Nietzsche's Dialogic Ethic After Illusion: Rhetoric and Difference

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Nietzsche’s Dialogic Ethic After Illusion: Rhetoric and Difference

A Dissertation

Presented to the Faculty

of the Department of Communication & Rhetorical Studies

McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts

Duquesne University

In partial fulfillment of

the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

by

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Preface

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Abstract

What is the nature of the relationship between communication ethics and rhetoric? How may study of the interplay between dialogue as a communication ethic and ground of rhetoric contribute to greater understanding and constructive meeting of the narrative and virtue contention that characterizes the contemporary postmodern historical moment? A prominent alleged source of postmodern value contention and a neglected source for advancing the study of the interpenetration of ethics and rhetoric, Friedrich Nietzsche, as a novel hermeneutic entry to engage these questions and demarcates the fields of inquiry this study addresses.

The present work begins with meeting the contemporary historical moment characterized by metanarrative disintegration. With metanarrative disintegration, difference and multiplicity are now privileged. The privileging of difference communicates a turn to dialogue rather than the modern bias towards telling in shaping communicative activity. Meeting the alterity within the temporal existential moment occurs through the operative of metaphor. Levinas’ focus on the dialogic tension between saying and said displays the manner in which meeting emerges to offer temporal ground. The multiplicity of ways meanings emerge to offer temporal ground become realized through the imbricating architectonic Nietzschean metaphors of perspectivism, genealogy, and revaluation of values, producing a dialogic ethic of meeting. This outcome interprets otherwise the work, as Levinas also does, of whom many consider the founder of deconstruction, Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche’s dialogic ethic displays the ongoing interplay of recognition of decaying said and the ongoing hope in the saying as meeting.
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Chapter One: Nietzsche’s Dialogic Ethic Meeting Metanarrative Disintegration

The present study articulates a communication ethic that constructively engages difference that drives contemporary narrative and virtue contention in an age after metanarrative disintegration. The ground for this constructive communication ethic arises from interpreting otherwise one of the subterranean springs of our contemporary postmodern historical moment, Friedrich Nietzsche. Dialogue serves as the alternative hermeneutic entrance taken into Nietzsche’s work rather than engaging his writings from the standard deconstructive bias. The present work argues that dialogue, not the monologic, mechanistic unmasking of indeterminacy within texts of human language, animates Nietzsche’s architectonic rhetoric of his communication ethic. Dialogue and rhetoric are viewed as united through their primary interpenetrating function, the disclosure and articulation of meaning, meaning communicable through whatever form the temporal, existential situation avails, through word, gesture, or act, for example.

Approached from this dialogic perspective, the meeting of difference embedded in competing values, morals, and traditions affords opportunities for questioning, interpretation, criticism, judgment, and action, the recurring interplay of dialogue and rhetoric that simultaneously gives meaning to our words and deeds. Opportunities discovered through interpreting otherwise Nietzsche’s metaphors of perspectivism, genealogy, and revaluation of values then reveal the architectonic rhetoric of a constructive communication ethic, dialogic meeting. Dialogic meeting, the articulation of interrelationships of Nietzsche’s guiding metaphors of perspectivism, genealogy, and revaluation of values, describes Nietzsche’s communication ethic meeting the ills of his
age through a renewed dialogue with, not only a deconstruction of, tradition, in the contemporary and eternally recurring contest of competing values.

**Introduction**

For the present work, dialogue provides the ground for Nietzsche’s metaphors: perspectivism, genealogy, and revaluation. Dialogue then rhetorically embeds traditions within a contemporaneous temporal moment of meeting whereby the said of tradition is resurrected through the saying of its critique and simultaneous embedding within the historicity of dialogic meeting. Dialogic meeting draws its characterization of these imbricating Nietzschean metaphors from Mikhail Bakhtin’s meditations on dialogue and Levinas’ dialogue with Martin Buber on Buber’s idea of meeting. The resurrecting of tradition through dialogue in an existential moment of temporal meeting reveals Nietzsche’s architectonic rhetoric of dialogic meeting. This communication ethic culled from Nietzsche’s architectonic rhetoric posits truth not as a consequence of individual human agency but as an eternally recurring consequence of the dialogue of word and deed, flesh, mind, and spirit unfolding in meeting the drama of temporal moment and society.

Dialogic meeting results from Nietzsche’s engagement with the aporias of his modern historical moment. To address the dangerous rising tides of decadence, nihilism, and resentment, Nietzsche offered his contemporaries a fitting response through the architectonic rhetoric of metaphors of perspectivism, genealogy, and revaluation of values that when viewed collectively disclose his situated, constructive communication ethic, dialogic meeting. Perspectivism provides a dialogic orientation to interpretation
and invention through a return to classical understandings of rhetoric. Genealogy provides the means for rhetorical inquiry and criticism as a revolutionary process of resurrecting traditions through their existential meeting in dialogue with the temporal contemporaneous moment. Revaluation then provides the epideictic revaluation of values that dialogic meeting calls forth through its architectonic rhetoric, rhetoric revalued not as mere tropic play and persuasion but rather as an architectonic art of making meaning grounded in the guiding values of its communication ethic, dialogic meeting. An architectonic rhetoric engages in the making of perspectives out of the resurrecting of tradition through their epideictic embedding within the temporal moment of their meeting. “Art is architectonic with respect to making, and the architectonic art of making is rhetoric, in so far as rhetoric is an art of thought” (McKeon 4). Nietzsche advances an architectonic rhetoric, an art accomplished through the interpenetrating metaphors of perspectivism, genealogy, and revaluation of all values. Levinas’ understanding of the communicative activity, as witnessed in the tension that binds saying and said, grounds interpretation of the interplay of dialogue and rhetoric as they congeal into Nietzsche’s fitting response, his communication ethic of dialogic meeting.

Through his imbricating actions, Nietzsche invited his contemporaries to join his interpreting otherwise of the modern metanarratives of Science, Church, State, and Progress, which he perceived to dominate his times. Returning to Nietzsche’s invitation to dialogue through his works, we perceive in consideration of his imbricating metaphors of perspectivism, genealogy, and revaluation, the possibilities for an architectonic rhetoric grounded in the saying of a constructive communication ethic, dialogic meeting.
An architectonic rhetoric and communication ethic disclosed through dialogic meeting intertwines word and deed, affect and logic, substance and style. In this way, dialogic meeting affords a fitting response to the aporias of what Alasdair MacIntyre names in After Virtue as “emotivism,” radical relativism, and deconstruction as the aftershocks of a post-Enlightenment, post-Christian modern historical moment of metanarrative decline and apparent dissolution after virtue. However, within the shadows and echoes of these metanarrative ruins that once held sway echoes opportunity: The opportunity afforded through engaging traditions through dialogic meeting, calling forth their rhetorical orderings of life and meaning through their saying, through exploration of how traditions can become resurrected through their embedding within the temporal, existential moment of dialogic meeting. Dialogic meeting provides the communicative space for persons to meet tradition embedded within the contemporary historical moment, offering an unsaying of the said and resurrection of the tradition through enactment of its meeting of the situation and moment of its encounter, an encounter that changes situations as resources of traditions called forth to meet and affect reality as alternatives to contemporary ethics of word and act.

The present study seeks to afford an interpretation and exploration of such opportunities through a dialogical and rhetorical investigation and extension of Nietzsche’s communication ethic and its architectonic rhetoric evinced through the interrelationships enacted by his guiding metaphors of perspectivism, genealogy, and revaluation of values. Through a close reading and genealogical accounting of these metaphors throughout Nietzsche’s corpus, it will be disclosed how these metaphors, taken collectively, construct a communication ethic grounded in the values that guide its
enactment, dialogic meeting. Dialogic meeting embeds rhetoric as a necessary constructive component to a communication ethic guiding response to contemporary exigencies. A fitting response emerges to the ethical debates that question our contemporary historical moment through the saying of an architectonic rhetoric inspired by Nietzsche and his insights. This communication ethic, dialogic meeting, hence employs an architectonic rhetoric as a guide for fitting constructive rhetorical response to the ethical questions that shape the contemporary postmodern historical moment after illusion amid metanarrative disintegration.

**Nietzsche: Implicated in Postmodernity**

Questions of why to turn to Nietzsche are answered by witnessing his pervasive influence in contemporary scholarship and culture across disciplines and hermeneutic biases. Early examples of Nietzsche’s burgeoning influence are recorded in the writings of philosophers such as Georg Simmel, Karl Jaspers, Martin Heidegger, and Jean-Paul Sartre (Kaufmann, introduction, *Basic Writings of Nietzsche* ix). Writers and poets such as Albert Camus, André Gide, Thomas Malraux, Thomas Mann, Herman Hesse, and Rainer-Maria Rilke all cite Nietzsche as a major influence upon their works (Kaufmann, introduction, *Basic Writings of Nietzsche* x). Even in the field of psychology, Freud, Adler (Ibid) and Jung (Magnus & Higgins, “Nietzsche’s works and their themes” 24) drew upon his ideas. Freud had even “claimed to have stopped reading Nietzsche’s work for fear that Nietzsche had anticipated too many of his own ideas about human nature and the role of unconscious forces” (Leiter 2). Within theology, Paul Tillich considered Nietzsche, along with Marx and Freud, as the “greatest modern “Protestants’””
(Kaufmann, introduction, *Basic Writings of Nietzsche* xi). However, Nietzsche’s
prevalence weaves through modern philosophy, ethics, psychology, and literature.
Nietzsche remains a presence among contemporary popular culture through varied
references in music, television, and films that testify to his continuing influence (Magnus

Additionally, “the British moral philosopher Bernard Williams, and the American
pragmatist Richard Rorty [...] situate their thought with respect to its debt to Nietzsche”
(Leiter 1). Nietzsche even serves as a key protagonist to Alasdair MacIntyre’s narrative
of the perennial importance of Aristotelian tradition and noble virtues in morality and
ethics in his influential works, *After Virtue, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry,* and
continuing through MacIntyre’s latest work, *Dependent Rational Animals.*

In addition, MacIntyre’s works disclose a consequence of our contemporary
postmodern landscape within the discourse on morality and values, the loss of universals
and traditions to guide judgment (Lucaites and Condit 11). Stuart Sim states that the
leading contemporary philosophical style “is ‘antifoundational’” wherein one disputes
“the validity of the foundations of discourse, asking such questions as ‘What guarantees
the truth of your foundation (that is, starting point) in its turn?’” (3) The struggle for a
substantive standpoint from which to enter the conversation on values becomes
paramount. How to interpret, articulate, and enact a communication ethic in a world
shaken to its cornerstones by emotivism, deconstruction, and the traumatic terror and
wars of the past two centuries, recurs throughout the shifting currents of the postmodern
conversation. Sim continues,

Postmodernism has drawn heavily on the example set by
antifoundationalist philosophers, perhaps most notably the iconoclastic nineteenth-century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, whose call for a ‘revaluation of all values’ constitutes something of a battle-cry for the movement. (3)

Nietzsche often hailed as a precursor of poststructuralism and postmodernism, therefore stands as a foundation for antifoundational contemporary thought.

However, the problem of articulating a constructive communication ethic within the contemporary postmodern condition is complex. The topic rises to the fore of MacIntyre’s influential study, After Virtue. MacIntyre therein states

What we possess [. . .] are the fragments of a conceptual scheme, parts which now lack those contexts from which their significance derived. We possess indeed simulacra of morality, we continue to use many of the key expressions. But we have – very largely, if not entirely – lost our comprehension, both theoretical and practical, or morality. (2)

Regarding the practical enactment of moral ideals and traditions through their communication and aesthetic, architectonic rhetorical constructions, MacIntyre later reports that “There seems to be no rational way of securing moral agreement in our culture” (After Virtue 6). If no foundations remain that gain communal consent upon the meaning of good and evil, truth and lie, how could agreement on guiding values for thought, speech, and action be reached? The difficulty of locating communal common ground amid political, corporate, religious scandals of recent years and rising tides of unreflective cynicism and emotivism, claiming “all moral judgments are nothing but expressions of preference” only reinforces the severity of the problem (MacIntyre, After
Virtue 12). If correct, then undecidability of such fundamental human questions of truth or lie, right or wrong and the ground upon which to decide such questions to guide word and deed would designate postmodernity as after morality, as after illusion of metanarrative Truth.

One way out of this conundrum is to further investigate dominant influences upon our current legitimation crisis. Jean-Francois Lyotard opens a fruitful path of inquiry by reminding us of the textured present in which we eternally reside, our contingent human condition. Lyotard posits that “Post modern would have to be understood according to the paradox of the future (post) anterior (modo) (81). Therefore, Lyotard characterizes the postmodern condition as bereft of the traditional metanarratives that previously justified values and ethical reasoning: the postmodern present simultaneously always adrift amidst the currents of the past and the unspoken possibilities of the future.

Situating itself within this tension, the present study takes one route to address the problems posed by our contemporary context by investigating a major source of suspicion that plagues judgment between competing value claims today, the maelstrom that howls in the wake of Nietzsche’s revolutionary revaluations. Nietzsche’s notion of moral inquiry, genealogy, evolves into revaluation, as an eternally recurring invitational dialogue demanding that individual agency be perceived as a contextual element always embedded within historicity. Drawing from the diversity of narratives calling for the opportunity to serve as the foundation for future action, Nietzsche authors a drama of ethics and moral reasoning through the play of epideictic rhetorical prose. “His brilliant style does not hide or cloud issues but dramatizes them” (Solomon, introduction, Reading Nietzsche 8). The present study seeks to explore and explicate the play and turning points
of the plot of ethical argument in our lives from the vantage of Nietzsche’s thought embedded within the storm and stress of authoring an ethical life.

Authoring by necessity implies an awareness and engagement of difference. Dialogue serves as a constructive path on which to embark beginning at the interplay of dialogue and rhetoric, the meeting of difference after metanarrative disintegration and the illusions of ‘public disclosure.’ Russian philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin, following Nietzsche’s deconstruction of metanarratives, foresaw the benefit of employing a dialogic perspective from which to engage and meet the multiplicity that the temporal moment afforded. “Life by its very nature is dialogic” (Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoyevsky’s Poetics 293). Given this perspective, the dialogic meeting of exigencies of the existential moment provides constructive affirmation of alterity through the interplay of dialogue and rhetoric as architectonic art of constructing perspectives from which to work.

**Bakhtin: Dialogue as a Metaphor of Nietzsche’s Meeting Difference**

The tradition of dialogue that springs from the work of Russian philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin aids our understanding of Nietzsche’s perspectivism and the architectonic rhetoric of his genealogical inquiries and epideictic revaluations of values. Bakhtin’s ideas of dialogue and monologue as communicative practices and orientations to knowing serve as bridges between Nietzsche’s countering of perspectivism and asceticism and Levinas’ ideas of saying and said. In this way, Bakhtin serves as a meeting in dialogue between these key figures and opens possibilities for different ways of engaging their work through the metaphor of dialogic meeting that emerges through the process of this study. To fully realize this connection, we extend our discussion of
Nietzsche’s metaphors. Engagement begins with Bakhtin’s ideas on dialogue, adding Levinas’ and Buber’s dialogue on meeting, and further augmenting this theoretical ground are Levinas’ ideas of saying and said as ways Nietzsche manifests these notions in his architectonic rhetoric of dialogic meeting.

An important issue to be cognizant of in reading the work of Russian philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin is that his notion of being, be it that of the self or of meaning in language, is one of becoming, one of dialogue. For Bakhtin, “the very being of man (both external and internal) is the deepest communion. To be means to communicate” (Problems of Dostoyevsky’s Poetics 287). A quest that leads him to conclude, “the word is born in dialogue” (Dialogic Imagination 279). Meeting difference in dialogue helps to unfold Nietzsche’s perspectivism as an existential grounding of knowing and its communication in the dialogic orientation to making meanings known through meeting others in dialogue.

Therefore as Holquist notes, “the situatedness of the self is a multiple phenomenon: it has been given the task of not being merely given [. . .] it is dominated by a “drive to meaning,” where meaning is understood as something still in the process of creation” (Dialogism 23). For Bakhtin, as he states in his Speech Genres and other Late Essays, this drive is not one geared to a single, absolute meaning but to understand the multiple nature of every single unit of meaning, of every utterance. The limits of meaning exist in dialogue through the change of speaking subjects. It is through this dynamic interplay of voices that meaning arises, through the process of dialogue (Bakhtin, Speech Genres and other Late Essays 92-3). Therefore, Holquist states that the being of each speaking subject engaged in dialogue is then one of “co-being,” “an event
that is shared. Being is a simultaneity; it is always co-being” (*Dialogism* 25). This leads
one to further explore the nature of being which Bakhtin saw as evidenced through
consideration of consciousness. For as he states

> Consciousness is in essence multiple . . . Not another person remaining the
> object of my consciousness, but another autonomous consciousness
> standing alongside mine, and my own consciousness can exist only in
> relation to it. (*Problems of Dostoyevsky’s Poetics* 288)

It is this notion of consciousness, which further describes the interrelation of
consciousness, being, and dialogue. Other people’s consciousnesses cannot be perceived
or defined as objects or things. Consciousnesses can only relate to one another through
engaging each other in dialogue. “To think about them means to talk with them;
otherwise they immediately turn to us their objectivized side: they fall silent, close up,
and congeal into finished, objectivized images” (Bakhtin, *Problems of Dostoyevsky’s
Poetics* 68). The ground of Nietzsche’s perspectivism, it will be shown, follows a similar
path in stressing how communication shapes and orders consciousness according to a
dialogic meeting of difference (*The Gay Science* 354). This relation Bakhtin articulates
also alludes to the Levinasian notions of saying and said as extensions, adding further
texture to this seminal difference between perspectives of meeting in existence and
experience.

Consequently, within the developing conceptual framework of Mikhail Bakhtin,
“Life by its very nature is dialogic” (*Problems of Dostoyevsky’s Poetics* 293). Engaging
other consciousnesses in open dialogue allows a person to participate wholly and
throughout his “whole life: with his eyes, lips, hands, soul, spirit, with his whole body
and deeds. He invests his entire self in discourse, and this discourse enters into the
dialogic fabric of human life, into the world symposium” (Bakhtin, *Problems of
Dostoyevsky’s Poetics* 293). Meeting difference in dialogue discloses in multiple ways
the nature of human identity as multiple, as born in relation, as well as the contours of
relation and meaning as informed through meeting.

Bakhtin further explains the glaring importance of recognizing meaning as
becoming within the sociohistorical context through his concept of heteroglossia.
Situatedness serves a crucial role for Nietzsche as well in his interpreting otherwise
objectivity not as disinterest but as situated positions. Affect and interestedness are
defining characteristics of knowing and communication. Heteroglossia, as presented in
*The Dialogic Imagination* is the

base condition governing the utterance. It is that which insures the
primacy of context over text. At any given time, in any given place, there
will be a set of conditions, social, historical, meteorological,
physiological—that will insure that a word uttered in that place and at that
time will have a meaning different than it would have under any other
conditions. (Bakhtin 438)

It is this layering of communication, this necessary recognition of the dialogues behind a
specific dialogue, “that permit language to be used in ways that are indirect, conditional,
distanced,” that allow for ironic and parodic interpretations and utterances (Bakhtin, *The
Dialogic Imagination* 323). Consequently, these ironic elements constantly remind us of
the “normal language” that informs the current, highlighted dialogue (Bakhtin, *The
Heteroglossia is therefore properly described as a quality of language itself, which is necessarily various.

The ironic and double-voiced character emphasized as heteroglossia is a quality of a language becoming meaningful at a particular historical moment. “Heteroglossia, like most of Bakhtin’s other concepts, is both historical and normative; it refers to both a variable state of affairs and to one which is constant” (Vice 18). “The authentic environment of an utterance, the environment in which it lives and takes shape, is dialogized heteroglossia, anonymous and social as language, but simultaneously concrete, filled with specific content and accented as an individual utterance” (Bakhtin, Dialogic Imagination 272). Meaning occurs meeting difference, others, in dialogue, seeing meeting as a saying of the said of experience. “The word in language is half someone else’s” (Bakhtin, Dialogic Imagination 293). Nietzsche foresaw this co-being as productive of meaning as a dialogic encounter of multiplicity within and without the person. As both Bakhtin and Nietzsche prescribed awareness of alterity each also, through the course of their writings, enacted a constructive dialogue with difference that affords the embracing of the traditions of the said through their revaluation as saying in the temporal existential moment.

The Metaphor of Meeting

Meeting presupposes distance that draws forth difference in one’s experience of reality. Without recognition of difference, be it of other, time, culture, text, or perspective, one’s theoretical construct of self would impossible, or at least unrecognizable, to a Western understanding. Meeting conveys one’s orientation to
interpretation and the making meaning of one’s experiences through communication. Meeting concerns how one enters consciousness of this communicative space in which difference draws forth one’s subjectivity. Subjectivity is known through the opening of communication as the will to power directing consciousness, consciousness born out of the dialogic life processes, the intake, interpretation, and response to stimuli, for example.

Meeting also provides a way to explain Nietzsche’s architectonic rhetoric of dialogic meeting as the concretion of speech and activity, perhaps best realized through his own manner of thinking. Kaufmann describes Nietzsche not as a “system-thinker but a problem-thinker” (Nietzsche 82). Nietzsche, in his unyielding existential testing of traditions and their presuppositions against the questions of the temporal moment, personified the type of understanding of self as meeting as attributed to him by Buber below. “Only problems that present themselves so forcefully that they threaten the thinker’s present mode of life lead to philosophic inquiries” (Kaufmann, Nietzsche 89). Inquiry becomes a form of meeting guided by the questions one asks resulting from the engagement with the difference of relations that the question unfolds. “Questioning means experiencing fully, with an open mind and without reservations” so one may fully attend to the multiple meanings meeting may afford (Kaufmann, Nietzsche 90). In this way, being becomes accessible as the becoming event of meeting situated within the contours of concrete experience, “All truths are for me soaked in blood” (Nietzsche as qtd. in Kaufmann 90). The texture and contours of meeting as communication, the activity of relation between self and difference we now develop through discussion of the ground of meeting as metaphor.
The theoretical sources of this metaphor come from the thought of Martin Buber and Emmanuel Levinas whose insights help to sharpen the language used to explain how Nietzsche’s rhetoric articulates this metaphor of values and morals that influence communicative activity. According to Levinas’ treatment of Buber’s theory of knowledge

it is in man that its action [that of being] unfolds (BM, 203). Man is not a subject who constitutes: he is the very articulation of the meeting. The human self is not a being among beings, but a being who is a category, and who since Nietzsche, according to Buber, has been recognized as such (BM, 155). He is meeting. He is that which puts itself at a distance (and already the anonymous existence of the world and of things that have survived the use we make of them is affirmed in that distancing) and he is at the same time the entering into relations with that world which is distant—other. (“Martin Buber” 24)

We communicate our being through meeting difference in the other, in the alterity of experiences with the ever-changing textures of human temporality and historicity. We exist in our activity of meeting for in this activity we communicate the meanings we make of our being. Meeting makes the meanings of one’s self-perception as well as one’s interpretation of reality, the difference that characterizes the situatedness of human existence.

The human person then simultaneously exists “as possibility of distance and relation” (Levinas, “Martin Buber” 24). In this way Levinas explains how one’s concrete
situatedness conveys the contour of one’s being, the totality of a person in how one meets otherness.

He is not at the center [of being] by virtue of being a thinking subject, but in his totality, because his totality is the concreteness of his situation. His totality sustains his thought itself, and is already transcendence. ‘Only when we try to understand the human person in his whole situation, in the possibilities of his relation to all that is not himself, do we understand man’ (BM, 181). ‘It is not by a relation to oneself but by a relation to another than man can be complete’ (BM, 168). (Levinas, “Martin Buber” 24).

The understanding of meeting as one’s relation to difference, to all that is not oneself comes to explain subjectivity through articulation of this relation in speech and act. Communication becomes not an effect but a cause of consciousness as it directs how one meets difference in the concrete situation of the events of meeting that express one’s being. This leads to how this meeting can be explained through the lens of communication (as event of being or how being in its becoming may be made knowable through its thematization and communication) as dialogic meeting.

A useful way to describe the metaphor of dialogic meeting is to describe its core elements. First, we begin with the notion of dialogue. Second, the notion of meeting as derived from the communicative sense of saying and said drawn from the works of Emmanuel Levinas. Why employ Levinas’ notions of saying and said as the perspective of dialogic meeting? First, dialogic meeting implies the possibility of reconciliation of word and deed within a postmodern moment of crises. Second, saying and said articulate
the temporal imbricating textures of dialogue, discourse, within a communicative context, dialogue viewed as speech. This enables the exchange of meaning between word and deed in accord with the values out of which each arises, not ignorance of the ground from which they spring. Saying and said employ communicative terminology or names to signify the architectonic rhetoric guided by dialogic meeting.

Through the perspective of dialogic meeting, Nietzsche provides a foundation for erecting a constructive response to decisions and the crises of ignorance or denial of the ground of word and deed. An architectonic rhetoric emerges from a rhetorical reading of Nietzsche through the prism of dialogic meeting. Herein, the affirmation of all life he calls for may emerge grounded in the values and perspectives his words enact. They are not meant to refute or solve but to respond. Nietzsche, with the resurrection of the values that ground temporal existence and meeting, offers a trace of the flowing of meaning between moments of past, present, and future. A trace anchored by the values and perspectives we resurrect, revalue, and carry forward in our discovery and creation of responses to the questions our lives author embedded in the everyday mysteries of the human condition.

Architectonic rhetoric describes rhetoric of making meaning through dialogic meeting of difference, be it meeting of ideas, events, histories, traditions, or other persons situated within the horizons of the temporality of engagement. It discovers perspectives to guide creation through the experience of human existence and operates to disclose perspectives via genealogical inquiry into the bases of these communicative acts. Revaluation resurrects traditions resulting from genealogical inquiry guided by dialogic meeting, the values that direct criticism and creation within the temporal moment.
Making meaning through an architectonic rhetoric grounded in dialogic meeting allows for the resurrection of perspectives within the horizons of temporality of human existence and experience. Communication as dialogic meeting acknowledges it picks up the currents of previous conversations, engages the flow of these ideas, and leaves ripples to be interpreted by others, granting that meaning remains a malleable metaphor of human consciousness and communication.

**Levinas’ Saying and Said: A Framework for Nietzsche’s Architectonic Rhetoric**

The language used to situate and explain these metaphors and broach their potential contribution to contemporary discussions on ethics and rhetoric comes from Levinas’ notion of the saying and the said. These interrelated metaphors explain how dialogic meeting, sketched from interpretation of Nietzsche’s architectonic rhetoric, functions.

According to Smith, “the meanings discoverable in phenomena represent the “said,” the orderly world of Newtonian physics: the “saying” is their interpretation” (46). Nietzsche, through his architectonic rhetoric, seeks to shake these traditions from their totalized hijacking by Modernity and return them to the world of life as it is lived, as saying malleable to meet the questions of a pluralistic postmodern historical moment.

For Levinas, interpersonal communication demands “correlation of the saying and the said, that is, the subordination of the saying to the said, to the linguistic system and ontology, is the price that manifestation demands” (*Otherwise than Being* 6). In other words, Smith explains that
What the saying ‘is’ transcends language as the term is normally used at least, since language must, in order to be language, accept the ‘conditions’ of linguistic expression, those very conditions that are “scorned by prophetic discourse. Language is equivocation or failed simultaneity, not the steady light of truth but the twinkling light of what we think we might have seen but [. . .] well, perhaps not. (55)

The subject or speaker is not solely determinative of meaning. Even self-understanding is ultimately determined at least in part from without through interaction with others’ interpretations. Hence, Nietzsche’s repeated pleadings “Hear me! For I am such and such a person. Above all, do not mistake me for someone else.[ . . .] Have I been understood?” (Ecce Homo, preface 1; “Why I Am a Destiny” 9). In other words, do not totalize me, do not misinterpret me.

Such statements demonstrate that Nietzsche did perceive some stability of meaning, at least a passing stability in which one could ground one’s words to be able to communicate, to assume meaning of one’s words could be understood. Each represents a trace of infinity, knowable to us only as a trace, within the intertwining threads of historicity, contingency, and natural mystery at the core of the human condition, threads like those of the web that change in the morning light and evening dew, swayed by autumnal winds. Light opens new lines previously obscured by darkness present within perspective on what lies ahead as communication occurs within the noise and confusion of hope that one can be understood despite distraction and disinterest.

This states acceptance of the transient nature of revelation of truth the human being can discern embodied through more truthful, honest language. Hence, language is
metaphor, “language is rhetoric” (Nietzsche, “Lecture Notes on Rhetoric” 107). Meaning is realized through dialogic meeting. Dialogue provides the communicative ground upon which rhetoric may employ language to author meanings of meeting difference.

However, monologue remains a part of this process, of seeing difference at the heart of making meaning of mysteries one confronts in the face or words of another. Until the monologic grasping for meaning seeks to use, until its will to power becomes driven by conquest, ownership, control, and resentment. Monologue then becomes the negative reactive drive to totalize in one’s own image and idea, without consideration of the difference that strains for breath beneath the imposition of one’s interpretation as the interpretation. Monologue resides as a tension against dialogue until monologue seeks not to know but to silence, crushing difference into the similarity of the known.

As the process of translating thought and emotion into language involves a latent totalizing of experience to the constrictions of standardized linguistic agreement to be communicable, one must be attentive to but also not unnecessarily exceed the bounds of propriety in this totalizing translation. Each word frames the unframeable for the other; therefore, one accepts a fine risk in writing the words of an other to an other.

A fine risk is found in how the said influences communication.

The said thematizes the interrupted dialogue or the dialogue delayed by silences, failure or delirium, but the intervals are not recuperated [. . .] The interruptions of the discourse found again and recounted in the immanence of the said are conserved like knots in a thread tied again, the trace of diachrony that does not enter into the present, that refuses simultaneity.

(Levinas, Otherwise than Being 170)
Without dialogue, its possibility remains, without meaning. Dialogue provides the necessary space with which the activity of communication can employ rhetoric to name without imposition. Saying enacts dialogue as an emergent sense of meeting while the said enacts a monologue of embedded meaning shaped by the past.

Yet imposition is required for communication, for agreement upon meanings within language for ideas and perspectives to be shared between persons when encountering reality.

In totalizing being, discourse qua discourse thus belies the very claim to totalize. This reversion is like that which the refutation of skepticism brings out. In the writing the saying does indeed become a pure said, a simultaneousness of the saying and of its conditions. A book is interrupted discourse catching up with its own breaks. But books have their fate; they belong to a world they do not include, but recognize by being written and printed, and by being prefaced and getting themselves preceded with forewords. They are interrupted, and call for other books and in the end are interpreted in a saying distinct from the said. (Levinas, *Otherwise than Being* 171)

This study carries out such an interruption of Nietzsche’s works that through its saying offers an unorthodox said of Nietzsche’s thought. Seen differently, values work as limits to halt totalizing forces inherent within language and communication for Nietzsche. Interpreting as saying is distinct from the said seen in Nietzsche’s persistent intertextualism (*Genealogy of Morals*, preface 4, III; *Ecce Homo*). Making requests to consider earlier works in reading later works Nietzsche calls his readers to see his works
as sayings, saying dependent on their engagement for their meanings, as his later prefaces appended to his earlier works designates unfinalizability. As Nietzsche states of his late work, *On the Genealogy of Morals* he was “still seeking my own language for my own things [. . .]” (preface 4). One begins as an interruption of the said by means of a saying, of making meaning of the reserves of language within a new, temporal existential moment of context.

Returning to old works, to the said of one’s thought, provides textures as reflection provides a loophole for saying of the said. “Interpretation is thus a way of returning the said to saying: the said, which were it not for the forces of philosophy, poetry, and prophecy, would enclose itself in a totality of silence” (Smith 55). Interpretation urges the resurrection of tradition, of the said, within human experience and existence, interpretation as discovering meanings amid the mud of human temporality and historicity embodied in the moment of meeting. This is not interpretation undertaken solely as the resurrection of categories to silence difference within experience and remove responsibility from actor to the tradition out of which they claim to act. In the communicative activity necessitated in saying, a speaker forces meaning into the domain of the said, thereby betraying it. Levinas’ text twists and turns as it wrestles with this problem: saying is never fully present in the said, yet the said also constitutes the only access we have (*Otherwise than Being* 78-81). Levinas’ texts struggle as Nietzsche’s texts struggle with these ever shifting limits because neither wishes to totalize, asceticize, monologize dialogue. Dialogue must remain to enable and maintain possibilities for life, for one’s words to adapt to its ever-changing waves that reorder and resituate speakers, readers, and the language that divides and unites them.
This recalls the nature of dialogic meeting as here conceived through human language. “Saying is communication, to be sure, but as a condition for all communication, as exposure” (Levinas, *Otherwise than Being*, 81-2). Nietzsche with Levinas rejects humanism for a naturalism or organicism that goes beyond mere humanism. De-situating through genealogy works to check the possibility of replacing the other with the self. As exposure, meeting is a precondition to speech, communication, and ethics, Nietzsche emphasizes the only way to knowing is through the known—who, what, why, questioned with the understanding of one’s placement or emplotment within the context of natural, physical forces and influences.

In agreement with Levinas in favoring significance over signification, Nietzsche removes foundations to resurrect traditions. Nietzsche criticizes and questions the grounds of taken-for-granted values and perspectives to author change, to re-engage traditions in the temporal, existential moment of meeting. In meeting, traditions, the said, may be freed from their abuse, imprisonment, and suffocation, induced by the ministers of modernist dogma of Progress, of the technicians of knowledge in the employment of how without recourse to why.

We live according to where our attention is focused. When, who, why, and how become questions one struggles with, not questions one answers. For in answering communicative activity states steps to impose power on others. Such a technician’s communicative activity blindly leads to monologizing and the said of breathless words and the silencing modernization of traditions as techniques and known answers to unasked questions. Traditions not met in the existential contemporaneous temporal moment of difference remain not as living reservoirs for ordering life and granting
meaning but rather as bodies without skeletons. Meaning emerges through a dialogic orientation to the encounter with alterity and others, meaning emerges perhaps most fully and naturally through dialogic meeting amid the unknown saying of the temporal, existential moment.

