Husserl and Foucault on the Subject: The Companions

Harry Nethery IV

Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/etd

Recommended Citation

This Immediate Access is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. For more information, please contact phillipsg@duq.edu.
HUSSERL AND FOUCAULT ON THE SUBJECT:
THE COMPANIONS

A Dissertation
Submitted to the McAnulty College & Graduate School of Liberal Arts

Duquesne University

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

By
Harry A. Nethery IV

August 2013
HUSSERL AND FOUCALT ON THE SUBJECT:

THE COMPANIONS

By

Harry A. Nethery IV

Approved July 11th, 2013

Dr. Lanei Rodemeyer
Assistant Professor of Philosophy
(Committee Chair)

Dr. Leonard Lawlor
Professor of Philosophy
(Committee Member)

Dr. Fred Evans
Professor of Philosophy
(Committee Member)

Dr. Daniel Selcer
Associate Professor of Philosophy
(Committee Member)

Dr. James Swindal
Dean, McAnulty College of Liberal Arts
Professor of Philosophy

Dr. Ronald Polansky
Chair, Department of Philosophy
Professor of Philosophy
ABSTRACT

HUSSERL AND FOUCAULT ON THE SUBJECT:
THE COMPANIONS

By
Harry A. Nethery
August 2013

Dissertation supervised by Dr. Lanei Rodemeyer

In this text, I argue for the revision of Husserlian phenomenology through a dialogue with the work of Michel Foucault. Specifically, I argue that Foucault’s critical project, in which we isolate the contingent limits of thought so as to pass beyond them, and thus think new ways of being, can be filled out by the work of Edmund Husserl and differentiated into two lines of inquiry: a critical ontology and a critical phenomenology. This is accomplished by bringing these two philosophers, commonly held to be diametrically opposed, into dialogue such that together they say something that neither could say on their own.
DEDICATION

For my parents, Mary L. Nethery and Harry A. Nethery III.

Thank you.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This text was completed as a doctoral dissertation from the Philosophy Department at Duquesne University, who supported my final year of research with a Dissertation Completion Fellowship. As such, I would like to thank the Philosophy Department for their support.

I would like to thank Dr. Lanei Rodemeyer for her tireless and unending support of both myself and this project. Her mentorship and friendship have been pivotal in helping me to develop the line of thought in this text. For everything that she has done for me, I am eternally grateful.

I would like to thank Dr. Leonard Lawlor for his mentorship and his help in developing this text. His work and mentorship have been pivotal for my readings of Foucault in particular, and of 20th century French philosophy in general.

I would like to thank Dr. Fred Evans and Dr. Dan Selcer for their invaluable feedback on this project. Their insightful comments and questions were pivotal for developing some of the finer points of this text.

I would like to thank the Simon Silverman Phenomenology Center at Duquesne University for their support. Dr. Jeff McCurry, the director of the Phenomenology Center, allowed me the use of the Center’s materials and was always willing to discuss Husserl with me. Angelle Pryor was instrumental in helping me locate the texts that I needed for this project.

I would like to thank my Eureka and Pittsburgh families, without whom I would have gone mad ages ago. From Eureka I would like to thank Stacie, Ray, Jesse, Jessica
and Todd, and from Pittsburgh I would like to thank Nate, Andrea, Aaron, Kim, Paul, John, Jim, Taine, Ashley, and Ryan.

I would like to thank my Anita and Jim for their unwavering support throughout my graduate career.

I would like to thank all of the graduate students at Duquesne University for putting up with my incessant talk and questions about Husserl and Foucault.

Finally, I would like to thank Brittany Duncan for her brilliance, her love, and her support. There are not the words in this language, or any other, to express my love, admiration, and appreciation for her. Thank you Brittany.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE OF CONTENTS</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEDICATION</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§1. The Companions (Les compagnons)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PART ONE – THE SUBJECT</strong></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter One – Foucault and the Subject</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§2. Introduction</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§3. Foucault’s General Project: The Critical Ontology of the Present</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Critique and Ontology</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§4. Foucault’s General Project and his Resistance to the Phenomenological Subject</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§5. Foucault’s Critique of Subject-Oriented Philosophy</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§6. Foucault’s Reversal of the Phenomenological Reduction</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Husserl’s Phenomenological Reduction</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§7. The Motivation for the Reduction in Foucault</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§8. The Exclusion of the Subject (1966): “The Thought of the Outside” and “Les</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>suivantes”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§9. The Suspension of the Subject (1969): <em>The Archaeology of Knowledge</em> and “What is an Author?”</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§10. The Reduction in Later Works</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§11. Conclusion</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Two – Husserl and the Subject</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§12. Introduction</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§13. “The Theory of Consciousness is a Theory of Apperceptions”</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§14. Apperception</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§15. Apperception and Internal Time Consciousness</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) The Present</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Far and Near Retention</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Far and Near Protention</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§17. “Radiating Back” and the Openness of Consciousness</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
§18. Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 78
PART TWO – THE LIMIT ............................................................................................................. 79
Chapter Three – Husserl at the Limit .................................................................................. 79
§19. Apperception and History .............................................................................................. 79
   a) Strata, Static and Genetic Phenomenology ................................................................. 82
§21. First Stratum: the Sphere of Ownness ........................................................................ 85
§22. Second Stratum: Empathy ........................................................................................... 89
   a) The Two Correlates of Intersubjectivity ..................................................................... 99
§25. Apperception and Historical Constitution: Husserl’s “Pathological Object” .... 107
Chapter Four – Foucault at the Limit ................................................................................ 113
§26. Foucault and the Pathological Object ......................................................................... 113
§27. First Axis: Power (Disciplinary Power) ....................................................................... 116
§28. Second Axis: Knowledge (Discourse) ....................................................................... 122
   a) The Confessional ......................................................................................................... 124
   b) Psychiatry and the Constitution of Sexual Abnormalities ........................................ 128
§29. Third Axis: Ethics (Forms of Conduct/Ways of Being) ............................................. 135
   a) From Law to Being: Expert Psychiatric Opinion ....................................................... 137
   b) The Zero-Point of Discipline: The Family ................................................................. 143
§30. Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 148
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 151
§31. The Critical Project: Two Lines of Inquiry ................................................................. 151
   a) The Intertwining of Experience ............................................................................... 152
   b) Critical Phenomenology and Critical Ontology ....................................................... 155
   c) The Transcendental and the Historical .................................................................... 156
   d) The Indefinite Work of Freedom .............................................................................. 158
Bibliography .......................................................................................................................... 160
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

All page numbers refer first to the text in its original language, and second to the English translation.


WA Kant, Immanuel. “Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?” Berlinische Monatsschrift 4 (1784), pg. 481-494 Translated by Lewis

II


TCP


IST

Introduction

That Husserl regarded his teaching as extending “seeing” in philosophy and psychology may be illustrated by an incident which occurred in his Freiburg-period. Upon asking the wife of a visiting-scholar/professor what she got out of listening to his so technical lectures, he was told that the lessons in phenomenology gave her so many new eyes. In Husserl’s opinion this aptly expressed the spirit of his undertaking. Where we are accustomed to finding simplicity, a very complex situation is shown to exist; and after numerous distinctions have been drawn carefully, the reader is made to feel that only a beginning has been made.

-André Schuwer

§1. The Companions (Les compagnons)

In his 1966 essay “The Thought of the Outside,” Foucault argues that at the limit between the interiority of consciousness and the outside of language (or, the anonymous streaming being of language) there is a kind of figure that haunts us. This limit-figure, or the companion (le compagnon, a term borrowed from Maurice Blanchot), “always remains hidden but always makes it patently obvious that he is there; a double that keeps his distance, an accosting resemblance” (PD: 562/163). The companion accosts us, according to Foucault, by showing us “the nameless limit [la limite sans nom] language reaches” (PD: 564/165). In any case, this companion is a haunting presence, threatening to make manifest to us a limit we can never reach.

While we will return to the idea of the outside later in this text, I would like to use this idea of a companion – a hidden, accosting resemblance or double residing at a

---

1 From André Schuwer’s unpublished lecture notes, given at Duquesne University on January 21st, 1971. These unpublished lecture notes are housed in the Simon Silverman Phenomenology Center at Duquesne University. I would like to thank Jeff McCurry for permission to use this citation.
limit – as an image for the connection between the work of Husserl and Foucault. In this text, I will argue that at the limit of Foucault’s philosophy we find Husserl and that at the limit of Husserl’s phenomenology we find Foucault. That is, when you take Foucault’s project to its limit we find subjectivity (and therefore Husserl), and when you take Husserl’s project to its limit we find history (and therefore Foucault). This argument will proceed in two parts.

In Part One of this text, ‘the Subject,’ I examine two separate ways in which Foucault and Husserl’s work encounter each other. In the first chapter, I show that Foucault implicitly engages in a reversal of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction, which is, of course, the active suspension of the natural attitude from our descriptions of experience. To say that Foucault engages in a reversal is to say that rather than the suspension of the natural attitude, he instead actively suspends the modern notion of the subject from his analyses, such that he can describe the ways in which power and knowledge constitute forms of conduct that individuals are then forced to take up within disciplinary society. This reversal of the phenomenological method is analyzed through a number of Foucault’s primary texts, essays, and interviews. In the second chapter, we then turn to Husserl and draw from his work a theory of the subject that is fundamentally open to the constitutive processes of knowledge and power. This is done through the analyses of Husserl’s descriptions of internal time consciousness, apperception, association, and passive synthesis, in which we will find that consciousness can be understood as a process of becoming which is structurally open to change. Thus, we will find Foucault meeting Husserl in the first chapter in the form of the reversal of the

\[ \text{**Footnote:** This interpretation of Foucault is heavily indebted to the mentorship and work of Leonard Lawlor. Also, for the definitive exposition of Foucault’s essay “The Thought of the Outside,” see Chapter 7 of Lawlor’s *Early Twentieth-Century Continental Philosophy.*} \]
phenomenological reduction, and we will find Husserl meeting Foucault in the second chapter in the form of a theory of the subject that is amenable to Foucault’s analyses.

In Part Two of this text, ‘the Limit,’ I argue that we can understand Husserl and Foucault as each examining one side of a common limit. This common limit is us – those individuals who live within a disciplinary society, which is itself grounded in a shared and objective cultural world. In the third chapter, I argue that the limit in Husserl can be found in his descriptions of the constitution of the cultural world. This argument proceeds through the analyses of Husserl’s descriptions of the intersubjective constitution of a shared objective and cultural world in his 5th Cartesian Meditation and through an analysis of Husserl’s description of experiencing oneself as a “pathological object” in his Ideas II. The fourth chapter will pick up where Husserl left off, so to speak, and examine Foucault’s descriptions of the ways in which forms of conduct, i.e. ways of being, are constituted within disciplinary society through the processes of power and knowledge. Specifically, we will use as our guiding example the constitution of a young man as a “pathological object” by his community due to his desire for a specific type of body. Foucault’s limit will be found where his analyses begin, i.e. those bodies that are forced to take up the ways of being constituted through disciplinary power.

In the conclusion, I argue that, out of this companionship, we can revise Husserlian phenomenology in such a way as to bring it into the service of Foucault’s critical project, which will have the further effect of differentiating the latter’s project into two separable, but ultimately intertwined, lines of inquiry. Foucault’s critical project, as outlined in his 1984 essay “What is Enlightenment,” is the attempt to isolate various historically constituted, and thus contingent, limits of present thought, such that we can
think new forms of being. Through analyzing the role of the subject in Foucault and Husserl’s work and the idea that both philosophers are examining their respective side of a limit, we will ultimately find that isolation of the contingent limits of thought must proceed on two registers. The first register is Foucault’s critical ontology, in which we are shown that ways of being we believe to be necessary are in fact historically constituted, and thus contingent. The second register is a critical phenomenology, in which we describe the structure and functioning of consciousness, such that we can understand how these limits become embedded within perception and how it is that we actively perceive these limits in our “perceptions, attitudes and behavior” (FL: 282).

As such, this text is the endeavor to bring the work of Husserl and Foucault together, such that they say together something that neither could have said on his own. Not only that, but to bring them together in such a way that their companionship can be productive for our thought now, in the present.
PART ONE – THE SUBJECT

Chapter One – Foucault and the Subject

I try to historicize to the utmost in order to leave as little space as possible to the transcendental. I cannot exclude the possibility that one day I will have to confront an irreducible residuum which will be, in fact, the transcendental.

-Michel Foucault

§2. Introduction

In this chapter, we will examine Foucault’s side of the companionship, and show how the subject is always at the limit of his thought (a subject who, in turn, will be the focus of the second chapter). We will begin by examining Foucault’s overall project, such that we can isolate a notion of the subject that will allow us to see the ways in which Husserl is a companion or a limit-figure for Foucault. Using his overall project as context, we will then turn to Foucault’s critique of subject-oriented philosophy, specifically phenomenology. Next, we will take this notion of the subject and show how Foucault’s project contains an implicit methodological commitment as regards a kind of ‘suspension’ of the subject from analysis. That is, if our goal is to find out how the subject is constituted through discourse and power-relations, we must first attempt to suspend the constitutive activities of consciousness, such that these relations can become manifest. This idea of ‘suspending the subject’ will be traced through a selection of Foucault’s texts, and we will find that this method is employed in order to show us the contingency of the limits of our present ways of being.

§3. Foucault’s General Project: The Critical Ontology of the Present

Late in his career, Foucault argued that his work can be understood under the general heading of a ‘critical’ or ‘historical’ ontology of ourselves (or the present). Foucault writes that this project “could be called an ontology of the present, of present reality, an ontology of modernity, an ontology of ourselves” (GSO: 20). This critical ontology, as a general project, is best illustrated through the following two quotes, which, when taken together, give both the aim and the methodology of his project. We will first briefly examine each quote and then undertake a more full analysis in the following sub-section. First, the goal of Foucault’s project (as critical) is to:

…separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think. … [I]t is seeking to give new impetus as far and wide as possible, to the indefinite [indéfini] work of freedom. (WE: 1393/315, translation modified)

At its most basic, Foucault’s overall project is to show us both (1) what we are and (2) the possibility of no longer being what we currently are. That is, Foucault’s work seeks to isolate the contingent limits of thought, such that the isolation of these limits will show us that these limits are contingent, and, since they are contingent, they can be crossed-over.

This critical ontology operates along three axes:

First, an historical ontology of ourselves in relation to truth through which we constitute ourselves as subjects of knowledge; second, an historical ontology of ourselves in relation to a field of power through which we constitute ourselves as subjects acting on others; third, an historical ontology in relation to ethics through which we constitute ourselves as moral agents. (MF: 237)

Even to readers who are barely familiar with Foucault’s work, the parallel between this statement and Foucault’s published texts should be apparent. *The History of Madness,*
The Birth of the Clinic, The Order of Things, and The Archaeology of Knowledge make up the axis that Foucault refers to as the “constitution” of ourselves “as subjects of knowledge.” The History of Madness is concerned with the transformation of madness into a pathological illness, or how a “scientific psychiatry” of the nineteenth century had become possible (HFC: 315/296). In The Birth of the Clinic, Foucault examines the development of the medical clinic, in which patients became ‘subjects of knowledge’ through the way in which illness came to be perceived. The patient’s body underwent a fundamental transformation from the vessel for hidden illnesses and ailments, to a space of open visibility in which illnesses can be pursued and laid bare, and the medical clinic was the place in which this constitution unfolded. Foucault writes, “[w]hat was fundamentally invisible is suddenly offered to the brightness of the gaze” and thus that “the abyss beneath illness, which was the illness itself, has emerged into the light of language” (NC: 195). The Order of Things is an examination of the fundamental change that occurred in the ways in which life, language, and labor were understood. This fundamental change involves the movement of the rules of ordering in these domains from representation to a set of laws that function behind representation in some way or another. Foucault writes,

[O]ne traces… language as it has been spoken, natural creatures as they have been perceived and grouped together, and exchanges as they have been practiced; in what way then our culture has made manifest the existence of order, and how, to the modalities of that order, the exchanges owed their laws, the living beings their constants, the words their sequences, and their representative value. (MC: 13/xxi).

This fundamental change constitutes us as subjects of knowledge, for Foucault, because a certain view of human beings develops from this change in ordering. Specifically, this
fundamental change ushers in the view of human beings as transcendental subjects. The *Archaeology of Knowledge* is also an examination of the constitution of the subject as a subject of knowledge, but in a more broad and general way than the specific analyses of these other three texts. That is, in this text Foucault is concerned with understanding how it is that the subject is constituted through discourse and discursive practices as such, and thus how, for example, we can think of “mental illness” as “constituted [constituée] by all that was said in all the statements that named it, divided it up, described it, explained it, traced its developments, indicated its various correlations, judged it, and possibly gave it speech by articulating, in its name, discourses that were to be taken as its own” (AS: 45/32).

The power axis is located within *Discipline and Punish* and the first volume of the *History of Sexuality*, while the constitution of “ourselves as moral agents” is found within the other two volumes of the *History of Sexuality*. *Discipline and Punish* is an examination of the transformation of punishment from the public torture and executions of the classical era to the prison system of the modern era, in which “a specific mode of subjection [i.e. the penal system] was able to give birth to man as an object of knowledge [objet de savoir] for a discourse with a ‘scientific’ status” (SP: 32/24). That is, criminals were transformed from “real bodies that feel pain” to “a juridical subject, the possessor, among other rights, of the right to exist” (SP: 20/13). While *Discipline and Punish* examines the creation of juridical subjects through relations of power, the first volume of the *History of Sexuality* is an analysis of the constitution of human beings as subjects of

---

4 This argument plays out through Chapter Nine of *The Order of Things*, “Man and his Doubles.”
sexuality and the proliferation of discourses concerned with sexuality in the modern era, “the ‘putting into discourse of sex’” (HS1: 21/12).

The ethical axis is found in the final two volumes of the History of Sexuality, i.e. *The Uses of Pleasure* and the *Care of the Self*, which examine “the forms and modalities of the relation to self by which the individual constitutes [constitue] and recognizes himself *qua* subject” (HS2: 12/6). Volume Two, *The Use of Pleasure* is primarily concerned with “the manner in which sexual activity was problematized by philosophers and doctors in classical Greek culture of the fourth century B.C.” while *Care of the Self* “deals with the same problematization in the Greek and Latin texts of the first two centuries of our era” (HS2: 18/12). In both cases, Foucault examines “how individuals were led to practice, on themselves and on others, a hermeneutics of desire, a hermeneutics of which their sexual behavior was doubtless the occasion, but certainly not the exclusive domain” (HS2: 11/5).

While laying out Foucault’s work along these three axes is helpful for explanatory reasons, it is actually the case that all three axes are inextricably bound up with each other. For instance, when one is analyzing the constitution of the subject as a sexual being, one finds: “(1) the formation of sciences [*saviors*] that refer to it, (2) the systems of power that regulate its practice, (3) the forms within which individuals are able, are obliged, to recognize themselves as subjects [*sujets*] of this sexuality” (HS2: 10/4). That is, the constitution of the subject as a sexual being entails the formation of discourses of knowledge on sexuality, the formation of systems of power to regulate sexual behavior,

---

5 The first volume of the *History of Sexuality* is also an analysis of the constitution of human beings as objects of sexual knowledge. This will be described below.
and forms of morality wherein the subject conforms to certain moral rules so as to see themselves as, for example, subjects free of sin.

In any case, when taken together, we find that Foucault’s overall project is the attempt to show that what we are now is not necessary, and that there are other forms of living than those we have now. This is done through showing how we are constituted as subjects of knowledge, subjects of power within a network of power relations, and how we constitute ourselves as moral agents. Indeed, in reference to the project of the three volumes of the *History of Sexuality*, Foucault writes that “[t]he object was to learn to what extent the effort to think one’s own history can free thought from what it silently thinks, and so enable it to think differently” (HS2: 15/9).

a) Critique and Ontology

In order to understand Foucault’s use of the term ‘critical,’ let us begin with a brief background of his text “What is Enlightenment?” It is a text on an essay by Kant, which the latter wrote in response to an open question in a 1784 issue of the *Berlinische Monatschrift*. Kant’s response to the question “Was ist Aufklärung?” marks, for Foucault, both a definitive point in our recent history and the development of a critical attitude which must be modified and “permanently reactivated” (WE: 312). Kant’s essay consists

---

Beatrice Han-Pile, in her text *Foucault’s Critical Project*, argues that Foucault’s project is a series of failed attempts to reinterpret Husserl’s historical a priori without the transcendental. She writes, “Despite the many attempts… Foucault was unable to give the old Husserlian historical a priori a new satisfactory version” (196). Instead, she argues that Foucault’s project, from beginning to end, was caught up in the doubles of Chapter Nine of *The Order of Things*. As such, while the notion of an historical ontology “is not contradictory per se,” it is not tenable due to Foucault’s “insistence on the theme of the self-constitution of the subject” (195). For Han-Pile, self-constitution and historical ontology are not tenable together because the latter consists of practices that lie outside of the subject. Ultimately, however, Han-Pile misses a productive interpretation of Foucault’s relationship with phenomenology through a commitment to Foucault’s own authorial intentions – because Foucault intended to reject phenomenology, they cannot enter into a productive dialogue. And, because Foucault rejected phenomenology, the success of his project hinges on whether or not he was actually successful in distancing himself from phenomenology.
of a meditation on the relation between philosophical thought and the present, in which he argues that the world is itself in a state of immaturity, and that the Enlightenment offers a way out of this immaturity. Kant writes:

Enlightenment [Aufklärung] is man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity is man’s inability to make use of his own understanding without the guidance of another. This immaturity is self-incurred if its cause is not lack of understanding, but lack of resolution and courage to use it without the guidance of another. (WA: 481/85)

For Kant, immaturity is the state in which human beings rely on the rational activities of another, rather than relying on their own use of rationality. For example, Kant argues that we are in a state of immaturity when “… I have a book to have understanding in place of me, a spiritual adviser to have conscience for me, a doctor to judge my diet for me...,” etc. (WA: 482/85) If immaturity is the state of humanity in which we rely on the reasoning of others, or the state in which we “do not think,” (WA: 482/85) then maturity would be the state in which we rely on our own reasoning activities. Thus, for example, we are in a state of maturity when we are in charge of our own conscience. However, under Foucault’s interpretation, Kant’s Aufklärung is not an event, but instead a process or an attitude. Rather than some event, like a revolution, in which everyone’s viewpoint is changed all at once, Foucault argues that Kant’s Aufklärung requires a constant modification of “the preexisting relation linking will, authority, and the use of reason” (WE: 1381/305). We slip back into immaturity at any time when we let the reasoning of another stand in for our own reasoning. Thus, Aufklärung requires a constant determination to modify the link between will, authority, and reason within oneself. Indeed, the motto of the Aufklärung for Kant is “Dare to know!” (WA: 481/85)
Of course, for Kant the way out of this immaturity is through his critical analyses, i.e. the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the *Critique of Practical Reason*, and the *Critique of Judgment*. Foucault argues that, for Kant, the critical question is the question “of knowing [savoir] what limits knowledge [connaissance] must renounce exceeding” (WE: 1393/315). Foucault writes:

Kant, in fact, describes Enlightenment as the moment when humanity is going to put its own reason to use, without subjecting itself to any authority; now, it is precisely as this moment that the critique is necessary, since its role is that of defining the conditions under which the use of reason is legitimate in order to determine what can be known [connaître], what must be done, and what may be hoped. (WE: 1386/308)

For Kant, if we are to exit our state of immaturity, requiring us to modify the link between will, authority, and reason, then we must examine the limits of reason itself, such that we will not attempt to use reason outside of its own limits. Furthermore, this examination of reason’s limits will show us that we must be guided by reason itself, rather than allow for the substitution of our own reasoning for those of another.

Foucault appropriates this notion of critique from Kant, but modifies it drastically. Whereas Kant wants to find the limits of reason such that we do not attempt to pass beyond those limits, Foucault wants to find these very limits so that we can go beyond them. He writes:

But if the Kantian question was that of knowing [savoir] what limits knowledge [connaissance] must renounce exceeding, it seems to me that the critical question today must be turned back into a positive one… The point, in brief, is to transform the critique conducted in the form of a necessary limitation into a practical critique that takes the form of a possible crossing-over [franchissement]. (WE: 1393/315)

Critique is the isolation of the limits of thought for the sake of going beyond them, of establishing new forms of life, or of modifying the “preexisting relation linking will,
authority, and the use of reason” but in a creative way, rather than the isolation of a limit such that we know where not to go. Indeed, Foucault writes that critique is the “historical analysis of the limits imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them [de leur franchissement possible]” (WE: 1396/319). As such critique is always undertaken in the name of the present. Foucault’s work is interested in isolating the series of events that have led us to see ourselves in the way that we do in our present era. Indeed, Foucault uses Kant’s essay on Aufklärung for this very reason. Just as, for Kant, the Aufklärung is an ‘exit’ from immaturity, Foucault’s version of critique is an ‘exit’ from our modern era.

The overall goal behind Foucault’s project follows from the definition of critique given above, i.e. that critique is “the indefinite (indéfini) work of freedom”. Critique is employed in order to find and test the contingent limits of thought, which is itself undertaken for the sake of going beyond these very limits. As such, passing beyond these limits can be understood as the goal of contemporary philosophy. That this work is the work of freedom is directly related to the idea that the limits of thought are contingent. If these limits are contingent, then there is no necessary teleology behind reason, otherwise these limits would instead be necessary. And, if there are no necessary limits, then we are free. However, because there are no necessary limits, this kind of work is indefinite. That is, since there is no teleology behind human reason, there cannot be some final state in which we have attained absolute knowledge or perfect knowledge. The work of freedom is indefinite [indéfini].

---

7 This is confirmed by Lawlor in Chapter 9 of his Early Twentieth-Century Continental Philosophy, pg. 202. He writes, “This indefinite work of freedom, by means of which we become other than what we were, by means of which we transform our thinking and our lives, is the very project of what we call continental philosophy. It is perhaps the only project worthy of the name ‘philosophy.’”
Because critique is interested in isolating our contingent limits, it is not focused on the pursuit of universal structures of consciousness, but is instead an inquiry into the events that have made us what we are today. Foucault writes, “criticism is no longer going to be practiced in the search for formal structures with universal value but, rather, as a historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying” (WE: 1393/315).

The methodology, design, and ontological status of Foucault’s project follow from this basic commitment to the isolation of contingent limits through archaeology and genealogy:

*Archaeology*: The term ‘archaeology’ designates the methodology of critique, in that it looks for those events that have determined our contingent limits in the present, rather than searching for transcendental structures of consciousness. As such, instead of looking to first-person experience for clues as to the structures of consciousness, Foucault will instead turn to historical documents. He writes that critique is “[a]rchaeological – and not transcendental – in the sense that it will not seek to identify the universal structures of all knowledge [*connaissance*] or of all possible moral action, but will seek to treat the instances of discourse that articulate what we think, say, and do as so many historical events” (WE: 1393/315).

*Genealogy*: The term ‘genealogy’ designates the design of critique, which again follows from Foucault’s overall project. Since the limits of thought are contingent, and not necessary, critique will not “deduce from the form of what we are what it is impossible for us to do and to know” (WE: 1393/315). Rather, critique will, to return to the text cited in the previous section, “separate out, from the contingency that has made
us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think” (WE: 1393/315) In order to accomplish this goal, the design of Foucault’s project must proceed by following the various lines which connect us to particular historical events, thus marking a kind of genealogy. This is in distinct opposition to a kind of analysis which would relate historical events to progress of reason (rather than the relation of the development of reason to historical events). Indeed, Foucault writes that genealogy is aimed at “[a]n entire historical tradition (theological or rationalistic) [which] aims at dissolving the singular event into an ideal continuity – as a theological movement or natural process” (NGH: 1016/380).

Ontology: Throughout Foucault’s later writings, one finds a constant use of the term ‘ontology’ when Foucault describes his lifelong project. This can again be seen through the idea that critique focuses on limits so as to move beyond them. Specifically, this should be clear when Foucault writes that critique will show us the “possibility of no longer being, doing, and thinking what are, do, or think.” That is, if Foucault is concerned with no longer being what we currently are, then he is attempting to find the possibility of new forms of being. As such, critique is always in the name of becoming other than what we are now, and is thus an ontological, rather than purely historical, project. Or, as he tells us in his 1982-83 lecture course The Government of Self and Others:

This other critical tradition does not pose the question of the conditions of possibility of a true knowledge; it asks the questions: What is present reality? What is the present field of our experiences? What is the present field of possible experiences? Here it is a question of the analytic of truth but involves what could be called an ontology of the present, of present reality, an ontology of modernity, an ontology of ourselves. (GSO: 20)

That is, critique, as ontology, is concerned with the contingent limits put on our present ways of being.
We can now understand the full scope of Foucault’s appropriation of Kantian critique. Foucault’s critique is the investigation into what has made us what we are now, and, by recognizing that these limits are contingent, shows us the possibility of going beyond them. As such, Foucault’s project, since its outset (implicitly or explicitly), has been thoroughly and fundamentally concerned with ontology, i.e. of thinking new forms or ways of being.

§4. Foucault’s General Project and his Resistance to the Phenomenological Subject

We can understand the relation between Foucault’s project and his resistance to theories of the subject on two registers. First, we can understand the relationship theoretically, in which we find that his resistance to the subject, and his resulting methodology, are entailed by his general project. Second, understood practically, his general project itself follows from a general resistance to the subject that resulted from the institutionalization of phenomenology in French academia during the middle of the 20th century. Let us briefly explore both registers.

Theoretical: If Foucault’s general project is to be understood as a critical ontology of the present, in which we focus on the contingent limits of our present and possible fields of experience, then he will resist any view of the subject in which the subject is posited as the origin of all meaning. This follows logically from Foucault’s general project. If all meaning flows from the subject, then the limits on our present and possible fields of experience would be necessary, as they would be part of us universally qua human, subject, consciousness, etc. If these limits are contingent, then we must, in some sense, be constituted. And, it will turn out for Foucault that we are constituted through the
three axes of critical ontology, i.e. knowledge, power, and ethics. As such, any theory of
the subject which posits the subject as the source of all meaning will be inadmissible
under Foucault’s general project and the terms it sets out. That the phenomenological
subject, be it through Husserl, Sartre, or Merleau-Ponty, is the example *par excellence*
should be of no surprise. This will be explored more in the next section.

