Decolonizing Psychic Space: Remembering the Indigenous Psychology Movement in Taiwan

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DECOLONIZING PSYCHIC SPACE:
REMEMBERING THE INDIGENOUS PSYCHOLOGY MOVEMENT IN TAIWAN

A Dissertation
Submitted to the McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts

Duquesne University

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

By
Rong-Bang Peng, M.A.

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Rong-Bang Peng

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REMEMBERING THE INDIGENOUS PSYCHOLOGY MOVEMENT IN TAIWAN

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ABSTRACT

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By

Rong-Bang Peng

December 2012

Dissertation supervised by Michael Sipiora, Ph.D.

This project is part of the historical struggle of the indigenous psychology movement in Taiwan. It turns a critical gaze back upon the movement itself in order to decolonize it from colonial cultural imaginary. The contribution of this project is two-fold. First, on the theoretical level, it introduces a critical perspective into the growing body of indigenous psychological research. The indigenous psychology movement risks repeating the vicious cycle of colonization and re-colonization without critically looking back at its own historical trajectory. Second, on the level of intervention, writing the history of the indigenous psychology movement will make this project a crucial first step toward relieving Taiwanese psychologists from the cultural aphasia resulting from the traumatic encounter between two worlds.
DEDICATIONS

To my dearest wife, Li-Shen Liao (1969-2010), who wholeheartedly believed in me and loved me; and to my mentor, Der-Heuy Yee (1951-2012), who was an inspiration in my search for a psychology that gives voice to the heart (xin) of the Taiwanese people.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My “journey to the West,” so to speak, has finally come to an end with the completion of this dissertation. This journey, like many other journeys, involves a departure which, without guidance, friendship, and love, does not guarantee a fruitful return.

First of all, I would like to thank Dr. Michael Sipiora for giving me the freedom to work on a project with which he might not be familiar. And along the way, especially during the time when I was unable to see myself finishing this dissertation, he gave me the firmest support and showed genuine appreciation of the importance of my work. Without his openness, enthusiasm, and friendship, this dissertation could not have been done.

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I am also deeply indebted to Dr. Bruce Fink with regard to my understanding of psychoanalysis. He was the one who showed me the power of psychoanalysis, both theoretically and clinically. He was also a wonderful and careful reader, and I am grateful that he accepted my invitation to be a committee member of this dissertation.

Other faculty members of the department deserve my thanks as well. Each of them inspired me and guided me in their unique way: Dr. Martin Packer was the one who helped me deepen the understanding of hermeneutic phenomenological psychology, Dr. Constance Fisher’s warmth and openness helped build my confidence as a therapist, Dr. Eva Simm’s course on human development reshaped my vision of developmental psychology from a phenomenological perspective, Dr. Daniel Burston introduced me to the amazing world of R. D. Laing, Dr. Paul Richer’s guidance helped me to be a thoughtful and effective teacher, and Dr. Roger Brooke’s erudite mind broadened my understanding of the different approaches in psychotherapy. I am appreciative of all
those who are named here and those whom I forgot to name for making the psychologist/therapist I am.

Friendship and love from friends and colleagues were essential to this journey: Joshua Gregson’s warm welcome when I first arrived at Pittsburgh, Daniel Warner’s witty conversations, Leora Berstein and Katerina Daniel’s wonderful cooking, Sipho Mbuqe, Michael Miller, and Jamie Ghany’s dedicated friendships… these were what made this journey worthwhile and memorable. I have suffered from tremendous loss in this journey, but I have also learned about the power of friendship and love from all who have supported and encouraged me during the darkest hours of my life.

Most importantly, I would like to thank my parents Chun-Nan Peng and Shui-Mien Wu for their long-lasting and unconditional support, both psychologically and financially. They are the solid foundation of whatever I have accomplished.

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Chapter 1

Indigenous Psychology: The Conjunction of Two Wor(l)ds

In more ingenuous times, when the tyrant razed cities for his own greater glory, when the slave chained to the conqueror's chariot was dragged through the rejoicing streets, when enemies were thrown to the wild beasts in front of the assembled people, the mind did not reel before such unabashed crimes, and the judgment remained unclouded. But slave camps under the flag of freedom, massacres justified by philanthropy or by a taste for the superhuman, in one sense cripple judgment. On the day when crime dons the apparel of innocence — through a curious transposition peculiar to our times — it is innocence that is called upon to justify itself. (Camus, 1991, pp. 3-4)

Kuo-Shu Yang, the founder of the indigenous psychology movement in Taiwan, begins the story of his profound intellectual and professional transformation from a Westernized psychologist to an indigenous psychologist by revealing to readers his dream, the dream for a genuinely “indigenous psychology” in Chinese societies:

I have had a professional dream for about twenty years—to turn the unhealthily Westernized psychology in Chinese societies into a genuinely indigenous Chinese psychology. (Yang, 1997, p. 63)

The rhetoric of relating one’s dream to the collective destiny of the people to which one belongs easily reminds readers of the historic “I have a dream” speech delivered by Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. in 1963 in front of the Lincoln Memorial, in which he called for the nation to rise up and live out the true meaning of its creed: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal.” Indeed, Yang’s story does bear resemblance to Dr. King’s speech. However, the resemblance is more than in rhetoric; it is in the humbleness of their dreams as well as in the great agony involved to realize them.
What started as one man’s dream eventually culminated in an academic movement. Over the past 30 years, the indigenous psychology movement advocated by Yang has become an undeniable phenomenon in Taiwan. More than half a dozen conferences directly related to or inspired by the movement have been organized since the inception of the movement in the mid-1970s. Advocates and interested scholars have published more than 200 papers, most of them written in Chinese; nevertheless, English-written papers seem to be growing in numbers in recent years (Hwang, 2004). A Chinese semiannual journal entitled *Indigenous Psychological Research in Chinese Societies* was created to provide a forum for indigenous psychological research in 1993; in the same year, the Laboratory of Research for Indigenous Psychology was established in the Department of Psychology at the National Taiwan University (NTU) to hold seminars for researchers to share their thoughts and works (Hwang, 2005a). In 1997, the Foundation for the Advancement of Indigenous Psychology in Chinese Societies was established to provide organizational support for indigenous psychological research. In 2000, a four-year, nationally funded project of Chinese indigenous psychological research was launched as a part of a multi-million dollar governmental program, and some of the results became a special issue (volume 22) of the journal of *Indigenous Psychological Research in Chinese Societies* in 2004. All told, more than two generations of Taiwanese psychologists have been either mobilized to participate in the movement or at least influenced or troubled by it (Gabrenya, Kung, & Chen, 2006). In his article about the historical development of social psychology in Taiwan, Hei-Yuan Chiu (2004), a prominent Taiwanese sociologist with a background in psychology,
comments that indigenous psychological research has, since the 1990s, become “the most important trend” within social psychological research in Taiwan (p. 210).

The call for an indigenous psychology is not a phenomenon peculiar to Taiwan; in fact, starting from the mid-1970s psychologists in other parts of the world such as India (Nandy, 1974), Mexico (Díaz-Guerrero, 1977), the Philippines (Enriquez, 1977), Japan (Azuma, 1984), and Korea (Kim, 1990) also advocate their own versions of indigenous psychologies. Indian psychologist Durganand Sinha nicely summarizes that indigenous psychology “has developed as a reaction to or rejection of dominance of Western psychology…and has assumed almost the shape of a ‘movement’ in many erstwhile colonial and developing countries” (Sinha, 1997, p. 135). Despite the fact that indigenous psychologies were gaining ground in various Asian societies and the Muslim world, the marginal voices of indigenous psychologies flew mostly under the radar of mainstream American psychology in the 1970s and the 1980s (Turtle, 1989). The year 1993 was a landmark for indigenous psychologies—under the editorship of Uichol Kim and John W. Berry, the first anthology of indigenous psychologies, entitled *Indigenous psychologies: Research and experience in cultural context*, was published. Toward the end of the 1990s, as the related discussions became more heated, several special issues were organized by interested scholars and published in peer-reviewed journals such as *Asian Journal of Social Psychology* (1998/2000/2005), *Applied Psychology: An International Review* (1999), and the *International Journal of Psychology* (2006). In 2006, under the editorship of Uichol Kim, Kuo-Shu Yang, and Kwang-Kuo Hwang, another anthology of indigenous psychologies, entitled *Indigenous and cultural psychology: Understanding people in context*, was published. The emergence of
indigenous psychologies has become, as Carl Martin Allwood and John W. Berry comment, an “interesting new phenomenon” in psychology (Allwood & Berry, 2006b).

It has taken nearly three decades for indigenous psychologies to be finally recognized as an “interesting new phenomenon,” as something worthy of attention. I will argue, however, that this recent recognition—a seemingly victorious moment for the indigenous psychology movement—is at the same time misrecognition. And, as I will strive to demonstrate, this (mis)recognition of indigenous psychologies, if properly analyzed, can serve as the entry point to really unpack the phenomenon of indigenous psychologies in its complexity.

The Recognition/Misrecognition of Indigenous Psychology

The Negro is a slave who has been allowed to assume the attitude of a master. The white man is a master who has allowed his slaves to eat at his table. (Fanon, 1952/1967, p. 219)

The emergence of indigenous psychologies is often misrecognized as the emergence of a new approach in psychology. As a so-called “culture-related” approach, it is often compared to the other two culture-related approaches, namely, cross-cultural psychology and cultural psychology. Since most psychologists are more or less familiar with the two established culture-related psychologies, it is quite intuitive to compare this new phenomenon with the old ones. “Culture,” however it is defined, seems to be the main concern for the three of them. When Harry C. Triandis, an American psychologist

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1 As I have alluded to in the following quote, the notion of “recognition/misrecognition” is inspired by Frantz Fanon’s classical work on colonial subjectivity Black Skin, White Masks (1952/1967); however, as Fanon pointed out in the lengthy footnote (fn. 25, pp. 161-164), the theoretical formulation of the role of the imago in the formation of the subject should be credited to Lacan’s (2006) conception of the mirror stage.
and the chief editor of the first edition of the *Handbook of Cross-Cultural Psychology* (1980), was invited to be a keynote speaker, representing the cross-cultural perspective at the Third Conference of the Asian Association of Social Psychology (AASP) in 1999, he as well as the other five keynote speakers were asked by the conference organizer “to focus and to share their views on how these three different perspectives can be consolidated” (Hwang & Yang, 2000, p. 183). This request makes the conference papers an interesting and representative anthology with which to begin a discussion of the recognition/misrecognition of the indigenous psychology movement.

Is indigenous psychology a new approach to psychology? If so, how is it different from the other two existing culture-related approaches? And finally, is there a way to synthesize the three approaches? These are questions Triandis tries to address in his keynote speech, which was published a year later in the special issue of the *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*.

To begin with, indigenous psychology, cultural psychology, and cross-cultural psychology are taken by Triandis to be “sub-disciplines” or “approaches” of the broad area that deal with culture and psychology (Triandis, 2000, p. 185). The major difference among them is that each has its own kind of sampling bias. As Triandis puts it,

Indigenous psychologists sample especially the meaning of keywords in the culture. Cultural psychologists are more likely to sample ethnographic information and ignore information that comes from laboratory experiments. They are likely to look for relationships within the culture. Cross-cultural psychologists are more likely to sample information across cultures. They are methodologically in-between

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2 Six distinguished scholars from three culture-related psychologies were invited as keynote speakers: the cross-cultural perspective was represented by Harry Triandis and John Berry; the cultural psychological by Richard Shweder and Patricia Greenfield, and the indigenous psychological by Kuo-Shu Yang and Uichol Kim (Hwang & Yang, 2000).
experimental (rigorous control of situations, manipulation of dependent [sic] variables) and cultural psychologists. (p. 185)

According to Triandis, the methodological difference among the three can be best illustrated by using the emic-etic distinction. Triandis explains the distinction as follows:

The emic view emphasizes that psychological processes take unique culture-specific forms; the etic view emphasizes that psychological processes are basically the same and have different manifestations…. In short, universals create the basis, and cultural differences are superimposed. (Triandis, 2000, p. 186)

By adopting the framework of the emic-etic distinction, Triandis perceives “indigenous psychology as emphasizing emics, experimental psychology as emphasizing etics, and cultural and cross-cultural as located in-between, with cultural closer to indigenous, and cross-cultural closer to experimental psychology” (p. 186). The main advantage of indigenous psychology is that:

This approach allows a researcher to get to the heart of a culture, by analyzing the central concepts used very frequently by its members, and the relationships among these central concepts. One can discover phenomena that only exist in one culture, and are entirely unknown and unexpected by researchers from other cultures. (p. 190)

Because Triandis articulates the difference between cultural psychology and indigenous psychology only in terms of how emic each one is, it is not surprising when he concludes that “[to] a large extent the advantages of indigenous psychology are shared by cultural psychology” (p. 191). Therefore, one can say that there is nothing new about indigenous psychology except that it tends to be more emic than cultural psychology; it does not really create any new niche since the advantages are already demonstrated by an

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3 The emic-etic distinction is commonly used in anthropology and cross-cultural psychology. The two terms were first coined by linguistic anthropologist Kenneth Pike (1967) to refer to the distinction between an insider’s view (the emic view) and an outsider’s view (the etic view) of a cultural system.
existing approach. In fact, indigenous psychology’s emic orientation actually becomes its main disadvantage. As Triandis says,

It is very difficult to convince mainstream psychologists that they should pay attention to the findings of this approach. They say: I am interested in universal psychological phenomena, not in anthropology. Furthermore, there are potentially too many findings that can be generated by this approach. It is difficult to convince mainstream psychologists to pay attention to that many findings. In addition, the richness of findings raises the question: Which findings are “really” important? One needs some criterion that can rank-order the importance of the findings. For example, do the findings predict behavior? (p. 191)

There are quite a few things to unpack in the above quote. First, according to Triandis’s understanding, the emic-etic spectrum is not categorical, but hierarchical. Second, the “mainstream psychologists” are those who see themselves on the etic/universal side of the spectrum; they are privileged to be acultural, to be convinced, to recognize or disregard findings, and to prescribe standards for the importance of research. Last but not least, indigenous psychologies are disadvantaged the moment they are placed in the hierarchical emic-etic spectrum since they fall under the approach named “Indigenous Psychology,” which is inevitably less than cultural psychology and all other psychologies on the spectrum. Indigenous psychologies, then, are doomed to be inferior. Triandis therefore suggests two ways for indigenous psychologists to correct their methodological inadequacy so that they may be “visible” to the mainstream. The first one, as quoted above, is to conform to the standards prescribed by the mainstream—for example, “predictive validity”—to rank their findings. Second, in order to get the attention of mainstream psychologists, the best strategy for indigenous psychologists is to become the examiners of cross-cultural theories rather than to become theorists in their own right. As Tiandis says,
Mainstream psychologists pay attention only when they are shown that their favorite theories are only valid in their own culture, and cannot be generalized to other cultures. A demonstration of that point is best done by using the methods of mainstream psychology, in different cultures, and by showing, for instance, that one obtains the usual findings in the West, but not in the East. In short, mainstream psychologists are more likely to pay attention to the findings of cross-cultural than of indigenous or cultural psychologists. (p. 191)

In the following discussion, I will focus on two aspects of Triandis’s comparison of the three psychologies: (a) how indigenous psychology is conceptualized in relation to the other two psychologies, and (b) how indigenous psychology is situated in the “culture vs. universality” issue.

John W. Berry, a well-respected Canadian psychologist, was another keynote speaker representing the cross-cultural perspective at the AASP conference. Curiously, being the chief editor of the second edition of the *Handbook of Cross-Cultural Psychology* (1997), Berry’s take on the three psychologies seems to have reflected a generational difference between the first and the second generation of cross-cultural psychologists. Compared to Triandis’s adamant positivistic and ethnocentric stance, Berry (2000) attempts to offer a more inclusive position which takes into account the changes in the field within the past two decades.

For Berry, the emic-etic spectrum on which Triandis relies to compare the three psychologies appears to be too simple to adequately address the complexity of the affair. He divides the etic approach into the imposed etic approach and the derived etic

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4 The usage of the term “imposed” here refers to the ethnocentric nature of the cross-cultural comparisons done in the early years of cross-cultural psychology.
approach\(^5\) in order to avoid the methodological pitfall of equating the etic with the universal.

The other noticeable difference from Triandis’s view is the *historical* nature of Berry’s comparison: He does not merely compare the three psychologies on the basis of *categorical* differences as if they are *things* to be compared; instead, he tries to more or less restore the *historicity* of the approaches—to see them as a historically evolving “sequence of activities” as he compares them (p. 198). What results from *historicizing* the comparison is a framework that integrates the revised emic-etic methodological distinction with a reinterpretation of the three goals of cross-cultural psychology that Berry and Dasen proposed in 1974.

From Berry’s viewpoint, Triandis’s take on cross-cultural psychology, that is, “to *transport* current hypotheses and conclusions about human behavior to other cultural contexts in order to *test* their validity” (p. 198), does not cover the full spectrum of the tasks of cross-cultural psychology. He refers to Triandis’s narrowly defined cross-cultural psychology as the “*imposed etic* methodological approach” and he argues that it is only the first goal of cross-cultural psychology (p. 198).

The second goal of cross-cultural psychology, “to *explore* new cultural systems to *discover* psychological phenomena not available in the first culture,” is associated with the “*emic* methodological approach” (p. 198). Berry identifies the emic approach with the emergence of “cultural,” “indigenous,” and “ethnic” psychologies (p. 198). As he argues in an earlier text, this move toward the *emic* approach has to do with the “diversification in the notion of *culture* and how it may be related to psychology” (Berry,

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\(^5\) The usage of the term “derived” here refers to the *derivative* nature of the cross-cultural comparative approach proposed by Berry.
Some of this change came from the influence of cultural anthropology, especially from one of the most influential interpretive anthropologists Clifford Geertz:

In the 1970s, a move was afoot to emphasize more the symbolic view, in which culture was to be found within and between individuals in their shared meanings and practices....This emergent view (in anthropology) of culture as ‘an historically transmitted pattern of meaning embodied in symbols’ (Geertz, 1973, p. 89) and as ‘a conceptual structure or system of ideas’ (Geertz, 1984, p. 8) has given rise to a more cognitive emphasis in psychology on the intersubjective, interpretive conception of culture, now broadly adopted by those who identify with ‘cultural psychology’ (Cole, 1996; Shweder, 1990). (Berry, 2000, p. 199)

The other change came from the cultural “Others” who had previously been studied by cross-cultural psychologists as objects. As Berry points out,

There can be no doubt that for many years cross-cultural psychology was done mostly by those in the Western, economically and politically powerful nations; the objects of their attention were usually ‘others.’ When these others lived elsewhere, they were ‘tribes,’ and when they were closer at hand they were ‘subcultures’ or ‘minorities.’ (Berry, 1997, p. xi)

These cultural Others tend to use the emic approach because methodologically it can help them to “[understand] themselves in their own terms” and “[draw] upon their own culturally-rooted concepts and intellectual traditions” (p. xi). As Berry points out, these cultural Others brought about the emergence of “acculturation psychology,” “ethnic psychology,” “indigenous psychology,” and “ethnopsychology” (Berry, 1997, pp. xi-xii).

The third goal of cross-cultural psychology is associated with the “derived etic methodological approach” which seeks to “integrate psychological knowledge gained from these first two activities, and to generate a more pan-human psychology that would be valid for all people” (p. 198). Berry does not believe that one can simply rely on the imposed etic approach to create a psychology that is universal to all humankind; he emphasizes that a universal psychology can only come from the derived etic approach...
that is grounded in a solid foundation of a diversity of cultural or indigenous psychologies. So, unlike Triandis, Berry does not prioritize the etic approach over the emic approach; on the contrary, he seems to have reversed the priority so that the emic approach becomes the foundation of the etic approach. This is what he calls the “culture first, comparison second” rule (p. 202). Nevertheless, Berry has not given up the pursuit of a universal psychology, of which the etic approach is an indispensable part. As he says, I consider that the cultural and the comparative perspectives are both necessary; neither is sufficient (Berry, 1999a). This view was well argued by Pike (1967) who considered that the emic and etic perspectives are like the double view one gets from a stereoscope; the object is the same, but the two optics are slightly different, providing depth, relief and perspective on what is being observed (see also Berry, 1999b) (p. 201).

This stereoscopic “double view” that integrates the cultural/emic perspective with the comparative/etic perspective is at the core of Berry’s argument; he argues that the two perspectives do not form a dichotomy but a *symbiosis* in which both are “necessary” and neither is “sufficient.” However, if one carefully examines the “symbiosis” proposed by Berry, one finds neither a symbiotic relation (in which each one contributes to the other’s existence) nor a stereographic relationship (in which each alone is flat, so to speak), but a *dialectic* relation6 in which the cultural/emic approach is *needed* by the comparative/etic approach to create a universal psychology.

By carefully reviewing two leading cross-cultural psychologists’ comparisons of the three psychologies, we have come a step closer to what I am trying to convey by the

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6 Young in his book *White Mythologies* (1990) has argued that even though the system of Hegelian dialectic is often used as a conceptual resource to formulate oppression and resistance to it, the system itself is a product of ethnocentrism (p. 33). As he explains, “This [dialectic] structure is not, as might at first be imagined, derived from a fantasy of power relations modeled on a medieval joust but from the phenomenological account of a subject perceiving an object, a same/other dialectic in which the other is first constituted by the same through its negation as other before being incorporated within it” (p. 37).
composite term “recognition/misrecognition.” Let me briefly summarize the two viewpoints to point out the recognition/misrecognition therein. In Triandis’s article, indigenous psychology is indeed recognized as an approach. However, as an approach, it is first characterized as an approach doomed to be inferior because it is placed on the furthest emic end of the emic-etic spectrum, in which the etic end represents the universal and the ideal, and the emic end represents the cultural and the trivial. Second, indigenous psychology is characterized as an inadequate approach: indigenous psychology is too “trivially rich” to be considered as anything other than subordinate to the etic/universal approach. From the above characterization (or image) of indigenous psychology, this recognition is, in fact, a misrecognition because indigenous psychology is not seen as a psychology in its own right. As Oliver (2001) keenly points out, this form of recognition/misrecognition belongs to “the particular pathology of colonial and oppressive cultures” (p. 23). In the context of psychology, this pathology of recognition has its roots in the colonial relation between mainstream American psychology and psychologies in other parts of the world, and this relation according to Sinha (1997) is characterized by domination and neglect.

On the other hand, Berry’s attempt to create a more inclusive cross-cultural psychology (rather than in opposition to cultural psychology and indigenous psychology, as Triandis does) is admirable but still problematic. With regard to the conceptualization of the three psychologies, we have learned from Berry as well as Triandis that if one tries to conceptualize them within an ahistorical framework as methodological categories, one simply loses sight of the uniqueness of indigenous psychology because, as a methodological approach, it is not that different from cultural
psychology. One has to adopt a historical framework in order to tell the difference between indigenous and cultural psychology. Berry has clearly demonstrated that culture psychology and indigenous psychology are two distinctive events in the history of cross-cultural psychology. The emergence of cultural psychology is the result of a paradigm shift in which the notion of “culture” dramatically changed. The emergence of indigenous psychologies is part of a greater event in which the previously objectified cultural Others began to speak for themselves, to act like subjects. As Berry describes it,

Cross-cultural psychology, while still dominated by Western views and psychologists, is no longer their exclusive preserve. What started as a Western-based attempt to understand the “others” is now a field well-populated by these “others.” In part, this has come about by many developing world psychologists having experienced Western psychology (as graduate students, as research collaborators, or as “consumers”), and being attached to, and wary of it. (Berry, 1997, p. xiii)

However, the uniqueness of the indigenous psychology movement as an event in which cultural Others voice their subjectivity is soon covered up by Berry’s schematization of the symbiotic integration of three methodological approaches which, as I have pointed out, is a methodological variation of the Hegelian dialectic. In Berry’s grand schematization of the historical development toward a universal psychology—from the imposed etic to the emic to the derived etic approach, the function of the emic approach is to create a diverse knowledge base of indigenous psychologies which can again be integrated into the etic approach that really generates universal knowledge. Universal knowledge for whom? One must wonder. Is the integration really a symbiosis in which the integrated knowledge benefits both sides, as Berry has claimed, or is it a dialectic in which the Others are needed and integrated into the same, as I have argued?
Allwood and Berry (2006a) have recently published an international analysis of the origins and development of indigenous psychologies which might give us some clues as to this issue. In their worldwide survey, indigenous psychologists were asked to briefly address four questions related to the history and characteristics of indigenous psychology as they understand it in their local context as well as in the global context. After analyzing their answers, Allwood and Berry found several common themes. One theme they found among all indigenous psychologists’ responses was that “IP [indigenous psychology] is a reaction by scholars and practitioners to the dominance of WP [Western psychology]” (2006a, p. 263). This reaction, characterized by Allwood and Berry as “post-colonial reactions to mainstream psychology” (p. 243), consists of two parts: first, indigenous psychology is “viewed as a response that rejects the validity and usefulness of WP in their societies,” and second, it “also seeks to provide an alternative psychology to the massive presence of WP in their own society, and internationally” (p. 263). The emergence of indigenous psychologies is therefore, as Sinha (1997) has observed, a “crisis” reaction in non-Western societies in which “de-colonization” of the psyche and “cultural empowerment” are desperately needed (p. 137). Berry’s (2000) recognition of indigenous psychology as an event in which cultural Others voice their subjectivity apparently corresponds to this theme.

