Sprache als Be-wügen: The Unfolding of Language and Being in Heidegger's Later Work, 1949-1976

Douglas F. Peduti

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SPRACHE ALS BE-WÊGEN:
THE UNFOLDING OF LANGUAGE AND BEING
IN HEIDEGGER’S LATER WORK, 1949-1976

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Graduate School of Liberal Arts

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In partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

By
Douglas Francis Peduti, S.J.

December 2009
SPRACHE ALS BE-WÖGEN:
THE UNFOLDING OF LANGUAGE AND BEING
IN HEIDEGGER’S LATER WORK, 1949-1976

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ABSTRACT

SPRACHE ALS BE-WÄGEN:
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By
Douglas F. Peduti, S.J.

December 2009

Dissertation Supervised by James Swindal, Ph.D.

Much neglected is Heidegger’s latter work in favor of the fundamental ontology of Being and Time. Consequentially, conceptions of Heidegger’s question of Being are oftentimes misconceived. Currently three main models have been proposed: (1) existential phenomenology, exemplified by Joseph Langan in the 1950s; (2) the popular thought of Being model in the 1960s as developed by William Richardson; (3) and in counter distinction to these unified models Joseph Kockelmans offers in the 1970s the many ways model, touting the end of systems. These misconstruals have spawned much Heideggerian dialogue, and in recent years, has had its effect upon Western continental scholarship from structuralism to post-structuralism.

Rather than usual conceptual models, this dissertation proposes a new model of Heideggerian scholarship seen through the lens of “Being as Saying.” Neither mystical
nor incomprehensible Heidegger’s unique linguistic turn negotiates the inadequacies of modern conceptions of the subject, object and cognition. Through a careful reading of Heidegger’s work from 1949-1976, I trace Heidegger’s utter reliance upon language as the way-making of Being, “Sprache als Be-wëgen.” More originary than ordinary language, Heidegger’s Being as Saying arises from Nietzsche’s insights on nihilism. For Heidegger Being is no-thing, and as such reveals itself as unconcealment. We hear it as a deep, unsettling silence. From Being’s two-fold character of concealing and revealing and humanity’s subsequent discomfit, we derive all forms of communication, including thought and logic, even our world as a response to, and/or evasion from this pervasive silence.

Most notably Heidegger unseats the preeminent stature of thought and subject, only to reincorporate them within language. To achieve this he develops notions of Ereignis and Geviert, at once simple and complex, by which Being manifests itself, no longer through Dasein as prime discloser, but through a crossing of four regions. What emerges is a dynamic gathering-as-separated dialogue, a far richer, relational understanding of the world and the person. Heidegger’s new way can best be described as a “phenomenology of the inapparent,” wherein Being and humanity are in a relational dialogue of unconcealing and revealing. With this insight we can reengage the Western philosophical tradition meditatively.
DEDICATION

For Elizabeth,

my mother,

words simply fail to express my gratitude to her.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Not unlike other projects, this thesis had many phases, able hands, and sharp eyes. From the outset it seemed that even its conception was never without assistance. From Tom Sheehan’s plea for a new Heideggerian paradigm to Wilhelm Wurzer’s open-ended questioning, the project emerged over time. Yet its inchoate inception never would have moved forward without the constant encouragement of my director, Jim Swindal. While not a Heideggerian himself, he drew my prose beyond my own comfortable circle of interpretation. Richard Rojcewicz, a seasoned translator of numerous texts of Heidegger, continually tied my own thought closer to Heidegger’s text. Andrew Cutrofello, on the other hand, offered weekly advice on various interlocutors of Heidegger and their concerns. From their guidance I was able to bridge Heidegger’s later work with current Western traditions. Finally, I must thank my brother Jesuits not only for their playful support, but also for the reflective opportunity away from active ministry with financial assistance, permitting this project to reach its conclusion. To these and many friends and family who prefer to remain unmentioned, indeed I owe a debt of gratitude.
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INTRODUCTION

— … the pathway …

“The pathway gathers in whatever has its Being around it; to all who pass this way it gives what is theirs.”¹ Martin Heidegger wrote this line in 1949, a step along the way in a small essay entitled, “Feldweg,” now published in the volume entitled, Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens. In it Heidegger envisions a new way in the experience of thinking toward the question of Being. As Heidegger grapples with this problematic issue from the earliest moments of his career,² language emerges as a continual theme throughout his life.

And so from his earliest days to his death, Heidegger always returned to language as central to his question of Being. Any experience of thinking, even the experience of thinking of Being involves language. Language is both part of the way toward Being and that which grants the way, both tool and its context of granting the possibility of using language. As “part” and “that which grants,” Heidegger’s mature understanding of Being

² The title of his 1916 habilitation thesis, based on a work of Thomas of Erfort, a member of the school of Duns Scotus, was entitled, “Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus” treats this very issue of language, its meaning and sense.
and language has long been grist for philosophical mills. How can language be both that which grants the tool and the tool itself? Heidegger revisited this quandary time and time again. To this question and to Heidegger’s response, we turn our attention.

It seemed contradictory at least, and to some it sounded even worse, it sounded mystical: a veritable death knell for any philosopher. How could Heidegger navigate between a false ultra-rationality and irrationality? Language somehow seemed to be the thread that was common to both. How could Heidegger devise a new understanding of the self, without incurring all the constrictions the dichotomy between subject and object of Cartesianism? Language helped. How could Heidegger rework the understanding of the world and our relationship to it? Language was his guide. How could Heidegger understand Being behind beings without falling into the pitfalls of metaphysics? Language emerged as the answer.

Exactly what that answer was depended on the specific approach in his attempt to discover/recover/relate to Being. Through his journey of life Heidegger changed his approach of language vis-à-vis the question of Being, but, all the same, remained steadfast in that which was most his own philosophical stamp, the “Turning,”³ [Kehre] toward the Being’s history [Seinsgeschichte].⁴ And so one might say that Heidegger’s

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³ Among Heideggerian scholars this term’s translation and meaning is still hotly contested. We shall soon define it.
⁴ This term is also debated. On the one hand, it is translated as “Being’s history” or the “history of Being.” Both phrases place the objective genitive, Being, in priority with history or its saying as an attribute modifying it. The other translation, “historical Being” places the emphasis on the modification of Being. Both seems to evade the complex and nuanced meaning which Heidegger tries to capture, that Being is not an entity.

What is at stake has been the theological issue of whether Heidegger intends a univocal Being that precludes a Christian concept of Being as God, “onto-theo-logos” or whether Heidegger intends Being which appears to us through history, both with tainted accretions and the ability to uncover it, neither in the sense of the Being as the Christian concept nor in its denial as is the case with atheism. On the other side of the debate, questions arise whether this term can refer to one of the three Persons of God in Christian theology. These discussions are far too broad for our purposes here. We will allow such worthy discussions for the theologians to draw out implications.
own pathway has given to him what was his, a way. A way best described as Being:Saying.

This current work sets its task toward understanding language as the unfolding of Being as offered by Heidegger’s thinking. Most, who consider the problem of the relationship between Being and language, understand it as a tangential issue, but not so for Heidegger. Heidegger came to appreciate a deep, indeed, originary relationship. This quest for this originary relationship spanned the entirety of his life; our task of understanding Heidegger’s relationship between Being and language will need careful attention to all of Heidegger’s movements, a way not easily traversed.

To appreciate the immensity of this task, we apportion our approach to this problematic into three major parts. Part I is entitled, “ΦΑΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ;” the use of the Greek phrase is a purposeful attempt to avoid the various, recent meanings of “phenomenology” at this point in our discussion until we have a chance to clarifies its nuanced meaning. The Greek means “to show itself” or “to be in the light.” For Heidegger “φαίνεσθαί” is the deepest type of knowing and this section approaches Heidegger’s work as it shows itself, with as little interpretive overlays as possible. While some interpretation is always present, our goal in this section is to allow Heidegger’s words to speak to us, to allow his way to show itself to us.

Part I is indeed the largest section of our work; it contains chapters 1-6. It traces Heidegger’s discussions of language, briefly in the early works, then in detailed fashion in works from 1949 onward. Chapter 1, “Early Approaches I,” will discuss Heidegger’s

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Heidegger discusses Being as that does or does not appear and why its appearance or lack thereof is so. The issue for us is that Heidegger continually returns to this topic and each time holds for a closer relationship between Being and its history and how language is the center of that discussion. This is our topic. For this reason I opt for “historical Being,” for it seems to draw out ably this closer relationship.
first approach, which was one of fundamental ontology. It includes his *magnum opus*, *Being and Time*, published in 1927, the year Heidegger’s mother dies, as well as other works in the 1920s and 30s. It mined ordinary experience so as to discover Being; Being was its focus. Its primary focus entertains the question on language certainly; but the relationship of language as discourse to thinking and to Being as such draws out important formal indicators that language is deep within the ontological care structure of Dasein and still immersed deeply within the experiential, everyday ontical existence of Dasein. Ultimately this poses a problem, which Heidegger soon realizes, that the analysis of the meaning of Being cannot be achieved fully within the analytic of Dasein.

In an effort to resolve this difficulty, Chapter two, “Early approaches: II” focuses on much of his work in the 1940s with the early Greek philosophers, Nietzsche and culminated in Heidegger’ *Contributions*. This second approach, we argue, was one of destructive retrieval to uncover Being. Within this period Heidegger massaged and transformed language in order to uncover originary thought and language, asymptotically nearing, but never reaching, Being. Its emphasis was the thought of Being.

Heidegger’s two earlier approaches on language, both interesting and fulsome in their own account, but ultimately incapable of leading Heidegger toward that which he ultimately sought, that is Being. While the first approach emphasized Being and the latter the thought of Being, both still have difficulty relating language and Being. Still both are helpful for they have *Seinsgeschichte* as their primary inquiry with language at its heart.

Once these two approaches are outlined, a third approach will be fully explored, which began slightly before 1950 and continued in different ways until his death. It is the
main area of our research and contains Heidegger’s mature thought on language and Being. Our third chapter’s title, “From Language and Being toward Being: Saying,” indicates the trajectory of Heidegger’s later work. Like the two previous approaches, it too has Seinsgeschichte as its concern. Yet unlike the two previous approaches, it explores the deeper relationship between Being and Language. It is in the “between” of Being and Language wherein Heidegger has reached Seinsgeschichte in a way that doesn’t fall into the traps that are still some variation of metaphysics, which veils Being as another thing. This chapter moves from a discussion of ontological difference toward Ereignis.

Ereignis shows language’s centrality with Being and beings. This approach, then, reformulates Seinsgeschichte as the originary Saying, the originary language [Sage], from which all languages, all forms of communication, whether implicit and explicit, all forms of theoretical formulation, even logic itself, derive. All of these forms of communication are found along the path of language as Saying. Each step of this pathway will highlight some new understanding toward originary language. Every step is of greater moment, Ereignis, occurring between the human\(^5\) and Being. In short, this approach illustrates how language for Heidegger is both the way and its steps along the way.

\(^5\) Notice the purposeful and careful use of the term “human” in the section regarding Heidegger’s later philosophy and language. This is markedly de-centering Dasein from the early works. This not to say, however, that Heidegger did not employ the term, “Dasein” in his later works. One need only look into Zollikon Seminare to find its pervasive use. But there, Heidegger is dialoguing with psychologists, whose primary focus is the human person and the then new type of psychoanalysis called “Daseinanalysis.” As such it seems quite pertinent. Our project is not Dasein per se, but language and Being. Thus, the term, “human” retains the meaning and sense of Dasein without its opacity while downplaying individuality of the term, “man”—all the while highlighting the centrality of Being with human involvement. No one term will completely satisfy all the various ways Heidegger intends. Yet “human” seems least problematic.
Beginning with “Kehre”\textsuperscript{6} in 1949 and concluding with Heidegger’s 1950 essay entitled, “Sprache,” this chapter follows Heidegger’s concern with the problems of fundamental ontology and destructive retrieval, yet at the same time employs these approaches to discern what indeed is the relationship between Being and language. During this brief, yet fecund two years, Heidegger’s account emerges. It is the account of how originary language heard as Silence is communicated as Saying; it occurs as the gathering of the fourfold into things and world. In pain, man notices an ontological difference between Being and beings and listens to the Stillness. In hearing, man corresponds and human language emerges. This chapter outlines Heidegger’s work wherein he delves deeper into the question of Being through language.

Next, Chapter 4, “From λόγος toward Being:Saying” begins with the insight of “Sprache,” that originary language is primarily a showing and as such is relational. Originary language is heard as Silence. Upon hearing this Silence, man in pain responds as given in ordinary language. This relational, indeed conversational character of Being as Saying is fundamental. Ordinary language is relational and can no longer be conceived as a tool, nor is it simply that which allows Being to emerge. Intimately,

\textsuperscript{6} Our reason for choosing this essay as our point of departure is not to say that this was Heidegger’s first use or understanding of Kehre for he indeed uses the term and its meaning in earlier works. See “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit” (1930),” or its English translation, “On the Essence of Truth.” Heidegger cites the first use of Kehre in published materials in a later work in 1947, “Letter on Humanism,” but admits that ten years earlier it was already part of his thought. Thomas Sheehan argues that Kehre made its debut in July 1928 in Die Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz, GA 26: 201.30, 35. Cf. Thomas Sheehan, “Kehre and Ereignis: A Prolegomenon to Introduction to Metaphysics” in A Companion to Heidegger’s Introduction to Metaphysics, ed. Richard Polt and Gregory Fried (New Haven, CN: Yale University, 2001) 4.

Nor that this is to say that choosing the essay “Die Kehre” is by any means random. Rather, “Die Kehre,” marks Heidegger’s explicit exploration into what indeed is entailed in Seinsgeschichte. “Die Kehre” is the lecture in which Heidegger moves his gaze away not only from Dasein as is the case for the early years but also away from the truth of Being in the middle years and looks closer into what makes a thing a thing. This is, I argue, is the beginning of finding Being as the originary language unfolding into language.
language and Being are now gathered as Ereignis. By looking at the whole once again, we see that Being and language are indeed far closer than once thought.

In this chapter we see Heidegger’s way as one which focuses on λόγος. Heraclitus’ λόγος becomes for him the way of exploring how speech as verbal communication wrongly became the primary, perhaps sole, understanding of language. By exploring this movement, Heidegger too wants to incorporate Heraclitus’ “flux” as part of the unfolding of Saying, highlighting a non-stagnant framework for his way. Most intriguingly, Heidegger explores the ramifications of λόγος; it draws thought and discourse closer, and tries to bridge Being and beings.

In chapter five, “From Sprache toward Being:Saying” we follow Heidegger’s movement from a “logos” understanding of Being:Saying and toward a relational understanding of language as Being:Saying. During this period Heidegger engages most directly language and Being. It culminates with Heidegger’s 1959 essay “On the Way toward language.” Heidegger comes to his clearest point regarding language and Being. Ereignis, the manifestation of Being as Saying is a way-making. Originary language as way-making, though, is way-making as the originary language, “be-wëgen als Sage.” It does bring the essence of language as Saying into ordinary language. And yet, way-making is always already the unique region of the essence of language itself, from which our thinking of language emerges. Language is the Gestalt, the whole, from which all steps of language derive. Even the dangerous (yet not without saving power) machination and enframing emerge from the whole of language. And the whole emerges as Ereignis as the “site” of Seinsgeschichte as Being:Saying.
Once Heidegger finds this crucial insight of *Ereignis*, he circles back to a discussion of Dasein. For fundamental ontology located Dasein as the “site” of *Seinsgeschichte* as Being:Saying. Therefore, Chapter Six, “From Da-sein toward Being:Saying” follows Heidegger reworking his notions of Dasein. More properly Heidegger understands man as mortal as one of the four elements of the fourfold through which Being as *Ereignis* is manifested. Now Heidegger calls man Da-sein; through Da-sein we move toward Being:Saying.

Heidegger surveys in his 1961 volume, *Zollikon Seminare* the region of dwelling of Da-sein. Dwelling allows us to see man in his proper sense. Since Heidegger is discussing psychological issues of man and his proper dwelling, Heidegger must reenter the arena of ontology begun in *Being and Time*. It is through this reengagement with fundamental ontology, hermeneutics, and phenomenology, wherein Heidegger sees way-making though possibilities. Phenomenology is now seen not simply Being showing itself in the very way it shows itself; Heidegger’s mature understanding of phenomenology is looking ahead [*Vor-sicht*]. With the twofold characteristic of Being as concealing/revealing, manifested as *Ereignis* in the gathering/separatedness of the fourfold, Heidegger see Being unfolding as possibilities with limitations. And man is now the placeholder of the “nothing,” clearing out all beings so that Being as Saying can be heard as Silence.

Concluding Part I, “ΦΑΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ” we see chapters 1-6 placing the burden of its evidence upon the actual texts and their contents. While these chapters’ content is certainly important, also important is the way the Heidegger’s works circles around many central philosophical issues all arriving at Being as Saying, originary language and its
relation to beings. From language and Being toward Being: Saying, from \( \lambda \gamma \omicron \varsigma \) toward Being: Saying, from Sprache toward Being: Saying, from Da-sein toward Being: Saying—all say the same thing, Being as Saying. Most importantly, we find in these chapters the path of way-making unfolding as Ereignis.

Once Heidegger’s language as both the way of Being and the steps toward Being is explored in the works treating language, we must investigate what this unfolding might entail. In order to accomplish this, we must view earlier major interpretations of Heidegger’s understanding of language and Being. Part II, “WIEDERHOLEN” repeats or retrieves the earlier chapters, but as a way to analyze them through the eyes of scholarship. The many scholarly attempts, interpreting how language and Being unfold for Heidegger, show in various ways by concealing and revealing Heidegger’s facility to gather together creatively all the facets of Being and language while maintaining Seinsgeschichte. This to say that one might capture Being but miss language’s important role or another might see the importance of language but strays from Being. Some see content; others see method. Each in their own way contribute and yet, still conceal Heidegger’s Sprache way-making.

“Overgrown Paths,” our seventh chapter, deal with major interpretations of Heidegger’s understanding of Being. These interpretations attempt to draw together all the various works of Heidegger into a coherent whole, whether as an explicit whole or simply as a way of organizing the work through one topic. Thomas Langan, William Richardson, Joseph Kockelmans et al. developed strong models of how Heidegger’s corpus should be viewed. Each had good success as it showed us part of Heidegger’s way: “phenomenology,” “thinking of being,” and “many ways.” Yet from our present
vantage point, they appear as successful failures. They are all foremost authorities on Heideggerian scholarship. Yet it appears that their models conceal as much as they reveal. Language’s relation to Being is still tenuous, elusive.

Earliest Heideggerian scholarship emphasized Dasein as a way toward Being \([Sein]\) with language as just a side bar. When Dasein becomes the centerpiece, the outcome is humanistic with unique existential and phenomenological terminology as proffered by Langan. Richardson’s breakthrough displaced the centrality of Dasein for Being, moving from a phenomenological mindset toward a thoughtful one, from phenomenology to thought. Since this paradigm placed Being, not Dasein, at its center, Richardson needed to account for the divergence in Heidegger’s work; and so Richardson developed the explanatory account of Heidegger I and II. Its drawback was its mischaracterization of the \(Kehre\) as a shift in Heidegger’s thinking, when in fact the \(Kehre\) was the constant factor throughout all of Heidegger’s work. Historical being, \(Seinsgeschichte\), has always been Heidegger’s concern; this is the \(Kehre\).

Nearly a decade later another paradigm arose. Rather than attempt to make a meta-narrative of Heidegger’s work as did the earlier paradigms, Joseph Kockelmans chose the approach of many approaches. Heidegger remarked late in his life that perhaps his way was one of many ways. Kockelmans’ approach has invoked a strong plurality of meaning possibilities of Heideggerian language as is illustrated in his major compilation\(^7\) with a weak, non-binding centrality. Rather than thinking of Being, this paradigm focused on the multiplicity of the language of Being.

Our eighth chapter, “\(Be-wêgen\),” then, sets a new trajectory of unfolding the way of Being as Saying. Rather than a static paradigm with either humanistic or pluralistic

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tendencies, whether with or without unity, we need a paradigm that is not static. As a paradigm that has transformation or movement as its guiding relationship, Be-wügen does not exclude the previous paradigms, but transforms them. The house of Being brought forth by Heidegger includes certainly Heidegger himself, Langan, Richardson and Kockelmans, but a multitude of other voices that respond to Language as Saying. Indeed, the steps of this pathway unfold ever anew while always already being the pathway as way-making.

It is this creative tension between the pathway, the plethora of things on the pathway and the relationship between the pathway and humanity that these major paradigms have engaged so rightly. But it is the way in which these were engaged that becomes the issue. Between beings and Being, between subject and community, between identity and difference, between the first beginning of Western philosophy and the other beginning—between is the key to this current project. Framing “between” as a way rather than way-making ends in a cul-de-sac. Presenting the issue in a positive light, we see that way-making doesn’t frame, but opens up the path as possibility; “between” is identity as relation: Ereignis.

This current paradigm holds constant the meaning of Kehre as Heidegger held consistently throughout his works. It also reflects the shift of approaches from the early ontological approach to the middle destructive retrieval of “logos” approach and finally to the later language approach, creatively placing Ereignis as the center of these unfolding approaches as language as Saying. In the last approach is contained in the earlier two, as steps are contained in the way. But the final approach is not the sum total of steps, but the transformation of a “way” to “way-making.”
Thus “way-making” unifies the multiplicity, not in superficial “ways.” But in an elusive and originary source from which all is derived, which conceals itself in all, and to which all seeks its ground as non-ground. Yet this “way-making” is not set in stone, but as a dynamic swaying of Being and language as the originary Saying. Once we have gathered how this could not been seen or understood for a variety of difficulties in previous scholarly attempts as illustrated above, “way-making” can unfold afresh.

Part III, then, takes up the task of unfolding of way-making. It appears to us in our epoch, but it is of all epochs. More importantly, in drawing man to the Silence, Being as Saying transforms beings into their most proper light, transforms man into what is most proper, and brings to light Being as concealing/revealing as Ereignis. Thus, “URALTER EIGNIS” addresses the question of the “age-old enowning” or showing of Being, given as Seinsgeschichte, as continual way-making.

The ninth chapter, “Unfolding,” discusses the possible ways in which Ereignis can be an unfolding. Moving from the first beginning, leaping toward the other beginning, all the while remaining between the two, unfolding shows what leaping might look like. Engaging both the philosophies of the first beginning and the other beginning, this chapter discusses all the ways unfolding of Being as Saying, manifested as Ereignis in the fourfold can and cannot be understood. More than other chapters it engages the reader in a discussion of possibilities of Being within the limitations of beings.

The major foil of this chapter is Hegel, who had the right problem of unfolding, but the wrong answer. He offered a linear progression of Absolute knowing, realizing itself through the process of Aufhebung. Heidegger’s Unfolding is neither progression, nor linear; rather it is multifaceted as Ereignis.
The final chapter, “Dénouement,” looks at the possibilities of unfolding of language as Saying, as encountered in the world. All movement along the path is a response to the original language as Saying. Thus all languages find their source and summit in Being as Saying. All forms of communication, all forms of theory, all forms of movement of life, have in their plurality their unity in the original language as Saying. They, too, are the external forms emerging from the originary language: language as Saying that can never be reached, but only to that which they respond.

This last chapter argues that current non-Heideggerian approaches too are inadequate. Linguistic theories are still metaphysical; structuralist theories cannot account for the divergence of multiplicity; post-structuralist theories have no commonality. The reception of Heidegger occurred, as of yet, three waves and in four basic regions, which, we argue, coincide with stratifying of the fourfold. While the current Heideggerian scholars apply Heidegger’s meditative thinking in new and creative ways, they fall short of way-making, as they do not bring the four regions into a gathering/separateness. Truly remarkable in their applications, they too fall short of way-making. For in their stratifying into four regions, already they are enframing.

Finally in our concluding chapter, we offer a way which permits the gathering/separateness of the four regions that interrelate. As such these regions to be understood they need to be communicable in their multiplicity, unity, sameness, difference. Conversely, French theory cannot account for any true communication in the face of multiplicity; thus they lack any unity. Badiou, in his Being and Event, does seem

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8 This phrase encompasses a number of philosophies, also collectively known as postmodernism. It is employed by François Cusset in his book, French Theory: How Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze & Co. Transformed the Intellectual Life in the United States, trans. Jeff Fort with Josephine Berganza and Marlon Jones (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota, 2008).
to balance these issues of the “world,” but he fails in that he is unable to account for the human. Anglo-American and post-analytic theories of language fall short of human experience. Only Heidegger seems to negotiate these issues with “Sprache als Be-wëgen.” Thus unfolding of language and Being in Heidegger’s still is viable, hardly passé in our current philosophical discussions. It creatively holds Being, beings, language and humans, and it gathers; and, in gathering, unfolds into all aspects of the event Heidegger called Ereignis. In Ereignis language and Being influence all arenas of human interest and study. This, we argue, is the true unfolding with language and Being as Sprache als Be-wëgen, a dynamic paradigm shorn of Hegelian overtones. This phenomenology can truly speak to us—and we can dwell properly.
PART I

ΦΑΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ
CHAPTER ONE

Early Approaches I

— We uncover the path . . .

SEIN UND ZEIT

When any philosophy undertakes its departure, it should ask where to begin and what are its presuppositions; and yet, at the same time by doing so, it has already begun—for things appearing to us as such and such the case, is already in the middle of a stance. For Heidegger, the beginning could not take the path of the failed dialectics of Hegel, the culmination of the gigantic, artificial construction of metaphysics. Through dialectics can we ever know anything except for that which we ourselves have constructed? Since that is the case, then we are merely able to describe it. In doing so we might find some hint, some indicator, which will show us the way.

Likewise, the approach in this section through the treatment of Being and Time, the Beiträge, and continuing through Heidegger’s work until the 1970s will be one of description. We will neither defend nor criticize Heidegger’s approach, we will employ it. While for many readers steeped in philosophical analysis, this approach seems pointless. But pointless, it is not; the point is to allow Heidegger’s work to show itself as it engages in its own project of searching, uncovering, retrieving, hearing, responding to
Being in all is manifestations—only then can Being show itself in the very way that it shows itself.\(^9\)

For Heidegger phenomenology seemed a better alternative of seeking Being, and particularly that of Edmund Husserl. Regarding this problematic of what we can know, Husserl writes: “[t]hroughout phenomenology one must have the courage to accept what is really to be seen in the phenomenon precisely as it presents itself rather than interpreting it away, and to honestly describe it. All things must be directed accordingly.”\(^10\) Heidegger chose this pathway akin to Husserl’s phenomenology, for he desired not only to allow the phenomenon of Being to appear, but also to describe its appearance in such a way which does not obscure it in our image. In short, we want to avoid interpreting away Being.

For Husserl the Hegelian system, all psychologisms, all Idealisms, all Empiricisms are wrong precisely on this account; they interpret away what can be seen, reformulating Being into a preconceived pattern. Heidegger held that these systems all concealed the worthy question of Being. Husserl’s phrase at the end of his preface of *Logical Investigations* soon becomes phenomenology’s banner slogan: “Back to the things themselves.” If we return to the things themselves, then we can eschew interpreting away Being.

Joining in on Husserl’s banner call, Heidegger famously writes in *Being and Time*: To the things themselves! [»Zu den Sachen selbst!«];\(^11\) for Heidegger this seemed a

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\(^9\) From the outset a caveat must be made: our project is never without hidden constructions or agendas. Our claim, like Heidegger’s is to minimize and expose those constructions, so as to allow Being to appear in the very way that it appears.


better, more concrete\textsuperscript{12} access to Being and a warning to interpret only what is really to be seen in the phenomenon. Its method as phenomenological and its content as things or beings were Heidegger’s fundamental presuppositions.\textsuperscript{13} His phenomenology, like Husserl’s, saw itself as descriptive and avoiding of all thoughtlessly accepted philosophical standpoints or directions.\textsuperscript{14}

Although the descriptive phenomenology of Husserl searched for the essential structures of consciousness by examining phenomena, Heidegger sought Being in the structures of beings by examining the meaning and ground of what appears or more specifically the existential structures of Dasein.\textsuperscript{15} Heidegger’s phenomenology soon took a different tack from Husserl, for, according to Heidegger, Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology could not find its way out of its solipsism of the subject and

\textsuperscript{12}GA 2: 1/19. This emphasis early in the text for a concrete working out of the question of Being counters many claims that Heidegger is an Idealist. For instance, William Blattner argues that Heidegger employs a temporal Idealism. While \textit{Being and Time} is vulnerable to this claim, Heidegger’s later work avoids the analytic of time as a means by which we access Being. See William D. Blattner, \textit{Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism}. (New York, NY: Cambridge University, 1999).

\textsuperscript{13}It may be a helpful reminder that through the use of the term, “presuppositions,” we, like Heidegger do not mean to establish an unproven principle from which later suppositions are derived. Rather, presupposition of phenomenology—allowing entities to be seen as they appear—is laid down as an avenue of discovery. See Paul Gorner, \textit{Heidegger’s Being and Time: An Introduction}.

\textsuperscript{14}One must admit that Heidegger’s claim of utter disassociation with all philosophical standpoints is indeed in itself such a claim. Heidegger, at this point in his thought, does not seem to be able to counter this criticism.

\textsuperscript{15}While Daniel Dahlstrom suggests that Dasein should no longer remain esoteric, and suggests its translation as “there-being,” we shall respectfully retain Dasein. Our reasoning hinges on Heidegger’s latter shift to Da-sein. Following Dahlstrom’s suggestion, “Da-sein” would then need to be translated as “being-there.” The distinction between “there-being” and “being-there” seems too fine a line for readers to follow. We shall cover this later in chapter 6.
consciousness; Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology\textsuperscript{16} is “to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself”\textsuperscript{17} … through discourse.\textsuperscript{18} In other words, solipsism is overcome in Heidegger’s phenomenology because there is no bifurcation of subject and object. Heidegger would not begin with the self or with the world, but with how things show themselves to us as Being-in-the-world [\textit{In-der-Welt-Sein}]. Rather than the foundation of knowledge, which grounds all forms of knowing, Heidegger wants to look deeper toward Being.

The question of Being, then, becomes paramount. Indeed, asking the question of Being is a mode of Being. It is the mode of Dasein. There is difference among beings [\textit{Seindes}], but there is one being [\textit{Dasein}], for whom its Being [\textit{Sein}] is an issue\textsuperscript{19} and each case it has its Being to be its own [\textit{daß es je sein Sein als seiniges zu sein hat}].\textsuperscript{20} Heidegger holds that through Dasein we can find a way toward Being.\textsuperscript{21} The question of Being is the relationship of Being and Dasein and the mode of inquiry takes place in language.

\textsuperscript{16} Etymologically, Heidegger breaks phenomenology into its two ancient Greek components: φαίνεσθαι, means to show itself; and λόγος is the account of that which is seen—one might call it discourse. Phenomenology gives us a relational revealing, an account. Thus, from the outset we see the importance of the relationship between Being and language. See \textit{GA} 2: 36-52/49-63.
\textsuperscript{17} \textit{GA} 2: 46/58.
\textsuperscript{18} Heidegger distinguishes the many senses of “discourse” which are inadequate, and the adequate sense in which he means “discourse.” He concludes his analysis on “discourse” in section §7, B: “When fully concrete, discoursing [\textit{Reden}] (letting something be seen) [\textit{Sehenlassen}] has the character of speaking [\textit{Sprechen}]—vocal proclamation in words [\textit{stimmliche Verlautbarung in Worten}] … an utterance [\textit{stimmliche Verlautbarung in Worten}] in which something is sighted in each case.” In this early formulation of language we see how the character of letting something be seen also has the character of speaking. The question we will constantly pose is precisely this dual character of language of speaking and letting things be seen. What should the reader should not overlook in all the details is that phenomenology has the character of speaking. \textit{GA} 2: 44/56.
\textsuperscript{19} \textit{GA} 2: 16/\textit{Being and Time} 32.
\textsuperscript{20} \textit{GA} 2: 17/\textit{Being and Time} 33.
\textsuperscript{21} \textit{GA} 2: 7/\textit{Being and Time} 25. Heidegger here emphasizes that what we seek, must be guided beforehand by what is sought. While the project of fundamental ontology is the task of Dasein, it is still guided by Being. This early statement in the Heideggerian repertoire shows two things: while the task of fundamental ontology is Dasein’s, it is nonetheless guided by Being. This supports our thesis that Being and Dasein both have a role to play in concealing and revealing Being through language.
Dasein is also always in relation to other entities and their totality is what we call the “world.” Dasein is ontically closest to itself\(^{22}\) and the world while ontologically Dasein is farthest [das Fernste] away from itself and the world. Therefore, while we must begin by looking at Dasein in its everydayness [\(\text{T}aglichkeit\)],\(^{23}\) we employ language in the ontological project of uncovering Being through Dasein.

What we find in everyday life is that Being hides “in” beings. Using the clues of everyday language,\(^{24}\) we encounter the cover-up through a formal indicator [\(\text{formalen Anzeige}\)]\(^{25}\) of how the cover-up occurs and underlying truth. Phenomenology traces this path in order to unveil Being. Furthermore, phenomenology unveils the covered-up-ness [\(\text{Verdecktheit}\)] toward Being. Covered-up-ness is the counter trajectory of phenomenology. In fact \(\text{Verdecktheit}\) is the reason for the need of a fundamental ontology, for we must uncover layers of ontology to find a fundamental ontology by

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\(^{22}\) GA 2: 21/\textit{Being and Time} 36. Heidegger’s text reads as follows: “\textit{Das Dasein ist zwar ontisch nicht nur nahe oder gar nicht das nächste—wir sind es sogar je selbst.}” Macquarrie and Robinson follow Heidegger’s emphatic italics of “sind.”

\(^{23}\) GA 2: §5.

\(^{24}\) In \textit{Being and Time} language is pivotal. While Heidegger never called language a tool in \textit{Being and Time}, like that of a hammer; it is, nonetheless, the means by which Dasein seeks Being. Broadly speaking, then, I argue that Heidegger at times does hold language to be used like a tool in its serviceability: it is the tool of excavation, but is also the means of covering over. Language then is the thread into the labyrinth of the ontic toward the ontological. Language, understood thusly as tool, is integral to Heidegger’s project even from its earliest conception.

Later understandings of language emerge out this “language as mere tool” notion, where Heidegger explicitly calls language a tool, when employed ontically. See GA 4: 37/“\textit{Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry}” (1936), wherein Heidegger writes: “\textit{Die Sprache dient zur Verständigung, Als dazu taugliches zu Werkzeug ist ein »Gut«.}” [Language serves to facilitate understanding. As an appropriate tool for this purpose, it is a ‘good.’] See also GA 12: “On the Way to Language” (1950s) for similar usages.

\(^{25}\) GA 2: 155/\textit{Being and Time} 152. A formal indicator is one that indicates or gestures, but it indicates not a “form” as in sense of the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition; rather, it indicates some of the content of the phenomenon, but a content of which can never be exhausted. See Richard Polt, \textit{The Emergency of Being: On Heidegger’s Contributions} (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2006) 37. There Polt notes that Heidegger’s clearest explanation of formal indication occurs in Heidegger’s 1929 \textit{The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics} 296-97.

Current discussions surrounding “formal indication” have flourished recently. One morning was dedicated to formal indication at the 2009 Heidegger Circle meeting, where Leslie MacAvoy presented a paper entitled, “\textit{Formal Indication and the Hermeneutics of Facticity}.” Similarly, the forthcoming 2010 SPEP conferences will feature Ted Kiesiel’s paper, “\textit{Formally Indicating Our Historical Situation}.”
interrogating Dasein phenomenologically. In other words, phenomenology would not be necessary, if Being were not to hide from Dasein and if Dasein were not to hide from Being.

This was Being and Time’s project; to uncover being through historical [geschichtlich] Dasein in a historiological [zu einer »historischen«] interpretation\(^\text{26}\) of language. By the term, “historischen” Heidegger meant to distinguish his process from that of mere history, which is still metaphysically based. Since Dasein is a historical being, the central problem of ontology of Being is the phenomena of time.\(^\text{27}\) Time would be the ultimate knot to untangle, for how could one assess time while within time.

While the analysis of time becomes problematic, the project of Being and Time does avoid the typical problematical issues of solipsism, dualism, abstraction, idealism and empiricism. Why? This is the case because the phenomenological project is about Being-in-the-world, not about the individual subject. We allow Dasein to appear phenomenologically in an ontological, not in an epistemological, manner.

Consequently, ontology is not a kind of anthropology, biology or psychology. These sciences look at inner or outer worlds; ontology is more fundamental than inner or outer worlds, separated subject or object. For Heidegger, these dualities’ claim of transcendence or objectivity means that man is something that reaches beyond himself.

But this claim relies on a separation of object from the subject, a claim which Heidegger

\(^{26}\text{GA 2: 53/Being and Time 63. Heidegger understands both interpretation and history in two senses: In this phrase “»historischen« Interpretation,” a derivative sense is indicated. For Heidegger more primordial terms for history and interpretation are “Geschichte” and “Auslegung.” Hence, »historischen« Interpretation” ontologically speaking resides farther away from Being than does “Geschichte” and “Auslegung.” See GA 2: 50-51/Being and Time 62.}

\(^{27}\text{GA 2: 24/Being and Time 38.}\)
rejects from the outset. While these sciences emphasize man’s separated objectivity and conceived transcendence, Heidegger’s phenomenology notices the prior connectedness of Dasein and the world. Heidegger argues that these sciences, rather, are dependent upon ontology.

Prior to conceived separateness, there is relation. The “world” and “man” are related and in such a way that they are mutually implicated. Always Dasein and Being are involved in each other’s concept, to speak in Western continental philosophical jargon. Instead of prior separateness there is prior involvement [Bewandtnis], involvement of Dasein with others, with the world, and with Being. This certainly is a fundamental distinction between Heidegger and the prevalent view of objective sciences of the time.

In these sciences, we find the view of language as a tool, which is closely related to the hiding of Being in the overall setup of Sein und Zeit. Through these sciences man discovers Being as the highest Being in a historiological interpretation. Being is sought through the use of language which is the manifestation of thought. Within Being and Time language is the means Dasein uses to uncover Being in a historical fashion. But language is also the means whereby Dasein conceals Being. Thus, in addition to time, language becomes problematic.

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28 GA 2: 49-50/Being and Time 65-66. This Heideggerian rejection is the rejection of priority of the duality of subject and object. Some have claimed that Heidegger argues that all sciences are thus null and void. Heidegger’s claim is more modest, we argue, that sciences are derivative and simply have a deeper ground than mere epistemology; it is not the claim that logic or any other science is without worth. Rather, Heidegger subverts the primacy of these sciences to the status of “tools.” In their place we shall see language emerge as ontologically primary.

29 If it is true, as Heidegger holds, that every philosopher has one thought, this is ours: relatedness is prior to any identity. We shall see that this relational character comes in many visages: gathering/separateness, concealedness/revealedness, truth/untruth, gathering in/going out, and community/individual.

30 GA 2: §10.

31 GA 2: 115/Being and Time 112.
The process whereby Heidegger uncovers Being through language is precisely the way of *Sein und Zeit*. By beginning with the everydayness of Dasein, Heidegger’s project is necessarily an existential-phenomenological pathway. “Part One” of *Sein und Zeit* treated the interpretation of Dasein in terms of temporality. Originally Heidegger held that this pathway could move beyond Dasein. But only the first two divisions of “Part One” were completed: the analysis of Dasein; and Dasein and Temporality. The treatment of “Time and Being” was attempted in *Being and Time*, but Heidegger was unsatisfied with its results and never published it. Therefore, the pathway of *Being and Time* appears as Dasein’s uncovering of Being through time. Dasein is the lens, through which Being is sought in time; as such this investigation is provisional, for it “merely brings out the Being of this entity, without interpreting the meaning of Being.” All paths in *Being and Time* speak of Dasein and leads back to Dasein.

The overall plan in *Being and Time* was to continue to interpret the meaning of Being of Dasein via “Part Two.” It would have discussed the basic features of the destruction of the history of ontology. From a discussion of Dasein “Part Two” would move through time toward a treatment of Being as such. The destruction of the history of ontology was not written. In fact, the remainder of the project was unfinished here in *Being and Time*. But the project continued in various ways in later works, when a deeper

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32 GA 2: 24/"Being and Time" 38. It is for this very reason that *Being and Time* is a successful failure. The text leads us toward Being in Dasein, but we must look elsewhere for its interpretation. *Being and Time* ends with Dasein. This, we argue, is why some understand Heidegger’s project solely as a simple phenomenological, indeed, humanistic endeavor.

33 GA 2: 53/"Being and Time" 63. The destruction of the history of ontology arrives, as we shall see, in the second approach we call the destructive retrieval, which is similar to the approach of *Being and Time* sans Dasein’s centrality. In lieu of Dasein’s central place, destructive retrieval explores language as the means of disclosure. True, humanity, in the person of Heidegger, is disclosing in that case as well, but the emphasis then will be Being’s disclosiveness/concealment of Being as the Abandonment of Being.
analysis reveals time and space to be grounded metaphysically. Once that understanding occurs, Being and language can continue.

Before we can focus on Being and language, we must first review the basic thrust of *Being and Time*. For, we argue, the answer to the question of Being and language lies within the way itself and its trajectory in an incipient way in *Being and Time*. Let us interrogate Dasein and gather what we can of the relationship between Being and language. In it we shall discover that there is much we can glean positively of Being and language, yet that which we harvest is not everything. The harvest has humanistic elements and overtones of the metaphysical structure which Heidegger first wished to abandon entirely as a cul-de-sac toward the question of Being. But in realizing that way, the later Heidegger can place language in its proper relation toward Being. Let us delve into *Being and Time*, so that we may find early indications of the relation of language and Being.

Each section of *Being and Time* uncovers a deeper level in the ongoing search for Being. As Being is more and more revealed in beings, we see that language is there in the process. As we have noted, language is the means by which Dasein reveals Being: language is used to describe Dasein’s understanding, Dasein’s moodedness, and even Dasein’s discourse is described through the use of language. Granted that Heidegger’s treatment of language is meager in *Being and Time*, nevertheless it reveals a deeper, yet undefined relationship between language and Being. Minimally, one must concede that language accompanies each layer of revealing the way toward Being.

This is the basic orientation of Dasein; only through language Dasein comports itself understandingly toward that Being [sich in seinem Sein verstehend zu diesem Sein
This is referring to the simple, irrefutable fact that Dasein exists and for whom Being is an issue. Thus, Heidegger holds a unique relatedness between Dasein and Sein; language is that which reveals [or conceals as in idle chatter] that relation. What is the character of this uniqueness, we shall explore in great length.

Dasein is not an abstracted meaning of the subject, but rather Dasein is an ontological designation. Dasein is Being-here.\footnote{GA 2: 70/Being and Time 78.} As Heidegger explicitly draws out: “when we designate this entity with the term “Dasein,” we are expressing not its “what” but its “Being.”\footnote{GA 2: 57/Being and Time 67.} “Furthermore,” writes Heidegger, “Dasein is an entity, which in each case I myself am.”\footnote{GA 2: 41, 42/Being and Time 67, 68.} It has each time the character of “mineness” [Jemeinigkeit].\footnote{GA 2: 71/Being and Time 78.} And at the same time Dasein belongs to the condition called Being-in-the-world, that, while it is a compound expression, “it stands for a unitary phenomenon.”\footnote{GA 2: 71/Being and Time 78.} Thus, the ontological term “Dasein” rescinds from the traditional terminology of a human being as an instance or that of human beings as a genus of philosophical analysis. But Dasein is neither an instant nor a genus of human being; as such Heidegger’s term overcomes traditional philosophical analysis.

Rather than traditional philosophical analysis, we look to the way Dasein appears. First, Dasein comports itself by decision toward Being; and Dasein does this in one of
two ways. Since it is its ownmost possibility [eigenste Möglichkeit], it can choose itself or it can lose itself; it can choose itself authentically [eigentlich] as something of its own or not. Heidegger is careful here to locate both ways in Being-in-the-world. Authenticity and unauthenticity are modes of Being. [Die beiden Seinsmodi der Eigentlichkeit und Uneigentlichkeit].

The preliminary analysis is ontico-ontological, that is to say, we look at that which is closest to us in appearance in order to allow that which is hidden to appear. We readily see things around us; we see ourselves; we encounter the world and its order. Yet this everyday structure is quite superficial. It appears as though we are alongside or opposite other things and are opposed to the world.

But even the above superficial stance remains a unitary phenomenon. This phenomenon is “Being-in-the-world.” For things to appear they depend on a “world” in which to appear. For things to appear in the world they need to “be” in the world. For things to appear, existing in the world, they appear “with” many other entities. For other entities to appear in the world there needs to be a unitary sense in which all of the appearances are occurring as something that can be grasped. In short, and this is the second aspect of Dasein, Dasein and “world” are inseparable; this is what we take Heidegger to mean by a unitary phenomenon of “Being-in-the-world.”


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40 GA 2: 57/Being and Time 68. From the German root, “eigen-,” it is easy to see the importance of the relation of “ownmost” and “authentically” choosing. There are some who argue for a third mode of indifference with others. But this seems quite problematic in the case of Dasein with itself.

41 GA 2: 72/Being and Time 78.
Facticity occurs as that which is apparent, occurring as “Being-in” as such. Finally, we can look at “Being-with.” “Being-with” views Dasein with others amidst discourse in its fallenness. These three ways are still views of the same Being-in-the-world, which is a basic state of Dasein.

For the most part, Being has been represented exclusively in the history of philosophy by a single exemplar of knowing the world [Welterkennen]. For this reason, knowing has always been given priority and our understanding of Dasein’s ownmost is led astray. We are led astray in the appearance that our understanding of Being is Being itself. And thus the history of thought in Western philosophy as given in epistemology diverged from the history of Being.

As a corrective, we need a founding mode of Being, which has a unitary, not dualistic structure.\(^\text{42}\) As Heidegger expressed, “Being-in-the-world” is a unitary phenomenon. Rather than plumbing the depths of thought, we must start not from our thoughts, but from everyday, ontic experience. If Being-in-the-world is a basic state of Dasein, then Being-in-the-world must show itself ontically too. In a sentence, Heidegger writes well the connection between the ontological basic state of Dasein as Being-in-the-world and the ontic world in general: “Being-in-the-world, as concern, is fascinated by the world with which it is concerned.”\(^\text{43}\) This is where Dasein looks first, there [Da], before any subsequent looking inward or outward of the sciences, says Heidegger. Indeed Heidegger’s focus in \textit{Being and Time}, if not his entire life, explores the relation between the ontic and the ontological.

\(^{42}\) \textit{GA} 2 §12.

\(^{43}\) \textit{GA} 2: 82/\textit{Being and Time} 88. “\textit{Das In-der-Welt-sein ist als Besorgen von der besorgten Welt benommen.}” Macquarrie and Robinson place the word, “fascinated” in italics and follows Heidegger’s own emphasis with “\textit{benommen.}”
Between the ontic and the ontological is the “region” we must map out, if we are to see the relation of language and Being. For in that region, we could say that we see the relation between the contents of meaning, given ontically, and its structure, indicated ontologically. We shall investigate Dasein at the ontic level, then move toward the ontic-ontological, finally reaching the existential care structure of Dasein. But to express it thusly would be stating the issue of language and Being as a project of Western metaphysics. Expressed as a unitary phenomenon, we shall see how language and Being appears between the ontic and the ontological; how language contents and structure unfold as one phenomenon of language and Being as the way. First, we begin with the everyday world.

**Worldhood of the World**

While examining anything outside in world we see things, e.g., a desk, and worlds, e.g., “the world of Hollywood.” We discuss them and think about these “worlds;” they come and go—things perish, the Victorian age passes. In fact there are many senses of world. They are cultural and historical; speaking of them in this manner is “ontical” [ontisch]. Yet all these senses presuppose a unity, a “worldhood;” and while things and worlds dissipate, worldhood always remains, so we say the ontological [ontologisch] grounds the ontic.

Worldhood is related to all structures of the “world.” And yet why is it that we see things in the world or a world as a whole instead of “worldhood”? If we are to be

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44 GA 2: 85/Being and Time 91.
able to interpret the worldhood of Dasein and the possible ways Dasein is made worldly, then as Heidegger writes: we must show “why the kind of Being with which Dasein knows the world is such that it passes over the phenomenon of the worldhood both ontically and ontologically.”\textsuperscript{45} In other words, if Dasein is so closely related to beings, then why is “worldhood” and Being hidden?

With this trajectory of questions Heidegger directs his attention toward the uncovering of “worldhood” and Being. World is that which is part and parcel of factical Dasein, that whenever Dasein is, it is as a “Fact;”\textsuperscript{46} as such Dasein can be said to live in an environment \textit{(Umwelt)}. While it seems contradictory that “world” is both outside of Dasein and the “there” in which Dasein abides, the ambiguity is not a failure of our faculties, but is indeed that which lies at the heart of Being. World is ontic and ontological; it has a “thingly” character [\textit{existentiell}].

Worldhood, on the other hand, is not a “thing,” but a structure [\textit{existentialie}] of Dasein. It is always already there. The worldhood of the world includes the totality of all relations, the environment \textit{(Umwelt)}. All the relations are all gathered and not noticed theoretically\textsuperscript{47} unless the totality is somehow disturbed at which point Dasein notices equipment \textit{(Zeug)}. Thus, we see already that ontic things can be seen only if there is an ontological relation. “Things” are given in their structure.

Just as Dasein notices two modes of Being: ontic and ontological, so too “things,” now called equipment comes in a variety of modes. Beings are in the mode of readiness-

\textsuperscript{45} GA 2: 88-89/\textit{Being and Time} 94. Macquarrie and Robinson’s translation is somewhat awkward for Heidegger’s phrase: “warum das Dasein in der Seinsart des Weltkennens ontisch und ontologisch das Phänomen der Weltlichkeit überspringt.” Perhaps a smoother translation would render the text thusly: why Dasein in its way of knowing the world passes over the phenomenon of the worldhood both ontically and ontologically. The italicization of “why” is consistent with Heidegger’s text.

\textsuperscript{46} GA 2: 75/\textit{Being and Time} 82.

\textsuperscript{47} GA 2: 90/\textit{Being and Time} 95.
to-hand [Zuhandenheit] when there is no disturbance in the context
[Verweisungszusammenhang]\(^{48}\) of the totality of equipment [Zeughaftigkeit].\(^{49}\) When the
context is blocked there is unreadiness-to-hand and equipment becomes conspicuous
[Auffallen]. When there is no context at all, beings are in the mode of presence-at-hand
[Vorhandenheit]. There are many variations of modes of equipment,\(^{50}\) depending on the
variation of blocked context.

As modes of equipment arise, so too their relations to Dasein emerge as that
which appears. The relations emerge from a unitary Being-in-the-world. With the
relations emerge an engagement with these relations and a way of relating to them called
circumspection [Umsicht]. From our totality of references emerges ontic “spatiality,”
“temporality,” and “causality,” as well as our semantic space. What we are arguing is
that far deeper than simply perceptual and social worlds, references lie too in structure.

This dual relationship is that which our everyday language partakes.\(^{51}\) In this
section Heidegger has an inkling that our language conceived as semantics or as a
performative act too narrowly confines what he holds to be language, simply as part of
“Being-with.” Language too is tied up somehow in references. And thus we must look
closer as what is meant by a reference and a sign.

In worldhood, Dasein comes across equipment and their relations in various and
complex ways. Equipment can appear as signs. As signs, which designate many kinds of

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\(^{48}\) GA 2: 110/Being and Time 113.
\(^{49}\) GA 2: 92/Being and Time 98.
\(^{50}\) GA 2: §15-16.
\(^{51}\) Günter Figal of Freiburg, Germany recently delivered at Duquesne University in Pittsburgh on October
18, 2008 a keynote address entitled, “Spatial Thinking: Considering the Possibility of Phenomenology.”
Figel emphasized Heidegger’s point here that Dasein is part of the phenomenon and yet discloser of
phenomenon. He argued that Heidegger’s conception of space leads to openness, a region [Gegend] of
openness in which disclosiveness can truly appear. It is this open region from which space as commonly
understood is derived. See his forthcoming publication.
things, but they also can be formalized as a universal kind of relation [zu einer
universalen Beziehungsart].

Signs, then, include the relations from Dasein to
equipment and from equipment to equipment, measured by Dasein. More importantly,
writes Heidegger: “A sign is not a Thing which stands to another Thing in the
relationship of indicating.” On the contrary, it is an item of equipment which explicitly
raises a totality of equipment out into circumspection so that the readiness-to-hand
announces itself. The salient feature here is that signs don’t point simply to another
thing, like a line, but signs gather a referential totality such that the equipment raises a
totality out into circumspection. Only as readiness-to-hand announces itself, then signs
ontically can become concretized or seen as a thing.

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52 GA 2: 103/Being and Time 108. There is no attempt to describe the blocked context, entities, and their
related signs as a type of correspondence of cause and effect; it simply suffices to illustrate their co-
implication. If one were to ascribe the blocked context as the cause and signs as their effects, then a type of
idealism would ensue, for causality emerges as the mind constructing the signs and their relationship. If,
on the other hand, one’s temperament would cite entities as cause for the emergence of signs, then the
opposite tendency of materialism follows. Heidegger’s phenomenology remains indifferent to this type of
causality.

St. Augustine in De Magistro most notably draws this connection between words and things; thus,
for Augustine words arise from things. Yet even Augustine sees some of the problems of this simply word
and thing correspondence, when he discusses the line from Virgil’s Aeneid (Book II, 659): “Si nihil ex
tanta superis placet urbe reliqui.” [If nothing from so great a city it pleases the gods be left]. If words
arise from things, then how do we explained the word, “if”? The question arises to what thing would the
word “if” refer? This issue becomes crucial for language, as we will discuss in chapter two, language must
be part of the very ontological structure of being, and subsequently can be ontically observed. Otherwise,
language is always drawn into this correspondence of a duality problematic. Briefly, we might counter
Augustine in that we could accept that words come from things, but both words and things emerge from
Dasein’s totality of references.

St. Augustine’s concern echoes Plato’s earlier reflection in the Cratylus. The dialogue wonders to
what extent names are natural or conventional. If names are entirely natural, then the names don’t refer,
but are the things themselves; there is no relationship, only identification; if the contrary were true: names
are entirely conventional, then names can never truly refer; there is only difference. Heidegger worked on
Plato during this early period. Plato’s Sophist, GA 19 was Heidegger’s interest in 1924-5, somewhat before
Being and Time. Later Heidegger engaged Plato more directly on issue of truth in 1931-32 and 1940.
Those works include: “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth,” found in GA 9 and a lecture course: The Essence of
Truth: On Plato’s Cave Allegory and Theaetetus, GA 34.

This topic of identity and difference of “things” becomes central to Heidegger’s later theory of
language. More than mere correspondence or simple relatedness between words and things, Heidegger
holds a complex relationship of identity and difference between things in language as part of the Ereignis.
See Identity and Difference, GA 11: 30-40; 73. We shall discuss this topic in chapter two.

53 GA 2: 107/110.
From this we should note three relations between a sign and reference: a sign indicates a way of relation, a “towards-which” [Wozu], which can become concrete, yet is founded upon the equipment-structure; the indicating of the sign has the character of ready-to-hand [zu-handen] and belongs to a totality of equipment, or to a context of references; and as ready-to-hand it allows the environment to be accessible for circumspection. Thus, a sign is ontic as ready-to-hand and indicative of the ontological readiness-to-hand [Zuhandenheit] reference; for this reason, the reference cannot be a sign, for references are the bases of signs.54

Most importantly, we must not allow the point to be forgotten that signs and references indicate involvement with Dasein. The involvement of Dasein is the source of the reference toward the totality and can seen in a variety of ways, as a “toward-which,” [Wozu], “for-the-sake-of-which,” [Worumwillen], “for-which” [Wofür], “with-which” [Womit], “in-which” [Wobei], etc. in relation to these emerging signs and things. Thus, Dasein is always related to the world in a particular phase of the world and to the worldhood as a whole. “Before” there are things, signs, even references “in” the world, Dasein is in relation to worldhood. For Heidegger this relationship is drawn by Dasein, and we, as a being with the character of Dasein, experience it as intentionality.55 This idea of intentionality Heidegger borrows from Husserl56 and Franz Brentano.57

54 GA 2: §17.
55 While we argue that intentionality is deeper than consciousness, we do not argue that intentionality is merely materialist’s attraction, like that of the Stoics. Rather intentionality as we conceive it lies “between” Being and beings.
56 See Husserl, Ideas I, wherein Husserl describes intentionality as the character of consciousness as both the stream and unity of consciousness: “It is intentionality which characterizes consciousness in the pregnant sense of the term and which, at the same time, justifies designating the whole stream of mental processes as the stream of consciousness and as the unity of one consciousness. … Under intentionality we understand the own peculiarity of mental processes ‘to be the consciousness of something’” §84.
57 See Brentano, Psychology, 88. Brentano describes intentionality as a referent, direction or immanent objectivity: “Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called
Consequently, the intentionality of Dasein toward “worldhood” heals the philosophical rupture between the subject and object. This intentionality is the basis for all references and all systems of signs, the referential totality, and signs as readiness-to-hand. Moreover, this intentionality is the source not only of equipment, and its later attribution of a “thing” or “object” but also awareness as consciousness and its later accreted term “subject.” Yet, as we have already asserted, we now demonstrate that Heidegger, unlike Husserl and Brentano, does not see intentionality primarily as a feature of consciousness. Rather, Heidegger illustrates the evidence of referentiality in the ontological structure of “worldhood.” Consciousness does not found intentionality, but for Heidegger intentionality “precedes” consciousness, which “grounds” thought.  

58 From this ontological structure, the phenomenological attitude announces itself for Dasein. It is the wherein, which is the “worldhood” [Weltlichkeit] of the world.  
59 It appears as the totality of relations, all of the “toward-which” and all of the “for-the sake of which” [Worum-willen] as the totality of all relations or environment [Umwelt] with familiarity [Vertrauheit] and the relations [Bezüge] in the world is the basis of the understanding of Being.  
60 Thus, we see the worldhood of the world given as the totality of relations and familiarity in terms of the understanding of Being. Dasein’s understanding of Being emerges out of its ontological structure.

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58 We must nuance this notion later in Heidegger’s later work, “Words” (1959) with “thinking as thanking.” The nuance will question whether we can privilege either ontology or consciousness. Indeed Heidegger will privilege neither ontology nor consciousness but rather Being as Saying. See GA 12: 221/ “Words,” On the Way to Language 152.
60 GA 2: 116/Being and Time 119.
Why do we belabor this point that consciousness emerges out of the relation between ontic “thing” and ontological structures? We do so in order to show that all these relations which are part of consciousness are “grounded” in a relation that is best described as language. Language allows consciousness and the understanding of Being. This is contrary to the view that language emerges out of consciousness and thought. The relation between language and Being must be prior to the relationship of thought and Being as given in the thought of Being. Yet this relationship between language and Being cannot be demonstrated fully at this point in *Being and Time*. At this juncture language as linguistics is inadequate for the task we have laid out, but our task here is to recognize the seeds of a later analysis of language and Being.

Indeed this relation of language and Being for Heidegger will continually re-emerge through years of inquiry. Each time the relationship becomes more intimate. Even though in this early work of *Being and Time* this relationship is still implicit, it will become necessary to understand more explicitly how things, Dasein, and world are at the heart of the issue of language and Being. Let it suffice here to illustrate simply that Being-in-the-world demonstrates Dasein’s relation with the “world” to be far more related than merely connecting established things with words. Likewise, language is intimately connected to “worldhood,” not solely to Dasein existential structures, as is commonly understood. We will continue to return to these entities—things, words and relations as part of Being-in-the-world—only to allow Heidegger to unknot and reveal slowly a concealed relationship of Being and language. But first we look to Heidegger’s treatment of language as it emerges as part of “Being-with.”
Being-with

Perhaps the most criticized section of Heidegger’s Being-in-the-world is his treatment of “Being-with.” It seems that such a robust account of Dasein and relations would also lead to a robust sense of community. But Heidegger restricts community to a distinction of authenticity and inauthenticity and develops little beyond that distinction in twenty, short pages. Indeed, I argue that a truncated treatment of “Being-with” can develop more robustly only when a strong sense of individualism is displaced.

The question arises for our pondering: can phenomenology centered around Dasein be sufficient to displace individualism? We shall argue that Heidegger’s move toward Dasein is necessary; however, it is not sufficient. Somehow community must emerge out of an idea which Heidegger later calls the fourfold. Still, Dasein as “Being-with” has valuable lessons. Lessons, occurring in the terminology of authentic and unauthentic, lead us once again to the issues of ambiguity, relationality, and of Dasein.

Dasein appears authentically as that which answers itself in terms of the “I” or the “subject,” while the authentic answer of the multiplicity occurs as the “who,” [das Wer]. Heidegger explains that the “who” maintains itself as identical throughout all experiences and ways of behavior.61 Dasein encounters these entities, but unlike equipment, they appear as Being-in-the-world. They are neither ready-to-hand nor present-at-hand [Vorhanden]; on the contrary, these entities appear like Dasein; they are “there” and with Dasein.

61 GA 2: 155/Being and Time 150. One must recall that Dasein is simply not a being with the character of Dasein, but Dasein is the character of a being for whom Being is an issue and in each case mine. Therefore, the term “Dasein” does not indicate a mere multiplicity of individuals, but an existential structure of Dasein that is Dasein-as-Being-with and relational in character.
How is the “who” characterized? The “who” is not all of those besides “me.” Rather, the “who” has the sameness of Being as Dasein with the circumspective concern of Being-in-the-world. Just as the reference of Dasein to disclosedness is in the circumspection [Umsicht] with readiness-to-hand, so too is the case with the “who.” The phenomenological attitude, too, is one of concern [Besorgen]. Dasein dwells. Such is the case with the “who.” The “who” is like Dasein, like another Dasein. Thus, Dasein dwells and dwells as “Being-with.” Part of Dasein’s structure is “Being-with” as the “who” and must be relational in character.

And we thus see that the “who” is not simply another Dasein, it is an indication of Dasein’s own structure; it is an existential structure. Heidegger explains, “The Other is encountered in his Dasein-with [Mitdasein] in the world.” Furthermore Heidegger notes: “These entities are not objects of concern, but rather of ‘solicitude’ [Fürsorge].” With these two quotations we are not to understand Dasein-with simply as a multitude of Dasein, but another existential structure where-in Dasein dwells in the world. Dasein dwells as Mitdasein, even as Being-alone. Dasein is somehow relational in its identity.

In each case of Mitdasein the dwelling takes place in both authentic and inauthentic modes. Just as Dasein has modes of Being and beings come in a variety of modes, similarly “Being-with” has two basic modes. The negative mode is indifference.

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62 Sartre has famously developed this notion in both Nausea and Being and Nothingness, especially with the term, the “gaze.” Heidegger’s notion, on the contrary, shows no connotations of violence in “Being-with.”
63 GA 2: 159/Being and Time 155.
64 GA 2: 160/Being and Time 156. Our point here is that while ontically focused there are others, but ontologically Dasein is always Dasein-with.
65 GA 2: 162/Being and Time 157. Solicitude is a correlative of circumspection, with the clear difference in that while circumspection is toward the “world,” solicitude is toward other Beings with the character of Dasein.
The positive modes have two extreme possibilities. The phenomenological attitude of “solicitude” [Fürsorge], then, has authentic “leaping-in” [einspringen] and “leaping-ahead” [vorausspringen]. The overly simplistic analogy oftentimes used to explain these two authentic modes is offering a man a fish to eat (“leaping-in”) or teaching a man to fish (“leaping-ahead”).

While the reference to beings is one of circumspection, the reference to “Being-with” is considerateness [Rücksicht] authentically as “forbearance” [Nachsicht] and inauthentically in many ways that ultimately leads to inconsiderateness [Rücksichtslosigkeit], all due to indifference. Thus, we can rightly conclude that “Being-with” is always with others, always in relation to others, and always for the sake of others.

Like Dasein in its everyday structure, “Being-with” has authentic and inauthentic modes. The “who” [das Wer] appears as “Being-with” [Mitsein] with Dasein. The inauthentic mode appears as the “they” [das Man]. For Heidegger the inauthentic mode appears as public. That is to say that Being-with appears as not for the sake of others, but its Being is taken over by others. This enhances their power and dissolves one’s own Dasein, a clear indication of inauthenticity. Identity as defined solely by others is inadequate.

The various relations of Mit-Dasein as the “they” are basically ways of distantiality [Abständlichkeit]. The “they” distances Dasein from its own character and

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66 GA 2: 163/Being and Time 158. Much quoted, these two modes are usually misunderstood as one being authentic and the other extreme is unauthentic but Heidegger is clear that both modes are positive. “Die Fürsorge hat hinsichtlich ihrer positiven Modi zwei extreme Möglichkeiten.”

67 GA 2: 164/Being and Time 159. The German is ambiguous in its sentence construction, but the above is the preferred translation by Macquarrie and Robinson.

68 GA 2: 164/Being and Time 160.
distances the character of Dasein from all of the “who.” Thus the “they” removes more and more the others of Mitdasein. What is left is an other-less “they.” The everything is managed for us; everything becomes well-known and is manipulated. Everything and every Dasein is managed as a way of “leveling-down” [*Einebnung*], “averaging” [*Durchschnittlichkeit*] by the “they.” Dasein fails authentically to maintain that which is ownmost, as Dasein, a being for whom Being is an issue.

In conclusion, Dasein is a not a mere multiplicity, but a being, for whom Being is an issue as a being concerned for others. The structure of Dasein is also Mit-Dasein. Authentically, Dasein can never be a lone individual, nor can Dasein be part of a mob. Rather Dasein always already has solicitude for others as another Dasein, for whom Being is an issue. Dasein’s proper identity occurs in relations with others in community.

While this hardly is a robust account of community, it certainly is not void of any ethical or moral concerns; many have accused Heidegger of lacking any ethical concern. But why not develop such an account here in *Being and Time* or elsewhere for that matter? When questioned by Jean Beaufret on November 10, 1946 on the relationship between ethics and ontology, Heidegger responded with a letter that is now published as “Letter on Humanism:” wherein he writes a correct ontology is more fundamental than an ethics, but one could construe ontology as being a correct ethics.69 We are learning that any ethics must be based upon not only a true account of community, but also on a discussion of “Being-in” as such, to which we now turn.

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69 One must admit that Heidegger never wrote specifically regarding ethics. Yet as I infer, one could at the very minimum understand ontology as the foundation for an “ethics;” ethics emerges from the proper dwelling of the ethos. See “Letter on Humanism,” in *Pathmarks*, ed. William McNeill (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University, 1998); GA 9: 186-189“Letter on Humanism,” *Pathmarks* 270-272. Nevertheless, one must accept that, for Heidegger, ethics is metaphysical by nature. We shall discuss Heidegger’s, *Building Dwelling, Thinking* as dwelling impinges ontologically upon language and Being.
Before we do so, a note on language is necessary. If discourse of all types, both authentic and inauthentic, arises as “Being-with,” then any false notions of community could belie the truer nature of language as simple discourse. If the complaint that Heidegger’s notion of community is thin in *Being and Time*, then his notion of discourse also seems to be thin. Indeed, this is, we argue, what Heidegger realizes later in the 1950s.

**Being-in**

A much briefer treatment of “Being-in” will follow, since in many respects this topic of the Being of the “there” seems to be disclosed in a focal way in the *Beiträge*. Yet we cannot overlook it entirely, for it contains a few specific remarks Heidegger offers on language. “Being-in” centers on Dasein’s involvement with and to objects; it involves all beings “in” the world of Da-sein, of the “there,” *[Da]*.

Dasein always finds itself “there,” i.e. attuned to the “world.” This state-of-mind *[Befindlichkeit]*\(^{70}\) is a fundamental structure of Dasein; it shows Dasein involvement with things in a clearing *[Lichtung]*; Being-in-the-world is itself the clearing.\(^{71}\) As beings are uncovered and present in a clearing, they are disclosed. In such a mode of disclosedness *[Erschlossenheit]* beings are revealed as “there.”

What might miss the unsuspecting reader is the co-relation of the “there” and “Being-in.” While Dasein is the site of the clearing of beings; Dasein too is the clearing site of Being as “Being-in.” In the disclosiveness of beings, Being is hidden; in the

\(^{70}\) *GA* 2: 178/ *Being and Time* 172.

\(^{71}\) *GA* 2: 177/ *Being and Time* 171.
disclosiveness of Being, beings are concealed. This unique position of Dasein as the site clearing of Being and beings occurs through moodedness.

In moodedness, Dasein is always regarding beings. With circumspection [Umsich] Dasein regards beings as ready-to-hand. This concern [Besorgen] with beings shows its relatedness as it shows it relation to itself as dwelling. These relations as moodedness occur in authentic ways and in inauthentic as the public. Public moodedness shows Dasein as not proper to itself, but aligned with the “they.”

But more than simply passions of the soul, as the philosophy of the first beginning would call them. Moodedness shows Dasein’s concern with beings is at the same time a concern for itself; and concern for beings and itself, moodedness also shows a concern for Being.

This preliminary analysis of Being-in-the-world shows the relation of the ontic and the ontological. More importantly, this analysis of the everyday world leads Dasein toward a structure that allows such a Being-in-the-world to be the site of disclosure. We see that Dasein not only shows these ecstatic directions of facticity [Faktizität] as “Being-in,” fallenness [Verfallenheit] as “Being-with” and existentiality [Existenzität] as “worldhood” as a multiplicity of possibilities as Being-in-the-world, but also Dasein shows its constitution. To this structure, we now turn.

**Toward an Ontological Constitution**

Just as from the appearance of the worldhood of the world, Dasein is led to Being-in the “world” as its everyday structure, so too we are led towards Dasein’s constitution
through Being-in. There are two constitutive ways to see the being of the “there:” in
“state-of-mind” [Befindlichkeit] and “understanding” [Verstehen]. Both draw us toward
the existential structure of Dasein. Heidegger characterizes them as equi-primordial by
discourse [durch die Rede].\textsuperscript{72} The “there” of beings also discloses the characteristic of
Dasein’s being, that character is “thrownness” [Geworfenheit],\textsuperscript{73} that Dasein is “there.”
Dasein’s thrownness is such that the being of the “there” maintains itself. One could say
that as clearing clears what is shown is the “there” of Dasein and the “there” of the world.
Yet the clearing never shows them “there” in the same sense.

The fact that Dasein is ontologically “there” draws Dasein continually back to
itself ontically as mooded. Heidegger writes: “In a state-of-mind Dasein is always
brought before itself,”\textsuperscript{74} not in the sense of perceiving itself, but finding itself in the mood
that it has. Dasein is always in some mood. The variety of moods is numerous. Even
theoretical thinking has not left all moods behind it. Proximally and for the most part,
moods lead Dasein in the manner of an evasive-turning away [in der Weise der
ausweichenden Abkehr].\textsuperscript{75} The issue for Dasein is that its structure is such that it
constantly surrenders itself to the “there” of the world and lets the world matter in such a
way that Dasein evades itself.

Equi-primordial with Befindlichkeit is “understanding.” To say that Dasein is
“there” in a disclosive sense is to say that there is a “world” is wherein Dasein abides.

Being-there is also Being-in. This relationship highlights the reference of Dasein and

\textsuperscript{72} \textit{GA} 2: 178/\textit{Being and Time} 172. Macquarrie and Robinson translate “durch” as by—perhaps “with
discourse” could be a better translation. They retain Heidegger’s italic emphasis.
\textsuperscript{73} \textit{GA} 2: 180/\textit{Being and Time} 174.
\textsuperscript{74} \textit{GA} 2: 180/\textit{Being and Time} 174. Heidegger’s text reads as follows: “In der Befindlichkeit ist das Dasein
immer schon vor es selbst gebracht, es hat sich immer schon gefunden, nicht als wahrnehmendes Sich-
vorfinden, sondern als gestimmtes Sichbefinden.”
\textsuperscript{75} \textit{GA} 2: 181/\textit{Being and Time} 175.
world. The disclosedness of this purposeful relationship of the “for-the-sake-of-which” is what we call “understanding” [Verstehen]. Heidegger reminds us: “A state-of-mind” has its understanding, even if it merely keeps it suppressed. Understanding always has its mood.” Discourse discloses that understanding and state-of-mind are co-implicatory.

“Understanding is the existential Being of Dasein’s potentiality-for-being,” writes Heidegger. Thusly defined, understanding is not a concrete mode of knowing, but that which makes all knowing possible. The structure pertains to the whole basic state of Being-in-the-world. The totality of involvements is revealed as the categorical whole of a “possible interconnection of the ready-to-hand [einer Möglichkeit des Zusammenhangs von Zuhandedem].” But this unity can be revealed only if a possibility of it has been disclosed. As such we call it “projection” [Entwurf]. This is not Dasein comporting itself toward a plan; rather, Dasein has already projected itself in terms of possibilities. Both the thinking and intuition are derivative forms of understanding.

We see that Dasein is “thrown-projection” [geworfenes-Entwurf]. Always Dasein is directed to the world and sees this directedness in terms of possibilities. Always the possibilities of Dasein are seen in terms of the world. Neither understanding nor state-of-mind has priority, for neither could be without the other. Together they form a fundamental structure of Dasein. Dasein is “thrown-projection.”

Discourse, the third equi-primordial structure of Dasein is the means which “thrown-projection” is drawn into clearing. That which is understood is revealed through “articulation” [Artikulation] when the being is brought close interpretively. This articulation is prior to any

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76 GA 2: 190/Being and Time 182.
77 GA 2: 192/Being and Time 184.
79 GA 2: 192/Being and Time 184.
80 GA 2: 193/Being and Time 184-185.
assertion made of it. Though the “as” structure is articulated for the first time in assertion, it has its structure in articulation. Indeed when Dasein relates to equipment it is already in a structural, if unasserted, “as” structure. The totality of references too needs the “as” structure, but it does not need a thematic interpretation.

The thematic interpretation is given in what Heidegger calls the “fore-structure” [Vor-Struktur]. When something in the world is encountered, the thing already has an involvement which is disclosed in our understanding of the world and gets laid out in interpretation. We never throw a primary signification onto a thing.

We have this totality of references in advance in a “fore-having” [Vorhaben]. Likewise, every “fore-having” is grounded in a “fore-sight” [Vorsicht]. The projected character gives Dasein its sight; but Dasein can have sight only of what it has drawn out of circumspection. “Fore-sight,” then, is the first attempt of interpretation of the “fore-having” and is the first having of what is seen. From the “fore-having” and the “fore-sight” arises the interpretation that is decided for a definite way of conceiving it, “fore-conception” [Vorgriff]. And in a similar fashion what occurs as “fore-sight” and “fore-having” always has some framed givenness called “fore-conception.” In every case interpretation is grounded in something that appears to us in advance. This is what Heidegger calls the Fore-structure [Vor-Struktur] of fore-sight, fore-having and fore-conceiving. The Fore-structure as such is necessarily circular. In other words, we have eyes because we see.

When entities within-the-world are discovered along with the Being of Dasein, they are said to be understood. When they are understood they are said to have meaning [Sinn]. Heidegger cautions us that that which is understood is not the meaning, but the entity or Being. Heidegger

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81 GA 2: 199/Being and Time 191.
82 GA 2: 199/Being and Time 191.
83 GA 2: 200/Being and Time 191.
84 GA 2: 200/Being and Time 192.
Meaning is that wherein the intelligibility [Verständlichkeit] of something maintains itself. That which can be articulated in a disclosure by which we understand, we call ‘meaning.’”

Meaning is the “upon which” in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something.

The crucial move for Heidegger is the fact that the question about the meaning of Being in so far as it enters into the understanding of Dasein. The meaning of Being can never be contrasted with beings; nor can the meaning of Being be given as the “ground” which supports entities. For “ground becomes accessible only as meaning, even if it is the ground as the meaningless abyss.”

One could speak of the ground of meaning as groundless, but we prefer to maintain adherence to the Fore-structure. Thus, the meaning of Being is limited by the understanding of Dasein, and this in turn, is determined by the “worldhood” which includes beings.

Thus we come to the circle of interpretation. As the disclosiveness of the “there” understanding pertains to the whole of Being-in-the-world. In every understanding of the world, existence is understood with it. All interpretation [Auslegung] operates in the “Fore-structure.” Any interpretation which is to contribute understanding must already have been understood to interpret it. The circle can never be avoided; to attempt to do so is to misunderstand understanding from the ground up. Rather than a vicious circle, for Heidegger it is a circle that reveals something of Being.

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85 GA 2: 201/Being and Time 193.
86 GA 2: 202/Being and Time 194.
87 Aristotle was the first to discuss this issue in his work entitled, Περὶ Ἑρμηνείας, from which we derive our term, hermeneutics. The work is usually referenced by its Latin title, De Interpretatione. Aristotle confined the term to mean self-expression or communication in discourse, De Interpretatione, 16a. Heidegger broadens significantly hermeneutics and discourse to include not simply propositional, apophantic language, but also general language and even self-expression and communication in any form. Heidegger worked vigorously on Aristotle in 1921-22 before writing Being and Time, as evidenced by GA 61, 62: Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle and Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection with Aristotle. See Thomas Sheehan’s illuminating discussion on Heidegger’s engagement with Aristotle’s work: “Hermeneia and Apophansis: The early Heidegger on Aristotle,” in Heidegger et l’idée de la phénoménologie, Franco Volpi et al. (Dordrecht, NE: Kluwer, 1988) 67-80.
In terms of traditional philosophical discussions, the hermeneutical circle would be seen as a situation of *aporia*, a contradictory situation, wherein no solution can be found. While philosophers through the ages have used such *aporias* to illustrate absurdities, or unsolvable problematic, Heidegger employs this as the very heart of Dasein and Being. It is the very arena of language, from which all discourse arises. Although Heidegger does not elaborate much on this topic in *Being and Time*, it does emerge later. We simply need to be aware of the fact that in the core of Heidegger’s early work are the seeds for later meditation on language and Being. For in its treatment we how structure and content of linguistics can show itself as both the step and the way, unfolding as Being as Saying

Before we move on to those works, we will unfold the trajectory of *Being and Time* somewhat further until we complete the complete structure of Dasein as care [*Sorge*]. Care is Dasein ahead-of-itself being already-in-the-world as a being alongside entities within the world. To understand or to discuss one part of the structure is to use necessarily the other parts to help explain it. All three aspects are equi-primordial and co-implicatory and never without the others. At the same time in order to explain or understand them we must use discourse, which has it very root in the care structure. As we begin to see this dilemma of the hermeneutic structure along with the trajectory of Dasein, we see why *Being and Time* is a successful failure. Within Dasein’s structure a deeper kind of language lies prior to assertion, and without language as assertion we cannot understand or articulate fully Dasein’s structure.89

From interpretation [*Auslegung*] an assertion [*Aussage*] arises; it is derivative. By considering an assertion we can see how the “as” structure can be modified. This analysis is crucial since from the ancient times, for Heidegger, λόγος functioned “as the only clue for

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88 One need not look any farther than Plato, Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* B or Nietzsche.
89 Heidegger will spend much time and many pages in the attempt to discuss fully this problematic.
obtaining access to that which is, and for defining the Being of such entities." The primary signification of “assertion” is “pointing out” [Aufzeigen]. Second, “assertion” means “predication; we assert a predicate of a subject and the subject is given a definite apophathic character. Finally, “assertion” means “communication” [Mitteilung] and speaking forth [Heraussage].

With these characteristics, assertion is leveling off of the hermeneutical “as-structure” [Als-Struktur]. It is derivative of the hermeneutic “as-structure” and is merely a pointing-out. Assertion means no less than predication. Finally, assertion means communication. It is, therefore, a pointing-out which gives something a definite character and which communicates. With the “as-structure” logic is developed; thus, even logic is rooted in the existential analytic of Dasein. All of those arenas of communication and thinking in everyday life, then, are derivative modes of the hermeneutic “as-structure.”

As we have learned assertion is also derivative of understanding. We can see how understanding is more primordial than cognition in Heidegger’s mindset. While cognition is the outcome of the process of thinking, understanding is how the process can occur in the first place; cognition relies on understanding. This is not a constructivist approach to thinking. Rather, understanding discloses the thing as something and discloses in itself as what Dasein is capable. Understanding configures both Being and the thing together. Meaning is never private, but always includes the world. Dasein can be transparent to itself—seizing on the concealedness/disclosiveness as a being. Heidegger highlights understanding as a more primordial structure, so as to illustrate that any modes of cognition arise from it.

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90 GA 2: 205/Being and Time 196. One might question Heidegger whether “ἀνθέφειτος” or “νοούς” might serve the same function.
91 GA 2: 205-6/Being and Time 196-197.
92 GA 2: § 33.
Likewise, discourse [Rede]$^{93}$ is more primordial than simply language or words. Rather, Rede makes possible spoken language. It is articulation of meaning and intelligibility; it includes hearing and keeping silent [Schweigen], hearing and silence. More than grammar, logic and meaning, instead Rede includes hearing by attending to others and oneself with silence as its attending, if primary, mode. The task of liberating discourse from grammar, logic or meaning as language-as-components requires a positive understanding of the basic structure of discourse in general as an existentiale structure of Dasein. Hearing is based on the more primordial hearkening; hearkening is relational, even silence reveals the relational structure of Dasein. Discourse [Rede] is the existential-ontological foundation of language [Sprache].$^{94}$

Conversely, to see language-as-component is to engage in the world ontically. Language-as-component engages in “idle talk” [Gerede]. Idle talk is constituted by gossiping or passing the word along; it is superficial. Average intelligibility is different from primordial understanding. Itelligibility is without making it one’s own and is utterly public and is not imparted by communication. It is groundless floating and leaves the roots of intelligibility untapped. Silence from primordial understanding, on the other hand, quiets “idle talk” by drawing Dasein to its ownmost; thus, it reveals the ontological depths of Dasein as care.

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$^{93}$ William Richardson prefers to translate “Rede” as “logos,” following Joseph Möller in Existenzialphilosophie und katholische Theologie (Baden Baden, DE: Verlag für Kunst und Wissenschaft, 1952) 57. Richardson rightly seems the increasing importance of Rede as “logos” making-manifest and letting-be-seen in Heidegger’s opus, but I will argue that Richardson wrongly attributes this importance solely to “logos” as thinking of Being. Rather, I contend that “thinking of Being” is but one way of “logos.” Eventually, Heidegger prefers “Being as Saying” over “Thinking of Being.” Cf. Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, 66-70. Kockelmans follows Richardson’s direction of translating Rede as “logos” and finds with it three levels, from most primordial to least: enunciation, attribution and communicating. The problematic with this distinction, Rede appears as a mode of Verstehen. See Kockelmans, Heidegger’s “Being and Time, 152-153.

$^{94}$ GA 2: 213/Being and Time 203.
Care Structure

While the three aspects of the care structure appear as separate and were treated as separated, they are actually gathered as Being-in-the-world. As thus Heidegger finds that these together occur as a formal indicator of the deeper analysis that worldhood, being-in and being-with have ontological status.\[95\] The ontological status reveals the primordial totality as a whole. The whole is revealed by the trajectory of the phenomenological approach.

Having arrived at the care structure as a whole, we need to address this totality of the structure briefly before concluding our meditation on *Being and Time*. To do so we look, not outside, but within Dasein for the attunement that discloses Dasein to itself. Since Dasein’s average everydayness can be defined as Being-in-the-world which is fallen and disclosed, thrown and projected, and for which its ownmost potentiality-for-Being is an issue, both in its Being alongside the ‘world’ and in its Being-with Others, Dasein’s everydayness is that which reveals or conceals Dasein.\[96\] That primary mood that reveals is anxiety [Angst], which fundamentally reveals the unity of Dasein’s structural elements as care—\[97\] we are that type of being whose Being is revealed in being concerned about its Being. We are aware of this pre-ontologically, but it is masked in our everyday existence. The experience of Angst is a confirmation of the primordial totality. Worldhood shows the ecstatic direction of “existentiality” [Existenzität], Being-in has the ecstatic direction of “facticity” [Faktizität]; Being-with has the ecstatic direction of “being-fallenness” [Verfallenheit].