*Practical:* Foucault’s general project is actually a result of a concrete resistance to
the phenomenological theory of the subject which dominated French academic thinking
during the 1950s and 60s. To see this, let us begin by looking at how Foucault understood
the French philosophical academic system during the 1950s. In a talk from 1981, titled
“Sexuality and Solitude,” Foucault describes the trajectory of the academic climate in
France in the following manner:

In the years that preceded the Second World War, and even more so after
the war, philosophy in continental Europe and in France was dominated by
the philosophy of the subject. *I mean that philosophy took as its task par
excellence the foundation of all knowledge and the principle of all
signification as stemming from the meaningful subject.* The importance
given to this question was due to the impact of Husserl, but the centrality
of the subject was also tied to an institutional context, for the French
university, since philosophy began with Descartes, could only advance in
a Cartesian manner. (*EWF1:* 176, my emphasis)

As we can see, Foucault understood the French academic system as committed to a basic
sense of Cartesianism, in which “the principle of all signification [stems] from the
meaningful subject” – both as a kind of cultural commitment to Descartes (“…since
philosophy began with Descartes”) and in the revival of this commitment in France
through the introduction of phenomenology in Husserl’s lectures given at the Sorbonne in
1929 (which were later published as the *Cartesian Meditations*). In either case, it is clear

---

8 See Alan Schrift’s “The Effects of the *Agregation de philosophie* on Twentieth-Century French
Philosophy” and Gary Gutting’s *Thinking the Impossible* for discussions of the intellectual horizon of
academic philosophy at the Ecole Normale Superior during the 1950s.
that a philosophy of the subject involves, for Foucault, “the principle of all signification as stemming from the meaningful subject.”

For Foucault, Husserl’s entrance onto the philosophical scene in France revitalized the philosophical commitment to the idea that all meaning is constituted by the subject, while also setting up a line of opposition to this idea. In the introduction to Canguilhem’s *Normal and the Pathological*, Foucault writes that:

Delivered in 1929, modified, translated and published shortly afterward, the *Cartesian Meditations* soon became the contested object of two possible readings: one that sought to radicalize Husserl in the direction of a philosophy of the subject, and before long was to encounter the questions of *Being and Time*: I have in mind Sartre’s article on the “Transcendence of the Ego” in 1935; and the other that would go back to the founding problems of Husserl’s thought, the problems of formalism and intuitionism; this would be, in 1938, the two theses of Cavaillès on the *Méthode axiomatique* and on *La Formation de la théorie des ensembles*. Whatever the ramifications, the interferences, even the rapprochements may have been in the years that followed, these two forms of thought constituted in France two strains that remained, for a time at least, rather heterogeneous (LES: 1584/466).

In both cases, it would seem that, for Foucault, Husserl’s impact on French philosophy took the form of a kind of rupture, from which two paths divergent paths emerged. On the one hand, there is the renewed interest in the subject, revitalized through Husserl’s phenomenological project. On the other hand, in the face of this renewed interest, there is the attempt to show that certain things are not themselves the result of the constitutive acts of the subject, e.g. mathematical or logical truths. Of course, Foucault recognizes that this is Husserl’s argument as well. In an interview from 1978, Foucault tells us that “The great texts of Edmund Husserl, of Alexandre Koyré, formed the other face of phenomenology, opposite the more existential phenomenology of *le vecu*” (EWF3: 252).
operations of knowledge and rationality. Earlier in this same piece, Foucault writes that this dividing line:

… separates a philosophy of experience, of meaning, of the subject, and a philosophy of knowledge, of rationality, and of the concept. On one side a filiation which is that of Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty; and then another, which is that of Jean Cavaillès, Gaston Bachelard, Alexandre Koyré, and Canguilhem (LES: 1583/466).

For Foucault, the Husserlian phenomenological subject became institutionalized within French academic thought, through the philosophies of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, both of which he understands as using phenomenology to give a theoretical basis to Marxism. In an interview from 1968, Foucault tells us:

I belong to a generation of people for whom the horizon of reflection was defined by Husserl in a general way, Sartre more precisely, and Merleau-Ponty even more precisely. It’s clear that around 1950-55, for reasons that are equally political, ideological and scientific, and very difficult to straighten out, this horizon toppled for us. (FL: 695/41)

Later, in an interview from 1983, Foucault traces a connection between the various philosophical projects in France during the 1960s to a resistance against this institutionalization, and its perceived failure in bringing about any kind of change, which its Marxist tie was supposed to bring about. Again, Foucault tells his interviewer that:

So I would say that everything that took place in the sixties arose from a dissatisfaction with the phenomenological theory of the subject, and involved different escapades, subterfuges, breakthroughs, according to whether we use a negative or a positive term, in the direction of linguistics, psychoanalysis or Nietzsche. (EWF2: 1256/438)

Ultimately, this dissatisfaction led Foucault to a series of analyses aimed at the very idea of the subject as the foundation of knowledge and meaning.
§5. Foucault’s Critique of Subject-Oriented Philosophy

Let us now turn to Foucault’s critique of subject-oriented philosophy. Through analyses of Foucault’s critique, we will be able to see what I am calling a reversal of the phenomenological method within Foucault’s methodology. Simply put, I will argue that Foucault’s resistance to the subject leads him to suspend the subject from his investigations, in a way analogous to the suspension of existential claims found in Husserl’s phenomenology. Whereas Husserl suspends the world to find the subject, Foucault suspends the subject to find the systems in which the subject is constituted, and thus enacts a reversal of Husserl’s phenomenological method.

Foucault’s critique can be understood to play out on two different levels. First, there is his general critique against subject-oriented philosophy, in which Foucault argues that there is a general theme, what he calls the “sovereignty of the subject [souveraineté du sujet],” (AS: 22/12) which implicitly guides the analyses of those who presume that the subject is the foundation of knowledge and meaning. This presumption then leads their analyses to conclusions that fit within a pattern generated by this general theme. Second, there is a more specific set of critiques laid out against phenomenology found within Chapter Nine of Foucault’s The Order of Things, in which Foucault levels a series of charges against the modern invention of the subject. The second level of Foucault’s critique has been thoroughly examined and analyzed by Leonard Lawlor, primarily in his text The Implications of Immanence, but let us briefly review his critique. In Let mots et les choses, Foucault argues that a transformation occurred in the nineteenth century “sciences of man,” in which “natural history becomes biology… the analysis of wealth becomes economics… [and] reflection upon language becomes philology” (MC:
Consequently, humans came to be understood as “a living being, an instrument of production, a vehicle for words which exist before [us]” (MC: 324/313). This then entailed a recognition that we are finite:

Man’s finitude is heralded – and imperiously so – in the positivity of knowledge [savoir]; we know that man is finite, as we know the anatomy of the brain, the mechanics of production costs, or the system of Indo-European conjugation; or rather, like a watermark running through all these solid, positive, and full forms, we perceive the finitude and limits they impose, we sense, as though on their blank reverse sides, all that they make impossible. (MC: 324/313)

In turn, this recognition of finitude leads to what Foucault calls an “analytic of finitude, in which man’s being will be able to provide a foundation in their own positivity for all those forms that indicate to him that he is not finite” (MC: 326/315). The “analytic of finitude” entails a series of doubles that revolve around the idea that humans are both the subject and object of inquiry. While all of the doubles apply to phenomenology, perhaps the most famous critique occurs in the double of the “empirical and the transcendental” (MC: 329/318). Here, Foucault argues that, under the analytic of finitude, “Man… is a strange empirico-transcendental doublet, since his is a being such that knowledge [connaissance] will be attained in him of what renders all knowledge [connaissance] possible” (MC: 329/318). Of course, Foucault has in mind the phenomenological claim that we can find the transcendental conditions of the possibility of experience through the description of empirical objects. Thus, for Foucault, a fundamental ambiguity occurs between the idea that humans are both transcendental and empirical (MC: 332/322).

The clearest formulation of Foucault’s general critique can be found in his *Archaeology of Knowledge*. Here, Foucault tells us that history has traditionally been viewed as a kind of progress, in which historical events and documents are organized
around a general theme. This “continuous history” (AS: 21/12) seeks to look at how “continuities are established, how a single pattern is formed and preserved” (AS: 12/5) between various historical events. The historian, on Foucault’s account, approaches historical analysis with the idea that the movement of history is one of continuity and progress, and thus establishes relations between historical events on the basis of continuity.

The framework of continuity itself, Foucault argues, is “the indispensable correlative of the founding function of the subject,” or what he also calls the “sovereignty of the subject” (AS: 22/12). The framing of history in terms of continuity is supplied by a certain idea of human beings, viz. that human beings are the foundation of knowledge and meaning. This idea is inextricably bound to the further idea that, because we are the foundation of knowledge and meaning, our faculty of reason is always moving towards the goal of absolute knowledge or perfect justice. If this notion of human beings is taken up by the historian, then historical events will be related to each other in terms of their own relation to the progress and unfolding of reason. That is, human consciousness will be the center around which history is analyzed: “Making historical analysis the discourse of the continuous and making human consciousness the original subject of all historical development and all action are the two sides of the same system of thought” (AS: 22/12).

As such, the primacy of human consciousness, and the continuity that is its correlate, gives rise to a general theme, the “sovereignty of the subject,” from within which historical analysis is to be carried out. This yields at least two outcomes: First, as we have seen, itformulates the way that historical events and documents are to be grouped together. By prescribing what groupings count as valid or invalid, certain
questions are dismissed or passed over. Questions of continuity are privileged over questions of discontinuity. Through organizing historical events in a specific way, some questions are taken to be valid while others are ignored or simply passed over. Second, the framework prescribes tools for analysis, specifically with regard to the way in which historical documents are to be treated, read, and described. Specifically, documents are treated as “the language of a voice since reduced to silence” (AS: 14/6) and the “inert material through which [one] tries to reconstitute what men have done or said, the events of which only the trace remains” (AS: 14/7). That is, documents are treated as the expression of a human consciousness that existed in a time no longer accessible to us. They are then read and described in regards to,

… not only what the documents may have meant, but also whether they were telling the truth, and by what right they could claim to be doing so, whether they were sincere or deliberately misleading, well informed or ignorant, authentic or tampered with. (AS: 13/6)

In other words, documents are described strictly in terms of the human consciousness that produced it, and thus the description of these documents becomes centered on the subject. Documents are the expression of someone, who meant to say something, on the basis of which we can reconstruct the past. As we can see, the ways in which documents may be described is given from within the framework of continuity and its subject-oriented view of history. The rules for the way that historical unities are to be formed and that documents are to be described are called, by Foucault, “ready-made syntheses,” that “we normally accept before any examination” (AS: 32/22). The investigator thus comes to the table already with the idea that the movement of history is the correlate of human consciousness. Her questions are then framed by continuity, which limits what may be asked and the manner in which answers can be conceived.
Ultimately, we can understand Foucault’s argument in the following manner: if we subscribe to the “sovereignty of the subject,” i.e. if we presume that the subject is the foundation of knowledge, then our analyses will be implicitly guided by this presumption. Furthermore, our analyses will then confirm our implicit presumption through fitting evidence for our analyses into a general pattern supplied by the presumption itself. Specifically, if we believe that the subject is the foundation of knowledge and meaning, then we will view humanity as having an internal teleology whose end is absolute knowledge. Thus – to return to the idea of critical ontology outlined above – presuming an internal teleology to human beings, in the form of reason, will give rise to a belief in necessary limits of thought and being. If Foucault’s goal is to show us the contingency of thinking and being, then this idea of the subject must be rejected.

§6. Foucault’s Reversal of the Phenomenological Reduction

Foucault’s rejection of the subject, I argue, leads him to a reversal of the phenomenological reduction through the suspension of the subject from analyses of historical documents. This reversal of the phenomenological reduction allows Foucault to isolate the processes through which we become subjects of knowledge, power, and ethics. In the end, we will find Foucault returning to the subject that he suspends in the three volumes of the *History of Sexuality*.\(^{10}\)

This section begins with a brief explanation of the phenomenological reduction made famous by Husserl, so as to set the scene for further discussion of Foucault’s reversal of the reduction. The section will then continue with an examination of three

\(^{10}\) This will be the subject of Chapter Four.
texts in which we can find Foucault’s employment of this reversal of the phenomenological reduction, followed by an explanation of how the reduction operates within Foucault’s later texts. Taken together, I can then show that Foucault must return to that which he originally suspended, i.e. the subject.

a) Husserl’s Phenomenological Reduction

Husserl’s phenomenological reduction, developed in his 1913 text *Ideas I*, is a methodological move in which we delimit a region of experience through the suspending of what Husserl calls “the general positing that characterizes the natural attitude” (Hua III: 53/57). This general positing underlies what Husserl calls our “natural attitude,” which consists of an attitude towards the world, in the sense that it factually exists. That is, for Husserl, our belief in the world “does not consist of a particular act” or “an articulate judgment about existence” (Hua III: 53/57). Instead, our belief that the world and those around us factually exist is instead a constant attitude that we have towards the world. Husserl writes that it is “something that lasts continuously throughout the whole duration of the attitude, i.e. throughout natural waking life.” (Hua III: 53/57). This attitude is what Husserl calls the “natural attitude.”

For Husserl, in order to separate off the question of the structure of consciousness from the thorny question of the relation of the mind to the world, or mind to body, he argues that we must describe our experience in such a way that this general positing, as an attitude, is not in play. As such, rather than “remaining in this attitude, we propose to alter it radically” (Hua III: 53/57). This radical alteration, for Husserl, involves the modification of the general positing that characterizes the natural attitude, specifically
through the “parenthesizing,” “putting out of action,” “excluding,” or “suspending”\textsuperscript{11} of the world’s existence. That is, in order to describe consciousness such that we can elucidate the structures through which it constitutes the world, we must first put the factual existence of the world “out of play” or “in suspense.” Husserl writes:

Nevertheless the positing undergoes a modification: while it in itself remains what it is, we, so to speak, “put it out of action” we “exclude it,” we “parenthesize” it. It is still there, like the parenthesized in the parentheses, like the excluded outside the context of inclusion. We can also say: The positing is a mental process, but we make “no use” of it… (Hua III: 54/59)

Furthermore, this “reduction” does not only consist of the suspending of the general positing of the existence of the world. Husserl argues that any idea which presumes the existence of the world must be suspended as well: (1) the totality of the cultural and natural sciences, with their theories and beliefs about the consciousness and the world (Hua III: 108/131), (2) the transcendence of God (Hua III: 110/134), and all natural or religious teleologies (Hua III: 111/134).

These reductions, Husserl argues, “initially makes possible the turning of regard to transcendentally pure consciousness” (Hua III: 108/131). Once we have suspended all theories and notions given to us by science, we are left only with the world \textit{as it appears to consciousness}, rather than the way it appears to us in the natural attitude, i.e. filtered through all sorts of beliefs and theories. We can then carry out analyses of the very structures of consciousness.

How we understand the notion of structure, however, changes depending upon whether Husserl is engaging within a “static” or “genetic” phenomenological analysis.\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{11} Husserl, in a discussion of whether or not the pure ego can be excluded, says that there are investigations in which one would put the pure ego “in suspenso” (Hua III: 133).

\textsuperscript{12} The difference between static and genetic phenomenology is discussed in Chapter Two.
At the static level, such as in *Ideas I*, consciousness appears, after the reduction, through the structure of noesis and noema (consciousness-of). However, once Husserl focuses on the constitution of internal time and other genetic analyses, consciousness is usually referred to as a kind of flow or process. So, while it is true that in one sense the reduction yields essential structures, it can also be understood as yielding essential processes wherein our experience of the world is constituted.

§7. The Motivation for the Reduction in Foucault

The general motivation for a reversal of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction can be found in an interview from 1976, in which Foucault tells his interlocutor the following:

I wanted to see how these problems of constitution [problèmes de constitution] could be resolved within a historical framework, instead of referring them back to a constituent subject [un sujet constituant] (madness, criminality, or whatever). But this historical contextualization needed to be something more than the simple relativization of the phenomenological subject. I don’t believe the problem can be solved by historicizing the subject as posited by the phenomenologists, fabricating a subject that evolves through the course of history. *One has to dispense [débarrassant] with the constituent subject, to get rid [débarrasser] of the subject itself, that’s to say, to arrive at an analysis that can account for the constitution of the subject [la constitution du sujet] within a historical framework.* And this is what I would call genealogy, that is, a form of history that can account for the constitution of knowledge, discourses, domains of objects, and so on, without having to make a reference to a subject that is either transcendental in relation to the field of events or runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of history. (EWF3: 147/118, my emphasis)

As we have already seen, Foucault’s project is to show that the limits of thought and being are historically constituted, and therefore contingent, and that this project occurs through the analyses of the axes of knowledge, power, and ethics. However, if Foucault

---

13 The idea that consciousness is a flow or a process is discussed in Chapter Two.
wants to show how the subject is constituted along these three themes, then he cannot take the constitutive activities of the subject into account.

Foucault’s methodological statement, that he had to “dispense with the constituent subject” so as to “account for the constitution of the subject within a historical framework,” plays out in Foucault’s work through the active suspension\textsuperscript{14} of the subject from his analyses. Concretely, this suspension occurs when Foucault examines historical documents.\textsuperscript{15} So as not to interpret historical documents in a way that falls in line with the “sovereignty of the subject,” one has to “suspend” the subject from analyses, and all of the notions that this theme brings into play.

This idea of suspension plays out in three different ways throughout Foucault’s works. First, in two texts from 1966, viz. “The Thought of the Outside” and “Les suivantes” (the first chapter of \textit{The Order of Things}), the idea of suspending the themes of the “sovereignty of the subject” take the form of the “exclusion” of the subject in the former and the erasure of proper names in the latter. Second, in two texts from 1969, viz. \textit{The Archaeology of Knowledge} and “What is an Author?”, Foucault is directly concerned with the “suspension” of the themes associated with the “sovereignty of the subject.” Third, Foucault’s later texts, viz. \textit{Discipline and Punish} and the three volumes of the

\textsuperscript{14} Foucault uses this term repeatedly throughout his \textit{Archaeology}. This will be examined further in §8.

\textsuperscript{15} Dreyfus and Rabinow recognize the dialogue between Foucault’s method in his early texts and Husserl’s phenomenological reduction and project of description, in their description of archaeology as “the bracketing of serious meaning” (MF: 49). Dreyfus and Rabinow interpret Foucault’s archaeological method as the attempt to “bracket the truth claims of the serious speech act he is investigating” (MF: 49). Ultimately, they argue that the archaeological project fails due to Foucault falling victim to the ambiguous doubles outlined in Chapter Nine of \textit{Let mots et les choses}. However, Dreyfus and Rabinow miss other interpretations of Foucault’s relationship with the reduction through interpreting Foucault’s work through his own critiques of phenomenology. As such, for them, the only question is whether or not Foucault can free himself from the doubles of man, which they see happening with Foucault’s move to genealogy. Furthermore, because Dreyfus and Rabinow describe Husserl’s project as a series of “implausible methodological contortions” and an “implausible tour de force,” it is no surprise that they miss any productive interpretations of Foucault’s work, and seek only to understand what Foucault ‘actually meant’ (MF: 36).
History of Sexuality, can be understood as analyses carried out from within this reversal of the phenomenological reduction. Ultimately, the reversal of the reduction is deployed in order to reveal those processes through which we become subjects of knowledge, power, and ethics.¹⁶

Let us now examine each of these in turn.¹⁷

§8. The Exclusion of the Subject (1966): “The Thought of the Outside”¹⁸ and “Les suivantes”

Foucault’s 1966 essay “The Thought of the Outside” is an attempt to elucidate and describe “language in its raw being (être)” (PD: 547/148, translation modified) in which we will find the “dispersion” of subjectivity (PD: 549/150). That is, the subject is, for Foucault, constituted by language, rather than the other way around. Contra the common idea that the subject is the foundation of language (thus the foundation of knowledge and meaning), Foucault argues instead that the subject is merely a “grammatical fold” [un pli grammatical] in the “continuous streaming of language” (PD: 565/166). That the subject is a fold implies a relation of constitution from language in its raw being to the subject. In fact, Foucault argues in this text that the subject of literature is a void or a position in which language expresses itself: “The ‘subject’ of literature (what speaks in it and what it speaks about) is less language in its positivity than the void

¹⁶ Foucault’s movement from the structures of discourse in his early works to the processes of power in his later works almost mirrors Husserl’s movement from static to genetic phenomenology. That is, as Husserl’s work progressed, we see a move from a focus on the structures of consciousness to a focus on consciousness as process, primarily in terms of internal time consciousness as ‘flow.’

¹⁷ The elaboration of the idea that Foucault’s later works are analyses from within his reversal of the phenomenological reduction can be found in Chapter Four, though it will be discussed briefly in this chapter.

¹⁸ The most interesting and philosophically insightful discussion of this essay can be found in Leonard Lawlor’s Early 20th Century Continental Philosophy.
that language takes as its space when it articulates itself in the nakedness of ‘I speak.’” (PD: 548/149).

The only way for us to see this, he argues, is through the exclusion of the subject, or in an experience of “language from which the subject is excluded” (PD: 548/149). He writes that “the being of language only appears for itself with the disappearance of the subject” (PD: 549/149). In order to examine the being of language we must first find a way to exclude the subject and all of the constraints on meaning that the modern view of the subject entails and thus analyze the being of language in a way that “escapes the mode of being of discourse – in other words, the dynasty of representation…” (PD: 548/148). That is, we have to exclude the bearer of discourses if we want to analyze language free of “the mode of being of discourse.”

This exclusion of the subject occurs through the statement “I speak,” which “distances, disperses, effaces that existence [that of the subject] and lets only its empty emplacement appear” (PD: 548/149). Foucault argues that the statement “I speak” acts as a kind of experience in which one can glimpse that which is exterior to the interiority of consciousness, i.e. language in its raw being. This occurs because the statement “I speak” “refers to a supporting discourse” which is itself missing. Foucault writes:

“I speak” refers to a supporting discourse that provides it with an object. That discourse, however is missing: the sovereignty of “I speak” can only reside in the absence of any other language; the discourse about which I speak does not preexist the nakedness articulated the moment I say “I speak”; it disappears the moment I fall silent. (PD: 547/148).

Normally, the statement “I speak” is accompanied by an “of” or an “about” – I speak of or about something, for instance I can speak about some philosopher or another. However, without the presence of the “of” or the “about,” any supporting discourse that
might “provide it with an object” is not found (PD: 547/148), and a shift in focus occurs. While the subject would seem to be the seat of meaning, and that anytime the subject speaks meaning follows, the “I speak” takes this relationship and turns it upside-down. Since the “I speak” carries no meaning, it is not of or about anything, the subject that speaks it becomes merely a position or a place in which language articulates itself. When I say “I speak,” I become that position in its nakedness.

This position is a kind of ‘void’ within the streaming of language in its raw being. Foucault writes that this void is “an absolute opening through which language endlessly spreads forth, while the subject – the ‘I’ who speaks – fragments, disperses, scatters, disappearing in that naked space” (PD: 547/148). Rather than a unity or an identity, which would serve as the foundation for language, the subject is instead an opening for language’s articulation of itself. Again, Foucault writes “And the subject that speaks is less the responsible agent of a discourse… than a nonexistence in whose emptiness the indefinite [indéfini] outpouring of language uninterruptedly continues” (PD: 547/148, translation modified).

However, while Foucault argues in this text that we must exclude the subject in order to see that the subject is a kind of void or “empty emplacement,” this does not mean that excluding the subject eliminates it. Rather, Foucault is here concerned with excluding the subject and the discourses that she brings to the table in order to show us the contingency of our own limits. Again, though Foucault excludes the modern notion of the subject, he does so such that he can illuminate what we are now in our current era.

Similar language to exclusion occurs in Foucault’s analysis of Las Meninas, the 1656 painting by Diego Velázquez (from the former’s 1966 text The Order of Things).
As Lawlor argues, Foucault analyzes Velázquez’s *Las Meninas* in order to show us “the prior law that makes the play of representation possible,” which itself “is the fundamental condition for all these epochs and perhaps for the epochs that are still to come” (II: 95). In order for this to occur, however, Foucault argues, we must “erase the proper names” of the figures in the painting.\(^{19}\) He writes that if one wishes to analyze the painting in a way that allows for us to see this “fundamental condition,” we must “erase (effacer) those proper names and preserve the infinity of the task” (MC: 24/9).

According to Foucault, proper names obscure our analysis of the painting. Simply put, if we want to understand the play of representation in *Las Meninas*, then we need to focus on the gazes within the painting itself, which can be obscured if we focus on who is who in the painting. In fact, there is a fundamental ambiguity to representation and to *Las Meninas* that is completely done away with if we assign proper names to the painter and to the subjects within the painting. Foucault writes that “[t]hese proper names would form useful landmarks and avoid ambiguous designations; they would tell us in any case what the painter is looking at, and the majority of the characters in the picture along with him” (MC: 25/9). However, for Foucault, it is precisely within the ambiguity of these gazes that the play of representation is revealed, and if one wishes to keep this ambiguity open, one “must pretend not to know who is to be reflected in the depths of that mirror, and interrogate that reflection in its own terms” (MC: 25/10).

For us to keep the ambiguity of the painting open, so as to see the play of representation, we must erase the proper names of those in the painting. This erasing, in effect, removes the subject from the painting and allows for the painting to be

---

\(^{19}\) In Ch. 8 of *Implications of Immanence*, Lawlor gives an extended discussion on Foucault’s removal of proper names in *Las Meninas*. However, Lawlor does not connect this with Husserl’s phenomenological reduction. See his Ch. 8 for a complete analysis of Foucault’s treatment of *Las Meninas*. 
interrogated precisely on its own terms, rather than filtered through our cultural and historical knowledge of who those figures were and what the painting might then represent. In fact, Foucault does not use the proper name “Velázquez,” which suggests a similarity between this analysis and Foucault’s later essay “What is an Author?” If we attach the name Velázquez to the painting we, in effect, constrain the possible meanings given by the painting, just like the author constrains the possible interpretations of a text. Furthermore, the original title for this chapter in the French edition of *The Order of Things* is “Les suivantes” or “the followers,” which, as Lawlor argues, is a “reversing or even denying what the painting seems to represent, its principle theme, the sovereigns or the infant” (II: 105). As such, the name of the chapter itself suggests the exclusion of the “sovereignty of the subject.”

However, though Foucault tells us we must “erase” (*effacer*) the proper names of the painting, this is again in the name of his overall project, i.e. the isolation of the contingent limits of our present possible experience. As such, he is not arguing that we must erase ourselves, but that we must suspend a specific notion of ourselves, and the underlying themes that this notion entails, in order to find these limits and their contingency.

§9. The Suspension of the Subject (1969): *The Archaeology of Knowledge* and “What is an Author?”

Perhaps the most striking example of Foucault’s reversal of the phenomenological reduction occurs within his methodological treatise *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. In this text, Foucault attempts to outline the method that was present in his earlier books and essays, i.e. “the archaeological method.” This method, Foucault writes, is the “project of
a *description* of discursive events” (AS: 39/27, translation modified, my emphasis). This project of a description of discursive events requires that we first delimit the field of discourse and its element the “statement” (AS: 39/27), which, as we will soon see, requires a “change of viewpoint” on the part of the investigator (AS: 123/111). It is only through the statement that, Foucault argues, we can understand how it is that we are constituted as subjects of knowledge.

However, this discursive field must be delimited from the field of normal language or culture. Foucault writes that the description of the statement “requires a certain change of viewpoint and attitude to be recognized and examined in itself” (AS: 123/111). This change in viewpoint occurs through the “suspension” of a series of four notions that the traditional historical analyst imposes upon historical events and documents themselves, which may or may not be native to the events and documents. “Once these immediate forms of continuity are *suspended* [*suspendue*], an entire field is set free” (AS: 38/26, my emphasis). And, again, Just as Husserl suspends the existence of the world so as to delimit a field of experience wherein we can describe the constitutive activities of consciousness, Foucault suspends the “sovereignty of the subject” so as to delimit a field of language wherein we can describe the constitutive activities of knowledge on the subject through the residuum of the statement.

First among the notions to be suspended are the ideas of *tradition*, *influence*, *development* and *evolution*, and *spirit*. These five notions, when put to use in historical analysis, carry within themselves certain aspects that motivate historical events to be organized around the primacy of human consciousness. The notion of tradition, Foucault writes, “is intended to give a special temporal status to a group of phenomena that are
both successive and identical (or at least similar)” (AS: 31/21). For example, one could take various reenactments of a story that is handed down by tradition and group them according to their continuity with each other, in that they share an element in common though they occur at different times. As such, tradition enables the historical analysis to “isolate the new against a background of permanence” (AS: 31/21). Influence is used to describe a kind of causal process that can occur between two disparate events, thus connecting them in continuity with each other (AS: 31/21). The notions of development and evolution supply historical analysis with a kind of teleology by giving “the outline of a future unity” (AS: 32/22). Finally, the notion of spirit allows the traditional historical analyst to establish continuity through the idea that given periods of time share a “community of meanings” (AS: 32/22) and can thus be connected up with each other on the basis of continuity between these communities. Of all these notions, Foucault writes that “these pre-existing forms of continuity, all these syntheses that are accepted without question, must remain in suspense [il faut donc les tenir en suspens]” (AS: 37/25, my emphasis).

Second, according to Foucault, the investigator must put out of play “those divisions or groupings with which we have becomes so familiar” (AS: 32/22). Creating histories of genres, Foucault argues, is to impose a continuity upon historical events and documents that may not have existed at the time they actually occurred. The genre of literature is a genre distinction that is specific to our modern episteme. For example, a tale that we may classify as belonging to the history of literature may have been first used primarily as an ethical tool. In any case, genre distinctions are a category that the historian imposes back onto historical events such that they may be grouped in terms of
unities continuous with the development of that distinction. Foucault writes that these distinctions “are always themselves reflexive categories, principles of classification, normative rules, and institutional types” (AS: 33/22). So that historical events and documents can be described prior to the framework of continuity, these genre distinctions must be suspended, as they give us a pattern through which to group historical events and documents.

