Non-Being and Memory: A Critique of Pure Difference in Derrida and Deleuze

Frank Scalambrino

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NON-BEING & MEMORY:
A CRITIQUE OF PURE DIFFERENCE IN DERRIDA AND DELEUZE

A Dissertation
Submitted to the McAnulty College and
Graduate School of Liberal Arts

Duquesne University

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

By
Frank Scalambrino

August 2011
NON-BEING & MEMORY:
A CRITIQUE OF PURE DIFFERENCE IN DERRIDA AND DELEUZE

By

Frank Scalambrino

Approved: April 15, 2011

Dr. Daniel J. Selcer
Associate Professor of Philosophy
(Committee Chair)

Dr. Fred J. Evans
Professor of Philosophy
(Committee Member)

Dr. Ronald M. Polansky
Professor of Philosophy
(Committee Member)

Dr. Christopher M. Duncan
Dean, McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts

Dr. James Swindal
Chair, Philosophy Department
Associate Professor of Philosophy
ABSTRACT

NON-BEING & MEMORY:
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By
Frank Scalambrino

August 2011

Dissertation supervised by Daniel J. Selcer

The psychology philosophy split has restricted viable readings of today’s psychological research. My project (within the philosophy of psychology) is to provide these readings. Specifically, in this dissertation I analyze the data and the interpretations of a large number of contemporary memory research articles. I use these articles to support my claim that Immanuel Kant misunderstood what in the Critique of Pure Reason he labeled “affinity.” Further, Jacques Derrida and Gilles Deleuze inherit this Kantian misunderstanding by way of G.W.F. Hegel’s attempt to eliminate it. Put another way, the component in question is that which grounds the post-structuralist justification for “pure difference,” and the wider context of this discussion is Plato’s problem of non-being. That is, Kant’s reading of affinity and Derrida’s and Deleuze’s respective
readings of pure difference all function as failed attempts to solve the problem of non-being.

Taking Plato’s *Parmenides* and *Sophist* as points of departure, I show how each of the above-mentioned thinkers, including Aristotle, fails to meet Plato’s criteria for, i.e. solve, the problem of non-being. I then use contemporary memory research for the sake of enunciating my own solution to Plato’s problem. The critical structure of my discourse is directed at Derrida and Deleuze, then, as a critique of their readings of pure difference, and this is to accentuate the difference between my response to the problem and theirs.

Kant’s misunderstanding of memory committed him to an ontological filled-duration illusion. On the one hand, my reading of contemporary memory research depicts being as bound by memory. On the other hand, memory’s binding is governed by play, i.e. memory as being’s play-ground. And, gaps can be noticed by regarding shifting engagements of procedural memory or memory’s cycling, though these gaps are often covered over by priming and habitual scripts. Hence, just as these gaps justify calling ontological filled-duration illusory, these gaps also constitute my solution to the problem of non-being. I paraphrase the fruit of solving the problem: Your being is not persisting; it is pulsing. Perhaps the largest impact of my solution is to be found in ethics.
DEDICATION

To that which brought you here.

“Ah, my dear old friend, how fortunate we are to be walking here together on such a charming day! … You look as solemn as the grave. Don’t you feel this little breeze?”

~Marcel Proust, *In Search of Lost Time*
Translated by C.K. Scott Moncrieff and Terence Kilmartin; revised by D.J. Enright

“The golden watchword – Many chains have been laid upon man so that he should no longer behave like an animal; and he has in truth become gentler, more spiritual, more joyful, more reflective than any animal is. Now, however, he suffers from having worn his chains for so long, from being deprived for so long of clear air and free movement: these chains, however, I shall never cease from repeating, are those heavy and pregnant errors contained in the conceptions of … metaphysics. Only when this sickness from one’s chains has also been overcome will the first great goal have truly been attained: the separation of man from the animals.”

~Friedrich Nietzsche, *Human all too Human* §350
Translated by R.J. Hollingdale

“Empty is the word of that philosopher by whom no affliction of men is cured. For as there is no benefit in medicine if it does not treat the diseases of the body, so with philosophy, if it does not drive out the affliction of the soul.”

~Epicurus, “Fragment 54”
Translated by Cyril Bailey
AKNOWLEDGEMENT

“[W]here there is no contract of service, those who give up something for the sake of the other party cannot (as we have said) be complained of (for that is the nature of the friendship of virtue), and the return to them must be made on the basis of their purpose (for it is the purpose that is the characteristic thing in a friend and in virtue). And so too, it seems, should one make a return to those with whom one has studied philosophy; for their worth cannot be measured against money, and they can get no honor which will balance their services, but still it is perhaps enough, as it is with the gods and with one’s parents, to give them what one can.”

~Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, BK IX (NE 1164a33-1164b5)

It is good to remember those who have loved us into being. I would not have been able to complete this work without the support of my family. In particular I would like to thank my mother, my father, my four sisters, and my fiancée Stephanie Swales.

I would also like to thank the faculty of the philosophy and psychology departments at Kenyon College. In particular, my psychology professors and advisors: Dr. Stoltzfus, Dr. Smolak, Dr. Lecesse, Dr. Levine, Dr. Williams, and Dr. Murnen; and my philosophy professors: Dr. Pessin, Dr. De Pascuale, and Dr. Richeimer.

I would also like to thank the faculty of the philosophy department at Kent State University. In particular I would like to thank my Thesis advisor Dr. Michael Bryon and the other members of my Thesis committee: Dr. Deborah Barnbaum, and Dr. Polycarp Ikuenobe. In addition, I would like to thank Dr. David Odell-Scott, Dr. Linda Williams, Dr. Kwang Sae Lee, Dr. Frank Ryan, Dr. Jeffrey Wattles, and Dr. Gene Pendleton.

I would like to thank the faculty of the philosophy department at Duquesne University. Upon first arriving at Duquesne University in 2006, I immediately recognized Dr. Wilhelm Wurzer as a mentor. I either enrolled in or audited every course
he offered thereafter, and in 2008 he agreed to supervise my dissertation. Despite Dr. Wurzer’s death in 2009, I continue to feel motivated by his celebratory nature and by the “poetic dwelling” of his spirit. The grace and courage with which he faced death continue to inspire me beyond what words can communicate.

I would like to thank Dr. Daniel Selcer for his supervision of this dissertation. Our wrangling over philosophical topics has proved both beneficial and pleasant. I would also like to thank Dr. Fred Evans and Dr. Ronald Polansky – both I and this dissertation have certainly benefitted from our numerous interactions over the years at Duquesne University. I remember writing papers, prior to this dissertation, for both Dr. Evans (Deleuze) and Dr. Polansky (Aristotle) on the topic of non-being. In addition I would like to thank Dr. James Swindal, Dr. Thérèse Bonin, Dr. Jennifer Bates, Dr. Jay Lampert, Dr. Tom Rockmore, Dr. Patrick Miller, Dr. Lanei Rodemeyer, Dr. George Yancy, Dr. Charles Don Keyes, and Dr. Stephen Newmyer. I am grateful to have had the opportunity to study at Duquesne University.

Finally, I would like to thank the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center at Braddock Hospital for employing me in their Emergency Room while I completed coursework at Duquesne University. I would also like to thank Kent State University and Duquesne University for employing me as an adjunct philosophy instructor while completing my PhD at Duquesne. Also, I would like to thank the numerous schools and library personnel for allowing me access to their library facilities for the purpose of completing my dissertation: Duquesne University, the University of Pittsburgh, Kent State University (particularly the Main, Stark, Trumbull, and Tuscarawas Campuses), DePaul University, Loyola University, and the École Normale Supérieure of Paris.
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ABBREVIATIONS


I had already been trained in formal logic when, for the first time, I watched a man die. I was majoring in psychology at Kenyon College and working in the emergency department of a trauma center in Canton, Ohio. Witnessing such experiences I became persuaded of the idea that there is a difference between thoughts about death and the experience of death. Perhaps this is why I became so enthusiastic when I first learned of the philosophical problem of non-being.

So, what is the problem of non-being? In order to understand this problem, start with the question itself: What is non-being? This question has perplexed philosophers because all answers seem self-refuting. In other words, since when you answer this question, an answer is being given, the answer cannot refer to non-being. Put simply, this would be like telling a fish that has never been out of water that “dry” is the opposite or negation of the water the fish currently experiences. The words are all understandable; yet, the fish neither knows dryness, nor has the fish become different through an awareness of dryness.

The problem of non-being is especially unique, then, because this self-refutation goes all the way down to the term “non-being” itself. In fact, for this reason some philosophers hold that the problem of non-being cannot be a problem at all. Likewise, they say the question “what is non-being?” is not a real question. On the one hand, non-being does not refer to anything. On the other hand, you cannot decide upon an answer to the question without taking non-being to be something and attempting to negate that
thing. Hence, this is the very problem of non-being. That is, what is non-being, and how can this question be answered given the topic about which it supposedly asks?

When philosophers attempt to solve the problem, rather than merely dismiss it, they usually do so by distinguishing between being and becoming, and then consider non-being to refer to the difference between the two. As I will show in this dissertation, Immanuel Kant came closest to date to solving the problem by positing a third non-entity, i.e. the thing-in-itself, as different from the object which is experienced and the various experiential stages of its becoming. So, Plato pointed to the path and Kant cleared the way to the formulation of a solution. However, Kant fell short of solving the problem, and philosophers in his wake have, to date, not corrected his shortcomings.

There is a significant list of philosophers who have attempted to solve the problem of non-being. Moreover, given the unique perplexity of the problem, I engage a number of these thinkers in order to provide a proof for my solution. After all, the thinkers with whom I disagree about non-being are eminent philosophers, e.g. Aristotle, G.W.F. Hegel, Jacques Derrida, and Gilles Deleuze. Hence, I thought it prudent to do more than just claim these thinkers are wrong in regard to non-being.

Also, when facing such seemingly impenetrable perplexity, philosophers often inquire regarding the value of the problem, of the question, or of its solution. In other words, what is at stake regarding non-being? As I will show in this dissertation, Plato considered this question important because you cannot understand being until you understand non-being. So, what is at stake with the problem of non-being is being. This is a powerful claim, i.e. if you cannot solve the problem of non-being, then you do not understand what being is. I affirm both the perplexity of the problem and its value. In
fact, I find the solution’s paradigm shift to be particularly interesting, i.e. when you understand the solution to the problem, you understand being, and thereby your being, differently.
“The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato.”
~Alfred North Whitehead

“[P]hilosophy without the history of philosophy is, if not blind, at least dumb…”
~Wilfrid Sellars

“What then will you do about philosophy? Where will you turn, while these difficulties remain unresolved?”
~Plato, (Parm 135c)

Chapter One: Part I – Introduction: The Problem of Non-Being

Dissertation Overview

The topic of this dissertation is the problem of non-being. I address this topic in order to criticize the contemporary readings of “pure difference” put forth by Jacques Derrida and Gilles Deleuze as their solutions to the problem of non-being. The method with which I address the topic, and thereby provide a critique of pure difference, may be divided into two treatments. The first treatment is negative; negative because I show that – based on the criteria for solving the problem of non-being – neither Derrida’s nor Deleuze’s reading of pure difference solves the problem. The second treatment is positive; positive because I solve the problem of non-being.

§1 Part I Overview – The first part of the dissertation contains (1) an explication of the problem of non-being, (2) a reading of pure difference according to Derrida and a reading according to Deleuze, and (3) the negative first treatment showing that neither version of pure difference solves the problem of non-being. Now, the explication of the problem necessarily invokes a number of philosophers. Yet, as the explication is for the

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sake of the single problem of non-being, these thinkers may be merely regarded as so many attempts to articulate solutions.

The series of thinkers to be encountered then includes: Plato, Aristotle, Immanuel Kant, and G.W.F. Hegel. The manner in which these thinkers treat the problem of non-being provides the context for reading pure difference in Derrida and Deleuze. As I will show, specifically Plato provides the first formal statement of the problem, and he himself offers a rendition of (what may technically be referred to as “pure”) difference to solve the problem. However, Kant is the thinker of all these mentioned who came closest to date to solving the problem of non-being. Moreover, I take both Derrida and Deleuze to be post-Kantian thinkers. Hence, I invoke Aristotle and Hegel in regard to non-being to help the reader grasp the manner in which Derrida and Deleuze appropriate Plato’s difference in their post-Kantian attempts to solve the problem.

None of the three thinkers upon whom I focus in the dissertation, i.e. Kant, Derrida, and Deleuze, solve the problem of non-being. Yet, I chose these three thinkers because, on the one hand, Kant cannot be avoided as his structure of experience constitutes the greatest advance on the problem. And, on the other hand, with the benefit of post-Hegelian hindsight, Derrida and Deleuze stand as the most sophisticated opponents to anyone who would contend to solve the problem of non-being. This is the case because in order to argue against Hegel’s dialectic Derrida and Deleuze opt for a return to Kant’s structure of experience. With Kant’s structure of experience as their point of departure, Derrida and Deleuze are then able to employ the ideas of Plato and Aristotle in regard to non-being, i.e. difference and potentiality, toward overcoming Hegel’s dialectic.
Whereas the Hegelian dialectic was supposed to eliminate the need to posit Kant’s idea of the “thing-in-itself,” it was Kant’s structure of experience which necessitated him – as I will show – to posit the thing-in-itself in the attempt to solve the problem of non-being. So, in returning to Kant to overcome Hegel, Derrida and Deleuze replace the idea of the thing-in-itself with the idea of pure difference. And, whatever else one may say about Hegel’s dialectic, Hegel’s dialectic constitutes his attempt to solve the problem of non-being. Hence, pure difference – as I will show – functions for Derrida and Deleuze as an attempt to solve the problem of non-being.

It is not mere coincidence that after more than 2,000 years, the most sophisticated attempts to solve the problem of non-being repeat – albeit differently – the idea a character in Plato’s dialog the Sophist put forth as an answer, i.e. pure difference. This is yet more support for the claim that Derrida and Deleuze stand as the most sophisticated opponents to anyone who would contend to solve the problem of non-being. That is, looking back over 2,000 years of philosophy, Derrida and Deleuze were able to incorporate the most viable ideas regarding non-being toward returning to what has always seemed the most viable solution. It is, in my opinion, remarkable that Plato could articulate a problem which would stand unbreached for over 2,000 years; and, he seemingly was able to anticipate the limit of what could be offered as a solution as well.

§2 Part II Overview – The second part of the dissertation, then, contains my solution to the problem of non-being. My solution adheres to the same criteria enumerated in Plato’s formal statement of the problem and adhered to by his successors such as, for example, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Derrida, and Deleuze. As I noted above, then, in returning to an idea of difference in the attempt to solve the problem of non-
being, Derrida and Deleuze take Kant’s structure of experience as their point of departure. Now, the aspect of Kant’s innovative structure of experience which I contend kept him from solving the problem derives from a – perhaps excusable for the 18th century – misunderstanding by Kant of psychology. Namely, of what Kant refers to as the three original sources or powers of the mind, Kant did not recognize these sources as rooted in memory. Hence, standing on Kant’s shoulders, I solve the problem of non-being by revealing Kant’s sensation and imagination as rooted in and functions of sensory memory and working memory respectively.

*There is a longstanding prejudice amongst philosophers regarding memory.* Put generally, philosophers tend to think of sensation as devoid of memory, and to think of imagination as more powerful than memory. Furthermore, despite their criticisms of phenomenology both Derrida and Deleuze adhere to this psychological prejudice. Though contemporary psychologists researching memory do not share this prejudice, neither do they attempt to solve philosophical problems. Therefore, on the one hand, I support my change to Kant’s structure of experience by citing contemporary memory research. On the other hand, whereas the post-Kantian readings of Derrida and Deleuze fail to solve the problem of non-being, my post-Kantian reading informed by both contemporary memory research and the work of Derrida and Deleuze solves the problem of non-being.

This, then, is the positive aspect of my critique. Rather than provide just a different idea, such as pure difference or the thing-in-itself, my solution to the problem provides a different relation, and a different perspective, by solving the problem. Yet, it is, of course, possible, as I will show in the conclusion of the dissertation, to construct an
idea from the results of my solution (Deleuze should be happy). What is more, I believe
this idea I have constructed is original in regard to the literature. You can be the judge
after you read the dissertation. Lastly, though the manner in which this solution to the
problem of non-being might fit in with some portion or with Plato’s dialogs as a whole is
not a concern which I will pursue in this text, I conclude the dissertation with a brief
discussion of the new vista of being which my solution to the problem of non-being
provides. I also provide a brief discussion of the value of such a vista.

The Relations amongst Becoming, Being, and Non-Being

“Socrates: ‘Is any one of the manys what someone says it is, then, any more than it is not what he says it
is?’ Glaucon: ‘No, they are like ambiguities [enigmas and puzzles]…’
Socrates: ‘Then do you know how to deal with them? [my emphasis] … Surely, they can’t be more than
what is or not be more than what is not, for apparently nothing is darker than what is not or clearer than
what is.’
Glaucon: ‘Very true.’
Socrates: ‘We’ve now discovered, it seems [my emphasis], that the many conventions of the majority of
people about beauty and the others are rolling around as intermediates between what is not and what purely
is.’
~Plato (Rep 1997, 479b-e)

§3 The Context of the Problem – The purpose of this section of the Introduction is
to establish the context for introducing the problem of non-being. I take Plato (c. 428-c.
348 B.C.) to have achieved the most precise Ancient statement of the problem of non-
being. The dialogs widely considered to take the problem of non-being as a central
theme are the Parmenides and the Sophist. And, I take Plato’s statement of the problem
in the Sophist as the first formal statement of the problem. What is more, Plato’s Sophist
includes the anticipation of various attempts to solve the problem indicating why each of
the attempts fails as a solution. Though the value of initially returning to Plato, then, is

5 As I will explain below, I am reserving upper case letter terms, i.e. Being and Non-Being, for the Ideas of
being and non-being, so as to make my text more reader friendly.
more than merely organizational, it should be acknowledged that Plato was able to organize the problem of non-being by indicating two impasses such that any attempt to solve the problem must overcome. Despite the care Plato took in outlining the intricacy involved, what one may consider to be Plato’s solution – as I will show in the next section – is unsatisfactory. However, his statement of the problem still holds such that it may be used as a touchstone to gauge any progress toward a solution.

§4 Platonic Background to the Problem – Before stating the problem of non-being found in the *Sophist*, a brief discussion of Plato’s Book V of the *Republic* provides a wider context for understanding the problem of non-being. There Plato suggests a distinction is to be made between Being, Becoming, and Non-Being.⁶ (Rep 1997, 479c-e) And, according to Plato, an explanation of this distinction is not something to be easily given. Plato associates the difficulty with enigmas or puzzles (*αἰσθήματα*).

Recall that in the beginning of Book V (Rep 449a) Socrates is encouraged into a “digression” which, among other things, passes through the “divided line” (Rep 509d-511e) of Book VI and culminates with the “Cave Allegory” (Rep 514a-520a) of Book VII. This digression is supposed to discuss the differences between citizens and the training as propaedeutic which separates the philosopher from the others. Noburu Notomi’s *The Unity of Plato’s Sophist* links the digression of the *Republic* just mentioned with the digression of the *Sophist*, and in this way, though Notomi does not pursue the connection, the problem of non-being is further supposed to be linked to the training and discovery of the philosopher.⁷ Recall also, Plato takes pains to note in the Cave allegory

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that to the prisoners in the cave the philosopher’s discourse may sound ridiculous (Rep 517a). Yet, if the philosopher is capable of solving the enigmas and making the journey, then this discourse leads from “the realm of becoming” inside the cave to the “realm of being” outside the cave [ἄξων τοῦ γινομένου ἐπὶ τὸ ὄν] (Rep 521d). Further, then, as prefatory, the standard Plato passage to quote if discussing Becoming is Timaeus §28. There Plato states,

As I see it, then, we must begin by making the following distinction: What is that which always is and has no becoming, and what is that which becomes but never is? The former is grasped by the understanding, which involves a reasoned account. It is unchanging. The latter is grasped by opinion, which involves unreasoning sense perception [Plato’s emphases].

I quote this passage here for its relevance, though I will discuss it momentarily.

§5 The twofold task in working out the question of non-being – At this point it is worth pausing to briefly reflect on the term “Becoming.” As you can see from the Greek above, gignomenou is related to the verb gignesthai [γίγνεσθαι] and the noun genesis [γένεσις]. So, the Greek translated here as “becoming” points to notions of “origin” and “source” and a “beginning” such as a “manner of birth,” “production,” “generation,” or “coming into being.” Moreover, Francis Macdonald Cornford (1874-1943) in his book Plato’s Theory of Knowledge: The Theaetetus and the Sophist precisely links becoming, and the distinction between being and becoming, from the Republic with the distinction

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as it is further discussed in the *Sophist*.\(^{11}\) What is more, in his article “Plato on Not-Being,” Gwilym Ellis Lane Owen (1922-1982) among the *Republic* and *Theaetetus* lists the *Parmenides*, the *Euthydemus*, and the *Cratylus* as dialogs which use such locutions as ‘what is not’ without ever asking whether these are capable of coherent use. The *Sophist* by contrast proceeds on the view that if and only if we can understand the proper use of ‘what is not’ … shall we understand philosophically the situations those expressions are commonly invoked to explain.\(^{12}\)

Owen’s insight not only indicates the value of solving the problem of non-being, it points back to the very nature of enigmatic discourses – beyond even the *Republic* – and the puzzles regarding Being, Becoming, and Non-Being.

Suddenly it does not seem so obvious that discerning the distinction between becoming and being – as was supposed in the *Republic* – makes one a philosopher. Rather, the task of discerning being itself is now caught up in the problem of non-being. As Plato characterized the relation between being and non-being in the *Sophist*, to get clear about the one is to get clear about the other (Soph 250e-251a). And, were this perplexity the case – which I take it to be – in regard to being, then it would pertain, of course, to not just Plato’s dialogs but the study of philosophy itself. Moreover, the reasons for which I will discuss below, it seems as though Plato never put a solution to the problem of non-being in writing. Attempting to solve the problem of non-being, the final answer put forward by Theaetetus is “difference,” i.e. difference as non-being.

Below I will show why this attempt does not solve the problem of non-being. As Ronald Polansky put it in his *Philosophy & Knowledge: A commentary on Plato’s Theaetetus*,


We certainly should doubt that the *Sophist* completes the account of nonbeing unless it also completes the account of being… Rather than completing these accounts, the stranger says so much as necessary to show that not-being is something (and perhaps he says nearly as much about it as humanly can be said).\(^\text{13}\)

As both Owen and Polansky point out, then, beyond the difficulty of the problem of non-being, the coupling of Being and Non-Being is often either missed by Socrates’ students, or they are not up to the task.

§6 Plato’s Solution — In sum, one way to generally account for the above indicated lack of sophistication in the dialogs other than the *Sophist* is to suggest — as is suggested in the *Apology* (28e & 30a-b)\(^\text{14}\) — that “to live the life of a philosopher” is “to examine myself and others.”\(^\text{15}\) In this way, philosophical discourse truly is an examining and an attending to (care, concern for) the “souls” involved in the discourse. So, the discourse reveals as much as the souls involved can power. (Cf. Soph 258b6) Inevitably, then, there will be discussions where topics surface — such as non-being — without the interlocutors having the capacity to plunge into the depths of the topic(s).\(^\text{16}\) The concluding language of *Republic* Book V itself provides a good example.

On the one hand, perhaps Socrates ironically couches the problem in a way appropriate to his particular interlocutor. On the other hand, perhaps Socrates honestly, as befitting a midwife,\(^\text{17}\) can only remember within the context which his interlocutor is able to establish. At the conclusion of Book V, according to Socrates, whoever discerns the difference between becoming and being discerns the difference between a lover of

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\(^\text{14}\) Cf. *Phaedrus*, 270b; *Gorgias* 464c; *Alcibiades* 146e.


\(^\text{16}\) Cf. Mark Moes, *Plato’s Dialogue Form and the Care of the Soul*, (New York: Peter Lang, 2000).

\(^\text{17}\) Cf. *Theaetetus* 149a-151d. Hereafter cited Theaet.
opinion (φιλοδοξία) and a philosopher (φιλοσόφος). Now, there appear to be two words in play here, other than “love of.” Yet, the term “sophia” is elusive and enigmatic, e.g. consider the double entendre of wisdom/cleverness or simply the question: what is wisdom? If the first two terms are to be understood, then it seems as though a third term also requires understanding despite the inability to count it as a separately perceived term. Similarly, working on the difference between the two terms becoming and being, some of Socrates’ interlocutors fail to attend to the third term, i.e. they pass over – without noticing or attempting to solve – the problem of non-being. Hence, as the Eleatic visitor explains in the Sophist, until you examine your soul sufficiently to be able to solve the problem of non-being, you do not know the difference between either of the two terms above – Being and Becoming or Philosopher and Sophist –; for “the sophist is a clever rogue who will not be got out of his hole.”

§7 Dependency of reckoning with being upon reckoning with non-being – You might ask, then, about a context other than Plato’s dialogs: To what sort of mistake does not having a solution to the problem of non-being lead? It is not so much what should be thought as what should not be thought about non-being. In other words, treating non-being as a part of being leads to what Kant would call a “transcendental illusion.” A classic example can be found in Jean-Paul Sartre’s Being and Nothingness: An Essay in Phenomenological Ontology. According to Sartre, “The explanation of the world by means of becoming, conceived as a synthesis of being and non-being, is easily given.” As such, Sartre treats non-being as a thing that can be part of a synthesis. The point here

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is that in contexts other than Plato’s dialogs, philosophical discourse still contends with non-being.

The influence of Aristotle, in particular his *Metaphysics*, on Western philosophy is unquestionable. In fact, were I to put this provocatively I might say it was Aristotle’s false solution to Plato’s Puzzle of non-being which produced the image in which the history of philosophy may be found. This, of course, assumes a widely held belief that the history, and perhaps the “Western tradition,” of philosophy began with Aristotle.\(^\text{20}\) As I will show below, Aristotle lost sight of non-being by conflating non-being with not-being, and then taking hypothetical becoming – which is a form of not-being – as ground of experience. The result was a logical rendering of being as inherent substance, which, of course, assumes a god’s eye point of view.

The problem with Aristotle’s assumption of a god’s eye point of view is that it reduces ontological negation to logical negation. Notice, for example, as Ronald Polansky points out,\(^\text{21}\) according to Aristotle: God thinks but does not know. If this is the case, then God does not know the principle of non-contradiction.\(^\text{22}\) However, if it is not the case that God knows, and is therefore affirming the principle of non-contradiction by thinking in a way to be governed by, the principle of non-contradiction, then it must be the case that God is governed by the principle of non-contradiction. Yet, this, of course, is tantamount to turning the principle of non-contradiction into God; such a rendition of God should sound contradictory indeed. In other words, the principle of non-contradiction is not God; hence, Aristotle’s reduction of ontological negation to logical

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\(^{21}\) Cf. Ronald Polansky, *Aristotle’s De Anima*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 19. “Hence, there is no philosophical reason for attributing any mere knowledge or wisdom to God.”

\(^{22}\) Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche*: Vols. 3 & 4, 115.
negation overly narrowed his perspective, and subsequently Aristotle lost sight of non-being.

It is in this way that the “history of Western philosophy” has hitherto been unable to think the relation between the ideas of Being, Becoming, and Non-Being. Re-thinking Aristotle’s reduction of ontological to logical negation became a preparatory task to be completed by Kant’s “Copernican revolution.” So, a brief discussion of Aristotle in this dissertation has become inevitable. First, discussing Aristotle goes toward clarifying the mistaken frame promulgated under the name “Aristotle” through which a significant amount of historical philosophical thinking engaged the problem of non-being. Second, the Plato I quoted above regarding Becoming at *Timaeus* (27d5-28a3) already highlighted the perplexity in discerning an idea of Becoming in relation to Being and Non-Being. As Plato indicated there, it is always from within the stability of that which is, i.e. being, that any negative relation to being can be discerned. Certainly of “that which becomes but never is” you may say “it is not.”23 Within the Aristotelian paradigm, then, process philosophy’s concern with becoming is a concern with not-being. Hence, in particular, then, Deleuze’s reading of process philosophy expresses an attempt to rethink Aristotle’s reduction of ontological negation for the sake of rethinking Becoming.

Whereas discussing Plato is a return to the origin of the problem’s formal statement, discussing Aristotle is a return to the initial shift of context – or frame or paradigm – away from Plato’s statement of the problem; and, it was this shift which clouded thinking the relation between the ideas of Being, Becoming, and Non-Being. So, what hangs in the balance with Aristotle’s shift – what is at stake, what is the value of

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discussing the return to Aristotle’s shift? Answering this question requires you look at a different aspect of the same evidence, as it were, to notice that ultimately Aristotle’s reduction of ontological negation to logical negation assumes – but does not justify – a notion of ontological persistence. This assumption receives its contemporary articulation by grounding being in time. Though, if reckoning with being is contingent upon reckoning with non-being, and if Aristotle was mistaken to reduce ontological negation to logical negation, then the assumption of persistence turns out to – wrongly – be justified by a logical understanding of negation, and the mistaken idea about being derives precisely from a mistaken idea of non-being. Put another way, grounding being in time begs the question.

Recall that above I referred to becoming as “hypothetical,” because, as pure, becoming never is, i.e. you cannot even step in such a river “once.” Becoming is not Being. One way to characterize this is to say the being of your discursive mind is displaced from the becoming (its and non-discursive becoming), and thereby unable to grasp becoming qua becoming. But still, becoming is not being. Hence, a major difference between non-being and becoming is lost in the process of Aristotle’s shifting the problem, i.e. becoming’s relation to being allows for it to be discussed.

So, Aristotle’s reduction of ontological negation to logical negation must be re-thought while keeping in mind Plato’s perplexing insight that you do not encounter the same problem in attempting to discuss becoming as you do when you attempt to discuss non-being. In this regard, Kant’s Copernican revolution will be successful. As Kant

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24 It is important to note that I am not claiming Aristotle thinks of all destruction as the same; rather, I am claiming his thought of complete (hypokeimenal) destruction as non-being derives from a mistakenly reduced notion of negation. In other words, instead of thinking the relations between Being, Becoming,
points out, simply stating “nihil” is far too heavy handed a style. You cannot just declare it and move on as if it were something which could simply be “unbound.” The nuance to which I adhere in discussing the subtleties encountered in approaching the problem of non-being, then, is to follow Plato and make an initial distinction between not-being and non-being.\(^{25}\) Not-being with a “t” is taken to refer to the power of logical negation, and not-being in regard to the physical relates to being as becoming relates to being. I elaborate on this more below.

Given the perplexities of the problem of non-being and the difficult, though unavoidable, task of encountering Aristotle’s paradigm shift, in this introduction, I will first show Plato’s statement of the problem of non-being in the *Sophist*. In showing the problem I will also show the two perplexities or impasses you encounter, as discussed by Plato, when you attempt to solve the problem. Second, I will show Plato’s proposal of difference as a solution. Finally, I will show how Aristotle’s arsenal,\(^{26}\) i.e. his logical apparatus for making distinctions, renders a reading of not-being as a solution to the problem of non-being. As you will see, it is Aristotle who formalizes a strategy for mistakenly grounding being in time and equating non-being with death. This, then, should be sufficient for an introduction to such a complicated problem, i.e. it should provide you with a foothold for the “heavy going” which will follow.


\(^{26}\) What Spinoza might think of as the “hodgepodge of Peripatetic distinctions.”
Plato’s criteria for solving the problem of non-being, i.e. his criteria can be used to grade attempts to solve the problem. So, grasping the specificity should further help you navigate the entirety of the discussion. For example, in Chapter 2 I will support my claim that Kant’s critical philosophy in general, and specifically his *Critique of Pure Reason*, represents the furthest advance to date on the problem by showing how Kant was the first thinker to successfully overcome the first of two impasses which Plato requires be overcome if you are to solve the problem. Further, I will support my claim that Kant failed to solve the problem of non-being by showing how he failed to overcome the second impasse of Plato’s two impasses. These are also the criteria with which I expect my solution to the problem to be judged.