On the other hand, Berry’s (2000) project of a symbiotic universal psychology does not seem to be well supported among indigenous psychologists. Indeed, Allwood and Berry (2006a) did find that more than half of the contributors discussed the possibility of creating a universal psychology. However, if one carefully examines the responses, those who considered that possibility did not emphasize how a universal
psychology can benefit all humankind; instead, they emphasized that it can “serve as a
challenge to the presumed universal status of WP” (p. 265). In other words, it was the
decolonizing aspect rather than the symbiotic aspect that was the emphasis of indigenous
psychologists when they considered a universal psychology. Besides, Berry himself
seems to be aware of the ethnocentric nature of a so-called “universal psychology” in his
2006 article. As Allwood and Berry (2006a) note, “while the ‘derived etic psychology’
may be more informed by many other cultures, it would still remain anchored in one
specific cultural understanding” (p. 265). Moreover, there is another theme that almost
all indigenous psychologists endorsed besides the postcolonial reaction theme: they all
agreed with Sinha (1997) that indigenous psychology is “a facet of worldwide concern
for making knowledge culturally appropriate” (p. 131). As Allwood and Berry (2006a)
have observed,

IP was seen as an attempt to produce a local psychology within a specific
cultural context….The local culture is unanimously identified both as a
source of inspiration for developing an IP, and as a concrete goal in
achieving an IP….Their unanimous concern with this theme means that it
is widely accepted both as a local characteristic and as a global one. (p.
263)

Thus according to Allwood and Berry’s analysis, the main concern of indigenous
psychologists is in the local rather than in the universal. Since a universal psychology is
less an interest of indigenous psychologists, who really needs it? One can reasonably
argue that the project of a universal psychology is a dialectic rather than a symbiotic
process which involves, as Young (1990) has pointed out, “the creation, subjection and
final appropriation” of cultural Others for the sake of Euro-American subjects (p. 33).

Will cultural psychologists, who are often presumed to be more appreciative of
the otherness of other cultures, be able to offer an alternative to the ones already
examined? Richard A. Shweder, a prominent psychologist whose notion of cultural psychology is heavily influenced by Geertz’s *Interpretation of Cultures* (1973), was also invited to give a keynote speech at the AASP conference representing cultural psychology. In his comparison of the three psychologies, Shweder (2000) argues that there is hardly any difference between indigenous psychology and cultural psychology, yet both of them are quite different from cross-cultural psychology which seeks the uniformity of human behaviors (p. 212). He argues that cultural psychology is the study of diverse “mentalities” rather than the study of “mind,” in which the term “mind” refers to “the totality of actual and potential conceptual contents of human cognitive processes” and the term “mentality” refers to “the actual cognitive functioning of a particular person or people” (p. 210). From Shweder’s perspective, the above characterization of cultural psychology does not deny the universals of common humanity; nevertheless, he claims that “the search for and privileging of things that are uniform across all people and cultures” is not the proper project of cultural psychology (p. 210). This position is summarized in his slogan, “Universalism without the uniformity” (p. 210). Therefore, the kind of universality, if the term still applies, that Shweder seeks in cultural psychology is neither a blunt ethnocentric universal, nor a dialectic universal which is elaborated but nonetheless ethnocentric, but the *freedom* to get beyond the limitations of any particular cultural perspective by “staying on the move between different ways of seeing and valuing things in the world” (p. 219).

At the core of Shweder’s idea of cultural psychology is this freedom to think *otherwise*, to think outside of the limitations given in one’s own culture. What he does not quite stress in his keynote speech, however, is the role that cultural Others play in the
exercise of such freedom. This freedom that Shweder espouses actually depends on cultural Others. As Shweder explains in his major work *Thinking through cultures: Expeditions in cultural psychology* (1991):

Cultural psychology is an interpretative enterprise in Geertz’s sense. Yet just what is it one actually does in the interpretation of (intentional) worlds and (intentional) lives? The answer to that question has much to do with the process of “thinking through others”…in at least the four senses…: (1) thinking by means of the other; (2) getting the other straight; (3) deconstructing and going beyond the other; and (4) witnessing in the context of engagement with the other. (p. 108)

In the first sense, as Shweder explains, the other is used to “reveal hidden dimensions of our selves” (p. 108); in the second sense, the other is rationally reconstructed as having an internal world or system consisting of “indigenous belief, desire, and practice” in order to justify the existence of an alternative worldview (p. 109); in the third sense, the other is “passed through” or “intellectually transformed” into something else by exposing his or her hidden life or incompleteness (p. 109); and in the fourth sense, the other is represented or depicted as an “alien other in an alien land” encountered by the “self-reflexive” cultural psychologist whose job is to depict the encounter (p. 110). One should have no doubt by now that this “interpretative enterprise,” upon which cultural psychologists pride themselves, is still another way of using cultural Others for the sake of Euro-American subjects. However, this does not mean that there is no improvement in Shweder’s formulation. In his fourth sense of cultural psychology as “thinking through others,” Shweder does something quite significant (whether he is fully aware of it or not): he reveals the conditions under which so-called “cultural knowledge” is produced. It is through the awareness of cultural differences created by the inter-cultural encounter that a cultural psychologist is able to understand the Others in
relation to him or herself or to understand him or herself in relation to the Others. Therefore, the one who is depicting the other should not be left out of the picture because the representation or knowledge of the other is eventually for oneself; cultural knowledge is perspectival rather than objective.

Through analyzing the perspectives of psychologists whose works are at the interface of cultures, I have argued that the recent recognition of indigenous psychology as a new approach in psychology is a misrecognition of the indigenous psychology movement. The recognition/misrecognition either adopts the view that indigenous psychology is a subordinate methodological approach, that it is a dialectic complement of a futuristic universal psychology which is inevitably ethnocentric, or that it is not different from cultural psychology, which is a perspectival representation of cultural Others not yet challenged by the Others themselves. Despite their efforts to grapple with the unfamiliar phenomenon called “indigenous psychology,” there remains an unintended referential framework that determines how the indigenous psychology movement appears to these psychologists.

On the theoretical level, this unintended yet powerful framework is not different from what Said (1979) refers to as the discourse of Orientalism or what Hall (1995) refers to as the discourse of “The West and the Rest.” This powerful discourse not only determines the form in which the indigenous psychology movement is to be understood by psychologists, but in many ways also determines how anything “cultural” appears on the intellectual horizon of psychologists.

The recognition/misrecognition I have identified is not just a one-sided pathology; it is a two-sided phenomenon. Not only must Euro-American psychology recognize
indigenous psychology in a way that does not threaten but enhances or enriches its core values, its history, and its identity; indigenous psychology also needs Euro-American psychology to recognize it, to grant it a place in history despite the fact that Euro-American psychology is the very thing it is fighting against. It is not difficult to find this paradoxical desire—a desire to be rid of the influence of the West but at the same time to be recognized by it—in the works of indigenous psychologists. For example, in the introduction of their co-edited book *The Sinicization of Social and Behavioral Science Research in China* (1982), Kuo-Shu Yang and Chung-I Wen write:

> The subjects whom we studied are Chinese people in Chinese society, but the theories and methods we used are mostly imported from the West or of the Western style. In our daily life, we are Chinese; when we are doing research, we become Western people. We repress our Chinese thoughts or philosophy intentionally or unintentionally, and make them unable to be expressed in our procedure of research....Under such a situation, we can only follow the West step by step with an expectation to catch up their academic trend….Eventually, our existence in the world community of social and behavioral science becomes invisible at all. (as cited in Hwang, 2005a, p. 230, italics added)

This paradoxical desire to be recognized by the colonizer or oppressor has been identified by Fanon in *Black Skin, White Masks* (1952/1967):

> As long as he [the slave] has not been effectively recognized by the other [the master], that other will remain the theme of his actions. It is on that other being, on recognition by that being, that his own human worth and reality depend. It is that other being in whom the meaning of his life is condensed. (p. 217)

If the dynamics of recognition identified by Fanon hold true, it means that without unpacking how this recognition/misrecognition works on the subjectivity of the indigenous psychologists, the indigenous psychology movement will likely go astray—it will be trapped in the vicious cycle of the pathological searching for recognition rather than become the driving force of decolonization.
Chapter 2
At the Center: Psychology and its Imaginary Relation with Others

From 1492 to the 1990s we are dealing not with change, rupture and difference but rather with suppression, amnesia and deliberate avoidance of realities, cultural as well as psychological. We are dealing with the deformed sight of a blinded eye. (Sardar, Nandy, & Davies, 1993, p. 88)

It has been said that there are two kinds of white people: those who have never found themselves in a situation where the majority of people around them are not white, and those who have been the only white person in the room. At that moment, for the first time perhaps, they discover what it is really like for the other people in their society, and, metaphorically, for the rest of the world outside the west: to be from a minority, to live as the person who is always in the margins, to be the person who never qualifies as the norm, the person who is not authorized to speak. (R. Young, 2003, p. 1)

Others and the Eye of the World

In 1993, five hundred years after Christopher Columbus’s historic voyage across the Atlantic, Indian political psychologist Ashis Nandy and two well-known public intellectuals of the Muslim world Ziauddin Sardar and Merryl Wyn Davies audaciously revisit the historic voyage and its global aftermath in the short and yet powerful book Barbaric Others: A Manifesto on Western Racism. Arguing against the widely held view that the significance of Columbus’s journey was that he accidentally discovered the New World in his first voyage westward, the three authors claim that, except for that it was an “unprecedented encounter” (p. 1) between the two worlds across the Atlantic, nothing “new” was “discovered”; in fact, the Old World of Europe that Columbus represented actually “missed,” rather than “discovered,” the novelty of the newness of the New World.
The authors point out that, for centuries before Columbus ever landed on the New World, Europe had already nurtured an “anxiety-ridden perception” (p. 1) about Other People and about the natural world. Since those Other People (or Others) were beyond Europe’s actual reach and touch, the perception (or imagination) was based primarily on “fears, fantasies and demons inhabiting the Western mind” (p. 1) rather than on the experiences of actual encounter with the Others. They further point out that this perception of Other People was so deeply ingrained that it had become “an integral part of Europe’s self-identity” (p. 1). Under such premises, the “historic events of 1492” actually stood for an unprecedented opportunity for Europe to renew itself: not only to rid itself of the long-standing anxieties about the unknown Others, but also to redefine Europe in relation to non-European Others.

Historically, Europe eventually missed the unprecedented opportunity to really encounter the Others in their newness, in their novelty. However, what is more important than missing the opportunity is that, it was not a pure accident that the real encounter did not happen; there was a constitutive factor that prevented it from happening. As the authors keenly point out, the “blinded gaze” of Europe’s eye of the world, its oculus mundi, was what was preventing the real encounter with the Others from happening:

The eye of the West….was blind when it turned to observe what was not European or Western. When it observed the Other, oculus mundi was blinded, paradoxically, by its own perceptions and previsions. It not merely helped falsify the Other, but in fact invented it out of Europe’s own inner demons—Europe’s fears, anxieties, and disowned self. (p. 88)
Europe’s own “perceptions and previsions,” that is to say, its own imagination and anticipation, became the main visual function\(^7\) when it gazed upon the Others. As a result, when the two worlds across the Atlantic eventually met in 1492, Europe’s longstanding imagination of Others was not shattered by the newness of the experience; on the contrary, it “acquired flesh” (p. 88): what was originally inside the European psyche was flesht out and became something observable, something eventually manageable out in the world. The subjectivity of Others in the actual world—that is to say, as real people having their own concerns in their various ways of being in the world—was denied; they were subjected to the blinded eye. Europe thus proceeded to administer and interact with the Others as if they were nothing other than what it perceived. The vast diversity of peoples around the world were lumped together for all practical purposes in one, gigantic category of Otherness. The distinctness of a particular Other was lost in the generality shared with all Others, that of being different and sundered from the West. This distinctiveness was left for the experts or professionals to debate. (p. 89)

Therefore, the real significance of the historic events of 1492 was that it “established not only what it is to be modern, but what it is to be Other, not European, distinct from the West” (p. 91); in other words, it marked a critical moment in history in which a “perversion of reality” (p. 91) not only occurred but in the years to come, layer by layer, gradually structured the core of how Europe relates to the Others. As a compiled world atlas, Dutch geographer and map maker Gerhardus Mercator’s Atlas (1570) was the most potent legacy of Columbus’s historic voyage because historically it was the first embodied display of the world as seen by Europe’s blinded eye.

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\(^7\) In his article, “Allegories of Atlas,” Rabasa Jose (1995) brilliantly analyzed the “visual function” of history. His main argument is that, in the process of creating a map, European history serves as the inseparable visual function in the personification of geographic space in terms of a Eurocentric perspective.
The reason why I started out this chapter by reviewing Sardar and the other two authors’ explication of Europe’s problematic relation with Others in *Barbaric Others*, is very much the same as theirs when they revisited Christopher Columbus’s historic voyage: we are still living out the history of 1492. History moves rather slowly when something fundamental has to be changed, especially when it comes to what constitutes our way of seeing the world.

With the innovations in navigation technique and the breakthrough in navigation route made by Christopher Columbus, European expansion in the world took off with unprecedented speed. By the time of World War I, the imperial powers of Europe had taken control over ninety percent of the surface territory of the globe (R. J. C. Young, 2001). In the following years, the traditional imperial powers of Europe suffered a rapid demise after two World Wars and were replaced by two new powers, the United States and the Soviet Union in competition for world domination. And decades later, to the surprise of many, the seemingly indestructible power of the Soviet Union suddenly collapsed, with the United States becoming the single dominant power in the world from the 1990s until now. However, even though there were changes of players as well as changes in the form of their world domination (that is, from the direct and more violent form of control over land and people, to the indirect and more subtle form of control over the economy in the name of “world trade”), Europe’s *oculus mundi*, its eye of the world, did not change much in this competition for world dominance. On the contrary, as Rabasa (1995) beautifully said, it resembles “Caesar’s laurel crown” which has a *transhistorical* and *transnational* dimension. “Caesar functions as an empty slot where different leaders may inscribe themselves,” said Rabasa. “Like the symbol of Caesar, the
world revealed by Mercator’s *Atlas* is a transhistorical and transnational theatre where imperialist configurations take form by means of particular national appropriations” (p. 363). Therefore, as long as taking control is still the main intention in the interaction with Others, the eye of the world actually does not change. Just like Caeser’s laurel crown, it can be given a different name and then inherited by different world powers. One way or another, Others are still subjected to the blinded eye, whether of another world power or, most likely, of a different form of domination.

In comparison to the long history of European expansion, the establishment of modern universities as the professional site of production for specialized knowledge came rather late; in fact, it was not until the 19th and 20th centuries that the idea of “freedom of scientific research, teaching and study” and its institutional foundation had gradually become the standard in universities (Rüegg, 2004). Therefore, the eye of the world endorsed and legitimized by European expansion, was inherited by universities as a part of the European tradition and inevitably shaped the eye of the world of the modern sciences. As Haller (1995) points out,

The sciences…became the means through which both scientists and social scientists sought to determine the relative value of the races of man, delineate social categories, and even justify the rationale of race legislation. (p. xii)

**Others and the Power-Knowledge-Desire Relations**

There is an old Chinese old saying which can be roughly translated as, “one who was frightened by a snake sees it everywhere”; similarly, for a very long time the eye of the world inherited by the modern sciences could only see Others in the “perversion of reality” invented by its own blinded gaze, rather than Others in the actual world.
Historically, the critique of the problematic relation between Europe (or the West) and Others, and of the perversion innate to its eye of the world almost always came from Others who were dehumanized by the blinded eye, or from those who have witnessed the violence resulting from the dehumanizing power of the blinded eye. It was first voiced in the analysis of the traumatic effects of the colonial situation written by Western-trained intellectuals in or from the colonies, such as Mannoni (1950/1990), Fanon (1952/1967), Césaire (1955/2000), and Memmi (1957/1991). And later on, with the flow of post-war immigration from ex-colonies to the West, some migrants, or their children, who subsequently held positions in universities and still felt strongly about the marginalization of their places of origin, started to offer profound critiques of the Eurocentric nature of western history and on the implicit assumptions about Others in western knowledge (R. J. C. Young, 2001). Among them the more renowned are: Homi Bhabha, Stuart Hall, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Dipesh Charkararty, and Edward Said, whose eloquent critique in Orientalism (1978) of the cultural politics in academic knowledge helped founded the academic field of postcolonial studies.

Mercator’s Atlas was historically the first embodied display of the world as seen by Europe’s blinded eye. In a similar sense, Said’s Orientalism was the first systematic exposure and analysis of the existence of Europe’s eye of the World. On the first page of Orientalism, Said brings out one of his main arguments by introducing an anecdote of a French journalist’s regretful comment on the ruined city of Beirut. Through a careful analysis of the rather short comment, he points out that the so-called “Orient” is a “European invention” (p. 1), a “European representation of the Orient” (p. 1, italics

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8 The French journalist regretfully wrote, “it had once seemed to belong to…the Orient of Chateaubriand and Navel.”
added). He further elaborates by saying that, among all the relations Europe has with the Orient, the Orient is “one of its deepest and most recurring images of the Other…. The Orient has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience” (pp. 1-2). He then emphasizes that, even though this Orient is a representation invented or imagined by the West, it is not merely imaginative but “an integral part of European material civilization and culture” (p. 2). Using Foucault’s notion of discourse developed in The Archaeology of Knowledge (1971), that is, as a systematic dispersion of discursive events, Said first delineates the contour of what he means by the term “Orientalism”:

The Orient is an integral part of European material civilization and culture. Orientalism expresses and represents that part culturally and even ideologically as a mode of discourse with supporting institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, even colonial bureaucracies and colonial styles. (Said, 1978/2003, p. 2, italics added)

And a few paragraphs later, Said further employs the notion of “power-knowledge relations” developed by Foucault in Discipline and Punish (1975)—which, in Foucault’s own words refers to the fact that “there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations” (p. 27)—to propose a meaning of Orientalism based on the power-knowledge relations of institutionalized disciplinary power:

Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient. (p. 3, italics added)
With the deployment of this authoritative systematic discipline, Said argues that European culture “gained in strength and identity by setting itself off against the Orient as a sort of surrogate and even underground self” (p. 3).

In order to clearly position Said’s contribution to this project—that is, what conceptual tools his *Orientalism* has to offer in the analysis of the problematic relation between psychology and its Others—I will have to first contextualize *Orientalism* in the dialectical history of critical intellectuals’ struggle to theorize and fight against colonialism. Historically, it was not until very recently that we have become aware that colonialism is a multi-layered form of domination, which involves almost all layers of the Other’s daily life—political, economic, cultural, and psychological. Before the rapid decolonization of European colonies in the 1940s, most critical intellectuals and revolutionists in these colonies placed their focus on the political and economic aspects of colonialism or imperialism. They argued that the only way for the colonies to be “self-determined,” to be really free from imperial domination, was to become independent nations. However, not long after the ex-colonies became independent nations, they were soon confronted with a harsh reality: independence was not the antidote to colonialism; on the contrary, it was the beginning of a new form of colonization in which the newly founded nations were still subservient to, not the old imperial powers, but the economic system of capitalist power. Thus, the analysis of neocolonialism’s capitalist system on the global scale became the task for many critical intellectuals.

Compared to the critiques devoted to the political and economic aspects of colonialism, critical intellectuals’ identification and analysis of the cultural and
psychological aspects of colonialism came later in the dialectical process of understanding aspects of colonialism. It was not until the disillusionment of those dreams of political or economic autonomy of the newly founded states that critical intellectuals turned to those prophet-like sensitive minds (such as Fanon) who, in the elated atmosphere of independence, had already voiced their concerns about the psychological and cultural impacts of colonization; they also turned to western critical traditions other than Marxism for conceptual resources that could be employed in the identification and analysis of the previously ignored aspects of colonialism. It was at this critical juncture in which the reflections on colonial experience and the conceptual resources from western critical traditions became hybridized, that we were able to appreciate the theoretical contributions made by Said’s *Orientalism*, and thereby to distill the conceptual tools required in the analysis of the problematic relation between psychology and its Others.

Generally speaking, critical intellectuals mainly draw upon two western critical traditions for conceptual resources to deal with the problematics with regard to cultural and psychological aspects of colonialism: from the tradition of post-structuralism, such as Derrida’s (1967/1997) deconstructive methods and Foucault’s (1971/1972) methods of discourse analysis; or from another equally important tradition—psychoanalysis, especially from Lacanian psychoanalysis. Despite the fact that, as R. J. C. Young (2001) points out, Said relies more on Derrida’s deconstructive methods than on Foucauldian discourse analysis in his actual analyses in *Orientalism* (p. 388), in terms of the productivity brought about by *Orientalism*, Said’s main theoretical contributions are along two lines. His first theoretical contribution is more obvious and frequently
identified. It was Said who introduced Foucauldian discourse analysis and the discussion of power-knowledge relations to the theoretical field of colonial discourse analysis. And it is here that the introduction of the notion of discourse is key. Why? This has to do with how Foucault constructs the notion of “discourse.” In Foucault’s understanding of it, the notion of discourse involves events, discursive events; and whether or not a discursive event would emerge depends on the contingencies of historical, material, and institutional conditions (Foucault, 1971/1972). When understood as a mode of discourse, Orientalism’s historical, material, and institutional aspects become theoretically discernable as constitutive parts of a system of representation. With this theoretical foundation, Foucault’s discussion of power-knowledge relations can thus be translated to the colonial context as a conceptual tool utilized in the identification and analysis of how Orientalism—or broadly speaking, colonial discourse—becomes a discourse of domination, an epistemic violence toward Others, and eventually a form of cultural and psychological colonization. Foucault and Said’s concerns with the “discursive regime of knowledge” (R. J. C. Young, 2001, p. 385) will also be one of the main concerns of this part of the project, and the conceptual tools of Foucauldian discourse analysis will be employed in the analysis of the problematic relation between psychology and its Others.

Compared to the first contribution, Said’s second theoretical contribution is not that obvious because it involves not what he proposes but what he hints at but left undeveloped. This undeveloped problematic in Orientalism, briefly said, involves whether or not the resources of psychoanalysis can be further translated into effective conceptual tools in the analysis of colonialism.
The employment of the conceptual resources of psychoanalysis in the analysis of colonialism first appeared in the works of Mannoni and Fanon, in which the latter is not only in itself a painful self-analysis of the colonized psyche but also at the same time a profound critique of the misuse of psychoanalysis in the defense of colonisation. Mannoni (1950) was the first to employ the conceptual tools of psychoanalysis in the analysis of the so-called “colonial situation,” in the psychological sense of the term (p. 18). He argues that, if understood at the psychological level, the colonial situation can be discerned as “a case of the meeting of two entirely different types of personality and their reaction to each other“ (p. 17), and in such a meeting of the two parties the European becomes the colonizer and the native become the colonized. The results of this meeting may be tragic, but it is definitely not accidental. As Mannoni explains, the formulation of a colonial situation requires a “coupling” of the two parties involved: it is a co-creation of the European who behaves like a superior and dominant being due to his own inferiority complex, and the native who is anxious about being abandoned due to his or her uncivilized dependency complex. Therefore, the colonial situation is, as Mannoni puts it, “primarily the results of misunderstanding, of mutual incomprehension” (p. 31).

