point, you took somebody else's parent, never mind the circumstances." I would... if you could... tell me about that; about what you meant?

P2: Well, [clearing his throat] first of all, what I think is that, you know, some of our people in the liberation struggle, they lost parents...

Sipho: Mhhh.

P2: But at the moment, they are well cared for, you know, like, they get scholarships...

Sipho: Mhh.

P2: And etcetera... and I have been asking myself, now, since I know... I happen to know both the parents, these kids of the deceased, you know, the deceased and her husband and also the husband was... The last time I knew about his activities, he was unemployed...

Sipho: Mhh.

P2: And when I was starting to think, "eyi! Are they going to school? Who's helping the to go to school? Who's helping with food and clothing?" Things like that.

Sipho: Okay, so basically, you're concerned about their welfare.

P2: Exactly, yha! Not that I got money [chuckles] or... perhaps there is something big I can do... you know, maybe... maybe... maybe... maybe... maybe... maybe... you know, I might... maybe... towards... maybe... their well-being... Not out of my pocket, but there are many institutions where... Maybe if they are at school, they are struggling to get funds... One can go to the premier's bursary, can go to... blah, blah, blah... you know, try and get some funds to help them, you know. I was thinking along those lines.

Sipho: Okay.

P2: But one... you would ask what I have done [chuckles] so far? Absolutely nothing. You know, I've also a hectic... Okay, maybe that is an excuse. [chuckles] Whether [it] is valid or not, is another question. I didn't do that, you know, also, with mixed feeling, I... ay!... should I approach them? How would they see it? Should they be angry? You know, that's the other thing; one of the things that delayed me to approach them... you know, I don't know, how would they take it? [Heavy sigh]

Sipho: Okay. Mhm. Okay.

P2: But you should really... maybe... maybe if you could help me with that... I would appreciate that.

Sipho: Okay, mhh.

P2: To meet them, talk, you know, I mean... That's what I think the TRC failed to do. I mean, the whole TRC process... I think it was about reconciliation...

Sipho: Mhh...

P2: And you can ask, “well, there was the TRC process... what has it done?” You know... [clears throat]

Sipho: Mhh, okay....

P2: If they hate me... I mean... they still hate me, you know? Because the TRC never did anything, and if we... we really want true reconciliation, I think we should [start] with... you know. You start with yourself, reconcile with yourself with certain things, then go to others. [clears throat] And as far as I am concerned, we never reconciled to them. Okay, I might say, you know, within me, I would like to talk to them, and all that, but, who knows... how do they feel about me? Nobody knows.

Sipho: Okay... eh... the other thing that struck me in the interview is that you described that as an “unfaithful day.”

P2: Mhh.

Sipho: it’s something that struck me because you are not first person I’ve interviewed who described it as “an unfaithful day,” so I wonder if you could tell me more... What would it mean to you for it to be an unfaithful day?

P2: You know, I think perhaps I did indicate, or maybe I failed to indicate, that... that... eh... there were many... The previous day, there many incidents that occurred, for three days before that day, we went to the deceased’s house almost every day before the... before she was burnt... [clears throat] and all those occasions were not successful.

Sipho: Okay... mhh.

P2: And that day, it was never a premeditated thing, that we are going to meet at this point and burn her, it coincidentally happened that she was met at that juncture. [clears throat] It was never planned... it wasn't planned to happen, but things happen, and they happen so fast...

Sipho: Mhh, okay.

P2: I think that's it, not that there is a remarkable... that maybe it meant...

Sipho: Okay... you also describe the process as traumatic; you said that...

P2: Mhh, yha, it has been. I mean, I have been re... you know, the incident has been reliving itself since it happened to me for quite some time until I was in prison, but... ehm... okay... I was reading a lot in prison, so it... it just vanished, but the thoughts are still lingering on. Hence, I am also, you know, feeling that... ay... I need to meet, you know, her offspring. You know, even if they hate me, I would still want to meet them so that we can really reconcile, you know?

Sipho: Mhh okay.

P2: I know it... it won't be an easy thing, but I would be happy if one day I die know[ing] that I tried to make peace with them.

Sipho: So, you said there are times... sometimes you relived the moment of the incident. If you could tell me...

P2: You know, like, I don't see this *Grootman* [Afrikaans for big man, a sign of respect] now; I don't even know where he is, you know, but I used to see him a lot. I mean, he's drinking and I am also drinking, and, you know, when I see... that will come honestly

[chuckles] you know, the issue of his wife would come and will stay with me for quite some time, you know, maybe for a week or so. You know, I am this kind of person; I tend to look deeper into things and sometimes think, when I used to meet him, I was always thinking, “ay! [clears throat] I wonder if his [wife] was still alive, what would... what would his life be?” You know, they were staying here in... what is it... this... street?

Sipho: Main road.

P2: Main road, *ja* [yes], and, apparently, I don't know whether he sold the house or what, if he sold the house, under which circumstances did he sell the house? I am asking myself, you know, those kinds of questions; you know? And the... when I saw that this *Grootman* was not okay, because he was always a neat kind of person, he was drinking, but, you know, he was drinking responsibly. And when you would... when I [would] find him drunk and... you know... (emphatic voice tone) Eyi! I feel pity and ask myself such questions [Clears Throat] Although, you know, I said even previously that... Eyi! Okay, I know the circumstances that led to that thing, but still, as a human being, you think... as a human being, or perhaps a perpetrator who's got a heart [chuckles], when you see your victims you will always think, eyi! you know? Especially when you see them in a shameful manner, you know, in a sad situation, you'll... you'll feel pity... you'll ask yourself questions, like I said, you know? When I saw this *Grootman* drunk and he's not the gentle and clean person I use to know, I would start wondering, what if, you know, his wife was still around... he would definitely not be like this [heavy sigh]

Sipho: Oh! Wonder if... ehh.

P2: [I] sort of sympathize with him in the situation I see now. This *Grootman*, you know, maybe [I] think that... maybe he is in this situation because, maybe the wife is no longer here, or... you know, it also traumatic to him as well as it is traumatic to us as perpetrators, you know? I was thinking along those lines.

Sipho: Okay.

P2: It might be something else, you know, that led to him to... for him to find himself in that situation. [Clears throat] I did talk to him, but we never went into detail, and [I] said what... what, you know, he just said, and *bekus' etywaleni* [in a drinking environment], you know, "he said ag! Just let us just forget about that you know, mna, I have forgiven you." And you know, we never really entertain it that much.

Sipho: Okay.

P2: But to me, I was happy, you know, that I talked to him. I was happy... I was happy, and I thought I would make a follow up, but really, I didn't, and I am not sure whether he is late or still alive. I am [not] sure what happened to him.

Sipho: So, in your attempt to talk to him, he was receptive.

P2: He was, ja, ja.

Sipho: Okay, but for you, it's like, when you see... the, you know... if I am getting you correctly, you said when you see him in the state that he is in now, you wonder if the absence or the death of his wife contributes to the state of his...

P2: Yha, mhh, exactly, yha, and I should say [chuckles] maybe its [been] two or three years ago since I saw this *Grootman*, honestly, you know? Two years ago, I didn't come [home] so frequently, as frequent as I do now...

Sipho: mhh...

P2: And that might also have contributed to the loss of contact *kum naye* [between us], but I used to see him *etywaleni ntoni ntoni* [in a drinking environment].

Sipho: Mhh, okay.

P2: But it's [been] quite some time, honestly, *lento ndithi* [that's why I say].

Sipho: Mhh

P2: It's [been] maybe three or so years.

Sipho: Okay.

P2: [heavy sigh]

Sipho: Eh... the other thing you mentioned in our previous interview was... you said there was anger. You talked about, like, there was that which contributed to this or things that took place on or before this incident...

P2: Mhh...

Sipho: And you... I think you also mentioned... I think you also mentioned how, like, the things that, for example, that you saw, or, like, that the conditions that your mother worked in as... as..,

P2: Conditions of living.

Sipho: Conditions of living...

P2: General conditions of living...

Sipho: I wonder if you can just tell me more about that and the link between them.

P2: Okay.

Sipho: Maybe if you can make me that connection a little bit more clearly...