Despite the breadth of thinkers, then, I seek to maintain a focus on the problem throughout, and emphasize areas of overlap which constellate the multiple thinkers involved. Hence, I do not consider the breadth of thinkers excessive. For example, in order to justly treat Kant’s achievement in regard to Plato and Aristotle on the problem of non-being, I will devote the entire chapter to discuss the salient points from Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*. And, by salient, here, I mean salient in regard to the problem of non-being, i.e. Kant’s structure of experience. Also, I will return to Aristotle to explicate both Derrida’s discussion of the “Metaphysics of Presence” and Deleuze’s attempts to rethink Kant’s structure of experience. Moreover, given their prominence in regard to the problem of non-being, a discourse with Plato and Kant will persist throughout the dissertation, and in contradistinction to Kant, I will provide a rendition of Hegel’s attempt to solve the problem of non-being for the sake of establishing all the pieces needed to provide a reading of pure difference in Derrida and Deleuze as their attempts to solve the
problem of non-being. And, by relating these two different readings of pure difference back to Plato’s criteria for solving the problem, I will show how both Derrida and Deleuze fail to solve the problem of non-being.

Lastly, you may also use the significant amount of specificity involved in Plato’s criteria for solving the problem of non-being to orient yourself to this dissertation. In other words, regarding the structural overview of the dissertation, the first part of the dissertation may be thought of as my work on the first impasse of the problem of non-being, and the second part, the second impasse. Moreover, the order of the first part of the dissertation follows the logical and historical direction in treating the problem of non-being. Again, the major figures I will discuss on the way to Derrida and Deleuze are Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel. This is certainly a hefty list. Yet, I am only looking at these figures in regard to the problem of non-being. If it seems outlandish to you, then feel free to consider the names – of these thinkers – as mere signs referring to strategies for solving the problem of non-being. You may consider them as if the names were mere mnemonic devices for remembering possible approaches to solving the problem. As you will see, beyond merely adhering to the same criteria in regard to the thinking of these thinkers, there is a considerable amount of overlap, i.e. they are actually dealing with the same problem.

Plato’s Puzzle of the *Sophist* – The Problem of Non-Being

“Visitor: ‘Come on, pull yourself together for us as well as you can and try it – since you’re young. Try to say something correct about that which is not, without attaching either being, one, or numerical plurality to it.’

Theaetetus: ‘I’d have to have a strangely large amount of enthusiasm for the project to try it myself after seeing what you’ve gone through.’”

–Plato (Soph 1997 239b-c)
§9 Two aporia en route to solving the puzzle: What is non-being? – What is non-being? Plato’s response to this question circa 360 B.C. is embedded in his dialog the Sophist, specifically in a passage of his text between 238c to 239e.27 I have divided this passage into three parts which I refer to respectively as (1) the complicated nature of the problem of non-being, i.e. the first perplexity or impasse of the problem of non-being, (2) the paradoxical nature of the problem of non-being, i.e. the second perplexity or impasse of the problem of non-being, and (3) what I refer to as “Plato’s Puzzle” of non-being. Together these three parts constitute Plato’s formal statement of the problem of non-being.

§10 First Perplexity – Where Plato’s passage picks up, the Eleatic visitor and Theaetetus are in dialog concerning not-being. The Eleatic visitor to Theaetetus states,

[W]e maintain that you may not and ought not to attribute being to not-being? … Do you see, then, that not-being in itself can neither be spoken, uttered, or thought, but that it is unthinkable, unutterable, unspeakable, indescribable?

(Soph 1895, 238c)

[Σὺννοεῖς οὖν ὡς οὕτε φθέγξασθαι δύνατον ὁρθῶς οὕτ’ εἰσεῖν οὕτε διανοηθῆναι τὸ μὴ ὁν αὐτὸ καθ’αὐτό, ἄλλ’ ἔστιν ἄδιανόητον τε καὶ ἄρητον καὶ ἄφθεγκτον καὶ ἄλογον;]

In response, Theaetetus agrees with the visitor. Now, I consider this a concise statement of the complicated nature of the problem of non-being and of what I call, “the first perplexity” of the problem. That is, in responding to the question: What is non-being?

Since we cannot attribute being to any non-being worthy of the name, it seems the solution cannot be spoken, thought, or described. In the effort to make this problem clearer, notice how when we speak of, think of, or describe non-being, non-being is being

27 I discovered this way of parsing the relations to non-being independently of: John E. Boodin, “Time and Non-Being,” Psychological Review: Monograph Supplements, 6.3, (1904), 109-119. Moreover, on the one hand, Boodin finds the two moments to be the “logical” and the “metaphysical,” and on the other, Boodin is not interested in solving the problem of non-being. He merely discusses two moments of non-being.
spoken of, *being* thought of, or *being* described. Moreover, because *being* cannot be attributed to non-*being*, of non-*being* we cannot even say “non-*being.*” This is the difficulty in the problem of non-*being* indeed. And the common response when faced with such difficulty is to suggest non-*being* is “ineffable.” The next part of the passage from the *Sophist* indicates the problem with such a response.

Yet, it is valuable to note, before moving on to the next part of the passage, that this much of the problem of non-*being* from the *Sophist* was already stated in Plato’s earlier text[^29]. The question is posed in the *Parmenides*:

> When we say something is not, are we saying that in a way it is not, but in a way it is? Or does this ‘is not’ signify without qualification that what is not is in no way at all and does not in any way partake of being?[^31] (Parm 163c5-8)

As you can see, the latter option is the problem of non-*being* thus far presented from the *Sophist*. In summary form, Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe (1919-2001) put it thus, “*Parmenides’* argument runs:”

> It is the same thing that can be thought and can be What is not can’t be  
> ∴ What is not can’t be thought.[^32]

Anscombe’s syllogism serves as a good example of a logical statement of the problem of non-*being*. As such, her syllogism is summarily appropriate for the first part of the *Sophist* passage. Moving, then, to the next part of the passage illustrates the problem with both such a logical statement and the claim of ineffability noted above.

**§11 Second Perplexity** – The second part of the *Sophist* passage indicates what I refer to as the paradoxical nature and “the second perplexity” of the problem of non-*being*.

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being. Where the second part picks up Theaetetus seems to believe he understands the problem of non-being as evidenced by his agreement with its statement by the Eleatic visitor. Yet, the Eleatic visitor complicates the problem further by changing the standpoint from the perspective of someone who would attempt to prove non-being to the standpoint of someone who would attempt to refute non-being. For anyone attempting to refute the notion of non-being “is compelled to contradict himself as soon as he makes the attempt.” (Soph 1895, 238d) The Eleatic visitor clarifies, “For I, who maintain that not-being has no part either in the one or many, just now spoke and am still speaking of not-being as one; for I say ‘not-being.’ Do you understand?” (Soph 1895, 238d) In this way, the Eleatic visitor points to the paradoxical nature of the problem of non-being, i.e. both attempting to prove and attempting to refute non-being immediately leads to contradiction.

Further clarifying this paradoxical nature, the visitor reminds Theaetetus, “a little while ago I said that not-being is unutterable, unspeakable, [and] indescribable: do you follow?” (Soph 1895, 238e) It is as if the Eleatic visitor is asking: *What are we discussing if non-being cannot be discussed?* Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) refers to such a perplexity as the “supreme paradox of thought,” because one sets out to think, say, or write, what cannot be thought, said, or written. In this way, neither a logical rendition nor the claim of ineffability suffices to solve the problem of non-being. Both are rather more like restatements of the problem.

Allow me to reflect upon what has just been stated by gesturing toward conversations to come later in the dissertation. The contemporary post-Kantian way to discuss the “paradoxical nature of the problem of non-being” falls generally within the

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purview of the question of “non-discursivity.” That is, taking the mind to be discursive in its functioning, non-discursivity is supposed to refer to whatever must be beyond the mind’s reach. This further accentuates the Kierkegaard quote above. That is, shifting to the context of the question of non-discursivity allows for the examination of the paradox of thinking about what cannot be thought. In other words, the claim that the term “non-discursive” is not an oxymoron can be supported in a number of ways, but due to the very nature of discursivity, the viable theoretical options must be hypothetical.

§12 Non-discursivity, a vocabulary term – Non-discursivity, as the other of discursivity, then, may be considered in one of the following two fashions. (1) Discursivity may be thought of as an effect of something non-discursive. In other words if you consider some bit of evidence as an effect (or expression) of a necessary precondition without the condition itself being able to be thought as other than condition, then the condition may be said to be non-discursive. (2) Non-discursivity may be thought of as somehow too excessive for the discursive mind to capture, i.e. the non-discursive might exceed the discursive mind such that the mind cannot think it.

Whereas those who affirm non-discursivity think it in one of the two above fashions, those who deny non-discursivity consider notions such as “pre-conditions,” “excessivity,” and “relationality” to be just as much products of the mind such that “non-discursivity” can never mean anything other than more discursivity; thereby they consider it an oxymoron. Notice how this discussion of non-discursivity mimics the above discussion of the paradoxical nature of the problem of non-being. Hence, it is valuable to mention the notion of discursivity here because within the more general discussion of non-discursivity the thinkers whom I will later examine may be mapped
specifically regarding their strategy for solving the problem of non-being. That is, whereas Kant and Deleuze affirm, Hegel and Derrida deny, non-discursivity.

§13 Plato’s Puzzle – The third part of the Sophist, then, noted above pertains to the conclusion of the passage by Plato with what may be read as an invitation to solve a puzzle. The Eleatic visitor declares, “until we find some one or other who can speak of not-being without number, we must acknowledge that the Sophist is a clever rogue who will not be got out of his hole.” (Soph 1895, 239c5) Plato’s invitation to solve the puzzle of non-being is an invitation to accept the first two parts noted above as criteria for solving the problem of non-being. Hence, these three parts together constitute a formal statement of the problem of non-being.

§14 Introductory exposition of the general strategy for solving the puzzle – Lastly, then, as an early indication I take the following quote, reportedly concerning Gorgias, as an example of a plausible strategy for solving what I call the “problem of non-being.” That is, the following is an approach to the problem of non-being which does not fall victim to “immediate contradiction.” In other words, the most viable strategy for solving the problem of non-being is an approach attributed to Plato’s contemporary Gorgias (c. 485-c. 380 B.C.).

Though Gorgias himself, it should be noted, did not provide a solution to the problem, the strategy he suggested was to broadly distinguish between two types of non-being, associating one with experience and one with thought, i.e. distinguishing between non-being and not-being. This distinction allows for the experience of non-being even though whoever would experience it could not express it. Concerning Gorgias,
In what is entitled *On the Nonexistent* [*On Not-Being*]\(^{34}\) or *On Nature* [*Gorgias*] proposes three successive headings: first and foremost, that nothing exists; second, that even if it exists it is *inapprehensible* to man; third, that even if it is *apprehensible*, still it is without a doubt incapable of being *expressed* or explained to the next man [my emphases].\(^{35}\)

As can be seen in the above quote, distinguishing between the standpoints of experience and thought allows one’s discourse to focus on types of relations rather than on entities in relations. Notice, this allows for the expression that non-being is inapprehensible without the immediate contradiction highlighted above. However, as the quote also captures, *it is still not clear what this inapprehension might look like in experience*. For example, certainly unconscionness is not experienced, but it is not non-being. Hence, inapprehension is necessary but not sufficient to describe an experiential relation to non-being.

To sum, thus far I have described the problem of non-being, and I have indicated the general strategy I take to be appropriate for its solution. If the problem of non-being can be solved, then, the following seem to be required. First, a discursive expression of non-being, i.e. *not-being*, is insufficient as a response to the problem because it either entails merely logical negation – being about concepts and thought not about being – or it encounters what Plato’s Eleatic visitor described as the “immediate contradiction” of *being* an expression of *not-being*. Second, approaching non-being through experience seems to be the best strategy. However, the necessary inapprehension of non-being further entails the requirement of awareness of the inapprehension. In this way, for

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example, the notion of consciousness is far too narrow to be up to the task of solving the problem of non-being. Hence, the solution to the problem of non-being will involve looking for non-being in experience not in concepts or logic, and it will involve an awareness of the (experiential) structure which allows for being.

In this way, contra Gorgias non-being will be able to be explained by describing where to look in experience for the decisive inapprehension. And, though what I am about to say in this paragraph regarding Kant will not be fully clear until the end of the next chapter, it was Kant who fully tapped the beauty of this Gorgian strategy – making the crucial distinction in his Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy between logical and real, i.e. experiential, negation. In fact, Kant is adhering to Gorgias’ strategy when he locates the thing-in-itself after appearance by regressing back “down” the trajectory of experience from the unity of an object of experience. Hence, the (non-discursive) thing-in-itself will be Kant’s solution to the problem of non-being. Further, as Derrida and Deleuze return in different ways to Plato’s positing of difference as a solution to the problem, they will be returning to Plato’s puzzle by way of Kant, i.e. pure difference will replace the thing-in-itself as the solution to the problem of non-being for Derrida and Deleuze.

Irony Transcends Language: The Platonic Idea of Difference in Itself

In this last section on Plato, I touch on some of the remaining passages of the Sophist. My purpose for addressing these passages is to specifically show, on the one hand, the response to the problem of non-being found in the Sophist, i.e. Difference. On the other hand, I argue there may be another, i.e. more ironic, interpretation which reads

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36 Immanuel Kant, Theoretical Philosophy 1755-1770, David Walford and Ralf Meerbote, tr., 211. Hereafter cited as NM.
Plato’s *Sophist* as providing a solution different from Difference. Again, based on Plato’s own criteria, neither solution is satisfactory. However, I must note that I find what might be Plato’s ironic solution to the problem of non-being to be brilliant. In order to achieve the purpose of this section, I initiate a discussion of dialectic which will continue throughout the first part of the dissertation. For the sake of clarity, I will use upper case letters when referring to formal Being and Non-Being, and lower case letters when referring to the being and non-being supposedly “beyond” the forms.

§15 *Ontological Emergence* – There are, of course, multiple definitions of dialectic depending upon which thinker you consult. Suffice to say, then, I begin with a quite general notion of dialectic as the “process of organizing thought” to be further specified throughout the dissertation. Recalling the distinction made in *Timaeus* §28, quoted above, the process of organizing thought may begin with either the understanding or with sense perception. To begin, then, I provide an example from Plato in which he begins dialectic with an image, i.e. sense perception, before considering other ways to begin the process of organizing thought as potential solutions to the problem of non-being.

Following Plato, then, imagine a light descending from the sky. The source of the light is being and the darkest darkness furthest away from being is non-being. Moreover, neither being nor non-being – though for different reasons – as Plato points out in the *Republic* passage I quoted above, can be “seen.” Keeping with the metaphor of vision: it is as if, at the level of brightness which is bright enough – without being too bright – for vision there are the forms of which anything *can* be. So out of the darkness of what is not being (anything), things begin to be as they emerge into the light of the forms – non-
being, becoming, being. In this way, the forms govern both what can be and what can be thought. Though, of course, not a solution to the problem, a metaphorical employment of the forms is possible at the outset so as to orient to the problem. Such is the example of movement from darkness into light. Hence, you can think Being and Non-Being, which means there is a form or idea pertaining to each, but you must keep in mind that these are merely the forms.

I mention this metaphor because I think it nicely captures the aspect of formal relation involved, and this aspect provides depth to the criteria Plato established for the problem’s solution. In other words, though you are attempting to think about being and non-being, the act of thinking itself indicates the level of light which is neither the pure brightness of being nor the pure darkness of non-being. Here again, then, you see – even with this less rigorous, i.e. metaphorical version – a restatement of the paradoxical nature of thinking Non-Being.

The above image indeed conjures a complicated dialectic. Yet, there are only two aspects of the identifying movement of thought, i.e. dialectic, which need be pursued in this introduction. First, the aspect of relationality involved in thinking Being and Non-Being, and second, an overview of dialectic as it relates to this relationality. I will engage the issues of dialectic and relationality more thoroughly in later chapters. So, for now, notice by invoking a discussion of the forms in relation to being and non-being there are three terms to be dealt with at this level of generality. In order of the descending light metaphor: being, the forms, and non-being. Yet, since it is with the forms or Platonic Ideas that one is able to think, it is as if the movement begins in the middle of these terms.
It is neither irrelevant nor tangential to recall here that Plato never explains how a prisoner becomes unchained in the Cave Allegory. Within the dialectical movement of the forms, then, there is a form of Being and a form of Non-Being, and organizing these forms allows one to think, for example, of Being and Non-Being. A question which you should already be able to answer – given Plato’s criteria above – is whether the Being and Non-Being which can be thought are being and non-being. Of course, they are not. Here, then, the image I am producing – following Plato –, the brightness of the sun : being :: the darkness of the cave : non-being, is itself a way to organize that with which you can think of as Being and Non-Being, i.e. the forms. Hence, either images or forms can begin a movement of organization toward providing a vision of Being and Non-Being. Yet, this vision, as vision – whether imaginal or symbolic – will paradoxically always fall short of an unmediated view of being and non-being.

Notice, then, dialectically there are a number of ways to set up the three terms in relation to one another, and depending upon how you set up the terms, the movement through these terms will look differently. After discussing the perplexity of “what is not” [τὸ μὴ ὄν] (236d9-242ba) and the perplexity of “what is” (242b6-251a4) in the Sophist, Plato addresses both the relationality amongst the terms involved in, and the different beginnings of the dialectical process of, organizing these relations. Plato initiates this discussion with what he calls the “five great kinds” (Soph 251a5-259d8) which are: Movement (or Change) [κίνησις], Sameness [ταὐτόν], Rest [στάσις], Difference [ἐτερόν], and Being [τὸ ὄν].

So, of the three terms – being, the forms, and non-being – I will now examine a formal (symbolic) beginning to the dialectic. My examination follows along the same
path as Plato’s discussion in the *Sophist*. Moreover, perhaps it makes sense to consider the starting point of dialectic a form, rather than a beyond the form, since it is the forms which are supposed to allow for the thinking in which the beginning (of dialectic) is thought.37 Whatever his rationale – the dialog does not speak to it – Plato begins with the form of Being, and Movement (or Change) and Rest (or Non-Change) follow since the form of Being either moves or does not, i.e. Being may be thought of as at rest or in motion.

Building to his conclusion, at 252d8 Plato invokes what will come to be known as the Law of Non-Contradiction: “I suppose it’s ruled out by very strict necessity that change should be at rest and that rest should change [my emphasis].” (Soph 1997, 252d5) From here a discussion is begun regarding the relation between the forms. The Eleatic visitor notes, “Since some will blend and some won’t, they’ll be a good deal like letters of the alphabet. Some of them fit together with each other and some don’t.” (Soph 1997, 253a) Just as, according to the Eleatic visitor, it takes a grammarian to “know which kinds of letters can associate” and a musician to know which musical notes “mix and which ones don’t,” (Soph 1997, 253b) the dialectician will know how the forms associate with one another. It is important to note that Plato culminates these comments regarding dialectic and the forms noting that the entire discussion is in the service of attempting to “get away with saying that which is not.” (Soph 1997, 254d1)

Next, from Being, Motion, and Rest come Difference and Sameness (Soph 249c8-254d15). Accordingly, “So that which is [Plato’s emphasis] isn’t both change and rest; it’s something different [my emphasis] from them instead.” (Soph 1997, 250c) And,

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from here, it follows that a distinction must be made. The *difference* between the forms, e.g. Movement and Rest, is *not* the form of Difference itself. That is, there is a difference between “participation” in the form of Difference and the form of Difference itself. Whereas participation in the form of Difference pertains to relationality, the form of Difference itself emerges as a dialectical term, i.e. one of Plato’s “five great kinds.” The forms are different from each other, but they are not all the form of Difference. Hence, in this way, you can state the pervasiveness of the form of Difference by saying that the forms “participate” in the form of Difference. Moreover, this is why Difference must be one of the great kinds, because without Difference there would be no plurality (Soph 256d-e).

Keep in mind that on the one hand, this is mere formality. Yet, on the other hand, this is the formality which governs thought. With the distinction, then, between the form of Difference – which emerges in the dialectical *movement* of organizing thought – and participation in the form of Difference – which governs plurality and relationality –, it is possible to think the form of Being and *then* think the form of Non-Being as Different. It is as if, participation : Movement :: Sameness : Rest, and though these forms participate in Being, they are Different than Being.

§16 *Formal Opacity of the dialectic* – Now, here is the importance of the paradoxical nature of non-being and what I call the dependency of reckoning with being upon reckoning with non-being. On the one hand, *being* allows for the forms, so a possible snare is to think that the form of Being is being itself. As you can see, it certainly seems – *tautologically* – true. Yet, as you are thinking it, the Sameness that you think, of course, derives from participation in the form of Sameness. This should be a
sign that you are “in” the forms. Yet, are the forms not in being? Notice the difficulty, i.e. the perplexity, here. This will be cleared up by looking not at being but at non-being. This is why I refer to this aspect of Plato’s problem as the “dependency of reckoning with being on the reckoning with non-being.” That is, until you solve the problem of non-being, you are caught in the sophist’s snare. You can only see what the sophist shows you, i.e. Being and Difference – neither of which is being or non-being, and both of which are forms, i.e. Ideas. Such then is a value of solving the problem of non-being, a different reckoning of being emerges.

§17 Participation v. In-Itself – Now, none of what I have just said is controversial in itself. For example, some commentators, such as Michael Frede (1940-2007), hold that the achievement of Plato’s Sophist is found in its ability to illustrate that non-being can be said. However, be this as it may, rather than solve the problem of non-being, “not-being” shifts the focus to the problem of discerning the relational function of logical negation. This is why Job van Eck suggests, “the theory of falsity and negation we find in the Sophist is a masterpiece of logical analysis.” According to Paul Shorey, in the Sophist absolute being and non-being “remain a mystery” (Cf. Soph 251a, d, 254c); moreover, “the Sophist merely fixes the Practically necessary conventions of logical discourse about them (251a).” Hence, despite, or rather in addition to, the accuracy of the above claims, Plato is working with a distinction which may point beyond logical analysis. That is, as I will show, logical negation pertains to participation in the form of

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Difference, i.e. not-being, and it is still an open question at this point whether Difference in itself will emerge as a non-logical negation which solves the problem of non-being.

Put another way, I am here rehearsing Plato’s distinction between “in themselves” [αὐτὰ καὶ ἀντικ] and “with reference to others” [πρὸς ἀλλα], also referred to as standing alone and in relation, in regard to the forms. This distinction is quite important because it succinctly states the results of dialectically moving through Plato’s “great kinds” on the way to solving the problem of non-being, and the difference between two types of difference. This important distinction – which I will return to throughout the dissertation – is the distinction between the “ἐναντίον” (enantion) of difference in relation to others and the “ἑτερον” (heteron) of difference in itself. It is in this way, that difference, i.e. the form of Difference in itself, came to be considered a potential solution to the problem of non-being. Neither logical analysis nor the difference between the forms which allows for their participation in Being, then, ἑτερον points to an examination of the form of Difference by itself. Hence, beginning the dialectic with the form of Being in itself, you arrive at the form of Difference in itself, and as different from Being, Difference receives consideration as a solution to the problem of non-being.

§18 Heteron v. Enantion – Now, depending upon how you respond to the problem of non-being, it is, of course, possible to believe ἑτερον has only one function; such is the belief that ἑτερον reduces to ἐναντίον. From such a mistaken view some have even suggested that difference in itself is merely a dream. However, ἑτερον may be

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45 Cf. Martin Heidegger, Plato’s Sophist, 393.
viewed a different way. For example, if the forms govern discursive thinking, then the form of difference in itself, i.e. ἕξνλ, might point “beyond” the forms to non-being. As such, you could say that the form of difference standing alone is a discursive attempt to say non-discursive non-being. Though such an attempt fails to solve the problem of non-being, since it does not meet Plato’s criteria for the solution, it does indicate the persistence of the problem even when moving into a purely logical plane or from a logical perspective. In other words, you may still be securely “in” the forms, and yet, perhaps, have access to an outside of the forms by way of the form of Difference, and remember it was via dialectic that you arrived at the form of Difference in itself. So, even if Plato’s *Sophist* is taken to achieve the goal suggested by the above commentators, Plato’s *Sophist* may also be taken to provide an ironic solution to the problem of non-being. As such, it is as if the *Sophist* is an aporetic dialog indeed – the place to look for the resolution of its central problem is *outside the text* (!).

To be clear, I have just discussed a formal beginning to dialectic following Plato in the *Sophist* which moves through his “great kinds” to arrive at the form of Difference in itself. And, in this way I am providing an interpretation of Plato’s *Sophist* such that Difference is not Plato’s solution to the problem of non-being. Rather, this interpretation takes Difference (in itself) to point outside the dialectic. This could be Plato’s (ironic) solution to the problem of non-being because, since it does not state a solution, i.e. it does not say non-being, it does not violate the above criteria Plato enumerated for the problem’s solution.

So, what I am suggesting – keeping in mind descriptors such as ineffable – is that Plato’s dialog may mimic the dialectical arrival of Difference in itself as a term. Were

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this the case, a reference to the outside of the dialog would be tantamount to a reference to non-discursivity, and looking through the form of Difference would be like looking through the dialog. Hence, the dialog dialectically organizes your thinking culminating with Difference in itself as the purported formal, dialogical, solution. The solution would be ironic because it does not meet the criteria that the dialog itself establishes. In this way, its very failure to solve the problem of non-being ironically suggests the mechanism for the problem’s solution – “look through” the form of Difference in itself to see what is different from the forms (more on this below).

To sum thus far: as Plato himself indicated (discussed further just below), a solution to the problem of non-being is required to gain the ultimate insight involved in regard to any “beyond” in relation to the forms. In this way, Plato’s thesis of the dependency of reckoning with being upon reckoning with non-being should now be clear. It is by striving to solve the problem of non-being that you come to consider an “outside” to the forms, and being – not the form of Being – is outside the forms. Hence, the way I would organize Plato’s terms – my dialectic in Platonic terms –, then, would be: The Platonic Idea [ἰδέα] itself points “beyond” the (logical) relational certainty between the forms [εἴδον], and as the great Kinds [γένον], the forms allow for a determinant translation of becoming [γένεσις]. Further, from a formal beginning to dialectic, I would take the beginning and the end of the dialectical movement, i.e. Being and Non-Being, to be Ideas which point outside of the dialectic in a non-determinative way. As such, after solving the problem of non-being, it is possible to speak of Non-Being, so as to reference non-being while being mindful that the reference is itself not non-being.
§19 Proléptic: Anticipation of what is to come – Yet, at this point it still remains an open question whether the form of Difference serves such a purpose. On the one hand, because I think it does not serve such a purpose, I might seem to be siding with Derrida, but really I am not. On the other hand, since Deleuze pursues the project of using Difference to solve the problem of non-being, I might seem to be fully disagreeing with him, but really I am not. Hence, my position will be made clear through the rest of the dissertation.

Having above discussed beginning a dialectical movement with an image and with a form or Idea of Being, now consider the last option: what if you suppose the dialectic starts with the very beyond the forms which you are attempting to think? To support a claim that a dialectical movement can begin with a beyond the forms, you might reference the first exercise above, i.e. the metaphorical use of light and dark, suggesting that starting the dialectic with sense perception itself shows that there is an outside of dialectic toward which Ideas can point. As such, the exercise of supposing the dialectic to start with an outside to dialectic may look similar – think Gorgias here – to beginning with sense perception.

§20 Initiating Dialectic with a supposed Beyond – So, now, consider the exercise of attempting to start the dialectic from an outside: If you suppose being to be outside the forms, then you may refer to the forms in general as Non-Being. (Cf. Parm 162a) In other words, per this exercise the forms are different than being. Yet, beyond this supposition: if once the dialectic is engaged, the dialectic can only produce forms, then considering that which allows for the forms as something different from the forms, encounters the impasse that perhaps the dialectic has led to the form of difference rather
than something different from the forms. Hence, this supposition does not advance toward a solution to the problem because the dialectical result may still be formal. Rather, this exercise leads to the same results as the exercise of beginning the dialectic “in” the forms, i.e. with a form. What the dialectic churns out may be Being not being, or it may be Difference, rather than being or non-being.

Put another way, supposing the dialectic starts from outside the forms is tantamount to using the forms to recognize that where the forms begin in the dialectical movement is actually the second step after an undifferentiated first step. However, not to be escaped, the dialectical undertow in turn differentiates the first step as a form, i.e. the form of Being. Since the dialectic’s organizational mechanism of identification depends on using the forms, there is no non-formal way to engage the dialectic. Or, at least, there is no way to produce a non-formal result upon engaging the dialectic. Hence, if you are to avoid the formal closure of the dialectic’s undertow, you must discover a way for the content of the dialectic to point outside the dialectic. Consider the following passage.

Re-invoking the image here from the *Sophist*, which echoes a passage noted above from the *Republic*,

The sophist runs off into the darkness of that which is not [Plato’s emphasis] … and he’s hard to see because the place is so dark. … But the philosopher always uses reasoning to stay near the form being. He isn’t at all easy to see because that area is so bright and the eyes of most people’s souls can’t bear to look at what’s divine [my emphasis]. (Soph 1997, 254a-b)

Having “descended,” then, from being, the form of Being is one of the great kinds; the form of Non-Being is not. Yet, there is a form with which you think otherness such that you can indicate Non-Being as the other of (the form) Being. This form is the form of

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Difference, i.e. ἕξνλ, and, hence, of the great kinds, only Difference seems to fit the bill of dialectical content which might point outside the dialectic.

As such, it can be argued that the undifferentiated starting point is undifferentiated because it is a starting point which is different from itself – i.e. Difference in itself. Though this uses reasoning and “stays near the form,” it turns out that whether the starting point is being or Difference is undecidable. What is more, if Difference is being, then what is Being? Hence, through this exercise of attempting to start the dialectic from the outside, you should see that dialectic can be used to organize the forms and to point beyond the forms, but not to express any “outside” of dialectic. Rather, dialectic must claim that it both begins and ends with the forms or that it only organizes forms. And, this because even supposing a non-dialectical or a non-discursive starting point, dialectic consumes, i.e. subsumes, your starting point. So, from a dialectical standpoint the “non” of non-dialectical – and also of non-discursive – should really be a “not” because it does not have the status of the non which the problem of non-being takes to refer to the negation of being. Rather, it has the status of referring to a negation of the form, i.e. Being.

§21 Non-being: What’s at stake? – So, this exercise also speaks to the value of solving the problem of non-being, i.e. Plato’s dependency of reckoning thesis. A value of solving the problem of non-being: non-being is that which the tyrannical movement of the dialectic cannot capture. Or, better put, since dialectic renders all of its terms formal, non-being escapes the dialectic. Hence, the most salient results of the above thought
exercises are twofold. On the one hand, you can see the tyrannical nature of dialectic.48 As such, suddenly all three of the supposed beginnings to the dialectic – sense perception, an Idea, an outside of dialectic – are in danger of being aspects of, i.e. already within, the dialectic. On the other hand, you can see how it is possible to treat a form as an Idea so as to point outside the dialectic (from within the dialectic). Whereas formal relation is logical, the “pointing” use of an Idea in relation to the non-discursive is heuristic. Yet, combining these two results: you have also seen that once you attempt to understand that to which the Idea “points,” then you are again caught in a dialectical undertow which will churn out forms deriving their meaning, and ultimately the meaning of your Idea, from (internal) relations amongst the forms. However, as Plato indicates, there is hope, and a way to escape the sophist – you just need to solve the problem of non-being.

Allow me to restate the above using the vocabulary with which this section began. You might say, the form Being appears to be determinative due to a sort of dialectical eclipse. In other words, the form of Being dialectically appears to be being itself. So, using the form Being as an Idea does not work as well as using the form Non-Being, but as you have seen, Non-Being is not a major or “great” form. Rather, Difference, i.e. ἕξης, must be used from within the dialectical movement in place of Non-Being. In this way, the Idea of Difference may be used ostensively to ostensibly point outside of, and escape, the dialectical undertow.

Put differently, Difference in itself as different from itself, eclipses non-being differently than the way Being eclipses being. Whereas the difference internal to Being which allowed for its motion is eclipsed in Sameness, i.e. Being is the same as itself, the

48 I find the description of “tyrannical” to be, perhaps exponentially, appropriate as it further connects the Sophist with the Republic where, it will be remembered, the philosopher is not needed until the tyrant appears in the city (soul). Think of the Nietzsche quote I put in the Dedication section.
difference internal to Difference, e.g. Difference is different from itself, allows for the – albeit paradoxical – formulation of Difference as a solution the problem of non-being. Hence, you see the derivation of the concern for the non-discursive which provokes such thinkers as Kant, Heidegger, and Deleuze, among others. That is, if Difference in itself by being different from itself points outside the discursivity of the forms, then non-discursivity becomes a viable topic for consideration in discovering a solution to the problem of non-being.