Fanon (1952) recognizes that Mannoni “has managed to achieve a grasp… of the psychological phenomena that govern the relations between the colonized and the colonizer” (p. 83), and he also agrees with Mannoni’s analysis of the colonizer’s Adlerian overcompensation-driven behaviors; however, Fanon firmly protests against Mannoni’s attribution of the colonized’s inferiority complex to an ontogenetic origin, that is, as stemming from his childhood. Fanon argues that the colonized’s inferiority complex is neither ontogenetic nor phylogenetic, but sociogenically created in the process of
colonization; it is primarily an economic inferiority that is subsequently epidermalized⁹ as an internal complex (p. 11). If the colonizer’s psychology is also taken into consideration, Fanon’s point is that the colonial situation is a black-white relation based on “dual narcissism” in which “[t]he white man is sealed in his whiteness, the black man in his blackness” (pp. 9-10). Fanon’s formulation of the colonial situation as an antithetical relation based on narcissism is clearly influenced by Lacan’s notion of the mirror stage (p. 161). Together with his emphasis on the sociogeny of such an imaginary relation, Fanon translates the conceptual resources of psychoanalysis into the analysis of colonialism in a powerful and inspiring way: the traumatizing moment in which one’s subject position is configured operates not merely ontogenetically, but also sociogenetically. We are thus able to discern the psychological traumas of colonization as psychoanalytic moments which configure different subject positions in the colonial situation. It is therefore theoretically justified, or at least justifiable, when we translate psychoanalytic concepts in dealing with the problematic of subjectivity in the colonial situation.

There is no doubt that Said thinks along the lines of Mannoni (1950) and Fanon (1952), especially the latter, when he discerns the Orient as the Other, as a “contrasting image, idea, personality, experience” (Said, 1978/2003, p. 2) the West uses to define itself. By delineating the Orient as the imaginary representation of the West, Said is referring to the colonizer’s subject position in relation to his narcissistic invention of the image of the Other, which is clearly a Fanonian proposition. However, this psychoanalytic proposition was not further developed in Orientalism. Therefore, the

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⁹ Epidermalization is a term created by Fanon, which refers to the internalization of inferiority along the differentiation of skin color.
insights and the psychoanalytic conceptual tools developed in the previously mentioned works of Fanon and others were not used to their potential by Said. In Bhabha’s (1994) words, Said pays “inadequate attention to representation as a concept that articulates the historical and fantasy (as the scene of desire) in the production of the ‘political’ effects of discourse” (p. 103, italics added). In addition, what is more important is that the notion of discourse and power, translated by Said to colonial discourse analysis, is a notion Foucault developed during the time of his two major works, The Archaeology of Knowledge and Discipline and Punish. This notion of discourse and power, as evidenced by Foucault’s modifications of his own theoretical framework in his later works, does face some theoretical difficulties when dealing with the historical strategic changes of discursive power and the problematic with regard to subjectivity (Foucault, 1980a). These theoretical difficulties, naturally, are also reflected in Orientalism: Orientalism as proposed by Said, is a mode of discourse which continuously dominates, restructures, and has authority over the Orient by way of producing knowledge; it is an authoritative power with a somewhat Foucautian will-to-know and will-to-dominate. Without making some theoretical modifications, it is difficult to conceive of “the historical enunciations of colonial discourse,” and of “the process of subjectification as a placing within…colonial discourse” in such a theoretical construct, as Bhabha says (p. 103).

It is on this crucial point that Bhabha (1994) makes an admirable theoretical intervention. He creatively rereads Said’s Orientalism so as to theoretically revamp the notion of colonial discourse. Bhabha brings in two new elements to reconstruct Said’s more disciplinarily-defined notion of colonial discourse: first, he introduces the notion of
“apparatus” developed in Foucault’s later work, and redefines colonial discourse as an apparatus of discriminatory power in which power-knowledge relations are just one of its many heterogeneous power strategies (p. 100). Colonial discourse as an apparatus is a notion which emphasized the strategic function of the use of power. It does not exclude or replace Said’s original insight that colonial discourse is a discursive power but repositions it as one of many deployable power strategies in a given historical time, that is, as a “discursive strategy” (p. 95) of the colonial discourse. And more importantly, desire is also part of the apparatus of discriminatory power; it is defined as a power strategy which operates relationally with other deployable power relations, that is, as a “psychic strategy” (p. 95) of colonial discourse.

Second, by giving desire a theoretical place in the apparatus of discriminatory power, Bhabha further translates psychoanalytical concepts such as fixity, disavowal, narcissism, fetishism, and identification as conceptual tools in discerning the operation of desire in relation to other power relations in the colonial situation. Armed with these conceptual tools, Bhabha discerns a “process of ambivalence” (p. 95) when colonial discourse is confronted with the difference of the Other: the Other is always beyond representation but nevertheless has to be repeatedly represented so as to mask the irrepresentable difference. The result of this process of ambivalence is a form of fixity of colonial subjects to the Other as representation which from Bhabha’s perspective can be read in terms of “fetishism” (p. 106). Bhabha further indicates that this fetish object or stereotype is at the same time an object of “surveillance power” and an “object of desire” (p. 109); it is therefore not only a field of the exercise of discursive regime, but also a field of identification. Bhabha argues that, it is in the psychoanalytic moments of
narcissistic identification or disavowal of the Other as representation that the different colonial subject positions are configured (pp. 109-111).

Without a doubt, Bhabah’s creative reading of Said’s *Orientalism* is a significant theoretical move in the analysis of colonialism. In his psychoanalytic reconstruction of the notion of colonial discourse, Bhabha “upgrades” the Foucauldian notion of power therein and adds the psychoanalytic dimension of desire to the power-knowledge analytical paradigm, which was originally proposed by Said to merely discern the discursive regime of colonial discourse. As a result of his theoretical construction, the original paradigm has become a *power-knowledge-desire* analytical paradigm which can be utilized to discern the apparatus of discriminatory power of colonial discourse. It is a significant *hybridization* for the theoretical field of colonial discourse analysis in which reflections on colonial experiences and conceptual resources from the tradition of psychoanalysis and post-structuralism become hybridized in a more comprehensive theoretical framework to discern the psychological and cultural aspects of colonialism. In this sense, it is a critical theoretical intervention in the dialectical history of critical intellectuals’ struggle to theorize and fight against colonialism. This power-knowledge-desire analytical paradigm and its related conceptual tools will be guiding this project in discerning the problematic relation between psychology and its Others.

**Psychology and Its Others**

The problematic imaginary relation between psychology and its Others is rarely discussed in the literature of mainstream psychology. One might defend this negligence
on the part of mainstream psychology by blaming the philosophical connotations of the
term “the Other” and demand that the problem be formulated in a different manner, since
psychology has long since broken away from philosophy and successfully established
itself as an empirical science. Besides, one might further complain about the title of this
chapter, “Psychology has an imaginary relation with its Others? What a bizarre way of
talking about psychology!” Indeed, most psychologists tend to see what they do as
empirical science and nothing other than that. For example, they conduct experiments
to study conformity, dissect lab rats’ brains to explore biological mechanisms involved in
obesity, design computer models to simulate decision making, and use psychological
tests to assess the pathology of their clients. Thus, some of them might argue,
“Psychology is based on the results gained from empirical observations in rigorous
methodological procedures. It is not based on imagination, not to mention the
imaginary relation with others or whatever that means.”

It is actually quite understandable why psychologists like to pride themselves on
doing empirical science because historically that depiction has been a hard-earned
recognition from the scientific community at least according to the authoritative story
told repeatedly in most psychology textbooks. And it is also understandable why most
contemporary psychologists identify psychology as an empirical science since for them it
is the tradition in which they have been trained, and after years of being “conditioned” to
think empirically it is difficult to think otherwise. In many ways, empiricism has
become one of the fundamental assumptions adopted by psychology which functions
more like a disciplinary ideology rather than a theoretical orientation open for discussion,
as is also pointed out by Packer and Addison (1989, p. 31). The problem is, in spite of
the common belief, psychology may not be as empirical as most psychologists would like it to be.

To begin with, as psychologist and well-respected historian of psychology Kurt Danziger (1990) points out, psychology does not deal with natural objects, it deals with “test scores, rating scales, response distributions, serial lists, and innumerable other items that the investigator does not just find but constructs with great care” (p. 2, italics added). Which means that, even when a psychologist claims that she or he is doing “observation,” she or he is not just observing but already doing some kind of “translating” which translates things and events in the actual world into, in Danziger’s (2003) term, “psychological objects.” As he comments in this article in which he proposes to study the “biography of psychological objects,” there is “no empirical observation that does not require some discursive interpretation to give it a communicable form, and the data are not raw ‘findings’ but careful constructions in accordance with explicit and implicit rules” (p. 21). Therefore, the naturalistic, mutually-independent subject-object relation assumed in so-called “empirical observation” is more myth than fact in the actual practice of psychology.

Apart from the fact that empiricism may not to be the best fit for psychology, it has become an impediment to the development of psychology. Danziger (1997) points out that despite the seemingly flourishing appearance created by the constant revamping of theories, the empiricist tradition of psychology actually fails to render visible, not to mention corrigible “the presuppositions about our subject matter that are implied in the [psychological] categories we use to define the objects of our research and to express our empirical findings” (pp. 7-8). Consequentially, psychologists act like “naïve naturalists”
while in fact they are “conventionalists” with regard to the categorical presuppositions they use to accumulate empirical knowledge. As Danziger comments, psychologists “tend to proceed as though everyday psychological categories represented natural kinds, [and] as though the distinctions expressed in their basic [psychological] categories accurately reflected the natural divisions among psychological phenomena” (p. 8). That is to say, psychologists trained in the empirical tradition presuppose that there is a sort of “correspondence” between theory and reality, and historically psychologists try to guarantee this correspondence by being rigorous in methodology. Nonetheless, no matter hard they have tried, what they try to fix is something based on, in Packer and Addison’s words, “the impossible ‘correspondence theory’ of truth” which can never be fixed by methodological modifications (Packer & Addison, 1989, p. 28).

Once the empiricist pretension is unveiled, psychologists will find themselves awakening to a new scene of psychology that is unfamiliar and challenging, if not threatening. They will find that new problems start to emerge although many of them are really not that “new” but were rendered invisible in the empiricist tradition. The problem of “Others” is one of those new yet old challenges to psychology, especially after the end of the Second World War when psychology gradually became less a privileged field for White psychologists than a common asset for all (Pickren, 2007). However, it has not been easy for psychology to realize that its eye of the world has been blinded; it was when psychology traveled to the edge of the Euro-American world and suddenly met the firm gazes of Others, or when it was confronted by Others from within, that psychology awoke to the existence of Others. At the beginning of his phenomenal book Naming the Mind: How Psychology Found its Language (1997), Danziger told a
personal story about how he woke up to the problem of Others. I will give a shortened version of it here.

Probably in the late 1950s or early 1960s Danziger went to a university in Indonesia as a visiting scholar for two years, and one of the requirements was for him to teach a course on psychology. When he got there, he found that there was already an Indonesian professor teaching psychology but of a different kind. Danziger was excited to learn that there was an indigenous psychology being taught, so he persuaded the Indonesia professor to offer joint seminars with him. That is where the problems started. In their preparatory discussions about what topics should be taken as important and what should be left out, they failed to come to an agreement. The seminar never happened. Reflecting on the event Danziger thought that he was confronted with psychology’s “exotic Dopplegänger” and he admitted that it was for him an unsettling experience (p. 2). Though unsettling, the experience turned out to be a positive one for him. Because of this experience, Danziger became keenly aware of the categorical presuppositions of psychology and eventually wrote an insightful book about the history of psychological categories. He summarized his experience as follows: “It is difficult to escape such reflections when confronted with alternative frameworks for organizing psychological knowledge and experience. Certainly, while teaching in Indonesia, I could never forget that mine was only one possible psychology” (pp. 3-4).

On the one hand, it was lucky for Danziger to get involved in a dialogical situation with the Indonesian professor who was able to confront him with a system of psychological thinking that is alien to but as valid as western psychology. On the other hand, it was also lucky for the Indonesia professor and even the students of psychology to
have Danziger as an interlocutor who was humble enough to be confronted by irreconcilable difference and eventually admit that western psychology is only one possible psychology. For the most part, especially under the dominance of the empirical tradition, psychology has not been so merciful to Others or their traditions, as history shows. As Holliday and Holmes (2003) point out, historically psychology has been an accomplice of scientific racism, and the history of ethnic minorities in psychology in the United States is “the tale of people who were objects of a concept and ideology—scientific racism—that was integral to the justification of their oppression and exclusion” (p. 47). And in his review of the relation between ethnic minorities and American psychology from 1966 to 1980, Pickren (2004) also shows that it was through continuous advocacy and activism that ethnic minorities forced mainstream American psychology to “yield a place at the table to non-White, non-European individuals” (p. 45). Furthermore, psychology did not have an honorable record when it expanded outside of the Euro-American world. As Staeuble (2006) says, “the distortion and destruction of the knowledge systems of the colonized have been both a precondition for the establishment of the positional superiority of Western knowledge and a lasting obstacle to postcolonial attempts at establishing alternative cultures of knowledge,” and psychology is “part of the disciplinary order of Western knowledge” (p. 185). Therefore, in terms of psychology’s relation with Others, it is fair to postulate that psychology functions like an apparatus of discriminatory power.

Psychology as an Apparatus of Discriminatory Power

At the time of imposing his domination, in order to justify slavery, the oppressor had invoked scientific argument. (Fanon, 1964/1967, p. 43)
The problem is, therefore, *in what ways* are Others—as real people having their own concerns in their various ways of being in the world—represented or constructed as speculatable, and even controllable, “psychological objects” when psychology is discerned as an apparatus of discriminatory power?

To begin with, how do we define “psychological objects”? And in what ways are they constructed? Danziger (2003) points out that psychological objects, like any other scientific objects, are not just *manipulanda*, things to be manipulated; they exist *historically* and change over time. Therefore, to study psychological objects in a way proper to their way of existence is to study their historicity, that is, how they come to be as such; or in Danziger’s metaphor, to study their “biography.” Danziger defines the “biography” of scientific objects (which includes psychological objects) as

> the historical study of how domains of phenomena come to be constituted as such, and how they are transformed into objects of scientific scrutiny and manipulation, how they grow and gain in saliency, and how they change with age and are eventually supplanted or given a new identity. (p. 20)

Because Danziger (1990) is well aware that historically scientific psychology is a social practice which in essence is an empirical investigative practice based paradigmatically on the notion of experiment, he argues that psychological objects should not be identified merely as “discursive objects” but as “epistemic objects” which in their making involve both discursive and nondiscursive practices. The term “discursive” as used by Danziger in this article is rather different from that used by Foucault in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, in which he, for the most part, reserves the usage of the term “discourse” and its adjectival form “discursive” for the archaeological study of knowledge, that is, the study of *discourse as event*. On the other hand, Danziger uses “discursive practice” to
refer to either the practice which involves theoretical construction or some kind of interpretative activities, or the practice which is potentially theorizable or interpretive for those who are involved in the practice at a given historical time. Danziger further explicates that, in the making of psychological objects, discursive practice involves the “theoretical construction” that goes into the making of such objects; and nondiscursive practice involves the “procedures” which instantiate the theoretical construction in “empirical exemplars” (p. 21). He emphasizes that even though the procedures, tools, and instruments used in nondiscursive practice are closely related to discursive practice, they cannot be treated as part of discursive practice; they have their own history which should not be seen as identical to that of discursive practice. In sum, due to the empirical nature of psychology, psychological objects, argues Danziger, “represent a fusion of the theoretical and the empirical” (p. 21) and changes in any of the two constitutive practices will be reflected in the configuration of psychological objects.

To a great extent, Danziger has crafted a systematic approach to psychological objects as epistemic objects. But this is not quite enough. As we have learned from the dialectical history of critical intellectuals’ struggle to theorize and fight against colonialism, as an ambivalent object, the representation of Others is more than an epistemic object but also an object of desire; desire is an indispensable dimension in the exercise of the discriminatory power. To further our discussion regarding how in the process of representing Others the representation itself is at the same time an epistemic object and an object of desire, an explication of Foucault’s notion of an apparatus will be necessary here.
I would like to first point out that Danziger’s explication of psychological objects can easily be integrated into Foucault’s notion of an apparatus, even though Danziger seems to disagree with Foucault’s overemphasis on the discursive, which is, as I have pointed out above, a disagreement in terminology than anything else. An apparatus is, as Foucault says,

A thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourse, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions—in short, the said as much as the unsaid. Such are the elements of the apparatus. The apparatus itself is the system of relations that can be established between these elements. (p. 194, italics added)

If representing Others is considered to be part of psychology’s strategic deployment of its discriminatory power over Others, Foucault’s notion of an apparatus as a “heterogeneous ensemble” which includes the said and the unsaid to a great degree echoes Danziger’s emphasis on both the discursive and nondiscursive practices in the making of psychological objects. I would also like to further point out that, in Foucault’s dialogue with psychoanalyst Jacques-Alain Miller, his modification of the notion of episteme not only echoes Danziger’s notion of psychological objects as epistemic objects, but also clarifies for us how episteme functions in the making of psychological objects. Foucault redefines the episteme as

the strategic apparatus which permits of separating out from among all the statements which are possible those that will be acceptable within….a field of scientificity, and which it is possible to say are true or false. The episteme is the ‘apparatus’ which makes possible the separation, not of the true from the false, but of what may from what may not be characterized as scientific. (p. 197)

That is to say, the two practices that Danziger points out function as the episteme of psychology’s strategic deployment of its discriminatory power over Others; their working
together determines what can be accepted as “scientific” statements in representing Others as psychological objects.

However, as I pointed out earlier, the representation of Others is more than an object of the discursive regime but also an object of desire. Therefore, while Danziger’s notion of psychological objects as epistemic objects provides us with an approach to the necessary conditions for Others to be represented as psychological objects—that is, Others have to be “scientifically” represented—is itself insufficient to account for either the strategic choice of what (e.g., why “intelligence”?) in Others is to be represented, or for the historical changes of the representation of Others (e.g., from the Others as a statistical variation to the Other as an agent of a culture system). Both of them—the strategic choice of the signifier of difference and the psychic investment/withdrawal of such a signifier—point to the dimension of desire in an apparatus of discriminatory power. Foucault in his later works proposes the notion of an apparatus as a modification of his notion of discourse, which put too much emphasis on synchronic analysis and ignored the diachronic aspect of the exercise of power. His emphasis on the strategic nature of the apparatus provides us with a theoretical foundation to discern the role played by desire in psychology’s exercise of its discriminatory power over Others regarding the strategic choice and the historical changes of psychological objects as the representation of Others. Regarding the strategic nature of the apparatus, Foucault says, the apparatus is essentially of a strategic nature, which means assuming that it is a matter of a certain manipulation of relations of forces, either developing them in a particular direction, blocking them, stabilizing them, utilizing them, etc. The apparatus is thus always inscribed in a play of power, but it is also always linked to certain coordinates of knowledge which issue from it but, to an equal degree, condition it. This is what the apparatus consists in: strategies of relations of forces supporting, and supported by, types of knowledge. (Foucault, 1980a, p. 196)
Foucault points out that, the major function of the apparatus at a given historical moment is to respond to an “urgent need” (p. 195). And as Bhabha (1994) points out, this urgent need for the colonial discourse is the ambivalence caused by encountering the difference of Others: Others must be represented and represented repeatedly so that their essentially irrepresentable difference can be masked by the representation of Others. This is how desire plays a role in the apparatus of discriminatory power: as a psychic strategy in reaction to a potentially traumatizing encounter, a play of identification in relation to the representation of Others. And in the case of psychology, this dance between power, knowledge, and desire substantializes itself in the history of Others as psychological objects, in the fixity and repetition of the representation of Others as an “impossible” object of desire.

From Racial Other to Cultural Other

The issue is not whether human beings are biological organisms with intrinsic characteristics. Man can’t fly and pigeons can’t talk. Nor is it whether they show commonalities in mental functioning wherever we find them. Papuans envy, Aborigines dream. The issue is, what are we to make of these undisputed facts as we go about explicating rituals, analyzing ecosystems, interpreting fossil sequences, or comparing languages. (Geertz, 1984, p. 268, italics added)

When one looks back on the history of psychology with a sensitivity to how Others are represented in psychology, one cannot but notice how insistent psychology has been in finding ways to represent Others. It is an imperative to psychology: Others must be represented, one way or another. Historically, psychology’s earliest representation of Others is the racial Other. However, the concept of “race” and its related theories were not psychology’s invention, but were inherited as a legacy of the European world’s
complicated history of interacting with Others. Etymologically speaking, the concept of “race” can be traced back to the end of the 15th century (Oxford English Dictionary), when Europeans started sailing south and then eventually west to bypass the Muslim-dominated East in order to find new paths of trading unrestricted by the Muslims. The concept of “race” is mainly used to differentiate the “Us race” and the “Other race” which, in a more Bhabharian term, is essentially a signifier of difference. As a signifier, “race” originally came from the traditional cultural-linguistic matrix of the European world, but as the matrix was changed by the European world’s further experience with Others (for example, slavery or colonization), or itself changed by having a new element introduced (for example, evolutionary thought), “race” as a signifier of difference changed accordingly.

For example, Richards (1997) points out that, in the traditional Christian cosmology, “Mankind’s’ basic unity was an article of faith: we are all descendants of Noah’s sons and daughters-in-law” (p. 1). This is why at the beginning of the European expansion, dark-skinned Africans were considered to be the descendants of Ham, Noah’s cursed son. For Europeans at the time, “blackness” registered the difference between the “Us race” and the “Other race”; we are all the descendents of Noah, but they are from the cursed Ham, therefore they are “eternally ordained to be inferior ‘hewers of wood and drawers of water’” (p. 1).

However, as Western history proceeded, differences in the experience of Others also contributed to how difference was registered in “race.” For example, in Richards’ “Race”, Racism, and Psychology: Towards a Reflexive History (1997), the history of the concept of “race” in the United States and in Europe cannot really be seen as one but has
to be treated separately as two genealogies. In the United States, the Native Americans who survived massive genocides were mostly “cornered” in the reservations and therefore posed no threat; therefore, for white Americans, the major Others were the dark-skinned African slaves who lived among them. Thus “race” in the United States mainly registered the “negro vs. white” binary and it was not until much later, when the United States became populated with people with different skin colors, that the differential registry of “race” became the “colored vs. white” binary. On the other hand, because historically Europe dominated non-European Others through colonization, Others were those who lived outside the European world in “primitive” and “non-civilized” areas; the concept of “race” in Europe therefore registered the “primitive vs. civilized” binary which reflected the colonial experience of the European world.

However, after the Second World War, Europe and the United States seemed to have changed seats regarding their relations to Others: Others from ex-colonies flooded to the European world and therefore Europe is forced to face Others from within; on the other hand, the United States had become the dominant world power, and started to interact more frequently with Others outside of the American world. These new experiences of interacting with Others in many ways changed the fate of “race” as an effective signifier of difference, whether it continued to be psychically invested to represent Others, to rationalize the domination over Others, or at the same time effectively mask the anxiety cause by the difference of Others.

While “race” as the signifier of difference was not psychology’s own invention, psychology did play a critical role in making the racial Other a scientific object. In fact, as Richards (1997) points out, psychology from its very beginning was deeply involved
in the enterprise of scientific racism—the repeated attempts to make the racial Other a scientific object. In another major work, Richards (2002) identified two major trends of thought which helped found psychology: first, the experimental methodology which consists of two wings, the experimental/empirical wing pioneered by scholars like Gustav Fechner and William Wundt, and the statistical wing represented by Francis Galton and Karl Pearson; and second, evolutionary thought associated with Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer (p. 32). If we review the influences these two trends had on the establishment of psychology as a empirical science, with a focus on how they helped to formulate the discursive and nondiscursive practices of the discipline, we will find that these two trends of thought also profoundly influenced how the racial Other was constructed as a psychological object.