With regard to the third set of notions, Foucault writes, “…the unities that must be suspended [suspens] above all are those that emerge in the most immediate way: those of the book and the oeuvre” (AS: 33/23, my emphasis). These two unities lend continuity to historical analysis by explicitly implicating the subject in the description of historical documents. The unity of a book is seen as coming from the author: the reason why *The Confederacy of Dunces* is not *Blood Meridian* is because they have different authors. The *oeuvre* seeks to make a unity out of a number of books through their sharing the same author, and this implicates the subject directly into historical analysis. The historian imposes the notions of the book and oeuvre onto the objects of her analysis, and this limits her analyses such that they only be carried out in terms of the subject that produced them. As such, both notions, of the book and the *oeuvre*, must be suspended.

The final step in the act of suspension is to put out of play “two linked, but opposing themes,” viz. the *secret origin* and the *already-said* (AS: 36/25). Of these themes, Foucault writes,

The first theme sees the historical analysis of discourse as the quest for and the repetition of an origin that eludes all historical determination; the second sees it as the interpretation of ‘hearing’ of an ‘already-said’ that is at the same time a ‘not-said.’ (AS: 36/25)
The theme of the *secret origin* supplies continuity to historical analysis by offering a kind of teleological impetus that sustains the notion of history as progress, i.e. rationality. For Foucault, historians search for the origin of various historical phenomena, and implicitly connect this origin with the rationality of human beings. However, this origin can never be found. Foucault writes, “Thus one is led inevitably, through the naivety of chronologies, towards an ever-receding point that is never itself present in any history” (AS: 36/25). However, the search for this origin also organizes historical events in a linear progression through the search itself. That is, if the historian is searching for an origin of some historical event, and this origin is conceived of in terms of human rationality, all the events that she organizes will be along this same progression. Furthermore, this theme is what disallows historical analysis in terms of discontinuity or rupture, since it arranges history in a “great chronology of reason” (AS: 16/8).

The second theme, that of the *already-said*, revolves around the idea that historical documents are the expression of a human consciousness. Historical analysis thus becomes the task of interpreting what a document *meant to say*, which is itself something that is both *said* and *not-said*. Thus, what we have are two themes that impose continuity onto the ways in which historical events and documents are to be grouped and analyzed. As with the previous notions, these two themes must be suspended.

The sovereignty of the subject prescribes to the analyst that historical documents are only analyzed in terms of how ‘what the document says’ relates to ‘the subject that produced it.’ That is, what did the author ‘mean’ to say? Was the author right? Can we reconstruct the deductive process that led the author to say what she did? However, by peeling away the traditional notion of continuity, historical documents can instead be
analyzed in radically different ways which are not tied to the primacy of the subject. If we can put the framework that assumes these notions ‘out of play,’ the investigator is able to see how a group of signs can function in relation to other domains, rather than simply the domain of author and book. Foucault calls this group of signs a “statement.” Foucault describes it as:

A modality that is proper to that group of signs; a modality that allows it to be something more than a series of traces… a modality that allows it to be in relation with a domain of objects, to prescribe a definite position to any possible subject, to be situated among other verbal performances, and to be endowed with a repeatable materiality. (AS: 140/107)

The statement can be described in terms of: (1) how the statement formulates the objects that it is talking about, (2) the ways in which the statement assigns a position to whoever formulates it, (3) the way that it is organized in relation to other statements, and (4) how the statement varies or remains identical through different uses. These avenues of analysis are closed off, or simply not accounted for, when a group of signs contained within a historical document are interpreted through the framework of continuity. “One is not seeking, therefore, to pass from the text to thought… One remains within discourse itself” (AS: 101/76).

As such, what we find here in Foucault’s *Archaeology* is the elaboration of a method of a suspension whose goal is to delimit a field of language for the description of the statement. Similarly, in Husserl we saw that the phenomenological reduction is the suspension of the natural attitude such that we can delimit the field of pure consciousness. Foucault’s methodology in this text is perhaps the most direct example of Foucault’s reversal of the phenomenological reduction, as regards the ideas of method and description. The goal of the *Archaeology* is to lay out a methodology with which one
can *describe* historical documents, rather than *interpret* them as evidence of the progress of human rationality. This requires the active suspension, on the part of the investigator, of a set of themes and notions that implicitly guide to interpret historical documents as evidence of the teleological progression. It is only after we suspend these themes and notions that a field of language is “set free” in which one can describe historical documents as statements, which are themselves the general element of a discursive field. Similarly, for Husserl, in order for us to delimit a field of experience in which we can describe our experience (such that essential structures and processes come to the foreground) we must actively perform the phenomenological reduction, which is itself the suspense of the “general positing of the natural attitude,” which is accomplished through the phenomenological reduction. In both cases, the act of delimiting a field requires an act of reduction.

The notion of the *oeuvre* is expanded in Foucault’s essay “What is an Author?” Originally presented as a lecture in 1969 before the *Société Française de philosophie*, Foucault argues that, contra Barthes, the author has not yet died or disappeared. Rather, the author is more present than ever within contemporary literature. However, for Foucault, the author is not an element within discourse, but rather a kind of role that plays a classificatory function. Foucault writes that the author-function “permits one to group together a certain number of texts, define them, differentiate them from and contrast them to the others… it establishes a relationship among the texts” (QA: 826/210). For instance, the name Aristotle lets us group together texts that he wrote, differentiate them from texts that he did not write, and put him in contrast with what others said during his time and
during other time periods. However, this kind of grouping ends up limiting or constraining the possible meanings we can get from a text. Foucault writes:

The author is not an indefinite [indéfini] source of significations that fill a work; the author does not precede the works; he is a certain functional principle by which, in our culture, one limits, excludes, and chooses; in short by which one impedes the free circulation, the free manipulation, the free composition, decomposition, and recomposition of fiction (QA: 839/221).

This limitation and exclusion occurs through the implicit presumption of authorial intention. Simply speaking, a text can only mean what an author intended it to mean, and thus interpretation becomes the hunt for authorial intentions. These authorial intentions then guide how it is that we interpret a philosopher or a piece of fiction. Under the guiding sway of the author-function, one would argue that her interpretation is “correct” because it is closest to what the author intended to mean, compared to other interpretations. This ends up constraining or limiting the proliferation of meaning through the restraint on what a text can mean, thereby foreclosing in advance other possible interpretations and meanings that may be elicited from a text.

The author-function serves to unite and keep a set of works within a single coherent unity, which, in effect, forces us to interpret texts according to the intentions of the author. In order to free the meaning of literature from the sovereignty of the subject, and the analysis that it dictates (this time in terms of authorial intention), one must remove the author from analysis. Again, though Foucault does not make this latter move in his text explicitly, it seems bound up with his idea that “as our society changes, at the very moment when it is in the process of changing, the author function will disappear, and in such a manner that fiction and its polysemous texts will once again function according to another mode...” (EWF2: 839/222).
If we understand Foucault’s idea of the author-function as an elaboration of the theme of the oeuvre from the *Archaeology*, the notion of suspension must be implicitly at play. That is, if we are to examine a document in terms of its possible meanings, then we must suspend the author’s proper name from the work, such that we do not interpret all of her works according to what we understand to make up her ‘work.’

§10. The Reduction in Later Works

While the notion of suspension does not occur in *Discipline and Punish* and later works, I suggest that it is still operating at an implicit level, and on two registers. First, Foucault’s approach to historical documents outlined in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* is still present throughout his later career, in the sense that archaeology becomes incorporated into his more general critical project. If we are to use historical documents to analyze how the subject has been constituted through knowledge, power, and ethics, then we cannot bring the guiding theme of the sovereignty of the subject to the table with us. Even though he not does acknowledge this, it would seem that the same methodological principle must still be at play. If Foucault wants to analyze ancient Greek and Roman texts for clues into the constitution of the self in light of the imposition of forms of conduct or ways of being, then he cannot approach these texts with a framework that tells him in advance that, for instance, the ancients represent crude or better ethical ways of thinking. To escape this kind of interpretation, Foucault simply must suspend those notions he laid out in his earlier writings.

The second register lies in Foucault’s general project, in the sense that this project requires the very suspending that we have examined in this section. If we are to see the ways in which we have been constituted through knowledge, power, and ethics, and thus
see that our limits are contingent and the possibility of going beyond them, then his analyses must suspend the idea of the subject as the foundation of knowledge and meaning. If we did not suspend this idea, then we would never see that our limits of thinking and being are in fact contingent. That is, this suspending is a kind of methodological motor for his general project.

As such, we can understand Foucault’s later works, especially *Discipline and Punish* and the three volumes of the *History of Sexuality*, as analyses that occur from within the reversal of the phenomenological reduction and whose aim is to show us the processes that yield subjectivity, i.e. the constitution of ourselves as subjects of knowledge, power, and ethics.

§11. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that Foucault’s general project can be understood as a critical ontology of the present, in which the contingent limits of present possible experience are isolated. This project entails a resistance to the modern notion of the subject, which plays out in the form of a reversal of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction throughout Foucault’s texts. This reversal of the reduction operates through the suspension of all of the themes associated with the theme of the “sovereignty of the subject,” and is undertaken so as to show that we are not, essentially, the modern notion of the subject, and thus that the limits of our present experience are contingent.
Chapter Two – Husserl and the Subject

Consciousness is an incessant process of becoming... It is a never ending history.
-Edmund Husserl

§12. Introduction

The goal of this chapter is to draw, from Husserl’s analyses of internal time consciousness and passive synthesis, a picture of the subject whose experience of the world can be, in a sense, constituted in the ways that Foucault lays out throughout his work; for example, a subject that can be disciplined through the arrangement of desks in a classroom (SP: 149/147). This constitution, I will argue, occurs through apperception, the structure through which consciousness constitutes meanings that are not themselves directly present. Apperception itself is grounded in the structure of internal time consciousness, where the activities of protention and retention extend consciousness beyond what is directly given in experience. As we will see, it is the fundamental openness of both retention and protention that allows for change in the content of our apperceptions, which is then a change in the meaningful experience of our world. Ultimately, the work done in these two chapters will lay out the structure of consciousness such that a subject can be phenomenologically described as enmeshed within a network of knowledge, power, and ethics.

This argument, however, will require two chapters. In the first chapter, I will lay out the structure of apperception through an analysis of Husserl’s writings on internal time consciousness, and the related syntheses of association, motivation, and sedimentation. I will show that it is the openness of internal time consciousness and its

---

20 From Husserliana XI, pg. 31/69,
syntheses that provide the structure of an agent that can take up a discursive practice. The next chapter will follow Husserl as he ‘bumps’ against the limit of his own thought, and begins to tumble into that of Foucault’s.


The leading clue for my argument is to be found in a manuscript from 1921, published posthumously in Husserliana XI, in which Husserl describes the difference between static and genetic phenomenology, and the necessity of the latter. In this manuscript Husserl writes that:

*The theory of consciousness is directly a theory of apperceptions: the stream of consciousness is a stream of a constant genesis; it is not a mere series [nacheinander], but a development [auseinander], a process of becoming according to laws of necessary succession in which concrete apperceptions of different typicalities (among them, all the apperceptions that give rise to the general apperception of a world) grow out of primordial apperceptions or out of apperceptive intentions of a primitive kind. (Hua XI: 339/628, my emphasis)*

Here, Husserl argues that the theory of consciousness is properly understood as a theory of apperceptions, specifically as the development of consciousness through apperception. In so far as apperceptions follow “from” [aus] each other, as much as “after” [nach] each other, consciousness is to be understood as a “process of becoming.” Understood in this way, Husserl argues that we can describe consciousness from two perspectives. First, we can undertake a “static” description of consciousness in which we elucidate its basic structures in basic terms. Second, a “genetic” description instead looks to describe consciousness in its development, so as to elucidate those operations through which a meaningful world is constituted.
Ultimately Husserl concludes that to understand consciousness in its development is to understand consciousness in terms of *apperception*, since it is through apperception that we constitute a meaningful world, in which we make judgments, imagine, perceive, etc. However, how are we to understand this? What is apperception, and how does it function such that a meaningful world is constituted?

§14. Apperception\(^2\)

What is apperception?\(^2\) The word itself gives an introductory clue as to its meaning: the prefix ‘ap’ signifies a kind of distance, thus making apperception a kind of distant perception. For Husserl, the ‘distant’ does not signify our ability to, for instance, perceive spatially far away objects. Instead, the ‘distant’ refers to the way in which apperception intends meanings within experience that are not themselves directly present.

Before turning to examples, let us first look at Husserl’s definition of apperception:

> Apperceptions are intentional lived-experiences [*intentionale Erlebnisse*] that are conscious of something as perceived, [but this something as perceived] is not self-given in these lived-experiences (not completely); and they are called apperceptions to the extent that they have this trait, even if in this case they also consciously intend what in truth is self-given in them. (Hua XI: 336/624)

\(^2\) This reading of Husserl is heavily indebted to the work and mentorship of Lanei Rodemeyer. In her text *Intersubjective Temporality*, Rodemeyer shows the openness of the subject in Husserl, specifically in terms of the constitution of world-time, which then provides the setting for our experiences of a shared world. The constitution of world-time, in turn, depends on the openness of consciousness to the constitutive activities of others. In any case, I will take the openness of the subject farther than Rodemeyer does in her text, by showing how this openness to, and passive synthesis of, the constitutive activities of others can be understood within the Foucauldian framework of the constitution of the subject by discourse, knowledge, power-relations, etc.

\(^2\) By apperception, I am grouping two terms that Husserl used, though not consistently, viz. appresentation and apperception. Appresentation, the way in which an object indicates sides which are not present, will be subsumed within the general term ‘apperception.’ This will be done for the sake of simplicity, though the author recognizes the difference between the two terms. For a complete discussion on this distinction in Husserl’s writings, please see Lanei Rodemeyer’s *Intersubjective Temporality*, specifically Chapter Two. See also, Klaus Held’s “Einleitung,” in *Edmund Husserl: Die Phänomenologische Methode, Ausgewählte Texte* (Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam), I: 5–53. Translation by Lanei Rodemeyer as “Husserl’s Phenomenology of the Life-World,” in *The New Husserl: A Critical Reader*. Ed. Donn Welton. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003.
Here, Husserl directly defines the notion of apperception as a kind of intentionality, within which consciousness intends meanings that are not themselves directly given. For example, I look at the six-sided die on my desk. Since my vision is anchored to a perspective, when I look at the die I only see one profile of it, perhaps the ‘six’ side. However, within this perception of the die, along with the profile of the die that is facing me now, I also perceive that the die has sides which I cannot see, though could, were I to pick up the die and turn it around in my hands. When I walk down the streets of Pittsburgh, I see rows of apartments and townhouses. I look at them, and in my perception of the front side of the house is necessarily included the back side of the house. In either case, the experience of an object as an object, i.e. as an object that takes up space, simultaneously contains my perception of the side of the object currently facing me and the indirect perception of the other sides of the object that I cannot see at the present moment. Husserl writes, “… the two [presentations and apperceptions] are so fused that they stand within the functional community of one perception, which simultaneously presents and appresents, and yet furnishes for the total object a consciousness of its being itself there” (Hua I: 150/122, Husserl’s emphasis). Thus, apperception is a making “co-present” within perception that which is not directly given (Hua I: 109). That is, my experience of the die goes beyond that which is immediately given in it – I apperceive the sides that I cannot see but experience as belonging to the object none the less. Indeed, for Husserl, “… every perception of this type [apperception] is transcending: it posits more as itself-there than it makes ‘actually’ present at any time”
(Hua I: 151/122) and “[a]pperceptions transcend their immanent content […]” (Hua XI: 336/624). 23

However, it would be misleading to think that apperception is only active in terms of our perception of spatial objects. Apperception is the generic term for all of the meanings which we constitute that are not themselves directly given in experience. For example, when my gaze sweeps across the desk and rests upon the die, I do not only perceive a physical object taking up space, but I perceive precisely a six-sided die, an object for playing, for testing luck, for deciding who will play first in a game, etc. Again, this is a case of apperception. The uses of the die are not directly present in perception, but they are given as possibilities of use which define the object as such. In his *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl describes apperception as “charged with certain characters of value and practices – characters that altogether transcend the stratum of the mere thing” (Hua I: 27).

We can see how our experience of objects as meaningful occurs through apperception. Without apperception I would only ever have a profile of the object, and thus never actually experience the object as meaningful: since I would not be able to experience that which is not itself directly present, no meanings would be attached to the bare perception. Thus, if apperception is the structure through which a meaningful world is constituted, then it is through apperception that discourse would constitute the subject.

23 See also §50 of Husserl’s *Cartesian Meditations*, in which he describes apperception as a making ‘co-present’ (Hua I: 109).
§15. Apperception and Internal Time Consciousness

In order to enter into the complexities of Husserl’s analyses on internal time consciousness, it would be best to first engage in a brief sketch of his overall theory. Let us use Husserl’s favorite example – a tone played on a violin. I hear a violin tone – I hear the tone begin, and as it plays, I perceive the tone as extending through time, and when it ends, I can recall experiencing an ‘entire’ tone. That I perceive the tone as ‘extended through time’ is due to consciousness – the current moment of the tone that I am hearing is ‘connected’ with the moments of the tone that have just past and, furthermore, as I listen to the tone I ‘expect’ the tone to keep going or to stop, signaling its end. Now I listen to a melody rather than a single tone. I hear the melody begin, and as I perceive the different tones, they are all connected with the tones that have passed, such that I have the experience of a continual melody, and a melody that ‘builds-up’ over time. That is, the perception of a melody is intimately involved with the retention of the tones that have passed and those tones that I expect to come. Or, to use a final example, I am listening to someone speak. This person says to me, “Husserl was a phenomenologist.” For me to experience this as a whole statement after the speaker finishes the sentence is due, again, to the structure of internal time consciousness. Each guttural sound that I hear is connected to sounds that have just past and to sounds that are not yet, sounds that I expect to hear. In the case of each example, without the functioning of internal time consciousness, we, as humans, would only ever have experiences of a ‘now’ with no connection to the past or to the future. As such, we would only experience a series of ‘frames’ with no link between them such that they could even be called a series – what

24 An excellent brief overview of what is meant by “internal time consciousness” can be found in Rodemeyer’s *Intersubjective Temporality.*
Rodemeyer calls “instant amnesia” (IST: 9). Or, without internal time consciousness, each letter that is read in a text would only ever be that letter, and words would never form (nor would I be able to identify each letter as I see them, since this would require the comparison of the current perception with others that have passed). In Husserl’s terminology, these experiences that have just passed, but are still connected to the now, are held onto through the form of ‘retention.’ Similarly, the experiences that we expect, but have not yet come, are given through the form of ‘protention.’ As to the present moment, or the ‘now’ moment, this will have a handful of names throughout Husserl’s life. All of these terms will be delineated in much more detail shortly.

While the basic idea that our experience of an extended present requires the holding of past appearances and the anticipation of appearances to come remains constant, Husserl’s understanding of the basic conceptual structure of internal time consciousness changed throughout his life. Let us now look briefly at two of these basic conceptual structures: (1) the schema of content and the apprehension of content and (2) absolute consciousness. The second, absolute consciousness, will be the basic conceptual framework that we will use in the analyses in this text, as this is Husserl’s main approach in his middle and later works.

First, there is the ‘schema of content and the apprehension of content,’ (1893-1909) which was applied to the general question of how it is that we perceive

---

25 For an exceptional exposition on the many twists and turns in Husserl’s thought, as regards time consciousness, see Kortooms, Toine. *Phenomenology of Time*. Dordrecht: Springer, 2010.
26 Different scholars understand the movement of these structures in Husserl’s thought in different ways. Brough and Bernet see Husserl as abandoning the schema (1907 for Brough and 1917 for Bernet), while Kortooms finds the schema still operative in Husserl’s C-Manuscripts. Furthermore, Mensch argues that Husserl never left the schema behind at all, and that a proper understanding of internal time consciousness requires the schema. I will follow the Brough and Bernet interpretation, and examine the structure of internal time consciousness in terms of a self-constituting flow.
27 I follow Brough’s interpretation.
succession or transcendent objects as temporal. According to this view, contents are
given to consciousness as *temporally neutral*, and it is our apprehensions that assign to
them their temporal modality, viz. as present or just past. If we hear a violin tone *now*, it
is not the tone itself that designates its various moments as now or just past. Rather, it is
the animating activity of apprehension that gives each moment of the tone a temporal
designation within consciousness. While there are issues of infinite regress as well,28
Husserl’s rejection of this schema ultimately stems from the idea that the content is
temporally neutral. Since, as Brough writes, “If the contents were genuinely neutral with
respect to time-determination, then tone *a*, for example, which objectively is Now, could
in principle be apprehended as past.”29 Indeed, Husserl explains:

> The question then is: Cannot the same content that is now the *presentat in a perception arbitrarily* function as the *representat in a memory*? (Hua X: 317/329)

As such, and for a number of other reasons, Husserl abandons this model for what
he terms ‘absolute consciousness.’30 However, Brough points out that the idea of
absolute consciousness appears in writings before Husserl explicitly rejects the schema in
1909.31 Specifically, in an earlier manuscript from 1907, Husserl slightly shifted his focus
from the perception of transcendent objects as temporal to the temporality of *immanent objects* – to the object as experienced rather than to the experienced transcendent object
(the perceived tone rather than the tone as such).32 This shift, Brough argues, opens for

---

29 Brough, 312 (1972)
30 Again, Kortooms argues that the schema is operative as late as Husserl’s Bernau Manuscripts, while
Mensch argues that it is never abandoned at all.
31 Brough, 307 (1972)
32 See Rodemeyer’s *Intersubjective Temporality* for a discussion of other ways in which this shift is understood (27).
Husserl “the theme of an absolute dimension of consciousness,” which becomes Husserl’s notion of absolute consciousness – a stream of intentionality that both constitutes immanent temporal unities as well as its own unity as a stream. Of this new interpretation, Brough writes:

First, it does not explain time-consciousness in terms of apprehensions and contents, of whatever sort. Second, it is primarily and unambiguously a theory of the experiencing of immanent temporal objects, and includes the identification of experiencing or inner time-consciousness with the absolute time-constituting flow.

As regards the first point in the citation above, instead of apprehensions and contents, Husserl focuses on the intentionality through which immanent temporal objects are constituted, i.e. the activities of retention and protention. As regards the second point, rather than asking how it is that we perceive a transcendent temporal content as temporal, Husserl focuses directly on the constitutive activities of consciousness and how it is that the immanent appearance of an object is constituted as a persisting and identical temporal object. Husserl discovers that our experience of the now has a ‘streaming’ quality to it. We do not experience single fragmentary nows, which are then somehow connected together. Instead, our experience is fluid. Husserl writes:

Now if we consider the constituting appearances of the consciousness of internal time, we find the following: They form a flow, and each phase of this flow is a continuity of adumbrations. But as a matter of principle […] no phase of this flow can be expanded into a continuous succession […] On the contrary, we necessarily find the flow of continuous “change”… (Hua X: 370/381)

Here, Husserl is pointing to our experience of a temporal object. We do not simply find a succession of nows, but rather a ‘flow’ whose moments can only be abstracted in terms of

---

33 Brough, 308 (1972)
34 Brough, 313 (1972)
phases, each of which is itself a continuity of present appearances, retentions of these appearances and protentions of appearances in the future. The idea that our experience of the now is a phase rather than a point will be examined in the next section.

This flow of consciousness not only constitutes the unity of immanent temporal objects, but its own unity as well. This, Husserl writes, is not to be understood as two flows: one flow in which an immanent object is constituted and one flow in which the continuity of the subject is constituted. Rather: “The self-appearance of the flow does not require a second flow; on the contrary, it constitutes itself as a phenomenon in itself…” (Hua X: 381/393). Again, he writes:

As shocking (when not initially even absurd) as it may seem to say that the flow of consciousness constitutes its own unity, it is nonetheless the case that it does and that this is something that can be made intelligible on the basis of the flow’s essential constitution. Our regard can be directed, in the one case, through the phases that “coincide” in the continuous progression of the flow and that function as intentionalities of the tone. But our regard can also go along the flow, be aimed at a section of the flow, at the passage of the flowing consciousness from the beginning of the tone to its end. (Hua X: 378/390)

Here, Husserl is pointing out the following: if we examine the experience in which temporal objects are constituted, we find two things. First, we find the constitution of the object as an immanent temporal object. Second, we find that our constitution of the object is connected with other previous constitutions, such that each experience is connected with the last, and each are connected in terms of one single flow. For example, my experience of the violin tone also consists, at least latently, of the experience of putting the record onto my record player. In turn, this experience is connected to the previous experience of wanting to put the record on, or of looking for the record itself. That is, the description of any phase is already going to point to phases that have already preceded,
thus constituting a continuity to the flow itself. Furthermore, Husserl identifies this flow as the absolute level of consciousness: “[The flow] is absolute subjectivity and has the absolute properties of something to be designated metaphorically as ‘flow’…” (Hua X: 371/382).

Let us now look more closely at the components of internal time consciousness.

a) The Present

For Husserl, the ‘now’ must be understood in terms of an extended present, or a duration, or, as he will call it in his later manuscripts, “the living present.” To speak of a ‘now’ in Husserl’s analyses is, in itself, misleading, since the ‘now’ seems, in ordinary language, to denote some kind of point, perhaps in the way that I can say “This is now.” Yet, for Husserl the ‘now’ cannot be understood as a point, simply since we never experience the now as a point. He writes, “What is ‘given’ to perception is necessarily something temporally extended, not something with the character of a mere point in time” (Hua X: 168/173). By ‘temporal extension,’ we should understand a kind of continuum: in the center, I have an immediate appearance directly before me, around which radiates both the retentions of past appearances and the protentions, or anticipations, of appearances yet to come. Of this continuum Husserl writes: “[In the flow] I find a phase of the ‘now’… But I find ‘together’ with this phase a continuity of phases that make up the consciousness of what elapsed earlier…” (Hua X: 378/389). For example, I pick up the six-sided die on my desk and turn it over in my hands – running my gaze along one side of it, and now along another side. This experience of gazing at the die is always an experience of the continuum of the appearances of the die, which are constituted temporally – an immediate appearance is given to me, with which is combined the
retention of a past appearance of the object and the protention of a side that I expect to see. As such, to speak of the ‘now’ is always to abstract from the flow of experience a duration of time with somewhat arbitrary boundaries.

Husserl refers to this immediate experience alternately as “primordial impression” [Urimention] and “primordial sensation” [Urempfindung]. In the example of a musical tone, the term “primordial impression” indicates “the absolutely original consciousness in which the actual tone-point stands before us ‘in person’” (Hua X: 325/338). This “in person” aspect of the tone can be understood as follows: it is the center, around which past primordial impressions are held and future primordial impressions are expected. Even still, this primordial impression is itself only a limit or a border [Grenze]: “But the perception of what is present is, after all, only a limit [Grenze] in an enduring perception…” (Hua X: 354/364), and again:

The primal sensation-consciousness flows, which means: If a primal sensation belonging to the flow exists, then, looking at the entire succession, there are – in continuous sequence – primal sensations that do ‘not yet’ exist and others that ‘no longer’ exist; and the primal sensation that actually exists is a limit [Grenzpunt] between two continua – the continua of the ‘not-yet’ and of the ‘no longer.’ (Hua X: 372/383)

As such, even though primordial impression designates the in-person aspect of, for instance, a tone or a present adumbration, this in-person aspect cannot be thought of as a mathematical point of sensation, but rather as itself the limit or border between retention and protention. Or, as Rodemeyer argues, we can think of a primordial impression as a protention that is always already in the process of fulfillment or disappointment (IST: 142). Once the protention is fulfilled or disappointed, this fulfilled or disappointed protention sinks back into retention, as the retained in the next phase of consciousness,

---

35 Rodemeyer argues that in his later texts the term Empfindung is used in reference to hyletic data (IS 10f).
etc. Rodemeyer argues on this basis, and I agree, that this description of the living present gives us a fundamental link between the intentionalities of retention and protention, since retentions are themselves newly or past fulfilled protentions (IST: 141). However, while Rodemeyer will argue that it is protention which is fundamentally open and thus serves as the link to other human beings (IST: 183), I will argue retention shows its own openness as well. I will return to this in the next two sub-sections.

b) Far and Near Retention

Thus far, I have discussed the basic definition of retention – the holding onto of a past primordial impression and its connection with a present primordial impression. It is now my task to go much deeper into this form of intentionality, as it is through retention that past meanings are held in such a way that they can silently and implicitly motivate how it is that we experience the world.