The present work begins with meeting the contemporary historical moment characterized by metanarrative disintegration. With metanarrative disintegration, difference and multiplicity are now privileged. The privileging of difference communicates a turn to dialogue rather than the modern bias towards telling in shaping communicative activity. Meeting the alterity within the temporal existential moment occurs through the operative of metaphor. Levinas’ focus on the dialogic tension between saying and said displays the manner in which meeting emerges to offer temporal ground. The multiplicity of ways meanings emerge to offer temporal ground become realized through the imbricating architectonic Nietzschean metaphors of perspectivism, genealogy, and revaluation of values, producing a dialogic ethic of meeting. This outcome interprets otherwise the work, as Levinas also does, of whom many consider the founder of deconstruction, Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche’s dialogic ethic displays the ongoing interplay of recognition of decaying said and the ongoing hope in the saying as meeting.

Nietzsche wrote as a dramatist of the human condition. He presupposed that the drama he critiqued was already known. People were living that drama. His task is to make visible what people already know. In keeping with Nietzsche’s spirit, this work foregrounds Nietzsche’s drama and then like Nietzsche seeks to illuminate that which when met simply requires us to nod in affirmation.
**Chapter Two: Deconstructing Nietzsche’s Thought within Rhetorical Studies**

The second and third chapters serve to situate contemporary communication and rhetorical studies of Nietzsche as a hermeneutic background against which to develop the arguments and course of the present study. How will this saying of the said of Nietzschean scholarship within communication and rhetorical studies enrich the investigation of the problem this study addresses? The comparative dearth of scholarly commentary on Nietzsche’s potential contributions to understandings of the interplay between dialogue and rhetoric and most importantly, towards a constructive communication ethic reveal ways in which the present study may provide an original contribution to contemporary conversations on rhetoric, dialogue, and communication ethics. A contribution glimpsed by employing dialogue, not deconstruction, as a hermeneutic entrance to interpret otherwise Nietzsche’s corpus as articulating an architectonic rhetoric of dialogic meeting, a communication ethic disclosed in meeting difference within the temporal existential moment of contemporary narrative and virtue contention after illusion and metanarrative disintegration.

**Introduction**

The relative silence and neglect of Nietzsche’s dialogic perspective and ethic and his rhetorical moral inquiries has augmented the problem of defining the ground he clears for contemporary scholarship on the interplay of dialogue, rhetoric, and communication ethics. McGuire alludes to this situation: “First, that existentialism in general and Friedrich Nietzsche in particular have been overlooked by persons making statements
about the ethics of rhetoric” ("The Ethics of Rhetoric” 133). Perhaps Nietzsche’s rhetorical style of philosophical argumentation enacted through a myriad of forms from aphorism, poetry, parable, narrative, to standard essays has complicated and arguably obfuscated necessary inquiry into how his styles impact reception of the substance of his writings. How do the metaphors and tropes, the material of his rhetorical philosophy on the genealogy of values and morals, inform the content of his epideictic revaluation of values? This study will address this and related questions and their potential effects. How do they impact the present status of the problem? Because while Nietzsche has received belated but increasing attention for his contributions to the definition and theory of rhetoric, the discipline of communication and rhetorical studies remains relatively silent on the question of the ethics his rhetoric performs and thereby advocates despite the vast intellectual vistas his shadow touches.

Chapter two begins to explore the significance of this influence as it engages scholarship on Nietzsche's definition of rhetoric and descriptions of his rhetorical theory and practice. The conversation opens with scholarship detailing Nietzsche’s rhetorical strategies, including Paul de Man’s influential interpretations of Nietzsche’s theory of rhetoric. De Man's early and continuing influence on interpretations of Nietzsche, especially his characterization of tropes in regard to rhetoric, becomes a point of contention for Thomas, framing his disagreements with de Man. These opening issues inform discussion of Thomas’s *Reading Nietzsche Rhetorically*, which remains the only book-length treatment of Nietzsche’s rhetorical theory and practice.

Chapter three extends engagement with these scholarly conversations on rhetorical theory and practice as it engages characterization of whether Nietzsche's works
suggest an aesthetic or epistemic character for rhetoric. Considerations of the character of Nietzsche’s rhetoric imply questions of influence and subsequently turns to connections between his ideas and those of Kenneth Burke. Articles by Desilet, Hawhee, Thomas, and Bruner chronicle Nietzsche’s influence on Kenneth Burke and Burke’s comments on the place of ethics within Nietzsche’s poetic and rhetorical philosophy. Finally, there are discussions of Nietzsche directed toward concerns related to the interplay of rhetoric, communication, dialogue, and ethics. Analysis of McGuire’s 1980 article, “The Ethics of Rhetoric: The Morality of Knowledge” will be augmented by those of Conway and especially that of Hawes, whose perspective approaches parallel standpoints of the present study. McGuire’s work offers the only current scholarship that directly treats Nietzsche’s potential contributions toward an ethic of rhetoric and foreshadows key strategies for constructing a communication ethic from Nietzsche’s works, the central concern of the present study beginning with the fourth chapter.

Chapter three concludes the portrayal of the scholarly background against which the present study proceeds as it explores scholarly comment on ethical issues related to Nietzsche’s rhetoric. This last area of emphasis serves as the gate through which the present study begins to unfold. Emphasis and focus upon Nietzsche’s seminal concerns with values and morals suggests that greater attention paid to these areas discloses important insights. The present study then engages Nietzsche’s writings as a rich field to cultivate our understanding of rhetoric as communication, the interplay of rhetoric and dialogue, and his constructive communication ethic of dialogic meeting.
Nietzsche’s Theory and Practice of Rhetoric

The first path of inquiry within communication and rhetorical studies seeks to infer and develop Nietzsche’s implicit definition, theory, and practice of rhetoric. This path begins the review in that its concerns are foundational, what is Nietzsche’s understanding of rhetoric and how is it enacted throughout his writings? Scholarly inquiry of this topic begins with de Man’s early studies of Nietzsche’s rhetorical theory and practice. His inaugural studies frame later discussions of Nietzsche’s rhetorical methods and strategies, highlighted by the appearance in 1994 of an issue of *Philosophy and Rhetoric* devoted solely to Nietzsche, Douglas Thomas’s book, *Reading Nietzsche Rhetorically*, and other separate articles by Heckmen, Merrow, and Thomas. These works address Nietzsche’s strategies of interpretation and persuasion through an array of topics that include the relationship between physiology, aesthetics, metaphysics, epistemology, and rhetoric. Understanding of the philosophical import of his choices of style illustrated, for example, in Crawford’s discussion of his practice of genealogy and its relation to questions of truth. In addition, Heckman’s article explores Nietzsche’s use of metaphor in his early posthumously published but influential essay, “On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense” and Merrow addresses Nietzsche’s comments in *Ecce Homo* on Demosthenes as a symbol of Nietzsche’s style and view of truth as an effect of persuasion.

Deconstructing Persuasion: De Man’s Interpretation of Nietzsche’s Rhetoric

However, before we analyze these later works in depth, we must first return to the beginning of such inquiries regarding Nietzsche within contemporary rhetorical scholarship, the work of Paul de Man. The work of Paul de Man functions as a dominant
perspective on interpretation of Nietzsche within and without the field of communication
and rhetorical studies. De Man’s influential articles and book, *Allegories of Reading*, in
many ways inaugurate the modern discussion of “Nietzsche’s Theory of Rhetoric,” a title
of a 1974 Symposium article authored by de Man. Here and in the sections devoted to
analysis of Nietzsche in *Allegories of Reading*, de Man offers his interpretations of
Nietzsche’s theory and practice of rhetoric. De Man, throughout his analyses and texts,
relies heavily upon Nietzsche’s posthumously published lecture notes on rhetoric and the
influential but also posthumously published early essay, “On Truth and Lying in a Non-
Moral Sense,” both dating from 1872-1874, and Nietzsche’s first published book *The
Birth of Tragedy* appearing in 1872. De Man’s selections of texts thereby limit his
interpretations to the near total exclusion of works upon which Nietzsche’s contemporary
reputation largely rests, such as *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (1883-5) and *On the Genealogy
of Morals* (1887). This serves as a common hermeneutic bias among scholars writing
along deconstructive lines of Nietzsche research within and without communication and
rhetorical studies. The consequence of this philological strategy or hermeneutic bias is
that it isolates Nietzsche’s ideas on rhetoric to his explicit comments on rhetoric in his
early texts regardless of his evolving ideas and practices that illustrate the multifarious
ways he employed rhetoric in his later, better known writings.

Interpreting these early-unpublished texts, de Man quoting Nietzsche, brings
forward a common interpretation framed as a synecdoche of Nietzsche’s views, “. . .
Language is rhetoric, for it only intends to convey a *doxa* (opinion), not an *episteme*
(truth) [. . .]” (“Nietzsche’s Theory of Rhetoric”35). While the possibilities and
implications this statement raises for understanding human language and the nature of
meaning are discussed at length, the inherent ethical issues this statement raises receive no comment by de Man. He continues, “Tropes are not something that can be added or subtracted from language at will; they are its truest nature. There is no such thing as proper meaning that can be communicated only in certain particular cases” (‘Nietzsche’s Theory of Rhetoric’ 35). A consequence of such a perspective implies the existence of relativism inherent within human language whereby meaning derives less from context than by subjective awareness and interpretation of the subtle play of tropes. The structure of meaning inherent within human language can then be marshaled as evidence in support of deconstruction since it follows directly from the nature of the text or discourse under analysis.

Later in the same essay commenting on “On Truth and Lying in an Extra-Moral Sense,” de Man adds, “This essay flatly states the necessary subversion of truth by rhetoric as the distinctive feature of all language” christening the beginnings of “Nietzschean deconstruction” (‘Nietzsche’s Theory of Rhetoric’ 39). Toward the close of the discussion recorded at the end of the article, de Man states:

Every interpretation can be said, in Nietzsche’s terms, to be both truth and lie, and this double aspect can best be understood with regard to the complex relationship between literal and figural meaning within the linguistic sign. Nietzsche uses at least two terms for ‘misreading’: one is ‘will to power’ and the other is simply ‘interpretation.’ Both combine in the forceful reading that presents itself as absolutely true but can then, in its turn, be undermined. The will to power functions as the willful re-interpretation of all reality. (‘Nietzsche’s Theory of Rhetoric’ 50)
These two statements greatly inform the view of Nietzsche’s theory of rhetoric perceived by other important contemporary French interpreters of Nietzsche such as Derrida, Foucault, Kofman, Deleuze, and Bataille, as well as those of Heidegger and many prominent Anglo-American deconstructionist critics such as Norris and Miller. Meaning is an endlessly recurring contest of fluctuating validity among interpretations.

However, the important variable as to how to judge between competing perspectives unfolds in the shadows where truth remains merely a chimera. As de Man states, the imperative demands not truth but plausibility, “the proposition therefore contains no criterion of truth, but an imperative concerning that which should count as true” (*Allegories of Reading* 120). The Gordian knot of not being able to know how to decide between competing interpretations, of the relative nature of evaluative criteria, arises out of the nature of language itself; we are committed to it as we are committed to language. De Man follows this process by describing how the past only becomes known in the future and how the truth established in the future then determines the meaning of the past (*Allegories of Reading* 124). From this endless turning of reversals “there is no escape from this, for the text also establishes that deconstruction is not something we can decide to do or not to do at will. And this use is compulsive or, as Nietzsche formulates it, imperative” (*Allegories of Reading* 125). One outcome of this conception of the hermeneutic process foregrounds rhetoric, rehabilitating “persuasion as the final outcome of the deconstruction of figural speech” (*Allegories of Reading* 131). Rhetoric and philosophy are now united in ways Plato fervently sought to deny for “if the critique of metaphysics is structured as an *aporia* between performative and constative language, this is the same as saying that it is structured as rhetoric” (*Allegories of Reading* 131).
Recalling Nietzsche’s earlier statement, as language can only disclose opinion, not truth, all language and meaning remain eternally open to the changing interpretation of competing wills to power.

The deconstructive standpoint then supports a rhetorical reading of Nietzsche’s writings because the resituating of the relationship between nature and metaphysics parallels Nietzsche’s own discourse. As de Man characterizes it, “And in Nietzsche we are dealing with a radically ironic rhetorical mode” (“Nietzsche’s Theory of Rhetoric”45), a mode this study will seek to explore more fully through the ethical consequences of such a perspective for rhetoric and communication ethics in our contemporary postmodern moment. Before doing so one must first attend to challenges Thomas makes to de Man’s influential and groundbreaking interpretation of Nietzsche’s theory of rhetoric.

**Countering De Man: Thomas and the Recurring Question of Value in Rhetoric**

Thomas begins his alternative interpretation in response to de Man in a May 1996 *Communication Theory* article, “Reading De Man Reading Rhetoric.” According to Thomas, de Man’s reading of “rhetoric along Nietzschean lines” is “misdirected” (“Reading De Man Reading Rhetoric” 189). The result of this misunderstanding of rhetoric “as exclusively tropological (as de Man does), produces a misreading that, while perhaps productive for de Man’s project of deconstruction, is untenable for guiding theories of critical practice and interpretation” ultimately producing not new insight but “error” (“Reading De Man Reading Rhetoric” 189). The corrective Thomas presents is a deconstructive reading of de Man’s deconstructive interpretations. Thomas claims that his interpretation illustrates “not only the necessity of incorporating a theory of value into
a Nietzschean approach to rhetorical theory” but also de Man’s untenable denial of “the construction of value in his formulation of the aпоріа between trope and performance” (“Reading De Man Reading Rhetoric” 189). According to Thomas, de Man’s error then compels him to falsely deny or fail to recognize how Nietzsche’s conception of rhetoric “parallels earlier historical articulations of rhetoric, which rely on a fusion of trope and persuasion as a means of the social production of knowledge” (“Reading De Man Reading Rhetoric” 188). Therefore, from this perspective, de Man posits Nietzschean rhetoric as one in which form exists separately from content and persuasion that subsequently exist independently of the social, cultural, and historical forces that call it forth into being.

The separation of trope and persuasion, of form and content also devalues the value inherent in rhetoric as a naturally occurring social undertaking.

The result, for de Man, is to classify rhetorical reading as a ‘state of suspended ignorance’ as ‘any question about the rhetorical mode of a literary text is always a rhetorical question which does not even know whether it is really questioning.’ (“Reading De Man Reading Rhetoric” 191)

Thomas claims that de Man further extends his deconstructive characterization of rhetoric as he concludes his seminal work, Allegories of Reading. “[R]hetoric is a text in that it allows for two incompatible (persuasion and trope), mutually destructive points of view, and therefore puts an insurmountable obstacle in the way of any reading or understanding” (de Man qtd. in Thomas, “Reading De Man Reading Rhetoric” 194). A possible escape from indeterminability comes from Nietzsche as de Man returns to
Nietzsche’s essay, “On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense.” De Man claims that Nietzsche “provides the possibility of escaping from the pitfalls of rhetoric by becoming aware of the rhetoricity of language” (*Allegories of Reading* 110). Recognition of the rhetoricity of truth and meaning in human language therefore provides the means to use this knowledge to author one’s own truths and meanings from the words at hand.

However, such an espousal of an endless relativistic deferral of meaning does not gain support from Nietzsche’s writings, “A figure which gains no buyer becomes an error” (Nietzsche, “Lecture Notes on Rhetoric” 108). As Thomas remarks, “Clearly, Nietzsche’s key concern here is not the rhetoricity of language but instead the social effects of language and the values that language imposes on us as social beings” (“Reading De Man Reading Rhetoric” 195). The rhetoricity of language is a means of making known the social nature of valuation, for what tropes are accepted, those which find buyers, subsequently reveal the rhetorical and persuasive nature inherent within the linguistic combinations of human language adopted by that society at that time. The social nature of language discloses the inherent potential persuasive and rhetorical elements when enacted through choices made by the “taste of the many” (Nietzsche, “Lecture Notes on Rhetoric” 108). Such a concession to the guiding influence of the herd or society and community in determination of meaning also limits the scope of subjectivity as the dominant interpreter of meaning, value, and rhetoricity within the activity of human language, activity that occurs between persons, texts, and times.

Another important component of de Man’s analysis, which Thomas critiques, refers to the disembedded nature of rhetoric from Nietzsche’s tasks. Failing to see how Nietzsche employed rhetoric limits how one can infer Nietzsche’s theory of rhetoric. On
the other hand, Thomas takes the approach of joining rhetoric to Nietzsche’s work, “rather than relating rhetoric to structure [as de Man does through his separation of trope and persuasion], Nietzsche set out to relate rhetoric to perspective” (“Reading De Man Reading Rhetoric” 196). This connection is crucial in that it explains Nietzsche’s approach through his use of rhetoric within his works, showing that rhetoric also carries an inherently hermeneutic element in its nature, as Nietzsche’s recurring emphasis on perspectivism shows. Perspective can only be ascertained through acknowledgement of the rhetoric one employs in describing their hermeneutic standpoint. Announcing the biases from which a perspective operates implicitly announces the values and judgment enacted through its articulation and adoption or rejection when engaging the question demanding response. Perspectivism requires awareness of the embedded nature of communicative activity that speaks and writes from and to and with perspectives such as time, place, gender, class, etc., perspectives that simultaneously describe and prescribe.

Thomas’s book, the only book-length study of Nietzsche within communication and rhetorical studies, further develops this link between rhetoric and hermeneutics by claiming

Nietzsche’s contribution […] amounts to a deconstruction of Platonic philosophy—an inversion of the value hierarchy that places truth and essences prior to interpretation—and a theory of interpretation that follows the logic of the supplement, demonstrating how Platonic truth is always an artistic construction of the human subject. (Reading Nietzsche Rhetorically 1)
Rhetoric serves as the basis of philosophical argument as each truth appears as a construction of human art. Argument becomes more a productive practice of aesthetic appeals than dispute between competing epistemological claims. The action of rhetoric is thereby “marked by overflowing possibility, wherein the experience of one’s emotions and imagination, rather than the empirical experience of “historical accuracy,” is the guiding force” (Thomas, *Reading Nietzsche Rhetorically* 4). What Nietzsche offers then is a dramatizing of the interpretative process, “It is frequently the very process of engaging the thought, the idea, the text, or the language that constitutes an argument itself” (Thomas, *Reading Nietzsche Rhetorically* 5). Reading becomes an action driven by emotion, dictated by *pathos*, not *logos*. As a result we reach the gray poststructuralist conclusion that “truth is revealed as a human, artistic creation both freed from and bound to the constraints of language as a representational medium” (Thomas, *Reading Nietzsche Rhetorically* 13). As truth becomes an act of creation and not discovery, philosophy becomes the pawn of rhetoric rather the traditional situating of rhetoric as handmaid to philosophy.

The revised rhetoric Thomas claims Nietzsche provides is “a rhetoric of value, which is at once a questioning of the origins of values and a problematizing of the process by which we create values in the world” (Thomas, *Reading Nietzsche Rhetorically* 15). The inquiry into the values that undergird perspectives places “the ground on which one evaluates interpretations of discourse” open to question (Thomas, *Reading Nietzsche Rhetorically* 41). Thomas claims that

For the rhetorician, Nietzsche’s arguments provide answers to two essential questions: What does it mean to have a rhetorical epistemology?
and What does it mean to do rhetorical inquiry? (Thomas, *Reading Nietzsche Rhetorically* 41)

Thomas claims that Nietzsche affirms the placement for decision-making criteria firmly within the social sphere. Additionally, Thomas claims that Nietzsche’s thought calls forward a “new sense of inquiry [. . .] characterized by the absence of metaphysical and ontological claims, which are replaced by a controlling epistemology of untruth, grounded in the simulacrum” (*Reading Nietzsche Rhetorically* 41). Thomas states, quoting Deleuze, that the simulacrum is, “‘an image without resemblance [. . .] always engulfed in dissimilarity’” (*Reading Nietzsche Rhetorically* 40). The simulacrum provides an alternative to the constricting limits of dialectic hobbled as it rests upon false opposites and dichotomies. There exists no truth/untruth, only truths and/or untruths determined by the time and context at which the question is open to interpretation and the will of the interpreters. According to Thomas, Nietzsche’s thought and works are then grounded “in a rhetorical epistemology of perspectivism, which affirms the power of the simulacrum and provides such a basis for inquiry and critique” (*Reading Nietzsche Rhetorically* 41). The goal of this practice of inquiry and critique “is the reversal of Platonism” (Thomas, *Reading Nietzsche Rhetorically* 41). A reversal characterized by admission of the inherently contingent, rhetorical plays of truths as linguistic constructions, not Truth as unquestioned fact of existence knowable only through reason and dialectical discovery.

Therefore, what does this reversal achieve for rhetoric, as human will and experience become the arbiters of decision-making and not Truth? Nietzsche invites participation into the ‘dangerous maybe’ of the creation of truth through the metaphorical
process of translating thought, feeling, impulse, into human language (Thomas, *Reading Nietzsche Rhetorically* 72). The determination of what is true or false rests within the social sphere as a question of *kairos*. As Thomas concludes, time “determines the functions of language, art, Truth, danger, vision, and ultimately, style” (*Reading Nietzsche Rhetorically* 170). Time perceived within the community determines whether a message’s style provides a fitting response to a present exigence.

Therefore, Thomas’ argument claims a Nietzschean rhetoric provides insight into how we negotiate meaning within community (Thomas, *Reading Nietzsche Rhetorically* 173). Also, theoretical insights develop from the dual nature of the rhetorical enterprise so conceived. “As endorsement, Nietzsche asks us to change the way we live in the world, to embrace art and illusion, to advocate risk and danger, to place ourselves beyond good and evil” (Thomas, *Reading Nietzsche Rhetorically* 174). Nietzsche asks us to abandon Plato and embrace Protagoras as we remake truth in our time, as context and not essence, serves as the arbiter of truth. Second, as critique, Nietzsche provides a revised rhetoric as a means to investigate the social construction and negotiation of the world through language “without the blinders of metaphysics or negation. It is a freedom from the ascetic ideal that has dominated contemporary Western thought and has poisoned rhetoric as philosophy’s other” (Thomas, *Reading Nietzsche Rhetorically* 174). Rhetoric and its eternal process of revision become Nietzsche’s legacy, the compelling call for the conversation to continue.

**Reversals: Resituating Rhetoric as Deconstruction**

The engagement with contemporary scholarly work shifts to work by Heckman as his article illustrates how scholars explicitly link Nietzsche, Derrida’s deconstruction, and
rhetoric. The essay follows a path similar to Thomas’s in its origin, growing out of a disagreement with de Man’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s essay, “On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense.” Turning to “a somewhat finer net” than de Man’s reading affords, Heckman claims that Derrida’s process of “questioning the metaphors that structure philosophical discourse” offers greater understanding of Nietzsche’s argumentative process in “On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense” (Heckman, “Nietzsche’s Clever Animal” 303; 304). Metaphor, a term that inherently defies definition, constructs the bridge between philosophy and rhetoric. For as Derrida notes in describing metaphor, “What is defined, therefore, is implied in the defining of the definition” (“White Mythology” 230). The core claim being that metaphors are offered to define metaphor itself, in seeking to define metaphor one cannot avoid using the idea being defined, metaphors, in their definition (“Nietzsche’s Clever Animal” 303). It is this circularity that draws Heckman to the thesis of his essay that the relationship between words and what they claim to represent is a metaphorical relationship, “So it is the metaphorical character of our knowledge that guarantees our incapacity to attain the truth” (“Nietzsche’s Clever Animal” 311). This insight Heckman claims Nietzsche articulates in the famous section from “On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense.”

What therefore is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms: in short a sum of human relations which became poetically and rhetorically intensified, metamorphosed [übertragen], adorned, and after long usage seem to a nation fixed, canonic and binding; truths are illusions of which one has forgotten that they are illusions; worn-out [abgenutzt] metaphors which have become powerless to affect
the senses; coins which have their obverse effaced and now are no longer of account as coins but merely as metal. (Nietzsche as qtd. in Heckman 311)

This consequence reiterates an important point made by Thomas in his disagreement with de Man; one must always acknowledge the great social value Nietzsche placed upon rhetoric and hence, penultimate rhetorical claims, those to truth. Such validity rests not in theory but in use in the public sphere as effaced coins purchase no capital so dead metaphors gain no ear.

Despite these revolutionary insights into the nature of the relationship between word and meaning, ultimately the problem remains: how can one argue for literal truth? Heckman claims that according to Nietzsche at least within “On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense” one cannot. Yet results are not the focus of Heckman’s inquiry, it is the insights that Nietzsche brings forward that deserve greater attention. Of Nietzsche’s essay Heckman claims “the text enacts precisely the predicament it describes” (“Nietzsche’s Clever Animal” 318). The irony of this turning over of the metaphorical nature of Nietzsche’s rhetorical claims is that it concludes along similar lines to those of de Man, supporting a deconstructive reading. As Heckman concludes, "For if the message concerns the impossibility of literal truth, the point cannot be made in a literal manner” otherwise it contradicts itself (“Nietzsche’s Clever Animal” 319). It cannot disclose that which through its saying it denies exists.

Therefore Nietzsche’s claims ultimately contradict themselves just as Derrida illustrated that philosophical definitions of metaphor contradict themselves by employing the idea being defined in its definition, in essence leaving a self-defining definition of the
idea being defined. Therefore, if this is the case, Nietzsche’s text “must insist on the subversion of its own literal message; this is in order to show what cannot be described” (“Nietzsche’s Clever Animal” 319). Although this leaves the matter unsettled, Heckman states that “[. . .] the extent that he makes us aware of the issue, Nietzsche fully deserves our attention” (“Nietzsche’s Clever Animal” 319). This attention is centered on the impossibility of communicating that which Nietzsche’s texts claim to communicate.

The irony of the circular path of Heckman’s analysis foreshadows undercurrents in several of the studies of Nietzsche’s rhetorical theory and practice in the special issue of Philosophy and Rhetoric devoted to him in 1994. We begin at the beginning of this special issue with Conway’s article, “Parastrategesis, Or: Rhetoric for Decadents.” Conway’s article revolves around the idea of parastrategesis, which he defines as “a rhetorical method he [Nietzsche] develops in order to circumvent the deleterious formative influence of his own decadence” (“Parastrategesis” 181). Given this identification of Nietzsche’s method, decadence becomes a central concern as “he attempts to create the sort of readers who will detect, and correct for, his own complicity in the decadence of modernity” (“Parastrategesis” 181). So why would Nietzsche call for his readers to treat his works for their decadence? Why did not he edit and remedy the symptoms? Because as Conway notes, Nietzsche freely admitted, “I am, no less than Wagner, a child of his time, a decadent” (Nietzsche, The Case of Wagner, preface). Yet why would Nietzsche adopt such a concern for lack of proper style as central to the “critical apparatus” of his “post-Zarathustran philosophy” (“Parastrategesis” 181)? How could such a lack be discerned if style was a contingent affair of relativistic adjustment to circumstance?
To answer these questions we turn to Conway’s definition of decadence as the core symptom of Modernity.

Nietzsche understands decadence as an internal, “physiological,” disarray that involves, in alternative expressions, “the degeneration of the instincts [Instinkt-Entartung]” (TI 9:41), or “the disregaration of the instincts” (TI 9:35). He also offers the following two “formulae of decadence”:

“Instinctively to choose what is harmful for oneself” (TI 9:35); and the need to “fight the instincts” (TI 2:11). Modernity, he claims in his post-Zarathustrian writings, is an epoch beset by creeping decay, which can be neither reversed nor arrested. Any attempt to implement political countermeasures will only exacerbate the decadence of modernity and hasten its advance. Modernity shares this fate, we now learn, with its greatest critic. (“Parastrategesis” 182)

The consequences of Nietzsche’s self-diagnosis as an arch-decadent are many. Conway claims that for Nietzsche he must “relinquish all claims to rhetorical mastery, for he cannot enforce an effective distinction between esoteric and exoteric teachings” (“Parastrategesis”182). Therefore, the distinction between the “many,” the real herd audience and the “few,” the ideal audience, dissolves so only misunderstanding follows in the wake of this overturning of distinctions and cues to interpreting Nietzsche’s works. Nietzsche’s works become decadent in style as their words turn on each other and foster chaos of meaning. Because the irony of his ideas is no longer able to be discerned, there is now no way to distinguish between literal and ironical, between what may be intended within a horizon of significance and what is being criticized in the rhetorical flourishes of
Nietzsche’s diseased style. Nietzsche’s works deconstruct themselves as they deconstruct the traditions upon which they are built and only subjective relativism and the absence of meaning retain meaning.

Therefore if rhetorical mastery means what Conway claims, “the strategic deployment in the service of larger political ends” (“Parastrategesis” 182-3), Nietzsche “serves merely as a vessel or medium for the esoteric wisdom he bears” (“Parastrategesis” 187), the significance of this wisdom left for his disciples to enact. “He is dependent upon his readers not only to continue the epochal work he begins, but also to bring it to fruition” (“Parastrategesis” 188). The results of his labor would not be realized in the audience of his modern world but could only emerge through his posthumous birth in a postmodern age for Nietzsche “makes the parastrategic dimension possible, while his readers make it actual” (“Parastrategesis” 190). In a note following this quote, Conway states that his “account of Nietzsche’s parastrategesis is indebted to the constellation of readerly strategies collected under the general rubric of ’deconstruction’” (“Parastrategesis” 200). As is common, Conway aligns Nietzsche’s rhetoric with deconstruction. Deconstruction of Nietzsche’s texts, as Conway claims Nietzsche encourages his readers to do to complete his texts and cure the decadence of his style which he himself cannot escape, “initiates [. . .] a heroic, manly agon, wherein worthy successors are molded through mutually empowering contests with their master” (“Parastrategesis” 192). Nietzsche apparently envisioned his readers and successors as what Conway terms “a knightly vanguard of warrior-genealogists” (“Parastrategesis” 191). Readers who would carry on the war on meaning Nietzsche inaugurates in his own deconstruction of the inherent decadence within his diseased style.
However, could Nietzsche’s readers and followers have betrayed his trust and by ignoring his direction have turned the “insider outside” away-unfulfilled (“Parastrategesis” 194)? According to Conway, the grand experiment Nietzsche sought to complete in his readers perhaps as Frankenstein hoped to author through the monster dies stillborn. Conway characterizes Nietzsche’s “actual readers” not as “warrior-genealogists” but rather as “creatures of ressentiment, versed in the “effeminate” arts of subterfuge, duplicity, and deception” (“Parastrategesis”197). Despite this record of abysmal failure in accomplishing his alleged task, Conway concludes by stating that “Nietzsche has in fact exerted a powerful influence on the course of twentieth-century thought, and he commands an ever growing influence as we approach the millennium” (“Parastrategesis” 197). On the other hand, given the critique the article proffers, Conway claims on the last page that the fact that Nietzsche “has been lionized by sundry permutations of the reviled “man of ressentiment,” is, finally, beside the point” (“Parastrategesis” 198). “In the end, Nietzsche may be ‘born posthumously’ after all, in spite of himself” (“Parastrategesis” 198). Alternatively, perhaps “Nietzsche may be ‘born posthumously’” in spite of the caricatures deconstructive readings tease from his thought.

The link between genealogy and deconstructive interpretation forms the core of Claudia Crawford’s essay, “A Genealogy of Worlds According to Nietzsche.” Crawford explores the possibilities of Nietzsche’s genealogical division of worlds between being and becoming, appearance and the real, thought, language and the world symbolized. The significance of this course is that it claims to reveal the consequences of Nietzsche’s characterization of the world as will to power by seeking to create, “after Nietzsche’s
prompting, a genealogy of worlds” (Crawford “A Genealogy of Worlds According to Nietzsche” 202). The origination of these different worlds, the actual world, the world of becoming, the world of being, the ‘apparent’ world, and finally, the Dionysian world, Nietzsche’s affirmation of the reality of appearances, form this critical path (Crawford, “A Genealogy of Worlds According to Nietzsche” 202-17). The source of these divisions and possible falsifications parallels what Nietzsche posits as the misinterpretation of language as directly reflecting the reality it describes rather than recognizing the metaphorical and symbolic nature of human language (Crawford, “A Genealogy of Worlds According to Nietzsche” 203-04). What this rupture reveals for Crawford is the bases upon which to follow Nietzsche’s genealogy of worlds and the relation of this characterization of reality as will to power. Because of this rupture between sign and signified, between thinking and being, “[. . .] language and thinking are only fleeting fictional adaptations of the becoming of will to power [. . .] we and all our fictions are this will to power” (Crawford, “A Genealogy of Worlds According to Nietzsche” 208). Meaning in language manifested only through giving away to the dominant interpreting will to power.

The consequence Crawford’s view poses for interpretation of Nietzsche’s famous metaphor is that it emphasizes the danger inherent in his genealogical investigations. The danger of toppling worlds requires the recognition that all is fiction, which leaves no ground upon which to stand. As Crawford follows Nietzsche’s philological pretensions and deconstructive readings of the master myths of the world of being behind the sensual, natural world, she concludes that while “Heidegger still courts a ‘true’ world. For Nietzsche fictions are what we have and what we only always will have” (“A Genealogy
of Worlds According to Nietzsche” 212). Crawford’s readings seem to follow the circular path evidenced in Heckman’s and Conway’s previously noted scholarship, finding Nietzsche searching out ways to decipher and make meaning of what one perceives, floundering in attempts to author a formidable foundation for interpretation, judgment, and action other than merely subjective relativism. “For Nietzsche, appearance is also always necessarily disappearance—Being (permanence) cannot be” (Crawford, “A Genealogy of Worlds According to Nietzsche” 215). Therefore, the history of metaphysics and morality fail as systems of control over the chaos of meaning, of the supreme translations of the real into the contingent actual world we inhabit.

Crawford concludes that leaves us at the ledge of the deconstructive part of the process, “we are not yet at the realization of the ‘Dionysian’ world (D), where the ‘real’ world (C1) becomes ‘appearance’ (B1) affirmed. This would be a fiction of yet another order” (“A Genealogy of Worlds According to Nietzsche” 217). The genealogical critiques of Nietzsche revealed the false foundations of Western metaphysics and the erroneous interpretation of language as being, not as a socially contingent form of becoming, not merely symbolizing the ideas it metaphorically communicates. Now Nietzsche’s self-appointed task remains: how to move beyond the mere interplay of forces and competing wills to power?

How does the metaphor of will to power signal a natural evolution of multiplicity of ground when no metanarratives remain? Wills to power connected to a multiplicity of ground, revealing the other side of rhetoric—rhetoric as deconstruction, in addition to the traditional characterization of rhetoric as efforts at persuasion. However, the metaphor of will to power has been attached to Nietzsche with more overt clarity than Nietzsche
himself intended (Kaufmann, *Nietzsche* 247-54). Nietzsche utilizes the metaphor of will to power, not as a singly privileged metaphor, but rather as a metaphor of action articulating an ongoing struggle with difference and multiplicity.