Evolutionary thought had a profound influence on many of the so-called “modern sciences,” psychology included. The major contribution of evolutionary thought was that it provided Europeans with a new self-image which liberated them from the Christian cosmology and thus allowed them to no longer define themselves in terms of the articles of faith. However, this new self-image not only implied that Europeans gradually saw themselves as “Homo sapiens,” as one among many species evolved in the long history of evolution, it also implied that the world in which the Europeans dwelled was gradually separating itself from the Biblical world. Therefore, the relation between Europeans and the other species, and the relation between Europeans and the natural world had to be reconsidered and redefined. The amazing productivity of evolutionary thought lay in the passion as well as the anxiety evoked by these yet-to-be-answered questions. In the case of psychology, evolutionary thought supplied an “overarching integrating
framework” for different psychological inquiries such as “animal behavior, child development, individual differences, physiological psychology, social psychology, psychopathology, emotion and the very nature of ‘Mind’ itself” (Richards, 1997, p. 1). With the emergence of these new domains of psychological inquiry, we find that evolutionary thought provided psychology with a kind of “comparative homology,”10 so that various differences such as developmental difference, individual difference, species difference, racial difference, or psychological difference could become visible through comparison using a certain hypothesis of sameness. Since evolution is essentially a biological process, all these comparisons are fundamentally biological in nature.

The discursive practice involved in the making of the racial Other as a psychological object started along the lines of biological comparison. For example, early in the history of psychology the “Spencer hypothesis”11 was repeatedly used to measure the difference between the “white race” and the other “lower races,” but most of the results did not confirm the Spencer hypothesis (Richards, 1997). These failed attempts did not discourage psychologists from finding other possible differences between the “white race” and other “races.” When American psychology gradually formulated its own brand of psychological categories, such as “behavior” and “intelligence,” as is explored historically by Danziger (1997), “behavioral performance” and “intelligence test scores” became other sites of possible difference. For example, American psychologists attempted to measure difference in school performance between

10 R. J. C. Young (2001) comes up with this term in his chapter on Foucault. Foucault thinks that ethnology consists of a structural science predicated on a hypothesis of sameness which enables it to theoretically approach other cultures; and in Yang’s term, this is a kind of “comparative homology” exercised by ethnology (pp. 396-397).

11 The “Spencer hypothesis” hypothesizes that the amount of energy allocated to higher functions of reason and will is greater in whites than in “primitives”; therefore, “primitives” should outperform whites in simple tasks such as reaction time (RT). As Richards (1997) points out, proving/disproving the hypothesis creates an obvious “no-win situation” for non-whites.
“Negro” children and “white” children as a scientific proof to justify the continued segregation of education in the American South; and Army tests were used to justify the hostile immigration policy toward southern European immigrants (Richards, 1997). These attempts failed eventually; they were proven to be either scientifically dubious or else the difference in performance could be better accounted for as originating from socio-economic difference than from “racial” difference.

The racial Other, as a psychological object based on evolutionary thought, gradually became socially undefendable in discursive practice. Racial difference had been repeatedly used to provide scientific justification for injustices toward non-whites, which gradually evoked opposition and criticism not only from within the psychology community but also from the public, especially from the popular liberal press and black magazines. By 1930, race psychology as a specialized subfield in psychology was under a lot of social pressure (Richards, 1997). But more importantly for psychology as an empirical science, the racial Other as a psychological object was also scientifically undefendable in nondiscursive practice. In the case of making the racial Other a psychological object, discursive practice provides the theoretical construction to account for how the racial Other is different from us through comparison, or in other words, the necessary signifier of difference; and the nondiscursive practice provides empirical procedures to instantiate the signifier of difference in concrete experimental setting. And historically “race” as an essentially biological signifier of difference had proven to be difficult to instantiate in concrete experimental settings by empirical procedures as a scientific object in nondiscursive practice.
The nondiscursive practice discussed by Danziger mainly involves the problematic of measuring: how does one properly translate the theory or hypothesis constructed in the discursive practice into a measurable variable in order to instantiate the theoretical construction or hypothesis in the concrete experimental setting by empirical procedures? In the history of scientific racism, measuring had always been problematic, especially for those who attempted to empirically validate racial difference. As Richards (1997) points out, early in the history of scientific racism, physical anthropologists were obsessed with “fleshing out” evidence of racial difference by measuring skulls. Their research results were not influential in psychology as a whole, but their obsession to measure was definitely inherited by psychologists.

Historically for psychology, statistical method is at least as important as experimental method, if not more important. This is especially true with regard to the history of making the racial Other a psychological object. Compared to those obsessive physical anthropologists, psychology had better theoretical architects in the constructing of racial difference. In fact, Francis Galton, the major architect of scientific racism, was also one of the main founders of the statistical method in psychology. With the efforts of Galton and other British statisticians, the statistical method became psychology’s most powerful tool in discerning and constructing difference. It eventually constituted a relatively independent subdiscipline of psychology, namely psychometrics, which specialized in the theory and technique of measuring psychological properties. In the early years of psychology, the more statistically-minded psychologists’ main concern was how to theorize and measure the individual or racial difference in heredities due to the influence of evolutionary thought. However, as more psychological categories such as
“intelligence,” “behavior,” and “personality” started to emerge, the theory and technique of psychometrics were modified or revamped accordingly to measure individual and group difference in those categories, racial difference included.

Through our brief review of the history of psychology’s experimental methodology, it is fair to say that this experimental methodology gradually evolved to be psychology’s most powerful weapon: a quantifying tool which consists of the empirical procedures to instantiate theoretical constructions in the experimental setting, and of the statistical methods to processes the experimental results; it became psychology’s “proof” of its credibility to the scientific community. However, in its actual operation, especially with regard to how the difference of Others is constructed and measured, it is a rather unique and powerful mode of representing difference: it quantitatively constructs the difference of Others through theoretical comparison based on the hypothesis of sameness, and instantiates such a difference in concrete experimental settings by empirical procedures. And as we have seen in our brief historical review, this mode of representing difference as a nondiscursive practice has a relatively independent existence from the discursive practice of “race,” the signifier of difference. As a result, even if “race” had gone through some modifications in its differential registry, or could no longer be defended as the signifier of difference in discursive practice, this mode of representing difference was rather unaffected and continued to evolve by modifying itself accordingly to the change of differential registry. Therefore, the demise of the signifier “race” is not the critical issue; as long as there is another signifier of difference to replace “race,” psychology can still effectively construct another psychological object to represent Others by this powerful quantifying tool. In this sense, the Other is always measureable
and representable; as E.L. Thorndike says, “everything which exists must exist in some quantity and can therefore be measured” (as quoted in Richards, 2002, p. 252).

Around the mid-1930s, because of the social pressure and criticism from within the scientific community, “race” was less psychically invested and was no longer able to function effectively as the signifier of difference in the discursive practice of psychology. Some psychologists started to wonder why there was a need to see differences in “race” which later became a blooming interest in racial prejudice and attitudes (Richards, 1997). It was not until the rise of Nazi anti-Semitism in Germany that American psychologists started to view, from the outside, how “race” as the signifier of difference could be utilized politically and ideologically as a way of justifying oppression. The Holocaust was the straw that broke the camel’s back, so to speak. After the Second World War, “race” as the signifier of difference became almost psychically withdrawn; “race” became a taboo, a forbidden signifier which, if named, had the capacity to bring on the most unimaginable disasters.

However, for psychology as a whole, most psychologists did not really see the problem in representing Others by way of quantified difference, which always refers to a norm set in “white” terms, so to speak; therefore, it was not that Others should not be represented, but that “race” itself was a “bad” signifier of difference. On the other hand, this powerful quantifying tool could also be used in ways other than justifying racism. In fact, liberal psychologists, black psychologists, or so-called “ethnic minority” psychologists theoretically constructed difference based on economic and social factors and used this quantifying tool to argue that the difference of Others was actually not racial but economic and social (Holliday & Holmes, 2003).
After the mid-1930s, the attempt to make the racial Other into a psychological object was temporarily dead. Some psychologists started to wonder, “Why is there a need to see the difference in race?” This wonder evoked a great deal of interest in the study of racial prejudice and attitudes; “racism” rather than “race” became the focus of psychologists’ theoretical interest (Richards, 1997; Samelson, 1978). However, reflection on the Nazi experience turned psychologists to the study of how personality and social group affect human behavior (Richards, 2002). This research not only reminded American psychologists to be more aware of the fact that human are social beings, but also inspired them to be more actively involved in social issues. Due to both the theoretical and the activist involvement of psychologists in social issues, social psychology became a salient field in psychology, and psychology as a whole became more receptive to the idea that social context is crucial in the understanding of human behavior. In a sense, this emphasis on contextual significance was a prelude to the emergence of the cultural Other. Social psychology to a great extent paved the way for the cultural Other to emerge since “culture” was considered to be one of the social dimensions of human existence.

More importantly, psychology itself went through dramatic changes after the Second World War, both internationally and domestically. Domestically, besides the post-war immigrations from Europe, the change of immigration policy in 1965 drastically changed the “color component” of the American population, and psychology in no way could resist this change. More and more “colored people” or “ethnic minorities” became or fought to become members of the psychology community. Once they entered the system, they became dissatisfied by or disillusioned with psychology’s
explicit and implicit ways of excluding their representation in psychology, in both senses of the term. Therefore, they not only wanted to be the Others in psychology (for example, they asked for more institutional representation), they also objected to how they, as Others of psychology, were represented (or the lack thereof) by psychology (Holliday & Holmes, 2003). Historically, this was how psychology in the United States became more diversified.

Internationally, the United States had become one of the two dominating world powers, and in order to contain communism from spreading, the United States tried aggressively to make friends in the world by economic and political supports, as well as sharing its higher educational resources with the rest of the world by funding international students. As a result, American psychology spread from its traditional Euro-American centers to places where psychology as a discipline was never present or only vaguely present. In the 1970s, when these non-traditional centers of psychology became more established, psychologists from these centers became aware that the psychology they had learned was not “relevant” to the concerns in their own societies (Azuma, 1984; Sinha, 1993). Thus, they initially argued that the concerns in their societies should be properly represented by psychology, but later more of them started to advocate for a psychology of their own that better addresses these concerns (Enriquez, 1993; Kim, 1990; Mataragnon, 1979; Yang, 1997). Historically, this was how psychology became more internationalized.

“Culture” as the signifier of difference for psychology emerged in this post-war condition in which psychology became more diversified in the United States (I would argue in Canada as well) and became more internationalized around the globe. In this
gradually diverse and international condition, there is a lacuna in psychology’s discursive practice with regard to Others: it did not have a proper term to replace “race” as the signifier of difference. Therefore, when psychologists took from anthropology the concept of “culture,” which itself is a rather disputed concept among anthropologists (Kuper, 1999), to account for the difference of Others, it quickly became the preferred signifier of difference in place of “race.” The boom in culture-related psychologies—such as ethnopsychology, cross-culture psychology, cultural psychology, and indigenous psychologies—starting in the 1970s is historical evidence of this metonymy of the signifier of difference in psychology.

From the perspective of power, “culture” as the signifier of difference is not just a replacement of “race,” but a strategically “better” signifier of difference—not only for the psychology establishment, but also for psychology’s Others. It is a signifier that is abstract enough; as Radeliffe-Brown (1940) says, “we do not observe a ‘culture,’ since that word denotes, not any concrete reality, but an abstraction, and as it is commonly used a vague abstraction” (p. 2). But at the same time, it can refer to almost anything, as this most quoted definition of culture in culture-related psychology says:

> Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behavior acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups, including their embodiments in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e., historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values; cultural systems may on the one hand be considered as products of action, on the other as conditioning elements of further action. (Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1952, p. 181)

As a result, we can see that mainstream psychology and culture-related psychologies all work around the concept of “culture” each in their own way. Representing the cultural Other has become a battle on many fronts: domestically in the United States, and globally
in non-traditional centers of psychology; and a battle in many forms: institutionally in the establishment of psychology, discursively in the form of and right to representation, and “desirously” in the struggle with one’s identity beyond identification with the idealized mainstream American psychology.
Chapter 3
At the Margins: A History Misrecognized and Misappropriated

History, like science, is controversy, not story-telling. (R. M. Young, 1966)

In September 2009, the Taiwanese Psychological Association (TPA) held its 48th annual meeting at the Psychology Department of the National Taiwan University (NTU). That year was also the Department’s 60th year since its establishment in 1949. Since it was the first, and for almost 20 years the only, psychology department in Taiwan, many Taiwanese psychologists tend to think that psychology in Taiwan began with the establishment of the Department. Therefore, the fact that this annual meeting was hosted by the Psychology Department of NTU in its 60th year made it a historically significant event.

In traditional Taiwanese/Chinese chronology, sixty years of time is marked as one jia zi, and the end of that implies that something has almost gone through a full cycle of its life, and is about to enter a new one. The year 2009, therefore, symbolically stood for psychology in Taiwan having almost gone through its first developmental stage, and was about to enter a new one. Traditionally people would devote some time to reflect on the past if they realized that something, if it mattered to them, had been in existence for one jia zi. They would take that brief but precious moment to reflect on how things had come to be the way they were, both good and bad, so as to celebrate what they had achieved and to learn from their past mistakes. It was only at these brief moments of historical reflection that people are able to temporarily detach themselves from the daily routine and have a clearer view of their own life trajectories.
There is no doubt that TPA was aware of the historical significance of holding the annual meeting at the Psychology Department of NTU in 2009. As Li-Jen Weng, then president of the TPA and the chair of the Psychology Department at NTU said, TPA decided to take this opportunity to invite Taiwanese psychologists to “review the one Jia zi of the development of psychology in Taiwan, so as to preview the future” (Weng, 2009). Three venerable professors—Dr. Ying-Mao Liu (experimental and cognitive psychologist), Dr. Yung-Ho Ko (clinical psychologist), and Dr. Kuo-Shu Yang (social and personality psychologist)—were invited as keynotes to address the audience about the historical development of their respective fields in Taiwan; other participating psychologists were also invited to speak on subjects related to the history or the future of the development of psychology in Taiwan.

Indeed, the 48th annual meeting of the TPA could have been an extraordinary event, given that it took place at a historically significant time at a historically significant site. Disappointingly, the meeting turned out to be no more than an ordinary annual meeting. The keynote addresses were almost the only section of the meeting that responded to the main theme designated by the TPA, most presenters did not bother to contextualize their own work in a historical manner, not to mention providing either a “review” or “preview” of the development of their respective field. What most participating psychologists presented at the meeting was research reflecting their current interests, and the historical dimension of such research was limited to the form of “literature review,” which could only afford a rather limited history of the subject in question. On the other hand, the keynote addresses of the three venerable professors, which constituted almost the only historical section of the meeting, were presented
mostly in the form of exhibiting past achievements, a privileged honor belonging to veterans.

Nevertheless, in their brief previews of the future development of psychology in Taiwan, one cannot but notice a sense of urgency in their tone, especially in Ko and Yang’s speeches. Both of them showed a great deal of eagerness in conveying to the audience that the development of psychology in Taiwan is indeed at a historical crossroad. Ko (2009), as a seasoned clinical psychologist, appeals to the new generations that “the most important thing right now for the development of clinical psychology in Taiwan is to construct our own clinical psychological theories” (p. 55); and Yang (2009) encourages the new generations to continue the revolution of hua ren indigenous psychology he and others started more than 30 years ago (p. 86). In his keynote address, Ko emphasizes that “theory is the soul of a discipline” (p. 57) and he expects seasoned clinical psychologists to take the initiative to theorize on the basis of their years of clinical experience, rather than relying indolently on Western theories. Ko emphasizes that, without the will and capacity to indigenously theorize clinical experience, the practice of clinical psychology in Taiwan would always be “clinical psychology in Taiwan” rather than “Taiwanese clinical psychology,” and in that case it would be nothing but a “soulless” psychology (p. 57).

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12 The two terms “hua ren” and ”zhong guo ren” are not distinguishable in English; they are both translated as “Chinese.” The term “zhong guo ren” is considered, especially by Taiwanese, to be a term with too many political implications (for example, Taiwanese and Chinese are both zhong guo ren and therefore the future of Taiwan is to return to the welcoming arms of China), and therefore has gradually lost its currency in the daily language use of Taiwanese as a term to refer to themselves; Taiwanese now prefer to identify themselves as “tai wan ren” rather than “zhong guo ren.” However, it is also undeniable that Taiwanese and Chinese do share the same cultural-linguistic matrix to a great extent. The term “hua ren” is therefore being used more frequently in recent years to replace the term “zhong guo ren” because of its emphasis on the shared cultural-linguistic aspect rather than the divided political aspect between the Taiwanese people and the Chinese people.
Ironically, Yang and Wen (1982) use the same expression “soulless” to describe the condition of psychology in the mid-1980s, and one could even say that this very awareness of the soulless condition of psychology was what led to the indigenous psychology movement nearly 30 years ago. Hearing the same “diagnosis” being given again to describe the condition of psychology in Taiwan after three decades of the indigenous psychology movement is bewildering. What is more troubling is the indifference shown by most participating psychologists to the invitation to historically reflect. It is almost like history does not matter, be it the historical reflection of their predecessors in psychology, or the historical significance of their own work.

Lessons from the History of Psychology

History of psychology is not a salient field in Taiwan. Most Taiwanese psychologists are not particularly interested in looking back into the past of psychology. The history of psychology in their view is, metaphorically speaking, like a long and winding river which has a clear directional flow. The outline of the story of psychology can probably be best summarized in the following banal expression: “psychology has a long past but a short history.” The long past of psychology is usually mentioned rather briefly in this story; for example, in an introduction to psychology textbook by Wade and Tavris (2003), this long past of psychology is presented in the section of “Psychology’s Past: From the Armchair to the Laboratory” and it traces the history of psychology back to Greek thinkers because they “raised questions that today would be call psychological”

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13 Hermann Ebbinghaus began his introductory psychology text *Outline of Psychology* (1902) with this famous statement (Hergenhahn, 2005).
Then the story goes through the changes in psychological thought in past centuries with some comments here and there about the mistakes past thinkers made without “empirical methods,” and quickly fast forwards to the end of the 19th century when psychology started to emerge as a modern discipline.

From this point on, the previous fast-paced story-telling seems to enter a slow motion mode, even to the degree of gazing. In this linearly progressing history of psychology, the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century was the crucial moment for psychology to enter its “present” from its “long past.” And the most crucial of all was the establishment of the experimental method. The experimental method was psychology’s announcement that it had evolved from a brand of “armchair” philosophy to a new discipline of empirical science based on “laboratory” findings. Wilhem Wundt’s establishment of the first psychology laboratory in Leipzig, Germany becomes the object of the historical gaze and the focus of the story because it is seen as the event which stood for the birth of “modern psychology.” As a consequence of this landmark event in 1879, the history of psychology, this long and winding river which had its origins in the Greek philosophers, started to change its directional flow. After early phases of structuralism, functionalism, and psychoanalysis, it gradually incorporated streams from modern medicine and other natural sciences; and with the continuous devotions of great minds, it eventually became the splendid scene of scientific psychology in the United States.

This river-like, linear history of psychology was learned by most Taiwanese psychologists in their training; maybe the emphasis or the details were slightly different, but the core structure of the story stayed very much the same. Therefore, the historical
narrative that psychology “originated in Europe but became great in the United States” becomes the history of psychology as identified by Taiwanese psychologists; most will not cast a doubt on the truth value of the story, not to mention not knowing its particularity and the problems thus involved. The problem is that this biographical history of modern psychology may not be as trustworthy as it is believed to be.

Early in 1966, when the history of psychology started to become a recognized field in psychology, Cambridge scholar Robert M. Young wrote a long article criticizing the low level of scholarly works in the field. After reviewing a long list of representative works in the field, he points out that most of them had not yet reached the “useful but limited stage of amateurism” (p. 13) and therefore could not be qualified as scholarly historical works. He points out that it was “unfortunately symptomatic” for the history of psychology that it suffers from three limitations: “great men,” “great insights,” and “great dates” (p. 29), which as a result created historical works in the form of an “expository history.” Since most of the works in the history of psychology were written by working psychologists for their colleagues or students, they naturally stress the history of problems which reflect their current interest, and as Young points out, “history is thus written backwards from the viewpoint of a modern textbook” (p. 15). Young argues that these pragmatic considerations generated significant problems. He points out that this presentist approach had produced “shockingly bad history,” and that it “denies the student one of the most valuable helps to be gained from historical reading:

14 Institutionally, the American Psychological Association (APA) formally recognized the Division of the History of Psychology in 1966, and many of the Division members were actively involved in the Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences founded in 1965. Funding wise, not only the National Institutes of Health (NIH) establish a History of the Life Sciences Study Section which made grants for research in the study of the biological and related (including psychological) sciences, there were also funds for establishing departments or institutes of the history of medicine and science and fellowships for potential teachers (R. M. Young, 1966).
perspectives” (p. 15). Young also points out that, even though some works in the history of psychology had started to refer to Thomas Kuhn’s new historiography, there was only “scant evidence” that Kuhn’s idea of “understanding the past in its own term” was actually grasped by these works. Young’s article began the critique of the historical narrative in the history of psychology. However, it was not until the 1980s, when more dialogue started to take place between the history of psychology and the history of science,\(^\text{15}\) that historians of psychology reconnected to the critique made by Young.

In his article “Of What Is History of Psychology a History?” (1987) British historian of psychology Graham Richards argues that the development of the history of psychology needs to be critically examined. He first points out that the early works in the history of psychology were written by psychologists with a clear aim to provide a “respectable genealogy” for the nascent discipline: they defended the legitimacy of psychology by presenting psychology as “the legitimate heir to the main western philosophical tradition” (p. 201). The widely-accepted story that psychology “originated in Europe but became great in the United States” was the historical product of such a defense. It provided a simple storyline which not only genealogically connected the nascent discipline of psychology to the glorified European tradition but also stressed the scientificity of psychology by emphasizing its experimental methods, which at the time seemed to be a good enough defense for the legitimate status of psychology as a young but respectable science. He further argues that the efforts of the history of psychology to emulate the history of science since the 1960s was nothing but a “repeat

\(^{15}\) History of psychology became a salient field in the 1980s, especially toward the end of it. The publication of several major works (Buss, 1979; Danziger, 1990; Leary, 1990; Rose, 1985) and the establishment of a new journal named *History of the Human Sciences* (HHS) in 1988 contributed greatly to active dialogues between the history of psychology and the history of other sciences.
performance” of psychology’s earlier striving to become a respected science (p. 203). But this emulation is quite problematic because it assumes that psychology is not different from the natural sciences and therefore the history of psychology should be interpreted in the orthodox terms of the history of science. And such an approach, according to Richards, “begs some central questions and prevents some genuinely interesting and very important issues from being confronted” (p. 203).

Richards then points out one of the begged questions: there is a crucial difference between psychology and the natural sciences, which is, that the widely used distinction between “internalist” and “externalist” approaches to historiography does not really apply to psychology because “Psychology, the discipline, directly emerges out of ‘psychology’ the subject matter” (p. 205); in other words, there is a reflexive relation between psychology, the discipline, and psychology, the subject matter. Richards suggests that historians of psychology should admit that the scientific status of psychology is problematic and this should be explored rather than defended by the history of psychology.

In his article “Does the History of Psychology Have a Subject?” (1988) historian Roger Smith directly probes the core issue of the history of psychology: does the history of psychology have a continuous subject as its subject matter? Smith’s main points can be summarized as follows: first, most works in the history of psychology accept highly questionable notions of “psychology,” their subject matter; and second, the history of psychology as a disciplinary domain does not have a historically invariable “psychology” as its corresponding subject. Smith begins his arguments by first criticizing the “textbook history” of psychology. He argues that the linear history of psychology
presented by most textbooks contributes to the “normative framework” of the psychology community and that such texts embody and transmit values important to psychologists’ sense of worth and identity. However, Smith also points out that this simplified version of psychology’s history is eventually dangerous to psychology itself. First, this simplified version of psychology’s history is selective in nature, it “privileges one body of knowledge and practice as ‘truth’, reducing the imagination’s power to conceptualize alternative truths” (p. 148). Second, the linear history modern psychology presents is essentially an oversimplified view of history: it “distorts and simplifies what have been far from inevitable events and circumstances” (p. 148). And third, this historical narrative presupposes that “psychology” is a continuous subject but this presupposition is exactly what should be explored by the practice of historical inquiry.