§22 The Sophist as ironic dialog – Lastly, as promised above, here is my reading of the Sophist in regard to the problem of non-being. I read the Eleatic visitor as clinging to dialectic and the use of reason. I think the philosopher, then, is supposed to be someone who is ultimately capable of disciplining the principle of reason within their own thinking. This, of course, as the Republic indicates is predicated upon discipling your appetites so as to be able to gain a foothold toward disciplining reason. Now, what remains an open question is whether the Eleactic visitor’s discourse is to be taken as ironic, i.e. is he planting a seed at a level of depth in the soul of Theaetetus which is not too deep for Theaetetus to nourish with thought? As indicated above, I take this question to mimic a question at the level of the reader/Plato discourse, i.e. I read the Sophist as Plato’s production of an image which, if the reader nourishes it with thought, is capable of invoking the solution to the problem of non-being. In my opinion regarding such a piece of Plato’s thought, this is a marvellous accomplishment in itself because it forces you to acknowledge non-discursivity, i.e. a non-subsumable operation occurring outside the text. Yet, it certainly does not explicitly state the solution to the problem of non-being.
I grant that a consideration of Difference is a fruitful exercise toward a solution to the problem, but as the Eleatic visitor’s comments betray, his overcoming of Parmenides – by being able to (logically) say “not” – is not a solution to the problem of non-being.

Recall that the Eleatic visitor says:

Nobody can say that this *that which is not*, which we’ve made to appear and now dare to say is, is the contrary of *that which is*. … With regard to *that which is not*, which we’ve said is, let someone refute us and persuade us that we’ve made a mistake – or else, so long as he can’t do that, he should say just what we say. He has to say that the kinds blend with each other, that *that which is* and *the different* pervade all of them and each other, that *the different* shares in *that which is* and so, because of that sharing, is. But he won’t say that it is that which it shares in, but that it is different from it, and necessarily, because it is different from *that which is*, it clearly can be *what is not* [Plato’s emphases]. (Soph 1997, 259a-b)

In this passage, the Eleatic visitor mentions twice (as Plato emphasizes) that he and Theaetetus say the not is. This is the not that at the end of the passage he says Difference can be. So, it seems to me, the Eleatic visitor is himself noting that they have not solved the problem of non-being. Theaetetus does not seem to find a problem in what the Eleatic visitor is saying. In other words, Theaetetus (lacking the soul for it?) cannot refute the Eleatic visitor, so he cannot call the “we” into question. He must say what the Eleatic visitor says; he must accept whatever the dialectic churns out for him. After the passage above, Theaetus is reduced to saying, “True.” (Soph 259b6) Then, as in the passage just quoted above and in the passage I refer to as “Plato’s Puzzle,” the Eleatic visitor, again – Plato, again – prompts Theaetetus – the reader – “if anyone doesn’t believe these contrarieties, he has to think about them himself and say something better than what we’ve said.” (Soph 1997, 259b7-8)
Further, notice were you to call something into question about what they’ve said, it would not be to question the internal logic – not a challenge to the Law of Non-Contradiction –; it would be to question Difference as the solution to the problem of non-being. In other words, the Difference that is being said – whether for the Eleatic visitor, Theaetetus, Plato, Derrida or Deleuze – does not solve the problem of non-being. Specifically, it fails to overcome the second impasse of the problem.

Who knows? Perhaps Plato knew the answer to the problem of non-being. He, however, did not put it in writing. Perhaps, he thought – incorrectly – it could not be put in writing. For years now I have been in awe of Plato. I have communicated more than once both that my mind will never equal Plato’s and that Plato’s mind towers over mine. Yet, since Plato never put the answer in writing, I believe I deserve the credit for solving the problem. After all, it is a matter of faith whether you believe Plato had the solution to this problem or not. Hence, I deserve the credit for putting the solution in writing, so readers can “see” the answer for themselves.

§23 From Plato and Gorgias to Aristotle – To conclude the sections of this introduction regarding Plato, notice that in relation to the position taken to be held by Parmenides and his student Zeno, namely that that which is not cannot be spoken or thought, Plato and Gorgias represent two putative refutations.49 Plato’s approach has been taken to highlight the formality of the Eleatic position, and thereby accentuate logical negation or formal Difference in refutation. Gorgias’ approach has been taken to point to an other to formality which cannot be apprehended, and thereby seeks to refute the Eleatic position by highlighting a distinction hitherto apparently overlooked. In

standard style I have referred to these readings of Plato and Gorgias as putative refutations of Parmenides or solutions to the problem of non-being by associating them with the locus of their supposed non-beings, i.e. conceptual and experiential, respectively. It falls then to Aristotle to organize this trinity of positions through a process of dialectic. In the following sections I will discuss how Aristotle organized these thinkers so as to formulate his own answer. As you will see, Aristotle’s articulation of his own solution is ultimately the maintaining of Plato’s answer and a Gorgias informed positing of not-being.

In order to demonstrate Aristotle’s relation to this trinity it is necessary to discuss a bit of his terminology. On the one hand, certainly the immense scale of Aristotle’s thought, though combined with the scope of my purpose, necessitates that I be prudent. On the other hand, it would be an oversimplification to merely point here to “matter” as the opposite of “form” or “potentiality” as the opposite of “actuality.” Aristotle’s position is indeed more subtle. Hence, in the remaining sections of this introduction, I will discuss Aristotle’s attempt to solve the problem of non-being. I will focus on Aristotle’s own attack on Parmenides and Zeno, and I will show how Aristotle sought to overcome the supposedly inapprehensible, according to Gorgias, nature of that which is not.

This discussion of Aristotle will be fruitful in multiple ways. First, it will speak directly to the movement from Plato toward a contemporary reading of difference and the problem of non-being. Second, it will provide a deeper reading of dialectic, which I have merely generally referred to thus far as a means to organize thought, and this is further important because it speaks to the method of all the remaining thinkers to be discussed in.
regard to non-being. In fact, I devote the entirety of a chapter between Kant and the Derrida and Deleuze chapters to the very issue of dialectic as the relation between thinking and non-being. Third, in formulating their putative solutions both Derrida and Deleuze rely heavily on Aristotle, specifically his response to Zeno in *Physics* Book VI. Lastly, all three of these aspects, enhanced by looking to Aristotle, further provide a more rigorous rendition of what it might mean to “look through” an Idea to see into otherwise inapprehensible experience or “outside” the forms.

**Aristotle’s Paradigm Shift: Aristotle’s Reading of the Problem of Non-Being**

“[T]here is a sophistic turn of argument, whereby we draw our opponent into the kind of statement against which we shall be well supplied with lines of argument.”

~Aristotle (Top 111b31-33)

Aristotle provides his reading of Parmenides and the problem of non-being in the culmination and conclusion of the *Metaphysics*, i.e. Book XIV. There, “Twill ne’er be proved that things which are not, are.”

(Meta 1958, 1089a3) stands as Aristotle’s articulation of the Parmenidean expression of the problem of non-being. Aristotle contextualizes the problem as pertaining to plurality suggesting that for Parmenides despite the appearance of plurality, “all things that are” must be one, i.e. “being itself.”

(Meta 1995, 1088b36) Aristotle then asks a series of directed questions which culminate in a transition from asking about non-being to asking about not-being – moving from (a) directed questions to (b) a paraphrase of the Parmenidean position to (c) a topic change with which Aristotle articulates his attempt at a solution to the problem of non-being. However, Aristotle does not acknowledge the shift he invokes. Rather, he directs the


questions as if merely clarifying the vague Parmenidean statement which he chose as exemplary. Yet, this transition constitutes his point of departure for both criticizing the Parmenidean denial of non-being and propounding his own solution to the problem of non-being.

Aristotle begins his questioning of the Parmenidean doctrine by asking,

firstly, if ‘being’ has many senses (for it means sometimes substance, sometimes quality, sometimes quantity, and at other times the other categories), what sort of one [or unity, i.e. ἕν] are all the things that are, if non-being is to be supposed not to be? [ποιόν οὖν τὰ ὁντα πάντα ἕν, εἰ μὴ τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔσται;] (Meta 1995, 1089a8-10)
The possibilities Aristotle entertains here are telling,

Is it the substances that are one, or the affections and the other categories as well, or everything – so that the ‘this’ and the ‘such’ and the ‘so much’ and the other categories that indicate each some one thing will all be one? (Meta 1995, 1089a10)

In this way you can see how suddenly Aristotle is asking not about that which is not (non-being) but about the not that is (not-being). Under the assumption that the problem is about plurality, Aristotle’s version of the problem of non-being becomes: “of what sort of non-being and being do the [plurality of] things that are consist?” (Meta 1995, 1089a15) Moreover, Aristotle has effected a transition with which he is able to draw discussants toward the kind of statements against which he is well supplied with lines of argument. In this and the next section, I will comment on this strategy in general, concluding with his solution. I will begin, then, by explaining what I refer to as Aristotle’s “matrix of opposition.”

§24 Aristotle’s Matrix of Opposition – The texts involved here are Categories chapters 7, 10, and 11 and Metaphysics Book X chapters 3 and 4. Aristotle holds that

52 Cf. Aristotle, Topics (111b31-33); this section’s epigraph.
there are four (4) kinds of opposition [ἀντίκεισθαι]: (a) contraries [ἐναντίω]; (b) relatives [τὰ πρὸς τι] (and their correlatives or reversals [ἀντιστρέφοντα]); (c) possession and privation (or lack) [ἐξῆς καὶ στέρησις]; (d) affirmation and negation [κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις] (or contradictory predication [ἀντιφάσεις]). Notice, though Aristotle uses ἕτερον to help define some of the above terms, ἕτερον (in) itself does not appear within his matrix of opposition. With reference here to the Platonic language noted above, it is as if the “in itself” – in regard to difference – has been reduced to the “with reference to others.” So, though Aristotle appears to respect so many differences, he (also) defaces difference. Yet, more importantly, it is Aristotle’s matrix of opposition which will determine his reading of non-being, and as such, it will be not-being not non-being upon which he ultimately works. In other words, the problem of non-being for which Aristotle proposes a resolution will no longer be the problem as articulated in Plato’s *Sophist*.

In order to see the shift which occurs with Aristotle, notice that contrary opposition involves the term ἑναντίον which is the very term opposed to ἕτερον in the above discussion of Plato’s forms. In other words, whereas ἑναντίον was taken to be difference in relation to others, ἕτερον was taken to be difference in itself. Given the reading of Aristotle I am providing here, you should not be surprised to read Aristotle say in the *Metaphysics* X §4, “there is also a greatest difference, and I call this contrariety.” (Meta 1995, 1055a5) The Greek here, of course, for contrariety is ἑναντίωσιν. And, notice what Aristotle says he means by “greatest.” “(a) that is greatest which cannot be exceeded, and (b) that is complete outside which nothing proper to it can be found [my emphasis].” (Meta 1958, 1055a10-12)

In other words, there is no opposition outside the greatest contraries, i.e. *contradiction*. So, the other types of opposition in the matrix, then, fall within the scope of contrariety as the greatest difference. This should be taken as sufficient evidence that Aristotle is either not concerned to think about difference in itself or he has somehow shifted its meaning away from Plato. Hence, on the one hand, Aristotle’s matrix of opposition is an expansion of Plato’s ἐνναυρίον. On the other hand, as Aristotle reads non-being by way of his matrix of opposition he is working on what ἐνναυρίον referred to in Plato, and that is not-being. Were my goal to merely show that Aristotle does not solve the problem of non-being I would stop here. However, given the influence of Aristotle’s reading of the problem of non-being it is valuable to see both how Aristotle reads the problem of non-being and exactly what he offers as a resolution.

§25 *Aristotle’s strategy regarding the problem* – It is worth mentioning that I read Aristotle’s strategy for accomplishing a shift from non-being to not-being as following the same strategy he encouraged his students to adopt as a debating technique. In his *Rhetoric* II, §§22-23, Aristotle suggests using the different types of opposition as so many amongst possible *topoi* with which to construct arguments. He suggests the virtue of these *topoi* is their simplicity in structuring a topic. For example, of all the ways X and Y may or may not relate, saying “X and Y are opposites” is a simple way of identifying X and Y in relation to each other. And the value of such effects, Aristotle notes in the *Rhetoric*, is that they “charm the crowd’s ears more finely.”[^55] (Rhet 1395b30)

So, Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* is worth mentioning here because, as it seems to me, this is precisely how Aristotle reads his predecessors on the problem of non-being. In regard

to Parmenides, Zeno, Gorgias, and anyone who might oppose the principle of (non)contradiction, Aristotle’s readings range from that of unsympathetic to that of straw man. As there is no topoi for difference in itself, Aristotle does not consider that any of his “opponents” could be attempting such an enunciation. For example, Aristotle in his On Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias provides a reading as if Gorgias were completely unsophisticated. In other words, Aristotle reads him literally. As such, Aristotle, after providing some paraphrases of Gorgias, simply states, “Now it does not at all follow from what he has said that nothing is.”56 (MXG 979a34) Aristotle then suggests both of Gorgias “and others” – for whom Aristotle does not even provide a paraphrase – that their “proof” is “refuted thus: if what is not is, it either is simply, or else it is in a similar sense something that is not.” (MXG 979a35-36) In other words, Aristotle has already determined that what is not must be read through his matrix of opposition.57 As will further be shown, his treatment of Parmenides and Zeno is quite similar.

§26 Being, Unity, and Voice – Returning to Aristotle’s reading of Parmenides with which this section began, it logically follows for Aristotle that if you are asking about the different ways in which “being” is meant, then you are inquiring about, on the one hand, predication, i.e. the categories, and, on the other hand, you are inquiring about iteration, i.e. the various voicings of the word itself. So, first, in regard to the categories as that which is predicatable, is there a relation of ontological dependence across the categories which suggests some ultimate “thing” of which the categories are predicated? Rather than merely “sometimes mean substance, sometimes quality, etc.” is there a

meaning to which “is” somehow always refers? Second, as the last question already indicates, considering the various voicings of the word itself invokes a discussion of synonymy and homonymy, i.e. univocity and multivocity or equivocity. (Cf. Cat 1a) Is each voicing of the term “being” similar merely in voicing alone, or is there a meaning which unifies each voicing? Lastly, on the one hand, these two inquiries might resolve with the same answer, e.g. being itself or the One.\(^{58}\) On the other hand, somehow Aristotle must avoid committing to an infinite regress on either question, i.e. categorization or iteration.

Though Aristotle considers this question regarding whether being and unity have some “underlying nature” to be the “hardest inquiry of all,” \((1001a3)\) it is tempting to simply say that it is being itself which unifies the categories. However, to do so gives rise to the question of how such unity would occur, e.g. are the categories unified by all being species of the genus being?\(^{59}\) Aristotle explicitly denies this option, noting:

> it is not possible that either unity [τὸ ἓν] or being [τὸ ὄν] should be a genus of things; for the differentia of any genus [γένος] must each of them both have being and be one,\(^{60}\) but it is not possible for the genus to be predicated of the differentia taken apart from the species … so that if unity or being is a genus, no differentia [διαφορά] will either be one or have being. But if unity and being are not genera, neither will they be [first] principles. (Meta 1995, 998b 23-27)

So, notice first and foremost that, again, he has moved from considering being and unity or the one to a discussion of plurality. (Meta 1001a3-1001b26) Aristotle’s implicit critique here suggests Parmenides treats being as a genus, and as such cannot account for the differences between individuals, i.e. plurality of being. In noting, then, that the

\(^{58}\) Cf. Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutations*, §33


\(^{60}\) Cf. Aristotle, *Topics* (144a36)
differentia – that which differentiates one member of a species from other members within the same genus – must both be and be a unit, Aristotle directs attention away from genera and toward individual iterations. Hence the question: in each case (unity) of something that is (being) what is the relation across the iterations? This is a question of vocity, i.e. univocity or multivocity because Aristotle wishes to preserve the different individuals without losing coherency of meaning. (Meta 1001a29-b1) So, what is the relationship across the various iterations of “is”? Does “is” mean something different every time it appears?

One of the more celebrated phrases from Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* occurs in Book IV §2, “There are many senses in which a thing may be said to ‘be’, but they are related to one central point, one definite kind of thing, and are not homonymous.”61 (Meta 1995, 1003a33) I will use this statement as a point of departure for answering the above questions regarding vocity and multiple iterations, but first I will discuss this passage as it clearly shows the paradigm shift which the problem undergoes from non-being to not-being in the thinking of Aristotle. Consider Aristotle’s explication of the celebrated quote:

so ‘being’ is used in various senses, but always with reference to one principle [ἀρχή]. For some things are said to ‘be’ because they are substances; others because they are modifications [(affections) πάθη] of substance; others because they are a process toward substance, or destructions or privations [στασιμα] or qualities of substance, or productive or generative of substance or of terms relating to substance, or negations of certain of these terms relating to substance [my emphases]. (Meta 1933, 1003b6-9)

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This passage captures the notion of focal meaning to be discussed next and sets up Aristotle’s application of privation as a kind of opposition, i.e. “negation,” applied to a term relating to substance which equates difference in itself with non-being. As I will discuss below, Aristotle’s use of principle here \( \dot{\upsilon} \rho \chi \eta \) will be his way of attempting to navigate Gorgias’ criterion of inapprehensibility or imperceptibility.

However, at this point it is enough to note that with the above Aristotle believes he has provided proof for the following conclusion – which is actually the very next sentence of the above quote:

It is for this reason that we say even of non-being that it \( \varepsilon \nu \) non-being [emphasis in Ross translation]. \( \delta \circ \upsilon \ k \zeta \ t \ o \ \mu \gamma \ \dot{\varpi} \ \dot{\upsilon} \ \varepsilon \nu \nu \alpha \ \mu \gamma \ \dot{\upsilon} \ \phi \alpha \mu \epsilon \nu \). (Meta 1995, 1003b10)

You can see that Aristotle’s Greek uses “\( \mu \gamma \ \dot{\upsilon} \ \dot{\upsilon} \)” and Ross translates it accordingly as “non-being.” Yet, noticing the previous sentence’s reference to the negating of terms, Hugh Tredennick’s Loeb translation reads, “not-being \( \varepsilon \nu \nu \) not-being.” (Meta 1933, 1003b10) I suppose it would even be appropriate – in this Aristotelian context – to write, “non-being \( \varepsilon \nu \nu \) not-being.” What I have in mind here is that since Aristotle takes non-being to be a mistaken or pseudo problem deriving from the Parmenidean and Platonic incorrect, i.e. non-Aristotelian, interpretations of being, you can take Aristotle here as fully conducting his business, as it were, in the light. In other words, since Aristotle is talking about statements containing terms relating to substance, Aristotle seems quite candid about the fact that he is not trying to solve the problem to which “\( \mu \gamma \ \dot{\upsilon} \ \dot{\upsilon} \)” refers in Parmenides and Plato. Hence, Aristotle has transformed the problem from that which is not (non-being) to the problem of the not that is (not-being).

Returning to the various iterations of being, then, Aristotle’s celebrated *Metaphysics* Book IV §2, quote, “There are many senses in which a thing may be said to
‘be’, but they are related to one central point, one definite kind of thing, and are not homonymous” (Meta 1933, 1003a33) speaks directly to the question of vocity. Though “is” is not a genus, it is appropriate – following G.E.L. Owen – to speak of a “focal meaning” in regard to the various iterations of being. As Aristotle indicated in Book VII, “there are several senses in which a thing is said to be primary: but substance is primary in every sense.” (Meta 1995, 1028a32) It is important to note that it is in this way – through predication of individuals in regard to substance – that Aristotle has appropriated Plato’s language of καθ’ αὑτό, i.e. in itself. In other words, rather than direct the language of in itself at universals, Aristotle directs the language of in itself predication at individuals. On the one hand, this is consistent with his Posterior Analytics where Aristotle notes, “One thing belongs to another in itself [καθ’ αὑτό] … if it belongs to it in what it is.” (Post An 73a34-5) On the other, it will be remembered that “to predicate of an individual” is not to name it. In this way, καθ’ αὑτό predication in Aristotle becomes “essential” predication – the in itself as the essence of what it is – opposed to “accidental” [κατὰ συμβεβηκός] predication. Analogously, then, the distinction between a “this” and a “such” can be seen, “thises are items that are indivisible and one in number in the category of substance [Lewis’ emphasis].”

In sum, after contextualizing the problem of non-being in Parmenides as a problem regarding plurality, Aristotle reformulated the question to ask: “of what sort of

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non-being and being do the [plurality of] things that are consist?” (Meta 1995, 1089a15)

With this question as point of departure Aristotle’s paraphrase of the Parmenidean position amounts to this: “The [above] question evidently is, how being in the sense of substances is many [emphasis in Ross translation].” (Meta 1995, 1089b8) Notice Aristotle has moved from Parmenides on non-being to plurality to substances in the plural. So it will be a discussion of substance with which Aristotle will respond to the problem of non-being, and I will focus on this discussion in the next section.

§27 Aristotle on plurality – Coming full circle, as it were then, recall at

Metaphysics X §3, Aristotle described plurality in the following way:

The one and the many are opposed in several ways, of which one is the opposition of the one and plurality as indivisible and divisible; … And the one gets its meaning and explanation from its contrary, the indivisible from the divisible, because plurality and the divisible is more perceptible than the indivisible [my emphases]. (Meta 1995, 1054a20-27)

Pulling this all together, following the model of the focal meaning of the multiple iterations of being, a plurality of perceptibles are predicated not as so many iterations of universal being but as so many iterations toward the essence of an individual substance.

“We have now outlined the nature of substance, showing that it is that which is not predicated of a subject, but of which all else is predicated.” (Meta 1995, 1029a7)

Moreover, “the question which both now and of old, has always been raised, and always been the subject of doubt, viz. what being is, is just the question, what is substance?” (Meta 1995, 1028b2-4) Hence, the Parmenidean being as one has become substance individually encountered as essentially one (individual). It is each individual which is one. Plurality is saved, and Aristotle has separated substantiality from universality.
§28 Aristotle on heteron – Lastly then, having just discussed the opposition between the one and the many – quoted directly above – Aristotle explains where he locates difference, i.e. ἔτερον, in regard to plurality as plurality of individual substances. Not only, then, is this precisely how Aristotle enunciates his understanding of non-being, but this is also precisely how Aristotle responds to – Parmenides’ student – Zeno in regard to change and motion. Addressing the one and the many (or plurality) by way of his matrix of opposition Aristotle explains,

To the one belong, as we have indicated graphically in our distinction of the contraries, [i.e. the matrix of opposition,] the same and the like and the equal, and to plurality belong the other [τὸ ἔτερον] and the unlike and the unequal [my emphasis]. (Meta 1995, 1054a30)

Notice, then, what Aristotle has accomplished. In this section I argued – or rather “described” since Aristotle is pretty explicit about his interpretive violence – that with the notion of focal meaning Aristotle shifts the understanding of being as either a genus or a universal – whether either Parmenides or Plato actually held these positions is a different question68 – to an understanding of being as substance. (Cf. Meta 1028b2-4)

In this way, I showed you how Aristotle appropriated Plato’s language of καθ’ αὑτό, i.e. in itself, toward directing the problem of non-being away from universality toward substantial plurality – again, whether Plato actually held such a view of “universal” is a different question. I also showed you ἔτερον’s conspicuous absence from Aristotle’s matrix of opposition. Now, I will continue showing you how Aristotle’s application of his matrix of opposition to individual substances goes toward his solution for the problem of non-being. Yet, keep in mind, as the above constitutes Aristotle’s shift

of the problem from non to not being, Aristotle certainly does not solve the problem of non-being.

Priority & Privation: Reckoning, Counting, and Being

“Visitor: ‘So it has to be possible for that which is not to be, in the case of change and also as applied to all the kinds. That’s because as applied to all of them the nature of the different makes each of them not be, by making it different from that which is.’ [Plato’s emphases]”
~Plato (Soph 1997, 256d-e)

§29 Aristotle’s solution to the problem of non-being: Death (unqualified destruction) – The passages I will be examining in this section may be considered as further textual evidence supporting my claim that Aristotle’s reading shifted the problem of non-being to a problem regarding not-being. However, the focus of this section is to show the mistaken way in which Aristotle’s reading resolves the problem of non-being. Toward this end I will continue showing you how Aristotle’s application of his matrix of opposition to individual substances goes toward reinstating difference as ἕξεσθαι, and you will notice this Aristotelian use of ἕξεσθαι pertains to a specifically designated kind of not-being, i.e. a derivation from the logical structure of his matrix of opposition. What I am doing here, then, is picking up the thread of a question Aristotle began in Metaphysics Book XII which he takes his discussion of Parmenides in Book XIV to resolve. The thread begins with Aristotle asking, “One might raise the question from what sort of ‘not-being’ generation takes place; for not-being has three senses.” (Meta 1995, 1069b27) As Hugh Tredennick indicates in his Book XII footnote, the three senses concern (1) “the negation of various predications,” (2) “falsity,” and (3) “unrealized potential.”

Now, there are, of course, a number of ways to organize these three “senses,” and though Aristotle does not acknowledge it in Book XII, he takes the question of not-being

in regard to generation – as a type of change – to be a different iteration of the problem of non-being. This is clear by the culmination of the thread in Book XIV. To follow Aristotle’s own organization, then, is to cross reference types of change, the privative type of opposition, and his understanding of priority all in a trajectory of convergence such that his shift from non to not being overlaps with his demonstration of the type of not-being which pertains to generation. What makes this clear, for example, in Book XIV is Aristotle’s comment that “since non-being in the various cases has as many senses as there are categories [(1)], and besides this the false [(2)] is said not to be and so is [(3)] the potential, generation proceeds from the latter [my emphasis].” (Meta 1995, 1089a27) In general, then, showing Aristotle’s arguments along this trajectory will show the mistaken way in which his reading resolves the problem of non-being. In particular it will show how Aristotle’s reading of the opposition between potentiality and actuality as privative provides his response to the problem of non-being.

So, in order to fully understand his response, it is also necessary to understand how Aristotle argues for the priority of actuality in the above mentioned opposition with potentiality. In Metaphysics IX §8 Aristotle holds that actuality precedes potentiality in account [ιόγῳ] (Meta 1049b12-17), time [χρόνῳ] (Meta 1049b17-1050a3), and being [οὐσίᾳ] (Meta 1050a4-11). Hence, the meaning of this section’s title: privation and priority provide Aristotle with three types of not-being which coincide with the ways in which actuality is prior to potentiality. His various negations of predications and falsity pertain to priority in account. Any negation of being, as negation of actual substance having priority to its potential for change or destruction, pertains to priority in being. As

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already indicated, this will be his response to the problem of non-being. Lastly, his treatment of priority in time is a little less straightforward than the other two. Suffice to say at this point, counting as a potentiality constitutes a type of not-being. For example Aristotle says, “Time is not number with which we count, but the number of things which are counted.” (Phys 1995, 220b9) The relevance and efficacy of Aristotle’s account of priority in time, then, derive from his use of it to criticize Zeno’s attempt to defend Parmenides. Moreover, a brief examination of his discussion of time will be beneficial for later chapters, i.e. 3 and 4. Therefore, in addition to priority in account and being, I will also address the sense in which time is not-being.

Whereas at Categories §14 Aristotle distinguished between “six kinds of change” (Cat 15a14-15) – those being: generation, destruction, increase, diminution, alteration, and change of place –, in On Generation and Corruption, Aristotle distinguishes between “unqualified” and “qualified” “coming-to-be and passing-away.” (GC 318b13-318b17) The first two of the six kinds of change, then, from Categories §14 pertain to unqualified coming-to-be and passing-away, and the last four kinds of change pertain to qualified coming-to-be and passing-away. And, in Physics Book I §7 since he is discussing “becoming,” i.e. γίγνεσθαι, Aristotle brackets destruction and separates the other kinds of change into “absolute becoming” which is generation or “coming into

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existence,” and the other kinds of change as “coming to be this or that.” (Phys 1957, 190a33)

§30 Aristotle’s Assumption: Persistence – Now across these different groupings of change, the distinguishing feature around which they revolve is the question of persistence. For example, Aristotle explains that “in all cases of becoming there must always be a subject – the thing which becomes or changes, and this subject, though constituting a unit, may be analyzed into two concepts and expressed in two [opposed] terms [my emphases].” (Phys 1995, 189b34) This subject is the infamous Aristotelian ὑποκείµενον, i.e. hypokeimenon. According to Liddell and Scott it means “to underlie, as the foundation in which something else inheres, to be implied or presupposed by something else [my emphases].”75 This is important because, on the one hand, Aristotle will need to employ the entirety of the apparatus I pointed to in the introduction of this section to argue for the ὑποκείµενον. In other words, arguing for the hypokeimenon invokes Aristotle’s matrix of opposition, actuality and potentiality, analogical reasoning, and priority of actuality. On the other hand, destruction as unqualified passing-away gets its meaning from the claim that the ὑποκείµενον no longer persists. “Thus perishing [destruction] is change to not-being.”76 (Phys 1995, 224b9) Again, this requires moving through Aristotle’s apparatus of argumentation to fully understand his claim. However, you can already see how Aristotle is poised to mistakenly equate non-being with death.

Arguing for a subject that persists across change, then, Aristotle suggests “the subject [ὑποκείµενον] is numerically one [ἐν] thing, but has two conceptually distinct

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aspects.” (Phys 1957, 190b24) As Aristotle explains it, “the actual change itself takes place between the terms of an antithesis,” (Phys 1957, 190b33) i.e. the two conceptually distinct opposed terms. In fact, Aristotle justifies his positing of an underlying subject which persists through the process of change by regarding the binary opposition’s two terms in the following way,

considering one of its terms taken singly as competent, by its absence or presence, to accomplish the whole change.

… And of this ‘underlying’ factor we can form a conception by analogy; for it will bear the same relation to concrete things in general, or to any specific concrete thing, which the bronze bears to the statue before it has been founded [my emphasis]… (Phys 1957, 191a9)

The reason analogy is possible here is because “the two terms of the opposition itself stand on a different footing from each other.” (Phys 191a19) Specifically in this case the terms are privative. In other words, given the presence \( \piλρουσία \) or absence \( \alphaπνουσία \) of an identifying aspect, Aristotle suggests that you may truthfully affirm or negate the presence or absence of the related privation. This is somewhat complicated, so let me provide an example.

Socrates changes. For example, he looks different in middle age than he did in his youth. Yet, Aristotle maintains that the individual who was Socrates in youth is still Socrates in middle age, despite his changes. How? This invokes a discussion of Aristotle’s famous four causes \( \acute{\alpha}ηηη\eta \). (Cf. Post An 74b5) Briefly, so as to not get too far afield, consider Physics Book II §3. Here, invoking \( \acute{\epsilon}ναντίον \), i.e. logical difference, Aristotle notes, “the same cause is often alleged for precisely opposite effects. For if its presence \( \piλρουσία \) causes one thing, we lay the opposite to its account if it is absent \( \alphaπνουσία \).” (Phys 1957, 195a12) So, there is an initial logical distinction between what is present and what is absent, and with this distinction Aristotle is able to deduce that
which is inapprehensible. What is more, due to the analogical justification Aristotle is working with, despite its absence in regard to perception Aristotle deduces the presence of a persisting inapprehensible subject, i.e. ὑποκείμενον. The four causes, then, are: (1) the agent or initiator of change [ἀρχή], i.e. the efficient cause; (2) the essence, “the whole or synthesis or form” [ὅλον καὶ ἡ σύνθεσις καὶ τὸ έίδος], i.e. the formal cause; (3) “the for the sake of which” [τέλος], i.e. the final cause; and, (4) the “substratum” [ὑποκείμενον], i.e. the material cause.77 (Phys 195a15-25) Aristotle also discusses the four causes in his philosophical lexicon at Metaphysics V §2 (Meta 1013a-1014a).

Moreover, of the four causes, or “becauses,” at Physics II §7Aristotle notes, “in many cases three of these ‘becauses’ conicide.” (Phys 1957, 198a25) In this way, the formal, efficient, and final causes may be grouped together in opposition to the material cause, and this opposition provides the ground for various analogical relations to the opposition.