Within temporal consciousness, retention plays a two-part role. For Husserl, the flow of consciousness consists of both immanently constituted temporal objects, e.g. violin tones, and of the unity of the flow itself. Husserl writes, “There is one, unique flow of consciousness… in which both the unity of the tone in immanent time and the unity of the flow of consciousness itself become constituted at once” (Hua X: 378/390). As such, retention functions at both the level of the constitution of the immanent temporal object and at the level of the unity of the flow itself. Again, Husserl writes:

Every adumbration of consciousness of the species “retention” has, I answer, a double intentionality: one serves for the constitution of the immanent object, of the tone… The other intentionality is constitutive of the unity of this primary memory in the flow… In its process of being continuously adumbrated in the flow, it is continuous reproduction of the continuously preceding phases. (Hua X: 379/390)
As such, retention has a kind of double intentionality, in that it is active at both the level of the constitution of an immanent temporal object and at the level of the constitution of the unity of the flow itself. As to the first kind of intentionality, when a primordial impression elapses, i.e. becomes ‘just past,’ this impression is held onto by consciousness and synthesized with the next primordial impression, thus giving us a temporal object. For example, each moment of the violin tone that elapses is held onto by consciousness such that we have an experience of an enduring tone. The second kind of intentionality, however, is much more complex. Let us return to the example of the violin tone. The tone itself is not experienced as completely detached or distinct from the continuous flowing duration of, for example, my day. Rather, the violin tone is part of the larger context of the experience of my day – there is my single flow of consciousness in which the violin tone takes part. This is due to the second function of retention, in which the flow of experience as a unity is constituted. Each ‘now’ is the result of the synthesis of retention and protention, and, as such, any retention of a previous ‘now’ is also the retention of the retentions and protentions that went into the constitution of that previous ‘now.’ To follow the line further, if we abstract a series of three ‘nows,’ the most recent ‘now’ will contain the retentions and protentions that were involved in the constitution of the previous ‘nows.’ We need only multiply the abstracted ‘nows’ of this example to see how a unity would be constituted through the system of retention. To this end, Husserl writes,

… [T]he first primordial impression becomes changed into a reproduction of itself, this reproduction becomes changed into a reproduction, and so on. But together with the first reproduction there is a new ‘now,’ a new primordial sensation; and the latter is combined continuously with the former in one moment in such a way that the second

---

36 The term “reproduction” is later dropped by Husserl, as regards retention.
phase of the flow is primordial sensation of the new now and reproduction of the earlier now. (Hua X: 379/391)

A further distinction can be made with retention, as identified by Rodemeyer, viz. between ‘near’ and ‘far’ retention in Husserl’s analyses on time consciousness. These terms can briefly be explained as follows. Near retention is the activity of retention that we were examining under the generic name of ‘retention’ up until now, i.e. the holding of past primordial impressions. Far retention is the system of ‘retentions of retentions’ given above, yet much more. It is also the system which stands as the ground, for example, of our use of language. When I speak, I do not recollect the words that I use – I do not think before each word, and attempt to call up the word as a kind of recollection (though I can if I am having trouble expressing a concept). Rather, when I speak the words that I use come to me spontaneously – I simply call them up in the act of speaking. For Rodemeyer, this is evidence that language lies not in recollection but as latent and “passively present”\(^{37}\) in far retention (IST: 89). This manner of having past experience lay latent but passively present is what Husserl terms ‘passive synthesis.’\(^{38}\)

Rodemeyer locates an initial clue into the distinction between near and far retention in a passage from Section 37 of the *Passive Synthesis Lectures* (Hua XI: 177/226), which does not mention the terms at all (IST: 87). In this section, Husserl is describing the “distant sphere” of “empty presentations”, the “nil” which “is the constant reservoir of objects that have achieved living institution in the process of the living

---

37 Rodemeyer locates this notion of ‘passively present’ in the work of Klaus Held. I take up her usage.
38 The terms “passive” and “active” within Husserl’s work require full analyses in themselves, but we can roughly sketch the difference as follows: By “passive,” Husserl means those processes of consciousness which constitute a world for us that are not themselves “active” intentions of a concrete ego. For example, my active intention of making a cup of coffee is undertaken on the basis of the passive constitution within internal time consciousness.
present” (Hua XI: 177/227). In this description, Rodemeyer highlights the following passage:

Initially, however, we want to say that every accomplishment of sense or of the object becomes sedimented \([\text{niederschlägt}]\) in the realm of the dead, or rather, dormant horizontal sphere, precisely in the manner of a fixed order of sedimentation \([\text{Sedimentordnung}]\): While at the head, the living process receives new, original life, at the feet, everything that is, as it were, in the final acquisition of the retentional synthesis, becomes steadily sedimented \([\text{niederschlägt}]\). (Hua XI: 178/227)

Rodemeyer associates “at the head” with the retention that holds onto the recently ‘just past’ and constitutes the present immanent temporal object. “At the feet,” then, is associated with the system of ‘retention of retentions.’ It is important here to note the language of ‘sedimentation’ in the passage quoted above, as it will play an important role in the second part of this chapter

The terms far and near retention are rarely used by Husserl, but one instance occurs in Section 25 of the second part of the *Passive Synthesis Lectures*, which Rodemeyer, for good reason, associates with the passage given above. The passage is as follows:

The present turns into the past as the past that is constituted for the ego through the lawful regularity of retention; and finally, everything that is retentional turns into the undifferentiated unity of the [far] retention \([\text{Fernretention}]\) of the one distant horizon, which extinguishes all differentiations. However, this extinguishing is to be understood in the following way: The affective force is necessarily decreased with the submersion, which is to say, it decreases the force that makes possible the special prominent elements, the unities for themselves even with the non-intuitability of retention, be they singularities or multiplicities or even multiplicities of a higher level, for instance, cyclical multiplicities. What is given there broadly in near-retention \([\text{Nahretention}]\) as something extended as a unity of continuously connected affections, and likewise, what exists there as a multiplicity of elements given together or that follow one after the other, but as largely diverse – [all of this] moves closer together; I would say that corresponding to the temporal perspective, to the phenomenal moving-closer-together of those matters that have just
been, is an affective perspective; flowing is a flowing together of affections. (Hua XI 288/422, translation modified)

The relationship between these two passages that Rodemeyer points out should be striking. In this passage Husserl draws a line between two different types of retention. The first, far retention \([\text{Fernretention}]\) is a “distant horizon” \([\text{Fernhorizont}]\) of an “undifferentiated unity” \([\text{unterschiedslosen Einheit}]\).\(^{39}\) Rodemeyer connects this description of far retention with the description given of retention in the first of the two passages above, that of the “retentional synthesis” that lies “at the feet” in which “acquisitions” become “steadily sedimented.” The second, near retention \([\text{Nahretention}]\) is described “as a multiplicity of elements given together or that follow one after the other,” i.e. the constitution of immanent temporal objects. This is connected with the first passage, in which Husserl describes the process of retention which functions “at the head” wherein “the living process receives new, original life.” Near retention is the activity of intentionality that is described by Husserl usually as only retention, i.e. the holding on of consciousness to primordial impressions that are recently past. It is in near retention that the experience of immanent temporal objects is constituted, as it is near retention that holds the adumbrations of an object together in perception. Furthermore, Rodemeyer differentiates near retention into two different functions. First, “near retention

---

\(^{39}\) While we do not have time to undertake a full analysis here, it must be noted that Husserl’s use of the term “undifferentiated unity” can be seen as phenomenologically problematic for a number of reasons. First, this term extends beyond the bounds of what can be described phenomenologically. Second, since far retention is always related to the activities of far protention, then it must also be the case that this undifferentiated unity is always already on its way to differentiation, and thus this unity is never completely “undifferentiated.” Finally, as we will see in the section on apperception and passive synthesis, apperception occurs through the association of a presentation with a previous type of experience held within far retention. If far retention is “undifferentiated,” then it would be impossible for it to contain “types of experience.” The solution to this problem is perhaps to think of the idea of an “undifferentiated unity” as a limit concept, rather than a phenomenological reality. That is, far retention is only undifferentiated at its limit, which it does not reach because it always already in the process of differentiation through the activities of internal time consciousness.
forms the retentional phase that then sinks into far retention with its ever-diminishing affective content” (IST: 89). That is, the activity of near retention provides the form and content for the activity of far retention. Second, “near retention contributes to the formation of an experience that may later be recollected, giving us the ability to reproduce past events and ‘relive’ them in the present if we wish” (IST: 89). This is clear – not only does the activity of near retention provide the content for far retention, but it also provides the content of memories, which can be recollected.

However, what about far retention? Already we have seen that it is a “retentional synthesis” in which retentions become sedimented, as well as a “distant horizon” of an “undifferentiated unity.” This retentional synthesis is the system of the ‘retentions of retentions’ discussed above, which forms a level of experience that is latent, but still passively present, e.g. the level of the retention of such things as language. Each phase of the living present passes into retention, through its synthesis with a present primordial impression, and is then contained within the synthesis of the next primordial impression as well. However, these retentions do not get reproduced ad infinitum. Instead, their specific content gets diminished and these retentions become part of an undifferentiated unity, which then forms a “distant horizon.” Just like the ‘just past’ forms a kind of ‘near’ horizon in experience, so does far retention, but one that is “distant” in the sense that it is not actively present in my experience. To illustrate this distinction, let us use an example. Suppose that a fly enters the room, and as soon as it crosses into my field of perception I become annoyed, and, as it attempts to land upon my coffee cup I shoo it away. The fly that I had to shoo away from the cup of coffee on my desk is still ‘near’ in my experiential horizon – I am still annoyed and my gaze sweeps across the room in the
attempt to locate it, and thus the experience of the fly is still in a sense present in my current living present. This nearness of the experience of the fly will fade as time passes, until I reach the point where I am not concerned with the fly whatsoever.  

However, if we instead focus on the initial annoyance triggered from first seeing the fly, we can understand how far retention is a kind of “distant horizon” within experience, and how this distant horizon is passively present. All of my past encounters with flies, and their attempts to land on various items that I am either eating or drinking, have been held within the system of far retention, as a kind of general type of experience. This general type is then awakened upon seeing the fly enter the room. I am instantly annoyed when I see the fly, rather than wondering what an insect of that type might do, because a general type of experience within far retention has been awakened and I am now expecting the fly to attempt to land in my coffee.  

This general type of experience is passively present in the sense that it is not active within my current horizon of experience. I am not expecting to see a fly; rather, one enters my field of vision. However, even though it is not active, this general type is not completely absent. Instead, it is latent, such that should a fly enter my field of vision, I can expect it to fly towards whatever edible item is in my possession. In this sense, we can think of far retention, the system of the retention of retentions, as a “distant horizon” that is latent but passively present within experience.

---

40 As we will see in the third chapter, the constitution of an objective world is accomplished intersubjectively. Thus, the cup on my desk is still an object that can be disturbed by others, such as a fly. Though the fly may disappear and my concern for it may dissipate, I will still have an awareness of the cup on my desk as a possible object for an insect to land on or crawl into.

41 As such, we can understand Husserl’s “undifferentiated unity” as a unity that is always in the process of differentiation.
For Husserl, as retentional experiences (consisting of retentions and protentions) fade into far retention, they become *sedimented*, and thus sedimentation occurs in far retention. Husserl writes, “[E]verything that consciousness undergoes through changes and transformations, even after the transformations, remains sedimented in it as its ‘history’” (Hua XI: 38/77). Husserl directly refers to sedimentation as the ‘subsoil’ of memory:

Memories emerge as awakenings of components of the *subsoil* of memory [*Gedächtnisuntergrundes*]. The latter contains ordered sedimentations [*Niederschläge*] – layered in a fixed order – of all particular retentions, of all presents that have been constituted. (Hua XI: 194/245, emphasis mine)

From these two passages cited above, we can see that sedimentation has to do with a kind of layering within far retention. We find another clue when Husserl writes that the “distant sphere” of far retention contains “sedimentations of all previous accomplishments of previous living presents” (Hua XI: 178/228). That is, our past experiences fade into the system of far retention, and they do so in terms of a kind of layering, hence the metaphor of sedimentation.

c) **Far and Near Protention**

Thus far I have said very little about protention, or the intentional aspect that anticipates primordial impressions that have not yet arrived. For instance, my perception of the book on my desk as an identical temporal object involves the present adumbration and the retention of past adumbrations. However, part and parcel with this perception is my protention of the adumbrations to come, whether possible adumbrations (I do not turn the book over so that I can see its back) or actual adumbrations (I actively turn the book in my hand, and as I do so I anticipate adumbrations that immediately follow).
Rodemeyer often refers to protention as a kind of link: protention is the intentional activity that anticipates a primordial impression, and upon the fulfillment of this anticipation, the now present primordial impression sinks into retention. As such, protention links the present adumbration with adumbrations yet to come. In describing the experience of a tone, Husserl writes:

… [A] continual “intention” reaches into the future: The actually present portion of the duration again and again adds a new now, and a protention adheres to the tone-constituting “appearances” – a protention that is fulfilled as a protention aimed at this tone just as long as the tone endures and that is annulled and changes if something new begins in its place. (Hua X 297/308)

Here, protention is connected with the addition of new tone-constituting appearances. The protention is aimed at the tone-appearances that are yet to come, and are fulfilled when the tone arrives, or are not fulfilled should the tone suddenly end, which is itself evidence for the activity of protention. For example, I am listening to a melody build over a duration, and as the melody begins to build towards a kind of tonal climax, it suddenly stops. I experience this sudden stop as a kind of rupture, as my protention of the continuation of the melody is suddenly unfulfilled, with the possibility of fulfillment “annulled.”

Using the distinction between near and far retention as a guide, Rodemeyer lays out a similar distinction in protention, as regards temporalizing consciousness (though Husserl never made the distinction himself) (IST: 161). This distinction is between ‘near’ and ‘far’ protention, in which the terms near and far are understood in a similar way to their usage in terms of retention. Much like near retention, the concept of near protention has already been discussed at length in the preceding sections under the generic term protention, and denotes the activity of consciousness wherein future primordial
impressions are anticipated, as regards the constitution of an immanent temporal object. And again, just as far retention constitutes a structure of past experience which is passively present within experience itself, far protention constitutes a kind of anticipated structure, in the sense of a horizon of possibilities. Husserl writes, “Just as a retentional horizon of the past is invariably connected to each impressional present [impressionale Gegenwart], a protentional horizon of the future is no less invariably connected to an impressional present” (Hua XI 73/115). Both of these activities of protention are partially responsible for the openness of consciousness as such, in that both my perception of a present object and the field of perception (within which it occurs) are a going beyond of consciousness, in the sense of going beyond what is immediately given. The ground of this going beyond is the activity of protention, in terms of: (1) the constitution of an immediate temporal object in near protention and (2) the constitution of a protentional horizon in far protention.

Since near protention should be clear enough, I will instead turn my attention directly to far protention. For Rodemeyer, far protention has a parallel function with far retention, though with an essential difference: while far retention is a system of ‘retentions of retentions,’ in which past experiences are held yet passively present, far protention is a system of openness to future experience (IST: 161). While the content of far retention is of past retained experiences, protention does not strictly speaking have content. Instead, far protention ‘protends’ future experience as both (1) the structure of openness to an extended present as such and (2) as the expectations of types of experience or experiential objects that are yet to come, and thus outlines in advance a horizon of potential and possible experience. It is the second of the two that will interest
us more. Rodemeyer argues that this horizon of far protention is based off of both: the living present and general types of experience held in far retention. She writes that far protention is “based not only upon current constitution but also on typifications that are sedimented through passive synthesis” (IST: 161).

Let us now turn to an example in order to further illustrate far protention. Suppose that I am entering a library that I have never visited before. While I have never been to this particular library, I have a basic set of expectations that have accrued through repeatedly visiting other libraries in the past. These past visits to libraries (held in far retention) form an expectation in terms of a general type of experience, and this general type of experience forms my horizon of potential experience in my visit to this new unfamiliar library. In the library, I expect to find rows of shelves filled with books, ordered according to a system, and divided up into sections such as ‘fiction’ and ‘non-fiction.’ Furthermore, since this is a public library, I do not expect to find any original language texts by Husserl, but I do expect there to be a ‘New Fiction’ section. As such, as I enter the library, I begin to look for a ‘New Fiction’ section rather than attempting to see if they have a copy of *Husserliana X*. Or, if I become hungry, I begin to plan a way to find food at a nearby cafe, rather than getting up from my desk and looking for a cafe in the library itself, since I have never been in a library with a cafe. As such, were I to accidentally discover that this particular library has a cafe, the retention of this experience would enter into my system of far retention and alter the general type of experience associated with libraries. That is, perhaps I will look to see if the next new library I visit has a cafe. However, since this is a single occurrence, I will not expect that every library I visit should have a cafe, but I will be pleasantly surprised, rather than shocked, were I to
find another library with one. And, were I to visit more and more libraries with cafes, then this would become part of my general type of library experience, and I would expect all libraries to have cafes, to the extent that I would be surprised were I to visit a library without one.\textsuperscript{42}

As such, we can now more fully see the connection between far retention and far protention. Far retention is the system of past experience in which general types of experiences are formed and held. These general types of experience are then given within the system of far protention, which is itself the implicit expectation of these same general types. Rodemeyer writes that far protention “would be involved in current constitution through its protention of general types and habits (in conjunction with far retention)” (IST: 161). In the example above, my far protentions associated with the library are all taken from the well of far retention, in which these general types of experience are held. Far protention, then, is a linking of present experience with possible experiences yet to come, forming their general outline in advance through the use of general types of experience held passively in far retention. This aspect of far protention, in turn, points us to the analysis of passive synthesis, which is an analysis of how past experience can become integrated into present experience.

\textbf{§16. Apperception and Passive Synthesis}

Apperceived meanings are given within a present experience as “co-present” – they are not linked or joined to a present experience after the fact. Rather, that which is perceived and apperceived are all bound up in one experience. Husserl writes:

\textsuperscript{42} As such, we can understand Husserl’s “undifferentiated unity” as a unity that is always in the process of differentiation.
In our example of the awakened co-presence of the antechamber, the empty presentation of this antechamber does not occur in an isolated way: rather it arises in connection with the perceptual presentation in which we survey the seen room with our gaze knocking on the door, as it were. The connection of this perceptual presentation with the empty presentation is a “synthetic” \([\text{synthetische}]\) one, which is to say, a unity of consciousness is produced that carries out a new constitutive accomplishment, whereby both objectlike formations receive special characters of unity noematically. (Hua XI: 75/117)

Here, Husserl is discussing an example in which my perception of a door within the main room of my house is immediately bound together with the apperception of where that door leads, viz. the antechamber. Here, Husserl describes this unity as synthetic. “Synthetic” should make us think of a compound. Since Husserl does not use the opposite term, “analytic,” in which a composite is dissolved into its parts, I would argue that we should think of this co-presence as \textit{partes intra partes} rather than \textit{partes extra partes}.\textsuperscript{43} In fact, Husserl often refers to the unity of apperception and perception as an “intertwining” \([\text{verflechtung}]\).\textsuperscript{44} Thus, apperceived meanings are themselves co-present in experience, with that which is immediately perceived, as a kind of a compound rather than a conjunction. This co-presence often occurs through what Husserl calls “association.” The term “association” denotes a general process wherein contents of consciousness become linked together, but in terms of a kind of synthesis. To say that association is a general process is to say that its activity can be located at a variety of

\textsuperscript{43} This theoretical framework of \textit{partes intra partes} of course comes from Merleau-Ponty’s descriptions, in his \textit{Phenomenology of Perception}, of the experienced relationship between the parts of our body.

\textsuperscript{44} We will find numerous instances of Husserl referring to apperception as “intertwining” in the third chapter of this text, specifically in his analyses of empathy.
levels within the constitution of experience.\textsuperscript{45} However, the activity of association is itself rooted within internal time consciousness.\textsuperscript{46}

In its most basic form, association consists of the bringing together of general types of experience held in (far) retention with our current present experience, based on a similarity between our present experience and a general type of experience held in far retention. This bringing together is understood in terms of a kind of “awakening.” Husserl, in a manuscript from 1924, writes that “Association is awakening” \textit{[Assoziation ist Weckung]} (Hua XI: 408/508). In another manuscript, he writes, “[W]e will then find the similarity of something awakened with something that is immediately awakening as proper to immediate association, as proper to immediate awakening” (Hua XI: 122/167).

What are we to make of this “awakened,” and why is it intimately connected with the notion of association? Husserl describes awakening as “the augmentation of vivacity, that is, of affectivity […]” (Hua XI: 413/515). If far retention holds general types of experience, and association is the awakening of a past general type of experience based on a current experience, then we can see that awakening is supposed to denote the way in which a past general type of experience becomes present within a current experience. That is, this general type of experience becomes affective again precisely in its form as a general type of experience, by providing an outline of possibilities on the horizon of far

\textsuperscript{45} We will find association operating at multiple levels in the third chapter of this text, in the analyses of the constitution of a shared cultural world.

\textsuperscript{46} In this section Husserl writes, “The doctrine of the genesis of reproductions and of their formations is the doctrine of association in the first and more genuine sense” (Hua X 119/164). This would lead one to believe that association is most properly a phenomenon of remembering. However, we can also understand the “first and more genuine sense” of association and reproduction if we think of it in terms of \textit{access}. That is, we have access to the phenomenon of association \textit{first} through the act of remembering. Then, once we describe this experience, we find that it points us to a deeper level of association. Indeed, after Husserl describes an act of remembering he writes, “But it is precisely the analysis of associative phenomena that draws our attention to the fact that consciousness must not necessarily be a consciousness of a single object for itself…” (Hua X: 119/164).
protention which are themselves in accordance with the general type of experience. As such, we then find far retentions “awakened” within our present experience, exercising affective force in the form of future possibilities of experience. Indeed, Husserl writes that, “Association is only at work in the protentional path [der protentionalen Linie] of original time consciousness, and also functioning there as awakening [awakened], as we know, is the continual retentional path” (Hua XI: 77/119). As such, we can then make sense of Husserl’s general description of association in Section 26:

We see very quickly that the phenomenology of association is, so to speak, a higher [ursprünglichen] continuation of the doctrine of original time-constitution. Through association, the constitutive accomplishment is extended to all levels of apperception. (Hua XI: 118/163)

Here, Husserl is describing association as a “higher continuation” of the constitutive activities of temporalizing consciousness, since association propagates the “constitutive accomplishment” of temporalizing consciousness to “all levels of apperception.” Association extends the accomplishments of temporalizing consciousness to all levels of apperception because it is the passive bringing together of a retention and current experience. Thus, since apperception is the intention of meaning that is not itself present, and association is the process whereby past experience is brought passively into present experience, we can easily see how it is that association propagates the constitutive activities of temporalizing consciousness to “all levels of apperception.”

47 The editor of the English translation of Hua XI, Anthony Steinbock, points out this is most likely a mistake, and that it should read “awakened.”
Association is brought about, Husserl argues, through “motivation.” Motivation “occurs in the ‘present’ consciousness, namely in the unity of the conscious stream, characterized as time-consciousness (originary consciousness) in act” and consists of:

…either ‘sediments’ [Niederschläge] of earlier acts and accomplishments of reason, or ones which emerge, in ‘analogy’ with the former, as apperceptive unities without actually being formed out of acts of reason or else they are completely a-rational: sensibility, what imposes itself, the pre-given, the driven in the sphere of passivity. (Hua IV: 222/234)

Past experiences, in the form of general types held deep within far retention or retentions whose content can still be recollected, “motivates” associations to form within consciousness at the passive level. For instance, if I am in an unfamiliar city and I see a sign (the motivating term) on a building that designates it as a library, a multiplicity of associations are passively motivated, i.e. without any rational act on my part. Before I even walk through the door of the library, I passively expect to enter a series of large rooms filled with rows of shelving filled with books or to find a “new fiction” section (the motivated terms). It is through my past experience with libraries, now held within far retention as a general type of experience, that this association arises passively. In a paragraph remarkably similar to Hume’s discussion of habit in his *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, Husserl writes:

Once a connection is formed in a stream of consciousness, there then exists in this stream the tendency for a newly emerging connection, similar to a portion of the earlier one, to continue in the direction of the similarity and to strive to complete itself in a total nexus [Gesamtzusammenhang] similar to the previous total nexus. (Hua IV: 223/234)

My first experience with a library forms a connection in my stream of consciousness, which then has the tendency to arise again should I encounter another library. The more

---

48In *Ideas II*, Husserl makes a distinction between two different kinds of motivation, viz. passive motivation and “motivation in the pregnant sense of Ego-motivation (motivation of reason)” (Hua IV: 223/234). In what follows, I will be concerned primarily with the former.
libraries I visit, the stronger this connection becomes, until merely the sight of a library motivates a set of passive expectations in regards to that building.

However, we must not understand the functioning of association in terms of deterministic causality. Rather, the motivated associations can always be disappointed or unfulfilled. Husserl writes,

By motivation we mean that certain data and their protentional horizons are demanded as co-emerging [mitauffretend] along with the emergence of other data in our lived-experience. But such associative demands can be annulled [aufheben] in the course of present experiencing. (Hua XI: 107/152)

The concept of motivation is not deterministic since, for example, my perceptual intentions can always be disappointed. For instance, I pick up the six-sided die on my desk and begin to turn it in my hands, looking at each side in turn. Based on my past experience with dice, in which I found that they were always numbered on their sides and that no number is repeated, I implicitly expect to see the numbers one through six represented on the sides of the die. However, this does not determine my perception of the die in any way. If, as I turn the die in my hand, I find that there is not a side with the number six, but instead two sides with the number five, then my implicit expectation is disappointed or unfulfilled – it is “annulled in the course of present experiencing.” That is, any present state of affairs can resist my expectations for it and consciousness must then adjust accordingly. It is in this sense that motivation is not deterministic.

To summarize, apperception is the perception of meanings that are not directly present, which occurs through the process of association. In this process, a facet of present experience awakens a past general type of experience through similarity, and this

---

49 Within the phenomenological reduction all natural sciences and their findings are suspended. Thus, one cannot make use of natural or physical causality.
past general type of experience becomes present within our current experience; not as a mere addition, but is given within the experience itself as a horizon of possible experience through association. That is, the passive addition of a past general type of experience lays out in advance the possibilities for our current experience, though not in any kind of strict causal manner. Instead, our protentions may themselves be disappointed, which then itself will become part of a sedimented layer of experience within far retention.

§17. “Radiating Back” and the Openness of Consciousness

Throughout this chapter, I have argued that various facets of the structure of internal time consciousness and apperception show us that consciousness is fundamentally open. It is now time to make clear what this claim means. By open, I mean that we can find the following in Husserl’s phenomenological descriptions of consciousness (whether or not he realized it or intended it): (1) consciousness is not static but can instead be understood as a process of becoming and (2) this process of becoming is not closed off to external influences through being open to the influence of discursive and non-discursive practices, knowledge, and power.

First, it is quite clear that Husserl himself understood consciousness as a process of becoming, rather than a static entity. In §48 of *Passive and Active Syntheses*, in a section titled “Consciousness as a Storied Structure of Constitutive Accomplishments,” Husserl writes:

> Consciousness is an incessant process of becoming [unaufhörliches Werden]. But it is not a mere succession of lived-experiences, a flux, as one fancies an objective river. Consciousness is an incessant process of becoming as an incessant process of constituting objectivities in an
incessant progressus of graduated levels. It is a never ending history [eine nie abbrechende Geschichte]. (Hua XI: 218/270)

We have already seen Husserl describe consciousness as a “stream of constant genesis,” which consists of a development [auseinander] rather than a series [nacheinander] (Hua XI: 339/628), but here we can directly see Husserl’s insistence that consciousness is a process of becoming, or a “never ending history.” While Husserl repeatedly refers to consciousness as a flow, here he is making a differentiation between a flow as a river, which would be a series of successive phases, and a flow as a kind of process or development. That consciousness is a process or a development can be understood through the functioning of far retention and far protention. As experience accrues within far retention, they form general types of experience which are then given through far protention as a horizon of possible experience. As such, past experience is carried within my experience of the present. This will be crucially important in the next chapter, when we find that the present, for Husserl, is always constituted historically, within a community of subjects undergoing and acting.

Second, aside from the question of teleology in Husserl’s Crisis, the picture of the subject that Husserl gives us in his phenomenological descriptions is one whose experience of the world is open to external influences. In order to illustrate this point, let us examine a discussion on fulfillment and disappointment from Husserl’s Passive and Active Syntheses. In this section, Husserl argues that when one of our perceptions is disappointed, i.e. a protention is unfulfilled, this disappointment “radiates back” [strahlt zurück] through the system of far retention and alters the content of the previously sedimented layers (Hua XI: 27/65).
In Section Five, Husserl tells us that the term ‘fulfillment,’ in the case of perception, is connected to the system of protention. Each primordial impression is connected to a protention, or an expectation of a primordial impression in the future. Indeed, Husserl writes that “all fulfillment progresses as the fulfillment of expectations” (Hua XI: 26/64). For example, suppose that I am turning a solid red ball (the size of an apple) in my hand. As I turn the ball, each adumbration in which the ball is red and solid fulfills the protention that was connected to the previous primordial impression.

Disappointment, on the other hand, occurs when a protention is not fulfilled by the arriving primordial impression. For example, as I turn the solid red ball around in my hand, the protentions attached to the current primordial impression will continue to expect ‘red’ and ‘solid.’ However, as the ball turns, I find that one side of the ball is actually indented and green, and thus, rather than a solid red ball in my hand, I am holding a ball that is red on one side, but green and indented on another. This disappointed protention becomes an “alteration of sense” [Sinnesänderung] which, Husserl writes, “radiates back to the preceding perception and all its previous appearances… They are reinterpreted in their very sense as ‘green’ and ‘indented’” (Hua XI: 27/65, my emphasis). If, in the face of my disappointed protention, I were to recall turning the ball in my hand, the content of this recollection would be different than if I had never made the discovery at all. If I had never made the discovery that the ball is green and indented on one side, my recollection of turning the ball in my hand would be simply that – the recollection of turning a red and solid ball in my hand. However, now that this protention has been disappointed, the recollection of turning the ball in my hand would now consist of both the original protention (that the ball is red and solid) and,
superimposed upon it, the retention that the ball is actually green and indented on one side. That is, the original intention is still contained in the recollection, but now with the additional retention that the ball was actually different than what I had expected. To this end Husserl writes,

[I]f we were to bring the retentio nal elements (i.e. the series of appearance of which we are still freshly conscious, but which have become completely obscure) to intuitive givenness in an explicit remembering, we would notice the following situation in memory: We would find in all the horizons of these retentio nal components not only the previous prefiguring [Vorzeichnung] in the previous structures of expectation and fulfillment… but we would find superimposed [darübergelagert] upon it the corresponding transformed prefiguring that now points continually to ‘green’ and ‘indented.’” (Hua XI: 31/69).

Let me use a more concrete example. Suppose that I am in a monogamous relationship with a partner, and I have recently found out that she has been romantically involved with someone else without informing me. As I think back to the previous days, weeks, and months, a whole range of activities that I had not noticed, nor would I recollect as strange had I not known my partner was cheating, become strange or suspicious, and now indicate to me the presence of my partner’s romantic involvement with another. For instance, perhaps the frequency of my partner’s late nights at work has gone up substantially, but not enough for me to notice outright. Or, perhaps my partner has been spending an increasing amount of time with an “old friend” that she does not introduce to me. In both examples, my recollection changes depending on whether or not I know that my partner is romantically involved with someone else. Those late nights at work or days spent with an “old friend” are now remembered as moments of suspicion and sadness, in that I am now aware that she was not at work on those days and was, instead, in the arms of another. In other words, the disappointment of the expectation of my partner’s
commitment to a monogamous relationship “radiates back” and partially alters the content of the sedimented layers of retention held in far retention. This alteration is only partial as I can still remember my original expectations.