Using Foucault’s general critique of the human sciences, Smith argues that psychology’s disciplinary existence consists of “relations among bodies of knowledge and forms of power” that can be traced to “institutional, occupational, and personal enactments,” and psychology as such is historically configured by these power-knowledge relations, rather than by any pre-existing reality (p. 150). Therefore, instead of a presentist linear history, Smith proposes a “present-centered” critical history of psychology. The present of psychology is still the main concern of this critical history, but the present is neither a natural result of progress, nor is it a peak of development; rather, it is a present made possible by historical contingencies.

From this critical stance, Smith points out that “psychology” as a seemingly continuous subject is in fact a narrative construction of textbook histories formed selectively choosing to emphasize some part of psychological knowledge (for example,
experimental psychology) and linking it with a particular historical tradition (for example, the western philosophical tradition); however, what actually made “psychology” historically recognizable was its “social presence” since the generation of Wundt or James (p. 154). Therefore, the real subject of the history of psychology should be the historical contingencies which made possible the emergence of psychology as such, and the power-knowledge relations which sustain it. The different “faces” of psychology in different societies is a result of those historical contingencies. As Smith provocatively points out, psychology was not “one discipline” formed in “one set of historical circumstances”; it is “the ‘generic sign’ of a cluster of competing would-be disciplines” (p. 156).

In the introduction to the special issue of History of the Human Sciences published in 1991, the executive editor Kurt Danzier, who just published his major work Constructing the Subject: Historical Origins of Psychological Research (1990), responded, for the most part, positively to Smith’s article. He agreed with Smith that we should by all means “bury the ghost of the history of psychology,” but he nevertheless argued that it does not mean the end of the disciplinary domain of the history of psychology. It means that a reappraisal is needed of psychology’s appropriate subject matter (p. 327). Danziger concurs with Smith that psychology only recently became historically identifiable as a “social activity” and thus he proposed that “the appearance of psychology as a discipline” should be one anchoring point for historical studies. Danziger argues that if the history of psychology is not to become the story about the pursuit of timeless “human nature,” it has to be grounded in “the specific social activities” that constitute psychology as such. He then points out that modern psychology since its
inception has an inescapable feature of erecting universalistic knowledge-claims on a rather localized social basis despite the fact that the discipline has multiple origins and that its development has not been one of linear convergence. Danziger argues that it is only by “privileged certain local developments over others” that psychology is able to make such universal claims and speak of the history of psychology (pp. 327-328). He points out three factors which have contributed to the univocalization/universalization of locally developed American psychology. First, the internal politics of the discipline: History has been used by psychologists such as Boring (1950) to place their particular version of the disciplinary project at the central position. Second, psychology as a discipline has been unequally developed in different nations, and American psychology has surpassed that of other nations both in quality and quantity. Third, the uneven development of psychology made it easier to structure the history of the discipline in terms of a continuous and progressively developing subject. As a result, this linear history marginalized trends, both local and international, that did not fit the perspective of mainstream American psychology and played down the pervasiveness and significance of fundamental disagreements. However, as psychology in other places grew rapidly in recent years, the American-centered history of psychology has become less convincing as representing the history of psychology. Danziger therefore proposes a “polycentric historiography” to replace the old historiography which not only positions American psychology at the geographical center, but also positions a particular brand of it (empirical, experimental mainstream psychology) at the conceptual core of the discipline.

Besides the proposal of a new polycentric historiography, in “Does the History of Psychology Have a Future” (1994), Danziger further proposes that psychology is in need
of a *critical history*. He first examines two opposite models of institutionalizing disciplinary history: one represented by physics which institutionally separates the study of its history from the disciplinary practice, and the other represented by economics in which the study of its own history is an integral part of the disciplinary practice. By comparing these two opposite models, Danziger argues that the natural sciences and the human sciences have very different ways of “mobilizing tradition,” and therefore they have different kinds of historical “sensibilities” (pp. 468-472). The natural sciences are largely consensus enterprises, they usually mobilize tradition by a brief account of the recent relevant research literature to demarcate a sphere of uncertainty and ignorance within predefined research areas, and this small piece of recent relevant historical past is presented in the “literature review” section of a study. On the other hand, the human sciences are often divided by alternative schools of thought which tend not to agree with each other, and therefore, their way of mobilizing tradition usually involves “critical historiography” (p. 471) with considerable chronological depth so that the differences among schools can be seen with maximum visibility. The “shallow history” (p. 471) of research papers does help the natural sciences maximize consensus around the formation of what is already known and what is still uncertain. However, the efficiency of problem solving comes at a price: the natural sciences institutionalize a “lack of reflective historical consciousness” (p. 471); they “progress” in a way as if science were beyond history.

Danziger points out that in terms of their research practice, most experimental psychologists mobilize tradition in a way similar to that of physicists; therefore, there is hardly any room in their world for a reflective or critical history (p. 472). One could
even argue that there was perhaps no need for a critical history, since after World War II the American model was the one to be emulated rather than criticized. The historical narrative that psychology “originated in Europe but became great in the United States” provided the necessary sense of identity and pride for American psychologists, and they just had to focus on what they were doing and the “shallow history” that could help them clarify their research questions was all they needed. However, things started to change in the mid-1970s. With the recovery of European psychology, the American model of “behavioral science” was no longer the only game in town, and the American-centered historical narrative was also contested. And externally, as the scientific advance started to show its negative impacts, the general public became skeptical about the supposedly transcendental claims made by science. There was even the glimmer of a suspicion that science is not beyond history; science is a social activity and, like other social activities, it is historical in nature. Critical histories of science started to emerge as a response to the fall of scientism, which in many ways inspired critical historical studies of psychology to question its natural science model. In addition, the “human geography” of psychology also started to change; psychology’s Others started to enter the field and they were not satisfied with the status quo. And along with the end of American hegemony in psychology, both the old discipline hierarchy of placing the “hard-core experimentalists” at the top and the old historiography of placing the Euro-Americans at the center were challenged from within and without American psychology. The old historiography has lost its appeal and the shallow history was never a genuine history; Danziger therefore proposed that psychology was in need of a different kind of historical consciousness in order to deal with the complexity of its current affairs. As Danziger says,
it is “when the authority becomes questionable, when the professional community is divided in some profound way, that a critical disciplinary history has a significant contribution to make” (p. 478).

Danziger argues that there are at least three ways a critical historiography might have an effect on psychology. First, the discipline of psychology has traditionally defined its subject matter in ahistorical terms, that is to say, as human “nature.” But as we already know, human subjectivity is not a thing-like object; it is historically and locally configured. Critical studies’ interest in the historicity of human subjectivity and its conceptions therefore should have a legitimate place in the discipline of psychology. Second, the historicization of human subjectivity forces the discipline to reexamine, and eventually historicize, its ahistorical investigative practices. And as Danziger comments, this might help the discipline of psychology to finally realize that “psychology’s investigative practices are historically contingent products reflecting a limited set of knowledge interests” (p. 480) and break up its “methodological gridlock,” its obsession with quantifying methodology. Third, the discipline of psychology was given high hopes at its birth, but has failed to participate in the major currents of intellectual discourse in the 20th century. By gathering historical depth in theoretical discussions, Danziger expects a change in the social contribution of psychology.

On the basis of the arguments reviewed above, we can assert that the history of psychology that has been taken for granted by the majority of Taiwanese psychologists is itself quite problematic. This historical narrative, that psychology “originated in Europe but became great in the United States,” presupposes that history progresses in a linear fashion as if history is a homogeneous temporal-spatial duration. Instead we can
propose that it was actually an oversimplified historical narrative constructed by elite psychologists not only to defend the problematic scientific status of psychology, but also to place their specific disciplinary agenda at the center of psychology. While this historical narrative did provide American psychologists with a sense of identity and worth, it also came at a price; it privileged a certain trend of psychology (the experimental tradition) and its practice as the “hardcore” of psychology, and marginalized or ignored other trends of psychology and other systems of psychology. For example, in almost all psychology textbooks, psychoanalysis is dealt with in the “past tense” as if it were irrelevant in the contemporary context, which we know is far from an accurate depiction. Other trends which do not share the same perspective or philosophical ground with the mainstream, such as phenomenological psychology, are hardly mentioned in this grand narrative.

As for psychology in other places in the world, Brock (2006) summarizes the rules of inclusion/exclusion rather nicely:

Rule #1: If your work did not have a major impact on American psychology, however influential it might have been elsewhere, it does not count.

Rule #2: If your work had a major impact on American psychology, even though its influence was limited or nonexistent elsewhere, it is an important part of the history of psychology.

Rule #3: Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Oceania do not exist. (pp. 3-4)

That is to say, whether psychology from other places in the world will show up in this grand narrative really depends on its impact on mainstream American psychology. This grand narrative cannot ignore Europe, because it is considered to be the birthplace of psychology; but other systems of psychology which did not play a role in the formation of American psychology can simply be ignored and considered as nonexistent.
What is ironic is that most Taiwanese psychologists consider this historical narrative, which in principle excludes their contributions, as *the* history of psychology. But what is more bewildering is that, even those who advocate for an indigenous psychology also embrace this historical narrative almost without a doubt. It seems that the abovementioned lessons from the history of psychology have not been learned by Taiwanese psychologists; they identify with a history without knowing that they are the Others of this history, and still strive to be recognized by this very history that ignores their legitimate existence.

**From a History of Psychology to *the* History of Psychology**

Do you feel that your own people and country are somehow always positioned outside the mainstream? Have you ever felt that the moment you said the word ‘I’, that ‘I’ was someone else, not you? That in some obscure way, you were not the subject of your own sentence? Do you ever feel that whenever you speak, you have already in some sense been spoken for? Or that when you hear others speaking, that you are only ever going to be the object of their speech? Do you sense that those speaking would never think of trying to find out how things seem to you, from where you are? That you live in a world of others, a world that *exists for others*? (R. Young, 2003, p. 1)

This misrecognition of the historical narrative constructed by mainstream American psychologists as *the* history of psychology has to be first explicated historically in a global context. If we look back to the early phase of the discipline of psychology at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, not only was psychology practiced in many nations (for example, Wundt’s lab experiments in Leipzig, Charcot’s psychopathology research in Paris, Galton’s psychometric studies in London), it was also heading toward divergence rather than convergence. There were frequent international exchanges but at the same time the discipline exhibited a “profound localism” (Danziger,
In other words, in its early phase the discipline of psychology in the Euro-American world was a polycentric practice in which psychology showed a different “flavor” in different localities and none of these “flavors” was easily transplantable.

As for the development of the discipline of psychology in Asia, according to Turtle (1989), modern psychology appeared in Asia very early on in history, and its advent and development coincided with the decline of the old colonial regime in Asia. However, due to linguistic barriers, economic poverty, and mostly, the difference between modern psychology and the local social-cultural matrices, the development of the discipline in Asian countries had been rather difficult and stayed in a kind of apprenticeship to European and American psychology for decades. According to Turtle’s (1989) observation, it was not until the 1970s that psychology in Asia overall showed more signs of maturity.

The eruption of World War II changed everything. Since Europe was one of the main battlegrounds, many European cities and academic institutions were either wrecked or threatened by ground battles or airstrikes. Financing the war put a heavy burden on governmental budgets. Most war-unrelated academic activities, including that of psychology, were either forced to stop completely or survive in a rather resourceless condition. Thing were not better in Asia. Those countries which had psychological institutions established before World War II such as China, India, and Japan all took part in the Pacific War, either voluntarily or involuntarily. The development of psychology in these countries was seriously hindered by the war, if not completely stopped by it (Blowers, 2006; Turtle, 1989). On the other hand, the United States was barely touched

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16 India established its first psychological institution in 1916, China in 1920, and Japan established its first psychology lab in 1903.
by the war and it benefited greatly from being the supplier of war necessities. Therefore, neither the institutions nor the academic activities of American psychology were threatened by the war; on the contrary, American psychologists’ active participation in wartime affairs and especially the psychology community’s affiliation with the military establishment actually broadened the base of psychology’s social support and helped change psychologists’ role in American society from a more academic role to a more socially involved role (Evans, Sexton, & Cadwallader, 1992). Overall, American psychology became more active and powerful than ever during and after World War II.

In comparison to its pre-war condition, postwar psychology was a completely different scene. American psychologists had demonstrated to the government and to the general public that their expertise could be of great use during the war, and they were determined to market their expertise more widely with the help of the newly reformed and more activist-oriented American Psychological Association (Evans et al., 1992). As Pickren and others (Buchanan, 2003; Pickren, 2005, 2007) point out, World War II and the changed conditions of postwar American life resulted in rapid expansion in every area of psychology, and created the need for a great number of professional psychologists. American psychology was no longer the dubious science that had to defend itself, but had become a rapidly expanding industry.

As American psychology became stronger than ever, the once active European psychology went into postwar depression and Asian psychology’s way toward maturity was still seriously hindered by postwar regional unrest. Overall, there was no psychology in any other nation that had the scale, funding, and social support comparable to that of American psychology. Under such conditions of uneven development,
European psychology soon became the importer of, or “colonized” by American psychology despite the rich local traditions that developed in various nations before the war (van Strien, 1997). In the case of Asia, psychology began to show a much stronger presence in Asian countries as part of American influence. With American support, many countries started to establish psychology departments or institutions, and those which already had psychological institutions shifted their allegiance from European psychology to American psychology (Turtle, 1989). The United States became the major exporter of psychology and psychological education after World War II. Therefore, in its postwar development, psychology also became profoundly Americanized. As a result, these postwar changes created “a pattern of international exchange of psychological knowledge” in which the exchange of knowledge was essentially asymmetrical: from the center (the United States) to peripheries (non-US nations), and rarely the other way around (Danziger, 2006). In this center-periphery scheme, American psychology could basically ignore other psychologies and make universal knowledge-claims without hesitation while other psychologies could not afford to ignore American psychology without the status of their knowledge-claims being questioned. The center-periphery scheme profoundly shaped the global landscape of psychology after World War II, and in many ways it is still the dominating structure within psychology, probably less effectively so in Europe or other places where they have found ways to enrich psychology with their own traditions.

In the Taiwanese context, the history is even more complicated than the global context just described. Although it is commonly believed that the establishment of the Psychology Department of NTU in 1949 marked the beginning of modern psychology in
Taiwan, this story of origin actually covered up the historical fact that modern psychology made its first appearance in Taiwan during the period of Japanese colonial rule. The Institute of Psychology specializing in the study of Taiwanese aborigines was established at Taihoku Imperial University in 1928 as one of the Japanese Empire’s Southeast Asian research bases. However, after World War II, all the faculty members and students of the Institute of Psychology left Taiwan and went back to Japan. It is not clear whether they were forced to leave or left voluntarily. But in terms of the nature of the Institute’s psychological practice, there seemed to be no reason for them to stay after the war since most of the Institute’s activities involved the assistance of the Japanese colonial government’s administration of the Taiwanese aborigines, which was hardly one of the urgent administrative concerns of the new government.

The reemergence of psychology in Taiwan after World War II was actually based on the legacy left by psychological practice during colonial rule. The legacy was not in the form of teaching or training, but in the form of material resources (research papers, books, and experimental instruments) left by the Institute of Psychology. These material resources were accidentally discovered by Thome H. Fang, then chair of the Department of Philosophy, and he assigned Xiang-Yu Su, a faculty member of the Department of Philosophy who had three years of psychological training at Tokyo Imperial University, to take charge of establishing a new psychology department. The Department of Psychology was eventually established in 1949, and the department’s

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17 Taihoku Imperial University was founded in 1928 by the Japanese colonial government in Taiwan, and it was the second Imperial University founded overseas in Japanese colonies (the first one being Keijo Imperial University founded in 1924 in Korea). The founding of these two overseas Imperial Universities was part of the strategic deployment in the Japanese Empire’s expansion plan: Keijo Imperial University served as the academic base for the Northern Advancement Policy in which China was targeted, and Taihoku Imperial University served as the academic base for the Southern Advancement Policy in which Southeast Asia was targeted. After World War II, Taihoku Imperial University was reformed and renamed National Taiwan University by the government of the Republic of China in 1945.
mission was to develop psychology as a theoretical and practical science which could help facilitate the well-being of people and make positive contributions to society (Chuang et al., 1999). Therefore, if the establishment of the Department of Psychology at NTU in 1949 is to be considered a significant event, the real significance was that it marked the transition of the disciplinary practice of psychology in Taiwan; the nature of the psychological practice in Taiwan had changed from a colonial science in the service of the Japanese Empire’s Southern Advancement Policy (Yeh, 2010), to a normative science expected to contribute to the welfare of a troubled nation (Chuang et al., 1999).

The above history shows that the history of Taiwanese psychology actually consists of two earlier histories. One belongs to Japanese psychology in the colonial context in which studies of folk psychology were conducted with Taiwanese aborigines so that they could be properly managed (Wu, 2007). The other one belongs to Chinese psychology which adopted the discipline of psychology as part of the “package deal” of Western modernity, and whose development in mainland China had been seriously interrupted by seemingly endless wars (Blowers, 2006). These two histories briefly overlapped in Taiwan after World War II and were the forces that gave birth to a new history of psychology impregnated in a different geopolitical context. At this new historical stage, the main factor that shaped Taiwanese psychology’s development was the “American factor”: by ways of financial support, book donations to university libraries, and scholarships/fellowships offered, the United States quickly changed the postwar landscape of psychology in Taiwan.

The faculty members in the Department of Psychology at NTU were first generation Chinese psychologists who were mostly educated in Japan in the tradition of
German psychology. One of them, Fa-Yu Chen, continued the study of Taiwanese aborigines for a short while in the direction of the research done by the Institute of Psychology in the colonial period (F.-Y. Chen, 1952a, 1952b; Cheng, Chen, Rin, & Chang, 1958). When they started their teaching careers in Taiwan, these first generation Chinese psychologists were confronted with a different landscape of psychology in which Germany psychology had declined and American psychology had become overwhelmingly hegemonic. They were forced to teach and research in the unfamiliar tradition of American psychology which seemed at the time to be the only model for psychology. Even though some of them might have expected to go back to China, the Chinese civil War between the Kuomintang (KMT; also referred to as the Chinese Nationalist Party) and the Communist Party of China (CPC) prevented such a return. Instead the KMT and more than a million Chinese people retreated to Taiwan and reestablished the government of the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan, while the CPC took control of mainland China, formed a new government, and declared the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PROC) in 1949. These Chinese psychologists eventually stayed and continued their professional careers in Taiwan. The turbulent China in which their profession began was a world away\(^{18}\) and they no longer belonged to the history of Chinese psychology after 1949. Instead, in a geopolitically anti-communist and pro-American Taiwan, they became pioneering figures in the postwar history of Taiwanese psychology.

\(^{18}\) After the retreat in 1949, the KMT government strictly prohibited any form of communication between Taiwan and China out of fear of communist infiltration. Any communication between Taiwan and China had to be done cautiously and indirectly (mostly through Hong-Kong) otherwise one was at risk of breaking the martial law declared in 1949. The Taiwanese government eventually lifted martial law in 1987 and allowed the Taiwanese to visit China in 1988; however, nearly forty years of separation and the never ending negative propaganda against each other during this time had created an overall sense of deep mistrust between the Taiwanese people and the people of China.
In terms of professional development, the next generation of Taiwanese psychologists was luckier than the first generation Chinese psychologists whose professional careers were seriously hindered by war. This next generation was able to pursue their professional careers in a relatively stable environment sustained by the coercion of the KMT government. Most of early students who graduated from the Department of Psychology at NTU pursued diverse career paths, but some outstanding alumni were hired by the department as lecturers to share the teaching load of faculty members. These young lecturers were teaching newly published American textbooks that they themselves were learning at the same time (Chuang et al., 1999). After several years of teaching, these eager young lecturers were encouraged by the department to go overseas to the United States for graduate studies with scholarships offered by the United States or the Taiwanese government, and they later became the first generation of postwar American-trained Taiwanese psychologists. The three venerable professors invited to be the keynote speakers of TPA’s 48th annual meeting were the first among them. Because their years of self-learning and graduate education were all in the tradition of American psychology, when they returned to teach in the department, they passionately pushed for curriculum reform based on the American model. The reform of the curriculum further Americanized the disciplinary training and practice of Taiwanese psychology. With the extensive use of American textbooks, the historical narrative constructed by mainstream American psychologists became the first historical perspective of the students of psychology in Taiwan.

Due to the relatively small academic publishing market, both Taiwanese psychologists and publishers were discouraged to publish textbooks authored by
Taiwanese psychologists. Even if they did publish such work, it was soon replaced by American textbooks which updated relevant materials with amazing speed. In such a difficult publishing environment, one could hardly expect Taiwanese psychologists to formulate their own historical perspectives through the gradual process of authoring psychology textbooks. Therefore, psychology students in Taiwan mainly acquired their perspective on the history of psychology through textbooks authored by mainstream American psychologists, translated or not. Furthermore, since the textbooks used in many different courses were not that different in terms of their historical perspectives, the same historical narrative was repeated in different courses and thus essentially acquired the status of common knowledge among Taiwanese psychology students. And lastly, since the historical narrative constructed by mainstream American psychologists presupposed a presentist stance that history progresses in a linear fashion, the historical past was summoned to justify the status quo and to guarantee the future of that status quo.

Therefore, Taiwanese psychologists and their students who were “brainwashed” by this historical narrative did not find it necessary to investigate the historical past. They were more inclined to spent time catching up with “current developments” or “groundbreaking discoveries” in American psychology. Consequently, they remained quite ignorant of other non-mainstream historical perspectives, and the debates over the historiography of psychology never seemed to enter their intellectual horizons. Without the challenge from other historical perspectives or from critical reflection on the power-knowledge relations involved in the construction of textbook histories, the American-centered history eventually became the history of psychology for Taiwanese psychologists and their students. By being exposed to this historical narrative over and
over again, they became deeply convinced that mainstream American psychology represented the present and future of psychology, and that therefore it was the psychology on which Taiwanese psychology should be modeled.

A History Misidentified and Misappropriated

We must at present do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons, Indians in blood and color, but English in tastes, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect. To that class we may leave it to refine the vernacular dialects of the country, to enrich those dialects with terms of science borrowed from the Western nomenclature, and to render them by degrees fit vehicles for conveying knowledge to the great mass of the population. (By Thomas Babington Macaulay in "Minutes on Indian Education," as cited in Spivak, 1999, p. 268)

When people tell personal stories about themselves, they are not simply describing a past that is fixed and gone but re-membering their past in the narrative they tell. Some events in their lives are emphasized, and some are ignored; they can tell upbeat stories about themselves, or they can tell depressing ones. Therefore, the stories they tell about themselves are not simply about their past; these stories also reflect how they conceive of their present and imagine their futures. Analogously, the historical narrative constructed by mainstream American psychologists is not simply a description of the historical facts, but a selective re-membering of the past which reflects how the present of psychology is conceived of, how the future is imagined, how changes are evaluated, and so on. That is to say, this particular historical narrative reflects mainstream American psychologists’ historical conception of the discipline of psychology; it is essentially a temporal framework employed to determine the relative positioning of different trends of psychological knowledge, and evaluations of these
different trends are already implied in the act of determining their relative positioning (which trends should be placed at the core? Which trends should be seen as belonging to the past? Which trends should be seen as belonging to the future?).

For example, the thinking and practice of psychoanalysis are very much alive in many parts of the world. Psychoanalysis continues to exist not only as a therapeutic practice, but it has already had a great deal of influence in many areas in the human sciences such as literature studies and cultural studies. Even the “hardcore sciences” such as neuroscience are reevaluating psychoanalytic theories in light of the new discoveries in the field (Mancia, 2006). However, many Taiwanese psychologists tend to talk about psychoanalysis as if it belongs to the unscientific past of psychology, and this prejudiced attitude toward psychoanalysis is likely due to the historical narrative they have learned which positions psychoanalysis as one of the three now surpassed early schools in the history of psychology. Similarly, the paradigm shifts that occurred in the American context (for example, the fall of behaviorism and the rise of cognitive psychology) or the rise of certain psychological trends in the United States (for example, the recent rise of neuropsychology and the extensive use of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in studying psychological functioning in terms of brain activities) are often taken out of the context by Taiwanese psychologists as universal trends with which Taiwanese psychology should try to keep up.