**Nietzsche’s Task: Rhetoric as Social Strategy**

The importance of recognizing the material nature of language for Nietzsche’s practice of rhetoric recurs in Porter’s study, “Nietzsche’s Rhetoric: Theory and Strategy.” Nietzsche’s isolation of the material being of language and “affirmation of the rhetorical essence of language itself be part of a larger rhetorical strategy,” (Porter, “Nietzsche’s Rhetoric: Theory and Strategy” 221) that authors a critical “assault on inherited and habitual ways of imagining the world” (221). The association between form and content determines the contours of Nietzsche’s rhetoric as it does the exchange of all meaning through human language. “Rhetoric is “speech” through and through. *It is performativity, and not just the possibility, of discourse*” (Porter, “Nietzsche’s Rhetoric: Theory and Strategy” 237). It is the social and contingent nature of the performance of rhetoric that emphasizes and embodies the analogous social nature of interpretation.

Therefore, the task is framed by the context, the speech redefined and remade through its extension as it is interpreted; the meaning of the speech unfolded and augmented as it is shared among its audiences. As Porter later comments, “our reading of Nietzsche’s rhetoric would be incomplete were we to forget that the performative value of his writings *is* their rhetorical value, even when rhetoric is no longer the explicit theme” (“Nietzsche’s Rhetoric: Theory and Strategy” 241). While the only texts where Nietzsche explicitly discusses rhetoric remain his 1872-1874 lecture notes for a course
while teaching at the University of Basel, the rhetorical performances his works enact provide a rich field for inquiry.

Porter claims that emphasis upon the performative nature of Nietzsche’s rhetorical practice reveals “that language is uncontrollably historical, overlaid with inheritances, fraught with entanglements and contradictions that are of its nature only to the extent that it has no autonomous nature, but only a history” (“Nietzsche’s Rhetoric: Theory and Strategy” 241). Language as history brings forward not only the inherently rhetorical nature of language but also of interpretation. Meaning then becomes an *agon*, a contest whereby the truth emerges through the competing forces and perspectives vying to determine how events, persons, and ideas are to be remembered and understood.

That history . . . is comprised, variously, of memory traces and forgetfulness, conscious or otherwise. Nietzsche’s rhetorical artfulness consists in the attempt to awaken their memory, and to implicate both himself and the reader in them. Reading Nietzsche, then, is like a perilous balancing act: one is forever in want of ground on which to stand.

(Porter, “Nietzsche’s Rhetoric: Theory and Strategy” 241)

Nietzsche’s rhetorical performances then enact his genealogical investigations, seeking to uncover the motives behind dominant perspectives, those rhetorical standpoints that attain power at different historical moments. However, it will be argued later in the present study that the unnoticed dialogic style of these performances reveal a potentially destructive and constructive rhetorical theory. Such a dialogic orientation to Nietzsche’s ideas activates its audiences to become part of the history of the process of language,
style, and meaning shifting with the tides of power and changing times by meeting the
difference these contexts disclose.

While the multifarious ways style reveals a dialogic tendency in Nietzsche’s
rhetorical performances will be developed later in this work, Gilmour addresses the
complimentary ways that style reveals more about the philosophical perspectives
Nietzsche develops to affirm life (246). Again, the conflict over the being of language
and the becoming of the reality it seeks to symbolize conflate the communication of truth
according to Nietzsche, “the truth about language (which Nietzsche attempts to capture in
language) is that language is incapable of capturing truth” (250). The question then
becomes how does Nietzsche attempt to address this paradox through his language,
which both helps and hinders communication?

A solution arises ironically as Gilmour notes how Nietzsche addresses ways
language frames the boundaries of human thought and how grammar drives ideas to
become concepts. Concepts being ideas that have garnered social acceptance and usage.
“The main point of all these observations is that Nietzsche’s various stylistic gestures
serve to defamiliarize the very activity of communication” (261). Defamiliarization then
personalizes language and demonstrates how Nietzsche’s “language calls into question
and interrupts the anesthetizing process of “socialization” to which, he says, all language
is suspect” (Gilmour 261). Socialization here functions as an error from Nietzsche’s
perspective as it yields to the falsification of the becoming of the real world through the
being of the falsified world of the systems and grammar of language, especially that of
metaphysics. Yet how can one escape the necessary lies of Western philosophy,
metaphysics, systems and grammar in order to communicate to others but through the shared systems of language that embody human thought and experience?

Gilmour claims Nietzsche seeks his answer and escape from this dilemma through recourse to the least socialized and most defamiliarized forms of language, poetry (266). Philosophy serves as a type of socialized language that needs to be cured of its false pretenses. To this end Gilmour claims that for Nietzsche “the ironic serves to bring philosophy back to its aesthetic origins, to “poetry” understood perhaps in the way Nietzsche understood it, “in the most radical sense of the word” (266). Evaluation of this aestheticizing process Gilmour places within his question, “To what ends, indeed, is Nietzsche’s speech shared” (266)? Gilmour’s conclusion remains mixed, in that while Nietzsche’s “essentially ambiguous, dissimulating character of his practice as a writer” leads often to obfuscation and illumination (266-67). Personalizing language thereby generates multiplicity of interpretations as the current state of Nietzsche scholarship indicates, some informative others less so depending upon the conditions in which and the perspective from which meeting occurs.

Kathleen Merrow confronts the ambiguities associated with Nietzsche’s many styles by suggesting that Nietzsche posits himself in *Ecce Homo* as an heir to the famed Greek orator, Demosthenes (285). The illumination of this self-styled genealogy of persuasion leads Merrow to suggest that in “choosing Demosthenes as alter ego for his own art of style . . . Nietzsche chooses to foreground truth as an effect of persuasion—just that aspect of rhetoric most troubling to the ‘philosophical Greeks’ and their descendants” (286). Merrow begins her genealogy of the influence or connection of Demosthenes with Nietzsche’s rhetoric from his early 1872-73 lecture notes claiming that
“Nietzsche’s early lectures become raw material for his later published works, which take the material in new directions” (287). This intertextual connection which Nietzsche himself encourages in his readers (On the Genealogy of Morals, preface 4) remains an important element of the dialogic quality of his style which will be developed later in the present study.

Contrary new directions that Merrow charts include ways Nietzsche cites the rhythms of becoming and appearance as tools to deconstruct traditional ideas of Truth as well as the opposition between philosophy and rhetoric. The central metaphor of rhythm associated with Demosthenes characterizes style but also “for Nietzsche . . . rhythm was the form of becoming itself and thus the world of appearances. . . . as the most primary sensation of time, as the very form of time at the very heart of cultural perception” (298). The kairotic nature of communicative activity of nonverbal gesture or tone of voice also plays a significant role in the evolution and evocation of style within rhetorical performance.

The significance of this perspective on style for interpretation of Nietzsche underlies his abiding contention that “truth “exists” only in and through form—that truth is made by the persuasion of style and form rather than simply decorated by them”(300). Through his conceptions of Dionysus and the metaphor of the will to power Nietzsche then revalues appearance and truth (304). “Nietzsche’s concept of the will to power then attempts to bring truth and deception, truth and persuasion, truth and style back together outside of the oppositions that were generated when Being and being came apart” (304). Truth and the sources and forms of its creation revolve around a contingent rhetorical poetical center. “Truth” is refigured by Nietzsche as a human poetic process: a “making
believe” rather than a process of discovery, a result with a history rather than an origin” (304). The will to power then changes as the rhythms of time change altering the truth that is made in different contexts. As Merrow concludes, “Nietzsche’s texts present a playful, cheerful affirmation of the worlds appearance, dissimulation—an artistic, creative attitude towards life and reality once it is grasped that values, truths, and selves are made, not found” (307). From a value perspective, the contingent world of becoming becomes the only real realm where truth can be fashioned, a world of possibility to be made and remade eternally through the changing poetic and rhetorical persuasion authored by competing perspectives that attain power.

The issue of power resonates with Bruner’s discussion of the convergence of the rhetorical and the political spheres in his use of Nietzsche’s rhetorical philosophy of language to ground limit work as a politicized form of rhetorical criticism in his 2002 Western Journal of Communication article, “Rhetorical Criticism as Limit Work.” Bruner explores how a wide array of thinkers including Kenneth Burke and Nietzsche “have analyzed and critiqued the discursive processes through which human subjectivity is constructed, maintained, and transformed, and in so doing have consistently pointed to a convergence between identity philosophy and “critical” rhetoric” (“Rhetorical Criticism as Limit Work” 281). Bruner sees in Nietzsche the acceptance and articulation of “the fundamentally metaphorical nature of language makes all meaning making rhetorical” (284). Working to expose the political ramifications of this aesthetic stance, Bruner emphasizes a connection to identity philosophy as he states: “The art of rhetoric, then, within Nietzsche’s philosophy of language, becomes the art of identity production and management” (284). If all ideas are at their core discursive creations why not identity,
both on personal and political planes? However, how can one ethically maneuver between the personal and the political given these parameters? Each choice of aesthetic construction involves a subsequent suppression of all other alternatives and each choice establishes “aesthetic, and politically and materially consequential limits” (285). Bruner argues that one space to seek guidance lies in the realm of failed dramatic discourse, not the traditional domain of successful speeches because “dramatically rejected speech signals a transgression of ideational limits” (286). Transgression of known limits then provides access to previously unknown corridors of idea creation through engaging dramatically rejected speech.

Recognition of the signs of rejected dramatic speech brings rhetoric into the “very heart of politics, for rhetorical criticism becomes the art of criticizing the function and relative virtue of limits and absences associated with being a citizen-subject” (Bruner 286). Bruner notes that the connection between rhetorical criticism and politics evolves out of the socially constructed meanings that enable communication and social evolution through “‘stabilizations’ (mutually recognize meanings)” (286). Stabilization then becomes a shifting mediational space for rhetorical criticism of political possibilities.

However, the notion of limit work augments this analysis by illustrating the limits these stabilizations also place on social discourse and decision making as well as how they can potentially enact negative hegemonic practices (Bruner 286). “As noted, limit work is based on the analysis of transgressive discourse, for it is through transgressions, or resistance, that limits are revealed” (Bruner 288). The absences these limits reveal demarcate orientations toward differences within different situations and also potentially “a great deal about constraints on subjects within the ideational (and material) economy”
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(Bruner 287). Bruner applies the insights gained from the use of rhetorical criticism augmented by the lens of limit work and identity philosophy to national identity construction processes in various rhetorical situations such as 1988 West Germany, 1993 Russia, and 1995 Quebec (290-95). The goal of these studies serves to reinforce the importance of maintaining possibility for continued progress and the opportunity to change when situations dictate. “The primary goal of limit work is to maintain a critical practice that keeps those articulations from devolving into socially destructive certainties” (Bruner 296). Freedom involves opportunity for self-creation, interpretation, criticism, and expression within the social sphere.

To impose a single ideational identity upon all parties in a particular social or national setting destroys the potential artful living Nietzsche and others call for, what the human and democratic spirit calls for in the “endlessly limiting process of identity formation” (Bruner 295-96). Limit work as rhetorical criticism offers a means to analyze and help protect the democratic principle in the practice of public persuasion and assure a place for minority perspectives in social discourse.

**Implications**

The first path of rhetorical studies of Nietzsche articulates the recurring influence of deconstructive interpretations and appropriations of Nietzsche as a seminal source within major proponents of this approach, especially De Man and Derrida. However, these approaches have been increasingly called into question by recent Anglo-American philosophical studies of Nietzsche (Leiter, *Nietzsche on Morality* 3). As the present
chapter shows, deconstructive approaches take little account of Nietzsche’s prominent concern with value and morality, among other issues.

Chapter Three will therefore expand the scope of potential contributions of Nietzsche’s thought for communication and rhetorical studies. Chapter Three traces the final three discernible paths that serve as the roots of contemporary rhetorical readings of Nietzsche. They likewise function as the background, the said, that will help inform and propel the present inquiry into Nietzsche’s corpus and how his thought offers a dialogic alternative to the academic deconstructive stance dominating interpretation of his thought within the discipline. This interpreting otherwise of Nietzsche presents an architectonic rhetoric and communication ethic that affirms life through its meeting of difference. To ground our reading, we now turn to this scholarly background. Rhetorical scholarship as said provides added texture to the present study's articulation of Nietzsche’s architectonic rhetoric of dialogic meeting generating meaning through meeting difference in the temporal, existential moment after illusion. In the spirit of Nietzsche, chapter three does what Nietzsche did as it provides a dialogic reading of Nietzsche’s ideas in a time of recognized multiplicity.
Chapter Three: Hermeneutic Background for Interpreting Nietzsche Otherwise

Chapter two articulates Nietzsche’s rhetoric as clearly aimed at one rhetorical task, disarming and dishonoring of a societal lie undergirded by a metanarrative that is no more. In the spirit of Nietzsche, chapter three deconstructs deconstruction moving from technique to implication. The question this chapter addresses is when viewed from a constructive framework, what is pointed to by this unknowing dialogic ethics prophet?

Continuing exploration through a saying of the said of the final threefold roots of rhetorical studies of Nietzsche serves as the topic of Chapter Three. Having discussed the foundational concerns with defining and theorizing about how rhetoric works through the prism of Nietzsche’s writings, we move to related theoretical concerns. Influences of perspective emerge as primary concerns in seeking where to situate Nietzsche, either as the author of a rhetoric concerned mostly with aesthetics, epistemology, as a precursor to Burke’s rhetorical work, and alternatively, as providing ground for the construction of an ethic of rhetoric. Discussion of these final threefold roots of contemporary rhetorical studies of Nietzsche frames the background against which the present study responds. This analysis lays out a foreground of Nietzsche’s contributions to rhetoric as a task primarily concerned with the creation and communication of meaning drawn from the meeting of difference in dialogue. Dialogic meeting then serves as a textured metaphor of an architectonic rhetoric and anchor Nietzsche’s contributions toward a constructive communication ethic for a postmodern historical moment after illusion unmasked amid metanarrative disintegration.
Introduction

Continuing the saying of the said from the previous chapter, we build upon the foundation laid by those seeking to discern the definition, theory, and praxial discoveries of scholars writing on Nietzsche. The saying of the final three roots of rhetorical scholarship on Nietzsche seeks to define the background against which the present study and its concerns develop interpreting Nietzsche otherwise than from the deconstructive hermeneutic bias. Discussion of major themes within discovery of a Nietzschean rhetoric, the final three roots further extend these possibilities. Growing out of the defining of rhetoric from the previous chapter there surfaces a lingering debate over the primary focus of Nietzsche’s writings in authoring either an epistemic or an aesthetic rhetoric. The situating of Nietzsche’s rhetoric within a primarily aesthetic or epistemic focus implies important consequences into seeing or effacing concerns at the heart of any rhetorical communication: ethics, values, and the awareness of audience, with each perspective offering allegedly dramatically different perspectives from which to speak.

Other alternative perspectives emerge on rhetoric when situating Nietzsche against some of its most noted scholars, for example, tracing the Nietzschean roots of Kenneth Burke’s writings on rhetoric. The final alternative opens out of engagement with the fourth and final root of scholarly inquiry on Nietzsche, inquiry into Nietzsche and the ethics of rhetoric. This path centers on work by two scholars, McGuire, and Hawes. McGuire authors the only article in the discipline to explore in depth the possibilities of constructing an ethic of rhetoric culled from Nietzsche’s works. Hawes extends this line of though by linking elements of Bakhtin’s ideas on dialogue with Nietzsche’s rhetoric on values and morals. These two works close the said of Nietzsche
within communication and rhetorical studies as they open the turn from background to foreground. These scholarly encounters mark the turn to dialogic meeting of Nietzsche’s corpus and the primary concerns of the present study. Nietzsche’s writings and the possibilities they accord understanding of the interplay of dialogue and rhetoric, the unbreakable union shared with communication ethics, a connection it will be claimed Nietzsche consistently explored even if such a seminal concern has not noted the same level of scholarly attention within the discipline.

**Nietzsche as Advocate for an Aesthetic or Epistemic View of Rhetoric?**

The question of theoretical ground shaping Nietzschean rhetoric traces the directions of work which posits Nietzsche as a contested point of entry in the heated debate over the possible epistemological character of rhetoric or whether Nietzsche offers through his writings an alternative aesthetic characterization of rhetoric. This path chronicles the continuing debate between Poulakos and Whitson et al., McGuire, Thomas, and Hikins. Poulakos and Whitson et al., McGuire, and Thomas all affirm Poulakos and Whitson’s seminal 1993 *Quarterly Journal of Speech* article, “Nietzsche and the Aesthetics of Rhetoric,” claiming Nietzsche’s works offer evidence for articulating an aesthetic characterization of rhetoric. Hikins serves as the foil for this approach, cast as the “epistemic pest” (Ayotte, Poulakos, and Whitson 121) who claims that rather, Nietzsche provides the foundation for an eristic epistemic characterization of rhetoric (Hikins, “Nietzsche, Eristic, and the Rhetoric of the Possible” 354). Hikins later affirms that “Nietzsche has been catapulted to the center of discussion in rhetorical theory” (“The Seductive Waltz” 380). Hikins here concludes that closer attention to Nietzsche’s later
works often left mostly unnoticed by rhetoricians yields a “new philosophical foundation for rhetoric,” leading to “a very different rhetorical epistemology” (Hikins, “The Seductive Waltz” 395-96). Hikins names this new epistemology “rhetorical perspectivism” that seeks the “processural evoking of knowledge through the discursive comparison and contrast of multiple perspectives” (“The Seductive Waltz” 396). Therefore, we begin to view this localized strand of scholarly debate on Nietzsche’s ideas as a source for an aesthetic or epistemic based rhetoric.

**Nietzsche’s Rhetoric as Creating Art: A Celebration and Critique**

Poulakos and Whitson inaugurate this line of inquiry by invoking Nietzsche as a source that authors an aesthetic alternative to the debate over the epistemic nature of rhetoric. Welcoming Scott’s “recantation” regarding rhetoric as epistemic Poulakos and Whitson build upon “Nietzsche’s critique of epistemology” which they claim “makes rhetoric into an artistic, not an epistemological enterprise” (“Nietzsche and the Aesthetics of Rhetoric” 132). The refutation of epistemology evolves out of the Nietzschean assumption that “art, not truth, . . . serves the purposes of human life . . . it goes on to suggest that any and all epistemologizing relies on unrecognized aesthetic impulses” (“Nietzsche and the Aesthetics of Rhetoric” 132). Thereby the authors conclude “Nietzsche provides a discursive lifeboat for all who have abandoned the ship of epistemics” (“Nietzsche and the Aesthetics of Rhetoric” 132). Aesthetic concerns then usurp the throne as the guiding light of rhetorical invention, judgment, and performance.

The grounds for the rejection of the epistemic nature of rhetoric in favor of an aesthetic rhetoric must be made clear from the outset as they serve as the seminal point of stasis between these competing perspectives. Nietzsche according to Poulakos and
Whitson rejects epistemology because “Knowing the “real” or seeing “the same real properties” is nothing but a subject’s attempt to construe “all the rest of the world from its own viewpoint. . . .” (Nietzsche, *Will to Power* 636 qtd. in “Nietzsche and the Aesthetics of Rhetoric” 133). At the center of this debate lays the conception of knowledge as either a stable entity, which can be possessed and known or rather as a continuing process of competing claims of knowledge seeking to gain adherence and acceptance, to prove their right to be called ‘true.’ Truth then becomes determined not by recourse to an objective reality but rather to the subjective judgment of a localized audience and their response to the art of persuasive argument offered it.

Consequently rhetoric exists inherent to the ways of knowing as it becomes inseparable from the ways of interpreting and communicating what one perceives from a single perspective in a given context or time. Alternatively, from the traditional philosophical perspective of the Western Platonic tradition, rhetoric merely serves as a veneer to embellish and persuade one of the real ‘truth’ that exists independently of any claims made describing or arguing for its veracity. The consequences of this revision of traditional Platonic thinking which Nietzsche asserts emphasizes the inherent and determinative social and public characteristics of what “knowledge” represents, “If self-consciousness is the outcome of social interactions, then it is the “we” that makes the “I” (“Nietzsche and the Aesthetics of Rhetoric” 135). The self originates not in the unconscious or subconscious realm but through consciousness of one’s social self, how one interprets oneself based upon information gained from the situation one temporarily inhabits.
However, Poulakos and Whitson follow Nietzsche closely and do not claim that this implies a complete rejection of the possibility of knowledge; rather they reject one traditional Western Platonic characterization of knowledge.

By questioning the very possibility of knowledge, Nietzsche probes the aesthetic presuppositions of knowing. In so doing he argues that no epistemic project can denounce its artistic origins [. . .] For Nietzsche, rhetoric is not an epistemological undertaking but rather part of a greater artistic act—the act of ordering the chaos of life. (“Nietzsche and the Aesthetics of Rhetoric” 136)

All acts of communication then become part of the inherently rhetorical process of shaping and conveying knowledge through the art of constructing knowledge, through the signs and symbols of human language and discourse. These artistically created metaphorical forms shape human thought and speech for it is only through these forms that we may come to know. At ground, knowledge cannot escape the inherently metaphorical and artistic nature of human language through which it is made known.

Accordingly, the artistic not the epistemological criterion becomes penultimate as “What we call knowledge, then, is a gestalt of effective aesthetic appearances created to satisfy people’s needs for life” (“Nietzsche and the Aesthetics of Rhetoric” 138).

Rhetoric arises out of a communal or social need, the need for the translation of a perspective from the intra- to the interpersonal domain. “Language operates rhetorically because it highlights only one out of countless perspectives and because it transforms perceptual limitations into significations. Language, then, is rhetorical because it signifies one’s preferred view of something” (“Nietzsche and the Aesthetics of Rhetoric”
139). Rhetoric enables the communication of preference between persons enabling argument and the possibility of choice between competing perspectives. According to Nietzsche’s skepticism regarding knowing, knowledge of a perspective is all the knowledge to which humans have access, access granted through organizing the chaos of the material world into the socially agreed upon and accepted forms of cultural, contextualized human language, or the art of rhetoric.

The organizing and ordering function of language achieved through rhetoric implies distance and separation as Nietzsche notes "[a]ll knowledge originates from separation, delimitation, and restriction; there is not absolute knowledge of the whole" (Nietzsche qtd. in Poulakos and Whitson, “Nietzsche and the Aesthetics of Rhetoric” 140). The emphasis upon the aesthetic nature of language, how signs and symbols represent metaphorically the ideas, persons, things, and events of which they are comprised, becomes the ground of judging arguments. As recognition and understanding of difference serves as the seedbed of knowledge, aesthetic evaluation and judgment becomes the criteria of contingent truth, what moves a particular audience validates.

Therefore, knowledge of rhetoric or the construction of an aesthetically satisfactory appeal to truth or knowing through artistic means derives from its public results. While epistemic rhetoric is said to speak to the “world’s inner logic with a cerebral language said to correspond to it. . . . By contrast, aesthetic rhetoric draws its strength from seeing an audience affected by its message” (“Nietzsche and the Aesthetics of Rhetoric” 141). Hence as there is no knowledge of the whole, there are no collective standards, and rhetoric emerges out of its success in specific situations. A shift in
perspective on what rhetoric is occurs through this movement from epistemic concerns to aesthetic concerns. Poulakos and Whitson state

the project of rhetoric changes significantly the moment we ask not what is known but how a language utters the hitherto unsaid, and in so doing how it unsettles familiar propositions of truth or knowledge. For our part, we are not saying that there is no relation between listener and speech, reader and text, subject and object; what we are saying is that in all three cases the relations obtain aesthetically. (“Nietzsche and the Aesthetics of Rhetoric” 143)

All knowledge created through the metaphors and tropes that adorn and order human thought as it is translated into language, comprise the domain of rhetoric as choice becomes a question of which aesthetic appearance persuades and which fails. Each act of language implies an audience, those localized audiences then become the standard against which one measures the success or art of their words.

Reclaiming Rhetoric as Nietzsche’s Epistemic Quest

However, James W. Hikins interrupts the funeral march for rhetoric as epistemic with two articles in response to the aesthetic rhetoric perspective Poulakos and Whitson argue Nietzsche offers. Hikins first counters “Nietzschean aestheticism” with claims that Nietzsche offers an epistemologically grounded eristic rhetoric in contrast to the aesthetic option brought forward by Poulakos and Whitson (“Nietzsche, Eristic, and the Rhetoric of the Possible” 353, 353-77). Then in his second 1999 reply to Poulakos and Whitson, Hikins claims that Nietzsche’s later writings revalue his earlier notions of truth and
rhetoric as especially presented through his early writings and lecture notes on rhetoric ("The Seductive Waltz" 380-99). The significance of these revisions illustrates Nietzsche authoring a rhetorical epistemology of perspectivism.

Hikins begins his description of an eristic rhetoric culled from Nietzsche’s writings by identifying the ground from which he perceives Nietzsche works. Quoting Nehamas, Hikins notes Nietzsche’s multiple styles are “that ‘facts are precisely what there is not, only interpretations” (Nehamas as qtd. in Hikins, “Nietzsche, Eristic, and the Rhetoric of the Possible” 356). This theoretical standpoint defines Nietzsche’s critique of the traditional Western Platonic philosophic tradition and is said to serve as “Nietzsche’s tool for disassembling philosophy” (Hikins, “Nietzsche, Eristic, and the Rhetoric of the Possible” 357). Hikins defines this unique variety of rhetoric as implying not an aesthetic but rather an “Eristic rhetoric” (Hikins, “Nietzsche, Eristic, and the Rhetoric of the Possible” 357). For Hikins, Eristic rhetoric is

an imaginative art, driven by strife and discord and characterized by play (as in playing a game), whose object or telos is the momentary securing of a perspective, that is, a transient realization of a point of view or attitude, typically expressed via the modality of the sublime [. . .] the principal goal of Eristic is constructive in its efforts to explore facets of imaginable, alternative worlds, fictive domains erected by means of the Eristic. Eristic seeks to capture, if even momentarily, the sense of a world other than that described by a given culture at any point in history. In short, the competent practitioner of Eristic is a master of the possible [. . .] Eristic transforms this proclivity for the possible into an archetypal rhetorical
Therefore, unlike the traditional philosophical method of dialectic, eristic rhetoric does not seek adherence or a final solution but rather to discover and state possibilities that arise in a given situation (Hikins, “Nietzsche, Eristic, and the Rhetoric of the Possible” 358). Yet can any contest involving language ever really lose completely a concern with the forms that touch the ear, mind, and heart of the audience, are these not inseverable from the threads that bind rhetorical communication?

However, the means through which hearers are persuaded of the existence of these alternatives is the aesthetic domain, “the Eristic art transcends the dialectical by virtue of the aesthetic—it becomes aestheticism” (Hikins, “Nietzsche, Eristic, and the Rhetoric of the Possible” 359). The point turns on how Hikins situates eristic rhetoric in relation to epistemology and argumentation as he proffers his initial response to Poulakos and Whitson. Hikins claims that Poulakos and Whitson in following Nietzsche undercut their own perspective on rhetoric as anti-epistemic in that “any artistic performance requires a context of reality” (Hikins, “Nietzsche, Eristic, and the Rhetoric of the Possible” 364). Any aesthetic performance is grounded in or implies a specific perspective on contested ideas such as truth, knowledge, or reality (Hikins, “Nietzsche, Eristic, and the Rhetoric of the Possible” 364). “In other words, reality constrains aestheticism” (Hikins, “Nietzsche, Eristic, and the Rhetoric of the Possible” 364). Hikins contends that the main premise of Poulakos and Whitson is flawed, “Aestheticism thus cannot replace or “oppose” knowledge with art, for art is essentially dependent on knowledge” (Hikins, “Nietzsche, Eristic, and the Rhetoric of the Possible” 364). Art
becomes a type or variety of knowledge as eristic becomes a type or variety of rhetoric, each inescapably relies to some extent upon knowledge.

Hikins then concludes his first counter-argument against the proposed aesthetic rhetoric with the claim that ultimately what is called for is a “knowledge-oriented rhetoric” (Hikins, “Nietzsche, Eristic, and the Rhetoric of the Possible” 371). Such an epistemologically oriented rhetoric differs in three main ways from an aesthetically oriented rhetoric according to Hikins. First, a knowledge-oriented rhetoric “holds the incorporation of knowledge in discourse (as a component of the grounds for human action) as a chief goal” (Hikins, “Nietzsche, Eristic, and the Rhetoric of the Possible” 371). Second, a knowledge-oriented rhetoric “views knowledge as cumulative, building subsequent discursive inquiry on previous knowledge . . . it recognizes that some knowledge claims may well be mistaken . . . as the discursive process reinspects the stock of knowledge, erroneous claims are culled out” (Hikins, “Nietzsche, Eristic, and the Rhetoric of the Possible” 371). “Third, a knowledge-oriented rhetoric recognizes that a rhetor’s aesthetic choices must be tempered by an understanding of the consequences of the “sensual process of seduction” beyond rhetorical efficacy” (Hikins, “Nietzsche, Eristic, and the Rhetoric of the Possible” 371). Granted that rhetors choose what to name and explain about a situation, a knowledge–oriented rhetoric has the added benefit of recognizing the ethical responsibilities that adhere to one’s discursive choices. Choices which enact ethical consequences beyond the mere aesthetic criterion of discourse achieving persuasion or not (Hikins, “Nietzsche, Eristic, and the Rhetoric of the Possible” 371). Judgment between competing rhetorical claims then falls outside the bounds of art or within the domain of ethics, between truth and lies.
Therefore truth reappears as a point of contention between these competing varieties of rhetoric as knowledge influences judgment that implies a social basis for justification of choice and action. According to Hikins, while Poulakos and Whitson posit Nietzsche “as an archenemy of truth” they fail to consult opposing views as those offered by Maudemarie Clark. Hikins cites Clark’s contention that Nietzsche later rejected his early position on truth and that further research in his later works might discover the “grounds (suggested even Eristically!) for a Nietzschean *epistemic* rhetoric—one producing truth and knowledge?” (Hikins, “Nietzsche, Eristic, and the Rhetoric of the Possible” 371) Yet, could this miss the distinction between rhetoric as a producer and servant of knowledge, knowledge that does not equal truth?

While a knowledge-oriented rhetoric may account for and dispute claims of truth or lie, Hikins claims that an aesthetic rhetoric which opposes art to knowledge “ignores the ethics of *rhetoric* completely” (Hikins, “Nietzsche, Eristic, and the Rhetoric of the Possible” 371). Because an aesthetic rhetoric as envisioned by Poulakos and Whitson “is *exclusively effects oriented*” Hikins claims it invites ethical abuse as truth entails only the success, not the propriety of the discourse given the situation (Hikins, “Nietzsche, Eristic, and the Rhetoric of the Possible” 373). The far reaching consequences of this collapse of criteria for evaluating rhetoric, amputating its ethical sense, results in limiting rhetoric to nothing more than “*mere performance*” (Hikins, “Nietzsche, Eristic, and the Rhetoric of the Possible” 374). This is a crucial point of contention not to be underestimated, the bond between the meanings of words, their saying, and the multiple unknown meanings the audience constructs of the ideas, values, and ethics, these words state and enact.
An escape from the ruination of rhetoric as licentious performance appears as Hikins dances with Nietzsche’s later works, works that he claims offer the basis for a “new philosophical foundation for rhetoric” (Hikins, “The Seductive Waltz” 395).

Hikins begins by noting that “Nietzsche has been catapulted to the center of discussion in rhetorical theory” (“The Seductive Waltz” 380). Hikins then claims that “sensitivity to Nietzsche’s mature position calls into question a whole range of postmodern views that our field has appropriated from thinkers caught up in the seductive waltz with Nietzsche’s eventually abandoned skepticism” (381). Therefore in contrast to the prominent view of Nietzsche as a critic and skeptical of any notion of truth as illustrated through de Man’s appropriation outlined above, Hikins states that greater attention needs to be paid to Nietzsche’s “later theory of perspectivism, as requiring significant re-evaluation of his oft-cited lectures on rhetoric” (“The Seductive Waltz” 381). Limiting Nietzsche to his early notes as stated above risks ignoring the works for which he is known and misrepresenting his ideas and their development over the course of his career.

Hikins’ invitation to embrace Nietzsche’s “mature position” on truth, epistemology, and rhetoric, contributes to the conversation of a Nietzschean turn in rhetorical theory by seeking to “familiarize rhetorical scholars with a perspective on Nietzsche that has been submerged and marginalized by those who use his work to ground postmodern rhetorics” (“The Seductive Waltz” 381). Greater attention paid to Nietzsche’s later works reveals his abandonment of his skeptical views on truth as articulated in his lecture notes on rhetoric and early essays, essays that serve as the foundation for the common contemporary postmodern interpretation of Nietzsche, especially as discussed above within the discipline. According to Hikins
the later Nietzsche repairs to a faith in *science* as “the sound conception of cause and effect” (Nietzsche, *The Antichrist*, 49), embraces a version of the *correspondence theory of truth* (Clark, 135), and regards his early view of *art* as having attained an “importance he later came to regard as preposterous” (Tanner, 10)” (“The Seductive Waltz” 381).

Hikins augments this claim by producing a genealogy of postmodern theorists whose own works build or rely upon the view of Nietzsche culled from his early works, such as Derrida, Lyotard, Foucault, Bataille, Deleuze, Althusser, and Irigary (“The Seductive Waltz” 381-84). Therefore, “The theoretical beginning points for the views of all these central figures in postmodern rhetoric lie in a particular interpretation of Nietzsche’s *theory of truth*” (“The Seductive Waltz” 381). These theorists all gather around Nietzsche’s alleged insights regarding skepticism of truth and "belief that language is essentially figurative and not referential or expressive" (Selden qtd. in Hikins, “The Seductive Waltz” 383). Language then once uttered slips into the ether and out of time and any contextual situation that would shape interpretation, creation of meaning, and response.