In turn, a deeper analysis reveals the existential modes “beneath” the ecstatic directions. “Existentiality” had the existential mode of “understanding” [Verstehen]; “facticity” has the\footnote{\[95\] GA 2: §39.} \footnote{\[96\] GA 2: 240/Being and Time 225.} \footnote{\[97\] GA 2: 242-243/Being and Time 225-227.}
existential mode of “state-of-mind” [Befindlichkeit/Stimmung]; “being-fallen” has the existential mode of “discourse” [Rede]. These modes also can appear inauthentically: understanding as “ambiguity” [Zweideutigkeit]; “state-of-mind” appears as “curiosity” [Neugier]; “discourse” as “idle talk” [Gerede].

The existential or existentiell modes of Dasein point to a deeper existential-ontological construction. Thus “understanding” points to “projection” [Entwurf]; “state-of-mind” points to “thrownness,” “always already” [Geworfenheit]; “discourse” points to “fallingness” [Verfallen]. Each existentially appears: “projection” as “death;” “thrownness” as “guilt;” “Fallingness” as conscience.”

Yet all the modes and in all their levels occur as unity, Being-in-the-world as “care” [Sorge]. Care is Dasein ahead-of-itself being already-in-the-world as Being alongside entities within the world. Heidegger here is undoing common notions of truth, Being-as-presence and undoing Western philosophy. But Heidegger retains the practical, for indeed the theoretical was always given in the practical. The practical is what directs us in the trajectory from the everyday by informal indicators to find the structure of Dasein as “care.”

Angst is one such formal indicator; it leads us to it by the discomfiting mood of “uncanniness” [Unheimlichkeit]. Due to the discomfit, we rather flee into “the they” and into “tranquilized familiarity” [beruhiger Vertrautheit] of the “at-home” [Zuhause]. The Existential structural of “Fallenness” as absorption in-the-world can become the existentiell “falling” or fleeing as idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity. Idle talk, groundless floating, curiosity [Neugier], all disclose everything as everywhere and nowhere; ambiguity [Zweideutigkeit] suppresses everything
as everything and nowhere. But what is the motivation of the fleeing? Dasein is equi-primordially both in truth and in untruth, as a Being unto death.  

**Dasein and Temporality**

From this realization—Dasein as discloser and concealer, as grounded both in truth and untruth—the true trajectory of the analysis of Dasein emerges. Heidegger can now raise the question of Dasein’s potentiality-for-Being-a-whole [*Ganzseinkönnen*]. As long as Dasein is, there is something which Dasein could be, and thus, something is always outstanding. Included in what is outstanding is the “end” or death. Death is revealed as the goal of one’s ownmost Being. Death leads Dasein to “anticipation,” [Vorlaufen] of its own possibility of non-being and the discomfitting mood of “uncanniness” [*Unheimlich*]. Since death is the ownmost possibility of Dasein; it leads Dasein to impassioned [involved] “Freedom-towards Death.” Death’s “call” reveals “Guilt” [*Schuld*] to Dasein as the one who is guilty; Dasein is not guilty in a moral sense, but in the sense that Dasein’s ownmost possibility is as not-Being or the “not” [Nicht]. Facing the possibility of not-being leads Dasein to conscience [*Gewissen*] and ultimately leads to resoluteness [*Entschlossenheit*] to “hermeneutic situation,” which for Heidegger is the totality of all these explicit presuppositions of death.

Thus, death as an existential nullity is not a privation. “Guilt,” the “Not,” “Conscience,” “Call,” “Resoluteness,” “Situation” all reveal that untruth is hiding the Being that belongs to Dasein. The unity of existentiality, facticity, and fallenness, which

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98 GA 2: 223, §44.
99 GA 2: 310/Being and Time 276.
100 GA 2: 308/275.
is the totality of Dasein’s structural whole, reveals the “truth” that belongs to Dasein. That “truth” is revealed as temporality. Anticipatory Resoluteness as self-transformation leads to no identity, the potentiality-for-Being-a-whole, [Ganzseinkönnen]. Temporality is the entirety of the whole as fallen-projecting-thrownness, which reveals the structure of temporality.

Thus Heidegger holds that Dasein’s structure lies in the very fabric of temporality. While the trajectory of Being and Time seemed a long pathway, it is not a movement of steps along a linear path. Temporality once appeared as a series of instances along the way of a lengthy exposition, but is now revealed not as an instant but as a non-linear moment. Heidegger writes: “Temporality temporalizes itself as a future which makes present in the process of having been.”¹⁰¹ This is non-successive readiness-to-hand time. It is shown as ecstasies of already, having-been and present.

Historicality, then, is the form of authenticity while history is the form of inauthenticity. Being’s history is not a Hegelian progress [Fortschritt] through time. The “Moment” [Augenblick] is the change with respect to Dasein who accepts, discloses, and is resolute towards death. Disclosing is a fuller form of authenticity; it allows for a change of identity and gives ourselves a fate [Schicksal]. Fate for Heidegger is not the fate of the materialism of the Stoics nor is it one of religious fate. Rather “fate” acknowledges Being-onto-death as the “Moment” [Augenblick]. It changes Dasein. But more importantly, the “Moment” transforms Dasein from a linear Being to a Being of circularity, a futural-having-been-in-a-moment-of-vision Being, poised between the future and past. Rather than future that will never be, Dasein faces a primordial interpretation [Auslegung]. As such the “Moment” is the fullest form of authenticity.

¹⁰¹ GA 2: 463/401.
leads to authentic changes in cultures or worlds and gives an authentic destiny [Geschick] shorn of the Hegelian stream of time and amassing of wealth and power. This is time as the horizon of Being.

For Heidegger time as horizon of Being emerges from this primordial time of time as the “Moment.” Heidegger expresses it thusly: “Temporality reveals itself as the meaning of care.” Present-at-hand time is successive and unites temporality with all those of disclosing Being: its tendencies toward all those of everydayness: “datability,” “spannedness,” “significance” and “publicness.” Inauthentic time is part of Dasein’s tendency to conceal.

Again, the ongoing primordiality is seen in the care structure. Care is primordial; also care appears whole and direct. Care is revealed as temporality; the structural aspects of Dasein appear as standing–out or as “ecstasies” of temporality; they are the phenomena of the primordiality of the “Moment.” In care Dasein appears as “Ahead-of-itself [sich-vorweg],” “Being-already [Schon-Sein-in],” “As-being-alongside [Sein-bei]” equi-primordially. So too temporality appears as Future [Zukunft], past [Gewesenheit], and present [Gegenwart] equi-primordially. Dasein is drawn relationally to- [zu], in- [auf], and with- [bei] equi-primordially vis-à-vis Being. Dasein, then, is seen having the character in-between, in-between truth and untruth, in-between time and in-between Being.

Since temporality reveals itself as the meaning of care, Heidegger insists that care leads us through formal indicators to temporality. Temporality [Zeitlichkeit] of future [Zukunft], past [Gewesen] and present [Gegenwart], now show themselves as truth: future as “driving,” past as “context,” and present as “what happens.” Truth is now revealed as

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102 GA 2: 432/374.
a “truth” consisting of both truth and untruth. The attributes of disclosing [Erschliessen] are all at once to close-over [Verschliessen], to uncover [Entdecken] and to cover up [Verdecken].

While we noted early in this chapter that Dasein’s tendency to conceal is the reason that we need phenomenology, we now see that phenomenology too may still be part of the concealing, for Dasein is both revealer and concealer. A Dasein-centered analysis can never find a pathway of solely revealing. Heidegger writes: “The ontological source of Dasein’s Being is not ‘inferior’ to what springs from it, but towers above it in power from the outset; in the field of ontology, any ‘springing-from’ is a degeneration.”103 While Heidegger has shown to us that ontology is prior, perhaps even superior, to that which springs from it, the phrase ‘towers above it in power’ still hints at some mode of construction with power, toward some “something” of Dasein, other than Being-itself.

Concluding this long and winding journey, following the trajectory of Being and Time has been fruitful, but not conclusive. We have revealed a path that shows us a way toward Being, only to find that the pathway we have uncovered is but of our own device. We have uncovered ourselves in the process of uncovering. The steps, admittedly, are labyrinthine, even seemingly extraneous to our topic of Being and language. But have we not seen the crucial point to which we have come? We have come to the very nexus of Dasein and Being, which will be shown in language. Moreover, we have found that language properly understood is more primordial than originally conceived. In this demonstration alone, we have come a far distance along the path.

103 GA 2: 442/383.
But the question still is unresolved: What is exactly the relationship between language and Being. If language is merely a tool, it will be ontic, but how can ontic language be employed to describe the deeper ontological description. Certainly the being with the character of Dasein uses language. Yet language’s relationship to Being must be as deep as that which it describes. Surely, it must be part of the care structure, but shall it be placed within understanding or Mitsein? Language does have expressive characteristics, tied to possibility. But, at the same time, language is relational and seems to reside in Mitsein. Moreover, language seems to straddle both understanding and Mitsein, as between, or that which enables the hermeneutic circle to remain intact. These questions lie at the heart of why Being and Time seems inadequate to Heidegger’s task.

We must now turn to Heidegger’s next major approach to Being and language in the Beiträge as Being unfolds as the Ereignis, the event. Rather than look to Dasein, we ask: What is the Being of the things-that-are and how integrally is language related to it? In that way the overall plan in Being and Time could continue to interpret the meaning of Being of Dasein. From Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology of Dasein, we move toward a meditation on the event of appropriation as the manifestation of Being. We now move toward the destruction of the history of ontology as Heidegger intended, but could not, complete in Being and Time.

\footnote{104 This trajectory arises from Richard Polt’s most lucid and helpful treatment of the Beiträge. See Polt, The Emergency of Being 1.}
CHAPTER TWO

Early Approaches II

— The path, circling around, is drawing us along ... 

POETRY AND GREEK PHILOSOPHY

In a very clear way the unfinished work of Being and Time becomes the focus of this next phase of Heidegger’s investigation of Seinsgeschichte, but rather than a search for a fundamental ontology, Heidegger engages in the destruction of the history of ontology. Being and Time has given us a phenomenological trajectory toward the relationship between Being and language and yet that path seemed to be a cul-de-sac.105

After Being and Time Heidegger’s major efforts detail the destruction of metaphysics and

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105 As Dieter Thomä writes poignantly on Heidegger’s treatment of the mountainous collection of terminology in Being and Time and its aporetic conclusion: language’s indexicality “endorsed the privilege of a Dasein surrounded by things caught, for their part, in a net of meanings and references.” Later Heidegger transforms the system of indexical language into a liberating effect by attending to the “things” themselves. This chapter illustrates the direction toward the things themselves, via the thought of Being. See Dieter Thomä, “The Name on the Edge of Language: A Complication in Heidegger’s Theory of Language and its Consequences,” in A Companion to Heidegger’s Introduction to Metaphysics, ed. Richard Polt and Gregory Fried (New Haven, CN: Yale University, 2001) 111.

Heidegger realizes how the usage of language in Being and Time led toward opacity in his thought; once he had broken through this opacity, he reflected years later on this issue in 1946 in the “Letter on Humanism;” “The liberation of language from grammar into a more original essential framework is reserved for thought and poetic creation.” GA 9: 314/“Letter on Humanism,” Basic Writings 240.
de-centering of Dasein; both Kant and Nietzsche become dialogue partners, not simply to outline metaphysics and its ultimate destruction, but also in our words to map out a new course.

Heidegger argues in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*¹⁰⁶ that any process of epistemology leads to a Supreme Being of Metaphysics and unattainable pure reason. While Kant saw the problem of Being within the first *Critique*, somewhat as Heidegger does now. Kant concludes differently with the *aporia* that what we know (phenomenon) must be grounded by that which we cannot know (noumenon). While in dialogue with Kant’s works, Heidegger comes to appreciate the fact that ontology, though not metaphysics, still has inherent problems that mirror the problems of metaphysics.¹⁰⁷ Ontology’s problem lies in the circularity of a discloser, who is also disclosed in a process of disclosiveness using the language of the discloser; the problem is that while it discloses well Dasein as an analytic, it fails to disclose fully the meaning of Being.

What similarity does this hermeneutic circle share with Kant’s problem of the noumenon, the noumenal self, and noumenal Being? In both cases, that which we cannot know or see is then posited with a coined term. Man treats the posited term as though it were the solution to a solved problem, rather than the problem itself. In both cases, man uses terms of language as buckets of meaning, scooping up known entities. Both Kant and Heidegger in *Being and Time* fail to disclose Being fully.

¹⁰⁶ GA 3: §8.
¹⁰⁷ Heidegger writes in a treatise composed in 1940, entitled “*Die seingeschichtliche Bestimmung des Nihilismus*”/“Nihilism and the History of Being” that metaphysics and ontology are both inherently theology and thus, express themselves as a will to power: “Metaphysics is inherently theology. It is theology to the extent that it says the being as being, the ὤν ἕν ὤν. Ontology is simultaneously and necessarily theology.” GA 6.2: 313/“Nihilism as Determined by the History of Being,” Nietzsche IV 209.
Tellingly, the early Heidegger and Kant both seem to offer the human person somehow as the key; it might be said that the human appears for the modern era as a *Deus ex machina* as did God so often for the Medievalists. Nietzsche’s bold claim that metaphysics leads to nihilism reverberates a death rattle even in Heidegger’s *Being and Time*, for if ontology has not first adequately clarified the meaning of Being, it remains blind to its task, as Heidegger has already cautioned us.\(^{108}\)

During this time Heidegger turns toward poetry and the philosophies of, and those prior to, Plato and Aristotle as an avenue of discovery through this problematic. Poets break open language to reveal new possibilities of reality. What are those characteristics of poetry which assist in a new way toward the understanding of Being and language? How were the philosophies of Heraclitus and Parmenides more primordial than the narrow conception of thought since Plato and Aristotle, as Heidegger asserts? These are the questions which preoccupy Heidegger in the ensuing years.

To address the *aporia* of these questions, we now direct our attention to Heidegger’s destructive retrieval.\(^{109}\) It is contained in much of his work in the 1930- and 40s on the early Greek philosophers, poets and centers around the *Beiträge*.\(^{110}\) This approach massaged and transformed language in order to uncover originary thought and language, asymptotically nearing, but never reaching, Being. It circled around the same issues of Being, language and things. It even breaks apart language in an attempt to retrieve Being. Its emphasis was the thought and language of Being.

\(^{108}\) *GA 2: 15/Being and Time* 31.
\(^{109}\) We are following Kockelmanns and Richardson, who translate “*Wiederholung*” as “retrieve.” See Kockelmanns, *Heidegger’s “Being and Time* 70; Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* 89.
\(^{110}\) This claim is neither to define this period as solely a period of destructive retrieval nor is the way of destructive retrieval exclusive of these years.
On this new path we primarily will discuss Heidegger’s works in this order: “Plato's Doctrine of Truth,” and “On the Essence and concept of φύσις in Aristotle’s Physics B, I,” both of 1931, will treat the shortcomings of Western philosophy in its early years, fracturing truth; followed by a treatment of poetry in “Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry,” 1936, and a treatment of art in “The Origin of the Work of Art,” 1936, to rupture language and “things” via “aesthetics;” and finally “Nietzsche I,” 1936, explores how art is simply a manifestation of the will to power. Once these ways have taken root as the history of Being, we will focus on “Seyn” of the Beiträge elucidating the relationship of Being as such with language. The path of the thought of Being leads to no-thingness.

The pathway of the thought of Being, then, is offered as Heidegger’s entrée toward Being. While the above ways are not the entirety of Heidegger’s work during this period, they are certainly emblematic of our concerns for language and Being. Instead of phenomenology, Heidegger enters the thought of the “world” of the first beginning, i.e., Western philosophy; Heidegger breaks apart thought by using poetry and art and lays it open for new possibilities. Heidegger employs both art and thought so that we may be drawn toward Being. For this reason, we could characterize this inquiry of Heidegger as engaging in the thought of Being. Heidegger begins with the Western philosophical tradition.

111 Both essays are translated by Thomas Sheehan and are found in GA 9/Pathmarks.  
112 “Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry” is found in GA 4/Elucidations, a compilation of reflections that spans the entirety of Heidegger’s lifetime. This early essay is surprising in its clarity of later themes, which encourages us yet again to categorize Heidegger’s early, middle and later periods without setting clear definitional boundaries only insofar as these categories help to draw out themes. Likewise, this early talk with later themes highlights the fact that Heidegger’s thought is more consistent than might be offered by William Richardson’s theory of Heidegger I and II.
Heidegger holds that those thinkers before Plato and Aristotle did not even call thinking philosophy. Thinking for them was the thinking “of Being.” Heidegger highlights the double meaning of the genitive usage here. Thinking is “of Being” insofar as it is appropriated by Being and belongs to Being. Thinking also is “of Being” as it listens to Being. Years later in 1946, Heidegger ponders this idea in “Letter on Humanism:” “As belonging to the being that listens, thinking is what is according to its [thinking’s] essential origin.”¹¹³ In other words, since man is a listening being, thinking must have the same comportment as listening. This path of listening seeks Being as essential origin; thinking, by using language, might show us the way toward Being.

But this way of thinking from the time of Plato onward, became concerned with, and entangled in, truth and its attainment, not the thinking “of Being.” Truth has been ensconced in the notion of truth as an agreement to the thing. In his allegory of the cave, Republic, Book VII, Plato depicts in various stages the movement of a prisoner from the dark cave into daylight and back again. Heidegger notes that while each level of dwelling the prisoner sought a particular level of truth [\(\alpha\lambda\eta\beta\varepsilon\varsigma\)] normative at each level,¹¹⁴ dwelling was defined by that which it sought. For example, the lowest level of imagining [\(\iota\kappa\alpha\omicron\omicron\alpha\)] was defined by that which it sought, namely, images or shadows

¹¹³ GA 9: 147-148, 150/“Plato’s Doctrine of Truth,” Pathmarks 241, 243. Heidegger continues insightfully his way of thinking regarding language of essential origin: “Language still denies us its essence: that it is the house of truth of being. Instead, language surrenders itself to our mere willing and trafficking as an instrument of domination over beings. Beings themselves appear as actualities in the interaction of cause and effect. … But if the human being is to find his way once again into the nearness of being he must first learn to exist in the nameless.” Heidegger’s point of departure uses thought, rather than language, as the way. Heidegger persists in drawing along the way, ever closer to the Being of beings. For that reason, we will find that he will abandon later the thought of Being path for a new one as Being as Saying. Could it be that, at this point, he holds that language is that which directs us to things, while thought directs us to Being? Soon he finds this distinction also to be a cul-de-sac.

lowest because it was most changeable and, therefore for Plato, less knowable. To know, for Plato, was to imitate or to participate in the objects of knowledge, the unchanging, eminently knowable forms. Heidegger, roughly speaking, holds Plato as defining things by their participation in transcendental, knowable forms.

For Heidegger, Plato concealed the actual dwelling of the human person and wrested truth from its grounded situation. Instead of truth as non-concealment, truth, for Plato, was the accord between what was seen-as-separate and the seeing of the seen-as-separate. How this accord was explained preoccupied philosophers thereafter.

Heidegger sees this preoccupation with truth a humanistic venture. In this venture Being is hidden and language is at the service of truth’s adequation to an outside source; its central problem is the explanation of how any thing can move toward the totally other without the mediation of a third thing; in other words, how does participation of forms participate.

Aristotle, too, continues to conceal Being and language, Heidegger insists. In addition to Plato’s truth as seeking forms, Aristotle’s concealment occurs on the level of the conception of a “thing.” The thing is comprised of form and matter as a substance. The form is not, outside, but within the thing itself as its essence or its nature. The Romans translate into natura, from which we receive the word, nature. But rather than Plato’s problem of Being hidden in the search of an outside adequation of truth, Aristotle’s problem of Being is now hidden within “enformed things”

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115 See Plato’s *The Republic*: 514a-517a.
116 Ample space has been dedicated previously to this so-called “third man argument,” coined by Aristotle and the problem of infinite regression in Plato’s participation of the forms.
117 Aristotle defines φύσις in *Physics* 1.192b21: “… nature is a source or cause of being.”
and the need to adequately their inward truth; adequation now struggles to be expressed outwardly.

In 1939 Heidegger discusses the concept of "Фύσις" in *Physics B*. Like Plato’s notion of truth, Aristotle’s concept of nature hides Being. The essence of "Фусис" is defined through its state of movedness, namely, κίνησις. This state of movedness, though, is of its own “nature.” Since movedness is of its own “nature,” Aristotle finds the best way to express its Фусис-like nature is by placing into an appearance; i.e., only where there is μορφή, a stationary shape. Heidegger concludes that Aristotle infers that μορφή constitutes the essence of Фусис, or at least co-constitutes it.

Since μορφή is seen as the essence, as an appearance without the movement of Фусис, any discussion of the Фусис must be described by a word that seems also to be without movement. Thus λόγος must be stationary and can only reflect the stationary form of the thing. Aristotle’s problem is one of adequation between the moving thing and the stationary μορφή and its correspondingly stationary λόγος.

But Heraclitus describes λόγος differently. According to Heidegger, fragment 93 of Heraclitus offers another meaning of nature and its corresponding λόγος: nature is in flux, logos is unconcealing/concealing. The fragment reads as follows: “The Lord whose oracle is at Delphi neither speaks nor conceals, but gives a sign ["Όυτε λέγει Όυτε λέγει οὖτε κρύπτει αλλά σέμαινει"]. Heidegger reinterprets this fragment: “λέγειν is

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opposed to κρύπτειν;”121 Heidegger says, therefore, revealing is counterpoised to concealing. Thus, Heraclitus has the meaning that the oracle does not directly unconceal nor does it simply conceal, but it points out, Heidegger emphasizes. This means: it unconceals while it conceals, and it conceals while it unconceals. Since Heraclitus’ λόγος follows nature, pointing to the flux, it too is flexible.

Nature can be looked at from these above two viewpoints, as moving and stationary, because while nature is one kind of Being, Being is twofold and expresses its twofold manner; Being is the gathering of the self-concealing revealing.122 Φύσις is Being come out into the unhidden. Heidegger elaborates on this point with another fragment of Heraclitus, namely, fragment 123: “φύσις κρύπτειθαι φίλει: Being loves to hide itself.”123 Though φύσις comes out into the unhidden, it prefers to remain hidden. Heidegger explains: “Self-revealing is a coming-forth into unhiddenness, and this means: first preserving unhiddenness as such by taking it back into its essence. Unhiddenness is called α’—λήθεια.124 Truth, then, is essentially not human knowing and asserting; rather, truth as self-revealing/concealing belongs primarily to Being itself. Φύσις as α’—λήθεια, is unconcealing as the unconcealing of what is primarily concealed.125

In this text two issues need illuminating for Heidegger. Heidegger privileges Heraclitus over both Plato and Aristotle, because of their misunderstanding of truth as seemingly static, whether immanently [μορφή, a stationary shape] or transcendentally [changeless εἶδος]. Second, the search for truth hides the search for Being; this is the reason, in part, why Being is so elusive and its meaning ambiguous. But more

123 Diels-Kranz 22B123/McKirahan 10.42.
importantly Being, Heidegger insists, is elusive for the reason that Being is not a thing with a φύσις, but loves to hide in beings.

When we come the being called human being, when we see Aristotle’s definition of the human person—ἀνθρωπός-ζῷον λόγον ἐχον: man, the animal who has logos—to see how misleading that construal can be. In that construal man had language as a capability. Instead, Heidegger defines the human being as the living entity who holds oneself in the word. For Heidegger the human being dwells within the word, he moves and lives in its house. Heidegger notes that we can interchange “word” for “language,” provided we think the nature of language adequately and originally, namely, from the essence of λόγος correctly understood. The human person does not have the capacity of language or speech merely, but language has within itself the means to gather; the human person can use a word, but more properly a human being is born into a language, immersed in it. Once with within language’s ability to gather meaning,

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126 While this formulation is attributed to Aristotle, the case needs to be clarified. In Politics 1253a 9-10 Aristotle writes: “Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in vain, and man is the only animal who has the gift of speech.” and similarly in 1332b 5: “Man has reason, in addition, and man alone.” See Aristotle, Politics, trans B Jowett, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1984).

While the translation is not false, some further details are needed to nuance fully the term, “λόγος.” Λόγος means more than reason for Aristotle. W. K. C. Guthrie lists eleven common meanings of λόγος in the fifth-century Greek world: anything said, worth, account, proportion, reason or argument, reason, speech, measure, general principle and definition are among them. See A History of Greek Philosophy, Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1962) 419-24. Of these possibilities, Aristotle, in the fourth-century, never indicated that λόγος was the highest function, for that was νοῦς, or contemplation. Nor is reason more primordial than the ability of speech. Barring those limitations, any of the other synonyms would be acceptable. To compound the confusion, Seneca renders Aristotle’s text into Latin as “Rationale enim animal est homo.” The catchphrase, “Man is a rational animal,” has been attached to Aristotle’s hand ever since.

More importantly, λόγος does not exhaust the nature of man. Man is also by nature a political animal. Hannah Arendt in The Human Condition shed lights on this misconception of man’s solitary nature. She includes Aristotle’s other dimensions of man, including being a political animal [ζῷον πολιτικον]. Thus, Arendt rightly is critical of Heidegger on this point. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago, 1958) 27. Confer with Aristotle, Politics 1253a 2-3.


128 Heidegger is deferring to the common meaning for “λόγος” in the fifth-century Greek world, wherein “λόγος” can mean word or language interchangeably.
etc., then the human person can use language to make assertion. Due to the above gathering, then, humans can derive from language the ability to use language as assertion. This route seeing language merely as a tool, this Aristotelian route of man having language, draws away from Being. A new possibility is needed.

Rather than continue with the philosophical language of Plato and Aristotle, Heidegger diverges from this first beginning and investigates language as poetry for the possibility of its source leading toward Being. Or more accurately said, Heidegger hereafter continues to intersperse philosophy of the first beginning with poetic reflections. Since poetry refuses the jargon of philosophy, it seems the perfect arena to avoid the traps of the first beginning.¹²⁹

But Heidegger does not simply choose a poet simply for literary excellence. Rather, Heidegger chooses Hölderlin as poet because Hölderlin’s mission was composing poems solely about the essence of poetry. Without using philosophical jargon, Hölderlin is already part of the conversation of what is question worthy, namely, Being. Essence, source, ground are all terms which both worlds of philosophy and the poetry of Hölderlin employ. Hence, Heidegger’s poetic divergence still holds the same goal as the first beginning: Being.

“Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry”¹³⁰ is remarkable in its ability to knead the conceptual framework of the philosophers and rework its language so that Being is revealed in language. Heidegger deliberately italicizes the first title word of its encompassing volume, Erläuterungen, for emphasis; its root, lautern, draws the reader,

¹²⁹ But Heidegger comes to realize that poetry also has jargon of its own. See GA 12: 186/“The Nature of Language,” On the Way to Language 92.
¹³⁰ This lecture was first given in Rome on April 2, 1936 and was later published, compiled with other similar, but later, reflections under the title Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung. The English is translated well by Keith Hoeller under the title, Elucidations in Hölderlin’s Poetry.
not to philosophical appearances, but to the sounds that poetry make readily heard. As 
heard, these poetic sounds allow Being to appear.131 The shift from knowing-as-seeing to 
knowing-as-hearing is quite deliberate. Philosophical thought is subordinated, so that a 
new type of thinking can emerge.132

Heidegger takes five stanzas from Hölderlin’s poetry as encapsulating 
Heidegger’s own intentional confrontation with philosophy.133 Poetry confronts 
philosophy’s false clarity, which demands our obedient attention; playful, even innocent, 
poetry invites, entices, and persuades us to come closer to Being. But poetry is not a 
harmless game. Language grants the first possibility of standing in the openness of 
beings.134 For this reason poetry can be dangerous, but with a harmless appearance.135 
As we come closer to Being, we come to the awareness of the possibility of the Being of 
beings. We come closer to the fact that the beings, which inflame our hearts, might 
deceive us with illusions; as Heidegger pens: “Language first creates the manifest place 
of this threat to being….”136 Language makes manifest and yet conceals beings and 
Being. As such it is a danger both to beings and to itself. Language is a tool, but not a 
mere tool; rather, a tool in a more primordial sense, not a tool at man’s disposal, but it is

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131 Heidegger’s reference to sounds does not refer to sound as such, but poetic “sounding” which draws us 
to Being.
132 Regarding his interest in poetry, Heidegger states succinctly in his “Germanien und Der Rhein” lecture 
course of 1934: “The poetic turn towards his [Hölderlin’s] poetry is possible only as a thoughtful 
confrontation with the revelation of Being which is successfully accomplished in this poetry.” GA 39: 6.
133 These poems can and should be found in their original context. See Friedrich Hölderlin, Friedrich 
Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, 1968): III, 377; IV, 246; IV, 343; IV, 63; VI, 25.
134 Robert Bernasconi draws out the purpose of poetry; it is more than purifying the language. He rightly 
argues that the task of poetry is to be fundamental, as Ursprache (“Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry”) or 
“projecting saying” (“Origin of the Work of Art” and “Poetry Language Thought”). See Robert Bernasconi, 
The Question of Language in Heidegger’s History of Being (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press 
135 GA 4, Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung: 45/“Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry,” Elucidations 
62.
“that primal event [**Ereignis**] which disposes of the highest possibility [**die höchste Möglichkeit des Menschseins verfügt**] of man’s being.”¹³⁷ Language is at the service [**verfügen**] of the event, **Ereignis**, not as mere tool, but as unfolding “tool” of **Ereignis**.

How does language occur? The third set of verses discusses this question. Language disposes as **Ereignis** in conversation [**Gespräch**]. While man’s being is grounded in language, grounding occurs only in conversation.¹³⁸ Language is essentially conversation and poetry is essentially the essence of conversation. What usually is meant by language—its words, grammar, and its expression—is only an effect, a manifest aspect, of primordial language. Heidegger concludes: “Being able to talk and being able to hear are co-original [**Redenkönnen und Hörenkönnen sind gleich ursprünglich**].”¹³⁹

For Heidegger hearing and talking are a relation that is deeper than language as assertion. Because they are relational in a primary sense, they can become be employed in assertions afterwards.

Yet it is not we who have begun the conversation, but the gods, who give conversation its foundation and significance, claims Heidegger. Heidegger’s discussion seems to the philosophically minded to verge on the theological or mystical. Though we might question Heidegger’s turn, as John Caputo does,¹⁴⁰ let us simply confine our reflections to the notion of conversation as event. Later we will address what Heidegger

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¹³⁷ *GA* 4: 38/“Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry,” *Elucidations* 56. The verb, “**verfügen**” is a rich term which can be translated variously as “dispose” or “at the service of.” These variations will be explored in the next chapters as we discuss Being as Saying in conjunction with its unfolding.

¹³⁸ Turning toward conversation as the model, Heidegger is looking for a non-static way of describing Being.

¹³⁹ *GA* 4: 39/“Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry,” *Elucidations* 57. Most startling in this discussion is that Heidegger speaks not at all of thinking or the thinking of Being, which is usual indicative of this period. Cleverly, it is a talk which includes listeners, the need component of conversation as hearing; thus, the talk is modeled by the medium.

might mean by “gods,” when it bears full on the discussion of the “fourfold.” In
conversation, one or the other person does not make the conversation, so its significance
cannot come entirely by one or the other, or to the sum of the members. Instead, the
conversation’s significance lies between the parties. Whether we should quibble over
language as between or among members of a conversation is a topic for the next chapters.
At minimum one must agree that conversation can never be founded on a single
individual subject. Heidegger asks who is it that bears this conversation from the gods to
man? It is none other than the poet. The poet is the message bearer of significance and
foundation.

Finally, Heidegger enlarges the topic of a particular conversation into the realm of
human dwelling taken as a whole. Our dwelling is most human when it is poetically
grounded, when it is conversational. Thus poetry is not simply expression, but lies in the
domain of language and is the founding of being and the essence of all things; thus poetry
makes language possible, yet not as we usually understand language makes poetry
possible; poetry is the sustaining ground of history.141

Heidegger concludes that Hölderlin puts into poetry the very essence of poetry—
but not in the sense of a timeless valid concept \[zeitlos gültigen Begriffes\].142 This
essence of poetry belongs to a definite time, in a particular conversation. The poem
stands in the time of need143 \[düftige Zeit\] because it “stands in a double lack
\[gedoppelten Mangel\] and a double not \[Nicht\]: in the no-longer \[Nichtmehr\] of the gods

142 GA 4: 47/“Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry,” Elucidations Elucidations 64.
143 This is Koehler’s italic emphasis, which is not contained in Heidegger’s text. I retain them for the exact
purpose of contrasting this phrase which the usual understanding of the current moment as full of reality.
Heidegger does indeed intend to offer such a contrast of the current moment as one full of potential.
who have fled and in the not-yet [Nochnicht] of the god who is coming.”¹⁴⁴ The poem in its essence stands between the no-longer and the not-yet. The language of the poem opens up an ontological space in time, which seems suspended. The essence of the poem is the interface of time and language and Being. Rather than defining this moment as an instant, Heidegger highlights it through the double negative.

But more than a semantic turn of phrase, the double negative defines that which is most effective in the poem’s essence as defined more by the tension of its negation, of what it lacks, than by what it contains positively. In attempt to understand the double lack, the poet uses a positive phrase, employs time, and employs a “world” to convey that which is not. The positives attributes, speaking in terms of metaphysics, is the effect of the double lack. The positive attributes of the moment and the things it contains are historically due only to the “double lack.” Due to what they are not, makes them historical.

But more than simply historical, the “double lack” makes the essence of poetry primordially historical or historical in the highest degree. Heidegger explains: “The essence of poetry which is founded by Hölderlin is historical in the highest degree [geschichtlich im höchsten Maße], because it anticipates [vorausnimmt] a historical time [geschichtliche Zeit].” Historical time is not a moment of history, but a moment of significance. Heidegger, then, concludes that this opening of significance makes the essence of the poem historical. To what extent can we say that the poem’s possibility equals the essence of the poem? Neither the poem’s words, grammar, nor any part which it contains, makes up its essence, but that which it does not contain, which evokes

¹⁴⁴ GA 4: 46/“Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry,” Elucidations Elucidations 64.
possibility that is indeed its essence.\textsuperscript{145} And the poet is the one who makes this “nothing” possible. As Heidegger depicts the poet, as the one who: “… holds firm in the Nothingness of this night [im Nichts dieser Nacht].”\textsuperscript{146} The poet embraces nothing, bearing it to others.

Heidegger does see that Hölderlin’s poetry is that which best reveals his point: that the relationship between language and Being is more intimate than first ventured. Moreover, it seems that Hölderlin’s poetry is Heidegger’s counterexample to Plato’s philosophy. Rather than participation in eternal forms to define life, Heidegger defines that which is most historical in life by the essence of poetry as a double lack.

\textbf{THE ORIGIN OF THE WORK OF ART}

Having drawn the language of poetry to nothing, Heidegger now needs to break open this intimate relationship of language and Being on the side of things. “The Origin of the Work of Art”\textsuperscript{147} could be seen as Heidegger’s counterexample to Aristotle’s substance, defined as en-formed matter. Aristotle’s simple substance is broken open in

\textsuperscript{145} Heidegger writes further on this point. The nothing is not possible unless it is part of time: “As a historical essence, however, it is the only true essence. [As geschichtliches Wesen ist es aber das einzig wesentliche Wesen.] GA 4: 46-47/“Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry,” Elucidations Elucidations 65.

\textsuperscript{146} GA 4: 46/“Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry,” Elucidations Elucidations 64.

\textsuperscript{147} GA 5: 1-66/“The Origin of the Work of Art,” Off the Beaten Track 1-50. Heidegger first delivered this public lecture to the Kunstwissenschaftliche Gesellschaft at Freiburg im Bregau on November 13, 1935, repeating it the following January in Zürich, Switzerland. The fixed divisions show a later expanded redaction, offered as a tripartite lecture series—“Thing and Work,” “Work and Truth,” and “Truth and Art”—at the Freies Deutsches Hochstift in Frankfurt am Main in November 17 and 24 and December 4, 1936.

While usually the English text is borrowed from Julian Young’s translation in Off the Beaten Path, in some sections I prefer Albert Hofstadter’s translation. Specifically, Hofstadter translates helpfully “Denken” as “thinking.” The gerund, “thinking” seems more consistent than the substantive, “thought” with Heidegger’s emphasis on Being as event. Hofstadter’s translation can be found in Basic Writings: 140-202.
the work of art for Heidegger. In searching for the origin of art, might we also find in it an allegory or path to the origin of beings?¹⁴⁸

Heidegger asks: What is a work of art? It is a commonplace to hear that the work of art is more than the existence of its material. But even interpreting this adage as extreme idealism, we should still be able to gather what art is from the artwork. To do that we must find the essence of art, which is not in the material of the work, but perhaps it could be found in its connection to the artist or later with the art aficionado. So we see that art is tied intricately to the artist and others. While we see that art is more than the material and the work, paradoxically, too, we learn in “The Origin of the Work of Art” that the artwork is the source of the artist’s life. This, the work of art, reveals not only the Being in things, but also things in their Being.

Since the first beginning of philosophy we look to the “thingly” character of art as though the thing were inert. Traditional interpretations distort both the “thing” and “work.” For Heidegger, art arises, not as equipment as “thing” and “work,” but as a “world,” which opens space for man and things. Art, too, is of the “earth,” that is to say that some of the artwork is concealed as physical. Heidegger uses Van Gogh’s painting of the peasant’s shoes in order to unknot the problematic of art. The shoes of the peasant symbolize the mundane, the earthy, while the art as a whole uplifts the shoes into having great significance to anyone who might meditate upon it. Art is both of the “earth” and the “world.”

Artwork is of the “world.” As in Being and Time, world is defined as the structural whole of significant relationships that Dasein experiences. “World” is already

¹⁴⁸ Bernasconi notes that from the time of “The Origin of the Work of Art” Being and language is draw closely together for Heidegger. Bernasconi writes: “Being is thought of in respect of its coming to language.” Question of Language, 38.
familiar to Dasein in everyday human existence. And yet Dasein has always been co
disclosed with the disclosure in all of humanity’s projects and possibilities. Albert
Hofstadter remarks on this multifaceted disclosure of art: “‘World’ names the essential
mystery of existence … the disclosedom of beings, [and] the openness of Being.” In
other words, the peasant’s shoes speak to us of a world of toil that beautifully speaks to
us in a way that is deeper than words and concepts.

Artwork is of the “earth.” “Earth” is strange to us, continues Hofstadter. It is that
which is void of Dasein. “Earth” is vibrantly not present to us as ready-to-hand. Rather,
it is present-at-hand. It protects or shelters, even nourishes without our notice. In
Hölderlin’s poetry we find references to “earth” in poetry. Hölderlin celebrates this
protection and nourishment of the “earth” by what it affords us. It freely offers. The dirt,
not noticed and not significant, is there nonetheless.

Artwork is both “world” and “earth.” Artwork is the creative strife [Streit] of
“world” and “earth;” more precisely, Heidegger writes: “The opposition of ‘world’ and
‘earth’ is strife.” This strife, while sounding violent, is not violent; instead it reveals
beings and lets them come to radiant appearance in a dynamic fashion. The work
instigates this strife. Hofstadter concludes of art: “In all its work the language of art and
thought houses the splendors that come to light.” Lowly is its status among things, the
pair of shoes now is elevated to speak grandly, spanning “world” and “earth.” Heidegger
concludes: “Matter and form and the difference between them have a deeper origin.”

149 Basic Writings 141.
151 Basic Writings 142.
152 GA 5: 20/“The Origin of the Work of Art,” Off the Beaten Track 15.
While the artwork is both of “world” and “earth,” the “world” and “earth” are not to be conceived as form and matter, nor even concealment and unconcealment, but one of strife. For example, what art is should be given from what the work freely offers; we should come to know the essence of art in the work. Yet in order to know the work of art, we rely on the essence of art, which does not lie in the work. This dynamic process brings together art’s essence and its work; it gathers as it holds separate—as strife. The work as gathering-while-holding-separate is the reason that work of art can be seen as a symbol [Symbol]. Thus, for Heidegger the symbol as symbol is dependent on strife. But we must ask: how far from Dasein should that gathering-while-holding-separate, this strife, be construed? Construed too far, the symbol appears as if there were no separateness; construed too closely and it appears as though “earth” and “world” are completely separate.

To field this question of construal, Heidegger circles back to philosophy. Heidegger holds that the “thingness” of the thing in Western philosophy can be seen in three ways. The first way a thing appears is as a thing too-far from Dasein such that the essence of the thing vanishes as separate from the thing. The Greeks called the “thingness” with a vanished essence [τό ὑποκείμενον] of a thing with characteristics [τό συμβεβηκότα], which occur along with it. “Roman thinking takes over the Greek words without the corresponding, equally original, experience of the Greeks,” insists Heidegger. The Western interpretation of the Being of beings becomes stabilized in the following terminology: “ὑποκείμενον becomes subjectum; ὑπόστασις becomes

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153 GA 5: 4/“The Origin of the Work of Art,” Off the Beaten Track 3. Heidegger draws from the Greek word, “συμβέβηκότα,” for Heidegger it is that which brings “into conjunction with.”
154 The italics are retained in both Heidegger’s text and Young’s translation. GA 5: 8/“The Origin of the Work of Art,” Off the Beaten Track 6.
But this translation of Greek into Latin is not without consequence. What once always came along [τά συμβεβηκότα], now is seen as unimportant, accidental, disconnected from Dasein who keeps them [τά συμβεβηκότα], gathered together. The too-far thing’s essence vanishes because the thing seems that it is all “world.” It looks akin to Kant’s unity of apperception, wherein multiplicity of the manifold disappears.

The rootlessness of Western thought then continues in describing this “too-far thing” in this fashion as it pertains to language. Language seems to take this unified structure as indicative of what is true; sentence structure seems to follow the thing-structure. But does it? Heidegger cautions us:

We must ask: Is the structure of a simple propositional statement (the combination of subject and predicate) the mirror image of the structure of the thing (of the union of substance with accidents)? Or could it be that even the structure of the thing as thus envisioned is a projection of the framework of the sentence? At this point is still unclear how language can be both originary and derivative for Heidegger. But what is clear to Heidegger is the realization that, in order for language and things to relate in any way, they must have a mutual source. Heidegger argues: “Both sentence- and thing-structure derive, in their typical form and their possible mutual relationship, from a common and more originary source.” Heidegger calls this a too-far view of a thing. In this too-far version of a thing, language emerges as a structural whole; all variations are but reflections of the one natural origin.

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156 GA 5: 7-9/“The Origin of the Work of Art,” Off the Beaten Track 5-7. This extended quotation seems rhetorical, but for Heidegger the question is sincere. Language seems both originary and derivative, but as of yet is still unclear exactly how it can be both. Heidegger certainly holds that language appears as both; but as of yet, it is not clear how that is the case.
158 We shall look closer at these structuralist claims in our final chapters on unfolding of Being as Saying.
Another philosophical tradition takes a view in which, instead of the essence of the thing vanishing, the thing itself vanishes because, as Heidegger holds, it is too-close. The thing appears simply as the manifold given in the senses. But do we ever really first perceive a throng of sensations, e.g. tones of sound waves and splotches of color in the appearance of things—as this too-close thing-concept asserts? Rather, do we not hear the car crashing, feel the wind brush against our skin, not isolated noises and sensations? “In the too-close thing-concept there is not so much an assault upon the thing, but rather,” Heidegger offers, “it is an inordinate attempt to bring it into the greatest possible proximity to us.”

Thus, the too-close thing vanishes because the thing appears as all “earth,” all multiplicity without unity.

Language built upon this too-close conception of the thing-structure emerges as simple building blocks, a multitude of infinite parts, which can be assembled and reassembles in an infinite of ways. Any given assembly of blocks is new and interesting. No one assembly is the correct variation. All assemblages are equally correct and conventional. Rather than structured, language is mere expression.

A third tradition, equally old as the two previous ones, holds sway. This is to say it both remains and is stationary. This analysis of the thing as matter [ὑλή] and form [μορφή] is posited at the same time. What is constant in a thing, its consistency, lies in the fact that matter stands together with a form. The thing is formed matter. This interpretation of the thing invokes the immediate sight with which the thing concerns us through its appearance [ἐξετάζει] as the immediate view. Such a distinction is the basis

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159 GA 5: 11/“The Origin of the Work of Art,” Basic Writings 152.
160 Here too we shall assess the expressivist claims in our final chapter.
161 GA 5: 11-12/“The Origin of the Work of Art,” Off the Beaten Track 8-9. One can see, by now, Heidegger’s threefold analysis of a thing as criticism of the idealists and empiricists schools in favor of the
for art and aesthetics, for it entails the possibility of an aesthetic appearance along with
the thing. But Heidegger is still concerned about the origin in this view: is it the thing or
its appearance which is primordial? Heidegger asks: “Where does the matter-form
schema have its origin; in the thingness of the thing or in the work-character of the
artwork?” He will finally come to the conclusion that they are co-originary.

What seems to be lacking here is Heidegger’s analysis of language arising from
this view. While it is clear that language would have characteristics both of the things
and the appearances, structure and expression, it too seems inadequate in that language
emerges as an effect of the thing-structure. Heidegger still needs to express a way that
describes thing-structure and sentence-structure as co-originary, but with a mutual
primordial source.

So we see, all three models have presumptions and semblances. All three include
the thing, its traits, and the manifold of sensations. While the models seem very
scientific, reasonably philosophical, they don’t seem to fit with what the
phenomenological description has taught us in Being and Time. The models don’t square
with the equipment mode of the work of art. The equipment mode proffers an important
yet, up to this point, unseen clue towards the way of finding the thingly character of the
thing and the work-character of the work. In short, depending on the situated use of the
equipment, matter and form will differ. Van Gough’s painting is the disclosure of what
the pair of shoes is in truth. Being emerges from this disclosure, the unconcealment—

163 This final point, indeed, is our conclusion to this current work in its inceptive formula: Being as Saying,
originary language, is the source of, and movement for, the unfolding of language into all derivative forms
of communicative variations and nuances, defined broadly as language.
This is an occurring, a happening of truth at work.\textsuperscript{164} Truth occurs for Heidegger in the happening of the work.

The work opens up a \textit{world} and keeps it abidingly open in force as “world” and “earth.” Each—“world” and “earth”—is essentially different one from another and yet is never separated. The opposition of “world” and “earth” occurs as strife. In essential strife, the opponents raise each other into the self-assertion of their essential natures. Self-assertion of essence, however, is never a rigid insistence upon some contingent state, “but rather a surrendering into the hidden originality of the source of one’s own being.”\textsuperscript{165} The work accomplishes this by setting forth strife between “world” and “earth.” In part, the essence of art is given as strife, in the form of a double refusal, the no-longer and the not-yet. Refusal of “world” and refusal of “earth” emerge as work-in-strife-as-art. Strife is what emerges as the beautiful in art. And thus Heidegger is able to say of the work of art: “\textit{Beauty is one way in which truth as unconcealment comes to presence.}”\textsuperscript{166} Strife is also the source of beauty. Employing the vernacular, beauty isn’t simply in the eye of the beholder.

But strife is not a rift [\textit{Riss}] nor a crack, a tear, laceration, cleft between the “world” and “earth;” rather, strife is the intimacy with which opponents belong to one another … by their common ground.”\textsuperscript{167} Only when “world” and “earth” are noticed as a thing does there appear a rift, but the rift appears as fixed in place like a rune etched in granite. It is fixed in place within a “\textit{figure}” [\textit{Gestalt}].\textsuperscript{168} The figure is the structure of

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{164} \textit{GA} 5: 21/“The Origin of the Work of Art,” \textit{Off the Beaten Track} 16.
  \item \textsuperscript{165} \textit{GA} 5: 35/“The Origin of the Work of Art,” \textit{Off the Beaten Track} 26-27.
  \item \textsuperscript{166} \textit{GA} 5: 43/“The Origin of the Work of Art,” \textit{Off the Beaten Track} 32. The italics are Heidegger’s emphasis.
  \item \textsuperscript{167} \textit{GA} 5: 51/“The Origin of the Work of Art,” \textit{Off the Beaten Track} 38.
  \item \textsuperscript{168} This italicization reflects Heidegger’s own emphasis.
\end{itemize}
the rift in its self-establishment. The structured rift is the jointure [Fuge] of the shining of truth. Heidegger writes: “What we call ‘figure’ is always to be thought out of that particular placing [stellen] and placement [Ge-stell] as which the work comes to presence when it sets itself up and sets itself forth.” Thus, art and poetry allow the advent of truth to happen as strife between “world” and “earth.” Truth for Heidegger is not a matter of correctness or adequation.

But such an advent of truth needs more than the artwork and Dasein. There is still something else that happens. In the midst of beings as a whole an open place comes to presence. There is a clearing. This clearing, thought from beings, is more in being than is beings [Sie ist, vom Seienden her gedacht, seiender als das Seiende.] This open center is, therefore, not surrounded by beings. Rather, “this illuminating center itself encircles beings—like the nothing that we scarcely know,” writes Heidegger in a rare flourish.

How shall we find Being in this clearing? Neither philosophy nor poetry alone seems to be able reach Being. Phenomenology can go only as far as Dasein can reach. But Being in these modes seems to lie too far beyond, or too near immanently, or merely

169 This same phrase is the name given purposefully to each demarcation of chapters in Beiträge. Each chapter becomes a facet of strife from which Being emerges as concealed and yet unconcealed.
170 GA 5: 51/“The Origin of the Work of Art,” Off the Beaten Track 38. Heidegger emphasizes the term “work” as operative in understanding the rift.
171 One should recognize Heidegger’s hidden-in-context dialogue partner: Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment. Kant’s sublime seems to be Heidegger’s foil.
172 This “something else” is given as the Event [Ereignis] in the third edition of 1957.
173 GA 5: 39–40/“The Origin of the Work of Art,” Off the Beaten Track 30. One must ask what Heidegger might mean in this sentence. What does “more being than a being” entail? One could surmise that Heidegger is referring to his ontological difference, that the clearing has a higher ontological status. Rather than attempting to answer this question here in this chapter, for it lacks substantial evidence in the text, we shall in our next chapter attempt to dilate what such a phrase could mean. Suffice it to say that were Plotinus alive, he and Heidegger would have a lively debate around this section and Ennead I, 6 {1}, the historical verses the intellectual source of beauty.
of Dasein’s world. Have we come to another impasse? Heidegger is persistent in looking for Being. And so he circles once again, around Being.

Heidegger holds that the essence of all art is poetry and that poetry is language, so instead looking a Dasein or the thing, we look to language. But language is usually understood as a kind of conversation. As Heidegger argued earlier in “Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry,” language includes hearing and speaking. “But language is neither merely nor primarily the aural and written expression of what needs to be communicated,” Heidegger asserts. Relaying meanings is part of what language does, but that is not what language is in its originary essence. Instead, language brings beings as beings, for the first time, into the open. To express this in a negative formulation, if language were not present in its originary sense, there would be no openness, and neither ordinary language nor its meaning could ever be possible.

Thus, language is the bearer of beings into the open. Heidegger describes this bearer of beings in the open: language “nominates beings to [zu] their being and from out of [aus] that being. Such saying is a projection of the clearing in which announcement is made as to what beings will come into the open as.” As a projection, language is that which stands out as from Being. Moreover, projective saying as poetry is the saying of “world” and “earth” as strife. In conveying strife, language itself is poetry in its essential

175 As quite in line with his approach at this time, Heidegger circles around the aoria; he comes to some workable solution, only to criticize that working definition with another following one: from philosophy, to language, to usage, back to philosophy. Circling argumentation is not evasive for Heidegger, but a nearing toward the Being. In this case, philosophy was criticized earlier for its static definition, then poetry is offered as a better model for its give and take, conversational character, and now conversation is criticized as not originary enough by employing philosophical analysis of substance.

176 GA 5: 61/“The Origin of the Work of Art,” Off the Beaten Track 45.

177 GA 5: 61/“The Origin of the Work of Art,” Off the Beaten Track 46.

178 GA 5: 61/“The Origin of the Work of Art,” Off the Beaten Track 46. Heidegger’s emphasis is retained.
sense. The reader it to assume that art is a form of poetry; thus, language is in art in its essential sense.

Language, though, is not simply the projecting out of the clearing, not simply arising out from Being, language permeates the very strife of things. We saw earlier that in the essence of poetry, poetry happens in language only because it preserves the primordial strife. Like creatively composing poetry, the prose in language occurs in the open of saying, which permeates and guides it. Poetizing within the clearing of beings has already happened, unnoticed, in a deeper mode of language.\(^\text{179}\)

In this way art too can be poetry. It is not only the creation of the work that is poetic. This is indeed the case; equally poetic is our continual engagement with the art. Both artist and devotee are poetic in their involvement with art. Artwork as such is artwork only when this creative poetizing occurs; it works to bring our Being to take a stand within the truth of beings. For Heidegger’s “Origin of the Work of Art,” art and language both have poetry as their essence.\(^\text{180}\)

The essence of poetry is the founding \([\textit{Stiftung}]\) of truth as the strife between “world” and “earth.” But this founding is not a firm foundation; it is a founding as holding sway. Heidegger elaborates: “‘Founding’ is understood, here, in a threefold sense: as bestowing, as grounding, and as beginning.”\(^\text{181}\) Hence, the founding of truth

\(^{179}\) Heidegger diverges somewhat from this description of the unfolding of language. Rather than language emerging from poetry, Heidegger will nuance both poetry and language vis-à-vis originary language. We shall see in the next chapter, that both poetry and language as prose emerge from originary language, but poetry and language are like two arms, arising out of that primordial essence of language.

\(^{180}\) Heidegger in later works will emend this relationship between language and poetry and which is more primordial; eventually Heidegger will come to understand poetry and the prose of language having their origin in originary language. This topic will be addressed in our next chapters.

\(^{181}\) \textit{GA 5: 63/“The Origin of the Work of Art,” Off the Beaten Track 47.}
grounds as a beginning that bestows the open. \(^{182}\) Rather than trying to explicate this any further, we shall allow it to remain in its dense formulation, until later works, wherein Heidegger is able to unfold language more clearly. For our purposes we need only to appreciate the fact that philosophy and art, thought and aesthetics, \(^{183}\) are not distinct for Heidegger, but rather have a common root.

**THE WILL TO POWER AS ART**

What is this common root for philosophy and art for Heidegger during this period? Are they simply sounding boards from which to work, mere circling criticisms: philosophy criticizing poetry and poetry criticizing philosophy? Heidegger gives us a clue in “The Will to Power as Art.” Philosophy and art are both effects of the will to power. Both establish the “uppermost value [der oberste Wert] in terms of which and according to which all beings are to be.” \(^{184}\) Rather than unchanging forms, both truth and art are historically grounded; they are grounded as the uppermost value of their respective

\(^{182}\) In this dense last paragraph of “The Origin of the Work of Art,” Heidegger draws together many notions together as the totality of truth as the holding-sway of strife of earth and world. The thing is the bearer of such strife, art is the event of that truth, the truth of that event is provided by Being, humans engage it creatively, and all of which Being sustains the truth in thing, artwork and humans. We shall return to this gathering-unfolding many times, as this is Heidegger’s main question of Being as Saying: how does Being as Saying unfold as language. See GA 5: 63/“The Origin of the Work of Art,” *Off the Beaten Track* 47.

\(^{183}\) For Heidegger the artwork is the bearer of the beautiful in conjunction with the artist and the observer. Robert Bernasconi comments that art, then, is placed outside the truth. See Robert Bernasconi, *The Question of Language in Heidegger’s History of Being* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1985) 32.

\(^{184}\) “Der Wille zur Macht als Kunst,” GA 6.1: 22-23/“The Will to Power as Art,” *Nietzsche I* 26. Between the years of 1936-1940 Heidegger offered four lecture courses on Nietzsche at the University of Freiburg-im-Breisgau. “The Will to Power as Art” was the first lecture course during the winter semester of 1936-37. Ostensibly, Heidegger has changed primary dialogue partners, from Kant to Nietzsche. This dialogue with Nietzsche has oftentimes been the subject of heated debate. Nietzschean scholars have noted rightly that Heidegger has used some of Nietzsche’s text for purposes opposed to what Nietzsche intended. While they are not incorrect, it is fair to note also that Heidegger did not claim to do otherwise. Thus, Heiddeger’s glossing of Nietzsche’s view is purposeful and not without awareness.
arenas. This uppermost value is always criticized and replaced with new or better highest value.

Heidegger follows Nietzsche in that the former also sees that any critique of highest values shows the doubtful origins of the values from the outset. Nihilism is rooted in this dynamic relation. In fact, Heidegger, quoting Nietzsche, insists, “Nihilism means that the uppermost values devalue themselves.”

Nietzsche’s manner of thinking is one of perpetual reversal, every value is eventually overturned *ad infinitum*. For example, while Schopenhauer interprets art as a “sedative for life,” Nietzsche claims art is a stimulant of life; on the question whether truth is changeless, Nietzsche claims that truth is a kind of error. Both art and truth are set as highest values and as such each value will be soon overturned by, and for the next highest value.

In the case of truth, truth is more so the faculty of thinking than it is a correspondence to what would be called reality; the essence of a faculty is, Heidegger postulates, “grounded in the essence of will as power [*Willen als Macht*]; and “will is taken to be a kind of cause [*Ursache*].” The intellect can be said to have the faculties of reasoning and willing. While a faculty can be known as a power, and usually is so known—Heidegger’s Nietzsche sees will as power and power as will. For Nietzsche the characteristics of the will are of passion and affect, the irrational. Thus, Nietzsche’s truth is founded on the irrational. Heidegger transforms this notion of irrational truth vis-à-vis rational truth into the dynamic truth as holding sway, flexible notion of truth.

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186 See *GA* 6.1: 26-27/“The Will to Power as Art,” *Nietzsche I*: 29-30 for a provocative discussion on thought and aesthetics. The notion of truth as a stable, perhaps even static reality for Nietzsche is the error. He wishes to replace this notion of truth with a more fluid notion of truth. Hence, Nietzsche goads us: truth is an error.
188 *GA* 6.1: 38/“The Will to Power as Art,” *Nietzsche I*: 41.
Likewise, “holding sway” is the basic mode of Dasein, where man confronts the “Da” in the openness and concealment of beings. Passions for Heidegger never have to do with mere desire, but are always connected to a world of Dasein, beyond Dasein.

Startlingly, Heidegger comes to the claim that “[S]elf-assertion is original assertion of essence/Selbst-behauptung ist ursprüngliche Wesensbehauptung.” Any discussion of self-expression, e.g., the essence of language, poetry or art, is a discussion arising from the will. As such, it too will be overturned.

More germane to our topic, meditation on art is a matter of illuminating the Being of beings in language. Heidegger asserts that art is the basic occurrence of all beings [Grundgeschehen alles Seienden]; to the extent that they are, beings are self-creating, created [das Seinde ist, sofern es ist, ein Sichschaffendes, Geschaffenes]. While seemingly contradictory, Heidegger’s statement lies at the heart of what he means by Dasein: Dasein is created and self-creating; created in time, and self-creating through the course of life.

Self-creating emerges as a will to power. Likewise, the will to power becomes visible in terms of art. Art in its creativity is the countermovement to nihilism. As such, Heidegger reflects on Neitzsche’s claim that art is worth more than “truth.” For as a countermovement to nihilism, we see how art for Heidegger is a configuration [Gestalt] of the will to power; art is another outcome of the will to power.

In order to illustrate this point that art is a configuration of the will to power, Heidegger traces the development of the history of aesthetics and returns to philosophy.

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189 GA 6.1: 57/“The Will to Power as Art,” Nietzsche I: 61. Again, we retain Heidegger’s original emphasis.
191 GA 6.1: 73/“The Will to Power as Art,” Nietzsche I: 75.
For the ancient Greeks art and knowledge coincided. But as soon as matter as φύσις was described as ὑλή—μορφή, knowledge and all practical arts were separated: truth and logic were separated from ethics, τέχνη, and aesthetics. In the modern age the split became so radical that knowledge was purified to reason and aesthetics dropped to a level of mere feelings. At the height of the Enlightenment era when aesthetics received, as Heidegger notes, its highest rigor of form, great art comes to an end. Heidegger explains the situation in these somewhat broad terms: Kant described aesthetics as disinterested delight and Hegel sublimated it into the absolute, and yet with no commensurate examples of art. Thus, Hegel asserted that art has lost its power as the preserver of the absolute. Heidegger would agree with Hegel to the extent that art does lose its power, but it does so because in the Enlightenment period aesthetics is filtered out of the knowledge process.

Nietzsche later sees art as the countermovement to Hegel’s grounding man’s historical existence upon beings as a whole. Thus, one could say that not only great art comes to an end with enlightenment, but so too the fabric of Enlightenment’s valuation is now seen for what it truly is, constructed values. That which is constructed can also be deconstructed. As truth declines in its effectiveness, art emerges as the most effective source of power. As Heidegger poignantly pens, “Art is the supreme configuration [Gestalt] of power.”

Constructed values of the Enlightenment are exploded by Nietzsche’s conception of art as rapture [Rausch]. But Heidegger notes that Nietzsche’s rupture itself is noteworthy. For rupture alone would be simply to invert one system of valuation with

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another: the Enlightenment for the Romantic period. And for Heidegger, this is simply replacing one system of metaphysics with another. Rather than replacing one system for another, Heidegger places them in tandem. For Heidegger breaking through and elevating Kant’s disinterested beauty as rapture becomes the basic mood akin to Nietzsche’s view, while Kant’s disinterested beauty does the attuning, writes Heidegger.\textsuperscript{194} Placing rapture and sublime beauty together, Heidegger explodes the subjectivity of the subject and the objectivity of the object; the Dionysian reverie undoes the Apollinian structure of individuation; the Apollinian form and principle of limit undoes the Dionysian matter and principle of the unlimited.\textsuperscript{195} Heidegger also ends the replacement of one value system for another, e.g., the classic for the romantic, and opens up the event of nihilism as the constant cycle of their mutual replacement. Aesthetics as the will to power, then for Heidegger, is opened up as ongoing discord with truth.

Indeed this raging discordance between truth and art is exactly what Heidegger seems to have been preoccupied within this period of thinking of Being. Philosophy structures experience; poetry as the essence of all art breaks open that structure. The circling seemed to define and redefine each vis-à-vis the other,\textsuperscript{196} yet never reaching Being. And still, new light has shone in the end of this dialectical process: nihilism. Metaphysics, the search for truth, and the creativity of art end in the devaluation of all values and nihilism results, but not as an end which ultimately overcomes and destroys them, but overcoming in the sense that it never ends and leads to nihilism. Nihilism,

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{194} GA 6.1: 125/"The Will to Power as Art," Nietzsche I: 123.
\textsuperscript{195} These are Nietzschean terms arising from The Birth of Tragedy: Out of the Spirit of Music/Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik, 1872.
\textsuperscript{196} Bernasconi understands the dialogue between poetry and thought leads to the thinking of Being, as we argue. Employing “Anaximander’s Saying” 19, Bernasconi makes the claim that all poetry is thinking and thinking is poetry in both narrow and broad senses, that both exist in metaphysics. We must find, he argues, a language for thinking that is not bound by metaphysics. We shall agree, barring “thinking;” our quest is a language that is related to Being. See Bernasconi, Question of Language 46.
\end{footnotesize}
while nothing, sheds light on Being as no-thing. Neither truth nor art, but nihilism, shows Being.

While Heidegger discusses this issue from the perspective of the consequences to metaphysics, let us redirect the effects of nihilism onto language and Being. For language—this oscillation of truth and art, this resonance—illustrates that language is no mere sequence of communicative signs, and therefore, no mere correspondence of truth to the thing, as would the correspondence theory of truth have us to believe. To this point, Heidegger demonstrably writes:

... language as resonant [lautendes] signification roots us to earth and transports us to our earth and roots us to our world, meditation on language and its historical domination is always the action that gives shape to Dasein itself. The will to originality, rigor, and measure in words is therefore no mere pleasantry; it is the work that goes on in the essential nucleus of Dasein, which is historical existence [als eine geschichtlichen].

Rather than correspondence, language resonates between “world” and “earth” just as the thing is the holding sway of the strife between “world” and “earth.” It is precisely into this resonating relation between truth and art that Heidegger places language. Heidegger holds that language is that “relation [Verhältnis] between art and truth [as] a discordance that arouses dread.” For Heidegger the main insight which Nietzsche offers us is the connectivity of truth and art, of essence and that which veers away from essence. Nietzsche’s insight dislodges the notion that Being is opposed to Becoming. The

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connectivity, which is discordance, draws us closer to Being and language looks closer to primordial relation.

This discord, this dread, draws us closer to Being. It draws us toward the silent resonation of nothingness. One might conceive of this silence simply as a lack of language, but for Heidegger this silence is indeed language’s deeper reality. The destruction of metaphysics and aesthetics leads us to nihilism. While philosophy and art see nihilism as cul-de-sac, Heidegger sees new possibilities of a deeper relation. As the double negation of the thing [it is no longer and not yet] proffered meaning to the thing, now nihilism too can proffer meaning to Being and language. Or better said, the silence and dread of Being draws us closer and appropriates us. Heidegger explicates that nihilism is not vacuous, but it is a reordering of the structure [Ordnungschema verwandeln]. Could it be that nihilism is a reordering of us, appropriating us from Da-sein, Being-there into silence and concealing the “Da,” the “there,” so that we are drawn toward Being? And in being drawn toward Being, we hear Being as silence.

Now that we have gathered together all the Heideggerian moments of Being and language—Western philosophy, poetry, the thing, the work of art, truth, strife, the event and nihilism—we are left with the question: have we come closer to Being and, more importantly, to Being and language in this circling mode of destructive retrieval, drawing us closer to silence? Or are we still left with a type of humanism?

In 1947 Heidegger responds to a letter by Jean Beaufret, who asked Heidegger certain questions regarding Sartre’s “Existentialism is a Humanism,” dated 1946, wherein

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200 Discordance [Zwiespalt] for Heidegger means: “the opening of a gap between two things that are severed. … Only two things that are related to one another can be opposed to one another.” GA 6.1: 191/“The Will to Power as Art,” Nietzsche I: 189.

201 We shall outline this fully in our upcoming discussion of the Beiträge.

Beaufret describes both Sartre and Heidegger as atheistic existentialists. Heidegger demurs, by showing the inadequacies of humanism. Heidegger answers that we must find a new route that is not humanistic, not of our own design.

The design that we employed thus far describes language as a tool devised and employed by us to discover Being. But Being, insists Heidegger, offers itself to thought, which comes to us via language. Language houses Being. The house of language in which we dwell, houses Being as well. And yet Being offers itself and comes to language. Man can use language like a tool in the house, but language itself houses Being and man dwells in the house. To solve this conundrum we cannot look to Dasein alone, but to Being.

But if Being is heard as silence, then how could Heidegger ever hear it himself or convey such a pathway to us? Certainly the standard means of explicating a text with ordinary words would not convey silence. Conveying silence by the use of words seems an impossible task. Yet silence and nothing aren’t empty concepts or sets for Heidegger;

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203 Beaufret comments here are slightly misleading. Neither atheism nor theism is sufficient in Heidegger’s works; both are outcomes of the inadequacies of metaphysics.

204 GA 9: 145/“Letter on Humanism,” Pathmarks 240. Heidegger writes provocatively on language in “Letter on Humanism,” “Being offers itself to thought: ‘Such offering consists in the fact that in thinking being comes to language. Language is the house of being. In its home human beings dwell. Those who think and those who create with words are the guardians of this home. Their guardianship accomplishes the manifestation of being insofar as they bring this manifestation to language and preserve it in language through their saying.’ And at the end of the letter Heidegger furthers this point: ‘With its saying, thinking lays inconspicuous furrows in language. They are still more inconspicuous than the furrows that the farmer, slow of step, draws through the field.’” GA 9: 364/“Letter on Humanism,” Pathmarks 276.

But in the same letter Heidegger wavers regarding language’s derivation from thought. He writes “In its essence, language is not the utterance of an organism; nor is it the expression of a living thing. Nor can it ever be thought in an essentially correct way in terms of its symbolic character of signification. Language is the clearing-concealing advent of being itself.” GA 9: 326/“Letter on Humanism,” Pathmarks 248-249.” He continues: “The usage “bring to language” employed here is now to be taken quite literally. Being comes, clearing itself, to language.” GA 9: 192/“Letter on Humanism,” Pathmarks 274. A new relationship between Being and language requires a new type of thinking beyond thinking as mediation between language and Being as those offered remarks late in the letter.

Frank A. Capuzzi translates Being as “being’ throughout “Letter on Humanism.” I retain his lower-case configuration solely to maintain his phrase exactly as Capuzzi has written it. The character and tone of the letter reveals Heidegger’s meaning of “Sein” to be consistent with his other works.
and to draw out any positive account of Being leads falsely down the path to will to power and the necessary outcome of all Western philosophical engagement and results in nihilism as absurdity. To explore silence and its relation to language and Dasein and secondly, to express how intimate indeed is this relation, we now turn down another pathway, to nothing, or perhaps better said, to the nameless; we now turn our attention to the last chapter, or as Heidegger calls it, the last *Fuge* in the *Beiträge*\(^{205}\) entitled “Seyn.”\(^{206}\)

**BEITRÄGE**

Rather than explicate the *Beiträge* in all eight of its variations on a theme of

\(^{205}\) Rather than exoteric, the *Beiträge* is esoteric; that is to say, Heidegger postponed its publication until after his death, keeping it for a small circle of confidents. It is well known that Otto Pöggeler was privileged an early copy. Less known is the fact that pre-publication typescripts were available among some Heidegger students. Current debate still centers on the question why it was that Heidegger kept them from the public: whether they were kept private to avoid the suspicious eye of the *Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeitspartei* and editorial conscription or whether their safekeeping indicated their stature as unfinished or indicated their inability to be read, understood or appreciated in philosophical circles.

Although the *Beiträge* was kept from general readership, it was still touted as Heidegger’s second major work for forty years both in German and English circles and long before its official German publication as *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* in 1989 by Klostermann, GA 65 and its English debut in December of 1999 as *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)*, trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University, 1999) or forthcoming publication by Richard Rojcewicz, *Contributions to Philosophy (On the Event)*\(^{207}\) 2009. See Babette E. Babich, *Words in Blood, Like Flowers: Philosophy and Poetry, Music and Eros in Hölderlin, Nietzsche, and Heidegger* (New York, NY: State University of New York, 2006) 334.

\(^{206}\) While the previous works or ways entailed a detailed description of the development of Heidegger’s thought—they were explications of Heidegger’s own process of thinking—the *Beiträge* is not of the same genre. Rather than a path of thinking, it is like a performance of Being in eight fugues [*Fuge*]. Each fugue, as the musical metaphor implies, reprises the same theme in a different mood to draw out all implications. Moreover, the eight chapters are suggestive of a musical octave. As a performance the *Beiträge* moves with Being rather than representing Being in an oppositional fashion. Perhaps now it is clear to the reader why indeed the thought of Being now falls silent, giving way to Being as *Saying*. *Beiträge* is the performance of that transformation, while western philosophy is its representation.
Being, like fugal settings, we will focus on the center\textsuperscript{207} of its concern: Being. Each fugal setting attempts to say the same thing, “to grasp the whole once again.”\textsuperscript{208} While focusing on Being, we shall see language’s deep abiding relationship, not as a tool, but as the way of Being as Saying.

In addition to the familiar dialogue issues of Western philosophy and poetry, explicated in the sections above, Heidegger soon includes a third thematic issue of technology. When technology occurs in a mode of outstripping Dasein as “machination” [\textit{Machenschaft}] and “enframing,” Being is manifested in a way not yet explored. Already technology has appeared sporadically in this mode in various works and will continue to appear sporadically.\textsuperscript{209} Yet “enframing” [\textit{Ge-stell}] now becomes crucial to Heidegger’s articulation of how Being manifests itself. “Enframing” is the historical mode of revealing truth that characterizes this epoch in terms of imperatives and control. This third theme might include what is known as τέχνη or technology, but “machination” for Heidegger entails more. “Machination” could be seen as the final effects of will to

\textsuperscript{207}The word “center” is chosen precisely. Being-as-saying is our central question, located between the ontic and ontological; historical Being is not a thing among other things, but the center of all inquiry as that which makes possible all things. While originally the text held this section nearer to the center, Friedrich-Wilhelm von Hermann set “\textit{Das Seyn}” as the concluding chapter. He took as his directive the note which Heidegger, dated 8 May 1939, placed within the first typescript of the “Table of Contents.” The note read: “‘‘\textit{Seyn}’ as Section II [Part II] is not correctly arranged; as an attempt [\textit{als Versuch}] to grasp the whole once again [\textit{das Ganze noch einmal zu fassen}], it does not belong at this juncture [\textit{gehört er nicht an diese Stelle.}]”. See \textit{GA} 65: 514/\textit{Contributions} 365. Also see Babbette Babich, \textit{Words in Blood, Like Flowers} for an interesting account of these proceedings.

\textsuperscript{208}This eighth chapter draws interesting correlations with Descartes’ Rule 8 in the \textit{Regulae}, wherein repetition of the previous methodology draws the reader’s mind to be consistent with the matter studied. This similarity, however, is restricted for Heidegger “\textit{Seyn}” isn’t simply a repetition, but an attempt to grasp the whole once again. As such it is not conforming the mind to set matter, but allowing Being to emerge between.

\textsuperscript{209}Heidegger wavers in various works whether “enframing” is partial or total.
power. In its extreme, the will to power built an edifice that precariously teeters under its own weight. While dangerous, it too reveals. It reveals Beyng [Seyn].\(^{210}\)

“Beyng” [Seyn] is the focus of the Contributions [Beiträge].\(^{211}\) While the chapter on beyng is not a summary or linear logical conclusion of the book, it certainly is its primary focus with the question of how beyng reveals itself. Earlier we called the Contributions an esoteric work, which is to say that Heidegger meant the work to remain outside of the public eye, but more importantly, the Contributions is unusual in its prose and notoriously difficult to interpret because it is written not as a piece of metaphysical exposition, but as an enactment of beyng revealing itself.\(^{212}\) The words of the book and its structure are meant as a way of attuning the reader so that beyng may reveal itself. Language in the Contributions, then, is the means by which we clear the way so that beyng may reveal itself. The chapter begins with this line; “Here lie the boulders of a

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\(^{210}\) Heidegger in the Beiträge reformulates the familiar Sein with the eighteenth-century orthographic, Seyn. Emad and Maly translate it in the Contributions as be-ing, so as to mark the distinction. Emad and Maly attribute the shift to the fact that Heidegger means that Being [Sein] demarcates the metaphysically grasped concept while be-ing [Seyn] indicates the way of historical thinking. William Lovitt in his translation of “The Turning” likewise uses the term “be-ing.” This latter case is complex and shall be discussed in the next chapter. “Beyng” has been quite reasonably suggested by Richard Rojcewicz as the term indicating “Seyn;” we follow his suggestions with the exception of its capitalization, since it is never confused with any other attributions heretoforth. Still, any translation choice for the word is at best arbitrary. I prefer Rojcewicz’ distinction, yet avoid its capitalization, since that conveys remnants of the “highest Being” of philosophical metaphysics. Hereafter, we shall now employ “beyng,” whenever Heidegger uses “Seyn.”

\(^{211}\) GA 65: 511/Contributions 363. In deafeningly clear prose that only an editor could appreciate, Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, writes what he sees as the purpose of the Beiträge in his “Editor’s Epilogue”: “Following the first, fundamental-ontological [fundamentalontologischen] onset of the question in Being and Time, Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning) is the first, encompassing attempt [»der erste umfassende Versuch«] at a second [zweiten], being-historical [seinsgeschichtlichen], i.e., ‘more originary’ [»ursprünglicheren«] onset [Ansetzung] and elaboration [Auarbeitung] of the same question [dieselbe Frage], in which the meaning of being—as the truth and essential sway [als der Wahrheit und dem Wesen], i.e., essential holding sway of beyng [Der Wesung des Seyns]—is inquired into and this essential holding sway is thought as enowning [Ereignis].” I am in agreement that the Beiträge has the same goal as did Being and Time: Seinsgeschichte; but I will refrain from defining Ereignis solely by the terms of truth and thought, for that reasserts Ereignis as the thought of Being. Rather, Ereignis’ domain lies beyond what the thought of Being could possibly indicate.

\(^{212}\) The editors of the Contributions explain: “The cohesive, systematic, and closely interrelated ‘joinings’ of Heidegger’s ‘being-historical thinking’—which comes ‘alive’ only in enactment-presents the translation process with the possibility of rethinking, revising, and eventually combining … words in a new way.” Contributions xviii.
quarry, in which primal rock is broken ….”\textsuperscript{213} The boulders are those pieces, which we have illustrated in the section above as circling between Western philosophy and poetry.

Such a circling or blasting of ordinary ways of thinking of Being, meditative thinking of Being allows beyng to rise as the “between” \textit{[Zwischen]}, a self-clearing essential holding sway in which gods and man recognize each other and that they belong together.\textsuperscript{214} Beyng is neither the ontic nor the ontological understanding of Being in \textit{Being and Time}. It is not unlike the ontological difference. The “between,” however, broadens the situation beyond the purview of Da-sein.\textsuperscript{215} The “ontological difference” has the “quality” of a passage, from the end of metaphysics to the “other beginning;”\textsuperscript{216} it is the “basic structure” of Da-sein.\textsuperscript{217} The effects of the “between” mean abandoning traditional metaphysical conceptions. Such abandonment stirs a distress \textit{[Not]} that attunes the listener to deeper distress \textit{[Er-schrecken]} of the revealing of beyng. Words can never suffice to describe or explain this revealing of beyng. Indeed, it is heard as silence.\textsuperscript{218} What flows from it, its philosophy—we can call its beyng-historical thinking—is of the thinking of the other beginning as opposed to Western philosophy.\textsuperscript{219} Let us explore in depth how beyng-historical thinking appears.

\textsuperscript{213} \textit{GA} 65: 421/\textit{Contributions} 297.
\textsuperscript{214} This topic of identity as relation is fully explored in \textit{Identität und Differenz} (1955-57). \textit{GA} 11/\textit{Identity and Difference}.
\textsuperscript{215} Like the new formulation of \textit{Seyn}, Heidegger now hyphenates \textit{Da-sein} in order to indicate a more originary connection between being and its need of Da-sein to reveal itself. Here too we shall adopt this new variation.
\textsuperscript{216} Heidegger never clarified this phrase. While it is clear that the first beginning is that of Western philosophy, the “other beginning” mostly likely, from my view, is the abandonment of of Being. Between the two beginnings is the “ontological region” he wishes to explore.
\textsuperscript{217} \textit{GA} 65: 469/\textit{Contributions} 330.
\textsuperscript{218} To this point Heidegger writes most poignantly: “Only the chill of the boldness of thinking and the night of errancy of questioning lend glow and light to the fire of beyng.” \textit{GA} 65: 430/\textit{Contributions} 303.
\textsuperscript{219} This is not to indicate that the other beginning is the philosophy of Eastern traditions, for they too are part of the first beginning. More importantly, beyng-historical thinking is outside traditional Western definitions of history or Being.
Beyng-historical thinking does not simply reverse traditional metaphysics, but is a “de-cision [Ent-scheidung] as projecting-opening [Entwurf],”\textsuperscript{220} which includes the reversal of the first beginning. “De-cision” refers to the ongoing strife between “world” and “earth.” “De-cision” is not the actual cleft [Riss] between the “world” and “earth;” rather, it emerges from or out of [Ent-] the cleft.\textsuperscript{221} “De-cision” is the intimacy with which opponents belong to one another by their common ground. With silence, projecting-opening is another “characteristic” of beyng. It might be said from traditional metaphysical terminology, that silence is Being qua being and projecting-opening is being qua beings, but that would draw us away from beyng. What draws us toward beyng is the attunement of distress.

Distress [\textit{Not}] is heard through the totalizing effects of machination, more precisely called the gigantic [\textit{Das Reisenhafte}]. Not primarily a magnitude, the gigantic is the unconditioned domination of representing and producing; the gigantic is the denial of the truth of beyng in favor of “what belongs to reason” [\textit{»Vernünftigen«}].\textsuperscript{222} The gigantic is neither in control of itself nor is it aware of itself. But its appearance in an epoch leads Da-sein to distress because Da-sein is losing its false understanding that it [Dasein] is the center of all meaning and is the master of language.

\textsuperscript{220}Interestingly yet unpersuasively, Parvis Emad holds that \textit{Ereignis}, this enacting thinking of being as projecting-opening, is a change in Heidegger’s thinking. We agree with this line of reasoning in the introductory chapter and cited Richardson’s Preface to \textit{Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought}. He continues to equate Heidegger’s change [\textit{Wendung}] in thinking with “Turning,” by declaring it to be the turning, [\textit{Kehre}]. Here we must respectfully differ, citing our earlier careful reading of Heidegger’s response to Richardson. Thus, we conclude that the “Turning” is historical thinking, given as being’s history, \textit{Seinsgeschichte}. See Parvis Emad, “On Be-ing”: The Last Part of Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)” Companion to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy, eds. Charles E. Scott, Susan M. Schoenbohm, Daniela Vallega-Neu and Alejandro Vallega, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University,2001) 230-237.

\textsuperscript{221}In Heidegger’s terminology, from “de-” the cleft “-cision” between the “world” and “earth” emerges “de-cision”[\textit{Ent-scheidung}]. His hyphenation conveys that while emerging out of the strife between “earth” and “world,” “de-cision” is never separated from the strife.

\textsuperscript{222}\textit{GA} 65: 442/\textit{Contributions} 311.
This “de-centering” of Da-sein, as I coin the term, is that effect that appears to Da-sein, as occurring outside of Da-sein’s control. For this reason initial distress [Not] is felt due its disenfranchisement. But in this initial distress, the deeper distress of beyng’s refusal as abandonment of beyng [Seinsverlassenheit] is revealed as horror or startled dismay [Er-schrecken]. Da-sein is shocked in two ways; first, Da-sein is not the center of its “world;” secondly, Da-sein can never attain beyng. In the abandonment of beyng, Da-sein is thrown “between” the “world” and beyng. The effect upon Da-sein is one of deep distress. The major explication for Heidegger is that Dasein can never attain purely Being’s domain.

Da-sein is “thrown;” Da-sein is “thrown” free from a being toward beyng. While a person first becomes a subject by throwing himself free of “a being” and had returned to himself, here Heidegger indicates a “thrownness” [Gewörfenheit] that is quite out of the person’s control and without return. This free-throw occurs in an originary fashion. And it will always lack a return in this originary sense. For the return [Rückkehr], while seemingly is a way to know itself, it actually is a forgetting of knowing of itself. The return is always a concealing, never a revealing.