Aristotle suggests it is key, if one is to overcome Parmenides, that you “distinguish matter and privation.” For Aristotle holds that “the matter, accidentally is not, while the privation in its own nature is not.” (Phys 1995, 192a4-5) As Aristotle explains it,

we distinguish between ‘matter’ and ‘privation’ (or absence of form) … privation as such, is the direct negation or non-existence of the form of which it is the privation. So that matter, though never existing in isolation, may be pretty well taken as constituting the ‘concrete being’ of which it is the basis, but privation not in the least so.78 (Phys 1957, 192a5-7)

In this way, whereas informed matter is apprehended through perception, absence as inapprehensible is arrived at by analogy. Rather than “look through” the Idea in itself of

78 Replacing “shortage” with “privation” throughout.


ἕτερον, Aristotle provides his justification with an analogy based on privation in regard to that which has priority. Likewise will be the mechanism for arriving at matter in itself and privation in itself. Lastly, Aristotle provides an extended definition of privation at Metaphysics Book V §22. Of his treatment there it is worth noting, “There are just as many kinds of privations as there are of words with negative prefixes.” (Meta 1995, 1022b33) Hence, again the efficacy of Aristotle’s separation of substantiality from universality or being from thinking is that you can think of not-being despite an entity’s being. In fact, it is from the priority of an entity’s being that you can analogically think its not-being, and that by way of privation. Further, this may be taken as Aristotle’s attempt to resolve or deny the descriptive criterion of ineffability regarding non-being, i.e. according to Aristotle non-being can be said analogically as privation.

§31 Aristotle on Analogy – The celebrated Aristotle on analogy (ἀναλογία) quote appears at Metaphysics IX §6. It is also here that Aristotle explains the potentiality actuality opposition.

What we mean can be plainly seen in the particular case by induction; we need not seek a definition for every term, but must grasp the analogy: that as that which is actually building is to that which is capable of building, so is that which is awake to that which is asleep; and that which is seeing to that which has the eyes shut, but has the power of sight; and that which is differentiated out of matter to the matter; and the finished article to the raw material. Let actuality be defined by one member of this antithesis, and the potential by the other. But things are not all said to exist actually in the same sense, but only by analogy – as A is in B or to B, so is C in D or to D; for the relation is either that of motion to potentiality, or that of substance to some particular matter [my emphases]. (Meta 1995, 1048a35-b8)

Mary Hesse suggests, “these metaphysical analogies seem to be primarily concerned with the understanding of metaphysical terms. Thus they are examples of the introduction of
novel *language* by means of analogy [Hesse’s emphases].” The value of analogy here, then, is that you may arrive at the inapprehensible by way of analogy from the apprehensible. This is quite similar to *Physics* I §9 (192a27-34) where Aristotle explains that privation in relation to matter in itself may be thought along a continuum of actualization. In other words, regressing toward the more privative from an apprehended individual, i.e. informed matter, the continuum spans the point at which form and matter separate. In this way, you can supposedly think matter in itself though you cannot perceive it – *you cannot* perceptibly *apprehend it.*

Pushing the distinction between matter and privation that Aristotle deemed important for overcoming Parmenides, privative opposition provides access to Aristotle’s reworking of ἐτέρων. Privative opposition yields a distinction between an in itself [καθ’ αὐτό] as matter and an in itself as not-being, i.e. “the privation in its own nature is not-being.” (Phys 1957, 192a4-5) Therefore, on the one hand, as Norbert Luyten pointed out,

> We can say that matter, *as opposed* to substantial determination, cannot be anything more than mere determinability. … Thinking this through, one seems compelled to say that such mere determinability must exclude any determination. In other words, it [matter] has to be pure indetermination [my emphasis].

On the other hand, since “potentiality and actuality are different … it is possible that a thing may be capable of being and not *be*, and capable of not being and yet *be* [emphases in Ross translation].” (Meta 1995, 1047a19) The capacity or potential involved here though inapprehensible to perception yields its presence as absence to reason by analogy.

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This is precisely how Aristotle’s attempt to solve the problem of non-being produced an ambiguity between matter in itself as not-being and privation in itself as not-being. In order to clear up this ambiguity Aristotle assigns privation in itself to the non-becoming kind of change, i.e. destruction. Hence, this is the argumentation with which Aristotle mistakenly equated non-being with death, i.e. destruction.  

§32 From Actuality and Analogy to Potentiality and Persistence – In order to keep all this clear it is important to discuss the manner in which actuality for Aristotle is thought to be prior to potentiality. To begin with, the terms involved here are δύναμις, i.e. potentiality, ἐνέργεια, i.e. activity or actuality, and ἐντελέχεια, i.e. unfolding or activity toward perfecting its end. There is evidently a significant debate regarding how to translate and relate these terms. However, it is not necessary for me to enter into this debate here. The below may be understood without resolving their terminological debate. Moreover, as Zev Bechler points out, “that the connection between the potential and the actual in Aristotle’s ontology is strictly logical is readily seen by the fact that no physical principles are ever considered in inferring either from the other.” Also, Aristotle’s
description of potentiality is clear enough to support the claim that potentiality exceeds actuality;

we say that potentially, for instance, a statue of Hermes is in the block of wood, and the half-line is in the whole, because it might be separated out, and even the man who is not studying we call a man of science, if he is capable of studying. (Meta 1995, 1048a33) Potentiality, then, clearly exceeds actuality in that whatever becomes actual had the potential to become in various ways other than it actually did. The implicit claim, i.e. the assumption of persistence, is supported in the same analogical way ideas of potentiality and matter were supported. In other words, the absence as presence of a hypokeimenon allows for the assumption of persistence. Further, Aristotle may also mean by potentiality not only that definite kind which is said to be a principle of change in another thing or in the thing itself regarded as other, but in general every principle of movement or of rest. For nature also is in the same genus as potentiality; for it is a principle of movement – not, however, in something else but in the thing itself qua itself. (Meta 1995, 1049b4-1049b9) (Cf. Cat 14a27-14b8) So, actuality precedes potentiality in account [λόγω] (Cat 1049b12-17), time [χρόνῳ] (Cat 1049b17-1050a3), and being [οὐσίᾳ] (Cat 1050a4-11). As Aristotle concluded, “We have distinguished the various senses of ‘prior’, and it is clear that actuality is prior to potentiality.” (Meta 1995, 1049b4-1049b9) Aristotle amplified, “it is obvious that actuality is prior in substance to potentiality; and as we have said, one actuality always precedes another in time right back to the actuality of the eternal prime mover.” (Meta 1995, 1050b2-1050b6) Put another way, “In all the productions of nature and art what exists potentially is brought into entity [into being] only by that which is in actuality.”

84 Think of the second way noted above to discuss non-discursivity.
Hence, these passages confirm Aristotle’s claim regarding the priority of actuality.

The particular combinations of privation, then, with (1) priority of being, (2) priority of time, and (3) priority of account reveal the three not-beings in play here. First, matter in itself, or – what logically amounts to the same – the hypokeimenon, is absent compared to the present form matter combination which constitutes the perceived substance. Second, privation in itself as destruction is absence as not-being, i.e. the no longer being present of the already absent hypokeimenon. This is privation from proximate to remote to unqualified passing-away. Third, in so far as potentiality is predicated of apprehended substance as inapprehensible, then potentiality is an intellectual product rationally constructed to indicate absence. Though the opposition involved is logical, and the supposition involved is rational, still the lack of correspondence between physicality and logic highlights the idea of potentiality as lacking being in comparison with actuality. This is like the difference between all maps and the territory they are supposed to describe. Every map qua map is not – is different than – the territory. In sum, the three terms involved here are: potency, annihilation, and intellectual identification. Furthermore, intellectual identification, as I have been gesturing above, is opposed to identification through perceptual apprehension. This is further confirmed in Aristotle’s comments from Metaphysics Book IX §9 and §10:

“Potentiality is discovered from actuality (and therefore it is by an act of construction that people acquire the knowledge) [my emphasis].” (Meta 1995, 1051a29-1051a33)

Hence, “The terms ‘being’ and ‘non-being’ are employed firstly with reference to the

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categories, and secondly with reference to the potentiality or actuality of these or their opposites.” (Meta 1995, 1051a34-36)

§33 Aristotle v. Zeno – Lastly, then, Aristotle’s attack on Zeno both completes his attack on the Eleatic understanding of non-being and sheds further light on the ontological lack assigned to counting and time.³⁷ (Cf. IL 969a27-33) What, then, is Zeno’s contribution to the Eleatic reading of non-being? As Plato put it in the Parmenides, on the one hand, “Can something that is in some state not be so, without changing from that state? – It cannot.” (Parm 162b-c) On the other hand, “So everything of the sort we’ve described, which is both so and not so, signifies a change. … And a change is a motion.”(Parm 162b-c) Hence, “if it is nowhere among the things that are –as it isn’t, if in fact it is not – it couldn’t travel from one place to another.” (Parm 162c-d) In this way, Zeno’s puzzle is presented here as: Change and motion are supposed to involve non-being; but if an object is not being, then the object cannot change or be in motion. Hence, there can either be no non-being, or there can be no change and motion.

This as Zeno suggests at the beginning of the dialog is the way he hopes to defend the Parmenidean notion that all is one. (Cf. Parm 128d) If you hope to save plurality over oneness, then you must have some account of not-being – this one is not that one – so as to account for plurality, but if you believe in not-being, then you must reject change and motion. Notice, this is perfectly reasonable, if there is no object, i.e. the object is not, then the object cannot be in motion or be changing. Aristotle resolves this puzzle with his idea of potentiality, and, this is yet another way you can see his idea of potentiality in his attempt to say what is not, i.e. solve the problem of non-being.

Aristotle advertises *Physics* VIII, §8, as a solution to Zeno’s paradox of motion, and paraphrases “Zeno’s argument” in the following way:

> before any distance can be traversed half the distance must be traversed, that these half-distances are infinite in number, and that it is impossible to traverse distances infinite in number … in the time during which a motion is in progress we should first count the half-motion for every half-distance that we get, so that we have the result that when the whole distance is traversed we have counted an infinite number, which is admittedly impossible. (Phys 1995, 263a5-263a10)

Aristotle indicates he has solved the apparent perplexity here because, “we put forward a solution to this difficulty turning on the fact that the period of time contains within itself an infinite number of units.” (Phys 1995, 263a11) Now, at this point, neither his paraphrase of Zeno’s argument nor his solution seem to have much to do with the problem of non-being. However, both of these relations become apparent as soon as Aristotle discusses motion in terms of potentiality. According to Aristotle,

> In the act of dividing the continuous distance into two halves one point is treated as two, since we make it a beginning and an end; and *this same result is produced by the act of counting* halves as well as by the act of dividing into halves. But if divisions are made in this way, neither the distance nor the motion will be continuous; for motion if it is to be continuous must relate to what is continuous; and though what is continuous contains an infinite number of halves, they are not *actual* but *potential* halves. If he makes the halves actual, he will get not a continuous but an intermittent motion [my emphases]. (Phys 1995, 263a23-30)

Notice, then, “what is continuous” is “potential,” and as potential, it is infinite. The two aspects brought to the fore here are notions of positionality and variability in measurement. Just as the referential content of “two minutes from now” depends upon when you read it, so does the placement of concreteness or the determination of a unit

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depend on what one measures.\textsuperscript{89} And, this is precisely how counting pertains to not-being.

Jacob Klein in his \textit{Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra} poses the question provocatively:

\begin{quote}
The continual practice of counting and calculation gradually fosters within us that familiarity with numbers and their relations which Plato terms ‘arithmetic and logistic art’ (\(\text{ἀριθμητική λογιστική [τέχνη]}\)) which enables us to execute any operation of counting or calculating we wish. But those numbers which we have at our disposal \textit{before} we begin counting or calculating and which must clearly be independent of the particular things which happen to undergo counting – of \textit{what} are these the numbers? [Klein’s emphases]\textsuperscript{90}\end{quote}

That these numbers lack being enables them to be used in the manner of “Zeno’s argument” noted above. Each determination of a now is a counting, and therefore not an actual continuity.\textsuperscript{91} \textit{It is not time which persists but the persistence that is counted which is time}. This persisting subject is, of course, the \(\text{ὑποκείμενον}\), i.e. \textit{hypokeimenon}.

However, recall that the logical structure of the justification of time as potentiality is the same as that in the justification for the existence of the \(\text{ὑποκείμενον}\). Looking at potential, then, whether as measurement, or ground of being is like looking through a Platonic Idea at what is not (an Idea). Yet, as Aristotle’s apparatus of privation, priority, and analogical reasoning show, it certainly is a rational construction as supposition which is accounting for these not-beings in Aristotle.

\textit{§34 Priority & Privation} – In conclusion, in this section I have shown the mistaken way in which Aristotle resolves the problem of non-being. Since for Aristotle it

\textsuperscript{89} Cf. “‘One’ evidently means measure.” (Meta 1088a14)
is by way of privation from the priority of an entity’s being that you can analogically think its not-being, analogically posited not-being, such as potentiality, is taken as that which allows for change – Parmenides trampled. Similarly despite Socrates’ changes in appearance, Socrates as a specimen of substance is supposed to persist. Here focal meaning of predication coincides with subject persisting through change to account for “how” the individual who was Socrates in youth is still Socrates in middle age, despite changes. In this way, a difference between a substantial and a non-substantial change emerges, and substantial change involving the greater privation is taken to be non-being.

Despite the implicit critique, then, that Aristotle’s apparatus functions like a reverse engineered *post hoc* justification – as if saying, “it is through analogy that I constructed this, therefore its analogical reasoning is its justification” – Aristotle’s resolution to the problem of non-being contains even greater faults. As the previous section showed, Aristotle is not working on the problem of non-being as found in Plato’s *Sophist*. And, as this section showed, Aristotle’s apparatus, as logical, fails to indicate a non logical negation of being. In this way, Aristotle’s reading of non-being collapses the Non-being, Becoming, Being triad from Socrates’ *Republic* Book V exchange with Glaucon, noted previously, into Being and Becoming with not-being to account for change. As a result, it is an unqualified change, i.e. destruction, which he mistakenly posited as a solution to the problem of non-being, since otherwise there is only being and becoming. Having, on the one hand, just examined not-being as it relates to priority in being as Aristotle’s resolution to the problem of non-being, i.e. his response to Parmenides and Plato, and, on the other hand, just examined not-being as it relates to *time*.
as Aristotle’s response to Zeno, the next and final Aristotle section examines not-being as it relates to priority in *account*.

**Dialectic : Discovery :: Demonstration : Justification**

§35 *Aristotle & Priority of Logos, Dialectic v. Demonstration* – By the end of this section I would like for you to understand the difference between dialectic and demonstration according to Aristotle, in particular how they differ in regard to starting points. This difference is involved in each of the remaining thinkers to be discussed. I have already gestured toward stating this difference. However, this section constitutes an extended examination. As such, a number of the threads which I will tie together here have already been introduced. The primary thread for this section, then, is priority in account, and this is because demonstration and dialectic differ from one another in regard to the kind of account that is prior in each case. Roughly put, though both begin with assumptions, demonstration begins with axioms and dialectic begins with problems.

Demonstrations are taken to be pedagogical and pertain to providing justification for holding a belief or position. Dialectic is taken to be exploratory, in the sense of discovering first principles, through a process of organizing thought based on initial assumptions for the purpose of testing those assumptions. In this way, whereas deductive arguments are formulated in both demonstration and dialectic, induction is taken to pertain more to dialectic. Put another way, on the one hand, the ideas with which demonstrations begin are ideas taken to be somehow constitutive in regard to the beings demonstrated. That is, one’s demonstrations are successful because the ideas involved in the demonstration are correct in regard to the object of demonstration. On the other hand,
the ideas with which dialect begins are regulative. Because you are seeking to know, you organize your thinking by regulating the ideas with which you think. The final distinguishing difference between demonstration and dialectic which I will explore in this section is their different relations to experience.

Looking at the passages where Aristotle explicitly refers to the beginnings of demonstration and dialectic provides a better understanding of the difference involved. The relevance of a passage from the Prior Analytics requires it be quoted in full,

The premise of demonstration differs from the premise of dialectic in that the former is the assumption of one member of a pair of contradictory statements (since the demonstrator does not ask a question but makes an assumption), whereas the latter is an answer to the question which of two contradictory statements is to be accepted. This difference, however, will not affect the fact that in either case a syllogism results; for both the demonstrator and the interrogator draw a syllogistic conclusion by first assuming that some predicate applies or does not apply to some subject. (Pr An 23b24-24a34)

This passage supports my claim above that both demonstration and dialectic begin with assumptions. It also supports my claim that dialectic begins with problems or questions. In regard to demonstration, then, on the one hand, “hypotheses are the origins of demonstrations.” (Meta 1995, 1013a16) On the other hand, “By the starting points of demonstration I mean the common beliefs, on which all men base their proofs.” (Meta 1995, 996b26-30) That is, “all demonstrative sciences use the axioms. … The axioms are most universal and are principles of all things [emphasis in Ross].” (Meta 1995, 997a10)

So, in attempting to better understand the starting points of demonstrations, there seems

to be some discrepancy regarding their status as assumptions.\textsuperscript{95} Approaching from a different set of quotes might help.

According to Aristotle in the \textit{Topics} a demonstration proceeds from premises which “are true and primitive, or are such that our knowledge of them has originally come through premises which are primitive and true.”\textsuperscript{96} (Top 100a26) Yet, “Dialectic does not construct its syllogisms out of any haphazard materials, such as the fancies of crazy people, but out of materials that call for discussion.” (Rhet 1356b35) In fact, “dialectic is a process of criticism wherein lies the path to the principles of all inquiries.” (Top 101b3-4) So, you can see that the starting ground for demonstration is to be more solid, so to speak, than dialectic. And, given the stronger language of the \textit{Topics}, why maintain that the principles with which demonstration begins are assumptions? Aristotle makes this clear in the \textit{Posterior Analytics} noting,

\begin{quote}
I call \textit{principles in each genus those which it is not possible to prove to be}. Now both what the primitives and what the things dependent on them signify \textit{is assumed}; but that they are \textit{must be assumed for the principles} and proved for the rest [my emphases]. (Post An 76a32-34)\textsuperscript{97}
\end{quote}

Hence, “it is impossible that there should be a demonstration of everything.” (Meta 1995, 1006a10) This helps clear up the relationship between dialectic and demonstration nicely because it is – as noted above – dialectic which provides the “principles of all inquiries.” So, the regulative use of ideas chosen “out of materials that call for discussion” helps to identify more solid starting points for demonstrations from principles which seem

\textsuperscript{95} The question which has appeared: Are the so called “axioms” as starting points of demonstration still assumptions?
\textsuperscript{97} Cf. \textit{Topics} (Top 101a26b4) and (Pr An 24b12-16).
adequate enough to be considered constitutive, i.e. indicative or demonstrative, of the materials in question.

In this way, a hypothesis is a proposition you assume for the purpose of demonstration. 88 And, as such, you can see how commentators, for example Jonathan Barnes, suggest demonstrations are ultimately pedagogical. Pointing to the more solid, axiomatic, beginnings of demonstration Barnes holds, “the theory of demonstrative science was never meant to guide or formalize scientific research; it is concerned exclusively with the teaching of facts already won”; moreover, “it does not describe how scientists do, or ought to, acquire knowledge; it offers a formal model of how teachers should present and impart knowledge [Barnes’ emphases].” 99 This last part of Barnes’ comment gestures toward the other distinction with which I compare demonstration and dialectic, i.e. the contexts of justification and discovery. 100 As Aristotle points out in the *Physics*,

> When the objects of an inquiry, in any department, have principles, causes, or elements, it is through acquaintance with these that knowledge and understanding is attained. … therefore, in the science of nature too our first task will be to try to determine what relates to its principles. The natural way to do this is to start from the things which are more knowable and clear to us and proceed toward those which are clearer and more knowable by nature. (Phys 1995, 184a10-17)

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100 There are a number of ways to reiterate this fundamental distinction between dialectic and demonstration. For example, Karl Popper (1902-1994) in the *Logic of Scientific Discovery* refers to “the distinction between the psychology of knowledge which deals with empirical facts, and the logic of knowledge which is concerned only with logical relations [Popper’s emphases].” Karl Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, Karl Popper, tr. (London: Routledge, 2002), 7. However, I prefer the terms context of discovery and the context of justification.
Commenting on this very passage, Wolfgang Wieland suggests, “In the context of inquiry into principles this means: we start with the thing which is already known to us, but which we wish to know with a knowledge derived from principles.”

Now I chose to quote Wieland not just to continue bolstering my appeal to the authority of various respected commentators, but also because his language broaches the topic of what is other than “knowing derived from principles.” Notice in the above passage with which Aristotle opened the *Physics*, his language points to the different starting points which seem to suggest either having or not having the principles required for demonstration. Given Aristotle’s emphasis earlier on priority in actuality and account, ignorance will turn out to be having the wrong or inappropriate first principles. (Post An 77b20-77b27) Even if your first principle is correct in one science, it may not function in another; for example, geometers are said not to concern themselves with whether shapes are good or evil. Again, dialectic, then, is required to organize thought so as to bring about appropriate first principles. If you cannot *justify*, then you seek to *discover* the first principles with which you can demonstrate knowledge.

§36 *Aristotle on justifying your discovery*  – As G.E.L. Owen (1922-1982) points out in his “Tithenai ta Phainomena,” dialectic begins with phenomena in that “phenomena” may refer to opinions or products of perception. So, on the one hand, dialectic may begin with opinions related to the material which calls for discussion. On the other hand, dialectic may begin with experience. The former road is that of logical
analysis of the propositions involved, e.g. “It is clear then that in every problem we must look to the … relations of the subject and predicate; for all deductions proceed through these.” (Pr An 44a36-7)¹⁰⁴ In regard to the latter road, then, “it is the business of experience to give the principles which belong to each subject.” (Pr An 46a24)

Now logical analysis can play a role in the former because it is possible to articulate a starting point for dialectic by reading your predecessors through a regulative idea. In other words a regulative idea may be used as a heuristic.¹⁰⁵ And, this is when the process of discovery resembles the process of invention. Recall, according to Aristotle in the Poetics,

> Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else; the transference being either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or on grounds of analogy [my emphasis].¹⁰⁶ (Poet 1457b6-9)

Further, “a good metaphor implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in dissimilars.” (Poet 1459a8-9) This makes Aristotle’s arsenal composed of causes, opposition, analogy, etc. even more comprehensible in that it contextualizes Aristotle’s efforts in regard to the invention and discovery of principles with which to secure knowledge for demonstration.¹⁰⁷

Consider for example, a celebrated passage from Aristotle’s De Anima,

> Suppose that the eye were an animal – sight would have been its soul, for sight is the substance of the eye which corresponds to the account [εἰ γὰρ ἦν ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς ἡ ἄνωθεν, ὅτι, ἵν ἀντι τοῦ διὰ οὐσία ὀφθαλμοῦ ἢ κατὰ τὸν λόγον], the eye being merely the matter of seeing.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. (Pr An 43a20-43a24) and (Pr An 46a6-46a9).
¹⁰⁵ Cf. (Post An 89b27); (Post An 89b36); (Post An 93a35).
when seeing is removed the eye is no longer an eye, except in name – no more than the eye of a statue or of a painted figure.\(^{108}\) (Anim 412b17-21)

First off, this is, of course, an analogy (the eye : sight :: living creature : soul). Yet, it is worth pausing on this term logos, i.e. \(\lambda \nu \gamma \omega \circ\). For example, Smith’s translation above renders \(\kappa \alpha \tau \alpha \; \tau \omega \nu \; \lambda \gamma \omega \nu\) as “corresponds to the account” and W.S. Hett’s Loeb translation has “in the sense of formula.”\(^{109}\) What you do not want to miss is that “logos” is a third, if you count eye and creature as one and two. So, once you grasp the analogy, for example, by starting from either the eye or the creature, you can later start from the logos by naming the ratio involved. For example, rather than ask, how does a dog relate to an eye, you can ask, “Does a dog have a soul?” On the one hand, you are using the term whose meaning the analogy has provided. On the other hand, the meaning of the term you are using is its ratio among the other terms in the analogy. In other words, you may use the idea of soul to regulate your thinking about entities such as dogs.\(^{110}\)

Moving now to an examination of the experiential gateway into dialectic, in Book II §2 of his \textit{De Anima} Aristotle suggests “what is clear and more familiar in account emerges from what in itself is confused but more observable by us.” (Anim 413a11)

And, “This brings us to the crucial distinction between the \textit{aestheta} and the \textit{noëta} in Greek, the \textit{sensibilia} and the \textit{intelligibilia} in Latin,”\(^{111}\) i.e. sensibility and intelligibility. To see how regulative ideas are at work here consider an example from Aristotle’s \textit{Metaphysics}. According to Aristotle, “some matter is perceptible and some intelligible … and intelligible matter is that which is present in perceptible things not qua


\(^{110}\) Cf. \textit{Metaphysics} (1046a9-15)

perceptible, i.e. the object of mathematics.” (Meta 1995, 1036a9-12) How something may be present, then, in a perceptible thing not by perception is through dialectic. That is, you make assumptions about the perceptible matter, say a perceived object, and depending upon how well these regulative ideas fit with what you already know, the ideas may be incorporated as further formative of the object’s identity – an intellectual identification.

Notice how this functions toward Aristotle’s attempt to overcome Gorgias. If apprehensible is perceptible, then intelligible – as opposed to perceptible – is Aristotle’s way of perceiving not-being, i.e. through a type of intellectual apprehension. Remember the idea involved here is an assumption. So, on the one hand, the idea itself is a kind of not-being akin to the manner in which counting is a not-being noted in regard to Zeno and time above. On the other hand, not-being as an idea derived from a type of logical opposition may be supposed in the perceived object as potentiality. To the extent the supposition fits with knowledge about the object – does it move?; does it change? – the potency of an object perceived may be credited to a kind of intellectual apprehension or identification, dependent upon intellect, which is not the apprehension of perception which Gorgias is taken to have had mind. It is, perhaps, actually easier just to follow the logic involved here. The logic which enables Aristotle’s move is modus tollens. Let A stand for apprehensible, and let P stand for perceptible. If P, then A. Not A, therefore not P. It may be said, then, that the principles detected intellectually relate to the object in a regulative way. As such, Aristotle may claim to have overcome Gorgias’ criterion of (perceptual) inapprehensibility – yet, to no avail for the problem of non-being.

§37 Aristotle’s solution to the problem of non-being – At this point the difference between the starting points of dialectic and demonstration should be clear, including the manner in which dialectic provides starting points for demonstration. To conclude, consider Aristotle’s response to the problem of non-being one more time. According to Aristotle, “Change from subject to non-subject is perishing [εἰς οὖχ ὑποχείμενον φθορά].” (Phys 1957, 225a17) The destruction of the ὑποχείμενον, i.e. hypokeimenon, is taken to be the extreme of privation which is, according to Aristotle, non-being. I have sufficiently argued the fact that the negation involved here is governed by Aristotle’s matrix of opposition. Moreover, as you should be able to see now: the extreme of privation is an assumption, the persistence of the ὑποχείμενον is an assumption, and potentiality as persisting indication of the ὑποχείμενον is an assumption. Further, the absence taken to indicate the presence of a persisting ὑποχείμενον amounts to an invention which Aristotle justifies through his analogical apparatus, etc. (Cf. Phys 195a)

Recall, according to Aristotle, “It is necessary, as we say, to presuppose for each thing that which is it potentially [my emphasis].” (Meta 1995, 1089b32) And, as one commentator put it, “The non-existent object can exist potentially (δυνάμει) … This account provides a reply to Parmenides’ rejection of non-being.”

Hence, “Potentiality is discovered from actuality (and therefore it is by an act of construction that people acquire the knowledge) [my emphases].” (Meta 1995, 1051a29-1051a33) And, it is from the above assumptions that Aristotle is able to conclude, “Thus perishing [destruction] is change to not-being.” (Phys 1995, 224b9) Again, the heavy logical hand of Aristotle’s demonstration of non-being misses the subtle problem in Plato’s Sophist. Hence,

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Aristotle arrived at “three senses of not-being,” i.e. potency, annihilation, and intellectual identification from his logical apparatus.

Aristotle’s *On Interpretation* comment now seems predictably (logically) prescient, “Perhaps, indeed, the necessary and not necessary are first principles of everything’s either being or not being, and one should look at the others as following from these.”

To sum, in his attack on Parmenides, Aristotle moved from (a) being and unity or the one to (b) plurality to (c) individuals in plurality to (d) the way in which individuals are thought about to (e) the way in which you think about negation, and in combining (d) and (e) he constructed his attempt to solve the problem of non-being, or rather, provide a *demonstration* of non-being.

Introductory Summary

The above should constitute an “introduction” to the problem of non-being. As you move through the dissertation, then, remember the criteria stated for the solution of the problem by Plato in the *Sophist*. You should remember the different starting points for dialectic. I will focus on the topic of dialectic specifically in the chapter after Kant. This topic permeates the dissertation. To this end, the distinction between regulative and constitutive ideas – which truly will not reach its zenith of formalization until Kant – will also factor largely in later discussions regarding non-discursivity. Be sure to remember how I use “not-being” to signify logical not or negation, as opposed to non-being. And, as I move through the chapter on Kant, you will recognize the manner in which he seems to be following the suggestion of Gorgias toward arriving at non-being. Both of the chapters dealing with Derrida and Deleuze will refer back to both Plato and Aristotle

from this Introduction. What I have above referred to as the “dependency of reckoning” thesis, or the manner in which discerning being depends on solving the problem of non-being, will be returned to in the chapter on Deleuze and at the end of the dissertation.

Ultimately, there are two aspects which Kant, Hegel, Derrida, and Deleuze all mistakenly adopt from Aristotle. The first is Aristotle’s paradigm shift. This, of course, will not be fully clear until you are reading about it in the following chapters. Given the peculiarity of Kant’s position, he, again, will come closest to escaping Aristotle’s shifting of the problem. However, and this brings me to the second aspect adopted by these thinkers from Aristotle, Kant’s belief in the priority of imagination in regard to memory kept him from escaping Aristotle’s paradigm. I will briefly discuss the origin of imagination’s priority in Aristotle in the next chapter. Yet, given the structural overhaul Kant provides to Aristotle’s thought, the issue is really with Kant and no longer with Aristotle regarding imagination and memory.

To sum, the next chapter is concerned to articulate Kant’s attempt to solve the problem of non-being, and also to make clear Kant’s structure of experience. This is important because it is with – as is consistent with Gorgias’ suggestion – Kant’s novel structure of experience that he advances upon a solution to the problem. The chapter after Kant is concerned to explicate two formal and mistaken approaches to the problem of non-being. First, I provide a formal logical reading of negation toward illustrating the manner in which formal logic fails to solve the problem. In essence I have already made this claim above in regard to ἐναρτίον, etc. However, I will briefly take some space at the beginning of chapter after Kant to explicitly support this claim. Possibly a large barrier for many people, unfortunately, is that they – following Aristotle’s Metaphysics – might
try to read me as if I am denying the principle of non-contradiction. I am not. Rather, I am giving to the principle of non-contradiction, what belongs to the principle of non-contradiction. I do not think the principle of non-contradiction is God. Without lapsing into a less rigorous way of expression, I would like to say being – as revealed by non-being – exceeds the jurisdiction of the principle of non-contradiction.

Given the influence, reminiscent of the provocation to discuss Aristotle, of Hegel, I will also explicitly discuss Hegel in regard to dialectic and non-being after the chapter on Kant. On the one hand, the Hegel Kant combination is much like the Aristotle Plato combination. Hence, many of those who adopt or address the views of Kant or Plato – such as Derrida and Deleuze – do so by way of Hegel or Aristotle, respectively. On the other hand, Hegel offers a response to the problem of non-being, and it is fruitful to recognize how it both fails to solve the problem and yet is influential. Chapters 4 and 5 are concerned to articulate the accounts given by Derrida and Deleuze, respectively, of pure difference. I will also examine comments made by Derrida and Deleuze specifically in regard to non-being. I will briefly sum and conclude the chapters of Part 1 before beginning Part 2. Part 2 will contain its own much briefer Introduction. Suffice to say here that, following the title of the dissertation, Part 1 is concerned with non-being, and Part 2 is concerned with memory. Further, in Part 2, I will present a reading of multiple findings from contemporary memory research. I will conclude the dissertation connecting Part 2 with Part 1, explicitly critiquing pure difference in Derrida and Deleuze, and presenting my solution to the problem of non-being.
“Plato employed the expression ‘Idea’ in such a way that we can readily see he understood by it something that not only could never be borrowed from the senses, but that even goes far beyond the concepts of the understanding … our reason, however, now no longer finds itself in its original state, but must laboriously recall the old, now much obscured, ideas through a recollection (which is called philosophy).”