In addition, the ethics of rhetoric is oriented around the supposedly Nietzschean notion that “There is no absolute ethic or universal knowledge system; there are only linguistically based perspectives” (Gilman, Blair, and Parent qtd. in Hikins, “The Seductive Waltz” 384). Hence, if this holds, the central significance of Nietzsche’s concerns with the relativistic nature of knowledge is merely the play of tropes it employs to generate adherence to its views as emphasized in his early posthumously published notes and essays.
Hikins claims the reasons for this limited selection of Nietzsche’s primary texts rests on the predetermined skeptical theoretical commitments of these commentators as well as those of Thomas, Poulakos and Whitson (“The Seductive Waltz” 385). Their view of Nietzsche as enacting a stable, consistent skepticism throughout his literary corpus “is untenable” (Hikins, “The Seductive Waltz” 385). According to Hikins, the source of this misrepresentation of Nietzsche’s ideas rests upon the excessive dependence on Nietzsche’s unpublished works, a hermeneutical practice that has drawn criticism from numerous prominent Nietzsche commentators such as Kaufmann, Clark, Alderman, and Magnus (“The Seductive Waltz” 387). Why does this selection of texts misrepresent Nietzsche’s ideas? The untenability of this unnecessarily limited reading of Nietzsche’s corpus results in misunderstanding the importance of major metaphors such as will to power as well as misrepresenting Nietzsche’s differentiation and critiques of transcendental truth and empirical truth (Hikins, “The Seductive Waltz” 387). Could greater inclusion of the entire corpus lead to dramatically different interpretations?

Then, what does inclusion of Nietzsche’s later works (and greater reliance on Nietzsche’s published works) add to the discussion of his thought? A new Nietzsche appears who is not solely an unyielding critic of transcendental truth but rather a strong proponent of empirical truth since this reveals the one true world which humans and nature collectively shape (Hikins, “The Seductive Waltz” 389). Such a conclusion does not deny the complete uselessness of dialectic, in contrast it repositions dialectic as a tool for humans to utilize “in discovering empirical truths” (“The Seductive Waltz” 389). From this view, rhetoric then creates and could advance new types of knowledge within a continuing of conversations on knowledge.
Given this revised foundation, what consequences do these new vistas hold for further investigation of Nietzsche’s rhetoric? Hikins finds an interesting answer by contrasting the expanded conception of Nietzsche’s works with the early lectures on rhetoric and unpublished works that he claims elaborates a new Nietzschean rhetoric (“The Seductive Waltz” 393-96). A rhetoric Hikins characterizes as an amalgamation of a more inclusive hermeneutic consideration of knowledge embedded within Nietzsche’s rhetoric.

Five tenets then comprise the foundations and major contours of this new Nietzschean rhetoric as outlined by Hikins. First, acknowledgment of important truths that can be communicated between persons resituates ethics as a crucial concern of the rhetorical enterprise but “must be at least in part a function of humans’ cognitive interest and the ‘objective’ knowledge our perspectives reveal” (“The Seductive Waltz” 395). Second, given Nietzsche’s rejection of transcendentalism, representationalism, and the related notions that “rhetoric cannot be based on ‘the essence of things,’” and “that rhetorical acts comprise, entirely and exclusively, human artifacts” appearance as criterion of truth is replaced by empirical interpretation as a conveyor of contingent truth. For “Without question, on occasion rhetoric functions referentially and veridically to evoke knowledge claims about real aspects of the empirical world” (Hikins, “The Seductive Waltz” 395). Knowledge cannot be denied as a necessary resource for the social functioning of rhetoric.

This revised version of the possibility of perceived truth leads Nietzsche to replace a “representational theory of truth” undergirding rhetorical appeals and argument with what Hikins terms the third tenet revealing an “attenuated correspondence view of
truth” (“The Seductive Waltz” 395). Nietzsche, now allegedly relieved of the dogma of “the reality/appearance dichotomy and the representational view of language” is freed to recognize “that some language, including the “little truths of science,” does communicate knowledge, even if this knowledge is perspectival” (Hikins, “The Seductive Waltz” 395). While truth claims may then always call for possible revision given the contingent nature of human existence and knowledge, Nietzsche’s rhetoric enacts a perspectivism that “mediates between radical objectivism and radical constructionism, generating both doxa and episteme” (Hikins, “The Seductive Waltz” 395). The perspectival standpoint allows for integration of a multiplicity of appeals to knowledge as aids to rhetoric and persuasion.

Recognition of these foundational ideas prompts Hikins to state that this now provides “a new philosophical foundation for rhetoric” (“The Seductive Waltz” 395). This fourth insight Hikins names “perspective realism” which states that all human knowledge is perspectival. Against the background of an empirically perceived natural world, humans “perceive . . . various aspects of multi-aspected things, whose aspects are all there is to perceive; hence, the disappearance of appearance and with it the claim that sensations are “presented externally through an image” (Hikins, “The Seductive Waltz” 396). We live then not only in symbols and humanly constructed images and interpretations but are able to evaluate these competing interpretations against the background of the empirical, natural world.

This perspectival standpoint concerning truth and knowledge ushers in the fifth and final tenet and a “very different rhetorical epistemology, one best described as rhetorical perspectivism” (Hikins, “The Seductive Waltz” 396). Hikins claims that the
goal of this new rhetoric is "neither the direct discovery of knowledge (a view often labeled positivism), nor the wholesale linguistic creation of knowledge (constructionism), but instead the processural evoking of knowledge through the discursive comparison and contrast of multiple perspectives” (“The Seductive Waltz” 396). Now because “our revised Nietzschean rhetoric . . . wherein language operates both referentially and tropically in evoking truth (or pursuing play), as it encompasses perspectives” thereby supplants the merits of either “objectivist or constructionist formulations” (Hikins, “The Seductive Waltz” 396). However, does Hikins’ realignment of Nietzsche and revaluation of predominant contemporary aesthetic interpretations of his collective thought leave us a new Nietzsche who “has learned new steps with which we must now become familiar” (Hikins, “The Seductive Waltz” 397)? On the other hand, does Hikins merely offer a semantic recasting of Nietzsche behind merely another mask for a different use?

**Dissonant Recurrences: Defining Nietzsche’s Rhetoric Between Art and Knowing**

McGuire casts Hikins’ waltz as out of tune with Nietzsche’s consistent skepticism regarding the attainment and communicability of Truth (“Dancing in the Darkness” 96-104). The counter argument against Hikins’ views emanates from a disagreement regarding Nietzsche’s alleged recantation of his skepticism and what in fact denotes a “rhetorical” interpretation of Nietzsche from those of “other fields” (McGuire, “Dancing in the Darkness” 96-101). An unnecessarily limited view of rhetoric implicates Hikins as committing the same error he attributed to the flawed and constricting aesthetic view of Nietzsche’s rhetoric discussed above.
McGuire begins his critique by noting that “anyone dealing with Nietzsche’s extensive writings on language is in fact working “in” the field of rhetoric” (“Dancing in the Darkness” 97). This broader designation of what constitutes a rhetorical interpretation re-situates the epistemological description of Nietzsche’s views on truth in and of language as a “communication question” (McGuire, “Dancing in the Darkness” 97). This positioning allows McGuire the space to claim that Nietzsche’s skepticism regards rhetoric not epistemology. “One can believe that no One Truth can be proved or communicated even at the same time one believes there is One Truth” (McGuire, “Dancing in the Darkness” 97), a belief inherent in the preceding claim itself. McGuire states investigation and articulation of this doubt and other related ideas about the relationship between language and consciousness make “Nietzsche a rhetorical phenomenon worth attention” (“Dancing in the Darkness” 97). The rhetorical interest in Nietzsche then emanates from the well-worn path of the Greeks for “Rhetoric deals, as Plato knew, not with what is real, but with what is apparent, that is, what can be made to seem real. In my view, such a claim would be generally agreed upon underpinning of any rhetoric” (McGuire, “Dancing in the Darkness” 97). McGuire then grounds Hikins’ rhetorical reading of Nietzsche as a biased and miscast interpretation of why Nietzsche is worthy of rhetorical study, a reading based more on epistemology, cosmology, and ontology than rhetoric or the arguably rhetorical elements of these areas.

McGuire continues by questioning Hikins’ assumptions regarding the merit of Nietzsche’s later works as greater than those of earlier writings and Hikins’ means of gathering textual support for his interpretations. “First, by what fiat is it suddenly true that any writer’s later works are always better than early ones?” (McGuire, “Dancing in
the Darkness” (97). In addition, while Hikins’ emphasizes the importance of necessary attention be paid to Nietzsche’s mature writings, McGuire states that he fails to cite from many of the pivotal works of that period, often agreed as beginning with the works of 1881 until Nietzsche’s collapse in 1889. These works include *The Dawn*, *The Gay Science*, *Beyond Good and Evil*, and *The Wagner Case*, works McGuire states Hikins failed to cite or interpret in his essays in support of the exegesis of these texts as crucial for understanding Nietzsche (“Dancing in the Darkness” 98). The significance of these omissions by Hikins is that hermeneutical conceit works only to further Hikins’ theoretical commitments, “rehabilitating Nietzsche into some sort of British-philosophical uniform” while missing “Nietzsche’s very point of departure—his beginning—the threshold of his philosophy” (McGuire, “Dancing in the Darkness” 101).

Rather than comply with the nihilism inherent in asceticism as Nietzsche interpreted it, he sought to offer the path toward an affirmation of life. Despite all its potential cruelty and ugliness, Nietzsche offered possibilities of a revaluation of values, a rhetorical turning of what tradition, institution, and the State dictate as important for the individual.

This rhetorical turn is what served as a base of sorts for Nietzsche and emphasized the role of aestheticism in his thought. Since we live in appearance, the work of arranging and rearranging appearances as the basis for life becomes a more honest means to willing life. As McGuire concludes, these errors demonstrate that “Hikins’ has missed the entire point of Nietzsche’s pursuit of truth and discovery that there is none in any or all of the philosophical or religious systems of humankind” (“Dancing in the Darkness” 103). According to McGuire, Hikins then misunderstands the crucial importance of rhetoric to Nietzsche’s philosophy as Hikins
fails to see in the absence of truth as a basis for values not the opportunity
that Nietzsche sees to self-create, but only the nihilism, the depression,
that precedes the frenzy of creative activity through which life is made
meaningful by and for the individual. (“Dancing in the Darkness” 103-04)

The aesthetic qualities of self-creation and revaluation Nietzsche presents in his later
‘mature’ works then itself overturns and invalidates Hikins’ and subsequently not
Nietzsche’s ‘rhetorical perspectivism.’

Ayotte, Poulakos, and Whitson re-enter the fray in their 2002 reply to Hikins by
questioning his hermeneutic practices for their reply “does not advance an explicit
interpretation of Nietzsche; rather, it reasserts the importance of primary texts as starting
points of interpretation” (“Mistaking Nietzsche” 121). Ayotte, Poulakos, and Whitson
begin with McGuire’s earlier contention that Hikins’ division of “Nietzsche into the
early, middle, and late Nietzsche” (“Mistaking Nietzsche” 121) is seriously flawed
because “Hikins blunders when he claims that Nietzsche abandons his earlier works”
(“Mistaking Nietzsche” 122). In 1886, Nietzsche wrote a new Introduction to his first
work, The Birth of Tragedy, originally published in 1872. His 1888 late work Ecce
Homo offers an evaluation of his entire corpus, evidence to counter the notion that
Nietzsche’s later published writings offer the only valuable entry into his work to the
ignorance of earlier discarded texts. Ayotte, Poulakos, and Whitson also claim that
textual evidence abounds for a more comprehensive view of Nietzsche’s works when
interpreting his thought as illustrated by On the Genealogy of Morals.

If this book is incomprehensible to anyone and jars on his ears, the fault, it
seems to me, is not necessarily mine. It is clear enough, assuming, as I do
assume, that one has first read my earlier writings and has not spared some
trouble in doing so: for they are, indeed, not easy to penetrate. (Nietzsche
22 as qtd. in Ayotte, Poulakos, and Whitson 123)

This mistake and misinterpretation of what evidence is available illustrates Hikins’
failure to acknowledge the claim at the heart of the early aesthetic characterization of
rhetoric by Poulakos and Whitson. Can the grammar of human language escape the
traditional Platonic and Western metaphysical and epistemological presuppositions of the
ability of language to capture things as they are, to capture truth in its letters?

Nietzsche rejects this possibility as Ayotte, Poulakos, and Whitson quote from his
Gay Science (354) and Twilight of the Idols (“‘Reason’ in Philosophy” 5) in support of
their counter argument. “For Nietzsche, then, it is simply foolish to believe we have
discovered ontological categories when all we have done is affirm the grammatical ones
with which we are working” (“Mistaking Nietzsche” 123). The escape of these snares
involves “an art of exegesis” as described in Nietzsche’s Preface to On the Genealogy of
Morals (22-23) resting on the aphoristic form and its interpretation. The connection
between aphorism and interpretation points toward an earlier contested issue, “In effect,
Nietzsche reiterated what students of rhetoric have known all along: figuration cannot be
taken out of language” (Ayotte, Poulakos, and Whitson, “Mistaking Nietzsche” 124).
Not surprisingly, this merges nicely with the aesthetic rhetoric the authors previously
claimed Nietzsche promotes throughout his works.

Therefore, Ayotte, Poulakos, and Whitson propose that such purposeful ignorance
taints Hikins’ hermeneutical practices and explains “why he wants to remove “Truth and
Lying,” The Birth of Tragedy, and The Will to Power from the bookshelves (386-387)”
("Mistaking Nietzsche" 124). This leads to a key to this debate over what Nietzsche offers rhetorical scholarship.

The problem is that Hikins deforms Nietzsche and subordinates rhetoric to philosophy. Wishing to "open the door to knowledge of the only reality there is, namely, the world we perceive" (395), he sings the praises of perspective realism: "we now possess a new philosophical foundation of rhetoric" (395). Had Hikins consulted "On the Prejudices of Philosophers," [from Nietzsche’s 1888 work Twilight of the Idols] he would have seen that a philosophical foundation of rhetoric was not what the "late and mature" Nietzsche had in mind: "What makes one regard philosophers half mistrustingly and half mockingly is not that one again and again detects how innocent they are [ . . . ] but that they display altogether insufficient honesty, while making a mighty and virtuous noise as soon as the problem of truthfulness is even remotely touched on."

("Mistaking Nietzsche" 126-27)

So we return to where it may have begun with the question of rhetoric and/or philosophy as enacted between Plato and Gorgias more than two millennia earlier. Moreover, a parallel note to this contemporary enactment of the eternal debate on newer Nietzschean ground, at least within rhetoric, both end with ethics, though neither develops the values that guide both standpoints. Granted, an ethic of rhetoric is not the proposed foci of these articles. However, it remains a relatively silent and missing foundation of either rhetorical edifice be it art, knowledge, or both.

Changing Reflections: Rhetoric as Simulacrum
Yet could a consequence of this debate over defining rhetoric as aesthetic or epistemic miss the point? Could this centerpiece of contention within rhetorical scholarship merely be the mimicry of the eternal rift between philosophy and rhetoric, between objective truth and contingent truth with automaton-like, reactive political drives and declining returns, if any returns arise at all? Douglas Thomas claims that these debates demand or voice the need for “a new way of thinking about the way we think about rhetoric . . . rhetoric as simulacrum” (“Reflections” 72). Thomas claims that understanding rhetoric as simulacrum extends the aesthetic view of rhetoric presented by Poulakos and Whitson in three important ways. Before addressing these three contributions, it is important to understand how Thomas conceives of rhetoric as simulacrum.

According to Thomas

This simulacrum is the very internalization of differences, which reflects the observer and is reflected by the observer[ . . .] Rhetoric becomes a multiplicity, internalizing and processing disparities and differences. The implication, then, for a Nietzschean turn in rhetoric, is to begin by treating rhetoric as a multiplicity, rather than a singularity. (“Reflections” 72).

As no collective whole is knowable so then is no single conception of rhetoric valid across different situations.

The first benefit of this acknowledgment of the difference at the core of rhetoric helps to explore how to revise the tradition, “exploring the “rhetoricity of philosophy,” thus reversing the phrasing from “rhetoric as epistemic” to “epistemology as rhetorical” (“Reflections” 74). This situates the will to knowledge and truth within the domain of
social life, judging claims on how they relate to life experience not solely against theoretical constructs.

The second benefit Thomas claims for the rhetoric as simulacrum perspective is that it implicates the actor within the act through symbolizing rhetoric as enabling the becoming of meaning rather than Being as it is traditionally understood within Western Platonic philosophic thought (“Reflections” 74). “Our interpretations become ‘transformed and deformed’ as we enter into them. There is only a thematic of becoming, absent Being” (“Reflections” 74). The performance of rhetoric then becomes the means through which it reveals its multiplicity, how it connects the real with the possible. “As Whitson and Poulakos illustrate, for Nietzsche, appearance is the reality, and an aesthetic kairos accounts for the emergence of more successful discourses” (“Reflections” 75). The art of timely discursive argument becomes the standard for judgment between competing claims.

Third and finally, the reward of rhetoric as simulacrum “frees rhetoric from the yoke of Platonism” (“Reflections” 75). Rhetoric functions as a means to author possibilities, to generate perspectives to guide future word and action, not to end conversation by providing a final answer. From this perspective, rhetoric again posits knowing as a process, not a product; therefore its conclusions remain open to reinterpretation when conditions seem to warrant revision. “The power of the simulacrum is its ability to affirm difference without the necessity of denying similarity” (“Reflections” 75). The both/and solution of rhetoric as simulacrum then destroys traditional Platonic distinctions between real and representation, offering instead how “Appearances become the convergent, the product of lived experience, essences become
divergent, moving away from those experiences and existing only as the conditions of possibility” (“Reflections” 75). Therefore, reversal leads to indistinguishability and hence to their subversion (“Reflections” 75). A subversion Thomas claims the process of aestheticization accomplishes and thereby provides the escape of rhetoric from the shadow of Platonic philosophy, which has sought to devalue it for millennia, a new dawn for an old idea?

As acknowledged above, Nietzsche does not offer merely a theory or conception of rhetoric. Nietzsche also employs rhetoric throughout his works. How does this rhetoric work within Nietzsche’s names, how does it function as rhetoric and in what ways does this function shape the values that it communicates and from which it discovers and creates meanings in discourse? Closer attention to Nietzsche's communicative activity at the interplay of dialogue and rhetoric reveal a different path. Therefore, it will be argued that what Nietzsche offers rhetoricians is rather a textured understanding of an architectonic rhetoric witnessed in the interplay of dialogue and rhetoric, enacting the seminal position of rhetoric inherent in language, interpretation, communication, and ethics.

**Nietzsche and Burke: Connections and Possibilities**

Awareness of the interpenetrating nature of the interplay between dialogue and rhetoric leads further into the implications of Nietzsche’s values upon his philosophy and ideas regarding communication, rhetoric, and ethics. This trio of articles’ insights draws from explications of the connections between Nietzsche and Kenneth Burke. Thomas employs ideas culled from the works of Nietzsche, Burke, and Lacan to posit order as
“central to understanding rhetoric” and hence describes “a rhetoric of order [that] examines how the individual interacts with his or her community through the influence, development, and maintenance of intersubjective agreements” (“Burke, Nietzsche, Lacan” 336). Two articles, one by Desilet and one by Hawhee, pursue connections solely between Burke and Nietzsche. Their inquiries revolve around Burke’s appropriations of Nietzsche’s ideas and their possible influence upon Burke’s theory of the development of the negative in human language; dramatism and the relationship between language and interpretation; and the drama of the ethics of poetry revealed through a study of rhetorical style.

Working from the periphery to the center of these divergent studies of Nietzsche’s rhetorical connections with Burke, we begin with Thomas’s discussion of the relationships that adhere between the ideas of Nietzsche, Burke, Lacan, and the notion of rhetoric as a hierarchical tool of social organization and order. Thomas bases his study upon two central metaphors, hierarchy and order. Rhetoric is then positioned as a mediating tool between the competing claims of community and self. Thomas focuses his analysis upon two key features of these central metaphors. First, “rhetorics of order are both produced by the intersubjective agreements that surround them and maintained and constructed by the inherent dimensions of power that subsist within them” (Thomas, “Burke, Nietzsche, Lacan” 337). Second, “in each system of rhetoric and order is the means by which supernatural, socio-political, ideological constraints position the human subject” (Thomas, “Burke, Nietzsche, Lacan” 337). These traditional hierarchies limit the forms order may take in different contexts. “One must remain within the order as a subject through identification or suffer the consequences of division, the denial of
positioning as a subject within a community” (Thomas, “Burke, Nietzsche, Lacan” 337). Subjectivity becomes a function of the agreements of social powers and ordering hierarchies that form specific contexts. Subjectivity as a function exists as a rhetorical dramatic phenomenon embodying inclusion or exclusion, purgation, and redemption.

Additionally, rhetoric serves as the means to order and give form to these powerful hierarchies of socio-political, supernatural, and natural orders rests upon its unique ontology and epistemology according to Thomas. The interaction of the rhetorical elements of “the social, or order, and trope” results in the correspondence to trope, epistemology, and social order (Thomas, “Burke, Nietzsche, Lacan” 339). The convergence of rhetoric, epistemology, and social order “allows for the evaluation of the strategic uses of language” (Thomas, “Burke, Nietzsche, Lacan” 339). The social nature of rhetoric allows for the rhetorical evaluation of social phenomenon such as recognition of order through hierarchy in the social sphere. Language determines social, political, natural and supernatural potentialities as these determine language and its potentialities.

Therefore, the rhetorical determination of the form of society through the mediation of hierarchy and order arguably suggests “that Nietzsche develops a dramatism, similar to Burke’s, through his analysis of active and reactive forces” (Thomas, “Burke, Nietzsche, Lacan” 341). Based on this characterization, Thomas claims that “For Nietzsche, the very basis of communication is rooted in questions of rhetoric and order” (“Burke, Nietzsche, Lacan” 341). Lacan is employed by Thomas to account for the “motivation for individual human action” (“Burke, Nietzsche, Lacan” 353). Lacan’s psychological studies then allow for this new dramatism to emerge through sustained analysis of the conflict of choice brought about by interaction between
the Real and the Symbolic wherein the “subject’s relationship to the community is contingent upon a choice that is always already made” (“Burke, Nietzsche, Lacan” 347). Communication built upon the social domain out of which it originated therefore shapes and is shaped by the social order it gives rise to, articulates, and sustains through its interpretation and use of powers employed to create, revise, and destroy.

Such an outline Thomas asserts reveals “the ‘primeval problem,’ that Nietzsche seeks to explain is how to create a “memory for the human animal” such that the will of the master may be followed by the slave” (“Burke, Nietzsche, Lacan” 341). Thomas draws from this assertion Nietzsche’s distinction between motives, one seeks either to affirm and celebrate the organizing order of the aristocracy or to spur the resentment of the priestly and lower classes excluded from this particular source of order in society (“Burke, Nietzsche, Lacan” 343). The consequences of resentment as a source for rhetoric of order Thomas traces through Hobbes’s writings. These are said to illustrate how at the socio-political level Hobbes and the commonwealth are able to “naturalize coercion and reformulate it as the appropriate response to the social demand for order” (“Burke, Nietzsche, Lacan” 348-50). Order directed not by natural and social conditions and temporal context but order directed by the political and rhetorical will to power currently at the top of the ruling hierarchy.

Thomas concludes that these different perspectives provide added clarity to the central question, “rhetoric both produces and is produced by the way in which we order our world” (Thomas, “Burke, Nietzsche, Lacan” 353). Rhetoric organizes subjectivity just as the form subjectivity may take is limited by the social order that rhetoric empowers. Likewise rhetoric provides the potential tools for dismantling socio-political
orders, calling for the eternal work of rhetoric within societies as a mediating tool between individual and community.

As stated above, only two other articles focus attention upon the complex (and largely unexplored) nature of Nietzsche’s role in the evolution of Kenneth Burke’s ideas on language and rhetoric. Gregory Desilet began the scholarly conversation on the nature of the relationship between the thought of Friedrich Nietzsche and Kenneth Burke with his 1989 article, “Nietzsche Contra Burke: The Melodrama in Dramatism.” Desilet’s argument grows out of the comparison of their different perspectives on the negative, leading to the recognition of two “distinctive genres of dramatism” (65). The significance of these differing approaches to “the symbolic action of drama” (65) reveals the deeply situated nature of Nietzsche’s rhetorical and communicative praxis. As Desilet states

Before Burke, Nietzsche also noted the inseparableness of living and judging and used this connection as the cornerstone of his perspectivist theory of thought and language. That judgments must be made, regardless of the firmness of the foundation upon which they are weighed, is an inescapable consequence of living [. . .] Language-using, as identifying and knowing, rests upon value, requires interpretation, and reflects what Nietzsche calls perspectivism. (70-1)

However, despite these noted similarities, Desilet states that this leads the two in different directions, leading to competing genres of dramatism. Desilet claims that Burke presents a dialectical mode of argumentation that utilizes the negative as a means of excisement in
his comic vision of dramatic conflict (64-9, 79). Dramatic conflict ordered through the dialectic that composes the tension between comedic episodes.

On the other hand, Nietzsche’s espoused attitude of *amor fati* offers a non-dialectical and tragic, though not pessimistic, vision of the drama of symbolic activity in everyday life (Desilet 74-80). Nietzsche therefore provides an alternative to Burke whom Desilet casts as “fashioning a drama of human relations more melodramatic, and consequently more victimizing, than it need be” (80). Desilet concludes that to lessen the victimage inherent in human development and relations as exhibited through symbolic activity, “it will turn upon a shift in methodological perspective from the moralistic negative to the discriminative negative, from an exclusive to an inclusive process” (80).

A shift Nietzsche’s attitude of *amor fati* and destructive as well as affirmative architectonic rhetoric of his communication ethic, dialogic meeting may yet reveal.

A decade later, Debra Hawhee extends this conversation with her 1999 article, “Burke and Nietzsche.” Hawhee begins by noting that the “general trend in rhetoric’s Burke scholarship, it seems, is to sidle around his connections to Nietzsche” although “the connections are definitely there” (Hawhee 129). One connection Hawhee develops in detail is the central importance of ethics for both Burke and Nietzsche in their understanding of human language, communication, rhetoric, and relationships.

Here Burke supported his claim by invoking Nietzsche: ‘In a sense Nietzsche did this [talked of ethics in terms of man], and in a sense he is impregnable. Nietzsche is the first exclusively ethical philosopher, the first philosopher to begin on ethical terms, rather than on metaphysical
ones’ (1). In short, Burke writes, ‘Nietzsche made the necessary modern step of starting directly with ethics’ (1). (Hawhee 132-33)

Such interpretations by Burke of Nietzsche show the importance of analyzing Nietzsche’s ideas on language, communication, and rhetoric alongside his ideas on ethics rather than parsing these two imbricating domains.

According to Hawhee, another ethical concern shared by Burke and Nietzsche is the interdependent nature of the relationship between language and values. Hawhee claims that Burke, “Following Nietzsche . . . cited language as the shaper of values” (135). Through a close reading of similarities between Burke’s *Permanence and Change* and Nietzsche’s early-unpublished yet highly influential essay, “On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense,” Hawhee discusses the personal and cultural impact of the metaphorical and rhetorical nature of language and its powerful role in shaping the horizons of thought and of human ethics (133-37). Ethics most clearly realized through the artifice of poetry.

These characteristics lead to the relationship between art and ethics in the thought of Burke and Nietzsche as Hawhee states: “Poetry signifies a becoming, the furnishing of what Burke calls a “master-purpose” (163); hence, for both Burke and Nietzsche, ethical systems are built from poetry” (139). Hawhee reinforces this point in Burke’s thought quoting from a letter he penned to Frank on September 4, 1922: “Ethics is the aesthetics of living, or aesthetics is the ethics of art” (Burke qtd. in Hawhee 139). Ethics and aesthetics fuse in Nietzsche and later Burke’s thought.

This fusion reveals the pragmatic nature of Nietzsche’s writing styles as embodiment of his perspectivism and ideas regarding the inseparable bonds between
ethics, communication, art, and rhetoric (Hawhee 141). “For Burke, Nietzsche enacted his own principles” as evinced by how “Nietzsche enacted his critique of language by using language, by demonstrating metaphor’s residue (“Truth and Lying” 251), by deploying metaphor after metaphor, comparing perceptions to spider webs (253) even as he spun his own” (Hawhee 141). Ideas Burke “examined in complex ways” (Hawhee 141). Such commonplaces between Burke and Nietzsche reinforce Hawhee’s claim of the congruities between these two thinkers. Such commonplaces ultimately point toward Nietzsche’s role in Burke’s development of his celebrated theory of “perspective by incongruity” which when integrated into his ideas of dramatism and symbolic action help to “carve out a discipline” (142). However, despite these important points of convergence between Burke and Nietzsche and the possibilities they open for greater understanding of the thought of each and their formidable contributions to the study of rhetoric, these two articles remain the only scholarly excursions along this path.

**Nietzsche, Ethics, and Rhetoric**

The final perspective discovered among rhetorical scholarship on Nietzsche employs his work as a standpoint from which to develop an ethic of rhetoric. McGuire’s 1980 article, “The Ethics of Rhetoric: The Morality of Knowledge,” remains the only comment in the discipline that explicitly cites Nietzsche as potentially offering an ethics of rhetoric through his analysis of Nietzsche’s will to power as an enactment of rhetorical force in the world (146-48). Two later articles by Conway and Hawes extend the possibilities for Nietzsche’s work as means to constructing a dialogic rhetorical ethic in relation to specific communication paradigms and speech situations.
Conway explores what Nietzsche might “contribute to our understanding of the ethical dilemmas that beset the complex, totalizing broadcast media of the late twentieth century” (217). Conway concludes that Nietzsche offers a more honest speech situation than the idealized one promoted by Habermas. Nietzsche, he claims, offers a speech situation in which we may utilize self-knowledge to better interpret the distortions that plague all human communication situations (228-9). Nietzsche offers a representation of how to use this self-knowledge to better guide our decision-making.

In confronting decision-making situations Hawes looks toward dialogue as a possible paradigm of communication in contrast to dialectic (229). Hawes’s ideas converge with McGuire’s thoughts on the rhetorical nature of some of Nietzsche’s key philosophical metaphors as he states, “For Nietzsche, interpreting and evaluating constitute the eternal return. That which does the interpreting and evaluating is the will to power” (234). Hawes also presents assumptions analogous to those of this study that “Nietzsche strives to be an affirmative philosopher, a dialogician, one who is both an interpreter-physician . . . and an evaluator-artist” (237). Hawes’s article then moves onto explore Bateson’s works and the connections between cybernetic minds and dialogue (243-56). This theoretical move extends his work outside the scope of the present study. However, the connection between Nietzsche and Bakhtin’s ideas on dialogue serve as crucial insights in guiding the present study and opening a path to interpreting Nietzsche otherwise than from the standard deconstructive hermeneutic bias.

McGuire’s path-making article subsequently begins with the articulation of an assumption that remains the case twenty-five years later, “that existentialism in general and Friedrich Nietzsche in particular have been overlooked by persons making statements
about the ethics of rhetoric” (“The Ethics of Knowledge” 133). The reasons for this exclusion of Nietzsche and existentialism from discussion of ethics and rhetoric stem from the traditionalism of rational reasoning and “True” appeals as the ground of decision-making. Quantitative information places the question of ethics in relation to rhetoric as academic, occurring mainly “in textbooks and consists of repetitions of moral maxims about the responsibilities of speakers” (McGuire, “The Ethics of Knowledge” 134). Finally, McGuire asserts that

statements about ethical rhetoric have been borrowed from the more general realm of statements about human conduct; this is philosophically naive because it ignores the conditionality of ethical judgments. In sum, we have not elaborated an ethic for rhetoric. (“The Ethics of Knowledge” 134)

From this perspective, McGuire is not arguing for an epistemic or eristic characterization of rhetoric as Hikins does above but rather one that is constructed with an awareness of the conditionality of any suggestion of an ethic for rhetoric. The difference becomes clearer in describing McGuire’s concise definitions of rhetoric and rhetorical knowing, not bound solely by traditional philosophical positivist definitions.

McGuire therefore suggests that “rhetoric in any condition serves the general function of contributing to what counts as knowledge in society—that rhetoric is an agent for the social construction of reality” (“The Ethics of Knowledge” 137). Rhetoric as social reality confines the epistemological issue to one contingent upon social factors. Rhetorical knowledge “does not mean “verifiable” or “true” propositions, but whatever counts and works as knowledge in a particular culture” (McGuire, “The Ethics of
Knowledge” 137). These social qualifications of knowledge also call for a revised understanding of rhetoric, one that describes “models for making discourse . . . in a particular social reality” (McGuire, “The Ethics of Knowledge” 137). The knowing of this characterization of rhetoric deals not only with speakers “but with how one manages or participates in certain kinds of social intercourse, and with what kinds of verbal or nonverbal strategies may have efficacy in the society” (McGuire, “The Ethics of Knowledge” 137). Rhetoric then “means pieces of social discourse, it consists of verbal models of human thought. . . . how a rhetor views and constructs the subject of discourse, or what society has need of knowing, hearing or saying” (McGuire, “The Ethics of Knowledge” 138). Rhetoric enacts a process that involves creating a discursive or rhetorical knowledge as a foundation for determining persuasive practices, practices judged against the social realities that call the discourse into being.

Yet how could an ethic of rhetoric so conceived then aid in choosing between the alternatives rhetoric makes available to a social reality? McGuire sees an answer in Nietzsche’s revision of objectivity as not meaning the discovery of one “Truth” but rather “Here “objectivity” means allowing a diversity or multiplicity of visions, not insisting upon one” (“The Ethics of Knowledge” 141). Following Nietzsche, McGuire states that the question upon which ethics turns is whether particular versions of reality, traditional or institutional perspectives have “hitherto hindered or furthered human prosperity?” (“The Ethics of Knowledge” 142), perspectives ultimately implicating the will to power.

To put the perspective of Nietzsche’s critiques in a nutshell: all value judgments (all judgments) originate in a human motive to define, structure, and control—that motive is the will to power. All human
“knowledge” is directed at simplification and “taking possession of things”—in the end, Nietzsche says, “We can only comprehend a world that we ourselves have made.” (Nietzsche, *Will to Power* 495, 503 qtd. in McGuire, “The Ethics of Knowledge” 142-43)

Nietzsche’s perspective works from an assumption of rhetoric as ordering social reality, a social reality dependent on rhetoric to aid in its functioning and choosing between competing perspectives, competing wills to power.

However, the question remains how does Nietzsche or Nietzsche’s works offer an ethic for rhetoric? The will to power reframes the question at the ground of an ethic of rhetoric as McGuire notes. The question becomes not one of truth or lie but one of value. The existential component of the equation makes rhetoric “the means for living the public life—it was for participants in society, not viewers” (McGuire, “The Ethics of Knowledge” 146). Rhetoric not only shapes the alternatives but also compels selection between them. An ethic of rhetoric actualizes the theoretical assumptions and bases of its will to power, of its perspective and associated choices. As enactment of judgment between choices or wills to power, “the morality of knowledge is measured against enhancement of humans’ willingness to assume responsibility as co-creators of social belief and action” (McGuire, “The Ethics of Knowledge” 147). Rhetoric adheres to each component of this description as rhetoric also shapes the alternatives and means for constructing, measuring, and comparing values.