Furthermore, the alteration that “radiates back” [zurückstrahlen] through disappointment also “radiates ahead” [vorstrahlen] and affects how it is that I experience relationships or solid red balls in the future. Husserl writes,

And these configurations radiating ahead [vorstrahlend] in a protentional-expectational manner will awaken the projected image or model of this configuration, allowing it to be expected, and through this the coalescence of the configuration will simultaneously be favored once more as fulfillment. (Hua XI: 190/241, my emphasis)

Since the content of protention is taken from the system of far retention, the next time that I approach this specific ball, I will expect a side to be green and indented. That is, an aspect of experience that is not itself directly present has changed and thus altered how I experience the ball. Perhaps now I will be suspicious of solid balls that I encounter in the future. Or, perhaps in a future monogamous relationship I will experience “late nights at work” or “time with an old friend” as suspicious. Or, to return to the example of an unfamiliar library, if I were to find that this library has a café, my disappointed expectation (that the library did not have a café) radiates back and then radiates forward through my new expectation that libraries can have cafes, whereas before I dismissed the notion outright. As such, the structure of consciousness, at the level of internal time consciousness and apperception, is fundamentally open – it allows for a change in the content of our far retention, which then motivates a change in the ways that we experience the world.
These two facets of openness that I have just outlined, i.e. that consciousness is a process of becoming and that our apperceptions can be altered through the radiating backward of disappointed protentions into far retention and the radiating forward of the altered general type of experience as a horizon of possible experience, allow us to see within Husserl’s middle and late writings a theory of the subject that is amenable to the constitutive activities of discursive and non-discursive practices. For example, in *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault describes the ways in which schools took on the organizing principles found in the military in order to discipline students (SP: 149/147). Desks were arranged in rows and aisles such that the teacher could see what each student was doing from her desk or from walking down the aisles. This disciplines students in the sense that since they know that they are being watched, they must control their activity, pay attention, and do their work. If one student were to believe that he could get away with not paying attention, and then was caught by the teacher, his disappointed protention (of not being caught) would then radiate back into the system of far retention, altering one of the general types of experience associated with “school,” and then radiate forward as the apperception of “constantly being watched.” If this apperception of being surveilled is then repeated in different areas – perhaps the student works in a factory after school – then the apperception of “constantly being watched” would become a facet of his experience. Anywhere he goes and anything he does is at risk of being seen and reported, and thus he must regulate his behavior according to what his culture deems proper. As such, we have a subject constituted through the non-discursive practice of having his body arranged within a space.
§18. Conclusion

What is remarkable is that Husserl does not follow this discussion further or describe other instances in which an alteration of meaning can occur in the content of the sedimented layers of far retention. That is, he does not look at other ways in which our experience of the world can change due to external influences. Instead, the discussion of alteration “radiating back” through the system of far retention is dropped once Husserl moves beyond his discussions of perceptual disappointment in his Passive and Active Synthesis. However, my position is that if he had pursued this further, he would have paralleled the analyses of Foucault. That is, this line of inquiry would have lead Husserl to the idea that our experience of the world, and of each other, can be fundamentally altered through discourse and practice. Indeed, the picture of the subject that I have drawn from Husserl goes against the picture of the subject that Foucault locates within phenomenology. That is, even though Husserl would assert that the subject is the origin and foundation of meaning, we find in his phenomenological descriptions a subject that is receptive at its most fundamental level to the influence of meaning from outside the subject. As such, the subject and its relationship with meaning is not one-way.

As such, I have now sketched out a theory of the subject in Husserl’s work that will be amenable to Foucault’s descriptions of the constitution of the subject as a subject of knowledge and power through discursive and non-discursive practices. In the next chapter, we will follow Husserl as he begins to reach the thought of Foucault in the latter half of his 5th Cartesian Meditation and his descriptions of the constitution of oneself as a “pathological object” [pathologischen Object] in Ideas II (Hua IV: 80/85).
PART TWO – THE LIMIT

In the next two chapters, we will see how Husserl, through apperception and the constitution of a social world, runs into the work of Foucault, and how Foucault, through his idea that systems of thought have become part of our perceptions, attitudes, and behavior, runs into the work of Husserl.

Chapter Three – Husserl at the Limit

Even Husserl’s last philosophy is in no way a gathered harvest, an acquired domain of cultivated spirit, a house in which one can conveniently set up housekeeping. Everything is open, all its paths lead out into the open.

- Eugen Fink

§19. Apperception and History

While Husserl’s best known, and most discussed, analyses of history occur in his late text The Crisis of European Philosophy, perhaps his most interesting analyses occur in the second half of his 5th Cartesian Meditation. Here, Husserl examines how it is that we constitute an objective and cultural world, i.e. a world that is “there for everyone” and whose meaning is infused with cultural predicates. In these analyses, Husserl argues that our perception of the world is inextricably bound to history, through the passive constitution of a cultural world within perception, which is itself formed through the “undergoing and acting” of a community of subjects. If, for Husserl, our perception of the present is intertwined with cultural meaning, and thus co-determined through history,

---

then we are remarkably close to Foucault’s insistence that “systems of thought… have become part of our perceptions, attitude and behavior” (FL: 282). It is in the second half of the 5th Cartesian Meditation, specifically Section 58, that we find Husserl’s analyses paralleling those of Foucault. However, instead of pursuing this line of thought further in the 5th Cartesian Meditation – i.e. the constitution of the subject’s experience through external influences such as knowledge and power – Husserl merely indicates problems associated with the constitution of the cultural world rather than giving the analyses themselves.

In this chapter, we will follow Husserl right up to this limit, and examine how it is that history can permeate perception such that our perception of the present is inextricably bound to the past, through its functioning at the level of passive synthesis. Then, we will turn to Husserl’s Ideas II, in which we find a description of a subject becoming a “pathological object.” In both cases, these analyses of Husserl’s work will rely heavily on the analyses of apperception and passive synthesis from the previous chapter, as it is through apperception that we experience meanings which are not themselves directly present, e.g. cultural predicates, and which allows for the openness of consciousness to becoming. That is, while the previous chapter set up a theory of the subject whose experience of the world can be constituted through systems of thought, this chapter will show such constitution in action through Husserl’s descriptions of the passive constitution of a shared objective and cultural world.
§20. The Constitution of the Cultural World: Husserl’s 5th Cartesian Meditation

Husserl’s *Cartesian Meditations* are an expansion of two lectures given in Paris in 1929, in the Amphithéatre Descartes at the Sorbonne. Ostensibly, the *Meditations* are one of Husserl’s many “introductions” to phenomenology, whose aim was to introduce French academia to the idea of transcendental phenomenology. In this text, Husserl develops phenomenology as a radical transformation of Cartesianism, in the sense that phenomenology begins with an “absolute poverty of knowledge” but ends up with results vastly different from those of Descartes. That is, while Descartes, in his *Meditations on First Philosophy*, achieves a “regress to the philosophizing ego… as subject of his pure *cogitationes*,” he misinterprets this ego and ends up in solipsism (Hua I: 3).\(^{51}\) Phenomenology, on the other hand, begins from this regress but finds constituted within it a shared Objective and cultural world formed with other subjects.

While the *Cartesian Meditations* are an introduction to phenomenology, under the surface this text constitutes a reply to perhaps the most famous objection against phenomenology, viz. the charge of solipsism.\(^{52}\) The phenomenological reduction and its move to the first-person perspective, so the objection goes, leaves us alone in a world without others, and thus as the *solus ipse*. As such, by beginning with the “subject of his pure cogitationes” like Descartes, Husserl is forced into a world absolutely devoid of other subjects. However, what we find in the *Cartesian Meditations*, specifically in the

---

\(^{51}\) Husserl argues in *Ideas II* that solipsism is a contradictory notion, in that the isolation from a group of subjects is not true solipsism, it is a mere isolation. “This abstraction [solipsism] does obviously not consist in our arranging for a mass murder of the people and animals of our surrounding world, sparing one human alone. For in that case the remaining subject, though one and unique, would still be a human subject, i.e., still an intersubjective Object, still apprehending and positing himself as such” (Hua IV: 81/86). The actually radically abstraction of intersubjectivity occurs in the reduction to the sphere of ownness, which we will examine in this chapter.

\(^{52}\) Perhaps the most famous articulation of the charge of solipsism is found in Heidegger’s *Being and Time*. 81
5th Cartesian Meditation, is not the subject as the \textit{solus ipse} – a subject forced to undertake various philosophical contortions in order to emerge from the void into a world of other subjects – but rather a subject who has before her a shared objective and cultural world that is “already finished” [\textit{immerfort schon fertig}] in perception (Hua I: 136/106). The description of experience, at its most basic level, leads us to the constitutive activities of others, in so far as my experience of the world is of a shared objective world infused with cultural meanings.

Let us now follow Husserl through the constitution of the cultural world, starting from what he calls the “sphere of ownness” to empathy (the constitution of other subjects), and to the constitution of the objective and cultural world that occurs through empathy.

\textbf{a) Strata, Static and Genetic Phenomenology}

Before we turn to an analysis of the 5th Cartesian Meditation, we must first examine how Husserl understands the constitution of the cultural world in relation to static and genetic phenomenology. Throughout the 5th Cartesian Meditation, Husserl describes the constitution of a shared objective and cultural world in terms of apperception, and as taking place within a structure that consists of multiple strata [\textit{Schichten}] or levels [\textit{Stufen}] that occurs at the passive level. For explanatory purposes, these levels can be roughly divided as follows:

\textit{First Stratum: The Sphere of Ownness [Eigensphäre]}

The first stratum of constitution is that of one’s own stream of subjective processes and modes of appearance, which is itself the necessary condition of the
possibility of having a world at all – much less a world that is shared with other subjects and infused with cultural predicates – and is thus the “founding stratum” [fundierende Schicht] of experience (Hua I: 127/96). This level of constitution occurs through internal time consciousness and the activities of passive synthesis, in which the living present is constituted.

**Second Stratum: Empathy [Einfühlung]**

The second stratum of constitution is that of empathy, or the constitution of another subject as another subject within experience. At this level, bodies [Körper] are constituted as lived bodies [Leiber] through the apperception of the Ego of the other.

**Third Stratum: Objective World [objectiven Welt]**

The third stratum of constitution occurs through the difference between my subjective modes of appearance and the subjective modes of appearance appresented by another subject. That is, the difference between the world as it looks from my ‘here’ and the world as it looks from your ‘there’ gives rise to the apperception of the world as shared and objective.

**Fourth Stratum: Cultural World [Kulturwelt]**

The fourth stratum of constitution occurs through a community of subjects that are “vitaly immersed in a concrete surrounding world” [in eine konkrete Umwelt hineinlebt] and “are related to it in undergoing and doing” (Hua I: 162/135). That
is, a cultural world is built through the practices of a concrete community of subjects. Furthermore, this final stratum consists of the accrual of cultural meaning through “temporal genesis” (Hua I: 162/135).

While I stressed the importance of genetic phenomenology in the previous chapter, specifically as regards understanding apperception, it would be a mistake to understand the constitution of the cultural world as progressing temporally through the four levels given above. For Husserl, it is not the case that we begin with the experience of our own subjective stream of appearances, and then move up temporally through the higher levels of constitution every time we perceive anything. Rather, the constitution of a shared objective and cultural world happens “all at once.” Husserl writes:

[The analysis of the constitution of a shared objective and cultural world] is not a matter of uncovering a genesis going on in time, but a matter of “static analysis.” The Objective world is constantly there before me as already finished, a datum of my livingly continuous Objective experience and, even in respect of what is no longer experienced, something I go on accepting habitually. (Hua I: 136/106)

Since the constitution of a shared objective and cultural world is “constantly there before me as already finished,” we must describe the constitution of the objective world as a structure rather than a process. For Husserl, this means that we must engage in the “precise explication of the intentionality actually observable in our experience of someone else and discovery of the motivations essentially implicit in that intentionality” (Hua I: 150/121). Rather than search for the origin of this or that particular cultural world, we are instead examining how it is that a cultural world is constituted at all.

However, a differentiation must be made here. While the description of the multi-leveled intentionality wherein we constitute other subjects and a shared world is a static
analysis, thus only examining it *qua* structure, this does not mean that certain levels within this structure (or the structure itself) is not amenable to a genetic analysis – in fact, far from it. As we have already seen, apperceptions are the result of a temporal genesis, and thus are always amenable to genetic analysis. And, if the constitution of a shared cultural world is given within perception through apperception, then any level that consists of apperception is amenable to genetic analysis as well. It is important to note that the fourth level, that of the cultural world, can also be analyzed genetically. This analysis would look at how a specific concrete cultural world was constituted through the specific historicity of that community, i.e. it would be a genetic inquiry into the contents of intersubjective consciousness.

I would like to note now that the following multi-leveled structure of constitution is operative at the level of passive synthesis. Apperceptions are always at the level of passive synthesis, since, according to Husserl, they are not “acts of thought” (Hua I: 141/111) and are always “intertwined” [*verflechtung*] (Hua I: 143/114) with a presentation. As such, we will find that a cultural world is always given ‘beforehand’ and is thus the basis for active acts of the ego.

§21. First Stratum: the Sphere of Ownness

In order to examine how it is that we constitute other subjects within experience, and thus a shared objective and cultural world as well, we must first “carry out, inside the transcendental sphere, a peculiar kind of epoché with respect to our theme” (Hua I: 124/93) in order to bring us to a “horizon of transcendental experience [that] is peculiarly my own” (Hua I: 126/95). Even though the phenomenological reduction has been in effect throughout the *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl argues we risk begging the question
if we do not actively attempt to suspend the constitutional activities of others within our
description. Husserl writes:

If the transcendental constitution of other subjects and accordingly the
transcendental sense, “other subjects,” are in question [...] then the sense,
“other subjects,” that is in question here cannot as yet be the sense
“Objective subjects, subjects existing in the world.” (Hua I: 124/92)

The standard phenomenological reduction, as we have already seen, involves the active
suspension of the general positing that characterizes the natural attitude. Yet, this is not
enough, because it will turn out that my descriptions of an object within the
phenomenological reduction are already shot through with the constitutive activities of
others, in so far as I apperceive the sides of an object that are not themselves directly
present (Hua I: 153/125). As such, Husserl argues that we must put into effect a new
phenomenological reduction, within the already deployed original reduction, by actively
suspending all of the “constitutional effects of intentionality relating immediately or
mediately to other subjectivity” (Hua I: 124/93).

This new reduction, however, must not be understood as simply trying to imagine
oneself in a world without other subjects, as the solus ipse objection might maintain.
Rather, Husserl writes, “such abstraction is not radical; such aloneness in no respect
alters the natural world-sense, ‘experienceable by everyone,’ which attaches to the
naturally understood Ego and would not be lost, even if a universal plague had left only
me” (Hua I: 125/93). 53 The solipsistic move is not radical enough because it still posits a
shared world but one that is now devoid of subjects, while the ground for this positing is
the constitutional activities of others. For Husserl, solipsism either never achieves or
misunderstands its goal.

53 This argument is mirrored in Hua IV: 81/86.
Husserl argues that this novel epoché requires (at least) three steps in which we attempt to “delimit, within my horizon of transcendental experience, what is peculiarly my own” (Hua I: 126/95, Husserl’s emphasis). First,

[…] we abstract first of all from what gives men and animals [Tieren] their specific sense as, so to speak, Ego-like living beings and consequently from all determinations of the phenomenal world that refer by their sense to “other” as Ego-subjects, and accordingly, presuppose these, such as cultural predicates [Kulturprädikate]. (Hua I: 126/95, translation modified).

Here, we first suspend the idea that other humans and animals are subjects, i.e. consciousness, with their own subjective stream of appearances and all of the results of these activities. For example, we suspend the idea that this object is a pencil or that object is a cup, since “pencil” and “cup” refer back to the constitutive activities of others. Second, we suspend the idea of the soul, or whatever it is that we think is behind the activity of humans and animals, or what Husserl calls “other-spiritual” [Fremdgeistigen] (Hua I: 127/95). Finally, we suspend:

[…] the characteristic of belonging to the surrounding world [Umweltlichkeit für jedermann], not merely for others who are also given at the particular time in actual experience, but also for everyone, the characteristic of being there for and accessible to everyone, of being capable of mattering or not mattering to each in his living and striving – a characteristic of all Objects belonging to the phenomenal world and the characteristic wherein their otherness consists… (Hua I: 127/95, Husserl’s emphasis)

This final step in the novel epoché requires that we suspend the idea that myself, everyone who does exist or has existed, and all objects, are experienceable by other subjects, or, in other words, we suspend the characteristic of “belonging to the surrounding world” to all subjects and objects.

---

54 The initial transcendental epoché is assumed (Hua I: 126/95).
After this novel epoché has been affected, we are left with what Husserl calls our “sphere of ownness” [Eigensphäre], which is a “unitarily coherent stratum of the phenomenon world” and is “essentially the founding stratum” of experience (Hua I: 127/96). This founding stratum consists of the stream of subjective appearances in which I constitute a living present (Hua I: 135/104). Within this stream of subjective appearances, Husserl says we find a field of bodies [Körper], with one body that all of the appearances are “reflexively related” to, i.e. my body (Hua I: 128/97). Husserl writes,

Among the bodies belonging to this “Nature” and included in my peculiar ownness, I then find my animate organism as uniquely singled out – namely as the only one of them that is not just a body but precisely an animate organism. (Hua I: 128/97, Husserl’s emphasis)

The body that is singled out is my body, in which I find a field of sensations that can be directed by the ways in which I govern my body. For example, as I turn my head a series of appearances follow, and they change if I turn my head the other direction. “[T]he kinesthesias pertaining to the organs flow in the mode ‘I am doing,’ and are subject to my ‘I can’” (Hua I: 128/97). As such, my stream of subjective processes is always oriented according to the position of my body. Since the constitutive activities of others have been suspended, we further find in this reduced world our own “value predicates” and “works” (those that stem from my activity only) (Hua I: 129/98) and my own “habitualities” (Hua I: 134/104).

However, even with all of the constitutive activities of other subjects suspended from description, we find “a division” within our “whole transcendental field of experience,” “namely the division into [the] sphere of ownness […] and the sphere of

---

55 In order to illustrate this point, Husserl uses the example of the reversibility of touch. The reversibility of this relation becomes of the utmost importance to Merleau-Ponty, especially in *The Visible and the Invisible*. 

88
what is ‘other’” (Hua I: 131/100). This division or separation occurs through what Husserl calls a “mundanizing self-apperception” [verweltlichende Selbstapperzeption], in which I, in the sphere of ownness, apperceive a separation between my body and other bodies, since this body is the only I can control (Hua I: 130/99). Even though the predicate “experienceable by everyone” has been suspended, we still find a basic division within the sphere of ownness between: (1) “the systems that constitute what is included in my peculiar ownness” and (2) “the systems that constitute what is other” (Hua I: 129/98). As such, this division gives us the founding stratum for the experience of an “Objective world,” but, at this level, transcendent objects are experienced as “objects of possible experience” rather than as objects within a world shared with other subjects (Hua I: 135/104). It is through empathy that this founding stratum of an objective world is fully constituted as a shared objective and cultural world.

§22. Second Stratum: Empathy

The constitution of other subjects (both human and animal) occurs through what Husserl terms “empathy” [Einfühlung]. Empathy is the act through which an alter-ego is apperceived as intertwined [verflochten] with another lived body. Husserl’s analyses of empathy have been widely discussed, as this concept is, to put it mildly, a source of controversy. In what follows I will only engage in a brief analysis of empathy, as there are numerous expositions of this concept in the secondary literature. What will be of primary interest to us, for the remainder of this chapter, are the results of empathy rather than the process itself, since, for Husserl, “the other Ego makes constitutionally possible a new infinite domain of what is ‘other:’ an Objective Nature… to which all other Egos and I myself belong” (Hua I: 137/107).
Let us begin by attempting to circumvent some of the objections against Husserl’s notion of empathy by clarifying what is and what is not at issue in his descriptions. Husserl’s notion of empathy does not designate some ontological or metaphysical claim, in which the existence of the other depends on myself, i.e. the constituting consciousness. Rather, the notion of empathy is supposed to describe the fact of the perception of the other. As I walk through the streets of Pittsburgh, I have sidewalks, buildings, cars, garbage cans, fire hydrants, and other people in my field of perception. My experience of other human beings is factually different than my experience of a fire hydrant. This difference in constitution is Husserl’s main concern, and specifically, he is examining how it is that we continuously and harmoniously experience other subjects as having an Ego which can, by definition, never be given in perception. Throughout the 5th Cartesian Meditation, and in his analyses of empathy in Ideas II, Husserl constantly insists that the constitution of the other requires a lived body to be present to me in experience (Hua I: 142/112), and begins his descriptions with another human “enter[ing] our perceptual sphere” (Hua I: 140/110). It is the fact of the experience of other human bodies as human bodies that is of concern for Husserl. And, as we will see, the act of empathy does not impose upon another lived body anything that is not already there, i.e. temporalizing consciousness – the lived body is not a “sign” of another ego, but a “presentation” of it (Hua I: 153/124).

For Husserl, the experience of other lived bodies as lived bodies consists of two features (Hua I: 141/112). First, I only experience another lived body as a lived body when that body is present to me in perception, and, when this lived body is present, I continuously experience it as lived. Second, while the lived body is always present to me,
the alter-ego, the ego of the other, is never directly present. Rather, it is apperceived, and this apperception is intertwined with the presentation of the lived body: “The appresentation which gives that component of the Other which is not accessible originaliter is intertwined [verflochten] with an original presentation (of ‘his’ body as part of the Nature given as included in my ownness)” (Hua I: 143/114, translation modified, my emphasis).\(^{56}\) As such, for Husserl, the act of empathy, much like the structure within which it operates, consists of at least two strata: (1) the associative pairing that occurs at the level of the lived body and (2) the higher level associative pairing in which the alter-ego is apperceived. Husserl writes,

> The general style of this and every other apperception that arises associatively is therefore to be described as follows: With the associative overlapping of the data founding the apperception, there takes place an association at a higher level (Hua I: 147/118).

It is the associative pairing of my lived body and the lived body in my field of perception that is the founding stratum for a higher level apperception, in this case, the apperception of the alter-ego. Let us briefly examine each level in turn.

First, when another living body enters my “perceptual sphere” it is “apprehended as an animate organism,” and thus immediately as a living body (Hua I: 140/110). That the body entering my field of vision is experienced as lived is, according to Husserl, due to “an apperceptive transfer from my animate organism” to the former (Hua I: 140/110). This apperceptive transfer is termed “pairing,” which is itself a “primordial form [Urform] of that passive synthesis which we designate as ‘association’” (Hua I: 141/112, Husserl’s emphasis, translation modified). As examined in the previous chapter,

---

\(^{56}\) See also Hua IV: 169/177. In both cases, Husserl uses the term verflechtung, which is taken up by Merleau-Ponty.
association is a form of passive synthesis in which a general type of experience held in far retention is “awakened,” due to some similarity between the general type and the currently experienced entity/object, and then apperceived as intertwined with my current experience, perhaps as a horizon of experience or a side of the object that I am not currently perceiving. In this case, pairing is the awakening of a general type of experience “based” on my experience of my own body, which “comes about when the Other enters my field of perception” (Hua I: 143/113). This experience of my body is “awakened” and “transferred” apperceptively to the lived body in my field of perception. However, two caveats must be made. First, this transfer of meaning from my body to the lived body is not an “inference by analogy,” specifically because it is “not a thinking act” – it occurs at the level of passive synthesis and is given within the perception itself, before any rational act by the concrete ego (Hua I: 141/111). Second, the passive synthesis of pairing is not a synthesis of “identity” (Hua I: 142/112). That is, pairing does not collapse the newly perceived lived body into part of my own consciousness, but rather associates this lived body with my own and forms a “pair.” The primary feature of pairing, which further distinguishes it from identity, is that it involves a mutual imposition of sense between that which is paired. Husserl writes,

On more precise analysis we find essentially present here an intentional overreaching, coming about genetically (and by essential necessity) as soon as the data that undergo pairing have become prominent and simultaneously intended; we find, more particularly a living mutual awakening and an overlaying of each with the objective sense of the other… an apperception of each according to the sense of the other… (Hua I: 143/113)

---

57 This, of course, is a genetic analysis, but Husserl still holds that the structure occurs “all at once,” and thus the overall framing of the descriptions as “static.” However, it is interesting to note that even though Husserl wants to engage within a static analysis of this structure, the analysis of each level are themselves genetic. Thus, Husserl is pushed, perhaps against his own will, into the realm of the genetic.
When my lived body, “prominent” in my field of sensation, perceives another lived body (which is also prominent within my field of perception but in a different way), pairing occurs, and through this pairing I acquire the sense of my body as the lived body for another, or as outside the other, in addition to apperceiving that body as a lived like my own (Hua I: 143/113).

The second, higher stratum of empathy, founded on the pairing of my lived body with another, is the apperception of the alter-ego, which can never itself be directly present in perception. That this second level is founded on the original pairing can be understood through Husserl’s description of the other’s lived body as the “core of an appresentation” of the alter-ego.\textsuperscript{58} Husserl describes this stratum as follows:

But, since the other body there enters into a pairing association with my body here and, being given perceptually, becomes the core of an appresentation, the core of my experience of a coexisting ego, that ego, according to the whole sense-giving course of the association, must be appresented as \textit{an ego now existing in the mode There}, ‘such as I should be if I were there.’ My own ego however, the ego given in constant self-perception, is actual now with the content belonging to his Here. Therefore an ego is \textit{appresented, as other} than mine. (Hua I: 148/119, Husserl’s emphasis).

Within my sphere of ownness, my body is always given to me as “here” through a stream of subjective appearances that are oriented to the position of my body (Hua I: 145/116). Furthermore, through “the free modification of my kinesthesias, particularly those of locomotion, I can change my position in such a manner that I convert any There into a Here” (Hua I: 146/116). When a body enters my field of vision, I “apperceive him as having spatial modes of appearances like those I should have if I should go over there and

\textsuperscript{58} Again, it must be kept in mind that while empathy is amenable to a genetic analysis, the process is itself “all at once.” That is, empathy is already finished in an act of perceiving another body and thus these two stratum must be understood as occurring “all at once” – the world I experience is always already an objective and thus shared world with other subjects. This will be examined in greater detail in the following section.
be where he is” (Hua I: 146/117). This is due to a higher level of pairing, in which my oriented stream of subjective appearances is ‘transferred’ to the other lived body, but not in such a way that I think it is seeing what I am seeing. Rather, he is apperceived as seeing the world from “there,” which is a position that I could have were I to walk over to him and look at where I was previously standing. Furthermore, the alter-ego apperceived in pairing is apperceived as having its own type of fulfillment, since it can never come to presence like the back side of an object can. The alter-ego is fulfilled through continuous harmonious experience (Hua I: 144/114).\(^{59}\)

As such, we have now examined the dual-leveled structure of empathy. At the level of passive synthesis, first a body becomes paired with my own through association, in which it gains the sense ‘lived body’ through its similarity to my own. Second, this body becomes the “core of an appresentation,” i.e. that of the alter-ego. Through empathy, the other is constituted as a living body, with its own stream of subjective appearances, and thus external to myself. Again, this relation is reciprocal, as I also experience myself as outside the other. It is through the experienced difference between our stream of subjective appearances that a shared objective world is constituted, to which I and all others belong.

§23. Third Stratum: The Constitution of the Objective World (Space and Time)

Empathy, through which we apperceive another lived body as an ego with its own subjective stream of appearances (from the orientation of over ‘there’), also produces our

\(^{59}\) Suppose that a body enters my field of vision, but it is completely still. It is only through continually watching for movement or through walking up to it for further investigation that I will verify whether that body is a living body or, perhaps, a statue.
experience of a shared objective world, i.e. our experience of one single Nature to which I and everyone else (who does exist, has ever existed, or possibly exist in the future) belong. The passive synthesis of associative pairing constitutes for me, in the form of an apperception, an experience of an alter-ego governing a body like mine, yet from over ‘there.’ Husserl writes that this pairing:

[…] appresents first of all the other Ego’s governing in his body, the body over there, and mediately his governing the Nature that appears to him perceptually – identically the nature to which the body over there belongs, identically the Nature that is my primordial Nature. It is the same Nature, but in the mode of appearance: “as if I were standing over there, where the Other’s body is.” (Hua I: 151/123)

We already examined the immediate appresentation of the alter-ego through empathy. However, how is a shared Nature appresented through empathy? The answer is actually deceptively simple. Husserl writes,

*In the apppresented other ego* the synthetic systems are *the same*, with all their modes of appearance, accordingly with all the possible perceptions and the noematic contents of these: except that the actual perceptions and the modes of givenness actualized therein, and also in part the objects actually perceived, are *not the same*; rather the objects perceived are precisely those perceivable *from there*, and *as* they are perceivable from there. (Hua I: 152/123)

In other words, when another body enters my visual field, I perceive it as looking, or potentially looking, at the same objects that I am, but as seen from over ‘there’ and as having a corresponding stream of subjective appearances of these objects, the same as I would have if I were to go stand where this other body is currently standing. The previous two citations may perhaps be interpreted as the projection of a privileged model of perception onto all subjects. However, whatever model that may be (of, say, white male bodies) is not operative at this level of constitution, in that discriminatory apperceptions of race and gender are at a higher level of constitution. Here, by identity, Husserl is only arguing that all subjects have to perceive themselves as sharing a basic world, in order for them to constitute cultural worlds (with their own systems of discrimination). Again, this stratum of constitution is the condition of the possibility of the perception of bodies in racial or gendered ways.
constant and incessant repetition of this experience forms an objective Nature (Hua I: 155/127) on two inextricably related levels, viz. space and time.

The objectivity of the world as a spatial objectivity is constituted through the apperception of objects as having sides that I cannot currently see, which occurs through empathy. That is, when I experience the alter-ego as perceiving the same object as I am, she is doing so from a perspective which gives her a side of the object that is not currently visible from my perspective ‘here’ (Hua I: 153/125). Thus, the object is constituted as an ‘objective’ object. Husserl writes,

[…] every natural Object experienced or experienceable by me in the lower stratum receives an appresentational stratum (though by no means one that becomes explicitly intuited), a stratum united in an identifying synthesis with the stratum given to me in the mode of primordial originality: the same natural Object in its possible modes of givenness to the other Ego. (Hua I: 153/125, Husserl’s emphasis)

The first stratum of the object is its constitution within our sphere of ownness through the activities of internal time consciousness and passive synthesis. The object then receives the second “appresentational stratum” through the act of empathy, which produces the difference in perspective between an object seen from my here and from your there. This givenness to others, through the apperception of the object as having sides that I cannot see but are experienceable by others, constitutes our experience of a shared world, i.e. of a world experienced, through our bodies, from over there and from over here. As such, this difference results in “the ‘real,’ the mundane separation of my psychophysical existence from someone else’s, a separation that shows itself as spatial, owing to the spatial character of our Objective animate organisms” (Hua I: 157/129).