Da-sein’s lack of ability to return is due to the inability to hold onto any “ground” of the free-throw. Heidegger calls this lack of ground, “Ab-grund.” By staying

\[223\] Indeed one could draw similar attention to Kant’s shock at the discovery of the antinomy.
\[224\] \textit{GA} 65: 452/\textit{Contributions} 318.
\[225\] The double negation in this sentence is purposeful; we are defined by what we are not in a twofold sense. We are defined by our inability to return to ourselves entirely and we are defined by the inability to find a ground while we are “at sea.”
\[226\] The editors of \textit{Contributions} discuss in the “Translators’ Foreword” their decision to leave Ab-grund untranslated for the most part as “Ab-ground.” Like the German word “Ereignis,” we shall not translate “Ab-grund.” The words “abyss” or “non-ground” do not reflect properly that Ab-grund is a ground that prevails while staying away. \textit{Contributions} xxxi. Heidegger writes in Sections 242 that Ab-grund indeed is a staying-away. Within its meaning is included the context of space-time and the interesting topic of
away, holding sway beyng is a foundation to Da-sein as a lack. Da-sein hears this lack as silence and distress is its attunement. Lastly, this free-throw is the source of Da-sein’s possibility in Ereignis.227 “Beyng is Er-eignis” [Das Seyn ist das Er-eignis], Heidegger writes unequivocally. Er-eignis “names beyng in thinking and grounds beyng’s essential holding sway [seine Wesung] in its own jointure [eigenes Gefüge]….”228 Thus beyng allows itself to be manifested as Ereignis.

In section 267 Heidegger outlines succinctly—in rare fashion—the eight facets of Ereignis in its occurring.229 As Daniela Vallega-Neu cautions her readers, these are not separate en-ownings or occurrences,230 but more so different aspects of one occurrence—the essential holding sway of beyng as Ereignis. Each aspect thinks the occurrence of beyng entirely while highlighting a particular aspect of manifested beyng. Together all aspects are a way of thinking the whole once again. What is effective in this procedural performance is the relatedness of each aspect with the others in their circularity referentiality, wherein the last aspect is related to the first. Also effective is the way Heidegger describes manifest beyng as it relates to beings in an unfolding way while remaining beyng. Analogously said, this octet is a dilated view of beyng which is “before” time; or perhaps better phrased, it is the condition for the possibility of time.

“Place.” While quite interesting these do not bear directly to our topic. See GA 65: 372-388/Contributions 259-271.

227 While Emad and Maly translates Ereignis as en-owning, I will retain the German, since I hold that neither “en-owning” is helpful for English readers nor does “happening” or “event” capture Heidegger’s full intent. See Der Satz vom Grund (1957) GA 10 62/The Ground of Reason 91. Also see Zur Sache des Denkens (1962) GA 14: 20/On Time and Being 25-26. Heidegger indicates in both of these later works that “happening” and “event” are inadequate in their meaning, for they retain notions of space and time. Conversely, Ereignis is the possibility for space and time.

228 GA 65: 470/Contributions 330.

229 Not coincidental, the eight ways correspond to the eight fugues. While all say the same, beyng, each draws out a differing focal point. Although the current fugue recounts the previous seven, it is not simply a recap, for it draws out beyng’s uniqueness.

230 Vallega-Neu follows the terminology of Emad and Maly’s Contributions. See Daniela Vallega-Neu, Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy: An Introduction (Bloomington, IN: Indian University, 2003) 107.
First, beyng is an overall process, more precisely an \textit{Er-eignung}. The gods need beyng and in order for them to be manifested, beyng needs Da-sein to assist. Beyng needs Da-sein in order for Da-sein to near the ground that holds to the abground, for out of this relation the gods and Da-sein are gathered. In cruder terms, beyng gathers Da-sein to listen to beyng so that the gods may have beyng; Da-sein is drawn “in” the “between” of this gathering process. Beyng gathers.

Second, the \textit{Ereignis} of the \textit{Er-eignung}, the event of the overall process, gathers within it the de-cision [\textit{Ent-scheidung}]. The de-cision causes distress, which emerges from the ground of the abground, experienced as the strife between “world” and “earth,” and allows gods and man to come forth into partedness. In other words, the \textit{Ereignis} gathers and holds together gods and man coming forth as “separate;” yet this gathering-while-separate is the cause of distress. Beyng separates and gathers.

Third, as gods and man are brought forth into partedness, the \textit{Ereignis} as de-cision draws them out as countering [\textit{Ent-gegnung}] each other. As separate-while-gathered, this positioning of gods countering man becomes the bridge over the needfulness of beyng’s abgrund. One could say that the holding sway of beyng maintains its hold of the sway through this countering bridge of man to gods. Man and gods span the tension between gathering and separating.

\textsuperscript{231} As it will soon become readily apparent to the reader, the eight aspects are densely compact and nearly impossible to comprehend. The reader might find helpful the concluding image of each paragraph, which certainly belies the attempt to illustrate \textit{Ereignis} without representational thinking. But this concession seems only fair to the reader.

\textsuperscript{232} Many have wondered what Heidegger might mean by the gods. Much of his latter works makes much of the gods or divinities as one of the fourfold. Until those latter works are explored, we cannot articulate here its full meaning. It must suffice for the moment to say that gods in the \textit{Beiträge} are not Heidegger’s preference for polytheism over monotheism; instead, the gods are those that need beyng and those that need Da-sein to assist in their being.

\textsuperscript{233} All eight aspects of \textit{Ereignis} are contained within the space of roughly one page. They should recall for the reader the eight fugues, all within an instant, and yet before time—and how that truly is impossible for the mind to grasp, since it is that which occurs before concepts and minds. \textit{GA} 65: 470-471/\textit{Contributions} 331-332.
Fourth, the countering of the gods and man is the source of the perceived strife between “world” and “earth.” The more the needfulness of the de-cision, the greater the countering must be. Beings are set free of their mere beyngness. Setting-free [*Entsetzung*] distinguishes beyng from beings. Beings are set free from their lostness in mere beingness [*Vorlorenheit in die bloße Seiendheit*] into the non-ordinariness [*Ungewöhnlichkeit*] of their being. This occurrence is the attunement of startled dismay, the originary silence; the secondary and related attunement of distress [*Not*] is Da-sein’s experience in the domination of machination and the gigantic. Startled dismay shows itself as a difference between beyng and beings. This difference is not one of two entities, but rather as an occurrence, occurring in the essential sway of beyng. Man, distressed by the tension, recognizes he exists in tension—and sets free things.

Fifth, this setting-free is both the withdrawal [*Entzug*] in the domination of machination and the holding sway of beyng as refusal [*als Verweigerung weist*]. The setting-free is grasped out of the clearing of the there [*Da*]. The withdrawal from machination is secondary to the originary withdrawal of being as silence. The essential holding sway is not just the beyng of beings because it occurs in the “not” of beings; the essential holding sway in the beyng of beings is precisely as that which withdraws in the concealing-sheltering [*Verbergen*] of truth. The more things are set free, the more machination occurs, and the less beyng is noticed.

These first five aspects all have the same characteristic of “going-out” from beyng. Beyng “moves out” “beyond itself.” Yet, beyng neither moves, nor moves out,

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and certainly beyng does not go beyond itself. The next three aspects have the countering “movement.” They gather as one. And yet again, beyng is not one, for it is no-thing.

Sixth, beyng holds sway as simpleness [Einfachheit]. Rather than imagining that beyng is due to the relation of the “between” between gods and man, we see that Ereignis is indeed the relation. While beyng appropriates [ereignet] Da-sein, beyng is not the origin of Da-sein [Das Seyn ereignet das Da-sein und ist dennoch nicht dessen Ursprung], Heidegger explains. Since beyng is not the origin of Da-sein, it is readily apparent that the issue discussed is not one of relating two entities. The “between” holds sway without any mediation [unvermittelt]. As unmediated, then, beyng holds sway as simpleness.

Seventh, the mark of simpleness of beyng is uniqueness [Einzigkeit]. It needs no differences as it holds sway “in itself” or “from beings.” From this point, then, beyng is not any kind of being, but is manifested in many ways. Daniela Vallega-Neu elaborates that while unique, beyng occurs historically, finitely, and determinately in manifold ways of enowning, concealing, sheltering, forgetting, creating, preserving. Its uniqueness doesn’t nullify the various modes of beyng, but “it designates this concreteness, historicality, and finitude in each mode of being.” Thus, beyng as a mark of simpleness is unique, in that beyng designates modes of beyng.

Eighth, beyng’s uniqueness grounds its aloneness [Einsamkeit] and surrounds itself only with the nothing [das Nichts]. Therefore, it holds sway to any being only mediately [nur mittelbar] through the strife of the “world” and “earth.” Could we not say that beyng’s aloneness is the source of silence, which is heard by Da-sein?

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236 GA 65: 471/ Contributions 331. This sentence should of itself dispel any notions that Heidegger’s beyng is the philosophical version of the Christian God.

Vallega-Neu sets the eight aspects into two groups: those that are involved in differing and those that are involved in gathering. The first five moments of *Ereignis* focus on the differing aspects of beyng while the last three, simpleness, uniqueness, and aloneness, focus on the gathering aspects.”

While gathering-differing is beyng holding sway in its entirety, holding sway can be seen in terms of holding or gathering, on the one hand; and, on the other hand, sway can be seen as differing. Breaking *Ereignis* down into its constituent parts, however, betrays the at-one-ness.

While seemingly without import, this emphasis sheds light upon how beyng can be both silence and a silence that is heard. Beyng is ambiguous; that is not to say that it is vague. Rather, beyng is twofold-as-one. This ambiguity is primary to all ambiguity in beings, namely, beings emerge in the strife “between” “world” and “earth.”

Lastly, beyng and only beyng is and a being is not ["daß das Seyn und nur das Seyn ist und daß das Seiende nicht ist"].

Ironically for this reason, beings, which are not, hear the silence of beyng, which is. This is yet another way of saying that beings shun beyng, for they hear nothing and are shocked to find that the nothing is and they are not. Nearing beyng, beings are brought forth by the silence, which draws Da-sein near to what it is, to beyng. Da-sein is brought into the open through renunciation. Through renouncing beings, beyng appropriates Da-sein. Da-sein is not primarily in control in *Ereignis*, unlike the Dasein of *Being and Time*. In *Ereignis*, Da-sein hears; in *Being and Time*, Dasein uncovers.

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239 *GA* 65/472/Contributions 332. The italics are Heidegger’s emphasis. While they are readily seen in the English translation, the German text maintains them as well.
From this renouncing-hearing language emerges. For Heidegger language does not arise from man, nor does man arise from language and still further, language and man cannot mutually determine each other as is the model for *animal rationale*.\(^{240}\) Instead, language emerges from beyng. Not language as assertion, but language as Saying of beyng [*Das Sagen des Seyns*]. Language is the resonance that belongs to *Ereignis*, as the “enstrifing” [*Erstreitung*] of the strife between “world” and “earth.” “Language arises from beyng and therefore belongs to it [*Die Sprache entspringt dem Seyn und gehört deshalb zu diesem*],” Heidegger unabashedly writes. “Everything once again depends on projecting-open and thinking [*Entwurf und Denken*] ‘of’ being.”\(^{241}\)

Just as in all the various aspects of beyng, wherein beings are intimate to beyng, and gods need Da-sein to offer beyng, wherein beings emerges in the strife between gods and man—all the while beyng is simple, unique and alone—in the *Ereignis*, so too language belongs to beyng in the resonance of the holding sway as the Saying of beyng. Beyng is manifested as *Ereignis*; originary language is manifested in the startled dismay [*Er-Schrecken*] of the broken boulders of metaphysics and literature, given in a particularly acute way in our epoch as machination.

As we conclude this chapter, it is important to recall the ever narrowing circling path that Heidegger has fashioned. From the destructive retrieval of the first beginning of philosophy and literature to the thinking of Being, Heidegger reached the nihilism of Nietzsche, only to find Being as Nothing. Then, in the *Beiträge* Heidegger circled even closer in the enactment of beyng, wherein *Ereignis* emerges as the manifested beyng as

\(^{240}\) *GA* 65: 499/Contributions 351.

\(^{241}\) *GA* 65: 501/Contributions 352. The parentheses surrounding “of” is Heidegger’s own emphasis. Again, we should not be misled by the term. For Heidegger “of” means that Da-sein is appropriated by beyng and belongs to beyng. Meditative thinking also is “of being” as it listens to being.
itself and projected-open. As Ereignis shows beyng’s relation to the gods and man, Ereignis too shows the resonance of the holding sway of beyng; originary language emerges as Silence, the Saying of Being.

Through this complex, if incomprehensible, treatment Heidegger comes to the realization that instead of Dasein primarily appropriating Being through language in Being and Time, beyng primarily appropriates Da-sein and language is indeed the resonance of that holding sway. Rather than language portrayed as part of anthropological humanism in a constructed metaphysics, language is Saying as Being.

In other words, the conversation of beyng has long ago already begun, the path was begun before our entrance. Language and beyng have long been part of the human experience, and yet we, as individual humans, come late and go along with it as it is already in progress.

How do we access that which houses us? If we were to gaze at Dasein, we miss the house. We must look to beyng and language. Yet as we gaze closely at beyng and language as a way, the path, which draws us, also dissipates into nothingness before us. How could Heidegger best explain this?

This approach certainly has it difficulties. To continue our house metaphor, as we dismantle the house, do we move out of the house? That indeed seems impossible. Is the house dismantled slowly while simultaneously rebuilding it—all the while we live in the house? This seems more plausible. And this seems to be Heidegger’s trajectory in this period. He refashions what we mean by things, highlights poetry as breaking the

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242 As many have indicated, the Beiträge is impossibly incomprehensible. It might follow that the above treatment is also unintelligible. But in many ways, is this not Heidegger’s point regarding beyng? Beyng is that which lies “before” that which is intelligible. Yet in its manifestation as Ereignis, Being as Saying becomes comprehensible. It is the dilation of ontological space as Ereignis, of which we have lingered for a while.
structures of language while allowing life, fresh meaning, and new thought to emerge, and most importantly he dwells on beyng as “nothingness.” While “nothingness” is the absurd culmination of metaphysics, it is also the source of new meaning toward the thought of beyng as Saying in Ereignis. Heidegger’s point was that in order to listen to beyng and language, we must first be comfortable with its silence. Now that we are comfortable with this silence, we can now move in its resonating holding sway in our next chapter, “Being-Saying.”
CHAPTER THREE:

From Language and Being toward Being:Saying

… *das Ganze noch einmal zu fassen* …

“Only the chill of the boldness of thinking and the night of errancy of questioning lend glow and light to the fire of beyng.”

From the last chapter we have experienced silence and the broken boulders of the first beginning. We stay attuned to *Ereignis* and we moved in its resonating holding sway. We experienced both our startled dismay and its near, if not utter, incomprehensibility. We moved from its originary mode as beyng, and saw its “unfolding” as “Being-Saying.” We have seen also the uncomfortable dwelling with the Silence of beyng and how that appears as *Ereignis*. All this “occurred” before language and beyng unfolds into its ordinary modes of language, Being and beings as *Sprache* in time and space.

To appreciate the great strides Heidegger made from 1927 through 1949 we have traversed much ground, tracing sometimes scant evidence of language’s relation to

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243 While the term “Being:Saying” most precisely conveys the meaning Heidegger intends, we will eventually employ the “as” structure to convey it more generally, as given in our title: Being as Saying. The subtle difference of the latter is its, Being:Saying’s, historical [geschichtlich] rendering.
244 *GA* 65: 514/Contributions 365. While this was the task of the previous chapter, all the while focusing on be-ing, now we look at the whole once again, focusing on language.
245 *GA* 65: 430/Contributions 303.
beyng. In *Being and Time* language was most evident as an existential mode of the care structure as Being-with [Sein-bei], given as discourse [Rede] and its inauthentic counterpart, idle chatter [Gerede]. This placed language as emerging out of Dasein’s structural aspect of Being-with others as part of fallenness [Verfallen]. We argued that language is also deeply immersed in the experience of everyday life as illustrated by Dasein’s references of “worldhood,” that language is “full” of ontic contents, interconnected in the referential totality of “worldhood.” As such, language has its roots in the care structure as projection [Entwurf] as well as fallenness [Verfallen]. Thus, *Being and Time* discovered language from “within” Dasein’s existential structure and from “without” in ontic experience.

But as phenomenology, *Being and Time* was unable to unfold the analytic of Dasein. Since Dasein was central to all descriptions of phenomenon and could not find a way to move beyond itself, Heidegger needed a new approach. To that end, roughly for the next decade Heidegger developed a new way of thinking, the method of destructive retrieval, whereby he broke through the structures of language and philosophy to find nihilism as the avenue toward beyng. This period of Heidegger culminated, we argued, in the *Beiträge*, which enacted meditative thinking or as others call it, beyng-historical thinking,\(^{246}\) in order to near ever closer to beyng, only to find beyng as Nothing [Nichts]. But not simply Nothing, for in its withdrawal, beyng also emerges in Da-sein’s startled dismay of Ereignis, manifested beyng as itself and projected-open [Entwurf].\(^{247}\) As

\(^{246}\) I opt for the phrase “meditative thinking,” for the reason that what characterizes it best is its move away from calculative thinking and into a meditative stance. While not at all incorrect, the phrase “beyng historical thinking” might suggest wrongly to an unknowing reader that what characterizes this type of thinking is its historical [Read: linear] character. Conversely, Heidegger holds that meditative thinking is a thinking in Being’s history.\(^{247}\) The astute reader will notice that Heidegger employs the same term for “projection” in the care structure of *Being and Time* and “projected-open” of Ereignis in the *Beiträge*. Certainly, the two are related, since
*Ereignis* shows *beyng’s* relation to the gods and man, *Ereignis* too shows the resonance of the holding sway of *beyng*: originary language as Silence, the Saying of *beyng*. Language in this period was both the means of destructive retrieval toward *beyng* and the originary language as Saying of *beyng*. Originary language emerged out of nihilism, as the withdrawal of *beyng*.

Both periods include discussions of language and Being. But language and Being become more intimately connected as Heidegger’s work progressed through the years, such that language’s “source” must be found in *Ereignis*. Now that we have traversed these waters toward *beyng* in the *Beiträge*, asymptotically reaching *beyng*, the lesson learned from the *Beiträge* is that *beyng* and language can be understood properly only as traversing “with” *beyng*, not “toward” *beyng*. In metaphorical language we must travel downstream with the current not upstream against the current—*beyng* is the current.

And yet the difficulty with the *Beiträge* and its performative esoteric style is its incomprehensibility. Was it a philosophical foray into experimental thinking for Heidegger and thus not meant for public discussion? We have already dismissed that caveat. Still, the peril of discussing the *Beiträge* with any seriousness is harsh, derisive criticism from all philosophical sources. Perhaps, for this reason Heidegger kept it out of the public eye for years. Given its esoteric formula, Heidegger needed a way to express its newfound insights of *Ereignis* in ways that would be more accessible. Heidegger continued in this vein in the decades to come, tracing in varied ways, the way of *Ereignis* as it appears to us.

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both have “an open directionality.” I would, however, caution the reader not to form an exact identity between two since the care structure is “of” *Dasein* while *Dasein* is only one part “of” *Ereignis*. 
The next three chapters follow Heidegger on this trail toward Being as Saying. Whether he explored language and Being, or λόγος, or language as poetry, or Da-sein, all paths lead to Being as Saying. These paths are less treacherous and more accessible to the general listener, unlike the Beiträge. Still, they in historical fashion will speak the same Being, and perhaps we can then hear more intently.

This present chapter begins with the insights of the Beiträge and flows from the source of beyng. It begins with the quandary of nothing [Nichts] as originary language in the projected-open [Entwurf]. With beyng and language so intimately related, we have found the solution to our question of how language has unity. This unity is originary language as the Saying of beyng. Saying of beyng is the withdrawal of beyng and is “heard” as Silence. Now we must proceed to explore further the “essence” of language that flows from this unity. We must negotiate a path between the care structure and nihilism, between spoken language and Silence. More importantly, we must speak in a way that ears may hear.

The title of this chapter, “From Language and Being toward Being:Saying,” indicates the trajectory of Heidegger’s work in this next period. Like the two previous approaches, it too has Seinsgeschichte as its concern. Now we must explore how Being and language for Heidegger is both the way and its steps along the way toward Being:Saying.

What might be the proper method to explore our question? Phenomenology started with everyday, ontical life and worked toward the structures of Dasein. Destructive retrieval seemed the opposite method, taking structures and breaking through them so as to allow beyng to appear in its originary way. One might suggest that a
simple historical, linear approach would best accomplish the task of tracing *Seinsgeschichte*. An historical approach seems most plausible. Our historical approach, however, won’t develop the trajectory in linear fashion as though language emerges in a uniform way from Being as Saying. Rather, we shall treat each of Heidegger’s works from 1949-1976, which either discuss language or is directly relevant to it. What will emerge in our historical approach is not unlike that of a river—there are eddies, rapids, seeming doldrums and even backflow—language’s relation to Being develops not linearly, but in multifaceted ways. The relation between Being and language emerges as Being allows, not as Dasein would wish.

“The Turning”

Let our first step begin with the Bremen lectures of 1949, specifically with the “The Turning” [*die Kehre*].248 Previously we have argued that Heidegger’s focus throughout his lifetime was the question of Being [*Seinsfrage*] and in particular, Heidegger’s concern was to work through his idea that Being “has” a history.

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248 Two slightly different versions of “Die Kehre” can be found in Klostermann’s Gesamtausgabe. Band 79, *Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge*, which contains the text as part of the lecture series “Die Kehre,” was part of a lecture series in December 1-4, 1949 in the Bremen Club. The lecture series was given unaltered in March 25 and 26, 1950 at Bühlernhöhe under the title, “Insight into That Which is. [*Einblick in das was ist*].” This particular lecture was the fourth, entitled, “Die Kehre;” it followed “Das Ding,” “Das Ge-stell,” and “Die Gefahr.” The ordering of the lectures should offer us an insight into how “The Turning” should be situated, that together with the way we wrongly conceive of a “thing,” our modern world is beset by machination, which enframes and leads to danger. And as that danger emerges, so also the saving power arises. While we wrongly conceive and think in calculative ways, primarily Being [*Sein*] assists our thinking in new ways in accordance with Ereignis. Beyng conceals itself as Being [*Sein*] or, as a favor, reveals itself in a flash as beyng [*Seyn*].

A second version of “Die Kehre” is located in Band 11, *Identität und Differenz*; it separates the lecture from its series context. Its English translation by William Lovitt can be found in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. by William Lovitt (New York, NY: Harper-Torchbooks, 1977). The major distinction we shall find is that the two versions differ dramatically in the sole usage of Being [*Sein*] in Volume 11 and, in contrast, volume 79 employs the pivotal usage of Being [*Sein*] in conjunction with beyng [*Seyn*].
and as such language is intimately related to Being. Presently we will argue specifically that the “Turning,” 249 [Kehre] is Heidegger’s overall way toward Seinsgeschichte and “Turning” has particular manifestations, all of which are related to the overall sense of “Turning.”

Within this lecture Heidegger gives us strong evidence of what he means by “the Turning” and through it we deduce what he means by Seinsgeschichte. Our argument hinges on the Beiträge’s usage of beyng [Seyn] in lieu of the earlier usage of Being [Sein]. While this shift of language from Being to beyng seemed idiosyncratic, it has a specific purpose in this lecture. To wit, Being [Sein] “has” a history, while beyng [Seyn] is “without” or “before” history; Being is concealed and revealed in many modes in the attunement of dismay or need [Not] while beyng is always revealed-as-concealed as the abandonment of beyng [Verlasseneheit], i.e. in the subjective genitive sense, through the grounding attunement [Grundstimmung] of startled dismay [Er-schrecken]. Seyn is more originary for Heidegger. It is this movement of terminology from Sein to Seyn that

249 Among Heideggerian scholars this term’s translation and meaning is still vigorously debated. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann outlines four ways of interpreting Kehre: in division two of Being and Time, the Kehre describes the turn from the Zeitlichkeit of Dasein to the Temporalität of Being; the turn from the fundamental ontology of Being and Time to beyng-historical thinking, generally characterized by the works of the 1930s and 1940s; within the Beiträge the in-turning [Einkehre] within Ereignis; and the turning from the abandonment of beyng, which is the focus of this 1949 eponymous lecture. See Herrmann, Wege ins Ereignis: Zu Heideggers “Beiträgen zur Philosophie” (Frankfurt am Main, DE: Klostermann, 1994) 67-68.


Finally, Emil Kettering and Bret Davis, following Kettering’s argument, interpret the Kehre overall as the double-structured relationship between being and man as the matter of Heidegger’s thought throughout all of Heidegger’s works, whether unsuccessfully so in the early or effectively so in the latter works; see Kettering, NAHE: Das Denken Martin Heideggers (Pfüllingen, DE: Neske, 1987) 328-330; Bret W. Davis, Heidegger and the Will: On the Way to Gelassenheit (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University, 2007) 322. I find, however, that Davis’ relation of the Kehre to the will to be ungrounded in Heidegger’s own works; see Heidegger and the Will 60-65.
illustrates the “Turning.” It is the question how might Being might properly be
“thought.”

Following Emil Kettering we argue that the “Turning” as the double-structured
relation between man and beyng is the self-same matter of Heidegger’s concern
throughout all of his life’s work. How Heidegger envisioned that relation has varied, but
it was always the same Seinsfrage: how is it that Being “has” a history. Certainly, this
does not preclude any of the four senses—from the Zeitlichkeit of Dasein to the
Temporalität of Being; from fundamental ontology of Being and Time to beyng-historical
thinking, the in-turning Einkehre within Ereignis; and the turning from the
abandonment of beyng—that Herrmann delineates, for they are steps toward a fuller
appreciation of how deep and pervasive the Kehre is involved in Heidegger’s project.
Nor would I entirely dismiss Richardson’s notion that Heidegger changed his thinking,
for if the Kehre is properly thought, if Da-sein is open to Ereignis, it will induce a change
in Da-sein. Richardson’s notion is tertiary, though; Herrmann’s four senses are
secondary and illustrate the primary notion that Being “has” a history.

All conceptions hinge upon the fact that Heidegger can show that Seyn is
somehow distinguished from Sein, but also it is the case that Seyn is Sein. This seems
contradictory, or perhaps vague. It is, however, neither. It is ambiguous, that is to say,
that such an ambiguous position is Heidegger’s exact point and the key to understanding
the Seyn/Sein distinction; because Being is ambiguous as holding sway, all its
formulations in the history of Being unfold as holding sway.

\[\text{250 To say that all beings unfold in a historical way, is not to invoke a Hegelian understanding of history; rather, beings are “seinsgeschichtlich.” Robert Bernasconi explicates well the difference in understanding of history between Hegel and Heidegger. For Heidegger the history of Being is a destiny \([\text{Geschick}]\). We}\]
Seinsgeschichte shows holding sway throughout all formulations as identity and difference. This identity/difference formulation is best contrasted in one sentence early in this lecture. It describes the holding sway of Seyn/Sein. It reads as follows:

Weil jedoch das Seyn sich als Wesen der Technik in das Ge-Stell geschickt hat, zum Wesen des Seyns aber das Menschenwesen \(^{251}\) gehört, insofern das Wesen des Seyns das Menschenwesen braucht, um als Sein nach dem eigenen Wesen inmitten des Seienden gewahrt zu bleiben und so als Seyn zu wesen \(\ldots\) \(^{252}\)

Nevertheless, because beyng as the “essence” of technology has adapted itself into Enframing, the “essence” of humanity belongs to the holding sway of beyng in so far as the holding sway of beyng needs the “essence” of humanity in order to remain preserved as Being according to its own holding sway in the midst of beings and, therefore, to hold sway as beyng. \(^{253}\)

The “Being/beyng” [Sein/Seyn] identity/difference distinction is a crucial step in this section. \(^{254}\) Heidegger makes the distinction of beyng [Seyn], occurring as beyng’s abandonment, and Being [Sein], holding sway in the midst of beings; and yet Heidegger maintains the identity of Being [Sein] as holding sway in the midst of beings is beyng [Seyn]. Thus, beyng turning in [einkehren] as abandonment and turning as projected-open, heard as Silence in the Beiträge, now turns in the midst of beings as Being as Saying. This deft move is not the orginary turn of holding sway manifested as Ereignis

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251 Heidegger italicizes “-wesen” of “Menschenwesen.”
253 The translation is my own. While Lovitt’s translation is fine for the most part, he fails to distinguish any of the many deliberate distinctions between Heidegger’s usage of Seyn and Sein. Also, in lieu of “essence,” which has deep metaphysical overtones, I translate “Wesen” as “holding sway” for beyng and yet retain the term for humanity and technology, for the sole purpose of highlighting beyng. Overall, this terminology in our translation is more consistent with the Beiträge in the last chapter.
254 Unfortunately, this distinction can only be maintained within this lecture. While this lecture and the section of the Beiträge entitled, “Being” maintain a consistent distinction, other later works will not illustrate such a distinction. This momentary crucial distinction loses its importance when engaging in Seinsgeschichte. Moreover, Heidegger will arrive at a stage in his career when he will dismiss all terms for Being as still steeped in the first beginning of philosophy; to illustrate that point he will opt for “Being,” indicated as “\(\text{Zur Seinsfrage}\)” (1955) is such a work.
in the Beiträge, but it is the key, we argue, to Heidegger’s lifelong pursuit of
Seinsgeschichte.

Heidegger elaborates how beyng, “the source” of time and space, is Being “in”
time and space. It occurs through the dangerous-saving255 “enframing” [Ge-stell]; for
this reason such a distinction, up to now, has not been noticed. Heidegger discusses its
occurrence: “Yet probably this256 turning—the turning of the abandonment of beyng into
the safekeeping belonging to the holding sway of Being—will finally come to pass only
when the danger, which is in its concealed essence ever susceptible of turning, first
comes expressly to light as the danger that it is.”257 Enframing danger also brings forth light.

Careful attention to this sentence is needed. What is the turning of the
abandonment of Being? Abandonment [Verlassenheit] of beyng is the originary Kehre as
in-turning [Einkehre], consistent with the sixth Ereignis aspect in the Beiträge. From this
originary “in-turning” as abandonment of beyng, Dasein notices this abandonment and
for this reason Dasein is needed, described as the first Ereignis aspect in the Beiträge.
Dasein notices the abandonment of Being [Sein], but it is not primarily Dasein’s doing. It

255 Richard Rocjewicz argues that enframing does not save, but what saves does grow there. With Ted
Kiesel, I maintain that enframing does indeed include both a danger and a saving power, in the sense that
the danger is the saving power in so far as the danger brings the holding sway of the saving power.
Heidegger writes in GA 79: 72: “Die Gefahr ist das Rettende, insofern sie aus ihrem Wesen das Rettende
bringt.”

256 GA 79: 71. The italics is not contained within the text of Heidegger’s “Die Kehre” in volume 79: 49; it
is retained in volume 11; William Lovitt’s translation of “The Turning” in The Question Concerning
Technology and other Essays, derives from GA 11. Neither Lovitt’s translation, nor Heidegger’s text in GA
11: 57 contain the distinction between “Seyn” and “Sein.” Other differences within between volumes 11
and 79 include: no hyphen in “Ge-stell” while 79 maintains “Ge-Stell;” “entsprechenden” is italicized; a
phrase in Band 79: “was ein völlig anderes Ereignis ist als der Vorgang,” is different in Band 11: “was
ergebnisfert etwas ganz anders ist als der Vorgang.”

257 GA 79: 71/“The Turning” 41. The German text reads as follows: “Vermutlich aber ereignet sich diese
Kehre, diejenige der Vergessenheit des Seins zur Wahrnis des Wesens des Seyns, nur, wenn die in ihrem
verborgenen Wesen kehrige Gefahr erst einmal als die Gefahr, die sie ist, eigens anwesst.” In this sentence
volume 11 italicizes “diese”; “Seyn” is absent; where Band 79 has the phrase: “eigens anwesst,” volume 11
inserts: “eigens ans Licht kommen.”
appears as that primary beyng/Being showing itself in the very way it shows itself as abandonment, heard as Silence.

From Dasein’s vantage point then it appears as the oblivion [Vergessen] of Being is not like forgetting things or having a lapse of memory. Instead, the oblivion of Being is that concealedness which is the source and foundation of all unconcealedness or truth [ἀλήθεια]. Is it too much of a stretch to say that abandonment is closely related to originary concealedness or Saying heard as Silence? I argue, “No.” It is the identical concealedness, but it has a different aspect; it is now “has” a history.

One could effectively argue that in no way could Heidegger prove such a point. Heidegger would not deny such an objection. But Heidegger’s claim here is not unlike Kant’s claim that while we do know that something (=X) affects us, we cannot know what it (=X) is in itself, which indeed affects us. Heidegger holds that Sein is that which we recognize while Seyn is the term that indicates that which is “beyond” Da-sein.259

Da-sein is needed for Seyn to manifest itself as Ereignis. The Seyn/Sein distinction, then, is Heidegger’s way of demarcating the fact that Dasein is needed in Ereignis. And Heidegger’s point to show that Seyn and Sein are the self-same manifestation in Ereignis shows that Da-sein is not the sole, nor the primary “actor” in Ereignis. Seyn’s abandonment heard as Silence is the nearing of Sein here [Da].

As abandonment of Seyn as heard as Silence [Stille], it is Saying.260 As the holding sway amidst beings Sein is heard as Saying. Both are originary language.

258 This is Lovitt’s editorial note. See The Question Concerning Technology 36.
259 The above sentence is meant merely as an analogical device. “Seyn” is in no way “beyond” nor does it “cause;” both of these terms indicate relational activity that flows out of the originary holding sway, as it were, far downstream.
260 While Heidegger does not explicate this specific point in this lecture, it can be inferred from he has written elsewhere. We have seen this in GA 65: 470-471/Contributions 331-332; we will soon look closer
Silence and Saying are the self-same and yet, Silence is different from Saying. As
originary language, words never suffice to define. What Silence and Saying can convey
is that Silence or Nothing is heard as the abandonment of byng [Seyn] while Saying is
how it is given.261

This turning is byng [Seyn] as it brings itself and its holding sway to language
[Sprache bringt] as Sein. Without language every purposeful deliberation
[Überlegenwollen] remains without its way [Weg] and its byway [Steg]. Without
language, looking out [sich umtun] to every dimension of ontology would not occur.
Without language, Sein’s “ability to be effective [wirken]” would be lacking.262

The turning of byng, then, is what brings forth this language understood in the
broadest sense. Without this language deliberation cannot ever be attempted. Without
this language, it seems “ontological space” is thwarted. Beyng’s holding sway offers this
“ontological-space-as-language” by its “action” of holding sway.

These sentences follow the German text more faithfully than does Lovitt’s
translation. While it is clear in the text that through beyng’s holding sway language is
given, it isn’t at all clear how this language should be “thought.” It isn’t simply language
as speech, but rather language as broadly held as all forms of utterances. This is correctly
conveyed by Lovitt’s addition of the English word, “utterance;” even though the German
does not indicate it here. Later263 Heidegger makes it clear that by use of the word,
“language,” he intends far more than ordinary speech, a word, and even an utterance or

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261 In other later works Heidegger oftentimes employs the colon, e.g., Silence: Saying: Nothing. The colon in modern script effectively conveys that the relation of identity and difference. See GA 12: 190/“The Nature of Language.”
262 GA 7: 71/“The Turning,” The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays 40-41.
263 We shall shortly discuss this in “Language.”
gesture. Originary language is the Saying of Being and is the “reason” that ordinary means of communication occurs.

Heidegger continues to clarify what he intends with the word, “language.” Language is never primarily the expression of thinking, feeling, and willing [niemals erst Ausdruck des Denkens, Fühlens und Wollens]. Rather, language is the primal dimension [anfängliche Dimension] within which man’s essence is first able to correspond [entsprechen] to Being and its claim [Anspruch] and is first able to belong [gehören] to Being. This primal corresponding, [dieser anfängliche Entsprechen] expressly carried out, is thinking [Denken].

We must not presume that thinking here is simply what we commonly hold thinking to be; language most certainly is not an outward expression of thinking. Heidegger will convey what he means by that word momentarily. More importantly, Heidegger holds that this type of language is that which links man’s essence to Being and is appropriated to, or belongs to Being. This belonging allows man’s essence to listen to Being; this “listening” Heidegger calls thinking.

Through thinking, we first learn to dwell in the realm in which there comes to pass [sich ereignet] the entwining [Verwindung] of the destining of Being [des Seinsgeschicks], the entwining of Enframing [des Ge-Stells]. Heidegger holds that thinking [Denken] leads man to proper dwelling. Such dwelling is brought about primarily through Being and secondarily by man; the Silence of Being draws man to his

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264 “Verwindung” is oftentimes translated into English as “twisting.” While Lovitt translates Heidegger’s “Verwindung” as surmounting, I choose entwining. “Verwindung” for Heidegger is not so much an “overcoming,” which “surmounting” implies, but a thorough twisting or binding. I choose a positive attribution to indicate both the strangling danger, but also the strength of the saving power.

265 This will be the subject matter of two Heideggerian lectures in the following years: “Bauen Wohnen Denken” and “…dichterisch wohnet der Mensch....”
ownmost “self” and chooses to listen and respond accordingly. In Enframing, Being “speaks” most loudly and man hears the danger more readily. The effect will be a twofold entwining as one of the destiny of Being and of Enframing. One should correctly assess that they correspond in some fashion.

Beyond the process of corresponding, though, questions abound. The lecture delineates what technology is, how it is not entirely within our control, how it leads to danger and why as this danger it remains the saving power. What remains unanswered is to what extent is man involved and to what extent is Being involved in this entwining? How is thinking related to language overall, and to its articulation in particular? How is language related to proper dwelling?

While the reader might wish that Heidegger would address these questions directly, it shall not be the case that Heidegger addresses them at this given time. Rather, our next step along the pathway of Being and language is looking directly at things in “The Thing” [Das Ding]. After the Bremen lectures, Heidegger wrote a few smaller works, which do not bear greatly on our topic of Being and language. In 1949 Heidegger wrote “The Pathway” [Der Feldweg], which we discussed briefly in our introduction; he also wrote a new introduction to an earlier work, “Introduction to ‘What is Metaphysics,’” wherein Heidegger places metaphysics in its proper setting of Being. Within it Heidegger writes that we need to view all: “… beings as beings appear in the

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266 All these issues are quite interesting; certainly apt subject matter for modern man, yet they are not entirely within the scope of the topic of Being and language. What is germane to our topic is that they are all forms of language as Being as Saying.

267 “Das Ding” was presented originally as a lecture at the Bayerischen Akademie der Schönen Kunste on June 6, 1950. The original text was published in the Jahrbuch der Akademie, Band I, Gestalt und Gedanke 1951, 128ff. Later it was incorporated into Klostermann’s Gesamtausgabe, GA 7, Vorträge und Aufsätze. The English translation, located in Poetry, Language, Thought, is the work of Albert Hofstadter.
Refocusing our sight onto beings as they appear in the light of Being is the method by which the relation of language and Being will indeed come to light.

“The Thing”

Before we step forward into Heidegger’s major work on language, we must comment on how Heidegger envisions things as nestling the fourfold in “The Thing.” Within “The Thing” Heidegger seeks the relation between Being and man vis-à-vis other beings. Like “The Origin of the Work of Art,” “The Thing” explores how things appear to us not only as blocks of matter, but also speaks to us of a deeper, more primal relation [anfängliches Entsprechen] between Being and man. Specifically, “The Thing” discusses how things are defined more by the fourfold. Like the simple complexity of the Ereignis in the Beiträge, we shall see that there is simplicity and a multifaceted dimension to a thing.

“The Thing” moves toward the “thingly” side of things through which Being comes to light. Perhaps not directly pertinent to our topic, we find that while focusing on the elements which comprise a thing as we did with the aspects of Seyn in the Beiträge, new light is cast onto the relationship between a thing and Being. Since Dasein is involved in this relationship, light shines too on the relation between language and Being.

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268 GA 9: 366 “Introduction to ‘What is Metaphysics,’” Pathmarks 278. Heidegger’s phrase details the ways beings were discussed in the history of philosophy—in materialism or spiritualism, as matter or force, as becoming, as representation, will, substance, subject or energeia, even as eternal recurrence of the same—each time … “erscheint das Seiende als Seiendes im Lichte des Seins.”

269 “Das Ding” was originally part of the Bremen lectures, but also was offered in adapted form a number of times afterwards in 1950 as a single lecture: in the Bavarian Academy of Fine Arts, June 6 and in Icking, June 10, 1950. The German text of the Bremen lecture is located in GA 71, while this adaptation can be found in GA 7, Vorträge und Aufsätze. Albert Hofstadter’s excellent English translation of the selection in GA 7 can be found in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. and intro. Albert Hofstadter (New York, NY: Harper-Colophon, 1971) 165-186.
In short, a thing is not simply a thing that persistently stays; it is a gathering of the fourfold \([\text{Geviert}]\): of earth and sky, divinities and mortals. Language as a correspondence of this gathering \([\text{Entsprechen}]\) is involved in this gathering.

This gathering is taking a step backward from representational thinking as given by the first beginning of Western philosophy of what makes the jug a jug: from Plato’s \(\varepsilon\iota\delta\omicron\sigma\varsigma\) through the \textit{res} of the Latin Romans to Kant’s thing “in-itself” \([\text{Ding an sich}]\).\(^{270}\)

Moreover, gathering backs away from metaphysical causality. The term “gathering” suggests a tightening of loose ends that are interrelated\(^{271}\); as such Heidegger’s word suggests that a thing is not a solid, inert block of dead matter, but interwoven elements, including active involvement by mortals. At the same time the thing “gathers” these elements and Being is shown through this gathering.

For example, the jug is not so much a singular inactive thing, as much as it gathers the fourfold into a single time-space; the jug stays as gatherer. True, the jug is a vessel for liquid containment, but it also contains the earth from which it was made, the changing process of earth into a shape, the mortals’ intentions of creating it, the fundamental awareness\(^{272}\) together construe the possibilities of the jug. The jug is more of emptiness than solid block. Empty, the jug gathers many-into-one. “This manifold-

\(^{270}\) Slavoj Žižek, insightfully, though not without some problems, compares Heidegger’s discussion of the “thing” with Kant’s “\textit{Ding an sich}.” Žižek concludes that Kant’s “\textit{Ding an sich}” is nothingness. This nothingness would not be akin to Heidegger’s Silence, but some correlation could be drawn between Heidegger’s “Stillness,” as described below on page 105. See Slavoj Žižek, \textit{The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology} (London; New York, NY: Verso, 1999) 51.

\(^{271}\) An interesting comparison can be made of Nietzsche’s description of Wagner as a contra-Alexander with Heidegger’s notion here of “gathering” of interrelated loose ends.

\(^{272}\) For the term, “divinities” in the fourfold, I construe it broadly here as possibility; later it will be discussed in all of its ramifications.
simple gathering is the jug’s presencing [Wesen],” explains Heidegger. As a manifold-as-singular, the jug gathers-as-presencing. In a nicely crafted set of sentences, Heidegger summarizes the presencing of the jug: “Preceding everything that is present [allem Anwesenden zuvorkommend], they are enfolded [eingefaltet] into a single fourfold [einziges Geviert]. In the gift of the outpouring [Gusses] dwells [weilt] the simple singlefoldness of the four [die Einfalt der Vier].” A “thing” as enfolding the fourfold appears as a thing, in this case, a jug.

The jug, as gathering presence, is Heidegger’s avenue to review “world.” “The thing things the world, [Das Ding dingt Welt]” Heidegger elliptically writes, elliptical not for evasion, but for an account of what happens. The thing stays, i.e., gathers, the fourfold’s happening into the oneness of the “world.” When we think of the jug merely as a jug, we save or preserve [schonen] the presence of the jug in the region, from which it presences [west] and preserve the jug into a particular space and time, we fix it out of which it was an original presencing of the fourfold. This fixity is the nearing of the “world.” Heidegger holds that the nearing of the “world” is the process of the fourfold; he outlines the process: “As we preserve [schonen] the thing qua thing, we inhabit [bewohnen] nearness [Nähe]. The nearing of the nearness [Das Nähern der Nähe] is the true and sole dimension [eigentliche und die einzige Dimension] of the mirror-play

273 Now that the topic of discussion is regarding beings, we replace “essence” with “presencing.” Essence conveys static reality, while presencing suggests an active, on-going process, more in line with the term “holding sway.”
277 We save the jug in so far as we, mortals, are part of the fourfold; Da-sein is active in worlding as an existential effect of the care structure. Finally, the thing as gathered nears “world.”
278 We insert the example of the jug into Heidegger’s original sentence so as to make it more tangible. See GA 7: 182/“The Thing,” Poetry, Language, Thought 181.
[des Spiegel-Spiels] of the world."²⁷⁹ By fixing things as things, we inhabit the “world,” which “nears.”

While nearing seems to be ascribed positively as coming close to Being, instead, nearing is akin to the jug’s lack, its emptiness. The “mirror-play” clues us into the fact that this fixing a thing as thing is closer to a representational illusion. But Heidegger is calling us to dwell, not inhabit the “world.” Inhabiting the world, man resides within a given world; man simply needs to represent it accurately. Dwelling, man is part of the world’s gathering.

This dwelling is not a mere shift of attitude, though it does indeed shift our attitude [Einstellung]. Indeed, this dwelling is a step back from the attitude of representational thinking [vorstellenden Denkens]; but it is also a step forward into a residence of co-responding [Aufenthalt in einem Entsprechen] with the “world.” No longer should we see things as objects, viewed by subjects. A thing is a gathering of the fourfold. But, nevertheless, a thing of fourfoldness nestles or minimizes [gering]²⁸⁰ itself as one thing in the world.

Heidegger explains further this occurrence. While things are simplified as part of the “world,” they are still a gathering of the fourfold. The appearance seems otherwise; the relational seems dependent on the unity of the thing.²⁸¹ Moreover, compare this depiction of things and their “formation” with that of “ready-to-hand”/“present-at-hand” in the phenomenological description of Being in Time. While Dasein is central in Being

²⁸⁰ GA 7: 184/“The Thing,” Poetry, Language, Thought 182. While Hofstadter translates “gering” as “cojoin”; it seems that Heidegger’s meaning should convey, as the German word typically does, something “insufficient.”
²⁸¹ The degree of of dependence upon the unity of the thing would invite a fruitful comparison with Leiniz’s monodology.
and Time to the gathering of the totality of references, mortals\textsuperscript{282} are one of four major aspects of the thinging of things.

Certainly the two descriptions have commonalities, but after “The Turning” man’s involvement in “worldhood” is curtailed. How does the thinging of things occur without Dasein’s primary influence? Heidegger explains it in this fashion. Though, while a “thing” is a gathering of the fourfold, all of a sudden [\textit{jäh vermutlich}], as the “world” worlds, the simplicity\textsuperscript{283} of the thing wrests itself\textsuperscript{284} from the fourfold; and a thing things.

To explain this conundrum contained in thinking of a thing, Heidegger turns to language. In this relationship between man dwelling and the world worlding, where things gather from the fourfold, where oneness is also a relation of fourfoldness, language as correspondence [\textit{Entsprechen}] is operative. Thus, a thing’s essence is a holding sway, which follows language [\textit{Entsprechen}], which in turn, follows beyng’s holding sway. This is not a linear progression, nor a phenomenology, but a holding sway unfolding. It is not linear because it is “before” time and space; it is not an existential phenomenology because it is not solely within the human domain. How should this holding sway unfolding look?

\textsuperscript{282} We cannot here in the space allotted draw out the spectral differences among Heidegger’s “Dasein,” “Da-sein,” “man” and “mortals.” We shall, for the sole purpose of this section, define them in the broadest context possible, as roughly referring to man.

\textsuperscript{283} Heidegger employs the Old German terms “ringing” [\textit{Gering}] as part of the semblance of the one thing and “ring” [\textit{Ring}] as the gathering of the fourfold. It is reminiscent of Heidegger’s usage of “discourse” [\textit{Rede}] and it inauthentic counterpart of “idle chatter” [\textit{Gerede}] in \textit{Being and Time}. The meaning conveyed is such that the fourfold is the correct resonation, while the fixity of the thing is secondary. See \textit{GA 7: 182} “The Thing,” \textit{Poetry, Language, Thought} 180.

\textsuperscript{284} Heidegger adds this note: “sich löst ins Freie—das Gering—das Versammeln in das Sichbefreien—Sichfügen—in das Zusammengehören der Vier.” I translate Heidegger’s unclear meaning as the following: The thing frees itself into the open – ringing: the gathering in the self-freeing—conforming—in the belonging-together of the four. Its implication seems that the gathering and the breaking into the open the thing, as free in the open, is still conforming to the fourfold.
Heidegger wants to convey this unfolding situation such that man has part in the relationship of the worlding of the world, but too, that the situation is beyond man’s control. But more than a faculty of man, language now is meant as the means by which the correspondence [Entsprechen] of the holding sway of Being “is.” Language in this sense, then, is near to the neighborhood of man’s being. Heidegger has come to a new path in his understanding in the relationship between language and Being. Language certainly is more originary than linguistics. Let us turn more directly to language.

“Language”

Heidegger turns toward language’s role in “worlding the world” [das Welten von Welt]\(^2\) in “Language” [Die Sprache].\(^3\) This lecture works carefully through a complex set of relationships: the relationship between Being as originary call, the gathering rest of the fourfold into the thing, language as the bidding call of Being, and man who hears this call and responds. Metaphorically speaking, from the “thingly” side of things, we step toward the “Being” side of Saying and directly into a dense account of language. These are not dialectically related; rather, Heidegger is un knotting their heretofore common dialectic understanding.

Heidegger does not ask the question: What is the essence of language? Rather, Heidegger asks in what way does language occur as language. In short, language speaks

\(^3\)The lecture, “Die Sprache,” was first given at Bühlerhöhe in memory of Max Kommerell, October 7, 1950 and again at the Württembergische Bibliotheksgesellschaft in Stuttgart, February 14, 1951. Later its text was included in GA 12, Unterwegs zur Sprache. It is the only essay omitted in the English translation of On the Way to Language. Instead, its English translation used here is found in Poetry, Language, Thought. Albert Hofstadter is its translator.
[Die Sprache spricht]. Ordinarily we think of speech as the audible expression and communication of human feelings [Gefühle]. This idea of speech as an utterance is the most common. It already presupposes the idea of something internal that utters or externalizes itself. Speech is also regarded as an activity of man; though, this seems to contradict Heidegger’s earlier claim that language speaks. Lastly, human expression occurs as representation and presentation [Vorstellung und Darstellung] of the real and the unreal [Wirklichen und Unwirklichen]. All these descriptions are in conjunction with that, which we associate to be linguistic phenomena.

But when we listen to a poem, we listen. But what do we hear? We hear something else going on. There seems to be more than linguistic phenomena occurring. According to the ordinary account of language, we hear ourselves speak and we hear of our experiences, feelings, our representations. A poem, however, speaks more than simply the things of our world. For this reason, Heidegger sees a poem more that other forms of language readily able to help us in our first steps toward the discovery of how indeed does language speak.

Heidegger, like Plato, wonders what might be binding in that bond [Bündinge jener Bindung] between words and what they evoke, but unlike Plato Heidegger envisions something nearer. We listen to what is spoken in Georg Trakl’s poem, “A Winter Evening” [»Ein Winterabend«]. We hear more than what we already knew of

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288 Heidegger uses the tradition terminology in German idealism. GA 12: 12/“Language” 192.
things and the world. Accordingly, we can say that language speaks and is neither primarily an expression nor is it an activity of man.  

As the objects are named, e.g., snow, threshold, pain, the poem does not apply words as much as it calls “into” the word [ruft ins Wort]. “The naming calls [Das Nennen ruft].” Calling brings closer the presence. But this simply isn’t bringing closer. Calling is also a calling out into the distance, in which what it called remains, still absent [In die Ferne, in der Gerufenes weilt als noch Abwesendes]. Nor is calling a wrestling [entreißt] that calls away from remoteness, for the call calls into itself [ruft in sich], always there and here [hin und her]: there, always absent; here, calling into presence. As such calling is twofold, a reaching out to what is absent, and drawing the absent near while it remains absent. Heidegger asks what is more present: the so-called items at hand, or the presence of what is called and remains absent. Heidegger holds the latter.

What does this drawing near entail? The call bids things to come. Not to be present among things present [Anwesende unter das Anwesende], as the laptop beneath the fingertips of the person composing. The call bids things to come into a place of arrival [Ort der Ankunft], which is also called, as a presence sheltered in absence [Abwesen geborgenes Anwesen]. It invites things in such a way that they may bear upon men as things. Heidegger describes the entire process: “In the naming, the things named are called into their thinging [in ihr Dingen]. Thinging [dingend], they unfold world [ent-

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falten sie Welt], in which things linger [weilen] and so are the abiding ones [je die
weiligen sind].”

In calling, the poem as language names and sounds the world-fourfold here [Welt-
Geviert her]; and thusly, the poem calls world to the things there [zu den Dingen hin].
The poem calls things to the world and the world to things. Things are neither called to
the world of metaphysics, nor to the physical cosmos, nor to the totality of things, rather
things are called to the world-fourfold. The poem as language calls the fourfold to rest
into things while, nevertheless, remains the fourfold. So too language as Saying [Sagen]
as poem, which names the world, calls to itself here and there [her und hin]. And so we
can understand now Heidegger’s terse sentences: “The world grants to things their
presence. Things bear world. World grants things.” Language of the poem calls
things to come to world and world to things.

But world and things do not stand as two entities beside one another
[nebeneinander]. More precisely, the two biddings are different [geschieden], but not
separated [getrennt]. Nor are the biddings merely coupled [gekoppelt]. They
interpenetrate each other [Sie durchgehen einander] and traverse a middle [durchmessen
die Zwei eine Mitte]. In the middle they are one [In dieser sind sie einig]; they are
intimate [innig], but not as a fusion [Verschmelzung]. A fusion has no divisions. Rather,
between of world and thing [im Zwischen von Welt und Ding] prevails [waltet] as dif-

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295 GA 12: 19/“Language,” On the Way to Language 199-200. Perhaps the use of this term, “unfold” [ent-
falten], more than any in this chapter is central to explicate what Heidegger is articulating during this
period. “Unfolding” bridges old conceptual frameworks—of location of here or there, of time: then and
now and later, of present and absent—into unity-in-separation and holding sway.
296 Heidegger’s point is shown here how the poem draws from the fourfold a world and the fourfold is the
world.
Wesen. Die Dinge gebärden Welt. Welt gönnt die Dinge.”
ference [Unter-Scheid]. World and things, then stand as an intimate gathered-difference.

Heidegger continues to discuss this difference and what it entails. The intimacy is presencing [west] of the between, presencing in the dif-ference [west im Unter-Scheid]. Dif-ference does not mediate after the fact by connecting world and things, but by being the middle. It first determines the world and things in their presence, “i.e., in their being toward one another, whose unity it carries.” Difference doesn’t mean a distinction as much as unity-in-distinction. As Heidegger writes, “The dif-ference for world and thing disclosingly appropriates things into bearing a world; it disclosingly appropriates world into the granting of things.” Dif-ference is not a distinction nor is it a relation [weder Distinktion noch Relation]. In the best case, it is a dimension for world and thing [Dimension für Welt und Ding], not a dimension of space-time, but the dimension [Die Dimension]. What is really called in the bidding that calls thing and world is the authentic calling [eigentlich Geheiße], the dif-ference.

The imagery of Trakl’s poem becomes the vehicle whereby the poem poses both aesthetically as imagery of things in the world and structurally as Heidegger’s dif-

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298 The actual German sentence is somewhat varied from that of the above translation: “In der Mitte der zwei, im Zwischen von Welt und Ding, in ihrem inter, in diesem Unter-waltet der Schied.” A direct English translation, “In the middle of the two, in the between of world and thing, in their ‘intimacy, in this ‘dif-’ prevails the ‘-ference,’” would make little sense. The point best made is that the separation carries the intimate unity. GA 12: 22/“Language,” On the Way to Language 202.


301 Holfstadter translates “ereignet” as “disclosingly appropriates.” While certainly correct, its translation can mask connection of “ereignet” to the Beiträge. Both usages in Heidegger’s text are italicized, also verifying its specialized meaning as given in the Beiträge. GA 12: 22/“Language,” On the Way to Language 202-203.

302 We shall retain Holfstadter’s translation for lack of suitable possibilities, barring the use of the German, “ereignet.” This latter alternative would pose insuperable difficulties with subject-object agreement.

303 Heidegger emphasizes “die” to indicate its singular meaning.

ference. Heidegger discusses the imagery of the threshold of the door between the inside
of the house and the outdoors. Dif-ference, then, is the threshold \([Schwelle]\) of the door:
it is the sill that bears the door as a whole. It holds the middle in which the outside and
the inside \([das Draußen und das Drinnen]\), penetrate each other \([einander
durchgehen]\).\(^{304}\) The middle never wavers; always it separates while unifying.

With the threshold imagery is included the pain \([Schmerz]\). Ostensibly, the pain
belongs to the wanderer, who nearly walks through the threshold, but upon seeing
longed-for food on the table is frozen. Pain blocks his way, as if the entrance were not a
door, but a stone barring his way. Due to pain, the threshold is noticed.\(^{305}\) Were the man
simply to enter the house, the threshold would have been unnoticed.

Notice how man is now simply part of the equation of dif-ference. For Heidegger
the pain is the rift \([Er is der Riß]\). “Pain rends \([Der Schmerz reißt]\),”\(^{306}\) he pens. What
should not be overlooked is the obvious fact that man feels pain. While things and world
penetrate each other and hold together as separated, they are simply absent without the
correlating pain of man, certainly given in sensation, but broadly construed to encompass
psychological, mental and spiritual pain. In pain, man now notices intimately the
intimate dimensions of the threshold. The pain is the joining of the rift. Heidegger then
concludes that pain is the dif-ference itself.\(^{307}\) The pain of man indicates the dif-ference;

\(^{304}\) Most effective is the imagery and its implications of bridging the Cartesian subject/object distinction. 
\textit{GA} 12: 24/“Language,” 	extit{On the Way to Language} 204.

\(^{305}\) While Heidegger does not notice, a person has a threshold of tolerance of pain as well. It might be said
that a certain degree of pain leads to the threshold “without” while a greater degree of pain leads to the
threshold “within.” Nevertheless, as in both cases, it is reasonably assumed all degrees of pain leads to
threshold experiences.

\(^{306}\) The astute reader should notice the relation between “dif-ference” here and “de-cision” in the “The
Origin of the Work of Art.” Both contain the word and meaning of rift \([Riß]\), though the latter uses the

while always there, now it is problematized. It is the problem of the central, indeed primary, role of the original call [Das ursprüngliche Rufen], Saying.

The original call [ursprüngliche Rufen] seems to flow in the following non-linear fashion. The simplicity of the intimate bidding [des innigen Heißen] which calls the difference and does so by leaving it unspoken [ungesprochen] and authentic [eigentlich]. This bidding is the nature of speaking and we can find it in Trakl’s poem. It is also in speaking’s nature to bid; the bidden is man. The primal calling draws man to the difference in pain. Dif-ference lets the thinging of the thing [das Dingen des Dinges] rest [beruhen] in the worlding of the world [im Welten der Welt]. In this process, Heidegger attempts to explain how man fits into this occurrence: the “bidding of language commits the bidden thus to the bidding of the differ-ence.” In other words, language commits man to the differ-ence, who, in pain, sees things resting in the world.

In resting, the Stillness is kept. There the differ-ence stills the thing as thing in the world. The differ-ence stills in two ways. It “lets things rest in the world’s favor [Gunst].” And it lets the world suffice itself [sich benügen] in the thing. This double stilling takes place as: Stillness [die Stille].

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308 GA 12: 26 “Language,” On the Way to Language 206. The reader should not miss the connection among the following terms: bidding/Heißen and naming. Interesting correlations between Heidegger and Plato can be drawn: an inverse relationship of Heidegger’s account of “Dimension” with Plato’s account of the passive “receptacle” [ὕποδοχή] as a “third kind” in the Timaeus (48e4) and Heidegger’s “naming” with Plato’s concern with naming in the Cratylus.

311 Throughout, I capitalize “Stillness,” whereas Hofstadter does not. Like the silence/Silence distinction, it seems that “stillness” implies purely a phenomenological occurrence, while “Stillness” retains a meaning deeper than mere phenomenon.
Stillness does not mean that it is simply without sound. In the Stillness the difference gathers the things and the world out of itself as it calls them into the rift that is the difference itself. Stillness is the unity. Heidegger elucidates: “Language speaks in that command of the difference calls world and things into the simple onefold of their intimacy. Language speaks as the sounding of Stillness.” This sounding is not anything human and yet it is also of the human. Sounding is not human in that it stems from Being, yet sounding is of human in that it is heard through humans. In this sense it is “linguistic” [»sprachlich«], i.e., having taken place [ereignet] out of the speaking of language [aus dem Sprechen der Sprache]. What takes place [Ereignete] is the presencing of man thus brought into his own through language. Stillness presences man. Heidegger draws out these implications: “Such an appropriating [Ereignen] takes place [ereignet sich] in that the very nature, the presencing, of originary language needs and uses mortals in order to hear the peal of Stillness. Only as men belonging within the peal of Stillness are mortals able to speak in their own way [auf ihre Weise] in spoken language.”

315 Heidegger places the word, “sprachlich” within quotation, so as to indicate he is not referring to the study of linguistics; instead, the sounding is of speech. GA 12: 27/“Language,” On the Way to Language 207.
318 While Heidegger places “braucht” in italicized form, Hofstadter places both “needs” and “uses.” The effect of Hofstadter’s emphasis is that need and use are part of Stillness. I would retain only Heidegger’s emphasis, since it implies that Stillness and need are intimately related. Furthermore, the English word “use” adds what Heidegger doesn’t write.
319 Presently we must comment on Heidegger’s meaning of the two terms, “men” and “mortals.” While “men” indicates the everyday term, “mortals” indicates one element of the fourfold. While all mortals are men, not all men are mortals, in the sense that, to quote “The Thing:” “mortals are mortals—not because their earthly life comes to an end, but because they are capable of death as death. …” viewing the shrine of Nothing. In short, some men choose not to view the shrine of Nothing. See GA 7: 180/“The Thing.” Poetry, Language, Thought 178.
From the Stillness, we are able to speak. All spoken language is drawn from listening to Stillness. Authentic hearing holds back its own saying. Called out of the difference, mortals speak on their own part by responding [Entsprechen]. Yet poetry seems to hold a priority of speaking Stillness. Poetry is never merely a higher mode of everyday language for Heidegger. Rather, everyday language hardly sounds a call any longer. It is like a forgotten and used up poem. This fault lies with man. Heidegger explains: “The speech of mortals rests in its relation to the speaking of language.” Mortals rarely abide in the Stillness; they break the Stillness.

How does the broken Stillness shape the mortal speech of verses and sentences? We are still uncertain, but certainly we must never regard utterance [Verlautbarung] or expression [Ausdruck] as the decisive element [das maßgebende Element] of human speech [des menschlichen Sprechens]. In broken Stillness, man speaks with broken language that did not listen and could not respond.

Yet, having listened to the command man responds. Every mortal spoken word is spoken by cor-responding [ent-spricht] in a multiple sense [mehrfältigen Sinne]. It is listening and it is speaking. Most importantly cor-responding lies “in the form of which the Stillness of the difference calls world and things into the rift of its onefold

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Soon in this essay Heidegger will even claim that mortals cannot hear because they break the Stillness. It would seem, rather, that men break the Stillness, while mortals attend to it.

Likewise, “ihre” is italicized.

Heidegger’s text reads as follows: “… echte Hören hält mit dem eigenen Sagen an sich.”

Please note the variation of “responding” [Entsprechen] from “primal corresponding,” [anfängliche Entsprechen], which is thinking [Denken]. The latter clearly is more primordial, and is necessary for the former to occur. Compare GA 7: 71/“The Turning,” The Question Concerning Technology 40-41.


Heidegger is placing again on the table the discussion that once was part of the distinction of discourse [Rede] and idle chatter [Gerede] in Sein und Zeit. But here the distinction is deeper. How deep does Heidegger intend here? We must await his analysis.

Man speaks by hearing. Hearing keeps itself listening, restraining, not just to hear the command afterward, but also to anticipate [zuvorzukommen] it.\(^{327}\)

In summary fashion, as if all could be nestled into four sentences, Heidegger writes: “Language speaks. Man speaks only as he responds to language. This responding is a hearing. It hears in so far as it listens to the command of Stillness.”\(^{328}\) In these four sentences Heidegger described what could be called the path of language as a whole. While it has steps along the path, Heidegger’s “Language” offers the reader an eagle’s eye view of the whole. Language emerges as “Being: Saying” from which all languages flow.

Now that we have listened to “Language,” we can gauge whether this section ran like raging rapids or dragged ceaselessly like the doldrums. In either case, we have heard Heidegger’s account of how originary language heard as Silence is communicated as Saying as the gathering of the fourfold into things and world. In pain, man notices this difference and listens to the Stillness. In hearing, man corresponds and human language emerges.

We have seen this path as a whole, but Heidegger still needs to flesh out a number of particular elements in that path. In the next few years he again looks to the philosophers before Socrates and literature, but not to reach beyng as toward the \textit{Beiträge}, but to move with beyng and to add details to particular steps. Neither employing merely phenomenology narrowly defined nor his destructive retrieval, he

applies both in a way that could best be described as being-historical thinking and looks toward the unfolding of Being:Saying.
CHAPTER FOUR

From λόγος toward Being:Saying

“The discussion, as corresponds to a way of thinking, ends in a question. It questions and looks for the location of the gathering site.”

While we have seen Heidegger’s path as a whole, we now need to investigate various steps of the “Being:Saying” path. As the path appears now, it still looks similar to other pathways of Being in the philosophy of the first beginning. Heidegger still needs to flesh out a number of particular elements in his path in order to fully distinguish what he intends by Being:Saying.

Searching for an answer to the question of Being and language, Heidegger rethinks his path in the first few years of the 1950s. Heidegger again looks to the philosophers before Socrates, interspersing their insights with issues of dwelling, thinking, technology and language, but not as a way to reach Being or look “toward” beyng as he did in the Beiträge, but rather to move “with beyng” and to add details to particular steps, but most importantly to find a site for discussion. Neither employing the

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methods of phenomenology narrowly defined\textsuperscript{330} nor his destructive retrieval, Heidegger applies both in a way that looks toward the unfolding of Being as Saying.

\textbf{EARLY GREEK THINKING}

“Logos”

Heidegger soon takes up the issue of proper thinking vis-à-vis Being. Heraclitus’ λόγος becomes for him the way of exploring how speech as verbal communication wrongly became the primary, perhaps the sole, understanding of language. By exploring this movement, Heidegger too wants to incorporate Heraclitus’ “flux” as part of the unfolding of Saying. If ideas are innate or unchanging, then the thought of Being leads us to false conceptions of Being as innate and unchanging, as presence or as the Supreme Being. On the other hand, if ideas are part of the flux, then they too must be changeable. To what extent do our notions of ideas lead us to notions of Being. During this period Heidegger, then, engages the question how thinking of Being leads toward or away from Being.

Within fragment 50 of Heraclitus’ work Heidegger explicates how such a shift in language seemed to have occurred. The essay, “Logos (Heraklit, Fragment 50)”\textsuperscript{331} illustrates the path of λόγος. Λόγος has moved from its original meaning as laying

\textsuperscript{330} The ways that phenomenology is defined are varied. We shall take up this issue in later chapters. Nevertheless, it will suffice for our purposes here that Heidegger amends his phenomenological approach in the later years of his work.

\textsuperscript{331} This essay can be found in \textit{GA 7, Vorträge und Aufsätze}. David Krell translated the text into English under the same title, “Logos (Heraclitus, Fragment B 50).” Its text is part of a collection entitled, \textit{Early Greek Thinking}. Originally this essay was presented as a lecture to the Bremen Club on May 4, 1951.
something in relation to another into the current meaning as speaking and reason. While Heidegger takes certain liberties with the translation, his question is quite apt for our project: How does λόγος as “relational placing” turn into speaking?

Λόγος as “relational placing” was originally revealing the concealment of that which could be called “One is All.” Λόγος revealed Being. Now λόγος is seen as an effect of that revealing in spoken language. Λόγος is now word. Heidegger retrieves the original sense of λόγος by massaging the contents of fragment 50, not unlike a destructive retrieval, but with a different intent. Heidegger intends to release the relationship between speaking and originary Saying through a discussion of λόγος. One translation reads:

When you have listened [ἀκούσαντας] not to me but to the Meaning [λόγου], it is wise within the same Meaning [ὁμολογεῖν] to say: One is All [Ἐν Πάντα].

Immediately Heidegger highlights that the solution to the riddle of fragment 50 is achieved not by listening to man as speaker, but listening to the meaning conveyed. Heidegger removes man from the place of centrality.

Having made that simple, yet profound shift, Heidegger then “listens” directly to λόγος. Heidegger understands λόγος to be derived from λέγειν and the proper sense of λέγειν is “to lay.” Heidegger holds that λέγειν lends itself to the German, “legen,” which means: to lay down and lay before. This properly means, for Heidegger, that

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332 See Diels-Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (Berlin, DE: Weidmannsche Verlag, 1951.) 28B8, line 17. Richard D. McKirahan translates it thusly: “Listening not to me but to the LOGOS it is wise to agree that all things are one.” See McKirahan, Philosophy before Socrates (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1994) 10.47. Heidegger capitalizes the “eta” and drops the copulative:Ἐν Πάντα.
λέγειν primarily means the “laying-down and laying-before which gathers itself and others [sich und anderes sammelnde Nieder- und Vorlegen].”

As such a “laying down,” λόγος is a saying aloud. How does this “laying” come to mean saying and talking? “Legen” is related to “lesen,” a “bringing together” in the sense of collecting and bringing together in a reading. We read what is given before us. Thus laying down is related to reading. What seems to be a stretch of the imagination for the modern reader is drawn out by Heidegger.

Heidegger explains further that gathering [die Lese] is already included in laying [die Lege]. Gathering and laying are related, not as two different activities, but one and the same process. If you will, the enfolding of the unfolding and the unfolding of the enfolding are the same process. Every gathering [Lesen] is already a laying [Legen]. Every laying is of itself gathering.

Since “gathering” and “laying” are the same process, Heidegger draws them together and calls it a “letting-lie-together-before” [beisammen-vorliegen-Lassen]. This new characterization of language as λόγος extends into the uttermost possible essential origins of language and to the uttermost ordinary extension of language. As λόγος, language spans more “territory than common language.” If originary language focuses on the swaying of Being as holding sway, then everyday language highlights the holding of the sway of Being as holding sway. But more accurately, originary language is holding sway and subsequently, common language relates that holding sway. Thus, all types of language must be seen in this light, as flowing from this “letting-lie-together-before.”

333 GA 7: 214/“Logos,” Early Greek Thinking 60.
334 GA 7: 216/“Logos,” Early Greek Thinking 62.
The full extension of language ranges from originary language to everyday language, but this fact is hidden. There is more to language as such, then, by what Heidegger explains in these terms. It includes hiddenness. This “letting-lie-together-before” is hidden or sheltered in protection [Hut] as unconcealment [Unverborgenheit] in common language. Everyday language receives its essential form of “letting-lie-together-before” as unconcealment [Unverborgenheit].

But the unconcealing of the concealed into unconcealment is the very presencing of what is present [Anwesen des Vorliegenden in die Unverborgenheit]. We call this “what is present” the Being of beings, or more precisely, the Saying of Being [Sagen].

Heidegger then sees the unconcealing as a way of revealing; its laying is as showing or Saying. But the reader should be wary that the Saying of Being is a content or a “what;” Being is not reified. Saying of Being is as unconcealing of the concealed into unconcealment.

Heidegger next relates originary language to common language. The originary meaning of common speaking [Sprechen] in language is Saying as “letting-lie-together-before” as gathered and gathering. Language, then, is determined neither by a vocalization [φωνή] nor by signifying [σημαίνω], but by the Being of beings. Common language derives its speaking from Being.

This relation is not incongruent with Being and Time, Heidegger relays. Within its pages, Being appears and comes forward to its own luminous self-showing;336 λόγος brings by itself that which appears and comes forward in its lying before us to

335 Heidegger condenses this into one brief, copulative sentence: “Sagen ist λέγειν.” [Saying is λέγειν.] GA 7: 218/“Logos,” Early Greek Thinking 64. While Krell translates “Sagen” as an infinitive—“to say,” I prefer to translate it as a gerund—“Saying,” since it retains the gathering-laying meaning better far better than a timeless infinitive.

336 GA 7: 218-219/“Logos,” Early Greek Thinking 64. See Being and Time, §7b.
appearance. What Heidegger does not explicitly say in Being in Time, though, is that Dasein has discourse because Dasein is of Being. Discourse then, can be seen related as part of the “there” of Dasein. As such, there is a stronger relation between relationality in “worldhood” and “Being-with” than Being and Time indicates.

If this Saying is appearing, then how is listening related? What is hearing [Hören]? If saying is not characterized as a vocalization, then neither can corresponding hearing occur as registering a reverberation meeting the ear. As we all know, this does occur as the ears sense auditory sounds. Hearing, primarily so, is this gathering of oneself directed to, and maintaining, the hearkening attunement [wenn ihr euch im horchsamen Gehören aufhaltet]\(^{337}\) to Being. Poetically, Heidegger expresses this simply: “We have ears, i.e., our bodies are equipped with ears, because we hear.”\(^{338}\) To what must we direct our attention? We must be attuned properly to Ἐν Πάντα.

"Ἐν Πάντα, however, is not what the λόγος relates as a maxim or gives as a meaning to be understood. Nor is Ἐν Πάντα what λόγος pronounces. It both cases we hear Ἐν Πάντα as two entities. But neither of them is an entity." Ἐν Πάντα suggests the way in which λόγος essentially occurs; it occurs as “One: All, All: One.” [Eins: Alles, Alles: Eins]\(^{340}\) Ἐν is the unique, unifying One. It unifies by gathering and lets it lie before us as a whole, Πάντα. Ἐν Πάντα lets lie together before us in one presencing of things which are usually separated from, and opposed to one another, such as day and night. Λόγος essentially occurs, then as that which lets-lie-together-before.” What does it let-lie-together-before? Πάντα. This unifying rests in λέγειν.

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\(^{337}\) GA 7: 222/“Logos,” Early Greek Thinking 67.

\(^{338}\) GA 7: 220/“Logos,” Early Greek Thinking 65.

\(^{339}\) Heidegger italicizes “was” and Krell retains this emphasis. The point not to be missed is that λόγος is not an entity either.

\(^{340}\) GA 7: 224/“Logos,” Early Greek Thinking 69.
This resting is neither a mere comprehensive collecting nor a mere coupling of opposites which equalizes all contraries. Heidegger draws emphasis: “Λόγος is in itself and at the same time" a revealing and a concealing. It is ‘Αλήθεια.” Unconcealment needs concealment, λήθη, a forgetting or concealing. From concealing arises unconcealing, its negation; the alpha privative is dependent upon its root. ‘Αλήθεια, though, occurs as both a revealing and a concealing. It does not occur as opposites.

Therefore, not as arbitrary opposites, but as originary opposites of “presence” and absence; λέγειν as presencing rests as a gathering. Heidegger can thusly say that "Εν Πάντα says what λόγος is: λόγος says how “Εν Πάντα occurs [west]. Both are the same [Selbe].

Then within the fragment, whatever occurs in the λέγειν of the “Meaning” [λόγου] and in the λέγειν of the “same Meaning” [ομολογεῖν] have a primordial origin—and this in the simple middle region between both. Heidegger wonders whether this middle region between both is the path for mortal thinking.”

Heidegger ventures an answer that will be addressed more fully in a later essay on Parmenides, “μοῖρα.” Yet his answer here is helpful in envisioning the path overall. In the thinking of Heraclitus, Being (presencing) of beings appear as λόγος, as the Laying that gathers. Presencing appears and disappears as quickly as lightning. But the lightning-flash that flashes between the “Meaning” and the “same Meaning” remains unforgotten. Heidegger calls this

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341 GA 7: 225/“Logos,” Early Greek Thinking 71. Heidegger’s text reads: “Der Λόγος ist insich zumal ein Entbergen und Verbergen.” Only “in sich zumal” is italicized both in Heidegger’s text and Krell’s translation, indicating the simultaneity character of the revealing and concealing.

342 Again the reader should be cautioned to hold provisionally these words of “presence” and “presencing,” for they are still reminiscent of metaphysical thinking. Eventually, Heidegger and we will replace these term with “holding sway.”

343 GA 7: 226/“Logos,” Early Greek Thinking 71.

344 GA 7: 230/“Logos,” Early Greek Thinking 75.
flash, Zeus\textsuperscript{345} and, at other times, μοίρα or fate. In either case, Heidegger conveys both quickness and inevitability. This flash, when sent, steers all things as the totality of beings present “in” Being.\textsuperscript{346} And when the flash disappears and is once again hidden, the conception of λόγος is transformed from the “Meaning” to the “same Meaning.”

Thus for Heidegger the conception of λόγος has changed and its essence is now brought forth as the Laying that gathers. As that which is holding sway, both holding and swaying together are one, yet λόγος is perceived and heard most often as merely a stationary item. Yet its primordial essence as laying that gathers, as holding sway, brings to language the means to secure Being within the essence of language as holding sway instead of thought as conception.

Securing Being within the essence of language instead of prioritizing Being as relayed through conceptual thought is a significant realization for Heidegger. Λόγος, meditatively thought as the laying that gathers, becomes the essence of “Saying” [die Sage]. Language now becomes Being as Saying. Language would be the gathering letting-lie-before of what is present in its presencing.\textsuperscript{347} Language becomes pivotal for Heidegger’s understanding of Being.

But, as Heidegger notices the quickness of the lightening of λόγος, it abruptly vanishes. No one held onto its streak of light and the nearness of what it illuminated. In its disappearance what we call ordinary language remains. Consequentially, ordinary language is still seen as expression and unconcealment is quite different from Being as Saying, the unconcealing concealing.

\textsuperscript{345} This lightning-flash [Blitzen] offers a clue to what Heidegger means of the divinity in the fourfold. Hazarding speculation, one might offer the following suggestions: change of insight, change of paradigm, change-seen-as-changing.

\textsuperscript{346} GA 7: 228/“Logos,” Early Greek Thinking 73.

\textsuperscript{347} GA 7: 233/“Logos,” Early Greek Thinking 77.
Heidegger cautions us that we see this lightning only when we station ourselves in the storm of Being. In the storm our ordinary language and originary language coalesce. All too briefly, ordinary language is seen for what it really is. We, however, drive the storm away. We organize and calculate, plan and build edifices to have the appearance of calm. Ordinary language remains. But this calm [Ruhe] is not the tranquility [ἀταραξία] of Epicurus or the Stoic Epictetus. That, for Heidegger is only anesthesia [Betäubung], a deadening of anxiety in the face of thinking. Heidegger’s calm is everyday life after the storm of Being appears suddenly, and, just as suddenly disappears.

But to what extent is Heidegger’s exploration metaphorical? The latter description of Zeus makes it seem so. Yet his point is not metaphorical—Being is not grounded in conceptual thought. Being now appears as λόγος, as that which “lets-lie-together-before” and Being appears as that which recedes. Perhaps for this ostensibly

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348 One wonders whether Heidegger intends quite the full meaning that Krell’s translation implies. Krell’s “tranquility” for Heidegger’s “Ruhe” certainly has overtones of the Stoic tranquility, ἀταραξία. Such a translation seems implausible, for Heidegger wants to distinguish his thought from those “materialists” who would hold matter as simple and “lifeless.” On the other hand, lekta, the Stoic “sayables” lie between mere vocal sounds and the world. This would not be incongruent with Heidegger’s approach to language.

Likewise, one should make mention of Schopenhauer’s image of tranquility and Nietzsche’s reference to it. Schopenhauer understands that everything that happens, happens necessarily. Such a fatalistic realization is a source of comfort and tranquility for Schopenhauer, for nothing can be done. See The World as Will and Representation, trans. by E F J Payne (Dover, MA: Dover Press, 1969) § 56. Furthermore, Schopenhauer’s notion of the painless condition is the “aesthetic state.” Nietzsche likens Epicurean ἀταραξία to Schopenhauer’s “aesthetic state,” but characterizes it as rapture, the opposite of Kant’s disinterested delight. Heidegger holds that Nietzsche, following Schopenhauer, misunderstands Kant’s doctrine of beauty. See Nietzsche: I The Will to Power as Art, trans. David Farrell Krell (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1961) 92-114.

349 ἀταραξία or tranquility was a strong value, even the “sum and end of a blessed life” for Epicurus, such that withdrawal and disengagement from society was encouraged. See Epicurus: “Letter to Menoeceus,” Greek and Roman Philosophy after Aristotle, ed. Jason L. Saunders (New York, NY: Free Press, 1966) 51.


350 GA 7: 233/“Logos,” Early Greek Thinking 77.
contradictory reason, does man hide from the storm of Being. We cannot grasp it; nor can we perceive it.

**DWELLING**

**“Building Dwelling Thinking”**

Rather than building edifices that block the storm of Being, Heidegger directs our attention toward dwelling that draws us and keeps us close to Being and its storm. The lecture “Building Dwelling Thinking” [*Bauen Wohnen Denken*]\(^{351}\) leads us nearer to true thinking as dwelling. Rightly, Hofstadter wants the reader to notice the title’s lack of commas, indicating the closeness of the terms. The terms indicate a proper building, which arises out of a proper dwelling, which in turn, arises from proper thinking. This relationship is neither causal nor linear; but all three together mutually enhance the proper attunement. Indeed, the proper attunement is the mutuality of their “Saying” relationship. It is a matter of drawing near, not grasping.

The relation between Saying and language stands as the focus of this lecture. Immediately Heidegger criticizes the common understanding of language and man’s role in its formation. “Man acts as though he were the shaper and master of language, while

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351 This lecture was offered at the Darmstadt Symposium II on “Man and Space,” August 5, 1951; the text of which is printed in its proceedings, *Neue Darmstädtler Verlagsstalt* (1952) 72ff. Klostermann includes it in *GA 7, Vorträge und Aufsätze*.

Two English translations are available. The earlier, found in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, is translated by Albert Hofstadter. The second is translated by David Farrell Krell as part of *Basic Writings*. Neither text is wholly satisfactory; Hofstadter translates “Wesen” as “nature” while Krell translates it as “essence.” Perhaps unavoidable, both translations seem to err on the side of common understandability at the expense of Heidegger’s nuances. I would prefer to translate “Wesen” provisionally as “presencing,” eventually employing the more precise phrase of “holding sway.”
in fact language remains the master of man,”\textsuperscript{352} Heidegger provokes us. Man’s false sense of identity as the center of the all things is part of the difficulty. This subversion of dominance \[betriebene Verkehrung dieses Herrschaftsverhältnis\] over language drives man into alienation \[Unheimische\].\textsuperscript{353} Instead, language is the highest and everywhere the first \[… ist die Sprache der höchste und der überall erste].\textsuperscript{354} This is to say that language is far broader than a tool of man. Understanding language and all things as mere tools has led us into the current predicament; we build in a “means-end Schema” \[Zweck-Mittel-Schema]\textsuperscript{355} which alienates.

But if we were to listen to what language says, we would hear a different tone. We hear that building is really dwelling \[Wohnen\]. We hear that dwelling is the manner in which we live, not as occupants, but as dwellers. “To be a human being,” writes Heidegger, “means to be on earth as a mortal \[Sterblicher].” The basic character of dwelling is sparing and preserving \[Schonen\], which is to say that mortals dwell in the way they preserve the fourfold in its essential being, its presencing.\textsuperscript{356}

But language \[Sprache\] withdraws \[entzieht\] from man in its simple and highest speech \[Sprechen\]. Within this sentence Heidegger indicates in typical German usage

\textsuperscript{352} Both Heidegger and Hofstadter emphasize through italics the two \textit{dramatis personae}, man and language, in this relationship. \textit{GA} 7: 148/“Building Dwelling Thinking”\textsuperscript{146}.\textsuperscript{353} Heidegger’s dialogue partners appear to be Marx and Freud. While Freud’s complex of Thanatos and Eros driving a person’s personality seems more consistent with “de-centering” Dasein than would the dialectic materialism of Marx. Both Marx and Freud, however, understand man to be alienated from his true nature. On this latter point Heidegger is in agreement.