P2: You know, I said... I can't recall the dates and so on, but [Clears Throat] what led to the unrest in the township, in Colesberg then, was there were certain demands that were sent to authorities, you know, those were about the living conditions locally, you know, like better housing, like water... clean water, you know, there were many houses then which didn't have taps in their yards; you had to walk some few meters sometimes, or maybe a kilometer or so to get clean water [Clears Throat]. There was this bucket system, you know, it's very degrading, you know, even these days, you still find [it] degrading, too. Those were one of the... some of the demands that we set for the authorities to look at: that they should abolish the bucket system, they should provide better for all the homeless. There were a lot of... of such demands, but instead of the... of the authorities doing something about the demands, they initiated this violent situation. We saw troops and many policemen around, and they came into the township, made certain announcements, you know, certain provocations, you know, because there was this cop called Van Heinstein who would go into the township with a loudhailer

[megaphone] and say whatever he wishes to say, you know, out of provocation, [clears throat] and as result, when they did not respond positively to those demands...

Sipho: Mhh.

P2: People boycotted, you know, the white businesses; they didn't allow certain vehicles, delivery vehicles, commercial vehicles, to come into the township. And all that in response to the... no response of the authorities to our demands. Well, there was this incident also, in July of ... of the killing of Krakra and others. I think that has also made especially the youth very angry; people were arrested after... before and after that incident. They were beaten up by the police, brutally beaten up. There were even civil claims launched against the minister of police, the then minister of police. I know a few people who were brutally beaten by the police then. All that police brutality, you know, led or contributed to the anger that we had as citizens. You know, this didn't happen once off and the police would go, you know. It happen continuously; people would be detained without a trial, and whilst being detained, they would be beaten up, come back, you know... they would share their experience while they were detained. All that, you know, creates anger.

Sipho: So, you mean that there are things that contributed to or led... like the provocations from the police...

P2: Yha!

Sipho: That led to that situation and also to the general living conditions...

P2: Mhh yha! You know, there was a formal [community] meeting where we sensitized the authorities about the living [conditions] not that, in fact, that they didn't know [chuckles] about our living, you know, but we sensitized them in this way, that we were fed up, you know, with this living in squalor and abject poverty and... whereas, just few meters from our township, they are living in [a] far better life, in an opulent life [Clears Throat]. I mean, the dumping sites, that is one of the things that we also, you know... you know, one of the demands we wanted [was that] they should provide better housing for people. Secondly, we also wanted them to do away with the bucket system. Thirdly, we also said they do away with dumping area, the dumping area was in the township... not only the dumping area, but the sewage, the dumping. The nitesol dumping plot was in the township, so nitesol from everywhere, from town, from... it will [would] be dumped in the township, and it was also, you know... that alone was also degrading, you know; it showed that they didn't even... eh... take us as fellow human beings. So, instead of saying they would do something or they won't do anything, there was police provocation, which led to many incidents of violence. I don't think we started violence or the people in Colesberg started violence; all this happened... It was because of the police; they initiated violence; they come [came] and detained a lot of people, about hundred people, beat them, and later, those charges were dropped from all those people. But people were beaten up; people were killed...

Sipho: Okay... the other question that I... it's not a question, per se, but it's an area that, when I looked, I thought it wasn't... I didn't get it clear or covered, after, like... You told me, for example, you told me about the incident, the court process, and the procedures, and then you told me about your time in prison, how this played a role, and

then you also told me about afterwards, and your reaction when the TRC report came out. But the process leading up to the trial, when you were arrested: how was that? I didn't get your description or your experiences...

P2: When I was arrested ...?

Sipho: Yha, like, when... what led to that? When were you arrested, shortly after the incident? What happened, and what was the situation?

P2: Okay [chuckles]. There was a state of emergency in the country... eh... I was trying to get out of the country, you know, like many youths at that time, but while I was in Bloemfontein [clears throat] where my father is, he felt like, "ey! don't go away; you know, your mother has just passed away; you've got your siblings behind you... blah blah," you know. And he... he... compelled me, you know, to go to his lawyer, and I told him, "ey look! [chuckles] the lawyer, he might be a lawyer and a friend of yours, but maybe he is not acquainted with things like this," and all that. But he insisted that we do that, and apparently the lawyer phoned the police in Colesberg [and] said, "do you... are you looking for this person?" And they asked, "where is this person at?" "Okay, he is a son of my friend and he is around..." and they said, "no, call him into your office." And I was called into his office. I was arrested [chuckles] in that office. I was arrested by Bloemfontein police there and later on, Colesberg came to fetch me.

Sipho: Mhh.

P2: I was given a bail and... but... most the time, I spent it in prison; I was detained almost every second week after my release. There was a day, it was in September, September '86; I was released from the detention after few months in detention... about

four months in detention... five months in detention, and I only stayed two days [chuckles] and I was frogmarched from the township to the police station in daylight [chuckles], only to be released few weeks before we went on trial at the then Supreme Court in Grahamstown... yho... in... in Graaf Reinet.

Sipho: Mhhh

P2: okay okay I was never tortured or beaten up during my arrest

Sipho: Mhh ehh, you said you mentioned that most likely people in Colesberg did not start violence that it is the police the provocation that led...

P2: to the incidents of violence, yha there were some few evidence of violence you know by the youth in Colesberg like the police were driven out of the township their houses were attacked, some of them their properties were burnt out.

Sipho: Mhh...

P2: You know, that response to the police brutality, it only happened after the police had beaten up people, has arrested people, has also killed people.

Sipho: Okay.

P2: But before that, there was no violence, hence, we made a peaceful... [clears throat] a peaceful meeting, and met with the authorities. We never had any intentions of becoming violent...

Sipho: Mhh.

P2: And, you know, last time, I also mentioned that, you know, this happened coincidentally, when there was this call from the then ANC president Oliver Tambo that we must render South Africa ungovernable. We also interpreted that... okay, I mean [chuckles] the authorities in South Africa would never listen to anyone, but they will [would] just continue with their brutality because everywhere in the country (we could see from TV, newspapers), people were, you know, peaceful marches people were detained, people were killed, people were beaten up, et cetera; and we thought, “who are we for the...

Sipho: Mhh.

P2: Authorities to listen to us.”

Sipho: I see what it meant, in your words. The last issue that I would like to get further clarification on... you described the events in the court as disturbing.

P2: During the trial?

Sipho: Yes, you said the events in the court or trial were disturbing; can you tell me more?

P2: Oh! That was a distorted version of the whole state witnesses...

Sipho: Okay...

P2: of what has [had] transpired. Even their witnesses, who were never there...

Sipho: Mhhh.

P2: because if they were there, like Mpikiso, I mean, he was a clear municipal police...
what we called then “green flies” if they were around there...

Sipho: Mhh...

P2: they could have arrested the people, you know?

Sipho: Okay.

P2: They could have immediately arrested, I believe, or perhaps we believe, that the police only arrested us, you know, started to be looking for us, for this... for that incident of the burning of Nokwakwa because P1 made a confession...

Sipho: Okay...

P2: You know [clears throat], and out [of] that confession, then they found witnesses.

Sipho: Okay.

P2: One of the witnesses was not happy about his testimony because it was a distorted version and it was something he was told say against us in court. As a result, he approached Charles a few months after, as I understand, or as I was given to understand, a few months after trial, when he heard that P1 was about to be hanged, and said, “man! I feel so bad because what I said during the trial was really not what I experienced or what I witnessed; I was told to say that.” And he made several statements under oath to that effect and even lawyers made application for... for... for the stay of execution based on the new evidence that came into light.

Sipho: Mhh... okay.

P2: He was even prepared; he even went to... there was this news paper called *The New Nation*. Zwelakhe Sisulu was the editor then; he was even... he was interviewed by *New Nation's* journalists. You know, there is a full story, if maybe you would [be] able to get to... to the archives of the now... now defunct *New Nation*... I am not sure where that is... maybe if you can find out, you might get that the now defunct *New Nation*...

Sipho: Okay, so it was disturbing; I mean, the process was disturbing in the sense that what transpired was not presented...

P2: Portrayed, yha, in court the way it happened... I mean, what was most disturbing [was that] people whom you thought you know, they got you... you've got no grudges [chuckles] against them... you know, people whom you regard as friends, they were to testify against you, and they will come with the testimony which is totally not what you know or what really happened; that is disturbing.

Sipho: Okay, I see.