Taiwanese psychology’s misrecognition of the historical narrative constructed by mainstream American psychologists as the history of psychology has become problematic in many ways. First, as a discipline locally practiced in Taiwan, Taiwanese psychology has overall developed a paradoxical sense of historical consciousness.
Taiwanese psychologists care and know about the development of psychology in the United States, but are relatively indifferent to, and ignorant of, the historical and present development of psychology in Taiwan. And one can even say that Taiwanese psychologists to a great extent identify with the history of mainstream American psychology as if it were their own history, and try their best to be part of this glorified history. If their research is recognized by mainstream American psychology and cited in textbooks, most Taiwanese psychologists will consider it to be a great honor because they are now “internationally” recognized. In comparison to “international” recognition, whether their research is locally relevant or not is a relatively minor concern to them.

Second, since almost all the significant events and theoretical innovations in the history of psychology took place in the United States, rather than locally in Taiwan, the local practice of psychology in Taiwan appears to be less significant and less advanced in comparison to the practice of psychology in the United States. For many Taiwanese psychologists, the sheer quantity and diversity of psychological publications in the United States is convincing enough evidence of the significance and advancement of American psychology. This implicit presupposition of the significance and advancement of American psychology automatically places Taiwanese psychology in a marginalized and inferior position. It therefore becomes “self-evident” to Taiwanese psychologists that the main task of Taiwanese psychology is to “catch up” with the development of American psychology. As a result, psychological practice in Taiwan has been mostly driven by a kind of inferiority complex originating in an implicit reference to mainstream American psychology, rather than by the reflexive relation between the disciplinary practice of psychology and the psychological life of the local community. And as
Richards (1987) says, this reflexive relation is crucially important to the relevance and worth of the disciplinary practice of psychology with regard to the concerns of the local community to which it belongs:

Psychology, the discipline, directly emerges out of ‘psychology’ the subject matter. The success of a psychological theory might well be determined by such factors as whether people ‘see themselves’ in it, whether the view of life contained in it corresponds to everyone else’s less articulated feelings and perceptions, whether, in short, it meets the needs which people at the time wish psychological theories to meet. (pp. 205-206)

However, in the case of Taiwanese psychology, the reflexive relation between the disciplinary practice and the psychological life of the local community has been greatly disturbed by Taiwanese psychology’s envious relation with American psychology. As a result, rather than being a reflexive practice integral to the psychological life of its local community, the practice of psychology in Taiwan has instead become estranged from its local community.

Taiwanese psychologists’ misrecognition/misappropriation of the historical narrative constructed by mainstream American psychologists is actually part of the local consequence of the postwar American hegemony within the discipline of psychology. In the American dominated center-periphery scheme, mainstream American psychology becomes idealized in peripheral areas like Taiwan; its history becomes the history of psychology, its psychological categories become “natural” categories, and its values and knowledge criteria become the universal standards that psychology in peripheral areas should follow.

Unlike the human child’s identification with the gestalt image of the “ideal-I” discussed in Lacan’s (2006) article on the mirror stage in which the child’s playful
experience with his own image in the reflected environment helps to establish a
relationship between the child and its environment, identification with this idealized
mainstream American psychology actually becomes a threat to the autonomy of
psychological practice in peripheral areas such as Taiwan. It not only offers a fictional
history which covers up the genuine historical trajectories of peripheral psychologies, but
it also disturbs the functioning of psychology as a reflexive practice and estranges
psychological practices in peripheral areas from their local community. It is only by
critically historicizing the history of psychology that we are able to see how this history
has been misrecognized and misappropriated by psychologists at the margins, and how
the identification with the idealized mainstream American psychology has led
psychologists at the margins astray from the possibility of having a genuine indigenous
psychology. History does matter, and it has to be re-membered.

Yet, everything considered, the non-Western world cannot disown its
cultural self entirely, even it wants to do so. Its version of the oculus
mundi cannot be other than inauthentic and occasionally comic. In that
inauthenticity and comicality there is always another play that is
possible—there is always the possibility of a failure to live up to the
expectation of the West. The play and the failure offer a small way out
for the non-West from an otherwise totalizing situation. (Sardar et al.,
1993, p. 87)
Chapter 4

Indigenous Psychology: A History Forgotten and Remembered

The most serious blow suffered by the colonized is being removed from history and from the community....He is in no way a subject of history any more. Of course, he carries its burden, often more cruelly than others, but always as an object. (Memmi, 1957/1991)

As pointed out in chapter 2, the blinded gaze of Europe’s eye of the world involves a “perversion of reality” in which the imaginary dimension of the European psyche “fleshed out” and became dominant in Europe’s relation with Others. A similar “perversion of reality” also happened to non-European Others when they encountered the overwhelming power of the West. Non-European Others became narcissistically attached to the idealized West and thus alienated from their own traditions and even from their own histories. This identification with the idealized West is often considered to constitute progress in the modernization of non-European societies. As demonstrated in chapter 3, Taiwanese psychologists’ misrecognition and misappropriation of the history of psychology is a symptomatic aspect of their identification with the idealized mainstream American psychology.

The emergence of the indigenous psychology movement in Taiwan was initially a “wakeup call” to Taiwanese psychologists’ problematic relation to an idealized mainstream American psychology. Or in Kuo-Shu Yang’s words, it was a wakeup call to the fact that he had been thoroughly “brainwashed” by mainstream American psychology and became an “almost 100 percent Westernized psychologist” (Yang, 1997, p. 63). However, this moment of clarity was once again covered up by the history of psychology and the wakeup call to the problematic relation with idealized mainstream
American psychology was misappropriated by Yang as part of the “cultural revolution” in the history of psychology (Yang, 2005, p. 3). What Yang, as well as other indigenous psychologists, did not realize was that history was also part of the “brainwashing” and therefore should not be accepted as is but critically reexamined. That is to say, the history of psychology has to be critically historicized so as to disrupt its power to idealize mainstream American psychology. This is only the first step. In order for Taiwanese psychology to become a genuine indigenous psychology—that is, a social practice grounded in the reflexive relation with its local community rather than driven by identification with idealized mainstream American psychology—the marginalized and thus forgotten historical trajectory of Taiwanese psychology has to be re-membered by way of critical historiography.

Psychology’s Journey to the East

Psychology was first introduced to Chinese-speaking societies at the end of the 19th century. Sciences and technologies from 19th century Europe had demonstrated their practical value or even “magical” power—for example, in the production of the mighty weaponry used by Western colonial powers to force the late Qing government into trading on unequal terms, or in the scientific experiments performed by Western missionaries for the general public in order to coerce them into religious conversion (Luo, 1995).

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19 The term huaren shehui 華人社會 often refers to Taiwan, Hong-Kong, and China in which the majority of the population are ethnic Chinese. Depending on whether the emphasis is on ethnicity or on language, it is either translated as “ethnic-Chinese societies” or as “Chinese-speaking societies.” With its emphasis on the shared linguistic heritage, “Chinese-speaking societies,” is the preferred translation for the following reasons: first, the adaptation of psychology to the Chinese-speaking world is essentially a “translingual practice” (Liu, 1995) in which language is the very battleground of colonization and as well as of decolonization. Second, the histories of the three societies (including that of psychology) are in many ways related, if not entangled; decolonization will therefore be most effective as a joint effort of the three. Acknowledging the shared linguistic heritage is the first step toward such an effort.
1996)—as the desirable “Western technological knowledge” (yiji 夷技) that Chinese people had to acquire so as to defend themselves against colonial ambitions. Psychology, in contrast, had never in any way “proven” itself to be useful or even necessary at all when it was first introduced to this part of the world. In fact, psychology was such a foreign form of knowledge that the early translators of psychology texts had to choose Chinese characters not previously conjoined just to translate the basic terms such as “mind” and “psychology” into Chinese, not to mention the difficulties involved in translating other major conceptual building blocks of which the edifice of psychology is composed (Blowers, 2006; Kao, 2009).

Psychology has come a long way in Taiwan and other Chinese societies since its introduction to the Chinese-speaking world. Psychology seems to have successfully established itself as a respected science in which the authority of psychological knowledge is prescribed, and more recently as a licensed clinical profession in Taiwan to which the responsibility for treating mentally-disturbed patients is entrusted. There is no doubt that psychology has already gained a foothold and will continue to flourish in Taiwan and other Chinese-speaking societies. And indeed, most psychologists consider psychology’s current establishment and its continuous development in Chinese-speaking societies a story of progress, as psychology’s successful “journey to the East,” so to speak.

However, the apparent success of psychology in Chinese-speaking societies should not prevent us from probing important but often ignored questions. The most puzzling one among them regarding the introduction of psychology to the Chinese-speaking world is the question regarding “why.” As evinced by the difficulties
encountered by the early translators of psychology texts, there seemed to be a huge cultural-linguistic barrier that needed to be overcome. Furthermore, the early translators, such as Yan Yongjing and Wang Guowei, must have been aware that psychology was a rather young science compared to the longstanding Chinese intellectual tradition of the study of the heart (xin 心) in which traditional Chinese intellectuals (shiren 士人) used to take much pride. Why was psychology introduced in the first place? This question opens up a whole range of other questions regarding the historical conditions of the introduction of psychology to the Chinese-speaking world.

“Psychology” in Western sense of the term was introduced to the Chinese-speaking world in the context of missionary activities in coastal Chinese cities. The neologism “xinlingxue 心靈學” (mind-spirit study) was coined by Yan Yongjing (1838-1898) as the corresponding Chinese term for “psychology” in his translation of American clergyman Joseph Haven’s *Mental Philosophy: Including the Intellect, Sensibilities, and Will* (1859). Yan was educated in a Christian school at Shanghai and later went to the United States for higher education in the 1850s. Haven’s *Mental Philosophy* was used extensively as a school textbook during this time, and Yan found Haven’s approach to mental philosophy (or psychology) essential to the understanding of human nature (Kao, 2009). Yan returned to China in 1862, a year after he graduated with honors from Kenyon College in Ohio, and went back to Shanghai to help found St. John’s College in 1879 in which he served as the dean and was a lecturer in several courses. Yan decided to translate Haven’s *Mental Philosophy* as a textbook for the philosophy course he taught. However, as a translator, Yan found himself in a difficult
position and was compelled to invent neologisms so as to introduce the ideas of psychology to the Chinese-speaking world.

The Chinese character *xin* 心 (heart) was originally a pictographic representation of the heart which in the Chinese intellectual tradition refers to the master (*zhu* 主) of the five essential organs (*wuzang* 五臟) of the human body. Heart as an “organ” in this context should not be taken in the Western anatomical sense. It is a functional center essential to human existence. The body-mind dichotomy does not really apply here. *Xin* not only refers to the visible organ located in the chest, it also refers to the *invisible* psychological or spiritual functions attributed to it. The study of *xin* (heart) is, therefore, not only a matter of medicine, but also a matter of moral-spiritual cultivation (*xiuyang* 修養) in the Chinese intellectual tradition. Yan’s translation did introduce a new science of the mind to the Chinese-speaking world, but the introduction of this new science was neither to break away from nor to replace the longstanding Chinese intellectual tradition of the study of *xin* (heart). As Blowers (2006) points out, the introduction of psychology, like many other Western texts translated at the time, was seen as “an aid to moral guidance” (p. 96) which at the time was part of Chinese intellectuals’ strategic use of Western knowledge (*xixue* 西學) to enhance “self-strengthening” (*ziqiang* 自強). Yan’s decision to coin “psychology” as *xinlingxue* 心靈學 was probably an attempt to bridge the Christian religious/spiritual (*ling* 灵) tradition with the Chinese tradition of the study of *xin* (heart).

The idea of “self-strengthening” through the strategic use of Western knowledge was not merely an individualistic attempt on the part of Chinese intellectuals. In fact, it became a policy of the Qing government after the humiliating defeat of the Second
Opium War (1856-1860) by the British Empire and the Second French Empire. The Self-Strengthening Movement (ziqiang yundong 自強運動; 1861-1895) involved a broad range of institutional reforms which included modernizing the military, establishing a new office in charge of foreign affairs, building schools specialized in the training of scientific, technological, and diplomatic personnel, sending out young students overseas to learn Western knowledge, and building industrial and communication infrastructures. The main goal of the movement was to make China a stronger and wealthier Empire in order to defend itself against the ambitions of Western colonial powers. To a great extent, the Self-Strengthening Movement was an institutional reflection of the ti-yong 體用 principle endorsed by Chinese intellectuals at the time. The introduction of Western knowledge should be based on its utility (yong 用) and should not threaten the essence (ti 體) of the Chinese intellectual tradition (Luo, 1998).

The defeat of the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) by the Japanese Empire practically ended the Self-Strengthening Movement of the Qing government. Most Chinese intellectuals were shocked and humiliated by the fact that the Qing Empire was defeated by its recently modernized tribute state.²⁰ For Chinese intellectuals, it was an indication that the mild reform of the Qing government was a total failure. Some of them still had hope for a second reform but many were radicalized and yearned for a political revolution (Luo, 2007). Nevertheless, both the conservatives and the would-be revolutionists agreed that the Chinese intellectual tradition should no longer be seen as

²⁰ The tribute system (chaogong tixi 朝貢體系) was Imperial China’s major framework for dealing with foreign affairs. Foreign countries affirmed the authority of Imperial China by paying tribute to the Emperor, and in return the Emperor granted trading privileges to those tribute-paying countries. The tribute system was an organic part of Imperial China’s world order. However, starting from the end of the 18th century, the Imperial China’s world order was gradually eroded by the expansion of European power into the Asia-Pacific region. The humiliating defeat of the First Sino-Japanese War marked the historical transition of regional power from China to Japan.
the essence of Chinese civilization but rather as the representation of the old China that needed to be radically revamped.

It was in this radical sentiment that “the West” became no longer a mere geographical term but a *psychological* category. Chinese intellectuals started to idealize the West (*zunxi* 尊西) and pushed for a more radical educational reform which prioritized the learning and teaching of Western knowledge. The establishment of the Imperial University of Peking in 1898 was the first of such reforms. The Qing government eventually decided to abolish the imperial examination (*kejü* 科举) in 1905, which put an end to the traditional scholar-official (*shidaifu* 士大夫) system. And since the imperial examination had been the backbone of the traditional Chinese educational system for more than a thousand years, the abolishment of it was an official announcement from the government that the Chinese intellectual tradition would no longer be prioritized and institutionally supported. Without institutional support, the Chinese intellectual tradition was soon marginalized and eventually became the subject of sinology (*hanxue* 漢學 or *guoxue* 國學)—a specialized area of study within the new disciplinary order of Western knowledge—rather than a living tradition. As prominent Chinese historian Ying-Shih Yu (1991) points out, in the years between 1905 and 1911, the idea that Western knowledge represents the universal truth was already deeply rooted in the mind of Chinese intellectuals.

The second phase of the development of psychology in China started in this period when Western knowledge became idealized as universal truth and institutionally supported by the Qing government. Since Japan was then regarded by Chinese intellectuals as the successful Asian model of modernization, Japanese texts and systems
quickly became the “shortcut” for Chinese intellectuals to acquire Western knowledge due to its use of the *kanji* (Chinese character) system. In order to quickly train a new generation of intellectuals who could serve as seeded teachers of Western knowledge, the Qing government decided to set up teacher training institutes based on the Japanese model in which psychological courses were offered as part of the curriculum. As Blowers (2006) and Kao (2009) point out, psychology at this time was strongly influenced by Japanese psychology (whose major influence at the time was European psychology) due to the extensive use of textbooks translated from Japanese. In 1907, Harold Høffding’s *Outline of Psychology* was translated into Chinese by Wang Guowei (1877-1927), a prominent scholar of both Chinese and Western knowledge in the early 20th century. Wang was one of the early overseas students who went to Japan in pursuit of modern Western knowledge, and it is likely that his translation of the term “psychology” as *xinlixue* (heart-principles-study) was a direct adaptation of the Japanese *kanji* translation. *Xinlixue*, instead of the earlier translation *xinlingxue* (heart-spirit study), later became the standard translation of the term “psychology” in the Chinese language.

The change of translation from *xinlingxue* to *xinlixue* was therefore a historical event which involved more than a change in words: it marked the early institutionalization of psychology in Chinese-speaking societies and the historical transition of psychology’s status from a complementary Western knowledge to a science taken as universal truth. In other words, it marked the birth of Western knowledge’s domination in the study of *xin* (heart). As Liu (1995) reminds us, translation is a translational practice that is never natural or neutral. Translation is *practical* and
**political.** It happens all the time due to practical purposes or needs, and consequentially one always has to ask oneself “in whose terms, for which linguistic constituency, and in the name of what kinds of knowledge or intellectual authority does one perform acts of translation between cultures?” (p. 1) In the context of psychology, the hypothetical equivalence between “xin” and “mind” was conventionalized, or in Liu’s term “thrown together” (p. 12), under the historical condition in which Western knowledge became the authoritative voice in determining the signification of the Chinese character *xin*. In other words, *xin/mind* became the _super-sign_. As Liu (2004) explains,

> What is a super-sign? Properly speaking, a super-sign is not a word but a _hetero-cultural signifying chain_ that crisscrosses the semantic fields of two or more languages simultaneously and makes an impact on the meaning of recognizable verbal units, whether they be indigenous words, loanwords, or any other discrete verbal phenomena that linguists can identify within particular languages or among them. The super-sign emerges out of the interstices of existing languages across the abyss of phonetic and ideographic differences. As a hetero-cultural signifying chain, it always requires more than one linguistic system to complete the process of signification for any given verbal phenomenon. The super-sign can thus be figured as a manner of _metonymical_ thinking that induces, compels, and orders the migration and dispersion of prior signs across different languages and different semiotic media. For that reason, it offers ample insight into the workings of _intellectual catachresis_. (p. 13, italics added)

Since *xinlixue/psychology* spoke the universal truth about *xin/mind*, the traditional study of *xin* (heart) became, in Foucault’s words, a form of “naïve knowledge” which is “located low down the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity” (Foucault, 1980b, p. 82). And as a result, the introduction/translation of psychology created a Chinese-speaking psychology that knows much about the mind but is quite ignorant of *xin* (heart).
The third phase of the development of psychology in China happened after the establishment of the Republic of China in 1912. First, the Japanese influence on Chinese psychology almost ceased to exist. As Blowers (2006) points out, Japanese influence on Chinese psychology started to wane at the beginning of the 20th century, and instead the United States became more influential in Chinese education through establishing new universities (by Protestant missionaries) and providing financial aid to encourage Chinese students to study in American. However, the eventual cessation of Japanese influence was a result of the Japanese Empire’s growing ambition to occupy Chinese territory. The Western powers’ decision to transfer the concessions of the Shandong province from Germany to Japan in the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 sparked widespread student protests in China and anti-Japanese sentiment among the general public. Japan was no longer invested psychologically by Chinese intellectuals as a role model of modernization, but as an aggressive and ambitious enemy of the nation.

Second, the discipline of psychology became further institutionalized. Starting in the 1920s, more psychology departments were established in prestigious universities such as Nanking Higher Normal College (1920), Peking Normal University (1920), the National Peking University (1926), Qinghua University (1926), Yenching University (1927), and Fujen University (1929). Even though most of these newly established psychology departments still emphasized education, as Blowers (2006) points out, with the returning of more American-trained psychologists, gradually there was more emphasis on the American model of empirical research and professional training. Psychologists at this time were also actively involved in creating journals and popular magazines. These platforms served several functions. They were a forum for
psychologists to share their thoughts, an educational platform to popularize psychological knowledge, and a portal to the new developments of psychology in the United States and other nations. As Blowers (2006) and Kao (2009) point out, Chinese psychology at this time was clearly modeling itself on mainstream American psychology and gradually shifting away from its early Japanese/European influence.

Third, the further institutionalization and professionalization of psychology resulted in a more rigorous disciplinary boundary. Gradually, only those who were professionally trained in the discipline of psychology had a say about human psychology, and those who did not have that training were disqualified from speaking. As Zhong (2008) points out, many eminent Chinese scholars such as Cai Yuanpei (1868-1940), Liang Qichao (1873-1929), Wang Guowei (1977-1927), and Zhu Guangqian (1897-1986) were originally quite interested in the development of psychology in China and they were also active in the early years of psychology in China. However, as psychology became more institutionalized and professionalized, they gradually ceased to speak in psychology. It was not that they stopped being interested in psychological affairs; rather, they became keenly aware that they no longer had the “right” to talk about psychology. The exclusion of nonprofessional psychologists did help early Chinese psychologists to form a consensus group. However, it became detrimental to the development of the young science of Chinese psychology in the long run—Chinese psychology became fixated in an essentially historical and cultural disciplinary boundary imposed by or modeled on mainstream American psychology. This disciplinary boundary became the ultimate reference of what should be included in or excluded from the disciplinary practice of
psychology. The implied cultural and historical assumptions in this process were never critically examined.

Last but not least, the psychological practice of Chinese psychologists at this time had created a Chinese-speaking psychology in “American terms,” so to speak. As Blowers and others (Blowers, 2006; Blowers, Tat Cheung, & Han, 2009) point out, there were not many empirical studies done during this time, and Chinese psychologists were mostly involved in the introduction of, or commenting on, Western psychologies of which mainstream American psychology was a major part. That is to say, Chinese psychologists’ discursive practice at the time mostly involved the translation of psychological categories, theories, methods, and history of mainstream American psychology into Chinese. Consequentially, their collective efforts had created a Chinese-speaking psychology which was essentially a system of super-signs utilized to guide discursive and non-discursive psychological practices, and it had the authoritative power to name local psychological phenomena in a way that corresponded to the psychological categories or theories of mainstream American psychology. Thus, the relation between the discipline of Chinese psychology and the psychological life of the local community was, and in many ways still is, radically different from the reflexive relation between the discipline of psychology and the psychological life of the local community in the Euro-American context (Richards, 1987). The significations of local psychological phenomena were not articulated on the basis of the cultural-linguistic matrix of the Chinese language (in the sense of metaphor) but metonymically imposed from the hetero-cultural signifying chain of super-signs. Thus the meaning and
structure of local psychological life always had to come from elsewhere, from the camouflaged traces of super-signs.

The 1920s and the early 1930s were probably the golden years of Chinese psychology. Starting in 1937, China was drawn into a series of wars, first the war with the Japanese Empire and later the Chinese Civil War. The development of psychology in China was serious impeded by continuous wars. Research activities were mostly forced to stop, and teaching and publishing were barely sustained. The result of the Chinese Civil War was the partition of China into two political entities—China and Taiwan, respectively—in 1949, and the history of Chinese psychology split into three different historical trajectories in China, Taiwan, and Hong-Kong.

From Sinicization to Indigenization

From a cultural-linguistic perspective, the development of psychology in Taiwan after 1949 was in many ways a continuation of Chinese psychology. It basically followed the pattern of modeling mainstream American psychology (though with a much stronger influence due to geopolitical factors), and Taiwanese psychologists continued to create an inauthentic Chinese-speaking psychology based on the metonymic relation with mainstream American psychology through the system of super-signs. Nevertheless, the relatively stable academic environment in Taiwan provided Taiwanese psychologists with an opportunity to actually practice this psychology to the extent that the inauthenticity of psychological practice started to become painfully undeniable for some Taiwanese psychologists starting in the 1970s. Their collective efforts to create a psychology which is more relevant to or more “compatible” (qihe 契合), in Kuo-Shu
Yang’s term, with the psychological life of the Taiwanese people was later called the indigenous psychology movement (*bentu xinlixue yundong* 本土心理學運動) or the indigenization movement of psychology (*xinlixue bentuhua yundong* 心理學本土化運動).

In the past few decades, the indigenous psychology movement has grown to be an undeniable phenomenon in Taiwan. Among its advocates, Kuo-Shu Yang is often seen as the “father” of the movement. Indeed, Yang has been the father figure of the movement in many ways. He has been the main theoretical architect of the movement; he was the first to conceive of the necessity of a “new psychology” and made it a personal responsibility to promote it; he was also the mentor of several generations of psychologists who later became the advocates of indigenous psychology; and his strong will and determination to carry the movement forward had been the indispensible impetus behind many crucial moments in the history of the movement. That is to say, his personal involvement and vision have greatly shaped the configuration of the movement as we know it. Yang’s personal history and his account of the movement provide important insights into the development of this approach.