Additionally could a morality of knowledge employ rhetoric in its engagement with a multiplicity of perspectives to situate choice and to enhance human action? Two associated closing points Hawes raises are worth noting due to their importance in
response to this question and due to their importance for the present study. First, Hawes sees his work as pointing toward a “decidedly more participatory ethic. It is also an ontological shift from objectivity toward answerability” (257). These insights are crucial for they foreshadow the understanding of rhetorical ethics to be addressed by this study. A rhetorical ethic constructed from interpretation of Nietzsche’s works demands an existential approach whereby the interpretation and evaluation of philosophical ethical perspectives are always undertaken through analysis of their dialogic enactment through word and deed, through their communication with the conditions of their continual becoming.

Second, Hawes states he seeks “to keep dialogic conversation an open (im)possibility” guided by a “praxis of dialogics” that requires “more theoretical and empirical attention devoted to them” (257). While Hawes continues along a separate path in his work writing these ideas into other concerns regarding the nature of human life and its interface with technology, this idea will resonate throughout the present study. The perspectival approach that Nietzsche employs as will be argued here builds upon this approach to rhetoric and ethics, the eternally recurring demand that one meet each face and situation anew, aware of the unknowable difference at the heart of all human cognition, interpretation, communication, and activity. The present then seeks to take up this proposal by Hawes to further explicate what such a ‘praxis of dialogics’ would look like if constructed upon the ground cleared by Nietzsche as one open path.

Implications
The following present excursion into Nietzsche’s works provides such attention by seeking to reveal how Nietzsche authors an inherently dialogic orientation to values, the process of valuation, and ethics. Such a standpoint drawn from interpretation of Nietzsche’s thought contributes to presentation of a communication ethic, not forever deferring judgment as with deconstruction but in offering a constructive alternative that calls for answerability. Rather Nietzsche offers a communication ethic guided by a stated set of values but also open to the possibility of change. When a revision to a previously perceived fitting response to the rhetorical situation demands, the dialogic meeting of difference within the mud and mystery of the temporal, existential moment allows for new meanings of traditions to emerge.

The saying of the said accomplished by these two interconnected chapters on Nietzsche scholarship within communication and rhetorical studies reveal an interesting paradox. Nietzsche, a figure whose works revolve around values and ethics, yet only a single article foregrounds the question of ethics as its point of hermeneutic entry into explicating Nietzsche’s rhetoric. Additionally, few sought to speak Nietzsche’s language, with little account taken of his own terms and their significance for unfolding the multiplicity of meanings his works offer the study of dialogue, rhetoric, and communication ethics.

These elements of the landmarks of contemporary rhetorical scholarship on Nietzsche point toward the path taken by the present study. Guided by these insights and debates, metaphors from Nietzsche’s own texts will provide hermeneutic entry into his architectonic rhetoric and communication ethic, realized most fully through its practice, for as he states, “Good style in itself—a pure folly, mere ‘idealism’” (Ecce Homo “Why I
Write Such Good Books” 4). This is not to deny the worth of theory drawn from careful reflection; however it does post an important warning, not to let theory overwrite its significance, one Nietzsche never tired of demanding. To act with unyielding honesty in the service, not only discovery or creation of knowledge, aware of one’s situated standpoint within the limits and opportunities of our natural human condition (Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals* III: 12). Exegesis of what these and other related ideas on the questions of value, morality, and the dynamic interplay of dialogue and rhetoric as a process of making meaning out of the chaos of human existence point toward other unexplored territory in the Nietzschean corpus. The following chapters carry forward the said of the above noted scholarship as a background to meet these foreground concerns. Now we turn to the issues at the heart of the present study. What may Nietzsche’s corpus offer towards advancement of understanding the unbreakable union between word and deed, communication ethics and rhetoric, the interplay of dialogue and rhetoric? With the disciplinary scholarship on Nietzsche serving as the said, the background, the present study proceeds to a textured saying and dialogic meeting of Nietzsche through his thought and words implicated within this postmodern historical moment after illusion amid metanarrative disintegration.
Chapter Four: Nietzsche’s Perspectivism as Ground of Dialogic Meeting

The present study positions Nietzsche as an important hermeneutic entrance into conversations on communication ethics amid contemporary postmodern narrative and virtue contention. Nietzsche’s metaphor of perspectivism announces the ground of dialogic meeting, a communication ethic for a postmodern historical moment defined by difference, change, and contesting values after illusion. Nietzsche’s perspectivism situated at the interplay of dialogue and rhetoric engages existential and temporal reality and the difference manifest in human existence through the metaphor of dialogic meeting.

Dialogic meeting articulates a stabilizing of the ground of ethics, the relationship between word and deed. Dialogic meeting, situated within the realities which unite word and deed reveals the concretion of communication, ethics, and rhetoric into what Schrag identifies as “the rhetorical conversation of mankind, setting forth and making manifest to the hearer and reader multiple perspectives of world, self, and other” (Communicative Praxis 190). The ethics of this union, which dialogic meeting discloses, resonates throughout Nietzsche’s works as his abiding concern with the power and values of morality attest. The importance of the influence of morality cannot be overestimated as Nietzsche deems morality “the relations of supremacy under which the phenomenon of ‘life’ comes to be” (Beyond Good and Evil 19). Exploration of this seminal interrelationship discloses morality, the life-giving phenomenon, beginning with concretion of communication, rhetoric, and ethics, as interpreted through Nietzsche’s metaphor of perspectivism.
Introduction

Perspectivism implies the inescapable necessity of meeting reality, of giving order to the chaos, to give life a goal. Perspectivism expands the notion of rhetoric. Nietzsche revalues rhetoric not as mere *technē* but conditions, interweaving threads of the fabric of human communication. Human communication viewed as the window framing human consciousness as dialogue, power, and life. The determining criteria of rhetoric exist in the communicative activity of answerability for the other as well as reflexivity. Meeting discloses an understanding of the self as implicated in ethics, communication, and rhetoric. Meeting is not mere dialoging as telling but rather engaging reality in the moment amid present, past, and future. Meeting does not presuppose an ending or a possibility of an end except in death and its attendant silence.

Dialogic meeting melds communication and action, not communicative praxis but a communication ethic as hub at the axis of interplay between communication, ethics, and rhetoric. Values serve as the ground of communication and the play of rhetoric for Nietzsche. Rhetoric and style are grounded in ethical concerns such as truth made known through meeting. Communication enacts perspectivism as disclosing the situated nature of all forms of meaning. Meaning arising from questions of ethics and values, which relations drive to the fore.

Why turn to Nietzsche as entry into the discussion of possibilities for developing a dialogic communication ethic? Because Nietzsche enacts ethics as grounded in meeting reality as communication. At the interplay of communication, ethics, and rhetoric this hermeneutic entrance provides the grounds and means for dialogic meeting.
Dialogic meeting serves as an appropriate hermeneutic entrance to engage questions in a postmodern historical moment after illusion—age defined through virtue contention following the fall of metanarratives. Perspectivism enacts an ethics of invention as ground for a communication ethic. Invention realized not through individual agency but through acknowledgement of the necessity of difference, others, alterity, as providing the necessary background against which one responds and creates meanings. Genealogy offers a communication ethic through architectonic rhetoric. Architectonic rhetoric understood in the classical sense Bakhtin advocates, “a concrete architectonic interrelationship” of meanings built to order the chaos of reality and assign values to competing ideas and stimuli (Toward a Philosophy of the Act 63). Revaluation of values provides the concretion of ethics, rhetoric, and communication at the point of union between word and deed, each element implicated and implicating the others.

What results from this Nietzschean perspectivism is a de-centered rhetoric definable only in terms of the ethics and communication of meanings it discloses through the meeting of difference as reality in dialogue. Rhetoric de-centered and refocused not on the agency or subjectivity of the speaker but upon the deed, the communicative activity, which the rhetoric discloses, its ethical and communicative ground that call it forth into being. Rhetoric exists only as the meeting of the exigencies of reality through discourse. Meeting that occurs through the creation, realization, and communication of the meanings of meeting.

Levinas’ following statement augments our discussion as he articulates several motifs that recur in Nietzsche’s development of the metaphor demonstrating the
imbricating nature of hermeneutical and rhetorical activity of interpretation and invention
as grounded in the values and morals of dialogic meeting, perspectivism.

Perhaps the names of persons whose saying signifies a face—
proper names, in the middle of all these common names and
commonplaces—can resist the dissolution of meaning and help us to
speak. Perhaps they will enable us to divine, behind the downfall to
discourse, the end of a certain intelligibility but the dawning of a new one.
What is coming to a close may be a rationality tied exclusively to the being
that is sustained by words, the Said of the Saying, the Said conveying
fields of knowledge and truths in the form of unchanging identities,
merging with the self-sufficient Identity of a being or system—complete,
perfect, denying or absorbing the differences that appear to betray or limit
it. This intelligibility reaches its apotheosis in the ultimate identity of ‘the
identical and the non-identical’ asserted by Hegel, which probably
completes and concludes the philosophy of the Same and of immanence,
or ontology. (Levinas, foreword 5, Proper Names)

Several connections appear between Nietzsche’s perspectivism and Levinas’ notion of
moving beyond the humanistic dependence upon the name to bestow meaning. First, we
must always recall that Nietzsche works from a Classical understanding of the person as
grounded in the affects that one enacts, character interpreted and evaluated by the ethos
and pathos their speech and acts disclose. Identity becomes a conditional relation born in
the social fabric of existence, not the sole possession of the individual. Second, the
multiple ways dialogic meeting may be manifested comprise the destructive and creative
energies of interpretation, invention, and style used to communicate ideas. Third, difference and change permeates the nucleus of human being and knowing and the denial of this fact of life finally appears to have been put to rest by the critics of the modern said of knowing and living. Finally, a meeting of the said of the past through the saying of its meanings in meeting the exigencies of the contemporary historical moment may offer a new path to living speech through dialogue.

Dialogue as a metaphor of speaking and meeting therefore provides a saying of the said within the shared space of speech and activity. Nietzsche’s communication ethic grounded in the style of his architectonic rhetoric of dialogic meeting clears a constructive path to encounter exigencies by a discourse that enacts one’s values and morals through the reunion of the ethical unity of wisdom and eloquence in the activity of life. To this possibility attention now turns to sketch the contours of Nietzsche’s metaphor of perspectivism as a means to knowing and making known the saying of the said through dialogic meeting.

A Genealogy of Perspectivism

Our journey begins by meeting Nietzsche’s “most important published discussion of perspectivism” which appears in his work, On the Genealogy of Morals (III: 12) (Leiter 13). Nietzsche begins his explication of the nature of perspectivism by seeking to direct its affective stance in meeting “resolute reversals of accustomed perspectives and valuations with which the spirit has, with apparent mischievousness and futility, raged against itself for so long” (On the Genealogy of Morals III: 12). Nietzsche requests that the seeker of knowledge view differently these twists that shape the quest.
Nietzsche requests that the knowledge seeker affirms and welcomes such upheavals of one’s convictions, values, and morals by subsequent inquiries. This “discipline and preparation of the intellect for its future ‘objectivity’” requires one to interpret otherwise (On the Genealogy of Morals III: 12). The future objectivity to which one disciplines oneself revalued by Nietzsche to express not the “nonsensical absurdity” of “‘contemplation without interest’” (On the Genealogy of Morals III: 12). Rather, Nietzsche advocates an interpreting otherwise than modern notions of objectivity to posit human knowing as a hermeneutical and rhetorical process that actively expresses one’s wills and affects in directing one’s reasons “in the service of knowledge” (On the Genealogy of Morals III: 12). Nietzsche’s revalued notion of interested objectivity understood as “the ability to control one’s Pro and Con and to dispose of them, so that one knows how to employ a variety of perspectives and affective interpretations in the service of knowledge” (On the Genealogy of Morals III: 12). We will pursue in detail later in this chapter how perspectivism echoes guiding tenets of Aristotle’s venerable definition of rhetoric as “an ability, in each particular case, to see the available means of persuasion” (On Rhetoric I.2.1). For now, it is sufficient to state the potential connection to allow us to return to Nietzsche’s further elaboration of the nature of his metaphor of perspectivism.

Nietzsche then earlier in his preface to On the Genealogy of Morals hints at how one may act in the service of knowledge. Discussing his reaction and rejection of the “Pro and Con” of Dr. Paul Ree’s 1877 book The Origin of the Moral Sensations, Nietzsche met Ree’s propositions “not in order to refute them—what have I to do with refutations!—but, as becomes a positive spirit, to replace the improbable with the more
probable, possibly one error with another” (*On the Genealogy of Morals*, preface 4).

Nietzsche thereby urges one to serve knowledge through perspectivism not necessarily by “hypothesis-mongering” but rather by enacting perspectivism as a saying of the primordial function of rhetoric [...] to ‘make-known’ meaning both to oneself and to others. *Meaning is derived by a human being in and through the interpretive understanding of reality. Rhetoric is the process of making-known that meaning.* (Hyde and Smith 348)

Perspectivism develops a way of approaching the task of serving knowledge through the interpretive activity of making known meaning through the dialogic meeting of one’s experiencing of existence.

Nietzsche further textures the metaphor of perspectivism with perhaps its penultimate articulation of the existential, situated nature of the relationship between the subject and the process of knowing. He warns against unchallenged acceptance of what knowing for the human subject is not, what it has never been, and what it can never become expressed in “the dangerous old conceptual fiction that posited a ‘pure, will-less, painless, timeless knowing subject’” (*Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals* III: 12). For Nietzsche such a view to knowledge as a said, unchanging and existent outside the bounds of human experience turns “reason against reason” for it works to downgrade physicality to an illusion; likewise pain, multiplicity, the entire conceptual antithesis ‘subject and ‘object’——errors, nothing but errors! To renounce belief in one’s ego, to deny one’s own ‘reality’—what a triumph! not merely over the senses, over appearance, but a much higher kind of triumph, a violation and cruelty against *reason*—a voluptuous
pleasure that reaches its height when the ascetic self-contempt and self-mockery of reason declares: ‘there is a realm of truth and being, but reason is excluded from it!’ (On the Genealogy of Morals III: 12)

Such assertions mark the ruptures, which Nietzsche authors in the said of the modern facade, finding space for the emergence of the postmodern. Nietzsche claims that such ascetic, Kantian presuppositions regarding knowledge forbid knowledge due to their unquestioned grounds or reasons (Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals III: 12). Such a denial of the conditions that shape human knowing Nietzsche perceives as inherent within the concept of knowledge that dominated his modern historical moment.

Nietzsche’s severe concern with this blindness to the situated nature of human knowing even begins his polemic. In the first section of his preface to On the Genealogy of Morals he warns that “We are unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge . . . Present experience has, I am afraid, always found us ‘absent-minded’” (Nietzsche, preface 1). Such lack of awareness of the embedded nature of our experience of knowing and knowledge leads to “count the twelve trembling bell-strokes of our experience, our life, our being—and alas! Miscount them” (Nietzsche, preface 1, On the Genealogy of Morals). Lack of awareness of the how one’s situatedness of their existence implicates contextual influences upon their knowing as a saying of the said of experience leads not to eternal, stable, unchanging Truth. Rather, falsification of the truth of the human condition leads to error and denial of reason through one’s denial of the situated character of human reason, knowledge, and being, as always situated and temporally bound.

Additionally significant to Nietzsche’s critique of such false ways of knowing arises as he attacks this perspective on knowledge based on its values and morals. The
perspective of reason it claims, one founded on truth, Nietzsche proceeds to assert is actually founded upon lies against the nature of human knowing as it occurs within the interestedness, contingent, temporal plane of human existence. Change does not imply the impossibility of truth but rather a revision and revaluation of its rhetoric, its claim to the status of the said of the categorical imperative.

Likewise, the denial of “one’s ego” and “one’s own reality” results in an erasure of one’s responsibility for the consequences of their knowledge claims. If one acquires knowledge as if it were a commodity open to all that merely repeat the same method, one’s personal responsibility in implementing this knowledge disappears. For example, in the same way that the soldier who pleads his innocence to a murder charge under the guise that he was only following the orders of his commanding officer. Knowledge of the said effaces personal responsibility in exchange for monologic universalizability, denies responsibility by denying its grounds, in turning reason into “an incarnate will to contradiction and antinaturalness” (Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals III: 12). Such a will brings forth not saying but said, not dialogic meeting but monologic denial of difference and the effacement of responsibility behind the mask of epistemological method.

Turning to discovery from the ashes of critique, Nietzsche advances his metaphor of perspectivism. Perspectivism Nietzsche designated to be truer to the conditions and conditional nature of human knowledge as well as to human reason situated within the currents of difference that animate human existence. Nietzsche claims that the aforementioned pretensions and illusions of knowledge “demand of the eye an absurdity and a nonsense” (On the Genealogy of Morals III: 12). The use of an embodied,
physiological metaphor for the knowing process, one that occurs through the flesh of the eyes, is not to be ignored. Seeing is an embodied means of knowing which is exactly Nietzsche’s core of perspectivism. To deny the body and all associated notions such as affects, interest, and physical opportunities and limitations, denies the ground of human reason and life. One cannot offer a rational account if one denies the conditions that frame it. Nietzsche continues

There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective ‘knowing’; and the more affects we allow to speak about one thing, the more eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will our ‘concept’ of this thing, our ‘objectivity’ be. But to eliminate the will altogether, to suspend each and every affect, supposing we were capable of this—what would that mean but to castrate the intellect?— (On the Genealogy of Morals III: 12)

Interestingly, Nietzsche ends his elaboration of the guiding ideas of his metaphor of perspectivism not with a characteristic exclamation point but with a question mark. In the manner in which Nietzsche communicates the insight of perspectivism seeks to enact its meaning, to be a saying of the said, to engage the other in the activity the speech suggests. One is called to ponder whether or not Nietzsche’s idea holds or whether one discovers reasons against its veracity. Engaged in this way, we begin to glimpse how perspectivism enacts Nietzsche’s architectonic rhetoric of dialogic meeting. The interpretive process of making known meanings shaped by one’s meeting difference, meeting other perspectives in the open space of dialogue. To better understand the multiple textures of this grounding metaphor the present study explores the significance
of perspectivism through interpretation of related themes and extensions in Nietzsche’s works.

**Perspectivism: Communication of Consciousness as Dialogic Meeting**

Under what conditions and why does invention in the form of perspectivism occur according to Nietzsche? What needs does it serve, what sorts of knowledge does it offer, to what values and morals may it enact in helping to pose a fitting response to temporal moment of meeting everyday exigencies? Sketching the background of perspectivism, the conditions of human knowing, offers an illuminating path into the concretion of contemplation and action, which perspectivism enacts in Nietzsche’s work and here begins that activity.

Perspectivism as Nietzsche envisions it then begins with conscious perception, as the beginning of one’s awareness of the taking in of stimuli. To the value of consciousness he turns for it is here that he finds the dawn of human knowledge determined by its communicability between persons. According to Nietzsche, “the subtlety and strength of consciousness always were proportionate to a man’s (or animal’s) capacity for communication, and as if this capacity in turn were proportionate to the need for communication” (*The Gay Science* 354). Communication of one’s perceptions, of one’s knowledge, then becomes the horizons of what one may come to perceive and know. In this way Nietzsche revalues the common sense relationship between language and experience as one not directed by the conscious perception of something, which then prompts its communication through the translation of one’s
perception into recognizable signs and symbols. Rather the primal and survival needs of human communication prompt what we may say and thereby see and come to know.

Yet such a process implies a multidirectional and layered understanding of how consciousness and communication interpenetrate human time and being beyond the directions and boundaries of mere individual will and agency.

Add to this that not only language serves as a bridge between human beings but also a mien, a pressure, a gesture. The emergence of our sense impressions into our consciousness, the ability to fix them and, as it were, exhibit them externally, increased proportionately with the need to communicate them to others by means of signs. The human being inventing signs is at the same time the human being who becomes ever more keenly conscious of himself. It was only as a social animal that man acquired self-consciousness—which he is still in the process of doing more and more. (Nietzsche, The Gay Science 354)

Life then directs our consciousness of self and other according to our need to communicate. Because communication requires an other-directed focus to manifest meaning between persons, it is the social situation that fosters self-awareness. Such a conception of consciousness as intertwined with communication presents problems and opportunities for Nietzsche. In developing our self-understanding we become conscious only of that for which our social language can communicate, limiting our sense of self to that for which our language possesses words to express. “Our thoughts . . . are continually governed by the character of consciousness—by the ‘genius of the species’ that commands it—and translated back into the perspective of the herd” (Nietzsche, The
Gay Science 354). However, such a concretion of consciousness and communication offers a novel conception of the unity of speech and activity to be discovered through the perception of consciousness through the lens of communication.

Jaspers points toward this emerging union of word and deed in Nietzsche’s thought. According to Jaspers, Nietzsche “takes all existence to be a kind of speech ‘through which the forces understand one another’” (299). Speech that authors understanding reinforces a textured conception of communication as the activity of saying, of actively responding to the exigencies and questions of a situation a person meets through the activity of saying their interpretation to an other, real and/or imagined.

This activity of consciousness as communication, as saying, leads one to “the essence of phenomenalism and perspectivism as I understand them . . . the world of which we can become conscious is only a surface- and sign-world, a world made common and meaner” (Nietzsche, The Gay Science 354). Perspectivism in this sense ascribes invention at the core of the values and meaning of communication and consciousness. Language shapes consciousness in providing the signs through which we encounter it in communication, in the active processing of consciousness in the words that speak its meanings.

While the social nature of consciousness shaped by the possibilities embedded in language affords sharing of meaning between persons it also simultaneously limits meanings to those shared words and their attendant meanings that reside within the language. This limitation also affects the significance of human knowledge. Nietzsche concludes that “We simply lack any organ for knowledge, for ‘truth’: we ‘know’ (or believe or imagine) just as much as may be useful in the interests of the human herd, the
species” (Nietzsche, The Gay Science 354). The utility of knowledge then comes under further scrutiny as a valuation for “‘utility’ is ultimately a mere belief, something imaginary, and perhaps precisely that most calamitous stupidity of which we shall perish some day” (Nietzsche, The Gay Science 354). The scathing critique Nietzsche advances emanates from what he sees as the questionable intellectual conscience that claims for human knowledge more than can be allotted given the facts of our ever-changing human condition. We also perceive from this dour pronouncement Nietzsche’s perspectivism, for it holds no truth, belief, or fact beyond ongoing interpretation.

The destructive potential of this insight Nietzsche mediates by connecting interpretation with the very existence of truth within the activity of interpretation, communicability, the limit of knowledge. “The metaphor of ‘exegesis,’ used to express the basic relation of human existence to being” claims Jaspers (289) describes the unfinalizability of the inherent perspectival character of human existence. What Jaspers perceives is that Nietzsche views the attaining of truth as an inherently dialogic process. “The word ‘truth’ is the name of a process . . . that in itself is never final: not a process of becoming aware of the truth as something initially independent, fixed, and determinate but of conferring and actively deciding the truth”’ (Jaspers 187). Truth emerges through analysis of the process and orientation to interpretation one brings to the questions that call for response. Truth emerges through acknowledgment of the values and morals that guide one’s interpretive acts. The kinds of truths one encounters then are understandable and gain meaning through how well they accord with one’s values that order their interpretive processes of knowing.
This is nowhere so clearly communicated by Nietzsche than when he states, “‘Alone one is always in the wrong; the truth begins with two’” (Nietzsche qtd. in Jaspers 403), illustrating Nietzsche’s dialogic orientation. For Nietzsche, truth emerges through dialogic meeting, through the encounter of an other. Such a dialogic orientation to knowing and truth acknowledges the role language plays in shaping the communicability of truth as the center of meeting.

If truth is not directly given, then the mask is part and parcel of existence—not the mask that is intended merely to deceive, but rather the protective mask that can be penetrated only by those whose vision is sufficiently authentic to hit upon the truth. Indirectness is no longer a technique of communication; it is the truth of being, manifest in existence and conveyed in speech. The mask involves both the common lie and authentic truth; as a mask a work offers changeability through ambiguity and foreground. (Jaspers 406)

Indirectness revealed as a component of the inherent character of the truth of being.

Being situated not as a passive intake of stimuli but as the communicative and rhetorical activity of making meaning and assigning value to difference manifest through meeting the eternal changes of temporal existential moment in which human life occurs. The limits of the truth of human life occur through the communicability of such meanings and values beyond the personal and into the social. A social fabric to which they are inextricably wedded due to the residue of others’ meanings that reside in all language use.
Therefore truth and communicability comprise forces residing at the stormy center of Nietzsche’s work. “In understanding his own philosophizing, he reflected upon no problems as often as those relating to what is communicable, how it can be communicated, what underlies incommunicability, and what conclusions follow from this” (Jaspers 403). This coincides with Nietzsche’s orientation through dialogic meeting; one must not act scientifically or dogmatically but metaphorically to meet others in dialogue, adept enough to change to meet the circumstances of one’s encounter with the other. “The drive toward the formation of metaphors is the fundamental human drive, which one cannot for a single instant dispense with in thought, for one would thereby dispense with man himself” (Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense” 88-9). Metaphor provides an opportunity to enact a saying of the said to counter the inherent recalcitrance in any saying of the said, the possibility of inherited meaning effacing the invention of meaning through meeting difference within the temporal existential moment. Hence it can be said that Nietzsche’s overriding task, along whichever philosophical lines one places it, remains dependent upon the possibility of communication.

So what does knowledge as framed by communicability convey in Nietzsche’s skeptical characterization? In many passages we find a similar answer or perhaps, an implicit rendering of the need for perspectivism as a saying of the meeting of the individual and social enacted by the metaphor of perspectivism. Nietzsche begins by offering an explanation from listening to the chatter on the streets.

What do they want when they want ‘knowledge’? Nothing more than this:

Something strange is to be reduced to something familiar. And we
philosophers—have we really meant more than this when we have spoken of knowledge? What is familiar means what we are used to so that we no longer marvel at it, our everyday, some rule in which we are stuck, anything at all in which we feel at home. Look, isn’t our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the will to uncover under everything strange, unusual, and questionable something that no longer disturbs us? Is it not the instinct of fear that bids us to know? And is the jubilation of those who attain knowledge not the jubilation over the restoration of a sense of security? (Nietzsche, The Gay Science 355)

Perhaps more important, Nietzsche offers a way to more, to live a richer fuller questioning life where knowledge is to be made not known or owned. Knowledge made by meeting others in the network of conscious communication. Through which our lives may become a saying, not a mere repetition of machines, a said of the same to silence difference of others. In other words, the known is exactly what requires continued questioning, not the monologic silencing within the straightjacket of a system imposed upon the dynamic nature of the ‘world riddle.’

Nietzsche reveals elements of his timeliness in confronting the biases of his age such as the unquestioned acceptance of the value of science. A scientific interpretation “that permits counting, calculating, seeing, touching, and nothing more—this is a crudity and a naïveté, assuming that it is not a mental illness, an idiocy” (The Gay Science 373). Such a prejudice removes the human, the perspective, from the interpretation and leaves the residue of one’s reasoning. A more truthful accounting arises through the traces of emergent perspectivism. “Knowledge, saying Yes to reality, is just as necessary for the
strong as cowardice and the flight from reality—as the ‘ideal’ is for the weak, who are inspired by weakness” (Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo* “The Birth of Tragedy” 2). Strength arises not out of conviction or repetition or representational correspondence but in the mud and mystery of meeting difference in the temporal existential moment. Truth found not in precision and accuracy but the ethics of meeting of difference, of perspective.

I favor any *skepsis* to which I may reply: ‘Let us try it!’ But I no longer wish to hear anything of all those things that do not permit any experiment. This is the limit of my ‘truthfulness’; for there courage has lost its right. (Nietzsche, *The Gay Science* 51)

The values that order inquiry then become important criteria when interpreting meanings of competing claims. Has the claim acknowledged its situatedness to acknowledge the limits of its applicability? Is the knowledge claimed of a human, perspectival sort or mere masking of unquestioned foundations set only outside contingent reality? Meanings and their invention become a question of the value of style in meeting the questions faced in times of narrative and virtue contention, the ethics of meeting thereby inform the meanings perspectives occupy as resources for an architectonic rhetoric of response.

**The Classical Rhetorical Roots of Nietzsche’s Perspectivism**

We begin our discussion of Nietzsche’s lecture notes on rhetoric with his comments on Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric since “Nietzsche finds the most impressive conception of rhetoric in Aristotle” (Behler 20). Starting from this Aristotelian standpoint, we progress to Nietzsche’s evolving genealogy of the relationship between rhetoric and language and how meaning emerges through language, highlighting
language’s inherent possibilities and limitations. Finally the notes lead to consideration of how Nietzsche regarded style as rhetoric’s resultant language art and how the style enacted through language discloses the communication ethics that adhere to any rhetorical language act.

Following a brief introductory sketch of conditions that comprise the origin of rhetoric and a preliminary overview of Plato’s critiques, Nietzsche moves onto the “most influential for all later conceptual determinations of the concept . . . the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle” (Nietzsche, “Lecture Notes on Rhetoric” 100). Nietzsche, quoting Aristotle states “[rhetoric is the power (faculty, ability) about each thing to observe all possible means of persuasion], “all that is feasibly probable and convincing” (Aristotle, *Rhetoric* I, 2 as qtd. in Nietzsche, “Lecture Notes on Rhetoric” 100). Nietzsche proceeds to interpret Aristotle as positing rhetoric as “neither *epistēmē* [knowledge in a scientific sense] nor *technē* [art or craft], but *dynamis* [power (faculty or ability)], which, however, could be elevated to a *techne*” (Nietzsche, “Lecture Notes on Rhetoric” 100). Nietzsche continues by emphasizing that it is not persuasion that serves as the object of rhetoric according to Aristotle’s definition.

Rather the definition turns upon the textured sense of the power to observe all the available means of persuasion for the “rhetor can defend a difficult cause, just as a physician who cares for an incurable patient” (Nietzsche, “Lecture Notes on Rhetoric” 100). Nietzsche also cites that it is the hermeneutic element of Aristotle’s definition to which “all later definitions hold firmly,” namely “to this *kata to endechomenon peithein* [according to all available means of persuasion]” (Nietzsche, “Lecture Notes on Rhetoric” 100). It is the hermeneutic element of attaining awareness of all available
topoi of persuasion that for Nietzsche lends rhetoric its “universal” element “applicable to all disciplines” and as such “is very important. It is a purely formal art” (“Lecture Notes on Rhetoric” 100). Art in the sense of a technē with the power to give form or order chaos according to the logos of the form persuasion should apparently take given the context. Rhetoric as an architectonic art of making meaning through meeting difference.

However, aside from acknowledgment of this universal element within Aristotle’s influential definition of rhetoric, Nietzsche finds fault within Aristotle’s lack of comment regarding “the fact that what has been seen is also to be presented somehow” (“Lecture Notes on Rhetoric” 101). This glaring omission of the necessity to communicate one’s interpretations by Aristotle Nietzsche suggests results from Aristotle’s bias against the later elaborated canons of “elocutio, dispositio, memoria, and pronunciatio” (“Lecture Notes on Rhetoric” 100). Overemphasis on the contemplative element or theory of rhetoric therefore according to Nietzsche impoverishes Aristotle’s contributions to understanding of the practice or praxis of rhetoric as a power working within the human world.

Nietzsche continues with his critique by stating that the communication of one’s interpretation must subsequently occur. Nietzsche claims that this “is already contained in pithanon [calculated to persuade]” therefore implying that Aristotle devalues delivery to the point where his conception of rhetoric could imply that “Even the legein [speaking] is not essential” (“Lecture Notes on Rhetoric” 101). The corrective to this loss of the mean and unwarranted inclination toward interpretation and contemplation to neglect of the performative and practical components of rhetoric Nietzsche finds in Quintilian’s definition of rhetoric.
In contrast to Aristotle, Nietzsche positions Quintilian as one who describes rhetoric as “the science of correct conception, arrangement and utterance, coupled with a retentive memory and a dignified delivery” (V, x, 54 as qtd. in Nietzsche, (“Lecture Notes on Rhetoric” 102). The significance of this genealogy of classical theory lies in the relationship Nietzsche perceives existent between rhetoric and language.

Without relinquishing the Aristotelian connection, Nietzsche states

The power to discover and to make operative that which works and impresses, with respect to each thing, a power which Aristotle calls rhetoric, is, at the same time, the essence of language; the latter is based just as little as rhetoric is upon that which is true, upon the essence of things. Language does not desire to instruct, but to convey a subjective impulse and its acceptance. (“Lecture Notes on Rhetoric” 107)

Language serves as a means of meeting difference-offering opportunity for communication, for exchange of meaning between persons as a co-construction.

Language describes a perspective towards truth, a perspective towards the untruth, but not the things themselves. Nietzsche desires we recall what language is at its base, a metaphor of our meeting reality, not a universal, unchanging saying of a Truth beyond human understanding.

However, that does not entail that language cannot convey truth. Nietzsche advocates language conveys the metaphorical interpretation, the perspective towards truth, given one’s situated nature as a speaker speaking within a temporal historical context to an audience addressing the said of other speakers and/or other exigency inherent to the specific act of speech articulated. To forget the embedded nature of all
communicative acts, especially rhetorical acts lead to misapplication of the *dynamis* of
the art and distortion of its meanings.

Therefore Nietzsche claims language signifies the metaphorical process of
knowing as “Man, who forms language, does not perceive things or procedures, but
*impulses*: he does not apprehend sensations, but merely copies of sensations” (“Lecture
Notes on Rhetoric” 107). Language as the container of meaning and its metaphorical
translation from impulse to linguistic communication, conveys not objects “but the
manner in which we stand toward them, the *pithanon* [power of persuasion (plausibility;
also a thing producing illusion)]. The full essence of things will never be grasped”
(Nietzsche, “Lecture Notes on Rhetoric” 107). This crucial insight serves to justify the
situating of perspectivism as the ground of Nietzsche’s architectonic rhetoric of his
communication ethic as it conveys the substance of rhetorical activity, the interplay of
perspectives. Perspectives constructed through the manifold resources of human
language.