P2: So, I mean, this guy, shame P3 thought, "well, he cannot live with that for the rest of his life, so he will... better, you know, spill the beans and say, you know, what has led to his testimony, you know, [his] fabricated testimony in court." Mpikiso and others until this day, he never [chuckles] said, "you know we are meeting," every time I do meet him, but... he won't say that, but I've forgiven him...

Sipho: Mhh...

P2: We never talked about that, but I said, "well, if I also want to be forgiven, then I should also forgive those who did any harm to me" [clears throat].

Sipho: I would say... I don't know if you have anything more?

P2: No [chuckles].

Sipho: Well, thanks a lot, again...

P2: Yha, no, it's okay. As you know, as I told you, that... sometimes it's difficult to think all these things.

Sipho: Yha...

P2: But...

Sipho: And I...

P2: Don't hesitate if you need any clarity on anything or you would like to interview me further...

Sipho: Mhhh...

P2: Just give me a shout.

Sipho: Okay, thank you again bro'

Appendix D: Interview with Mr. P3 English (translated from Xhosa)

Sipho: As you know, I am investigating/research about the case of Sisi Nokwakha. Moreover, I'm writing about it. My request to you is tell to me according to your understanding, what happened. If I have some question for clarity, I will ask you. And you are also free to ask me questions for clarity.

P3: The date I cannot remember. It was during 1985 and there was a consumer boycott you see. So people were not buying at certain places and they were compelled to buy at certain places (*stores*). So what happened there was Sisi Nokwakha Dilato whom we warned not to buy from (*a certain*) butchery and she was working at this butchery. It becomes clear that she was not listening (*to our warnings*) and she continued buying from this butchery you see. So the first day we took/confiscated/seized her things (*groceries*) from her and trampled on them. Despite of this she kept on doing this. We then went to her house and there was no one in the house, we entered the house through the window. We then burned the inside of the house. And we then left and slept in another house, because police were hunting us. We slept in another house on the way to town. We woke up early the next morning around the same the time she was on her way to work. And we waited her on her way to work because we could not find a chance of catching her. So we caught her in the morning on her way work, wearing her work overalls. Therefore, we attacked her and she ran to the nearby house, we found her in that house and burnt her you see. We poured petrol over her so AA lit her, AA and so that'll

show we attacked her. The police came; people screamed that here are police so we ran away. That's how it went. From then what happened the police started hunting us. They were looking for (P3 [nickname]) [nickname] P3, and I told them I am not P3 [nickname] I am Y[giving his real name]. They eventually found and arrested me, so we were caught/arrested. They took us one by one and tortured us. They would put our testicle in the drawer. They made braai underneath, whilst hanging you and they were beating you while doing all those things. It was Leeman, Libi Maliti, and this white man Souerman Spoorie—they called him Spoorie but he is no longer a detective—and Jansen and so on. It become clear that no! I could not stand the torture. So I told them what happened. Then they told me not to tell it as it had happened and that I should tell it their way. They then made me a state witness. So we went to Graaf-Reinet for the hearings of the case where I gave false statement. The statement I gave in court was the statement that I was told by them.

Sipho: Okay Bra I want some clarity. You say they hanged you and braai-ed. How did this happen?

P3: They tie you to the tree naked. They tie your feet and arms (stretched). Beneath you on the ground they made fire and they made braai. Then what burned you is the steam/vapour that comes from the braai fire.

Sipho: Oh, so it is the steam that burns you?

P3: Even in the cells, they shot us with teargas whilst we were inside the cell. We ended up bleeding. Do you see? When we were released, outside in the community they started looking for us again. At one point they shot us with pellets next to Reverend Tozi's

house. The house that is now staying Bhuti Samuel. You see what happened the police had tables with drawers. So the police took your testicles, put them in the drawer, and put your penis on the desk. They then close drawer with you testicles inside it. They then beat you and there is nothing you could do. All these things were done to us by the police from Sanlam and by Riot Squad from Oudtsoorn

Sipho: You said that you went to the house the first time? So how many times did she buy from the butchery??

P3: We warned her. If I remember well we warned her three times. She kept on buying and we kept on warning her. Until we had to take the decision.

Sipho: Mhm what decision?

P3: We decided to burn her once and for all because she persistently kept on buying from places that were boycotted. Another thing she had laid charges against with the police, because we took her shopping goods from her and destroyed them. So we decided that we would do what we did. A community meeting was called and everybody was told where to buy from and where not to buy from. So every resident knew about this, where to buy and where not to buy. So it was me, P1 and E.

Sipho: Who is P1?

P3: It is P1, E, T, JV,J was there as well, AA, and P2

Sipho: People who where what? What did they do?

P3: .We were together when this happened. We all burned her. But what is false is that they said she was lit by.. P1, (but) AA is the one who lit her. Whilst burning her, we were

beating her doing all those things, you know. We wanted to... we intended...to put tyre on her. Because the police were called, when the police were coming we ran away before we could put tyre on her.

Sipho: What did she say?

P3: She was crying now saying we must forgive her, this and that. We were telling her we would not forgive her because we warned you several times and you would not listen, you did it deliberately and then you go and report us to the police for destroying your goods.

Sipho: Okay, Mhh. So when you caught her... where did you catch her, where?

P3: At the house... you see, when you go down towards town behind Sisi Rosa's house, you can see her house. We caught her you see where... Thembile Dilato's house. That's the house where Bhuti Bonani was staying, my uncle Bonani is the father of Mazwi Ndlambe. Bhuti Bonani is the one who used to stay in that house. So when we caught her she ran into that yard (premises). Therefore, we did everything there... inside that yard.

Sipho: Mhhh

P3: We did it in that yard.

Sipho: Okay.

P3: Yes

Sipho: You say you beat her. How did you beat her or with what?

P3: We beat her with hand and stones, you see.

Sipho: Okay

P3: We poured petrol on and AA lit her after he lit her, we did not give her to get a chance to get inside the house. We kept on beating her until people screamed “here comes the police!” So we ran away leaving her burning. (On fire)

Sipho: So you said.. eh... you decided that if a person buys from a boycotted shop, they will be burned.

P3: Yes we decided at a meeting that if a person buys from a boycotted shop his or her belongs (purchases) will be destroyed. And if she or he keeps doing the same thing, the decision was to burn that person.

Sipho: So you say you were arrested.

P3: Yes.

Sipho: How did it happen that you were arrested?

P3: Police were hunting us looking and searching as a result we were not sleeping in our homes. We slept in the houses which had no occupants. There was the *pozi* (shack) that we frequently slept at, it had no occupants or owner. We would enter this *pozi* late at night and slept there and we woke up early in the morning so that people would not be able to see us do you see? But they found me at my maternal uncle’s house. In fact, at New Brighton.

Sipho: Mhh... okay.

P3: They found me I think that was about three to four in the morning.

Sipho: At Drayini?

P3: At New Brighton.

Sipho: Mhhh.

P3: So that's where now, they kept finding us one by one and locking us in cells. They took us one by one and they did whatever they wanted to do with you.. interrogating you . So the beat you and they did not play with you, put tube on your face. There was a sack that they put over your face. Yes so they did those things.

Sipho: So what happened? Did you and others say or do anything when she was burning? What did the community say?

P3: There were people watching but we did not pay attention to them. I cannot say heard what they said what, as I was not concentrating on them because we were concentrating on what we were doing.

Sipho: What do you say to her? Others who talked to her, what did they say? Where there no people who said something... anything?

P3: No. Only that we told her to burn, that she is burning because she is an informer. We told her, "if you had listened, you would not be in this situation now." We told her, "moreover, you turned us to the police for trampling on your belongings. And we talked to you several times and you would not listen. Rather and remember you said we would do you nothing. Now we've find you (Okay)."

Sipho: Oh, she said that nothing would be done on her?

P3: Nothing would be done on her.

Sipho: To whom did she say that?

P3: She said that to us.

Sipho: So you say you went to her house at night?