Yang was born in Shandong Province, China in 1932, a year after the Mukden Incident in which the Japanese Empire revealed its ambition to invade China. His childhood and teen years were mostly spent in the turbulence of war—first in the war against Imperial Japan’s invasion, and then in the Chinese Civil War between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Communist Party of China (CPC). When he was 16, Yang’s family, along with a group of more than a million Chinese people, retreated to Taiwan with Chiang Kai-Shek’s KMT forces. KMT, with the advantage of its military

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21 The Taiwanese population was about six million at the time. Therefore, the retreat of more than a million Chinese people created much tension between the two populations.
forces, soon established an oppressive one-party regime in Taiwan under the leadership of Chiang Kai-Shek. Despite the fact that Mao Tse-Tung proclaimed the victory of CPC and the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in front of thousands in October 1949, Chiang’s KMT regime in Taiwan refused to admit KMT’s failure nor would they accept the demise of the Republic of China (ROC) that it helped found in 1912. Chiang claimed that the retreat to Taiwan was only temporary, and that the KMT forces would eventually strike back and reclaim ROC’s sovereignty over mainland China.

The administration of the United States—ROC’s former ally and strongest supporter in World War II—was not happy about how the situation had turned out. On the one hand, the Truman administration blamed Chiang and the KMT for losing mainland China and therefore refused to offer further support. On the other hand, however, the Truman administration was also hesitant to recognize the legitimacy of China’s new state because of its communist regime. Nevertheless, with the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 and the continuing unrest in Southeast Asia, the Cold War mentality quickly became the dominant structuring force in the geopolitics of Asia. The Truman administration decided, albeit reluctantly, to provide financial assistance and military support to Chiang and the KMT regime in Taiwan as part of the United States’ Cold War strategic deployment against the spread of communism in Eastern Asia.

With support from U.S. government, Chiang’s KMT regime in Taiwan declared that the ROC had not disappeared but was instead in a state of crisis owing to the unfinished Chinese Civil War. Chiang’s plan to end the civil war was to “retake China” through military action. Nonetheless, he needed time to re-equip his military forces as well as to persuade the United States to join the action, without which his ambition would
not have a chance to succeed. Taiwan, in this grand plan, played a crucial role. It could never become a “normal” society. Instead, it had to remain like a military base, or the “springboard to retake China,” as the KMT phrased it. The KMT government therefore declared that the martial law instituted in May 1949 would be indefinitely extended for the sake of national security. However, military coercion was not enough for the KMT to claim rightful sovereignty of the ROC over all of China, nor was it enough to establish the legitimacy of its regime in Taiwan.

The ROC on Taiwan needed a reasonably convincing narrative to tell its citizens and the international community; in comparison to the PRC, the ROC on Taiwan presented itself as a republic worthy of defense. The Cold War ideological rhetoric of the “free vs. communist” binary was therefore used to draw the line: the ROC on Taiwan was the “Free China,” and the PRC was the “Communist China” or “Red China”. And in this grand scheme of the battle between the “freedom camp” and the “communist camp,” Taiwan was seen as two things at once. Militarily it was seen as the “unsinkable aircraft carrier” with which to retake mainland China, and politically it was portrayed as the ideal democratic Chinese society, a “lighthouse of liberty” for all Chinese people. Just as the two inherently conflicting metaphors imply, the self-proclaimed “democratic” state of the ROC under Chiang’s KMT regime was no more than an authoritarian military state in which thousands of innocent lives were lost and human rights were greatly violated. With critical voices suppressed and political dissidents jailed or killed, Chiang’s KMT regime undoubtedly created a “stable” society in which limited democracy and some reforms were implemented. In any case, it was good enough for many people to live an
ordinary life, especially for those retreated “mainlanders” (waishengren 外省人) who had drifted for years and thus yearned for a life undisturbed by war.

The yearning for a peaceful life also seemed to be reflected in Yang’s original choice of an academic major. According to what he later revealed in a public talk, his “romantic imagination” of the poetic life in the mountains was one of the main reasons he chose to be a forestry major (Center for Teaching and Learning Development at the National Taiwan University, 2008). However, his dream of living quietly in the mountains was soon disrupted, not by the eruption of a war but by an illness. He was diagnosed with tuberculosis and was forced to take a leave of absence for a year from National Taiwan University (NTU) in his sophomore year. This sudden period of spare time, as Yang (1999a) later recalls, was a life-changing period. Due to the nature of the disease, Yang was advised to stay indoors and avoid unnecessary social contact. He took the chance to read voraciously, especially in the humanities. The readings inspired him to reconsider what he wanted to do with his life if he recovered from the disease. The secluded life of living and working in the mountains now seemed too escapist and too individualistic a dream when his fellow people were still suffering from the unrest and disorganization resulting from the weakness of their nation. Like many people who preceded him, Yang was inspired to take up the social responsibility of an intellectual. Yang identified with prior intellectuals’ passion to save Chinese people from their miseries by ways of reform. However, he figured that since, for decades, a variety of reforms had already been implemented without much success, a fundamental reform had to happen on the human level for the institutional changes to really work. After a year of thinking, Yang returned from his leave of absence determined to change his majors.
The choice of a major had become for him the choice of a lifelong career, something not only to make a living at but at the same time to take up the social responsibility of an intellectual. Yang decided to change his major to psychology because psychology, as Yang figured, was the study of the human heart (renxin  心), which is at the core of the human (ren  人) issues he wanted to tackle. At the time, the Department of Psychology at NTU was the only psychology department in Taiwan, and the general public did not really have a good sense of what psychology was about. In their naive imagination, psychology was somehow a discipline more suitable for women than for men. Yang’s decision to be a psychology major was therefore a peculiar one, unsupported by most people around him (Yang, 1997).

With the clarity of hindsight Yang (1999a) admitted that his decision to become a psychology major was also based more or less on a naive belief in what psychology should be rather than on a well-informed understanding of what psychology actually is. Nonetheless, “not knowing” somehow became the driving force for Yang in his early days of learning psychology. Yang called this period an “exploratory” stage in which he explored the territory of psychology by teaching undergraduate courses and doing research based on the findings of American mainstream psychologists. In those years, Yang gradually changed his research interests from the formation and cure of experimental neurosis in animals, to behavioral learning in rats, monkeys and children, and eventually to the study of Chinese personality and social behavior due to the awakening of his “humanistic inclination” (Yang, 1997, p. 63). It was not until after more than a decade of learning, teaching, and doing research that Yang finally felt confident that he had a good grasp of psychology. This included receiving three years
of what he considered to be “the best training in scientific psychology available anywhere in the whole world” from eminent psychologists in the Department of Psychology at the University of Illinois (Yang, 1997, p. 63). He was confident as a psychologist and became academically productive in the following years (roughly from 1969 to 1974) doing what he thought he was supposed to do—researching Chinese subjects.

To his own surprise, starting in 1974, after nearly 15 years of teaching and researching as a psychologist, he found himself gradually losing his appetite for doing psychological research and felt that his work “did not have enough relevance or make much sense” regarding the study of Chinese psychological life (Yang, 1997, p. 64). To his dismay, the profession he had dedicated himself to whole-heartedly had somehow betrayed him. After much soul searching, he realized that the cause of his disillusionment was that he, as well as his psychology colleagues, was reproducing a “highly Westernized psychology” by

uncritically [accepting] the concepts defined, [adopting] the theories developed, and [utilizing] methods (and tools) invented by American psychologists, without seriously caring whether or not those concepts, theories, and methods were sufficiently compatible with the studied local phenomena and their social-cultural contexts. (p. 64)

He therefore concluded that a “new psychology” that would “make much more sense not only to Chinese psychologists but also to Chinese people at large” was needed (p. 65).

Therefore, Yang’s dream of a genuinely indigenous Chinese (huaren 華人) psychology began as an outcome of his temporary disillusionment with practicing psychology as a lifelong career. After realizing the cause of his disillusionment, Yang was again impassioned in his profession as a psychologist. In his own words,

I convinced myself that it was my responsibility to let my fellow Chinese psychologists know that they had been doing research in a rather fruitless
way. I considered it my lifelong mission to promote and help create a better psychology in Chinese societies, which would make better sense to Chinese people and be more applicable in explaining and predicting their psychological and behavioral functioning. (Yang, 1997, p. 66)

Yang’s rationale was that since he and his colleagues were doing “highly Westernized” psychological research, the reasonable step to rectify the status quo was to Sinicize (zhongguohua 中国化) psychological research. And through collective efforts to Sinicize psychological research, a “new” and more “compatible” psychology would be created. Nonetheless, he was not confident that his idea to Sinicize psychological research would be welcomed by his colleagues in the Department of Psychology at NTU who were still strong believers in the American tradition of experimental psychology in which the universality of psychology was never challenged. He therefore decided to push the idea in a “roundabout” way by first convincing his anthropology and sociology colleagues in the Institute of Ethnology at Academia Sinica of which he was a research fellow. Two of his prestigious colleagues in the Institute, Yih-Yuen Li (anthropologist) and Chung-I Wen (sociologist), supported his idea that an academic movement of Sinicization should be promoted.

Yang then moved temporarily to Hong Kong for a year to help establish the Department of Psychology at the Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) in 1978. During his time there, he took the opportunity to promote his idea of Sinicization by organizing a discussion group with his social sciences colleagues at the CUHK. The notion of Sinicizing research in the social sciences was fervently discussed and the group members concurred with Yang on the necessity of an academic movement of Sinicization in Chinese societies. With support from both his colleagues at the CUHK and in the Institute of Ethnology at Academia Sinica, Yang finally organized an interdisciplinary
conference entitled “The Sinicization of Social and Behavioral Science Research in Chinese Societies,” which was held at Academia Sinica at Taipei in 1980. The success of the conference and the ensuing publication of an anthology in 1982 successfully publicized the notion of Sinicization in the community of social sciences in Taiwan and other Chinese societies.22

In his article written for the conference, Yang (1982) proposes for the first time how to Sinicize psychological research. He summarizes four guiding directions:

1. empirically retesting the significant research findings obtained by foreign psychologists (p. 158);
2. empirically studying important psychological phenomena that are unique among Chinese people (p. 163);
3. revising foreign-origin theories and constructing new theories that are especially compatible with Chinese behavior (p. 169); and
4. improving foreign-origin research methods (and tools) and developing new methods (and tools) that are especially applicable to the study of Chinese people (p. 176)

These guidelines do not seem to come from any particular theoretical position but rather from Yang’s personal experience in his attempt to Sinicize psychological research. Yang suggested that his fellow Taiwan psychologists follow these guidelines so as to gradually stop being dependent on, or in Yang’s words stop “being breastfed” (duannai 断奶) by, Western psychology. These four guidelines became the first set of guiding principles (rather than rigorously imposed rules) for Taiwanese psychologists to Sinicize their psychological research during the 1980s.

Taiwanese historian Daiwie Fu (1993) interprets this Sincization discourse as “a local strategy of the dominant academic group in Taiwan’s social sciences for advancing

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22 Chinese social scientists were also deeply interested in the notion of Sinicization, but they were unable to participate in the 1980 conference because of antagonistic China-Taiwan relations. As a result, a more China-based conference entitled “Modernization and Chinese Culture” was held at the CUHK in 1983 in which the notion of Sinicization was discussed in the broader context of Chinese modernization.
their own intellectual interests within the local sociohistorical contexts of the early eighties” and its adaptation of a universal language (for example, “academic dependence” or “center vs. periphery”) was “at least partly to take advantage of the popular atmosphere of local color movement\(^{23}\) [or the Taiwan localization movement]...in order to defend their own intellectual position and to upgrade their academic machinery” (p. 257). He further argues that the “partial success” of the Sinicization discourse was due to “the ‘replacement’ or ‘transference’” of position and role which used to be occupied by the more radical advocates of the Taiwanese localization movement arrested in the Meilidao Incident (美麗島事件)\(^{24}\) in 1979.

I can only “partially” agree with Fu’s interpretation, and believe that the Sinicization discourse should be understood within the larger sociohistorical context. There were two major events—namely, the United Nations’ recognition of the PRC as the only legitimate representative of China in 1971, and the United States’ decision to diplomatically recognize the PRC in 1978—which significantly threatened the legitimacy of the KMT government. Also called into question were the two indoctrinated but dearly held ideological beliefs of the Taiwanese people: first, that the ROC is the legitimate representative of China, and second, that the United States is the strongest ally

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\(^{23}\) Taiwanese historians often trace back the publicization of the local color movement (or the Taiwan localization movement) to a heated public debate concerning xiangtu wenxue (literature of local color or indigenous literature) that happened between 1977 and 1978. It was originally a literary debate among writers but it quickly became a public debate about issues related to the critiques of modernization, colonization, and American imperialism, which at the time were still taboo topics in the authoritarian regime of the KMT.

\(^{24}\) Formosa Magazine (meilidao zazhi 美麗島雜誌) was a magazine created in 1979 by political dissidents which functioned as a platform to voice their political ideas and also as an institutional base to organize oppositional forces. On December 10, 1997, the magazine’s Kaohsiung service center held a Human Rights Day celebration without the permission of the KMT government, and it evolved into a serious conflict with the police and the army which was later called the Meilidao Incident (美麗島事件). The incident later became the KMT government’s excuse to persecute political dissidents. The massive arrest was a serious setback to the democratic movement. Many local political elites were arrested and jailed. However, it was also an awakening experience for many young people, and many of them later became the new generation of political dissidents.
of the ROC. These two ideological beliefs were the cornerstones of the KMT government’s propaganda, and they were also essential to the Taiwanese people’s collective identity, both culturally and politically. On the one hand, the Taiwanese people felt deeply betrayed and demanded a continued friendship from the United States, which was partially offered by enacting the Taiwan Relations Act passed by the United States Congress in 1979. As a result, the idealized image of the United States was temporarily shattered but was soon mended, at least politically. However, culturally, some educated Taiwanese, especially the postwar generation, began to rebel against the overwhelming influence of American popular culture in which they grew up. On the other hand, more and more Taiwanese people became disillusioned with the ROC’s rightful representation of China which gradually evolved into a political crisis for the KMT government and an identity crisis for the Taiwanese people.

Culturally, the Taiwanese people became bewildered about who they really were. Some decided to seek their roots (xungen 寻根) beyond the KMT’s propaganda, and some became doubtful of their Chinese identity and started to advocate for a Taiwanese identity. “Searching for one’s identity” was therefore a major theme in the overall cultural scene at the time. Politically, the Taiwanese people also became less tolerant of the KMT government’s ideological propaganda, its civil war mentality, and eventually its authoritarian regime to contain the supposed “crisis” that resulted from the Chinese

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25 For example, in the 1970s, the “sing our own songs” slogan advocated by the Campus Folksong Movement (xiaoyuan minge yundong 校園民歌運動) was greatly echoed among the young Taiwanese.

26 For example, the masterpiece Legacy (xinchuàn 薪傳) of the now world-renowned Cloud Gate Dance Theatre of Taiwan (yunmen wuji 雲門舞集) was first performed the night when the United States government announced that it would diplomatically recognize the PRC in December 1978. Legacy’s beautiful portrait of Taiwanese ancestors’ early migration from the coastal area of China to Taiwan and the eventual settlement through collaborative hard work greatly reverberated in the Taiwanese society of the time.
Civil War. They started to challenge the KMT government and demanded a more democratic state. They also became more actively involved in public affairs, such as environmental protection issues or labor issues, which for years were rigorously monitored and controlled by the KMT government. The eruption of all these once suppressed social powers was later called the Taiwan localization movement.

Initially, the KMT government tried to contain these forces by arresting dissidents and tightening political control, which resulted in stronger opposing forces. The KMT government eventually decided to legitimate its rightful regime by sharing power with local political elites. The KMT government also realized that the crumbling political ideology was no longer sufficient to legitimate its regime and therefore created a new one during the 1980s by emphasizing the “miraculous” economic accomplishments supposedly resulting from the brilliant leadership of the KMT government. This new ideology of economic growth was later shared by the KMT’s opposing party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). In July 1987, the martial law instituted in May 1949 was lifted by Chiang Ching-Kuo, Chiang Kai-Shek’s son and political heir, and Taiwanese society started to go through a series of dramatic changes. Coming out of the political coercion of the KMT government, most Taiwanese people were happy to embrace an economic-centered ideology which seemed to guarantee a better life. With the end of the Cold War in 1991, the Taiwanese government quickly embraced the post-coldwar ideology of neoliberalism strongly advocated by the United States and thus Taiwan became more ingrained in the capitalistic world order dominated by the United States. Taiwanese society as a whole became more Americanized in the past two decades rather than the other way around.
As Fu (1993) points out, in this sociohistorical context, Sinicization discourse was indeed a continuation of the Taiwanese social sciences’ previous interdisciplinary research agenda to construct “Chinese personality.” And there is no doubt that, strategically speaking, the “Sinicization vs. Westernization” binary was trying to “play it safe” (by making psychological research more Chinese) in a political environment in which proclaiming Chinese-ness was still an imposed ideology. In this sense, Sinicization discourse was indeed a defensive strategy, but it was not an attempt by some academic elites to “advance their own intellectual interests.” Rather, it was an effort to ensure that an academic movement in the social sciences could proceed without risking being politically suppressed at a time when the KMT government felt seriously threatened by opposing forces. The massive arrests of the Meilidao Incident occurred less than a year ago before the Sinicization conference took place, and in the authoritarian regime of the KMT government, any micro-politics in the name of “movement” or “revolution” would be closely examined. Freedom of speech was not guaranteed at the time even in the academic world. And in terms of its historical effects, Sinicization discourse proved to be productive and emancipative rather than oppressive, as Fu’s (1993) interpretation might suggest.

Different academic communities in Taiwan reacted differently to Sinicization discourse. It evoked the most discussion in the sociology community, especially in the community of Taiwanese sociologists living in the United States; it was only slightly echoed in the anthropology community, and the psychology community did not respond to the notion as strongly as expected (Yang, 1993). However, during his short visit to Harvard University in 1988, Yang was shocked by a question and became keenly aware
of how urgent it was that the movement continue to develop. This is how Yang (1997) describes his “Harvard experience”:

In the discussion session after my presentation, the well-known developmental psychologist Jerome Kagan asked me the question: What kind of psychology would have been developed by Chinese psychologists if there had not been any Western psychology? I was shocked by his question and, after a moment of silence, I managed to reply that Chinese psychologists would have developed some kind of collectivistic-oriented psychology without the hegemonic influence of Western or American psychology. To be honest, I found myself, then and later, dissatisfied with my answer. I must admit that Kagan's question gave me a chance to look more closely and squarely at the naked reality that little was left in Westernized Chinese psychology after those elements that had been borrowed from, or influenced by, Western psychology were taken away. Moreover, through my exchange of ideas with the seminar participants, I began to realize that North American psychology, the most developed in the world, was an endogenous kind of indigenous psychology…in the sense that its major concepts, theories, methods, and findings have originally and spontaneously evolved partly from the European intellectual traditions but mostly from the cultural and social-philosophical matrix of the American society. (p. 69)

After coming back from his visit to the United States, Yang became more active in mobilizing the movement. He invited psychologists as well as scholars from other disciplines to meet and discuss on a regular basis; he organized a series of conferences which took place every 2-3 years, he edited and published anthologies of major conference papers; he founded a Chinese Journal in 1993 so as to create a regular publication outlet for indigenous psychological research; and he helped to establish a foundation in 1997 to provide organizational support for indigenous psychological research. Meanwhile, in the late 1980s, Yang and his colleagues decided to use a different term, “indigenization,” to replace “Sinicization” in labeling their efforts. Yang (1997) says that there were two reasons for this change. First, the term “Sinicization” seems to suggest a kind of Sinocentrism; and second, after decades of separation,
Taiwan, China, and Hong-Kong had become three uniquely different societies in which people displayed different psychological characteristics despite the fact that they, to a great extent, shared a common cultural-linguistic matrix. However, from a discursive perspective, the change of labeling was also a reaction to changes in Taiwanese society. For most Taiwanese people, the continuous progression of the Taiwan localization movement from the 1980s to the 1990s had created a drastic change with regard to collective identity. They were less psychically invested in the old Chinese identity and became more psychically invested in the new Taiwanese identity. It became clearer for most people that Taiwan did not represent “free China.” Instead, “China” became the Other nation across the Taiwan Strait which represented not only a national threat but at the same time a land of economic opportunity. As a result, “Sinicization” was no longer an appealing label for the movement. In fact, the “Chinese” connotation of the term would be a barrier for some interested Taiwanese psychologists to take part in the movement.

More importantly, the change in labeling also reflected a change in discourse. As Yang (1997) points out, during the Sinicization phase of the movement, his attempt to Sinicize psychological research did not aim to establish a “Chinese psychology” or to develop an “indigenous psychology” because at the time he still insisted that there was only one scientific psychology and that “it was not legitimate to talk about indigenous psychology within that psychology” (p. 68). Yang’s “Harvard experience” changed his view. He was shocked by the fact that after nearly a decade of Sinicizing psychological research, he could not even imagine a Chinese psychology that was not influenced by the ideas of Western psychology. And he also realized that the “one scientific psychology”
he insisted on was actually mainstream American psychology which in essence was an *indigenous* psychology rather than a *universal* psychology. Therefore, Yang (1993) proposed that the indigenous psychology movement in Taiwan should strive to indigenize already Westernized psychology so as to establish an “indigenous Chinese psychology” (*huaren bentu xinlixue* 华人本土心理学) which is “indigenously compatible” with the psychological life of the Taiwanese people. And through the collective efforts of establishing indigenous psychologies around the world, a genuine global psychology, rather than the pseudo-universal psychology proclaimed by Western psychology, could eventually be established.

In order to discern the changes involved in conceptualizing the movement from the Sinicization discourse to the indigenization discourse, Yang’s indigenization discourse has to be carefully unpacked. First, the universal character of the “one scientific psychology” represented by mainstream American psychology in the Sinicization phase was given up due to Yang’s realization of the “indigenous” character of mainstream American psychology. A genuine universal psychology therefore became a psychology in the future tense, and it had to be accomplished by the collective efforts of indigenous psychologies around the world. Yang personally never gave up the idea that psychology should be a “science” but he decided to prioritize the notion of “indigenous compatibility” (*bentu qihexing* 本土契合性) over the “scientific” demand in the indigenization discourse. Consequentially, psychologists interested in more “qualitative” kinds of psychology such as phenomenological psychology or narrative psychology were more willing to identify with or take part in the indigenous psychology movement. Nevertheless, a group of critical-minded psychologists still considered the
indigenization discourse too “conservative” and decided to part ways with the movement despite their original interest in the movement in the early 1990s.27

Second, Yang’s conceptual distinction between three psychologies—namely, indigenous psychology, Westernized psychology, and indigenized psychology—and the relations between them to a great extent reflects his conceptualization of how the indigenous psychology movement in non-Western societies should proceed. In his 2006 English paper, Yang (2006) further explicates the three psychologies. He says,

[I]ndigenous psychology [is] a discipline that applies the scientific method to the study of psychological and behavioral phenomena of people in a specific ethnic or cultural group, in such a way that the theories, concepts, methods, and tools used are highly compatible not only with the studied phenomena, but also with their ecological, economic, social, cultural, and historical contexts. (p. 299)

Yang emphasizes that for a psychology to be qualified as an “indigenous psychology,” it has to be “spontaneously, naturally, and gradually formed through an endogenous process without the intrusion and domination of a powerful alien scientific psychology” (p. 299). Therefore, only “psychologies in the Euro-American countries and the former Soviet Union are genuinely indigenous” (p. 299). Yang considers psychologies currently practiced in most non-Western societies to be “Westernized psychologies,” which in essence are a kind of “artificially transplanted psychology” (p. 299) initiated and developed under the hegemonic domination of Western indigenous psychologies. They

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27 These critical-minded psychologists were mostly from the psychology department at the Fu Jen Catholic University (輔仁大學) which was overall not genealogically connected to the Department of Psychology at NTU. They were more radical in theoretical orientation and were more actively involved in social movements. Therefore, in a community dominated by NTU alumni and psychologists trained in the tradition of mainstream American psychology, who mostly believed that psychology should be an objective and empirical science, their existence was in many ways marginalized in the Taiwanese psychology community. However, their continuous effort in practicing an alternative psychology has gradually been recognized in recent years. And their journal base Research in Applied Psychology has become a platform of interesting debates which is radically different from that in Indigenous Psychological Research in Chinese Societies, the journal base of the indigenous psychology movement.
were formed “by a process of academic Westernization through which non-Western psychologists uncritically adopt Western theories, concepts, methods, and tools in their research with local people as participants” (p. 299). Yang acknowledges that psychologists in non-Western societies did attempt to modify the concepts, theories, methods, and tools of Western indigenous psychologies in local terms. However, he considers the modifications to be “superficial,” which at best created a variation of Westernized psychology.