A complex of sources, from conscious and unconscious impulses to the context in
which these impulses are perceived and interpreted determines the function of language.
“Language never expresses something completely but displays only a characteristic
which appears to be prominent to it [language]. . . . A partial perception takes the place of
the entire and complete intuition” as evidenced by the works of synecdoche, for example
(Nietzsche, “Lecture Notes on Rhetoric” 106-7). Given this metaphorical and partial
rendering of the impulses which our language seeks to convey Nietzsche concludes,
“*language is rhetoric*, because it desires to convey only a *doxa* [opinion], not an *epistēmē*
[knowledge]” (“Lecture Notes on Rhetoric” 107). Language is rhetoric; language is the
partial metaphorical translation of impulses, unconscious and conscious sensations into the signs made communicable through human language.

Language crafts the metaphors that congeal into perspectives, the *topoi* of rhetorical activity making meaning through meeting existential reality amid the temporal contextual impulses that influence language. Language defined through the rhetorical and metaphorical tools it affords to create meaning out of meeting difference, making order out of the contact of chaos, which pervades the existential and temporal moments of human life viewed through the perspective of language.

However, the characteristic linguistic element of a sensation that is most prominent is also the consequence of a mediation of personal and social forces. “What is usually called language is actually all figuration. Language is created by the individual speech artist, but it is determined by the fact that the taste of the many makes choices” (Nietzsche, “Lecture Notes on Rhetoric” 108). Nietzsche suggests that social, not only internal, subjective, contingent forces shape language and impact communication wherein *physis* influences style and figuration to express perspectives.

Meaning then remains under a plethora of influences determined by these original choices made by situated speech as a form of response or as Ijessling describes speech as “always understood as a listening” (129). Nietzsche states that “It is a matter of importance to observe for whom, and among whom, one speaks, at which time, at which place, and for what cause” (Nietzsche, “Lecture Notes on Rhetoric” 113). Style and meaning then result from meeting as listening and response to and within a complex of temporal, existential forces. “Therefore, in sum, purity and clarity everywhere; but all modified according to characteristics of place, occasion, speakers, and listeners—”
(Nietzsche, “Lecture Notes on Rhetoric” 113). Yet if situational constraints hold such sway, how may one succeed in conveying their perspective to an audience? Nietzsche finds a response in the consideration of the inherent rhetorical nature of language, style.

The work of the rhetor then demands the fashioning of a “characteristic style” because the rhetor “practices a free plastic art; the language is his material which has already been prepared” (Nietzsche, “Lecture Notes on Rhetoric” 113). One speaks with plastic forms, words and symbols present within cultural history and whose meanings still resonate with the significance attached to those past utterances. The rhetor then communicates in the person of an “imitative artist; he speaks similarly to the actor, out of a strange person, or to him, a strange object” (Nietzsche, “Lecture Notes on Rhetoric” 113). Again, we see the power of physis as significant in the contest to persuade and convey a convincing perspective toward difference in person, idea, or situation. To achieve a convincing manner, a rhetor must not appear to be out of tune with their audience whereby one’s style appears as artificial for it is at that moment that for Nietzsche the bond of identification between speaker and audience tears.

Style for Nietzsche involves successful mediation of the rhetorical situation through the correct translation of personal metaphors into proposed social metaphors or figures, which subsequently come to guide others’ reception of meaning and use of style. Style becomes simultaneously a comprehensive description and prescription of communicative possibilities. Given this proposed exchange between speaker and hearers, what determines results? “A figure which finds no buyer becomes an error. An error which is accepted by some usus or other becomes a figure” answers Nietzsche (“Lecture Notes on Rhetoric” 109). An answer, which emphasizes the contingent nature of rhetoric
and meaning, evoked through language, an answer that implicates rhetoric as the art of the probable, an architectonic art of perspectivism as ground for dialogic meeting. The determining factor as to acceptance and error remains a mystery acted out “according to unconscious laws and analogies” (Nietzsche, “Lecture Notes on Rhetoric” 109). A closer inspection of the form and content of the process appears to signal an adequate guide. It appears that Nietzsche anticipates this puzzle and situates his response as arising out of the relationship that adheres or appears to adhere between a speaker’s style and the values that follow from such a rhetorically constructed perspective.

Could values and moral sensation then be posited as natural guides to rhetorical style and action? If so, error then becomes a consequence of the artificiality of language. As Nietzsche claims, “It is in this way that the listener perceives the naturalness, viz., the absolute appropriateness and uniformity, whereas with each deviation from the natural, he perceives the artificiality and becomes distrustful about the matter presented” (“Lecture Notes on Rhetoric” 113-14). Through the perception of the naturalness of language, the appropriate form of the message given the situation appears as word meets the act of meeting. We now glimpse the ancient connection Nietzsche follows in his characterization of the imbricating relationship between rhetoric, values, and the ethical perspectives they signify.

The listener will believe in the earnestness of the speaker and the truth of the thing advocated only if the speaker and his language are adequately suited to one another: he takes a lively interest in the speaker and believes in him—that is, the speaker himself believes in the thing, and thus is sincere. Therefore, ‘appropriateness’ aims at a moral effect, clarity (and
purity) at an intellectual one: one will want to be understood, and one
wishes to be considered sincere. (Nietzsche, “Lecture Notes on Rhetoric”
114)

The results of different styles and their effects upon their audiences result from the
naturalness one’s language evokes. The convincing combination of moral and logical
appeals between saying and the act of meeting difference in the temporal moment
realized through the speech one employs to voice their interpretations to others. As
Nietzsche reveals “The real secret of the rhetorical art is now the prudent relation of both
aspects, of the sincere and the artistic” (Nietzsche, “Lecture Notes on Rhetoric” 115).
This prudent relation indicates where neither is sufficient alone but one may achieve
persuasion only through the fitting combination given the rhetorical situation the speaker
inhabits. Therefore, a speaker constructs a fitting response by

playing at the boundary of the aesthetic and the moral: any one-sidedness destroys
the outcome. The aesthetic fascination must join the moral confidence; but they
should not cancel one another out: the admiratio [admiration] is a basic means of
the pithanon [persuasion]. (Nietzsche, “Lecture Notes on Rhetoric” 115)

The advised combination of ethos and logos drawn forth through pathos compels
multiple perspectives on beauty as it discloses available resources for persuasion through
meeting, answering drawn forth from listening. For just as the logical conveys a sense of
beauty, so does the naturalness of the appearance of truth convey the logical veracity of
moral reasoning as an available proof of persuasion.

Therefore, Nietzsche states that “Beauty is, indeed, the most noble and divine
thing there is; whatever lacks it is despised. Even virtue is praised only because it is the
most beautiful of strivings” (Nietzsche, *Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language* 147). Through recognition of the appropriate coupling of logic, beauty, and virtue does “stylistic expression becomes a power for itself” (Nietzsche, *Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language* 216). Style revealed as a power through the use of language as a means to convey as well as employ available means of persuasion in meeting temporal and existential situations and responding through discourse. For Nietzsche even traces the origins of rhetoric back to dialogue (Nietzsche, *KSA* 1:545 qtd. in Behler 10).

Rhetoric emerges from the interplay of a dialogue with the audience and the meeting of the temporal existential moment, saying driven by listening. As style now represents power we see the culmination of Nietzsche’s appropriation and extension of Aristotle’s notion of the *dynamis* of rhetoric. Rhetoric viewed as a power emerging not only through the ability to observe in a situation all available means of persuasion, but also through the construction and delivery of one’s message. A message one learns how to communicate through a dialogic meeting of difference in the situation addressed through discourse.

Therefore Nietzsche’s more expansive conception of rhetoric’s *dynamis* than Aristotle’s more contemplative notion leaves us with an initial summary of what a communication ethic grounded in an architectonic rhetoric could look like from the vantage of Nietzsche’s early writings on rhetoric. Nietzsche posits rhetoric as always situated. Rhetoric originates as a called for response, it is inherently social in nature, in the source of its style as well as its reception, and that the appeals of rhetoric as articulated through language characterize the process of communication as a whole. Language is rhetoric, all language seeks to persuade in response utilizing not the Truth but available perspectives toward the true, as the limits of language illustrate. What of
the true remains limited by the existential, temporal difference of a communicative context, truth exists as it can be communicated. What can be conveyed via language is an impulse, a situated perspective. The evaluation of rhetoric is always contingent, as words and meanings change with the ebb and flow of the tides of culture and custom.

Difference and change not only determine what can be discovered but what can be created within the natural world. A natural world marked by human perspectives designated through discourse and language as forms of activity that shape the discovery, critique, and creation of future perspectives. Perspectives shaped through language providing contact points of thought, emotion, word, and deed in meeting difference. Perspectives presented through discourse drawn from the power of rhetoric to communicate word and deed in the moment of existential and temporal meeting. Rhetoric then revalued by Nietzsche, building upon classical sources, as a dialogic meeting of difference occurring at the interplay of self and other, intra- and interpersonal, the perspectival textures of values and ethics disclosed through interplay of dialogue and rhetoric.

**Implications of Nietzsche’s Perspectivism**

Explanation of Nietzsche’s perspectivism charts the coordinates that will guide and frame the horizons of significance of the present study. Consideration of communication, rhetoric, and ethics leads to how Nietzsche enacts these interrelated areas through his metaphors of perspectivism, genealogy, and revaluation of values. Study of the enactment of these metaphors lead to the original contribution of the present study, Nietzsche’s architectonic rhetoric of dialogic meeting. Dialogic meeting
constructs a communication ethic that his rhetoric announces and advocates through his saying of his ideas in dialogue with the said, the traditions that permeated his historical moment and resonate throughout contemporary times after illusion amid metanarrative disintegration.

Dialogic meeting therefore permeates Nietzsche’s three leading metaphors that explain how he situates rhetoric at the intersection of dialogue, communication, and ethics. It also sketches Nietzsche’s understanding of communication as dialogue of, with, and amid difference saturated with pressures of contesting values and narratives seeking to guide thought, speech, and act. Perspectivism provides the necessary theoretical ground for the emergence of Nietzsche’s architectonic rhetoric of dialogic meeting. Perspectivism presents the inseparable character of communication, rhetoric, and ethics as they are understood “when see through the prism of life” (Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy* “An Attempt at Self-Criticism” 4). Situating perspectivism at the intersection of communication, rhetoric, and ethics reveals Nietzsche’s dialogic, affective perspective towards these imbricating penultimate areas of study as ways to achieve his goals of enriching life through affirming life, meeting the manifold difference in which we are entangled, the mud and mystery of everyday.

The perspective of perspectivism forms the focus of this chapter as it provides the theoretical ground and background for the further unfolding of Nietzsche’s architectonic rhetoric of dialogic meeting as enacted through his related metaphors of genealogy and revaluation. In addition, perspectivism is most clearly presented through a genealogical saying of its development through Nietzsche’s thought. A genealogical excavation of Nietzsche’s textured metaphor of perspectivism begins with its implicit assumption of a
rhetorical perspective through its most complete articulation embedded within the
textures of *On the Genealogy of Morals* as revaluation of modern Kantian objectivity and
the Platonic-Christian philosophical standpoint dominant during Nietzsche’s career. This
revaluation of values states the perspective from which operates Nietzsche’s
communication ethic and its architectonic rhetoric. A communication ethic realized
through the architectonic rhetoric of its saying of the said by following chapters on
genealogy and revaluation of values.

Perspectivism situates Nietzsche’s concretion of communication, ethics, and
rhetoric through enactment of a dialogic perspective toward difference. What the present
study renders as the architectonic rhetoric of dialogic meeting, Nietzsche’s
communication to confront the modern exigency of the death of God within the turmoil
of Statism, Progress, and Industrial Revolutions amid world war and political strife.
Articulation of how dialogic meeting emerges in Nietzsche’s works requires explanation
of how Nietzsche understands communication, rhetoric, and ethics as interrelated and
intersecting forces at play approached through the prism of life. Such a prism denotes
life characterized by perspectivism, the conditions of communication and consciousness.

Perspectivism provides theoretical ground and communicative space for
genealogy to meet the said of traditions through dialogue of the contemporary existential
and temporal moment of meeting. A meeting that implies a revaluation of values,
necessitated through saying of the said, the encountering of traditions, narratives,
between the past, present, and future, which the event of meeting enacts. Meeting that
begins with dialogue invites exploration of perspectives available in any given situation.
Awareness of perspectives then leads to genealogical inquiry and judgment on future action expressed through revaluation of values undertaken from the situated perspective within the rhetorical conversation of humankind. Rhetorical conversation embedded within a specific existential and temporal reality that calls forth communication as a way to meet reality in dialogue, creating meanings from such encounters from which to live.
**Chapter Five: Nietzsche’s Genealogy as Rhetorical Deconstruction**

Perspectivism is meeting in dialogue. Reality prescribes this fitting response given the contingent, temporal nature of the human condition, one shaped by the dialogic meeting of difference. Genealogy designates the materials of dialogic meeting, the values that order interpretations resulting from meeting reality. Materials include the traditions, narrative histories, language, values, and ethics that influence present and future communication and action. Nietzsche designates values and ethics as the names at the pinnacle of the hierarchy of ordering schemes that mask reality in human terms. Genealogy seeks to interpret and narrate the said, the traditions that provide the sources of language and possibilities for meaning otherwise. Genealogy encounters reality through the architectonic rhetoric of dialogic meeting, the rhetorical realm of the probable, in which life is lived rather than the universal logic of the philosophical, outside time flesh wandering amid towers of ivory inconsequence.

Genealogy undertakes an exegesis of the past to discern the ground of traditions, the perspectives of values and affects from which they spring to serve life. Nietzsche employs genealogy to engender objectivity through communication between competing perspectives. Genealogy enacts a saying of the said as dialogic meeting of history and its transformation when resurrected in the temporal existential moment of dialogic meeting.

**Introduction**

To understand Nietzsche’s metaphor of genealogy is to understand what Nietzsche interprets through genealogy: perspectives, values, and affects, power within
human life. Genealogy undertakes a rhetorical inquiry into the communicative power of affects in interpreting reality through the lens of the values and affects that influence meeting of difference. For Nietzsche, the style of meeting difference indicates a will to power—a will to creative life and affirmation or a diseased will to nothingness, decadence, and resentment (On the Genealogy of Morals II: 12-25). Genealogy enacts an exegesis that discloses its biases while simultaneously seeking to interpret and make meaning of these competing perspectives after illusion amid metanarrative disintegration.

Seeking after illusion amid metanarrative disintegration to serve life in the temporal existential moment genealogy enacts a perspectival meeting of morals and values. Perspectivism, necessary limits, is embedded within Nietzsche’s genealogy of morals. Therefore, the character of any genealogical inquiry is necessarily perspectival as it works from the perspective of the probable, the rhetorical, not the universal, philosophical standpoint. This shift announces the path of genealogy as clearing the ground of the architectonic rhetoric of dialogic meeting. For as Ijessling states, rhetoric serves as a foundation of Nietzsche’s thought.

Rhetoric has an extremely important role in Nietzsche’s analysis of the structure of philosophy and the function of philosophical speech, in the genealogical detection of the factors responsible for the factum of philosophy and in the question of the precise nature of formulation and interpretation. One can even say that the problem of rhetoric has been a decisive influence on his thought and that much of his ‘philosophical’ terminology is derived from the classical rhetorical tradition. This also applies to the so-called ‘will to power.’ (106)
Genealogy interprets not to discover facts but to generate perspectives, alternative views, from which to encourage dialogue with others on the question addressed. The response influenced more by the moment in which the genealogical exegesis takes place than against the shifting fortunes of eternity. Genealogy aims to provide tangible insights that generate new perspectives and aid in decision-making, communication and action in the temporal moment and the future dawning from these perspectives, speech, and deeds.

How can insights, perspectives gained through the exegetical practice of genealogy, serve life, how may the knowledge generated serve life? These are Nietzsche’s questions that drive his genealogical inquiries into the metanarratives shaping his historical moment and to understand his practices, they must also become the ones used to guide subsequent genealogies of Nietzsche’s own works.

Therefore, while perspectivism situates the novel hermeneutic entrance Nietzsche opens upon discussion of the dominant rhetoric of everyday decision-making, values and morals, genealogy enacts Nietzsche’s communication ethic of ethics. Genealogy, functioning upon a perspectival approach to the rhetoric inherent in ethical claims and reasoning, seeks to revalue such value-laden appeals through criticism of the values and ethics these perspectives disclose upon meeting in dialogue. Genealogy therefore functions at a tension between destruction and construction in its perspectival inquiries, inquiries that acknowledge and do not deny their biases. Genealogy seeks to understand the conditions under which particular values and ethics rise to the fore to guide human action and prefigure human perspectives. For example, how does good become a known designation and evil an easily identifiable quality and act to communities and within narrative traditions?
The perspectival framework of ethics as epideictic rhetoric of human thought, speech, and activity becomes the subject of study for Nietzsche’s genealogy because no other single subject has attained such power. Ethics determines what is real and not, what is right and wrong, what the nature of the universe and the human person is and how one should act in response to these truths as justification for advocacy of perspectives and acts. Truths knowable only through the symbols and language of ethics and the names ethics bestows upon ideas, events, and persons to explain and value of the past to shape future perspectives and activity. This power attracts Nietzsche’s genealogical enterprise as no other. For has this penultimate question sufficiently been addressed given this power of ethics and moral reasoning? “What was at stake was the value of morality—” (Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, preface 5). Nietzsche employs genealogy as a revaluation of ethics done from a perspectival standpoint because according to Nietzsche, this path provides a more truthful, honest, and just approach to help guide human life through the “chaos and labyrinth of existence” (Nietzsche, *The Gay Science* 322). Genealogy then affords a new way of understanding and enacting ethics as meeting difference through a dialogic perspective framed by the pressures of the temporal existential moment of meeting.

Genealogy then does not seek to destroy or deny ethics because for Nietzsche ethics and values are seminal elements of the character of human thought and reasoning. Rather, with genealogy, Nietzsche seeks to interpret ethics and the valuations it advocates differently. By investigating dominant ethical perspectives and values within his historical moment, Nietzsche employs genealogy as a path to interpreting otherwise the
modern values and ethics that colored the life of his historical moment and continues to influence contemporary questions of truth, value, and good and evil.

Pathos of distance allows greater understanding of the communities of interpreters, genealogists, and others who collaboratively shape the perspectives available from which to make sense of the traditions, the echoes and shadows history provides to guide exegesis. History provides the language, values, and perspectives through which and against which genealogy works. Therefore to understand genealogy as a saying of history interpreted otherwise from convention, history must be revalued as a living record. Genealogy then analyzes and recalls, and in its saying of the said from the rhetorical perspective of affect and values resurrects history not as a said but as a saying in the course of meeting present conversations to aid living now and in the future.

A Genealogy of Nietzschean Genealogy

Explication of Nietzsche’s metaphor of genealogy begins with a question: Why might Nietzsche append the subtitle “A Polemic,” to his work, On the Genealogy of Morals? The Oxford English Dictionary defines a polemic as “a controversial argument or discussion; argumentation against some opinion, doctrine, etc.” Exegesis of this significant subtitle opens discussion of Nietzsche’s metaphor of genealogy because it reveals the rhetorical rather than philosophical nature of genealogy as critical moral inquiry. Genealogy implies a perspectival understanding of knowledge and knowing as always occurring within the situated historical, linguistic, political, moral, hermeneutical, and rhetorical perspective of the genealogist.
Therefore, emerging through the prejudices inherent in one’s perspective, one interprets, evaluates, speaks, and acts. The acknowledgement of the perspectival nature of knowing grounds Nietzsche’s metaphor of genealogy as polemic—as situated rhetorical inquiry, not seeking Truth as a final said, an ideal situated outside temporality and beyond human reason. Rather, genealogy engages in dialogic meeting of the question of the origin of values as a hermeneutic entrance into the question of the value of morality, of the value of the values our morals enact, situated firmly within the countercurrents of the contingent nature of Nietzsche’s contemporary historical moment. Nietzsche, through his metaphor of genealogy, seeks understanding and knowledge of the significance of morality for human living. Genealogy therefore engages in a rhetorical inquiry into the mud and mystery of how humans live their values and morals within the irony and paradox of everyday life. Genealogy does not imply a modern perspective-less mode of philosophical inquiry, undertaken amid the ideals and categorical imperatives of a truth one infers from observation or flurries of theoretical flight outside temporality, historicity, society, and contingency, outside of the human condition.

Otherwise than modern philosophical convention, Nietzsche further emphasizes the rhetorical nature of the hermeneutics of genealogy in his preface, “ideas on the origin of our moral prejudices” serves as the “subject of this polemic” (Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, preface 2). The polemic nature of Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals offers an interested, situated critical inquiry that seeks not solely the origin of morality. Rather Nietzsche seeks greater understanding of the prejudices that condition our understanding of its values, which we utilize to interpret the past as a background to guide future thought, word, and deed, situated within and against the demands of the
present. Paying greater attention to Nietzsche’s hermeneutical cues within his preface reveals genealogy as a rhetorical rendering of morality as a paradigm for making meaning within his modern age. To understand how Nietzsche undertakes this rhetorical critical inquiry into the origin and nature of the value of morality for life, we begin by rendering a genealogy of genealogy beginning with his preface to *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche’s guide to his evolving project.

Understanding this evolving project begins with the question of origin, not yet of morality but of perspective concerning “where the beehives of our knowledge are,” where “we men of knowledge find “our treasure” (Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, preface 1). Yet Nietzsche immediately complicates the sense of knowledge possible from the perspective of “men of knowledge” for “We are unknown to ourselves . . . and with good reason. We have never sought ourselves—how would it happen that we should ever find ourselves?” (Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, preface 1). Nietzsche alludes to this lack of self-knowledge as a problem of perspective. “Whatever else there is in life, so-called ‘experiences’—which of us has sufficient earnestness for them? Alternatively, sufficient time? Present experience has, I am afraid, always found us ‘absent-minded’: we cannot give our hearts to it—not even our ears!” (Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals* P: 1). Yet what sort of initial ‘knowledge’ could exist apart from our empirical perception of our experiences? How could one attain ‘knowledge’ without first considering the organic source of one’s capacities for knowing?

The consequence of such absent-mindedness posits a “pure, will-less, painless, timeless knowing subject” that “always demand we think of an eye that is completely unthinkable, an eye turned in no particular direction . . . these always demand of the eye
an absurdity and a nonsense” (Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals* III: 12). The absurdity and nonsense that argues for a ‘knowledge’ separate from the physiological, psychological, empirical, and social conditions from which it dawns ironically denies the possibility of ‘knowledge’ it seeks to acquire. In this way, trapped within the monologic meeting of reality in the said, the denial of difference, such ‘men of knowledge’ “count the twelve trembling bell-strokes of our experience, our life, our being—and alas! miscount them” (Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, preface 1). Denial of the limits of one’s knowledge as perspectival, interested, and situated eliminates the possibility of “bringing something home” (Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, preface 1). In this way, such ‘knowledge’ becomes incommunicable. Hence nonexistent for such chimerical treasures of our own making exist only within our closed, self-directed monologues outside of time, reason, and communal reality.

In contrast to the preceding suprahistorical monologic perspective on knowing, Nietzsche prescribes genealogy as a dialogic alternative attuned to the inherently social dimensions of communicable knowledge. “We have no right to isolated acts of any kind: we may not make isolated errors or hit upon isolated truths” (Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, preface 2). Such self-imposed isolation through a monologic meeting of difference wrenches knowledge from its roots and robs it of its connection to life and to the background history of bodies of knowledge to which it is connected, leaving it perspective-less and incommunicable, meaningless. One cannot discover the atom without first relying upon the said of previous errors and discoveries, collected in technical apparatus and writings of past investigations, why should one seek to self-deify the fruits of one’s inquiries?
Nietzsche proposes an alternative narrative structure of communicating knowledge. He asserts that we always, with or without acknowledgement, speak from the interests, soil, person, and background history that bring knowledge to light.

Rather do our ideas, our values, our yeas and nays, our ifs and buts, grow out of us with the necessity with which a tree bears fruit—related and each with an affinity to each, and evidence of one will, one health, one soil, one sun. (Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, preface 2)

Perspectives always situated as Nietzsche’s natural terminology states, our ideas and intellect the yield of fruit we bear from our soil and sun, fruit that we as the tree bear responsibility for coming forth from our will and health. We are called to answerability for the ideas that we present under our name.

Thus Nietzsche also resituates and naturalizes human agency as a responsive affair of answerability to the perceptions and creations of reality in which one resides and out of which one speaks and writes their name into “the basic text of homo natura” (Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil 230). Agency resides in the person as meeting, as a collection of forces, which enters the communicative fray and speaks and writes what one’s perspective compels one to utter. In loosing the bonds of the situated character of the human condition, such metaphysical illusion to heroes in the quest for knowledge as self-rolled wheels of progress shatter when run upon the rocky, muddy ground of the chaotic contingent nature of everyday life.

To translate man back into nature; to become master over the many vain and overly enthusiastic interpretations and connotations that have so far been scrawled and painted over that eternal basic text of homo natura; to
see to it that man henceforth stands before man as even today, hardened in the discipline of science, he stands before the rest of nature, with intrepid Oedipus eyes and sealed Odysseus ears, deaf to the siren songs of old metaphysical bird catchers who have been piping at him all too long, ‘you are more, you are higher, you are of a different origin!’ (Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil 230)

Nietzsche’s translating of the genealogist back within nature, the flesh out of which the flights of the mind occur, lays a radical responsibility upon the subject. As he famously remarks, “there is no ‘being’ behind doing, effecting, becoming; ‘the doer’ is merely a fiction added to the deed—the deed is everything” (Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals I: 13). Human identity, in other words, reflects a “seduction of language (and of the fundamental errors of reason that are petrified in it) which conceives and misconceives all effects as conditioned by something that causes effects, by a ‘subject,’ can it appear otherwise” (Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals I: 13). We find ourselves in our relations with reality, in our dialogic meeting of the everyday demands of living; we author the path of our lives by walking and living each day as if we were enacting this drama as a work of art, the highest form of human living, creation.

Therefore, the process of genealogy as a way of seeking knowledge revalues the modern notions of objectivity, disinterest, and progress as bearer of Truth. In contrast, Nietzsche offers a way that realizes its metaphorical ground situated within language as a translation of perceived reality into symbols of its existence by an actor situated within temporality, historicity, and the social circumstances of their language, affects, and body. The limits upon one’s claims then exclude categorical imperatives and universal accuracy
and applicability in favor of a more honest recounting of the limited nature of human truth and knowledge. Bounded by the shapes of language within the storm and stress of the unknown and unknowable past, present, and future, yet demanding the responsibility of the tongue and hand which author what forces under and beyond their control compel them to utter.

A genealogy of morals articulates the task and problem of morality as a hermeneutical, ethical, and rhetorical question of value eternally recurring and demanding response. Genealogy therefore turns on the moral domain of the promise, the origin of responsibility as value that Nietzsche suspends within the dialogic tension of forgetting and remembering. A genealogy of morals then meets the values inherent in the act of making promises, meeting the significance and consequences emanating from this origin of moral valuation. From Nietzsche’s perspective, the promise of genealogy resides in the inquiry into the value of living one’s morals thus accomplishing the goal of translating human back into nature. This translation then grounds the perspective of morals, viewed as the human ordering of the chaos of existence, according to the conditions of human living.

Nietzsche traces important consequences from this single simultaneous event of giving and bearing responsibility for one’s actions through speech. The promise serves as the foundation of relations, be it from economic trade, political treaty, or marriage compact. A genealogy of morals originates from morality enacted through the promise. Genealogy of the promise as communicative activity emergent between modes of temporality, between persons, and through language directing action highlights the significance of this origin of the prejudice of morals and foreshadows their penultimate
concern, “So let us add the hardest question of all! What, when seen through the prism of
life, is the meaning of morality?” (Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, preface 4). For
Nietzsche, morality as perspectival answerability to the demands of the contemporaneous
historical, rhetorical, hermeneutic, and moral moment becomes the perennial question as
to what fruit the trees of our values bear.

Nietzsche centers the nature of this responsibility in one’s orientation to the past
as an inherently moral act—“To breed an animal with the right to make promises—is this
the paradoxical task that nature has set itself in the case of man? is it not the real problem
regarding man?” (Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals II: 1). It is this central task of
promising, be it of repayment of a debt, honest accounting of an event or idea, or as
surety on a bank note, balanced against the compulsion of forgetting, in which Nietzsche
orients his genealogy of morals. Genealogy appears then as a promise given Nietzsche’s
hermeneutical prejudices, as a grounding communication ethic of dialogic meeting for his
critical and rhetorical process of inquiry, inquiry realized through simultaneous
inseparable tasks of destruction and construction.

The project is to traverse with quite novel questions, and as though with
new eyes, the enormous, distant, and so well hidden land of morality—of
morality that has actually existed, actually been lived; and does this not
mean virtually to discover this land for the first time? (Nietzsche, On the
Genealogy of Morals, preface 7)

Note that Nietzsche characterizes this new land as one which the genealogist discovers,
not creates. Genealogy offers a grounded perspective from which to view the paradigm
of Nietzsche’s historical moment, and from which to center his self-proclaimed task of a
revaluation of values. We engage the nature of morality and the values that ground its adherence through Nietzsche’s promise of genealogy as a guiding architectonic rhetoric and communication ethic of rhetorical criticism and inquiry.

**The Nietzschean Union: Genealogy and Morals**

Genealogy as reported above can be succinctly characterized as Nietzsche’s views of history honestly conducted, history ordered not by a will to truth or a will to knowledge but ordered by a will to power in service of and affirmation of creation and thereby life. Nietzsche directs his genealogical inquiries towards morality, the study of values that guide how life is lived and the penultimate power in shaping thought, word, and deed as well as perspectives upon past, present, and future. Nietzsche utilizes genealogy to discern what values and morals mark perspectives of growth or decline. Once this genealogical description has been conducted and analyzed, meeting as many perspectives and attendant values, what powers they serve, action can be taken resulting from this awareness.

Judgment sanctioned through the play of forces to praise or blame then help render the options available in meeting difference and exigencies within the temporal existential moment at the interplay of dialogue and rhetoric. This dialogue frames the communicative activity of interpretation of the play of perspectives that seeks power within any society or culture. Thus rhetoric shapes these perspectives to meet difference in an epideictic play of available possibilities of values and morals to guide future perspectives and the thoughts, words, and deeds they engender in the dialogic meeting of difference.
To understand this interplay of dialogue and rhetoric from the perspective of a genealogy of morals requires a textured impression of Nietzsche’s perspectives on morals and moralities as the foremost powers in shaping thought, word, and deed in ethics and through the conducting of human affairs. Nietzsche then employs genealogy to discover the values that ground, frame and promote particular moralities as a promise to do so honestly and with justice, not to secure scientific accuracy regarding the origins of morality. On the contrary, genealogy sought to explore Nietzsche’s “real concern [. . .] What was at stake was the value of morality” (Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy ofMorals* preface 5). The value of morality Nietzsche claims emerges through looking “in the direction of an actual history of morality” (*On the Genealogy of Morals*, preface 7). What this ‘actual history of morality’ would comprise Nietzsche characteristically never fully defines. However, he alludes to its imposing significance in his preface crucial to understanding the rhetorical union between genealogy and morality.

Let us articulate this new demand: we need a critique of moral values, the value of these values themselves must first be called in question—and for that there is needed a knowledge of the conditions and circumstances in which they grew, under which they evolved and changed (morality as consequence, as symptom, as mask, as tartufferie, as illness, as misunderstanding; but also morality as cause, as remedy, as stimulant, as restraint, as poison), a knowledge of a kind that has never yet existed or even been desired. One has taken the value of these ‘values’ as given, as factual, as beyond all question; one has hitherto never doubted or hesitated in the slightest degree in supposing ‘the good man’ to be of greater value
than ‘the evil man,’ of greater value in the sense of furthering the advancement and prosperity of man in general (the future of man included). But what if the reverse were true? What if a symptom of regression were inherent in the ‘good,’ likewise a danger, a seduction, a poison, a narcotic, through which the present was possibly living at the expense of the future? Perhaps more comfortably, less dangerously, but at the same time in a meaner style, more basely?—So that precisely morality would be to blame if the higher power and splendor actually possible to the type man was never in fact attained? So that precisely morality was the danger of dangers? (Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, preface 6)

This quoted passage foreshadows Nietzsche’s textured perspective toward morality as a perennial polemic on values. A genealogy of morals constitutes a perspectival retelling of the history of morals, seeking to influence, while simultaneously enacting, a morality of values through its speaking. In this way, we see morality as a danger due to its persuasive power, morality as compulsion.

Genealogy and morality thereby become dangers when one acknowledges the promise inherent in each, the ground of a rhetorical contest of meaning making. A genealogy of morals then serves as the retelling of the polemic on values that the history of morality relates and simultaneously enacts through its telling and retelling. Morality orders these perspectives and makes them communicable, although it also dilutes them through the socialization of one’s impulses through their communication within the accepted systems of language. The consequence of one’s meeting of this difference, this
recognition of the necessity of others and alterity for the construction of communicable meaning determines one’s communicative and rhetorical possibilities for either affirmation or denial of this foundation of the human condition. Genealogy of morality serves as a promise concerning explication of this process. Genealogical inquiry explores whether one affirms nobly this limited agency and subjectivity in the face of the contingent contours of existential reality. Alternatively, working from the slavish perspective, one seeks to impose one’s decadent denial through a nihilistic effacing of the face of the other that confronts them in the intertwined construction and destruction of meanings.

Morality emerges as a problem because for Nietzsche it signifies the ground upon which perspectives that shape perspectives emerge. However, he quickly explains that this relates not to mere semantic meaning but to social significance. For as Nietzsche traces morality to its ground, he pursues the roots of its power. The power of morality Nietzsche finds in what he designates as the morality of custom, the morality of the masses, and the morality of mores. The morality of mores Nietzsche posits as “the truly decisive history that determined the character of mankind” (*On the Genealogy of Morals* III: 9). This model of morality turned to custom to verify its values and ethics to guide action for as Nietzsche states, “the ‘sense of community’ masters us: please note this is almost a definition of morality” (*Will to Power* 281). Yet, ‘almost’ still leaves room for questioning and inquiry in testing the veracity of such traditions and socially sanctioned, taken for granted values, for with this loophole Nietzsche urges an interpreting otherwise in meeting the exigencies of the present.
A dialogic meeting of tradition situated within the temporal existential moment leads toward a morality of revaluation. Revaluation of morals authored through the dialogic tension between the contrasting moralities of slave and noble, a moral orientation not as much to material and social position as to how one orients oneself to one’s perspectives of value and values. What matters and why to this community, to this situation, given what can be known now?