P3: Yes, we went to her house couple of days before she was burnt. First thing, we went to her so we came to her house and she was at work. Therefore, I can say her and her husband were at work. Therefore, we decided to start with her house and then finish with her. So we find out that we had no chance because police were always there guarding her house. Therefore, one day we got a chance. We entered her back door house yard. We jumped the fence into her yard. We broke in and lit. We poured petrol, burned, and left. So she knew that we were targeting her. Her house now was full of police who had extinguished the fire and guarding her house. Therefore, we waited for her. So we said we should not wait for her when she comes back from work. We should rather watch her when she goes to work in the morning. So we waited for her in that house. Now when...

Sipho: Mhhhh...

P3 ...she saw us she tried to run and ran into that yard. So we have done everything in that yard.

Sipho: Now, I am referring to the time when this was happening how did you feel?..

When this was happening, now that caught her.

P3: How did I feel maybe?

Sipho: Like what did you think? How did you feel, when this was happening. Is there something that you feel inside you. Do you see what I mean?

P3: No, there was nothing. The only emotion I felt was scary [isiziki]. Although we were doing it, it was scary (gruesome); it was scary because killing of a person, do you see?

Sipho: Mhh...

P3: Only that I could do nothing because it was a decision that was taken and (*Moet*) we had to do this thing because we had warned her several times so and so...

Sipho: Mhh...

Sipho: By the time this happened, were you scared (Isikizi)?

P3: I was scared, because this thing, in fact, it was the first time such a thing happened at Colesberg. It was the first time it happened and when we say you are an informer (impimpi). You knew that you would end up burnt. You'll be burned there is no other way of killing but be burnt. And even when they arrested us, we were put in different cells. We were not put in one cell. They divided us, they did not put us together in one cell /

Sipho: Oh, so you were not put in the same cell?

P3: We were not put in one cell. One was put in another cell and another one in another cell, others were taken to Norvalspont (Okay) like that.

Sipho: Oh, so you were not put together in the cell. They arrested you, how did you feel when you were arrested?

P3: After we've been arrested?

Sipho: Yes, how did you feel when you were arrested?

P3: It was hard; it was hard, it was painful. After we were arrested, we were tortured and assaulted and they did anything and everything they wanted to do to us. Perhaps it was their way. If you cannot tolerate the pain they will end up killing you because they did a lot of things to you. When they those things, you were not taken to the doctor, and your family was not allowed to see you. . Sometimes you are swollen, they beat you till you swell and would not take you to see the doctor. They'll keep you in the cell until your swellings had come down. So it's like that.

Sipho: Now that this incident has passed. What do you think, how do you feel?

P3: When I think about it ... Yes, things were horrible and these were horrible things. Yes, they were horrible but we could do nothing, it's true because the government was treating us badly. , Therefore, we were against the government of that era. As those were ways of freeing us. We wanted to be freed. So no, it was bad in those times.

Sipho: Now when you look back, when you look at this Sisi's case today, how do you feel?

P3: No, to me that Sisi's case was unfair? Here and there, it was unfair.

Sipho: Tell me more.

P3: Because they forced me to say that it was someone else who had set her on fire. Whereas it was not that person who lit her. Things like that (Okay) so I decide that I should meet so I met. They brought Rhoshani a lawyer. I told Rhoshani how this happened and how it ended. So they sentenced P2 to the gallows, saying that he would be hanged. So I told it as it was. Moreover, P3 was saved from hanging by that way. (P3telling the truth as to who set her on fire.) Do you see? Roshani was a lawyer from Durban. So people who brought Roshani to me were Toto Mayaba, Bhuti Charles, Bhuti “K” Koko Asiya, do you see? They are the people who made us meet so we had to visit Roshani at night so and so. Therefore, we go to Roshani’s Hotel and tell him the right statement not the one I had given in court as I had as the state witness, not the statement they had given me.

Sipho: Mhh, Ohh so you were present by the time she was caught for buying things?

P3: I was present.

Sipho: Okay, I’m saying by the time she was caught for buying meat.

P3: Yes, I was present, because we were marshals.

Sipho: Okay, after you’ve caught her, you took those things, and then she went to buy?

P3: She went to buy again. Yes, we kept on taking her goods, throw them on the ground, and destroy them. We threw them out, all that. It was clear that she would not listen. She then put police on us and kept on doing this. We decided there is now only one decision if a person does a thing that is against the procedure, she should be burned.

Sipho: You say to me when I ask you and I need clarity—just clear clarity—how do you feel about her case? You say it was bad. Although I ask you what was wrong with her case, your reply was it was unfair that you were made to give a false statement.

P3: Yes.

Sipho: Okay.

P3: Because the reason was that we should boycott their shops. We did that because we wanted these whites to feel the hardship so that they can turn against government so it was like that because in most places more coloured people were employed so now they do not hire black people. In places where they do not want blacks, we decided not to buy from. We will buy from certain places. Therefore, we only bought from De Wits and Khayaletu places we bought from.

Sipho: Now these police, those you had mentioned with names, by the time they were beating you. What were they saying when torturing you?

P3: They said I must tell the truth so I said there is no other truth than what I was telling them. In torturing me, I told them I'm not the person you say I am. They said they wanted [P3 referring to him by his nickname]. I say I am not [P3 nickname]. My name is P3

P3: So they let me go in the first game. So I was freed: they hunted me again, wanting me. They tortured me. They released me again. The last time was the day they fetched me. I was asleep and it was dawn when they found me they beat me. As I've said, they said I should say it their way because the people leading us are misleading us. I said no, we are listening to no one. The police said our bosses were J and others what, that we

orders from J. I could not stand the torturing. I could not stand the torturing. I could not stand it. They ended up making me a state witness.

Sipho: Mhh.

P3: Yes.

Sipho: Mhhh...they said your bosses mislead you?

P3: Yes.

Sipho: You were singing on that day when this was happening?

P3: We were singing songs.

Sipho: Do you remember which songs you were singing?

P3: Yes the songs were “We arrived at Sanlam where there many whites.” And the other song was about the spurting of our parents’ blood. If you can remember well, it says “the blood of our parents is gushing on the streets. Yes, Ok and we were toy-toying [singing and dancing to protest songs.

P3: the other song was “we arrived at sanlam it was filled by whites and when we peeped we found that blood was spilled and it was a blood of a black person.” That freedom song goes that way.

Sipho: It says we arrived at Sanlalm?

P3: Yes it says we arrived at Sanlam and there were many whites, Sanlam was full of whites when we peeped black people’s blood spilling

Sipho: It was full.

P3: Full of whites

Sipho: We said.

P3: When we peeped

Sipho: We....?

P3: We arrived black people blood spilling

Sipho: Calling of black person blood spilling it end there?

P3: Yes it ends there.

Sipho: Okay, the one that say the blood of our parents is gushing on the streets? Does it end there?

P3: Yes, the blood of our parents is gushing on the streets. Yes it also say take up an AK
47 guerilla

Sipho: Okay

P3: We leave and go back home

Sipho: Yes were these songs you sung while she was burning.

P3: We sang we sang it before she arrived.

We were waiting for her and we knew she was using that road, she must use it.

Sipho: After you caught her, were you now singing?

P3: Now, when we caught her, there was no singing then because we were...

Sipho: What do they say: “was “we arrived at sanlam it was filled by whites and when we peeped we found that blood was spilled and it was a blood of a black person.” She had not yet arrived?

P3: She did not arrive then.

Sipho: On that day after she was burned where did you go? When people said, here come the police. You said it was told that the police were coming.

P3: We ran to the drayini side we went up the mountain by the graveyard and we climbed the mountain we went back to Bongweni.

Sipho: Did you all leave together?

P3: the crowd of became large; people , everybody came. Now that we were toy-toying the community members came out and joined the toy-toying. We were Toy-toying.

Sipho: So you went back? Where did you start toy-toying?

P3. Yes at Bongweni. So we toy-toyed coming down from Bongweni to town and we knew that we going to fight back at the whites.

Sipho: And then what happened?

P3: So we went, we were going down (towards town) and the whites (Boers) had already entered. They were now shooting us with pellets and rubber bullets so we then threw rocks at them with slingers. Have you seen slingers? We were not sleeping in our homes because they were hunting us. So we ended up sleeping in church buildings and in the

houses we knew had no occupants. We would go to these shacks and enter there at night so no one would see us entering or leaving.

Sipho: Okay, so when these people were taken to court you were at court as well, but as a state witness?

P3: Yes.

Sipho: Okay what did the police say to you when you were testifying?