Mastery is a central issue for Derrida and deconstruction, whether man would be the master of his world or philosophy would be a mastery of information. The relation between psychology and humanism, on the one hand, and the world, on the other, is a common theme of post-modernity. For an insightful discussion on the relation on this problem, see David Wood, \textit{Thinking After Heidegger} (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2002), especially chapter 6, “Heidegger after Derrida.”

that there indeed is a difference between language, which remains, and speech.\textsuperscript{357} Speech’s primal call [\textit{anfänglicher Zuspruch}] is not incapable of speaking, simply it falls silent [\textit{sweigt}]. It is this silence which man fails to heed.\textsuperscript{358} Consequently, without heeding the Silence, building as dwelling unfolds into the building that cultivates growing things reverts into the building that erects buildings.

Heidegger employs another image to help the reader to hear properly. Like the jug, famously defined by its double negativity in “The Thing,” the bridge is the image which allows man to ponder anew thinking-dwelling-building. The bridge gathers [\textit{versammelt}]. That is to say the bridge is not so much a means to cross over to the other side of the river, as it is the passageway between two sides, drawing the two sides together, allowing the passage of mortals. True, the bridge is both a means, a “tool” or an instrument for use, and “symbol,” but Heidegger draws tool and symbol together. The object doesn’t arrive first, then afterwards the symbol for which it stands. Rather, both emerge together. The need for gathering-passage is at the same time the bridge built over a river.

This gathering-passage of the bridge is another way to meditatively think, not things, but the fourfold. Heidegger draws out this image in a number of sentences: “The bridge \textit{gathers} the earth as landscape around the stream;” “The bridge lets the stream run its course and at the same time grants mortals their way;” “The bridge \textit{gathers}, as a passage that crosses, before the divinities—whether we explicitly think of, and visibly give thanks for, their presence, as in the figure of the saint of the bridge, or whether that

\textsuperscript{357} The reader should not be discouraged by Heidegger’s shifting of terms and meanings, for he is trying to untangle the various ways that we call language and how we use language to decipher its primary relationship to Being.

\textsuperscript{358} \textit{GA} 7: 150/“Building Dwelling Thinking,” \textit{Poetry, Language, Thought} 148.
divine presence is obstructed or even pushed wholly aside.” “The sky provides rain or drought; the water rushes as a torrent or slowly meanders beneath the bridge in a drought.” These sentences help the reader to “rethink” the bridge as means and symbol, which gathers the fourfold into a passage. We as mortals, perhaps unaware, are thankful for its granting of the safe passage from one place toward another.

Now Heidegger would like to draw us to the “thankful part” of thinking. As joiner of places and granting passage, the bridge leads us to the proper understanding of building as a first-rate letting-dwell [ausgezeichnetes Wohnen-lassen]. Building accomplishes its essential process by the raising up of locations. But if and only if we are capable of dwelling, then can we properly build. Building also includes man’s inward building of places, turning inward [›in sich gehen‹], assessing inward difficulties often relegated to the science of Psychology; even then mortals preserve the fourfold.

Heidegger’s major thesis in this lecture is that this preserving, even perhaps flourishing letting-dwell in the fourfold is not primarily the work or construction of man. Rather it flows out of the proper hearing of the silence of language as Saying as it keeps silent. While man as mortal has a part in the building, building-dwelling-thinking occurs through listening. Only in that fashion, Heidegger maintains, can man truly live.

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360 While “thanking” seems to be an odd, if off-handed comment in this discussion, we shall see that Heidegger in the next few years holds that thanking is a major constituent of thinking.
361 Notice how gathering replaces the usual metaphysical words for substance or identity. Moreover, Heidegger intends to supplant both Cartesian space and Hegel’s gathering linearly of the many into one as sublation/Aufhebung. Heidegger’s non-linear, non-spatial gathering gather while maintaining difference is quite different; from it, linear time and dimensional space flow.

I have replaced Heidegger’s “Ort” [space] with place, the latter of which is intimately connected to human influence. Heidegger would understand both “place” and “space” as having a human characteristic. While Hofstadter correctly translates it as “space,” Heidegger’s nuance seems to fall on deaf ears today. Modern metaphysical structures define space objectively, i.e., without any connection to a subject. For this reason I choose the term, “place,” which seems least prone to this understanding.

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362 Heidegger is emphatic on this regard. To this end, both he and Hofstader employ italics. GA 7: 162/“Building Dwelling Thinking,” Poetry, Language, Thought 160.
“… Poetically Man Dwells …”

A few months after Heidegger presented “Building Dwelling Thinking,” he offered another on the same topic of dwelling, entitled “… dichterisch wohnet der Mensch ….” 364 One might phenomenologically describe these two works as a credo for authentic living; 365 in part they are. One could also view them as Heidegger’s highlighting his thinking of Being approach. Again, this is the somewhat the case. But what emerges as the primary focus for Heidegger is Being as Saying, of which a proper understanding of language is key.

Heidegger sees man, for the most part, as not hearing language properly and, thus, not understanding language properly. Man is impressed with his great strides in communication: clever talking, writing, and broadcasting of spoken words. These strides are all for naught. Man gesticulates [gebärdet] 366 as though he were the shaper and master of language [Bilder und Meister], while in fact language remains the master of man. When this relation of dominance [Herrschaftsverhältnis] gets inverted [sich umkehre], man hits upon strange maneuvers [seltsame Machenschaften]. 367 Man expends

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364 The Bühlerhöhe was the location for this rendition of the lecture, given on October 6, 1951. Its text was printed Akzente, Zeitschrift für Dichtung, no. 1, 1954, 57ff. It is also contained in GA 7, Vorträge und Aufsätze. The wholly sufficient English translation, “… Poetically Man Dwells …” is found in Poetry, Language, Thought with Albert Hofstadter as its translator.

365 Certainly a simplistic, and for this reason, a false understanding of Heidegger as a mere advocate for authentic living has been postulated. Among Heidegger’s harshest critics dismiss him on this account. See Theodor W. Adorno’s The Jargon of Authenticity, trans. Knut Tarnowski and Frederic Will (Evanston, Il: Northwestern University Press, 1973).

366 The nuance of this word should not be lost; “Gebärden” means to gesture, motion, indicate with signs something. The meaning conveyed is that man is frantically trying to give an appearance.

367 These terms: “Bilder und Meister” and “Herrschaftsverhältnis” are these same used “Building Dwelling thinking” and now introduces the new theme of “machination” [seltsame Machenschaften] as the consequence of inverting our relationship with language. GA 7: 193/“… Poetically Man Dwells …,” Poetry, Language, Thought 215.
a great deal of effort, trying to assert his dominion: we insist that we are masters, our language is but our tool.

Language, however, is the highest and everywhere the first. While language always beckons us, man as a whole does not hear. But a few, who listen to silence, attend to its call. For Heidegger, these are the poets. They respond properly by listening. A poet is not necessarily one who writes poetry, but one who, in attending to silence, hears. As one who hears, the poet beckons others. In hearing, then, we can dwell in thinking-dwelling-building. In its proper meaning, poetry\textsuperscript{368} is thinking-dwelling-building. Heidegger further explicated: “But poetry, as the authentic gauging of the dimension of dwelling, is the primal form of building. Poetry first of all admits man’s dwelling into its very nature, its presencing being.” Poetry is the original entrance into dwelling,\textsuperscript{369} from which we build accordingly.

Authentic building—whether of ourselves, our thinking, or our places, indeed our lives—occurs in as much as there are poets, who draw us to language’s silent call.\textsuperscript{370} And yet, reciprocally, there can be no poets unless there is authentic dwelling. And so, Heidegger concludes this mutual relationship, of poetry and dwelling belonging together, each calling the other, in elliptical fashion: “… poetically, man dwells ….” Language’s silent call beckons, the poet hears and dwells in the silence. His utterance [\textit{Wort}] follows that poetical dwelling. In like fashion, man follows the poet’s word; this is authentic building.

\textsuperscript{368} While poetry enjoys a privileged centrality over language to the proper dwelling in this 1951 essay, later Heidegger will understand poetry as failing to reach Being, as does language in general. Originary language, then, takes precedence.

\textsuperscript{369} Poetic dwelling is dwelling because it attends to the silence of language. \textit{GA 7}: 193/“… Poetically Man Dwells ….” \textit{Poetry, Language, Thought} 215.

\textsuperscript{370} \textit{GA 7}: 206/“… Poetically Man Dwells ….” \textit{Poetry, Language, Thought} 227.
THINKING

Was heisst Denken?

While building and dwelling seemed clear, thinking for Heidegger still needed more discussion. In the following years Heidegger presented, before his formal retirement, two sets of lectures in the winter semester of 1951-52 and summer semester in 1952. These lectures were published as *Was heisst Denken?* This work is the only systematic presentation of Heidegger’s later thinking of the 1950s. Heidegger dedicates the first set of lectures on what he holds to be thinking, and then he discusses thinking from the vantage point of language—to continue the hermeneutic circle. While it doesn’t advance our understanding of the path thus far, the work is helpful as a way because its discussion throws brighter light onto Heidegger’s path as a whole; we begin to see Heidegger’s approach developing. The approach of first set of lectures has best described as thinking of Being, taking of Western philosophical concepts in order to find Being in its proper realm; interestingly, the second set takes an approach that has a more meditative tone of Saying of Being in *Ereignis*.372

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371 *Was heisst Denken?* was published by Niemeyer Verlag in 1954. This English edition was published in 1968 by Harper and was translated with an introduction by J. Glenn Gray as *What is called Thinking*. Its German text is Volume 8 of the *Gesamtausgabe*.

Heidegger read the final lecture after the summer semester ends, at “Colloquium über Dialektik” in Muggenbrunn on September 15, 1952. Its text, focusing on Hegel’s Dialectic, can be found in *Hegel Studien* 25 (1990): 9-40.

An essay of the same name, “Was heisst Denken?” (1952) is a condensation of these lectures. The German text of this essay is found in *GA 7, Vorträge und Aufsätze*. Translated into English in 1968 as “What calls for thinking,” by Fred Wieck and J. Glenn Grey, the essay is part of *Basic Writings*.

372 See J. Glenn Gray’s “Introduction,” *Was heisst Denken?* viii. In the present lectures Gray notices a Heideggerian development toward the conception of language as “that sphere in which man can dwell.
Within the text *What is called Thinking?* Heidegger discusses Being and thinking. Heidegger draws out the ramifications of two main relationships: between Being and thinking and between originary language and ordinary language. But as the reader might gather, the two relationships are really the same relationship from a different hermeneutic vantage point. Somehow, Being and language are interrelated more intimately than Being and thought in some ways; yet in other ways, Being is more intimately related to language. More precisely, Being is originary language.

**EARLY GREEK THINKING II**

“μοῖρα”

To illustrate his point that Being and language are related, Heidegger looks to Parmenides. Heidegger begins again with a discussion of thinking. Like Heraclitus, Parmenides helps us to think anew the relationship between Being and thinking. While thinking upon Heraclitus, fluidity of thinking developed for Heidegger; now looking toward Parmenides enables Heidegger to finding unity in the midst of that fluidity. In particular Heidegger employs Parmenides’ fragment VIII. Its discussion is best understood from a contemporaneous essay, “μοῖρα”\(^ {373}\) (1951). We shall interpret its

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373 This essay, “μοῖρα: (Parmenides, Fragment VIII, 34-41) is found in *Vorträge und Aufsätze*. The English is translated by Frank A. Capuzzi and is included in *Early Greek Thinking*. As proffered by the
pages before continuing onto What is called Thinking?, for it has the necessary step toward meditative thinking.

In “μοîρα” Heidegger’s holds that thinking and Being are the same. He employs a rather unique translation of Parmenides, which is not without contention. But Heidegger is not so much concerned with textual accuracy, but more so with stylizing its content in a new way.\(^{374}\) Heidegger’s understands that Being and thinking are the same in the sense that there is always a gathering-separation between thinking and Being. Both must retain their difference as gathered.

Western philosophy has erred by subsuming one as the other in varying ways. For Heidegger thinking is not the whole of Being. By naming the essay “μοîρα,” Heidegger wants to infer that this gathering-separation of thinking and being is fateful (μοîρα), that while separate they are gathered throughout one’s portion of life—in creation, sustaining, and destiny—fateful, but not fated. That is to say, to indicate the relationship between Being and thinking as a gathering-separation is to indicate that the destiny of Being [Geschick] is always as holding sway. The fact that Being is a holding sway doesn’t dictate the details of man’s life, as in the case with the Fates of Greek mythology. But as Being is holding sway, so too is the case for man’s “essence.”

Fragment VIII elaborates on the briefer Parmenidean fragment III upon which Heidegger’s thesis Being as gathering-separation hinges. Fragment III reads as follows:

\[\text{Tó γάρ ἀυτὸ νοεῖν στίν τε καὶ εἶναι.}\]

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German edition, this essay is an undelivered portion of the lecture course Was heisst Denken? In an earlier essay Heidegger described μοîρα as Zeus; see GA 7: 228/“Logos,” Early Greek Thinking 73.

374 Such was the case with Heidegger’s treatment of Nietzsche; few Nietzschean scholars would take kindly to Heidegger’s rendition of Nietzsche.
For thinking and being are the same.\textsuperscript{375}

While Parmenides holds together being and thinking, later thinkers have separated and opposed them. Others have combined them in such a way that equates them. In particular Heidegger takes exception with Berkeley and Hegel. Berkeley’s assertion that \textit{esse=percipi}—and Hegel’s Logic proclamation that the real is the rational,\textsuperscript{376} which, for Heidegger, is the unconditioned realization Berkeley’s proposition in modern times—has subordinated Being to thinking. Heidegger examines Berkeley’s phrase carefully. While Berkeley places Being as \textit{esse} before thinking as \textit{percipi}, Parmenides (Fragments III and VIII, 34-41) orders his phrase such that \textit{νοειν} (thinking) precedes \textit{εἰναί} (Being) in both fragments. This would seem to signify that Parmenides grants priority to thinking, while Berkeley grants priority to Being. Actually the situation is reversed, Heidegger claims: “Parmenides consigns thinking to Being, while Berkeley refers Being to thinking.”\textsuperscript{377}

What Heidegger insists is that the \textit{esse=percipi} equation is no mere equality, but that the first term of the comparison has everything that the second is, yet the first is more encompassing. Through this examination Heidegger intends both to illustrate Western philosophy’s error in understanding thinking and to show another way of thinking of Being.

This way of thinking is illustrated in lines 34-41 of fragment VIII. Heidegger notices that instead of \textit{εἰναί} for Being, Parmenides now uses \textit{εὖ} “being” \textsuperscript{»das


\textsuperscript{377} GA 7: 242/“μοῖρον,” \textit{Early Greek Thinking} 84.
Seiend«],³⁷⁸ which enunciates better the ambiguity of the duality of Being and beings.³⁷⁹ By doing so, says Heidegger, Parmenides illustrates that thinking arises only because this duality between Being and beings exists first; thinking then, is on the same side as this duality. Then, duality between Being and beings needs thinking to express this difference.

As such thinking [Denken] always emerges as “something said” [Gesagtes] and so rests [beruht] in λέγειν. This is to say that, for Heidegger, νοεῖν as the “taking heed of” [in-die-Acht-nnehmen] is grounded [gründet] in and comes to presence [west] from λέγειν as “letting-lie-before” [Vorliegenlassen].³⁸⁰ We find ourselves in similar territory as we found ourselves in “Logos.” Like the beyng/Being [Seyn/Sein] distinction of section 267 of the Beiträge, this distinction of νοεῖν /λέγειν indicates for Heidegger a twofold, holding sway, “nature.” Νοεῖν “allows” the “holding” all the while λέγειν “allows” the holding sway. Thinking, as “taking heed of” comes to presence in λέγειν. Thinking is twofold because “logos” is twofold, because Being is twofold.

The key to Heidegger’s trajectory is that every utterance and every silence is already something said, though the reverse does not always hold. To risk misleading the reader, we could describe it in terms of “causality.” Utterances emerge as something said because thinking is already something said. Now we can see how thinking for Heidegger falls under the rubric of language. Thinking emerges as “something said” because it speaks of the difference between Being and beings. But this way of description leads us away from Being and thus, we must always hold Being and thinking together, yet all the while maintain their distinction. This nimble reordering of thinking and Being is now

³⁷⁸ Heidegger uses this exact phrase, »das Seiend«. GA 7: 247/“μοῖρα,” Early Greek Thinking 88.
³⁷⁹ GA 7: 247/“μοῖρα,” Early Greek Thinking 88.
³⁸⁰ GA 7: 248/“μοῖρα,” Early Greek Thinking 89.
restructured as a type of Being as Saying; as holding sway Being as Saying is of gathering [gathering]-separateness[sway].

**THINKING II**

*What is Called Thinking?*

What is the nature of this gathering? For a treatment of this issue, we now return to *What is Called Thinking?* For Heidegger thinking and Being belong together, but they are not a conjunction. Likewise, for Heidegger thinking, \( \text{νοεῖν} \), taking-to-heart \( \text{in-die-Acht-nahmen} \),\(^{381}\) is not determined by saying, \( \text{λέγειν} \). Rather, thinking \( \text{νοεῖν} \) belongs to Being to the extent that thinking is our response to the call of Being. In that sense thinking and Being belong together because Being needs man to listen so that the gods may have Being—all the while, thinking flows\(^{382}\) from Being, which is Silence.

In lecture ten of the summer semester, the pertinent discussion arises on the twofold character of Being and, subsequently, thinking. Both are expressed linguistically by participles; and thusly, ordinary language’s relation to originary language is illustrated. Participles take part in both nominal and verbal meanings. Ordinary language expresses participles because Being and thinking are two-fold—all the while the two meanings refer to each other. These words are participles “because what they

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\(^{381}\) Notice how this phrase does not square with what would be called thinking of being. It is contained within the second, summer semester lecture. See GA 8: 206/What is Called Thinking? 203-204. Heidegger equates taking to heart with “letting-lie-before-us’ [Vorliegenlassen] in previous works. Both phrases have beings in Being [Seiendes seiend] as its reference. See GA 8: 228/What is Called Thinking? 224.

\(^{382}\) Again, the term “flowing” does not mean that the relationship is linear or causal; rather “flow” indicates that we are moving with Being and not toward or against it.
state, [their saying: *ihr Sagen*] is always applied to what is in itself twofold [*sich zweifältig*],” Heidegger notes. These words indicate both qualities of being stationary and having movement. Because ordinary language flows from originary language, ordinary language has a twofold character, which is best reflected as a participle.

Heidegger holds that the place of language inhabited properly, however, is usurped by common terms. The common speech [*gewöhnliches Sprechen*] becomes the current speech. We meet it on all sides, and since it is common to all, we now accept it as the only order to inhabit the formerly habitual proper speech of language. Thus, the commonness of language masks that there might be something awry.

But when we play with language, i.e., look at language as language, certain markers emerge that indicate language’s proper place. Language is a complex set of rules, not unlike a game. When we attend to this game of language [*Wortspielerei*], we hear what language really says when it speaks. If we succeed in hearing what language really is saying, then we come closer to the matter at hand. By looking at the game of language as a game, we learn about it as well as its limits and possibilities. By simply playing the game, we manage to learn only about elements within the game, not about the game itself. Heidegger expresses this situation thusly: “To speak language is totally different from employing language. Common speech merely employs [*benützt*] language.”

Language [*Sprache*], then, is not merely the field of expression [*Ausdrucksfeld*]. Neither is it the means of expression [*Ausdruckmittel*]; nor is it simply

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383 J. Glenn Gray’s translation captures Heidegger’s meaning, not the literal sense. See GA 8, *Was heisst Denken?*: 224/What is Called Thinking? 221.
385 GA 8: 123/What is Called Thinking? 119.
386 GA 8: 133/What is Called Thinking? 128.
the two together. Thought and poetry never simply use language; rather, they are, as Heidegger writes, the “originary [anfängliche], the essential [wesenhaft], and therefore, the final [letzte] speech that language speaks through the mouth of man [durch den Menschen spricht].”

In short, by looking at language and thought we travel “with” Being, by employing common language we travel “away from” Being in cul-de-sacs.

To come closer to Being, we look at words in new ways, not unlike destructive retrieval. Removing ourselves from the game, from the sphere where speech meets with understanding or lack of understanding, we hear the pure resonance beyond mere sound. In a nicely illuminating set of sentences, Heidegger explains: “Words are not terms, and thus are not like buckets and kegs from which we scoop a content that is there. Words are wellsprings that are found and dug up in the telling, wellsprings that must be found and dug up again and again, that easily cave in, but that at times also well up when least expected. If we do not go to the spring again and again, the buckets and kegs stay empty, or their content stays stale.”

Returning to language isn’t simple informative, returning to language is necessary in order to keep language as language indeed is.

And so we utilize this returning to language with the word, “thinking.” If we ask what the word “thinking” designates, we go back into the history of the word. In order to reach the realm of speech from which the words “thought” and “thinking” speak, we must become involved with the history of language. That history has been made accessible by the scientific study of languages called linguistics.

\[387\] What is most interesting in this sentence is the claim that thinking and poetry are threefold: beginning, presence, and end of all speaking via humans. \textit{GA} 8: 132-133/\textit{What is called Thinking?} 128.

\[388\] \textit{GA} 8: 134/\textit{What is Called Thinking?} 130.

\[389\] \textit{GA} 8: 135/\textit{What is Called Thinking?} 130.

\[390\] \textit{GA} 8: 135/\textit{What is Called Thinking?} 131.
Etymologically, thinking has similarities with thanking as shown in the Old English root word “thanc” [Gedanc]. “Thanc” is imbued with the original nature of memory, the inclination of holding that which is not its own. In recalling such a situation, the heart turns toward all that is in being in response.

Thinking, then, is both a holding and a thanking; it is a response of that which it already holds. For Heidegger this sense of gratitude, this intention, is always included in the proper sense of thinking as its originary memory; as such memory is the gathering aspect of thinking.\textsuperscript{391} Originary thinking is the gathering of the constant intention—the inclination with which the inmost—of everything that the heart holds in present being. What Heidegger calls thinking, then, includes memory, devotion, and thanks in its essential sphere [\textit{Wesensbereich von Gedächtnis, Andacht und Dank}].\textsuperscript{392} As such thinking is always already a “Saying” of language, a gathering separation. Thus, thinking is dependent on Being as Saying.

As we turn from thinking as language, and look to common language as language, we should carry with us the same holding sway, the gathering separation of thinking as Heidegger described earlier. Common language, even interpretation [\textit{Auslegung}] of texts, is always a dialogue [\textit{Gespräch}]. Common language is a dialogue\textsuperscript{393} with another person; interpretation is a dialogue with the work. But it is more; it is a dialogue with the originary Saying, and it is, for this reason, the realm of language. Speakers in the dialogue involve each other in that\textsuperscript{394} realm and abode about which they are speaking.

\textsuperscript{391} \textit{GA} 8: 143-147/\textit{What is Called Thinking}? 141-149.
\textsuperscript{392} \textit{GA} 8: 167/\textit{What is Called Thinking}? 163.
\textsuperscript{393} From poetry as authentic language, Heidegger now explores dialogue as the “essence” of language and Being. Both have the character of \textit{λόγος}.
\textsuperscript{394} Both Hofstadter and Heidegger retain this emphatic use of the italics to indicate the abyss of originary silence. Confer with “\textit{Alétheia},” (1943) wherein Heidegger discusses multiple interpretations; they lead to
and lead each other to it. “Such involvement,” insists Heidegger, “is the soul of dialogue. It leads the speakers into the unspoken.” The vast array of interpretations of a text, like dialogue, leads to originary Saying.

Not simply is it the case that a text has a wide range of interpretations; it is also the case that every word has a wide range of meanings. Heidegger calls this the mystery of language \([Geheimnis der Sprache]\). It is twofold. Language is a mere \([bloßen]\) system of signs \([Zeichensystem]\), uniformly available to everybody, and in this form \([gleichförmig]\) is enforced as binding \([verbindlich durchgesetzt wird]\). Language also “at one great moment \([die Sprache in einem großen Augenblick]\) says \([sagt]\) one unique thing \([Einziges]\), for one time only \([ein einziges Mal]\), which remains inexhaustible \([das unerschöpflich bleibt]\) because it is always originary \([weil es stets anfänglich ist]\), and thus beyond the reach of any kind of leveling \([deshalb unerreichbar für jede Art von Nivellierung]\).” Language, while seemingly manifold, is also one. Ordinary language can be seen as a structured, uniform system because it flows from originary language. Thus, we see the influence of Parmenides.

But ordinary language gets caught halfway. Mediocrity becomes the rule. Custom attaches itself to the rule. Common speech fails, then, to show language’s full range. Language in its full range can be likened to moving \([bewegen]\) on shifting ground \([schwankenden Boden]\) or moving on the “billowing waters of the ocean \([Wellengang eines Meeres]\).” Belying its proper light, ordinary language seems unchanging.

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the threat of relativism, and thus, lead to nothing, i.e. to Being as \(Ereignis\). See \(GA\) 7, “\(Alétheia\): Heraklit, Fragment B16: 268-269/“\(Alétheia\),” \(Early Greek Thinking\) 105-6.

\(^{395}\) \(GA\) 8: 182/\(What is Called Thinking?\) 178. The German text reads as follows: “\(Dieses Sicheinlassen ist die Seele Des Gespräches. Es führt die Sprechenden in Ungesprochene.\)”

\(^{396}\) \(GA\) 8: 195/\(What is Called Thinking?\) 191.

\(^{397}\) \(GA\) 8: 196/\(What is Called Thinking?\) 192. The reader should notice the term, moving, “\(bewegen;\)” language is moving, shifting, billowing akin to the sway of Being.
Conversely, the essential nature of language is illumined by the relatedness of what lies there before us \([\lambda \gamma \varepsilon \iota \nu]\) to this letting-lie-before-us \([\lambda \acute{o} \gamma \omicron \omicron \varsigma]\). \(^{398}\) \(\lambda \gamma \varepsilon \iota \nu\) is a telling, which is the matter of language \([Sagen \ ist \ die \ Sache \ der \ Sprache.]\): it tells. What does language tell? What language tells us, is what it speaks and what it keeps silent \([\text{schweigt}]\); it tells what it is. \(^{399}\)

Language keeps silent regarding the veiled nature \([\text{das verhüllte Wesen}]\) of \(\lambda \gamma \varepsilon \iota \nu\) and \(\nu \varepsilon \iota \nu\); they correspond \([\text{entsprechen}]\) to the unconcealed \([\text{Unverborgenen}]\) and its unconcealedness \([\text{Unverborgenheit}]\). Therefore, the essential nature of thinking cannot be adequately defined by \(\lambda \gamma \varepsilon \iota \nu\), taken alone, nor by \(\nu \varepsilon \iota \nu\) alone, or again by both together taken as conjunction. Somehow \(\nu \varepsilon \iota \nu\), taking-to-heart \([\text{in-die-Acht-nehmen}]\), is determined by \(\lambda \gamma \varepsilon \iota \nu\).

This means two things for Heidegger. First, \(\nu \varepsilon \iota \nu\) unfolds \([\text{entfaltet sich vom her}]\) out of \(\lambda \gamma \varepsilon \iota \nu\). Common language and the understanding of the dynamic between language and knowing set language as either flowing out of thinking or they co-determine one another. Taking \([\text{nehmen}]\) is not grasping, but letting come what lies before us. Second, \(\nu \varepsilon \iota \nu\) is kept within \([\text{eingehalten im}]\) \(\lambda \gamma \varepsilon \iota \nu\). The heart into which it takes things belongs to the gathering \([\text{Versammlung}]\) where what lies before us \([\text{Vorliegende}]\) is safeguarded \([\text{geborgen wird}]\) as such.

The conjunction \([\text{Gefüge}]\) of \(\lambda \gamma \varepsilon \iota \nu\) and \(\nu \varepsilon \iota \nu\) is the fundamental characteristic \([\text{Grundzug}]\) of thinking which here moves \([\text{regt}]\) toward its essential nature. \(^{400}\)

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\(^{398}\) GA 8: 204/What is Called Thinking? 202.

\(^{399}\) GA 8: 208-209/What is Called Thinking? 206.

\(^{400}\) Two paragraphs above, we cited Heidegger, explaining that the essential nature of thinking cannot be characterized by a conjunction of \(\lambda \gamma \varepsilon \iota \nu\) and \(\nu \varepsilon \iota \nu\), while here we note Heidegger’s saying that their conjunction is the fundamental characteristic, which then leads into its essential nature. The subtle
then, is not a grasping [Greifen], neither the grasp [Zugriff] of what lies before us, nor an attack [Angriff] upon it, insists Heidegger. In λέγειν and νοεῖν, what lies before us is not manipulated by means of grasping [mitt Griffen be-arbeitet]. Thinking is not grasping [Be-greifen] or prehending. The Greeks knew nothing of the grasping concept [Begriff] when they thought of thinking unfolding essence [Wesensentfaltung]. The reason is not at all that thinking was then developed [entwickelt] from that time into mature thought in the Enlightenment. Rather, evolving thinking [entfaltende Denken] of the Greeks is not yet confined within false limits.

Λέγειν and νοεῖν, both, by virtue of their conjunction Heidegger once called ἀληθεύειν: to disclose and keep disclosed what is unconcealed [entbergen und entborgenhalten das Unverborgene].

We shall return to this theme of ἀληθεύειν shortly, but let us for the moment, remain with thinking.

In conclusion of this lecture series, What is Called thinking?, we return to the question we asked at first when we found out what our word ‘thinking’ originally means. Thanc means memory; thinking that recalls—thanks. Can we take this gift of thinking into its hands, that is, take it to heart, in order to entrust it in λέγειν, in its telling statement, to the original speech of language? [in einem Sagen dem ursprünglichen Sprechen der Sprache anzuvertrauen].

In other words, can we allow thinking to once again reside in language? We shall see. To answer this question we must turn once again

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401 GA 8: 211-215/What is Called Thinking? 208-212. Herein is a clue that Heidegger moves beyond thinking of Being toward Saying of Being. Another clue lies in the use of unfolding; unfolding occurs not as development over time, progressing ever concisely. Rather, it unfolds as shining forth, not solely through Dasein, but more so through Ereignis. We shall delve into ἀληθεύειν and Ereignis as our next route of discussion.

402 GA 8: 247/What is Called Thinking? 244.
to things, but in the form of technology, wherein we see a fuller picture of the relationship between thinking, language, Being and man.

While there were a number of essays and lectures offered in early to mid 1950s, some ventured into old territory, perhaps to elaborate or tarry a little longer on topics we have already discussed. While they are interesting, and thus always helpful, we turn down the route of machination and danger, wherein Being shines forth through the danger and saving power of technology.

TECHNOLOGY

“The Question Concerning Technology”

Perhaps more than any other later work of Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology” [Die Frage nach der Technik] is known best; it became so perhaps for its timely topic in the 50s of the strangling fear of the Cold War and the atomic bomb. Even if that were the case, for Heidegger such would be evidence, not of current events, but of Being’s shining forth.

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403 These include many creative works within volume 13 of Gesamtausgabe, Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens. Also included in this period are two lectures from GA 7. Wer ist Nietzsche’s Zarathustra? (1953) translated as Who Is Nietzsche’s Zarathustra?, which was a lecture given to the Bremen Club, May 8, 1953. The English version is translated by Bernd Manus. This version is taken from Review of Metaphysics, XX (March, 1967), 411-31. Another lecture, Wissenschaft und Besinnung (1954) translated as Science and Reflection was offered in Schauinsland, May 15, 1953 and again in August 1954 in preparation for a conference “Arts in the Technical Age” in Munich. The English translation is found in the compilation of technology essays, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays. It is translated by William Lovett.

404 “Die Frage nach der Technik” (1953) is contained in GA 7, Vorträge und Aufsätze. William Lovitt’s translation, “The Question Concerning Technology” can be found both in Basic Writings (1993) and The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (1977). This lecture was quite popular in Heidegger’s time and was repeatedly offered: in Munich Academy, November 18, 1953, in Freiburg, February 12, 1954, at the Bavarian Academy of Fine Arts, November 18, 1955.
“The Question Concerning Technology” becomes Heidegger’s focal avenue to describe how Sein draws near to Da-sein in Ereignis. Like “The Thing,” it seeks the relation between Being and man via other beings. The relation between man and Being and Being’s openness occurs in the dangerous-saving event of enframing through machination. Enframing and technology become the parameters of thinking as truth for Heidegger, and are the center of this essay, but within its pages Heidegger also further charts out language’s relation to truth as revealed through Ereignis.

Today perhaps more than ever technology is a way of revealing. It is no mere means of revealing. Rather, technology holds sway where truth occurs in the region where revealing and unconcealment takes place in οὐλήθεια. Since the time of Plato technē belongs to bringing-forth, to poiēsis; and is linked to knowledge or epistēmē. But today technology reveals by challenging and provoking, unlike poiēsis.

Today things relay their meaning in the fact that they serve some end. All things including Da-sein are standing-reserve, i.e., they derive their meaning according to their availability to serve an end. This gathering of man as standing-reserve

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405 It might be said that this lecture is Heidegger’s answer to dialectic materialism as offered at the time in Marxist philosophical circles. More importantly, Heidegger is working out a new way of understanding how the “world worlds,” or in layman’s terms, what comprises all that we conceive of when we speak of the world.
406 Earlier we capitalized “Enframing,” for the neologism was unique. Now that it has become commonplace in our pages, we shall treat it as any other common noun.
407 GA 7: 13/“The Question Concerning Technology” 12. Hereafter, we ascribe “QCT” for “The Question Concerning Technology.”
408 GA 7: 14/QCT 13.
409 GA 7: 17/QCT 17.
is enframing \emph{[Ge-stell]}\textsuperscript{410}. While man for the most part had been defined historically as that which gathers and orders things and was unfolded \emph{[enfalten]} as disposition \emph{[Gemüt]}.

Now man, Heidegger holds, is now revealed as gathered standing-reserve.

As gathered, man no longer is seen as the prime agent of freedom, willing or causing. Rather, man is now defined as being affected by technology. There technology appears as a threat to man’s existence and could deny him his ability to enter into truth. It is dangerous. And where enframing reigns \emph{[herrscht]}, there danger \emph{[Gefahr]} exists in the highest sense\textsuperscript{411}.

Yet this enframing that locks man in a dehumanizing control also reveals a deeper truth, into an originary revealing \emph{[ursprünglicheres Entbergen]}. The ensuing danger of the inability to control technology, leads man to realize that he is not in control. Thus, enframing also spawns a saving power; it leads to a deeper understanding of man and Being in the relationship of the fourfold. While Heidegger has described the danger in other essays\textsuperscript{412}, he brings the theme to full light by employing full usage of Hölderlin’s poem, “Patmos.” The verse reads as follows:

\begin{quote}
\textit{Wo aber Gefahr ist, wächst \hfill Das Rettende auch.}\textsuperscript{413}
\end{quote}

But where danger is, grows

The saving power also\textsuperscript{414}.

Through this verse Heidegger describes the danger that technology wrought as enframing \emph{[Ge-stell]}, but with it a corresponding power that saves. Only through the extreme

\textsuperscript{410} \textit{GA} 7: 20/QCT 19. What is interesting is Heidegger’s conjunction of enframing and attunement. While both unfold the originary gathering, now through technology enframing is the primary mode of unfolding.

\textsuperscript{411} \textit{GA} 7: 29/QCT 28. Both Lovitt and Heidegger highlight “danger” through italics.

\textsuperscript{412} Recall, for instance, “Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry,” \textit{GA} 4: 38/\textit{Elucidations} 56.

\textsuperscript{413} Friedrich Hölderlin, “Patmos,” verse 28. \textit{Sämtliche Werke} (Berlin: Propyläen Verlag, 1943) 379.

\textsuperscript{414} Lovitt’s translation is quite sufficient for our purposes here.
danger does the saving power emerge. Heidegger concludes that the saving power is that man is being drawn close to Being, that “poetically man dwells upon this earth.”

Lovitt, in his introduction interprets this to mean that in enframing [Ge-stell] the reciprocal relation between Being and man, man is drawn to light and emerges in fulfillment through language. Thus, through the enervating effects of enframing [Ge-stell] man turns to language to seek out that relationship. While hardly a conclusive essay on language, “The Question concerning Technology” draws Heidegger’s attention more convincingly toward language, for not Dasein, but Ereignis becomes the focal point of Seinsgeschichte. As such, language as Saying moves clearer as the avenue toward that light.

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415 GA 7: 36/QCT 34. The reference is of the previous essay “… Poetically Man Dwells…;’ the allusion solidifies the fact that this essay’s concerns are those of proper dwelling, thinking and building. In danger we are drawn toward proper dwelling in Ereignis.

416 Lovitt, “Introduction,” The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays xx. In another vein, Richard Rojcewicz argues that the poetical is that which shines forth most purely. Furthermore, the poetical occurs in all art through beauty. See Richard Rojcewicz, The Gods and Technology, A Reading of Heidegger (New York, NY: SUNY, 2006) 186. Our point here is not whether poetry or common language, truth or beauty is the proper means of dwelling; rather, our point is precisely that all of these are part of language most proper, i.e., originary language, Being as Saying, heard as Silence, which draws man near. Both translators would certainly agree that the Greeks did not bifurcate truth from aesthetics, since both were part of an overall disclosiveness. Part of the disclosiveness and covered under the rubric of production for Plato and Aristotle are τέχνη, a craft or a knack, and ποίησις, a creation. Types of production are those not needing virtue wherein the end is already set. Rojcewicz equates τέχνη and ποίησις, somewhat blurring their subtle distinction. In contrast to these, πραχις or practical activity needs virtue to discern the means and ends. Lovitt and Rojcewicz, then, both are interested in disclosiveness as conveyed by Heidegger. For an illuminating discussion on this last point, see William McNeill’s section entitled, “Dispersions of Vision: Theory, Praxis, Techne” in The Glance of the Eye: Heidegger, Aristotle, and the Ends of Theory (New York, NY: SUNY Press, 1999) 63-71 or Heidegger’s 1946 “Letter on Humanism,” GA 9.
ON THE WAY TO LANGUAGE

“Language in the Poem”

Language’s various voices of poetry and dialogue are next discussed in the volume Unterwegs zur Sprache, On the Way to Language; language now wholeheartedly preoccupies Heidegger’s time and thinking. “Die Sprache im Gedicht,” “Language in the Poem”\(^{417}\) and “Aus einem Gespräch von der Sprache,” “A Dialogue on Language”\(^{418}\) were both written in 1953 after technology became problematized for Heidegger. It seems that technology places us straightaway on the way to language as Being as Saying.

What is most interesting within these essays is the way Heidegger develops language as a response to the originary call of Saying. All common languages are elaborations of that original saying. We knew this from What is Called Thinking?.

Heidegger attempts to enact here—what he learned there—in essays that reflect the dialogic and creative dimension of language, which “flow out” from Being, not against it. Poetry and dialogic structure enable us to see better the essence of language than mere prose or thought.

Also within the essays Heidegger discusses art and aesthetics. Heidegger’s point is that Saying is beyond the metaphysical structures of aesthetics and beyond narrow

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\(^{417}\) This essay was published as a part of the volume, Unterwegs zur Sprache by Verlag Günter Neske in 1959. Included within the essay is “Eine Erörterung [a discussion] von Georg Traks Gedicht.” Originally this essay first appeared, though, in Merkur, 1953, under the title: Georg Trakl. Eine Erörterung seines Gedichtes, No. 61, 226-258. The English translation by Peter D. Hertz follows “Die Sprache im Gedicht” as one of six lectures under the title, On the Way to Language (San Francisco, CA: Harper-San Francisco, 1971).

\(^{418}\) This essay was inspired by the occasion of a visit by Professor Tazuka of the Imperial University, Tokyo. It was published in Unterwegs zur Sprache and was entitled, “Aus einem Gersprach von der Sprache. Zwischen einem Japaner und einem Fragenden (1953-1954). Peter D. Hertz’s translation, “A Dialogue on Language,” can be found in On the Way to Language.
phenomenology, and language is not a matter of performing aesthetics, but it is a matter of man as message-bearer, relaying aright the message of Being as Saying, which includes all of the above.

The opening lines of “Language in the Poem” are quite helpful toward Heidegger’s understanding of language: placing [in den Ort weisen] and the heeding [das Beachten des Ortes] are both preliminaries of discussion [Erörtern], for language gathers. Discussion is a way of thinking [einem Denkweg] as questioning. It questions and looks for the location [Ortschaft] of the gathering site [Ort]. By questioning the site more carefully, Heidegger holds that we can hear originary language’s call of silence.

By the term “discussion,” Heidegger means all instances of language expressed by gathering into a site, poetry does this best through waves and rhythm. Through the instances of language we can hear the originary language as the silent call of Being. Heidegger’s point is best expressed by this phrase: “The dialogue of thinking [Gespäch des Denkens] with poetry aims to call forth the presencing of language, so that mortals may learn again to live within language [in der Sprache zu wohnen].”

Discussion gives thinking to the site. It draws us where it own presencing can be seen. The site gathers, and through it gathering light is seen. Heidegger describes the site thusly: The site’s “gathering power penetrates and pervades everything [Das Versammelnde durchdringt und durchwesel alles]. The site, the gathering power, gathers in [holt zu sich ein] and preserves all it has gathered [verwarhrt des Eingeholte], not like an encapsulating shell [abschließende Kapsel] but rather by penetrating [durchscheint]

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420 GA 12: 34/“Die Sprache in Gedicht,” On the Way to Language 161. Both Peter Hertz and Heidegger emphasize “Wesen.” Rather than Hertz’s translation of “Wesen” into “nature,” I use “presencing” so as to avoid the metaphysical connotations, of which both Heidegger and Hertz wish, but also more emphatically to place the reader in a context of dwelling aright in the holding sway of Being.
with its light [durchleuchtet] all it has gathered, and only through this releasing it [entläßt] into its own presencing [sein Wesen].”421 In other words, discussion as gathering allows the holding sway to occur. It gathers by shining through all.

The poem viewed as a discussion draws us toward the site of gathering. And by discussing a poem, we are drawn to what the poet hears. But the poet’s statement [Das Gedicht] remains unspoken. For none of the words or meanings, individual poems, nor their totality relay the poet’s site. Yet, Heidegger insists “every poem speaks from the whole of the one single statement [aus dem Ganzen des einen Gedichtes], and in each instance [jedesmal] says that statement. From the site of the statement there rises [entquillt] the wave [Woge] that in each instance moves [bewegt] his Saying as poetic saying [das Sagen als ein dichtendes].”422 Somehow, someway the unspoken whole shines through each instant, though each instance is not the whole.

Heidegger peers fully into the details of Trakl’s poem, though for our purposes we need only discuss Heidegger’s discussion as a whole, for his point is not the instances of the poem, as was the case with Hölderlin’s “Patmos” or Georg’s “Winter evening.” We look at the gathering site of the whole. Heidegger notes that Trakl does not use the word spiritual to describe his meaning, for that would hearken back to a metaphysical distinction of spiritual in contradistinction to the material. As gathering site this distinction is null and void; it bridges the gulf [Kluft] between [zwischen] the suprasensuous [Übersinnlichen] (νοητόν) and the sensuous [Sinnlichen] (αἰσθητόν).423

422 GA 12: 33-34/“Die Sprache in Gedicht,” On the Way to Language 160. This enigma of the site is the crucial element of what will become the defining characteristic of Ereignis.
423 GA 12: 55/“Die Sprache in Gedicht,” On the Way to Language 178-179. The reader should see here in metaphorical language the allusion of Heidegger’s technical term of “Riss.” Its meaning and purpose are the same, i.e., find the “between,” the “dif-ference,” the site of Ereignis.
It encompasses all that aesthetics and spiritual of metaphysical language had intended but it does more.

How do we describe this gathering site via poetry? The poet first listens. The poet’s work is to respond to the silence; the poet’s work, then is to “say after” [nach-sagen] and to say again that has been separated into a gathering. The poet’s language in the poem “becomes a saying-after [wird so zur nachsagenden], it becomes [wird]: poetry [Dichtung].” By saying what was heard, the poet puts into words what was heard as silence.

The spoken words [Gesprochenes] shelter [hütet] the poetic statement as that which by its presencing remains unspoken [als das wesenhaft Ungesprochene]. In this manner, the saying-after, thus is called upon to listen [ins Hören gerufene Nachsagen]. Within the words of the poem lie sheltered the unspoken silence, which the poet heard.

For Heidegger, then, Trakl’s poem draws us to that which Trakl originally heard as silence. We attend to that clear silence. For this reason Heidegger sees Trakl as a poet of note. The poet listens to the silence of the Saying of Being. In this sense the poet speaks in the poem, the whole within the instances, he gathers the site of hearing.

In a similar way Heidegger tries to gather the site of hearing in another essay, “A Dialogue on Language.” Its conceit is a dialogue; like poetry dialogue is another type of discussion. And so we see that discussion is a broad term describing as ordinary language as it relates to originary language. As a dialogue between two men of differing mother tongues Heidegger highlights that all ordinary languages listen to the originary silence. But in this essay, he explores how the differing languages, while listening to the

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same originary silence, can be so diverse—and in their diversity, how might they be able to communicate.

“A Dialogue on Language”

The point of departure for “A Dialogue on Language” is aesthetics. Although aesthetics are a Western concept and Japanese are hesitant to employ such Western conceptual structures, they do employ aesthetics in order to discuss art and its concepts while dialoguing with Westerners. Heidegger sets out a way to find out to what extent judgments and concepts are engaged in aesthetics and language.

The inquirer asks whether a true encounter \[\text{wahrhafte Begegnung}\] with European existence \[\text{Dasein}\] is taking place \[\text{geschieht}\], in spite of all assimilations and intermixtures \[\text{Angleichungen und Vermischungen}\].\footnote{GA 12: 83/“A Dialogue on Language” On the Way to Language 3.} The Japanese man responds that he has the constant sense of danger \[\text{Gefahr}\] that he will be led astray by Western concepts. The inquirer indicates that there is a greater danger, that, as he says, the “danger of our dialogues was hidden \[\text{verbarg}\] in language itself, not in what we discussed, nor in the way in which we tried \[\text{versuchten}\] to do so.”\footnote{GA 12: 85/“A Dialogue on Language,” On the Way to Language 4. Both Heidegger and Hertz emphasize “what” \[\text{was}\] and “how” \[\text{wie}\] were not the site of the danger, but within language itself.} Heidegger’s concern is that the language of dialogue, in fact all language destroyed \[\text{zerstörte}\] the possibility of saying what it was about. If language is the house of Being and man dwells
in that house, then people of differing language, live in different houses. And so, dialogue would be nearly [beinahe] impossible.\textsuperscript{427}

But this distinction is still metaphysical. In the words of the Japanese man: it “rests on the distinction between sensuous and the suprasensuous, in that structure of the language [Bau der Sprache] is supported by the basic elements of sound and script [Grundelemente Laut und Schrift] on the one hand, and signification and sense [Bedeutung und Sinn] on the other.”\textsuperscript{428} This occurs in the film, Rashomon, wherein Westerners believe they understand and captured the spirit of the Japanese world, but filmmaking is itself originally a Western technique. It also occurs in the case of gesturing. While we might be tempted to hold that a gesture is deeper than this distinction, that it holds the gathering of a bearing,\textsuperscript{429} Heidegger still insists that gestures still are steeped in the world. A gesture bears only one side of the encounter.\textsuperscript{430}

In these examples, Heidegger leads the reader and the dialogue to what the West has experienced as nihilism. The discussion of nothingness becomes the jointure between the East and the West, between differing languages and “worlds.” In the words of the Japanese man, Heidegger writes: “We marvel to this day how the Europeans could lapse [verfallen] into interpreting [deuten] as nihilistic [nihilistisch] the nothingness [Nichts] of which you speak in that lecture [What is Metaphysics? (1927)]. For us, emptiness [Leere] is the loftiest name [höchste Name] for what you mean to say with the


\textsuperscript{429} The German text reads: “Gebärde ist Versammlung eines Tragens.” Heidegger is drawing on Being and Time, §17, wherein any sign is already part of the referential totality of the whole “world.

\textsuperscript{430} GA 12: 102//A Dialogue on Language,” On the Way to Language 18. Heidegger’s text reads: “Wir jedoch ihm nur unseren Anteil entgegentragen.” It should be noticed that within the word, “entgegentragen” the distinction of difference included. Encountering another is always a gathering of differences.
word ‘Being’ [►Sein◄] …. 431 When the West sees nothingness as lacking all importance, it employs metaphysical interpretation.

But Heidegger intends here neither a destruction nor a denial of metaphysics, but rather a new way of thinking. The dialogue partners turn to what they call the nature of language, the presencing of language [Sprachwesen.] 432 The Japanese man searches himself for a Japanese equivalent; he shuts his eyes, he becomes silent, then he reports that there is such a word in Japanese. 433 But this word cannot be anything linguistic [Gesprächs], not unlike the “house of Being” phrase, not unlike the Japanese word “Iki,” but those phrases and even metaphysical words are merely hints [Winken] toward the presencing of language [Sprachwesen.] But even hints are enigmatic. They beckon to us [Sie wunken uns zu]. They beckon away [Sie wunken ab] and they beckon us toward [Sie wunken uns hin] that which calls us. 434

Hints, then, have a two-fold character that leads to the two-fold character of Being from beings. As such then, they are not mere images, which are representations; hints rather, include within themselves the self-same two-fold character of Being of holding sway, of gathering/separateness. What relays this two-fold nature to human nature is language. Between humans and the two-fold character of Beings and beings lies language in a hermeneutic relation. Not hermeneutics simply as interpretation [Auslegen], but also that which lies before it [vordem schon] as the bearer of message and tidings [das Bringen von Botschaft und Kunde]. Heidegger, using the inquirer’s voice in

432 GA 12: 108/“A Dialogue on Language,” On the Way to Language 23. While Heidegger italicizes “wesen” to indicate its latent western connotations, Hertz drops the nuance. For this reason we include both phrases to indicate the holdover, yet leading toward a new way.
433 We might take note of the meditative listening the Japanese man undergoes before speaking: he listens not to his senses, but listens instead.
the dialogue, writes: “Language defines the hermeneutic relation.” As such, inquiry has the proper tone of the two-fold character of Being.

In this hermeneutic relation, between the twofold and language, man realizes his true holding sway nature by corresponding [entspricht] to the call of the two-fold [Zuspruch der Zwiefalt], and bears witness to it in its message. Language is larger than man; and man by bearing witness to it is never simply a thing, like a commodity.

Language is a relation. Man can never experience this two-fold relation directly, for it is between.

Language, then, is not merely a matter of expression or linguistics, but more so language “is in its relation to the nature of Being, that is to say, to the sway of the two-fold lauf die Sprache in ihrem Verhältnis zum Wesen des Seins, d. h. zum Walten der Zweifalt.” While language is not metaphysical, it makes its appearance in the metaphysical. Likewise, while language is not an expression of either vocal utterance or inwardness, it makes its appearance there as well. It is not so much experience [Erlebnis] or thought, traditionally thought, language is more so language when it occurs as Ereignis and as such it remains unthought in every respect [bleibt … nach jeder Hinsicht ungedacht].

The site of this Ereignis—where man is the message bearer of the message which the two-fold’s unconcealment speaks to him—is found in the Japanese terms, “Ku” or emptiness and man walks the boundary of the boundless [der Mensch als der

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Botengänger der Botschaft der Entbergung der Zweifalt zugleich der Grenzgänger des Grenzenlosen]. Man walks the boundary, that is, man listens to silence of the two-fold.

Our relation to the silence is not a matter of aesthetics, though the language of aesthetics is the best linguistic way to convey it: “it is the pure delight of the beckoning stillness,” says Heidegger in the voice of the inquirer. In Occidental terms, the essence of language comes as near as it can to the silence.

Heidegger, then, offers an East Asian rendition of the nature of language in the voice of the Japanese man. Language is “Koto ba,” where “ba” signifies the petals which flow from “Koto.” “Koto” includes what we what might call grace or “charis.” “Koto” would be the happening or the saying of the holding sway, between αἰσθητόν and νοητόν, between aesthetics and knowing, of which the petals flow. Saying, then, is not the name for human speaking but that which hints and beckons, like a saga [Sagenhaft].

Upon reflecting further Heidegger transforms the question of the presencing of language into a reflection on the holding sway of Saying [Wesen der Sage], Saying’s “presencing.” The discussion is not about the presencing of language but its source [Quell] as the darkness surrounding the path [Dunkel um den Weg], which is the presencing of Saying as silence.

In order to discuss most properly language, it is portrayed best as a dialogue. If we speak about [über] language, it turns into a thing, and then its reality vanishes. To

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440 GA 12: 133/“A Dialogue on Language,” On the Way to Language 44. Section 34 of Being and Time also falls short is its ability to hermeneutics as conveying this notion. Heidegger’s text reads as follows: “So hätte alles Anwesen seine Herkunft in der Anmut in Sinne desreinen Entzückens der rufenden Still.” Both Kant and Hegel’s treatment of aesthetics are under scrutiny here.
avoid this we take a position above language instead of hearing from it. Then we would be speaking from [von] language and therefore, called from out of [von … her] language’s reality and led to [dahin] its reality. A dialogue achieves this. But this is a dialogue about language from language. This is the hermeneutic circle and we can never avoid it; it is inevitable [unausweichlich].

But the hermeneutic circle always remains superficial [vordergründig bleibt], for the hermeneutic circle does not mean that it gives us originary experience [ursprünglich erfahren] about the hermeneutical circle. Thus, Heidegger, in the voice of the inquirer says that he would avoid speaking about the hermeneutic circle as a presentation [Darstellung] as he would avoid speaking about [über] language.443

To avoid these ways Heidegger must reach a corresponding saying of language [entsprechen Sagen von der Sprache zu gelangen], which is what a dialogue does. But Heidegger takes exception with what has been called Plato’s Dialogues, for they do not remain appropriated to Saying. Nor does any simple dialogue between two persons have this deeper sense of dialogue. In any dialogue, Saying brings about the real dialogue.444 Heidegger describes this situation in the subjunctive mood, not meaning a contrary to fact situation, but as a condition of possibility.445 This does not speak “about” [»über«] language but of [von] language. It matters not that the dialogue is spoken or written. What matters is that the dialogue remains constantly coming [fortwährend im Kommen

444 While the questioning of whether Saying is indeed the source of intersubjectivity is a later inquiry for Heidegger, such an inquiry still would certain resonant with Being and Time’s “Being-with.”
bleibt\textsuperscript{446} with a character more of silence than of talk \textit{mehr geswiegen als geredet würde}. If fact, being silence of silence [\textit{Schweigen zuschweigen}] man is appropriated.\textsuperscript{447}

This veiled relationship [\textit{verhüllte Verhältnis}] regarding silence or the message and man or the messenger plays [\textit{spielt}] everywhere, Heidegger notices.\textsuperscript{448} Indeed this relationship is a connection of being-toward-each-other [\textit{Zueinanderwesen}] is not unlike the intermingling [\textit{Ineinanderduften}] of two scents in an orchard. The two scents for Heidegger are the presencing of language and the holding sway of Being. He concludes this remarkable comparison with these words: "the being-toward-each-other of vastness and stillness in the same \textit{Ereignis} of the message of unconcealment of the two-fold."\textsuperscript{449}

Thus, Heidegger has brought us toward a new pathway. Language is no longer a tool, nor is it simply that which allows Being to emerge. Intimately, language and Being are now gathered as \textit{Ereignis}. By looking at the whole once again, we see that beyng and language are indeed far closer than once thought. Through λόγος and meditative thinking we have taken great strides toward Being as Saying. But Heidegger takes us farther still. For he will lead us toward Being:Saying. While to certain ears this may sound the same: Being as Saying and Being:Saying, "A Dialogue on Language" may help those ears to hear the closer relation, the deeper tone of Being:Saying. And so we move directly on the way of language toward Being as Saying. We circle once again.

\textsuperscript{446} GA 12: 144/"A Dialogue on Language," \textit{On the Way to Language} 52.  
“Wenige sind erfahren genug im Unterschied zwischen einem Gegenstand der Wissenschaften und einer Sache des Denkens.”

We have investigated in detail Heidegger’s path of λόγος in the early 1950s from thinking of Being to Being:Saying in the last chapter. But the investigation ended in a question. We now need to recircle the path, in hopes of finding the site of language and Being. While it seems that Heidegger continues to follow the path through the remaining years, what emerges is a new stride. Like any stride having one step that is passing away and one step that is emerging, we see Heidegger moving from a “logos” understanding of Being:Saying and toward a relational understanding of language as Being:Saying.

And so we continue our historical pathway through Heidegger’s later works. Heidegger again looks to thinking, language and dwelling, but as a type of meditative thinking that moves “with beyng” and ponders originary language vis-à-vis technology. Heidegger circles his way through the thicket of Western philosophy to find a path toward language and Being. But unlike that period of destructive retrieval in the 30s and 40s.

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450 GA 13: 77/“The Thinker as Poet,” Poetry, Language Thought 5. Our translation alters the accepted translation slightly: “Few are experienced enough in the difference between an object of scholarship and a matter of thinking.”
40s, this period of meditative thinking Heidegger uses comparison as a way to find the
close connections and relationships. Heidegger’s new way includes *Gelassenheit*,
“letting-go” or releasement toward things into the mystery of the unfolding of Being as
Saying. Neither passive nor controlling, this new path is drawn as man converses with
Being. Reason and identity are refocused in light of this new path. Both emerge as
twofold because Being as Saying is twofold. Thus, we review what we mean by
philosophy and its principles. No longer a matter of scholarship, philosophy needs to
become a matter for thinking.

**PHILOSOPHY**

“What is Philosophy?”

In August, 1955 Heidegger presented “*Was ist das-die Philosophie*?.”\(^{451}\)
Presented in easy prose for the general public, the lecture places his idea of what
philosophy should be, not as a fixed project, but as an inquiry into the relationship of
Being and beings, centering on originary language. Philosophy, then, is correspondence
[Ent-sprechen]\(^{452}\) which speaks in so far as it considers the appeal of the Being of being.
Philosophy listens to the voice of the appeal.\(^{453}\) This corresponding is a speaking. It is in

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\(^{451}\) Heidegger was invited to present this lecture in Cérisy-la-Salle, Normandy in August 1955. The text
was first published under the title “*Was ist das—die Philosophie*?” by Pfüllingen, DE: Günter Neske, 1956.
It is also included in Klostermann’s *Gesamtausgabe, Band 11*. The English text is published as a small
monograph with the German text side by side under the title “*What is Philosophy*?,” trans. Jean T. Wilde
Klostermann *Gesamtausgabe*, followed by Wilde’s translation.

\(^{452}\) The astute reader will notice that “Entsprechen” of language in now hyphenated when referring to
philosophy. Heidegger intends to show that any philosophy must, like language, correspond to Being.

\(^{453}\) *GA* 11: 21/“*What is Philosophy*?” 75-77.
the service [Dienst] of originary language.\textsuperscript{454} Heidegger now, at the service of originary language is presenting the matter of thinking, not in academic circles, but mixed audiences, to the speakers of ordinary language. In the service of originary language Heidegger moves out of the narrow confines of academic halls toward the general public.

Heidegger explains what originary language means to the general audience, that our current conception [Vorstellung] of language has undergone strange changes [seltsame Wandlungen]. As a consequence, language appears as an instrument of expression [ein Instrument des Ausdrucks]. To understand this we must probably enter into a conversation [Gespräch] with the Greek experience of language as logos. Why? Because without a sufficient consideration of language, we never truly know what philosophy is as the distinguished co-respondence, nor what philosophy is as a distinctive manner [Weise] of language.

For this reason we look to poetry. But poetry is in the service of language in an entirely different way from philosophy’s thinking. Therefore, we need to discuss the relationship between thinking and poetic creation [Denken und Dichten]. Heidegger writes: “Between these two there exists a secret kinship [waltet eine verborgene Verwandtschaft] because in the service of language both intercede on behalf of language and give lavishly of themselves. But between them an abyss or gap [Kluft] exists, for they “dwell on the most widely separated mountains.”\textsuperscript{455}

\textsuperscript{454} Heidegger emphasizes “Sprache” and Wilde and Kluback follow, so as to illustrate that we are not speaking of common language, but originary language. GA 11: 25/What is Philosophy? 93.

\textsuperscript{455} GA 11: 26-26/What is Philosophy? 95.
A few months later, on October 30, 1955, Heidegger offered another speech, again to a general audience in Messkirch for the 175th birthday of Conradin Kreutzer under the title, “Gelassenheit.” Within this speech Heidegger attempts to present his way of thinking, using the occasion of the commemoration as a way to show how it, in common language, includes thoughtlessness [Gedankenlosigkeit], which occurs as a flight from thinking [auf der Flucht vor dem Denken]. Calculative thinking is one such flight; meditative thinking [besinnliche Denken] in particular is what Heidegger wishes to address as a flight from thinking. Contemplation, beyond the reach of ordinary understanding, seems best to describe what Heidegger means here by meditative.

While calculative thinking has been addressed by Heidegger as too utility oriented, contemplation is too distant. We should dwell on what lies closest. What lies closest?—man himself. Heidegger explains: “Man is a thinking, that is, a meditating being./der Mensch das denkende, d.h. sinnende Wesen ist.” The point is that man does not do thinking, but is a thinking being as meditative presencing.

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456 This speech was originally published by Günter Neske Verlag under the title of Gelassenheit and can be found in volume 16 of Klostermann’s Gesamtausgabe with other speeches, most of which are political in nature. This English translation is published by Harper & Row, 1966 under the title Discourse on Thinking. The translators are John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund. See Discourse on Thinking, (New York, NY: Harper-Torchbooks, 1977) and GA 16, Reden und andere Zeugnisse eines Lebensweges: 224.

457 GA 16, 519/Discourse on Thinking 45. Both Heidegger’s text and that of Anderson and Freund use italics, in order to show common language is derivative of originary language. Thus on common language as thoughtlessness, thought flees.

458 GA 16, 520/Discourse on Thinking 47. The emphases in the English text follow Heidegger’s text.
Technology has disabled our true thinking presencing; we calculate or contemplate. One leads us deeper into the technical and the other flees it. But neither can address the dangers of technology, like atomic energy. Neither reaches the ground, for both are part of this new relation of man to the world. For example, nature has changed for us; it now becomes a source for energy and power. The power concealed in technology determines the relationship. The world becomes uncanny, strange; and more importantly, man is unprepared for this transformation and we are ill-prepared for our inability to confront it.

To confront properly this uncanniness, meditative thinking must awake to technology, not flee from it. This meditative thinking [besinnliche Denken] demands that we engage what doesn’t seem to go together. But it does not engage like calculative thinking would engage. Rather, meditative thinking engages differently. Heidegger outlines how meditative thinking engages by not engaging: “We let technical devices enter our daily lives, and at the same time leave them outside, that is, let them alone, as things which are nothing absolute but remain dependent upon something higher.” This comportment is “Gelassenheit zu den Dingen,” a releasement toward things. This “letting go” is not the tranquility of the Stoics, nor exactly is it Meister Eckhart’s letting the world go and giving one self to God. The comportment is one of letting the world go and giving oneself to things and openness to the mystery [die offenheit für das Geheimnis] of the hidden meaning in technology.

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459 GA 16, 526/Discourse on Thinking 53.
460 GA 16, 527/Discourse on Thinking 54.
461 GA 16, 527-528/Discourse on Thinking 54-55. Both phrases are highlighted, so as to draw the listener closer.
Meditative thinking, which is both of these engagements together—releasement to things and openness to the mystery—allows us to dwell anew and allows man to live in a technological world without being threatened by it. Dwelling anew leads us to a new path.

Dwelling anew asks us to engage meditative thinking so that we might hear the call through technology and the world, letting go toward things and open ourselves to the mystery. While Heidegger doesn’t explain fully what he means by the mystery. His language leads us to surmise that he is speaking of Ereignis. Perhaps Heidegger avoids using “Ereignis” because he is using common language for a general audience. In any case, he does offer the possibility of a new path, by which we dwell.

The Principle of Reason

From the public realm Heidegger moves back into the academic world with two comprehensive works that discuss thorny issues. These issues would be what philosophy calls reason and substance. For meditative thinking [besinnliche Denken] to become a possibility, Heidegger must help us to rethink both thinking and things. While he has been doing this already, within these two years between 1956 and 1957 Heidegger leads us to meditative thinking through a thorough disengagement with Western “reason” and “substance.” Two major works, Der Satz vom Grund and Identität und Differenz, with a few smaller essays, show this path to meditative thinking.
In the Winter semester 1955 Heidegger offered the course entitled, Der Satz vom Grund, part I.\(^{462}\) This work addresses Leibniz’ principle of reason: “Nothing is without reason.” Hence, the English title, The Principle of Reason refers specifically to Leibniz. Yet, Heidegger’s title indicates, that while addressing Leibniz, the topic is broader than reason; Heidegger is addressing the issue of reason’s foundation. In many ways, it could be said that Heidegger’s dissenters have found Heidegger’s way thus far without reason. That is to say, Heidegger’s Seinsfrage is an empty project and his turn toward Seinsgeschichte is a blind alley. But Heidegger is illustrating that there indeed is a need to move out of the conceptual framework of the Western tradition.

Ironically, Heidegger wants to show that reason and questioning of the Western tradition itself need a ground: Being. As so in typical fashion, Heidegger kneads language to evoke new ways of dwelling that illustrates his point. Heidegger reshape the phrase into something quite different: Nothing is ... without reason.\(^{463}\) While the words and their order in the sentence are exactly those of Leibniz,\(^{464}\) Heidegger makes much of the sentence’s new meaning. Placing reason within the realm of Being, Heidegger subjugates reason’s power and limits it within Being’s realm. But Heidegger

\[^{462}\text{Der Satz vom Grund} is a published manuscript (1957) of a one-hour lecture course, offered at the University of Freiburg in Winter 1955 and Summer 1956. Heidegger offered an address with the same title and abbreviated contents at the Bremen Club, May 25, 1956 and at the University of Vienna, October 24, 1956. The German text is contained in volume 10 of Gesamtausgabe. Reginald Lilly’s English translation is entitled, The Principle of Reason (Bloomington, PA: Indiana University, 1991).\]

\[^{463}\] The presentation of the sentence is entirely my own. By grouping the first two words, “Nothing is” we recognize Heidegger’s familiar discussion of “Nichts;” Being [Sein] is no thing, “Nichts.” Being is “before” reason or “without reason.” The meaning of the latter phrase is our current topic. While Reginald Lilly translates “Seyn” as “Being,” we shall retain our distinction of “Being” as the translation for “Sein.” Lilly could easily make the case that Heidegger, outside of section 267 of the Beiträge, is not consistent with his meaning of Being/Beyng, Sein/Seyn, that Heidegger’s discussion of Sein in this text could arguably be that of Seyn. Our argument doesn’t hinge on either usage in these later cases as its crucial distinction was in “The Thing”or section 267 of the Beiträge. Consequently, we shall simply use “Being” so as to avoid bollixing the text.

\[^{464}\] It should be noted that Leibniz’s sentence was first cast in Latin: “Nihil est sine ratione.” Its English rendition, “Nothing is without reason,” for our purposes is quite adequate.
doesn’t want simply to undermine Leibniz or reason, Heidegger wishes us to look at both renditions in tandem. In this tandem view, a shift is noticed.

From Leibniz’s to Heidegger’s new rendition there is a shift that helps us to dwell. It is a leap from the first to the second rendition. Within this leap we find interesting possibilities for language: it is both a tool (first) and that which opens new possibilities. With Being, language shows us reason’s realm. Reason dwells within Being and language. Being, originary language, as both stationary and moving, it is the ground, without ground. Thus, Leibniz’s principle leaps out from that fundamental principle about beings toward the principle of reason as an utterance of being.

Those skeptical of Heidegger’s discussion⁴⁶⁵ use equivocation as their means of attack; they see that Heidegger abuses language for his own purposes. But Heidegger notes that such ambiguity of language is deeper than mere fallacy. The fact that ambiguity already occurs in ordinary language is indeed the clue illustrating that Being and originary language is always two-fold.

This two-foldness of Being, its Geschick, unfolds into ordinary language. We ordinarily think that language is historical; and therefore, many meanings inevitably occur. But Heidegger reverses this understanding. Since Being is two-fold as Saying in Silence, ordinary language flows from originary language. Heidegger writes: polysemy is always historical polysemy. It springs from the fact while speaking of language, we noticed the two-foldness of being [Seinsgeschick]; Heidegger writes that we are “struck,

that means addressed \textit{[d.h. angesprochen sind]}, differently by the Being of beings \textit{[Sein des Seienden]}.''

This two-foldness of Being is that which has been called “ground.” It is that of which is conceived in Western philosophy as reason, as the fundamental principle of all beings in Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza. But rather than conceiving of reason, man is actually being addressed by the Being of being. As being an addressing, the Being of beings also is Saying. Due to the “Saying” of Being reason can be conceived as the fundamental principle about beings. Thus, this principle leaps out from being the fundamental principle about beings as the principle of reason into an utterance of being.

Thus, when we think of what is the foundation or ground, we think first of something upon which another rests: a basis, a principle, a reason. But now Heidegger has drawn us to understand that Being is the “ground of all beings,” not as a thing, but as an utterance of the unfathomable Silence. Heidegger affirms this point in the following words: “The \textit{Geschick} of being is, as an appeal and claim, the verdict on the basis of which all human speaking speaks.” This is to say that it is precisely because Being is two-fold, can Being be the Being of beings. For this reason, we can say something exists rather than nothing at all. In this sense, then, there is something rational in things: reason, cause, principle. It is the two-foldness of the groundless ground of Being.

\footnote{GA 10: 143/\textit{The Principle of Reason} 96.}
\footnote{GA 10: 139/\textit{The Principle of Reason} 93.}
\footnote{GA 10: 140/\textit{The Principle of Reason} 94. The German text reads as follows: ”\textit{Das Geschick des Seins ist als Zuspruch und Anspruch der Spruch, aus dem alles menschliche Sprechen spricht.” While Heidegger does not italicize “\textit{Geschick}” Lilly does so to emphasis that it is Being’s two-foldness, which grants this.}
\footnote{GA 10: 40/\textit{The Principle of Reason} 26.}
Yet two-foldness is hidden: Being appears as Silence. As Silence it is a Saying. As Saying as Silence, Being draws man to its Silence and upon hearing man speaks of that which he hears. In contrast, Leibniz speaks of reason as the ground of all beings. What is clear to Heidegger in this last statement is that: “[t]he principle of reason is an uttering [Sagen] of Being.”\footnote{GA 10: 73/\textit{The Principle of Reason} 49.} But the principle of reason or the ground of beings remains as a remove from Being. Being is the abyss [\textit{Ab-grund}] in a concealed manner [\textit{Verborgenerweise}], from which reason and principles emerge as what man hears.\footnote{GA 10: 77/\textit{The Principle of Reason} 51. We recall the difference between Being and beying in the \textit{Ereignis} from the previous chapter.}

What man hears is not simply from his ears, but man hears also of a belonging to which man is attuned. Heidegger expresses hearing in this fashion:

This hearing [\textit{Gehör}] has something to do not only with the ear, but also with a human’s belonging [\textit{Zugehörigkeit}] to what its [his] essence is attuned to. Humans are at-tuned [\textit{ge-stimmt}] to what de-termines [\textit{be-stimmt}] their essence. In this de-termining, humans are touched and called forth by a voice [\textit{Stimme}] that peals all the more purely the more it silently [\textit{lautloser}] reverberates [\textit{hindurchklingt}] through what speaks [\textit{Lautende}].\footnote{GA 10: 76/\textit{The Principle of Reason} 50. Such a belonging belies the notion that listening to Silence is basically a perceptual concern. Perception can never speak to belongingness of one’s own most being.}

Hearing is belonging; and belonging is relational. Our hearing is attuned to the utter silence of Being, heard as Silence. Thus, common hearing included in ordinary conversational language is broader than ordinary hearing, broader than the faculty man uses. We hear the silence of Being as originary language. To it do we belong. Language in this sense houses man. We belong to it.

Might we again ask what is the principle of reason? Heidegger would answer that Being as Saying is the groundless grounding of beings. Being as Saying is that, which we call the abyss. Rather than reason being the fundamental principle of all beings,
Being grounds reason. It includes that which Aristotle calls “ὁν ὁν,” Spinoza calls “Natura,” and Leibniz calls “Ratio.” And Being, which silently calls out, is what in the Western philosophical tradition was heard as reason. Being calls.

“On the Question of Being”

But what sort of language could properly be used to indicate either Being or its call? Heidegger engages this question between winter and summer semesters in 1955, when he wrote “Über ‘Die Linie’” for the Ernst Jünger Festschrift. It is the occasion of Heidegger asking, again, what language could be used when discussing Being in light of nihilism, that is, Being across the line from beings. The question of Being dies, Heidegger remarks, if we stay within the language of metaphysics.

As we have seen Heidegger prefers “presencing” [Anwesen] of Being as opposed to Being’s being “present” as an essence [Wesen]. This presencing is directed toward the human “essence,” insofar as its presencing is a call [Geheiß] that on every occasion calls upon the human “essence” [Menschenwesen]. The human “essence” rather than “essence” as such is hearing [Gehör], because the essence of human beings belongs to this call, to the approach of presencing [ins Anwesen]. The call and the hearing belong together each time Being presences. But would this be Being, since the call and the hearing always belong together? No word can adequately convey this.

475 GA 11: 408/“On the Question of Being,” Pathmarks 308.
Heidegger offers his final ascription for Being, i.e., Being crossed-out: \textit{Sein}. The purpose of crossing out of Being is twofold. Simply, to indicate that no word, no sign, can convey Being as Being presences. But more importantly, the crossing points toward the four regions of the fourfold and their being gathered in the locale of this crossing through.\textsuperscript{477}

Heidegger explains how the call and the hearing belong together so intimately that one can never separate Being from the human, though Being is not simply of the human. Since man as one the fourfold is needed to bring the zone of Being into presencing, man and Being can never be separated by a clear line. Rather the line between man and Being must lie elsewhere. The location or zone of the line, then, would be the locality of the essence of consummate nihilism.\textsuperscript{478}

\textbf{Identity and Difference}

From the discussion of the Western tradition of reason and Being in relation to consummate nihilism, Heidegger explores the tradition’s conception of “substance,” which has emerged rationally. Now that reason is “placed” in its proper relation to Being, so too must we “place” a substance in its proper relation to Being. Between the years of 1955-1957, Heidegger worked on what he considered to be the most important

\textsuperscript{476} McNeill ascribes Being as “being” throughout, with and without the crossing. I will continue this formulation. The reader might wonder what are the subtle differences among all the designations. While they are subtle, they are not part of a consistent schema of all the variations of Being. Though this could be an interesting topic for a dissertation project, it is not ours. Finally, nowhere in this text does Heidegger employ “Beyng” [\textit{Seyn}], though the \textit{Beiträge} usage of “Beyng” would seem most appropriate appellation for the “consummate nihilism.”

\textsuperscript{477} \textit{GA} 11: 411/"On the question of Being," \textit{Pathmarks} 310-311. Heidegger refers us to the discussion on the fourfold in "\textit{Bauen Wohnen Denken}".

\textsuperscript{478} \textit{GA} 11: 408/"On the question of Being," \textit{Pathmarks} 308.
work since *Being and Time*, namely *Identität und Differenz*. Within its fifty-some pages Heidegger delves into the relation between Being and man vis-à-vis things. Once Heidegger called this relation the ontological difference; now he calls it *Ereignis*. With *Ereignis* as his guide, Heidegger explores once again what the “nature” of a thing is. With his new terminology, Heidegger tackles the nagging problem of “substance.”

Rather than employing either the Aristotelian terminology of substantial being or the Leibnizian problem of singular unity of Being as *ratio*, Heidegger employs identity and difference to discuss relational unity of Being to beings. Invoking Parmenides, Heidegger notices unity has always been thought in terms of identity: A=A. Identity was sameness, but Heidegger notices “sameness [*Selbigkeit*] implies the relation of ‘with,’ [»mit<];” that is to say, between the two “A”s in the equation, something else works between them to show identity. Thus, identity emerges from issues of duality, between “One and Many,” Being and beings, between subject and object. Throughout the history of Western philosophy the solution always included a mediating third thing, or mediation of synthesis. Since German Idealism from Leibniz to Hegel, identity appeared as an abstract unity between two things.

The principle of identity, however, speaks not of abstract unity, but of the Being of beings. We are related to beings of every kind; identity makes its claim on us. This

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479 The text of *Identität und Differenz* is located in Gesamtausgabe 11. The text includes as its first section the exact text of the June 27, 1957 lecture, “Der Satz der Identität,” presented during celebration of the 500th year of the founding of the University of Freiburg; section two is the revision of a lecture that concluded the 1956-57 winter semester course on Hegel’s *Science of Logic*, entitled, “Die Onto-Theologische Verfassung der Metaphysik,” [“The Onto-theological Constitution of Metaphysics”], offered in Todtnauberg, 24 February 1957. Joan Stambaugh translated well the text into English under the title *Identity and Difference* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago, 2003).

I make a few minor adjustments in her word choice, so as to reflect the language of Heidegger’s later work. Stambaugh tends to use language that is more consistent with her translation of *Being and Time*. While consistency certainly exists between the two works, Heidegger does intend to develop new ways of thinking in *Identity and Difference*. My word choice reflects those new ways.

480 GA 11: 34/Identity and Difference 25.
claim of identity speaks.\textsuperscript{481} It speaks in the sense that everywhere identity is a basic characteristic in beings; all beings have Being.

From Parmenides onward, Western philosophy heard the claim of identity as: the thought of Being is the same as Being; that is, they are identical. What was heard was that thought and Being belong together [Zusammengehören] as in Leibniz.\textsuperscript{482} And thus the project was always the attempt to connect them. For German Idealism, the connection was a unifying, authoritative synthesis, which mediated the unity of the manifold. Heidegger comments: “Philosophy represents this belonging together as nexus and connexio, the necessary connection of the one with the other.”\textsuperscript{483}

But one can also look at the belonging together [Zusammengehören].\textsuperscript{484} And thus the together is determined by the belonging. The reference here helps us to notice that it is no longer the unity of the together, but rather we need to experience this togetherness in terms of belonging. What would belonging mean in this case? How would the belonging of beings, man and Being appear? This leads us to new pathways.

Man belongs to Being as the totality of beings belongs to Being. But man also belongs to Being in that uniquely man listens to Being because man is appropriated to Being. Being, in turn, belongs to man in that Being is present only when man is open to its holding sway. We see, then, both man and Being are appropriated to each other.

\textsuperscript{481} I retain Heidegger’s italic emphasis. What could be lost to the reader in this text is Heidegger’s claim that identity is on the speaking side of Being [Sein], not the silence side of Being [Seyn]. \textit{GA} 11: 36/\textit{Identity and Difference} 25.

\textsuperscript{482} Though it cannot be seen here, Heidegger highlights in the text here the “togetherness” [zusammen] of the belonging. \textit{GA} 11: 37/\textit{Identity and Difference} 29.

\textsuperscript{483} \textit{GA} 11: 37-38/\textit{Identity and Difference} 29.

\textsuperscript{484} \textit{GA} 11: 38/\textit{Identity and Difference} 29. At this location in the text Heidegger highlights “gehören.”
They belong to each other. We need to look closer at this “belonging-to-each-other” [Zu-einander-gehören].

To look closer we must spring away from traditional metaphysical formulations. It springs away from man as rational animal. It too springs away from Being as the ground in which every being is grounded. We spring into the abyss [Abgrund]; only then can Being be present as holding sway [als Sein Wesen, d.h an-wesen]. Heidegger describes this springing: “This spring is the abruptness of the unbridged entry into that belonging which alone can grant a toward-each-other of man and Being and thus the constellation of the two.” This “unbridged entry” of mutual appropriation is from their active presencing, that is, not their passive natures of Western metaphysics. Into that active entryway, can we experience thinking as meditative thinking.

This springing comes not from ourselves. Due to the totality of technology [Vorstellung vom Ganzen der technischen Welt] we reduce everything to man and we fail to hear the claim of Being [Anspruch des Seins]. All things appear as part of the calculable. Being is challenged, but man too is now challenged, for man must now place himself as part of that calculative horizon. This mutual challenge [wechselseitigen Herausforderung] is what Heidegger calls enframing [Ge-stell]. This framing no longer appears as something that is present. Anything present comforts us because we grasp or control it. For this reason enframing startles us because it is not of our doing. Man is delivered over to this awareness of lack of control. Lack of control delivers us

485 GA 11: 40/Identity and Difference 31-32.
486 GA 11: 41/Identity and Difference 33.
488 GA 11: 44/Identity and Difference 35.
over to silence; silence is the call of Being. Man and Being are delivered over to each other \( \text{einzukehren} \). This is the event of the appropriation, the \textit{Ereignis}.\footnote{GA 11: 45/Identity and Difference 36.} Springing emerges from \textit{Ereignis}.

We can no longer speak of this way of springing in terms of thinking via \( \lambda \gamma \omicron \sigma \) or \textit{Tao}; rather it must be in terms of meditative thinking. It is not a happening as an event would occur, not occurring in time as a series of numerical events. \textit{Ereignis} occurs as the \textit{singulare tantum},\footnote{GA 11: 45/Identity and Difference 36. Heidegger uses the phrase, “\textit{singulare tantum},” without any highlighting. We employ italics for conventional usage of foreign terms.} where Being and man are drawn together. What we experience at the danger of technology is the prelude \([\text{Vorspeil}]\)\footnote{While Heidegger italicizes “\textit{Vorspeil},” Stambaugh does not. It seems quite pertinent to emphasize the fact that \textit{Ereignis} is not our experiencing of it, for it then would be drawn into a type of humanism. This leads us away from a traditional phenomenological account. GA 11: 45/Identity and Difference 36.} of \textit{Ereignis}. The saving grace of the \textit{Ereignis} is never produced solely by man; its transformation \([\text{Verwindung}]\) by virtue of the happening of the \textit{Ereignis} \([\text{brächte die ereignishafte}]\) will bring back technology into the servitude of man.\footnote{This statement clarifies the common misunderstanding that “enframing” is unrelenting, even totalizing. Rather, a holding sway occurs between technology overcoming our control and the \textit{Ereignis} bringing it back within man’s control. The sway between man’s control and lack is ongoing in this age. Heidegger’s text runs as follows: “…\textit{Zurücknahme der technischen Welt aus ihrer Herrschaft zur Dienstchaft innerhalb des Bereiches, durch den der Mensch eigentlicher in das Ereignis reicht.}” GA 11: 46/Identity and Difference 37.} In this vibrating \([\text{schwingende}]\) \textit{Ereignis}, man and Being reach their active “natures” and shed the qualities accrued in metaphysical speculation.

To think meditatively of the transformation in the \textit{Ereignis} as self-vibrating, that is, active, is to contribute partly to \textit{Ereignis}’ transformation. Thus, \textit{Ereignis} never occurs without man’s involvement. Meditative thinking receives the tools for thinking this self-vibrating realm from language,\footnote{Heidegger doesn’t distinguish here what type of language he means. Certainly he would not intend “common language” which does not hear. Yet, it seems unlikely that he intends “originary language,” for it is the Silence of Being. It seems that he is now looking toward language in its “essence.”} for language is the most receptive of this self-vibrating,
this holding sway. In as much as we dwell in this holding sway we are given over to language.