However, Nietzsche did not seem to find this morality, a morality lived through questioning, through living the values the morality expressed in meeting difference in the “chaos and labyrinth of existence” (Nietzsche, *The Gay Science* 322). Rather, Nietzsche characterized the morality he met in Europe during his day as herd morality, morality diagnosed as a problem, an inhibition to human achievement (*Beyond Good and Evil* 202). Herd morality characterized not by nobility of spirit but a much more plebian spark, “here, too, fear is again the mother of morals” (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil* 201). Fear of difference, fear of one’s neighbor prompts admonitions to love one’s neighbor, not filial concern (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil* 201). Judging reality through this lens leads to decadent morality for it “reproaches those who are different” (Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, “Expeditions of an Untimely Man” 34). The decadence then spreads outward from a personal disgust to articulation of disgust with life, a denial of life, a refusal to live life, to avoid it in meeting through a monological silencing of difference. Such a monological meeting of difference denies life and wills destruction and cynicism, authoring self-fulfilling prophecies of failure and destruction.

A crucial insight within Nietzsche’s criticisms of modern morality from his perspective is that meanings of morals and values that guide human living can only be
known and questioned as interpretations. Morals and values do not designate eternal facts as they designate the said of morality, the facts of meeting reality as recorded and said from a situated perspective in time and situation. Nietzsche elaborates upon this

[A]n insight first formulated by me: that there are no moral facts whatever [. . .] Morality is only an interpretation of certain phenomena, more precisely a misinterpretation [. . .] But as semeiotics it remains of incalculable value: it reveals, to the informed man at least, the most precious realities of cultures and inner worlds, which did not know enough to ‘understand’ themselves. Morality is merely sign-language, merely symptomatology: one must already know what it is about to derive profit from it. (Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols* “The Improvers of Mankind” 1)

Nietzsche objects to this curled tail of moral reasoning; the tail the snake consumes as monologic self-confession—what does it mean, what I say it means, in other words. This does not mean that meeting difference does not require naming. Rather it requires a certain meeting of the requirements of naming as a sort of ‘legislating of values’ or as a rhetoric and hermeneutic and communication ethic of the meeting of difference, of dialogic meeting of the phenomenal reality that we live. Those who profit from such a morality are those that use it as expression of their decadent will to power to rule others through mastery at interpretation through the monolithic symbols of the one claim it will express.

These dangers Nietzsche perceives emanating from the improvers of humankind’s use of morality as a tool of social organization and fear-mongering prompt an associated rise in another of the plagues of modern moral perspective, *ressentiment* (On the
Genealogy of Morals I: 10). Ressentiment describes a disease of the affect or will that corrupt one’s perspectives toward meeting difference within daily life, leading to a nihilistic effacement of difference through a monologic avoidance of the alterity in meeting. Ressentiment works to cripple one’s perspective so that “the sight of man now makes us weary—what is nihilism today if it is not that? — We are weary of man” (Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals I: 12). Nihilism bears weariness of others leading to an ignorance of life in exchange for a comfort in self-absorption and forgetting promises made, shutting out difference and the meeting life demands.

However, despite this danger within moralities of the modern age, Nietzsche glimpses possibilities of hope and affirmation of life and creation. Creation arising in the natural rhythms language employs in the saying of these perspectives in meeting reality that envelops human life, the natural world.

I formulate a principle. All naturalism in morality, that is all healthy morality, is dominated by an instinct of life — some commandment of life is fulfilled through a certain canon of ‘shall’ and ‘shall not’, some hindrance and hostile element on life’s road is thereby removed. Anti-natural morality, that is virtually every morality that has hitherto been taught, reverenced and preached, turns on the contrary precisely against the instincts of life — it is a now secret, now loud and impudent condemnation of these instincts. (Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols “Morality as Anti-Nature” 4)

A genealogy of morality reveals a need for revaluation of modern values to their pre-modern bases in the classical world. The error of modern moralists revealed in their
repeated decadent interpretations that make the different the same, turning this into that, morality into one’s personal virtues. “Différence engendre haine:” states Nietzsche regarding the “baseness of some people” (Beyond Good and Evil 263). Difference engenders hatred, hatred bred from denials of difference as denials of life, signs of decadence, yet these cling to all forms of morality according to Nietzsche. “In short, moralities are also merely a sign language of the affects” (Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil 187). How can meeting be dialogic in inviting the responses of others in crafting its own perspectives to make meaning of meeting temporal existential moments if its morals are passing emotions? Nietzsche offers as an answer an example of genealogy as revaluation of values of traditional modern morality as grounded in the logic and conviction of eternal, universal Truth.

Rather, for Nietzsche truth is found in the dialogic meeting of difference acknowledging the limitations imposed upon making meaning by the conditions of communicative activity within the temporal moment. “I understand by ‘morality’ a system of evaluations that partially coincides with the conditions of a creature’s life” (The Will to Power 256). Affect emerges as a personal contribution that augments the meanings of one’s existential situation. “Moral evaluation is an exegesis, a way of interpreting [. . .] Who interprets? — Our affects” (Nietzsche, The Will to Power 254). Morality revalued through genealogy frees morality from the straightjacket of blind repetition as said and returns it to the realm of dialogic meeting as a saying. Recognition of the limits of morality as a way of communicating, of making meaning of meeting the existential temporal moment, revalues morality as a natural emanation of the meeting of affect and situation within the natural fabric of the human condition.
The act of the promise offered within the textures of remembering and forgetting, affords not only the possibility of forgiveness but also relates a metaphor of the eternally recurring concretion of speech and act within the event of morality as a rhetoric and hermeneutic of life. The promise encourages the meeting of difference as the prospect of relations and the construction of community. What conditions meeting as a moral undertaking Nietzsche situates within the affects as will and emotion foreground the promise, a pathos of distance or a pathos of proximity to which genealogy leads and returns. Nietzsche identifies the metaphor of pathos of distance as a skeleton key to discerning the prejudices that nourish or pollute the soil from which springs morals and values.

**Nietzschean Shadows: Morality, Power, Distance and Dialogic Meeting**

Morality as connected with communication articulates a social not an individual need. The study of morals reveals a study of the values that narrate and hence order meaning taken from experience, morality as the lens through which we interpret the world and ourselves within it. As Kaufmann notes, Nietzsche functions as a “problem-thinker” who views morality as phenomena, as knowledge, as problem, as perspective towards phenomenal life, existential reality (*Nietzsche* 82). Nietzsche’s genealogy of morals provides a polemical account, an evaluative interpretive accounting from an embedded perspective. Nietzsche locates the ground of such an embedded perspective within the affects, the seedbed from which values and ethics grow through meeting of tradition, of said and the temporal existential moment. To understand the nature of this
meeting and how it influences subsequent perspectives requires awareness of the role of the affects in influencing how humans meet life through thought, word, and deed.

Nietzsche investigates the notion of pathos by uniting it with distance, implying that space is required to interpret the passions that direct one’s communicative activity and consciousness. Nietzsche’s idea of pathos of distance reveals the values and morals that order and are enacted by one’s communication and rhetoric: How one meets difference—answered through genealogical inquiry into one’s perspectivism toward difference, one’s pathos of distance.

The pathos of distance emerges as an important metaphor across several texts (*On the Genealogy of Morals* I: 2, III: 14; *Beyond Good and Evil* 257; *Twilight of the Idols*, “Expeditions of an Untimely Man” 37) as Nietzsche’s characterization of difference between the noble and the servile, referring both to differences in social economic status and values. Nietzsche situates this integral metaphor, the pathos of distance, as communicative space that allows for a more honest accounting and interpretation. Nietzsche also suggests that the difference in values may be employed in meeting as distinguishing a ‘higher nature’ (*On the Genealogy of Morals* I: 16). The development of distance as a pathos or perspective toward meeting difference adds texture to a mistaken characterization of binary opposition (Smith, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, explanatory notes 139-40). This texturing of the pathos of distance that grounds perspective in meeting difference also speaks to the inherently dialogic nature of Nietzsche’s perspective on pathos and his own idea of pathos of distance.

Distance provides a way to discern unfulfilled promises in which Nietzsche begins to suggest the necessity of disembedding one from illusions. To do this, Nietzsche
urges acknowledgement of one’s embeddedness in an era where prejudice, bias, multiplicity of ground carry forth the power no longer able to turn to the assurance of metanarrative promise. Without the assurance of a metanarrative promise, life is immoral. What permits morality to make a return visit is acknowledgement, not promise.

Passions and emotions captivate our attention as a response, a condition resultant from interaction with other forces. In this way, pathos of distance communicates the necessity of space for discernment, physical, intellectual, and social. Distance also implies the inherent difference present in discernment between competing forces that vie for attention and call for response. Viewed from this perspective, it follows that Nietzsche would proclaim “In short, moralities are also merely a sign language of the affects” (Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil 187). A logical progression from this insight would be to further investigate the ethics of this association, which he proceeds to do as he enacts his genealogical inquiries. He concludes that “Différence engendre haine:” states Nietzsche regarding the “baseness of some people” (Beyond Good and Evil 263). Difference engenders hatred. Nietzsche traces decadence in values and morals to one’s perspective towards meeting difference, as problem or opportunity.

Further illustrative of this point are Nietzsche’s comments regarding the ethical situation guiding his practice of genealogy of morals and the values they enact in meeting the existential temporal moment. Morality as an affect driven interpretation of reality occurs within Nietzsche’s textured interpretation of life as will to power (Beyond Good and Evil 259). Explicating the textured nature of the relationship between affect and will, Nietzsche provides another layering of the notion of meeting, the interrelated nature of affect and will. Nietzsche states that “the will is not only a complex of sensation and
thinking, but it is above all an affect, and specifically the affect of command’ (Beyond Good and Evil 19). This connection between affect and will reveals their nature when viewed from a communication perspective. Affect influences perception, interpretation, and communication as reception and action. Affect works as a multi-layered and multi-directional force on the meanings that emerge from dialogic meeting of difference due to the conception of the will in relation to power as a natural component of life as will to power.

Pathos of distance then plays an important role in ordering life, as affecting will to power in ways it manages difference as a background and foreground issue when meeting difference. Interestingly, given this seemingly subjective accounting of this crucial relationship, Nietzsche situates its governance within the realm of the social. As he states regarding the limiting of the will to power as a manifestation within human life, he states that “the ‘sense of community’ [that] masters us: please note that this is almost a definition of morality” (The Will to Power 281). Affect and will to power are shaped and directed by the pathos of perspective toward dialogic meeting of difference within the existential temporal moment. The meeting orders the meanings to emerge and the directions to take not thought, word, and deed resulting from agency, for agency itself can be manifest only through the relations that enable its emergence.

Hence, meanings and perspectives attain power through their perceived appearance as the union between perception and reality and communicated through the union of word and deed. A union from which we derive the notions of self, identity, and I, in terms of how it is reflected in the eyes of the Thou, or Other. “Always presupposing that there are ears—that there are those capable and worthy of the same pathos, that there
is no lack of those to whom one may communicate oneself" (Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo* “Why I Write Such Good Books” 4). Nietzsche designates dialogue as good style, as enacting the pathos of good style, dialogue as the ground of a rhetoric that can communicate itself, in communication lies possibilities of persuasion. Dialogue then fosters naming through meeting, negotiating of the distance of affect and will to dialogue as a component of genealogy.

Dialogic meeting then employs naming not as a sparring of neologisms but naming as the granting of value, valuing methods, perspectives and prejudices, communicative acts, deeds. Valuing implies or compels one to adopt a dialogic orientation to the imbricating rhetoricity of description and prescription. As the strands of a rope or the roots of the plant, values emanate above and below ground from these roots embedded in the soil of existential, phenomenal reality.

Leiter points towards the nature of the dialogic meeting of genealogy as he states important limits to recognize in explicating Nietzsche’s genealogical inquiries.

[B]oth slave and master moralities are examples of *morality*: they are both evaluative practices, concerned not with things or texts or foods, but with *human beings*, both the actor himself and his fellow humans. This allows conceptual space in which ‘moralities’ can still differ dramatically as to their value or purpose. (Leiter, *Nietzsche on Morality* 172)

Related to sophistic insights into the influential power of cultural context on shaping values and moralities, Nietzsche acknowledges their diachronic nature. Such recognition of limits of moral meanings and values offers health for one but destruction for another if haphazardly prescribed, ignorant of the forces shaping the context of the situation.
Nietzsche’s perspective towards a genealogy of morality is realized through the promise of meeting, of memory and forgetting, truth—not forgetting origin as interpretation. Genealogy embeds morals and values born of interpretations of phenomenal reality through the metaphor of language, not found within nature objectively outside the bounds of time and change.

Such change, Nietzsche posits, occurs dramatically through his stated perspective towards morality as the rhetorical activity of naming (Nietzsche, *The Gay Science* 58). What we call things becomes more important than what they are, for that knowing of what they are is always at the mercy of the moment of their meeting, what is already known, the said, and what from the said conditions its saying. Therefore, the task of translating man back into nature as an unsaying of the said is a genealogical retranslating of a present perspective on the past back into conversation with previous accounts. The contemporary moment demands that one engages the unsaying of the said through a new situating of the saying of the said in meeting questions through dialogue.

Genealogy works at this translating back as unsaying of the said, accomplishing the freeing of the said from its monologic straitjacket of the subjectivity of the speaker and positing said as said, as soil from which this saying as dialogic meeting now comes forth. Walk and work again begun on this soil, this past said, allows for new growth, for the saying of this said as an unsaying, as a planting in a new season uproots and effaces the traces of the growth of the previous season, an uprooting compelled not by the self but by one’s meeting of the difference that pulses at the heart of the human condition, at the core of language, and at the becoming of our being as realized through events situated within the phenomenal world within and without our mind, spirit, and flesh.
Implications

The “long story of how responsibility originated” presupposes the “tremendous labor of that which I have called ‘morality of mores’” for “with the aid of the morality of mores and the social straitjacket, man was actually made calculable” (Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals II: 2). This rendering of morality enacts and illustrates genealogy as unmasking of the rhetorical foundations of history as forgetting and remembering of the past, a past one in essence chooses to will. The territory of the past then becomes a promise, a responsibility the human person lays at their feet in undertaking any act of promising, or willing a version of the past into the future by relating it within the present.

Morality reveals the values that congeal within the paradigms of morality, the stories that order these values into hierarchies that guide thought, word, and deed. The prejudices one brings into or communicates reveals their values and morals, the organizing interpretive frame one applies to guide their understanding of how they meet reality or at least, their interpretation of reality as received through their senses.

These insights into the ground of morals and values subsequently call for revaluation as a necessary component of the unsaying of the said through the dialogic meeting of difference in the existential temporal moment. Traditions and histories are shaped through their telling as the oral stories of Homer trickle down through thousands of ears and mouths and centuries. Change as difference blooms with the activity of meeting as meeting changes the conditions of the available interpretations of traditions and histories met, let alone the affective influences on meanings created through this dialogic encounter. Revaluation of values results as a natural progression from
Nietzsche’s perspectival orientation towards communication at the interplay of dialogue and rhetoric engaging and enacting the recurring questions of ethics and values after illusion amid metanarrative disintegration.
Chapter Six: Nietzsche’s Epideictic Revaluation of Values

Revaluation of values is epideictic rhetoric of values at the interplay of dialogue and rhetoric. At this interplay, revaluation articulates acknowledgement of the embedded nature of discourse within competing perspectives on ethics in an era after illusion amid metanarrative disintegration. This situation privileges multiplicity and difference as perspectives towards values and ethics. Nietzsche’s metaphor of revaluation of values employs dialogue as an ethic to guide rhetorical deconstruction and architectonic construction of perspectival values and ethics meeting difference within the exigency of the existential temporal moment. Epideictic revaluation of values praises and blames, says yes and no to competing perspectives within a framework of acknowledgement. The limits of this perspectival standpoint informed through genealogical inquiry at the interplay of dialogue and rhetoric calls forth a dialogic ethic of meeting multiplicity and difference in ethical discourse seeking to guide word and deed after metanarrative disintegration.

Perspectivism entails the perceptual beginnings of rhetoric as the communicative ordering of our cognitive receptions of the stimuli that form our perceptions of reality. Genealogy further engages these communicative orderings by inquiring into their values. Inquiries question the operative perspective of a physiological, psychological, and social standpoint embedded within contingent human temporality. Revaluation creates an ordering of values out of an epideictic rendering of the values and morals that appear to direct thought, word, and deed within the historical moment of saying. Rhetoric emerges from invention as a context that calls forth-continual interpretation from an inherently
organic dialogic ground. The act of interpretation, of naming and as such conveying value upon objects through our interpretations, enacts epideictic rhetoric of values. Values become the *topoi* with which rhetoric constructs the architecture of reason, of past, present, future judgment. Revaluation of values enacts an architectonic rhetoric of dialogic meeting, rhetoric that answers the existential reality that compels its responsibility, the promise of its being as the event of answerability, of a response.

**Introduction**

The revaluation of values is the metaphor whose activity most explicitly demonstrates a concern with rhetoric of values. Nietzsche utilizes epideictic rhetoric, drawn from the character of a speaker, following Aristotle’s understanding of *ethos*, ethics derived from character, to highlight the rhetorical nature of the struggle between competing moralities.

Revaluation emerges then from a dialogic perspective on the genealogy of morals that it has undertaken to question and study. Revaluation serves as a component of perspectivism, which one must not deny because it is uncomfortable. The acknowledgement of the affective, unprovable, rhetorical foundations of truths is a requirement of intellectual honesty and rigor, one to be embraced as providing additional objectivity regarding the situated, contingent nature of truth in a given context.

For Nietzsche implies the necessity of a dialogue on revaluation as he states of perspectivism: “because we seek knowledge, let us not be ungrateful to such resolute reversals of accustomed perspectives and valuations with which the spirit has [. . .] raged against itself for so long” (*On the Genealogy of Morals* III: 12). This acceptance of
reversals discloses one’s pathos of distance, one’s perspective towards revaluation of values, a revaluation of reasons, when warranted, even as a theoretical means of opening new vistas of investigation. Revaluation from such a perspectival bias allows one “to see differently [. . .] to want to see differently, is no small discipline and preparation of the intellect for its future ‘objectivity’” (On the Genealogy of Morals III: 12). The articulation of this perspective of revaluation allows for an unrestrained striving for the truth of a given question, founded upon the theoretical base of perspectivism.

[T]he latter understood not as "contemplation without interest” (which is a nonsensical absurdity), but as the ability to control one’s Pro and Con and to dispose of them” illustrating and proving that "one knows how to employ a variety of perspective and affective interpretations in the service of knowledge. (Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals III: 12) Hence appears an opening for a more expansive view of argumentation as acknowledgement. Acknowledgement of the biases of embedded perspectives seeking to persuade while simultaneously engaging in the dialogic struggle for power through revaluation.

Nietzsche, through the dialogic perspectival investigations of genealogy, clears the ground for epideictic rhetoric of revaluation. This epideictic rhetoric of morals accepts the inherent rhetoric of interpretation, perspectives generated through genealogical inquiry as dialogic meeting. Revaluation acknowledges the necessity of utilizing more than merely the dialectic sparring of pro and con. Rather, such rhetoric would seek to engage in a dialogue with a multiplicity of voices. Thereby in the enduring struggle to be heard, dialogue acknowledges and is guided by the acceptance of the
necessity of multiplicity to grasp the unity of a decision to further knowledge, speech, and action in the service of life.

The objectivity gleaned through a genealogy guided by perspectivism grounded in dialogic meeting allows for the eternally recurring contest of competing values to struggle for adherence within revaluation conducted in an era after illusion. Revaluation becomes rhetoric in service of a dialogic ethic as it seeks to utilize its objectivity as a means of persuasion. Revaluation seeks to praise and blame to accomplish the persuasion of its hearers, as an esoteric or exoteric undertaking of the rhetor. Revaluation remains tied to perspectivism in that it seeks not to refute standpoints via traditional logical argumentation. Revaluation rather engages competing wills to power in dialogic meeting of alterity affirming and opposing views. Therefore, revaluation explores a greater quantity of views to approach the truths that characterize the situation or question under analysis, enhancing the Nietzschean objectivity of these perspectives.

Revaluation illustrates not the completed task but the ongoing questioning of presuppositions of accepted, embedded traditional viewpoints, acknowledgement of the “fact that man is the as yet undetermined animal” (Beyond Good and Evil 62) as are the questions regarding the values and morals that guide human word and deed. Revaluation embodies a controlled will to truth, one that does not cede questioning. One that questions with awareness as to what social impact revelation of some questions may have for people unaccustomed to such an honest embrace of truth’s significance as ugliness and beauty. For example, revaluation may be said to seek to provide greater objectivity and thereby greater clarity as to the nature of truth and lie through a genealogical moral inquiry into the origin of these concepts and their influence on our present values and
ethics. Through its saying of the ‘No’ and ‘Yes’ our situated existence demands of the said as background to the foreground of saying as dialogic meeting; we advance dialogic meeting as the recurring contest of the revaluation of the values in which we dwell.

Revaluation then operates within the duality of construction. Revaluation as a constructive rhetorical hermeneutic arising out of the necessity of destruction as demanded by the perspectival human condition in which we are called to meet difference in dialogue. Revaluation is grounded in dialogic meeting allowing for answerability of the other as a no and/or yes to the recurring epideictic contests of the values in which we dwell and out of which we think, feel, speak, and act.

To understand Nietzsche’s metaphor of revaluation of values, explication of its language and form, its epideictic character, is necessary. The epideictic rhetoric of revaluation influences Nietzsche’s perspective as it orders the arguments it makes in destroying and building perspectives from which to speak and act and linking the activity of revaluation with the dialogic ethic that directs its rhetorical activity.

A Genealogy of Epideictic Rhetoric

The rhetoric of revaluation adopts an epideictic character due to the nature of Nietzsche’s task. Epideictic rhetoric sets out to meet this task as a discourse of acknowledgement of values that emerge from dialogic meeting of ethos and pathos according to the logos of one’s perspective toward the reality that demands a response. As the variety of rhetoric Aristotle and others most closely associate with the task of ordering perspectives via appeal to passions, and arguing for values and affirmation of
morals as ordering of values, epideictic rhetoric affords a way to constructive engagement.

The adjective *epideictic* comes from the Greek verb *epideiknumi*, which seems to have a nontechnical sense of ‘to reveal’ or ‘to tell,’ [. . .] and performance are original and central to the aim of the genre of epideictic discourse. Following Aristotle, Greek and Roman authors state that epideictic rhetoric involves praise (Gk. *epainos*) or blame (Gk. *psogos*) (*Rhetoric* 1358b12-13, 27-28; *Herennium* 1.2.2, 3.6.10; Cicero *De inventione* 1.5.7; *Laudandi et vituperandi officium*, Quintilian *Institutio oratoria* 3.4.3). (Too, “Epideictic Genre” 251)

In this way, epideictic rhetoric weaves *ethos* into the nature of its appeals and reasons for speaking as a necessary common place of discourse directed to create perspectives and persuade audiences through disclosure and celebration of shared values. “The orator praises or censures actions, individuals, speeches, and qualities, drawing attention to external circumstances, physical attributes, and character and attributing characteristics that are not present” (*Alexandrum* 1425b38 and *Herennium* 3.6.10 as qtd. in Too, “Epideictic Genre” 251). In this way, epideictic rhetoric foreshadows dialogic meeting as it discloses its biases in constructing perspectives from which to order through the tension of praise and blame interpretation and future action.

Epideictic rhetoric exemplifies rhetoric as a language of revaluation—of old to new, of noble and good to slavish and bad and evil, of different to same (Isocrates 4.8; Plato *Phaedrus* 267a; Pseudo-Plutarch *Life of the Ten Orators* 838f as qtd. in Too, “Epideictic Genre” 251). Stylized language as dramatic tropes employed to encourage
and emphasize the praiseworthy and to chastise the reprehensible (*Alexandrum* 1425b39-40, 1426b13-22). The setting of such rhetorical disclosures occurred in a variety of settings in the classical world and spoke across temporal planes.

The third genre, epideictic (sometimes called ‘demonstrative’), however, was without a distinct or fixed setting; it mostly concerned the present, but might also invoke the past and the future (*Rhetoric* 1358b18-20); and this in turn left its audience less clearly defined. Aristotle refers to the recipient of this speech simply as ‘spectator’ (*theōros; Rhetoric* 1358b6).

.. (Too, “Epideictic Genre” 251)

These theoretical insights gave way to the emerging psychological understanding of discourse as a social power and as a tool for social edification and education in values and embraced moral perspectives.

Aristotle advances important notions of the epideictic approach to rhetoric foreshadowing a move toward recognition of the interplay of dialogue and rhetoric in the activity of persuasion. Aristotle states that “the audience member must be involved in the speech such that he thinks he himself, or his family, or actions, or some other aspect of his life, is being praised [. . .] (*Rhetoric* 1451b28-32)” (Too, “Epideictic Genre” 252). This notion of meeting Plato emphasizes as well although for the related purpose of education through praise and blame (*Republic* 492b-c; *Protagoras* 326a; 822d-3a; 829c-e; *Gorgias* 483b-c). Such educational considerations emerge for Aristotle and others as well in consideration of ethical questions at the core of any discourse designed to order perspectives and direct action through habituation of the values the discourse sanctions.

Aristotle acknowledges a distinct ethical dimension of praise and blame
when he declares that the aim of the genre is to praise what is good (*to kalon*) and to blame what is base (*to aischron*) (*Rhetoric* 1358b28); however, Quintilian declares that both the philosopher and Thoephrastus (c.372-287 BCE) removed it entirely from the realm of public and political life (3.7.1). Cicero reinforces the ethical program of epideictic speech, observing that it encourages men to virtue and draws them back from vice (*De oratore* 2.9.35), while elsewhere he observes that there can be no form of rhetoric that is more useful for city-states than one in which the orator is engaged in the recognition of virtues and vices, that is epideictic (*De partitione oratoria* 20.69; also 21.70). While affirming that the pleasure of the audience is the goal of epideictic discourse, Quintilian still attests to its usefulness when he affirms that panegyric, an example of the speech of praise and blame treats what is useful for Greece (3.4.14). (Too, “Epideictic Genre” 255)

Too notes that after the collapse of Athens as an intellectual and cultural center ironically epideictic rhetoric flourished. He even claims that epideictic became the prominent form of oratory to the extent that it was imposed upon all other forms of discourse—poetry, history, and even philosophy—from the Hellenistic period onward, which sustained a highly rhetorical culture. (Too, “Epideictic Genre” 255)

The continued development of epideictic rhetoric across genres and situations speaks to its architectonic qualities. As a genre of rhetoric, epideictic due to its boundless setting
and basic structure of praise or blame, its adaptability and multitude of purposes make it attractive as a means of discourse to direct perspective and activity.

The continued expansion of epideictic rhetoric leads to the perception that “in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, epideictic rhetoric came to eclipse the other two genres: all literature came to be subsumed under the category of praise and blame” (Vickers 54 cited in Too, “Epideictic Genre” 256). With the advances in education and literacy through the Renaissance, epideictic discourse became interwoven throughout emerging writings of a growing literary perspective. Even in the controlled prose and official documents dedicated to theological instruction and church doctrine, “sermons sought to persuade their audiences to assume moral behavior through praise of virtue and censure of immoral activities [. . .] in drama [. . .] in poetry” (Too, “Epideictic Genre” 256). Given its adaptability to situations and multiple purposes, the Renaissance also realized a re-emergence of the “sophistic mode of paradoxical encomium made a notable resurgence with a work such as Desiderius Erasmus’s The Praise of Folly (1511), in which Folly offers praise of herself” (Too, “Epideictic Genre” 256). Through his textured understanding of style, the way one communicates exerts great force upon interpretations of one’s meaning. Nietzsche emphasizes his concern for the metonymical relationship that adheres between form and content in his repeated appeals to pay greater attention to the affects, rhythm, and gestures that accompany discourse as hermeneutic cues of its interpretation in dialogic meeting of the situation in which it is said.

**Epideictic and The New Rhetoric: Values, Education, and Revaluation**

Meeting the situation between saying and said becomes a task addressed most fully through a dialogic perspective towards difference and multiplicity that invites
response in order to engage the eternally recurring rhetorical conversation of human history. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca extend the metaphor of dialogue in relation to epideictic rhetoric within their elaboration of the tenets of a new rhetoric. The authors state that

Dialogue, as we consider it, is not supposed to be a debate, in which the partisans of opposed settled convictions defend their respective views, but rather a discussion, in which the interlocutors search honestly and without bias for the best solution to a controversial problem. (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 37)

Such an orientation suggests that dialogue enacts a “heuristic viewpoint, as against the eristic one [. . .] that discussion is the ideal instrument for reaching objectively valid conclusions” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 37). What Nietzsche undertakes is a species of revalued epideictic rhetoric as a path to change and discovery through his revaluation of the decadent values he encountered guiding perspective, speech, and activity in his modern historical moment.

Other connections emerge between characterizations of epideictic rhetoric from classical theory to the new rhetoric the authors elaborate. According to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, to the Roman “theoreticians, [epideictic] was a degenerate kind of eloquence with no other aim than to please and to enhance, by embellishing them, facts that were certain or, at least, uncontested” (48). Such appraisals from the Second Sophistic help to characterize the general causes for the decline in epideictic rhetoric and its use as a commonplace to slander rhetoric as mere cookery and cosmetic conjuring (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 48). Despite the excesses of blind application of
technique and memorization of worn, flowery orations poorly suited to the audiences before them during the decline of the Roman Empire, the authors advance a more positive view, as occurred in the Renaissance. “Our own view, is that epideictic oratory forms a central part of the art of persuasion, and the lack of understanding shown toward it results from a false conception of the effects of argumentation” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 49). This perspective points toward the existential elements within Nietzsche’s rhetoric; he seeks not passive agreement but active, full engagement. Nietzsche demands his readers meet him fully within the nets of language, each struggling to discern the meaning of their experiences by meeting difference in dialogue. Such dialogic meeting compels the concretion of thought and action as communicative activity, demands a reunion of word and deed as arbiter of value among contending perspectives.

Perelman and Obrechts-Tyteca continue to explain their point through use of Demosthenes as an example, one that relates to discussion of Nietzsche’s rhetoric for as Merrow notes, Demosthenes serves as a model of ancient eloquence for Nietzsche, even in his last book the Greek orator garners his praise (Merrow 285).

Demosthenes, considered to be one of the models of classical eloquence, spent most of his efforts not just in getting the Athenians to make decisions in conformity with his wishes, but in urging them, by every means at his command, to carry out decisions once they were made. He wanted the Athenians to wage against Philip, not just ‘a war of decrees and letters, but a war of action.’ (49)
Discourse serves activity and communication as interpretation and rhetoric struggle to guide decision-making. According to Nietzsche, “Thoughts are actions” (Writings from the Late Notebooks 55). Therefore, the perspectives one accepts divulge their origin in cognition as communication, the physiological valuation that leads to the rhetoric of the senses. However, implicit within this multi-directional progression lay the values and morals that guide the rhetoric of word and deed as the reality of the metonymical relationship between ethics and rhetoric.

However, this does not mean to suggest a narrow view of rhetoric as the Progress of discourse. Rather, “The taking of a decision stands halfway, so to speak, between a disposition to take action and the action itself, between pure speculation and effective action” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 49). The authors continued discussion of the epideictic genre provides a synecdoche to characterize the main metaphors that reveal Nietzsche’s rhetoric, intensity of adherence as the power, the dynamis of rhetoric as architectonic.

Such a constructive approach leads to how Nietzsche undertakes rhetoric as epideictic revaluation otherwise than convention. First, greater discussion of the conventional descriptions of epideictic need to be pursued to illustrate Nietzsche’s interpreting and enacting epideictic rhetoric otherwise than rhetorical convention. “Epideictic speeches are most prone to appeal to a universal order, to a nature, or a god that would vouch for the unquestioned, and supposedly unquestionable, values. In epideictic oratory, the speaker turns educator” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 51). The epideictic rhetoric Nietzsche advances constructs an architectonic rhetoric of values built from dialogic meeting of difference in the temporal existential moment. Such rhetoric
develops perspectives from which to meet competing values and morals in conversations shaping ideas and action within the reality of human activity.

However, Nietzsche as educator turns education otherwise than convention through his epideictic revaluation of values that serve as the ground of education. Equally important to remember is Nietzsche’s unique understanding of his audience. In this way Nietzsche’s criticisms are less directed at those criticized as they are epideictic appeals to the esoteric “good Europeans” that comprise his audience, those for whom his words reinforce shared values and perspectives (Nietzsche, *The Gay Science* 357). Nietzsche’s rhetoric becomes education, education as revaluation, education to interpret otherwise than convention, education as affirmation of life, all life, and education in the service of life.

Educational discourse, like the epideictic one, is not designed to promote the speaker, but for the creation of a certain disposition in those who hear it. Unlike deliberative and legal speeches, which aim at obtaining a decision to act, the educational and epideictic speeches create a mere disposition toward action, which makes them comparable to philosophical thought. (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 54)

The speaker’s ethos emerges through the paths taken via discourse to meet the situation and audiences that call forth the response. This perspective levels the competing power of agency by emphasizing the insight that power and agency emerge through meeting, through the relations that enable dialogue and rhetoric to interact in giving meaning to the moment. “Epideictic discourse, as well as all education, is less directed toward changing beliefs than to strengthening the adherence to what is already accepted” (Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca 54). Epideictic rhetoric, through the construction of perspectives, strengthens the perspectival approach to dialogic meeting of the difference encountered in the temporal existential moment. It is the moment of meeting that authors the event of discourse, a power the speaker is called upon not to forget or risk in advancing only ‘mere rhetoric’ rather than helping to construct perspectives for meaning and responsible response.

Nietzsche’s rhetoric seeks to advance adherence to values that undergird his ethics, not to argue for questions of truth or lie. For Nietzsche, what needs further study are the values of these values underneath questions of truth or lie, why does such a distinction appear as paramount when making decisions? For Nietzsche, rhetoric grows out of the garden of values that drive communication. Communication orders cognition. Cognition values, chooses and selects what is of import to note and what can be ignored and forgotten, this physiological ordering informs our consciousness and our rhetoric, the communication of values we accept and urge upon others through our words and actions.

Rhetoric works not to solve but to answer, not to proclaim but to question, not to express but to respond. Rhetoric describes discourse that attains power through its ability to order human life and activity through the values for which it garners adherence. Nietzsche views rhetoric following Aristotle, as conveying a *dynamis*, a power inherent within language to reveal paths to persuasion. The stones with which we lay this path and upon which we walk this path mark the values that guide our valuation and ordering of values with which we make our way.