~Immanuel Kant

“The inaccuracy of scales used for commercial measurements, according to civil law, is discovered, if we let the merchandise and the weights exchange pans. So the partiality of the scales of reason is revealed by the same trick…”

~Immanuel Kant

“The pleasure of believing what we see is boundless, as we wish our souls to be…”

~Percy Bysshe Shelley

Chapter Two: Non-Being and the Thing-in-itself

Introduction and Justification for Chapter 2 Sections and Objectives

“There is a saying among philosophers, ‘You can philosophize with Kant or against Kant, but you cannot philosophize without him.’” In the spirit of this famous Lewis White Beck quote, I begin here with Immanuel Kant. And, the specificity of my purpose for invoking Kant precludes the involvement of the entire Kantian oeuvre. Specifically, then, this chapter regarding Kant contains three main sections which correspond to the three aspects I will discuss from the “A” and “B” editions of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason [Kritik der reinen Vernunft] (1781/1787) – Kant’s “Copernican revolution,” the structure of experience, and the thing-in-itself. In the Preface of the B edition Kant divides his Copernican revolution into two parts. Generally speaking, the three parts of the Critique of Pure Reason just noted which I discuss in this chapter pertain to Kant’s Copernican revolution itself, its first part, and its second part respectively. Also, I have

added a brief section for the sake of explicating an important principle for reading Kant. I refer to this principle as the principle of perspective within Kant’s system.

Concerning the problem of non-being, after Plato and Aristotle Kant is the thinker whom I credit most with changing the way the problem is understood. In other words, Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* provides a sophisticated vocabulary and a unique structure of experience with which to engage the problem of non-being. In particular, the two distinctions, derived from Kant, which provide a new vista to the problem of non-being are the discursive/non-discursive and experiential/conceptual distinctions.120 These distinctions are, of course, intimately connected to both Kant’s articulation of the structure of experience and his discussion of the thing-in-itself. Together Kant’s structure of experience and his two innovative distinctions provide a unique understanding of what may be called the “ground of experience.” This concerns me because I believe the ground of experience is the key to solving the problem of non-being.

Kant presents an interesting case in the history of Western philosophy because – as I will show in this chapter – Kant’s structure of experience yields his innovative distinctions by providing a new way of accounting for order and change in experience. Central to his account of experience is the role he attributes to imagination. Yet, ultimately, I see Kant’s privileging of imagination as at the cost of properly depicting the role of memory in the structure of experience. Whereas, imagination receives the status of a “condition for the possibility of experience,” memory is depicted as solely in the service of imagination. Hence, imagination has a constitutive role, and memory does not.

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120 Ultimately it is fair to credit Kant with these innovations because they derive from his Copernican Revolution.
For Kant memory is solely a concern for empirical psychology. So, whereas Kant’s structure of experience and the distinctions which derive from it advance significantly toward solving the problem of non-being, his privileging of imagination at the cost of memory kept him from solving the problem. Rather, resulting from the central role he attributes to imagination, and perhaps still under the spell of Aristotle’s paradigm shift, Kant was led to wrongly posit the thing-in-itself as his solution to the problem of non-being. Similarly, thinkers in Kant’s wake who adopt his structure of experience suffer the same ontological commitments from which Kant posits the thing-in-itself.

In this chapter, then, I will discuss Kant’s innovative distinctions and his privileging of imagination within the wider discussion of his parts of the Copernican revolution – the structure of experience and the thing-in-itself. However, by the end of this chapter I will not have fully shown the role I attribute to memory in the structure of experience. Given the complexity of memory’s involvement in experience, I devote the entirety of the chapter after Derrida and Deleuze to memory. Though by the end of this chapter, I will have presented an outlining sketch of the role I attribute to memory by discussing Kant’s structure of experience. Further, my claim that the Kantian structure of experience which privileges imagination should be recast with a more potent and vibrant role for memory should be supported by this chapter, and by the end of the dissertation my recasting of the structure of experience in light of contemporary memory research should fully show the role I attribute to memory. Ultimately this recasting of the structure of experience precludes the misguided ontological commitments which lead to various versions of the thing-in-itself.
Before proceeding with my discussion of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, a few comments should be made by way of disclaimer. In 1993, echoing a claim already made by Karl Ameriks in 1982, Günter Zöller states, “Over the past twenty-five years, scholarship on Kant has taken on colossal proportions, effectively defying summary assessment and manageable presentation.” Yet, and in fact, there is not to be found a concise summary of the structure of experience in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. However, what is most important by way of disclaimer is the realization that there will always be various strategies and alternative readings available in regard to the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Commentators have written from two volumes on the first half of the *Critique* to two quite different editions of a book on one thesis in the *Critique* to a seventeen page article on one word which Kant uses in the *Critique* to an almost five hundred page book on the shortest section of the *Critique*, etc. Given that my purpose for invoking Kant is primarily confined to his structure of experience, I set out to show salient alternative readings only when textual support from Kant is wanting or when – even with textual support – the issue’s complexity requires I show alternative readings for the sake of explication. This is my method for presenting Kant in light of the colossal nature of the secondary literature.

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Regarding translations of Kant’s German *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, I am consulting my German editions, the Norman Kemp Smith, the Werner S. Pluhar, and the Paul Guyer translations. As such, there is really only one German term I need to comment on at the outset, i.e. “Erkenntnis.”\(^1\) Whereas Kemp Smith translates this term as “knowledge,” Pluhar and Guyer translate the term as “cognition.” Moreover, the German term “Wissen,” which also appears in the *Critique*, is translated as “knowledge” by all three translators. The author of *A Kant Dictionary*, Howard Caygill, preferring the translation of *Erkenntnis* into “cognition” notes, “Cognition is with occasional exceptions (such as CPR A 69/B 94) distinguished from both knowledge and thinking.”\(^2\)

Though it is now standard to translate *Erkenntnis* in Kant as cognition instead of knowledge,\(^3\) the issue is more complicated than just a swapping of terms. For one thing, as Karl Ameriks points out, there are times when it is appropriate to translate *Erkenntnis* as knowledge.\(^4\) According to Ameriks, the business of translating *Erkenntnis* must be understood with “the proviso” “in German the correlates for ‘knowledge’ here, [quoting Kant at (B 147)] viz., ‘Erfahrung’ and ‘Erkenntnis,’ function more like our term ‘cognitive state,’ since they can be false, although their standard form is to purport to be true.”\(^5\) Further, Rolf George, consulting a dictionary from 1793, 

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1. I follow the standard of reading “Vorstellung” as “representation,” and I thereby modify the translation by Pluhar who, as opposed to Kemp Smith and Guyer, translates *Vorstellung* as “presentation.”
suggests in his “Vorstellung and Erkenntnis in Kant,”\textsuperscript{133} the verb form of Erkenntnis, i.e. “erkennen” “may be translated as ‘to come to know’ or ‘to know’.\textsuperscript{134} Yet, some commentators such as Rudolf A. Makkreel and Predrag Cicovacki suggest the English term “knowledge” should be reserved for cognition of a higher sort, i.e. “cognition that has attained certainty by being part of a rational system.”\textsuperscript{135}

As I shall discuss below, there are multiple species of cognition in the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}. For example, a particular cognition may be an intuition or a concept, and a concept may be empirical or pure. Further, the experience of an object is equivalent to having a determinate cognition of the object, and will count as knowledge of the object. In this way, my strategy will be to look at the context in which the term \textit{Erkenntnis} is being used, and if the term refers to cognition in the specific sense equivalent to having a determinate cognition of the object, then I will read \textit{Erkenntnis} along with Kemp Smith as “knowledge.” Otherwise, I follow Pluhar and Guyer in reading \textit{Erkenntnis} as “cognition.” Moreover, I will often show the German text when quoting Kant. It is ultimately my hope that by the end of the chapter, the specificity of my purpose for delving into the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}, and the clarity of my discussion will preclude the significant confusion which might otherwise result from the complex issues to consider in translating the German term \textit{Erkenntnis}.

\textsuperscript{134} George, “Vorstellung and Erkenntnis,” 34.
Kant’s “Copernican Revolution” is a Regulative Idea

“[T]he soul is in a way all existing things.”
~Aristotle (Anim 431b20)

Though Kant himself did not refer to his project as a “Copernican revolution,”\textsuperscript{136} it is customary to speak of, and begin with, his Copernican revolution, or his Copernican turn, in philosophy.\textsuperscript{137} So, I will use the customary quotation from Kant on the way to an articulation of his structure of experience. According to Kant,

> It has been previously assumed\textsuperscript{138} that all our knowledge must conform to objects. \textit{[Bisher nahm man an, alle unsere Erkenntnis müsse sich nach den Gegenständen richten;]}

> But all attempts to extend our knowledge of objects by establishing something in regard to them a priori, by means of concepts, have, on this assumption, ended in failure. \textit{[aber alle Versuche über sie a priori etwas durch Begriffe auszumachen, wodurch unsere Erkenntnis erweitert würde, gingen unter dieser Voraussetzung zu nichts.]}\textsuperscript{139}

> We must therefore make trial whether we may not have more success in the tasks of metaphysics, if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge. This would agree better with what is desired, namely, that it should be possible to have knowledge of objects a priori, determining something in regard to them prior to their being given. We should then be proceeding precisely on the lines of Copernicus' primary hypothesis. Failing of satisfactory progress in explaining the movements of the heavenly bodies on the supposition that they all revolved round the spectator, he tried whether he might not have better success if he made the spectator to revolve and the stars to remain at rest. A similar experiment can be tried in metaphysics, as regards the intuition of objects.\textsuperscript{140} (CPR 1996, B xvi)

\textsuperscript{138} Notice, this is suggesting a different assumption with which to begin (dialectic), i.e. a different regulative idea.
\textsuperscript{140} Translation slightly modified.
The suggestion with which the Kant quote begins is that pre-Kantian thinkers assumed (human) cognition and thereby (human) knowledge must conform to the way objects are. To put this in the singular: to know an object is for your knowledge to conform to what the object *is*. Being precedes knowing. The “failure” of this assumption, according to Kant, is that no amount of experience can make the connection between knowing and being a necessary one. Analogously, this is the perennial problem discussed when contrasting induction and deduction. Though you may have experienced myriad swans, all of which were black, it neither follows that *all* swans are black nor that the next swan you experience will be black.

In the larger discussion of metaphysics this concern may be characterized in terms of the relationship between order, change, and experience. The relationship between order and change may be thought through the cosmological distinction between the eternal and the perishable; the ontological distinction between the necessary and the contingent; or, the logical distinction between the analytic and the synthetic.\(^{141}\) That is, since, necessity is a requirement for knowledge. If it is not necessarily the case that the next swan you experience will be black, then – despite past experience – you do not *know* that swans are black. You may certainly think or infer that the next swan you experience will be black. Or you may harbor the opinion that all swans are black, but without awareness of a necessity involved, you do not know. As evidenced by skeptical concerns such as those found in the writings of David Hume,\(^{142}\) pre-Kant’s Copernican revolution, the way of thinking about order, change, and experience leaves a gap between necessity


and experience. In other words, if there is necessary order beyond changing experience, then how is one to become aware of the necessity? What inside of experience shows that there is order outside of experience? Or as Kant once put it, “How am I to understand the fact that, because something is, something else is?” (NM 239) Since, “Experience does indeed tell us what is, but not that it must necessarily be so and not otherwise,” (CPR 1996, A 1) experience is in danger of turning out to be inductive, and all deduction in danger of resting on induction. Changes in experience may lead you to use the words “cause” and “effect,” but this does not mean that the cosmos is ordered by cause and effect. Without an Archimedean point of necessity, the proposition that “being precedes experience,” from which is derived the proposition “being precedes knowing,” are both nothing more than opinions.

Kant’s Copernican revolution begins, then, by supposing objects must conform to “our knowledge [Erkenntnis].” This performs what Henry Allison refers to as “a ‘paradigm shift’ from a theocentric to an anthropocentric model [of thinking]” which he unpacks as “also a shift from an intuitive to a discursive conception of cognition” and “a shift in our understanding of what counts as knowing.”¹⁴³ Kant, then, locates the necessity required for knowledge in the logical necessity of general or formal logic. He takes general logic to “correspond quite precisely with the division of the higher faculties of cognition.” (CPR 1998, A 131/B 169) In this way, Kant has located the Archimedean point as a point within the mind, and because this necessity involved derives from general logic, Kant is able to speak of “our” knowledge. Logic as the ground of understanding means a universality of understanding akin to logical validity. This is an attractive aspect of Kant’s project. Yet, the resulting ontology is often too much for theorists to admit,

¹⁴³ Henry E. Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, xv-xvi.
and Kant’s solutions get passed over. That is to say, with the Copernican revolution it is necessarily the case that the propositions “being precedes experience” and “being precedes knowing” are merely opinions, i.e. they cannot be based on experience. Hence, an examination of Kant’s structure of experience is needed to explore its ontological commitments and identify the aspects of the mind responsible for these commitments. It is my claim that Kant’s structure of experience results in an ontology which came closest in the history of Western philosophy to solving the problem of non-being.

Kant’s relation to his predecessors – especially that of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz – is well documented. In fact, Kant himself suggested that “the Critique of Pure Reason might well be the true apology for Leibniz, even against those disciples [of Leibniz] who heap praises upon him.” Despite avowed differences the following quote from Leibniz is strikingly similar to Kant’s quote above which announces his Copernican revolution.

[N]othing enters our minds naturally from outside, and it is a bad habit of ours to think as if our souls received some messenger species or had gates and windows. We have all the forms in our minds, for all time even, because the mind always expresses all its future thoughts, and already thinks confusedly everything it will ever think distinctly. Nothing could be taught us whose idea was not already present in our minds as the matter from which this thought was formed. That is what Plato understood so well when he put...


forward his doctrine of reminiscence [i.e. anamnesis, recollection].\textsuperscript{146} Beyond Leibniz’s locating “all the forms” in the mind, his similar sounding declaration to that of Kant’s Copernican revolution begins and ends with references to memory. On the one hand, Leibniz seems to suggest a habit of thinking may be responsible for false notions regarding the soul, and this notion in itself is reminiscent of a statement by Nicolas Malebranche who held that “when we reason, the memory acts; and where there is memory, there can be error.”\textsuperscript{147} On the other hand, Leibniz seems to suggest Plato’s theory of recollection, which Kant explicitly refers to as the activity of “philosophy” itself, (CPR 1998, A 313/B 370) might be thought of along the lines of what contemporary memory research refers to as spreading activation and elaboration.\textsuperscript{148} That is, suspending judgment on any notion of innateness in Leibniz’s work, his movement of Plato’s forms into the mind and the subsequent attempt to work out a theory of memory is not only viable but intimately related to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason beyond even his Copernican revolution.

Arthur Schopenhauer’s (1788-1860) homage to Kant’s Copernican revolution helps indicate the ontological commitments resulting from such a revolution. In his The World as Will and Representation [Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung], Schopenhauer declares,

“The world is my representation”: this is a truth valid with reference to every living and knowing being, although man alone can bring it into reflective, abstract consciousness. If he really does so, philosophical discernment has dawned on

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{148} To the best of my knowledge no contemporary memory researchers – or anyone else for that matter – make this connection or claim. However, I am not incorrectly applying their technical terminology here.
\end{flushright}
him. It then becomes clear and certain to him that he does not know a sun and an earth, but only an eye that sees a sun, a hand that feels an earth; that the world around him is there only as representation, in other words, only in reference to another thing, namely that which represents, and this is himself. If any truth can be expressed a priori, it is this; for it is the statement of that form of all possible and conceivable experience, a form that is more general than all others, than time, space, and causality, for all these presuppose it.149 (WWI 3)

Thinking of Leibniz’s “all the forms” in the mind as forms of “all possible experience” Kant’s Copernican revolution, beyond epistemologically establishing the inseparability of perception from conception, established an epistemologically enclosed ontology. What I mean is that for Kant in order to experience an object there must be an object to experience. Yet, object formation necessarily requires the process of conforming to concepts such as – those Schopenhauer notes – space, time, and causality such that without these concepts the object would not be as such. Kant’s ontology, or his “Metaphysics of all metaphysics,”150 as he called it, is further perplexing in that it is the “end of metaphysics” which is supposed to derive from Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and specifically his Copernican revolution. On the one hand, then, it seems contradictory to speak of Kant’s ontology or ontological commitments. On the other hand, what I mean by Kant’s ontology, by way of his ontological commitments, is precisely the reconciling of the metaphysics of metaphysics with the end of metaphysics.

Upon completing the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant wrote a letter to his friend Marcus Herz stating, “This sort of investigation will always remain

difficult, for it includes the metaphysics of metaphysics.”¹⁵¹ It was, of course, in the second edition Preface that Kant formulated the initial assumption of the Critique in relation to Copernicus, and it is in the subsequent paragraph to the announcement of the Copernican revolution that Kant mentions the end of metaphysics in conjunction with “things in themselves.” In this subsequent paragraph, then, Kant deems the Copernican revolution a success (CPR B xviii) and divides the Copernican revolution into two parts. The first part includes the notion that objects must conform to our concepts (CPR B xix), and Kant declares the second part to indicate “that with this power to cognize a priori we shall never be able to go beyond the boundary of possible experience, even though doing so is precisely the most essential concern.” (CPR 1996, B xix-xx) Further, this second part is where Kant first mentions the thing-in-itself in relation to the Copernican revolution stating, “our rational cognition applies only to appearances, and leaves the thing in itself uncognized by us.” (CPR 1996, B xx) These indications of Kant’s ontological commitments culminate in Kant’s restatement of the Copernican revolution in terms of the thing-in-itself:

Suppose, now, we find that the unconditioned cannot be thought at all without contradiction if we assume that our experiential cognition conforms to objects as things in themselves, yet that the contradiction vanishes if we assume that our representation of things, as these are given to us, does not conform to them as things in themselves, but that these objects are, rather, appearances that conform to our way of representing. Suppose that we find, consequently, that the unconditioned is not to be met with in things insofar as we are acquainted with them… but is to be met with in them insofar as we are not… [First two emphases Kant’s; last emphasis mine]. (CPR 1996, B xx)

There are three ways to extradite Kant’s ontological commitments here, and only the third reconciles the metaphysics of metaphysics with the end of metaphysics.

¹⁵¹ Immanuel Kant, “[Letter:] To Marcus Herz, after May 11, 1781,” 181.
These three are: First, perhaps spatial and temporal properties are instantiated in the mind by concepts, but also are properties of things-in-themselves. In this way, perhaps the properties of things-in-themselves cause their instantiation in the mind. As a general statement this interpretation may be attributed to Adolf Trendelenburg\textsuperscript{152} (1802-1872). Second, perhaps things-in-themselves, at least, contain primary properties of space and time, and the secondary properties are added as \textit{a priori} concepts from categories of the understanding. In this way, space and time may be thought in the thing-in-itself without attributing causation to it. Both of these strategies for distinguishing between Kant’s epistemology and ontology attribute being beyond physical experience, i.e. they contain metaphysical claims. Moreover both of these strategies negate what has been gained by the Copernican revolution.

The first strategy denies the stalemate in metaphysics to which Hume responded and which prompted Kant’s \textit{Critique of Pure Reason} in the first place, and the second strategy turns Immanuel Kant into John Locke. To suppose either of these strategies to be correct is to suggest there was never a reason, historical or otherwise, for the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason} to be written. The third strategy, then, posits the thing-in-itself as some version of non-being, i.e. \textit{the thing-in-itself is posited as the solution to the problem of non-being}. Only this strategy resonates with the Copernican revolution. This is neither a negative theology of the thing-in-itself nor an attribution of any properties whatsoever to the thing-in-itself. Rather, Kant is faced with following problem: All that is is known through experience by conforming to concepts of cognition. Beyond concepts of

cognition, i.e. the uncognized, being cannot be attributed, i.e. it cannot be said that it is or that things are. Hence, Kant is ontologically committed to attribute being to that which can be experienced, and to deny being to what is beyond concepts of cognition.

Otherwise, he takes the position of either of the first two strategies above and his Copernican revolution becomes internally inconsistent. Furthermore, the third strategy reconciles the end of metaphysics with the metaphysics of metaphysics by solely doing epistemology, and in allowing the epistemological stance to close the book on metaphysics through its ontological commitments alone by making the negative metaphysical claim precluding other metaphysical claims. Put another way, by epistemologically enclosing ontology, positive ontological claims become epistemological claims, and negative ontological claims derive from one epistemological question: *What is non-being?* In sum, working on what Kant referred to as the problem of the unconditioned and the uncognized, Kant attempted to solve the problem of non-being by positing the thing-in-itself.

Now those who rarely adventure away from the cavernous depth of focusing on merely one thinker, and those who rarely focus at all might think that these questions – such as “what is non-being?” – are of little import to the world, i.e. the grating and derogatory claim that they are merely “academic.” However, this could not be further from the truth. On the contrary, it was a peculiar prejudice of the early twentieth century to distinguish sharply between the thinking of the practitioners of physical science and the thinking of philosophers, i.e. philosophers of science and philosophers of mind, psychology, religion, etc. By the end of the twentieth century, the news had finally
reached the majority that one could no longer sharply distinguish between theory and practice.

Similarly, and thankfully, even the distinction between analytic and continental philosophers in the twenty-first century seems to be merely nominal or a matter of taste. In other words, as Tom Rockmore articulates it in his book, *In Kant’s Wake: Philosophy in the twentieth century*, directly and indirectly “the complicated development of twentieth-century philosophy … can largely be understood as a series of reactions to Kant.”

In fact, Albert Einstein (1879-1955), Niels Bohr (1885-1962), Erwin Schrödinger (1887-1961), Werner Heisenberg (1901-1976), and Kurt Gödel (1906-1978) avowedly take Kant as their point of departure, and quantum physics itself may be characterized as a concern to establish an interrogation site – post the Copernican turn – at the limits of what can be experienced.

In Gödel’s own words, “the agreement described between certain consequences of modern physics and a doctrine that Kant set up 150 years ago in contradiction both to common sense and to the physicists and

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156 Philip Clayton, “Philosophy of Science and the German Idealists,” *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, 14.3, (1997), 287-304; Here, Schrödinger even references Kant’s Copernican revolution noting Kant is responsible for: “I see my tree and you see yours (remarkably like mine), and what the tree in itself is we do not know.” Erwin Schrödinger, *What is Life? and Mind and Matter*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 89.


philosophers of his time, is greatly surprising.”\textsuperscript{160} And, as Carsten Held notes, “the key idea of Kant’s epistemology” can be found “throughout Bohr’s works … Bohr, therefore, independently reproduces Kant’s Copernican turn toward transcendental idealism. And this turn is the more remarkable as it is not initiated by philosophical reflection, but provoked by the problems of quantum theory.”\textsuperscript{161} Hence, in the twentieth century while some philosophers were busy bickering in regard to their team names, i.e. analytic v. continental,\textsuperscript{162} other philosophers in Kant’s wake were busy building atomic bombs.\textsuperscript{163} Certainly these questions are not merely “academic.”

“[R]efusing to sit still and be measured … as if the atom were an impulsive thing,”\textsuperscript{164} Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, published in 1927, Bohr’s notion of complementarity, formulated in 1927, and Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, published in 1931, in many ways reflect the undecidability associated with the thing-in-itself.\textsuperscript{165} As H.J. Paton asks in his commentary on the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason},

The development of physics forces on our minds the contrast between appearance and reality, between the world as it seems to common sense and the world as it is to the scientific observer. This in turn gives rise to further reflections. If what is obviously real to common sense becomes mere appearance to the deeper insight of the scientist, may there not be a still deeper insight to which the real as known by the scientist is merely the appearance of a reality beyond?\textsuperscript{166}


\textsuperscript{166} Herbert James Paton \textit{Kant’s Metaphysic of Experience}, vol. 1, (Virginia: Thoemmes Press, 1997), 68.
From these Kantian concerns developed by the physicists, the relationship between observation and evidence, i.e. a different understanding of the meaning of the inseparability of perception from conception, began to emerge. The sound bite echoed from the voice of Norwood Hanson (1924-1967), “seeing is a theory laden enterprise.” And, figures such as the later Karl Popper (1902-1994), Willard Van Orman Quine (1908-2000), Thomas S. Kuhn (1922-1996), and Paul Feyerabend (1924-1994), among others, may be seen as concerned to promulgate an understanding of scientific observation as theory-laden so as, in part, to dispel notions of pre-theoretical evidence or pre-theoretical ways seeing. The influence rippled into the late twentieth century and can be seen in the work of philosophers such as Donald Davidson (1917-2003), Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995), Richard Rorty (1931-2007), and Jacques Derrida (1930-2004), among others. In the very least, these twentieth century insights stand on the shoulders of Kant’s Copernican revolution. Surely Kant’s predecessors provided an

171 Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1962). Though Kuhn should be considered more moderate than the stance Feyerabend is willing to embrace.
alphabet of ideas, but for the anthropocentric spelling out of phenomena to be read as experience, Kant is to thank for the idiom.

The Kantian Structure and Trajectory of Experience

“Their are contradictions myself.
Very well then, I contradict myself,
(I am large, I contain multitudes).”

—Walt Whitman, *Song of Myself*, 51, lines 7-9

The purpose for this section of the chapter is to show Kant’s structure and trajectory of experience. This is valuable because moving from a schematic representation of Kant’s structure and trajectory of experience I am able to regressively focus in, as it were, on Kant’s discussion of the ground of experience. Given what Kant says about the ground of experience I am able to indicate his error in choosing imagination as the power responsible for grounding experience. He should have chosen memory. Further, in the process of regressively focusing in on the ground of experience I am able to discuss the importance of Kant’s distinction between the discursive and non-discursive content of experience. Hence, this section proceeds by way of regressive focus toward the ground of experience such that it is separated into two parts.

First, following Kant, I will discuss the components of the structure of experience as if discussing species of the genus experience. As such, Kant’s first division is between sensibility and understanding. After following out this division I will have presented a skeleton of the structure of experience by indicating the progression of powers involved in an experience from initial point to terminal point along with their respective modes of representation. Second, I will discuss the ground of experience by discussing the ultimate synthesis which is necessary for experience. This, of course, is the synthesis of

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sensibility and the understanding. Kant discusses this synthesis in the section of the
Critique titled the Transcendental Deduction. After having discussed the Transcendental
Deduction, then, I will be able to fully show both the structure and trajectory of
experience and the ground of experience in Kant.

The Critique of Pure Reason is a veritable terminological cornucopia.
Consequently, constellating Kant’s cant can confound commentators. As a guiding
thread, however, the origin of some of Kant’s terminology coupled with the structure of
the Critique itself lead to a coherent rendering of his discussion of experience. I trace the
origin of Kant’s terminology to three general sources. An ancient debate within the
Socratic schools, specifically the issue of assent to true knowledge as figured between the
stoics and the skeptics, i.e. “from the Stoic-Academic debates about epistemology from
the third and second centuries BCE.”179 Also, I trace a cluster of terms to Leibniz and a
contribution to Kant’s understanding of logic from the Port Royal Logic (1662) [La
logique, ou l’art de penser] published by Antoine Arnauld (1612-1694) and Pierre Nicole
(1625-1695).

Regarding Ancient Stoic epistemology Cicero (106-43 BC) recounts the four
stage process of the Stoic doctrine as demonstrated by Zeno of Citium180 (c. 334-262
BC), founder of the Stoic school – the “Stoa poikilê,” i.e. “the painted porch.” According
to Cicero,

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\text{Zeno used to demonstrate this with gestures. When he had put his hand out flat in front of him with his fingers straight, he would say: “An impression [phantasia, i.e. \(\phi\alpha\nu\tau\alpha\sigma\iota\alpha\] is like this.” [visum huius modi est] Next, after contracting his fingers a bit: “Assent [\(\sigma\theta\gamma\kappa\alpha\acute{\theta}\varepsilon\omicron\varsigma\] is like}
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\[\text{[180] This is, of course, a different Zeno than the one discussed in relation to Aristotle in the Introduction.}
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this.” [adsensu huius modi est] Then, when he had bunched his hand up to make a fist, he would say that that was an “apprehension” or “grasp.” [κατάληψις] (This image also suggested the name he gave to it, katalēpsis, which hadn’t been used before.) Finally, when he had put his left hand on top, squeezing his fist tight with some force, he would say that scientific knowledge was like that: a state none but the wise enjoyed – though as for who is or ever was wise, even they [the Stoics] aren’t in a rush to say.\footnote{Marcus Tullius Cicero, \textit{On Academic Scepticism}, Charles Brittain, tr., (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2006), 84.}

Cicero’s quote describes the Stoic notion of grasping an appearance by way of impression, i.e. phantasia, in an apprehension, i.e. katalēpsis. The biographer Diogenes Laertius in his \textit{The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers} notes first that for the Stoics, perception “is an impression produced on the mind, its name being appropriately borrowed from impressions on wax made by a seal.”\footnote{Diogenes Laertius, \textit{The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers}, C.D. Yonge, tr. (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1853 ), 276. Hereafter cited as LOP.} Impressions, then, are “comprehensible and incomprehensible” which correspond with the two types of impressions, i.e. katalēptic or non-katalēptic. (LOP 276) Moreover, to assent to an impression is to judge it affirmatively. Hence, the Stoic is to affirm only a katalēptic impression and suspend judgment on non-katalēptic impressions.

Now, during this early period in the history of the Stoa, skepticism\footnote{Though I am well aware of the distinction to be drawn between the Pyrrhonian and Academic skeptics, in the effort to keep this discussion brief, I will not focus on distinguishing amongst the skeptics. Further, in regard to the specific debate I discuss here, it is not relevant to dwell on distinctions amongst the skeptics themselves.} had become the mode of Plato’s Academy [Ἀκαδημία] under the direction of Arcesilaus (316-242 BC). Cicero describes a debate between the heads of the two schools, i.e. the stoic Zeno of Citium and the skeptic Arcesilaus. According to Cicero, Arcesilaus considered the idea of not holding opinions to be valuable, and as such thought the wise person should withhold assent, i.e. suspend judgment. So, the skeptic asked the stoic what the wise
person should do just in case the wise person “couldn’t apprehend anything,” i.e. should the wise person suspend judgment?

The stoic responds by denying such a case to be possible because there is always “an impression from what is, stamped, impressed, and molded just as it is.” As rebuttal the skeptic proposes two scenarios in which the wise person, rather than apprehend nothing, encounters supposed indiscernible apprehensions such as twins or apprehensions in abnormal states such as dreaming. The skeptic proposes these scenarios so as to illustrate an instance without clear [enargēs] and distinct [ektypos] criteria, thereby undermining the possibility of affirmatively judging an appearance, i.e. assenting to a katalēptic impression. The story, of course, does not end there. Yet, before showing the relevance of the story for Kant’s terminology, there is another salient part.

Judgment remained a major point of contention between the stoics and the skeptics even by the time of the third leader of the stoic school, Chrysippus (c. 279-206 BC). Chrysippus’ innovative contribution to the debate was to borrow ideas from Epicurus (c. 341-270 BC). Though lost in history, Epicurus wrote a treatise titled On the Standard or Canon [Πεξὶ θξηγεξίνπ], the name referring to a stick or rule with which to measure or set limits. Laertius tells us this book contained the Epicurean criteria for truth. (LOP 435) Now, “Chrysippus adopted two of Epicurus’ three criteria, sense-perception and prolēpsis, i.e. πρόληψις. These two criteria appear to be subdivisions of

184 Marcus Tullius Cicero, On Academic Scepticism, Charles Brittain, tr., 45.
185 Marcus Tullius Cicero, On Academic Scepticism, 49-51.
Zeno’s single criterion, *katalēpsis* (‘apprehension’)."  

Whereas, Zeno of Citium receives credit for the term *katalēpsis*, Epicurus receives credit for the term *prolēpsis*, and this term – *prolēpsis* – has been assimilated into Latin as both notion (*notio*) and anticipation (*anticipatio*).  