How does identity relate to *Ereignis*? Identity isn’t this or that equated by a third thing. Identity occurs in its presencing of the abysmal *Ereignis*. Inactive notions of “substance” now give way to active holding sway in the *Ereignis*. The principle of identity now entails a springing. This springing into the essential origin of identity is the transformation into meditative thinking.

From this vantage point of identity, we can move toward Heidegger’s second section of *Identity and Difference*, “The Onto-theo-logical Constitution of Metaphysics.” It entails a “truer look” into difference in light of the identity as given via *Ereignis*. Hegel imagined thinking as the absolute idea and Being as the absolute self-thinking of thinking; this is philosophy for Hegel. He also imagined the history of philosophy in a historical relation in a dialectical process throughout time, though this relation is merely speculative. Yet, if all philosophy and the history of philosophy are externally related as beyond the overall control of man, that is to say transcendentally related, then how can it relate internally, that is, related to the world? And conversely, if they are related internally, then how could they relate externally? As absolute concept thinking of itself, even in time, it thinks only of itself, namely the same. Being, thought, beings are all the same for Hegel, could we not say? And so German Idealism has become onto-theo-logical. Whence comes difference?

Heidegger understands the conversation with the history of philosophy not as Hegel’s negating elevation of *Aufhebung*, but as a step taken back. We step back from thought as Being, to the question of what indeed gives us thought. We step back to the
realization that there is a difference between Being and beings. The difference is the ontological difference [Differenz], which is unthought. We now ask why that difference had disappeared. The abandonment [Vergessenheit] of that difference is what we look toward.494 Forgetfulness in terms of concealment ληθη 495 is our quandary now.

Only when we think of Being and its difference with beings can we address this issue. If we represent difference as a distinction between Being and beings, it appears as yet another thing, even if it is a distinction of understanding. Instead, we encounter the difference so encompassingly that we do not notice it; it appears as nothing. It is concealed in beings. Being is the Being of beings.

Metaphysics see beings as such, i.e. in general and as a whole; metaphysics thinks Being as the ground giving unity of what is most general and Being as the unity of all that accounts for ground, the “All-highest.” For metaphysics Being occurs variously as the first ground, ὑποκείμενον, first cause, causa sui, even as λόγος, substance, and subject. Metaphysics has the problem of presenting Being in either onto-logical or theo-logical frames.496 Let us look closer at the phrase Being of beings.

Being of beings—What could this “of” mean? Is it taken as the objective genitive sense, that beings are the beings or the objects of Being? Or is it taken as the subjective genitive sense or genitive of origin, that Being is the source of beings.” For instance, in

494 GA 11: 59/Identity and Difference 50. Stambaugh translates “Vergessenheit” as “oblivion.” “Abandonment” seems more of an apposite term for the English, as “a once having, now left” sense, like a mother who abandoned her child. Even in the abandonment there still lies a relation. “Oblivion,” on the other hand, connotes only an inert opacity. While the opacity is effective, the quality of indifference sees quite contrary to Heidegger’s meaning. It is this opacity that draws us always and everywhere longingly to this lack.

495 Cf. Plato’s Republic, Book IX. Ληθη is the river of forgetfulness in the myth of “Ur,” in which all mortals must pass before returning back to earth. Hence, mortals are left to relearn on earth what we once knew. Thus, Plato resolves to his satisfaction the quandry of the impossibility of learning anything we never knew. Cf. The Republic, Book X. 621a-b5. Notice also the “Myth of Er” also contains the Fates. It seems that destiny and truth are interrelated philosophically for both Plato and Heidegger.

496 GA 11: 67/Identity and Difference 60.
the case of the phrase, “a house of cards,” a house could contain cards within it objectively, but more often the meaning is that the house of cards is taken as the house made of cards. Neither of these senses seems to convey what Heidegger intends.

Rather, Being of beings means “Being,” which “occurs” transitively in beings. Being doesn’t leave someplace and go over to beings. Being moves transitively, in that it comes over unconcealingly and arrives as something of itself as unconcealed only by that “coming over.” While Heidegger’s language is spatial; it is only metaphorical language. Space and time emerge only “after” Being. Arrival in this language schema means to keep concealed in unconcealedness: therefore to abide in this keeping: to be a being.

What does it mean to be the Being of beings? Heidegger’s next description is quite dense and crucial. First we shall offer it as Heidegger does, unaided, and then in the next paragraph, we shall unpack it. Heidegger calls this concealing of Being, the “unconcealing overwhelming.” [entbergende Überkommnis]. Beings appear or arrive [Ankunft] such that Being keeps itself concealed in unconcealedness. Beings appear as present and differentiated [Unterschiedenen] in the sense that they are all the “Same” [Selben] in the differentiation [Unter-Schied], which grants and holds [hält] apart [einander] the “between” [Zwischen]. Within the “between,” the “unconcealing overwhelming” and the “arrival” are held toward one another as “borne away from” and “toward one another” [auseinander-zueinander]. The difference of Being and beings as

497 GA 11: 71/Identity and Difference 64. Heidegger’s text reads thusly: “Sein west hier in der Weise eines Überganges zum Seienden.”
498 GA 11: 71/Identity and Difference 64. Heidegger’s text makes full use of the colon, so as to identify each phrase as saying the same: “Ankunft heißt: sich Bergen in Unverborgenheit: also geborgen anwählen: Seindes sein.”
499 GA 11: 71/Identity and Difference 64.
500 GA 11: 71/Identity and Difference 65.
the differentiation of overwhelming and arrival: [is] the perdurance [*Austrag*] of the two in *unconcealing keeping in concealment* [*der entbergend-bergende Austrag beide*].\(^{502}\)

Thus we think the difference between Being and beings without making it disappear. We follow the difference. What is held apart is held in the tension of perdurance: not only does Being ground beings as their ground, but beings in their turn ground, cause Being in their own way—they are the fullness of Being. Within the “between” Being and beings are held constant, that is, the holding endures. The holding endures both as a holding together and a holding apart. And so Being appears as conspicuously absent and beings appears as the same, different things in the world. Being is perduring.

“Perduring” [*Austrag*] is the crucial hinge for Heidegger. While Heraclitus helped Heidegger to understand that Being is holding “sway,” Parmenides now helps Heidegger to understand that Being is as a “holding” sway. We have often employed this phrase, holding sway. Now we are able to fully appreciate the “holding” of the holding sway as “perduring” [*Austrag*]. Perdurance as holding is a circling: Being and beings around each other.\(^{503}\) One comes over the other; the other arrives in the one in reciprocal reflection.

In reflection, Being becomes perduringly present in beings as λόγος in the sense of ground, as the gathering of what unifies the Ἐν is twofold: it is the unifying one as primal and universal; it is the unifying one as the All-highest, like Zeus. Λόγος grounds and gathers everything into the universal and into the unique.

\(^{502}\) *GA* 11: 71/Identity and Difference 65. Stambaugh follows Heidegger’s emphasis; we follow suit.

\(^{503}\) *GA* 11: 75/Identity and Difference 69. Heidegger’s text reads as follows: “*Der Austrag ist ein Kreisen, das Umeinanderkreisen von Sein und Seiendem.*”
This same λόγος contains within itself the essential origin of the character of all language, and thus determines the way of utterance [die Weise des Sagens] as a logical way in the broader sense. From originary language emerges λόγος. Λόγος, then, is the “essence” of language. Λόγος as language is the site of Ereignis.

Our Western languages are languages of metaphysical thinking, each in its own way. Heidegger wonders whether the nature of Western languages is in itself marked with the exclusive brand of metaphysics, and thus marked permanently by onto-theology. Perhaps these languages offer other possibilities of utterance—and that means at the same time of the telling silence. Thoughtful utterance as meditative thinking has allowed us to follow this pathway.

**LANGUAGE**

In next few years Heidegger maps out language. Language had always stirred interest for Heidegger, but in the mid 1950s language took on significant importance on his road map toward Being as Saying. Three works specifically allow us to draw the contours of its trajectory: “Hebel—der Hausfreund,” “Das Wesen der Sprache” and “Dichten und Denken. Zu Stefan Georges Gedicht ‘Das Wort’” while a fourth, “Hegel und die Griechen” can succinctly convey what language is not. We turn down the direct path toward the “nature” of language.
“Hebel—Friend of the House”

In 1957 Heidegger composed “Hebel—der Hausfreund.” This creative work highlights language as the friend of those who dwell; language both shows and reflects, but also accompanies humanity. While representing, language also gathers; in gathering language makes the world inhabitable. Language, like the poet, is a friend who makes life inhabitable.

We discuss language first in its common understanding. It is commonly understood that every language has unique characteristics that make life most comfortable. For each region a language fits its people. Dialects arise that reflect the living patterns, even the personalities, of the people speaking it. Heidegger phrases the importance of dialects as a mysterious wellspring: “Dialect [Die Mundart] is the mysterious wellspring [geheimnisvolle Quell] of every mature [gewachsenen] language. Whatever is contained in the spirit of a language [Sprachgeist] flows out to us [zuströmt] from the dialect.” Heidegger understands that the experienced dialect contains the spirit of language; it could be said that the dialect is lived language. Thus, lived language is the common understanding of language.

In the midst of lived language, dialects both intensify language and simplify our life. Dialects are ennobling [Veredeln] such that they transform what happens [geschieht] and makes it poignant by way of an intensified [gesteigerte] language. Poetically, Heidegger explains: that both characteristics of dialects “transform everything into the


soft glow [milden Glanz] of the peacefully sounding word [ruhig klingenden Wortes].”

Like the house, which is only a house in its dwelling, language become language only when it is inhabited. Even more so, as a house in its living allows [wohnenlassen] us to dwell, and awakens [weckt] and assures [gewährt] ever more original [ursprünglichere] possibilities [Möglichkeiten] for dwelling—so too does language in its multiplicity and rich transformations of living allows us to dwell. In short, lived language houses all that makes a person human; and in living the language, humans make language into a dwelling of incomparable wealth.

Language makes life rich in its rich multiplicity. It accompanies us along the way like a house-friend. Heidegger writes, “The house-friend neither wishes to instruct [belehren] nor to educate [erziehen].” The house-friend journeys along. Similarly with language; it is a fellow sojourner. We dwell in language’s splendor, bask in its warmth and enjoy its friendly company in “world.” Language is comfortable [heimlich].

But language too can grow into a cold structure in “work.” Without dialects and regional personalities, indeed, without the differences of each person in a region, his or her quirks, the unique turn of phrase, the cadence that singles out that person, language is a mere container. If language were to instruct, it would become formal and therefore, not a suitable dwelling place. Supplanting language as friend, language as “work” drives us toward calculative dwelling. Ultimately, language becomes a “language machine” [Sprachmaschine], language without human contact; in enframing, the language machine.

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508 GA 13: 143/“Hebel—Friend of the House,” Contemporary German Philosophy 96. This statement seems to soften the stark difference between positive authentic and negative inauthentic language; but in reality all these splendid differences are part of authentic language and authentic language neither teaches nor instructs.
has become a frozen actuality [verwirklicht]. Language in “work” becomes like a lifeless tool. A “meme” is a current example.

Consequentially, we take language as the instrument for communication and information [Verständigung und der Information]. “This notion [Diese Vorstellung] of language is so familiar [geläufig] to us that we scarcely notice [kaum bemerken] its uncanny power [unheimliche Macht], Heidegger explains. In this event, technology controls language and the mode of living. Language here is uncomfortable [unheimlich].

How do we bring language to be a friend once again? Whenever talk [Rede] is one of deeper relations, language at once [sogleich] enters [eintritt] in—the poetic [die poetische]. The poets offer us hope as it draws us deeper into life. Dramatically Heidegger refers to Goethe in a rare gesture. Without instructing and as a companion, language is able to re-entrust [zurückzubergen] the calculability [erechenbarkeit] and technology of nature into the open mystery [offene Geheimnis] of a newly experienced [erfahrenen] naturalness of nature. The poets draw us deeper into life and “bring to language” [zur Sprache bringen] what language is in its essence.

Let us consider what Heidegger means by the phrase “bring to language.” If we look thoughtfully [bedachtsam], with regard to the bearing [Gewicht] of its words, language acquires [gewinnt] a deeper sense [tieferen Sinn]. Then, “to bring to language” means that we lift up what was unspoken and let it appear. “If we thoughtfully consider [bedenken] the character of saying [Sagen] in this regard [Hinsicht],” Heidegger writes, “it becomes apparent [zeigt sich] that language [Sprache] shelters within itself [birgt … in

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sich] the treasure [Schatz] of everything essential [alles Wesenhaften].” In this way the poet allows the written language to resonate [erklingen] as pure echo [reines Echo] of the riches [Reichtums] of the dialect [Mundart].” “To bring to language,” then, means that the poet draws out of language what it already has, yet unhidden, into light; it resonates with the dwelling of the village.

Whenever a person speaks, she speaks only so long as she always already gives ear [hört] to language. She speaks what she hears as she dwells. She hears of her family’s needs, hears anger at injustices, hears the deafness of the manipulative neighbor. But she hears because she gives ear to language.

Likewise, even the mishearing [Überhören] of language is still a kind of hearing [eine Art des Hörens]. Each person speaks from within [heraus] that language to which his essence is commended [gesprochen ist]. This language is the mother tongue [die Muttersprache]. Heidegger writes with emphasis: “It is language, not man, which genuinely speaks [Eigentlich spricht die Sprache]. Man speaks only to the extent that he in each case co-responds [ent-spricht] to language.”

In this short, but dense, important work on language, Heidegger helps us to see clearer that we are not the masters of language, but we do influence our living by listening closely to language. And by listening closely to it, language breaks open a pathway into new possibilities between “work and world.” Between the spiritual and the sensuous, between instruction and poetry, says Heidegger, lies the path of language.

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514 GA 13: 148/“Hebel—Friend of the House,” Contemporary German Philosophy 99. We see Heidegger highlighting the close relation between speaking and responding.
The sensuous for Heidegger are voice and script [Laut und Schrift], yet always within them a non-sensual meaning is told and appears [darin je und je ein Sinn verlautet und erscheint] that is not sensual. As sensual-with-meaning, the word traverses the expanse of the leeway between earth and sky and inhabits the house of the world.\textsuperscript{516} Language, like Being and things, traverses expanses, gathers as it separates. Language, then is not best as poetry or spiritual alone; rather language, is most properly language when it is “between” instruction and poetry. There language accompanies us both in the comfort and discomfit.

Heidegger, preferring Hebel over Goethe\textsuperscript{517}, concludes with an injunction: Johann Peter Hebel, the poet, lucidly wanders (wandert hellen Sinnes) upon pathways so that we can experience language. We can follow likewise, if we seek the friendship of the poet, who is friend to the house of the world.\textsuperscript{518}

\textbf{“The Nature of Language”}

Continuing to undo the contrast between the language of the poet and the language of metaphysics, we look to another work, “Das Wesen der Sprache” or “The

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\textit{is language.”} Could we say that language lies between the Nietzschean Dionysian and the Kantian sublime?  
\textsuperscript{516} \textit{GA 13: 150/“Hebel—Friend of the House,” Contemporary German Philosophy} 101. Heidegger’s text reads as follows: “Das Wort durchmisst als der sinnliche Sinn die Weite des Spielraums zwischen Erde und Himmel. Die Sprache hält den Bereich offen, in dem der Mensch auf der Erde unter dem Himmel das Haus der Welt bewohnt.”  
\textsuperscript{517} Heidegger’s preference of the poets quoted thus far is not due to their literary perfection, but to their ability to lead the reader to Being. Goethe draws his readers not to Being, but to sensuality, style and classical Enlightenment structures of Romanticism. Due to this style, even with \textit{Faust}, Goethe failed to garner Heidegger’s respect.  
\textsuperscript{518} \textit{GA 13: 150/“Hebel—Friend of the House,” Contemporary German Philosophy} 101.
Nature of Language.”519 This essay addresses the side of language that is affected by experience of language as tool. It delves into the issues of linguistics and philology as comprising a branch of metaphysics; hence, the term “nature” is summoned. Language as metaphysics serves as a negative example, illustrating that experience alone cannot be the source of language.

As a point of departure Heidegger reflects on experience: we see experience as a thinking experience. Language touches everything we think about and all that we perceive. Likewise, we experience language as touching at times the nexus of our innermost life, which seems to elude words. But how can this be the case that an experience eludes words, if experience were the sole source of language?

On the other hand, if experience could only gather data within and about language, then can we claim that language is the source of experience? If language were the source of experience, then experience would fit into the pre-established structure of language. But how can this be true that new experiences are already given?

Thus, the quandary of language continues at the linguistic level. If words in language were mere names, then they would merely point; if they are signs, they contain no new information. If words were always and only particular, they could never point or communicate. As components of ordinary language, much depends on how we think of the words and what they say. We cannot decipher what words say by merely using them in the language, for it seems that words have the baggage of metaphysics. As such,

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experience can never help us to reach the proper sense of language in its relation of words and things.

And still, poetry leads the way toward the nature or source of language. Circling to poetry, Heidegger introduces Stefan George’s poem, “The Word” as a way to investigate words. Heidegger gives ear to a poetic experience with the word in a new way, and traces it in thought. The stanza of interest is the last:

So I renounced and sadly see:
Where word breaks off no thing may be.

So lernt ich traurig den verzicht:
Kein ding sei wo das wort gebracht.521

In renunciation, the poet in the mood of sadness and with his senses sees. One might assume the poet sees because of his eyes, but Heidegger intends that he sees because he renounces the truth of metaphysics. The poet undergoes his sad experience due to the relation of word to thing. The word itself is the relation [Verhältnis] which, in each instance, says Heidegger, retains the thing within itself in such a manner that it “is” a “thing [Ding].” This seems like a traditional correspondence theory of truth and language, but soon we see that Heidegger means something quite different. In fact, it is precisely the realization that there is not a one-to-one correspondence of word to thing, this lack of ground, which draws the poet into sadness.

520 Notice that this entire period, like the 30s and 40s, Heidegger circles his way through the thicket of Western philosophy to find a path toward language and Being. But unlike that period of destructive retrieval, this period of meditative thinking Heidegger uses comparison as a way to find the close connections and relationships.
522 The theme of renouncing and mourning enter deeply into Heidegger’s thinking as early as the winter of 1934 with GA: 39, Hymnen >Germanien> und <Der Rhein>. An English translation in preparation is forthcoming by William McNeill and Julia Davis as Hölderlin’s Hymns: “Germanien” and “Der Rhein.”
Beyond experience, through renunciation, Heidegger comes to the realization that the relation between word and thing lies in language. The being of anything that is, then, resides in the word [wohnt in Wort], concludes Heidegger. And so we as readers are bought to a thinking experience though language. Through language we can have experiences and shared experiences, thoughts and shared thoughts, and dwell in a shared “world.” By doing so Heidegger directs us to the neighborhood both of poetry and thinking that lies in language. We come to this not though experience or thinking, but through meditative thinking.

This meditative thinking [sinnende Denken] on language goes deeper than etymological analysis; it searches out the radix, the root of all that is. It trawls for deeper depths. This root relation between word and thing announces itself in a single word. For Heidegger, the provisional word is λόγος. Λόγος speaks simultaneously as the name for Being and for Saying. For Heidegger meditative thinking has discovered that λόγος is not separate from Being, but λόγος is that which expresses both Being and Saying.

Heidegger next reflects upon the way of movement of λόγος itself as the root of all that exists. To a modern mind “way of movement” means that the object of knowledge is part of the method. But for meditative thinking [sinnende Denken] the way belongs, not in the object of knowledge, but in the region [Gegend] of language. When we think of a way as a distance connecting places, we wrongly conceive of the way.

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524 GA 12: 156/“The Nature of Language,” On the Way to Language 63. Heidegger holds that this sense is implicitly contained in the last line of the poem.
Not connecting distances, the region is the clearing that bring to the open where all was concealed. The way is without places, distances or times. The character of this region as a concealing and freeing [Freigebend-Bergende] is this way-making movement [Be-wégung], which allows all those ways of concealing and revealing. The way as way-making is not of movement, but of concealing-revealing. As the way-making movement, it is the source of all the unfolding ways of concealing and revealing.\footnote{GA 12: 186/“The Nature of Language,” On the Way to Language 91. This important move for Heidegger transfers the concealing-revealing occurring solely through Dasein into the region from which all concealing-revealing occurs with man’s help as the region of λόγος.}

The way reaches [langt] us, by letting us reach it though its touching us; it touches us by being our concern. Reaching us can be thought of in an ordinary sense of spanning distances, but Heidegger means it in a deeper sense, as a summoning, a calling, a sheltering, and a holding. The way calls us as Silence.\footnote{The call of Silence for Heidegger is that which confronts all humanity; this is to be distinguished from the call of the faithful in Christian terms. Søren Kierkegaard takes the Christian call and interweaves it with the Existential call, in various levels as the “knight of faith” or the “knight of infinite resignation.” One could argue that such a call for Kierkegaard would also entail its contrary, those not called. In contrast, Heidegger’s call of Silence summons all, regardless of religion. See Kierkegaard Fear and Trembling, trans. Johannes Silentio, ed. Sylvia Walsh and C. Stephen Evans. (Cambridge, GB: University Press, 2006).}

Renunciation of language as leading us to the way is way-making itself. Thus, Heidegger explains that the summoning [Das Be-lang] or the seeing of the “Need” [die Eignis (der Brauch)]\footnote{GA 12: 186/“The Nature of Language,” On the Way to Language 91. As the translator explains in a starred note: he omits this section, for he sees it simply listing cognates. This is partly true; but what is also true is that Heidegger lists all the terms he has used thus far to describe, even haltingly, this clearing character of the region. It is the calling; the sheltering, gathering. Finally Heidegger in note, “a,” writes this: “Die Eignis (der Brauch): “The Owning (the Need).”} belongs to Saying of language [das Sagen der Sprache]. But even these words do not convey properly meditative thinking, for the region is the original giver and founder of
ways [Wege allererst ergeben und stiften]; it gives way or moves us [Sie be-wëgt.].

But how can Heidegger convey meditative thinking as way-making?

Heidegger considers the Chinese word for “way,” Tao, as saying much more than what the West calls reason [Vernunft], mind [Geist], raison, meaning [Sinn], or Logos. This broader Saying is what Heidegger will mean by λόγος. Tao leads us not to another location, but only to where we already are. The word English word “way” leads away. If “way” were not translated, Tao would lead us to what Heidegger intends. The way-making [Be-wëgung] leads to our own neighborhood [Nachbarschaft]. We dwell in its nearness and it reaches us by becoming our concern. Way-making doesn’t lead us to another location, but draws us near to its region.

The nearness that brings poetry and thinking together into neighborhood we call Saying [Sage]. Saying is the “essential nature” of language [Sprache]. This essential nature has the twofold characteristic: the being of language: the language of being [Das Wesen der Sprache: Die Sprache des Wesens]. In the first phrase language is the subject whose being is to be determined. In the second phrase, Heidegger holds that we hear “being” as a verb, as in “being present” [anwesend] and “being absent” [abwesen], but more so, Heidegger’s meaning leads to the verbs, “to perdure” and “to persist”

531 GA 12: 186/“The Nature of Language,” On the Way to Language 92. Again, the translator omits another passage, which he understands as a discussion of German cognates. Within it Heidegger defines what he means by “Be-wëgen.” Heidegger’s discussion circles the word with shades of Swabian meanings that are typical, but not entirely Heidegger’s meaning; finally he writes: “Be-wëgen aber heißt: die Gegend mit Wegen versehen. ....wëgen” besagen: einen Weg bahnen, z.B. durch tief verschneites Land. Wëgen und Be-wëgen als Weg-bereiten und Weg als das Gelangenlassen gehören in denselben Quell- und Strombereich wie die Zeitwörter: wiegen und wagen und wogen.” I translate the sentence in the following way: “But way-making is: to provide the region with ways. .... “Wëgen” means: to blaze a way, for example, through a deeply snow-covered land. “Wayi ng” and “way-making” as way-paving and way as the letting be reached belong in the same source- and stream-domain as the verbs: weighing, risking and surging.” I take Heidegger’s meaning of “wëgen” to be one of on-going trailblazing. The meaning conveys a way, which is never regular or linear, but its making is the same as the way itself.

532 GA 12: 189/“The Nature of Language,” On the Way to Language 94. It is the colon [Doppelpunkt] which places the proper relationship as the relationship of the same, not of identity. Secondly, the translation of “Wesen” as “Being” is quite accurate.
[währen und weilen] as a persistence presencing that concerns and moves us [Es west an, währen geht es uns an, be-wëgt und be-langt uns]. Thus, we are exploring the language of perduring.

Since Heidegger holds the two phrases together with a colon; they are quite intimate, quite close. Heidegger states, then: “If these two modes of saying are to be neighborly in vesture of their nearness, then nearness itself must act in the manner of Saying [dann muß die Nähe selber in der Weise der Sage walten]; nearness and Saying would be the Same [Die Nähe und die Sage wären dann das Selbe].”\(^5^3^3\) Heidegger means here that language and perduring are near to one another and both are Saying. More properly language and preduring are near as Saying, for they do not have an identity as contrasting with the other, but identity as relational with the other.

Finally, nearness is an encounter with the fourfold. Nearness is not a magnitude. Heidegger claims that a magnitude would make a desert\(^5^3^4\) of the encounter of the world’s fourfold—“it is the refusal of nearness” [die Verweigerung der Nähe].\(^5^3^5\) This would occur when a word breaks off and no thing may be. “To break off” here means, for Heidegger, that the sounding word returns into soundlessness, back to where it was granted: into the ringing of stillness which, as Saying, moves the regions of the world’s fourfold into their nearness. Nearness as a magnitude leaves us deaf.

Rather, originary language as Silence draws us near and speaks. The movement [Be-wëgung] of nearness brings us to the fourfold and to its character of things being against each other [Gegen-einander-über der Dinge]. This type of nearness has its own

\(^5^3^3\) GA 12: 190/“The Nature of Language,” On the Way to Language 95.
sense and Heidegger calls it “nighness” \([\textit{Nahnis}]\).\textsuperscript{536} And while it is its own, it arrives through the movement of Saying drawing near. It could be said to be the occurrence of stillness. Nearness manifests itself as the movement of the world regions facing each other in the fourfold as “nighness;” the unfolding of movement is the nearness as “nighness.” Might this movement not be the \textit{Ereignis} of Stillness \([\textit{Stille}]\)?\textsuperscript{537} Indeed. More importantly, Silence draws us near Being as it draws us not to things, but to the “nighness” of fourfold.

Thus, language \([\textit{die Sprache}]\) is no mere human faculty \([\textit{Fähigkeit}]\), but the character \([\textit{Wesen}]\) of language, which belongs to the character of movement \([\textit{Be-węgung}]\) of the face to face encounter of the world’s four regions in the fourfold. This is to say that our ordinary language speaks and listens, for its originary language already has this characteristic. Indeed we see the close relationship between language, Being and the fourfold.

This breaking off of the word from Stefan George’s poem, \textit{“Das Wort”} is the true step back on the way of thinking.\textsuperscript{538} To “say” means to show. Stepping back is listening. Listening is related to Saying that grants its hearing in that region language belongs. Listening to this region leads to the very question of whether the nature of language can be discerned.

And yet language must somehow show its “nature.” Heidegger asserts here, and will discuss at great length, in “On the Way to Language” that the occurrence of appropriation acts \([\textit{Ereignis}]\) as that Saying in which language grants its essential nature to us. In other words, because we step back, \textit{Ereignis} has already reached us. Now we

\textsuperscript{536} \textit{GA} 12: 200/“The Nature of Language,” \textit{On the Way to Language} 104.
listen. What we hear is that language is beyond experience, beyond perception. Language is way-making as Silence, drawing us near and drawing us “nigh” to the fourfold.

In this essay we see two new developments: meditative thinking \textit{sinnende Denken} draws us to the movement \textit{Be-wêgen} of the way; and the way is how we hear Silence and are drawn to the region or neighborhood of language. Language, then, is not a mere human faculty. Its character belongs to the very character of the movement of the face-to-face encounter of the world’s four regions. Language belongs to Saying as its movement unfolds \textit{entfalt} in the nearness of the fourfold of all things. Language can no longer be seen as a correspondence between word and things. Language unfolds as Saying.

Before we move more deeply into that way toward language, we pause ever so briefly to illustrate exactly what the way is not. In 1958 Heidegger writes “Hegel and the Greeks.”\textsuperscript{539} Heidegger list four ways that Being has been represented through Western philosophy: \textit{E}v, the all, is the word of Parmenides; \textit{λόγος}, reason, is the word of Heraclitus; \textit{λόγος}, concept, is the word of Plato; \textit{Εὐρεγία}, actuality, is the word of Aristotle.\textsuperscript{540} These four words are for Heidegger incomplete. Hegel, who builds Absolute Knowing upon them, still misses Being as well.


\textsuperscript{540} \textit{GA} 9: 434-435/“Hegel and the Greeks,” \textit{Pathmarks} 328.
“The Word”

Heidegger continues his discussion on words and language between poetry and thinking in meditative thinking [sinnende Denken] with his essay of 1958: “Dichten und Denken. Zu Stefan Georges Gedicht ‘Das Wort.’” 541 Most poignant for Heidegger is the relation between the attunement of renunciation and Saying. Heidegger illustrates his meaning again in the same poem of Stefan George, “The Word.” Recall again the last stanza:

So I renounced and sadly see:  
Where word breaks off no thing may be.

So lernt ich traurig den verzicht:  
Kein ding sei wo das wort gebricht. 542

For Heidegger the poet’s renunciation stays as Saying: “As self-denial, renunciation [Verzicht] remains Saying [Sagen].” 543 Why is the poet sad? Is it renunciation that makes him sad? Or did sadness come over him after he learned renunciation? In either case, the attunement of lingers.

As lingering, renunciation is also receiving. Receiving is a way of being grateful. And so Heidegger explores how renunciation could turn into a thanking [als den Verdank]. In the sadness of renunciation, we are brought near and let go of that which

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541 This text was first delivered as a lecture during the matinee celebration, at the Burgtheater in Vienna May 11, 1958 under the title “Dichten und Denken. Zu Stefan Georges Gedicht Das Wort.” It was then published as “Das Wort” in Unterwegs zur Sprache by Verlag Günter Neske in 1959. Its text can be conveniently found in GA 12, Unterwegs zur Sprache. Its translation into English by Joan Stambaugh, “Words” is part of On the Way to Language, trans. Peter D. Hertz (San Francisco, CA: Harper-San Francisco, 1971). We prefer the English title, “The Word;” we will, when referring to Stambaugh’s work, use her title, “Words.”
distances us. We turn from sadness as we are brought near to our proper “nature.” And turning, we become thankful, and then thank; one owns oneself [das Sich-verdanken], i.e., is most his own as thanking and is attuned to joy [auf die Freude gestimmt].

Heidegger sees a mystery [Geheimnis] here wherein the word remains remote, while remoteness is drawn near [das Ferne nah], in sadness there is joy. The perdurance [Austrag] of this remoteness of such nearness is the nondenial of self [Sich-nicht-versagen] to the word’s mystery. There is no word for this mystery, that is, no Saying which could bring the being of language to language [das Wesen der Sprache-zur Sprache zu bringen]. To let ourselves be told what is worthy of thinking means—to think. Meditative thinking draws us near and “nigh.” To puts this into words is to stop thinking mediatatively. Such remains the mystery.

While listening to the poem, we are pondering poetry. While thinking about thinking, we are pondering thinking. This is how making poetry and thinking are. In pondering, we listen. Thus, listening is how poetry and thinking can indeed occur. As such thinking and poetry belong together with the same root of listening. Both, then, are types of language properly construed.

In concluding this lecture, let us listen once again to George’s last stanza: “where the word breaks off no thing may be.” What breaks off is not a word, but Word. The oldest word ever thought for Saying is λόγος. Where λόγος breaks off, no thing may be. But that is where language as Being as Saying is. Saying, which is a showing as

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546 GA 12: 224/“Words,” On the Way to Language 155. Heidegger’s text reads thus: “Sich das Denkwürdige sagen lassen, heißt—Denken. Indem wir das Gedicht hören, Denken wir dem Dichten nach. Auf solche Weise ist: Dichten und Denken.” Both Heidegger and Stambaugh emphasize with italics “are/list.” The import lies in this, that thinking and poetry are primarily listening. Joan Stambaugh translation of the last sentence could be translated more literally: “In such a way is: poetry and thinking.”
Silence, lets a thing appear as it is, as “it is.” In renunciation, Saying speaks to man, as drawing us near and “nigh.” We hear, subsequently λόγος.

The same word for Saying [Sagen] as λόγος is also the word for Being [Sein], that is, for the holding sway of beings [Anwesen des Anwesenden]. “Saying and Being [Sage und Sein], word and thing [Wort und Ding], belong to each other in a veiled [gehören zueinander in einer verhüllten], hardly thought and is not to be thought out, way [Weise].” For Heidegger, then, this belonging together can never be thought out entirely, for the relationship is before words as ordinary language emerges. And yet we insist on thinking it as λόγος.

In 1958 Heidegger takes to heart what it means to think in Grundsätze des Denkens. Its contents are interesting, but for the most part it does not advance our argument. The grounding principle of thinking is not the Hegelian dialectic, nor is it the Marxist production, but thinking is what is given in the nearing of the nearness. This we learned from “The Nature of Language” and “The Word.” And so we move onward toward the way of belonging together of Saying and Being.

“The Way to Language”

In 1959 Heidegger presented his most mature work on language and Being in Der Weg zur Sprache [“The Way to Language”]. Within it, Heidegger continues the

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547 GA 12: 224/“Words,” On the Way to Language 155. “Being” and “Sein” are both italicized to indicate the utter closeness of all the terms.
548 GA 11, Identität und Differenz. It is not translated as of yet.
549 This essay was part of a lecture series, offered at the Bavarian Academy of Fine Arts, Munich, in January, 1959, which was co-arranged with the help of the Academy of Arts in Berlin. The lecture series was expanded and revised for publication under the title of “Der Weg zur Sprache.” It first appeared in
themes of the earlier works, but adds to them the notion of language as unfolding

[Entfaltung]. The way toward language is the way unfolding as the silent call of Being as it is coupled with man’s listening; both call and listening together are part of the Saying enterprise of showing. This is “unfolding.”

If “call” and “listening” together can be maintained, linguistics can find its way back to Being. This essay presumes that the studies in linguistics are true in part: that speech is crucial; vocalization and expression, structural claims of language all are pertinent. But Heidegger argues for something deeper as well. The way toward language is twofold. It is listening to Being as Saying; language, too, is responding to that call unfolding through all facets of man’s life. Thus, even linguistics is unfolding of Being as Saying, even in its inadequate manner. Being as Saying speaks, indeed, calls until we listen. In listening we are on the way to language.

Language is both listening and speaking as a correspondence [Entsprechen]. And this correspondence is due to a deeper correspondence with Silence, as we have already learned. Thus, the way toward language might seem like a human path, which it is; but more so language is the path of Being.

What could be an apt image of our way in toto? Risking misrepresentation, we offer the reader a brief stationary momentary image. Imagine that we follow an originary path of language just as we blaze the path in front of us and travel on it. It is made by another and we are in relation to it, we speak and travel the path, wherever it leads. It

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print in the Fourth Series of Gestalt und Gedanke, 1959, ed. Clemens Graf Podewils. Then it was included as a part of Unterwegs zur Sprache by Verlag Günter Nesse in 1959. It too can be found in GA 12, Unterwegs zur Sprache. Its English translation by Peter D. Hertz, “The Way to Language” is part of On the Way to Language.

550 Heidegger’s sense of correspondence is not between word and thing, but between Being as Saying and our listening.
leads us as it unfolds itself; it leads and we blaze. One could also imagine the way darkly lit path, slowly becoming more bright with use.

Heidegger begins “The Way to Language” by alluding to Novalis, who proposed a progressive, universal poetry in his text, *Monologue*. While it seems that Novalis is on the right track, that language follows originary language, he actually follows a dialectical approach which is developed over time within the conception of Hegelian absolute idealism. While Novalis claims language to be a monologue, in actuality his is a dialogue. While linguists claim that language is a dialogue, they hold that it arose by man alone. How did we come to such an ironic monologic/dialogic understanding of language?

Accordingly, Heidegger comments on this situation as a way toward language: “The way to language: that sounds as if language were far from us, some place to which we still have to find our way.” This essay sets its theme as finding the way to language via language. Heidegger expresses it rather enigmatically: language brings to language as language. Thus, language is a web [Geflecht] of relations. On the one hand, this web ensnares us in its complex weave, but on the other hand, language offers a singular, clear insight: language is relational in its “essence.” We can never pinpoint the essence of any one of its parts, always do its parts speak of relation. Thus, language both reveals and conceals.

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551 Novalis, born Georg Philipp Friedrich Freiherr von Hardenberg, was a 18th Century, German romantic, who tried to create a new synthesis of art, philosophy, and science. Ostensibly, this seems to be Heidegger’s project as well. But, as we see, Heidegger finds Romanticism simply to be another metaphysical worldview.


553 *GA* 12: 230/”The Way to Language,” *On the Way to Language* 112. Heidegger’s text is phrased completely in italics: “Die Sprache als die Sprache zur Sprache bringen.” While speech and language could be interchangeable for “Sprache,” I deliberately use the same English word all three times, so as maintain consistency, if not on the level of the individual terms, certainly on the overall sense for Heidegger.
Unlike in *Being and Time* as an event of Dasein’s discovery of the concealing-revealing clearing, we now ask how we may trace these relational connections beyond Dasein. Heidegger speaks of untangling the knot in a way that is reminiscent of Plato’s and Aristotle’s interest in *aporia*: “The point is to experience the unbinding bond [*das entbindende Band*] within the web of language [*im Geflicht der Sprache*].” As such we have entered Heidegger’s involuted relation [*in sich zurücklaufende Verhältnis*] as the circle [*Zirkel*] of language: language is information and information is language.

Language as information is the route of the first beginning. The names of language in the West—γλῶσσα, *lingua*, *langue*, language—are evidence that language is defined in terms of outward signs of speech. Language is of the tongue. Aristotle’s text on interpretation, Περί Ἐρμηνείας, retains the classical structure in which language, as speaking, remains secure. The letters show the sounds. The sounds show the passions in the soul, and the passions in the soul show the matters that arouse them. Showing forms the infrastructure; later the relationship becomes transformed into a conversational relation between a sign and its signification in Augustine’s *De Magistro*. This notion of

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555 This problematic is discussed at length in Quine’s “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” wherein the two “dogmas” of logical and empirical sciences are not clearly demarcated as the logical positivists claim; instead they are a difference of degree. Quine’s discussion of the circle in sections 1-4 of the article also plays into Heidegger’s identity as relation. We define the circle as though we were outside the circle; yet we are not outside nor are we inside—then again in a certain way we are outside, for otherwise, we wouldn’t see the circle. Another issue is the circle the sum of parts; or is it defined by the relation of inside to outside, as given by the boundary. Regions, parts, boundaries, relations, definitions all comprise this complexity for Heidegger. *GA* 12: 231/“The Way to Language,” *On the Way to Language* 113. See W.V. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” *The Philosophical Review* 60 (1951): 20-43.


557 This is not to say that Heidegger means this is the case solely, for he will soon argue that language has more qualities, than these: body language and silence speak also.

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language as inner form and outward sign reached its peak with the linguistics of Alexander Humboldt.\textsuperscript{558}

Instead of reflecting on language \textit{qua} language, we should seek to let language be experienced as language. Otherwise, we build a metaphysical concept. This is not to say that language is experience. Conversely, when we see language as saying something, Saying\textsuperscript{559} encompasses speaking. But language is more than speaking. For example, a silent man doesn’t speak, but may say quite a bit.\textsuperscript{560} But even more originary than a silent man’s speaking, Silence [\textit{Stille}] is a Saying. Saying [\textit{Sagen}] and speaking [\textit{Sprechen}] are not identical.\textsuperscript{561} For Heidegger “Saying” means to show, to let appear, to let be seen and to let be heard what is silent. There are manifold ways of Saying. Speaking, on the other hand, is man’s response to Saying.

Heidegger holds that these manifold ways of Saying are united in “The essential being of language is Saying as showing.”\textsuperscript{562} Indeed it may be said that Saying is a self-showing. This “showing” character is not based on signs, but all signs arise from a

\textsuperscript{558} Cf. Augustine’s \textit{De Magistro}, Divisions 1-2. Christina Lafont makes the reasonable claim that this conception of language, the \textit{two-name theory}: “being the name of” and “being a predicate applying to” was the ruling view of language from Aristotle to Kant. See Christina Lafont, \textit{Heidegger, Language, and World-Disclosure} trans. Graham Harman (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge, 2000) 4.

\textsuperscript{559} Unlike Hertz we capitalize the word, “Saying,” in order to remain consistent throughout: language is as a Saying.

\textsuperscript{560} Of course, relating such a case is Heidegger’s precise problem, for in relating it, we must resort to linguistic or perceptual cues. Thus, others have criticized such an approach of defining non-language as language. Nevertheless, Heidegger’s point remains valid: “we have ears because we hear.”

\textsuperscript{561} \textit{GA} 12: 241/“The Way to Language,” \textit{On the Way to Language} 122. Heidegger’s text is quite direct: “\textit{Sagen und Sprechen sind nicht das gleiche}.”

\textsuperscript{562} \textit{GA} 12: 241/“The Way to Language,” \textit{On the Way to Language} 122. The italics are Heidegger’s emphasis: “Das Wesende der Sprache ist die Sage als die Zeige.”
showing. Signs belong to “showing’s” realm and for its purposes.\(^\text{563}\) In this orientation, speaking belongs to Saying and speaking is at the same time also listening to Saying. Thus, speaking listens first to Saying. Because it co-responds to Saying, speaking then is what we would say is conversational. Heidegger explains the situation in these terms: “Speaking \([\text{Sprechen}]\) is a listening \([\text{Hören}]\) not while \([\text{zugleich}]\) but \textit{before} \([\text{zuvor}]\) we are speaking.”\(^\text{564}\)

We are now able to see language as it is most properly its own. Language first and foremost is Saying by showing as “laying.” Since originary language has no organs of speech, which Heidegger calls its hearing, Silence, showing as listening, cannot be perceptual. It is not the lack of sound, which is heard, but that which precedes all perception.

Language speaks as showing, reaching into all regions of presences \([in\ alle \textit{Gegenden des Anwesens reichend}]\), summons from them whatever is present to appear and to fade \([erscheinen und verscheinen]\).\(^\text{565}\) Man, hearing what is shown,\(^\text{566}\) and through his organs of speech, speaks.

In a set of rhetorical questions Heidegger most emphatically lays the proper understanding of language at our feet. Heidegger invokes the metaphor of a stream: the shores of the stream are brought together by the stream. Is Saying separate from us? Or

\(^{563}\) Confer with \textit{Being and Time}, GA 2: §17, wherein references are the basis of signs. While \textit{Being and Time} is discussing phenomenologically the “worldhood” of Dasein, Heidegger here is discussing that which is broader than Dasein and thus, we shall see that what emerges is a new approach, not unlike phenomenology, but must also be broader. \textit{GA} 12: 242/“The Way to Language,” \textit{On the Way to Language} 123.

\(^{564}\) \textit{GA} 12: 243/“The Way to Language,” \textit{On the Way to Language} 124. While Hertz italicizes both “while” and “before,” Heidegger highlights only “before.” The effect is virtually the same.


\(^{566}\) Clearly the mixed metaphor is infelicitous. Nevertheless, it is Heidegger’s blending of hearing and seeing what is heard and shown as one, originary Saying. What becomes evident is that our ordinary language, understanding of man and his accompanying faculties are derivative in their multiplicity. Or perhaps better said, they are gathered in their separateness before they appear in their multiplicity.
is Saying the stream of the Silence, which its shores—the Saying and “Aftersaying” [Nachsagen]—itself joins, in which it builds them.\textsuperscript{567} Saying is both the stream of the Silence first as need [Brauch], and then the co-joined Saying with our “Nachsagen” as the Ereignis.

Our ordinary representations of language hardly find language as far reaching as this co-joined Saying in Ereignis. Again, in another question Heidegger asks: Is Saying itself the resting [Be-Ruhende], which grants the quiet of mutual belonging of what belongs in the framework of language proper?\textsuperscript{568} Language as Saying [Sagen] draws together Saying [Sagen] and Aftersaying [Nachsagen]. How can we conceive of this way? We cannot; it is beyond our conceptual framework. We can say this: Saying [Sagen] is the way and Saying [Sagen] with Aftersaying [Nachsagen] are the steps of the way; the steps dwell in the way as the way.

In the final section Heidegger discusses this way. The way is not a progression of thought. The way [Weg] allows us to reach something; it allows us to reach itself. The way allows us to reach [gelangen] Saying. Everything speaks of Saying; man too, speaks of Saying. But language also conceals Saying and reveals itself for the most part as linguistic articulation. But, as we know, Saying is in no way the linguistic expression [nachgetragene sprachliche Ausdruck] added to the phenomena after they have appeared. Rather, all radiant appearance [alles Scheinen] and all fading away [Verscheiden] rests

\textsuperscript{567} The German is most illuminating: “Oder ist die Sage der Strom der Stille, der selbst seine Ufer, das Sagen und Nachsagen, verbindet, indem er sie bildet?—[Note “a” adds:] Brauch und Ereignis.” GA 12: 244/“The Way to Language,” On the Way to Language 125.

\textsuperscript{568} GA 12: 244/“The Way to Language,” On the Way to Language 125. These two paragraphs, pregnant with rhetorical device, draw the reader’s assent. If our assent is indeed the desired case, then already we are near the thesis that language is both the way and the steps of the way. Yet, at this point this claim appears no differently than a Leibnizian multiplicity in unity. Rather than risking such an interpretation, Heidegger develops one further point before drawing his conclusion.
Saying frees all present beings free into their given presence and their given absence. All in all, “Saying pervades and structures the openness of that clearing which every appearance must seek out and every disappearance must leave behind, and in which every present or absent being must show, say, announce itself,” explains Heidegger.

Thus, Saying is the way of openness of the clearing, wherein all appearances and disappearances occur. Saying is the gathering [Versammlung] that joins all showings, which everywhere it shows [Gezeigte] itself as Ereignis. Emphatically Heidegger writes: “The moving force in Showing of Saying is Owning.” This is to say, Saying brings all things into what is most their own. This owning which brings them there, and which moves Saying as Showing in its showing, we call Ereignen. It yields the opening of the clearing. Ereignen is never the effect of a cause [die Wirkung einer Ursache], nor the consequence of an antecedent [die Folge eines Grundes]. The yielding owning [Das erbringende Eignen] is more than a grounding; it is Ereignis itself.

Ereignis cannot be represented, but only experienced as the Showing of Saying as an abiding dwelling [nur im Zeigen der Sage als das Gewährnde erfahren]. Ereignis is the giving yield whose giving reach [reichendes Geben] alone gives us such things as a “there is,” a “there is” of which even Being itself stands in need to come into its own as

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572 GA 12: 246/“The Way to Language,” On the Way to Language 127. Heidegger’s sentence runs as follows: “Das Regende im Zeigen der Sagen ist das Eignen.” This illustrates the phenomenology of Being and Time, yet moves beyond the ontological structures of Dasein to reveal deeper structures than Dasein at play here.
573 Heidegger refers us to GA 11, Identität und Differenz 28; Stambaugh refers us to Identity and Difference 37. This is the location where Ereignis is shown as itself.
574 The reader might recall that showing includes concealing and unconcealing together.
presence. It is the nearest of the near and the farthest of the far. Ereignis is the law [das Gesetz], not as a thesis but as a bringing, as an allowing-reaching.

Because the showing of Saying is Eignen, even the ability to listen to Saying, our belonging to it, rests in Ereignis. Man is brought to his own. Every word, every gesture is part of Ereignis. Heidegger insists: “Every spoken word is already an answer: counter-saying [Gegensage], coming to the ongoing [entgegenkommendes], listening Saying [hörendes Sagen].” Through Ereignis, the needing [brauchenden], the suitability [Vereignung] of men, Saying reaches language. Heidegger again discusses this way as the word in Alemannic-Swabian dialect: “wegen,” which means “to form a way,” [einen Weg bilden] and forming it, holds it ready [ihn bereit halten]. Way-making [Be-wëgen] thus means “to bring the way … forth” first of all [den Weg zu … allererst erbringen], and thus “to be” the way [der Weg »sein«].

Accordingly, Heidegger comes to his clearest point regarding language and Ereignis: way-making brings the essence of language as Saying into ordinary language is also the way-making of Saying into language. As we speak of the way to language now it is always already the unique region [schon immer seine einzige Ortschaft] of the

575 Heidegger directs us Sein und Zeit, §44; Stambaugh refers to her translation. Both refer to Dasein as being both in truth and in untruth as a being unto death. This can only be revealed by Ereignis as that which is most Dasein’s own.

576 Heidegger describes in a note indeed how difficult it is to think Ereignis, even as he has used it for twenty-five years, because we often incorrectly think solely of Being [Sein] here, and not Beyng/Being. GA 12: 248. Heidegger refers us to GA 7, Vorträge und Aufsätze: “Das Ding,” 163; “Bauen Wohnen Denken” 145; “Die Frage nach der Technik” 13. All of which we have covered their treatment of Ereignis in detail. Also he refers us to a later work we have yet to cover, GA 14, Zur Sache des Denkens.

577 Heidegger adds this phrase in note “a:” “Gelangenlassen, Bringen.” GA 12: 248.


579 GA 12: 249/“The Way to Language,” On the Way to Language 129-130. It might occur to the reader that “sein” should be capitalized, but Heidegger is quite clear on this regard; “sein” is a verb and should not be capitalized.

580 GA 12: 250/“The Way to Language,” On the Way to Language 130. Heidegger adds the parenthetical phrase so as to avoid any misunderstanding: “Die Be-wëgung bringt die Sprache (das Sprachwesen) als die Sprache (Die Sage) zur Sprache (zum verlautenden Wort).”

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essence of language itself [im Sprachwesen selbst], from which our thinking of language emerges.\textsuperscript{581} Language is the Gestalt,\textsuperscript{582} the whole, from which all steps derive, even the extreme step of enframing.

Gestalt of Saying now reveals the monological character of the nature of language. Gestalt does not and cannot coincide with the monologue of which Novalis was thinking dialectically. But language is a monologue in so far as it is language which alone [allein] speaks and language speaks lonesomely [einsam].\textsuperscript{583} Rightly, language has been called “the house of Being.”\textsuperscript{584} Language is the keeper, the shelterer, of presencing of the Ereignis of Saying as Showing. Language is the house of Being because language, as speaking, is the mode of Ereignis [die Weise des Ereignisses].

With the completion of “On the Way toward language,” Heidegger seems to arrive at his most mature thought regarding Being as Saying with language unfolding as the mode of Saying of Ereignis. For the most part, then, our discussion has drawn to a close on Being and language.

Yet a few odd threads seem to need reweaving. One such thread is the question of who man indeed is; since man is the speaker as listener of language, the notion of who a person is needs to be reworked. Man is not simply a subject, but more so, if you will, a living instrument of Ereignis. But while the spokesperson of the Ereignis, man is not simply an automaton. Man is not fated, but man, hearing the destiny of the Silence of

\textsuperscript{582} Heidegger offers us the formula of the way: “die Sprache als die Sprache zur sprache bringen.” GA 12: 250/“The Way to Language,” \textit{On the Way to Language} 130.
\textsuperscript{584} Heidegger directs the reader’s attention to “Brief über den Humanismus.” Confer GA 9: 364/“Letter on Humanism,” \textit{Pathmarks} 276.
Being is co-speaker of the silence. In his last years Heidegger reaches toward, but never fully arriving upon, this new understanding of a person. To this new, yet not fully developed, understanding of the human person we turn our attention. We look to Da-sein as a way to Being as Saying.
CHAPTER SIX

From Da-sein toward Being: Saying

“‘So geeignet gehört der Mensch in das Ereignis.’”

With Being as Saying, and language as the way toward Being’s manifestation as Ereignis, man as person seems to emerge as the next engagement of Heidegger’s attention. With language emerging as a mode of Saying of Ereignis, a new question arises: how does Dasein relate to language as it is now formulated? Who is man? Though man is the speaker of language, he is first a listener; thus, the notion of “who a person is” needs to be reworked. Man is not simply a subject, nor is he an automaton. Man is a co-speaker of Silence. Heidegger reaches toward a new understanding of a person in the last years of his life. To this new understanding of the human person we turn our attention on the way to Being as Saying. We need to explore how man belongs to Ereignis.

The human person can be understood properly only as dweller. In Sprache und Heimat, Heidegger offers another version of humanity dwelling within language.

585 GA 14: 28/On Time and Being 23. I translate Heidegger’s sentence: “ Appropriated in this way, man as being brought into Ereignis, man belongs to Ereignis.”

586 This lecture was read in Wesselburen, July 2, 1960. Its text can be found in GA 13, Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens.
Within this lecture language’s power is in its poetic nature. Language is that which is most hidden and therefore furthest reaching, imploringly bringing forth dwelling. Rather than language and dwelling, the directive phrase, says Heidegger, is “language as homeland.”

Language draws us to our true homeland and our true homeland is in true dwelling in Ereignis.

DA-SEIN

Zollikon Seminare

Dwelling allows us to see man in his proper sense. And this is what Heidegger surveys in the 1961 volume, Zollikon Seminare. While Heidegger eschews ontological and metaphysical distinctions for the most part in his later work, we see here in these seminars terminology quite like that of Being and Time’s ontic/ontological phraseology. In these seminars and in this brief period in the 1960s, we see the clear demarcation between early (works of 1930s and 1940s) and later (1950s) characteristics blurred. Why?—we must ask. Since Heidegger is discussing psychological issues with Boss and others, Heidegger must reenter the arena of ontology begun in Being and Time. Perhaps, when discussing who a person is, Heidegger needs to pull together the early notion of Dasein with its new place in Ereignis. At the very minimum Heidegger does need to draw on Dasein before Ereignis and readdress the notion of Dasein after Ereignis.

The conclusion we are drawn to make is that the meditative thinking [*besinnliche Denken*] of later years cannot preclude the ontological terminology of the early years. Since meditative thinking is relational, it doesn’t seek fixed truths. It relates the two beginnings by leaping. Between the philosophy of the first beginning and the other beginning lies the *Ab-grund*. Between the two beginnings, meditative thinking remains. Thus, meditative thinking must somehow relate to the ontological discussions of the first beginning too.

Appropriately, in these seminars we see Heidegger leaping to and from the metaphysical and ontological toward meditative thinking. Understandably, ontological terminology is prevalent in any discussion of the human person, since understanding of the person is still steeped in subject/object distinctions. Now we see meditative thinking as reengaging ontology in a thematic way, though Heidegger had been adjusting his notions of *Dasein* all along; and as Heidegger does so meditative thinking provisionally uses the terms of the first beginning.

Heidegger has been criticized for a “thin” description of the human person throughout his lifetime. While discussing *Being*, Heidegger’s attention would focus on objects like the jar, the bridge and table. Complexities of the human person were always in relation to the fourfold, given as mortal. Now this volume shows Heidegger clearly grappling with the issues of the complicated and multi-relatedness of the human psyche in *Da-sein-analytical* approach of Heidegger’s later phenomenological thinking. Part of the human psyche, as *Being and Time* has shown, can never be isolated. The human being is a being-with other beings.
Insofar as the human being is being-with [Mitsein], as he remains essentially related to another human, he is always engaged in language. Language as such is conversation [Gespräch]. As being-with belongs to being human, so too does being human belong to language. In Being and Time Heidegger used the word “discourse” [Rede] for language as a structure [existentiale] of Dasein. The later Heidegger employs a broader understanding of language as Saying [Sprache as Sage]. In the Zollikon Seminars we presently look to Da-sein as the bridge emerging between existential structures and Saying. Thus Da-sein is a way toward Being as Saying.

Many of the pages of Zollikon Seminars review, however, the territory of Being and Time. It also looks toward a structural analysis of Da-sein, a trajectory in which Boss and others employ Lacanian theories to explain personhood. While these might be important, if overly, structural advances, we need not delve deeper into that arena. Rather, let it suffice that we demarcate Da-sein.

First, Da-sein is not a subject and transcendence is not the “structure of subjectivity,” but its removal! [Beseitigung], writes Heidegger to Medard Boss on March 8, 1965. We remove any notion of transcendence as a structure of what it means to be a human person. Rather than employing transcendence to understand, meditative thinking strives to remain related. And still, meditative thinking involves leaping between the philosophy of the first beginning and the philosophy of the other beginning. We leap between transcendence and relatedness. A new understanding of Da-sein

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589 GA 89: 182-183/Zollikon Seminars 139-140.
590 Purposefully do we demarcate “Dasein” of Being and Time from “Da-sein” of the Beiträge and subsequent works. The mark of hyphenation is a movement from the phenomenology of Being and Time toward a meditative thinking.
591 Most notably William Richardson takes this avenue. See his “Heidegger among the Doctors,” in Reading Heidegger: Commemorations, ed. John Sallis (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University, 1993) 49-63.
592 GA 89: 192/Zollikon Seminars 240.
emerges. Instead of a transcending Da-sein, we look to Da-sein as the site of language as Saying. Da-sein is the site of relatedness, not the site of abstract aloofness.

In such a notion, we now see that language as Saying is not an overextension [Überdehnen] of the concept of language. Rather, language as Saying is constitutive of ordinary language. To find it, we don’t abstract; we look for the formal indicators of language as Saying within ordinary language. The usual meanings given to ordinary language are constrictions [Verengungen]. Heidegger comments with distinctness of purpose: “With this constricted concept of language in the sense of verbal articulation [Verlautbarung], I cannot understand anything at all.” Language as mere articulation lacks coherence.

Like Da-sein, language’s new meaning emerges. On May 14, 1968 Heidegger explains to Boss in a letter: “Language [Sprache] is identical with the understanding of being, and without this one could not experience death as death, that is, as the uttermost [äußerste] possibility approaching Da-sein.” Language, Da-sein and Being as Saying are tightly interrelated. Let us see how.

In clear contrast to Being and Time, Heidegger now understands language as the originary language unfolding as Ereignis, which “needs” [braucht] and draws on the service of the human being. Heidegger, in §7 of Being and Time, understood the Greek λόγος as discourse in the sense of the manifestation [offenbar machen] of the question of discourse. Franz Mayr and Richard Askay, the translators of Zollikon Seminars, along with Françoise Dastur rightly indicate that Heidegger now deepens his analysis of λόγος

593 GA 89: 200/Zollikon Seminars 248-249.
594 GA 89: 220/Zollikon Seminars 277. Both the editor and Heidegger uphold the emphasis; but the reader should be wary that identical for Heidegger does not mean equal. What the reader can infer is their intimate relationship is indeed far closer than what we have ever conceived beforehand.
in order to carry out the phenomenological “destruction” of logic and returns it to the initial sense as a showing in itself, that is to say, as Ereignis.

But what they do not acknowledge is the fact that, in order to relate the phenomenology of Being and Time to the destruction of logic toward the Ereignis, man uses meditative thinking, not the subject, as the lens through which Ereignis shows itself. Man, in his part as subject, might use and misuse phenomenology and logic to respond to Being, but as one part of Ereignis. Man as mortal is but one element of the fourfold through which Being manifests itself. While phenomenology occurs through man’s eyes alone, Ereignis with meditative thinking is through man’s eyes but, more importantly, with Ereignis Being is showing itself through man as part of the fourfold with man’s assistance.

SEIN

“Kant’s Thesis about Being”

Perhaps more than any other fallible image, this directs us to Seinsgeschichte in the Kehre. Turning from man as the center of the “process,” we focus on Being as Saying. Being is no longer presence or ground, but Being as Saying is the ungrounded ground, appearing as no-thing, heard as Silence. In May of 1961 Heidegger offers a

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lecture entitled, “Kants These über das Sein” [“Kant’s Thesis about Being”]. This lecture tries to persuade listeners that Being as ground is problematic.

But in this lecture Heidegger finds more problematic Kant’s conception of man, wherein the unity of apperception claims to unify all that man claims to know. This unified ground of the person as subject is what leads us to Being as ground. While Kant is correct to understand that the unifying-gathering role is λόγος, Kant fails to understand λόγος by transferring this role to the I-subject within man. This λόγος of the subject holds “all logic” in its custody [Haft].

As a corrective Heidegger again enlists Parmenides’ help, namely, fragment VIII:

Τὸ γάρ ἀυτό νοεῖν στίν τε καὶ εἶναι.
For thinking and being are the same.

The relationship between thinking and being is sameness, identity. In no case, as we have learned, does “identical” mean the same as “equal” [gleich]: thinking and being are not equal. Instead thought is the horizon [Horizentvorgabe] for the elucidation of Being. As Kant conceives it, through thought Being is represented. But Being is properly that which grants presence as presencing [das Anwesenheit Gewährende] as thinking. Thinking as a narrow lens cannot entirely capture Being’s totality. Being’s logic cannot be representational says Heidegger.

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596 The lecture was given on May 17, 1961 in Kiel. Its German text is found in GA 9, Wegmarken. “Kant’s Thesis about Being” is located in Pathmarks, translated by Ted. E. Klein, Jr. and William E. Pohl.
598 See GA 7, Vorträge und Aufsätze: 242/“μοῖρα,” Early Greek Thinking.
600 GA 9: 479/“Kant’s Thesis about Being,” Pathmarks 361.
Heidegger shows the deficiencies of Kant's thinking of Being. Kant interprets Being and thought as united through man. Hence, the unity of apperception in man becomes the source of unity in thought; it is the ability to tie together all appearances into one experience. Man as subject has the ability to unite all concepts in consciousness. How does Kant perceive this unity in man? Man is able to achieve such a unity by resorting to a higher ground. Kant posits that the unity of perception is grounded in “einende Einheit” (uniting unity) which lets all the “σύν” (together) of every “Θέσις” (positing) [Setzung] arise in the first place. Kant, therefore, calls Being “the originally synthetic unity” [»die ursprüngliche synthetische Einheit«].

In Kant we have the wrong understanding of Being because we have a representational idea of man and his essence, concludes Heidegger. What Heidegger means is that any representation is a copy, whether it is a representation of man or his essence. Rather, Heidegger attempts to correct both through the use of “The Turning” and Seinsgeschichte. Heidegger seems to use these key notions again and again to review his own work as a corrective to his simple phenomenology in the early years. Let us briefly illustrate this procedure in his final works.

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602 GA 9: 460/“Kant’s Thesis about Being,” *Pathmarks* 348.
603 It is during this time in April 1962, in which Heidegger writes “Vorwort,” a letter responding to William J. Richardson’s book, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*. The forward can be found in GA 11, *Identität und Differenz*. 
On Time and Being

Heidegger writes in 1962 *Zur Sache des Denkens*.\(^{604}\) This work explains *Sein und Zeit*’s inability to derive the meaning of Being from an analytic of Dasein, whose structure is connected to temporality. In *On Time and Being* “Being” and “time” are cor-relational as a totality, as Space-time; as such it is a manifestation of *Ereignis*, not related solely to Dasein’s care structure as explained in *Sein und Zeit*. Space-time, correctly understood as a manifestation of *Ereignis*, includes the fourfold. Correctly understood, man as the one who listens to Being is part of this *Ereignis*. Man, then, is part of *Ereignis*, but does not own it. Rather *Ereignis* has mankind. *Ereignis* also has Space-time, for the emergence of *Ereignis* is the onset of Space-time.

*Sein und Zeit* cannot derive phenomenologically Being from time because both time and Being are more of *Dasein* than of *Ereignis*. *On Time and Being* redirects us. Rather than our seeking Being, Being as that which concerns us comes toward us, as human beings.\(^{605}\) Being as Saying in presencing [*Anwesenheit*] is the constant abiding that approaches [*angehende*] man, reaches [*erreichende*] him, is extended [*gereichte Verweilen*] to him.\(^{606}\) The constant abiding is not presence, but rather Being abides as noticeable unabiding. In this fashion, can we understand the meaning of Being, through it own manifestation in *Ereignis*, drawing man and the fourfold together?

\(^{604}\) *Zur Sache des Denkens* can be found in *GA* 14, *Zur Sache des Denkens*. Translated by Joan Stambaugh as *On Time and Being* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972). Stambaugh’s translation sometimes takes certain liberties by peppering the text with additional phases in the hope of explaining dense material. At best, however, these additions mislead the reader and draw away from the original text into a thinking that is more in line with *Being and Time*.

\(^{605}\) *GA* 14: 12/*On Time and Being* 16-17. Heidegger’s text places nicely man’s role in context: “*Anwesen geht uns an, Gegenwart heißt: uns entgegenweilen, uns—den Menschen.*”

\(^{606}\) *GA* 14: 17/*On Time and Being* 12.
Heidegger clarifies *Ereignis* now. Through *On Time and Being* Heidegger comes to a new insight; he explains: “In the sending of the destiny of Being [*Schicken in Geschick des Seins*], in the extending of time [*Reichen der Zeit*], there appropriates [*Zueignen*]⁶⁰⁷ a dedication [*Übereignen*], a delivery over into what is their own, namely of Being as presencing [*Anwesenheit*] and of time as the realm of the open [*Bereich des Offenen*].” Through the manifestation of Being as *Ereignis*, both Being as presencing and time as the realm of the open emerge. They emerge as Being sends itself and drawing man near it.

Heidegger continues: “What determines both, time and Being, in their own, that is, in their belonging together [*Zussamengehören*], we shall call: *Ereignis.*⁶⁰⁸ *Ereignis* is now thought in the light of what becomes manifest in our looking ahead [*Vor-sicht*] toward Being and toward time as destiny and as extending, to which time and Being belong. We look ahead because Being draws us in time. Being and time are “matters” [*Sachen*]; they are not things. The “and” between them is left indeterminate [*Unbestimmten*] in their relation to each other [*ihre Beziehung zueinander*]. *Ereignis* is no longer presencing, like phenomenology, but presencing as looking ahead [*Vor-sicht*]. This perennial, indeterminate character of Being as presencing typifies Heidegger’s new phenomenology. Man is characterized as looking ahead toward Being because Being draws man.

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⁶⁰⁷ Parvis Emad translates “*Zueignen*” as “enownment,” but in other cases “coming-into-its-own,” depending on the context. The latter refers to thinking and is not accomplished on its on, while the former refers to being and indeed does the accomplishing, though never of “itself.” See Parvis Emad, *On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin, 2007) 83. We have translated it here as appropriating.

⁶⁰⁸ *GA* 14: 24/On Time and Being 19.
What is the character most distinctive of the destiny of Being in time?—*Ereignis*. It is a giving that is a self-withdrawing. Heidegger explains: “Denial [Verweigerung] and withholding [Vorenthalten] exhibit [bekunden] the same trait as self-withholding [Ansichthalten] in sending [Schicken]: namely, self-withdrawal [Sich-entziehen].”* Ereignis* has the peculiar property of bringing man into his own because Being withdraws. Man is the being who “perceives” Being by standing with the withdrawal as *Ereignis*. Thus, man as being brought into *Ereignis*, man belongs to *Ereignis*. Consequently, the attempt in *Being and Time*, §70, to derive human spatiality from temporality without first considering *Ereignis* is untenable, for it misses presencing as looking ahead [Vor-sicht]. Instead Being sends itself as self-withdrawal as Silence. This sending out is Heidegger’s new notion of time. With Being’s sending forth, we are drawn near, and we conceive time as the “process” of Being’s history through time. Being has history, *Seinsgeschichte*, not man.

That same year Heidegger offers a summary of *Zeit und Sein* entitled, *Protokoll zu einem Seminar über den Vortrag “Zeit und Sein’”* [“Summary of a Seminar on the Lecture ‘Time and Being’”]. While it mostly recounts “Time and Being,” the discussion returns to the relation between ordinary language and the language of thought as a way toward Heidegger’s new phenomenology of *Ereignis*. In short, ordinary language leads us to originary language. Speaking about ontic models presupposes that language in principle has an ontic character. What we wish to say ontically can be made

609 *GA* 14: 27/On Time and Being 22.
610 *GA* 14: 27-28/On Time and Being 22-23.
611 *GA* 14: 28/On Time and Being 23. Heidegger’s sentence is succinct: “So geeignet gehört der Mensch in das Ereignis.”
612 This work recounts for the most part *Zeit und Sein* with some annotations. Along with *Zeit und Sein*, it is located in *GA* 14. Joan Stambaugh translates the text and it can be found in *Time and Being*. 

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know only through words. Earlier in our discussion we found this to be a cul-de-sac, for our words led away from Being. But man’s relation to language can transform itself as man’s is changed in his relationship to Being.\textsuperscript{613} In this way, that is, through the changing of man in the transforming contact with Being as Ereignis, ordinary language leads us to originary language. More properly said originary language shows itself through ordinary language.

**PHILOSOPHY**

"My Way to Phenomenology"

From this insight Heidegger writes in 1963, "Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie" ["My Way to Phenomenology"].\textsuperscript{614} Rather that using concepts of traditional philosophy or the ontological terminology of Being and Time as presencing, Heidegger now sees the way in terms of phenomenology, but now as looking ahead [Vor-sicht]. This new type of phenomenology of looking ahead, then, allows us to grasp presencing as looking ahead as possibility [Möglichkeit].\textsuperscript{615} Not simply descriptive, Vor-sicht offers new possibilities of man and beings as transformed by Ereignis.

Looking toward new possibilities and perhaps offering an instance of new possibilities, Heidegger converses with a Thai Buddhist monk, Bikkhu Maha Mani on September 28, 1964 in Baden-Baden. Heinrich Petzet reports his eyewitness account of

\textsuperscript{613} GA 14: 60-62/"Summary" 51.
\textsuperscript{614} "Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie" is found in GA 14 and Stambaugh’s English translation is included in Time and Being.
\textsuperscript{615} GA 14: 102/"My Way to Phenomenology" 82. This is offered as a 1969 supplement. Heidegger holds it emphatically in italics.
Heidegger’s earlier, private meeting at his house in Zähringen with Bhikku Mahu Mani; a televised version ensued. The monk describes what meditation means for Eastern humanity: “The ‘I’ dissolves, until in the end only one thing remains: the Nothing.” Thus, the relationship for Buddhist thought has the subject dissolving into the Nothing. “But this nothing is not nothing,” continues the monk; “it is just the opposite—fullness. No one can name this. But it is nothing and everything—fullness.”

Heidegger responded as did Hegel years before this encounter: “That is what I have been saying throughout my whole life.” The monk responded in turn: “Come to my country; we understand you.” We have learned about Nothing previously, now we see man’s relationship to it, and as such the proper context for a person. Ostensibly, the dissolving of the “I” might seem to be Heidegger’s answer to the Western subject vis-à-vis Being.

But in that same conversation with the monk, Heidegger sees problems emerging. The effects of technology clouded the notion of nothingness for the monk. In his thirst for Western technology, the monk could not really understand “nothing.” Instead the monk opted for the “new.” Heidegger sadly noted that the people like this monk did not have the slightest idea what damage the technological setting can do. Petzet comments a year later: the monk left his order and joined an American television company. And so, dissolving of the “I” is not the answer, for it dissolves any resolve against naïve realism. “Nothing” is the way, but how that appears, we must wait. Heidegger is still silent on offering his answer.

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617 This statement lends credence to the thesis that Heidegger’s work was consistently seeking Being.
618 *Encounters* 181.
619 *Encounters* 182.
“The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking”

One reason for Heidegger’s silence on the human person is contained in what man develops as philosophy. The subject is entangled in Western philosophy. On October 30, 1965 Heidegger offers a lecture in Amriswil, Switzerland “Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens” (“The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking”). Its theme reiterates what we already know: philosophy as metaphysics has reached its end, but what does this mean? The end or purpose of philosophy and thinking go beyond metaphysics and traditional ideas of thinking. Both have a more originary source and broader ken. “End” means something different for Heidegger than what Derrida has made of it as deconstruction.

Not simply deconstruction, Heidegger’s thinking also remembers. It remembers the task of Heraclitus and Parmenides: to protect the interplay of unconcealment and concealment in the Lichtung des Seins. Western philosophy has interpreted this relationship of thinking in varying ways. For Hegel the thinking is dialectic movement in which the matter as such comes to itself, comes to its own presence [Präsenz]. For Husserl’s thinking brings the matter of philosophy to its ultimate originary givenness, and that means to its own presence [Präsenz]. But for Heidegger in Being and Time thinking is the clearing as the open region of Dasein for everything that becomes present and absent. “This is a ‘primal phenomenon’ [»Urphänomen«].” Now for the later

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620 This essay first appeared in a French translation by Jean Beaufret and François in Kierkegaard vivant (Paris: Gallimard, 1966). It is found in Klostermann’s series GA 14 and the English translation in Time and Being. Another English version is found in Basic Writings. Both English versions are translated by Joan Stambaugh.

621 GA 14: 79/“The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,” Basic Writings 440-441.

622 GA 14: 81/“The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,” Basic Writings 442-443.
Heidegger *Ereignis* with man allows the proper clearing and presencing [*Lichtung und Anwesenheit*].\(^{623}\) This is the task [*Aufgabe*] of philosophy. The purpose of philosophy, then, is to open man to *Ereignis*. This is the way—through destructive retrieval and through remembering—man is open to Being’s manifestation as *Ereignis*.

**Seminars**

Heidegger continues to demarcate the differences between Western philosophy and destructive retrieval as a way of leaping between the two in *Ereignis*. He does this in his final set of seminars, which transpires in 1966-1969. The first two of four seminars occur in Le Thor, France;\(^{624}\) they contrast Heidegger’s way with that of Hegel’s metaphysics. And so, Heidegger sees that currently conceived philosophy is still blocking our way toward understanding how man can most properly be open to *Ereignis*. In particular the second seminar takes exception with Hegel’s analysis by way of a question: What does philosophy need? For Hegel this means that philosophy needs something to be completed. For Heidegger philosophy always has “Need;” not as a lacking, but philosophy always has “Need” as one of its “positive” components. Unlike Hegel, Heidegger’s “Need” is not a missing component.

This issue of finding the “missing component” is the key toward unlocking Western philosophy in its current state of aporia. According to Heidegger, if for Hegel the dialectic between Spirit and matter is the driving force of philosophy, then life always

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\(^{623}\) *GA* 14: 90/“The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,” *Basic Writings* 449.

\(^{624}\) This is the second part of *Band* 15 of the *Gesamtausgabe: Seminare*. Its English text is contained in *Four Seminars*, trans. Andrew Mitchell and François Raffoul (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2003).
appears as torn and in need of repair. But Hegel never addresses the source of this dichotomy or this missing component. But whence did this dichotomy arise?

Heidegger places the question in these terms. If the tear or “scission” [Entzweiung] is the source of the need [Bedürfnisses] for philosophy, if philosophy arises as soon as life has become torn [zerreißend geworden ist], what is the driving force [treibende Kraft] of the dichotomy [Entzweiung]? In short what caused the rift of a prior unity, of which philosophy historically tries to mend?

But, on the other hand, if life is not first a unity and philosophy is not a piecing of it together, if life always occurs as a necessary division or multiplicity without order, then how can we speak of a unity at all? Heidegger phrases it thusly: “If philosophy is not a piecing-together [Zusammenstückten] and if the tearing [Zerrissenheit] is necessary [notwendig], then can one speak of a unity [Einheit] before the tearing [Zerrissenheit]? If separation is necessary, then philosophy could not hope to join its pieces. Given Hegel’s rendition of philosophy, we are left with a quandary.

More precisely, the quandary places Hegel’s Aufhebung in an ambiguous light. For if there is prior unity and subsequent separation and Aufhebung seems necessary, Aufhebung is inadequate to explain the cause of separation or its need for joining. If, as in the second case, there is never prior unity, but only a rift, then why is Aufhebung needed to rejoin the separation? Heidegger sees Hegel’s solution of Aufhebung as a non-solution. Heidegger explains: “Metaphysics starts from beings, raises itself to being, and then returns to beings as beings and clarifies them on the basis of the light of being.”

In other words, Heidegger sees Hegel’s philosophy as explaining the difference between

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626 GA 15: 291/Four Seminars 13.
627 GA 15: 306/Four Seminars 22.
beings by developing a concept of Being; since Being, is then used as the way to explain beings, then we need a way to explain why beings are inadequate vis-à-vis Being.

In contrast to Hegel’s drawing together of Spirit and matter, Heidegger offers the gathering-separation of the fourfold of Being as Saying. Rather than prior unity with the need for joining, or the prior disunity without a reason for unity, Heidegger offers unity and disunity as one, always occurring, occurrence. Ereignis helps us to understand both separation and gathering.

In Ereignis Being as Saying is the way of openness, wherein all appearances and disappearances of unity and disunity occur. Being as Saying is the gathering [Versammlung] that joins all showings, which everywhere shows [Gezeigte] itself as Ereignis. In its showing, Being shows itself as concealed. In concealing itself, separate things appear. As separate things appear, Being appears as concealment, gathering all things. In Heidegger’s thinking, the gathered-separateness is twofold throughout: as Being, as language, in man, and in things. Hegel’s quandary of philosophy is the same quandary for language, for man, and the ontological difference. Ereignis is Heidegger’s answer to Hegel’s troubling question of the dichotomy between Spirit and matter. With it issues of gods arise.

On September 23, 1966 Heidegger was interviewed by Der Spiegel magazine. While the interview was intended for the general audience and its tone was chatty, it does enter into our present topic of what is philosophy and how it affects us. Philosophy and all human endeavors have never been able to transform the world as given. As Marx

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629 The text can be found in GA 16, §253: 652-683. The English translation is the work of Maria Alter and John Caputo and appears in Philosophy Today XX, 1976 (2/4), 267-284. It is also found later in The Heidegger Controversy.
has already proffered, philosophy has been useless in that regard. To make his point, Heidegger offers his enigmatic answer: “Only a god can save [retten] us. The sole possibility of transformation that is left for us, insists Heidegger, is to prepare a sort of readiness, through thinking and poetizing. Heidegger wants to ready us for the appearance [Erscheinung] of the god or for the absence [Abwesenheit] of the god in the time of foundering [Untergang]; for in the face of the god who is absent, we founder [untergehen].”

Heidegger sees his new phenomenology as a type of readiness, or looking ahead [Vor-sicht], both in times of appearance or foundering.

What could Heidegger mean by this enigmatic sentence? And what does he mean by the gods? Gods are part of the fourfold, yet the meaning of fourfold is not entirely clear. Elsewhere we have covered fully three of the fourfold—earth, sky, and mortals—presently we are able to discuss Heidegger’s meaning of the gods. At the outset Heidegger would say that the gods are part of Saying. From the Beiträge we learned that the Being [Sein] needs man to manifest the gods. But this still seems all too incomprehensible. Let us look to another work for clarity, in which Heidegger is more lucid.

Besinnung was published in 1938, during the same years Heidegger pondered over the Beiträge. Section 70 of Besinnung discusses the gods as a type of fundamental knowing awareness [das wesentliche Wissen]. Not the awareness of

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630 GA 16: 671 /“Only a God can Save us” 277.
631 GA 4: 38/“Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry” 56.
632 Besinnung is contained in Klostermann’s edition: GA 66. Its English text, Mindfulness, was translated by Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary (New York, NY: Continuum, 2006). I prefer to avoid translating “Besinnung” as “mindfulness,” since Heidegger would like to distinguish his thinking from that of Hegel’s thinking. I prefer the phrase, “meditative thinking;” though the phrase occurs as two words, it conveys to the reader a movement away from “full knowing.”
633 GA 66: 229/Mindfulness 203. Emad and Kalary translate this phrase in a non-traditional fashion, whereas the philosophy of the first beginning would have it translated as “the essential knowing.”
certitude, fundamental knowing awareness is the awareness which lies outside of, or prior to, propositional claims. As such the fundamental knowing awareness or gods are without content. Without content, insists Heidegger, fundamental knowing awareness persists nonetheless. It arises out of the fundamental attunement of startled dismay \( \text{[Erschrecken]} \), as man is placed face-to-face with the abyss \( \text{[Abgrund]} \) of the Silence of Being.

Turning to this abyss man honors it, keeping solemn the differentiation between beings and Being. The gods are set in counter-distinction to man. Face to face with fundamental knowing awareness man, then, is drawn to what is most proper to himself. He sees the earth appear as it is, as surrounded by the stillness of a world and ventures forth into strife. In being drawn near to the abyss of Being, man hears its Silence: originary language. In response, man brings to Being the strife of earth and world, and being face to face with the gods, as ordinary language. This beginning dialogue of man and strife, facing the abyss, gives rise to a further dialogue. This dialogue is between mortals and fundamental knowing awareness, between man as mortal and the awareness of the possibility of permanence or immortality. Face to face in dialogue man and the gods begin to change. Heidegger phrases this dialogue in these terms: the dialogue is between those who are gods (overcoming their godlessness) and man (overcoming his “dis-humanization” \( \text{[Vermenschung]} \) of being a subject and historical animal) as the origin of their holding sway \( \text{[Ursprung ihres Wesens]} \) in \( \text{Ereignis} \).\(^{634}\) In \( \text{Ereignis} \) man becomes aware of his mortality and is always drawn beyond his finitude. Thus,

\(^{634}\) Heidegger offers a number of other various possibilities of this might transpire, but he sees all possibilities arising into the same: the origin of the holding sway of man and beings. For our purposes here, it matters not how this is attained. \( \text{GA 66: 230/Mindfulness 204.} \)
fundamental knowing awareness traverses the region where the gods are still nameable in ordinary language, says Heidegger.

Western philosophy has described fundamental knowing awareness in terms of entities, as gods. But gods are not “highest,” as given by metaphysics, gods belong to the “Need” of Being, which reverberates in everything. Gods do not invent man and man does not invent gods. Rather, both are decided by Being, not as ruling over them, but they are drawn together in the Ereignis. Gods are not creators. Gods are not beings, to whom man gets close to or away from whom man falls. We now see these false conceptions of gods emerge from the false interpretations of Being as producer and Being as presence.\(^{635}\)

Instead, gods arise out of the truth of Being as presencing, but cannot come to language that emerges as metaphysical. Metaphysics always draws us to back to gods as beings. Rather, the god’s godhood arises only out of Being in Ereignis [aus dem Seyn nur die Götterung sich ereignet]. Out of the holding sway of Being, does their godhood arise.

What are gods?—Nothing that we have imagined. In my own imagination, and because they are imagined, they are wrongly conceived—gods are the possibilities of the holding sway of Being; and man must offer a voice for their arrival. In Heidegger’s words in the proper Being-historical thinking [seynsgeschichtlichen Denken], gods “merely name the empty site [leere Stelle] of the undeterminateness of godhood [der Unbestimmtheit der Gottschaft] that arises out of man’s lack of attunement

\(^{635}\) GA 66: 235-236/Mindfulness 209.
The gods emerge out of the beginning of the holding sway of Being.

But today understanding gods has become impossible, for either we resort to metaphysical conceptions or we simply posit their opposite. Both conceptions are still steeped within the framework of metaphysics. And so Heidegger sees the last god arriving, which draws with it the startling dismay of enframing and the possibility, full of danger, but also of the saving grace.

Having discussed gods as the last of the fourfold (the gathered-separateness of beings), we can now move toward Being as Saying as possibility. For this possibility to emerge, we must first look at the method of interpretation once more. Within interpretation the way-making of the Saying of Being unfolds as looking forward. The forward looking [Vor-sicht] emerges into the foreground of the Being as Saying.