---

However, what about the constitution of a shared objective time? Rodemeyer, in her text *Intersubjective Temporality*, fills in a crucial piece of the puzzle (as to the constitution of a shared world) through her analyses of *world-time*, a term occasionally used by Husserl but one that he never fully described. According to Rodemeyer, ‘world-time’ is “a synthetic structure connecting” my internal temporalizing consciousness and objective time (clock time) (IST: 70), “which rests in the consciousness of all subjects, rather than just that of the individual” (IST: 69). That is, the constitution of an objective shared time occurs through a structure that is itself transcendentally intersubjective, in that it is through the constitutional activities of myself and others that one world-time is constituted, which then serves as the ground for figuring out ways to measure this objective and shared time. Rodemeyer uses the following citation from Husserl:

> My passivity stands in connection with the passivity of all others: One and the same thing-world is constituted for us, one and the same time [is constituted] as objective time such that through this, my Now and the Now of every other – and this life-present (with all immanences) and my life-present – are objectively ‘simultaneous.’ (Hua XI: 343/632)

Similar to the constitution of an objective space, world-time is constituted through the repetition of the experience of the alter-ego as experiencing the same world that I am, yet from a different perspective. The living-present constituted within my sphere of ownness is fundamentally the same with the living present of the other and this connection occurs through empathy, which is itself passive, and thus “my passivity stands in connection with the passivity of all others” – we are both experiencing the same world and at the same time.
As such, we have now examined the stratum of constitution wherein our experience of the world as shared with others spatially and temporally is constituted passively through the experience of the other. That is, our experience of the world, which is itself the founding stratum for us to constitute a world of discourses and non-discursive practices, is accomplished intersubjectively.


We are now at the final stratum of the passive constitution of the world as shared and shot through with cultural predicates. This stratum consists of the accrual of cultural meaning created and taken up in perception through the “undergoing and doing” of a subject within a community (Hua I: 162/135). Our perception of the world is built on this cultural stratum, insofar as, for example, objects of perception are always given to perception with a cultural meaning. For example, a hammer is not perceived as first an object of my experience, then as an object within a world that I share with others, and then finally as an object used for a specific purpose. Instead, it is immediately perceived as a hammer, i.e. as an object that is used for such and such a purpose.\(^{63}\) For Husserl, the perception of the hammer includes the presentation of the object and the apperception of the object as both shared and used for some general purpose. That is, our apperception of the usefulness of objects is intertwined with the presentation of the object itself. Remember that the entire structure we have outlined so far, and thus this level as well, is operative at the passive level of consciousness – thus, the cultural world is the passive

\(^{63}\) The best discussion of the intertwining between cultural predicates and objects of perception is found in Heidegger’s discussion of “worldliness” in Being and Time.
ground upon which (active) acts of the ego are carried out. As such, our perception of the present is intertwined with cultural meaning and is also historical.

Section 58 of the 5th Cartesian Meditation is devoted to the constitution of the cultural world. However, Husserl does not actually describe this stratum but instead indicates the various phenomenological problems that stem from it. Nevertheless, we can still make an outline of this stratum through specific selections within this section, and I will ultimately suggest that it is with Foucault that we find the concrete analysis of this stratum.

**a) The Two Correlates of Intersubjectivity**

Section 58 begins with the rather fascinating description of this fourth stratum as consisting of two correlates: (1) the constitution of “spiritual Objectivities [geistige Objektivitäten]” and “the various types of social communities with their possible hierarchical order” and (2) the constitution of the “specifically human surrounding world [Umwelt], a surrounding world of culture for each man and each human community” (Hua I: 160/132). Husserl calls these constitutive problems “correlated” [korrelative] which means that they are in a relationship of mutual reciprocity, and thus each constitutive side of the correlate influences the other. The first correlate is that of the constitution of “spiritual Objectivities,” which we can perhaps understand as cultural predicates, and types of communities with various hierarchies. Both aspects of this first correlate can be understood as made up of intersubjectively created meanings whose existence is not dependent upon me, but instead as cultural predicates of the community within which I exist and types of intersubjectively created hierarchies within communities.
The second side of the correlate is the cultural world as experienced from a specific perspective, in each case ‘mine,’ or of a world that has a “restricted objectivity” (Hua I: 160/132). The objectivity of the world as shared is “unconditional,” as it is an “absolutely unconditional accessibility to everyone which belongs essentially to the constitutional sense of Nature, of the animate organism, and therefore of the psychophysical man (understood with a certain generality)” (Hua I: 160/132). The cultural world as experienced from my perspective is a restricted objectivity precisely because my experience of the cultural world is my expression or taking up of cultural objectivities and predicates, and through the arrangement of my body in various ways. My partner and I share the same cultural world, though we each experience it from our own individual perspective, in which the world “presents itself to us according to our personal upbringing and development or according to our membership in this or that nation, this or that cultural community” (Hua I: 163/136).

The connection between these two correlates, and the reason why they are in a mutually reciprocal relationship, lies in the “undergoing and doing” of human subjects within a community (Hua I: 162/135). In a fascinating passage, we find Husserl telling us the following:

That every such [cultural] predicate of the world accrues from a temporal genesis and, indeed, one that is rooted in human undergoing and doing, needs no proof. A presupposition for the origin of such predicates in the particular subjects (and for the origin of their intersubjective acceptance as abiding predicates of the common life-world) is, consequently, that a community of men and each particular man are vitally immersed in a

---

64 The following descriptions from Husserl can be viewed, at least partially, as a solution to the problem posed by Ian Hacking in the latter’s essay “Making up People.” In this essay, Hacking debates the intelligibility of a doctrine of “dynamic nominalism” that argues “numerous kinds of human beings and human acts come into being hand in hand with our invention of the categories labeling them” (Hacking, 170).
concrete surrounding world, are related to it in undergoing and doing – that all of this is already constituted. (Hua I: 162/135, my emphasis)

This is an extremely important passage, and warrants a sentence-by-sentence analysis.

To begin, Husserl writes that “Every such [cultural] predicate of the world accrues from a temporal genesis [...]” Here, we immediately find a connection between cultural predicates and the activities of internal time consciousness, association, and apperception, through Husserl’s description of predicates as accruing through a “temporal genesis.” This tells us that cultural predicates are apperceived within experience, and are therefore are already given to us “beforehand” within experience, as “intertwined” with the original presentation. Indeed, Husserl ends the passage by saying that a cultural world is already constituted. As a hammer enters my perceptual field, I immediately perceive it as a hammer, and not, for example, as a pencil. When the hammer enters my field of vision, its presentation awakens a general type of experience held within far retention, i.e. the various uses for this object, and this general type of experience becomes associated with the presentation as a horizon of possible uses (through protention). And, as such, the cultural predicate is apperceived within experience.

Husserl completes the first sentence by telling us that the temporal genesis of cultural predicates is “rooted in human understanding and doing.” Indeed, he goes on to say that the presupposition for both the origin of cultural predicates in a subject and the origin of cultural predicates (as ideal meanings) are to be found within the vital immersion of a community actively related to each other and a world. Thus, we can understand this idea of rootedness in two ways: (1) that cultural predicates are rooted in me through my own activity within a world and a community of subjects and (2) that
cultural predicates as such are rooted in the activity of a community of subjects “vitally immersed” in a world. Let us look at each in turn.

First, my apperception of cultural predicates is entirely due to my own activity in relation to myself, others, and the world that I am “vitally immersed in.” Simply, cultural predicates are not innate within consciousness. That is, while the meanings may (and usually do) pre-exist my own birth, they are not in my consciousness at the moment of conception. Rather, as intersubjectively created meanings, they are meanings which must be ‘picked up’ by me and integrated into my experiential horizon in some way or another, either explicitly or implicitly. To use a benign example, it is only after my first experience with a hammer that the meaning ‘hammer’ (along with all of its uses and functions) can settle into my system of far retention as a general type of experience, such that it can be later associated with a presentation and apperceived with my horizon of experience. A meaning can be taken up by me implicitly, perhaps, through the attitudes that surround me as a child. For instance, if I were raised by two parents with a negative outlook on life, this negative outlook will be taken up by me implicitly and apperceived within my horizon of experience as the attachment of a negative valence to my relevant experiential possibilities. Indeed, Husserl writes that the surrounding world [Umwelt] “presents itself to us according to our personal upbringing and development or according to our membership in this or that nation, this or that cultural community” (Hua I: 163/136). That is, the world is apperceived by us according to the cultural meanings that we take up, and this is done either explicitly or implicitly. This brings us to the second sense of rootedness from the above passage.
While cultural predicates have their origin in each particular subject through their active relation to a community and to the world, cultural predicates as such have their origin within the intersubjective constitutive activities of a community of subjects actively related to each other and the world. For Husserl, cultural predicates are ‘ideal,’ in the sense that they are not subjective meanings that are confined only to me, but are objective meanings that other subjects can take up as well – e.g., the meaning ‘hammer.’ However, a meaning can only be ideal if it is repeatable and reproducible by other subjects, and thus has an existence separate from my own. As such, the presupposition for the constitution of ideal meaning, which is intersubjective (UG: 370/359), is a community of subjects to repeat the original meaning. In a passage from his *Origin of Geometry*, Husserl writes that “in the unity of the community of communication among several persons the repeatedly produced structure becomes an object of consciousness, not as a likeness, but as the one structure common to all” (UG: 371/360). For example, the meaning ‘hammer’ was first created by someone through an initial use. As this initial use fades into far retention, it is then available as a general type of experience that “can be reawakened,” i.e. I can use another object in the same way that I used the initial object (if it is roughly similar in shape). Husserl writes that this initial use

[...] immediately turns into the passivity of the flowingly fading consciousness of what-has-just-now-been. Finally this “retention” disappears, but the “disappeared” passing and being past has not become nothing for the subject in question: it can be reawakened. (UG: 370/359).

---

65 Ultimately, this existence is obtained when the meaning is written down and, thus, in order to be ideal ideal (omnitemporal) these meanings must become temporal, i.e. written down. See Lawlor’s “The Need for Survival: The Logic of Writing in Merleau-Ponty and Derrida” for a fascinating analysis of the way in which we can understand the work of both Merleau-Ponty and Derrida as fundamentally linked to Husserl’s discussion of the creation of ideal meaning in the latter’s *Origin of Geometry*.
Since I experience a shared and objective world, there are other subjects with whom I am in contact, and they can perceive my use of this object in this specific way, and they reproduce and repeat this action. Husserl writes,

In this full understanding of what is produced by the other, as in the case of recollection, a present co-accomplishment on one’s own part of the presentified activity necessarily takes place; but at the same there is also the self-evident consciousness of the identity of the mental structure in the productions of both the receiver of the communication and the communicator; and this occurs reciprocally. (UG: 371/60).

Their perception of my use of the object becomes a “present co-accomplishment” for my companions. This falls into their systems of far retention, and they then reawaken the meaning hammer through their use of this object in this specific way and thus apperceive that use within their system of far protention. While any given cultural meaning has an initial production in a particular subject, this meaning is only ideal through the intersubjective activities of a community of subjects who incessantly reproduce and repeat that meaning within their own horizon of experience.

Finally, to return to the initial passage from the 5th Cartesian Meditation, Husserl says that the constitution of the cultural world is a presupposition for the origin of cultural predicates in particular subjects and in general (Hua I: 162/135). However, is this not a circular statement? How can one say that the origin of cultural predicates is a cultural world, when the cultural world is composed of cultural predicates? This statement is only circular, however, from the perspective of formal or general logic. Phenomenologically, we can understand Husserl to be saying that the intersubjective activities of a community are the presupposition of cultural predicates – both their origin in me and their origin as such. That is, without a community acting and relating to a world, we would not have cultural meanings at all.
We are now in a position to see the connection between the two sides of the correlate, i.e. the correlation between cultural predicates and their oriented experience by me, is my active relation to a community of other subjects and to the world, in which I am constantly “undergoing and doing.” First, cultural predicates are not innate within consciousness, and, as such, they can only be taken up through a relation to other subjects and to the world that we constituted together as shared and objective. Second, I apperceive these accrued cultural predicates passively within my experience of the world through association, retention, and apperception. The presentation of an object awakens a general type of experience held within far retention, and this general type of experience becomes associated with the present object as a horizon within the system of far protention. Third, cultural meanings as such are tied to the intersubjective activities of a community of subjects, as meanings are only ideal insofar as they are repeatable and reproducible.

However, the passage cited above goes on further, and we find Husserl making the following fascinating claim, which is entailed by the description given above. He writes,

> With this continual change in the life-world [i.e., the constant accrual of cultural predicates through the activities of a community], manifestly the men themselves also change as persons, since correlativey they must always be taking on new habitual properties. (Hua I: 162/135, Husserl’s emphasis)

Here, we find Husserl himself highlighting the following claim: how we understand ourselves changes as the cultural predicates change and accrue through the activities of human beings in a community. That is, at the passive level of experience we have the constitution of ourselves, already given beforehand, as imbued with cultural predicates –
e.g. I am this type of body or that type of body, which then influences (if not determines) my place within a social hierarchy, from which I express the experienced cultural predicates through my experience of the world from my perspective. As such, in this brief statement by Husserl, we find space for Foucault’s argument that we are constituted as objects of knowledge, and that this constitution becomes embedded within “our perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors.”

However, a distinction must be made. The notion of “accrual” that Husserl employed above would give the sense that, once cultural predicates are sedimented in consciousness, they cannot change. This would then give the idea that cultural predicates create necessary limits of thought. However, Husserl’s own analyses of the radiating backward and forward of meaning in apperception counters this interpretation. If we recall, Husserl describes the way in which an unfulfilled protention can motivate a “radiating back” of meaning into the system of far retention. In his example, he describes a red ball that he is turning in his hand – a ball that he protends within his experience as red and solid all around. However, as he turns the ball in his hand, he finds that, in fact, one side of the ball is green and indented. This disappointed protention (red and solid) radiates back into the system of far retention and then radiates forward as a change in my horizon of expectations, as regards this ball and perhaps other balls in the future. As such, these cultural predicates can always change, and the idea of accrual can be understood to denote the various layers of meaning within an intention, both influencing and influenced by current experience.

In any case, we have now outlined the fourth stratum within which the cultural world is constituted. It consists of the accrual of cultural predicates through my (and our)
active immersion in, and relation to, a community of other subjects and the world. These cultural predicates are then passively experienced by me as a horizon of possible experience within far protention, through the activities of retention, association, and apperception. This stratum, like the other three, is constituted passively, and is thus there for us before any active position taking of an ego. That is, we immediately perceive the world as cultural.

§25. Apperception and Historical Constitution: Husserl’s “Pathological Object”

We can see the interplay of these strata of constitution in Husserl’s description of the “pathological object” in his text *Ideas II*. In a subsection found within a larger section on the constitution of material nature, Husserl gives a description of the constitution of an objective world through intersubjectivity, specifically as regards the constitution of an object as enduring in an objective space and time. Husserl’s description begins with the apperception of other subjects as suspended (Hua IV: 79/84). While this “apperceptive domain is lacking,” Husserl describes a world in which harmonious experience of the world still occurs, much as he did in his descriptions of the sphere of ownness in the 5th Cartesian Meditation, and thus a world in which the “influence” of empathy “would be absent from my world-image as now modified” (Hua IV: 79/84). Again, in the sphere of ownness we still have manifolds of sensations oriented towards our body, and, if experience is harmonious, then things “exhibit themselves as ‘actually being,’ or otherwise, if discrepancies of a known kind occur as exceptional, the things show themselves as being ‘different’ or not being at all” (Hua IV: 79/84). As such, “seemingly nothing has changed” – even with the apperceptions produced through empathy
suspended, I still have a world of coherent experience, i.e. the first stratum of the sphere of ownness (Hua IV: 79/84).

However, once we add intersubjectivity, i.e. others, back to our description, something very strange happens. Husserl writes,

Now all of a sudden and for the first time human beings are there for me, with whom I can come to an understanding. And I come to an understanding with them about things which are there for us in common in this new segment of time. (Hua IV: 80/84)

With the addition of others, a common world becomes constituted through the intersubjective constitution of an objective space and time. It is in and through this objective space and time that humans can “come to an understanding” “about things which are there for us in common.” That is, we share the same spatial world and the same temporal now in order to communicate, and to communicate about things. However, as I communicate with other subjects, “something very remarkable comes about:”

[…] extensive complexes of assertions about things, which I made in earlier periods of time on the ground of earlier experiences, experiences which were perfectly concordant throughout, are not corroborated by my current companions, and this not because these experiences are simply lacking to them […] but because they thoroughly conflict with what the others experience in experiences, we may suppose, that necessarily are harmonious and that go on being progressively confirmed. (Hua IV: 80/84, Husserl’s emphasis)

Various assertions that I have come to make on the basis of previous experience come into conflict with others when my harmonious experience of the world does not coincide with their own. While this is not Husserl’s example, imagine a young male growing up in a predominantly homophobic culture, who, early in his life, becomes aware that he is sexually attracted to other men. Due to this attraction, the idea of homosexual intercourse makes sense to him, and thus is perceived by him as both desirable and natural. However,
now imagine that same young male as he develops and he becomes more and more aware of his peers, elders, and cultures negative view of homosexuality. His experience of his desires will increasingly come into conflict with a society whose general outlook on these desires is negative. That is, while he experiences his desire for homosexual intercourse as natural, he will be increasingly faced with a culture that believes homosexuality, and thus homosexual intercourse, to be unnatural. After this conflict, Husserl writes:

As I communicate to my companions my earlier lived experiences and they become aware of how much these conflict with their world, constituted intersubjectively and continuously exhibited by means of a harmonious exchange of experiences, then I become for them an interesting pathological Object [einem interessant pathologischen Objekt], and they call my actuality, so beautifully manifest to me, the hallucination of someone who up to this point in time has been mentally ill [geisteskran]. (Hua IV: 80/85, Husserl’s emphasis)

Through the conflict of the young man’s experience with the intersubjectively corroborated experience of a community (perhaps through religion, politics, or popular media), his community apperceives him as a pathological object – as someone who is mentally ill and in need of help. The young man finds that his own experience of the world is somehow wrong, in that it does not match up with the experiences of others. Thus, not only does his experience conflict with the experience of others, but their experience conflicts with his.

Let us look at a number of consequences indicated by this description – consequences which Husserl does not take up but ones that we can draw from his analyses and the analyses done in the previous chapter of this text. First, what we must notice here is that all of the strata that were described in the previous sections of this chapter are operative within this description. We have the constitution of a thing within the sphere of ownness, and then modification of our experience of that thing through the
apperceptions gained by empathy, and the further apperceptions gained through social corroboration. As such, in his description of the conflict of experience between a subject and a community, we find Husserl employing each strata step-by-step, and in the final analysis, wherein a community perceives a particular subject as a pathological object, all four strata are in play.

Second, we must follow the lines of “conflict,” within the previous description, as they play out in both the young man’s perception of himself, now as a pathological object, and the perception that his community has of him as a pathological object. As regards the first, when the young man reports his desire for homosexual intercourse to others in his community, a conflict occurs between his past harmonious experience and the experience that they have of him and of homosexuality as such. Thus, his recollected experiences of homosexual intercourse as a natural desire turn out to be “false,” since even though he has this desire it has now turned out (through the decision of the community) that the desire for homosexual intercourse is unnatural. This newly experienced conflict between the young man’s experience and that of his community radiates back into his system of near and far retention, and now all of his previous recollections of feeling that the desire for homosexual intercourse was natural is overlaid with the sense “unnatural.” That is, his past is reinterpreted in light of this new information. This conflict not only radiates back into his system of recollections, but into his system of far retention as a modification to a general type of experience, which then radiates forward into his new continuous experience of the world. He still experiences a desire for homosexual intercourse, but now this desire is experienced by him as “unnatural” and therefore “wrong.” Furthermore, on the basis of this conflict and his new
experience of his desires as unnatural, the young man might decide to undergo “behavioral modification,” which often employs treatments like shock therapy, to rid him of these desires.

We must also follow the line of conflict through the experience of the community against whom the young man’s experience has now come into conflict. When he reports his previous experiences of his desires as natural, the conflict radiates back into their system of near and far retention in a way analogous to that of the young man’s. They now recollect him as before, but now with the added sense of “mentally ill” (through his “unnatural” desire). That is, they can recollect his behavior, which may have seemed “normal” before, but now this behavior is reinterpreted as the behavior of someone with “unnatural” desires, though they did not know it until now. Furthermore, this conflict radiates back within perception and then radiates forward through the alteration of a general type of experience which is then given as a horizon of experience as regards the young man. That is, they now apperceive “mental illness” when they perceive the young man, and since “mental illness” is a term embedded within a nexus of discourses (psychiatric, religious, political, biological, medical, etc.), the community then apperceives the young man in a way that is built up culturally, and thus (as Foucault has shown), historically.

Third, and we have already seen this, the apperception “pathological object,” whether given in the young man or in others, is an apperception that is constituted within the fourth stratum of experience, i.e. the layer in which cultural predicates accrue. And, as a pathological object (a set of cultural predicates) the young man is now changed in their experience as well as within his own, through the cultural predicates that they
apperceive in their experience of him and that he apperceives within his own world. It is the discourse that surrounds the idea of the pathological object – the accumulated knowledge and its various practices and relations of power – that become effected within experience in apperception, whether it is in the experience of the community or in the young man’s experience of himself (and, of course, his experience of them).

As such, here we find Husserl at his limit, in which he begins to approach the analyses of Foucault, in so far as there is a layer of passive experience in which the world is given to me as cultural and in which I perceive myself and others with cultural predicates. Furthermore, even though this may not have been Husserl’s intention, we can see how the predicates in this layer, even though they accrue, can be understood as malleable, in that they can always be altered through the way in which meaning radiates backward and forward within consciousness through apperception.
Chapter Four – Foucault at the Limit

Basically, I had been doing nothing except trying to retrace how a certain number of institutions, beginning to function on behalf of reason and normality, had brought their power to bear on groups of individuals, in terms of behaviors, ways of being, acting, or speaking that were constituted as abnormality, madness, illness, and so on. I had done nothing else, really, but a history of power.

-Michel Foucault

§26. Foucault and the Pathological Object

We ended the last chapter with an analysis of Husserl’s description of the pathological object, wherein a conflict of experience between an individual and his community resulted in their labeling him, and his labeling himself, a pathological object. Though this is not Husserl’s example, we used the example of a young man whose experience of sexual attraction to other men comes into conflict with the culturally constituted experience of a homophobic community. However, we only saw the young man’s constitution of himself as a pathological object – we did not look at how the cultural predicates that were applied to him were historically accrued, or at the processes through which the community constitutes the young man as pathological, that is, we did not see the constitution of the young man as pathological within the experience of the community. As such, we found ourselves at the limit of Husserl’s analyses. I now argue that once we approach this limit we will find the analyses of Foucault, i.e. the analyses of the processes of power and knowledge which constitute and impose forms of conduct upon individuals within a disciplinary society. In other words, we followed Husserl through the constitution of a shared world, and now he must pass the ball (as it were) to

66 From “Interview with Michel Foucault,” in *The Essential Works of Michel Foucault Vol. 2*, pg. 282.
Foucault, who will then give us the other side of the constitution of our experience as disciplined subjects.

However, we must immediately note that this relationship is reversible, and its reversibility gives us, in turn, the limit in Foucault. This can be understood on two registers. First, Foucault’s project is to show us that the limits of thought in our present era are those given to us through disciplinary society. Thus, Foucault is always talking about us – we who live within a disciplinary society – and, as such, it is our bodies and our thought that is the target of disciplinary power. And, insofar as we are the target, then it is us who are the limit of Foucault’s thought, i.e. those who must take up the cultural predicates created through disciplinary normalization. Second, and this follows from the first register, if we are the targets of disciplinary normalization, then before we can have a world of intersubjective cultural meaning, we must constitute a shared and objective world. Thus, the reversibility – if we follow Husserl to the limit then we need the analyses of the constitution of the subject through power, knowledge, and conduct, and if we follow Foucault to the limit then we need the analyses of the constitution of a shared world, such that cultural meanings can accrue and be imposed upon the experience of individuals within a community.

In this chapter, I will use the community’s constitution of the young man’s homosexual desire as pathological as a guiding example to show how it is that, for Foucault, our experience of the world – our “perceptions, attitudes and behaviors” (FL: 282) – is constituted through the processes of knowledge and power and the formation and imposition of forms of conduct, i.e. ways of being. As such, we will be examining the three axes of critical ontology – the constitution of the subject as an object of
knowledge, as a subject of power relations with others, and as a subject who takes up the forms of being constituted through these processes. Ultimately, the analyses contained within this chapter will show how it is that we can understand Foucault as analyzing the other side of Husserl’s limit (and thus understand Husserl as describing the other side of Foucault’s limit), as well as give an example of a contingent limit of thought that can be elucidated through bringing together the work of Husserl and Foucault. That is, we will see how a form of conduct is constituted through the relations of knowledge and power and then imposed from outside upon a subject’s desire. The analyses of the third chapter of this text, and the example of the constitution of oneself as a pathological object, complete the picture by showing us how it was that we take up these imposed forms of conduct.

Drawing on passages from Foucault’s lecture courses *Abnormal* (1974-75) and *Psychiatric Power* (1973-74), as well as from his major work *The History of Sexuality Vol. 1* (1976), this chapter will proceed by analyzing this communal constitution along the axes of power, knowledge, and the imposition of forms of conduct. Specifically, we will first examine the axis of disciplinary power, as it is through disciplinary power that we find the constitution of a “permanent knowledge of the individual” [*savoir permanent de l’individu*] (PP: 79/78). Second, we will examine the axis of knowledge through the lens of the proliferation of discourses surrounding homosexuality during the 19th and 20th centuries, in which a “form of conduct” is constituted through the linking of a desire with madness, and thus abnormality, which is consequently imposed on the desires of individuals. Finally, we will examine the ways in which these forms of conduct, constituted through the processes of power and knowledge, are imposed upon individuals
within a community, that is, normalization. It will turn out that all three axes presuppose one another, in a manner similar to Heidegger’s notion of “being-in-the-world,” and thus the separation of the three axes from one another is only possible for explanatory means – the three axes are interwoven [verflochten or entrelacée] with each other (SP: 27/23).

§27. First Axis: Power (Disciplinary Power) 67

For Foucault, disciplinary power is the process through which individuals within a society or given community are normalized. Foucault writes that disciplinary power is:

[...] no more than a particular, as it were, terminal, capillary form of power; a final relay, a particular modality by which political power, power in general, finally reaches the level of bodies and gets a hold on them, taking actions, behaviors, habits, and words into account: the way in which power converges below to affect individual bodies themselves, to work on, modify, and direct [...] (PP: 42/40)

Disciplinary power is the way in which bodies, actions, behaviors, habits and words figure into the constitution of a “normal” individual. In our example of the young man and his community, the constitution of heterosexuality is the “normal,” while anything that deviates from it is “abnormal,” e.g. homosexual desire. Specifically, Foucault argues, disciplinary power is composed of three primary characteristics:

1. Principle of Complete Control: First, disciplinary power consists of an “exhaustive capture of an individual’s body, actions, time, and behavior” (PP: 48/46). Whereas sovereign power attempted to seize a person’s product and time spent while making this product, disciplinary power is “a seizure of the body, and not of the product; it is a

67 We will focus here on power within disciplinary societies, i.e. disciplinary power, rather than sovereign power, since the former is the form of power at issue in the constitution of pathological objects. One of the best analyses of power as such in Foucault is given by Deleuze, and my interpretation here is heavily indebted to the latter’s reading (F: 77/70-99/93).
seizure of time in its totality, and not the time of service” (PP: 48/46). For example, armies during the period of sovereignty consisted of “a group of people recruited for a finite time for the needs of the cause, and to whom food and lodging were assured through pillage and the occupation of any premises found on the” (PP: 48/46). Militaries at the time only laid hold of the soldier’s product (war) and only during the time it was produced. However, during the middle of the 17th century, Foucault argues, there is a profound change, wherein militaries began to take total control of their recruits. That is, these recruits now lived in barracks and were “engaged” not only in times of war, but in times of peace as well, thus constituting a “standing army” (PP: 48/47). By the late 18th century, this complete control of the soldier’s time had differentiated further into the complete control of the soldier’s body as well, in the sense that the soldier’s body came to be viewed as “an inapt body,” out of which “the machine required can be constructed” (SP: 137/135). Quoting an ordinance of the French military from March 20th, 1764, Foucault writes,

Recruits become accustomed to ‘holding their heads high and erect; to standing upright, without bending the back to sticking out the belly, throwing out the chest and throwing back the shoulders; and, to help them acquire the habit, they were given this position while standing against wall in such a way that the heels, the thighs, the waist and the shoulders touch it, as also do the backs of the hands, as one turns the arm outwards, without moving them away from the body… Likewise, they will be taught never to fix their eyes on the ground, but to look straight at those they pass… to remain motionless until the order is given, without moving the head, the hands or the feet.’ (SP: 137/135).

Here, we find that every movement the soldier makes must be completed in accordance with a strict set of requirements – even the direction of their gaze is under control. In this change we can see a movement from controlling the product and time invested for the creation of the product (sovereignty) to the controlling of an entire life through the
complete control of both time and bodies (discipline). Furthermore, and we will see this in much more detail momentarily, even the spatial arrangement of bodies within a room, e.g. the classroom or workshop, comes under control of disciplinary power. Thus, Foucault writes, “Every disciplinary system tends [...] to be an occupation of the individual’s time, life, and body” (PP: 49/47).