*Nietzsche’s Revaluation of Values*
Nietzsche’s task of revaluation of values seeks to author the translation of the human back into nature with acknowledgement of situatedness of human person as meeting of multiplicity and difference in dialogue after illusion amid metanarrative disintegration. The perspectival nature of reality demands genealogical investigation of values and morals competing in the void created by unmasking of the illusion of metanarrative explanations of reality and justifications for action. Following this deconstruction of the illusions of past metanarratives through genealogy, Nietzsche seeks a return to the future through the past. As a means of embedding humans within the temporal and existential moment he engages in dialogic meeting of difference within the historical moment. The dialogic nature of this embedding activity engages epideictic rhetoric as a call for response and mutual engagement. Epideictic rhetoric constructs values revalued through their saying in the activity of meeting difference and multiplicity of perspectives in dialogue. To understand the task of revaluation this work turns to the perspective Nietzsche adopts in enacting a perspectival revaluation of values guided by genealogical insights of meeting difference in the saying of the said of values that influence human communication and activity.

Values are explainable through their rhetoric, their ability to create meaning and persuade of the veracity of their meanings in the social struggle for meaning and value. In other words, “Power might thus be construed as the standard and measure of values” (Kaufmann, Nietzsche 196). Values serve as motives and evaluations inextricably linked in a grammar and vocabulary of human explanations of life and reason. Perspectives are grounded in the reasons for their calling forth, for their discovery prompted by the estimation of their value in constructively meeting the situation. Perspectives emerge
from the play of forces of competing to direct attention, word, and action. Genealogy undertakes to explain these perspectives in terms of their values, to draw back the mask of their rationalizations and perceive who is their advocate. Genealogy of perspectives undertakes to discern value, to debate and in so doing, destroy and construct values in response to meeting perspectives in question in dialogue amid the competing interests of other perspectives seeking power in the temporal existential moment of decision.

The conversation then becomes a play between competing values: Explication of these values, the perspectives they support and explain, the necessity of choice and action, which these values urge:

Let at least this much be admitted: there would be no life at all if not on the basis of perspective estimates and appearances . . . Indeed, what forces us at all to suppose that there is an essential opposition of ‘true’ and ‘false’? Is it not sufficient to assume degrees of apparentness and, as it were, lighter and darker shadows and shades of appearance—different ‘values,’ to use the language of painters? (Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil 34)

Values then perceived as the ground of perspectives and hence the ground of action functions as the topic of critique implicitly and explicitly. The response articulates values as a response in itself silently bestows value upon process, persons involved and conclusions reached. In the end, the ground of rhetoric becomes valuation and revaluation. Dialogic meeting of the exigency seeking to shape the genealogical excavations of its values and meanings in the temporal existential moment and subsequent perspectives rendered and interpreted.
These introductions convey why Nietzsche attached such import to questions of value, because they enable meaning, perspective, reflection, and action as they interpenetrate any conscious act of communication, cognition, and activity. Values and valuation permeate even the marrow of humanity itself. “Perhaps our word ‘man’ still expresses something of precisely this feeling of self-satisfaction: man designated himself as the creature that measures values, evaluates and measures, as the ‘valuating animal as such” (Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals* II: 8). How this process of valuation works Nietzsche elaborates in a section of his notes collected in *The Will to Power*. Therein he states that “The apparent world, i.e., a world viewed according to values; ordered, selected according to values [. . .] The perspective therefore decides the character of the ‘appearance’!” (567). In this way, values become knowable only through their employment. The sense of these values and perspectives we inherit from language, science, religion, and other traditions whose narratives organize these values into meanings, recognizable interpretations of meeting the chaos of reality in the temporal existential moment.

Values characterize the situation of valuation as well determining which values attain power to direct human attention, word, and action and in what manner, to whom, and for what reasons. Likewise, values characterize the stimuli being met in discourse, “Our values are interpreted into things” (Nietzsche, *The Will to Power* 590). What value resides in gold except for the value individuals, societies, and markets convey upon it? The metal itself does nothing; it is not employed except in costuming and consuming yet commands incredible economic value, value not in or of itself. The value of honesty or lying shaped by the parameters of the situation, taking bread to feed a starving child
versus preserving rights of ownership—the highest ranking value compelling the appropriate action from the perspective of the person confronted with the choice and demand for action. Whether the act denotes necessity or illegality depends upon the perspective from which the ranking value is read into interpreting the situation. In this way, values adhere to the human necessity of judgment and action living in community.

Given the organic quality of values and valuation inherent in human life in community, why does Nietzsche call for a revaluation of all values as he met his own historical moment in the dialogue his writings enact? Reasons emerge from Nietzsche’s genealogical inquiries into the dominant value perspectives and centers of his day, which he perceived authored only paths to nihilism and destruction. This only further speaks to power inherent in values as rhetoric of power found in meeting, in saying and said of competing perspectives in an era of multiplicity and difference after metanarrative disintegration.

It is the power of the values of his era that Nietzsche perceived needed to be revalued. To revalue the values of his age required the prescription of a return to naturalize man back into nature, to naturalize the modern values and lead toward life, not its denial in waking death of nihilism. As Nietzsche declares, “man would rather will nothingness than not will” (On the Genealogy of Morals III: 28). To redeem activity of willing within dialogic meeting of difference Nietzsche inaugurates his revaluation of values. Revaluation announces activity he denotes as his task (Twilight of the Idols foreword). Revaluation, as Nietzsche’s task, comprises all of his writings that participate as sayings of the said to prompt revaluation toward a new dawn of values and valuation.
Nietzsche’s daybreak of new morals and values ironically seeks not creation as much as it does the brilliance of honesty and truth taken from the natural world surrounding and bearing the human condition. What Nietzsche then calls for is a naturalization of the flights of values from embedded reality to the chimerical worlds beyond reality as a means merely to deny life due to one’s personal decadence. Revaluation provides a perspective on the central tensions Nietzsche posits, the competing values in an era after metanarrative disintegration and death of God.

All naturalism in morality, that is all healthy morality, is dominated by an instinct of life — some commandment of life is fulfilled through a certain canon of ‘shall’ and shall not’, some hindrance and hostile element on life’s road is thereby removed. Anti-natural morality, that is virtually every morality that has hitherto been taught, reverenced and preached, turns on the contrary precisely against the instincts of life — it is a now secret, now loud and impudent condemnation of these instincts. By saying ‘God sees into the heart’ it denies the deepest and highest desires of life and takes God for the enemy of life [. . .] (Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, “Morality as Anti-Nature” 4)

This passage sheds light on Nietzsche’s task of revaluation of values. The metanarrative disintegration, which he narrates and as such, participates in, discloses the decadence that had come to cloud values in his modern era. The appeal to God was not one that sought to affirm creation and one’s responsibility towards life but one that eased one’s disgust at the elements of life not to one’s personal liking. Rather than meeting difficulty as opportunity, modern manifestations and values as calls to God operated more to judge
and castigate difference to become the same, to speak only from the perspective of the said (Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, “Morality as Anti-Nature”). The activity of dialogue and meeting removed from the uniqueness of the temporal existential moment draws forth no meaning, only its lack. Life becomes sleepwalking and repetition, not making meaning and meeting, living as passive vegetation and not communicative, cognitive, and physical active. This castration of the human spirit in the name of obedience and ritualized automatism came not to signify spirituality as to signal silence and the death.

The decadent silencing of the multiplicity of meanings, which burst forth in the activity of meeting, and the demands of the temporal existential moment, render life as living death. “For a condemnation of life by the living is after all no more than the symptom of a certain kind of life” (Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, “Morality as Anti-Nature” 5). Condemnation of this sort disembeds the critic from the situation he or she criticizes, unmasking their pretension to knowing the unknowable, speaking with the insight of all of life from the perspective of a single part. “One would have to be situated outside life, [. . .] to know it as thoroughly [. . .] as all who have experienced it, to be permitted to touch on the problem of the value of life at all” (Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, “Morality as Anti-Nature” 5). If one speaks from an inaccessible perspective, one speaks untruth and thereby falsifies all their speech praises and blames. The impossibility of speaking from beyond an embedded perspective of the temporal existential moment leads Nietzsche to conclude “sufficient reason for understanding that this problem is for us an inaccessible problem” (Twilight of the Idols, "Morality as Anti-Nature” 5). To accept the situated nature of the human condition breeds alternative paths
to meeting difference in dialogue. “When we speak of values we do so under the inspiration and from the perspective of life: life itself evaluates through us when we establish values” (Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, “Morality as Anti-Nature” 5). As the valuating animal, humans take on the responsibility of living life through meeting the moments and exigencies they encounter from the resources of their embedded perspective, the only one that life affords and the only one required to enable construction of a response. For even the anti-natural morality of decadence Nietzsche condemns, affirms life, illustrating the flaws of the untruth and errors resultant from denying the perspectival conditions of human life as valuation.

Revaluation of values then inaugurates a rebuilding of the values in which we dwell. Let the human condition the perspective in which one experiences and lives life, then frame one’s perspectival understanding, words, and deeds.

Let your gift-giving love and your knowledge serve the meaning of the earth [. . .] Lead back to the earth the virtue that flew away, as I do—back to the body, back to life, that it may give the earth a meaning, a human meaning. (Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, II: “On the Gift-Giving Virtue” 2)

The human meaning Nietzsche advocates is found in the epideictic rhetoric of dialogic meeting of difference in the temporal existential moment. Dialogic meeting builds meanings and values within the situated perspective human reality and existence affords as opportunity. Opportunity to make meaning and value and act situated within the relations that constitute human consciousness and communication, meeting of the relations and related nature of reality calling for a response. Working from within his
historical moment, Nietzsche calls for a return to life through a revaluing of the dominant values that deny the difference and multiplicity of perspectives, values, and meanings that color each moment.

Revaluation of values, the giving of a human meaning to the earth through recognition of one’s situated perspective on earth, demands meeting of decadence in the form of denying life by denying its perspectival, limited, embedded nature.

Indeed, this is my insight: the teachers, leaders of humanity, theologians all of them, were also, all of them, decadents: hence the revaluation of all values into hostility to life, hence morality—

Definition of morality: Morality—the idiosyncrasy of decadents, with the ulterior motive of revenging oneself against life—successfully. I attach value to this definition. (Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, “Why I Am A Destiny” 7)

The denial of perspective communicates a denial of life and revenge against the limits of human life as situated living and limited knowledge. Therefore, the epideictic rhetoric of decadents authors morality as a perspective to persuade further denial and decadent living. Living as revenge as it works from an unreal sense of agency. Accepting the lie as if when one spoke, one spoke for the whole although only a part. As if one spoke for all of humanity through his or her individual words addressed to a situation, a metaphor of the relations that situate and author one’s life and its meanings in meeting.

Meeting as revaluation offers a situating of one’s discourse within the multiplicity of difference and relations that provide meanings to one’s life as a dialogue. Dialogue that unfolds through and with the ways in which one constructs meaning out of the
encounters the temporal existential moment affords. Dialogue enacted from this perspective considers the conditions of its occurrence as important in ascertaining its possible meanings and value.

One will ask me why on earth I’ve been relating all these small things which are generally considered matters of complete indifference . . . Answer: these small things—nutrition, place, climate, recreation, the whole casuistry of selfishness—are inconceivably more important than everything one has taken to be important so far. Precisely here one must begin to relearn. (Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, “Why I Am So Clever” 10)

The knowledge of one’s embedded nature allows for greater insight into meeting, greater awareness of the forces at play and the sources of influence upon perspectives and their perception within the activity of dialogic meeting of difference and multiplicity after illusion amid metanarrative disintegration.

Nietzsche’s metaphor of revaluation begins with rhetoric, advances to rhetorical exegesis of nature of truth and lie, advances to Greek tragedy as affirmation of life in contrast to Platonic denial. Then through Zarathustra the revaluation of life’s values—Dionysian/Zarathustrian values as against the prevailing code of Christianity; re-write nature into the text of life, homo natura. Now to enact these revalued values as a way to meet difference in a postmodern context, a way to guide rhetoric as a communicative activity, a saying of the said as dialogic meeting. This meeting affords an architectonic rhetoric of bildung, in order to harmonize the relation of individual to community through shared culture: the values and language that speak and animate life between persons embedded within the historicity and contingency of the human condition.
A genealogy of the perspective of revaluation as a stance toward dialogic meeting multiplicity and difference explicates what Nietzsche understands the materials of revaluation to be: the rhetorical power of values and their influence on human word and deed. The metonymical connection between the form of revaluation and its content and values serves as the subject of the following section. This work continues its exegesis of values as elements, common places of epidectic interplay of dialogue and rhetoric in the communicative activity of Nietzschean revaluation.

**Implications: Nietzsche’s Epideictic Rhetoric of Revaluation as Dialogic Meeting**

Nietzsche meets morals through epideictic saying of the said as critique to create new values. He draws values from classical sources revalued through meeting the temporal existential moment through the perspective of these classical values. In this selection of classical values, Nietzsche aides his task of naturalizing values and morals to help translate man back into nature. “It is the *Saying* that always opens up a passage from the Same to the Other, where there is yet nothing in common. A non-indifference of one toward the other!” (Levinas, *Proper Names* 6) This foreshadows key elements of Nietzsche’s epideictic revaluation of values, one engaged with *pathos* of non-indifference towards those to whom he seeks to meet in dialogue through his writings after the shattering of illusions and metanarrative disintegration.

Drawing from genealogical inquiries into the values and moral perspectives, Nietzsche engages in dialogic meeting through his task of an epideictic revaluation of values. The argumentation supporting the truthfulness of Nietzsche’s perspective
articulates an architectonic rhetoric as acknowledgement in an era after metanarrative illusion and disintegration.

Revaluation of values begins with acknowledgement of the “fact that man is the as yet undetermined animal” (Beyond Good and Evil 62). Nietzsche’s perspectival characterization and approach to reality prompts a revaluation of values and ideas of self and agency. Word and deed resulting from relations that influence meeting difference and multiplicity in the perspective of a self, not from a fixed self, one fluid and constantly confronting consciously and unconsciously meanings and values struggling to gain adherence. In this way, the person engaging in revaluation of values as Nietzsche suggests is called to praise and blame, to author distance and attain perspective. Nietzsche considers such a grounded perspective as necessary to provide distance and to enable the discernment of difference and act in response.

To assist in how to perceive a healthy, situated perspective from a decadent, life-denying perspective, Nietzsche authors a dramatic metaphor of the consequences of how one meets reality. Nietzsche narrates the notion of the drama of meeting through the metaphor of the eternal recurrence. The eternal recurrence provides an existential temporal moment in which the reader is called to enact their perspective from which they meet the difference inherent in living life in the event of meeting as being. The situation of the eternal recurrence also demands accounting of one’s values and morals and enacts an epideictic accounting through one’s response to the questions posed. The scene, titled “the great weight” by Nietzsche follows as its rendering is the only way to communicate its possible meanings and illustrate how it elaborates upon the tenets of revaluation, the topic of this chapter.
What, if some day or night a demon were to steal after you into your loneliest loneliness and say to you: ‘This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times more; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and everything unutterably small or great in your life will have to return to you, all in the same succession and sequence—even this spider and this moonlight between the trees, and even this moment and myself. The eternal hourglass of existence is turned upside down again and again, and you with it, speck of dust!’

Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who spoke thus? Or have you once experienced a tremendous moment when you would have answered him: ‘You are a god and never have I heard anything more divine.’ If this thought gained possession of you, it would change you as you are or perhaps crush you. The question in each and every thing, ‘Do you desire this once more and innumerable times more?’ would lie upon your actions as the greatest weight. Or how well disposed would you have to become to yourself and to life to crave nothing more fervently than this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal? (Nietzsche, The Gay Science 341)

The struggle Nietzsche imagines through this scene, the ordeal of meeting the demon’s provocation of the eternal recurrence announces all the central elements of Nietzsche’s metaphor of revaluation of values. The question requires an evaluation of the perspective from which one meets the difference and multiplicity one encounters after metanarrative
disintegration. The illusion of agency and one functioning as a self-determining and self-propelled wheel independent of alterity and the situatuedness of one’s reality are deconstructed in the question demanding a response. The question requires accounting of one’s acknowledgement of their values and ideas as constructed through the awareness of their perspectival existence and knowledge. One knows through one’s perspective, one’s situation, values, and ethics. Meeting enacts the epideictic rhetoric of one’s dialogic meeting. The pressures of the need to communicate in speech and activity direct one’s architectonic rhetoric of building meanings and praising and blaming values through the words and deeds of one’s life in conversation with the cultural and social relations that texture one’s communication and consciousness.

The challenge that the eternal recurrence presents is acknowledgement after meeting metanarrative disintegration. Meeting this challenge discloses a revaluation of agency and an interpreting otherwise of modern subjectivity, selfhood as meeting not as individual expression of preference. The person existed through dialogic meeting of difference in the temporal existential moment. One’s pathos of distance in genealogical investigation of possible perspectives and values from which to speak and act construct the path from which emerges one’s ethos, one’s self born in meeting difference in a dialogic ethic.

The ethical has to do with *ethos* in its originative sense of a cultural dwelling, a mode or manner of historical existence, a way of being in the world that exhibits a responsibility both to oneself and to others. It is this that defines the bearing of self as ethical subject, whose subjectivity is always that of an intersubjectivity. (Schrag, *The Self after Postmodernity*)
Schrag’s rendering of subjectivity knowable only as intersubjectivity points to the heart of a dialogic ethic that Nietzsche anticipates. As a prophet of a dialogic ethic, Nietzsche calls forth deconstruction situated within his modern historical moment to meet the excesses of perspectives that he determined sought to deny and destroy life. Perspectives whose danger resided in their displacement outside of time, and hence outside of human meaning, value, and reality.

Nietzsche, as prophet of a dialogic ethic, authors an epideictic rhetoric of values to guide the activity of meeting. As he states in a work subtitled, “Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality,” he praises virtues to guide one’s genealogical investigations that enable the construction and destruction of perspectives affirming or denying of life from which to live. “Honest towards ourselves and whoever else is a friend to us; brave towards the enemy; magnanimous towards the defeated; polite — always: this is what the four cardinal virtues want us to be” (Nietzsche, Daybreak 556). This naming of guiding virtues communicates values to ground his dialogic ethic. These virtues are not open to choice but are compelled upon us from the perspective of the cardinal virtues. The values and ethics that guide life are found in living. Life as dialogic meeting of difference is aware of one’s perspective as a life situated amid the difference and multiplicity of the existential and temporal moment after metanarrative disintegration. Such a situated perspective after illusion compels honesty as one lives the mystery of unfinished dialogue that one is invited to engage. What will one make of one’s time—what a glorious challenge Nietzsche claims awaits our future heroes of the spirit and artists of human living in dialogic meeting of the mysteries of the temporal moment.
Nietzsche provides through his imbricating metaphors of perspectivism, genealogy, and revaluation of values the ground from which to construct a communication ethic to meet the contemporary postmodern historical moment. The communication ethic Nietzsche authors, dialogic meeting engages reality at the interplay of dialogue and rhetoric. At the interplay of these forces, dialogic meeting articulates an architectonic rhetoric that affirms reality through communicative meeting of the exigencies and questions that surround an age after illusion amid metanarrative disintegration. In terms of a dialogic ethic, Nietzsche offers fundamentally an ethic of acknowledgement that does not begin with humanism but with meeting the historical moment in which we live.

Dialogic meeting and its architectonic rhetoric construct perspectives from which meaning is made from the meeting of difference within the textured conversations of the existential temporal moment. Meanings emerge through genealogical inquiry into the ground of the perspectives of history and traditions that from the past direct present and future perspectives. Working from such a perspectival standpoint, revaluation enacts the architectonic rhetoric of dialogic meeting through saying of the said of these histories, traditions, and ethics within the difference of the contemporaneous moment. Saying of the said leads to revaluation of values to resurrect traditions necessary to making meaning of the chaos of the existential temporal moment, to use communication as way to order the chaos of reality with the assistance of the resources of history.
Dialogic meeting orders this communicative activity affirming difference through meeting of its manifold nature within the postmodern historical moment. As difference characterizes a time after illusion, dialogic meeting affords a constructive perspective from which to make meaning through meeting difference in dialogue. Dialogue serves to ground affirmation of the possibility of meeting through the communicative construction of perspectives. Perspectives emerge from the interplay of dialogue and rhetoric to help order and further engender the inclusion of difference within the ongoing rhetorical conversation of humanity. Dialogic meeting enacts a communication ethic as it articulates its values and ethics in its meeting of reality in communicative activity that unites word and deed in the artful activity of an architectonic rhetoric.

Introduction

Now as developed earlier in chapter four, Nietzsche positions perspectivism “to control one’s Pro and Con [. . .] in the service of knowledge” (Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals III: 12). However, knowledge is embedded within and occluded by language as “thoughts are the shadows of our feelings” (Nietzsche, The Gay Science 345). Hence, to understand knowledge and reason one must understand the affects that serve as the ground of one’s rationality and knowledge communicated through language. Language creates values such as good and evil, truth and lie that undermine and conceal the values of nature, hunger, thirst, need for shelter, and procreation. For Nietzsche, these natural values exist and evolve beneath the human created symbol and sign world of grammar and linguistic systems of language. What Nietzsche seeks to author through genealogical analysis of the rhetoric of values communicated through
language is a revaluation of the values language writes into and upon nature. Nietzsche
seeks to return our gaze to the physiological, psychological, and environmental values
that undergird the values of language, i.e., the values of morality. Genealogy is
Nietzsche’s metaphor of this practice of history as rhetorical exegesis, of discovering the
pathos of distance that orders our dialogic meeting between saying and said, and of the
everly recurring communicative contest for influence between nomos and physis,
cultural convention or natural will to power.

Genealogy as a critical interpretive practice has been preempted by predominantly
French poststructural and deconstructionist appropriations as the exploration of
commentary on Nietzsche within communication and rhetorical studies in chapter two
illustrated. Readings inspired by the work of Derrida and de Man especially are cited to
support the heralding of a “Nietzschean call for an end to interpretation” (Norris 66).
Norris furthers this link as he claims that “This bottomless relativity of meaning, and the
ways philosophers have disguised or occluded their ruling metaphors, are the point of
departure for Derrida’s writing like Nietzsche’s before him” (Norris 57). However, there
is another side to the notion of the question of meaning which Nietzsche’s legacy also
alludes, an echo of Sophistic perspectives on the inherent rhetoricity of all claims to truth
and knowledge. “Nietzsche in the end ‘rehabilitates persuasion’ by showing that
language in its performative aspects both pervades and delimits the project of
philosophy” (Norris 104). Unlike the debated deconstructionist appropriation of
Nietzsche, scholars in the Anglo-American philosophical community situate Nietzsche
along more naturalistic lines due to the purposes to which Nietzsche puts his rhetoric.
The present study concurs with Leiter’s assertion that “Nietzsche belongs not in the company of postmodernists like Foucault and Derrida, but rather in the company of naturalists like Hume and Freud [...] philosophers of human nature” (2-3). Yet that does not mean to suggest than anything near agreement has emerged within contemporary philosophical interpretations of Nietzsche. For example, consider the ambivalence of noted ethicist Alasdair MacIntyre on Nietzsche. In MacIntyre’s noted volume, *After Virtue* Nietzsche is chastised for his “emotivism” and “prophetic irrationalism” but MacIntyre in the same text later notes “that Nietzsche rejects emotivism” (Cohen 270-1). In a later work MacIntyre asserts that the flaws of genealogy include “incommensurability with classical thought is thus a prerequisite for the genealogical enterprise” and “that there is no way of posing questions about accountability” (*Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry* 208-9). However, Cohen states that “in a largely ignored recent work” *First Principles, Final Ends and Contemporary Philosophical Issues*, MacIntyre admits that “a theory about the predicaments of contemporary philosophy [...] requires the construction of something akin to what Nietzsche called a genealogy” (MacIntyre qtd. in Cohen 271). MacIntyre also concedes that “my own argument obliges me to agree with Nietzsche that the philosophers of the Enlightenment never succeeded in providing grounds for doubting his central thesis” (*After Virtue* 117). MacIntyre renders Nietzsche’s central thesis regarding a genealogy of morality “that all rational vindications of morality manifestly fail and that therefore belief in the tenets of morality needs to be explained in terms of a set of rationalizations which conceal the fundamentally non-rational phenomena of the will” (*After Virtue* 117). A
phenomena Nietzsche anchors in the orientation towards meeting difference within the
temporal moment.

However, this does not indicate that Nietzsche advocates a subjective,
individualistic, cult of personality style that rejects community. Nietzsche does reject the
herd, but as a barrier to self-knowledge. Nietzsche rejects as the only path a seeking after
self-knowledge, following dialectical methods of Socratic introspection, or a turn toward
dialogic meeting the temporal existential moment. Nietzsche’s version of self knowledge
is one that seeks to find the harmony between one’s body, mind, spirit, culture, historical
moment, not only one’s subjective desires (“Philosophy in Hard Times” 48-9). Harmony
one discerns only in meeting, in the communicability of one’s affects in the face of
social, temporal, existential meeting. Architectonic rhetoric constructs to give meaning
to the chaos of sensations and experiences in an ever-changing world.

Does this require an I-focus for such work? Nietzsche solidly answers with a
conditional No. The activity, including the words of one’s life, defines the meanings
attributed to our names; who we are becomes what we are known through what we
communicate through our doing and saying. That is style grafted upon character, not vice
versa. Nietzsche most often characterizes the font of subjectivity, the I, not as a path to
truth or spiritual joy but error and lies. “[T]here is no ‘being’ behind doing, effecting,
becoming; ‘the doer’ is merely a fiction added to the deed—the deed is everything”
(Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals I: 13). The individual actor does not exist
except as a force within a network of relationships; the I emerges only as a product of a
we within the communicative activity of engaging others (Poulakos and Whitson,
“Nietzsche and the Aesthetics of Rhetoric” 135). Obviously, Nietzsche is asking us to be
more honest and to look for more as the I becomes not cause but effect when seeking the soil of ethics and activity.

As he states regarding Zarathustra, “Not only does he speak differently, he also is different” (Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo* preface 4). Not disciples are sought here, reject me, find your own way, and then you may return, return as friend not follower, alongside not behind in my shadows (Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* I: “On the Gift-Giving Virtue”). In this way, we perceive again Kaufmann’s insight that Nietzsche writes as a “problem-thinker” not a system-thinker (*Nietzsche* 98). Nietzsche’s ideas become too dirtied growing amid the mud of everyday mysteries of meeting difference. Not a Kant’s objectivity but an existential, phenomenological objectivity, rather a perspectival, limited dialogic meeting of difference in the existential temporal moment. Objectivity as perspectival notion defined not by answers but by questions, not by expression but engagement, not by telling but meeting. Perspectivism gathers together difference in the existential, temporal moment of dialogic meeting, the fine risk human life demands as payment for communicative opportunity for leaning, for value, for creating meaning.

Does an investigator possess the hardness, obedience, honesty, for such a task, nothing less demanded in the highest quest after virtue? If so, Nietzsche offers rhetoric as a means to an education in *bildung*, an architectonic rhetoric of a grand style of intersubjectivity known through its enactment in meeting difference. A dialogic meeting of difference affords the possibility for understanding, affirmation, and community. A monologic meeting of difference affords the possibility for resentment, nihilism, and the destructive denial of life.
Nietzsche’s Communication Ethic: Dialogic Meeting

The present study seeks to construct from a reading of Nietzsche’s work an imbricating whole drawn from and through the lenses of rhetoric and communication ethics. The rhetoric and communication ethic that emerges is that of an architectonic rhetoric of dialogic meeting. Nietzsche first seeks to understand the conditions of communication through which he presents a novel understanding of communication grounded not in the self, other, audience, message, or context, but in the meeting of these disparate yet interpenetrating elements. Nietzsche perceives that it is through the prism of communication that humans order their consciousness and encounter reality.

Communication becomes the axis upon which knowledge; value, truth and lie become determined and subsequently determine through their evolution future thought, word, and deed. The understanding of the significance of communication Nietzsche pursues through his noted practice of genealogy. Nietzsche employs genealogy to discern the values and morals that undergird and serve as the cornerstones of the perspectives we discover and simultaneously invent in and through their meeting in and through discourse. Change is this sense Nietzsche sketches on a broad horizon as inherent not only in and through meeting, persons, contexts, but also within the temporality of human and natural existence.

Nietzsche seeks to urge us resist the temptation to think, speak, and act outside of time for such perspectives lead to nihilism, resentment, and destruction when not grounded in the appropriate affect and will, in a noble perspective. Otherwise, one employs language to escape the bonds of relation and responsibility that the human condition casts upon us as persons. We are born into a world not of our choosing and
must make our way amid others, despite how apart we may perceive or seek to be, we cannot function outside the nets of communication and social relations. To evaluate and judge the merits of these perspectives that we invent through meeting Nietzsche charges the task of genealogy.

However, Nietzsche’s metaphor of genealogy is not concerned with tracing bloodline but with the marrow of human meaning through language, the atoms of meaning, the values and morals that bear rhetorical power, persuasion, and possibilities. What values and morals produce and guide perspectives that affirm and enrich life through the ways they meet it in and through language? What values and morals produce and guide perspectives that seek to position one outside of time and the opportunities for relation and responsibility that deny and devalue life in its saying of life? It is to these questions that Nietzsche engages genealogy. How best to respond and how to revalue those decadent perspectives that deny relation, responsibility, and life Nietzsche authors his own architectonic rhetoric of dialogic meeting.

Revaluation then becomes the means to praise affirmative perspectives that may enrich life, reveal, and censure those that deny and devalue life. Nietzsche’s epideictic revaluation emerges out of rhetoric as dialogic meeting. The present work finds Nietzsche authoring epideictic rhetoric of revaluation built upon the interpenetration of three imbricating metaphors, perspectivism, genealogy, and revaluation. These metaphors taken collectively speak to the conditions and activity of making meaning through language, activity, and human communication. Perspectivism outlines the situation from which and how human meaning emerges, the concretion of hermeneutic and rhetoric elements adhering within invention. Genealogy guides judgment between
competing perspectives based upon the ground out of which they develop values and morals. Revaluation serves as Nietzsche’s architectonic rhetoric as grounded in dialogic meeting, its communication ethic. Through the activity of this dialogic ethic Nietzsche leads us toward the construction of an architectonic rhetoric to constructively engage the questions that arise in our historical moment.

Revaluation, built upon a classical notion of *ethos*, seeks to enact rhetoric as meeting by employing epideictic appeals that point toward the elements of the relations and responsibility through which communication occurs between persons. Revaluation grounds rhetoric in the dialogic meeting of difference. The epideictic personal appeals suggest one must not be tempted to escape time as a means of expressing power and directing meeting to one of commanding and not communicating. Epideictic rhetoric of revaluation keeps the forces that are situated within the communicative event of meeting as anchored in a dialogic encounter, not a monologic enactment of emotivism. Epideictic rhetoric keeps the conversation situated to avoid castration of the intellect and to further persuade that one’s yes and no be employed in the service of knowledge and the affirmation of life as perceived through its meeting in communication, the ground of human experience.

This embedded architectonic rhetoric of dialogic meeting reunites word and deed within the praxis of an architectonic rhetoric of dialogic meeting, a dialogically grounded rhetoric, which enacts the values and morals out of which it arises. A new dawn or a retelling of a worn path? That remains for the saying of the said of this meeting of a great thinker in the architectonic rhetoric of responsibility of responding to the exigencies
that plague and the questions that drive Nietzsche and what possibilities their saying may hold for our own.

The present study follows Nietzsche as he undertakes a genealogical inquiry into communication, the problem and opportunity it provides human life, the possibility of its affirmation and enhancement as well as its denial and destruction, anchored in the affect, force, and perspective that brings forth meanings. At the heart of communication Nietzsche probes the tension to communicate being or the otherwise than being. This judgment hence brings forth reasons for praise of those who affirm life through its horrors, ugliness, and beauty like the Greeks through their Dionysian celebration of tragedy. This judgment likewise brings forth reasons for censure and blame of those who deny and therefore destroy life through their impositions of guilt, sin, and fear of the chaos of existence and seek an escape through the construction of a beyond earth or beyond being through the currents of language.

Nietzsche reserves his harshest criticisms for those who seek to offer meaning for suffering, the pivotal question upon which human life may turn, through this communicative escape to a beyond nature and human being in the world. Through the creation and subsequent sayings of a heaven, hell, and eternal peace earthly, natural, physical life is devalued and denied in favor of a future static realm of milk and honey. To stop the upward gaze Nietzsche calls forth revaluation through the currents of language that are responsible for this escape from meeting the world of earthly, human reality.

Revaluation becomes Nietzsche’s architectonic rhetoric of an alternative, a meeting of the exigencies and questions of the temporal moment in dialogue, dialogue as
a means to make meanings that embrace difference from which human life blooms to speak its existence and to make sense of past, present, and future. Saying through meeting in dialogue the reality before its senses that influence the names it gives, the perspectives it adopts, the knowledge these choices author, that will shape what will come.

Communication as meeting, its bearing of meanings becomes the axis upon which the encounter of difference through language in the form and flesh of persons, events, ideas, and institutions, becomes present and prevalent to us in the varying degrees of power, in which their communication reveals its level of influence. Will the dawning sun raise one’s spirits or the completion of a new project or the soft laughter of a child in an adjacent room inform the mood and gestures that accompany one’s words? This simple question begins to speak to the power of pathos as Nietzsche breaks forth its meanings as subtle shading for his ideas regarding communication.

The present study hopes to further these investigations as they provide insights into multiple areas of inquiry within communication. The present study after illusion turns to Nietzsche to further inform our understanding of his ideas and their potential contributions regarding the interplay of dialogue and rhetoric as well as informing conversations on communication ethics in an age that implicates Nietzsche after metanarrative disintegration.

Additionally, this work then engages in an ongoing dialogue with Nietzsche’s writings as a guide to meeting the contemporary historical moment characterized by metanarrative disintegration, where metanarrative disintegration, difference and multiplicity are now privileged. The privileging of difference communicates a turn to
dialogue rather than the modern bias towards telling in shaping communicative activity. Meeting the alterity within the temporal existential moment occurs through the operative of metaphor. Levinas’ focus on the dialogic tension between saying and said displays the manner in which meeting emerges to offer temporal ground. The multiplicity of ways meanings emerge to offer temporal ground become realized through the imbricating architectonic Nietzschean metaphors of perspectivism, genealogy, and revaluation of values, producing a dialogic ethic of meeting. This outcome interprets otherwise the work, as Levinas also does, of one whom many consider the founder of deconstruction, Friedrich Nietzsche. Countering these perspectives, the present work argues that Nietzsche’s dialogic ethic displays the ongoing interplay of recognition of decaying said and the ongoing hope in the saying as dialogic meeting of difference.
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