P3: They said nothing. They were happy because these people were sentenced and they took me back to Colesberg.

Sipho: Okay, you, how did you feel?

P3: No, I was not happy. I was not happy so that is why I went back to Roshani to give him my statement.

Sipho: Roshani statement (Witness) you were freed

P3: Yes.

Sipho: Where were you then?

P3: I was here at Colesberg, Roshani came far from Durban to take statements. He took it at Central Hotel. I gave the statement and they said that statement it would free [save] him from being hanged.

Sipho: How did you feel after all this? Did they come back to tell you if that person was hanged or not yet?

P3: Yes, they came back to tell me it worked because he would not going to get the rope. Now he only got few years. So I was certified (happy) because he was saved from the rope.

Sipho: So you not sentenced, so now nothing happened?

P3: I was not sentenced.

Sipho: Okay. Tata is there anything you want to tell me that I did not ask you?

P3: There is nothing

Sipho: Okay, for now bhuti let me say thank you.

P3: Okay.

Sipho: I'll come back to you I'll transcribe these things

P3: Okay.

Sipho: That's if I've got questions.

P3: Okay .

Sipho: I will phone for you.

P3: Okay.

Sipho: I'll say thanks for now.

P3: Okay.

Sipho: Thank you.

P3: Sharp.

Sipho: Thank you.

P3: I will be available.

Sipho: Okay.

APPENDIX E: PARTICIPANT 3 INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS (Xhosa)

Interview with Mr. P3

Sipho: Njengoko usazi ndenza uphando ngala “*case*” kasisi Nokwakha, ndibhala ngayo. Ndicela undichazele ngokwazi kwakho e-h-h-h-h ukuba kwaqhubeka ntoni.

Xa ndimemibuzo ndiza kubuza apho ungaqondiyo khona, nawe undibuze, nam ndiza kubuza apho ndingacacelwa khona.

P3: So i“*date*” andisayikhumbuli, so ngo-85 into eyenzekayo kwakune“*boycott*” yabo. So abantu babengathengi kwiindawo ezithile, kufunek’ uthenge kwindawo ezithile. So intw’eyenzekayo kwakunalo Sisi, uNokwakha Delato, so into eyenzakayo lo sisi samkhalimela into yokuba akanakuthenga eSilarheni, [*be*]cause akungenwa kwesi silarha wayephangela kuso. So saya samwonisha kwacac’into yokuba akeva, uyaqhubeka ngokumane ayekungena, ethenga kwesi silarha kungathengwa kuso, uyabo (na). “*So the first day*” sazixutha iinto zakhe, sazinyathela, uyakona kanjalo. Kwacaci’into yokuba nakhona akeva, uyikhuthalele uyenza loo nto, so sahamba sobavingcela endlwini yabo. Kuqala safik’endlwini yakhe kungekho mntu, sangena ngefestile, satshisa phaya endlwini yakhe. Salala kweny’ indlu “[*be*]cause” amapolisa ayesi”*hunter*”, ubone wona amapolisa asifuna, so salala kweny’indlu kwalapha kule nging’ *ibhek’e”town*”. So (sa)vuka “*early*” ekuseni ngelaa xesha aphantela ngalo so sabe simlalele ke ngoku xa esihla “*because*” asinayo i“*chance*” yokumfumana ekuseni ephantela, enxib’i-ovaroli yakhe yomsebenzi

kanjalo. So sabe siyamhlasela ngelo xesha ke ngoku. Wabalekela kwenye indlu, sabe simfumana kuloo ndlu leyo, ke ngoku sabe siyamtshisa, samgalela i“*petrol*”, so u AA wamlayita. UAA wamlayita, uA. Sabe ngoku simhlasele, kwabe sekusiza amapolisa sekuthiwa nang’amapolisa, saya sabaleka injalo. Ngoku into eyenzekayo bemana besi-“*hunter*” besifuna ke ngoku, so bafuna loo P3yabo, so mna ndithi andingo-Askees, mna igama lam nguP3. So baye bandifumane, so basithatha ke “*one by one*” ngoku bemana besithosharisha, kanjalo kufakw’ amasend’ezilayini, babraye phantsi kwakho, ujingiswe phezulu ubethwa nokubethwa yonke loo nto. NgooLee, Libi Maliti, noo-.... eli Bhulu, uSowerman, nooJansen, kanjalo.

So kwacac’ into yokuba, no, andinyamezeli yabo(na), nokuthosharisa kwabo, so ndayichaza ukuba kwenzeka ntoni. Bandixelela into yokuba mandingayibeki ngalaa ndlela yenzeke ngayo le nto, mandiyichaze ngolu labo uhlobo. Ndayibeka ngalaa... then s’otsho enantsikeni, bandenz’i“*state witness*”, so saya ke kuloo “*case*” siyixoxa eRhafu. Sayixox’eRhafu, so ndachaza loo “*false*” yento “*because*” yayibubuxoki yonke laa nto ngohlobo bona bayibeka... nantsike ngayo, babeyibeke ngendlela yabo.

Sipho: Okay, so bra ubusithi,... kukho into endifuna indicacele, uthi kum,... ubusithi bakuxhoma, bakubraye. Yenzeka njani?

P3: Baya kubophelela soo emthini, (ba)bophelela inyawo, (ba)bophelel’iingalo, ukhululisiwe, uhamba ngaze, so phantsi kwamalahle kubasiwe mos apha, babraye, so wena ujinga apha, utshiswe ngalaa phunga, ngumphunga lo wenantsika.

Sipho: Ngumphunga, okay,

P3: So nasesiseleni badubul’i“teargas”. Uphaya esiseleni, upheth’usopha, uthini-thini, uyabona. So bathi nangoku ke ngoku sesiphuncukile, “weer” singaphandle, bephetha “weer” besi”*hunter*”, bazosidulula futhi apha ngakwaMfundisi’uTozi, phambi kwaMfundisi uTozi, kule ndlu ihlal’uBhuti Samyeli, basidubula apho ngepeleti.

Indlela babezenza,... kunelayi phaya e“police station”, ezi layi zetafile. So bathath’amasende la wakho bawafake phakathi elayini, ipipi le yakho bayibeke phezu kwetafile, so iyatshixwa, bayitshixe, bakubethe. Akukho nto unoyenza, yile genge kaSanlam, nale genge yeRiot yase-Oudtshoorn.

Sipho: Uthi tata lo sisi nay’endlini yakhe. Nafika, okuqala. Uthi uthenge kangaphi, wathenga kanye okanye...?

P3: Samwonisha “*because*” ndiyacinga kuba ndisakhumbula kakuhle, ingathi kwakukayi-*three* eman’ethenga, simane simwonisha, engeva. Simane simwonisha, so sathath’isigqibo.

Sipho: Mhhhh. Esithini isigqibo?

P3: Sathath’isigqibo, into yokuba ngoku ...“*because*”,.... masimtshise kube kanye qha “*because*” wenz’inkani, “*because*” kwezi ndawo, thina masingathengi, abantu kuthiwa mabangathengi kuzo. Yena ukhuthalele ukuthenga kwezi ndawo. Enye eyona nto futhi wasifak’amapolisa “*because*” ukulahla kwethu iinto zakhe, so waphel’esibamba, so sadisayida into yokuba masimenze le nto simenze yona. (Ku)ba wonk’umntu wayechazelwa, (ku)ba kwakubizwa iintlanganiso, ichazwe entlanganisweni endaweni ezithile, nendawo ethile awunakuya kuthenga. So wonk’umntu ongumhlali ebeyazi loo nto leyo. So ke yayindim, nguK, uS,

Sipho: ngubani uK?

P3: NguT1, uS, nguT2, nguJV, ibe nguP, ibe nguM, ibe nguT.

Sipho: Abantu, abantu, ni... nini ababetheni, abatheni?

P3: Aba? Sithi sasisonke ukwenzeka kwayo yonke le nto. Samtshisa sisonke, “*but*” i”*false*” yile bathi phaya walayitwa ngunantsika... Zange amlayite uT1. Umntu owalayitayo nguAA. So ekumtshiseni kwethu sasimbetha, simenza yonk’into, uyabona, “*because*” sasifun’umlantika, sasza kumfak’itayari qha ke xa... ba... ukuba amapolisa cac’ukuba sekubizw’amapolisa, cab’amapolisa sesiza. Sabe siyabaleka ngaloo ndlela.