Epicurus, in contrast to the Academy of Plato, the Lyceum of Aristotle, the Cynosarges of the cynics, and the Stoa of Zeno, conducted his hedonistic school in his garden just outside Athens, whereby his school name, “The Garden.” Indeed, Epicurus was neither stoic nor skeptic, for example, he held, “If you resist all the senses, you will not even have anything left to which you can refer, or by which you may be able to judge of the falsehood of the senses which you condemn.” (LOP 476) Hence, the senses and that by which one is able to anticipate, i.e. achieve *prolēpsis*, may be used so as to correctly assent, i.e. judge of appearances. It is in this way, that the stoics, under the direction of Chrysippus, formulated a richer account of experience with which to enhance their epistemology and respond to the skeptics.  

In his *Against the Logicians*, Sextus Empiricus (c. 160-210 AD) notes the “Skeptical Method” is directed not merely at stoics or hedonists but at all “Dogmatists.” Further, Sextus in his *Outlines of Skepticism* enumerates various skeptical methods with which to combat dogmatists beginning with the methods

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189 In fact, the stoics even used the notion of prolepsis in response to Meno’s paradox, cf. Dyson, p. 66.  
proposed by the skeptic Pyrrho (c. 360-270 BC). In general, Pyrrhonian skepticism may be said to follow a principle of interpretation.\(^1\) In other words,

[the Pyrrhonists] affirmed that facts are not by nature such as they appear to be, but that facts only seem as such; and they said, that what they doubt is not what they think – for their thoughts are evident to themselves, but the reality of the things which are only made known to them by their sensations. (LOP 408)

As a clear example, out of the ten modes of Pyrrhonian skepticism consider that the “sixth mode has reference to the promiscuousness and confusion of objects; according to which nothing is seen by us simply and by itself.” (LOP 411) Or the first mode, according to Sextus,

we are not able to prefer our own appearances to those produced in the irrational animals. So, if the irrational animals are no more convincing than we are when it comes to judging appearances, and if different appearances are produced depending on the variations among animals, then I shall be able to say how each existing object appears to me, but for these reasons I shall be forced to suspend judgment on how it is by nature.\(^2\)

Finally, of the modes in total Sextus boasts,

That every object of investigation can be referred to these modes we shall briefly show as follows. What is proposed is either an object of perception or an object of thought, and whichever it is it is subject to dispute. … Now, will they say that the dispute is decidable or undecidable? If undecidable, we have it that we must suspend judgment; for it is not possible to make assertions about what is subject to undecidable dispute. But if decidable, we shall ask where the decision is to come from [my emphases].\(^3\)

Asking for the origin, of course, Sextus contends will also lead to undecidability. In sum, Sextus says, “no object is ever perceived independently and entirely by itself.” (LOP 413)


\(^{3}\) Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, 41-42.
That is, “Those things which are known in relation to others are unknown of themselves [my emphasis].” (LOP 412)

Both terminologically and strategically, in determining his structure and trajectory of experience, Kant borrows from the Socratic Schools, as evidenced by the above depiction of the stoic-skeptic debate. The terms dogmatism, apprehension, the incomprehensible/comprehensible contrast, the conception of judgment in relation to experience, the awareness of prolēptic features in experience, and the unknowable nature of things in themselves all make their way into Kant’s structure of experience. What is more, Kant’s Copernican turn may be thought of as the unification of the stoic, skeptic, and Epicurean contributions regarding epistemology. In other words, the point at which Sextus leaves off the debate amongst the Socratic schools, Kant enters the scene and grants each faction their initial premise with his Copernican revolution.

Strategically, Kant has maneuvered his epistemological stance so as to incorporate the components upon which the debate amongst the Socratic schools hinged, while at the same time formulating an initial premise which precludes choosing any one position in the debate over another. In other words, things in themselves cannot be known – to the skeptics, there are some contributions from the senses of which one can neither apprehend nor have knowledge, i.e. a katalēptic grasp – to the stoics, and the manner in which one comes to judge the objects of experience, and thereby having knowledge of them, is through some prolēptic function of the mind – to the Epicureans. Hence, Kant’s structure of experience moves from the unknowable thing-in-itself through the senses, which combining with imagination forms an appearance [φαντασία], and into the logically structured understanding where the object of knowledge is grasped and
known. The wise person – the sage – for Kant is one who uses reason critically to reflect upon this structure and trajectory so as to formulate and to assent to scientific principles – formulating a canon – regarding experience rather than mere opinion.

The Critique of Pure Reason is riddled with references to the Socratic schools, including specifically epistemological references to the stoic-skeptic debate (A 569/B 597) and Epicurus (A 853/B 881); in addition, there are references to both Diogenes Laertius (B xi) and Cicero (A 689/B 717). For example, in a section titled, “On the impossibility of a skeptical satisfaction of pure reason that is divided against itself,” Kant begins the section by noting, “The consciousness of my ignorance (if this is not at the same time known to be necessary) should not end my inquiries;” on the contrary, according to Kant, such “is rather the proper cause to arouse them. All ignorance is either that of things or of the determination and boundaries of my cognition.” (CPR 1998, A 758/B 786) Shortly thereafter Kant references David Hume as a modern proponent of skepticism, and notes, “The first step in matters of pure reason, which characterize its childhood, is dogmatic. The just mentioned second step is skeptical, and gives evidence of the caution of the power of judgment sharpened by experience [my emphasis].” (CPR 1998, A 761/B 789) For Kant, the “nomadic” skeptics preferred undecidability to any “permanent cultivation of the soil.” (CPR 1998, A ix)

Before Kant, with Kant, and in Kant’s wake, it seems tenable, then, to link the thing-in-itself with skeptic undecidability. Recall, Sextus took pains to indicate that the justification for skeptical suspense of judgment derives from the “undecidability,” or the “undecidable” quality, of any judgment which would purport to determine the identity of

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the thing-in-itself. In this way, it is as if the skeptics are wielding the power of non-being against their fellow Socratics. And, in unifying the positions of the debate into one epistemological position Kant has embraced the thing-in-itself as undecidable.

The division into undecidable, on the one hand, and the necessary, certain, clear, and distinct, on the other, may be clearly seen in Kant’s structure and trajectory of experience. In general, the structure of experience is divided in two. Kant says, “Only this much appears to be necessary by way of introduction or anticipation, namely, that there are two stems of human knowledge, sensibility [Sinnlichkeit] and understanding [Verstand], which perhaps spring forth from a common, but to us unknown, root.” (CPR 2003, A 15/B 29) Whereas, I refer to Leibniz to help explicate the first stem, I will refer to logic in general to explicate the second stem.

Kant deals with the “unknown root” in his “Transcendental Analytic” section of the Critique, specifically the “Transcendental Deduction.” In fact, an initial glance at the structure of the Critique of Pure Reason will help facilitate a discussion of the stems of knowledge and the structure and trajectory of experience. Following the Kant scholar Howard Caygill, I have included a schematic representation of the “Table of Contents” of the Critique of Pure Reason. This graphic provides an at-a-glance look at the structure of Kant’s text which largely coincides with what I refer to as the structure and trajectory of experience.
The “Transcendental Doctrine of Elements” is the section of the *Critique* devoted to describing the elements of the structure and trajectory of experience. As the above schematic of Kant’s text shows – from left to right – in order to suppose objects of experience must conform to “our knowledge,” there is a movement from the “Transcendental Aesthetic” to the “Transcendental Logic.” Kant tells us this division

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195 Inspired by Howard Caygill, *A Kant Dictionary*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 146. This schematic is, of course, not exhaustive of the Table of Contents.
may be described as the division between “lower” and “higher” cognitive faculties, respectively, (CPR 1998, A 130/B 169) and this division indicates the sections which deal with the undecidable, on the one hand, and the necessary, certain, clear, and distinct, on the other, i.e. the aesthetic and the logic respectively.

The Transcendental Logic section of the Critique is further divided into two sections, i.e. the “Transcendental Analytic” and the “Transcendental Dialectic.” Whereas in the Transcendental Analytic Kant discusses the complex operation of applying the categories within an experience, in the Transcendental Dialectic Kant discusses the application of the categories both within and outside experience.196 Lastly, regarding Figure 1.1, the Analytic of Principles may be thought of as the center hub of the architectonic structure of the experience. Were I to assign an exact point, I would place the point between the “Deduction of the Categories,” a.k.a. the “Transcendental Deduction,” and the “Schematism.” That point for Kant acts as a crossroads where he branches out into multiple views of the entire architectonic. I will have further explained this in the Interlude below. For now, I will explain how the trajectory of experience may be thought of as a movement of limiting from the passive lower faculties which are “near” in relation to the thing-in-itself to the active higher faculties which are “remote” in relation to the thing-in-itself. I borrow the terms near and remote from Leibniz, as it is perhaps Leibniz to whom Kant owes the most for his description of the bottom of the structure of experience.

196 An analogy is appropriate here, analytic : justification (& demonstration) :: dialectic : discovery.
Aesthetic, “in its original Greek form (αηζζεηηθόο), means anything that has to do with perception by the senses, and this wider connotation was retained by Kant.”\textsuperscript{197}

Consider a highly readable passage – worth quoting at length – from Kant’s \textit{Lectures on Logic}, specifically what has come to be known as the Jäschte Logic,

The first degree, then, of perfection of our knowledge as to quality is its clearness. A second or a higher degree of clearness is distinctness. This consists in the \textit{clearness of attributes}. We must first distinguish logical from aesthetic distinctness in general. Logical distinctness rests on the objective, aesthetic on the subjective clearness of attributes. The former is a clearness by means of concepts, the latter a clearness by means of \textit{intuition}. The latter kind of distinctness, then consists in a mere \textit{vividness} and \textit{intelligibility}, that is, in a mere clearness by means of examples \textit{in concreto} (for much may be intelligible which is not distinct, and conversely much may be distinct which is yet hard to understand, because it reaches back to remote attributes, the connection of which with intuition is only possible through a long series) [all emphases Kant’s].\textsuperscript{198}

The limiting movement of the trajectory of experience perfects subjectively in aesthetic distinctness by means of intuition and objectively in logical distinctness by means of concepts. The former is the first stem of sensibility, and the latter is the second stem of the understanding – both of which are dealt with in the Transcendental Aesthetic and Transcendental Logic, respectively. Whereas the understanding may act upon itself and produce abstract results, experience is the condition \textit{sine qua non} of sensibility, i.e. there is intuition only where there is experience. In order to make experience objective, then, the product of sensibility must be combined with the understanding in a further limiting process. Hence, this process resulting in the experience of an object, i.e. objective knowledge, must begin with subjective experience, i.e. by way of subjective experience.


\textsuperscript{198} Immanuel Kant, \textit{Kant’s Introduction to Logic and his Essay on the Mistaken Subtlety of the Four Figures}, Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, tr. (London: Longmans, 1885), 52.
Not only do the stems differ, then, in their perfections, but they also differ in their negations. In his *Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy*, Kant makes the following distinction:

Two things are opposed to each other if one thing cancels that which is posited by the other. This opposition is two-fold: it is either *logical* through contradiction, or it is *real*, that is to say, without contradiction [Kant’s emphases]. This first opposition, namely logical opposition, is that upon which attention has been exclusively and uniquely concentrated until now. … The second opposition, namely real opposition, is that where two predicates of a thing are opposed to each other, but not through the law of contradiction. … Its meaning is the same as that of negation (*negatio*), lack, absence – notions which are in general use among philosophers – albeit with a more precise determination which will be specified later on. (NM 211)

The difference between the two negations relates to the intelligences in which they reside.

In the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant refers to these intelligences as discursive and intuitive, i.e. non-discursive. In other words, sensibility contains non-discursive aspects, but the understanding is solely discursive. (Cf. CPR A xvii & B 93)

Now, in order to respect Kant’s distinction between negations, I use the term “not” when referring to logical distinction and the term “non” to refer to what he calls “real” negation. Recall this may be read as Kant’s appropriation of Gorgias’ strategy noted in the Introduction and invokes the terms ἐναντίον and ἔτερον. What is more, Kant was correct to indicate that attention had been focused solely on the “not” form of negation before his teachings. Moreover, I will continue to press this distinction in the next chapter, i.e. the difference between not-being and non-being. However, for the purpose of understanding Kant’s structure and trajectory of experience, it is important to recognize the different stems – as Kant refers to them – of sensibility and understanding,
their different perfections, and their different negations. With this information in place, I can now discuss the structure and trajectory of experience beginning with sensibility, moving to the understanding, and finishing with the unknown root which combines them.

I have already indicated that – in an experience – the structure of experience amounts to a limiting structure. “Accordingly, the understanding limits sensibility, but without therefore expanding its own realm.” (CPR 1996, A 288/B 344) As such, the non-discursive is limited first by sensibility and then by the understanding into an objective experience resulting in knowledge of the object of experience. When Kant refers to a multiplicity prior to its limiting, he refers to the multiplicity as a “manifold.” Note, the adjective *mannigfaltig* literally means many [*mannig*] creases or folds [*faltig*], and the noun *das Mannigfaltige*, then, refers to a diversity or multiplicity in so far as it refers to a grouping of potential intuitions. For example, Kant will say,

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\text{[E]very appearance contains a manifold, so that different perceptions are in themselves encountered in the mind sporadically and individually, these perceptions need to be given a combination. Hence, there is in us an active power to synthesize. This power we call imagination; and the act that it performs directly on perceptions I call apprehension. For the imagination is to bring the manifold of intuition to an image. (CPR 1996, A 120-121)}
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Here Kant tells us the manifold of intuition contains a multiplicity which must be limited so as to fit, so to speak, into an image. Thus, the limiting at the intuitive level is a limiting of potentials within and across the groupings which constitute an appearance once apprehended.

Post apprehension of an appearance, a regression to a singular intuition – *by the mental operation of mathematics* – arrives at a manifold in the singular intuition itself. Once the image is further processed by the active stem of understanding, the image is
further limited so as to fit the appropriate concepts and be an object of knowledge. The beginning of the limiting within the structure of experience may be referred to as the “bottom” of the structure, and the top of the structure of experience which accounts for the limiting may be referred to as the “top.” As I will show, Kant seems to have been influenced by Leibniz in his thinking about both the bottom and top of the structure of experience. The guiding question here: If the bottom of the structure of experience is most near the thing-in-itself, then how are we to think of the manifold at the very bottom of the structure of experience?

The section of the Critique of Pure Reason titled “On the Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection” is widely read as Kant’s distancing himself from Leibniz. It is there that Kant famously claimed Leibniz “intellectualized appearances” just as Locke “sensualized all of the concepts of understanding.” (CPR 1996, A 271/B 327) To answer the guiding question, then, I will examine the way in which Kant criticizes Leibniz’s intellectualizing of appearances. Kant’s criticism both draws from Leibniz and answers the guiding question. Kant’s strategy here is to use the sensibility/understanding distinction in general and the discursive/non-discursive distinction specifically to criticize Leibniz’s principle of the identity of indiscernibles and then Leibniz’s principle of determination.

Kant notes that Leibniz, “compared all things with one another merely by concepts”; in this way he “naturally found among them no differences other than those by which the understanding distinguishes its pure concepts from one another.” (CPR 1996, A 270/B 326) In other words, regarding Leibniz Kant thought that “Appearance was for him the representation of the thing-in-itself, although a representation different in logical form from cognition through understanding [Kant’s emphasis].” (CPR 1996, A 270/B
Kant is here saying that Leibniz did not consider appearance to contain the non-discursive. Though, interestingly, Kant seems to have derived his reading of non-discursivity precisely from Leibniz. Kant makes a complicated but rewarding move here. In order to fully understand what Kant accomplishes it is important to provide an example from Leibniz.

According to Leibniz, God’s perfection entails that he does not create in a haphazard way. Now, combined with the principle of sufficient reason, i.e. “nothing takes place without a sufficient reason,” it is possible to “understand in a wonderful way how a kind of divine mathematics or metaphysical mechanism is used in the origin of things.” That is, God “acts perfectly” like a Geometer or “a good architect who makes the most advantageous use of the space and the capital intended for a building.” This should help illuminate Leibniz’s two principles which Kant criticizes, i.e. the principle of the identity of indiscernibles and the principle of determination. Leibniz’s principle of the identity of indiscernibles holds that “there are not in nature two real, absolute beings, indiscernible from each other, because, if there were, God and nature would act without reason in ordering the one otherwise than the other.” From this principle it follows for Leibniz that “each singular substance expresses the whole universe in its own way,” i.e. “every substance is like an entire world, and like a mirror of God … as the same city is represented differently depending on the different positions

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from which it is regarded.”

Despite, then, Leibniz’s mortality, given these principles, “it is possible to make some general remarks touching the course of providence in the government of things.”

It is to such affairs that the principle of determination pertains. Leibniz’s essay, “On the Radical Origination of Things,” is instructive here.

Given the complexity involved in Leibniz’s following game analogy, I quote him at length. My comments afterward connect the principle of determination with the aforementioned work from Leibniz so as to explicate the difficult notion of non-discursivity in Kant.

[O]nce it is established to be such as it is [by God], it follows that things such as they are will come into being. … There is always a principle of determination in nature which must be sought by maxima and minima; namely, that a maximum effect should be achieved with a minimum outlay, so to speak. And at this point time and place, or in a word, the receptivity or capacity to the world, can be taken for the outlay, or the terrain on which a building is to be erected as commodiously as possible, the variety of forms corresponding to the spaciousness of the building and the number and elegance of its chambers. The case is like that of certain games in which all the spaces on a board are to be filled according to definite rules, but unless we use a certain device, we find ourself at the end blocked from the difficult spaces and compelled to leave more spaces vacant than we needed or wished to. Yet there is a definite rule by which a maximum number of spaces can be filled in the easiest way [my emphases].

This is like the games where blocks are to be specifically organized or any game where a chaotic dispersion of species is organized. From the initial moment of encounter to the point of organization it may be said that there is a rule (or series of rules) for moving

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204 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics, Correspondence with Arnauld, and Monadology, George r. Montgomery, tr. (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company, 1902), 8.
205 Leibniz’s translator here, Leroy E. Loemker, suggests the essay may also go by the titles: “On the Process by Which the World Comes into Being from Its Roots” and “On the First Principles of Creation.”
from the first point to the second. It is in this way that God is like a Geometer for
Leibniz. Yet, as a divine Geometer the components with which God works are infinite.

Similarly, once having assumed that being involves more perfection than nonbeing, or that there is a reason why
something should come to exist rather than nothing, or that a transition from possibility to actuality must take place, it
follows that even if there is no further determining
principle, there does exist the greatest amount possible in proportion to the given capacity of time and space (or the
possible order of existence), in much the same way as tiles
are laid so that as many as possible are contained in a given
space [my emphases].

Given all the above principles, then, with which God governs creation, Leibniz is able to
draw an analogy between God’s creating and the playing of a game. The focus here is on
time and space.

According to Leibniz, the vastness of God’s creating is such that time and space
are infinite. Yet, from our (human) perspective it is as if we – with our physical eyes –
see merely the finite consecutive tiles on a game board comprised of time and space, each
tile – each thing – of which is like a looking glass into infinity. William Blake (1757-
1827) is perhaps appropriate here, “To see a world in a grain of sand, and heaven in a
wild flower, hold infinity in the palm of your hand, and eternity in an hour.”

Space and time, then, for Leibniz are like the tiles on the game board which, when
compared to the infinite vastness of God’s creation, derive their reality more from their
relation to each other than their determination of coordinates for us – even though they
do determine coordinates for us. It is as if God’s vastness is somehow folded into each
tile we experience. For example, a different intellect – an intellect with a different
“receptivity or capacity” – could determine, i.e. understand, different sized tiles by

Windus, 1906), 138.
parsing God’s vastness differently. Put another way, space and time are ideal and derive from the attempt of a finite mind to experience the infinite mind of God. With God as most real, time and space are ideal, not real. According to Leibniz, “By the word thing we mean that which appears, hence that which can be understood.” Moreover, it is “not necessary for that which expresses to be similar to the thing expressed.”

The thing is perspectival. Leibniz draws an analogy, as the view of a city from above “differs from the almost infinite horizontal perspectives with which it delights the eyes of travelers who approach it from one direction or another,” so “the appearance of parts differs from the appearance of their positions.” In other words, we reify or hypostasize time and space by treating them as real due to our inability to fully grasp the mind of God or God’s creation. Though things are infinitely divisible, they need not have an infinite number of parts – which would be a determination by our mind – because the number of parts depends on the type of mind “looking” at the thing. Leibniz puts this beautifully in saying, “there always remain in the abyss of things parts which are still asleep.” It is as if the universe itself – insofar as we can still speak of an “in-itself” – is a phantasm in the mind of God. The universe conceived as a sensorium or imaginarius of the mind of God. Such a notion might call to mind Isaac Newton’s (1643-1727) reference in Optics, to God’s “boundless uniform sensorium … [God] being everywhere present to the things themselves.” (Bk 3, pt 1, q28)

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213 For an account of contemporary physicists exploring this idea sometimes referring to the universe as a “hologram,” see: A. Aspect, “To be or not to be local,” Nature, 446, (2007), 866-867.
214 Isaac Newton, Philosophical Writings, Andrew Janiak, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 138-139.
Non-discursivity, then, refers to the “parts which are still asleep” “in the abyss of things,” and these parts will always remain asleep for a (human) mind like ours. For Kant, “Space is not a discursive or, as is said, general concept of relations of things in general, but a pure intuition.” (CPR 1998, A 25/B 39) Similarly, “Time is no discursive, or as one calls it, general concept, but a pure form of sensible intuition. Different times are but parts of one and the same time.” (CPR 1998, A 32/B 47) Whereas Leibniz seems to stress the relationality of each tile in his metaphoric example, Kant seems to stress the singularity of each tile. Kant has space and time as conditions for the possibility of intuiting the manifold which is itself a limiting of the abyss. Yet, even the limiting contains the non-discursive within each singular intuitive grasp contributing to the manifold of sensibility in which an appearance can be apprehended – an unimaginable depth. Hence, for Kant, we can never know the thing-in-itself.

Kant draws a distinction between the thing-in-itself and an appearance in space and time. Space and time remain contributions from our mind, and the manifold at the “bottom” of the structure of experience may be described as an abyss containing parts which remain asleep to the experiential apparatus of our mind. In sum, moving from the unknowable thing-in-itself toward the object of experience moves along a limiting trajectory through the forms of intuition – space and time – to a manifold of sensibility which will be further limited as an appearance is apprehended in the process of combining the two stems of sensibility and understanding.

Nietzsche’s seemingly prescient remark is appropriate here: “when you look long into an abyss, the abyss also looks into you.”215 (§146) If you might see a world in a

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grain of sand, what do you see when you turn that gaze toward you? Where are you in this structure of experience, i.e. in the structure with which you experience? Insofar as the limiting involved along the trajectory of experience is also a unifying, you might imagine the figure of a cone whose convergence points to you in the structure of experience. The term used by Kant is apperception, and Leibniz coined the term in his New Essays on Human Understanding [Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain] (1765) commenting on John Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690).

Within the structure of experience there are two types of syntheses which can occur – the synthesis combining the stems of knowledge in an experience or a synthesis which is merely intellectual, i.e. not involving intuition. Kant calls the first a figurative synthesis and the second an intellectual synthesis. (CPR 1998, B 152) So, the combination which occurs between the two stems, i.e. sensibility and understanding is performed by the power of imagination. Further, the unity to which the synthesis points – like the converging in a cone – is the transcendental unity of apperception. (CPR 1998, B 141) In the New Essays, Leibniz says, “The apperception of that which is in us depends upon attention and order.”216 Like following along the chain of words in this sentence, out of paying attention to the order of the flowing appearances emerges an awareness of that which is paying attention, and that is you.

In other words, the figurative synthesis is not a one to one synthesis; it is a limiting of a multiplicity, i.e. a manifold of sensibility that is unified. Whereas perception for Kant – like a series of tiles from Leibniz’s game board – consists in a

216 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, New Essays Concerning Human Understanding, Alfred Gideon Langley, tr. (Chicago: The Open Court, 1916), 76.
series of appearances each of which comes with an awareness of you as the (empirical) apprehender of the appearance, the unity of apperception is the (non-empirical) unity of these perceptions. In Kant’s words, on the one hand there is the “flow of inner appearances” called “inner sense or empirical apperception,” and on the other hand, there is the numerical identity across the appearances in the flow, i.e. the unity which means all these appearances relate to me [Kant’s emphases]. (CPR 1996, A 107) This numerical identity is the unity of pure – as opposed to empirical – apperception. (CPR A 107) And, this unity “precedes all cognition of the object, as the intellectual form of that cognition.” (CPR 1996, A 129) Hence, apperception “is an act of spontaneity; i.e. it cannot be regarded as belonging to sensibility,” and it produces the representation “I think that must be capable of accompanying all other representations [Kant’s emphasis].” (CPR 1996, B 132)

Now though the structure of experience – with its converging trajectory – takes place between the thing-in-itself and the “I think,” it is still not clear how the “I think” accompanies all of the structure’s representations. This can be cleared up by looking at the way Kant conceived of discursive cognition. In brief, discursive thought is judgmental. Pure apperception is spontaneous, which means between the two stems – the passive sensibility and the active understanding – pure apperception involves the stem of the understanding in the structure of experience. Similarly, according to Kant, “We can … trace all actions of the understanding back to judgments, so that the understanding in general can be represented as a faculty for judging.” (CPR 1998, A 69/B 94) Moreover, “judgment is nothing other than the way to bring given cognitions to the objective unity of apperception.” (CPR 1998, B 141) Borrowing a phrase from Arnauld in his Port
Royal Logic, “Man is an intellectual cause, in relation to that which he does with judgment.” Hence, it is through judgment, then, that the I think can accompany all representations. And, according to Kant, “in every judgment I am always the determining subject of that relation that constitutes the judgment.” (CPR 1998, B 407)

Now, judgment in the Critique of Pure Reason may be parsed in a number of ways. In regard to the subjective/objective distinction, I follow Béatrice Longuenesse in characterizing the difference between these judgments as subjective coordination and objective subordination. The value of this distinction will be seen below in my discussion of the Transcendental Deduction. Suffice to say for now, the flow of appearances are coordinated in a subjective judgment and subordinated to a concept in an objective judgment.

The standard way to parse Kant’s judgments, then, is by way of the various logics to which the different judgments relate. The two different logics in the Critique of Pure Reason are general logic and transcendental logic. (CPR 1998, A 77/B 102) According to Errol Harris, Kant’s hope for the transcendental logic “is to give an account of the experience of an objective world in terms of the necessary synthesis effected … a priori in the act of cognition, as the condition of apprehending any object whatsoever.” Further, according to Kant, general logic, as the logic (λογός) of Aristotle, (CPR 1998, B viii) abstracts from the content of objects and deals only with the forms of thinking. It is divided into analytic and dialectic. Analysis, i.e. Aristotelian demonstration, rests on the

principle of non-contradiction, and dialectic rests on the use of syllogism.

Transcendental logic pertains to the form of experience and of objects, i.e. the logic of the conditions for the possibility of experience. It is concerned with the \textit{a priori} concepts of objects, i.e. the construction of objects not the content. Synthesis, then, in transcendental logic provides the basis for the connections which allow for the representation of an object of experience. Synthesis in general logic allows for inferences.

Because I am interested in the structure of experience, I am interested in transcendental logic more than general logic. To be specific about this interest, I will refer back to the Kant quote above from his \textit{Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy}. There Kant distinguished between real and logical opposition. (OM 211) As its name implies, “logical opposition” pertains to general logic. This is the logic, then, in which – according to Aristotle – “it will not be possible for the same thing to be and not to be.” (Meta 1995, 1006b19) However, it is real opposition which pertains to the structure of experience. Examining the structure of experience and its transcendental logic, then, the specific judgments I will look at will be judgments of perception and judgments of experience. These judgments involve both stems of knowledge and their synthesis. After pausing here to summarize the ground covered thus far, I will discuss the judgments by way of the synthesis of the two stems discussed by Kant in his Transcendental Deduction of the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}.

For ease of reference I refer to the “three standpoints” which are involved in what I have been discussing thus far. Retaining, perhaps, something of Leibniz’s perspectivism noted above, Kant explained that “Every concept may be regarded as a point which, as the station for an observer, has its own horizon, that is, a variety of things
which can be represented, and as it were, surveyed from that *standpoint* [my emphasis].”

(CPR 2003, A 685/B 686) The three standpoints, then, are the experiential, the conceptual, and the performative or apperceptive. The experiential covers the structure of experience from the bottom to the determination of the object of experience. This standpoint is best thought in conjunction with sensibility. The conceptual covers the structure of experience pertaining to the understanding broadly designated. Lastly, the performative, or the apperceptive, pertains to the transcendental unity of apperception.

The performative standpoint is best thought of by the aspects with which it hangs together, i.e. the revelation of the “I think” performed by the transcendental synthesis of imagination or the performance of judgment by the “I think.” These standpoints are quite helpful because just referring to the stems and their combination muddles the influence of imagination in each of the stems prior to combination. For example, the standpoints are helpful in discussing the Transcendental Deduction below. Moreover, *Kant has an experiential standpoint whereas those before him do not. This is because the experiential standpoint is opened up by the Copernican revolution, and the experiential standpoint includes non-discursive content.* And, these aspects of the experiential standpoint just noted advance significantly toward solving the problem of non-being.

Before discussing the combination of the two stems of knowledge – sensibility and understanding – I pause here to summarize the large amount of terminology covered thus far. I have already indicated the top and bottom,\(^{220}\) as it were, of the structure of experience. Sensibility is composed of the pure forms of time and space. They are considered pure because they are contributions from mind, not from experience. That is, they constitute the way in which the mind determines an intuition – like sizing a tile in

\(^{220}\) For Kant’s use of this language see (A 44/B 61).
Leibniz’s example. The multiplicity captured by these intuitions, then, is limited, and these intuitions taken together comprise a manifold to be apprehended as an appearance. Sensation provides the matter for these forms; the appearance, then, contains the non-discursive.

Kant explains the next stage in the trajectory of experience as follows:

[T]here is in us an active power to synthesize this manifold. *This power we call imagination*; and *the act* that it performs directly on perceptions I call *apprehension*. For the *imagination is to bring the manifold of intuition to an image*; hence it must beforehand take the impressions up into its activity, i.e. apprehend *them* [my emphases]. (CPR 1996, A 120)

I delve further into this below. However, it is important to note here that the above covers the components of the beginning of the structure and trajectory of experience. Pertaining to the powers of the mind, Kant designates three original sources of all experience. According to Kant there are

three original sources (capacities or faculties [or powers] of the soul), which contain the conditions of the possibility of all experience, and cannot themselves be derived from any other faculty [or power] of the mind, namely *sense*, *imagination*, and *apperception* [Kant’s emphasis]. (CPR 1998, A 94/B 127)

So far I have, at least, indicated all of these powers above. What remains is to discuss the specific ways that these conditions for the possibility of all experience relate to one another – I will delve into this below.

With the exception of apperception (as it is a higher power of the mind), the above summarizes the lower cognitive faculties. Hence, I quote here Kant’s own summary of the higher cognitive faculties. Kant explains,

> These are: *understanding*, *the power of judgment*, and *reason*. In its analytic that doctrine accordingly deals with *concepts*, *judgments*, and *inferences*, corresponding exactly
to the function and the order of those powers of mind, which are comprehended under the broad designation of understanding in general [Kant’s emphases]. (CPR 1998, A 131/B 169)

So, what is “broadly designated” as – the stem of – “the understanding” consists of the power of understanding, the power of judgment, and the power of reason. The function of understanding – using the term to refer to one of the higher cognitive faculties – is conceiving, the function of judgment is judging, and the function of reason is inferring.

Now, these three higher faculties taken together (broadly designated as understanding) perform the function of thinking, and this thinking can take place in combination with input from sensibility or without input from sensibility. These three powers taken together can also perform the function of knowing in which case input from sensibility is necessary. Kant indicates the subtle difference in explaining the power of judgment,

All judgments are accordingly functions of unity among my representations, since instead of an immediate representation a higher one, which comprehends this and other representations under itself, is used for the cognition of the object, and many possible cognitions are thereby drawn together into one. We can, however, trace all action of the understanding back to judgments, so that the understanding in general can be represented as a faculty for judging. … Concepts, however, as predicates of possible judgments, are related to some representation of a still undetermined object. (CPR 1998, A 69/B 94)

Here Kant recalls the emphasis I have laid upon judgment above. Recall the combination of sensibility and understanding is a requirement for empirical knowledge. (CPR 2003, A 15/B 29) Insofar as I will be pursuing the experiential standpoint, I will not be examining

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221 Cf. “the understanding … is a faculty for thinking.” Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, tr., (A 69/B 94), 205.
222 Cf. (A 93); (A 95); (B 147); (B 161); (B 169).
a number of the aspects just noted. Yet, the above goes toward summarizing the components of the structure and trajectory of experience.