To address this problematic Heidegger offers a seminar on Heraclitus with Eugen Fink at the University of Freiburg im Breisgau in the winter semester of 1966. Its prevailing theme is that of interpretation and its necessity in all avenues of thinking—thus, we have come full circle through all our topics. Interpretation seeks what is yet unsaid: it seeks Being as Saying in beings; it seeks Beings as Saying in man in a community. While interpretation seems non-philosophical, it is most philosophical and the only way toward Being and the relation between Being as Saying and beings. It is the movement between the “literal” and the “metaphorical,” for both are of metaphysics.

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637 This seminar is not part of series above, of which two thus far have been discussed.
638 The text of the seminar is published as a part of a much larger conceived project. It can be found in GA 15. The English translation by Charles H. Seibert can be found in Heraclitus Seminar (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University, 1993.) GA 15/“Heraclitus Seminar.”
Most importantly, it is the movement of Being as Saying as seen in the *Kehre* in *Seinsgeschichte*.

The second set of seminars centers on Heraclitus’ fragments and discusses the issue of identity. Identity seems to be at the heart of interpretation toward Being as Saying. How we envision identity contributes toward our interpretation of Being as Saying. Not as a thing, not as a pure movement, Being as Saying can be interpreted as having an identity. What is the identity of Being as Saying? To answer this question, we must first look closer to the proper meaning of identity.

Identity must be understood as a belonging-together [Zusammengehören].” It arises in the relatedness of “the one” [ἐν] and “the many” [τὰ ποιύντα]. The Heraclitus seminar has many participants; and thus the literary conceit of the “many” participants emerging into “one” interpretation lends itself well to Heidegger’s notion of the holding sway concealing/unconcealing of events as *Ereignis*. Roughly speaking, from the voices of many does one event emerge.

First, the holding sway concealing/revealing of events as *Ereignis* place us always already in transformation. Heraclitus’ thoughts on transformations [Wandlungen] of “fire” [πῦρ] or energy and “turning” [τροπὴ] then imply that everything goes over into everything; so that nothing retains the definiteness of its character but, following an indiscernible wisdom, moves itself throughout by opposites [Gegensätze]. Hence, representational thinking emerges out of logic of the principle of contradiction. And at the same time, for Hegel, identity emerges as the holding together of these opposites. We can see how Hegel arrives at his *Aufhebung*.

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639 GA 15: 23/“Heraclitus Seminar” 10.
640 GA 15: 24-25/“Heraclitus Seminar” 11.
Yet Heidegger and Fink explore how the above meaning is not entirely Heraclitus’ meaning. Rather than moving itself through opposites, there is a steering [Steuern] of movement. Fink comments that the transformations of fire are in some measure a circular movement that gets steered by lightening, specifically by the wise one [σοφόν]. The movement [Bewegung], in which everything moves throughout everything through opposites, is guided [gelenkt].

Second, Heraclitus knows neither of Hegelian opposites nor of dialectic. Heraclitus knows of flux, which is steered. The steering could appear violent or oppressive, but true steering emerges as non-violent steering.641 Heidegger holds that we, like Being, are permanently set in motion and thus, we are caught in the hermeneutical circle and at the same time are being steered. We are in motion and are steered. Between metaphorical and literal language, Heidegger sees man as always already in transformation. The transformation occurs in part by our interpretation. But more so, the transformation is steered by Being as Saying in Ereignis, a way-making [Be-wegung] unfolding in all beings in all times and places.

Now that we have engaged what Heidegger means by interpretation and identity. We see Heidegger’s interest moving toward place, for identity and interpretation is always situated. And so Heidegger becomes intrigued again with “place” during these last years. His third Le Thor seminar in 1969 reviews the site of Ereignis, man rooted in a place. Heidegger notices how meaning [Sinn], truth [Wahrheit] and place [Ort (τόπος)] are three steps along the way of thinking. These steps succeed one another.642 For Heidegger meaning [Bedeutung] signifies “the turn” [die Kehre] to openness of

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641 GA 15: 24-25/”Heraclitus Seminar” 11.
642 GA 15: 344/Four Seminars 47.
being itself, rather than the openness of Dasein in regard to this openness of being [*Offenheit des Daseins*], in which thinking always more decisively turns to Being as Being [*entschiedener dem Sein als Sein zuwendet*]. Ereignis is the manifestation of Being in history as openness. But presently, the more important question for Heidegger is what binds [Verbindende] meaning and truth as unconcealment. What binds them is the ontological difference as manifested by Ereignis.

We have already seen Heidegger hold Being as nothing [*Sein:Nichts*], but now Heidegger takes specific aim at the binding aspect. For Hegel it is *Aufhebung* and unites Being with its antipode [Entgegengesetzte] of consciousness. For Hegel, then, Being is the moment of the absolute alienation of the absolute. According to Heidegger language and its conception is what leads Hegel to this untenable position. Language is no longer able to reach philosophy. The lack of dialogue between language and its use is troubling for Heidegger.

Marxism knows of these perplexities, and claims that philosophers have only interpreted the world [*die Welt nur verschieden interpretiert*], but the real issue is to transform it [*verändern*]. But Heidegger sees the binding factor between the world and philosophy as language. Being as Saying transforms man when man is open to its Silence and draws man near. In Ereignis man is transformed and his meditative language follows suit. For Heidegger, language and interpretation do indeed transform the world,

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643 GA 15: 344/*Four Seminars* 47. This has been known for quite some time in our work since *Being and Time*.
644 GA 15: 348/*Four Seminars* 49.

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but not in a Marxist way.\textsuperscript{646} Being as Saying draws man near and transforms man in man’s place of dwelling.

Heidegger explains the situation in these terms: “Ereignis of being [is the] condition [Bedingung] for the arrival of beings: Being lets beings presence [das Sein läßt das Seiende anwesend].”\textsuperscript{647} Being allows beings to be present, while Being appears as absent. And so Heidegger writes it thusly, “Sein: Nichts: Selbes;” Being is not alienated from the world in varying ways as in Hegel and Marx, but Being is identical with “nothing” as the Same.

Unlike Hegel and Marx, Being for Heidegger does not alienate man. Being, though manifesting itself, does so with the help of man. Being needs the finitude of beings, for man is the placeholder of the nothing [\textit{Der Mensch ist der Platzhalter des Nichts}].\textsuperscript{648} As placeholder, man doesn’t add anything to Being, but clears all other beings so that the space is left free for Being as Saying to draw near as Silence. Man is not alienated from Being, but drawn ever closer in Silence.

Continuing to distance himself from prevailing philosophical methods, Heidegger offers his last lectures in this series in September 6-8, 1973 in Zähringen, Germany.\textsuperscript{649} In this seminar Heidegger continues his onslaught against Hegelianism, but also takes aim at Husserl as being part of that self-same metaphysical project. Husserl’s categorical intuition is itself yet another positing of Being, insists Heidegger. Hegel and Marx are trapped in a type of transcendence while Husserl is trapped in immanence. All are trapped.

\textsuperscript{646} \textit{GA} 15: 352/\textit{Four Seminars} 52.
\textsuperscript{647} \textit{GA} 15: 363/\textit{Four Seminars} 59.
\textsuperscript{648} \textit{GA} 15: 370/\textit{Four Seminars} 63.
\textsuperscript{649} \textit{GA} 15: 373/\textit{Four Seminars} 64.
Heidegger, on the other hand, offers neither realism nor idealism, but the openness of *Ereignis*. Rather than a trapped philosophy, Heidegger offers a philosophy that is open. Hegel thinks Absolute Spirit as drawing all things unto itself. Husserl thinks within the Ur-structure of consciousness and constrains all matters to consciousness. Marxism thinks on the basis of world production: social production of society wherein society produces itself and the self-production of the human being as a social being. In each case man is trapped in a closed process.

While Hegel and Husserl seemed less influential during Heidegger’s lifetime, Marxism was still popular. Self-production of man and society plainly prevails. In Heidegger’s eyes, whether popular or not, all three approaches appear as inadequate. They are inadequate for they do not fully account for the possibility of Being as Saying manifesting itself through man and beings.

Heidegger offers neither Hegelian Absolute transcendence, nor Husserlian solipsism. Still less does Heidegger offer Marxist social production. Rather, Heidegger offers that the self-production of man raises the danger of self-destruction [*die Gefahr der Selbstzertörung hervorbringt*]. Amid such danger man is brought to startled dismay of his situation. He is brought to Silence. And man is drawn closer by Being’s Silence. Being draws man; man responds to the Silence and gives it voice. Such is the dialogue between Being’s originary language and mans’ responding, ordinary language. The communication always occurs in a gathering/separating, concealing/unconcealing, Being as Saying as *Be-wëgen in Ereignis*—unfolding.

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650 GA 15: 378/Four Seminars 73.
Let us conclude our thoughts on this period with Heidegger’s poem, “Sprache.”

Written in 1973, Heidegger offered it to a friend a few weeks before his death. We could construe its meaning as the abiding way for his life-work:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sprache(^{651})</th>
<th>Language</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wann werden Wörter</td>
<td>When will words</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wieder Wort?</td>
<td>Again be words?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wann weilt der Wind weisender Wende?</td>
<td>When will the wind of a pointing turn abide?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Language, Being, man and language: Heidegger draws us to back to Seinsgeschichte in the Kehre. As we are moved toward Being as Silence, our words can once again speak, when the turning abides.

We have traveled quite some distance with Heidegger; and yet we have found only what was before us from the beginning. From the beginning we saw the path of originary language as way-making and way-making as the originary language, “be-wëgen als Sage” has led us back to Being. And so we conclude this chapter with the main thesis that unfolding is that, which is most originary in language’s “process” of communicating.

Both the way of Being and the steps toward Being were explored in the works treating language between 1949 and 1976; we investigated what this unfolding might entail as Seinsgeschichte. In Ereignis Being is manifested with man’s help: Being as Saying has drawn man. In the Kehre we see that the way is way-making; we are drawn as we remain open to Being’s abiding Silence. Sein: Nichts: Selbe. Man, open to Being’s abiding presencing, is open to new possibilities in looking ahead, most especially in the danger of enframing.

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\(^{651}\) This poem was sent spontaneously by Heidegger to Raymond Paniker of the University of California at Santa Barbara under the date of March 1976. Its text is contained in GA 13: 229. The translation is nicely rendered into English by Thomas Sheehan. This version is found in Philosophy Today XX, 1976 (2/4) 291.
In our next chapter we will discuss three major paradigms of Heidegger’s notion of Being and language, then the following chapter will look ahead to a new possibility of Being and language, envisioning Being as Saying as way-making and unfolding though all beings as language. As such these chapters comprise the second phase of our project. While the first part attempted neither to present Heidegger’s work in order to disagree or agree, but instead it was an attempt\textsuperscript{652} to allow the works to appear as they are. Our second part pointedly discusses this very issue of hermeneutical influence.

\textsuperscript{652} The present author must admit that there can never be any description of another’s work without some subjective influence. One can still, nevertheless, attempt to minimize such effects. Confer with Paul Ricoeur, \textit{On Translation}, wherein he makes the claim that all translation is interpretation. Paul Ricouer, \textit{On Translation}, trans. Eileen Brennan (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006).
PART II

WIEDERHOLEN
CHAPTER SEVEN

Overgrown Paths

“The time of the ‘systems’ is over.”

In this chapter we will view three major Heideggerian paradigms and the implications of their systems on our topic of Being and language. These interpretations of Heidegger’s understanding of Being attempt to draw together all the various works of Heidegger into a coherent whole, whether as an explicit account or simply as a way of indexing the topic. We have outlined already the transcendental phenomenology of the first chapter, employed the destructive retrieval in the second chapter, and pondered meditative thinking of chapters three through six. Now we can begin to investigate what hermeneutic phenomenology might look like with Heidegger’s own works to guide us. By returning to Heidegger’s themes, we come to clarity on the entire project. Hence, we see the pertinence of this section “Wiederholen”—we repeat. More precisely in this chapter, we are now in a position to judge the effectiveness of paradigms by placing them beside Heidegger’s theme of Being’s showing itself as language.

Like any paradigm, Heideggerian paradigms give order and relation. As such, they lay before us the issue of hermeneutic structure as the focus of our concern. Whether the following three major paradigms of Heidegger’s pathway have hermeneutically framed the conversations of Heideggerian scholarship over the years is clear, whether they have done so properly is the issue of this chapter.

We list three paradigms here for the most part by their strongest proponent and label each according to its controlling thesis. What can be called the “existential phenomenological” approach is best exemplified by Thomas Langan. William Richardson proffers the “thought of Being”\(^\)\(^{654}\) model, and Joseph J. Kockelmans’ approach can best be described as the “many ways” theory. Each paradigm has certain supporting evidence within Heidegger’s works and often conveys the influences of its respective period.

Having written this, we likewise concur that each author had nothing but the highest regard for Heidegger and his work and attempted to convey this authentically, eruditely, and even tirelessly. In many ways these paradigms are indeed quite commendable and helpful, for paradigms allow others who may not be as well-versed with Heidegger to grasp him. Paradigms provide others with an entrée, which otherwise would leave them unable to grapple with Heidegger’s terminology and meaning. Like all paradigms these three sift through a vast amount of information and regularize it. They cut out a way through the maze, a path through the forest of works. As ways, they can reveal.

\(^{654}\) The “thought of Being” model is still quite popular and used widely as a means toward understanding and explicating Heidegger’s works. For instance, see Theodore Kisiel, *Heidegger’s Way of Thought: Critical and Interpretive Signposts*. Ed. Alfred Denker and Marion Heinz (New York, NY: Continuum, 2002).
On the other hand, these paradigms can conceal as much as, or more than, they reveal. In their attempt to draw together, they highlight certain aspects over others. One interpretation might highlight man’s important role, but Being is seen mostly, if not entirely so, from man’s line of sight. This, we argue is the shortcoming of the early portrayals of Heidegger as an existential phenomenologist. The second paradigm attempts to move toward thinking of Being as the way, in order to move beyond the shortcomings of the existential phenomenological paradigm. This model, then, needs to explain the divergence of Heidegger’s approaches. Subsequently, this model bifurcates Heidegger’s work into Heidegger I and Heidegger II. As such, its shortfall lies in its inability to distinguish sufficiently the “two Heideggers.” The third paradigm avoids the meta-narrative approach of the first two altogether and opts instead to depict Heidegger as proffering many ways to Being. While citing as support Heidegger’s own phrase contained in Klostermann’s *Gesamtausgabe*: “Wege, nicht Werke,” this paradigm doesn’t attempt to gather these many ways into a coherent whole. Rather, simply it offers many ways; its effect could mislead the reader to conclude that Heidegger cared little about any one concern. This belies Heidegger’s explicit and continual single-minded concern for the *Seinsfrage*. Each of these shortcomings conceals Heidegger’s concern regarding the question of Being such that it becomes not a way, but a worn out path that leads away from, not toward, Heidegger’s way. Hence, the title of our chapter indicates both that these paths have grown over Heidegger’s way and they are outmoded and in time will be infrequently used.655

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655 While we noted that these ways lead us away from Being and thus will be discarded, this is not to say that these approaches are not still readily available. Countless Heideggerians and anti-Heideggerians have employed any one of these major emphases in their work: they either emphasize a simple phenomenology, or overemphasize structure over content or content to the denial of structure. Most interesting have been
For our specific topic regarding Being and language, we have seen how Being as Saying unfolds; it illustrates Heidegger’s facility to gather together creatively all the facets of Being and language while maintaining his insight that Being “has” a history, *Seinsgeschichte*. This inability to depict both the way and the steps is how the above paradigms stumble.

To appreciate fully this chapter, “Overgrown Paths” and the next, “Being as Saying,” it might help the reader to recall Thomas Kuhn’s *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. While John Horgan coined the phrase “paradigm shift,” Kuhn draws our attention to the fact that theories do indeed affect the way we process information, or, as he claims in *The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change*, “the criteria of choice … function not as rules, which determine choice, but as values, which influence it [the choice].” Criteria by which we choose influence our choices. From Kuhn’s directive, we look at the theory of the paradigm in our study of Heidegger’s Being and language in order to scrutinize our choices and how they lead, or mislead, us along the way.

*Scientific Revolutions* argues that the development of scientific theory does not emerge from the linear acquisition of facts, but rather from changing intellectual circumstances and possibilities. As such, the sequencing of scientific paradigms are non-linear. Paradigms shift dramatically when a new gestalt is grasped suddenly as an attempt to include seemingly anomalous information. One should always judge the

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French philosophers into our current epoch. We shall argue in chapter nine that they too go lead away from the question of Being and, for this reason, go astray as viable philosophical pathways. Within the parameters of these extremes, possible avenues are explored in chapter ten.

helpfulness of a paradigm by its anomaly, for the outlying fact often points to a failed paradigm that is not fully articulating the system.

Applying this relationship of paradigm toward our present topic, we can understand how paradigms have developed in Heideggerian scholarship; but more importantly, we can understand how those paradigms are part of the intellectual, cultural milieu of the time. Consequently, the understanding of Heidegger’s question of Being has shifted in fits and starts. Because language seems to fit poorly in these models of Heideggerian thought, language fits the role of anomaly in Heideggerian scholarship.

It could be argued that Heidegger isn’t presenting a science or a theory. True, this is indeed the case. Still, in “Science and reflection” (1954) Heidegger addresses this question in a fuller fashion, for we live in a period in which everything is viewed through the lens and the language of science. Heidegger asks whether science is the theory of the real. To engage this question Heidegger asks what the word, “theory” means? He notes that the word “theory” stems from the Greek verb “Θεωρεῖν,” which grew out of the coalescing of two root words, “θεά,” [the outward aspect] as in the English word, theatre, and “ὁράω” [to view something attentively].659 “Θεωρεῖν” grows out of a phenomenon that is characterized by an attentive looking at the outward aspect. A theory, then, has the characteristic of looking at the outward aspect. As one looks at the outward aspect soon the question arises regarding the “contents” of the inward. In counter-distinction to the outward aspect, there must be an interior aspect that could be called the “real” or the “ground.”

659 GA 7: 46/“Science and Reflection,” Question Concerning Technology 163. For our discussion here, we do not draw out all of the implication of θεά and its relation to the word, “goddess,” i.e., that our looking is a response to the goddess already looking out at us. Nor do we engage in Heidegger’s connection with the goddess of truth. Simply our point here is to highlight for the reader that “Θεωρεῖν” grows out of a phenomenon that is characterized by an attentive looking at the outward aspect.
Heidegger concludes that although a scientific theory may be helpful, it must always be noted that science has its “ground” in something more primordial. Science as a theory of the real is a way toward Being, if indeed Being is to be sought. But Being is not simply the ground for Heidegger, but the groundless ground. Moreover, the distinction between inner and outer is part of the problem. Therefore, these paradigms are helpful only as much as they convey Ereignis, i.e., allow us to view attentively the outward aspect of Being, in their respective periods, as Being as Saying in relation Being as it shows itself as itself. Phenomenology, then for Heidegger, is clarifying the concept of scientific method; it sets aside the modernist need to bifurcate Being. This is not to say that phenomenology is a science. Rather, it is a way.

Existential Phenomenological Approach

The earliest period of Heideggerian scholarship emphasized Dasein as a way toward Being with language as a small part of the overall project. When Dasein becomes the centerpiece of the model, the outcome is too humanistic replete with unique existential and phenomenological terminology. Being and Time is the source of Heideggerian phenomenology. We see these qualities in Langan’s early existential paradigm of Heidegger. Present were strong tinges of a dark mood, looming from an interpretation of Heidegger’s Nichts, often seen as Nietzschean nihilism. “Being-untot-
death” as Dasein’s destiny burdened the text with a sense of foreboding. Perhaps it was
the post-WWII angst that colored later interpretations of the 1927 text. Certainly
existentialists like Jean-Paul Sartre were influenced by Heidegger’s *Being and Time*. It
would be uncertain, though, whether Langan’s existential interpretation was more
influenced by Sartre or Heidegger.

While serious scholars no longer hold much stock in Langan’s paradigm as
illustrative of Heidegger’s entire project, it still influences pervasively the general
consciousness of who Heidegger is and what Heidegger’s philosophy is about. One only
needs to glance over any undergraduate reading list; if one finds any Heidegger texts
therein, it would be that of *Being and Time*. If one were to ask a layman to place a label
on Heidegger’s work, more often than not, the label would be that of “Existential.”

Langan describes Heidegger’s work in precisely that light: an existential
phenomenology. Langan wishes to place Heidegger’s work into the model of unfolding
existentialism and how that differs from the Western philosophical tradition thus far. He
organizes the book accordingly; “The Existential Analytic” and “Recalling the Historical
Destiny of the Western Tradition” are its two major divisions. The first draws out the
structural aspects of Dasein and the second shows how this had been missed in history
and how this should be viewed currently. Langan’s major thesis states that these two
sections coincide with the project of *Being and Time* and encompass the entirety of
Heidegger’s project. Langan reports that while the project was unfinished in *Being and
Time*, Heidegger never abandoned the project. Through this claim one is easily led to
believe that the entirety of Heidegger’s project was formulated in *Being and Time*, yet
simply not completed.

The question one might have asked Langan is whether *Being and Time* does contain the whole of Heidegger’s project. If the answer were yes, then why would eighty-some following volumes be needed to complete Heidegger’s project? If the answer were no, then one could ask Langan what different ways do the later works have which *Being and Time* did not foresee. The answer, whether yes or no, depends precisely on what is meant by the whole of Heidegger’s project.

Heidegger himself describes the shortcomings of *Being and Time* and its inability to reach Being, his ongoing project of *Seinsfrage*. Heidegger writes in *Being and Time*: “Basically, all ontology, no matter how rich and firmly compacted a system of categories it has as its disposal [Verfügen], remains blind and perverted from its ownmost aim, if it has not first adequately clarified the meaning of Being, and conceived this clarification as its fundamental task.” If Langan meant that the Heideggerian project is larger than what *Being and Time* could accomplish as ontology, he would be correct. But one is directed by Langan to conclude that Heidegger’s project is fundamental ontology as an existential phenomenology. And yet it is Heidegger himself who protested to such a label; as Joseph Kockelmans writes: human existence is “neither the primary nor the ultimate philosophical issue.”

As evidence of our point—soon after *Being and Time* Heidegger moved away from the individual’s importance in the question of Being [*Seinsfrage*], unseating Dasein,

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664 Some of the shortcomings of *Being and Time* pertinent to our thesis and mentioned by Heidegger include: originary language as *Rede* (adjusted in GA 12, 1950s into “Being as Saying” as the originary language); the foundation of truth lies in Dasein’s existence (amended into Being is the ultimate foundation of truth in GA 9: “Brief über den “Humanismus,”” 1946; and the relationship between Being and finitude (modified into the “ontological difference” in GA 24: *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, 1927 and in GA 9: “Vom Wesen des Grundes,” 1929); logos as inherently apophantic (transformed into apophantic secondarily GA 9: “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit,” 1930 and in GA 3: *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, 1929).

665 GA 2: 15/Being and Time 31.

if you will. In its place he looks as those regions surrounding Dasein, like language and earth, which are interrelated in such a way that man is not completely in control of them. As Heidegger’s enigmatic phrase so aptly portrays: “Language is the house of Being.”

Man is not the master of language; or, as is the case with *Being and Time* discourse is part of the care structure of Dasein. Langan, however, describes this relationship of man and language in a way that retains man’s sole responsibility. He writes: “The poet and the thinker share the responsibility of ‘Bringing Being to house’ in forging language.” Responsibility does lie partially at the feet of the poet and thinker, indeed, but Being first must draw them near Being as Silence, from which they forge language. Langan mistakenly understands this responsibility of bearing language primarily as Dasein’s responsibility.

Likewise, in the *Beiträge* Heidegger illustrates the shortcomings of a fundamental ontology; ontology needs a “ground” as well. Rather than grounding it upon another ground, which in turn still would need to be grounded, Heidegger decides against the way of grounding or causing. Instead, Heidegger holds that such a trajectory is part of the first beginning, i.e., Western philosophy; it leads to nihilism. We must leap toward another beginning: nihilism is not nothing, but Nothing is. Between theses two beginnings, Heidegger sees Being emerging as the abyss of Silence. The Silence of Being shows itself as *Ereignis*; included in the *Ereignis*, man is drawn near and he hears

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668 *Meaning of Heidegger* 111.
669 As such, this paradigm leads the reader to understand the search for Being simply as one of Dasein struggling to be authentic. Thus, Theodor Adorno’s complaint against Heidegger depicts Heidegger’s work as a fatuous attempt at authenticity. Adorno claims that Heidegger is simply avoiding abstraction through a new mystification of the relation between language and its contents. While Adorno is mistaken in this charge of mysticism against Heidegger; his assessment illustrates well the cracks in Langan’s existential phenomenological paradigm. See Theodor W. Adorno, *The Jargon of Authenticity*, trans. Knut Tarnowski and Frederic Will (Evanston: Northwestern University, 1973) 96.
beyng [Seyn] as Silence. In the Beiträge man is not so much the discloser/concealer, but more so the site of disclosure of Being.

These two paragraphs are sufficient evidence to argue that the project of fundamental ontology of Being and Time cannot comprise the whole of Heidegger’s project. Fundamental ontology is too narrow to encompass Ereignis. Rather, Ereignis appropriates us and our humanistic ventures; Ereignis encompasses fundamental ontology. Certainly this is not to say that Being and Time and fundamental ontology are not part of the Heideggerian project; they are indeed. Being and Time, though, is not the entirety of Heidegger’s project; Heidegger moves fundamental ontology toward Saying as Being.

Let us examine two examples within Langan’s book in order to illustrate his thesis that fundamental ontology is the whole of Heidegger’s project, and thereby distorts other themes. First, the “fourfold” is gerrymandered into the three ek-stases of the care structure of Dasein in a way that can only indicate that Langan views all of Heidegger’s later work as a fuller explanation of Being and Time.

A case in point, Langan uses “Bauen Wohnen Denken” (1951) to discuss his notions of the fourfold [das Geviert]. Langan describes the fourfold quite adequately until he claims that three of the four elements in the gathering-as-separate of the fourfold can be identified as elements present in prior analyses of extases in Being and Time. It is the question of the “gods” which troubles him. He elaborates: “But what of the fourth element, the Göttlichen? Are there not but three extases possible in a

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670 Recall our discussion of “Building Dwelling Thinking” in the Chapter 4, “From λόγος toward Being:Saying,” wherein man’s mastery over language is called by Heidegger a “betriebene Verkehrung dieses Herrschaftsverhältnis” [subversion of dominance] 137-141.
671 Meaning of Heidegger 120-128.
Langan concludes that fourth must be something more, the whole of Being, and calls it mysterious. Langan’s phrasing leads the reader to understand the fourfold as issuing out of Dasein’s care structure of existentiality-facticity-being-fallen [Existenzität-Faktizität-Verfallenheit]. While one could discuss the virtues of Langan’s approach with mortals and the world, one must question his description of the earth. Langan describes earth as that encounter with Dasein. Yet, the earth is earth as the very way that Dasein is not as its encounter or its origin. Langan’s formulation would be problematic, for it would be tantamount to say that even the earth has its origin in Dasein.\[673\]

One might defend Langan’s approach as reasonable since he had no access to the Beiträge; for it is in the Beiträge wherein this relationship of the fourfold is best clarified. This seems a fair defense. Yet, other works of Heidegger available to Langan have described both Ereignis and the fourfold. Among those works, the following are listed in Langan’s bibliography: “Zur Seinsfrage” (1956), which contains a treatment of “das Geviert;” “Alétheia,” (1943) includes Ereignis in its discussion; “Das Ding” (1950) discusses “das Geviert;” “Bauen Wohnen Denken” (1951) outlines “das Geviert,” as Langan notes; “Die Frage nach der Technik” (1949-50) has a treatment of Ereignis; “Der Ursprung der Kunstwerkes” (1935-1936) includes a discussion including both Ereignis and “das Geviert.” In none of those works does Heidegger describe them in terms of the Dasein’s care structure. From this evidence, it seems very likely that Langan read these

\[672\] Meaning of Heidegger 123.

\[673\] Langan’s discussion of earth always places earth as an encounter with Dasein. He writes: “The fundamental exstasis of the earth is the present of that which is present, the now of the fundamental encounter with the things-that-are.” Meaning of Heidegger 122. The difficulty of such a conception is that earth by definition is always in relation to Dasein. Heidegger would never deny such a relationship, but earth for Heidegger is that which is first and foremost fundamentally outside of Dasein’s control. Langan underestimates this latter point.
works through the lens of *Being and Time* without realizing that they contain discussions on “das Geviert” beyond the purview of *Being and Time*.674

Our second example is more problematic for Langan’s model. Langan claims in chapter 6 of his book, “The Essence of Truth,” that all paths of Heidegger’s phenomenology lead to the essence of truth.675 We shall not argue here676 against the claim that all of Heidegger’s work is phenomenological; however, we shall argue simply against the claim that all paths lead to the essence of truth. For in the next chapter we shall argue conversely that all paths, including the essence of truth lead Heidegger to Being as Saying. Here we shall simply proffer a counterexample. The *Beiträge* is certainly a good case in point. But let us proffer instead those works of Heidegger Langan himself cites as proof against his model.

While “*Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*” (1930), *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (1929), “*Vom Wesen des Grundes*” (1929), and “*Was ist Metaphysik?*” (1927) certainly seem to illustrate Langan’s point well, one must notice that these works do not include the whole of Heidegger’s works since Langan published his work in 1959. Why does he narrow Heidegger oeuvre? Furthermore, all of Langan’s citations in his sixth chapter emerge surprisingly from only one of the above four works, “*Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*.” Simply by the brunt of evidence, it would imply that this period, even this single work, is the whole of Heidegger’s work. But that simply is not the case, for Heidegger himself questions the adequacy of the term, “essence” in relation to Being and truth.

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675 *Meaning of Heidegger* 130.
676 In our next chapter we shall take up the issue of what the later Heidegger means by “phenomenological.”
Perhaps Langan means to claim that the essence of truth is Being; this would soothe qualms about Langan’s missing the fact the Heidegger himself said that Seinsfrage is his concern. But this too would be problematic. For Heidegger through his work, Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, finds the identity of truth with Being to be an outcome of Kantian conceptual framework. To claim that the essence of truth is Being is simply to add one further metaphysical step, with the result that Being is truth. For this reason Heidegger strives vigorously to supplant metaphysics with a fundamental ontology. We cannot equate the essence of truth with Being.

Let us be more careful in our analysis; we shall grant Langan the claim that all Heideggerian phenomenology leads to the essence of truth, if he includes the following rejoinder, “which in turn, leads to Being.” Being is Heidegger’s question. Is not Being and Time and the early works all concerned with the question of Being? Heidegger, in these works, explicitly holds Being as his central focus. On the contrary, it is the question of truth in the history of Western philosophy that has led us away from the question of Being. Is not Langan leading us down the path of Western philosophy?

One can easily provide other counterexamples of many available works of Heidegger between 1930 and the publication of Langan’s work in 1959 to illustrate Heidegger’s concern for the question of Being. For example, Der Satz vom Grund (1955-56) is a direct discussion on the relationship between reason and Being. As given within this work, the Leibnizian principle of reason: “Nothing is without reason” must itself have a principle underlying it. Heidegger concludes that between the philosophy of this first beginning and the philosophy of the other beginning—which states the principle thusly, “Nothing is – without reason”—lies the groundless abyss as the source of all
beings, including that from which reason ensues. Rather than searching for the essence of truth as the ground of reason, *Der Satz vom Grund* looks to Being: Nothing, which is.

Likewise, any of Heidegger’s works included in *Unterwegs zur Sprache* lead the reader not to the essence of truth, but to the essence of language. But the essence of language is Being as Saying, or perhaps at least ρόγος. Truth always emerges from this more originary relationship of Being heard as Silence. On the other hand, propositional language, logic, and truth lead to Being as the highest Being of Western philosophy. Thus, Heidegger’s discovery in *Unterwegs zur Sprache* is indeed that the essence of truth flows out from the essence of language, not as would an existentialist would hold. An existential would understand that the essence of language flows out of the essence of truth, which, in turn is derived by humanity.

In conclusion, Langan’s understanding of Heidegger as an existential phenomenologist is a paradigm that constrains too narrowly the meaning of what Heidegger has written. It doesn’t include the anomaly of language and too heavily relies on Western philosophical conceptual tradition to describe what phenomenology is. It does accurately convey the mindset of 1950s Heideggerian scholarship and leads toward another mindset: the thought of Being. The thought of Being model quickly becomes the new paradigm of the 1960s.

**Thinking of Being Model**

It is toward this paradigm of the 1960s we set our critical eye. William Richardson took the challenge of engaging a greater swath of Heidegger’s writing to heart. With a stir, Richardson’s new paradigm entered into Heideggerian scholarship.
Richardson’s breakthrough displaced the centrality of Dasein for Being, moving from a phenomenological mindset toward a thoughtful one, from phenomenology toward thought.

Rightly this paradigm placed Being, not Dasein, at its center. For this reason, Richardson needed to account for the divergence in Heidegger’s work, from Dasein toward Being. Richardson famously developed the explanatory account of “Heidegger I and II.” “Heidegger I” is concerned with the Dasein-centered *Being and Time* and related works, the phenomenology of which Langan was so fond. “Heidegger II” is concerned with the later works of Heidegger which focus on the thought of Being. Interestingly, the works Richardson cites in his book are not much different from those which Langan cites and the major divisions of both are remarkably similar.

How did it arise that with similar sources Richardson and Langan arrived at different paradigms? It wasn’t a fact or a statement in Heidegger’s work, but a movement of thought that redirected Richardson. Richardson noticed a shift in Heidegger’s thought over time. With Heidegger’s written assistance, Richardson labeled the trajectory of Heidegger’s work as one of a way of “through … toward.” Never simply stationary existential phenomenology, the “through … toward” trajectory led Richardson to a new paradigm that incorporated change.

The challenge for Richardson’s paradigm was locating the source of the change. How did the different trajectories in the “two Heideggers” arise? Controversial to this

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day, Richardson’s model held this change as “Kehre,” the term Heidegger meant as Seinsgeschichte. *Kehre*, for Richardson, was unfortunately the way of unifying two types of Heideggerian philosophy.

This strong, new paradigm expanded the first existential phenomenological one toward one of “thinking of being,” but now with an unmistakable unity among the works. Richardson’s book was aptly named, with Heidegger’s assistance, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*. Its meaning was that Heidegger moved through phenomenology toward thought.

The book is rich in detail, extensive in scope, and well-argued. The book is not simple to read, but neither is it easy to lay aside. Indeed it is worth its heft. It has three divisions (or two divisions with a section to unify): “From there to Being,” “Reversal,” and “From Being to There.” We are clear from these division titles, which parts are known subsequently as Heidegger I (“From there to Being”), the linking chapter

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678 Heidegger explains in an elegant letter to Richardson, now set as the preface to Richardson’s own work: “… *Die Kehre spielt im Sachverhalt selbst. Sie ist weder von mir erfunden, noch betrifft sie nur mein Denken.*” [The turning plays in the matter itself. Neither did I invent it nor does it affect merely my thought.] “Vorwort,” William, S.J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003) xix.1-3. In the same letter to Richardson Heidegger explains: “Das Denken der Kehre ist eine Wendung in meinem Denken.” [The thinking “of” *Kehre* is a change in my thought.] xvi-ii. The point of emphasis is that the *Kehre* itself is not the operative change here, but rather Heidegger’s thinking on the *Kehre* has changed. I conclude from this that awareness of the *Kehre* is what distinguishes Heidegger from all previous philosophers; his thinking on the *Kehre* has indeed shifted over the years. I call Heidegger’s shift in thinking, following Heidegger, “wendung.” More fundamentally the *Kehre* affects Heidegger’s “wendung,” but not only Heidegger’s thought. *Kehre* as seen in Ereignis appropriates, and thus, changes man. As I have argued earlier, Seinsgeschichte is the *Kehre* in the sense that Being has a history, contrary to Western philosophy’s concept that Being is the timeless Supreme Being. Seeing this, Heidegger is changed. See GA 11: 149-150.

I prefer translating *Die Kehre* as “the Turning” in distinction to Richardson’s “the reversal,” or even to the more common, “the Turn,” for “the Turning” has fuller connotations of a verbal noun, of those crucial qualities of Being Heidegger later writes of in *Identity and Difference*.

679 This ingenious phrase was Heidegger’s suggestion to Richardson. Richardson’s working title was “From Phenomenology to Thought.” Never a movement of location, “from … to,” this deft phrase “through … toward” indicates a movement that is not spatial, never fully leaving one vector and never fully arriving at the second—truly a Heideggerian trajectory.
(“Reversal”), and Heidegger II (“From Being to There’’). The issues and linking of the “two Heideggers” for Richardson is a fundamental methodological question.

The content of that methodology for Richardson lies in the following major question: What does Heidegger mean by the thinking of Being? For Richardson the search moves from fundamental ontology to the search for authentic thought. Sifting through many of Heidegger’s works, noting that Heidegger speaks of it in many ways, Richardson opts to define authentic thought as “foundational thought” [das wesentliche Denken].

“Foundational thought” for Richardson is not the thought of metaphysics. Tracing thought from the philosophers before Plato and Aristotle, then moving toward Descartes, Richardson concludes the thought of metaphysics is one of transcendence, “‘going beyond’ the human orbit.” This is quite consistent with Heidegger’s analysis in this period, who explains transcendence in these terms: “For Greek thinking, being that is at rest remains purely distinguished (different) from changeable beings. This difference between being and beings then appears, when seen starting from beings and moving toward being [vom Seienden zum Sein hin erblickt], as transcendence, i.e., as the metaphysical.”

“Foundational thought” is not separated from beings. Conversely for Richardson, “Foundational thought” overcomes metaphysics, technicity, logic and humanism. The meaning of “overcoming,” for Richardson is the

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680 Richardson, “Introduction,” Through Phenomenology to Thought 16. We should note that Heidegger in Mindfulness uses this phrase to describe the gods. See GA 66: 229/Mindfulness 203. Emad and Kalary translate the phrase “das wesentliche Denken” as “fundamental knowing awareness.” While the reader may not appreciate fully the distinction between the two translations, we must highlight the fact that Richardson’s translation places “das wesentliche Denken” within the realm of thinking—it is thought. Emad and Kalary place “das wesentliche Denken” prior to thought in the realm of awareness. We opt for the later alternative as more indicative of Heidegger’s later work, while Richardson’s translation is indicative of Heidegger’s early work up to and including the works of the 1940s.

same as the meaning of “overcoming” for Heidegger; “overcoming” means stepping back. It is pre-subjective, pre-representative, non-logical, and even pre-rational; foundational thought allows beings to be.\textsuperscript{682} It tries to meditate Being as the process of truth and is brought about by the nature of man conceived as ek-sistence. As such the nature of man conceived as ek-sistence has the open-ness of the process of \( \dot{\alpha} - \lambda \dot{\eta} \dot{\theta} \dot{e} \dot{\iota} \alpha \), which is foundational thought. The conclusion of process of ek-sistence resides in a place for Richardson, and he calls it the “there” \([Da]\) of Being. Thus, the significance of the word, “Dasein,” becomes apparent to us.

To understand foundational thought via Richardson, then, one must explore what the relationship between Being and its “there” is. The reader should be aware of a latent tri-partite division which Richardson’s analysis develops: Being, “there” and the relationship of “is.” Let us focus on the problematic relationship of mediation first. Can “is” mediate between “Being” and “there,” when the “is” is Being itself? Thus, “fundamental thought” is portrayed in terms of mediation, between Being and its there. But our analysis overemphasizes and perhaps distorts Richardson’s point.

More accurately, Being and “there” are a cor-relation. The tri-partite division is muted somewhat. Richardson explains that Being maintains a primacy over its “there,” yet Being needs its “there” in order to be itself. While basically correct, the final phrase should be nuanced in light of our analysis of the \textit{Beiträge} section “Beyng:” Being, which has a history, has its “there” to show itself, yet beyng does not have a history nor does it have a “there.” Rather, beyng \([Seyn]\) shows itself as concealment. Being \([Sein]\) is the history, or the revealment of that concealment. Beyng is the ground in as much as it is the abgrund, the non-ground. Beyng needs Da-sein in order for Da-sein to near the

\textsuperscript{682} Richardson, “Introduction,” \textit{Through Phenomenology to Thought} 19-20.
ground that is drawn near to the abground, for out of this relation the gods and Da-sein are gathered.\textsuperscript{683} Between Being and beyng, Being as Saying manifests itself through the fourfold. The point of section 267 is the question of the possibility of what Being is before its manifestation.\textsuperscript{684} It is nothing.

\footnote{GA 65: 470-471/Contributions 331-332. The reader should also recall that Beyng is Being without a history in section 267 of the \textit{Beiträge}.}

Richard Rojcewicz draws an interesting question regarding the “there.” Basically, he disagrees with the distinction that I draw regarding Being/beyng and its relation to the “there.” As evidence he argues rightly that Heidegger calls the “there” the ground of Beyng. Rojcewicz concludes that Dasein is the ground of beyng, and argues for even a stronger conception of Dasein than the Dasein as the “there” in \textit{Being and Time}. This last conclusion is what I respectfully disagree. While the “there” certainly has Da-sein as the site of the manifestation of \textit{Ereignis}, the manifestation “occurs” through the fourfold, not simply through Dasein alone. Indeed we have seen that Heidegger himself employs the hyphenation distinction of Dasein/Da-sein to illustrate what we have called the de-centering of Dasein. In Richardson’s conception, Dasein is the ground of Being; in our conception the fourfold is the site of the manifestation of beyng, not the ground of beyng. Beyng is the unground of Being and Da-sein is part of the fourfold. To take a stance that Dasein is the ground of beyng would contradict Heidegger’s first sentence in section 267, “Beyng:” “Beyng is \textit{appropriation}. This word \textit{[appropriation]} names beyng in thinking and grounds beyng’s essential swaying in its own jointure.” Thus, appropriation as unground grounds beyng in thinking and its holding sway. Thus, I argue that appropriation in later Heidegger takes a central position while Dasein holds a lesser position, for appropriation needs not simply Dasein, but also needs the gods, mortals, earth and sky of the fourfold.

The “Grounding” section at first might seem to corroborate Rojcewicz’s point and thus support Richardson. In that section Da-sein is offered as the ground of beyng. This section engages in the question to what extent does Dasein appear as the ground as the \textit{terminus ad quem} of the \textit{Ereignis}. All that is manifested needs ultimately to have one “that which sees the manifestation.” In that sense Da-sein is the ground. But the Being/beyng distinction and its relation to the “there” is far more than its final arrival point.

This question of \textit{terminus ad quem}, is the philosophical direction, wherein I see Rojcewicz following Richardson are led more to the philosophy of the first beginning than the leap between the philosophy of the first beginning and the other beginning. Rojcewicz argues that Being is the metaphysical understanding of Being, with no history while beyng is Heidegger’s own understanding in that beyng has a history, he argues. First, one must indeed be careful with the usage of the word, “history.” As early as \textit{Being and Time}. Heidegger makes the distinction between “\textit{Geschichte}” and “\textit{Historie},” the latter is what the metaphysical conception of Being entails. Instead of “\textit{Historie},” Heidegger is interested in “\textit{Geschichte}.” For argument’s sake let us presume that we all intend “\textit{Geschichte}.” As such beyng with a history would contradict Heidegger’s point that beyng is prior to the arising of mortals and gods. Consequently, my contention throughout this thesis that in the leap between Being and beyng is the ground as the non-ground, manifested as \textit{Ereignis}, which has “\textit{Geschichte}.” This latter point is the basis of my disagreement with Rojcewicz, following Richardson.

Finally, the \textit{Beiträge}’s inconsistent use of “beyng/being” distinction doesn’t nullify my point for I argue that only in the section 267, “Beyng,” does Heidegger explore this relationship as a possibility before it is manifested as \textit{Ereignis}. All other sections discuss the \textit{Ereignis} in its manifestations from all vantage points or joinings or fugues. In that sense Heidegger and I both use the terms synonymously, for indeed they are the same. Only when one discuss the possibility of how Being is without its manifestation in the fourfold does the distinction makes sense or becomes relevant.

\textsuperscript{683} Finally, the \textit{Beiträge}’s inconsistent use of “beyng/being” distinction doesn’t nullify my point for I argue that only in the section 267, “Beyng,” does Heidegger explore this relationship as a possibility before it is manifested as \textit{Ereignis}. All other sections discuss the \textit{Ereignis} in its manifestations from all vantage points or joinings or fugues. In that sense Heidegger and I both use the terms synonymously, for indeed they are the same. Only when one discuss the possibility of how Being is without its manifestation in the fourfold does the distinction makes sense or becomes relevant.
The import of the above excursus is that Heidegger sees the pernicious effects of a tri-partite division. Such a division makes Being into a Being, not unlike any other being. Such a position is not tenable for Heidegger. Still a “between” somehow is manifested, neither there, nor not there. Heidegger is acutely aware of this problematic in section 267 of the Beiträge.

Richardson, by placing foundational thought as the between obscures Heidegger’s placement of “das wesentliche Denken,” whether we call it “foundational thinking” or “the gods.” Instead, in section 267 Heidegger places both mortals and “das wesentliche Denken” as arising together, but in counter-distinction to one another, not in counter-distinction to Being as its there. With earth and sky, they are the way that Being manifests itself as Saying in Ereignis. Thus, Richardson conflates the fourfold into a correlation.

The second necessary point needed to understand foundational thinking asserts that Being sends itself out unto its “there,” a sending that is a self-sending, and terminates in “there.” Being conceals itself in beings as it bestows itself in hiddenness. The “there” [Da-sein] is as the shepherd of Being. Being is known not primarily as in its “there” in Dasein, as Richardson contends. Being appears not primarily as Da-sein, as there-being as Richardson contends. But, as we contend, Being is know primarily by its negativity or more precisely, its concealment; Being is a no-thing before it can be a Being-there.

Thus, one must think of Being as a sending of itself. Being sends in that it is appears as an absence. Being is known not as it is, but as a no-thing. Being is known as a revealment of its concealment. This revealing of a concealing is a type of sending, for Heidegger. Therefore, Being is never exhausted by a single instance of revealing.
For Richardson, Being-there as occurring through thought limits the complexity of this revealing simply as appearing there. The fourfold of Heidegger broadens significantly how that Being-there appears. Thus, we have an encapsulated view of Richardson’s relationship between Being and its “there.”

Yet, this is not precisely the role of thought for Heidegger. Rather, as Richardson does note, thought of Being brings the above relationship of Being and its “there” to fulfillment. Thought, for Richardson, completes the process of non-concealment by bringing Being into manifestation that is most proper to the nature of man as language. The role of thought, then, cannot be thinking of thought and also the sending thought, at least as Richardson conveys it, for Being sends thought for Heidegger. Heidegger does find a way to combine thought and the sending of thought, but not with thought, but rather with Being as Saying.

From our work with the Beiträge and other works which discuss the fourfold [das Geviert], we understand a process of manifestation that is less focused on Da-sein. Being is brought into manifestation as Ereignis through the fourfold, not simply Da-sein. Certainly, man as mortal is involved; so too are the gods involved as fundamental knowing awareness; the earth as unchanging and elemental; and sky as ever changing. In many ways Richardson’s account of the Ereignis is still one of existential phenomenology. Though Richardson does offer the added caution that Ereignis is primarily the “work” of Being and not of Dasein.

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686 We have noted in the last chapter that Heidegger entitles section 70 in Besinnung as “Götter, Das wesentliche Wissen.” Emad and Kalary translate this latter phrase in a Heideggerian fashion as “fundamental knowing awareness,” whereas the philosophy of the first beginning would have it translated as “the essential knowing.” See GA 66: 229/Mindfulness 203.
For Richardson fundamental thought has an attitude as one of acquiescence of Being and responding to its appeal and letting Being be itself. Fundamental thought has a structure in the form of re-collection [An-denken] in the temporal dimension of future, past, and present. “[F]oundational thought,” writes Richardson, “is by this fact historical, sc. thinks Being-as-history in continual advent to thought through its dialogue with the past,” 687 and foundational thought thinks Being in its negativity of what is concealed as well as what is revealed. As such, foundational thought helps Being be itself. Richardson concludes his argument with the following sentence: “foundational thinking is the process by which human ek-sistence responds to Being, not in its positivity but in its negativity, as the continual process of truth-as-history.” 688 This process, as Richardson describes does indeed have its roots in Being and Time, but transforms itself in Heidegger’s works after 1930 with the writing of “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit.”

We would add that foundational thinking is the process by which human ek-sistence responds to being, but Ereignis is the process of Being’s manifesting itself in the fourfold and thereby appropriating man. The later is more foundational than foundational thinking as conceived by Richardson.

We see the roots of Richardson’s foundational thinking in Being and Time as Richardson discusses ek-sistence and temporality; in this sense Richardson’s account is indeed quite close to that of Langan’s paradigm. What is the difference of Richardson’s thinking of thought? In order to show such a transformation, Richardson took the existential phenomenology of Being and Time and translates “Rede” as “logos,” 689

688 Richardson, “Introduction,” Through Phenomenology to Thought 22.
689 Here we shall retain the style and usage of “logos,” which both Richardson and Kockelmans employ. This will distinguish the present usage from that of λόγος used by Heidegger or Heraclitus.
Richardson rightly sees the increasing importance of *Rede* as “logos” making-manifest and letting-be-seen in Heidegger’s opus, but Richardson too broadly identifies “thinking of Being” solely with “logos.”

Richardson’s “logos” as fundamental thinking of Being is the means by which he focuses all Heidegger’s works, from 1935 to 1951. We have already discussed all of the works of Heidegger in our previous chapter, to which Richardson refers. The crucial difference between Richardson’s account and ours is one of defining and applying of language. Richardson understands fundamental thinking as bringing Being into manifestation through that which is most proper to man, which is language. In our account Heidegger conveys beyng, originary language, as Being as Saying, heard as Silence. While Richardson understands foundational thinking as foundational, we see originary language still more foundationally as “abground,” as non-ground.

Let us review Richardson’s key phrase in his argument to highlight his point: fundamental “thought completes the process of non-concealment by bringing Being into that form of manifestation that is most proper to the nature of man: language, through which he says ‘is.’” We see in this sentence that thought completes that which Being began. It brings Being into manifestation; Being is brought into manifestation to the proper nature of man as language; and then man can say Being “is.” This seems wrong-headed.

Let us attempt to unpack the difficulties with this conception of foundational thought. First, Being seems quite passive. Heidegger is careful to draw out the

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importance that it is Being which manifests itself through Ereignis in the Beiträge. Admittedly, Richardson does clarify this point earlier, yet the remainder of his discussions throughout the book seems to follow this guiding sentence: Thought manifests Being. Being’s manifestation seems to be able to occur only through thought.

As we have noted earlier, Langan omits any reference to the manifestation of Being through the fourfold [das Geviert]. Interestingly, Richardson incorporates the same works as Langan does in his book, all of which Heidegger details with great effort “das Geviert:” “Zur Seinsfrage,” “Alétheia,” “Das Ding,” “Bauen Wohnen Denken,” and “Der Ursprung der Kunstwerke.” What was impressive in Richardson’s book was the fact that he included far more of Heidegger’s works than did Langan. Yet even in Richardson’s treatment of additional works through his careful retrieval of Heidegger’s thought in “Part III (120 pages),” scant treatment of the fourfold could be found.693

This omission should draw the reader’s attention to the fact that this paradigm of “thinking of Being” cannot countenance the fourfold.694 This anomaly alone should give us pause. Why would Heidegger expend much ink and reflection on such a “conception?” Our argument comes to the conclusion that the fourfold is indeed crucial to Heidegger’s understanding of Being; Richardson’s account fails in this regard. The omission of the “das Geviert” is why in many ways the “thinking of being” is not far from the “existential phenomenological” paradigm.

693 A small, two-page treatment can be found on 570-572, wherein Richardson writes tellingly of the Quadrate (Richardson’s term for the fourfold): “What does he [Heidegger] mean by Being as the Quadrate? The theme of our research is not Being but thought, so we do not feel obliged to solve the problem (if it can be solved).” The fourfold is unimportant for Richardson. Also Richardson mentions the Quadrate only in passing on page 625. See Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought 570-572, 625.
694 The interesting question is raised that while this paradigm does not reckon the fourfold, could it do so. It seems that “thinking of Being” is the gloss-over, the overly-human process of what Heidegger comes to realize is broader that mere human activity. Thus, we argue that the thinking of Being model obscures the true process of Being manifesting itself with humanity’s help. It glosses the complexity of the fourfold into a narrow human thinking. Indeed the thinking of Being model cannot countenance the fourfold.
Presently we are at a position where we can constructively criticize Richardson’s “two Heideggers” thesis. Richardson explains that the nature of the method in Heidegger I is characterized as transcendence, that is, to be-in-the-world, also called existence. Heidegger II, beginning with “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit” in 1930, has the method of ek-sistence, that is, “rescendence” or thinking again of Being. To call Being and Time (1927) or Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1929) works of transcendence would simply belie all of Heidegger’s own careful attestation against transcendence. While the earlier works are not worked out as fully as the later in its understanding of “rescendence” or meditative thinking as we call it, all of Heidegger’s works claim that Being has a history; or more precisely, Seinsgeschichte is Heidegger’s concern throughout his lifetime, even in Being and Time.

Second, Richardson carefully delineates that both methods have Dasein as a privileged being open to Being; and have a process of negativity of finitude (I, a finitude of transcendence; II, a finitude of sending). Here we agree with Richardson’s premise that all of Heidegger’s works outline the importance of defining “anything” more by what they are not. Heidegger explains that the jar is more an opening of space so that fluid can fill it, and less as a walled- and bottomed-ceramic thing; time is defined by its double negativity of being between the “no-longer” and the “not-yet;” Being is defined as abandonment and language is defined as hearing the Silence of Being. For Heidegger the double negative is crucial in his mature work; on this point we agree with Richardson.

Third, Richardson claims that both methods have a temporal-historical process (Being comes as futural as having-already in what is as past, and is rendered manifest

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695 We too have argued that ontology has similar problems as metaphysics does; this difficulty would not equivalent to Richardson’s charge.
through the co-operation of man as present): in I, the process is Da-sein; in II, the process is the fundamental history as Being. Here too, we agree that all of Heidegger’s works concern a temporal-historical process. Our ordinary experience of time relies on this deeper sense of both space and time, as we have already outlined in Zur Sache des Denkens (1962-64). This premise too finds us in agreement.

Finally, Richardson claims both methods come to fulfillment when man endorses his liberty (as “re-solve” in Heidegger I and as “thought” in Heidegger II.) This “liberty” claim of Richardson seems far from the discussions within Heidegger’s later works, and even in Being and Time Heidegger makes little of this topic. Man’s liberty seems most resonant with the Lockean terminology in Western philosophy. In “Vom Wesen des Grundes” (“The Essence of Ground”) (1929) Heidegger explains that a deeper, more originary freedom arises out of the problem of transcendence, and from freedom the ground of reason emerges. Thus, the methods do not come to fulfillment when a person endorses his liberty, but freedom emerges through humanity’s hearing the Silence of Being and co-responding. The very term “liberty” comes rather from the Enlightenment era and resounds with logic. Here we part ways with Richardson.

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696 Here we would claim that both have Seinskgeschichte at heart.
697 “Freedom,” a term we will take to be broader than liberty, and so would include liberty. See GA 9, “Vom Wesen des Grundes:” 172/“The Essence of Ground,” Pathmarks 132.
698 On the subtle distinction between “freedom” and “liberty,” one could make the case that Heidegger used “Freiheit;” and therefore, it can be translated equally well into English by either “freedom” or “liberty.” The Oxford English Dictionary has their appearance occurring roughly in the same timeframe: the first occurrence of “liberty was in 1386, while “freedom appeared shortly beforehand in 1225.
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Yet among English speakers there is a distinction, though unnoticed by many. “Liberty was oftentimes associated with the freedom attained against the arbitrary rule of absolute power. Thus, the 18th century is replete with its usage. “Freedom” became more prevalent in the 1940s with a broader context than mere political rule. Thus, taking a section of Roosevelt’s “Four Freedoms Speech” as an illustrative example: of speech, of religion, from want and from fear, we see a subtle difference. Liberty would express only speech and religion; “From want” and “from fear” have the broader context than mere politics. It is the context of dwelling. In another source, Webster’s Revised Unabridged Dictionary makes this distinction similarly, that freedom is the state of being free while liberty is the state of a free person. Thus,
Richardson claims that his “thinking of Being” in Heidegger II is the phenomenology of *Being and Time*.\(^6^{99}\) It is the same process of hermeneutic interpretation in a new modality. The new modality was needed when Heidegger realized that the meaning of Being could not be interpreted solely through an analytic of Dasein. Richardson claims that this new modality occurred with the “turning” in “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit.” We argued that this change in Heidegger’s thinking occurred while Heidegger worked on the Nietzsche volumes in the late 1930s. Babette Babich supports our contention in an unusual moment of disagreement with Richardson, as she oftentimes likes to cite Heidegger as saying: “*Nietzsche hat mich kaputt gemacht.*”\(^7^{00}\) In either case, the timing of Heidegger’s change in thinking is of little consequence for this argument.

Richardson concludes his argument by saying that the two Heideggers “are not the same (*das Gleiche*)—but they are one (*das Selbe*).”\(^7^{01}\) With all the above similarities Richardson’s “two Heidegger” theory seems for the most part empty. We are not persuaded, for Richardson’s above reasoning could more easily be evidence as the self-same growing, developing process method. Certainly, Heidegger did alter his approach, but we contend that shift in Heidegger’s thinking is less dramatic than Richardson contends. (The astute reader would note that earlier we criticized Langan in that he

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\(^6^{99}\) Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* 624.

\(^7^{00}\) Babette E. Babich used this Heideggerian phrase, much to Richardson’s dismay: “Nietzsche has completely undone me!” as the centerpiece of her presentation on her book, *Words in Blood, Like Flowers: Philosophy and Poetry, Music and Eros in Hölderlin, Nietzsche, and Heidegger* at SPEP, October 2008. Richardson took exception with her interpretation as being too dramatic. Richardson’s interpretation is less forceful.

\(^7^{01}\) Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* 625.
didn’t recognize any shift at all.)\textsuperscript{702} We noted in the \textit{Beiträge} and later works that while \textit{Being and Time} and other early works have attempted to uncover Being, they fail in their attempt because they focused on Dasein; they were successful, conversely, in that they led the way toward understanding Being as manifesting itself as \textit{Ereignis} more so than Dasein uncovering Being. Heidegger’s main concern was the meaning of Being and so Heidegger looked for a way toward that same goal.

The same year of Richardson’s magnum opus, 1963, Otto Pöggeler published a polished work, \textit{Martin Heidegger’s Path of Thinking}, which also reflected this paradigm of the thinking of Being. The theme of Pöggeler’s work examined the Being of beings in terms of the truth of Being. This truth of Being is concealed in beings. As concealment, Being brings the structural articulation of un concealment as world to language.\textsuperscript{703} Both Pöggeler and Richardson regularly used the term, “thinking” when Heidegger himself wrote, “thinking of Being” (\textit{Denken des Seins}).\textsuperscript{704} Our point here is that Heidegger is more concerned with Being while Richardson and Pöggeler fall short of Being.

Pöggeler phrases the relationship between Being and language the way Richardson phrases it; he writes: “Being brings articulation of the world to language.” While this phrase seems perfectly consistent with our thesis that language and Being are intimately related, Pöggeler, perhaps unknowing, phrases the issue in a way that situates

\textsuperscript{702} While this issue emerges as an issue of method, we will discuss this problematic in our next set of chapters in other arenas of “things” or Being. Heidegger is concern in all arenas of this characteristic of changing while remaining the same in terms of overemphasizing either the sameness or the difference. It occurs in the fourfold as togetherness aspect as opposed to the separate aspect. Heidegger deftly holds that “things” emerge from the fourfold as “together-as-separate.” Also Heidegger describes Being as “gathering-going away;” Being is always two-fold, a holding sway. While all three issues are different arenas of occurrence, they all have the same dynamic of changing-all-the-while-being-the-same. It is our fundamental issue of what unfolding entails; this we discuss in chapter nine.


\textsuperscript{704} For instance, see Richardson’s translation of Heidegger’s letter written to Richardson, xvi-ii.
articulation between language and Being. This way of phrasing is indicative of a subtle, yet pernicious way, driving a wedge between Being and language. This, we contend, is the major flaw of the “thinking of Being” paradigm: it sees, like the philosophy of the first beginning (Western philosophy), that language is derivative upon thought. In many ways this “thinking of being” model places thought as that which allows Being and beings to cor-respond; it becomes the proverbial “tertio quid.” As such, we argue that this “thinking of being” approach is a modified correspondence theory of truth. In the “thinking of Being” model, thought is that articulation which is between Being and beings.

But such a formulation still holds the same difficulties as the correspondence theory of truth. To correspond, the middle term must be like both of the joining terms, in this case Being and beings. While thinking is a faculty of beings, nowhere can we prove that thinking is of Being. For this reason Heidegger avoids this type of gathering of opposites and holds in its place that the gathering-separateness must always be together. Being of beings, therefore, must be conceived not as the thinking of beings, but as the ontological difference.

We argue that originary language as the Saying of Being heard as Silence “traverses that ontological abyss.” Man, hearing this, nears Being as it manifest itself as Ereignis. But a person can also not hear the Silence. This way is also way-making. Originary language is that which forms all types of communication, including thought and predication, ordinary language, silent gestures, logic, and even sciences—all emerge from it. Originary language is the manifestation of Being; likewise, originary language is each step of communication of Being as Saying. Thought is not needed to correspond to
Being, for Being and man cor-respond together in a joint process called meditative thinking. In short, we don’t uncover Being; Being shows itself through us and with us.

While Richardson and Pöggeler do notice this shift of Heidegger moving from Dasein in the early works to Being in the later works, they fail to take notice of the other shifts in Heidegger’s thinking: the fourfold, Heidegger’s emphasis on language as originary Saying, from which ordinary language and all form of communications derive (late 1950s); and finally, they do not recognize Heidegger’s new conception of phenomenology called “Vor-sicht,” wherein Ereignis is no longer occurring as presencing of that which is present, but presencing as looking ahead [Vor-sicht] (1960s). Thus the “thinking of Being” model fails in its attempt to characterize all of Heidegger’s ways, all the while it is successful by drawing attention to Heidegger’s own change of thinking. The paradigm, though, is successful in that it moves our attention away from Dasein and toward Being. This was a step forward.

“Many Ways” Theory

Let us now move to yet another paradigm, to that of Joseph Kockelmans. While Kockelmans never intended to formulate a paradigm of Heideggerian scholarship with his edited work, On Heidegger and Language, it, nevertheless, served as a paradigm for generations. Its plan was simply to offer a number of Heideggerian scholars the opportunity to write on the topic of language. Their work comprised eleven chapters

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705 Lest the reader misunderstand that we are merely quibbling with words, that we now replace thinking with meditative thinking; let the point remain clear, even meditative thinking is derived from originary language. From both of these, thinking later emerges.

organized under three basic areas of early Heidegger, later Heidegger, and general linguistic conceptions of ordinary language.

Rather than attempt to make a meta-narrative of Heidegger’s work as did the earlier paradigms, Kockelmans chose the approach of many approaches, seeing a guide in Heidegger’s own reflection: perhaps Heidegger’s way was one of many ways.\(^707\) Kockelmans’ approach has evoked a strong plurality of meaning possibilities of Heideggerian language as is illustrated in this major compilation, with a weak, non-binding centrality. Rather than focusing on thinking of Being, this paradigm focused on the thinking of the multiplicity of ways which the language of Being emerges.

*On Heidegger and Language* discusses both how Heidegger uses language in a variety of ways to understand Being, but also explores the deeper relationship between language and Being. Each author discusses from a particular vantage point how Heidegger employed language toward Being. Some saw the relationship in a phenomenological fashion. Others reflected on Heidegger’s language as though they were comparing merely differing linguistic tools. Still others moved toward the thought of Being model. Many theories emerged; dialogue ensued with rebuttal essays. The book emerged as a critical analysis of Heidegger’s understanding of Being and language and became a template for the way of many ways Heidegger himself envisioned as typifying his work. The book encapsulated the oft-quoted phrase from the *Beiträge*: “The time of the ‘systems’ is over.”\(^708\)

While enormous in its contribution of voicing many possibilities in the field of language and Being, Kockelmans’ work doesn’t attempt to weave the essays into any

\(^{707}\) See *GA* 1: 1. The frontispiece has the following phrase in handwritten script: “Wege, nicht Werke.”

\(^{708}\) *GA* 65: 5/Contributions 4. Heidegger’s sentence is worth recalling: “Die Zeit der »Systeme« ist vorbei.” Adorno has also proclaimed that the time of systems is over.
coherent whole. The attempt to draw some coherence came in the form of panel
discussions over individual essays with one overall final panel discussion—many types
of conversations about language and Heidegger. The effect was that while many
possibilities are indeed likely, there needed to be some unity, some criteria by which
some voices were not included as possibilities.

Certainly this tacit judgment was made at the onset of the project; otherwise, any
and all articles would have been included. Thus the “many ways” seemed not to be as it
had appeared initially: Heidegger and language, as a dialogue. More importantly, it did
not succeed entirely because it lacks the guidance in what appeared to be a cacophony of
voices. At the very least, these works should have the unity of Being as its concern, yet
this simple, but crucial concern of Heidegger is drowned out by the cacophony of many
voices. Overall, Kockelmans’ book invokes multiple interpretations without the focus of
the meaning of Being.

Singularly, some of the essays do allow the concern for Being to emerge. Essays
by Lohman, Pöggeler and, most notably, Kockelmans’ own essay entitled, “Ontological
Difference, Hermeneutics, and Language” draw the reader’s attention to Being. For the
most part, all the other essays focus not on Being, but on language, often seen as
linguistics. We have already seen that Heidegger understands Being as Saying to be
originary language, from which all ordinary languages emerge. Discussing language
solely as linguistics draws us away from Being. Even their discussions have the air of
academic argument, more so than the meaning of being.

In his essay, Kockelmans irons out precisely what the ontological difference is
and how it is primarily an early tool to heal the bifurcation of Western thought and being,
subject and object, etc. Most crucial is this essay is his development of *Ereignis* and language. Kockelmans concludes his treatment with the all-important realization that thinking receives its structure from language. He cites Heidegger, as we have seen, in *Identity and Difference*: “Thinking receives the tools for this self-suspended structure from language. For language is the most delicate and thus the most susceptible vibration holding everything within the suspended structure of the appropriation [*Ereignis*]. We dwell in the appropriation inasmuch as our active nature is given over to language.”709

With this conclusion, we wholeheartedly concur.

But ultimately Kockelmans follows Richardson’s “early and later approach-distinction” and “thought of Being”710 template. Kockelmans encourages the reader to place the phenomenological method of the early writings together with the hermeneutical method of the later writings. The approaches and writings belong together, he cautions the reader.711 They belong together, we agree. But how exactly do they belong together is the point of our disagreement.

In a later work, *Heidegger’s “Being and Time”*, Kockelmans finds that both approaches belong together as “logos;” he follows Richardson’s translation of *Rede* as “logos.” More precisely said, they understand Heidegger to redefine terms from the writing of “*Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*” (1930) onward, from *Rede* to “logos.” Kockelmans finds within *Rede* three levels, from the most primordial to least: enunciation, attribution, and communicating. Thus, we see the three-part division of *On*  


710 I will argue that such a multiplicity of voices can only be possible in a “thought of Being” model, for its natural consequence is a plurality of voices without any possible unity.

711 *On Heidegger and Language*, “Preface” xi.
Heidegger and Language emerging now as a conceptual framework, a means of expressing the three levels of “logos.”

The problem with this distinction is that “logos,” as Rede, now encompasses part of the care structure which was under Verstehen and “worldhood” in Being and Time. Attribution is the facility to connect signs and references. Parts of Rede and Verstehen have been conflated. Now Rede and Verstehen are seen as part of one comprehensive structure in “logos.” Instead of Rede as one of three equiprimordial structures of Dasein’s care structure [Verstehen-Befindlichkeit-Rede], we seem to have two: [Rede-Befindlichkeit]. Rede as “logos” now carries the burden of Verstehen as well. Under such a conception the care structure appears yoked as Logos-Befindlichkeit.\[712\] Indeed, this bifurcation looks much like Kockelmans’ early suggestion to keep together phenomenology and hermeneutic methods. Would we be too bold to separate them and index Befindlichkeit in the phenomenological method and Logos in the hermeneutical method? Perhaps so, for others indeed devise such a difference for Heidegger’s varying works.

At the same time Kockelmans describes what he means by “logos” as rooted in Verstehen and Befindlichkeit. As such we return ostensibly to the traditional mindset of the triple equiprimordial care structure of Being and Time. But how could “logos” as Rede be rooted in the same fashion, with which Heidegger originally intended? Before we can answer this question, let us continue a bit farther with Kockelmans’ definition of “logos.”

\[712\] An interesting study would investigate to what extent and when Heidegger might have entertained such a conception. One could easily find evidence for such an argument in the 1940s that Heidegger would have held such a conception in some form. Yet in the 1950s Heidegger would have found difficulties with this model. Certainly by the time the essay, “Das Wesen der Sprache” (1957) was published, Heidegger has unyoked poetry and thought; in that essay poetry and thought have similar, but different domains.
As rooted in *Verstehen* and *Befindlichkeit*, “logos” is the essence of language. It has two modes of keeping silent and attending to others. Thus, “logos” includes all the elements of language: what speaking is about, what receives its shape and form through language, communication, and making known to others. These are not properties of language for Kockelmans, but essential characteristics of the “logos” rooted in *Verstehen* and *Befindlichkeit*.

Rather than seeing “logos” as the essence of language, many other attempts like those of Noam Chomsky or Sapir-Worf have placed any number of these elements as the essence of language. Consequently, language has been labeled as “expression,” “symbolic form,” “communication,” “assertion,” or “the making known of experiences.” Clearly, even if these various characterizations were to be added together, nothing would be achieved in the way of a comprehensive conception of language. Such a conception can be reached only by means of an accurate analysis of the mode of Being characteristic of man as Being-in-the-world as seen in *Being and Time*, rightly insists Kockelmans.

Kockelmans sees the inconsistency within “logos” of *Being and Time* §34 [i.e., *Rede*]. “Logos” is both atemporal, lying outside the domain of language and temporal as a totality of meaning located in Dasein. The insistency lies in the fact that *Rede* can produce meaning only to the extent that meaning is given in language temporally and at the same time language is only an enunciation of atemporal “logos” as the totality of meaning, in which Dasein accrues words from significations. Can “logos” be both temporal and atemporal, both expression and system? In Kockelmans’ words: “Heidegger still maintains a totality of meaning which [is] itself and taken as such lies

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713 Kockelmans, *Heidegger’s “Being and Time”* 158.
714 *GA 2, Sein und Zeit*: §26, 163/ *Being and Time* ¶26, 167-168.
outside the domain of language and as such, therefore, is intemporal [sic.] and invariant.” Ought Kockelmans assert such a claim?

We could grant that “logos” lies outside the domain of language atemporally, if Heidegger didn’t maintain that the totality of meaning lies in “worldhood.” But Heidegger does indeed claim this and as such is related to Verstehen as the one element of the care structure. “Logos” must be temporal. The totality of meaning still resides in Dasein and in time.

Or we could grant that “logos” is indeed atemporal. As the essence of language it does not contain meaning, expression, or sense. As such it would be an atemporal structure. Thus, Kockelmans understands Heidegger to assert that “logos” is atemporal.

But can Heidegger claim both simultaneously, no matter whether he calls it “logos” or language? Kockelmans contends that this is why Heidegger gave up the idea that man has language and not is merely the place where language speaks, as in section 34. He sees Heidegger resolving the issue later by claiming that man does not have language.

We can accept this premise that Heidegger resolves this inconsistency with Rede in section 34, that language is primary that which houses Being and, due to this, man can also be the place where language speaks. But this Heideggerian solution is different than saddling Rede with the totality of meaning, as is done in Richardson/Kockelmans notion of “logos.” For the Richardson/Kockelmans claim of “logos” reverses this de-centering

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of Dasein and instead de-centers language, by upholding Dasein as that which houses language, which, in turn, houses Being. Certainly, this is an untenable claim.

Kockelmans explains his argument further. In “Vom Wesen des Grundes”/“Essence of Reasons,” Heidegger tried to show that the problem of ground is a problem of truth; and since truth is found in Dasein’s transcendence, the problem is one of transcendence. Agreed. But transforming Rede into “logos” does not solve the problem of transcendence. Rather, the point of “Vom Wesen des Grundes” seems to illustrate that neither Rede nor “logos” solves the problem of transcendence. Both Rede and “logos” are caught in the same problem of being located both in and out of time.

Finally, the Richardson/Kockelmans “logos” solution may well have been the avenue that Heidegger was exploring in “Vom Wesen des Grundes,” (1929) and “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit” (1930) and “Logos (Heraklit, Fragment 50)” (1944).” For this reason Richardson and Kockelmans are not entirely wrong to see Heidegger changing his thinking from phenomenology toward thinking. But we conclude in our next chapter that in the fifties Heidegger changed yet again his thinking, when he realized the difficulties arising from the so-called “logos” solution, wherein Heidegger renounces language.

In conclusion, we argue that the “many ways” paradigm is also faulty, for it holds the contradictory position of Dasein’s [the there of Being] “logos” existing in and out of time. The shortcoming of such a paradigm, then, discusses the spectrum of language as

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717 Kockelmans, Heidegger’s “Being and Time” 330.
718 This shortcoming is true of all “thinking of Being” models, including Richardson, Kiesel, et al. In contrast, we have seen in Heidegger’s later works that while ordinary language is temporal; it is a response to beyng, heard as Silence, which as originary language is atemporal. Thus, language as a whole is both temporal and atemporal. Such an “expanse” of time neither Rede of Being and Time nor the “logos” of Heidegger’s middle period and of Richardson and Kockelmans models can span. Ereignis becomes the solution for Heidegger in his later period, for it involves humanity, but exceeds it.
multiplicity without addressing its relation to Being. Thus, it too is unable to address the anomaly of language in all its variations vis-à-vis Being.

In conclusion, this chapter deals with successful failures: successful in that they led the way, failures in that the Being was not reached. Langan, Richardson and Kockelmans developed strong paradigms of how Heidegger’s corpus should be viewed. Each had good success showing us part of Heidegger’s way: “phenomenology,” “thinking of being,” and “many ways.” For a variety of reasons—especially since they did not have at their fingertips all of Heidegger’s texts—they did not lead us to the meaning of Being. And the anomaly of language remains unsolved. Yet, these paradigms must be seen as successful failures, like *Holwege*, like paths meandering in the dense forest, unable to find a clearing.

Because of these failures, Heidegger redirects his attention from “logos” and toward Being as Saying in a being-historical [*seinsgeschichtlich*]\(^719\) trajectory. *Ereignis’s* domain lies beyond what the thought of Being could possibly indicate. From these paradigms, we step forward toward the domain of *Ereignis*, and originary language as way-making.

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\(^719\) While “*seinsgeschichtlich*” in German can indeed be formed as an adjective, some have argued that Emad and Maly’s phrase, “being-historical” is broken English. True enough. Yet what Emad and Maly do preserve in their unusual translation is the intimate connection between Being and its history. The adjectival form as a constitutive characteristic construes better this relation as opposed to other English near-equivalents of “in the history of Being” or “in the terms of the history of Being.” While it is true that, as Rojcewicz suggests, “*erkenntnistheoretisches Buch*” is not translated into English as a “knowledge-theoretical book,” but as an “epistemological book,” Heidegger’s main point is that we wrongly treat Being as we would any other being; thus, it seems that Emad and Maly successfully emphasize in their broken, even strange sounding English phraseology that which Heidegger desires to preserve—the unusual case of Being.
CHAPTER EIGHT:

Be-wëgen

—“Die Sprache spricht als das Geläut der Stille.”\(^{720}\)

The last chapter explored previous paradigms of Heidegger’s way. Like 
*Holzwege*, they were unable to find a clearing; and in their case, they traveled amidst the dense verbiage of existential phenomenology and thinking models of Being. Heidegger in the 1950s found such avenues unsuccessful, yet nevertheless satisfying, for they help him to redirect his way. They redirected his attention from “logos” and toward Being as Saying in being-historical [*seinsgeschichtlichen*] trajectory. Heidegger found that *Ereignis*’ domain lies beyond what the thought of Being or existential phenomenology could entirely indicate. Following Heidegger we look toward a new paradigm, which would place *Ereignis* and originary language as way-making [*Be-wëgen*] as its main thesis. We hold that Being as Saying is the way-making model.

To set this thesis into place we need to outline the parameters of the problem. First, the relationship of Dasein and language needs further delineating, then the relation of language to Being can be gathered more intimately, and finally, Dasein’s relation to Being can be shown as itself more fully. Three works which, in varying extents, will


**BE-WËGEN**

**On the Truth of Being**

The first obstacle that needs overcoming is the issue of the relation of Dasein and language in the previous thinking of Being model. The structure of Dasein, more specifically, the care structure of Dasein in *Being and Time* needs readdressing vis-à-vis language and the later formulations of “logos.” Kockelmans’ *On the Truth of Being: Reflections on Heidegger’s Later Philosophy* begins to address this issue. It illustrates how the “thinking of Being” model extends into Heidegger’s later works, but with a further, important transformation. How exactly does that transformation appear for Heidegger? And how does he develop it from his notion of “logos?”

From earlier discussions on “logos,” Kockelmans equated Heidegger’s “logos” with *Rede* and extended its reach beyond time. That was helpful only to the extent that

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hermeneutics and apophantic language are related in a new way; language as assertion now emerges out of hermeneutic process for Heidegger, not as it is conceived usually that hermeneutics is governed by the rules of propositional language. But to the extent that “logos” was unable to reach “atemporal” Being, it remained problematic.

In his work, *On the Truth of Being*, Kockelmans further explores how “logos” could be the originary saying of Being wherein all forms of speaking respond. Kockelmans returns to Heidegger’s treatment of truth in the Greeks. Kockelmans follows Walter Biemel,\(^\text{724}\) in the conclusion that Heidegger’s philosophy on the whole centers\(^\text{725}\) on the question of Being and truth as όληθέια. Using the Greek notion of truth [όληθέια], Heidegger notices that its alpha privative is a supplement to the stem [λήθη], the river of forgetfulness. Thus, Heidegger holds that the Greeks saw truth as a sway of forgetfulness and remembrance, of concealment and non-concealment, signified by όληθέια. Listening to Greek thought Heidegger held that concealment is the default mode of truth. Concealment, though, is a mode of showing that is silent. In its silence, concealment speaks.

For Heidegger, Kockelmans adds, concealment is the way toward Being. Kockelmans explains the process. Concealment is a way of showing, which we hear as Silence, which leads us toward Being, unlike any being that we might hear. Showing as Silence, then, is also the essence of language, for Silence is a way of Saying, a Saying that is without words. To elucidate this point, Kockelmans writes chapter seven, “On the

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\(^{725}\) We have argued previously that this claim is too broad: we can certainly accept that the issue of truth of Being or thinking of Being is part of Heidegger’s concern, but from 1949 onward Heidegger’s moves from a “logos-centric” philosophy to that of a language-centric model as the way toward Being as Saying. This is a difference, as we shall shortly see.
Within that chapter, Kockelmans outlines Heidegger’s trajectory of Being as Saying toward the late 1950s. Since Being as Saying becomes Heidegger’s ultimate formulation of Being, the relationship between language and Being is drawn ever closer. Kockelmans’ model is shifting from thinking of Being toward Being as Saying.

Kockelmans rightly describes Heidegger’s Being-as-Saying in terms of the essence of language. Kockelmans contends that “logos” understood properly hearkens back to language’s original meaning. “Logos” as it is conveyed by its related verb, “legein,” does mean “to say” and “to speak.” But more primordial is its meaning “to let something lie forth.” The “letting lie forth” reveals as a non-concealment while “speaking” conceals. Moreover, both aspects of revealing and concealing occur together. As such, “logos” is the originary Saying of Being, argues Kockelmans, while man’s vocalization of it is a response.726

While we will argue against Kockelmans’ claim that “logos” is the originary Saying of Being, we will agree that man’s response to it is ordinary language as we know it. We shall formulate our argument more fully in the next chapter; through the Beiträge, that Heidegger sees the “logos” as part of the manifestation of Ereignis, as the Beiträge informs us: “Er-eignis names beyng in thinking.”727 But originary language is more originary, that originary language is the holding sway of Seyn/Sein “before” it is manifested as Er-eignis. This is originary language.

Let us compare this to Kockelmans’ argument. At first Kockelmans relates the essence of language and the essence of Being as related through thought as the “Letter on

726 Kockelmans, On the Truth of Being 151.
727 GA 65: 470/Contributions 330. We might add that while Er-eignis names beyng in thinking, Ereignis is its showing itself. From which we could conclude that naming is founded upon showing.
Thought is the means to language. Invoking “Letter on Humanism,” Kockelmans describes the role of thinking as that which brings the unspoken word of Being to language. Being comes to language as illuminating itself. As such, Kockelmans tacitly understands illuminating itself as “logos.”

Eventually, Kockelmans’ terminology moves away from the “logos” terminology. When, in the 1950s, Heidegger unfolds the relationship between Being and language, Kockelmans describes this movement without any hint of the thinking of Being model. In 1950 the term, “language” conveys the essence of language not as speaking but as primordial saying, given as a showing or pointing. Primordial saying is heard, listened to, before a person speaks. The remainder of Kockelmans’ chapter discusses Heidegger’s various works which discuss this relationship. Kockelmans treatment there of primordial saying is fair and careful, including the fourfold; and it depicts language less as a relationship, which merely humans have. It now depicts language more as language is the relation of all relations. Kockelmans surely sees Heidegger’s movement toward language as the path toward Being.

Kockelmans understands the point of this period of Heidegger’s work to be one wherein the relationship of Being and language no longer holds language as the middle correspondence between Being and things; we concur. The relationship is described in terms of “between” without anything in the “between.” While separation does still occur,

728 On the Truth of Being 151.
729 One might ask what does this relation of all relations entail for Kockelmans. Is it primordial to all relations? Is it the condition of all relations? Kockelmans does not explicate, though the later would have more of a Kantian tone than Kockelmans would be willing to ascribe to Heidegger. Certainly, the former is more consistent with Heidegger’s on works. On the Truth of Being 169.
it is one of gathered-separatedness, of “dif-ference” [Unter-schied]; the division is one of intimate relation of things and world. Kockelmans explains in an earlier chapter that the “dif-ference of the ontological difference must be understood as a process: “a dif-ferre, a bearing each other out, as if both Being and beings shared a common center that remains interior to both, a common measure that serves as the single dimension of both, a primal unity by reason of which each adheres to the other and out of which both ‘issue forth.’” Because the ontological dif-ference is a primal unity, language and Being must also have such a nearness—“Where the word breaks off no thing may be.”

Language is the correlation of Being and beings as di-ference, but the dif-ference itself can be seen only in the form of world and things. In itself it is conceived as between things. We see the relationship of language reflecting that nearness: Being:beings::world:things. Yet it is not Being as nothing, but “logos” as nothing. With this explanation Kockelmans defers to Richardson as Kockelmans reemploys the term, “logos.” Language is “logos” coming to pass. “Logos” spans both dimensions of temporality and atemporality. “Logos” then gathers as the calling.

But originary language is also that which calls. Since Being calls, we understand some sort of separation. Richardson suggests that there is a tension between the unity of gathering and the duality of separateness in the “logos-as-scission.” Kockelmans follows Richardson explicitly.