2. Principle of Omnivisibility: Second, disciplinary power consists of procedures of constant observation. Foucault writes, “In the disciplinary system, one is not available for someone’s possible use, one is perpetually under someone’s gaze, or, at any rate, in the situation of being observed” (PP: 49/47). We will look at the notion of perpetual observation momentarily, but first we must examine the reason why this perpetual observation is set into motion. For Foucault, disciplinary power is always in relation to a “final or optimum state” (PP: 49/47). The optimum state of a disciplinary system is when it does not need any particular person, i.e. a sovereign, to run it, but is instead carried out by the very subjects that are disciplined through it.68 That is, a disciplinary system is in its final state “when discipline [...] becomes habit” (PP: 49/47). Foucault gives the example of the 18th century Prussian army, in which daily exercise became a mandatory activity for enlisted soldiers, whereas prior to this, exercise in an army occurred primarily through “tests of bravery” (PP: 49/48). The requirement for daily exercise constitutes a training of the body, in which the body is made ready for war at any moment. Thus, within his daily exercise, the soldier is made to internalize the disciplinary power of the military itself, repeating it incessantly. However, the indefinite continuance of a disciplinary system is

68 Marilyn Frye discusses this notion, without reference to Foucault, in her essay “Oppression,” in which she argues that one of the primary characteristics of an oppressed group is the internalization of their oppression through self-discipline.
not only attained through exercise or training, but also through written records (PP: 50/48). Written records, Foucault argues, brings together knowledge and behavior, as a kind of “tissue” [un tissue] (PP: 50/49), through ensuring “that everything that happens, everything the individual does and says, is graded and recorded” (PP: 50/48). These records of behavior are then transmitted “up through hierarchical levels” and, finally, made accessible to all (PP: 50/48). The recorded behavior of an individual then travels through a hierarchy of individuals who are employed to study the behavior in a number of different discourses, e.g. medical, biological, psychiatric, etc. Finally, their study of the behavior is then made accessible to some central point, which either keeps the information for itself or disseminates it more widely. Foucault uses the example of a “professional school of design and tapestry,” which, in 1737, began to require written assessments of students to determine whether or not that student had the potential to become a master. These assessments required that students were divided into groups by age and given tasks according to their level. The students were then observed for their “behavior, assiduity, and zeal while performing his work” (PP: 51/49). These assessments were then transmitted through various levels until the reports finally reached the minister of the King’s Household (PP: 51/50). As such, Foucault argues, there is a proliferation of observing and recording centered on the student in the school. Furthermore, this accumulation of recorded behavior allows for disciplinary power to intervene immediately and punish those that resist normalization, since, because of this accumulation, it can “intervene without halt from the first moment, the first action, the first hint” (PP: 53/51). The need for disciplinary power to intervene from the first moment leads to a focus on potential behavior and its control. For example in the 18th
century, Foucault argues, workshops came to be organized on a principle of control over potential behavior, through both temporal and spatial means (PP: 53/51). Temporally, the worker’s day was broken into segments of work and non-working activity, with both lateness and absence from work meticulously recorded, as well as prohibitions against distracting others during their time of work (PP: 53/51). Spatially, workers in the shop must be distributed so that their action can be observed at all times with the least number of observers, i.e. through a panoptic mechanism. Ultimately, the principle of omnivisibility is the principle of the Panopticon, that mechanism through which bodies were arranged such that the maximum number could be observed with the least amount of supervision, and, ultimately, with no supervision at all (through the internalization of disciplinary power within the individual).

3. Principle of Isotopy: By isotopic, Foucault argues that disciplinary power has the characteristic of a kind of repeatability with its mechanisms (PP: 54/52). First, every disciplinary system consists of some kind of hierarchy which always consists of an above and a below, or its “subordinate” and “superordinate” elements (PP: 54/52). For example, there are the ranks within a school – the rank of each grade with each other and the ranks within an individual grade organized through performance and behavior. There are also ranks within the army, within a workplace, within academic and governmental institutions, usually divided by rank (understood primarily in terms of performance and behavior). Second, every disciplinary apparatus “must be able to connect up with each other,” and thus there must a certain repeatability of its elements (PP: 54/53). As such, Foucault writes, “school classifications are projected, with some modification, but
without too much difficulty, into the social-technical hierarchies of the adult world” (PP: 55/53). Third, and we will examine this in a latter section, every disciplinary system necessarily produces an “unclassifiable” residue, which that system then works to classify, which then produces more abnormality, and so on (PP: 55/53). These are the “margins” [marges] of a disciplinary power, which are also its “stumbling block” [le point d’achoppement] (PP: 55/53).

These three characteristics of disciplinary power, i.e. its complete seizure of an individual’s body and time, its requirement for constant observation and the proliferation of knowledge that results from it, and the isotopy of its apparatuses, all combine to show us the way in which, for Foucault, disciplinary power exercises a “subject-function” [la fonction-sujet], wherein disciplinary power is “applied and brought to bear on the body, on its actions, place, movements, strength, the moments of its life, and its discourses, all of this” (PP: 57/55). That is, the subject-function of disciplinary power is the formation of a disciplined individual, i.e. one who has internalized discipline and is thus normalized.

This analysis of disciplinary power has, for the most part, been quite abstract from the example of the young man given at the beginning of this chapter. However, we will examine the concrete power relations that give rise to the constitution of homosexual desire as abnormal (through disciplinary power) within the next section in the discussion of knowledge, as it is from power relations that knowledge is produced (PP: 79/78). In the example of psychiatry, Foucault writes,

The first effect of this relationship of power is therefore the constitution [constitution] of this permanent knowledge of the individual [savoir
permanent de l’individu] – pinned in a given space and followed by a potentially continuous gaze – which defines the temporal curve of his development, his cure, his acquisition of knowledge [savoir], or the acknowledgement of his error, and so forth. As you can see, the Panopticon is therefore an apparatus of both individualization and knowledge [connaissance]; it is an apparatus of both knowledge [connaissance] and power that individualizes one side, and which, by individualizing, knows [connaît]. (PP: 79/78)

That is, disciplinary power in general, and the act of observing in particular, gives rise to a proliferation of discourses that allows for further, more refined, observation.

§28. Second Axis: Knowledge (Discourse)⁶⁹

The second axis, or process wherein disciplined subjects are constituted, is the constitution of subjects as objects of knowledge, i.e. of the constitution of the “permanent knowledge of the individual” (PP: 79/78). This permanent knowledge of the individual, understood as the proliferation of discourses surrounding ways of being, is, as we have already seen, the “first effect of the relationship of power,” since knowledge is both required for and produced by normalization (PP: 79/78). Specifically, as regards the constitution of the young man in our example as a pathological object by his community, there is the imposition upon his desire of a form that is constituted in advance as abnormal. This pre-constituted form of abnormal behavior is produced through the discourses of (at least) psychiatry, medicine, and criminal justice (HS1: 42/30), each of which consists of its own set of peculiar power relations which bring about the

---

⁶⁹ For purposes of simplicity, I will be employing Deleuze’s distinction between discursive and non-discursive formations in order to group discourse under the general heading of knowledge. Deleuze distinguishes between discursive and non-discursive formations on the basis of the distinction between knowledge and power. For Deleuze, non-discursive formations consist of “instructions, political events, economic practices and processes,” i.e. relations, while discursive formations consist “of statements” (F: 18/9). We have examined this already in the first chapter of this text, but, insofar as a discourse is a field of statements, and statements can be such things as empirical observations or interpretations of behavior, i.e. psychiatry, then discourse and discursive practices are related to the axis of knowledge. I recognize the dangers of taking up the notion of discourse in this generic way, but a full analysis would take us too far off track.
proliferation of knowledge within each discourse. The point of connection for all of these discourses lies in both the community that enforces them and the individuals that take them up. Foucault writes,

There is no question that the appearance in nineteenth-century psychiatry, jurisprudence, and literature of a whole series of discourses on the species and subspecies of homosexuality, inversion, pederasty, and ‘psychic hermaphrodisim’ made possible a strong advance of social controls into this area of ‘perversity’: but it also made possible the formation of a ‘reverse’ discourse: homosexuality began to speak in its own behalf, to demand that its legitimacy or ‘naturality’ be acknowledged, often in the same vocabulary, using the same categories by which it was medically disqualified. (HS1: 134/101)

The constitution of discourses on homosexual desire, as a form of behavior, gives rise to further forms of discourse that proliferate through the power relations between those constituted as abnormal. This subject that takes up the form of conduct and produces a counter-discourse (from the standpoint of having this form imposed upon her) is a brief glimpse of the limit in Foucault, insofar as Husserl has shown us how it is that we can take up cultural predicates within experience, and thus have forms of conduct imposed upon us (for example, the predicate abnormal that attaches to particular contents, i.e. desires), as well as have a reaction against the predominant discourse.

In order to show how it is that knowledge constitutes its objects, we will use the example of the young man constituted by his society as a pathological object. Thus, we will examine Foucault’s analyses of the way in which the content of homosexual desire came to be constituted as an abnormal form of behavior. This will be done in two ways. First, we will briefly analyze the way in which the relations of power within the church, specifically between the priest and the penitent, slowly changed the focus of confession from sexual acts to sexual desires, and inaugurated a mode of discourse in which subjects
feel obliged to disclose everything about their sexuality, or “the way in which sex is ‘put into discourse’” (HS1: 20/11). Second, we will examine how the “formation of a meshing [engrenage] together” of psychiatry with judicial and familial discourses brought sexual behavior into the field of abnormality (A: 259/274).

a) The Confessional

For Foucault, the analysis of the transformation of the confessional within Christian religious practices is essential for understanding how sexuality came to fall within the realm of psychiatry and pathological disorders for two reasons. First, it is through the confessional that the body is put into discourse, through a transformation in the confessional from a focus on sins in the form of completed acts to a focus on sin in the form of “movements, senses, pleasures, thoughts, and desires of the penitent’s body itself” (A: 173/186). Second, Foucault argues that the body is forced to speak – forced to confess its desires and thoughts – in the mode of a confession, or an obligation to put into speech everything that one sexually desires. Rather than our current and prevalent notion that sexuality is repressed within modern disciplinary society, sexuality is instead something that has been constantly forced to “speak” – to confess it’s every desires and thoughts (A: 157/169, HS1: 48/35). This obligation to speak, a power relation first between priest and penitent and then psychiatrist and patient, is what gives rise to a proliferation of discourses surrounding the sexual desires, and the connection of sexual desire first with instinct and then with abnormality. Let us engage in a brief examination of Foucault’s analyses of the confession in order to understand its double functionality. Our primary focus will be the knowledge produced, but, as always, knowledge is produced through relations of power.
Foucault argues that a peculiar and specific transformation occurred in the 18th century within the Christian act of confession. Of course, confession is the ritual whereby a penitent confesses her sins to a priest, who then absolves the penitent of her sins through his own relation to God. We can thereby see that the confession is a specific set of power relations, primarily between the penitent and the priest, and the priest and God. We have already seen Foucault argue that the production of a permanent knowledge is the first effect of relations of power, so what permanent knowledge is constituted within the act of the confession? The purpose of confession is to tell the priest all of the sins that one has committed throughout the year, such that the priest can cleanse her of these sins in the name of God.\textsuperscript{70} Thus, what is produced in confession is the knowledge of the penitent on the part of the priest, or more specifically on the part of God, in the sense that one has to confess, and thus put their sexual acts into speech in order to be cleansed. Also, permanent bodies of knowledge are produced through the production of manuals for priests, which contained instructions on how to carry out the act of confession. These manuals contained the questions that one must ask in order to faithfully carry out the spiritual cleansing of his penitents.

The transformation that Foucault isolates, famously, is the shift within the act of confession between the confession of already temporally completed sexual acts (e.g. adultery or masturbation) to the confession of all sexual desires as such, especially as related to the body (HS1: 28/19). In the manuals of confession in the 18th century, Foucault finds a subtle change in the questions pertaining to sex that priests are suggested to ask their penitents. Previously, the questions within manuals of confession focused

\textsuperscript{70} In his lecture course Abnormal, Foucault gives a detailed description of the mechanisms through which the act of confession came to be mandatory (A: 155/167-180/194).
solely on completed temporal acts, and differed in degree based on how much detail of the actual act is required for a confession to be complete (HS1: 27/19). Thus, there was, on the one hand, manuals that asked questions in “veiled” ways (HS1: 27/18), and, on the other hand, manuals that required, for a complete confession, the:

[…], description of the respective positions of the partners, the postures assumed, gestures, places touched, caresses, the precise moment of pleasure – an entire painstaking review of the sexual act in its very unfolding. (HS: 27/19)

This focus on the act, however, begins to change in the 18th century, Foucault argues, when an increasing importance is placed on “all the insinuations of the flesh: [the] thoughts, desires, voluptuous imaginings, delectations, combined movements of the body and the soul” (HS1: 28/19). Desire came to be seen as the origin and cause of sinful acts, so a complete confession came to require that one confess all of her sexual desires. Of course, the body was seen as a kind of locus of sexual feeling, so the body was constantly implicated within the confession of all of one’s sexual desires and feelings. Insofar as the body was the locus of sexual desire, and the penitent was required to express all of her sexual desires, then the body was “put into discourse” through the act of speaking on the part of the penitent.

As such, a discourse was constituted that “had to trace the meeting line of the body and the soul [la ligne de jonction du corps et de l’âme], following all its meanderings” (HS1: 28/20), and that proceeded through the act of the penitent putting her desires into speech, since it is only when spoken that the priest can cleanse the penitent’s sin. This new discourse was the “new pastoral,” in which

[…] sex must not be named imprudently, but its aspects, its correlations, and its effects must be pursued down to their slenderest ramifications: a shadow in a daydream, an image too slowly dispelled, a badly exorcised
complicity between the body’s mechanics and the mind’s complacency: everything had to be told. (HS1: 28/19)

Thus, the power relations between the penitent and the priest led to the constitution of a permanent knowledge of sexual desires within Christianity, in the form of the act of the confession. Specifically, these relations bring about the obligation for the penitent to put all of her sexual desires into speech, such that the priest can cleanse her of her sins. As such, every time there is a new confession, more knowledge is added to the preexisting discourse.

Ultimately, we can see how it is for Foucault that the transformation of the confessional in the 18th century can be understood as

[...] a multiplication of discourses concerning sex in the field of exercise of power itself: an institutional incitement to speak about it, and to do so more and more; a determination on the part of the agencies of power to hear it spoken about, and to cause it to speak through explicit articulation and endlessly accumulated detail. (HS1: 26/18).

Here we have an institution (the Christian church) which is comprised of a series of power relations (between the penitent and the priest, and the priest and God), that creates an incitement to speak – confess your sins in the presence of the priest or risk spending eternity in the depths of Hell. We also have a determination to hear sins spoken about on the part of both the priest, who cleanses his penitents of sin through his position in relation to God, and the penitent, who wants to spend eternity in Heaven.

As such, we are now in the position to see the double functionality of the confession in the 18th century. First, it inserted sex into discourse through the requirement of the penitent to confess all of her sexual desires. Second, the confessional provided a model for the proliferation of discourse precisely in the form of the obligation of
confession. We will find this model taken up again within the psychiatric constitution of homosexual desire as an abnormal form of behavior.

b) Psychiatry and the Constitution of Sexual Abnormalities

The confessional, for Foucault, only set the stage for the categorization of abnormal forms of conduct based on various sexual desires. The concretion of sexual abnormality, and thus the constitution of homosexual desire as an abnormal form of conduct, occur primarily through the way in which psychiatry, in the 19th century, brought together “the problematic of the monster and instinct and the problematic of the masturbator and infantile sexuality” (A: 259/274). It is through the bringing together, or “the formation of a meshing [engrenage] together” as Foucault describes it in these passages, of the psychiatric discourse with both judicial and familial discourses that homosexual desire comes to be constituted as a pathology, and thus as an abnormal form of conduct, within the 19th century (A: 259/274).

The first half of the formation of this “meshing together” was between “the psychiatric and the judicial,” which centered on the 19th century problem of the motiveless criminal (A: 259/274). In his Abnormal lecture course, Foucault argues that psychiatry was brought into the judicial setting, which is an institution with its own set of specific and highly regulated power relations and surrounding discourses, for the purposes of assessing the madness or rationality of a defendant (A: 29/31).71 While this initially was for the purposes of dismissing charges if someone was mad, a “kinship” [le cousinage] between madness and criminality began to form through the principle of extenuating circumstances (A: 30/32), which is itself the legal principle that one may be

---

71 We will examine this process in much more detail in the next section.
indicted in absence of complete evidence (A: 9/9). Ultimately, the absence of complete evidence takes the form of expert psychiatric opinion, through which a connection is forged between the defendant’s behavior and his crime, and thus between psychiatric and judicial discourses (A: 15/15-24/26).\(^72\)

This bringing together of psychiatric discourse with the judicial institution gave rise to three primary effects. First, Foucault argues, “there is the definition of a field [un champ] common to criminality and madness” which consists of objects that belong to both discourses (A: 259/274). That is, by bringing together madness and criminality, psychiatry is required to generate a table of behaviors and their connections with crime, in terms of leading, causing, or motivating. As it turns out, this field is “confused, complex, and reversible,” in that “it seemed there might well be something like mad behavior behind every crime and, conversely, that there might well be the risk of crime in all madness” (A: 259/274). Second, this meshing together of madness and crime produced the need for a “medico-judicial authority” that is represented by the psychiatrist (A: 259/274), i.e. a “doctor-judge” (A: 21/22). If criminal trials require the differentiation between madness and rationality, then there must be someone who can sufficiently judge the difference, and then report this difference to the actual judge of the proceedings. Of course, this position is that of the psychiatrist, whose expert legal opinion is formed through a multiplicity of discourses (psychiatric, medical, biological, etc.). Third, Foucault writes, in the

[…] privileged concept of this field of objects covered by psychiatric power, there appeared the notion of instinct understood as an irresistible

\(^72\) This will be examined further in §29a, in which I examine Foucault’s analysis of the process through which offense is transferred from the realm of the legal to the realm of being through expert psychiatric opinion.
drive, as behavior that is either normally integrated or abnormally displaced on the axis of the voluntary and the involuntary. (A: 259/274)

That is, the connection between behavior and crime is conceptualized, within the psychiatric discourse of the 19th century, as based on instinct. Individuals have different types of instinct, which are then placed on the table of behaviors and their associated crimes as the causal link between the two. It is in these three effects that we see the way in which the meshing of psychiatric and judicial discourse produces abnormality.

The second “meshing together,” Foucault argues, is between the discourses of “psychiatry and the family” (A: 259/274). While the first meshing together was motivated through the problem of madness and crime, this second meshing is motivated “by the everyday character of the adolescent masturbator rendered fantastically monstrous, or, at least, dangerous” (A: 259/275). The problem of masturbation constituted, in the 19th century, a problem for the family in the sense that the sexual instincts of children must be carefully shaped and molded, and masturbation constituted an abnormal form of sexual behavior, in that procreation is not possible in masturbation.73 Thus, around masturbation, Foucault writes,

[…] devices of surveillance were installed; traps were laid for compelling admissions; inexhaustible and corrective discourses were imposed; parents and teachers were alerted, and left with the suspicion that all children were guilty, and with the fear of being themselves at fault if their suspicious were not sufficiently strong; they were kept in readiness in the face of this recurrent danger. (HS1: 58/42)74

In this passage we find Foucault bringing together the axes of power and knowledge in this description of the constant surveillance of child sexuality. Specifically, discourses,

73 Foucault gives an extensive analysis of the “problem” of masturbation in the 18th and 19th centuries in his Abnormal course lectures (A: 217/231-243/258).
74 In a fascinating passage from this same course, i.e. Abnormal, Foucault describes this surveillance as “the urgent folding [rabattement] of the parents’ bodies over their children’s bodies” (A: 233/248, my emphasis).
bodies of knowledge, are brought to bear on childhood sexuality for the purpose of normalizing their behavior. Furthermore, these discourses are constituted through the accumulation of interpretations of empirical observation.

This second meshing produces three effects that are parallel to those we saw in the first meshing described above. First, an “affinity” between sexuality and illness appears through the connection between masturbation and various types of bodily illnesses (A: 259/275). Foucault argues that masturbation is both a “constant” and a “random” element within the discourses that arise from the identification of sexuality with illness. Masturbation is a constant element insofar as “it is found everywhere,” i.e. as the cause of a large-scale multiplicity of different illnesses. However, it is also “random” in the sense that “masturbation may provoke any illness whatsoever” (A: 259/275). Second, this meshing “also reveals the need for recourse to a medical authority for intervention and rationalization within the family space” (A: 259/275). Similar to the way in which the way in the meshing together of psychiatric and judicial discourses produces the “doctor-judge,” this second meshing produces the need for someone who can intervene within the family, who can distinguish mental illness from rationality. This, of course, is the psychiatrist. The third effect produced by this meshing is the connection between sexuality and instinct. Let us look at this third effect more closely, as it is here that we will find the constitution of homosexual desire as pathology, and thus find the processes of knowledge wherein the young man’s homosexual desire in our example is constituted as mentally ill (as well as the processes of power).

In and through this meshing of psychiatric discourse with, on the one hand, judicial power relations and discourses, and on the other hand, familial power relations
and discourses, psychiatry underwent a dramatic extension of its scope, since both criminality and sexuality began to fall within its field of jurisdiction (through expert legal opinion and familial psychiatric intervention). This sudden expansion, Foucault argues, led to the new task within the 19th century of organizing “a unified field [un champ unitaire] of instinct and sexuality” (A: 261/276). Specifically, psychiatry was faced with the task of forming a unified field of objects of knowledge such that it could bring the discourses of criminality and sexuality under its purview. Indeed, Foucault writes,

[Psychiatry] has to show that the sexual instinct is an element in the formation of every mental illness and, even more generally, in the formation of every behavioral disorder, from major offenses that violate the most important laws to tiny irregularities that disturb the little family cell. In short, [psychiatry] must constitute [constituer] not only a discourse, but also methods of analysis, concepts, and theories such that with psychiatry, and without going outside it, it is possible to pass from infantile autoeroticism to murder, from discreet and caressing incest to the voracity of monstrous cannibals. (A: 261/276)

That is, in order to achieve its task of expansion through unification, psychiatry had to “constitute a discourse” within which it could speak of both criminality and sexuality. This constitution of discourse is accomplished through the accumulation and interpretation of empirical observations produced under various circumstances, which are themselves governed by particular methods determined through the interpretation of empirical behavior, etc.

Sexuality and instinct were brought together, Foucault argues, through the appearance within psychiatric literature of a naturalization of sexuality (A: 262/278). Specifically, Foucault isolates within Heinrich Kaan’s Psychopathia Sexualis from 1844 a general theme which consists of the idea that “human sexuality, through its

---

75 The original Latin of the relevant passages can be found on A: 288.
mechanisms and general forms, is inscribed within the natural history of sexuality that can be followed back to plants” and is itself a “dynamic manifestation of the functioning of the sexual organs” (A: 262/278). This natural sexuality is theorized by Kaan, according to Foucault, as a natural instinct, and thus desire, for the procreative heterosexual act of intercourse (A: 263/278).

However, this instinct is itself “fragile” (A: 264/279) because its end, copulation, is “only its chronologically final end” (A: 264/279). As such, sexual instinct is prone to diversion from this chronologically final end through the imagination, in which “additional, derivative, or substitute means of satisfaction” are formulated and desired. Since copulation is defined through heterosexual desire, then anything that falls outside of this norm becomes “abnormal.” Among these abnormal forms of desire, in which the natural desire for copulation is diverted through the functioning of the imagination, Foucault cites Kaan as listing masturbation, pederasty, homosexual desire, necrophilia, and bestiality.

It is the conceptualization of sexual desire as tied to a “natural instinct” for copulation that brings together psychiatry with the discourses of criminality and the family. According to Foucault, Kaan’s work ushers in a fundamental transformation in which the “the sexual instinct [is placed at] the origin of more than just somatic disorders” through the delineation of behaviors that supposedly stem from the frailty of sexual desire, i.e. the interaction between sexual instinct and the imagination (A: 265/281). As such, Foucault argues, “A series of non-delirious behavior disorders enter the psychiatric field” (A: 266/281). If psychiatry had previously held dominion over madness alone, now it had brought madness into contact with both criminality and the
family through the constitution of a unified field of discourses based on the location of
sexual desire at the level of natural instinct. Ultimately, an “etiology of mental illness” is
formulated on the “basis of the history of the sexual instinct and the imagination linked
to it” (A: 267/282). As such, for Foucault, “This is the first time that homosexuality
appears as a syndrome within the psychiatric field” (A: 293/310), insofar as homosexual
desire is listed as one of the abnormal behaviors of sexual desire conceptualized on the
basis of a heterosexual natural instinct.

We can now return to our initial example of the constitution of the young man by
his community as a pathological object. When the young man reports his sexual attraction
to other men, his experiences come into conflict with the experience, in the form of the
“perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors,” of others who have attached the cultural predicate
and ensuing form, “abnormal,” to homosexual desire. Thus, when he reports his desire
for other men, the community believes his experiences conflict with their own, and
immediately constitutes him as a pathological object. The notion that sexuality can fall
under pathology is itself culturally constituted, and accrues through the power relations
and discourses that surrounded, first, the Christian confessional, and then the connection
forged in psychiatry between sexual desire and instinct. This cultural predicate is
apperceived within the experience of the community, and is expressed through the
conflict of their experience with the young man’s (per the analyses of the third chapter).

Furthermore, we can also see here a “contingent limit of thought,” if we recall the
work done in the first chapter. The homophobic community, with which the young man’s
experience conflicts, can only think of desire through variations of heterosexual, i.e.

---

76 Etiology is the study of origination. Thus an etiology of mental illness would be a study of the various
causes of the various types of mental illness within individuals.
procreative, copulation. This limit to their thought is historically constituted through the accrual of cultural predicates surrounding psychiatry, in the form of discourse and power relations. And, because this limit is historical, it is therefore contingent. Ultimately, Foucault’s analyses of sexuality, now seen as a form of conduct that is the product of knowledge and power, show us that sexuality, as a form, is a limit to thought. This limit has been apperceived and then sedimented within the consciousness of the individuals of that community, affecting how they perceive sexuality.

Now, let us finally look at the third axis of critical ontology, i.e. ethics, or the imposition of forms of conduct upon the individual.

§29. Third Axis: Ethics (Forms of Conduct/Ways of Being)

The analyses of power and knowledge in the previous two sections have relied heavily on a term which we will now investigate more closely, viz. “forms of conduct.” While the third axis of Foucault’s critical ontology is commonly interpreted in terms of his late analyses of ethics, i.e. parrhēsia and the Ancient Greek theme of the care of the self, it can also be understood as a theme that was already present in both his early and middle period analyses. That is, while Foucault’s late period analyses of ethics centered on the modulation of a form of conduct within oneself, the implication of forms of conduct as both product and presupposition of power and knowledge was present even in his early analyses of madness. Thus, Deleuze writes, “Perhaps this third axis was present from the beginning in Foucault (just as power was present from the beginning in knowledge)” (F: 103/96). Indeed, in the first hour of the Government of Self and Others lecture course (1982-83), in describing the application of the study of the history of
madness to the three axes of critical ontology, Foucault describes the third axis in the following way:

Finally, third, this perspective involved studying madness insofar as this experience of madness defined the constitution of a certain mode of being of the normal subject, as opposed and in relation to the mad subject. (GSO: 3)

Here we can see the explicit connection between the third axis of critical ontology, i.e. the constitution of oneself as a moral agent, and the forms of conduct that are produced and presupposed by disciplinary power. That is, if one wants to be normal, then one must comport oneself in set of specific ways, and thus one must take on a specific form of conduct or way of being [manière d’être].

Understood in this way, we have been examining forms of conduct throughout this entire chapter, insofar as disciplinary society aims at imposing various forms of conduct which serve to self-discipline those who take them up. In the preceding sections of this chapter, we followed the example of a young man whose homosexual desire has come into conflict with the experience of his community. Specifically, we examined the ways in which the desire for the bodies that are the same sex as one’s own has come to be historically and culturally constituted as a pathological form of conduct through the processes of knowledge and power. Since we saw how it is that one can take up a form of conduct as a cultural apperception in the previous chapter, what remains for us to examine is the ways in which forms of conduct become disseminated within a given community. Of course, for Foucault, there are a variety of such mechanisms for the

---

77 The connection between “forms of conduct” [Foucault uses the terms se conduire and comportement, both of which are translated as “conduct” in one way or another by the translator of the Abnormal lecture course] and “ways of being” [manière d’être] is readily apparent within Foucault’s Abnormal lecture course, in which the terms are used almost interchangeably. Specifically, see (A: 15/15-24/26, 115/124) and (CT: 14, 65, 160, 162, 178, 184, 220, 221, 265, 285, 329, 338).
dissemination of forms of conduct within society, but for our purposes it is enough to focus on two: (1) the way in which offense is transferred from law to being through expert legal opinion, and (2) the way in which the sovereign-power of the family unit acts as both the “hinge” [la charnière] (PP: 82/81) and the “zero-point” [le point zéro] (PP: 83/81) for the various disciplinary apparatuses within society. It is through at least these two mechanisms that a historically and culturally constituted meaning, e.g. homosexual desire as pathology, is disseminated throughout a society. Let us now examine each in turn.

a) From Law to Being: Expert Psychiatric Opinion

One of the primary mechanisms through which forms of conduct are disseminated within a society is through the use of expert psychiatric opinion in judicial settings, in which forms of conduct are inextricably linked to crime and delinquency. For Foucault, “Expert psychiatric opinion makes it possible to transfer the point of application of punishment from the offense defined by the law to criminality evaluated from a psychologico-moral point of view” (A: 17/18). This transference of offense from law to being works towards constituting a form of conduct, through the way in which “normal” forms of conduct are imposed upon a population through the punishment of “abnormal” forms of conduct, which can only be done when an “abnormal” form of conduct is itself made punishable, rather than a specific act. That is, what comes under punishment is not an act, but an “irregularity” (A: 16/16). The punishable irregularity is then disseminated throughout society in the form of an indictment or statement: Here is an abnormal and irregular form of conduct and those that take up this form of conduct will be punished.
Judicial discourse, Foucault argues, possesses “the power to determine, directly or indirectly, a decision of justice that ultimately concerns a person’s freedom or detention, […] life and death” (A: 7/6). Justice in the courtroom, with this power to determine life or death, passes judgment on those who have committed offenses, i.e. broken laws. However, disciplinary power, unlike sovereign power, always aims for complete control of the individual’s body and time, such that its usability can be maximized. If we recall, sovereign power only sought control over a product and the individual’s time spent in producing it, while disciplinary power seeks to have control over the individual even in those times when she is not working. This complete control, as we have seen, is in the name of a future state in which the disciplinary system functions with minimal supervision through the internalization of discipline within individuals. Hand-in-hand with this future state is a focus, within disciplinary systems, on the control of potential behaviors, in the form of the imposition of forms of conduct. As such, a shift was required, in which judges could pass judgment not on the breaking of actual concrete laws, but on the basis of forms of conduct, which then allowed for the normalization of subjects through the potential penalties that could be incurred through various ways of being constituted as abnormal. That is, there is a shift in offense from law to being.