Sipho: Uthini yena?

P3: Wayekhala esithi masimxolele, ntoni-ntoni. Sisithi asiz’ukumxolela ke ngoku “*because*” kudala sikunqanda, sikuwonisha, so awuva, uyenz’ enkanini “*and*” enye into ke ngoku uyajika uyahamb’ uyo sibambisa kuba sithath’iinto zakho sazichitha, ntoni-ntoni.

Sipho: So ngoku nimbambayo, nimbamba phi, nimbambe ndawoni?

P3: Apha kule ndlu. (U)yabona xa usihla apha emva kwasisi Rosa, uyabona kwasisi Rosa? Sambamba phaya. Uyayibona le ndlu ihlal’ uThembile Dilato? Uyabona kukho indlu so, ... xa usihla kunendlu apha, yayihlala u..bhut’ uBonani, umalum’uBonani, utata kaMzwi Ndlambe, kwakuhlala yena kulaa ndlu. Sathi ekumbambeni wabalekela kulaa ndlu. So sathi ekumbameni kwethu wabalekela kuloo yadi, so yonke le nto sayenzela kuloo yadi, phakathi eyadini apho.

Sipho: Mhh

P3: Sayenzela kulaa yadi.

Sipho: “*Like*”, kwathini? Nina akho nto niyithethayo ngoku nenza le nto?

P3: Yayingekho into esasiyithetha, qha “*net*” sasi”*busy*” ngale nto siyenzayo.

Sipho: Okay.

P3: Yha.

Sipho: Akhukho “*like*”,... uthi nambetha njani, nimbetha ngantoni?

P3: Simbetha ngezandla, nangamatye (okay), uyabona.

Sipho: Okay.

P3: Sabe singalela ke nepetrol kanjalo (okay), wamlayita ke (okay) unantsik’ uAA.

Emlayitile njalo, ke ngoku sibe singafuni into yokuba ufun’i”*chance*” angen’endlwini (okay) uyabo(na) , so saphetha simbetha ngoku kuloo ndawo. So babe abantu bekhwaza: “Nang’amapolisa esiza”. So sabaleka samshiya evuth’enjalo, (okay).

Sipho: So kwakugqityiwe? Nase, ... nanigqibile nanimka sekugqityiwe ukuba umntu akuthenga uzotshiswa?

P3: Yha, so ke kwakesikugqityiwe. Into yokuba... xa igqityiwe into e“*meetingini*”, into yokuba aba bantu ... xana umntu ethenge kuloo ndawo ibhokothiweyo, ibhoyikhothiweyo, kufunek’ ungathengi kuwo uz’ uhambe uyokuthenga iinto zakho ziyachithwa,” *if*” (uku)ba uyikhuthalele futhi nangoku sezichithiwe usaphinda usayenza lantw’ inye, isigqibo sasinye, into yokuba mawutshiswe.

Sipho: So uthi nabanjwa?

P3: Yha

Sipho: Kwenzeka njani ukuze nibanjwe?

P3: Ukubanjwa, ... sasimane, ... bemane besizingela mos, besifuna, behambe besigqogqa, se' phethe ke ngoku, ... upheth' ungalali kowenu, ...sihambe silale kwezi ndlu zingenabantu;... ke ikhona nepozi esasithand'ukulala kuyo "*because*" yayingenabantu, ingenamnikazi wayo,... s'okungena kule pozi ngobusuku, ..silal'apho, sivuke "*early*" abantu bangasiboni, uyabona. (Mhh) "*but*" mna ukundifumana kwabo bandifumana ekhaya, kwamalume wam. "*In fact*" phaa eNew Bright (Mhh, okay). Bandifumana apho. Ndiyacinga kwakungaboo- 4, ... oo-3 (Mhh), ekuseni kanjalo, (Mhh).

Sipho: Edrayini?

P3: eNew Bright.

Sipho: Okay, (Mhhh)

P3: So kulapho ke ngoku, bekumane besifumana "*one bye one*" ke ngoku, besivalela esiseleni. (Ba)mane besithatha "*one by one*", (ba)mane bokwenza loo nto bafun' ukuyenza kuwe, (okay) yha. Bekuncwina, bokuncwina. So ukubethwa ubudlaliswa, ufakwe netyhupu aph'ebusweni. Ikhona ingxowa ebabeyifaka aph' ebusweni (Mhh), yha. So babesenza ke lezo zinto(Mhh)

Sipho: Eheee. Ngoku baba, "*like*" zang'uve, xa usiva "*like*" nje ngeli xesha isenzeka le nto, bathini? Akukho bantu babukeleyo? Bathini abany' abahlali?

P3: Babekhona abantu ababebukele, bekhona abantu, babebukele qha ke zange, ... sasi...sasingabahoyi. Andinakuthi ndandiyiva,... ndayiva into ababezithetha, ntoni-ntoni, so ndandinga“*concentratanga*” kule yabo into sasi“*concentrate*” kule nto siyenzayo into.

Sipho: Nina nithini kuye? Abanye ababethetha kuye babesithini kuye? Zange kubekho abantu ababenento, abanamazwi abawathethayo noba anjani?

P3: No, sasimxelela nje: “Yitsha, kaloku ibibubumpimpi bakho sowusitsha nje ngoku “*because*” ukuba wawu....wawuvile ngowungekho kule nto “*and*” ujike wahamba wosi....wasibambisa nosibambisa, ... (ku)ba sigqabhuz’into zakho,... sithath’ into zakho sazinyathela. So ke and kudala sithetha nawe ungeva, so ke wathi wawutshilo mos ukuba soze wena sikwenze niks, ngoku sikufumene”, (okay)

Sipho: Oh, wayethe yena soz’enzwe nto?

P3: Soz’enzwe nto?

Sipho: Wayesitsho kubani? (okay)

P3: Wayesitsho kuthi

Sipho: So uthi naniye endlini yakhe ebusuku?

P3: Mhh--ya, “*no*” sasiye ezintsukwini endlini yakhe. Into yokuqala saqala endlini yakhe, so safik’ endlini yakhe sasi... wayes’emsebenzini. Ndingatsho yena nomyeni wakhe besemsebenzini so sa”*decida*” ukuba masiqale ngendlu yakhe and “*then*” sizobuya sigqibele ngaye. So safuman’into yokuba nalapho asina”*chance because*” amapolisa ayathand’ukuba phaya, agad’indlu yakhe, ntoni-ntoni. So ke safumane,... ngelinye

lange...i-“*chance*”. Sangena kwi”*yard*” engasemva, satsib’iyadi, songena ke ngoku. Saqhekeza, sangena, salayita, sagelel’ipetrol, satshisa semka. (Mhh) So sabe siyazi ukuba silalele yena. Yab’indlu yakhe ke ngoku... iphind’amapolisa, ... ntoni-ntoni oyicima, ayigada. So samlalela yena into’ba,... sathi “*no*” kungcono simyeke xana etshayisa simgade ekuseni xana ephangela. So samlalela kuloo ndlu ke ngoku. Wathi (Mhh) xa (a)sibonayo, ezam’ukubaleka eyotshona kuloo yadi, yonk’into sayenzela kuloo yadi.

Sipho: Ngoku, sendithetha ngeli xesha yenzekayo le nto, wena uziva unjani? Ngeli xesha yenzakayo ngoku phaya, lo sisi sesimbambile.

P3: Ndiziva njani, mhlawumbi?

Sipho: E-e nje, wena,..” *like*” yintoni oyicingayo, oziva njani “*like*” ngeny’ixesha into xa isenzeka ukhona ne, uba nento oyifulayo apha kuwe, uyabona.

P3: “*No*”, yayingekho into ndandiyifila, qha ke net into endandiyifila njena yayingamasikizi nangona siyenza le nto “*but*” yayingamasikizi, yayingamasikizi “*because*” ukubulawa komntu, yabona. ...(Mhh) Qha ke kodwa ke ndingenakuthini “*because*” yayinguni..., yayisisigqibo esasithathiwe “*and moet*” (uku)ba siyenzile ke le nto “*because*” simwonishe kaninzi, so ke... so ke. (Mhh)

Sipho: Ngeli xesha yenzekayo le nto wena unamasikizi?