Barring the “logos-as-scission” phraseology, tension is indeed a suitable description for the process. Tension does exist in the fact that the calling of Being is both

730 On the Truth of Being 88.
732 On the Truth of Being 156. See Richardson, Heidegger 580.
Being which calls and Being as the calling. But the tension is confused when we speak of “logos.” For Richardson and Kockelmans that tension arises primarily from a conceptual/linguistic tension, not an ontological/ontic tension. And for this reason we have serious concerns regarding the “logos-centric” models. We employ the provisional phrase “language-centric” model to indicate that both Being as Saying is originary language and this primary mode is ontological before it can be conceptual or linguistic.

Heidegger intends that the ontological tension is primary, that ontological difference is the source of any subsequent tension. During this period in the 1950s Heidegger’s solution for this ontological tension of difference is Being as Saying, heard as Silence. Hearing Silence man is drawn near to speak words and to “world” the world as the gathering fourfold. Because Being as beyng turns inward, and Being conceals itself, Being is heard as Silence. Being appears twofold. That is to say that Being conceals, and in its concealment it reveals its concealment. Thus, while Being is both a concealing and revealing, the primary mode is concealment, for that which is revealed is a concealment as concealment. Heidegger calls this originary language. Because Being is such a process as originary language, all language, all beings also have this dynamic tension of gathered-separateness.

Richardson’s terminology of “logos” with Kockelmans following him in this discussion reverts back to the 1940s, and leads the reader to assume that the discussion still focuses on thought, not language. This reader could easily conclude that the essence of language is “logos” as thinking. Thus both Richardson and Kockelmans speak of this originary relationship as “thought of Being” or the “truth of Being.” As such they are not incorrect, but they are not sufficiently originary. Heidegger’s point, however, is that the
essence of language is originary language as Saying, heard as Silence. This is the
distinction of Seyn/Sein in the Beiträge, section 267.\textsuperscript{733} Sein has the truth of Being while
Seyn is without the truth of Being. Being all-the-while is both. Thus the Sein/Seyn
distinction of section 267 includes this tension of gathered-separateness.

This is not to say that thinking doesn’t enter the process. It does, but “logos”
emerges afterwards in Ereignis. Thought emerges as the manifestation of Being [Sein] as
Ereignis. Ereignis emerges for Heidegger as the better way to explain the ontological
difference. It involves the fourfold. Within the fourfold emerge thought and ordinary
language. Recalling briefly the process of eight aspects of Ereignis from the Beiträge,
we saw the gods are part of the manifestation of Being in Ereignis. Mortals bring the
gods forth. Being needs mortals to give life to the gods. Gods and mortals emerge as
gathered opposition. Earth and sky, respectively, hold firm and give sway. Together the
fourfold as gathered-separateness allows a thing to emerge. When a thing appears, Being
recedes as concealment. When Being allows itself to appear in a momentary flash,
beings recede. “Logos” cannot explain all these aspects, only can Being as Saying.
Thus, Heidegger opts for Ereignis.

This is the not-fully articulated nor understood ontological difference as held by
Heidegger in the early years. It is not a conceptual/linguistic difference as encouraged by
Richardson; though, we grant that such a conceptual tension occurs subsequently. But it
occurs not because it is originary, but because any epistemological/metaphysical/
linguistic outcropping will have traces of the ontological difference, the Ereignis. This
process is best described provisionally as a Being as Saying model.

\textsuperscript{733} See our earlier discussion in chapter 2, “Early Approaches: II” 93-98.
As Heidegger writes, as Kockelmans notes, and as we are drawn to cite again: “Thinking receives the tools for this self-suspending structure [sich schwebenden Bau] from language [aus der Sprache].”\(^{734}\) We emphasize the point that thinking receives the tools from language. Heidegger continues, but Kockelmans does not quote the next sentence: “For language is the most delicate and thus the most susceptible vibration [Schwingung] holding everything within the suspended structure of the appropriation.”\(^{735}\) Thought has the tools of this vibrating structure because language has this self-vibrating structure and grants it. From it, all forms of language emerge in their enunciation as expression and their silent “expression,” an all-important mode of any expression. From it worldhood emerges; from it both authentic an inauthentic modes of discourse and technology emerge. And similarly, from it emerges metaphysical structures.

As metaphysical and worldly structures emerge, and with them, the danger of technology, we are able to see the prelude to Ereignis. But with the danger we also see the saving grace of the Ereignis. Thus, we see the important distinction for Heidegger in this period: Ereignis is never produced solely by man; man’s transformation occurs by virtue of the Ereignis. The danger of technology isn’t simply man’s failure to be authentic. It is the manifestation of Being as Ereignis. In the danger, Being appears in a flash.\(^{736}\) And as quickly it appears, it again conceals itself.

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\(^{734}\) GA 11, Identität und Differenz: 46-47/Identity and Difference 38.

\(^{735}\) GA 11, Identität und Differenz: 47/Identity and Difference 38.

\(^{736}\) See GA 7: 228/“Logos,” Early Greek Thinking 73. In both “Logos” and μοίρα Heidegger discusses the enigmatic appearing of Being. The presencing of Being appears and disappears as quickly as lightening, writes Heidegger. But the lightning-flash that flashes between the “Meaning” and the “same Meaning” remains unforgotten. Heidegger calls this flash, Zeus\(^{736}\) and, at other times, μοίρα or fate.
Yet its return to concealment is not without effect, for man is transformed in this process. Being as Ereignis will bring back technology into the servitude of man.\(^737\) In this vibrating [schwingende] Ereignis, man and Being reach their active “natures” and shed the qualities accrued in metaphysical speculation.\(^738\) How might these active “natures” appear? We take this vibrating Ereignis to be a holding sway. Not unlike vibrating strings, which remain yet move, Being always remains yet moves between its appearing and concealing. Beings too have this holding sway quality. Through the experience of language, the holding sway of Being and beings appear. But more so, Being and beings are drawn close in the experience of language.

Kockelmans, did not, but could have cited Heidegger’s essay, “μοῖρα”\(^739\) (1951) to support his thesis that thinking and Being are more intimate than language and Being. In “μοῖρα” Heidegger holds that thinking and Being are the same. But we see that Heidegger does not mean the same as what Kockelmans intends. Heidegger’s understands that Being and thinking are the same in the sense that there is always a gathering-separation between thinking and Being. Both must retain their difference as gathered, not unlike that of “internal difference” of metaphysics.

But even in this essay, Heidegger’s “thinking” is not the whole of Being. This premise has two important consequences. To say otherwise, to say that “logos” is the whole of Being, is to say there would be no separation of the gathering-separation, no

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\(^737\) This statement clarifies the common misunderstanding that “enframing” is unrelenting, even totalizing. Rather, a holding sway occurs between technology overcoming our control and Ereignis bringing it back within man’s control. The sway between man’s control and lack is ongoing in this epoch. Heidegger’s text runs as follows: “… Zurücknahme der technischen Welt aus ihrer Herrschaft zur Dienstchaft innerhalb des Bereiches, durch den der Mensch eigentlicher in das Ereignis reicht.” GA 11: 46/Identity and Difference 37.


\(^739\) GA 7, “μοῖρα”/“Moira,” Early Greek Thinking.
ontological difference, only One. If Being is no-thing, and there is only One, then whence come beings? But to say the contrary, that there are only beings without Being—without beings Being—is absurd. The problems of the One are legion.

Second, to claim the contrary, that Being is never “logos,” that there is no gathering of the gathering-separation, would be a claim for only difference. To claim that there is only difference, is a claim that everything is the same. For if only difference exists, then it is all the same. While it seems that we have engaged in a bit of Sophism, we have indeed hit on a problematic. We have come to an equally absurd possibility both ontologically and epistemologically.

Between these two extremes we understand Heidegger to hold that “logos” is not included in the Seyn part of the gathering-separation of Being, while “logos” is part of the Ereignis as the gathering-separation of Seyn/Sein. While Being must have a gathering-separation as Seyn/Sein, “logos” is not its source. Instead Ereignis is. To be fair, Kockelmans would never claim either of the two conclusions above. Yet he does lean too heavily toward “logos” as did Richardson’s thinking of Being model. Thus, Kockelmans wrongly saddled “logos” for the work of Ereignis.

Another important distinction of the gathering-separation of Seyn/Sein is the fact that beings must always be distinguished from Seyn, otherwise their existence would be conflated simply as Being. As such, they would be Fated without any possibility of

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740 With this route, we find ourselves ensnared in the same deep quandaries as was Parmenides.
741 Included in the region of these problems are included the modern Rationalists.
742 We find ourselves entangled in the region wherein materialists and empiricists find themselves.
743 Theologically and metaphysically speaking, problems emerge from such an equating of beings and Being: usually Being is confused as the transcendent highest Being, but equally problematic is the confusion of immanent Being of pantheism or panentheism. Such adherents of the latter immanent Being would be Spinozan pantheism, Whitehead’s process philosophy and Hartshorne’s process theology, and most recently Pierre Teilhard de Chardin’s panentheism of the 1950s. For an interesting exposition of this
being otherwise. Yet Heidegger explains that this gathering-separation of thinking and being is fateful (μοιρα); that, while separate, thinking and being are gathered throughout one’s portion of life—in creation, sustaining, and destiny—fateful, but not fated. That is to say, in order to indicate the relationship between Being and thinking as a gathering-separation is to indicate that the destiny of Being is always holding sway, always a vibrating. The fact that Being is a holding sway doesn’t dictate the details of man’s life. But as Being is holding sway, so too is the case for man’s “essence.” And man’s essence appears as occurring through thinking while it, in turn, has its essence in language.  

As we learned, however, in “The Essence of Language” (1957), any experience of language entails an experience in the domain of the essence of language, which has different yet similar regions of poetry and thinking. Both are modes of Saying [Sage]. As such, this essay helps us to unyoke discourse and thinking in the “logos” model of Richardson and Kockelmanns. While poetry and thinking have similar domains and seem always to work together rooted in Befindlichkeit, they are not of the same region as we come near the essence of language. In this region there is a difference. Let us look more closely at the region not called thinking.

Heidegger calls language the language of Being. Language is possessed by Being. Language makes the way of Being as presencing. Kockelmanns, then, concludes that since Saying has two modes, any experience of language would involve these two modes: thinking and poetizing, saying and nearing.  

Language of Being is way-making

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744 We shall cover more of this topic in the next chapter on the unfolding of Being as Saying.

745 On the Truth of Being 166. It is not clear whether Kockelmanns holds thinking is the mode of saying and poetizing is the mode of nearing. This would not be Heidegger’s meaning. Rather both modes of language as thinking and poetizing are a saying and a nearing, but in different regions.
in that it both is a saying and a drawing near. Both thinking and poetizing in their proper understanding say and draw near as modes of the language of Being. Man does not draw near and say Being. Rather, Being draws near as absence and “says” as originary language, to which we respond. Kockelmans explicates well the notion of originary language, which “precedes” thinking. Kockelmans now moves beyond the model of the truth of Being.

Kockelmans’ way glosses over, however, the importance of way-making as always toward, never to, beings—always toward, never to, Being. The phrase, “to beings” describes a trajectory that has an end point: “logos” resides in Dasein. As such “logos” articulates meaning. Kockelmans describes this new direction as Heidegger de-centering language, ending in humanity. Kockelmans describes this as the question of “logos.” For Kockelmans language is de-centered around Dasein, that is to say, language has its end, which arrives with Dasein. Dasein is the end point of “logos” and the end point of language of Being in its modes of saying and nearing, thinking and poetizing. The phrase, “to beings” always leads to thinking of Being and “logos.” Language is not central for Kockelmans; unfortunately for Kockelmans Dasein is central.

Conversely, the phrase “toward beings” describes a trajectory that is always on the way. On the way toward articulation in ordinary language, Being can never fully arrive in beings. Beings always pose limitations. Thus, “toward beings” describes the way Being is partly expressed in beings. Dasein can only in part express Being as it speaks to us as originary language. We must recall the vibrating effect and the transformational aspect of Ereignis, wherein Dasein is a part of Ereignis. Having heard
the Silence of Being, Dasein responds with ordinary language. Thus, we see that originary language cannot fully be captured by humanity.

Thus Kockelmans describes a third approach for Heidegger, the Saying of Being model. Kockelmans explains that Heidegger developed it between 1957 and 1959. Yet Kockelmans’ explanation of it is not without with some holdovers from the previous “logos” period of the 1940s. We shall explain it without the “logos” verbiage.

The Saying of Being model has its roots throughout all of Heidegger’s work. While the 1930s discussion on Hölderlin’s poetry helped Heidegger to clarify the relation between the thinker and the poet, the lectures on Stefan George in the 1950s led Heidegger into a deeper reflection on language and Being. While Hölderlin’s poetry convinced Heidegger that his language needed to be transformed to draw nearer to Being, George’s poetry drew Heidegger to be transformed in his own relation to language: the language of Being drew him. The two major works, “The Essence of Language” and “The Word” illustrate Heidegger’s second major “change” in his approach to Being as language. This shift is from a language model to a renunciation of language. Our relation to language is transformed. It is the movement of language moving us toward originary language.

Still, Kockelmans entitles his book, *On the Truth of Being*, not “On the Saying of Being.” With this conception Kockelmans nears Being, but still looks toward Being as thinking, not Saying. He still looks to “logos” as the bridge, rather than *Ereignis* as the way. As such he starts to develop, like Richardson, other Heideggers—not simply Heidegger I and II, but III and others. We, on the other hand, see transformation in Heidegger’s works; but, still, we see the single question before us: the question of Being.
as Saying, which moves us closer to Being than thought is able to move us. From this analysis of *On the Truth of Being*, we were able to overcome our first problem of the relation of Being and language as a model of thought. Being as Saying as the vibrating and transformational way-making is the solution.

**The Question of Language in Heidegger’s History of Being**

In order to address our second problem in this chapter—how can the relation of language to Being be gathered more intimately—we look to Robert Bernasconi, for he does indeed look toward the Saying of Being as originary language as manifested by *Ereignis* as its prime reflection.\textsuperscript{746} Rather than many Heideggers, Bernasconi rightly sees continuity in Heidegger’s work. This is our second aspect of way-making. In addition to Being as Saying as way-making, the vibrating and transformational aspect, from which all beings emerges; Being is, nonetheless, unified.

In *The Question of Language*, Bernasconi begins with the same theme, which we have just delineated in Kockelmans’ work, namely, the thinking of Being. The way that “logos” and “ἀ—λήθεια” of the 1940s and early 1950s reiterated the 1920’s and 1930’s language of *Being and Time*’s thrownness and projection—all belonging together in the thrown project (*geworfenen Entwurf*) is the monograph’s major theme. Thus, the poet and the thinker have similar domains in Being. Both articulate in part that the essence of language and the essence of Being are closely related. But in part both find ordinary language failing to express that which expresses the meaning of Being fully. But while

\textsuperscript{746} See Bernasconi, *The Question of Language* 49. Bernasconi offers us the traces of Heidegger’s transformation in his thinking while maintaining that there is still continuity.
thinking alone and poetry alone can never reach Being, neither can they reach Being together. Thus, we see once again Heidegger’s need to find a new way.

Bernasconi, like Kockelmans, discusses the effects of the inadequacies of language: sadness and renunciation. The poet, and we could easily include the thinker, renounces [verzichten] his hope of finding the meaning of Being through ordinary language. Bernasconi charts new ground when he describes this renunciation as Heidegger’s approach to a new way. It is not in spite of this renunciation, but through the “unsaying” that takes place in renunciation, which points to the still as of yet unexperienced domain of the truth of Being. Yet, as the perspicacious reader notices, Bernasconi still adheres to the truth of Being mindset at the beginning of his argument. Soon he discusses this domain as the “primordial non-essence of truth.” While we have discussed this renunciation before, Bernasconi offers a clear insight of this movement. It is the movement away from a Dasein-centered world view toward an experience of the meaning of Being. Sadness occurs for both poet and thinker when they experience this lack of control over their world. Bernasconi pens: “man encounters only himself [as] ‘the final delusion.’” For this man is truly sad.

Among the various ways of interpreting this effect of renunciation, Bernasconi now describes it as the Kehre. It is the turn away from a Dasein-centered, purely humanistic world view to one of “Being centered.” We disagree in this particular assessment of the Kehre, for Heidegger uses this term far earlier than in the 1950s—when he first comes across the notion of renunciation of ordinary language as the way of the meaning of Being—and far broader than a simple reference to ordinary language.

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747 The Question of Language 67.
748 The Question of Language 72.
Perhaps we have outlined Bernasconi’s conclusion in simplistic terms; but careful explication is not necessary to judge his premise as false. We need to offer only the counterexample of the “The Turning” (1949) when the term, “Kehre” was employed and delineated by Heidegger. It is not meant as renunciation. There exists at least a decade between turning and renunciation, between Kehre and Verzicht.

Bernasconi’s robust argument does have its merits; it places Ereignis at the center of his enquiry. He notices that while Heidegger came to understand Being and Time as arising from a single experience, that of oblivion of Being, his dialogue with George’s poem “Das Wort” directed Heidegger toward another experience; Heidegger underwent an experience with language.749

Bernasconi argues that this is the difference between Erfahrung and Erlebnis, between an experience of Angst and a lived-experience over a lifetime. While Being and Time led Heidegger to the oblivion of Being, “Das Wort” led Heidegger to a “saying not-saying” [sagendes Nichtsagen].750 The not-saying is not Heidegger succeeding in saying what others have not said. The triple negation of the previous sentence leads us closer to the way of Heidegger, infers Bernasconi. The “saying not-saying” is Erlebnis and our access to Ereignis. Erlebnis connotes the idea of a venturesome journey over time.751

As such, our access to Ereignis is not through logical proofs, nor persuasive arguments, but through the lived-experience which leads us to renounce apophantic language; language as assertion is inadequate to reach the meaning of Being. The long-

749 The Question of Language 81.
750 The Question of Language 77. See GA 11, Identität und Differenz: 66/Identity and Difference 77.
751 Both Rojcewicz and I find this treatment of Erlebnis to be specious. Erlebnis is always a pejorative term for Heidegger. Bernasconi’s introduction of this term as a way of describing experience seems misleading at best. How does one have a lived experience over time? Rojcewicz poignantly comments that there is no sense of experience over time. Moreover, Heidegger does not employ this word, “erlebnis” in his works.
in-coming realization for Heidegger—that the logic, the language and the philosophy of the first beginning fail—is the renouncing. It is both danger and a saving power. It arrives in prelude form as Ge-stell, the enframing mankind in modern technology. For Bernasconi, living with this danger is the access to the Erlebnis of Ereignis.\textsuperscript{752} We would simply say living with this danger is access to Ereignis.

\textit{Ereignis} is not another word for Being, nor is \textit{Erlebnis}. But for Bernasconi \textit{Erlebnis} names the long term experience which arises as the lack of any word to convey the withdrawal of Being as oblivion and as its remembrance [Andenken]. This Heidegger calls \textit{Ereignis}. It brings before the eyes as concealment what was once concealed entirely from the eyes. It brings before the eyes the un-traversable abyss, which words can never be attained. The way is via a double negative.\textsuperscript{753}

While Bernasconi describes this as \textit{Erlebnis}, the lived-experience of man, Heidegger de-centers man and calls the occurrence, \textit{Ereignis}. Bernasconi is quite accurate is his assessment of \textit{Ereignis} and \textit{Erlebnis} coming together for Heidegger as a singular moment of greater importance. Yet Bernasconi concludes his discussion on the question of language in Heidegger’s history of Being without looking at the \textit{Beiträge} wherein \textit{Ereignis} is described beyond the \textit{Erlebnis} of Dasein. Thus, Bernasconi describes the renunciation as Heidegger “breaking apart” of language around humanity.

Conversely, we would say that Da-sein is de-centered and language is placed into the foreground. While Bernasconi describes well the experience from Dasein’s experience, he fails to encounter the meaning of Being. Concluding his argument at this

\textsuperscript{753} Way-making has always been explained by Heidegger as a double negation. For this reason Bernasconi’s explanation above as a triple negation, including \textit{Erlebnis} should also advise the reader’s caution.
juncture as he does, Bernasconi allows the state of the question to remain focused on Dasein with *Erlebnis*. The *Beiträge* does not, nor should we.

Before we move onto our last part of this chapter, we must assess what we have learned thus far. The relation of language to Being can be gathered more intimately as the Saying of Being as originary language as manifested by *Ereignis*. In addition to Being as Saying as way-making, the vibrating and transformational aspect, from which all beings emerges, we now see continuity in Heidegger’s work as a singular quest for the question of Being, which now is intimately entwined, not with thought, but with language. With Being/beyng and language so intimately related, we have found the solution to our question of how language has unity. Its unity is the Saying of Being/beyng as Silence.

Despite the great strides Bernasconi has made on the relationship between *Erlebnis and Ereignis*, he still falls short of Heidegger’s goal of reaching the meaning of Being. One must ask why. In his preface, Bernasconi protests against his critics, who find some traces of Derrida’s philosophy in his interpretation. Despite his claims to the contrary, Bernasconi’s monograph and argument, as it stands, is more a matter of deconstructing the philosophy of the first beginning, than a leaping between the first beginning and the other beginning as Heidegger advises in the *Beiträge*. As such, it appears like a mode of deconstruction à la Derrida. There are other traces of Derrida. Namely, Bernasconi uses the term, “rupture,” a few too many times; it is a term associated with the falsely attributed deconstruction method of Derrida. Instead of the Heideggerian “freeplay” in the ontological difference, Bernasconi uses “rupture;”

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754 *The Question of Language* 12.
instead of history as “geschichtlich,” Berasconi calls it a series of “ruptures.” These are minor excursions; yet the fact remains, Berasconi doesn’t leap and misses the meaning of Being.

What “leaping” Berasconi does not undergo leads the reader to surmise: does this discussion on language appear merely as another step in the philosophy of the first beginning? Could it be a Hegelian tendency of Aufhebung? We shall see. While helpful in many ways, this particular work of Berasconi and his other essays approach Heidegger’s pathway as if it were indeed a negation of desire, especially on the topic of Erlebnis and renunciation. But Heidegger—and Berasconi, for the most part—undergoes more than a negation of desire, for negation of desire, nevertheless, still remains in the domain of the subject. Heidegger does leap from the philosophy of the first beginning toward the philosophy of the other beginning. Heidegger also outlines what the other beginning might look like. Leaving the charge of “Hegelian tendencies” for another scholar to discern, we opt instead to explore what that leap between the two beginnings entails.

755 The Question of Language 36.
757 Judith P. Butler describes persons in the twentieth-century as subjects of desire, which derive in part from Hegel. She writes: “Hegel tells us that negation is specified in self-consciousness as “absolute negation” (Phenomenology of Spirit ¶178), which distinguishes self-consciousness from other phenomena that embody negation in other ways.” See Butler, Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-century France (New York, NY: Columbia University, 1987) 41.
To explore the leap, we proceed toward answering the final question of this chapter: what is Dasein’s relation to Being? How does Being show itself? This is the Ereignis, wherein the subject-object distinction collapses. Kenneth Maly sets the framework of the Beiträge as the singular project of his book, Heidegger’s Possibility. Maly begins his argument where Bernasconi had finished: the crucial issue of renunciation. Maly describes this as the third major step in Heidegger’s works.

Within this step of renunciation we can focus on the relation of Being and Dasein. This relationship is illustrated through Being as Saying in the Ereignis. It enables us to see what is the “essence” or the “ownmost” of human beings and what is ownmost to language. Through renunciation we can move beyond the philosophy of the first beginning and leap toward the other beginning. It is not a renunciation of the philosophy of the first beginning, so as to disown it or to overcome it; rather, it is a leap that remains between the two—between the philosophy of the first beginning and the other beginning—and thus overcomes metaphysics.

It is not a renunciation of the subjectivity of a human person, but a leap into a new, fuller subjectivity that allows the human person the freedom to leap between philosophy of the first beginning and the other beginning. Then, as a human person, he does not delude himself that he is the center of the unfolding of Being as Saying. Such a

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758 The reader should recall that ascription of “Be-ing” or “be-ing” always refers to Heidegger’s “Seyn.” We have consistently used “be-ing.”
759 Maly, Heidegger’s Possibility, 7. The first two steps, as the reader knows, are the following: 1) Dasein as Being there; 2) the ontological difference as the difference of Being and beings. Our third is the renunciation and the movement into the Ereignis as the manifestation of Being. All three involve Seinsgeschichte, the history of Being, not as linear history, but history as unfolding. This is the topic of next chapter.
way cannot be seen merely via analytic thought or ordinary language, but employs\textsuperscript{760} both in order to seek Being as Saying. Maly describes this turn as the “essential turning” of en-owning\textsuperscript{761} and we call \textit{Seinsgeschichte}, the history of Being.

Maly describes the process as one wherein “Being says-itself to thinking, and human thinking, thus addressed, actively says, ‘back’ to that saying of being. These two belong in a single dynamic.”\textsuperscript{762} Let us describe the process in these terms from the \textit{Beiträge: Seyn/Sein} in its turning \textit{[Einkehr]} is as a concealment. But as a concealment, it reveals itself as a concealment. As a revealing concealment Being says as originary language: Saying \textit{[Sage]}]. This is heard by humans as Silence. Heard Silence is the abandonment \textit{[Verlassenheit]} of Being. Hearing Silence, humans are drawn near in need and respond to it as it is heard. It is heard and responded as response \textit{[Nachsagen]}. The essence of \textit{Nachsagen} is “logos.” All of the above occurs as one dynamic “process” and appears to us as \textit{Ereignis}.

\textit{Ereignis} can never be thought or experienced as ordinary language or described from a metaphysical construal of language. Both \textit{Erfahrung} and \textit{Erlebnis} fall short of \textit{Ereignis}. Rather, Being occurring as \textit{Ereignis} arrives primarily on its own, but in part with our help. Appearing in time and because Being has our help, Being can be said to have a history \textit{[Seinsgeschichte]}. For this reason Heidegger has many times found that the ascription that we have of Being is always inadequate; nevertheless in the crossing of the fourfold, i.e. the fourfold’s gathering-separation, Being is historical \textit{[geschichtlich]}. Heidegger maintains that Being manifests itself in time—and in part we experience it.

\textsuperscript{760} Heidegger employs both analytic thought and ordinary language, in the sense that Heidegger claims to leap between the philosophy of the first beginning, of which both analytic thought and language are part, and the philosophy of the other beginning.

\textsuperscript{761} Maly, \textit{Heidegger’s Possibility} 7.

\textsuperscript{762} \textit{Heidegger’s Possibility} 40.
Moreover, Being as Ereignis, manifesting itself in the fourfold is what Heidegger mean primarily by the Kehre. While in section 267 of the Beitrag the Kehre\textsuperscript{763} is an in-turning, now we see the manifestation of that in-turning through the fourfold is the cause of beyng-historical thinking. Through thought and experience, even through metaphysical construals, we devise what we think we heard, but Being always with lightning flash appears again and man is transformed. Thus Being transforms us, if we are open to it. We are closed to it when we remain fixed on own thoughts, our experiences, our metaphysical constructions. Open to Being, Being draws us from thought, experiences, and philosophy of the first beginning toward Being. Between the philosophy of the first beginning and the other beginning, we leap. In leaping, we are between. In leaping, we are not leaping from the first to the second, but leaping from the philosophy of the first beginning toward the other beginning. As between, man is brought near to Being as Saying, listening to the Silence and responding to it.

Having been brought near to Being, man is transformed. We are transformed with the realization that language is not ours, but we are its shepherd. Before beings take form in our world and language is uttered, we come to Being as Saying as originary language. Attuning ourselves to this, we are drawn into our ownmost “selves.” As we are drawn to Silence, we are led to shape language.

Our earliest shaping of language is as λόγος. Maly, following Heidegger’s “Das Wesen der Sprache,” writes that λόγος is the name both for word, and Being. As way-

\textsuperscript{763} The reader will recall Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann four ways of interpreting Kehre: 1) in division two of Being and Time, the Kehre describes the turn from the Zeitlichkeit of Dasein to the Temporalität of Being; 2) the turn from the fundamental ontology of Being and Time to beyng-historical thinking, generally characterized by the works of the 1930s and 1940s; 3) within the Beitrag the in-turning [Einkehre] within Ereignis; 4) and the turning from the abandonment of beyng. See Herrmann, Wege ins Ereignis: Zu Heideggers “Beiträgen zur Philosophie” (Frankfurt am Main, DE: Klostermann, 1994) 67-68. We are here referring specifically to Herrmann’s third way of interpreting the Kehre.
making [das Be-wēgende] it “gathers everything into the nearness of the over-against-one-another.”  
And it does this soundlessly, and it is called the ringing of the stillness [das Geläut der Stille.] Both language as linguistics and thinking find their essence here. From it, not “logos” but way-making we must interpret what we hear and place into words. It also transforms us. Thinking, poetry and ordinary language follow. Any discussion of language and its origins or its meaning arises from this originary site, which Maly calls the “discussion that opens.”

What is most originary about language is its Saying [Sage] as Being. As we learned from “On the Way to Language,” “Sagen” means to show, to let appear, to let the world appear. “Sagen” allows the world to appear as a concealing/revealing, as a holding sway. “Sagen” is revealed in a flash, and quickly recedes behind beings. As Heidegger reminds us: “The moving force in Showing of Saying is Owning.” [Das Regende im Zeigen der Sage ist das Eignen]. The showing as Saying is drawing us to our ownmost selves. This way of Saying is the way that Ereignis speaks. In speaking, it draws us to what is our ownmost.

The way that Saying speaks in Ereignis shows us that thinking and ordinary language are a part of that site. But we do not control it, nor is language or thought in our control. We arrive there at the site through Being, Being as Saying. This is way-making.

This site Heidegger admits is dark, and incomprehensible. For this reason we must move from clear concepts and logic, from that which we believe we know, and move toward a relationship with language that allows it to draw us. By renouncing the

764 Heidegger’s Possibility 45.
766 Heidegger’s Possibility 51.
delusion that we are in control of language and we know its concepts, we are drawn into a new relationship with language that draws us into new possibilities.

Maly draws us closer to this dark, incomprehensible site. He offers us possibilities of Saying and Being throughout his book. As such, his book is helpful. Yet the book, too, has some drawbacks. Many of the drawbacks are drawn in the chapters of introduction and conclusion. In any work which discusses possibilities, soon the possibilities can become so fanciful, that the possibilities, themselves, may become the obstacle rather than the way of Being as Saying.

Maly’s discussions of the possibilities of theoretical physics are interesting. Citing Stephen Hawking’s finite universe with no boundaries, Maly piques the interest of the trendy physics reader. Interesting too, is the human-versus-nature paradigm of a new holon-movement. Hans-Peter Dürr of the University of München, (a former colleague of Heisenberg) asks philosophers for a new “holon,” a new model of particle-physics and transcendence."769 Interesting too are the questions of string theory and the “vibrating” nature of Being. All these questions one could argue are indeed interesting. Interesting, yet they miss the Heideggerian question of Being. Maly seems to have lost the original question in these flights of fanciful thought. He sometimes loses Being for the reductionisms of transformation and dynamism as ends in themselves. But overall, the body of the text remains close to Heidegger’s question.

769 Dr. Hans-Peter Dürr, “Physics and Transcendence,” paper presentation during the conference of the First World Congress of Jesuits and Philosophy in Frankfurt, Germany, given on September 4, 2007. This provocative paper describes the current models of particle physics as out-dated. A new model would show constant movement with sporadic tipping points that redirect movements of the particles. Such might be an application of the model of Heideggerian scholarship, which I later advocate.
Before we move on to our next chapter to see how new possibilities unfold, let us gather some of our separated aspects of Being as Saying together. In addition to Being as Saying as way-making, the vibrating and transformational aspect, from which all beings emerges; it is, nonetheless, unified. Being as Saying is the source. It draws us near. It does not dictate our life as fate; but we have a two-fold destiny because Being is two-fold. It makes our way. To find that way, we must have the proper awareness of language. Being as Saying does guide us in this gathering-separateness, in which we are drawn and transformed into its design. It hints and beckons us. To this unfolding aspect of Being as Saying we now turn.
PART III
URALTES EIGNIS
CHAPTER NINE

Unfolding

Die Sprache ist nicht ein verfügbares Werkzeug, sondern dasjenige Ereignis, das über die höchste Möglichkeit des Menschseins verfügt.\textsuperscript{770}

If the last chapters were described as investigating the “essence” of Being as Saying, then this chapter would describe the method of Being as Saying as unfolding—be-wêgen. But describing these chapters in this fashion falls into inflexible, metaphysical conceptual jargon. Unfolding is not the method of Being;\textsuperscript{771} Being is not a datum. Being as Saying is unfolding—unfolding is Being as Saying. This chapter shall address what this sentence might mean, while our concluding chapter lights the way of those who followed in the wake of Heidegger’s unfolding.

Through these two chapters we can discern better what unfolding can mean. They comprise this final section entitled, “Uraltes Eignis,” meaning age-old self showing.

Being has through the ages shows itself as itself and we are draw closer to our ownmost.

\textsuperscript{770} GA 4: 38. Keith Hoeller’s translation reads: “Language is not a tool at man’s disposal, but that primal event [Ereignis] which disposes of the highest possibility of man’s being,” “Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry,” Elucidations 56.

\textsuperscript{771} In “Seminar in Zähringen 1973,” Heidegger explains the difference between a way and a method: “In philosophy there are only paths [Wege]; in the sciences, on the contrary, there are only methods [Methoden], that is, modes of procedure [Verfahrensweisen].” GA 15: 399/“Seminar in Zähringen 1973,” Four Seminars 80.
How that appears in every epoch is both the same but also new. Unfolding always occurs as Being as Saying. Its way-making is the selfsame; yet every epoch sees it anew. As such we redirect our attention to the ontic appearing of Being.

In the last chapter we outlined Ereignis. In a brief, but helpful summary let us repeat the chapter. Seyn/Sein, through its turning in [Einkehr], conceal. But in concealing, Being reveals itself as a concealment. As a concealment it says that it is indeed a concealment, as originary language as Saying [Sage]. This is heard by humans as Silence. Silence is the abandonment [Verlassenheit] of Being. Hearing Silence, humans are drawn near and respond to it as we hear it. It is heard and subsequently our response to Silence is an after-response [Nachsagen]. The essence of Nachsagen is “logos.” Since it is dialogical as an after-response, language is primarily dialogical. From it, all forms of perception, logic, thought and language emerge as separate, while gathered by originary language.

Heidegger describes the above depiction as the “unfolding” [Die Entfaltung]. As the “unfolding” Being unfolds out as λέγειν, as a showing, a saying by laying forth. Heidegger taught us in What is Called Thinking? that νοεῖν unfolds itself [entfaltet sich] out as λέγειν. Since Being is two-fold as Saying in Silence—it is a concealing/revealing, it follows that λέγειν unfolds as λόγος as twofold: as ὀλθεῖσθαι, as a not-forgetting. But more importantly, we learned in the last chapter that λόγος is a mode of originary language, not originary language a mode of λόγος. Language, then, belongs to Saying as its movement unfolds [entfaltet] in the nearness of the fourfold of all

772 This “turning in” should not be confused with a return to Parmenides’s “One.” See GA 15: 394/”Seminar in Zähringen 1973,” Four Seminars 77.
773 GA 8: 208/What is Called Thinking? 206.
Finally, Being as Saying always already has a twofold component: it reveals in its concealment. Heidegger’s Being as Saying, then, needs man to respond, perhaps even complete its Saying. It is dialogical, in the sense that Being and beings need one another.

Ordinary language flows, or better said, unfolds from originary language. This is not to say that this “from-toward” phraseology is primarily spatial, temporal, or causal. Rather, unfolding is relational in such a way which allows spatial, temporal and causal relationships to occur. More precisely, unfolding speaks of the destiny of Being. We noticed in earlier chapters the destiny of Being [Seinsgeschick] is two-fold; Being always unfolds historically as a revealing/concealing. Thus, the Saying of Being as originary language unfolds historically.

Heidegger holds that ordinary language is twofold because originary language is twofold; it speaks of Being and the thing of which it speaks. It is dialogical because Being as Saying is dialogical. In this way language is a sign, as Being and Time illustrated. In the worldhood of Dasein, the totality of references has an elaborate web of meanings. Ordinary language of Dasein has corresponding polyvalence. Later in 1955 Heidegger explains that for this reason language is polysemic—having many meanings. While polysemic, language still is more fundamentally twofold; it is ambiguous. The ambiguity springs from the fact that Being is two-fold. Whenever we are speaking of language, we can notice a trace of the Being of beings in every being. Language points both to some “thing” and to Being. This ambiguity unfolds historically.

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775 GA 2: 107/110.
776 GA 10: 143/The Principle of Reason 96.
777 GA 10: 143/The Principle of Reason 96.
Thus the title of this section directs our attention to the way unfolding occurs historically through time in epochs. It is not the occurrence as Western philosophy has conceived thus far. How does it appear? We must engage Western philosophy, to know what it is not, then we leap between the philosophy of the first beginning and the philosophy of the other beginning. Between them we shall come closer to the unfolding of Being as Saying, unfolding.

**UNFOLDING**

**Reversal of Hegel’s *Aufhebung***

But we must be clearer on what we mean by unfolding historically. History is not Hegel’s ladder of ascent, as Robert Bernasconi calls the Hegelian system, or even as a ladder of descent as the so-called right Hegelians might refer to Hegel’s *Aufhebung*. Rather, Heidegger’s history of the growing oblivion of Being was a reversal of Hegel.\(^\text{778}\) Not an ascent or descent at all, Heidegger’s unfolding of Being is as Saying; unfolding is as a showing. Historically, unfolding for Heidegger is the showing of the Being of beings as Saying. Being manifests itself as *Ereignis* as the gathering/separation of the fourfold with the help of mortals. Being shows itself in beings. From *Ereignis* and through beings, our notions of space and time follow. This is what Heidegger means by

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\(^{778}\) Bernasconi, *Question of Language* 2.
historically unfolding;⁷⁷⁹ it is the originary relational way that allows our models of space and time.

Our experience of the history of philosophy, then, unfolds as the destiny of Being for Heidegger, not as an unfolded ladder of ascent and descent. Rather, it is the point of constant reentry into the philosophy of the first beginning, including Hegel’s ladder. Conversely, the experience of history for Hegel comes in the shape of the history of Spirit. While it might seem to the reader that the distinction of these two descriptions of the history of philosophy is merely a semantic distinction; they are different in more than linguistic ways. They are very different because each experiences the “end” of philosophy differently. For Hegel philosophy occurs as a goal extended through time, while Heidegger’s occurs as a showing.⁷⁸⁰ It shows by reentering the philosophy of the first beginning, and for this reason Heidegger’s notion of philosophy is a showing in and through time.

The “experiencing” of the experiencing of philosophy also occurs differently for Hegel and Heidegger. Hegel’s experience is related to the ongoing parousia—as Bernasconi describes it—the ongoing, increasing, showing of Spirit as presence throughout time. Heidegger’s experience of the destiny of Being is letting the nonapparent appear as apparent.⁷⁸¹ While Hegel outlines for us rules of presencing, Heidegger steps back from the rules of presencing and, in Heidegger’s phrase, leaps between rules of presencing and remembers it as commemoration.

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⁷⁷⁹ While I follow Maly on this point, Rojcewicz disagrees. Rojcewicz holds that what Heidegger here is referring to “is a change in the way the revealing/concealing of Being has taken place.” This seems more in line with Richardson’s hypothesis.

⁷⁸⁰ One could easily question whether there is an end at all for Heidegger, since an “end” is a term from the philosophy of the first beginning.

⁷⁸¹ Bernasconi, Question of Language 83.
But Heidegger’s way is not the converse of Hegelian dialectics, for that too would be replacing one metaphysical system with another. Rather Heidegger’s way is a leap between the rules of presencing and stepping back, allowing the abyss between them to emerge as the ungrounding “ground.” As such Heidegger’s way is not the converse of Hegel. Heidegger’s experiencing of philosophy is the way of remembrance [Andenken] in the 1940s and emended as the way of meditative thinking [besinnliche Denken] in the 1950s and 1960s.

Thus for Heidegger, “historically unfolding” shows the possible ways in which Being shows itself. This means for Heidegger “historically unfolding” is the way Ereignis manifests Being. It is a matter of moving from the philosophy of the first beginning, leaping toward the other beginning, all the while remaining between the two, Being’s unfolding [Die Entfaltung] has, and does not have, characteristics described by the philosophy of the first beginning.

These relational characteristics of unfolding have been outlined variously and inadequately throughout history as external and internal, or transcendent and immanent. We saw how Duns Scotus assisted Heidegger’s understanding of relation. Scotus, amending Aristotle, developed the category of relation which included both external and internal characteristics. Likewise, unfolding for Heidegger is a relational “category,” but primarily one of internality, not one of external extension. Noticing the philosophy of the first beginning’s understanding of unfolding as extension (seen strongly in Descartes), Heidegger overcomes it by reentering it. Heidegger’s understanding is not one of medieval ontology, nor does it illustrate modern methodus as its immanent framework.

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782 This term is used for the first time in Contributions, § 262, GA 65: 318/451-452.
which Leibniz might define as *ratio* or Spinoza might define as *natura*. Nor its opposite is Heidegger’s meaning. Kant and Hegel both saw unfolding as transcendental. In particular, Hegel noted the unique characteristic of language’s unfolding as having both external and internal aspects.\(^{784}\)

Along with the relational aspect of unfolding the question emerges in the first beginning of “where” the relation is located; between what does it relate? The relation was located variously as solely in the material world, or solely in the intellect, a connection between the world of ideas and the material world, or in the human person, or even in the Absolute Mind. The late modern philosophers in general saw unfolding as located in consciousness. Since the late modern period philosophical labels could be ascribed in broad, sweeping generalizations as idealism and materialism, and for this reason tend to oversimplify. Kant tried to bridge this division with his synthetic *a priori* and Hegel then tied to unite them in dialectical fashion, as extended consciousness through time.

Unfolding for Heidegger avoids all these pitfalls of the philosophy of the first beginning and leaps toward the other beginning. Certainly unfolding for Heidegger is not of the Hegelian dialectic, given as progress. Unfolding originary language as Saying is not a relationship of linear cause and effect, but is an unfolding of possibilities of limitations\(^ {785}\) from which our conceptions of Space-Time causality subsequently emerge. Unfolding shows apparent what was non-apparent; thus unfolding emerges as possibility.

\(^{784}\) See *Phenomenology of Spirit*, wherein Hegel argues in the section on religion, that the unity of self-conscious Spirit with itself is blended in such elements as language, which have an outer that has retreated into itself, and an inner that utters or expresses itself out of itself and in its own self, into thought ….”  
*Phänomenologie des Geistes* §527/*Phenomenology of Spirit* 424.

\(^{785}\) In the introductory chapter of *Heidegger’s Possibilities*, Maly entertains a notion of unfolding as characteristic of spatiality. While it is true that extension is a condition of space, Heidegger’s unfolding is not simply spatial or temporal but the possibility for both. See *Heidegger’s Possibility* 5.
But possibility always emerges limited as a destiny of Being, that it to say, it emerges as twofold, showing beings and the Being of beings. Simply said, unfolding for Heidegger is more originary to any of the conceived understandings of the philosophy of the first beginning. And yet the leap is the site between the philosophy of the first beginning and the other beginning.

Showing beings and the Being of beings is more than observing simple principles of causality; it is more primordial than perception as sensation in general or perception as given by Kant’s unity of apperception. Instead, in Ereignis we see the fourfold [Geviert] emerging as a complex, multivalent set of influences that lay out possible situations, from which we can derive principles of causality, time and space. Indeed we oftentimes derive incorrectly such principles. For instance in our epoch, it appears that we are independent subjects, viewing objective nature with established principles, but this subject/object dichotomy, for Heidegger and we argue, is derived from the fourfold, of which we as mortals are but one element in the relational gathering/separation of the fourfold as manifested in Ereignis.

Kenneth Maly describes this historical unfolding in *Heidegger’s Possibility*. Citing the Beiträge, Maly argues that “be-ing itself must enown thinking to itself.” Barring his awkward phraseology, we hold that Maly still draws out an important notion of unfolding of Being as historical. Being as Silence draws all beings. Drawing as Silence, Being draws Dasein as well as thinking unto itself. That is to say that thinking

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786 In each of Heidegger’s depictions of Kant or Hegel’s philosophy, Kantian and Hegelian scholars would find unhelpful Heidegger’s reading. While we aim for accuracy, our purposes here encourage us to move forward, since our topic is not an exhaustive comparative study of Kant or Hegel with Heidegger.

787 The reader should notice that our discussion avoids here our later, and fruitful, discussion of how Dasein might properly emerge as part of the fourfold.

isn’t simply a human affair while reflecting on observable data and principles. Instead, thinking is drawn toward Being to be more like the destiny of Being is; Being as Saying is twofold and thinking, following Being, is drawn to be twofold. Being as Saying unfolds in the Ereignis historically; Being as Saying also unfolds in the Ereignis as drawing thinking unto itself. More precisely, Ereignis is “between” the outward flowing of historical patterns and the timeless clearing of the now. Ereignis occurs as Seinsgeschichte. This is what we have argued as Heidegger’s fundamental understanding of Kehre, from which all tertiary understandings of history and turning derive.

Described in terms of the philosophy of the first beginning, Being has both indwelling and outward flowing characteristics as Being as Saying; also in terms of the philosophy of the first beginning, unfolding occurs between man, ideas and the world. Described in terms of Heidegger’s meditative thinking, Ereignis manifests Being. Unfolding’s clearing site is located as the gathering/separatedness of the fourfold—between earth, sky, gods and mortals—manifested as Ereignis.

While man is no longer the sole clearing site of Being, manifestation of Ereignis nevertheless needs man to play a part in the fourfold. Hearing Being as Saying as Silence, Da-sein is drawn to respond. This is the other important notion of unfolding. Not only is thinking drawn to Being, but also Da-sein is drawn toward Being as Saying. Maly would describe this as Da-sein’s being “enowned.” Again prescinding from the “enowning” language, we simply say that Da-sein is drawn ever closer to who Da-sein is: a listener of Being. Thus Da-sein is transformed in the listening. This is what Richardson understands as the Kehre and we argued was a subsequent effect of the originary Kehre.
What are the implications of this unfolding for Da-sein? At the site of the Riss, or the ontological difference, man notices Being and beings. As has already been described in many ways, the site of the de-cision or the Riss, man has, what has been called in various ways, as freedom or liberty. Freedom and liberty invoke connotations of license to do as one would wish. Rather than freedom or liberty, the opening site of de-cision does not lend itself to unlimited possibilities, for the Riss still has the same “characteristics” of the twofold destiny of Being. License to do as one wishes, when one wishes, now is seen incompletely as part of the philosophy of the first beginning, as the subject’s willing, making a choice, or even being willful. It lacks the twofold character of Being as Saying: showing beings and the Being of beings as the ontological difference.

Instead, man is drawn to the Riss, and is transformed by its dif-ference. Rather than freedom, man is drawn to listen to his ownmost “self.” Drawn to the Riss, man is drawn to Being’s Silence. Drawn, man is transformed by his renunciation of language’s inability to express properly the ontological difference, or the Ereignis. Having been transformed, man is open to Being’s call. Man is disposed [verfügt] to Being. Man is then drawn to dwell properly.

Verfügen

“Verfügen” is the second important distinction of unfolding. Drawn to Being, man is transformed to dwell properly. What does “verfügen” entail? The common translations of the German word, “verfügen” are given as the following: “to command,” “to dispose,” “to enact,” “to decree,” “to order,” and “to regulate.” One might say that
Being, in drawing, commands man not unlike *Sein und Zeit*, but now in the sense that man is transformed by the Silence. We now define “*verfügen*” precisely as “service.” Thus, man is at the disposal of Being; Da-sein is at the service of Being. The human will of the philosophy of the first beginning lies solely in the domain of the subject. As Da-sein is part of the fourfold, as Being manifests itself as *Ereignis, verfügen* lies between the subject and the object, it resides “in” Being. *Verfügen* is not simply freedom, but it also draws Da-sein back to Being, to be of service to Being’s unfolding. Thus we are free only to the extent that we are at Being’s disposal.

Language is the way we are at Being’s service. It is through ordinary language that man comes to the realization of man’s inability to characterize Being fully. In renouncing ordinary language as a tool at man’s disposal, he is transformed. But language is the way, not as a tool in the usual meaning of tool. Rather, as Heidegger writes: “Language is not a tool at man’s disposal, but that primal event [*Ereignis*] which disposes of the highest possibility of man’s being.” [*Die Sprache ist nicht ein verfügbares Werkzeug, sondern dasjenige Ereignis, das über die höchste Möglichkeit des Menschseins verfügt.*] Language is at the service [*verfügen*] of the event, *Ereignis*, not as mere tool, but as the unfolding “tool” of *Ereignis*. Through language, more precisely, through the renunciation of language, Da-sein is drawn to his ownmost as one element of the fourfold in the gathering/separation of *Ereignis* as the manifestation of Being. Being drawn, Da-sein comes to de-cision.

789 To assist the reader in this new meaning of de-cision, one could recall the common German phrase: “*Verfügen Sie über mich.*” Translated into English the phrase means, I am at your disposal in the sense that the question: “How may I help you?” conveys. Thus, we are at Being’s disposal.

790 *Heidegger’s Possibility* 59. Maly argues that de-cision has nothing in common with making a choice. We would argue that is has something to do with choosing, but certainly not everything. Also we might quibble with Maly’s phrase that *verfügen* “resides in Being.” Perhaps a better way of conveying Heidegger’s meaning is that man abides as Da-sein in service to Being.

Thus, the de-cision of Da-sein allows the opening of the clearing; it opens up the “ontological space” for concealing/revealing. It involves Da-sein as part of the fourfold as gathering-separating. It occurs as the unfolding of Being. It occurs as \textit{Ereignis}. As such it allows the moment of happening [\textit{Augenblick}], but more so it opens Da-sein to be more properly who he is: the shepherd of language. As Maly writes: “The coming-apart is at the same time a gathering of that open, midpoint, time-space for be-ing human.”\textsuperscript{792}

Thus, \textit{Ereignis} is not simply the manifestation of Being, but it is also the manifestation of beings and most decisively, it is the manifestation of Da-sein in de-cision.

Unfolding is the manifestation of Being in \textit{Ereignis}. Unfolding manifests as Being as Saying through the fourfold. Man as mortal is one element of the fourfold and; at the same time, Da-sein is the site of language as we are drawn toward Being, to dwell, to think, and to build. Language is the way; Da-sein is the site of the way. Man, then is peculiar in that he is but part of the manifestation of Being, but also the only way by which we come to know the manifestation of Being in the fourfold. Man is both appropriated by Being and the interpreter of that appropriation; man is twofold; man is twofold because Being is twofold. We are fated to be open to this appropriation, in the sense that appropriation is not the sole accomplishment of our wills. This appropriation occurs ambiguously as a “gathering” and a “going away.”

\textsuperscript{792} \textit{Heidegger’s Possibility} 60.
Gathering-going away

Maly describes this de-cision not simply as a gathering together of the fourfold, but as well a going-away. Both gathering [hinein] and going-away [entgehen] are held in dynamic tension. This dynamic tension, Maly calls a con-tension; he also calls it “πόλεμος,” the Greek word usually translated as “war.” While war or confrontation seems too strong a meaning, there certainly is tension. Maly uses Heidegger’s translation of Heraclitus, Fragment 53 for the source of πόλεμος. It is the tension of the concealing/revealing of Being vis-à-vis beings. What is being gathered and what is going-away? Both Being and beings are involved in this relational tension of the de-cision.

This con-tension of Maly is exactly what Heidegger simply calls “Ereignis” in the Beiträge. Maly borrows from section 267. The characteristics of the going-away [entgegen] are the descriptions of the first five of the eight aspects of the Ereignis as unfolding. The last three are the gathering [hinein] aspects of Ereignis. Yet these do not occur as oscillations of gathering, then going out; nor is it one of going-out then gathering. Rather the gathering and going-out is always already in dynamic tension. While we have already discussed the eight aspects of Being in detail in chapter two, here we shall highlight their going-away vis-à-vis gathering as the mode of unfolding.

Maly, following the Beiträge, lists the going-out aspects as: Er-eignung [Appropriation as an over-all process], Ent-scheidung [de-cision], Ent-gegnung [countering], Ent-setzung [setting-free], and Ent-zug [withdrawal]. It must be said that

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791 Heidegger’s Possibility 61.
794 GA 65, §267: 470-477.
Er-eignung is not so much a going-out aspect, but more so the completion of the overall process. Its prefix, “er-” conveys the completion of any action. The remaining four terms do, as Maly indicates, convey a “going-out” more properly. Taking the meaning of this prefix to its fullest extent, Maly highlights the “going-out” of Being. Er-eignung is the overall process of going-out. De-cision [Ent-scheidung] is projecting-opening of Being. This projecting-opening is the ongoing strife between “world” and “earth.” “De-cision” is not the actual strife of the “world” and “earth,” but “de-cision” emerges out from the cleft [Riss] as would a rune etched into a tablet. The gods and man are drawn out as countering [Ent-gegnung] each other and are set-free. Setting-free [Ent-setzung] distinguishes beyng [Seyn] from beings. Moreover, this setting-free is also the withdrawal [Ent-zug] in the domination of machination. These aspects of Ereignis all have the “going-out” characteristic. One might see here the very clear indication of unfolding of beings from Being. But this falsely would limit unfolding to the philosophy of the first beginning.

797 Heidegger’s terminology of employing hyphenation conveys that while emerging out of the strife between “earth” and “world,” “de-cision” is never separated from the strife. Thus, the “de-” of decision indicates a “from or out of” [Ent-], which is more primordial than spatial, temporal, or even causal relationships.
798 The philosophy of the first beginning has described unfolding as “going out” through the years in many ways. Some notable examples are the emanation theories of the Neo-Platonic tradition and of religious traditions. Neo-Platonists who are associated with emanation are Plotinus, Proclus and Porphyry. Religious emanation theories include more famously the Kabbalistic theory and that of Albert the Great. Even St. Thomas Aquinas’ discussion of the procession of creation from God might be, with certain restrictions, be placed among emanation theories. Emanation theories include an out-flowing aspect called “prohodos” or “procession.” See Enneads, V: ii: 1.
Yet, unfolding also includes “enfolding,” the turning in [Einkehr] of beyng799 as part of Ereignis. Maly describes these aspects as the gathering [hinein] of Ereignis. The last three of the eight aspects of beyng as enfolding are: Einfachheit [simpleness], Einzigkeit [uniqueness], and Einsamkeit [aloneness]. Simpleness [Einfachheit] is the relation simpliciter of the Ereignis. Rather than imagining that beyng is due to the relation of the “between” between gods and man, we see that Ereignis is indeed the relation of the “between” between gods and man. Beyng is simple. Beyng as a mark of simpleness is unique, in that beyng alone designates modes of beyng. Beyng is uniqueness [Einzigkeit], from which all varying modes of Being derive, whether as concealing or revealing. Beyng’s uniqueness grounds its aloneness [Einsamkeit] and surrounds itself only with the nothing [das Nichts]. All three aspects have the “ein” prefix, which follow “ein” of “Einkehr,” of turning-in. One might falsely presume that this is an enfolding as opposed to unfolding. This too would limit these aspects to the philosophy of the first beginning.800

As gathering-going away, Being is always two-fold, a holding sway, a concealing/revealing.801 It is never a process of procession, and then recession. Instead, the elements of the gathering-going away are held in constant tension. This tension characterizes Being as Saying as Silence and Silence as Being as Saying. Being shows itself in its Silence and Being is Silent in its showing. Being is always already twofold.

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799 To remind the reader, the Being/beyng distinction is one which is not consistently employed through all the works of Heidegger. But as we argued earlier, in section 267 of the Beiträge and “The Turning” in GA 79, the distinction is a finely tuned relation. The distinction offered is a way to indicate Being in general and having a history on the one hand, and beyng as without history on the other hand.
800 Related to “procession” of the emanation theory, the Neo-Platonists included “epistrophe” or “recession” as part of its emanation theory.
Now that we have looked at the Being “side” of Being as Saying as unfolding, let us now look at the “unfolding” side of Being as Saying. That is to say, let us look at ordinary language. Though we must always be conscious of the fact that there are never “sides,” for all of the previous paragraphs and that which follows is all unfolding of Being as Saying. Also, it would be wrong-headed to imagine that Heidegger is searching for the origin of language.\(^{802}\)

Ordinary language must have the same twofold characteristic: holding sway, concealing/revealing, gathering/separating. Ordinary language is ambiguous because Being is twofold. Conversation is both a listening and a speaking. Poetry is both a revealing and concealing. The study of linguistics shows us that language is both revealing expression in a concealed structure. Language both grants as saying something, but also conceals by holding back other words and ideas. Ironically, apophantic statements as assertion cover up meaning\(^{803}\) and the apophatic tradition in theology reveals through not-saying. Each and every interpretation then conceals and reveals. This is not to say that every interpretation reveals and conceals correctly. But it is to say that every interpretation is twofold, a concealing/revealing.

Heidegger warns against a strong reliance on language as linguistics. For linguistics disseminates itself and refuses to listen to Being. For this reason language appears as fixed, as a tool for man’s usage, a tool that adequately bridges things and ideas. But these are all false appearances of language. Language as linguistics is not

\(^{802}\) See GA 85, §46 “Ursprung;” 52/On the Essence of Language 42. Heidegger explores in contra-distinction to Herder, not the metaphysical essence of language, but what is most proper to language. While an interesting early work of 1939, On the Essence of Language doesn’t add to our present thesis.

\(^{803}\) Heidegger’s Possibility 94.
adequate simply for its false appearance of competency, but it is not adequate more so because in its false appearances: it conceals Being.

But all is not lost, for in realizing the inadequacy of language, man renounces both his command of language and language’s ability to reach completely Being. In the renunciation, man is drawn to Being and is led toward meditative thinking. Thus, language can lead to the possibility where words lead to the region where both poetry and thought have similar domains as λόγος. But remarkably so, the renunciation of ordinary language leads to the Silence of originary language. As such ordinary language has the trace of Being as Saying. This is the unfolding of Being as Saying.

One final remark must be mentioned on the relation of Unfolding and the philosophy of the first beginning. While we have distinguished sufficiently Heidegger’s way as con-tension, we may have led the reader inadvertently onto other paths. If the relation of unfolding is not one of procession or recession in time, then it might be surmised that we are speaking of relations of extension, of the mind and body akin to Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza; or that we are speaking of “unfolding” as a relation of difference and repetition à la early Deleuze, relation as “territorialization” and “deterritorialization” on planes of immanence and transcendence of the later Deleuze and Guatteri or the relation as the “mathematical” of Badiou. These philosophers have used the term unfolding and have referred to unfolding and the fold in ways that are not consistent with Heidegger’s meaning of unfolding. Each would be far afield of Heidegger’s thinking on “unfolding” in a variety of ways as either too humanistic, too
Way-making

Rather than stepping down the path of the first beginning, let us leap to Heidegger’s unfolding of Being as Saying. While it may seem as though the two “sides” of language—originary and ordinary—are bridged by the Ereignis, they are not bridged at all. Rather, they are the site of Ereignis in con-tension, as gathering-going away. It does not simply show us the way, but as Heidegger explains it is way-making, “be-wëgen.”

Be-wëgen, therefore, leads us to proceed cautiously. We barely know what our relationship to words is. We hardly know how language works, as Maly claims. Language is most helpful when it shows us its boundaries. At the point of its limitations, language shows its possibilities. Language draws us toward our boundaries and relations. Most importantly, language unfolding as be-wëgen transforms us.

Seeing how be-wëgen of Being as Saying transforms us, we are now able to reenter the discussion of what Heidegger means by his new phenomenology. If be-wëgen is way-making, if it is transforming us as we are drawn near to Silence; if, by showing itself Being as Saying brings us to our ownmost and we are part of the fourfold, then phenomenology can no longer be defined solely as Heidegger first defined it in Being and

804 Our purpose is not to outline or compare in an in-depth fashion Heidegger’s meaning of “unfolding” with that of those of major modern and contemporary philosophies. While interesting, each would be a vast study in of itself.

805 Heidegger’s Possibility 83.
Time as that which shows itself in the very way that it shows itself. While the phenomenology of Being and Time is not false, we see the further implications of what showing itself means.\textsuperscript{806} Phenomenology now also means that in showing itself Being transforms beings.

We see how the phenomenology of Heidegger unfolds. From Being and Time of Heidegger’s earliest period and through the destructive retrieval toward the Ereignis in the middle period and finally the meditative thinking as the lens through which Ereignis shows itself in Heidegger’s later works, phenomenology shows itself as it transforms. Phenomenology for Heidegger is way-making. While all three periods include within phenomenology the meaning that it is the study of that which shows itself in the very way that it shows itself. The later period looks closer at the way Being shows itself. Not simply though Dasein does Heidegger hold that Being shows itself, but through the fourfold.

When simple phenomenology appears as occurring through man’s eyes alone, it appears as man’s project. His language appears at times ontically, as a tool. The world is at man’s disposal. Man builds technology and political society to fit into man’s metaphysical worldview. Technology outpaces man’s ability to control, finally

\textsuperscript{806} As early as Being and Time, Heidegger noticed that Dasein’s fundamental mode of Being is one of “resoluteness” or openness to Being [Erschlossenheit], which involves some submission [Angewiesenheit] of Dasein to the world and to Being, such that Being reveals itself through Dasein. See GA 2, §18.

Still, for Heidegger in Being and Time, phenomenology is a study of that which shows itself, as in the case of Being, or in general shows what is apparent, while Heidegger later preferred to call his phenomenology “a phenomenology of the inapparent [eine Phänomenologie des Unscheinbaren],” as presented in his 1973 Zähringen Seminars. See GA 15: 399/“Seminar in Zähringen 1973,” Four Seminars 80.

Rojcewicz claims that already in Being and Time a phenomenology of the inapparent is present, that is to say the phenomenon of phenomenology is what first and for the most part does not show itself. I have yet to find this the case in Being and Time, since Heidegger explicitly defines phenomenology there as the study of that which shows itself as itself. We, for the most part, do not see properly, but it seems that this “opacity” is due more to man’s inauthentic stance toward Being, than this stronger “non-showing” stance of Being offered in his new phenomenology.
“enframing” and machination draw us toward danger and toward the saving power.

Through man’s eyes, all appears purely in human terms. But this cannot hold.

For, in a flash, Being appears. Realizing the saving power, man is drawn to listen and through destructive retrieval tries to rebuild, tries to relearn that man is not in control. Man realizes that he is but one of the elements of the fourfold, becomes more aware of the Silence of Being as Saying and abides more authentically. But as man rebuilds new structures to live more authentically, these new structures of polity, religion and psychology, even green technology entangle man and beguile him once again such that he believes that he can control his destiny. Technology builds and machination and enframing draw us toward danger and the saving power. Once again Being appears in a flash as Ereignis.

While it may seem to the reader that such a flash is what we might call novelty; it is not the case, for Being is always as holding sway. It may appear novel at the time, but that would only be a semblance. What has occurred in machination is a movement away from Being as Saying.

Maly describes unfolding as like a dance between the role of humans and that which is “thrown” to humans. While this is not entirely different from Dasein’s role as given in Being and Time, the noteworthy emphasis from the time of the Beiträge onward Heidegger draws out the implications that Dasein isn’t the focus of the revealing/concealing of Being. Rather, man, as mortals in conjunction with the gods, earth, and sky, are involved in the gathering/separation of the manifestation of Being as Ereignis. Maly portrays this dance in the following way: “The dance is between

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807 Rojciewicz emphasizes that fact that the condition of this flash has little to do with man’s inability to retain Being’s appearance because of its brevity, but more so Being is constantly appearing and constantly withdrawing in favor of beings. We concur.
emergence and interpretation, between the role of humans (the enowned throwing open of the throw of be-ing, which Da-sein does) and the emerging unfolding that throws itself to Da-sein.” In other words, Ereignis is both appearing and interpretation, both hermeneutics and phenomenology. What is different in the phenomenology for later Heidegger is the fact of Da-sein’s decreasing role and Being’s increasing role in Ereignis.

Ereignis with meditative thinking is through man’s eyes but with the addendum that Ereignis is showing through man. Being and Time framed the site of clearing with Dasein. Dasein uncovers Being and time. Heidegger worked beyond this notion of unfolding. Now “unfolding” is seen as manifestation of Being as Saying in Ereignis. What determines both, time and Being, in their own, that is, in their belonging together [Zussamengehöören], “we shall call: Ereignis,” writes Heidegger. Ereignis is now thought in the light of what becomes manifest in our looking ahead [Vor-sicht] toward Being and toward time as destiny and as extending, to which time and Being belong. Being and time are “matters” [Sachen]; they are not things. The “and” between them is left indeterminate [Unbestimmt] in their relation to each other [ihre Beziehung zueinander]. Ereignis is no longer presencing, like phenomenology, but holding sway as looking ahead [Vor-sicht]. This always indeterminate character typifies Heidegger’s new phenomenology: Being through ordinary language draws us to originary language, to itself. It is indeterminate in that the possibility is always open, never determined, even while we are drawn to originary language.

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808 Maly, Heidegger’s Possibility 11.
809 GA 14: 24/On Time and Being 19.
Vor-sicht

From this insight, Heidegger writes in 1963 “Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie” [“My Way to Phenomenology”].\textsuperscript{810} Rather that using concepts of traditional philosophy or the ontological terminology of Being and Time as presencing, Heidegger now sees the way of unfolding in terms of phenomenology, but now as looking ahead [Vor-sicht]. This new type of phenomenology of looking ahead, then, allows us to grasp holding sway as looking ahead as possibility [Möglichkeit].\textsuperscript{811} Not simply descriptive, Vor-sicht offers new possibilities of man and beings as transformed by Ereignis.

Later in 1966 Heidegger describes what the transformation of man and beings by Ereignis would look like in the “Heraclitus Seminar.” Heidegger describes it in terms of a directing or steering. The steering of Being could appear violent or oppressive, but true steering emerges as non-violent steering.\textsuperscript{812} We, ourselves, like Being, are permanently set in motion and thus, we are caught in the hermeneutical circle and at the same time are being steered. Between metaphorical and literal language, Heidegger sees man as always already in transformation, steered by Being as Saying in Ereignis. Steering is way-making [Be-wëgung], unfolding in all beings in all times and places. Not only does Being guide us, but we in turn, as guided, guide things in our “worlding of the world.”

Being guided and guiding, man now listens to Being less as a shepherd and more as a listener. Listening to Being as Saying, heard as Silence, man is changed. As changed, man now sees his “world” in new ways. Non-apparent Being-made-apparent,

\textsuperscript{810} “Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie” is found in GA 14 and Stambaugh’s English translation of it is included in Time and Being.

\textsuperscript{811} GA 14: 102/“My Way to Phenomenology” 82. This is offered as a 1969 supplement. Heidegger holds emphatically the word, “possibility” in italics.

\textsuperscript{812} GA 15: 24-25/“Heraclitus Seminar,” Four Seminars 11.
now reveals and conceals in new ways to Da-sein. As we know, Da-sein is Heidegger’s later distinction to indicate that man is “by nature” open, that is to say always fated to look-forward to new possibilities, directed by the appropriation of Ereignis. Da-sein understands himself and his world in new ways. Dwelling anew is brought on by the discomfit of his non-revealing inhabiting of his “world.” Dwelling is listening, but listening in a way that allows existential listening. Heidegger calls this Gelassenheit, a letting-be. Gelassenheit is a delicate balance between philosophy of the first beginning and the other beginning. It is a leap between the two beginnings. The division of philosophy of the first beginning as pure contemplation and philosophy as practical is no longer tenable. Rather, Gelassenheit is a balance between being guided and guiding, between purely contemplating and changing—that is transforming the “world.”

Marx knew well these perplexities, and claims that philosophers have only interpreted the world [die Welt nur verschieden interpretiert], but the real issue is to transform it [verändern].

Transforming the world came in the form of political and economic reformation, in the form of material dialectics. Together with French existentialism like that of Sartre, transforming the world, one’s sense of being an individual, indeed has become the self-production of man.

But Heidegger understood the danger contained in such a position. Heidegger maintains that the self-production of man raises the danger of self-destruction [die Gefahr der Selbstzertörung hervorbringt]. It has real possibilities because of this misunderstanding of Being and beings, and Dasein. The danger of such a position is that

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813 Marxists have seemed to distort these issues; simplifying the problem as one of politics.
it does not grasp the dependence man has on Being, and the need for Man to listen to the Being as Saying, heard as Silence. In such a false position, man is no longer drawn to Being, but asserts himself; rather than service to Being, man asserts himself.

But such a position is not merely dangerous: there too is the saving power. Heidegger sees the binding factor between the world and philosophy as language. Being as Saying transforms man when man is open to its Silence and draws man near. In *Ereignis* man is transformed and his meditative language follows suit. For Heidegger, language and interpretation does indeed transform the world, but not in a Marxist way.\(^{816}\) Being as Saying draws man near as transformation.

Unlike the dialectics of Hegel and Marx, which place man in an antagonistic position with the world, Being for Heidegger needs man in a cooperative gathering-while-separating stance. Being needs man to listen. Being needs the finitude of beings, for man is the placeholder of the nothing\(^ {817}\) [Der Mensch ist der Platzhalter des Nichts].\(^ {818}\) As placeholder, man doesn’t add anything to Being, but clears all other beings so that the space is left free for Being as Saying to draw near as Silence.

Silence quells all subsequent notions of alienation. Man is not alienated from Being, but drawn ever closer in Silence. Man is not alienated from himself as given by Freud, for Being draws man most properly to himself. Nor must man be alienated from the earth or his “world” as given in strife. Moreover, man need not be alienated from his gods given as fundamental knowing awareness, whether proffered in opinion or religion. Man need not be alienated but can be, as being guided by Being, with Dasein’s dual

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\(^{817}\) Once again we are reminded of Heidegger’s common way of definition: more by what it is not. Man is not so much man, as a placeholder for Being.

possibilities: of listening poorly to the philosophy of the first beginning or leaping well between the philosophy of first beginning and the philosophy of the other beginning.

The dual possibility of listening arrives from the Dasein’s “de-cision.” Dasein’s “de-cision” is what could be called the ontological space, where Dasein interprets Being as Saying, heard as Silence. It too has the character of unfolding, in con-tension. While drawn to Silence, man interprets it as a call to action, inner reflection or reflection on Being itself. Hence man’s response [Nach-sagen] is always guided by Being and is interpreted. Man is open.

Thus unfolding is not a ladder of negation or desire; nor is it one of alienation of man from all aspects of his world. Rather, unfolding is bringing man into proper relation, guided by Being and man guiding beings, not throughout time, but “unfolding” is making the non-apparent apparent in time.

While few would claim that Heidegger falls into the materialist tradition as offered above in the Marxist tradition, still, others offer the misguided claim that Heidegger is an idealist. This is surprising, given the multiply ways in which Heidegger discusses his reliance on “materialist’s concerns.” These include the fourfold, including the earth, the sky and the gods, all of which are outside of Da-sein’s control. While Blattner is one who claims that Heidegger’s thought is idealism. In his book, Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism, Blattner employs primarily early Heideggerian

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819 While it is true that the phrase, “beyond Da-sein’s control” could be be construed as consonant with Berkeley’s idealistic philosophy, “beyond Da-sein’s control” is meant in the material sense: we have not created the earth.
820 Mark Okrent argues similarly that Heidegger’s early works are failed, but as failed pragmatism. See Mark Okrent Heidegger’s Pragmatism. Ithaca: Cornell University, 1988. Likewise, Richard Rorty saw the possibility that Heidegger was a pragmatist.
references to the exclusion of later works that would lean toward an “idealistic” mindset that places Heidegger’s within the tradition from Plotinus to Kant.\textsuperscript{821}

Furthermore, Blattner poses his central argument that Heidegger’s temporal ontology relies upon a temporal idealism which fails because \textit{Being and Time} cannot reach a nonsequential form of time. He contends that, with later works like the \textit{Beiträge}, Heidegger sets out, also unsuccessfully, to evade this problem. The problem, as Blattner outlines it, is that since Being is not an entity, language needs to engage various failed phrases to cope with the failure: “the truth of Being,” “\textit{das Ereignis},” “presencing \textit{[wesen]},” to name a few.\textsuperscript{822} The result, concludes Blattner, is a quasi-mysticism.\textsuperscript{823} In all cases, he argues Heidegger relies on the priority of ideas and their formulation. And as James Swindal well noted, this point alone would not make Heidegger into an idealist.

The difficulty with Blattner’s assessment occurs primarily in his conclusion that Heidegger’s terminological shifting, that is linguistic transformations, is the point of Heidegger’s questioning. But as we have argued, Heidegger, through the Saying of Being heard as Silence and the renouncing of language, man’s centrality in the question of Being is de-centered and the gathering/separation of the fourfold takes place in \textit{Ereignis}. As such, man and his ideas cannot be the major premise in any of Heidegger’s later work, as Blattner contends. Finally, any claim that Heidegger is a materialist, idealist, conceptualist, or pragmatist, would falter on Heidegger’s fourfold and its unfolding in \textit{Ereignis}.

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\textsuperscript{821} William D. Blattner, \textit{Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism} (New York, NY: Cambridge University, 1999) 278. \\
\textsuperscript{822} While Blattner lists “the truth of being,” “being as such,” “the obtaining,” “lingering,” “the clearing,” “Being,” we have used the translations (or retaining the original German) to coincide with our usage in this thesis. \\
\textsuperscript{823} \textit{Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism} 309.
\end{flushright}
One final query regarding unfolding needs to be explicated. It is the question of man’s perception of con-tension, for man is part of the interplay of the fourfold. Overemphasizing the perception of the gathering-going out either as simply “gathering in” or “going-out,” one risks what would be experienced as total control or revolution. In a sense it would bear relevance on what Heideggerian would call totalization of machination. For instance, Jacques Derrida, though not a Heideggerian but one who studied under Heidegger’s French collaborator, Jean Beaufret from 1946 to 1962, describes Heidegger’s “de-cision” as a rupture, as being out of joint. In *Specters of Marx*, Derrida takes Heidegger to mean in “The Saying of Anaximander” that the “de-cision” or the jointure [aus der Fuge] is the site of harmony or joining. Likewise, Derrida holds Heidegger to be saying that unfolding is a gathering, an ordering. Opposed to order is disorder. Disorder is to be “out of joint” for Derrida. From our perspective Derrida is half right.\(^{824}\)

What does it mean to be out of joint? Derrida equates “out of joint” with injustice and untimeliness. He wrongly sees Heidegger advocating order and “gathering” with justice. Countering this conception Derrida argues that “out of jointness” is the possibility of alterity. Derrida explores this phrase: “Is not the disjuncture the very possibility of the other? How to distinguish between two disadjustments, between disjuncture of the unjust and the one who opens up the infinite asymmetry of the relation to the other, that is to say, the place for justice?”\(^{825}\) Derrida rightly sees “out of

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\(^{824}\) Admittedly, Derrida’s concern with the condition of being “out of joint” isn’t simply disorder, for he also means that every experience is not quite “on time.” As such for Marx there is a type of anachronism with experience.

jointness” as both the site of the possibility of the other and the site of justice/injustice. Through his analysis of German Ideology, Derrida tries to uncover what is out of joint in our own era and concludes that Marxist thought is still relevant to today’s world, even given globalization; such a Marxist construal would result in a new messianism, a messianism of a “democracy to come.” For Heidegger, our epoch exemplifies the inadequacies of the so-called idealistic and materialistic philosophical traditions.

But Derrida overemphasizes Heidegger’s intention of gathering. Derrida writes: “Heidegger, as he always does, skewed the asymmetry in favor of what he in effect interprets as the possibility of favor itself, out of the accorded favor, namely, of the accord that gathers or collects while harmonizing.” Instead, Heidegger, as we outlined above, holds the two in constant and ready tension.

Given the con-tension of the gathering-in and going-out, Heidegger might agree with Derrida that this is the site of the possibility of the other. But Heidegger sees the con-tension not primarily in terms of politics, morality or ethics, but as the condition of the possibility from which they can emerge. Having emerged, they have already taken on the form of metaphysics. Rather than dismissing this as altogether untenable, we would see the acceptance of such as part of the leap between the philosophy of the first beginning and the philosophy of the second beginning.

Consequently, Derrida is but one of many who take up Heidegger’s project in a way that may not be completely felicitous. Many of them, like Derrida, take up this very possibility of unfolding-as-dwelling. Each attempts to contend with Heidegger’s Being as Saying heard as Silence and its unfolding. We shall discuss these in the next chapter and analyze to what extent they take up Heidegger’s project as the possibility of the

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twofoldness of Being as manifested by *Ereignis* and its gathering/separateness of the fourfold.

Thus, this chapter’s major emphasis was the discussion of the unfolding of way-making first from the false avenues of interpretation. While one might inquire what is the positive way of understanding unfolding, we have found, following Heidegger, that more is garnered by the negative. A cup is more what it is not, than what it is. It is that which by means of its emptiness can contain fluid. Man is more a placeholder. Similarly, unfolding is best understood via what it is not.
CHAPTER TEN
Dénouement

“…phenomenology is a path that leads away to come before …,
and it lets that before which it is led shows itself.\textsuperscript{827}

The \textit{Oxford English Dictionary} defines dénouement as an unraveling or the final solution of a complication, difficulty or mystery. Following the \textit{OED}, we shall work toward the unraveling of Heidegger’s way in this chapter with those who have taken on Heidegger’s task, with those who have engaged in the way-making of Being as Saying. In one way, our topic may seem to arrive at a quiet end, like a comfortable death somewhat like the \textit{Einkehre} of \textit{Seyn/Sein}: to come to peace or quiet, as a turning-in. Certainly a quiet resolution can shine forth. But equally so, “dénouement” has the connotation that might conjure up thoughts of a revolution or collapse of an epoch.

If the goal of Dasein of \textit{Being and Time} was to uncover Being in fundamental ontology, if the \textit{Beiträge} was to circle Being, nearing its Silence in constructive retrieval, and if Heidegger’s renouncing of language in the later works drew Da-sein closer to a way-making of Being as Saying, then the challenge of Heideggerians is to allow Being to

\textsuperscript{827} Heidegger’s text reads as follows: “So verstanden ist die Phänomenologie ein Weg, der hinführt vor … und sich das zeigen läßt, wovor er geführt wird.” GA 15: 399/“Seminar in Zähringen 1973,” \textit{Four Seminars} 80.
reveal itself as concealment, that is to reemerge in ontical dwelling—all the while realizing that man is not in control.

The burgeoning world, the fracturing of the Cartesian self, the “silence” of God in the post-Holocaust era, and the rise of fundamental religious sects—all lead man into a crisis of non-control in our epoch. Epochal conclusions have been formulated in a variety of ways since Heidegger’s death. But the issue for us really isn’t regarding man’s lack of control. Rather, at issue is the completion or fulfillment of the way-making of Being as Saying, heard as Silence, manifested as Ereignis; our issue is not speaking of the end of an epoch, but speaking of a Saying of Being heard as Silence unfolding in the fourfold in all epochs as way-making.

And consequently, this final and chapter, “Dénouement,” engages the possibilities of unfolding of language as Saying as encountered in the “world” and in our epoch. This chapter will not engage the reception of Heidegger in all its manifestations—a near impossible, if not a monumental, life-task. Instead, we will characterize the reception, only to the extent that it bears relevance to our topic of Being as Saying unfolding as way-making. Specifically, the topic of this final chapter is Being as Saying unfolding as Ereignis, and how the fourfold appears or hides in our epoch.

To structure our chapter, let us first recount the major aspects of way-making. We already know of the gathering/separating of the fourfold, occurring in the Ereignis. Being as Saying is heard as Silence. Man is drawn near. Being and man together are transformed. Because Being is twofold as concealing/revealing, all manifestations also occur as twofold. These steps of the way were already outlined. Furthermore, we discussed how Being as Saying, heard as Silence, is way-making.
What still needs further exploration is how way-making continues to unfold ontically. Heidegger famously claimed that way-making is not his way, but the way of Being.\(^{828}\) Since Heidegger’s death and repose in Meßkirch on May 28, 1976, Being’s way-making continues—that is, if Heidegger is indeed correct in his assessment, and we do concur. We listen intently and look closely for ways in which Being shows itself to us as a concealing/revealing.

Consequently, we set our gaze on the reception of the way, as the phenomenology of looking ahead \([\text{Vor-sicht}]\). In an appropriate fashion, for Heidegger’s way to be assessable viably, including his later notion that the fourfold replaces Dasein as the fuller site of Being’s showing, it follows that the way-making of Being as Saying can be verified only when Heidegger as the primary bearer of the clearing of Being gives way to many others. For if Heidegger’s way is not his way, but the way-making of Being, then Being’s manifestation as \textit{Ereignis} should continue to speak to, and indeed transform, us today. Just as Being is twofold, so too is language; as Da-sein\(^{829}\) is de-centered in way-making, so too is Heidegger’s works. Let us “look-ahead.”

Certainly, this chapter is not meant to be an exhaustive analysis of all those who have engaged Heidegger. Even the celebrated two-volume work of the late Dominique Janicaud,\(^{830}\) which masterfully recounts the reception of Heidegger into France, is not sufficient to analyze all the various layers, permutations, and locations influenced by

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\(^{828}\) See Heidegger’s forward to Richardson’s opus.

\(^{829}\) The reader may recall our distinction from earlier chapters between “Dasein” of \textit{Being and Time} and “Da-sein” of Heidegger’s later work. The former is the site of clearing of Being; the latter is the listener of the Silence of Being and the renouncer of language’s ability to reach Being.

\(^{830}\) Dominique Janicauld, \textit{Heidegger en France}, (Paris, FR: Albin Michel, 2001). I look forward to its translation by François Raffoul and David Pettigrew. The latter has generously offered counsel on this chapter.
Heidegger’s way-making. Our work in this section is not one of historical layering of an epoch, but one of finding the patterns that emerge within that epoch, which indicate way-making more audible or noticeable.

Taking the research in Janicaud’s work as persuasively conclusive, we shall simply outline four basic patterns or ontological regions that have been fertile ground for the continuation of Heidegger’s work. While few employ Heidegger’s terminology, like that of Ereignis, nevertheless, they still are concerned with the unconcealment of Being through time. By extension they too are interested in Heidegger’s project of the unconcealing/revealing of Being. Listing them in terms of common parlance and with clear ties to the philosophy of the first beginning, we will engage the regions of anthropology, religion, politics, and technology. More precisely, we gauge their proponents’ attempts to leap between the philosophy of the first beginning and the philosophy of the other beginning.

Finally, the chapter will conclude that, in order to be more consonant with the way-making of Being as Saying, heard as Silence, these regions are not the elements of the fourfold, but occur as ek-static, ontic regions of expertise that emerge from man’s attempt to build and dwelling therein. With this caveat we explore these regions. Finally, we must engage them hermeneutically and phenomenologically not as isolated but as interrelated regions, related in their meaning, ontology and usage. As de-compartmentalized regions they will resonate better with the manifestation of Ereignis in the gathering/separateness of the fourfold. After all, ontical regions all have the twofold

831 The case could easily be made that the German, North American or even British reception of Heidegger could offer fruitful discussion. While they would illustrate well Heidegger’s thinking in positive ways, they do not, in my opinion, characterize either the extreme limits and false ways or the tremendous impact upon the thinking of general populace that the French has asserted.
gathering/separateness of the fourfold as the manifestation of the one site of ontological
difference, or de-cision, or most properly said, Ereignis. Each seems to be located in
different regions, but as Heidegger tells us they are all but variations of the self-same
Saying of Being.