Lastly, then, by way of a summary before discussing the complex Transcendental Deduction, since all of the powers just mentioned above have different modes of representation, it is possible to provide an summary figure here. Kant is most explicit regarding representations as he looks back and summarizes his broadly designated understanding of the Transcendental Analytic before he discusses the use of pure reason in the Transcendental Dialectic. I quote Kant at length here as he summarizes the “terms properly suited to each species of representation…”

Here is their progression [All emphases are Kant’s]: The genus is representation in general [Die Gattung ist Vorstellung überhaupt] (repraesentatio). Under it stands the representation with consciousness (perceptio). A perception (Perzeption) that refers to the subject as a modification of its state is a sensation (Empfindung) (sensatio); an objective perception is a cognition [Erkenntnis] (cognitio). The latter is either an intuition or a concept [Anschauung oder Begriff] (intuitus vel conceptus). The former is immediately related to the object and is singular; the latter is mediate, by means of a mark, which can be common to several things [Dingen]. A concept is either an empirical or a pure concept [empirischer oder reiner], and the pure concept, insofar as it has its origin solely in the understanding (not in a pure image of sensibility) [(nicht im reinen Bilde der Sinnlichkeit)], is called notio. A concept made up of notions, which goes beyond the possibility of experience, is an idea or a concept of reason [die Idee, oder der Vernunftbegriff].

In what may be taken as Kant’s very own summary of the structure and trajectory of experience, then, Kant summarizes the above progression at the end of the Doctrine of Elements noting, “Thus all human knowledge begins with intuitions, proceeds from

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224 I.e. from the conceptual standpoint.
thence to concepts, and ends with ideas.” (CPR 2003, A 702/B 730) Given Kant’s reference to the above list of terms as constructed according to genus and species, I have constructed Figure 1.2 to provide an at-a-glance image for the reader.

![Diagram of Representation]

I will now discuss the Transcendental Deduction toward fully describing the structure of experience in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

**The Thing-in-itself ex priority of Being: Kant’s Transcendental Deduction**

“Everything profound loves a mask; the profoundest things of all even have a hatred of image and parable… Every profound spirit needs a mask: what is more, around every profound spirit a mask is continually growing, thanks to the constantly false, that is to say shallow interpretation of his every word, his every step, of every sign of life that he gives.”

~Nietzsche, *Beyond Good & Evil* §40

225 Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 50.
The *Critique of Pure Reason* was first published in mid July of 1781, and from the earliest reviews such as the “Göttingen Review,” which appeared in January of 1782 to the present day the Transcendental Deduction has received heavy criticism. This includes, of course, the perhaps most famous of the reviews by – Kant’s friend, the “Sorcerer of the North” – Johann Georg Hamann (1730-1788). As one of Kant’s friends, Hamann had been receiving proofs of the *Critique* from Kant, and as a result he had already completed a review by the end of July 1781. In fact, though he wrote two reviews in total, given his friendship to Kant and his style of criticism his most scathing criticisms were only published posthumously.

In his first review, Hamann suggests that by Kant outdated metaphysics “is suddenly transformed from a two-thousand-year-old arena of endless strife into a systematically arranged inventory of all that we possess by means of pure reason.” Hamann further suggests that Kant proceeded “ass first” using “the weapons of light to spread the kingdom of darkness.” As Hamann’s second review (1784) makes clear, he takes issue first and foremost with Kant’s distinguishing between sensibility and understanding only to have such “learned troublemaking” culminate in a “meaningless, rutting, unstable, indefinite something = x” pointing directly to the Transcendental

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Deduction.\textsuperscript{230} Hamann’s position, however, should have been already clear to Kant as Hamann had written to him in a 1759 letter, “I must almost laugh at the choice of a philosopher to try to change my mind. I look upon the finest logical demonstration the way a sensible girl regards a love letter … [Hamann’s emphasis].”\textsuperscript{231} Contemporary criticisms of Kant’s \textit{Critique}, though rhetorically more moderate, point to the same difficulty of the Transcendental Deduction, i.e. how to put sensibility and understanding back together again.

The influence of the reviews from Kant’s contemporaries can be seen in Kant’s subsequent writing: \textit{Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics} [\textit{Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik}] (1783), his \textit{Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science} [\textit{Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft}] (1786), and in the second (B) edition of the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason} (1787). In fact, Kant explicitly asks in the \textit{Prolegomena} for the anonymous reviewers to show themselves, as it were, and enter into an open debate.\textsuperscript{232} (Proleg 130) Acutely aware of his public reception, in the Preface to the second edition of the \textit{Critique} Kant summarizes the four major changes made from the first edition.

(1) the misunderstanding in the Aesthetic, chiefly the one in the concept of time; (2) the obscurity in the [Transcendental] Deduction of the Concepts of the Understanding; (3) the supposed lack of sufficient evidence in the proofs of the Principles of Pure Understanding; (4) the misinterpretation of the paralogisms advanced against rational psychology. (CPR 1998, B xxxviii)


The second and fourth revisions, i.e. (2) the Transcendental Deduction and (4) the paralogisms, amount to quite substantial revisions. In fact, commentators refer to the two different Transcendental Deductions as the “subjective” or “psychological” deduction of the 1781 first edition and the “objective” or “linguistic” deduction of the 1787 second edition. Kant himself, however, thought of the revisions as merely a difference in their “method of presentation.” (CPR 1998, B xliii) To stress this last point even further, in the Preface to his Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science Kant insists, “There is no more to be done, or to be discovered, or to be added here.” Despite this, of course, the following year in the second edition of the Critique Kant substantially revised the Transcendental Deduction to such an extent that commentators treat it as a separate deduction.

Since its first publication, then, the Transcendental Deduction has remained a focus of scholarship and considered variously, for example, as the “very heart of the Critique of Pure Reason,” the “mystery,” or as “the jungle.” Moreover, it seems as though commentators span all the logical possibilities in regard to preference and the two editions of the deduction. Primarily, there are those who reject both editions on various grounds; those who prefer the first edition, e.g. Schopenhauer and Heidegger; those who prefer the second, e.g. many contemporary commentators; and, those who, like Kant consider the difference between the two merely stylistic.

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233 Cf. Graham Bird, Revolutionary Kant, (Chicago Open Court, 2006), 46-47.
Vaihinger’s (1852-1933) comments from 1902\textsuperscript{238} a number of commentators have suggested the “Transcendental Deduction” is a “patchwork.” By this, these commentators literally mean that it is a “patchwork, of different arguments composed at different times and representing very different points of view.”\textsuperscript{239} The suggestion here is that the deduction is out of order and so badly bungled by Kant that it is unsalvageable, and perhaps should be looked upon as modest eyes look upon a love letter. There at least seems to be general agreement that the “Transcendental Deduction is central to the Critique,” and Kant’s project in the Critique “to explain how synthetic judgments are possible \textit{a priori}”\textsuperscript{240} stands or falls with the deduction.

The problem of the Deduction may be seen clearly in juxtaposing the following two quotes from Kant. On the one hand, referring to the sections of the Critique which correspond with sensibility and the understanding, Kant states that transcendental logic “has lying before it a manifold of \textit{a priori} sensibility, offered to it by transcendental aesthetic. Transcendental aesthetic offers it this manifold in order to provide it with a material for the pure concepts of understanding.” (CPR 1996, A 77/B 102) On the other hand, “Pure concepts of the understanding,” Kant notes, “are quite heterogeneous from empirical intuitions (indeed, from sensible intuitions generally) and can never be encountered in any intuition. How, then, can an intuition be \textit{subsumed} under a category, and hence how can a category be \textit{applied} to appearances…? [Kant’s emphases]” (CPR 1996, A 137/B 176)

\textsuperscript{238} Hans Vaihinger, \textit{Die Transcendentale Deduktion der Kategorien}, (Germany: Niemeyer-Haller, 1902).
In regard to the former combination problem, Kant is restating what commentators refer to as the “blindness thesis” and the “emptiness thesis.” That is, the two stems of knowledge are sensibility and understanding, “Through the former, objects are [intuitively] given to us; through the latter, they are thought.” (CPR 2003, A 15/B29) Moreover, “Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind [my emphases].” (CPR 1996, A 51/ B75) In regard, then, to the latter combination problem, Kant introduces some “third” component which is the infamous “=x” (CPR 1998, A 250) or “transcendental object.” The =x may be seen as Kant’s attempt to characterize a sort of conceptual proléptic within his structure of experience. The transcendental object – as the condition for the possibility of an object – is meant to solve the latter combination problem by supposing that it shares properties with both sensibility and understanding. You can imagine commentators suggest this is an ad hoc insertion by Kant to solve the otherwise unsolvable problem. Notice, however, this ad hoc aspect of Kant’s deduction pertains to the second strategy. The first strategy might still be viable were there a way in the first strategy to deal with this heterogeneity problem of the second strategy. A number of thinkers have tried to work this out.

The most popular candidates for salvaging Kant’s deduction are: apperception, judgment, and imagination. Commentators privilege, then, specific passages related to these candidates. For example, H.J. Paton (1887-1969) privileges judgment and believes the section prior to the Transcendental Deduction to be the “key.” This section is titled, “On the Clue to the Discovery of all Pure Concepts of the Understanding.” To be clear, it is common among Kant scholars to refer to this section as the “Metaphysical Deduction,”

241 Consciousness à la Husserl or time à la Heidegger may be considered as falling under one of, or some combination of, these three candidates.
since Kant referred to it as such in concluding the Transcendental Deduction of the second edition *Critique.* (CPR 1998, B 159)

Now, as Arthur Melnick points out, “In the first edition Transcendental Deduction of the Categories Kant does not mention the logical functions of judgment. In the second edition (the B edition) the deduction can be said to be dominated by the logical functions of judgment.” Dieter Heinrich suggests this may be accounted for by supposing Kant’s purpose to change from the first edition to the second believing he had solved his objective problem sufficiently by the first edition. In other words, the second “objective” deduction “makes the validity of the categories intelligible,” and “the subjective side investigates their relation to the cognitive faculties in us which must be presupposed if these categories are to be used [my emphasis].” In this way, the second edition deduction demonstrates *that* the categories of the understanding are valid, and the first edition deduction demonstrates *how* such validity is possible.

As Paton reminds, “the categories are not innate ideas, but ways in which the mind must judge, or ways in which thought must unite the manifold of sense,” i.e. “ways in which all objects of thought must be united.” Hence, one can see the emphasis of judgment in reading the second edition deduction, and one can see the way in which a successful second edition still requires a successful first edition. Even if Kant is able to show that the categories have validity, the main problem of the deduction, i.e. *how* sensibility combines with understanding is left unsolved. All this supports the claim that despite the two types of strategies, any attempt to salvage the deduction must eventually

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245 Paton, “The Key,” 328.
confront what Kant refers to as the “indispensable function” of the imagination. (CPR 1998, A78/B 103)

As my way into discussing the Transcendental Deduction, then, I will discuss the deduction from the perspective of logic. This approach is most efficient as it makes the deduction comprehensible first, so as to allow a more focused examination afterward. This neither equates my comprehensible rendering of the deduction with a reading of Kant as successful in the deduction, nor does it suggest that I believe Kant to be successful in the subjective deduction. Ultimately I harbor a deep and significant respect for the mind that constructed the Critique of Pure Reason. However, I believe, for whatever reason, Kant picked the wrong power of the mind to privilege, i.e. he gave too much credit to the imagination. Treating the deduction, then, from the perspective of logic uses both edition deductions without privileging either. However, the approach does emphasize judgment – over apperception or imagination – as is to be expected from the perspective of logic. After this treatment of the deduction from the perspective of logic, I will then focus on the first edition deduction. I focus on the first edition deduction because I follow Kant in thinking of this deduction as not only the groundwork for both editions but also of the structure of experience itself.

According to Kant, “We can … trace all actions of the understanding back to judgments, so that the understanding in general can be represented as a faculty for judging.” (CPR 1998, A 69/B 94) Further, there are three types of judgments to which we can trace back – synthetic a posteriori, analytic a priori, and synthetic a priori. Now, a posteriori means after or from experience, i.e. dependent upon experience, and a priori means prior to experience, i.e. independent of experience. Synthetic (σύν-θεσις) refers to
the bringing of two positions or points together, and analytic (ἀνάλοσις) refers to taking apart. Hence, analytic a priori judgments are those judgments which do not require experience to be considered valid.

To judge that all bachelors are unmarried males, for example, is to take apart the concept “bachelor,” or, more specifically, it is to formulate a categorical judgment by taking apart the concept. This categorical judgment can be reformulated into a different type of judgment. Consider the judgment: if a person is an unmarried male, then the person is a bachelor. This is an example of an a priori analytic hypothetical judgment. These judgments are a priori because given the concept of “bachelor” alone I do not need to validate these judgments by looking at experience. Rather, I can check to see if my judgment is valid merely by understanding the concept itself, i.e. independent of experience. As a priori judgments are independent of experience, there is no need for analytic a posteriori judgments because in an analytic judgment I already have all I need in the concept alone for validation.

Synthetic a posteriori judgments, then, are judgments dependent on experience, i.e. they necessarily involve intuitive input from sensibility. In fact, these are the judgments which are constitutive of an experience. By bringing the results of sensibility together with a concept from the understanding, I synthesize a judgment of experience. In this way, the link between sensibility and understanding in an experience concerns synthetic a posteriori judgments. Lastly, synthetic a priori judgments are those judgments made independently of intuitional input from experience. Now, these may be of two different types. There are synthetic a priori judgments which regard the products of synthetic a posteriori judgments and those which regard the products of a priori
analytic judgments. The former type of judgment is to be used for scientific discovery, and the latter is typical of pure reason – which Kant wished to critique. Referring back to my comments made above, pure reason is exemplary of the (mistaken) dialectical use of formal logic. And, though the ideas derived from such use of the broadly designated understanding can be regulative, they should not be considered constitutive.

For example, the ontological proof for the existence of God begins with the concept that God is perfect. On the one hand, the proof analyzes this concept, and just as “unmarried male” may be analyzed out of the concept of bachelor, “not lacking in any way” may be analyzed out of the concept of perfect, i.e. complete. On the other hand, the concept of “lack” may be analyzed out of the concept of non-existence, since to not exist is considered to lack existence. The results, then, of these analyses are combined in a synthetic a priori judgment – a priori because intuitional input has not been required to get this far in the proof. Now then, there are a number of ways to synthesize the analytic results. Taking each analytic judgment up as a hypothetical judgment, a chain argument can be formed: If God is perfect, then God does not lack in any way (or attribute), and if God does not lack in any way, then God (does not lack existence) exists. Put symbolically:

\[
\begin{align*}
P \rightarrow C & \quad \text{[Judgment 1: Analytic a priori]} \\
C \rightarrow E & \quad \text{[Judgment 2: Analytic a priori]} \\
\therefore P \rightarrow E & \quad \text{[Judgment 3: Synthetic a priori]}
\end{align*}
\]

The first two judgments are analytic a priori and the third judgment – the one that combines the first two – is a synthetic a priori judgment. Though this is a logically valid argument, this process without intuitional input – in fact precisely because it lacks intuional input – can ever only provide a logical view of God, i.e. a view of God from the conceptual standpoint. Such a process results from a use of “pure reason.” Now,
synthetic *a priori* judgments which involve synthetic *a posteriori* judgments are the types of judgments involved in making experimental predictions. They are the types of judgments involved in judging about experience, not merely conceptuality.

It is important to note how these judgments, then, fit into the overall structure of experience. Kant provides a reminder just prior to entering into the Transcendental Deduction noting that “cognition of any understanding, or at least human understanding, is a cognition through concepts; it is not intuitive, but discursive.”246 (CPR 1996, A 68/B 93) This is important because despite the fact that all use of concepts is discursive, there is a distinction to be made. On the one hand, there is the solely discursive use of understanding, and on the other hand, there is the use of understanding which, though discursive, includes non-discursivity by way of intuitions. Hence, the synthetic *a priori* judgments which involve only *a priori* judgments are solely discursive, and synthetic *a priori* judgments which involve *a posteriori* judgments include non-discursivity.

This is just one way to see the importance of Kant’s distinction between the discursive and the non-discursive. For the sake then of examining the experiential, as opposed to conceptual, parts of the structure of experience – and therewith the form of negation which pertains to the experiential part of the structure of experience – I will be looking at the function of synthetic *a posteriori* judgments. These are the judgments which contain the non-discursive; these are the judgments which combine the products of sensibility with the understanding; and these are the judgments upon which Kant focuses in the Transcendental Deduction. In fact, the Transcendental Deduction refers to the section of Kant’s text titled “Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding,” and Kant says of “the categories: they are concepts of an object as such whereby the object’s

intuition is regarded as determined in terms of one of the logical functions in judging.” (CPR 1996, B128) See Figure 2.3. Hence, the Copernican revolution culminates in the determination of an object by way of the pure concepts of the understanding, i.e. the synthesis of sensibility and understanding through judgment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kant’s Logical Table of Judgments (A 70/B 95)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. According to Quantity of Judgments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Particular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. According to Quality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infinite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. According to Relation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Categorical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothetical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disjunctive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. According to Modality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problematic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assertoric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apodictic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2.3

Before discussing the relation between the forms of judgment and the pure concepts of the understanding, it is important to reflect upon the consequences of what Kant has accomplished thus far. Kant suggests the following relations “of thought in judgments”: in a categorical judgment “a relation of the predicate to the subject,” and the categorical judgment considers only “two concepts”; in a hypothetical judgment “the relation of ground to consequence,” and the hypothetical judgment considers two judgments; in a disjunctive judgment “the relation in a divided cognition, of all of the division’s members to one another,” and a disjunctive judgment considers “several judgments.” (CPR 1996, A 73/B 98) Regarding logical form, i.e. general logic, every judgment must contain one of the three aspects from each of the four groups in Figure

247 Cf. “the parts of a cognition’s sphere.” (A74/B 99)
2.3. Hence, a matrix could be devised to work out all of the possible combinations within the “Table of Judgments.” Such a matrix would begin to look like Figure 2.4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categorical (IIIa) rendering of Quantity (I a&amp;b) with Quality (II a&amp;b)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beginnings of a matrix of judgments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quantity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All S are P.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Particular</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 2.4**

A visual representation of the beginnings of a matrix of judgments shows that the internal kernel, i.e. Kant’s Archimedean point, of the mind’s power of the understanding is the “Square of Opposition.”\(^{248}\) Compare Figure 2.4 with Figure 2.5.

\(^{248}\) I would like to point out here, that this is solely my interpretation. I have never heard anyone make this claim. But, after spending more time than I would care to admit (hence the motivation for this footnote) in attempting to make sense of what Kant is saying across multiple texts, it dawned on me that he was using one of my favorite bits to teach in *Principles of Thinking* courses, i.e. the “Square of Opposition.” Afterward, my reading (below) of the relation between the Table of Judgments and The Table of Categories followed quickly after.
So, why is all this important? This is important because since formal or general logic is able to characterize the relationship between sensibility and understanding, Kant has ushered in the possibility of valid synthetic *a priori* judgments regarding experience. By having objects of experience conform to the logical functions of judgment – think the Copernican revolution here – using the same logical functions to think about experience then has the possibility of sustaining the validity which was involved in the forming of an experience. This is because the objective validity has to do with the form not the content, so Kant divides out beforehand the content which would confound this emphasis on form. In other words, synthetic *a priori* judgments might be valid so long as the reason employed is not pure.

In regard to the objective determination of an object of experience in general, then, the *categorical judgment* of affirming all of the apprehended manifold, i.e. the limiting of the manifold of sensibility in a manifold of apprehension, is “=*x,” i.e. an object of experience. Since this =x is a “predicate” of a categorical judgment combining sensibility with understanding, it is perhaps easier to show via predicate logic the determining process of subordinating judgments by way of moving from one form of judgment to another in a chain of analytic *a priori* judgments. For example, for any x, if x is an A, then x is a B; if x is a B, then x is a C; if x is a C, then x is a D, etc. 

\[(x)(Ax\rightarrow Bx), (x)(Bx\rightarrow Cx), (x)(Cx\rightarrow Dx), \text{ etc.}\]

Though this apprehension of intuition from sensibility is inductive, the form of apprehension itself is deductive. So, structurally Kant is on solid ground to begin dialectic. In other words, the objective side of his story is successful in showing *that* the process of determining the object ensures the objective validity of the object as such. In
fact, this is the same process I outlined above in dealing with the Ontological Argument for the existence of God, but the difference in this case is that the synthesis is experiential not solely conceptual. I will say more about this distinction just below. The important thing to remember thus far is that the objective side of this process is a process of conception involving the power of understanding and terminating at the point of conception, i.e. recognition in a concept. Hence, regarding the objective side of the combination of sensibility and understanding, the $=x$ represents the combination in the determination of an object through judgment.

Now, I have just indicated that the experiential synthesis resulting in the combination of sensibility and understanding is a logical combination. However, this formulation is not yet precise enough. A distinction should be made between the form of the combination of sensibility with understanding and the content. I have shown above that the forms of the connections involved in the combination of sensibility with understanding are logical, i.e. they are the logical forms of judgment itself, and thereby ensure that the combination will have objective validity. However, this regards just the form of the combination. Validity regarding the content of that which is apprehended from sensibility is more difficult to see. Kant argues for the validity of the content in two ways. First, he continues to push the possibility of a logical derivation by further specifying the concepts of the understanding which are involved by way of the forms of judgment prior to even the determination of the object of experience in a concept. This way is made more explicit in the second edition Transcendental Deduction, especially §26, yet perhaps Kant had it in mind, though not stated as such, in the first edition. Second, Kant’s other way of arguing for the validity of the content coincides with the
first edition Transcendental Deduction. There Kant focuses on the subjective processes involved in providing content to the determination of the object of experience. This involves the “three-fold synthesis of imagination.” Yet, Kant’s ultimate decision regarding how to validly ground the content appears in both edition Transcendental Deductions of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and this decision has tremendous consequences for his system.

In trying to ground the validity of the content of experience elsewhere than in logic, Kant points to an “empirical law.” In the first edition, there is one empirical law regarding the manifold of sensibility and a corresponding rule to be found in the three-fold synthesis of imagination. Kant calls the former law, “the law of affinity,” and he calls the latter rule, the “rule of association.” (CPR 1998, A112-113) In the second edition, specifically §19 Kant maintains the law of affinity, and Kant changes the status of association from a rule to a “law of association.” (CPR 1998, B 142) As Kant would have it, these laws are intimately involved with imagination. Yet, given the names of these laws and from the perspective of the 21st century, it is difficult to construct any narrative suspense here. In other words, as you may be able to anticipate, these laws are laws of memory. The fact that Kant in the 18th century was not able to see them as such meant that he was not able to close the door on metaphysics as he would have liked. Indeed, had he recognized these laws as indications of the power of memory he would have been able to solve the problem of non-being.

You might wonder why this problem of combination is so troubling for Kant. In fact, this problem is the Achilles heel of Kant’s system. Why can’t Kant just resort to some generalization like the real is rational, and then just include question begging as
valid for determining the content of experience? It is because here is precisely where Kant must pay his debt for the Copernican revolution. He cannot now just assume that in the object’s conforming to the mind’s modes of knowing that the mind is also conforming to the object as it really is. If the program of the latter option were viable, then there was no need for the program of the former, etc. Which is why Kant, here, is acknowledging the consequences of memory in affinity and association, and he takes himself to be justified in commenting on the identity of the ground of these consequences since he is dealing with the empirical content of experience. He acknowledges the lawful regularity produced by this ground, and in fact grounds the validity of the content of the combination of sensibility with understanding on this regularity. Yet, he ultimately takes the power of imagination to be more primary in the trajectory of experience, the trajectory which results in an object of experience.

I discuss Kant’s thoughts on the relationship between imagination and memory in the final section of this chapter along with a more extensive treatment of Kant’s grounding of subjective validity, i.e. the how of the combination of sensibility and understanding. For now, I will address the first way indicated above which Kant employs to argue for the validity of the content of the combination of sensibility with understanding. It is here for Kant that the concepts of the understanding, i.e. the categories, along with the forms of judgment play a leading role. What this means can be seen in the relation between the Table of Judgments and the Table of Categories.
Kant’s Transcendental Table of Categories (A 80/B 106)
[Concepts of the Understanding]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I. Categories of Quantity</th>
<th>III. Categories of Relation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unity</td>
<td>Of Inherence and Subsistence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td>(Substance &amp; Accident)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totality</td>
<td>Of Causality and Dependence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Cause &amp; Effect)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Of Community (Reciprocity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>between Agent &amp; Patient)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>II. Categories of Quality</th>
<th>IV. Categories of Modality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reality</td>
<td>Possibility - Impossibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negation</td>
<td>Existence - Non-existence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitation</td>
<td>Necessity - Contingency</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2.6

As Kant puts it in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*,

> *All determinations of the general concept* [my emphasis] of a matter in general must be able to be brought under the four classes of [pure concepts of] the understanding, those of quantity, of quality, of relation, and finally of modality – and so, too, [must] all that may be either thought *a priori* in this concept, or presented in mathematical construction, or *given as a determinate object of experience* [my emphasis].

Notice Kant is talking about determinations of the general concept. This general concept, as evidenced by the second part of the above quote, acts as a sort of hub or central hinge in the architecture of the mind. The concept of an object in general functions in describing all that may be thought *a priori* in the concept, conceived in terms of mathematics, or given in experience. In relation to the Square of Opposition, the question might be: How can the movement from a form of judgment which *determines an object in general* to a form of judgment from which derives a “determinate object of

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250 This list of three options indicates the treatment of the general concept by Derrida, Deleuze, and Scalambrino, respectively. This will be clear by the end of the dissertation.
experience” relate to the Square of Opposition? The answer is in the Table of Categories so long as you start at the bottom of each class and work your way up to the top.

Recall from the Transcendental Aesthetic of the *Critique* that after assuming the Copernican revolution,

> The effect of an object on the capacity for representation, insofar as we are affected by it, is *sensation*. That intuition which is related to the object through sensation is called *empirical*. The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called *appearance* [Kant’s emphases]. (CPR 1998, A 20/B 34)

This process involves the three-fold synthesis of imagination along with the forms of judgment and the concepts of the understanding. For example, take Quantity from the above tables. The initial judgment is a singular categorical judgment such that the totality of the intuitive input apprehended from sensibility is singularly reproduced as an appearance, i.e. an undetermined object of empirical intuition. The *singular* judgment involves *unity* because the stage of apprehension in the three-fold synthesis limits the sensible manifold, and the reproduction singularly represents the *totality* which was apprehended from the sensible manifold.

> Like pinching a cloth into a fold, the totality of that which constitutes the fold is represented as a unity. This unity constitutes the empirical perception of an appearance. From there, this appearance may be further determined by moving up the class to particular judgments by regarding a plurality of appearances in a strand of associated appearances. The movement from a singular judgment to either a particular or universal judgment is both the movement of fully determining an appearance as an object of experience and the movement from the subjective validity of the singular judgment to the objective validity which may be found in the particular or universal judgments. In order
to make a judgment which is particular or universal, then, a plurality of appearances must be involved. Once a plurality of appearances are involved, a particular or universal judgment, which results in the recognition of the plurality in a concept \(=x\), necessarily entails the unity of the plurality, in so far as the very subsumption under the concept has unified the plurality.

The logic is the same here as what I just went over regarding empirical unity. Just think of a plurality of pinches in a cloth tied together – at one unified spot – like a bindle on a hobo stick for carrying along whatever mysterious content strikes your fancy. Now, this unity is conceptual unity. In fact, the unification of the plurality of appearances constitutes entrance into conceptuality – it is retrospectively that you are no longer blind to the ladder steps of plurality and totality upon which you have just climbed. Likewise, in order to grasp this unity you must climb into the logic of relations, and in doing so, you enter the Square of Opposition. Relations in this part of the structure of experience are no longer governed by empirical laws. Rather, this conceptual part of the structure of experience is governed by the law of non-contradiction. Lastly, since perceptions “are representations accompanied with sensation,” (CPR 1998, B 147), another way to characterize the difference between the singular judgment and the other two types of judgment is to follow Kant’s teaching from the Prolegomena §18 and refer to the singular judgment as a “judgment of perception” and the other judgments – due to their determinacy in regard to the Square of Opposition – as “judgments of experience.” (Proleg 130) I will comment further on this in the next section.

Now despite the logical consistency demonstrated above, the deeper problem of the Transcendental Deduction remains. As I noted previously, Kant’s comments
regarding this problem are ambivalent. At times he would have his readers believe there
was never a need to reformulate the deduction, and at other times he would have his
readers believe the first deduction could be overlooked. Yet, to be sure, the how of all
synthetic judgments in regard to experience is still at stake. Kant has not shown how the
manifold of sensibility is to be combined with understanding. He has only shown that if
it were to be combined, then logical validity could be conferred upon judgments
regarding experience. So as to see what hangs in the balance, recall that formal logic is
the discursivity of thought, and therefore does not account for the non-discursive in
experience. Some commentators – and possibly Kant himself – want judgment to
account then for the act of combining sensibility with understanding, but judgment,
again, is a power of understanding. In other words, judgment only spans the gap – as
discursive power of the understanding – in regard to that with which it is homogeneous.
Judgment deals with cognitions, i.e. concepts and other judgments. Yet, perhaps,
judgment points to a power which fully spans the gap between sensibility and
understanding. In the second edition deduction Kant does say, “judgment is nothing
other than the way to bring given cognitions to the objective unity of apperception.”
(CPR 1998, B 141) Before plunging into this deeper problem of the deduction, it is
important to be clear about the purpose of such an expedition.

I have just shown the general outline – within the scope of my project – depicting
how Kant is successful in establishing the objective validity of the combination of
sensibility with understanding. What remains is to work out the how problem which
Kant attempted to solve in the first edition Transcendental Deduction of the Critique. In
other words, whereas judgment objectively determines the manifold of sensibility,
imagination subjectively determines the manifold of sensibility. In an experience, then, judgment depends upon imagination to further along the trajectory of experience culminating in the experience of an object. As I have dealt with judgment above, I will deal with imagination below. The guiding question is, namely: How is the non-discursive of sensibility carried over into a judgment so that such judgments are experiential and not merely conceptual? Not only is this the problem of the first edition Transcendental Deduction, but this problem characterizes the problem of experience in general.

In other words, somehow Kant must account for the non-logical involved in experience, or else Kant has leveled the distinction with which he was to critique pure reason. As such, it would be as if in entering the labyrinth of logic by way of the Copernican turn Kant was unable to find his way back out. Hence, I will treat this question as a guiding thread to investigate Kant’s proposed solution in the first edition deduction. Kant refers to his proposed solution as the “three-fold synthesis” of imagination. Lastly regarding my purpose for treating of this three-fold synthesis below, this investigation of the three-fold synthesis accomplishes the following in regard to my overall project: first, investigating the three-fold synthesis provides the remaining pieces to the structure and trajectory of experience by describing the difficult to describe connection between sensibility and understanding; second, the three-fold synthesis indicates how the success of the Critique of Pure Reason hinges upon the power of imagination; finally, following Kant’s distinction between a logical and a real relation, i.e. the conceptual and the experiential standpoints, an investigation of the three-fold synthesis shows why Kant from an experiential standpoint was required to posit the thing-in-itself in response to the problem of non-being.
Brief Interlude: Three Standpoints of the Architectonic

It is worth pausing here to make a few observations about the ground just covered in the structure of experience, and draw some important conclusions. In the structure and trajectory of experience, once the blindness thesis no longer holds, i.e. upon entering conceptuality, the acquired vision, as it were, with which you can look back over the synthesis of which you were previously blind is not the vision of perception but the vision of apperception. I referred to this product of Leibniz’s influence on Kant above as “the top” of the structure of experience. Whereas, perception pertains to the empirical appearance, apperception pertains to the unity of the perceptions. Kant truly seems to enjoy employing the pattern of unifying multiplicities. The purpose of this interlude is to briefly discuss these two aspects of the structure of experience. First, I will comment on the rhetoric of specification that Kant relentlessly employs and which figures throughout the architecture of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Second, I will comment on the perspectival capacity for which the advent of conceptuality allows.