P3: Ndandinamasikizi, yazi, le nto, “*in fact*” zange,... yayiqala ukwenzeka eColesberg intw’ enje. Yayiqal’ ukwenzeka, so ke xa sesitsh’ ubuyimpimpi ubuyazi ukuba “*net*” isiphetho sakho kukutshiswa qha. Uza kutshiswa be ayikho eny’indlela yokukubulala,

uza kutshiswa. “*And*” ke nangoku ke sebesibambile babengasivaleli ke esiseleni esinye, babesohlula singadityaniswa, yha (Mhh).

Sipho: Oh, so esiselini nani... naningadityaniswa?

P3: Sasingadityaniswa, sasisohlulwa,... omnye kwesinye isisele, omnye kwesinye isisele; eny’igenge ithathwe iyobekwa komaNorvalsport. (Okay). Njalo.

Sipho: Banibamba ngoku? Ngoku sowuzifula njani ngeli xesha sekubanjiwe?

P3: Sesibanjiwe

Sipho: Ewe, wena uzufula njani ngeli xesha sesibanjiwe ke ngoku?

P3: Kwakunzima, kwakunzima. Yayiyintlungu, kwakubuhlungu ngo’sibanjiwe “*because*” sasibethwa, sisenziwa yonke into . Yayindlela nje mhla(wu)mbi, ... and ukungakwazi ukunyamezela kuphethe mhla(wu)mbi bekubulala nokubulala, yonke loo nto (Mhhh) “*because*” ininzi into ababeyenza. (Mhh). akukwazi “*even*” xa bekwenze loo nto leyo kwakungekho nento yokuba ngoku uza balekiselwa kugqirha “*and*” i“*family*” akufunekanga ikubone nokubona uphaya esiseleni. Ngeny’ixesha udumbile ,ubethwe wadumba, abakudibanisi nagqirha, ugcinwa kwesa sisele “*till*” usake.

Sipho :(Mhh)

P3: So kunjalo.

Sipho: Namhlanje le nto yadlula. Xa uyijonga pha seyidlulile... esi sehlo yintoni oyicingayo, ufula njani, uziv’ unjani?

P3: Xa ndiyicinga nje man, e-eyi,... (pause and take a depressive tone and looks spaced).

Yha, (i) (zi)zinto ezazibuhlungu ezi zinto, uyabona, ezazibuhlungu kodwa ke sasingenakwenza ngakumbi “*because*” ke eyi! mnyani k-e eee! urhulumente wayesiphethe kakubi, uyabona, so sasi“*against*” urhulumente welo xesha “*because*” yayizindlela zokusilis....zoku... zokusikhulula, ... sikhululeke. So hayi kwakubuhlungu nyani ke ngaloo maxesha.

Sipho: Xa u... xana ke ngoku ujonga,... sesithi ke ngoku namhlanje ujonga into, i“*case*” yala sisi wena uyabona napha uziv’unjani xana.... ?

P3: No i“*case*” yala sisi kum, kakhulu njena yabi... yaba “*unfair*” uyabona, kwint’ezithile yayi“*unfair*”.

Sipho: Ngandicacisele, njani?

P3: “*Because*” into yokubana babefostela int’okuba, .. mandithi ngubani obetshisile “*when*” ubani engakanga ndamlayita uyabona into ezinjengezo. (okay) So ndadisayida into yokubana mandidibane,... ndadibana, bandiphathela uRoshani igqwetha, so uRoshani ndamchazela yonk’into ukuba le nto yahamba njani, yaphelela phi. So babe bemnike unantsike lo, UP2 lo i“*hung pale*” besithi uzayokuxhonywa, so ndayichaza ngobunjalo bayo, so wabe ke ngoku usinda ngaloo ndlela entambeni, uyabona. URoshani wayeligqwetha elisuka eDurban. So abantu ababendidibanisa naye yayinguToto Mayaba no bhuti Charles, Bhuti “K” uKoko Asiya, uyabona

Sipho: Okay.

P2: Ngabo abantu ababendidibanisa naye. So ufumanise into yokuba nakuRoshani lowo fune'sihambe ngobusuku ntoni-ntoni, (Mhhhh) siya kuRoshani ehotele. Yonke le nto, ubeke ke ngoku i“*statement*” esi“*right*”, hayi esiya isi“*statement*” babendingqinisa sona.

Sipho: Mhhh, Ohhh, So wawukhona wena ngeli xesha abanjelwa ukutheng'izinto.

P3: Ndandikhona.

Sipho: (Okay) Sendithetha ngeli xesha abanj'ukuthengi nyama.

P3: Ndandikhona “*because*” sasiziiMarshalls.

Sipho: (Okay) and “*then*” nina nahamba naye emveni nimbambile, ‘ba nizithathile eza nto “*and then*” yena wahambe w’othenga?

P3: Waphinda yena wahamba waya kuthenga (Mhmm), yha. Qho ke izinto zakhe besinama sizithatha sizenze loo nto, sizilahla phantsi, sizinyathele yonke loo nto, sizichithe, yonke loo nto. Wafumanisi ukuba akeva, wasifaka amapolisa, wab'eyenza “*still*” le nto le. “*No*” sadisayida into yokuba ke ngoku isigqibo sinye bekuth(i)we umntu xa eyenza loo nto leyo echasene nenkqubo yethu uyatshiswa.

Sipho: Okay. Uthi kum xa ndikubuza bra, ndifun'undicacisele nje kakuhle; uziva njani ngale “*case*” yakhe, uthi kwakubuhlungu. ”*No!*” xa uthi kum xa ndikubuza into eyayirongo ngale “*case*” yakhe eyayi“*unfair*” yinto yokuba wena wenziswa i“*statement*” esingesiso.

P3: Yha

Sipho: Kuba ubethiwe, uphind'uthi kwakubuhlungu kodwa kwakungekho ndlela singenza ngayo kuba umntu wayesilwela inkululeko yakhe.

P3: (Mhhh)

Sipho: Ndifun'ingathi uyandicacisela kanye apho xa uthi ayikho indlela esinokwenza ngayo, sasilwel'inkululeko.

P3: (mhhh)

Sipho: Ibengath'uyayiphuhlisa, ingathi uyayityebisa tata.

P3: “No”, ndithi kaloku into yayisenzeka ngelaa xesha eliya urhulumente we-Apartheid, wengcinezelo. So sasifun'abantu bakuthi bamanyane senze intw'eyi“one”, kungabikho mntu owenze into ngapha bebona into yokuba lo rhulumente usicinezele, ... yabo. So sidisayide intokuba, “no” into eyenzekayo indaw'ethile akunakuthengwa kuyo, (Mhhhh) uyabona, (Mhhhh), kuthengwe endaweni (Mhhh) ethile, and “then” ke ngoku into eyayisenzeka kwezi ndawo kuthengwa kuzo,... into eyasisenzeka kwakune“discount” eyayisenzeka (okay) “and” ezi shopu zibenemali ethile eziyinika (okay) umbutho, uyabona (okay), ezi sithi makuthengwe kuzo (Mhhhh) .

Sipho:Okay

P3: “Because” into njeba si.. makungathengwa kwezo “shop” ezo (Mhhhh), sasisenz'into yokuba nabo bayive la maBhulu into yokuba atsala nzima (Mhhh) azokwazi nawo uba “against” urhulumente (Mhhh). So kwakunjalo, “because” indawo ezininzi “let's say” kweziny'iindawo bekusebenza mos amaQheya kakhulu (Mhhhh), so ke ngoku ababaqashi abantu abamnyama. Saqonda okay ababafun'abantu abamnyama so ke le

ndawo asuzuthenga kuyo. Sakuvala, sakutheng'endaweni ethile. So kwakuthengwa “only” kuDe Wits (mhhh) nakuKhayalethu (Mhhh), indawo ekwakuthengwa kuzo.

Sipho: Ngoku wona amapolisa, ngoku eli xesha la mapolisa ubuwabiza pha ngamagama ngeli xesha akubethayo athini? Sekuthotsharisha ke ngoku.

P3: Athi mandichaz'inyani so ndibachezele ayikho eny'inyani endinayo ngaphandle kwale nto ndibachezela yona ekundithotsharisheni kwabo, ndibendisithi kwaye andinguye lo mntu nithi ndinguye bath... bafun' u-Askes, ndithi andingo-Askes mna igama lam ndingubani.