Thus, this shift happens through expert psychiatric opinion in legal proceedings,

[…] where the court and the expert encounter each other, where judicial institutions and medical knowledge, or scientific knowledge in general, intersect, [and] statements are formulated having the status of true discourses with considerable judicial effects. (A: 11/11)

Foucault argues that within modern legal discourse we find the principle of profound conviction, which requires that a judge and jury take into consideration all available evidence in their deliberations. However, some types of evidence seem to count for more
than other pieces of evidence, and this is not due to the “rational structure” \([\text{structure rationnelle}]\) of the evidence, but is instead “due to the status of the subject who presents the evidence \([\text{du sujet qui les énonce}]\)” (A: 11/10). For example, the eye witness testimony of police officers is privileged over the eye witness testimony of a mere bystander (A: 11/10). As such, due to their status, the expert opinions given by psychiatrists within the legal setting are taken up as “privileged judicial statements that include statutory presumptions of truth, presumptions that are inherent in them according to who it is that states them” (A: 11/11). It is in this presumed truth that we find legal offenses transferred from the law to being and, consequently, the constitution of the criminal delinquent, i.e. that individual whose forms of conduct and ways of being must be avoided or punished.

The constitution of the delinquent within the courtroom does not consist in the painting of a representation, which the individual on trial is then supposed to match. That is, expert psychiatric opinion does not install a “scene” within the courtroom that is supposed to represent the committed crime (A: 15/15). Rather, expert psychiatric opinion involves “the introduction of successive doubles,” wherein a “coercive synthesis” \([\text{la synthèse coercitive}]\) allows for the transfer of offense from law to being in the form of conduct (A: 15/15). The first doubling that allows for the transference of offense from law to being occurs through the doubling of the legal definition of the offense with a multitude of forms of conduct that are supposed to give the “starting point” of the offense (A: 15/15). Foucault writes,

First, expert psychiatric opinion allows the offense, as defined by law, to be doubled with a whole series of other things that are not the offense itself but a series of forms of conduct, of ways of being that are, of course,
presented in the discourse of the psychiatric expert as the cause, origin, motivation, and starting point of the offense. (A: 15/15)

Expert psychiatric opinion in the courtroom is supposed to describe the psychological background of the individual in question, such that the judge or jury can, in the absence of hard evidence, decide if the person was capable of committing such a crime. This occurs through the doubling of the actual offense with a series of terms, such as “psychological immaturity,” “display of perverted pride,” “serious emotional disturbance,” or “a profound affective imbalance” (A: 15/15). The function of this doubling of the offense with a form of conduct “is to repeat the offense tautologically in order to register it and constitute [constituer] it as an individual trait” through the establishment of a causal relationship (A: 16/16). The offense is repeated as a general motivation found within a certain form of conduct, and thus one can “pass from action to conduct” (A: 16/16). Foucault writes,

Expert psychiatric opinion allows one to pass from action to conduct, from an offense to a way of being, and to make this way of being appear as nothing other than the offense itself, but in general form, as it were, in the individual’s conduct. (A: 16/16)

For instance, an act of stealing might be paired with the defendant’s “display of perverted pride,” which is then used as the motivation for the crime. That is, the motivation for the crime is spread throughout the defendant’s entire being, in that it is his form of conduct that is to blame for the offense. This doubling has a further function as well, which “is to shift the level of reality of the offense, since these forms of conduct do not break the law” (A: 16/16). This shift in reality occurs through the constitution of a “normal” background, against which the conduct of the defendant is set (A: 16/16). This normal background consists of four main facets: (1) the “optimum level of development,” against which the
defendant is described as having “psychological immaturity,” (2) a “criterion of reality,” (3) moral qualities, and (4) ethical rules (A: 16/16). Thus, the level of reality of the offense is shifted to a form of conduct through the constitution of the individual as abnormal in relation to a set of normal traits.

Ultimately, Foucault argues, this initial doubling constitutes “the substance, the very material to be punished” (A: 15/15). Through the doubling of the offense with a form of conduct and the shift of reality from the offense to being, a criminal is constituted within the courtroom, who then himself becomes the target of the proceedings, rather than his crime. Foucault writes that “psychiatry does not really set out an explanation of the crime but rather the thing itself to be punished that the judicial system must bite on and get hold of” (A: 16/16). This constituted substance for punishment arises between the idea that the defendant “could have had some kind of responsibility” and the final verdict of guilt. Foucault writes,

A certain character has appeared who has been offered up, so to speak, to the judicial system: a man who is incapable of integrating himself in the world, who loves disorder, commits extravagant or extraordinary acts, hates morality, who denies its laws and is capable of resorting to crime. So that, when all is said and done, the person who will be convicted is not the actual accomplice in the murder in question, but this character who cannot integrate himself, loves disorder, and commits acts that go as far as crime. (A: 17/17).

Thus, this first doubling, which consists of both the doubling of the offense with a form of conduct and the shifting of reality from law to being, provides the initial constitution of the criminal within courtroom – someone whose very being is on trial, rather than the act that got them there. Again, Foucault writes,

What the judge will judge and punish, the point on which he will bring to bear the punishment, is precisely these irregular forms of conduct that were put forward as the crime’s cause and point of origin, and the site at
which it took shape, and which were only its psychological and moral double. (A: 17/17)

However, the transfer of offense from law to being is not yet complete. While the initial doubling paired the offense with a form of conduct that stands as its causal origin, the defendant must still be doubled with the form of delinquency. This occurs, Foucault argues, through expert psychiatric opinion, in which “the aim is to show how the individual already resembles his crime before he has committed it” (A: 19/19). This is done through coupling the defendant with a “series” of “misdeeds that do not break the law” (A: 19/19). That is, expert psychiatric opinion ties the crime for which the defendant is on trial with a series of misdeeds that are not themselves illegal. In effect, this creates a doubling between the defendant and the form of delinquency, in which crime is all but inevitable. Ultimately, this is tied, Foucault argues, to desire (A: 19/20). This doubling associates the defendant with a desire that is supposed to lie at the heart of delinquency, which, again, makes his future crime inevitable. 78

Though Foucault does not discuss this, the transfer of offense from law to being has a ripple effect throughout society. The tying of illegality to ways of being is a process of normalization, in that the delinquent form of conduct becomes “abnormal” and tied to the committing of crimes. If others in a given community want to avoid spending time in jail, then they need to avoid that form of conduct and to behave only in the ways that their society believes is normal. Furthermore, this ripple effect can also be seen in “early release” from prison for “good behavior.”

78 A specific contemporary example of this can be found in the murder trial of teenager Trayvon Martin, who was killed by George Zimmerman, allegedly in “self-defense.” One of Zimmerman’s attorney’s primary tactics has been to try and show that Martin was familiar with guns, had engaged in fights, and smoked marijuana, thus arguing that Martin was a delinquent and had the potential to hurt Zimmerman, though he, in fact, did not. In any case, here we can see the attorney’s pinning Zimmerman’s innocence to the supposed abnormality of Martin’s way of being.
b) The Zero-Point of Discipline: The Family

Besides expert psychiatric opinion, one of the other primary mechanisms for the dissemination of forms of conduct occurs within the family unit, which, Foucault argues, is “the hinge, the interlocking point [le point d’enclenchement], [that] is absolutely indispensable to the very functioning of all the disciplinary systems” (PP: 82/81). The family unit has a double functionality which serves as “a kind of pinning of individuals” [d’épinglage des individus] to discipline and to provide the “zero-point” for the junction between disciplinary systems (PP: 83/81). In other words, if a disciplinary society wants to control potential behavior, then it is best served by normalizing children, since adults are much harder to normalize. Thus, there is an intensification of the family unit with regards to its role in fixing 79 children to disciplinary apparatuses (PP: 83/81).

However, in order to understand how the family unit is able to play this role in the dissemination of forms of conduct, we ought first to examine how it is that the family is able to do this. For Foucault, the family unit is not itself to be understood as exercising disciplinary power, but rather sovereign power. Foucault writes, “[…] the family is a sort of cell within which the power exercised is not, as one usually says, disciplinary, but rather of the same type as the power of sovereignty” (PP: 81/79). While this may seem paradoxical, Foucault’s point is actually quite important. That is, it is the sovereign top-down power from parent to child that “pins” the child to discourse. This is because, Foucault argues, the father is “the most intense pole of individualization” (PP: 81/80). The father, “the bearer of the name,” issues commands from his position as sovereign, which the rest of the family are obligated to take up. The father is able to do this, and

---

79 Foucault uses the word fixer (PP: 83/81).
have his orders followed, because the dependencies formed through marriage and birth “gives the family its solidity” (PP: 82/80). Furthermore, Foucault argues that the family unit is an “entanglement [enchevêtrememt] of what could be called heterotopic relationships: an entanglement of local, contractual bonds, bonds of property, and of personal and collective commitments” (PP: 82/80). If we recall, one of the principle functions of disciplinary systems is isotopy, i.e. the repetition of disciplinary elements within different disciplinary apparatuses. The family, however, is the locus point between a multiplicity of different relationships, which are not themselves isotopic. It is the sovereign nature of the family unit that will allow for the disciplining of children. We will examine this again briefly in a moment.

The first function of the family unit is to “permanently fix [fixer] individuals to their disciplinary apparatuses, which will inject [injecter] them, so to speak, into the disciplinary apparatuses” (PP: 82/81). The sovereign power of the parents creates the set of obligations to which the child must adhere. Foucault writes,

It is because there is the family, it is because you have this system of sovereignty operating in society in the form of the family, that the obligation to attend school works and children, individuals, these somatic singularities, are fixed and finally individualized within the school system. (PP: 82/81)

These obligations are, of course, to go to school and to get a job when the child is at the right age. This obligation “fixes” the child to a disciplinary apparatus, specifically school, which then injects them into the disciplinary system as such (PP: 82/81). For instance, children are seated in aisles and rows for their optimal supervision by the teacher, who, through observation and grading, attempts to both train the child and to intervene at the
“first hint” of abnormality. It is the parents’ obligation to normalize their children through fixing them to disciplinary apparatuses in the form of familial obligation.

The second function of the family unit is to provide a “zero-point” for the meeting of disciplinary apparatuses. Foucault writes that the family is “the switch point [l’échangeur], the junction [le point de junction] ensuring passage from one disciplinary system to another, from one apparatus to another” (PP: 83/81). The family is not the origin of disciplinary systems, but rather the point where all of the disciplinary systems meet. This can be seen, Foucault argues, through the way in which children are sent directly to their family if they cannot be normalized within a specific disciplinary apparatus. For example, a child at boarding school who refuses to be disciplined will be sent back to her parents, who will then insert the child into a different disciplinary apparatus in the hopes of eventual normalization. Thus there is a circulation of the child between disciplinary apparatuses. Foucault writes,

When a number of disciplinary systems successively reject him as inassimilable, incapable of being disciplined, or uneducable, [the child] is sent back to the family, and the family’s role at this point is to reject him in turn as incapable of being fixed to any disciplinary system, and to get rid of him either by consigning him to pathology, or by abandoning him to delinquency. (PP: 83/82)

That is, when the child is rejected by every disciplinary apparatus as abnormal, the family is required either to cut ties with him (in the case of delinquency) or send him to a mental institution or rehabilitation clinic of some kind or another.

In any case, the importance of the family in the dissemination of forms of conduct should be clear. It is the family that forces the child into disciplinary apparatuses, and who must reject the child if the child cannot be normalized. Thus, the primary burden of normalization falls on the parents, with the child as the target of various discourses of
knowledge, relations of power, and of the imposition of forms of conduct that will lead to further discipline (or success as a disciplined, docile, and normalized subject).

We have now examined two of the primary mechanisms for the dissemination of forms of conduct within a disciplinary society. First, there is the transfer of offense from law to being through the use of expert psychiatric opinion in the courtroom. As we have seen, expert psychiatric opinion is introduced into the courtroom in order to provide “evidence” for a defendant’s guilt or innocence in a crime through the connection between crime and types of behavior that prefigure the crime itself, and are thus given as motivations for the crime. However, what actually happens through this use of “evidence” is the constitution of a “substance” to be punished. Second, the family unit acts as both the “hinge” and “zero-point” for disciplinary apparatuses through the sovereign power exercised by the parents upon their children. That is, the family plays the role of fixing children to disciplinary apparatuses, e.g. school or jobs, and, when these apparatuses fail, of either passing the child off to other disciplinary apparatuses for the purpose of further normalization or the outright rejection of the child as such.

Let us return to our example of the young man whose homosexual desire comes into conflict with the historically and culturally constituted experience of a community that holds homosexual desire to be pathological. This culturally and historically constituted form of conduct is disseminated throughout society through the threat of punishment and through the family’s role in fixing children to disciplinary apparatuses. Foucault shows the way in which homosexual desire is intertwined with criminality by beginning his Abnormal lecture course with a reading of two expert psychiatric opinions from then recent court cases in France, in which homosexuality is constantly brought up
within the psychiatrists’ descriptions of the defendants, and either implicitly or explicitly connected to the crimes themselves. For instance, in the 1973 trial in France of three individuals accused of blackmail and robbery (who Foucault labels as X, Y, and Z), the homosexuality of all three individuals is repeatedly raised within the context of the crime. As to X, the report states that,

Morally, he has been homosexual since he was twelve or thirteen years old, and to be with his vice could only have been a compensation for the teasing he suffered, when, as a child raised by the social services, he lived in the Manche. Perhaps his effeminate appearance aggravated this tendency toward homosexuality, but it was the lure of money that led him to blackmail. X is completely immoral, cynical, and even a chatterbox. Three thousand years ago he would certainly have been an inhabitant of Sodom, and the heavenly flames would have justly punished him for his vice. (A: 6/5)\(^80\)

This same report describes “the most characteristic feature” of Y as

[...] an idleness whose importance can hardly be described. It is evidently less tiring to change records and find clients in a nightclub than it is to really work. Furthermore, he himself recognizes that he became homosexual from material necessity, from the attraction of money, and that having acquired a taste for money he persists in it. (A: 6/5)

In both cases, the defendants’ homosexuality was brought into the context of the opinion. In the case of X, his homosexuality is directly connected to vice. In the second, the case of Y, homosexuality is brought up only as a kind of addition to the opinion. However, once again, homosexuality is raised only to connect it with vice, i.e. excessive idleness and attraction to money. Here, again, we find the limit in Foucault – those individuals whose desires are directly connected to vice through expert psychiatric opinion, and those individuals who then take up “normal” forms of conduct for fear of punishment. The family, through its role in fixing children to disciplinary apparatuses, must constantly

observe their children for abnormal forms of conduct which will hurt the child’s insertion into whichever disciplinary apparatuses are in question. In both cases, one of the primary functions of these mechanisms is to disseminate forms of conduct within a given society.

§30. Conclusion

In this chapter, using the example of the young man’s desire, we have analyzed the historical and cultural constitution of homosexual desire as a pathological way of being, or, in other words, as an abnormal form of conduct. Specifically, we analyzed Foucault’s arguments with regard to disciplinary power, the insertion of sex into abnormality through discourse, and the dissemination of forms of conduct through the mechanisms of expert psychiatric opinion and the family. In each case, the analyses were brought back to the example of a young man whose experience of a homosexual desire comes into conflict with the experience of a community that has culturally constituted this desire as pathological.

It is in this example that we can find the limit in Foucault. Specifically, the limit in Foucault appears the moment when we cross from the historical and cultural constitution of cultural predicates to the subject that apperceives these cultural predicates within her own experience as those of her “functional community” (Hua I: 150/122). That is, Foucault gives us the contingent, cultural, and historical constitution of specific ideas, e.g. madness or sexuality, and when we must then figure out how it is that we take up these ideas “within our perceptions, attitude and behavior” (FL: 282), we cross into the work of Husserl. Likewise, Husserl describes for us how it is that we both (1) intersubjectively constitute a shared and objective world, which is the basis for the constitution of a cultural world, and (2) are able to apperceive, within experience,
meanings that are not themselves given. However, when we need to understand how it is that these cultural meanings have been formed, as well as their contingent limits on present thought, then we must pass into the work of Foucault.

The middle ground between the two philosophers is our cultural experience of the present. This middle can be seen as a knot, as it consists of, on the one hand, the intertwining of apperceived meanings with perceived bodies, and, on the other hand, the intertwining of the processes of knowledge and power on bodies and the forms of conduct constituted therein. This intertwining within embodied experience can then be followed in two directions: along the way in which apperceived meanings are constituted within experience and along the line of the constitution of that meaning culturally through knowledge and power.

Thus, the relationship between Husserl and Foucault is reversible – you can pass from the thought of one to the other through our cultural experience of the present. And, in this reversibility, we find each philosopher’s limit in the other. Husserl’s limit is the way in which cultural meanings are constituted separately from the processes of constituting consciousness and Foucault’s limit is the way in which these cultural meanings are taken up and lived by individuals upon which they are imposed. Furthermore, we can see the necessity of both sides of the limit. That is, if we want to understand our experience of the world, we must understand that various ways of being are not natural or necessary to human beings, but are in fact culturally constituted through processes that function separately from the constitutive activities of human consciousness. However, we must also understand the ways in which these meanings are taken up and experienced within the very real lives of individuals.
Husserl and Foucault, each the companion of the other, “always remains hidden but always makes it patently obvious that he is there; a double that keeps his distance, an accosting resemblance” (PD: 562/163). As such, our experience of the present is haunted by these companions as well, and its analysis requires that we follow each philosopher through his respective analyses.
Conclusion

My problem is to construct myself, and to invite others to share an experience of what we are, not only our past but also our present, an experience of our modernity in such a way that we might come out of it transformed.

-Michel Foucault

§31. The Critical Project: Two Lines of Inquiry

Through the dialogue between Husserl and Foucault in this text, I propose that a differentiation can be made within Foucault’s general idea of a “critical project.” Specifically, I argue that the general critical project that he proposes, i.e. of isolating the contingent limits of thought such that we can think new forms of being, can be differentiated into two lines of inquiry: (1) critical ontology, and (2) critical phenomenology. Critical ontology, in our age of disciplinary society, is the line of inquiry pursued by Foucault, in which we examine the ways in which specific processes of knowledge and power constitute forms of conduct that act as limits on thought. Since these limits of thought are historically constituted, then, through critical ontology, we are led to discover that they are contingent, and other ways of being are possible. Critical phenomenology is the description of the ways in which contingent limits of thought are experienced and intersubjectively constituted through those actual concrete bodies that are the targets of disciplinary power. Through the phenomenological description of the ways in which these limits (1) function in consciousness as such (through apperception and on the basis of a passively given shared, objective, and cultural world and (2) are expressed and taken up in concrete circumstances, we are then able to find ways in which these limits might be removed. To use a more concrete analogy, one might say that the

81 From “An Interview with Michel Foucault,” in The Essential Works of Michel Foucault Vol. 3, pg. 242.
knowledge of how the machinery works is essential to locating and removing obstructions within it. Thus, by bringing the work of two supposedly diametrically opposed philosophers into dialogue, we have now filled out Foucault’s general project. Let us look at this more closely, as well as some of the further effects from this dialogue.

a) The Intertwining of Experience

In a number of places in this text, in the analyses of both Husserl and Foucault, we have encountered the term “intertwining” or “interweaving.” So much so, in fact, that it is fair to say that our experience of the present, i.e. the experience of ourselves, each other, and the world, consists of a knot of different levels and kinds of constitution intertwined with one another. On Husserl’s side, there is the structural intertwining within internal time consciousness, in which retention, impression, and protention are interwoven with each other at the structural level. Then, there is the general intertwining of apperception with presentation within perception as such, which can then be differentiated further into (1) the intertwining of our body and our stream of appearances in the sphere of immanence, (2) the intertwining of the alter-ego and the body of the other, (3) and the intertwining of cultural predicates, at the passive level, within our experience of ourselves, each other, and the world. On Foucault’s side, while Deleuze often uses the idea of intertwining [entrelacement] to describe Foucault’s various concepts (F: 61/54, 119/112, 129/121), Foucault uses the image as well in a number of passages. First, knowledge and power are interwoven with one another in the formation of ways of being (SP: 27/23). Second, we saw that psychiatric discourse constituted homosexual desire as abnormal through the “meshing together” of psychiatry with judicial and family discourses.
If Foucault is describing for us the systems of thought that have become embedded within our “perceptions, attitudes and behavior,” then he must mean that these systems have become intertwined within experience. That is, to use the work done in the previous chapters on Husserl, the forms of conduct that are produced through the processes of power and knowledge are taken up by subjects and apperceived within experience as such. Thus, the intertwining of knowledge and power is itself intertwined with our experience of the present, which itself consists of a multiplicity of intertwining. As such, we can say that our experience of the present is itself a knot of intertwined constitutive activities: (1) those activities that allow for the apperception within experience of meanings that are not themselves directly present and that passively constituted a shared, objective, and cultural world, and (2) the activities of knowledge and power, through which forms of conduct are produced and disseminated within a community. If, under the critical project, our task is to isolate contingent limits of thought such that we can think new forms and ways of being, then we must follow out the lines of constitution on both the sides of Husserl and Foucault – the intertwining within experience of internal time consciousness, passive synthesis, and the processes of power and knowledge. Not only are forms of conduct produced through processes that are external to the subject, but they are also taken up by the bodies they are targeting, which then experience and express these historically formed limits in a number of different ways.

Let us return to our example of the young man who has been constituted by his community as a pathological object, due to his homosexual desire. After reporting this desire to his community, the community imposes upon him an abnormal form of conduct,
which the young man then apperceives as intertwined within his general experience of himself, others, and the world, in specific and concrete ways, primarily in the form of a conflict. That is, the young man will still experience his desires as normal, but intertwined with this normality there will be a conflicting sense of abnormality which he is forced to take up in light of the community that he lives within. The young man’s experience of his desire will be an experience of the conflict between the normality that he feels, as regards to this own desires, and the abnormality that others tell him he should be feeling. If the young man takes up the imposition of abnormal upon his desires, then this conflict will result in the perception of his desire as shameful, or something that he wishes that he could rid himself of. Perhaps he will even go so far as to undergo “behavior modification” in an attempt to rid himself of these desires. If the young man resists the imposition of abnormality on his desires, then, in light of this conflict, he will experience his desires as not only normal, but perhaps revolutionary, something to take pride in. In this case, his experience of his desire is still directly in dialogue with the imposition of abnormality from outside by the community – he has created a counter-discourse in the face of those discourses that seek to determine his behavior as pathological. Similarly, the community that imposes this form of conduct on the young man will apperceive “abnormality” as intertwined with their experience of the young man as well. This predicate attaches to everything the young man does, and thus abnormality is intertwined with the community’s experience of the young man. Perhaps they will go so far as to suggest, if not force, some kind of “behavior modification” on him. Furthermore, this constitution of the young man as pathological is intertwined within the consciousness of each of the individuals within the community, in terms of themselves,
their own bodies, their relationships with each other, and the world, in the form of the apperception of normality and abnormality as a horizon around behavior as such. In either case, this intertwining of cultural apperception is itself constituted on the basis of an intersubjective constitution of a shared and objective world, which is the result of the intertwining between the presentation of a lived body and the appresentation of an alter ego in the process of empathy. The intertwining of all of these lines of constitution are expressed in our experience of the present, through apperception and the passive synthesis of a cultural world.

b) Critical Phenomenology and Critical Ontology

In the brief analysis of the intertwining of experience in the previous sub-section, in terms of both the young man whose homosexual desire has been constituted as an abnormal form of conduct and the community that has constituted and imposed this form of conduct upon him, we are already able to see the two lines of inquiry that can be followed out in the form of a critical phenomenology and a critical ontology. Let us use this example to delineate the two lines of inquiry generated by the problem of the contemporary constitution of homosexuality as an abnormal form of conduct:

Critical Ontology: A critical ontology of homosexuality as an abnormal form of conduct seeks to analyze the processes through which this form of conduct was historically constituted and imposed upon individuals within a given society. This occurs through the reversal of the phenomenological method, in which we suspend the culturally presumed naturalness of procreative heterosexuality as a normal form of sexual desire as well as the constitutive activities of the subject. This suspension then allows us to open up a field of
analysis in which we find that the constitution of homosexuality as abnormal is in fact not a necessary feature of humanity as such, but an historical constitution which occurred through the intertwining of various processes of knowledge and power. And, since this constitution is historical, then the form of conduct that it imposes, and the subsequent limits of thought that it imposes, is found to be contingent, and thus one that can be moved beyond. In essence, this is the line of inquiry pursued in the fourth chapter.

Critical Phenomenology: A critical phenomenology examines the ways in which the constitution of homosexuality as an abnormal form of conduct has become embedded within our “perceptions, attitudes and behavior.” That is, it seeks to isolate the myriad ways in which the cultural constitution of homosexuality as abnormal permeates both the young man’s experience and the experience of the individuals within the community that has forced this way of being upon him, and limits our experience of other possible ways of being through affecting how we perceive sexuality. This isolation within experience is undertaken in order to show us where these historically contingent limits lie within our experience of ourselves, each other, and the world, and, on the basis of the functioning of consciousness, how it is that we might develop strategies to remove them.

c) The Transcendental and the Historical

As we saw in the first chapter of this text, one of Foucault’s primary criticisms of phenomenology, and thus the transcendental subject, is that the notion of constituting consciousness carries with it a kind of “transcendental destiny” [destination
transcendentale] (AS: 148/112) in the form of an implied teleology (AS: 54/39).⁸² This implied teleology in the transcendental subject, Foucault argues, must be dismissed and the historical must be given primacy, otherwise discontinuity in history, and in change as such, would be impossible. That is, for Foucault, the relationship between the transcendental is one of “either/or” – either there is a transcendental subject and there is no such thing as the constitution of the subject through knowledge and power, or the subject is constituted through knowledge and power, and thus there is no such thing as the transcendental subject.

However, in light of the dialogue between Husserl and Foucault that we have now examined, and thus the relationship between ontology and phenomenology within the critical project, this relationship changes – specifically, it becomes a relationship of mutual reciprocity, rather than dichotomy, hierarchy, or primacy. In the third and fourth chapters of this text, I showed the way in which we can understand Husserl and Foucault as each working one respective side of common limit. In the third chapter, we followed Husserl through this description of the constitution of a cultural world, which is always passively present within experience. At this point, we passed into the work of Foucault, and, in the fourth chapter, examined the way in which disciplinary society constitutes contingent limits of thought through processes of normalization, in the form of normal and abnormal forms of conduct. In this sense, the transcendental and the historical need each other. On the one hand, if we have a passively present cultural world before us in all waking experience, then the content of this cultural world must be constituted in one way or another. On the other hand, if cultural meaning, and thus how we understand

⁸² This argument is partially worked out in Part Two, Chapter Five of the Archaeology of Knowledge, “The Historical a priori and the Archive” (AS: 166/126-173/131).
ourselves, is constituted through the normalizing processes of power and knowledge, then
these processes need a substance – a body to work on, shape, sculpt, or mold. In any case,
the transcendental and the historical are not, under this interpretation, mutually exclusive,
but instead reciprocal.

Furthermore, insofar as Foucault is critical of phenomenology for the implied
transcendental destiny or teleology within the transcendental subject, the work done in
the second chapter of this text allows us to see a different transcendental subject – a
subject that does not impose any destiny or teleology on how it understands itself or the
world. As such, this subject is able to act as the target of disciplinary apparatuses and
have her experience constituted through the imposition of forms of conduct upon her own
way of being.

d) The Indefinite Work of Freedom

Finally, I would like to end by briefly examining how this revision of Husserlian
phenomenology, through a dialogue with Foucault, can be of service to Foucault’s larger
project of thinking and being otherwise than we are now. In an interview from 1971,
Foucault tells us the following:

It has seemed to me that the work of an intellectual, what I call a ‘specific
intellectual,’ is to try to isolate, in their power of constraint but also in the
contingency of their historical formation, the systems of thought that have
now become familiar to us, that appear evident to us, and that have
become part of our perceptions, attitudes and behavior. (FL: 282)

Here, we find the same general critical project repeated in an earlier form. Of course, we
can see that Foucault sees his role as the “specific intellectual” who attempts to isolate
specific present forms of constraint on being. I suggest that the revision of Husserlian
phenomenology found within this dialogue with Foucault offers a tool for the specific
intellectual in the form of critical phenomenology. That is, under this interpretation, the job of the specific intellectual is two-fold, or, at least, the problem of the isolation of the contingent limits of thought must occur on two reciprocal registers. There must, on the one hand, be the analyses of how it is that cultural meanings embed themselves within our “perceptions, attitudes and behavior” through the functioning of consciousness as such. However, on the other hand, there must also be the analyses of the historical formation and dissemination of cultural meaning, and thus the analyses of knowledge and power. In other words, in order to follow out the lines that form the knot of our present experience, one must take on the analyses at the level of one of these two registers.

Ultimately, this revision of Husserlian phenomenology as critical phenomenology allows us to contribute to Foucault’s general project of isolating and passing over historically constituted contingent limits of thought by showing us two things. First, it shows us how forms of conduct can act as limits to thought (i.e. through apperception and the passive constitution of a cultural world). Thus, if we know how these limits form within consciousness, then perhaps this can act as the first step in the formation of strategies to undo these limits. Second, it brings us back to the subject from its postmodern rejection, in the form of a project of indefinite freedom. That is, it is we who are in question and our ways of being that we want to transform.
Bibliography