Why do we choose four regions? Four regions correspond roughly to the
fourfold. If we take man as mortal as the starting point, we see all things through that
single gaze, as elements of human anthropology. If we gaze solely at the earth and even
the cosmos as unchanging, in the sense that it always consists of matter, then what
emerges is an objective, concrete thing, separate from, but related to, man. If we gaze
solely at the gods, that is the fundamental knowing awareness (as translated by Emad and
Kalary), then we see opinions, beliefs, ideas as our own—but not simply ours, but only
ours in our control. Finally, if we look solely at the sky, that is the principle of incessant
change, then we see only some method or change—or in its extreme form, only chaos.
Four ontological regions coincide with a concentrated view of one of the fourfold
separated from, but not gathered as, fourfold. What we see is everything in terms of
beings, and we see nothing, but not the no-thingness of Being.

One caution must be proffered from the outset. Our project admits from the start
that Being is the primary influence upon the emergence of these regions; man’s influence
is secondary. So in any building of institutions, dwelling and listening to Being are
located as that of Da-sein’s. Indeed Being always already is our main question: Being as
Saying, heard as Silence, manifested as Ereignis, unfolded in the gathered/separateness of
the fourfold. Our regard here is to allow, in as much as we able as part of the fourfold, to allow ourselves to hear the Silence of Being as Saying.

**French Reception**

Before we look at specific philosophies of French reception, one must ask the question whether this discussion should be included in the larger discussion on Heidegger and language. To answer this question in the affirmative we shall use Heidegger’s own words: “When you will have seen my limits, you will have understood me. I cannot see them.” The engagement with those who follow will help us to see the limits of Heidegger, but more importantly, help us to understand way-making. The reception of Heidegger’s philosophy is the way we can assess way-making in our epoch. With these parameters lets us enter the four regions of interest as it was received in France.

Contrary to the mood of our chapter title, the late Dominique Janicaud describes the reception not as peaceful, but as a veritable polemical maelstrom. By way of entrée, let us look first at the French Cartesian tradition of consciousness and reason, which soon adopted Heidegger’s phenomenology. Janicaud supports our earlier claim that Jean-Paul Sartre had a robust influence on the public’s consciousness with *Being and the End*.

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832 An interesting, but not altogether persuasive presentation of the fourfold, can be found in Graham Harman’s *Tool-Being*. Harman argues persuasively that the fourfold is derived in part from Husserl’s second reduction (Ideas I, §13). Harman’s faulty second premise is the claim that the fourfold is formed from the intersection of two distinct Heideggerian dualisms: the opposition between tool and broken tool of *Being and Time*, and the difference between something specific and something at all. The claim is faulty because the first of the two dualisms is still part of Dasein’s “world,” not a separate element at all. See Graham Harman, *Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects* (Chicago, IL: Open Court, 2002) 204.


834 See Dominique Janicaud, *Heidegger en France* (Paris, FR: Albin Michel, 2001). Portions of the forthcoming English translation by David Pettigrew and François Raffoul were graciously provided to me by David Pettigrew for research purposes.
Nothingness \( [L’être et le néant] \); a veritable explosion of public interest swirled around French existentialism.

*Being and Nothingness* radicalized the role of human responsibility, to such an extent that each unique individual can and must from his situation extract meaning. Through the person’s choices, he defines his essence. Thus, the person is radically free and must choose in order to assert one’s being, since a person exists for himself (pour-soi) and negates his nothingness. Nothingness is the state of a thing existing in itself (en-soi). As such man is “condemned to be free”\(^{835}\) to negate his nothingness.

Sartre assumed some of Heidegger’s terminology and themes, and not without many flagrant misunderstandings. While unfortunate, this misappropriation of Heidegger’s *Being and Time*, unwittingly washed onto the shores of France an interest in Heidegger and flowed into the minds of non-professional philosophers together with French existentialism.\(^ {836}\)

Other significant figures beside Sartre who stirred interest in Heidegger included Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Emmanuel Levinas, Jacques Derrida, and Paul Ricœur.\(^ {837}\) Not surprisingly, each philosopher has taken up, or opposed, the Heideggerian banner, which focuses on what seems to be some form of an ek-static aspect of the fourfold or their interrelations. Merleau-Ponty developed his notion of the lived-body; Levinas wrestled with the complete otherness of God; Derrida employed a method of criticism, stylized by others as a deconstructive methodology; and Ricœur engaged Heidegger and hermeneutics. Responding to hearing Silence so prevalent in the post-Holocaust era, they

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\(^{836}\) With flair, Janicaud’s chapter on Sartre with *Heidegger en France* is entitled, “La bombe Sartre.”

heard as their ears enabled them to listen; usually their response was in some form of conversation with Heidegger and his works.

Derrida’s works engaged and challenged in part Heidegger with works like *On the Spirit*. His deconstruction was not unlike Heidegger’s own destructive retrieval. In later works, like *Rogues* and *Specters of Marx*, Derrida even employed and altered Heidegger’s own terms. *Specters of Marx* conscripted Heidegger’s “*aus der Fuge,*” but “out-of-jointness” for Derrida did not so much refer to the ontological difference as it did abiding sense that something is amiss. Indeed, the ontological difference is displaced with *différance*. *Différance* occurs due to the “space” between the sign and the meaning; meaning can never be attained and needs a constant string of terms or signs to continue its ongoing meaning. Yet meaning is always a step behind, always deferred.

Justice, a case in point, is constantly in need of redefining. Derrida mis-takes Heidegger’s “*aus der Fuge*” to be disorder and injustice, while harmony is justice. Derrida writes that Heidegger “interprets *Dikē* [justice] as joining, adjoining, adjustment, articulation of accord or harmony”—a never ending string of terms. While Derrida rightly sees Heidegger’s concern for a close link between things and persons, Derrida, sees Heidegger advocating structure and harmonious order at all costs in the name of justice.

But Derrida’s real criticism with Heidegger is with the ontological difference itself; Derrida sees it as ontotheology. Thus, he understands Heidegger’s concept of justice to lacking. But the later Heidegger himself has supplanted the ontological difference with *Ereignis*. Rather than Dasein, meaning or the terms which are part of the

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ongoing effort to bridge meaning and its definition, Heidegger steps back to place the ontological difference into the fuller *Ereignis*. In *Ereignis* no gap is found between meaning and its terms. Likewise, de-cision is part of *Ereignis* and not solely a function of Da-sein. Roughly explained, Heidegger’s concern was regarding a relation between Being and human consciousness and choice, which he now places all within *Ereignis*.

Similarly in *Rogues*, Derrida explores political theory and its need for defining and excluding those it deems unsuitable as a constitutive element for order. Alterity and *différance* become central concepts as a means to explore politics. Derrida asserts: ‘Thinking of *différance* is a thinking of the political.’ Thus, Cartesian notions of the autonomy of a subjectivity in charge of itself and of its decisions, evolving freely and in perfect independence is misguided. Instead, the human person is relational and employs others negatively as part of that definition both corporately and for self. Derrida rethinks both subjectivity and political theory as relational, but still maintains the human as central to any definition. Heidegger would consider Derrida’s efforts as a philosophy of the first beginning. Conversely, Heidegger allows Being to appropriate man, not simply man to Being.

These were the persons and themes of the first wave of French engagement in Heidegger’s wake, which remain relevant to our thesis. While never clearly demarcated as such, the second wave of French Heideggerians engaged phenomenology in other ways, which dialogued with philosophical trends of the day, especially ethical

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840 While not French, but a German living in America, Hannah Arendt certainly must be included in this first wave. She took to heart the grave problems which surfaced due to Heidegger’s seemingly callous disinterest with ethics. For this reason, we include her work, *The Human Condition*. Her work, however, could easily stand alone as a pillar of scholarship of an ontic express in way-making.
and political concerns, as well as philosophical currents that opposed existentialism. In particular, the engagement of structuralism and post-structuralism, begun earlier than Heidegger, now took on renewed vigor with Heideggerian jargon.

**False Paths**

In many ways structuralism became the philosophy in opposition to the overly humanistic existentialism of Sartre and the overly chaotic experiences in the post-war era. If the nothingness of Being could not be an entity, and if the way-making of Being as Saying transforms us, then Heidegger seemed to resonate with structuralism’s claims that the structure is that which determines each part. Structuralism succeeded in France in the 1950s and 1960s due to its claim of rigorous method and clear scientific certainty. It was a key moment of critical consciousness.  

Beginning with Ferdinand de Saussure of the nineteenth-century with language, structuralism includes such persons as Claude Lévi-Strauss in anthropology, and the Marxist Louis Althusser. Soon structuralism gained popularity with the early Michel Foucault (the later Foucault became a structuralist-turned-post-structuralist) who took on what he saw as the crisis of power and ethics. Foucault’s notions of “bio-power” reflected Heidegger’s machination; his non-linear genealogy imitated at times Heidegger’s *Seinsgeschichte*; and most evident in Foucault’s key ideas of epistemés, the

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841 For a lucid and convincing account of structuralism, see François Dosse, *History of Structuralism: Volume I: The Rising Sign, 1945-1966*, trans. Deborah Glassman (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota, 1997). Especially interesting is his chapter, entitled, “Nietzschean-Heideggerian Roots,” wherein he joins the themes of the decline of the West in Heidegger’s rectoral address of May 27, 1933 with Nietzsche’s “Death of God” as one cause of a reversal toward structure. While not false, it would be too simplistic an answer to explain fully the rise in structuralism by a fear of declining Western institutions.
“pan-opticon” and “knowledge is power” are themes possible in part from Heidegger’s destiny of Being. Finally, Jacques Lacan has developed a structural psychoanalytic theory that fits nicely with “Daseinanalysis.” These later structuralists found renewed vigor in Heidegger’s thought. Still, they ignored Heidegger’s primary question: the question of Being. Consequently, they misconstrued Heidegger’s Being as Saying, unfolding as way-making, as a conceptual framework, a methodological key, which could unlock systems.

If the structuralists were drawn to Heidegger’s “method” and “framework,” then the post-structuralists were born out of the distaste of such structural or systemic answers. Interestingly, both structuralists and post-structuralists find Heidegger’s philosophy useful. Claims of post-structuralists, which reject absolute truth or raw facts about the world, would find in Heidegger’s hermeneutics an ally. Heidegger’s “many ways,” interpretation, Dasein’s involvement in “worldhood,” and the fracturing of the Cartesian self were topics that readily appealed to post-structuralists. While we could name a few of these post-structuralists—Jacques Derrida, Roland Barthes, Gilles Deleuze—all so-named would indeed deny the label.

Indeed eschewing labels and categories, meta-narratives and metaphysics were part of the way of post-structuralism. Denial of the transparency of language and accessibility to the real were common themes. Cultural multiculturalism became the agenda of a new political left, and the distrust of institutional influences became part and parcel in the 1960s with the student riots in Paris or the race riots in America. While

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842 Of course, Derrida’s name also populates many of the lists of French structuralists.
each had particular issues to solve, the way toward their solving came via a deep distrust of authority and institutions in any fashion. A naïve, yet deadly serious, love of revolution stirred thickly in the air.

Both Structuralism and post-structuralism found Heidegger’s work a goldmine of resources. In such a brief treatment as this, our attempt is not sociological, political, or psychological, and certainly not exhaustive philosophical analysis. Rather than a point by point, toe-to-toe, rebuttal, our point is simply to illuminate the effect Heidegger had not simply upon the philosophical world but on the general populace.  

More importantly, we find in the structuralists’ and post-structuralists’ themes a strong resonance with Heidegger’s way, albeit overemphasized in ways that resemble more a *Holzweg*, a path which has no end. The debate surrounding structuralism and post-structuralism seemed to hold up one or the other of the two aspects (at the expense of the other) of Heidegger’s Being as Saying of the de-cision: either its “gathering” aspect or its “separate” aspect; either emphasizing the path itself or the steps along the path; either pure unity or pure multiplicity; either merely nothing or merely entities.

We can see how this could easily transpire. Taking one work of Heidegger’s oeuvre in isolation or excerpting one point leads toward bias. For instance, we could separate a section of our own Chapter 8, “Be-wëgen,” which speaks of way-making. The citation certainly sounds consistent with structuralists’ concerns. Let us cite such a passage from Chapter 8: “In addition to Being as Saying as way-making, the vibrating and transformational aspect, from which all beings emerge, Being is, nonetheless, unified. Being as Saying is the source. It draws us near. It does not dictate our life as

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844 Perhaps best conveyed for our purposes here, this would be an interesting topic for further study and scholarship.
fate; but we have a two-fold destiny because Being is two-fold. It makes our way."  

This passage could be used to infer that we are arguing for a “determinative sans human decision” approach. Simple proof-texting can easily lead us astray.

Or we could paraphrase a current American Heideggerian, Babette Babich, who, while discussing her paper topic at the Heidegger Circle in May 2009, voiced a robust structuralists’ theme. She asserted that while the details of any poem and the language in Milton, Hölderlin, and Heidegger satisfy the intellectual curiosity, the real work is what occurs in the process of the poem, in this case Hölderlin’s Der Ister and John Milton’s 1637 Lycidas. One could easily draw the analogous case in her paper presentation. The process of the presentation does the “work” while the audience is distracted in the details. 

Structuralists—whether anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists, or psychoanalysts and psychologists—certainly hear structural answers to human questions—humans are being formed. But this is but a half-truth.

Similarly, post-structuralists’ concerns can be noticed in Heidegger’s work during the period of the 1930s and 1940s, as recounted in Chapter 2, “Early Approaches: II.” Discussions of destructive retrieval, fracturing truth, the end of metaphysics, rupturing things, language and aesthetics as well as nihilism—all speak readily to post-structuralists’ ears. Most loudly do post-structuralists hear Heidegger’s oft-quoted sentence, as if it were a battle cry: “The time of the systems is over.”

We offer another current example of the same conference cited above, though this example highlights post-structuralists’ theme. A discussion ensued between two Heideggerians, Trish Glazebrook

845 See Chapter 8, “Be-wêgen” 305.
and Larry Hatab, whether Odysseus returned home from his travels for a hero’s welcome or love. One response emerged that no one single answer will ever be true; that as many people and interpretations as there exists, is the possible multiplicity of true answers. Post-structuralists’ concern for pure possibility of multiplicity is but an incomplete answer as well.

What is heard in both the structuralists’ and post-structuralists’ claims is but a partial answer for Heideggerians. And for Heidegger this partial answer is insufficient to draw us toward Being. Half-answers will not allow Being as Saying to emerge as Ereignis. It may seem as though the two “sides” of language for Heidegger, whether originary or ordinary, or the two aspects of language, whether structure or content, or context or expression, do indeed allow Being to emerge through the subject in a variety of possible ways. Yet we have seen earlier that the problematic modern conception of the self is one reason Heidegger moved first to Dasein, then to language, then to the fourfold as the site of the manifestation of Being as Ereignis. Any one “side” is a partial answer.

From the post-structuralist or postmodern, we stop for a brief moment to listen to the voice of the anti-postmodern. Oftentimes Alain Badiou, the Italian Giorgio Agamben, and the Slovenian Slavoj Žižek are included as anti-postmodern philosophers. What is common to them is the problematic issue of the self and the need to find another way beyond the self to allow Being to appear.

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848 Upon reading this paragraph, Rojcewicz adds to the mix of possibilities behind Odysseus’ return. He returned precisely to return home, to his Heimat.
849 While Heidegger doesn’t hold that there is one right answer either, he would hold that in all answers Being as Saying always holds sway, unfolding as way-making.
850 While post-structuralist and postmodern are not coextensive. For our purposes here we shall assume that they understand language in similar ways.
In *Being and Event* Badiou attempts to recover Being through set theory. For Badiou, Being is an empty set, a membership without inclusion. This seems similar to Heidegger’s “Nothing,” but it is different, for it is not Heidegger’s fullness of nothingness. Moreover, Badiou’s “evental site” is an abnormal multiple, “that none of its elements are presented in the situation,” that “the event does not belong to the situation.” What was Being, manifested as *Ereignis* for Heidegger is now replaced with mathematics as the language of reality with man as one of an unlimited number of variables. The “evental site” could not be farther away from Heidegger’s *Ereignis*, through which Being manifests itself in beings. Mathematics, which has no Being, is the expression of reality (beings). But mathematics is still part of *Ratio*. And as such, mathematics is a type of calculation. Reckoning, as orienting something in terms of something, always presents something and thus is in itself a yielding, or an appearing. Thus, mathematics is the expression of reality, but mathematics is also the calculation of the human, who in turn is part of reality—a part for which there is no mathematical formula. It is false way of positing the calculative while foregoing the calculator. Badiou’s expression of reality cannot fully expressing reality, even with his clever notion of the empty set.

Giorgio Agamben, on the other hand, doesn’t attempt to empty the situation of Being. Being, beings, and language are still very much a neuralgic issue. Agamben proposes that man is the living being who separates himself in political life from his own bare life. Bare life is not a biological or eugenic sense, but bare life is the life of sacred

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852 *Being and Event* 182.
853 *GA* 10: 103/Principle of Reason 155.
man (*homo sacer*), “who may be killed and yet not sacrificed.”

Bare life coincides with the Greek *haplōs*, the term by which first philosophy defines as pure Being. Once politics saw the bare life as easily dispensed, now Agamben reinvests the bare life with sacredness.

Man maintains his bare life in relation to his political via language. Agamben’s concern is the question: in what way does the living being “have” language. Between bare life and political life language lies sovereign as an “inclusive exclusion;” not as in Badiou’s empty set, but “inclusive exclusion” as a member of the political group, but foremost as an exclusion from the political group. Language, for Agamben, is sovereign in that “[t]here is nothing outside of language and language is always beyond itself.” It is a bridge which allows man to maintain his bare life together with his political life. No longer do political camps hold sovereign over man. Language holds sovereign.

We see in Agamben’s conceptual theory that language fills a similar role as “logos” did for Kockelmans; it bridges finitude and infinite, though language for Agamben bridges the singular with the plurality. But in either event, bridging the finite and the infinite with the finite is philosophically untenable. Heidegger’s way-making does not attempt such a path.

But Agamben acknowledges parting ways with Heidegger’s language as originary Being as Saying and way-making. According to Agamben, Heidegger’s Being loses all sovereignty in its nothingness; man loses his ethical and moral sense. Heidegger’s

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855 *Homo Sacer* 182. Rojcewicz is rightly skeptical of Agamben’s analysis. Our point is not to agree with his analysis, but to show his partial inculcation of Heideggerian ideas.

856 *Homo Sacer* 8.

857 *Homo Sacer* 21.

858 *Homo Sacer* 48.
abandonment of Being and its manifestation as Ereignis remains an untenable situation for Agamben. For this reason, Agamben holds that Heidegger’s Seinsfrage is without effect, without consequence.

Political life is the wedge between Heidegger and Agamben. Agamben holds that the political is still part of the essence of man. For Heidegger, Agamben’s argument would still be metaphysical. Perhaps, simply put, language for Agamben might be similar to Heidegger’s notion until the 1950s, when Heidegger renounces language as the means by which Being can show itself. Heidegger’s way-making limits human agency while Agamben reinvests human agency with a sacred task.

Agamben holds a unique linguistic turn, language turned sovereign—man’s sacred life turns life into a task. In simplistic terms, Agamben’s language could be conceived akin to Being, leading man to a task between the bare and political lives. Language, then, as sovereign prohibits bio-political camps which emerges in the West as fascism or Nazism. It holds bare life as sacred.

While ostensibly noble, we contend that Agamben’s task is yet another metaphysical building, from which danger (and saving power) will emerge in the end. For whoever holds the defining characteristic of the sacred also holds the keys to the power of sovereign language. Whoever controls language controls man.

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859 Arendt, though, is a key mediating link between Heidegger and Agamben.
860 Sacer Homo 151.
861 Indeed this could easily be the problematic premise for all anti-postmoderns. Shifting sovereignty from man to human, from human to social, from social to language never avoids the possibility of the danger of power. We should recall Heidegger’s caution on values: “Nihilism means that the uppermost values devalue themselves,” that every value is eventually overturned ad infinitum. From structuralists to post-structuralists, to anti-postmoderns values are constantly revolving—all versions of a will to power. Instead, Heidegger counsels us, as he did with aesthetics, to holds the opposing values together while keeping them separate: one as the mood, the other as the attunement. See Nietzsche, GA: 6.1: 23“The Will to Power as Art,” Nietzsche I: 26.
Insightfully, the quirky Slavoj Žižek, a Lacanian Marxist, writes: “Heideggerians are … in search of a positive, ontic political system that would come closest to the epochal ontological truth, a strategy which inevitable leads to error.”\textsuperscript{862} It is the search for the perfect epochal, utopian strategy that is \textit{the} error. Yet, Žižek is not in total agreement with Heidegger either. Žižek finds Heidegger’s way-making to be problematic because the world is problematic. There can never be a true intersection between the ontic and the ontological, Žižek argues in \textit{The Ticklish Subject}.\textsuperscript{863} This seems to be an anti-Heideggerian approach.

Žižek returns to the idea of the subject; the subject is brought back to the central location of the site of the non-showing of Being. Leaning on the conceptual framework of the structuralist and psychoanalyst Lacan, Žižek postulates that reality is “constructed” by humans in “retroactive causation,” that is to say, as a futural imaginative act by man, yet unlike the modern conception, the world can never be encountered.\textsuperscript{864} Thus the world constructed but never truly encountered shows the subject to be both interesting and a wellspring of possibilities for the political. The political is understood through the subject. Yet subjectivity always corresponds to a lack, an empty space, which the political can never fully conscript.

The empty space of subjectivity seems at first blush to correspond to Heidegger’s latter notion of man as a placeholder. Yet self-identity for Žižek is impossible, while self-identity [\textit{Eigentlichkeit}] is crucial in the early Heidegger and man as related to Being as Saying in the fourfold is quite evident in the later Heidegger. If man does not hear

\textsuperscript{863} \textit{The Ticklish Subject} 13.
\textsuperscript{864} \textit{The Ticklish Subject} 33. This too sounds Heideggerian, like Heidegger’s \textit{“Vor-sicht,”} but with the twist that it is never encountered. The anti-relational approach seems to typify Žižek’s work.
Silence, Being cannot speak as a concealed revealing. In *The Ticklish Subject*, Žižek argues primarily against *Being and Time*’s Dasein. As such, Žižek sees Heidegger’s position of Destiny emerging out of resolute anticipation as lacking “insight into the radically antagonistic nature of every hitherto communal way of life.”  

It is the communal life, from which Heidegger recoils into the historicity of Being, that is the difficulty, insists Žižek. With the historicity of Being, the “ontologization of this ‘speech-in-itself’” evolves as a proto-speech, as if speech in fact pre-exists itself as a kind of fully-constituted “speech before speech.” Thus, Žižek holds that Heidegger simply reifies Being once again, now as originary language and robs the subject of its full imaginative power. But we maintain that Being for Heidegger is never reified; Being is nothing.

One need only think of the Hollywood version of the “pre-cogs” in Steven Spielberg’s 2002 film, “The Minority Report,” to gain a sense of Žižek’s version of Heidegger, writes Thomas Brockelman in *Žižek and Heidegger, Techno-Capitalism*. Pre-cognition, though, is not Heidegger’s intent. Rather, ontology “is prior” to cognition in any form. Being as Saying, heard as Silence, is not another being or a deeper consciousness. Rather, Heidegger’s belabored point is that Being is nothing [*Nichts*]. As such, it is heard as Silence, and reveals itself as concealment, not a concealed thing. But this complaint of Žižek is not incorrectly lodged against *Being and Time*. But Heidegger had long ago found that to be problematic and emended his later work accordingly. 

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865 *The Ticklish Subject* 18.  
866 *The Ticklish Subject* 22.  
867 *The Ticklish Subject* 66.  
Žižek’s other complaint with Heidegger occurs with technology in “The Question Concerning Technology.” Žižek understands Heidegger to be a Luddite, fearing technology. In contrast, Žižek sees technology to be something akin to a prosthesis for the human body. What man cannot do alone, he can do wonders with the aide of technology. In The Parallax View Žižek mocks Heidegger: “Danger? What Danger?”

What danger? One need only read the newspaper on any given day in our epoch in order to fear deeply nuclear armaments in the hands of fundamental extremists to realize the absurdity of Žižek’s remark. But the real point against Žižek here is that Heidegger is not a Luddite, for in the same source of Heidegger’s “danger” lies also it “saving power” as in Hölderlin’s poem, “Patmos.” Heidegger rightly notes: “But where danger is, grows the saving power also.” Heidegger’s point is that technology does have an effect on us. But the concern is not one of earthly demise, but one of not hearing the Silence of Being in machination. Yet, even in such a case, Being appears like a flash. Technology is both danger and saving power in Being, heard as Silence, manifested in Ereignis. Indeed it is the way-making of Being which transforms us. Way-making is not anti-postmodern; perhaps the ways of post-modernity and way-making are both anti-modern.

Finally, way-making is not linguistics. The current debate in language, considered as linguistics is a non-way, according to Heidegger, for we are led away, not toward, Being. And we speak, listen, understand and learn in language nevertheless. Our ability to listen to Being is steeped in language. The words of understanding and discussion of what is more originary, still, must be related in ordinary words. The effect

\[870\] Hölderlin’s German text, of which Heidegger quotes, reads as follows: “Wo aber Gefahr ist, wächst Das Rettende auch.” See GA 7: 36“Question Concerning Technology” 34.
is that ordinary language, too, reflects this mode of structure versus expression. More precisely, it reflects the two-fold character of Being as concealing/revealing. The debate continues in linguistics between the innate grammar-as-structure approach in contradiction to the expression-as-content approach. \(^{871}\) It seems that these are “bridged” for Heidegger by *Ereignis*.

Yet Heidegger cautions us that structure and expression are not bridged at all. Rather, they are the site of *Ereignis* in con-tension, as gathering-going away. For this reason, then, structuralists and post-structuralists cannot be said to follow the way-making. Nor can the way of the anti-postmoderns, for it too doesn’t speak of gathering-

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\(^{871}\) One could spend one’s life investigating linguistic discussions—a non-way, according to Heidegger. The debate continues in linguistics. As a reaction to Saussure’s analysis that language is a static system, Noam Chomsky developed a theory of universal grammar with rules that are transformational. Michael Arbib, the author of the mirror cell theory, argues against grammar and holds that structures of the neural network which govern language. Against structural linguistic approaches one can find expressivist theories. One example is the Sapir-Whorf theory, which claims that any one specific language can shape the thought peculiarly to its speakers. Similarly, Michael Corballis argues that referentiality precedes language, and influences its evolution. Between the innate grammar-as-structure approach in contradistinction to the expression-as-content approach would lie a theory consistent with a Heideggerian approach. More importantly, all linguistic studies, while interesting, still remain fallow. The deeper, more originary question of Being is not present. For this reason, Heidegger would consider linguistic studies and the so-called linguistic turn as metaphysical.

And yet we speak, listen, understand and learn in language nevertheless. See a number of fascinating studies on language: Christine Kenneally, who presents the current debate between innate grammar and expression in *The First Word* (New York, NY: Penguin, 2008). Walter J. Ong argues for the primacy of orality over literacy, not only in individual and communal development, but also in all arts. See Ong, *Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word* (New York, NY: Methuen, 1982). Recent French theorists privilege a new orality, which argues that language is purely fluid, with no structural elements. See François Cusset, who traces this development in *French Theory: How Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze & Co. Transformed the Intellectual Life in the United States*, trans. Jeff Fort with Josephine Berganza and Marlon Jones (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota, 2008).

Other approaches include that of Charles Taylor and those of the Anglo-American tradition, which argue a culture-centered as opposed to person-centered theory, which holds that language arises out of human agency. While Taylor is concise and informative on various linguistic camps, he is, nonetheless, unable to explain how a plurality of languages and cultures can still understand each other, since cultures differ widely. See his “Philosophy of Language,” in *Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers I* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University, 1985) 213-292; also Taylor’s “Theories of Meaning,” in *Man and World* 13, 1980: 282-302.

For a balanced approach to language studies and more in line with a Heidegger, see Gregory Fried, “What’s in a Word?” in *A Companion to Heidegger’s Introduction to Metaphysics*, ed. Richard Polt and Gregory Fried (New Haven, CN: Yale University, 1999) 125-142. Fried discusses the two extremes of language: relativism of Sapir–Whorf, wherein only specific languages offer specific realities; and Anglo-Americans, who argue that all ambiguity is solved through clarity, that all languages give assertions. Thus, logic is universal and primary. Fried claims that Heidegger does indeed offer another option.
going away, but speaks only of inversion or emptying of Being. Nor can linguistics
speak properly of Being as Saying, heard as Silence and manifested as Ereignis. And yet,
Ereignis emerges nevertheless in all of these discussions. It is to the proper attunement
of Ereignis we now turn.

**Regions of Ontology**

From the ways of false paths, we turn our sights and listen to the words of authors
who guide us toward possible ways of Being as Saying as Ereignis. They try to hear
Heidegger’s way-making more closely. Indeed they seem to follow the fourfold and
develop regions of ontology, which do allow Being as Saying to emerge as Ereignis.
They are building, dwelling, thinking the dance between man and Being. And dwelling
is belonging within the fourfold. Such a dwelling is not simply attuning oneself
poetically, but more importantly, renouncing language. In renouncing, man is open to
hearing Being as Saying, heard as Silence. In hearing Silence, man responds by
dwelling. By dwelling, man builds. In building, man enframes; machination occurs
and—in a flash—Being appears. Man is transformed. And yet once again Being
disappears.

By way of introduction to this next section of current regional of ontology, let us
first listen to a verse in *The Ister*:

Hier aber wollen wir bauen. But here we wish to build.
…
Es brauchet aber Stiche der Fels
Und Furchen die Erd’,
Unwirthbar wär es, ohne Weile;
Was aber jener thuet der Strom,
But the rock needs incisions
and the earth needs furrows,
Would be desolate else, unabiding;
Yet what that one does, the river,
We hear of human desires, of the unfathomability of the river, and of the earth between. We hear of incising of rock and the desolation of unabiding. Heidegger appropriates this poem in 1942, we contend, as voicing the way-making of Being as Saying with man. It speaks of the fourfold, and of appropriation and transformation.

These verses of *The Ister* shall be the criteria by which we judge the success of the following regions of ontology. While we already spent much time with authors who offered arguments contrary or outside the limitations of Heidegger’s way-making, we now present some positive examples of way-making in regions of ontology, though not without a few caveats. Let us listen to Jean-Luc Marion as he appropriates way-making to his theological concerns, Bernard Steigler to technology, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe to the political, and Jean-Luc Nancy to the human person. As we listen, we must ask ourselves whether we hear the dance between Being and Da-sein more clearly of Being as Saying, heard as Silence—*Ereignis*.

April 29, 2009 Jean-Luc Marion presented a paper on the phenomenological relationship between theology and philosophy. Discussion ensued regarding his phenomenologically charged notions of liminality: “saturated phenomenon,” alterity, God, love and experience.” Borrowing broadly from the sixth century Christian Neo-

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874 The paper, proffered as a keynote address at The Silverman Center’s 2009 Symposium on Phenomenology, Duquesne University, has not yet been submitted in its final form, though its working title, “On the Foundation of the Distinction Between Theology and Philosophy,” was the impetus for interesting discussion.
Platonist, Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, Marion defines saturated phenomena are those which have overwhelming givenness; any attempt to retrieve them is fraught with difficulties, since the phenomenon is beyond human expression; as such, they are saturated. “Saturated phenomenon” is problematic since it traverses limits of finitude and reaches into the infinite. Like Heidegger’s discussions of λόγος, “saturated phenomenon” tries to bridge the gap between human expression and infinity in love. Similarly, love proves to be elusive. Like St. Augustine, Marion bemoans the fact that we all experience love, yet when asked to define it, it slips through our fingers. Moreover, any attempt to define it, limits its experience too narrowly.

In God without Being, Marion posits the reality of God’s revelation as pure gift. Beyond gift, categorizing God becomes problematic for Marion. Icons are those representations that refer the viewer beyond the image, and allow God to shine through. Idols, on the other hand, are those representations, which direct our gaze back at ourselves. Icons defy metaphysical categories, while idols are steeped in the metaphysical, argues Marion. The idol is always determined by a reflex, which allows it to come from a fixed point, an original from which it returns. (The idol is a specter, un revenant, or Gespenst, which haunts the conscience.) Not real, yet lingering, idols are the stuff of which metaphysical construction is built.

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875 One of Pseudo-Dionysius’s extant works entitled, Divine Names, indeed wades through super-abundant names for God. While all names are inadequate, through analogical inference names can speak more than the simple reality of the name. For instance, in Dionysius’s sentence, God is the rock of my salvation, God is not equated with a lifeless object, but the idea of grounded permanence is conveyed, and then more so. Whether one can admit of such inferences as valid is beyond the point. Rather, we use them as if they indeed were valid.


877 The reader should immediately recognize the allusion to Derrida, Specters of Marx, and the depiction of Zizek in “Specters of Realism” in Graham Harman’s Tool Being. While not real, idols, nonetheless, persist.
Marion follows Heidegger’s *Identity and Difference*, to describe the clearing of Being through beings while Being remains intact. This seems quite plausible in the case of icons. But what prevents an icon from becoming an idol? To answer this question Marion must indeed leap beyond the icon, beyond the ontological itself to the theological. This is the leap of faith to the Other, to God; thus, Marion equates God (theological) with Being (ontological). This is not consistent with Heidegger’s *Seinsgeschichte*. We would not make such a leap. Indeed if Marion desired to remain within the bounds of *Seinsgeschichte*, perhaps a better choice for him would be the second Person of the Trinity, Jesus the Christ, Logos made flesh. But Marion chooses the unfathomable Other as that which prevents an icon from its stagnating into an idol.

But, nevertheless, Marion heard the Silence, which he heard in terms of gods, one of the fourfold. Marion in another work, *The Erotic Phenomenon*, breaks through the aesthetic; in *The Idol and the Distance* Marion attempts to leap between the philosophy of the first beginning to that of the other beginning—all the while applying this Kierkegaardian-Heideggerian leap and calling it faith, and at times God. These attempts all follow Heidegger’s listening to the Silence, but all equate God with Being. In Heideggerian terminology, Marion is making the mistake of ascribing *Seyn* of the *Beiträge* to “do” the work of *Seyn/Sein* in the turning-in [Einkehre]. In that event *Seyn* now has a history. In short Marion delves into what others have mis-labeled Heidegger’s work, as onto-theo-logos.

And still, Marion is admirably working within the fourfold to a certain extent. Certainly we see how “gods” enter. Mortals too are present. Interaction between them in opposition with this “mediated” vis-à-vis the earth and its permanence in the materiality

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878 See GA 11: 63/*Identity and Difference* 70.
of the world, all bring together the fourfold to a certain extent. What we don’t see is the element of change or sky. Indeed the icon becomes a moment made infinite, and Augenblick, a presence, is not presencing. Thus, Being as Ereignis doesn’t seem to emerge. And so we remain ambivalent regarding icons and idols. How can we ever know that one is not the other? Indeed the dis-ease of religious articles, lies in this uncanny wonder whether they are not simply superstitious items—doubt is always mixed with belief in religious ontology.

From our ambivalence toward religious ontology, we move to the unsettling one of technology. Bernard Stiegler discusses well the issue of technics and its role in modern culture in the first half of Technics and Time, 1. Within its pages, Stiegler not unlike Žižek, draws out the extended allusion that technics is but a prosthesis, for which man develops in order to compensate his otherwise lack of prowess. Like a cornea transplant or a knee replacement, technics is an appendage added onto human faculties. In general, for Stiegler, technics “designates in human life today the restricted and specified domain of tools, of instruments, if not only machines.” Here Stiegler holds a clear separation between the man and his tools.

At the same time Stiegler designates language as a tool of man. Rhetoric, poetry, speech are employed to persuade, cajole, and powerfully coerce, not unlike a tool. In the same breath Stiegler admits the distinction of language as tool blurs the definition. For, as we know, language too is that which speaks to us beyond our control, as originary language. We are mere shepherds. Language is not a tool in that case—certainly not a prosthesis—but the site of Ereignis.

Indeed this situation is the problematic. Language, once considered a tool at our disposal, now lies beyond us. Could not our technics also be able to outstrip us and become our master? Such is the food of any rabid sci-fi buff. Yet, the ambivalence is clear and the subsequent dis-ease is present. Can our technics, the tool, be the very “essencing” of who man is: *homo faber*? The relation between artifact and artificer seems blurred.

Relational blurring increases as we speak of language, the individual, and community. Stiegler questions Rousseau. He asks: does language occur for the foundation of society, or does society arise from a decision of language? Stiegler argues against Rousseau in *Discourse of Social Inequality*, wherein Rousseau argues that language was not necessary until man stepped outside himself into a community; language has its origins as a “will” in society. But if that were the case, then speech and thought, even gesture, has it occurrence as a will to power of the individual before the community. But then language cannot be an originary Saying. For this reason the quest of language persists.

Indeed language, thought, community and subjectivity are all interrelated, but not simply as linguistics. Stiegler writes: “This fractioning out of Rousseau’s fiction can only at once express and ignore the fact that since language is thought, since the will-to-say is saying, language is the institution of society, and society is the institution of language.”880 Thus, Stiegler argues that technics and language have correlate levels, as Heidegger realized in “The Essence of Language.”

Stiegler argues that this search for origins is part of the metaphysics of the philosophy of the first beginning. He writes: “Speech, and later politics, proceed from

this memorial, in this speech, they come to *invent*. Religion, speech, politics, invention—
each is but an effect of the default of origin. The essential is the accident, the absence of
quality.”

Thus, we agree that the fictional “source” of language is but an accident.

The essential element is that of Being and it disappears. In its disappearance we
construct its absence as a presence, a source. Stiegler uses mythology to explain this
effect; it is Prometheus’s fault for stealing fire, the power of the gods, to compensate for
the experience of the lack, the need.

Ingeniously, Stiegler describes man’s compensation as the source of the two-fold
nature of language, a concealing and revealing. “Language, the *logos* as language,”
Stiegler suggests, “occurs (it too is disappearing, it too is two-faced, always capable of
meaning the opposite of what is intended) through technics, through the theft of fire and
the ‘arts’ (tekhnai). The *logos*, *qua* religion, *qua* politics, is (on the basis of the fault)
wholly technical, fruit of an originary incompleteness of technical being.”

Because man is incomplete, he needs to overcompensate through technics. Because man is
incomplete, man is as technical being. Through this, Stiegler explains, the temporality of
mortals is set up.

As in the Heideggerian analytic, this knowledge of the end, which is also a non-
knowing, forms the primordial situation out of which each person conducts himself or
herself. Stiegler adds one further premise. Through man’s use of tools, tools disappear.

“Their mode—the mode of *what*—is being-already-to-hand. A mode ignored by
theoretical knowledge. Tools are foresight—*Prometheus* is the foreseeing one.”

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883 Stiegler, *Technics and Time* 244.
Contrary to Heidegger, looking ahead is developed through time with technology. Heidegger sees “Vor-sicht” as part of man’s “essence.”

With Stiegler’s foresight, then, we see the interaction of the gods, mortals, earth, and sky. It seems that Stiegler has all the elements of the fourfold in play. Their gathering/separateness should be the occasion of Being as Saying, heard as Silence, to manifest Being as Ereignis. And yet it seems we are closer to an answer of the question who or what is man, not to the question of Being. Or perhaps more accurately said, we are discussing man’s relation to beings, not Being. We are squarely in the ontological region of metaphysical anthropology. The question of Being seems to have disappeared. Is this Being’s doing? Or is it the effect of our machination? It is unclear. This lack of clarity, we contend, is the call of the Silence and the dis-ease we feel regarding technics.\(^{884}\) This final attunement does draw us nigh.

From the Silence of man’s needs, we move toward the deafening silence of the noise of the political. From the “essence” of man we move toward the “essencing” of community. Hannah Arendt and Henri Birault linked the distress, the dis-ease of our world, with the appeal to an ethics which could exorcise it, and with it the specter of totalitarianism. Of all of the regions of ontology, Heidegger has been most silent—and most criticized—on politics. Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, a loyal Heideggerian and vibrant critic of Heidegger’s silence on the Shoah, co-authors Retreating the Political with Jean-Luc Nancy. Within its pages Lacoue-Labarthe explores the relation between politics and psychoanalysis. The question seeks to answer the internal and external dynamics of a person when the person is part of a “wider stage.” Given the specter of totalitarianism,\(^{884}\) Rojcewicz rightly questions Stiegler’s exact meaning for “technics.” His meaning for “Die Technik” is something technical or practical while Heidegger’s meaning includes technology, “λόγος,” or the theory behind the use of technical things.
Lacoue-Labarthe asks, can politics be a plausible answer to our dis-ease or must we call for a “retreat” from politics? Given brutal reactions, fearful regimes, nuclear armaments, terrorist cells and the destabilization of order, can we return to politics as our antidote? Do we increase more structure with control or more freedom, the question persists. We are ambivalent toward politics.

With these questions Lacoue-Labarthe turns to, and away from, Heidegger. For Heidegger this region of ontology in *Being and Time* is called “Mit-sein” and its ek-static form, “Mit-Dasein.” The terms are indicative of a “gathering” more than a “separation.” But Lacoue-Labarthe opts for the Levinasian terms of “l’autre” and “autrui.” Immediately, the reader should be alert to the fact that Lacoue-Labarthe has bracketed Heidegger’s “Being-with” structure and engaged the usual, conflictual understanding of community, which arises throughout all of the philosophy of the first beginning, and especially in the modern era with Hobbes, Rousseau, and Freud. With such a basic shift, it seems that Lacoue-Labarthe is signaling that he is emphasizing “separateness” over “gathering” aspect of the fourfold.

Yet Lacoue-Labarthe retains the Heideggerian understanding that any discussion of Being-with is equi-primordially “Being-in” and “worldhood.” Thus any discussion of the philosophy of the first beginning, say that of Freudian projection [Einfühlung], always already presupposes the relation to the “Other” with both internal and external relations. In identifying the “Other,” we identify ourselves as different and as subject and in the “world.” We are integrally related.

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885 We will use the usual English translations respectively; for “l’autre,” “the other” and for “autrui,” “the Other” is used.
Moreover, these societal relations are relations of language for Lacoue-Labarthe. This is not inconsistent with “discourse” in *Being and Time*. While language has a structure of identification, language also is a process of “alteration,” of otherness. Lacoue-Labarthe asks an insightful question on the relation between the subject and others, culture and politics, and power: “if with the subject something other than the subject is in question, then, with power something other than power is in question.”\(^886\) In other words, if we have difficulties with the modernist’s conception of the self, then too difficulties will surely arise with modern social/political structures of power.

While Lacoue-Labarthe sees difficulties with politics, he doesn’t retreat first, as the title of his book might suggest. Rather, first he finds it crucial to understand the dynamics involved in politics. Thus, the ambiguity of the title: he offers another treatment of the political. He deconstructs its meaning, and then he returns to it with renewed understanding. Lacoue-Labarthe chooses the concept of “figure” to explain our present difficulties. For example, the figures of “fatherland” and “motherland” become fixed and represent dynamic processes. The figure for Lacoue-Labarthe is a mark of an originary fiction at the heart of metaphysics; it is the identity principle of community. Yet the “figure” is a myth. It is, we contend, the onto-theo-logical construed as language. While initially helpful, “figure” soon becomes problematic for Lacoue-Labarthe. The figural undermines the transcendence impulse and leads towards the totalitarian impulse.

Now that Lacoue-Labarthe finds “figure” to be part of our difficulties, he suggests that we reinvent politics with a “non-figure” so that we may retreat from sovereignty.\(^887\) This, he argues, allows something to appear or sets something free. It means retreating

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\(^887\) *Retreating the Political* 131.
from the political as philosophically defined. One might ask: after the retreat from the political, what next? Here Lacoue-Labarthe leaves open, that is to say, refuses closure on the essence of the political. For in closure a figure is employed and impulse toward totalitarianism ensues.

Analyzing *Retreating the Political* according to our criteria of the fourfold seems both simple and yet incomplete. Lacoue-Labarthe does indeed engage mortals, gods (as basic fundamental ideas), sky (transition), and perhaps earth (specificity as opposed to generalities). But ultimately Being does not emerge. Our sights are fixed doggedly on our needs as a person and as a community and the interrelation between the two. The “retreat” could be construed as a renouncing of our language, a renouncing of our power, even a leaping between the philosophy of the first beginning toward the other beginning. And yet political “retreating” still seems unsatisfying.

*Retreating the Political* does not discuss tensions between equality and freedom, or between socialism and free-market capitalism. Discussions of utilitarianism, Marxism, multiculturalism or libertarianism are absent. So too are any discussions feminism. Each has its own concerns and foundational principles. How could these closed systems interact? Moreover, wouldn’t a unifying system that would bring them together simply be another meta-narrative, which inevitably eviscerates alterity? Dis-ease enters and with it the saving power of Being.

Since politics seems not to draw us closer to Being, or perhaps more accurately, politics draws us toward Being in its Silence of Being. Let us explore a region of ontology which engages directly the question of Being and its emergence. Jean-Luc Nancy composed *The Birth to Presence* with the emergence of Being as it central
question. For Nancy “presence” is not the standing, immobile or impassive presence; nor is it the platonic Idea. Rather, “presence” is a “come-to-there” or a “to-be-here” “presence.” In other words, presence is presencing, on-going, never stagnant. The birth of presence hasn’t occurred once, nor does presence cease being born.\(^{888}\)

If we were speaking of the presence of the “I,” the self-same “I” would be stationary and would have been born once. For Nancy identity of the self, however, is relational in time and place and never ceases to be born.\(^{889}\) If we were speaking of Being, it is not the supreme Being, a thing, but Being as Saying in abandonment. Being speaks in all things as Silence. As such it is open and abundant.\(^{890}\) If we were speaking of the presence of narrative of the written words in language, the narrative would be fixed for all times and places. Yet the narrative comes to life again each time in new ways.\(^{891}\) If we were speaking of the presence of a thought, it would be a permanent truth. Yet truths are situated and need to reinvested with meaning to be true for a given person.

Whether we speak of the person, language, thought or Being, Nancy insists that all partake of a dynamic structure, which belies concrete once-for-all answers. Like political, anthropological, religious systems which are closed, any discussion of Being must be relational and dynamic. Systems are closed and ignore alterity; and yet pure multiplicity and difference, whether of the Derridean or Deleuzian sort, make the fourfold intangible, even untenable. For pure presencing cannot occur unless it occurs in tangible things.

\(^{889}\) *The Birth to Presence* 10.
\(^{890}\) *The Birth to Presence* 36.
\(^{891}\) *The Birth to Presence* 77.
Thus, any region of ontology must include discussions of permanence and change, mortals and gods, that is the fourfold. A region of ontology too includes a contention of “gathering” and “separating.” As Being is two-fold, both concealing and revealing, so too any region of ontology is two-fold. As Being as Saying—heard as Silence, speaks to man as Ereignis, and man listens and responds by dwelling—is conversational, so too any viable region of ontology also is dialogical. Man nears Being through a double renunciation: that of the ground of the Abyss and that of language as crossing the Abyss; so too any region of ontology includes meditative thinking, that is renunciation of having “the” answer. As Ereignis manifests itself as the fourfold, any region of ontology mirrors Ereignis, all the while allowing itself to be appropriated to Being as man is appropriated to Being in service [Verfügung]. Finally, and more insightfully in the past, regions of ontology—religion, politics, anthropology, and technology—dialogue, interact and indeed are in relation to each other, for together as gathering/separating, they allow Being as Saying to emerge as Ereignis.

Each the above regions of ontology engages for the most part the fourfold. Each element of the fourfold mirrors the presence of the others. Moreover any treatment in a region of ontology takes seriously Heidegger’s injunction to dwell meditatively. Within each of the regions we saw first excavation of the prior structures of the philosophy of the first beginning. From there we build, and then inhabit. In building the construction becomes a closure; the closure knots towards an aporia. The dis-ease of the aporia leads us to listen to the Silence. There Being draws us nigh, and manifests itself as

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Ereignis. It might seem as though it is our doing, or not our doing at all, but Being’s. Rather, Heidegger holds that is through both Being and man.

In conclusion, this last chapter argued that current non-Heideggerian approaches are inadequate. They can be either too humanistic, or non-humanistic as scientism or idealism. Linguistic theories are still metaphysical; structuralist theories cannot account for the divergence of multiplicity; French theory\textsuperscript{893} cannot account for any true communication in the face of multiplicity; thus they lack any unity. Badiou, in his Being and Event, does seem to balance these issues of the “world,” but he fails in that he is unable to account for the human. Likewise, Anglo-American and post-analytic theories of language fall short of human experience.

In contrast, the above regions of ontology creatively hold Being, beings, language and humans; they gather and, in gathering, unfold into all aspects of the event Heidegger called Ereignis. Only way-making seems to negotiate these issues with “Sprache als Be-wëgen.” Thus unfolding of language and Being in Heidegger’s way still is viable, hardly passé in our current philosophical discussions. In Ereignis language and Being in the fourfold influence all arenas of human interest and study. This we argue is the true unfolding with language and Being as Sprache als Be-wëgen, a dynamic paradigm shorn of Hegelian overtones, and invested with Ereignis, way-making Being shining through, and transforming, beings.

Heidegger’s last line to Richardson in April 1962, written in Richardson’s preface seems quite appropriate at this moment: “… may it [Richardson’s text] help to bring on

\textsuperscript{893} This phrase encompasses a number of philosophies, also collectively known as postmodernism. It is employed by François Cusset in his book, French Theory: How Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze & Co. Transformed the Intellectual Life in the United States, trans. Jeff Fort with Josephine Berganza and Marlon Jones (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota, 2008).
the way, the manifold thinking of the simple, and therefore, the fullness, the sheltering matter of thinking.” Ähnliche Zitate lassen sich aus der Philosophie Heideggers finden. Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought xxii-xxiii. The translation is my own. The conclusion to Heidegger’s sentence, which referred to Richardson’s work, can now be applied to way-making as a whole. It reads as follows: “… möge helfen, das mehrfältige Denken der einfachen und deshalb die Fülle bergenden Sache des Denkens in Gang zu bringen.”
CONCLUSION

But the call of the pathway speaks only as long as there are men, born in its atmosphere, who can hear it. They are servants of their origin, not slaves of machination.895

Every epoch has its dangers. Gregory Bruce Smith lists what he considers to be matters of greater moment, those important issues of concern, impinging upon in our epoch. He deems four issues worth our attention: irrelevance of philosophy to everyday life, increasing politicization, increasing homogenization of humanity and reduction of humanity to universal workers-consumers, and finally, the confrontation between globalization and balkanization.896 Smith could have also included fundamental extremism and the conflict between religious versus secular beliefs, or even the threat to our environment. Our epoch does find itself increasingly in danger.

Whatever list a person might compose, the issues of our epoch, like any other, do indeed call to us. But we are not slaves of the dangers of machination. That is not our origin. Our origin, if we can hazard this speculation regarding our origin, is not

896 Gregory Bruce Smith, Martin Heidegger: Paths Taken, Paths Opened (New York, NY: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007) 1. While the title offered great interest, the egregious errors marred its credibility. For example, as part of his thesis in chapter one Smith argues that Heidegger acted the chameleon for academic patronage. On another occasion, he lists on page 30 among the tenets of Catholicism as “reincarnation” and “redemption of sins.” Either false assertion draws a furrow on any brow. A less generous reader would have discarded the book at that juncture. Nevertheless, some interesting ideas do emerge.
machination, but our origin is the pathway of Being as Saying or the “Sprache als bewegen.” We are born within it. We hear the Silence of Being. In hearing Being’s call, we are transformed and attempt to dwell accordingly. Indeed it is through the ordinary dwelling [Aufenthalt] by which Being calls and Being unfolds. This call of dwelling both leads us into the danger and with it becomes the part of the power to save us. Such is the way of Being; such is our way.

Our way has followed a long, winding pathway with side trails. Although some trails have led us down cul-de-sacs, we have kept our questioning eye upon Being. But more importantly, we have found that Heidegger’s work led us in circles, not vicious, but helpful non-linear pathways. Through hermeneutics and through phenomenology, Heidegger has led us near Being and, then realizing its utter Silence as communicating to us, redirects us to allow Being to flow through us as part of the fourfold. As part of the fourfold, man can dwell, through which Being shows itself. Heidegger calls this Ereignis. Ereignis is Being manifesting itself as Saying, heard as Silence. Being as Saying has a history [Seinsgeschichte]; we noted this to be the “Turning,” [Kehre]. As such, Being is originary language; our response occurs as ordinary language. Language, then, is indeed intimately related to Being for Heidegger. Because Being is Saying as Silence, we are drawn into communication.

Finally that communication is a way-making that both draws us and allows us freedom within its way. Freedom arises in the fact that Being is two-fold. That is to say, Being is as communicating itself as hidden. Being as Saying is a concealing-revealing. Wherever we look, we find this ambiguous situation throughout. In Being, between Being and beings, in the strife between earth and world, between gathering-separating of
the fourfold, and in ordinary language—all carry this destiny of ambiguity of concealing revealing. Between the philosophy of the first beginning and the other beginning Heidegger urges us to leap. Leaping, we are appropriated to Being and we can choose to dwell accordingly.

Our chapters have led us in three parts. First, we attempted to allow Heidegger’s own writings to allow Being to show itself in the way that it shows itself. Through the repetition of the second part, we came to appreciate ways that misconstrued Heidegger’s meaning, but more importantly, did not allow Being to show itself. Finally, our third part offered possibilities situated within our epoch, wherein Being might show itself. Being shows itself as always already showing itself. Between this and our interpretation of it, Being’s age-old history comes to light. We have viewed it in stages, but the way-making is not necessarily linear; neither is it merely structural nor is it merely content. Nor is it merely Being’s process entirely; certainly way-making is not merely man’s doing. Being is nothing and its way-making is best described by what it is not.

Heidegger appreciated this Being as Saying as way-making in light of the Ereignis. But he could not have come to it without first traveling the route of his transcendental-horizontal phenomenology of Being and Time, then the rocky path of destructive retrieval toward the Beiträge, and ultimately arriving in circling fashion toward meditative thinking and phenomenology as “looking ahead.” Heidegger’s thinking did adjust through the years, but it always had the question of Being as its primary focus. Let us retrace briefly the steps of this path so that we can retain the major signposts along the way of Being as Saying, language as way-making.
As much as *Being and Time* attempted to uncover Being through phenomenology and hermeneutics, it concluded rather inconclusively, that, though we indeed know more about man as Dasein as Being-in-the-world, we had not come closer to thinking about Being. Moreover, ordinary, ontic dwelling led us to believe at times that language was a tool, and yet ontological analysis revealed language to be far richer. Language is enmeshed in worldhood and yet, language is always already part of the existential structure of Dasein, who himself is enmeshed in worldhood. Worldhood “contains” meaningful relations to things and the care structure is the “means” by which Dasein relates meaningful content. *Being and Time*, then, left us with a conundrum regarding language and its relation to Being.

And so in its inconclusiveness, *Being and Time* led us to another path, which began not with Dasein, but with *Ereignis*, the manifestation of Being. As such, it gave us evidence that not man but Being has a history, *Seinsgeschichte*; and this turn, *Kehre*, toward the history of Being was from the outset part of Heidegger’s pathway. *Being and Time* has given us the formal indication that Dasein alone cannot be the site of Being’s disclosiveness.

As Heidegger delved into poetry, poetry of the philosophy of the first beginning in order to draw out the ramifications of language and Being, he noticed that any conceptual framework and its contents vary with regard to the vantage point of the viewer. Dasein, if viewing too close to things, sees all multiplicity, if viewing too far from things, sees all unity. Thus, with such a destructive analysis Heidegger arrived at the point that all viewings are still too humanistic in their approaches.
Indeed Heidegger had come to the realization that all such approaches in Western philosophy ultimate lead us to nihilism, for all such approaches are still ways of the will to power. The discordance between truth and art illustrated well this point. While philosophy structures experience and poetry breaks open that structure; both still are expressions of the will to power. Placing philosophy and poetry in such a dialogical process, Heidegger saw that language all along resonated between structure and content, between “world” and “earth.” Language somehow was crucial to his investigation of Being. Still language, while circling seemed to define and redefine truth and art vis-à-vis the other, yet language of this sort never reached Being. Language led us to no-thing-ness.

Rather than fear nihilism as a tragic consequence like Western philosophy, Heidegger saw it revealed a new insight; it revealed the way of Ereignis. In no-thing-ness, Being reveals its-self as itself as a withdrawal. With Being’s withdrawal, Dasein is brought to a startled dismay. Being’s main way of disclosure is through Dasein’s startled dismay. But Ereignis, the manifestation of Being, reveals other elements of its disclosure. Ereignis shows the relation between the gods and man. Ereignis too shows the resonance of the holding sway of Being as originary language as Silence, the Saying of beyng. The Saying of beyng for Heidegger was originary language.

Thus, for Heidegger language in this period was both the means of destructive retrieval toward Being and the originary language as Saying of Being. Originary language emerged out of nihilism, as the withdrawal of Being. Originary language emerged through ordinary language. This was an important realization for Heidegger. The difficulty with the Beiträge still to this day, though, is its incomprehensibility.
Thus, Heidegger needed to find a way along less winding and perilous ways to find the same insight. His insight that originary language more properly spoke also meant that originary language has a history, and subsequently man has a history. That is to say that Being in its abandonment, heard as Silence transforms man; that man having been transformed dwells more attentively to Being; and, at the same time man rebuilds, the building of which draws man away from Being’s call of Silence. Both revealing and concealing occurs. All paths lead to this awareness of Being as Saying as the originary language unfolding in all epochs as holding sway: concealing/revealing. And yet each path offers us new insights. Each recircled toward Being; Saying.

Heidegger’s first path directly engaged the topic of language and Being as the way toward Being as Saying. This period began with the insights of the *Beiträge* and developed them further in the Bremen lectures. What Heidegger showed in those lectures is the relation between things and Being lies in language. Indeed how Being conceals itself is how Being reveals itself as concealment—all through language.

This relationship between Being and things helped Heidegger to delineate a deeper relationship of Being to language as Being as Saying. For a thing’s truer “nature” is seen more by its lack, than by its positive characteristics. A jug is a jug by virtue of its emptiness; it can contain something. Rather than a thing qua thing, a jug is the relational gathering of the fourfold. Similarly, Heidegger provisionally would understand that words speak to us by their relation to Being and by their lack, so as to span things and Being. Thus language for Heidegger in this period acts like a bridge, spanning the divide. This metaphor of connecting sides is why we call this understanding of language provisional.
More importantly, Heidegger realized that language is not man’s device primarily, but language is that which nears man to his ownmost, to Being. Language is not the means; rather, language is primarily stillness. This shift of the site of language from man to Being helped Heidegger to see that man was not the sole discloser of Being. Man is but part of Being’s disclosiveness of concealedness. Man conceals and reveals because Being conceals and reveals. Stillness, the decisive element of language, brings man to his ownmost.

In this realization man is pained, and recognizes the difference between Being and beings. Heidegger calls this difference. In pain man then hears attentively; in hearing man sees and dwells properly. As such, man responds rightly to the Silence. Yet man too can turn away from the Silence. In this event, man attunes himself more to things and Being draws further away. This relationship between man and Being is primarily Being’s “action” and secondarily man’s response. For Heidegger this relationship between man and Being is like that of conversation.

Conversation as a working model led Heidegger to looking more properly at language as such. Hence, Heidegger revisits λόγος. Heidegger noticed that Being is primarily a showing as concealment in originary language before it is a laying down as revealing in ordinary language. Λόγος follows Being. But language as such is not concealing then revealing, as might a conversation occur. Originary language is simultaneously both together a gathering and a laying down.

Moreover, thinking does not bridge Being and language. Rather thinking as thanking, as a response to Being’s original call, is also relational. Thus thinking properly seen is another variation of originary language. It too is two-fold, both gathering and
laying forth because Being is two-fold. As such thinking and ordinary language, though manifold and flowing as unconcealing/revealing, are also related to Being in the same way.

While language seems to capture Being as Saying provisionally due to its authentic poetic style and its dialogical structure, Being is nevertheless still absent. Though language conveys the aspect of silence, which Being as Saying is most properly, it is not Being. Originary language is as nothing. Ordinary language, then, is a response, as in a conversation; it dialogues with silence. While Heidegger saw that language’s words hint at a two-fold character that leads to the two-fold character of Being from beings, he also saw that this cannot be experienced directly. Thus, Heidegger looks away from λόγος and toward Ereignis.

Heidegger’s new way includes Gelassenheit, “letting-go,” letting go of λόγος, but also letting go of things toward the mystery of the unfolding of Being as Saying as nothing. Neither passive nor controlling, this new path of meditative thinking is drawn out as man converses with Being. Both reason and identity are refocused in light of this new path. They emerge as concealing and revealing, as two-fold because Being as Saying is two-fold. Thus, philosophy and its principles, like language, are relational. Letting go of traditional philosophy, Heidegger reassigns to philosophy the old search for Being, not clarity of thought.

Rather than searching for the ground of thought, Heidegger looks to Being. Since Being is two-fold as Saying in Silence, and since ordinary language flows from originary language. Being now emerges as the “ground of all beings,” not as a thing, but as an
utterance of the unfathomable Silence, as the abyss [Ab-grund]. Being is the groundless-ground.

What does this mean? In silence, the abyss calls. To this abyss, we cling. We belong to Being and identify ourselves in relation to it. As such we are listening beings. But man also belongs to Being in that uniquely man listens to Being because man is appropriated to Being. Being, in turn, belongs to man in that Being is present only when man is open to its holding sway. We see, then, both man and Being are appropriated to each other. As such, we can say that Being is the groundless-ground.

Rather than using the term, groundless-ground, Heidegger called the unfolding of this relationship, Ereignis. But the unfolding of this relationship isn’t noticed until man and Being are mutually challenged by technology in enframing. Precisely in that startling experience man is dismayed by his lack of control. Lack of control delivers man over to the Silence. Man leaps into the Silence. As such man and Being are delivered over to each other. This is the event of the appropriation, the Ereignis. This springing we call meditative thinking emerges from Ereignis.

In our relation to Being, we also notice the ontological difference, now manifested as Ereignis. While this difference was once noticed, then it was forgotten, now our recalling it is the basis of λόγος. Thus, λόγος emerges from originary language, from the ontological difference. According to Heidegger, history once grasped wrongly that language emerged from λόγος. In Ereignis Heidegger comes to appreciate that thinking, dwelling and language are intricately interwoven as emerging out of Being.

Let us look more intently as the ontological difference. We see that what is held in the difference, i.e. Being and beings, perdures. But it isn’t conceptual, nor is it a thing.
Being appears as perduringly absent. Perdurance occurs as holding and as swaying. Perdurance as holding is a circling: Being and beings circle around each other. One comes over the other—Being and beings; the other arrives in the one in reciprocal reflection. Thus, we see in the ontological difference, now called *Ereignis* a new dynamic, from originary language emerges λόγος. Λόγος, then, is the manifested “essence” of ordinary language. Λόγος as language, as the *Beiträge* relays to us, emerges from the gathering ring of stillness, which is the ownmost of language.

As we turned directly to ordinary language, we saw that our dwelling with language can be comfortable or uncomfortable. But always it is originary language, not man, which genuinely speaks. Man speaks only to the extent that he in each case co-responds to originary language. Poets help us to co-respond. Heidegger circles his way through the thicket of Western philosophy as he did with destructive retrieval to find a clearer path toward language and Being. But unlike that period of destructive retrieval, in this period of meditative thinking Heidegger uses comparison as a way to find the closer connections and relationships, not breaking apart concepts. Heidegger nears the relationship between originary language and ordinary language.

But alas, in those close connections and relationships Heidegger still is unable to reach Being via language. This realization brings Heidegger to his most mature meditative thinking. He renounces ordinary language as a way toward Being. This is a linguistic turn of a sort. But such renunciation still reveals. It reveals for Heidegger that language draws us to the hiddenness of Being in that it is unable to go beyond beings in their relation to Being. This Silence is the way; it draws us. In fact, Heidegger calls it way-making [Be-wégung]. Through Being as Saying, way-making [Be-wégung] leads us

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897 See GA 12: 27, 204, 241.
to our own neighborhood. Way-making draws us near. Indeed nearness and Saying are
the same. Both draw us to the fourfold in a similar way called “nighness.” Thus man and
Being are appropriated to one another, and man is appropriated to the fourfold. Thus,
meditative thinking draws us to the movement [Be-wëgen] of the way; and the way is
how we hear call the region or neighborhood of language. Language belongs to Saying
as its movement unfolds [entfalt] in the nearness of the fourfold of all things.

We can now say that the relationship between language, Being as Saying and the
fourfold occurs in the attunement of renunciation. In renunciation, there is also a
receiving nearness and relinquishing distance. As such, we are brought to our ownmost
“nature”—for this we are thankful. Due to the word’s remoteness, we are drawn near.
This is the “essence” of language: its perduring-remoteness-drawing-near. We listen.
Thus, both thinking and poetry have their root in listening.

Next, Heidegger explores the unfolding characteristic of originary language. It
unfolds as two-fold—a response to the Silence—into all regions of dwelling, into
common language. Language is both listening and speaking as a correspondence not
between word and thing, but between Being as Saying and our listening. The path
unfolds itself; and wherever it leads, it leads us. It leads and we are drawn near. In this
sense language is unified, not as a universal grammar, but as a two-fold unfolding, a
revealing-concealing.

The revealing and concealing correspond. Language is revealing as
information—the route of the first beginning. True, language is of the tongue. There are
manifold ways of speaking. But language is also a concealing, in that it lets Silence be
heard. Silence is of the other beginning. Saying is both the way of the Silence first as
need [Brauch], and then the co-joined Saying with our “Nachsagen.” As such Being as Saying manifests itself as Ereignis. Ereignis gives us a “there is,” of which even Being itself stands in need to come into its own as presence. The “there is” is not simply Dasein, but primarily as the fourfold. Ereignis as way-making brings the essence of language as Saying into ordinary language. Language as language brings us to language. But Being primarily reveals itself as concealment in language.

Through the insights of the fourfold Heidegger redirects our notions of man. Though man is the speaker of language, he is first a listener, then a dweller. Always man is related. Da-sein is not first a subject and transcendence is not the “structure of subjectivity,” but its removal [Beseitigung]. Meditative thinking strives to remain related rather than resorting to understand through transcendence. Man is related as a gathering-separateness of the fourfold. Meditative thinking helps us to let go of overly humanistic thinking. Meditative thinking involves leaping between the philosophy of the first beginning [transcendence] and the philosophy of the other beginning [removal]. We leap between transcendence and relatedness. With such a leap, a new understanding of Da-sein emerges as part of the fourfold.

With the new understanding of Da-ein as related to the fourfold, we arrive at language’s new meaning. Language [Sprache] is identical with the understanding of Being. Language, Da-sein and Being as Saying [Sage] are tightly interrelated. By redirecting our understanding of man as part of the fourfold, we come to a proper relationship of Being and Da-sein. Appropriation of man by Being and subsequently of Being by man, we see the transformative relationship in Ereignis. Ereignis has mankind.
Ereignis also “has” Space-time. Thus, Heidegger returns to the themes of Being and Time, in a new, proper understanding of the relationship between language, Being and man and the “world.” Through the manifestation of Being as Ereignis, both Being as holding sway and time as the realm of the open emerge. They emerge as Being sends itself and draws man near it. Most distinctive of the destiny of Being in time is Ereignis. It is a giving that is a self-withdrawing. With Being’s sending forth, we are drawn near, and we conceive time as the “process” of Being’s history through time. Being has history, Seinsgeschichte, not man.

From this insight Heidegger now sees the new way of phenomenology, as looking ahead [Vor-sicht]. This new type of phenomenology of looking ahead allows us to grasp Being as Saying. We grasp it as holding sway, as looking ahead as possibility [Möglichkeit]. Not simply descriptive, Vor-sicht offers new possibilities of man and beings as transformed by Ereignis. Ereignis appropriating man affords us the proper notions of clearing and presencing as holding sway. This is the task [Aufgabe] of philosophy. The purpose of philosophy is to open man to Ereignis. This is the way—through destructive retrieval and through remembering—man is open to Being’s manifestation as Ereignis.

Having allowed Being to manifest itself, we analyzed in chapters seven and eight ways that issued from Heidegger’s own work. Our criterion was the extent to which these models afforded Being to show itself as Ereignis in the fourfold. Chapter seven dealt with the successful failures of Langan, Richardson and Kockelmans, who developed strong paradigms of how Heidegger’s corpus should be viewed. Each had good success showing us part of Heidegger’s way: “existential phenomenology,” “thinking of being,”
and “many ways.” For a variety of reasons—especially since they did not have at their fingertips all of Heidegger’s texts—they did not lead us to the meaning of Being. These paradigms were not able to resolve the issue of Heidegger’s later work, wherein Being occurred as Saying in *Ereignis*. Nevertheless, these paradigms must be seen as successful failures, like *Holzwege*, like paths meandering in the dense forest, unable to find a clearing.

Because of his own failures, Heidegger redirected his attention in his own work from “logos” and toward Being as Saying in a being-historical [*seinsgeschichtlich*] trajectory. Such a being-historical way takes shape within language. *Ereignis*’ domain lies beyond what the thought of Being could possibly indicate. From these paradigms, we stepped forward toward the domain of *Ereignis*, and originary language as way-making. What “logos” fails to achieve in its spanning of temporality and atemporality, being-historical accomplishes in *Ereignis* manifesting through the fourfold. Finally, the way of being-historical is always appropriated to Being as holding sway, a concealing-revealing.

Chapter eight then helped us to outline the parameters of the problem. First, the relationship of Dasein and language needed further delineating, then the relation of language to Being was gathered more intimately, and finally, Dasein’s relation to Being showed as itself more fully. Thus the *Sein/Seyn* distinction of section 267 best illustrated this tension of gathered-separateness. Not a conceptual, but an ontological distinction, *Sein/Seyn* led us away from thinking toward originary language as showing.

This is not to say that thinking doesn’t enter the process. It does, but “logos” emerges afterwards in *Ereignis*. Thought emerges as the manifestation of Being [*Sein*] as
Ereignis. Ereignis emerges for Heidegger as the better way to explain the ontological difference. It involves the fourfold. Within the fourfold emerge thought and ordinary language. Recalling briefly the process of eight aspects of Ereignis from the Beiträge, we saw how Being manifests itself in the fourfold. Together the fourfold as gathered-separateness allows a thing to emerge. When a thing appears, Being recedes as concealment. When Being allows itself to appear in a momentary flash, beings recede. “Logos” cannot explain all these aspects; only can Being as Saying. Thus, Heidegger opts for Ereignis. Being as Saying reveals and conceals.

This is the not-fully articulated nor understood ontological difference as held by Heidegger in the early years. It is not a conceptual/linguistic difference as encouraged by Richardson; though, we grant that such a conceptual tension occurs subsequently. But it occurs not because it is originary, but because any conceptual outcropping will have traces of the ontological difference, the Ereignis. This process is best described as a Being as Saying model.

In our model of Being as Saying, metaphysical and worldly structures emerge, and with them, the danger of technology, we are able to see the prelude to Ereignis. But with the danger we also see the saving grace of the Ereignis. Thus, we see the important distinction for Heidegger in this period: Ereignis is never produced solely by man; man’s transformation occurs by virtue of the Ereignis. The danger of technology isn’t simply man’s failure to be authentic. It is the manifestation of Being as Ereignis. In the danger, Being appears in a flash. And as quickly it appears, it again conceals itself. We experience this as a type of communication or language.
As we learned, however any experience of language entails an experience in the domain of the essence of language, which has different yet similar regions of poetry and thinking. Both are modes of Saying [Sage]. As such, “The Essence of Language” helped us to unyoke discourse and thinking in the “logos” model of Richardson and Kockelmans. While poetry and thinking have similar domains and seem always to work together rooted in Befindlichkeit, they are not of the same region as we come near the essence of language. In this region there is a difference.

As we move toward the “essence” of language, we see language of Being is way-making in that it both is a saying and a drawing near. Both thinking and poetizing in their proper understanding say and draw near as modes of the language of Being. Man does not draw near and say Being. Rather, Being draws near as absence and “says” as originary language, to which we respond with thinking and ordinary language.

Dasein can only in part express Being as it speaks to us as originary language. We must recall the vibrating effect and the transformational aspect of Ereignis, wherein Dasein is a part of Ereignis. Having heard the Silence of Being, Dasein responds with ordinary language. Thus, we see that originary language cannot fully be captured by humanity.

This Heidegger calls Ereignis. It brings before the eyes as concealment what was once concealed entirely from the eyes. It brings before the eyes the un-traversable abyss, which words can never attain. The way is via a double negative. Way-making has always been explained by Heidegger as a double negation.

The relation of language to Being can be gathered more intimately as the Saying of Being as originary language as manifested by Ereignis. In addition to Being as Saying
as way-making, the vibrating and transformational aspect, from which all beings emerge, we now see continuity in Heidegger’s work as a singular quest for the question of Being, which now is intimately entwined, not with thought, but with originary language. With Being/beyng and language so intimately related, we have found the solution to our question of how language has unity. Its unity is the Saying of Being/beyng as Silence.

How does Being show itself more fully? Heidegger draws us toward his third major step. The first two steps included first that Dasein was as Being there and second, the ontological difference was as the difference of Being and beings. Our third now is the renunciation into the movement into Ereignis as the manifestation of Being. All three involve Seinsgeschichte, the history of Being, not as linear history, but history as unfolding.

It is not a renunciation of the philosophy of the first beginning, so as to disown it or to overcome it; rather, it is a leap that remains between the two—between the philosophy of the first beginning and the other beginning as Silence—and thus overcomes metaphysics. It is not a renunciation of the subjectivity of a human person, but a leap into a new, fuller subjectivity that allows the human person the freedom to leap between the two, as a human person, who does not delude himself that he is the center of the unfolding of Being as Saying as Ereignis.

Moreover, Being as Ereignis, manifesting itself in the fourfold is what Heidegger means primarily by the Kehre. While in section 267 of the Beiträge the Kehre is an in-turning, now we see the manifestation of that in-turning through the fourfold is the cause of beyng-historical thinking. Through thought and experience, even through manifold metaphysical construals, we devise what we think we heard, but Being always with
lightning flash appears again and man is transformed. Thus Being, always vibrating, transforms us, if we are open to it. We are closed to it when we remain fixed on own thoughts, our experiences, our metaphysical constructions. Danger builds, but so too the saving power. Open to Being, we are drawn by Being from our thought, experiences, and philosophy of the first beginning toward Being as the groundless ground. Between the philosophy of the first beginning and the other beginning, we leap. In leaping, we are between. In leaping, we are not leaping from the first to the second, but leaping from the philosophy of the first beginning toward the other beginning. As between, man is brought near to Being as Saying, listening to the Silence and responding to it.

Having been brought near to Being, man is transformed. We are transformed with the realization that language is not ours, but we are its shepherd. Before beings take form in our world and language is uttered, we come to Being as Saying as originary language. Attuning ourselves to this, we are drawn into our ownmost “selves.” As we are drawn to Silence, we are led to shape ordinary language. Any discussion of language and its origins or its meaning arises from this originary site. What is most originary of language is its Saying [Sage] as Being.

The showing as Saying is drawing us to our ownmost. This way of Saying is the way that Ereignis speaks. In speaking, it draws us to what is our ownmost. The way that Saying speaks in Ereignis shows us that thinking and ordinary language are as part of that site. But we do not control it, nor is language or thought in our control. We arrive there at the site through Being, Being as Saying. This is way-making.

For this reason we must move from clear concepts and logic, from that which we believe we know, and move toward a relationship with language that allows it to draw us.
By renouncing the delusion that we are in control of language and we know its concepts, we are drawn into a new relationship of language that draws us into new possibilities.

Through these the last two chapters of the final section entitled, “Uraltes Eignis,” we can discern better what unfolding can mean. Being has through the ages shows itself as itself as a concealing/revealing and we are drawn closer to our ownmost. How that appears in every epoch is both the same but also new. Unfolding always occurs as Being as Saying. Its way-making is the selfsame; yet every epoch sees it anew. Unfolding historically is not via Hegel’s ladder of ascent in the Aufhebung. Rather, Heidegger’s history of the growing oblivion of Being was a reversal of Hegel. Unfolding is as a showing. Historically, unfolding for Heidegger is the showing of the Being of beings as Saying. Being manifests itself as Ereignis as the gathering/separation of the fourfold with the help of mortals. Being shows itself in beings. From Ereignis and through beings, our notions of space and time follow. This is what Heidegger means by historically unfolding; it is the originary relational way that allows our models of space and time.

“Verfügen” is the second important distinction of unfolding. Drawn to Being, man is transformed to dwell properly. We defined “verfügen” as service. Thus, man is at the disposal of Being; Da-sein is at the service of Being. The human will of the philosophy of the first beginning lies solely in the domain of the subject. As Da-sein is part of the fourfold, as Being manifests itself as Ereignis, verfügen lies between the subject and the object, it resides “in” Being. Verfügen is not simply freedom, but it draws Da-sein back to Being, to be of service to Being’s unfolding. Thus we are free only to the extent that we are at Being’s disposal. We are fated to be open to this appropriation,
in the sense that appropriation is not the sole accomplishment of our wills. This appropriation occurs ambiguously as a “gathering” and a “going away” held in dynamic tension.

As gathering-going away, Being is always two-fold, a holding sway, a concealing/revealing. It is never process of procession, and then recession. Instead, the elements of the gathering-going away are held in constant tension. This tension characterizes Being as Saying as Silence and Silence as Being as Saying. Being shows itself in its Silence and Being is Silent in its showing. Being is always already two-fold.

Seeing how be-wêgen of Being as Saying transforms us, we are now able to reenter the discussion of what Heidegger means by his new phenomenology. If be-wêgen is way-making, if it is transforming us as we are drawn near to Silence; if, by showing itself Being as Saying brings us to our ownmost and we are part of the fourfold, then phenomenology can no longer be defined solely as Heidegger first defined it in Being and Time as that which shows itself in the very way that it shows itself. While the phenomenology of Being and Time is not false, we see the further implications of what showing itself means. Phenomenology now also means that in showing itself Being transforms beings. It also means that man interprets Being’s silence as a call to action, inner reflection or reflection on Being itself. Hence man’s response [Nach-sagen] is always guided by Being and is interpreted. Man in his “essence” is open.

Thus unfolding is not a ladder of negation of desire; nor is it one of alienation of man from all aspects of his world. Rather, unfolding is bringing man into proper relation, guided by Being and man guiding beings, not throughout time, but “unfolding” is making the non-apparent apparent in time. Being as Silence appears as itself.
The final chapter engaged the possibilities of unfolding of language as Saying as encountered in the “world” and in our epoch. We explored how way-making continues to unfold ontically, as the phenomenology of looking ahead [Vor-sicht]. Being as Saying was not so much Heidegger’s way, but the way-making of Being.

We explored possible ontological regions of anthropology, religion, politics, and technology as examples of looking-ahead. These regions are not the elements of the fourfold, but occur as ek-static, ontic regions of expertise that emerge from man’s attempt to build and dwelling therein. In this discussion we come full circle to the ontic, but with the new insights Ereignis, the fourfold, unfolding and openness—all a two-fold holding sway of concealing and revealing, of gathering-going out of originary language.

In the structuralists’ and post-structuralists’ themes a strong resonance with Heidegger’s way, albeit overemphasized in ways that resemble more a Holzweg, a path which has no end. The debate surrounding structuralism and post-structuralism seemed to hold up one or the other of the gathering-going out aspects of Heidegger’s Being as Saying, either emphasizing the path itself or the steps along the path; either pure unity or pure multiplicity; either merely nothing or merely entities.

Yet Heidegger cautions us that structure and expression are not pathways, nor are they bridged. Rather, they are the site of Ereignis in con-tension, as gathering-going away. For this reason, then, structuralists and post-structuralists cannot be said to follow the way-making. Nor can the way of the anti-postmoderns, for it too doesn’t speak of gathering-going away, but speaks only of inversion or emptying of Being. Nor can linguistics speak properly of Being as Saying, heard as Silence and manifested as Ereignis. And yet, Ereignis emerges nevertheless in all of these discussions.
From, not through, the ways of false paths, we turned our sights and listen to the words of authors who guide us toward possible ways of Being as Saying as Ereignis. They try to hear Heidegger’s way-making more closely. Indeed they seem to follow the fourfold and develop regions of ontology, which do allow Being as Saying to emerge as Ereignis. They are building, dwelling, thinking the dance between man and Being. And dwelling is belonging within the fourfold. Such a dwelling is not simply attuning oneself poetically, but more importantly, renouncing language. In renouncing, man is open to hearing Being as Saying, heard as Silence. In hearing Silence, man responds by dwelling. By dwelling, man builds. In building, man enframes; machination occurs and—in a flash—Being appears. Man is transformed. And yet once again Being disappears.

Any region of ontology must include discussions of permanence and change, mortals and gods, that is the fourfold. A region of ontology too includes a con-tension of “gathering” and “separating.” As Being is two-fold, both concealing and revealing, so too any region of ontology is two-fold. As Being as Saying—heard as Silence, speaks to man as Ereignis, and man listens and responds by dwelling—is conversational, so too any viable region of ontology also is dialogical. Man nears Being through a double renunciation: that of the ground of the abyss and that of language as crossing the abyss; so too any region of ontology includes meditative thinking, that is renunciation of having “the” answer. As Ereignis manifests itself as the fourfold, any region of ontology mirrors Ereignis, all the while allowing itself to be appropriated to Being as man is appropriated to Being in service [Verfügung]. Finally, and more insightfully in the regions of ontology—religion, politics, anthropology, and technology—dialogue, interact and
indeed are in relation to each other, for together as gathering/separating, they allow Being as Saying to emerge as *Ereignis*.

Each region of ontology engages for the most part, one or another element of the fourfold. Yet each element of the fourfold mirrors the presence of the others. As so the regions of ontology are interrelated. Moreover, any treatment of a region of ontology takes seriously Heidegger’s injunction to dwell meditatively. Within each of the regions we saw first excavation of the prior structures of the philosophy of the first beginning. From there we build, and then inhabit. In building the construction becomes a closure; the closure knots towards an aporia. The dis-ease of the aporia leads us to listen to the Silence. There Being draws us nigh, and manifests itself as *Ereignis*. It might seem as though it is our doing, or not our doing at all, but Being’s. Rather, Heidegger holds that is through both Being and man.

The regions of ontology creatively held Being, beings, language and humans; they gather and, in gathering, unfold into all aspects of the event Heidegger called *Ereignis*. Only way-making seems to negotiate these issues with “*Sprache als Be-wëgen*.” Thus, unfolding of language and Being in Heidegger’s way still is viable, hardly passé in our current philosophical discussions. In *Ereignis*, language and Being in the fourfold influence all arenas of human interest and study. This we argued was the true unfolding with language and Being as *Sprache als Be-wëgen*, a dynamic paradigm shorn of Hegelian overtones, and invested with *Ereignis*, way-making Being shining through, and transforming, beings.

The pathway indeed gathers in whatever has its Being around it; to all who pass this way it gives what is theirs. This conversation has long ago already begun: the path
begun. What shall it and we decide to do with it next? We remain open, looking ahead, for that is who we are. More importantly, Being as originary language shines through us as part of the fourfold, manifesting itself as a revealing/concealing in Ereignis. We are drawn toward its silence and are brought into service. Being unfolds as language, as Sprache als Be-wégen, as way-making. We are drawn—we build, dwell, think—into its way-making as it shows itself, Being as Saying. Let us conclude where we began—with Heidegger’s own words: “But the call of the pathway speaks only as long as there are men, born in its atmosphere, who can hear it. They are servants of their origin, not slaves of machination.” Indeed we are servants, who are called … into service. And we hear the Silence of originary language.

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