Sipho: Okay

P3: So baye bandiphuncula kwi“game” yokuqala, ndaye ndaphuncuka so ndabuyela, baphinda bandi“hunter” ,bendifuna bondithotsharisha, ndikhululeka “weer” bandikhulula so okokugqibela ke ngoku yile mini ze bondilanda ekuseni ndilele ke ngoku. Bathi bandifumana bondenza eza nto zabo njengoba bendichaza. Babesithi mandiyibeke ngolo hlobo (okay) “because” aba bantu siva ngabo bayasilahlekisa nton- ntoni (okay), Ndathi “no” asivi ngamntu. babesithi (mhh) (**Mhh**) OoPinkjan ntoni- ntoni, so siva ngoPinkjan. So ke andamelana nayo indaba yothotsharishwa (mhhh), yabona z'andamelana nayo, so ndaphetha ke ngoku bandithatha bandenza i“state witness” sabo (mhh).

Sipho: Mhh,

P3: Yha

Sipho: Mhh. Bath'obaas benu banilahlekisa,

P3: Yha

Sipho: Nani, zange nina khe... nanacula ngalaa mini yenzakayo laa “way” nanacula.

P3: Sasicula amagwijo,

Sipho: Awukhumbuli nanacula awaphi?

P3: Athini? “eSanlam, (okay) safika eSanlam kuzele ngamaBhulu, negazi labazali bethu”, ukuba ndisakhumbula kahle. “*Igazi labazali bethu limpompoza ezitalatweni*”.
(okay) Yha (okay) sasibetha ke nethebula (okay), Yha

Sipho: Safik’eSanlam

P3: Mhhh

Sipho: Phi?

P3: ESanlam? (Mhhh) *safika le Sanlam kuzele amaBhulu, xa’thi masikroba safika kuphalala igazi lomntu omnyama, yayisitsho loo“freedom song”*

Sipho: Ithi safika eSanlam

P3: Ewe, ithi safike, safike le Sanlam kuzele amaBhulu xa’thi masikroba safika kuphalala igazi lomntu omnyama

Sipho: Kuzele?

P3: Kugcwele ngamaBhulu

Sipho: Sathi ?

P3: Masikroba

Sipho: Sa....?

P3: Safika kuphalala igazi lomntu omnyama

Sipho: Kuphalala ig....azi lo mntu o.....mnyama, okay.... iphelela apha?

P3: Iphelele

Sipho: Okay, eli lithi igazi labazali bethu limpompoza, iphelele apho?

P3: Yha, igazi labazali bethu limpompoza ezitalatweni (E-e-we) thabath' u-AKHA gerila.

Sipho: Okay

P3: Sihambe sigoduke

Sipho: E-e-e-we, thabathu u-AKHA, sihambe sigoduke. Ziculwa nga..., ziculwa ngeli xesha lo SISI atshiswayo.

P3: Zicula (okay), sayicula engaveli yena, engakafiki “*because*” sasimlindile “*because*” sasiyazi uhamba ngalaa ndlela (okay), uza “*moet*” ehambe (okay)

Sipho: Ngo' senimbabile zange ni... kwakungaculwa?

P3: Hayi ngo' sesimbabile kwakungasekho kucula ke ngoku “*because*” sasesi... (okay).

Sipho: Zithini? Safika eSanlam kuzele amaBhulu sathi masikroba safika kuphalala igazi lomntu omnyama. Okay, ithi igazi labazali bethu limpompoza ezitalatweni, okay. Akakafiki ngeli xesha, useza.

P3: Akafiki yena, akakafiki.

Sipho: Ngale mini, emveni ‘ba egqity’ ukutshiswa tata, na...na... naya phi? Xa kuth’wa nanga amapolisa, uthi kwath’wa amapolisa ayeza.

P3: Sabaleka seza ngapha eDrayini (mhh). Senyuka apha ngedrayini s’oqabela entabeni (mhhh) apha ngasemangcwabeni, (Mhh), so sabuyela ngaph’emaBongweni ke ngoku, ntoni-ntoni. (Mhh), yha

Sipho: Nihambe nonke?

P3: Sabe ke ngoku sekugcwele. Wabe esiza umntu,... wab,...e kusiza wonke umntu xa sesibeth’ethebula ke ngoku, kuphuma ilokishi yonke ke ngoku, yajoyina ithebula ke ngoku (okay), sabe sezibethi ithebula ke ngoku (okay)

Sipho: Najikela, naqal’itoyi toyi.

P3: Yhee eBongweni, so sabeth’ ethebula sesisihla, (Mhhh), sabe ke ngoku siqonda nathi siyozilwela kula maBhulu. (mhh)

Sipho: ”*And then*” kwathini ke ta?

P3: So sahamba sa... sasilee ezantsi, kanti nyani ke amaBhulu sengenile (mhhh), abe ke ngoku sesidubula ngepeleti nee “*rubber bullet*” (mhhhh), sabe ke thina siwagibisela ngezi “*lenger veer*”, (mhh), uyayibona intshuntshe. Sasingcucalaza singalal’ emakhaya “*because*” bayasifuna, so into eyenzekayo ke ngoku sihamba silala kwezi zakhiwo zecawa, ... apha ezicaweni nakwizindlu esiyaziyo loo ndlu ayinamntu (mhh). Sokungena ngobusuku, singabonwa mntu, singafuni ukuba sibonwe ngabantu xa singena apho, (okay) .Nophuma ke besiphuma eli (mhh), yha.

Sipho: H-h-ha, okay. So wena ngoku aba bantu basiwa e”*court*” nawe ukhona aph’e”*court*” ,wena ulingqina lika rhulumente?

P3 : Yha

Sipho: Okay, bathini kuwe ngoku amapolisa wena xa sowungqina?

P3: Akhonto bayithetha “*because*” bavuya nje ngoku xa seku... benikwa isigwebo, le genge, xa ndiyongqina phaya (okay), bandithatha bandibuyisa (okay) back eColesberg.

Sipho: Okay, wena waziva njani?

P3: No, ndandingonwabanga (Mhh), ndandingonwabanga (mhh), “*so that is why*” ke ndakwazi ukuphinda ndinikezele ubungqina kuRoshani (mhh), yha.

Sipho: Emveni kobungqina bukaRoshani uthi wab’uyakhululwa.

P3: Yha

Sipho: Wena uphi ke ngoku?

P3: Mna ndilaph’eColesberg. URoshani wayesuke lee eDurban wazothatha ke ngoku eso “*statement*” (mhh) si –esithathela eCentral Hotel (mhh), so ndabe ndiyamnika obu bungqina esithi oba bungqina ndimnika bona buzakwazi ukumkhulula entambeni (Mhh) uyabona, engakaxhonywa (okay), uTefo.

Sipho: Wena waziva njani ke ngoku emveni kwaloo nto? Babuya bazokuxelela futhi lo mntu uxhonyiwe okanye akaqhonywanga?

P3: Yha babu ..babuya ezondichazela wathi isebenzile “*because*” u... akazubheka ntanjeni (Mhh) ngoku, so ufumene nje iminyaka (okay), so ndabe ndixolile “*because*” ekubeni ba usindile entanjeni yabo ba... (okay)

Sipho: So wena zang’ugwetywe ke ngoku, ... zange kwenzek.....?

P3: Zange ndigwetywe mna.

Sipho: Okay, okay. Eny’into tata ofun’ukundichazela yona endingayibuzi?

P3: Ayikho.

Sipho: (Okay) Okwangoku bhuti mandith’enkosi.

P3: Okay.

Sipho: E-e-eh. Ndiza kubuyela kuwe wena ezi zinto ndiza kuzikhuphela.

P3: Okay.

Sipho: (Uku)ba ndinemibuzo, mhlawumbi.

P3: Okay.

Sipho: Sowumkile ndizakufowunela.

P3: Okay.

Sipho: Ndinayo ifowuni yakho.

P3: Okay.

Sipho: Ndizakuthi enkosi okwangoku.

P3: Okay.

Sipho: Ndiyabulela.

P3: Sharp.

Sipho: Ndiyabulela.

P3: Hayi uza kundifumana.

Sipho: Okay.