Yang defines “indigenized psychology” as the aim of the movement which would be accomplished by gradually transforming Westernized psychology through a process he calls “quasi-endogenous indigenization”—that is, non-Western psychologists’ efforts to consciously and purposely indigenize their research in such a way that the theories, concepts, methods, and tools created and used are sufficiently compatible with the studied local psychological and behavioral phenomena as structurally and functionally embedded in their ecological, economic, social, cultural and historical contexts. (pp. 299-300)

Yang (1993, 1999b) expands the four guidelines he proposed in the 1982 paper into a list of practical guidelines consisting of ten “Dos” and seven “Don’ts” in indigenizing psychological research (or the process of quasi-endogenous indigenization), and his

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28 Yang’s ten “Dos” consists of: (1) do tolerate ambiguous states and suspend decisions as long as possible in dealing with conceptual, theoretical, and methodological problems until something indigenous emerges in the phenomenological field; (2) do be a typical Chinese person when functioning as a researcher, and let Chinese ideas, values, and ways of thinking be fully reflected in the research process; (3) do take the studied psychological or behavioral phenomenon and its social, cultural, and historical context into careful consideration whenever conceptualizing the phenomenon and designing the study; (4) do consider the details of the studied phenomenon and its context before applying a Western concept, theory, method, or tool; (5) do give priority to the study of culturally unique psychological and behavioral phenomena or characteristics of Chinese people; (6) do begin research with a thorough immersion in the natural concrete details of the studied phenomenon and its original context; (7) do study not only the specific content of a behavioral phenomenon but also the specific psychological mechanism or process behind or underlying the behavior; (8) do base research on the Chinese intellectual tradition rather than the Western intellectual tradition; (9) do study not only traditional aspects of Chinese psychological functioning, but also the modern ones and the characteristic traditional modern combinations formed under the impact of societal modernization; and (10) do investigate the psychological functioning of the ancient Chinese and its relationship to the functioning of contemporary Chinese people. And his seven Don’ts consists of: (1)
notion of “indigenous compatibility” is at the conceptual core of these practical guidelines. In his most recent article, Yang (2012) continues to emphasize that the notion of “indigenous compatibility” should be the guiding principle of indigenous psychological research so as to facilitate the “condition of congruity” between psychological research and the studied phenomenon (p. 15). In his words,

indigenous psychological research [should] be conducted in such a way that the researcher’s theory, concepts, methods, tools, and findings sufficiently reflect, represent, and reveal the natural structure and process of the studied local psychological or behavioral phenomenon as embedded in the sociocultural context. (p. 15)

Yang’s dream of a “new psychology” eventually took shape in the indigenization discourse. It was initially a kind of asceticism in conducting research activities in the Sinicization discourse, and in the indigenization discourse it became a positive proposal of an agenda to indigenize Westernized psychology through indigenizing psychological research. The “how” of indigenizing psychological research was still in the form of practical guidelines expanded from the guidelines to Sinicize psychological research. However, these guidelines were now based on a clearly formulated notion of “indigenous compatibility” so as to facilitate the condition of congruity between psychological research and the studied phenomenon.

Decolonization through Indigenization?

don't uncritically adopt Western psychological concepts, theories, methods, and tools; (2) don't overlook Western psychologists' important relevant experiences in developing their own indigenous psychologies; (3) don't reject useful indigenous concepts, theories, methods, and tools developed by other Chinese psychologists; (4) don't adopt any cross-cultural research strategy with a Western-dominant imposed etic or pseudo-etic approach; (5) don't use concepts, variables, or units of analysis that are too broad or abstract; (6) don't consider research problems in terms of English or other foreign languages; and (7) don't politicize research.
The indigenous psychology movement was echoed by many Taiwanese psychologists in the 1990s, especially among NTU alumni since the indigenous psychology movement was very much a NTU-based academic movement. Through the collective efforts of the advocates of the movement, such as publishing papers and books, holding conferences and seminars, and engaging in dialogues with foreign psychologists as well as scholars from other disciplines, the indigenous psychology movement in Taiwan was beginning to be recognized as a significant phenomenon in psychology starting in the late 1990s, both domestically (for example, Chiu, 2004) and internationally (for example, Allwood & Berry, 2006b; Hwang, 1998). However, despite the seeming success of the movement, the indigenous psychology movement also started to show some signs of worrisome development started from the 2000s.

The indigenization discourse gradually lost its charm in inspiring the new generation of psychologists. From a critical historical perspective, the indigenous psychology movement was never a purely academic movement; it was also part of the various social movements resulting from the collective identity crisis that started in the 1970s. As I pointed out above, the Taiwanese localization movement involved disillusionment with the political ideology of the KMT government, and it resulted in the gradual separation of Taiwanese identity from Chinese identity. Similarly, the indigenous psychology movement involved temporary disillusionment with the idealized image of the United States. However, unlike political relations with the United States which soon mended, in the academic context temporary disillusionment became the window of opportunity for Taiwanese social scientists to be confronted with the dependency of their academic practice, and the Sinicization movement was their reaction.
to rectify the condition of dependency. In terms of discourse, the condition of dependency was conceptualized as a “Westernized” condition which was to be rectified by Sinicizing psychological research—that is, the individual psychologist’s ascetic effort to refrain from uncritically utilizing predigested Western psychological knowledge. The change of discourse from Sinicization to indigenization in the 1990s did not really change the conceptualization of how the Westernized condition should be rectified; the indigenization discourse continued to rely on the individual psychologist’s ascetic effort to indigenize psychological research. The major change involved in the indigenization discourse was that it proposed a new psychology—that is, an indigenously compatible psychology—as the desired object. However, with the democratic overthrow of the authoritarian regime of the KMT government in the 2000 presidential election and the following eight years of governance by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), a Taiwanese-led opposition party, terms such as “localization” and “indigenization” gradually lost their charm in inspiring movements since what these terms refer to were seen as accomplished rather than as goals worth fighting for. For the new generation of psychologists, the new “magic” terms in the post-coldwar Taiwan dominated by neoliberal ideology became “globalization” and “internationalization” rather than “indigenization” and “localization.” And as K.-H. Chen and Chien (2004) point out, terms such as “internationalization” or “globalization” to a great extent equal “Americanization” in the Taiwanese context (pp. 185-186).

As the indigenization discourse gradually lost its charm, its conceptual weakness in advancing the indigenous psychology movement started to become clear. As I tried to point out above, the Sinicization discourse was proposed during the time when the
idealized image of the United States was temporarily shattered and thus the overwhelming influence of mainstream American psychology was revealed to psychologists as a problematic dependency on “Western” psychology. As a result, the “Chinese vs. Western” binary was used in the Sinicization discourse to deal with the “relevancy” issue of psychological research. Psychological research in Taiwan became irrelevant to the psychological life of the Taiwanese people because of its dependency on Western psychology and therefore it had to be Sinicized. However, in the indigenization discourse, this “Chinese vs. Western” binary was further expanded to a “Chinese psychology vs. Western psychology” binary in which Chinese psychology became the aim in the agenda of the indigenous psychology movement. The agenda proposed by the indigenization discourse was essentially an anticolonial agenda which attempted to break free from dependence on Western psychology (Westernized psychology) by a collective effort to instate a Chinese psychology (indigenized psychology).

In Yang’s distinction of the three psychologies, the ideal psychology was indigenous psychology which was “spontaneously, naturally, and gradually formed” in a genuine indigenization process. And according to Yang (2012), this was psychology in its “pure form” (p. 7). However, this ideal psychology—that is, the one hundred percent indigenously compatible psychology—was an opportunity lost for non-Western societies since the psychologies in these societies were already a kind of Westernized psychology initiated and developed under the domination of a powerful Western psychology. The only choice left for non-Western psychologies was to pseudo-indigenize the already Westernized psychology by the ascetic efforts of psychologists so as to facilitate the “indigenous compatibility”—a notion derived from the ideal psychology represented by
indigenous Western psychology—of their research. Therefore, this anticolonial agenda did not really break free from the dependence on Western psychology. On the contrary, it was still entangled in its identification with the idealized image of Western psychology by instating an *inverse* ideal image of anOther psychology whose parameters are implicitly determined by the idealized image of Western psychology.

As I have shown in the previous two sections, psychology was introduced to the Chinese-speaking world in a colonial situation in which the West as a whole was idealized. This idealized West was represented by Europe before World War II, but in the postwar era it became represented by the United States. In the colonial situation, Western knowledge was introduced as a superior form of knowledge, and psychology was included even though its superiority was to a great extent presumed rather than proven. The further institutionalization and professionalization of psychology suppressed and marginalized traditional psychological practice (the study of *xin*) and created a Chinese-speaking psychology which in essence is a system of super-signs used to guide discursive and nondiscursive psychological practices, and whose authority comes from the metonymic relation with mainstream American psychology through the system of super-signs. Therefore, the practice of psychology in Chinese-speaking societies, Taiwan included, became an inauthentic practice in which the meaning and structure of the local psychological life were metonymically imposed rather than locally articulated. Therefore, psychology’s journey to the East was essentially a colonization of psychic space in which the “soul” (*xin*) grounded in the cultural-linguistic matrix of the Chinese language was no longer allowed to give voice to itself in psychology.
Furthermore, this inauthentic practice of psychology had an effect on the psychologists. They became problematic subjects in their practice of psychology. As Yang and Wen (1982) describe,

> The subjects whom we studied are Chinese people in Chinese society, but the theories and methods we used are mostly imported from the West or of the Western style. *In our daily life, we are Chinese; when we are doing research, we become Western people. We repress our Chinese thoughts or philosophy intentionally or unintentionally, and make them unable to be expressed in our procedure of research.* (as cited in Hwang, 2005a, p. 230, italics added)

As long as the authority of the idealized West held sway, this inauthentic practice of psychology and the split of subjectivity would not be seen as problematic. However, as I pointed out above, the idealized image of the United States was temporarily shattered in the 1970s, and as a result the inauthentic practice was seen as problematic. The indigenous psychology movement emerged in this window of opportunity. Both Sinicization discourse and indigenization discourse conceptualized the colonial situation of psychology with an anticolonial language which was once inspiring in the 1980s and 1990s when the language of oppositional politics was also used by other social movements in fighting against the authoritarian regime of the KMT government. Nevertheless, this anticolonial discourse gradually became less inspiring and started to show its conceptual limitation in effectively problematizing the colonial situation of psychology in Taiwan.
Chapter 5
Remembering the Dream: Toward a Postcolonial Critique

The indigenous psychology movement in Taiwan started as one man’s dream and eventually emerged as a collective effort of psychologists to find a way out of the overwhelming influence of mainstream American psychology so that the “soul” (xin) could be restored to the practice of psychology. However, both the Sinicization and indigenization discourses failed to provide an effective strategy for breaking free from dependence on Western psychology. On the contrary, the movement became unknowingly entrapped in the problematic imaginary relation with mainstream American psychology.

What most indigenous psychologists did not realize is that the call for an indigenous psychology actually emerged out of a traumatic encounter between two worlds in a colonial context, and colonial trauma is not something that can be simply wished away, ignored, or bypassed. As Kuan-Hsing Chen (1998), a prominent Taiwanese scholar in the field of cultural studies, keenly points out, “we are still operating within the boundary of colonial history, which has generated a whole set of… colonial cultural imaginary in which all of us are caught up” (p. 2, italics added). Therefore, to face colonial trauma involves more than setting indigenous psychological research guidelines—the “Dos” and “Don’ts” suggested by Kuo-Shu Yang in his manifesto-like Why Do We Need to Develop an Indigenous Chinese Psychology? (1993). It also involves more than enriching the epistemological and methodological complexity of indigenous psychology as suggested by Kwang-Kuo Huang (2005b), one of the most
assiduous and prolific indigenous psychologists in Taiwan. It is even *more than* using the hermeneutic phenomenological approach as a “cultural redemption” of the already-Westernized psychology, as suggested by Der-Heuy Yee (1997), the pioneer of hermeneutic phenomenological psychology in Taiwan. What they failed to notice is the depth (in relation to subjectivity) and pervasiveness (in relation to discourse) of this colonial trauma and how, on the imaginary level, it has shaped the historical trajectory of the indigenous psychology movement in Taiwan. At the center of this pathological searching for recognition, as I have demonstrated in chapter 3 and chapter 4, is a problematic *colonial subject* whose desire is determined by the *inverse idea/ideal of the West*. Ashis Nandy describes this inversion in his postcolonial masterpiece *The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism* (1983) as “the second form of colonization”:

This colonialism colonizes minds in addition to bodies and it releases forces within the colonized societies to alter their cultural priorities once for all. In the process, it helps generalize the concept of the modern West from a geographical and temporal entity to a psychological category. The West is now everywhere, within the West and outside; in structures and in minds. (p. xi)

The consequence of this inversion, this colonial trauma, is what I call the problematic colonial subject. It is *problematic* because, unlike the inversion that helps to shape the egoic gestalt as discussed in Lacan’s conception of the mirror stage (Lacan, 2006), the second form of colonialism *fragments* and *transgresses* a colonized people’s egoic gestalt, as Fanon (1952/1967), Nandy (1983), and Bhabha (1994) have pointed out. The desire of this subject is, therefore, as problematic as the subject himself or herself; it is inevitably a *hybrid* of desires in which the desire to be Western (or to be non-Western) is
at the core of the economy of desire, as Fanon (1965), Memmi (1957/1991), and Nandy (1983) have pointed out.

In an academic environment which is even more Americanized than it was in the 1970s, is there really a way out of the seemingly totalizing influence of mainstream American psychology? It seems to me that Foucault’s idea of “criticism” is a strategy worth considering, and to a great extent it helped to lay the foundation for the postcolonial critique provided by this project. Foucault’s (1980b) notion of “criticism” refers to a form of local theoretical offensive which is “an autonomous, non-centralized kind of theoretical production, one that is to say whose validity is not dependent on the approval of the established regime of thought” (p. 81). In another text, Foucault (1997) further explicates the operation of criticism as follows:

Criticism is no longer going to be practiced in the search for formal structures with universal value but, rather, as a historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying. In that sense, this criticism is not transcendental…it is genealogical in its design and archaeological in its method. Archaeological…in the sense that it…will seek to treat the instances of discourse that articulate what we think, say, and do as so many historical events. And this critique will be genealogical in the sense that…it will separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are do, or think. It is…seeking to give new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom. (p. 315)

In other words, criticism is a form of theoretical production that utilizes archaeology to historically eventualize “instances of discourse” so that the established regime of knowledge can be discerned as a result of historical contingency rather than as “natural” or as “inevitable.” And as Foucault points out, this criticism proceeds by means of “a return of knowledge” or “an insurrection of subjugated knowledges” (Foucault, 1980b, p. 81). By “subjugated knowledges” Foucault means two things. First, it refers to “the
historical contents that have been buried and disguised in a functionalist coherence or formal systemization” (p. 81), and as Foucault points out, “only the historical contents allow us to rediscover the ruptural effects of conflict and struggle that the order imposed by functionalist or systematizing thought is designed to mask” (p. 82); and second, it refers to “a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated: naïve knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificty” (p. 82).

Similarly, what I have presented in this dissertation is a postcolonial critique which does not instate anOther competing system of knowledge but attempts to provide a “way out” of the established regime of mainstream American psychology. The strategy of this postcolonial critique is to destabilize the seemingly totalizing power of mainstream American psychology by way of re-membering critical historiographies with regard to its construction Others, the presumed universality of its history, its metonymic practice in the Chinese-speaking world, and Taiwanese psychologists’ struggle with it on the imaginary level so as to reveal the power-knowledge-desire relations therein. What this project offers is a strategy to decolonize psychic space so as to open up the possibility for psychology in Taiwan to be practiced in an authentic manner—that is, as a reflexive social practice in relation to the psychological life of its local community—and so that the “soul” (xin) grounded in the cultural-linguistic matrix of the Chinese language can finally be allowed to emerge in the practice of psychology rather than be suppressed by the system of super-signs maintained by the problematic relation with idealized mainstream American psychology.
In sum, I consider this project to be part of the historical struggle of the indigenous psychology movement. What I have tried to do is to turn a critical gaze back upon the movement itself in order to decolonize it from the colonial cultural imaginary. This is a crucial step in decolonizing the psychic space of the colonized. Without it, even the most well-intended indigenous psychologist will keep falling back into the “vicious circle of colonization, decolonization, and recolonization,” as Chen (1998, p. 2) has warned.

This project has been a *historical* project in which the aim is to *remember* the history of the indigenous psychology movement in Taiwan. The term “remember” is used in two senses. The first sense is quite straightforward. I have written a history of the indigenous psychology movement in Taiwan because, in general, the history of psychology in Taiwan is rarely told. To the best of my knowledge, after all these years, there is only one book chapter by Hsu (1987) about the history of psychology in Taiwan; one journal article by Chiu (2004) about the history of social psychology in Taiwan; and one journal article by Hwang (2005a) about the emergence of Chinese indigenous psychology in Taiwan. It is as if there were a consensus among Taiwanese psychologists that psychology does not need a history in Taiwan; it is as if the magnificent, innovative, and dramatic events all happen at the center—in Europe or in the United States of America. This very fact of lacking a historical consciousness is in fact a symptom of colonization which is addressed in Chapter 3.

This brings me to the second sense of the term “remember.” Writing about the indigenous psychology movement in Taiwan has been a way of *re-membering* the historical trajectory of psychology in Taiwan. Through looking into historical
documents, formulating temporary hypotheses, and finding ways to organize the bits and pieces into a historical narrative, the historical trajectory of psychology in Taiwan eventually becomes clear. The history I have written is, therefore, not a history about progress; it is not about how psychology has helped to improve the lives of the Taiwanese people. Instead, it is a genealogical history in a Foucauldian sense.

This project has been an archaeological project which involves an analysis of the indigenous psychology movement on the discursive level. Since the analysis of discourse involves more than knowledge, it is no longer satisfactory to remain on the methodological level with regard to the discussion of indigenous psychology as most indigenous psychologists have done. That is to say, the recognition/misrecognition of indigenous psychology involves more than epistemology, more than philosophy, more than ontology; in other words, it is not only a knowledge issue but also a power issue. As I have argued, the pathology of recognition is characteristic of a colonial and oppressive culture; in this case, unfortunately, the pathology has been demonstrated to exist within the discipline of psychology. In order to bring both power and knowledge into my analysis, I followed the lineage of discourse analysis originally developed by Foucault in the Archaeology of Knowledge (1971/1972) and in Discipline and Punish (1975/1977), and by Said in Orientalism (1979), and by Bhabha in The Location of Culture (1994). The analysis of the “power-knowledge-desire relations” in which the discipline of psychology is embedded is laid out as part of a theoretical discussion in chapter 2, for it constitutes the horizon in which the indigenous psychology movement has emerged.
This portion of the theoretical work consisted of two parts. The first involved an analysis of the historical development of the discourse of “Others” that takes place at the center of psychology—that is, in mainstream American psychology. My argument has been that, in the post-World War II era, psychology has not only become part of the “psychosciences and disciplines” that help to shape the postwar Euro-American subjects (Rose, 1990, 1996); it has also played a constitutive role in shaping the postwar non-Euro-American subjects. I traced the historical formulation of the discourse of “Others” within psychology from the racial Other to the cultural Other. In the historical process of discursively positioning Others, “culture” is a new signifier of difference in place of “race.” The so-called “culture-related” psychologies that have gradually developed in the past couple of decades can be seen as the “surfaces of emergence” in which the representation of the cultural Other takes shape. The second part of the theoretical work involved an analysis of the historical development of the discourse of “the idealized West” that takes place at the margins of psychology. In this project, however, I limited myself to analyzing one case that I am most familiar with—psychology in the Chinese speaking world, especially in Taiwan.

Finally, this project has been a psychoanalytic project.29 The first sense of it being psychoanalytic is on the theoretical level. Even though psychoanalysis achieved its original success in and from the therapy room, it has never been bounded by it. Psychoanalysis has always been used as a theoretical resource for social criticism; in fact,

29 There is no doubt that psychoanalytic theory can be used either to oppress (for example, to pathologize homosexuality) or to provide rationales for oppression (for example, Mannoni (1956) rationalized oppression as a necessary dependence of the colonized). On the other hand, psychoanalytic theory can also be a powerful theoretical apparatus against oppression as many post-colonial writers have demonstrated. It seems to me that psychoanalytic theory becomes oppressive when it functions as a totalizing theory; when it functions as a criticism—findings holes in a whole, so to speak—it becomes a powerful weapon against a totalizing system.
Freud himself can be regarded as the founder of psychoanalytic social criticism. Later in his life, Freud wrote two influential essays *The Future of an Illusion* (1927) and *Civilization and Its Discontents* (1930) critical of the pathologies of religion and civilization. In the context of colonialism, Octave Mannoni’s *Prospero and Caliban: The psychology of Colonization* (1956) and Frantz Fanon’s *Black Skin, White Masks* (1952/1967) are two pioneer works concerning how the colonial situation creates its subjects—both the colonizer and the colonized. Other works have since advanced this discussion: Albert Memmi’s *The Colonizer and the Colonized* (1957/1991), Ashis Nandy’s *The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism* (1983), Homi Bhabha’s *The Location of Culture* (1994), and Kelly Oliver’s *The Colonization of Psychic Space: A Psychoanalytic Social Theory of Oppression* (2004). Oliver’s (2004) project to transform psychoanalytic concepts into social concepts by “developing a psychoanalytic theory based on a notion of the individual or psyche that is thoroughly social” (p. xiii) seems especially relevant to the colonial context in which the individual developmental schema of subjectivity has been greatly challenged. As Oliver says,

> If the psyche does not exist apart from social relationships and cultural influences, a social psychoanalytic theory is necessary not only to diagnose social phenomena but also to explain individual subject formation. We cannot explain the development of individuality or subjectivity apart from its social context. (pp. xiii-xiv)

I take Lacan’s *linguistic* formulation of Freud’s psychoanalytic theory as a powerful theoretical apparatus for social criticism. Many postcolonial authors have been using Lacanian concepts in their works. The re-conceptualization of psychoanalytic theory into a social theory as suggested by Oliver has been an interesting direction to take after the Lacanian reformulation, and I consider this project to be part of this theoretical
endeavor. Many of Lacan’s concepts (for example, his conceptions of the mirror stage, misrecognition, the structure of perversion, the notion of disavowal, the imaginary, the symbolic, etc.) have been the building blocks of this project on the psychoanalytic level.

The second sense of this as a psychoanalytic project is on the level of intervention. Psychoanalysis has always been about intervention, about inducing transformation in the subject in order to relieve him or her from suffering. This project of remembering the indigenous psychology movement in Taiwan is, to a great extent, analogue to the remembering process Lacan mentions in *Freud’s Papers on Technique, 1953-1954* (1991). There Lacan suggests that “the restitution of the subject’s wholeness appears in the guise of a restoration of the past” (p. 14). As he says,

One could say that [what] Freud touches [on] there...[is] the fact that [what] the subject relives, comes to remember, in the intuitive sense of the words, the formative events of his existence, is not in itself so very important. What matters is what he reconstructs of it....I would say—when all is said and done, it is less a matter of remembering than of rewriting history. (pp. 13-14)

As I have argued above, modern colonialism transgresses and fragments the egoic gestalt of the colonized. As a result, the colonized does not have a history unless it is related to the history of the colonizer; through the inversion of the idealized West, the traditional history of the colonized has become a scandal, a necessary negation in order to idealize the West. Writing history is therefore an effort to put the unspeakable—colonial trauma—into words. It is by writing about the history of this dream of one man—the dream for a genuinely indigenous psychology—that we, Taiwanese psychologists, will eventually be relieved from the cultural aphasia resulting from the traumatic encounter between two worlds and regain the ability to listen to our own heart (*xin*), giving voice to our own dreams.
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