It requires, perhaps, multiple readings of the *Critique* in addition to scavenging across sections to figure the faculties of the mind. Yet, doing so reveals that the genus-species structure is so pervasive throughout the text\textsuperscript{251} that the *Critique of Pure Reason* may be thought of as fractal of the genus-species character. In fact, Kant’s critique of pure reason is designed to provide a Canon for reason. According to Kant,

> Such a critique is accordingly a preparation, if possible, for an organon, and, if this cannot be accomplished, then at least for a canon, in accordance with which the complete system of the philosophy of pure reason … [can] be exhibited. (CPR 1998, A 12/B 26)

\textsuperscript{251} Cf. (CPR A 656/B 684) and (CPR A 658/B 686).
Hence, scavenging across sections of the *Critique* in a mode of discovery using the genus-species character as a heuristic, I was able to put together what may be thought of as Kant’s Canon for reason.

When viewing Figure 2.7, you must keep in mind the movement of the figure goes from largest multiplicity at the bottom to unity in the notion of a Canon at the top. This is a schematic, then, of the entire limiting trajectory and structure of experience. Above apperception in the schematic indicates where thought has the capacity to become involved with itself alone, i.e. pure reason. Therefore, I will be focusing in the area around apperception to discuss different ways of considering, i.e. viewing, the “complete system of the philosophy of pure reason,” as Kant put it just above. My concern, of course, is not the “complete system,” though I point out the manner in which it can be understood. Rather, I am concerned with just one of these different ways of considering the system, i.e. the experiential aspect of Kant’s system.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kant’s Canon in the <em>Critique of Pure Reason</em></th>
<th>Function in Regard to Experience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power of the Mind</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reason</td>
<td>Principles (cf. A 299/B 356)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding</td>
<td>Rules (cf. A 126)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apperception</td>
<td>Judgments (cf. B 141)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imagination</td>
<td>Syntheses (cf. A 78/B 103)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sensibility</td>
<td>Sensible Manifold (cf. A 77/B 102)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 2.7**

I have already indicated that I take there to be three main standpoints in Kant’s system of pure reason, and each “as the station for an observer, has its own horizon, that is, a variety of things which can be represented, and as it were, surveyed from that standpoint [my emphasis].” (CPR 2003, A 685/B 686) The three main standpoints of the *Critique of Pure Reason* I refer to as “the experiential,” “the conceptual,” and “the performative” or “apperceptive.” First, the experiential is the standpoint from which I have been discussing the structure and trajectory of experience thus far, covering the
structure of experience at bottom to the terminal point where the object of experience is determined. This standpoint is best thought in conjunction with sensibility. Second, the conceptual covers the structure of experience pertaining to the understanding broadly designated or in general. According to Kant, “If the understanding in general is explained as the faculty of rules, then the power of judgment is the faculty of subsuming under rules, i.e., of determining whether something stands under a given rule.” (CPR 1998, A 132/B 171) Kant explains that “the power of judgment is a special talent that cannot be taught but only practiced.” (CPR 1998, A 133/B 172) Despite the caveat, Kant indicates that an analysis of principles “teaches” the power of judgment “to apply to appearances the concepts of the understanding, which contain the condition for rules a priori.” (CPR 1998, A 132/B 171) And, here comes the multiplicity into a unity pattern again.

Just as a multiplicity of rules is unified into a principle, Kant concludes, “If the understanding may be a faculty of unity of appearances by means of rules, then reason is the faculty of the unity of the rules of understanding under principles.” (CPR 1998, A 302/B 359) It is in this way that reason “never applies directly to experience or to any object but instead applies to the understanding, in order to give unity a priori through concepts to the understanding’s manifold cognitions.” (CPR 1998, A 302/B 359) Hence, “One can call all cognition through which I can cognize and determine a priori what belongs to empirical cognition anticipation.” (CPR 1998, A 166) This anticipation is structured by principles which have developed from the practice of using judgment in regard to experience. Anticipation, then, is both a hallmark of the conceptual standpoint as a proléptic and the way in which synthetic a priori judgments are made. Because
there is continuity from the rules of combination to the principles with which reason operates, synthetic *a priori* judgments, then, are possible. Kant’s comments here both indicate the possibility of viewing the understanding broadly designated from some standpoint as separate and offers further justification for Figure 2.7.

The last of the three standpoints, then, is what I have referred to as the “top” of the structure of experience, i.e. the performative, or the apperceptive. This standpoint pertains to the transcendental unity of apperception. I refer to it as the performative to reflect a double sense in the reference. On the one hand, Kant has indicated that the transcendental unity of apperception is also known as the “I think” (§16, B 132) or “I am, which accompanies all my judgments and actions of my understanding.” (CPR 1998, B xl) On the other hand, according to Kant this “I, of which one cannot even say that it is a concept … accompanies every concept;”\(^2\) that is, “Through this I, or He, or It (the thing), which thinks, nothing further is represented than a transcendental subject of thoughts =x, which is recognized only through the thoughts that are its predicates…” (CPR 1998, A 346/B 404) Whereas the previous =x marked the spot of the unity of the (transcendental) object, this =x marks the spot of the unity of the (transcendental) subject.

(Cf. CPR A 109)

For Kant since, “I cannot cognize as an object itself that which I must presuppose in order to cognize an object at all,” (CPR 1998, A 402) apperception is *alétheatic* (cf.

\(^2\) It is interesting to note Nietzsche’s association of the apperceptive I with a passage from the *New Testament*. Consistent with Kant’s depiction here, Nietzsche – at the beginning of the Preface to *On the Genealogy of Morals*, [Walter Kaufman, tr. (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 15] – suggests “We are unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge – and with good reason.” Especially the reference of good reason seems to point to Kant and further the transcendental status of the apperceptive I. Nietzsche follows this with an explicit reference to Matthew 6:21. And, in Matthew 6:22 you find, “The eye is the lamp of the body; so then if your eye is clear your whole body will be full of light.” [Translation from: *New American Standard Bible*, (Anaheim: Foundation Publications, 1995).] Also, cf. the lamp metaphor here with Nietzsche’s famous declaration in the *Gay Science*, §125.
and in the teaching of Friedrich Wilhelm J. Schelling, regarding this I or transcendental self, “one cannot say of the self that it exists, precisely because it is *being-itself* [Schelling’s emphasis].”\textsuperscript{254} This is of notable import regarding Schelling’s concern with non-being. Schelling thinks,

> If the I were to vanish, then nature would have absolutely no meaning. It is there only to limit the I, not something in its own right similar to the I and just as substantial, but rather precisely as something that is pure ‘Not-I’ which really is in its own right a non-being. *The I*, in the primal act of positing [sic] itself, *sets this nonbeing* in an incomprehensible manner in opposition to itself… [my emphases]\textsuperscript{255}

Regarding the former hand, then, it appears as though the I performs the “acts” of the understanding.\textsuperscript{256} Like the copula in a judgment (*x is y*). Regarding the latter hand, gathering itself from its acts in the world, though perhaps *always already* there, the I is revealed by the unification of sequences of mental (psychical) performances in the world. It is this – following J.G. Fichte\textsuperscript{257} – to which Schelling refers as the “act of positing itself.” Apperception, then, may be seen as its own standpoint from which to view Kant’s system, i.e. differently from both the experiential and the conceptual purviews.\textsuperscript{258} In fact, it is tempting to associate Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775-1854) with the

\textsuperscript{253}Apparently, the term “Alethic” has already been appropriated into a linguistic context.
apperceptive, conceptual, and experiential standpoints respectively. However, such a claim would take me too far afield to support.

The trajectory moving up the structure of *experience*, then, begins with sense and moves through imagination to the terminal point from which a number of standpoints for regarding Kant’s system derive. This terminal point itself belongs within imagination. Hegel in *Faith and Knowledge* refers to this point as “the organic Idea of productive imagination” which “stands in antithesis to the empirical manifold, either determining it or reflecting on it.” Referring to the structure of the text – see Figure 2.1 above –, this is the point between the Transcendental Deduction and the Schematism. Referring to the reviews of the *Critique of Pure Reason* noted above, this is the =x. Specifically, this is the =x which marks the unity of the object in the structure of experience.

Recall the blindness and emptiness theses. According to Kant, “Thoughts without content are *empty*; intuitions without concepts are *blind* [my emphasis].” (CPR 1996, A 51/ B75) The subjective unity of =x stands as the initial point of vision, i.e. non-blindness, in considering the *performance* of an experience. The objective unity of =x stands as the initial point of vision in considering an object of experience. When looking back, as it were, over the trajectory leading up to the objective unity of =x, this is =x as determining the object of experience. *When* =x stands opposed to the empirical manifold in a relation of reflection, because you are reflecting on the object not experiencing the object, then, despite its current non-blindness, =x is *empty*. In sum, you find the experiential standpoint (1) when the objective =x culminates an object of experience in a judgment of experience; you find the conceptual standpoint (2) when the objective =x

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initiates (reflective) conceptual analysis as the subject term in an analytic judgment; and, you find the apperceptive standpoint (3) at the copula of these judgments.

It is also possible to contrast Kant’s standpoints with one another. From the apperceptive standpoint, for example, Kant can say that perception “is properly only a determination of apperception.” (CPR 1998, A 368) Notice, this is a different view of perception than the one from the experiential standpoint I noted earlier. From the experiential standpoint, perception is the (performance of) the three-fold synthesis of imagination. What is more, Kant describes apperception as, “The supreme principle for the possibility of all intuition in reference to understanding,” and noted that “everything manifold in intuition is subject to conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception.” (CPR 1996, B 136) From here Kant says, “If, however, I investigate more closely the relation of given cognitions in every judgment … then I find that a judgment is nothing other than the way to bring given cognitions to the objective unity of apperception [Kant’s emphasis].” (CPR 1998, B 142) Hence, the apperceptive standpoint provides a view of judging which relates the structure of experience to the transcendental subject.

Yet, Kant explains that the “ascent to ever higher conditions to approach completeness in them” is a “need of reason.” (CPR 1998, A 309/B 365) And, further, “Reason is driven by a propensity of its nature” (CPR 1998, A 798/B 826) not by the transcendental subject, i.e. the apperceptive I. The insight here highlights the manner in which inference seems to “work on its own.” It is as if the procedure of applying reason so as to draw inferences functions with or without a focus of attention. Now, in my opinion, if you wish to understand the relations amidst the constellation of Kant’s
philosophy and philosophy in Kant’s wake, keeping this principle of perspective in mind is imperative. By keeping the three standpoints in mind you are able to recognize, for example, the difficulty of putting Hegel and Heidegger into dialog is the difficulty of putting the conceptual and apperceptive standpoints into dialog.\textsuperscript{260} With this separation between the views you can see that the difference between logic and being is the difference between a technology in the mind with a life of its own and the host of being upon which it is parasitic.\textsuperscript{261}

To sum, consistent with Kant’s declaration, “All our cognition starts from the senses, goes from there to the understanding, and ends with reason, beyond which there is nothing higher to be found in us to work on the matter of intuition.” (CPR 1998, A 298/B 355) I have shown thus far in the chapter how a multiplicity of sense is unified into a series of multiple appearances, i.e. a multiplicity of imagination. The multiplicity of imagination is then unified into a series of objects of experience, i.e. a multiplicity of appearances subsumed under concepts of the understanding. The mechanism, of course, for subsuming these concepts was judgment. Kant, then, has it that a multiplicity of judgments as rules for combining concepts may be unified into a series of principles. Post the blindness thesis, i.e. post entering into conceptuality there is also a retrospective depicting of the trajectory of experience.\textsuperscript{262} The three views I have commented on above are the determining, the reflecting, and the apperceptive i.e. the experiential, the conceptual, and the performative respectively. To draw a summary analogy, the

\textsuperscript{261} Martin Heidegger, \textit{The Basic Problem of Phenomenology}, Albert Hofstadter, tr. Bloomington, 1988), 178.
\textsuperscript{262} Another interesting use of this perspectival type of heuristic: Cf. Yi-Fu Tuan, \textit{Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience}, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2003), 8.
experiential: the conceptual and apperceptive :: the affecting influences of an object : the effecting influences of an object. Furthermore, I have stressed that once experience is no longer within sight, then the emptiness thesis is encountered. In this way, the conceptual standpoint may be considered empty in so far as it pertains to a reflecting beyond the experience which provided the =x standpoint for reflection. In other words, from the conceptual standpoint, what the x equals is undecidable.

The Thing-in-Itself & Imagination

I begin this section of the dissertation by investigating the three-fold synthesis of imagination which allows for the combination of sensibility and understanding. The three-fold synthesis is viewed from the experiential standpoint. So when Kant discusses this synthesis he does not presuppose unity of apperception or reason’s dialectical inferring. In terms of the Transcendental Deduction, the three-fold synthesis regards the combination of the content of an experience as opposed to the form which is regarded by judgment and apperception through the categories of the understanding. Therefore, the three-fold synthesis of the first edition Critique is considered the subjective, rather than the objective Transcendental Deduction. Kant is dealing here with the problem for which imagination, as his solution, is an “indispensable function of the soul.” (CPR 1998, A78/B 103)

In other words, if Kant were to say that the concept of an object of experience were waiting, as it were, in the mind for the object to come into contact with the senses, then Kant would be proposing a version of innate ideas. Not wanting this, Kant must come up with a way to transform that which is provoking an object of experience into the dimension of conceptuality. This regards the subjective side of the Deduction, and not
the objective side. Kant avoided proposing a version of innate ideas on the objective side of the Deduction – as indicated above – by claiming that judgment is a procedure developed from practice. In addition to the subjective side problem here, Kant needs to similarly account for the way concepts are applied to an absent object of prior experience.

Recalling, then, the three “original sources” which “contain the conditions of the possibility of all experience,” i.e. “sense, imagination, and apperception [Kant’s emphases],” (CPR 1998, A 94/B 127) Kant, of course, picks the one in the middle – imagination. With this strategy Kant focuses on the imagination as the ground from which consequently proceeds the combination of sensibility with understanding. Hence, Kant will transform the non-discursivity of the sensible manifold, by way of a three-fold synthesis of imagination, into an object of experience. As I will show, imagination spans both the subjective and objective sides of the Deduction, and as continuous, then, guards against the loss of non-discursivity due to the ultimate heterogeneity between the two stems which imagination combines.

To begin, then, consider all the possible outcomes in the attempt to combine sensibility and understanding. First, the intuitive product of sensibility may be determined in general with merely subjective validity. This is what Kant refers to as a judgment of perception in the *Prolegomena*. (Proleg 130) Second, the intuitive product of the sensibility may be determined in such a way as to yield objective validity. This is what Kant refers to in the second edition Preface of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (CPR 1998, B 11-12) and in the *Prolegomena* (Proleg 130) as a judgment of experience. Lastly, the intuitive product of the sensibility, if the understanding “has no concept ready
for the given intuition,” may be paused in its relation to the concept of an object in general, i.e. without being determined by it. This is what Kant refers to in the Critique of the Power of Judgment as a reflecting judgment or a judgment of reflection. Though these possibilities regarding the combination between sensibility and understanding are specified under the genus of judgment, the specific difference is determined by the function of the power of imagination.

That is, what Kant refers to as the three-fold synthesis (CPR A 97) in the first edition Transcendental Deduction of the Critique of Pure Reason determines the type of judgment for the subject. It is not, and cannot be, the other way around. The “changing free play of sensations,” from which the intuitive product of sensibility is derived, “is not grounded in any intention.” (CPJ 208) According to Kant, the subject cannot force a judgment beyond the capacity limitations of imagination. In looking at the three-fold synthesis of imagination, then, be sure to focus on the way in which imagination, through synthesis, grounds the object of experience. Put another way, regressing from the object of experience down the structure and trajectory of experience in the attempt to arrive back at the object’s origin, one cannot proceed beyond imagination. Proceeding beyond imagination, one encounters the blindness thesis.

So what is this three-fold synthesis of the imagination? It is important to remember this is one synthesis with three parts, i.e. one process with three stages. According to Kant, the three parts of this synthesis are: First, “the apprehension of the representations, as modifications of the mind in intuition”; second, “the reproduction of

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265 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews, tr., 208.
them in the imagination”; and, third, “their recognition in the concept [Kant’s emphases].” (CPR 1998, A 98) The terminal point of this trajectory is the concept in which the apprehended representations are “recognized,” in one form of judgment or another. What then is the initial point of this trajectory? The initial point is the product of the receptive sensibility upon being affected in an experience. Kant notes, “I ascribe a synopsis to sense, because it contains a manifold in its intuition.” (CPR 1998, A 98) Kant’s prose moves fast, and, in particular, here it is important not to disregard the synopsis of sense or treat it as a synthesis.

Were it not a gross overgeneralization to equate Robert Brandom with the 20th century division of Analytic philosophy and Edward Casey with the division of Continental philosophy, I might suggest both the Analytic and Continental schools of philosophy misunderstand this particular teaching of Kant’s. In commenting on Kant’s Critique, Brandom, blurring the distinction between receptivity and spontaneity, makes explicit the mistake of considering the synopsis to be itself a synthesis. The synopsis is not a synthesis, but the synopsis is necessary (but not sufficient) for there to be a synthesis of imagination. For example, because Brandom refers to the synopsis as a synthesis, “there is synthesis in intuition and imagination also [my emphasis]” by way of chain argument, i.e. synthesis occurs in both stems, and “synthesizing activity is an aspect of judgment,” he arrives at the misleading conclusion – central to his project – “Thus all our cognitive activity consists of judgment and aspects of that activity.”

In explicitly making the mistake of referring to the synopsis as a synthesis, the regrettable

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result follows that the value of non-discursivity in Kant is lost on Brandom, i.e. for him the mind is totally discursive.

Brandom, however, is in good company as Edward Casey similarly misattributes synthesis to the sensible manifold. Conflating the initial passive point of the trajectory of experience with the initial active part of the three-fold synthesis Casey suggests,

[Running-through] is a moment expressly singled out by Kant as well as by Husserl, both of whom designate it with the same verb: “durchlaufen.” For Kant, it represents the basic action of “synopsis,” the lowest-level synthesis of the sensible manifold as effected by apprehension [my emphasis].

It seems to me Casey’s mistaking of synopsis for synthesis reflects a Husserl-like overvaluating of intentionality, and such an overvaluating of intentionality under values the non-phenomenal peripherality of the synopsis. It may also be the case that Casey thinks of the three-fold synthesis as three syntheses, as evidenced by his use of the descriptor “lowest-level” in regard to synthesis. In either case, the consequence: Casey’s comments regarding memory, “what Kant called ‘reproductive’ imagination in its empirical employment involves the mere combination of what is already presented in the sensible manifold,” constitute a misreading. In the first stage of the three-fold synthesis, i.e. apprehension, only several aspects – or tiles, recalling Leibniz’s metaphor – are maintained from the synopsis of the sensible manifold.

If you forget the separation between sensibility and understanding, both the depth and the value of Kant’s structure and trajectory of experience are lost. Kant insists, “Our cognition arises from two fundamental sources in the mind,” and “through the former an object is given to us, through the latter it is thought.” (CPR 1998, A50, B74) Hence, at

the beginning of the Metaphysical Deduction Kant notes that Transcendental Logic “has a manifold of sensibility that lies before it a priori, which the transcendental aesthetic has offered to it;” (CPR 1998, A 76-77/B 102) he is referring to the synopsis just (structurally) prior to the three-fold synthesis of imagination. As Longuenesse notes, “it is one thing to have present to mind an intuition ‘containing a manifold,’ quite another to appprehend this manifold ‘as’ manifold.”\textsuperscript{270} Loosely characterized by James Ward, “Objective experience, structurally regarded, is … from end to end a synthesis of what he [Kant] termed ‘a manifold’.”\textsuperscript{271} In other words, it must be remembered that the trajectory of experience is a limiting one. Recalling Leibniz’s tile game here, the non-discursive exceeds our discursive intellect.

Heuristically you might approach an idea of such excessivity by way of way of analogy from the specificity of a concept of understanding regressively to the synopsis of the manifold in sensibility and beyond; yet, since what is exceeded is the very framework with which we are able to think, we cannot even think the non-discursive by way of relation to our framework, i.e. “relation” is itself a part of the framework. Albeit no image can do justice to the excessivity involved in non-discursivity, a figuration of the limiting trajectory of experience may be helpful here. Think of the manifold of sensibility, an appearance, and the concept which determines that appearance in terms of increasing clarity and distinctness. Such as structure coupled with the limiting trajectory of experience might be thought of as a cone rotated so an X-axis runs through its tip. As such a movement from left to right toward the focal point of the cone may be thought of

\textsuperscript{270} Béatrice Longuenesse, \textit{Kant and the Capacity to Judge}, 41.
as the trajectory from the initial point of the manifold of sensibility to the terminal point of the cone tip determining concept. Consider Figure 2.8 below.

Figure 2.8 is meant to represent the state of the manifold of sensibility, the subsequent three-fold synthesis of the imagination, and the laws involved across the trajectory.

The structure and trajectory of experience within the purview of the experiential standpoint begins with the synopsis of the manifold of sensibility moving through the three-fold synthesis of imagination to the determination of the object of experience in the objective unity of $=x$. As indicated in Figure 2.8, examining the laws governing the synopsis of sense and the synthesis of imagination yields the correct reading of the structure and trajectory of experience. I quote Kant at length here given the importance of the quote. According to Kant – post the Copernican revolution – there are three
original sources of experience, “namely sense, imagination, and apperception [Kant’s emphasis]. (CPR 1998, A 94/B 127) Now, according to Kant,

On these are grounded 1) the synopsis of the manifold a priori through sense; 2) synthesis of this manifold through the imagination; finally 3) the unity of this synthesis through original apperception [Kant’s emphases]. (CPR 1998, A 94/B 127)

Notice, apprehension as part of the three-fold synthesis is not included with synopsis by Kant, but rather appears to coincide with imagination under Kant’s heading “2)”. Further, each one of these grounds has its own law. Whereas you might expect a temporal law regarding sensibility, the law governing synopsis is actually “affinity.” (CPR A 113) The law governing the (three-fold) synthesis is “association.” (CPR A 123)

And, the law governing the unity of the synthesis, i.e. the reference through judgments to apperception, is “non-contradiction.” (CPR A 151/B 191) The synopsis hangs together by the law of affinity, and the initial “fold” of the three-fold synthesis must “run through” the synopsis in a certain way. “For apprehension is only a placing together of the manifold of empirical intuition; and we can find in it no representation of any necessity which determines the appearances thus combined to have connected existence in space and time.” (CPR 2003, A 177/B 219) Rather, their “connected”-ness derives from their affinity.

Notice the rhetoric of specification at work in the following Kant quote. Devoting less than a page to apprehension Kant notes,

Every intuition contains a manifold in itself, which however would not be represented as such if the mind did not distinguish the time in the succession of impressions [my emphasis] on one another; for as contained in one moment no representation can ever be anything other than absolute unity. (CPR 2003, A 99)
First, notice how the quote indicates that time itself derives from “the succession of impressions” which is unified in a moment. Here is the genus-species figure again. 

Apprehension, taking place in time, will be reproduced into a series of appearances to be unified by apperception via recognition in a concept \( = x \). Notice how this coincides with the three original sources and the laws Kant noted above. This describes the first two stages of the process Kant calls the three-fold synthesis of imagination. It is instructive to consider Kant’s language here.

Kant’s first mention of the three fold synthesis occurs in The Metaphysical Deduction, i.e. the section just prior to the Transcendental Deduction. Recall, this section is titled by Kant, “On the Clue to the Discovery of all Pure Concepts of the Understanding.”\(^{272}\) There – in the translation of Paul Guyer and Allen Wood – Kant says, “the spontaneity of our thought requires that this manifold first be gone through, taken up, and combined in a certain way in order for cognition to be made out of it.” (CPR 1998, A 77/B 102) Here is Kant’s German: *Allein die Spontaneität unseres Denkens erfordert es, dass dieses Mannigfaltige zuerst auf gewisse Weise durchgegangen, aufgenommen, und verbunden werde, um daraus eine Erkenntnis zu machen.*\(^{273}\)

Concerning “taken up;” J.M.D. Meiklejohn translates “aufgenommen” as “received into,”\(^{274}\) and the cluster of related terms involved here are “absorbed,” “affiliated,” “recorded.” Similar to Guyer and Wood, Werner Pluhar translates the term

as “taken up.” In the Transcendental Deduction, then, using different terms Kant’s language alludes to the earlier passage of the Metaphysical Deduction:

Now in order for unity of intuition to come from this [synopsis] manifold (as, say, in the representation of space), it is necessary first to run through and then to take together this manifoldness, which action I call the synthesis of apprehension… (CPR 2003, A 99)

This is the passage mentioned by Casey above.275 The German reads:

*Damit nun aus diesem Mannigfaltigen Einheit der Anschauung werde, (wie etwa in der Vorstellung des Raumes) so ist erstlich das Durchlaufen der Mannigfaltigkeit und dann die Zusammennehmung desselben notwendig, welche Handlung die Synthesis der Apprehension nenne…* 276

This running through which Brandom and Casey conflate with the synopsis – recall the long Kant quote two paragraphs above – is the distinguishing of time in the succession of impressions which sense has placed in succession, governed by affinity. Running through belongs to apprehension, not synopsis. This is easy to miss, but it is the very reason why Fichte considered time to be imaginary. That is, time is determined in apprehension by *imagination* in the process of the three-fold synthesis, and hence, for Fichte “only for imagination is there time.”277

Comparing the German passages above, Kant’s verbs at A 77 become nouns at A 99. That is, what Kant refers to at A 77 as to be gone through becomes the running though at A 99. This describes apprehension in relation to the synopsis of sense. This next comparison is less obvious. At A 77 Kant’s “aufgenommen” becomes “die Zusammennehmung,” from received into or taken up at A 77 to take together or gathering


together in A 99. This gathering together does include a change from sense or impression to image. In other words, imagination must produce an image, but the production of this image derives from what has been apprehended from sense. Like the change of pitch in a voice, the two different pitches are parts of the same one breath. So, this production by imagination is a re-production of what has been apprehended. Which is why Kant says, “the reproductive synthesis of the imagination belongs to the transcendental acts of the mind [therefore]… let us call this power the transcendental power of imagination.” (CPR 1996, A 102) In other words, reproduction is the first sign of imagination as an original source or power of the mind, recall (A 94/B 127) above.

So, the other side of imagination as an original source or power of the mind is the productive imagination. These two sides of imagination or two imaginations show how Kant establishes a continuity of power which spans the gap between sensibility and understanding while spanning the gap between the empirical and the pure. Referring back to Kant’s metaphorical introduction at (A 2-3/B 6), John Sallis refers to this transition “from one kind of ground to another” as a transition from “ground to flight” indicating this second ground to which imagination has lifted as the point of departure of reason, i.e. the conceptual standpoint. The conceptual purview requires a “schema” as its initial point of departure. Moreover, “A schema is, in itself, always only a product of the imagination.” (CPR 1996, A 140/B 179) When the conceptual purview is coupled with that of the experiential, i.e. when sensibility is combined with understanding in an experience, the productive imagination provides this schema – derived from the workings of sensibility and the first two folds of the three-fold synthesis. When the conceptual

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purview regards itself, i.e. it is not coupled with the experiential, this exemplifies pure reason. As such, the schema is still produced by imagination; however, the schema is “provided by logic.” (CPR 1996, A 406/B 433) Hence, whereas the product of the reproductive imagination is empirical, i.e. empirical appearances, the product of the productive imagination in regard to objective unity is “the nonempirical object, i.e. the transcendental object = x.”

Kant uses the formulation “=x” seven (7) times in the Critique of Pure Reason. The first six refer to objective unity of an object of experience, and the seventh refers to the subjective unity of apperception. Of the first six, four of the uses appear in the five page section Kant devotes to “Recognition in the Concept,” i.e. the productive imagination’s role in the three-fold synthesis of imagination. Remember the three-fold synthesis takes place in the first edition Transcendental Deduction. Notice what Kant believes he has accomplished, and how he thinks he accomplished it.

The three-fold synthesis is all of imagination, so the reproductive imagination deals with the empirical aspects of sensibility, and the productive transforms them into something judge-able by apperception so as to be explicated by the understanding broadly designated, i.e. including reason. By placing this movement within the continuity of one power, i.e. imagination, Kant thinks he has solved the heterogeneity issue, derived from sensibility’s stem of knowledge compared to the understanding’s stem of knowledge, by combining them with the original power which resides between them – imagination. Now this is actually a viable strategy. However, Kant would have done better if he could have found some power of the mind residing within all of the

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280 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Werner S Pluhar, tr., 160.
original sources, rather than merely situated between them. Moreover, Kant’s choice of imagination as the power to combine the stem containing non-discursivity, i.e. sensibility, with the discursive stem, i.e. understanding, committed him to posit a thing-in-itself. And, it was precisely this commitment which kept Kant from solving the problem of non-being.

Though it will require the entirety of Chapter 8 for me to ground my criticism of imagination in Kant’s first Critique, I can generally state my criticism here within the context of what I have said above. There are two objectives for the remainder of the chapter, then; to expand my comments on the relation of imagination to memory in Kant’s thinking, and to indicate the connection between imagination and the thing-in-itself within the context of the experiential standpoint. Ultimately, I believe Kant overlooked the importance of memory in the structure of experience, and this committed him to positing the thing-in-itself from the experiential standpoint. In his defense, and considering passages in the critique such as the one reporting on the laws of affinity and association, Kant was not concerned to fully articulate the ground of experience. He was concerned to critique the use of pure reason. Yet, it seems to me Kant did not see the full import of the laws of memory whose position in the structure of experience he indicated.

Regarding memory in Kant’s Critique, psychologist Herbert Nichols (1852-1936) made the following observation.

> I would call attention to one of the most unique facts in all of literature, (one I have nowhere seen mentioned), namely that in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason … the subject of memory is not once referred to, nor even the word memory or its equivalent once used, not even incidentally throughout. … [Kant] actually builds up his system of mind utterly without memory.\(^\text{282}\)

I certainly concur with the spirit of Nichols’ comment. Of course, much has been learned about memory from the late 18th century to the 21st, so perhaps Kant cannot be faulted for not recognizing the potential in his system regarding memory. Yet, it is remarkable that of the usual German words for memory, i.e. “Gedächtnis” and “Erinnerung,” “Gedächtnis” does not appear at all in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Now the word “Erinnerung” may be translated as “recollection,” “remembrance,” or “reminiscence;” and, Erinnerung appears nine (9) times in the Critique. Once Kant offhandedly uses it to refer to Plato’s theory of recollection (anamnesis) – (A 313/B 370) –, twice he uses it to refer to the power of memory when he is just listing powers of the mind – both occur at (A 649/B 677) –, and the remaining times Kant uses this term in direct communication with the reader, e.g. “to remind,” “a reminder,” etc. Yet, Kant discussed memory outside of the first Critique, mainly in his Anthropology. So, it is possible to figure a view of the relation between imagination and memory to Kant’s mind. Therefore, I will comment on those passages here to support my claim that Kant privileged imagination over memory prior to addressing the relation between imagination and the thing-in-itself.

Despite the conspicuous absence of memory from Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, it cannot be suggested that the possibility of featuring memory instead of imagination never crossed Kant’s mind. Kant was aware of Leibniz’s Monadology (A 266/B 322); yet, where Kant attributes succession of appearances to imagination, Leibniz in the Monadology §26 explicitly refers it to memory, e.g. “Memory provides the soul with a kind of consecutiveness, which resembles reason but which is to be distinguished from it.” Further, in Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View,

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Kant specifically considers both imagination and memory, in sections §31 and §34 respectively. Kant published this work in 1798, i.e. eleven (11) years after the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, and six (6) years before his death in 1804. When considering memory in his Anthropology, i.e. section §34, Kant uses the term “Gedächtnis.” However, it is important to note the title of this section in which Kant discusses memory, it is “On the faculty of visualizing the past and the future by means of the power of imagination.” So, Kant treats memory here as a subsection of using the power of imagination to “visualize.”

What is more, section §31 is titled, “On the productive faculty belonging to sensibility according to its different forms,” and in this section Kant considers the subsections regarding the “faculty of association” and the “faculty of affinity.” In fact, he considers both apprehension and reproduction from the three-fold synthesis of the Critique, and he labels them “imaginatio plastica” and “imaginatio associans” respectively. (Anth 284)285 Oddly, he acknowledges that imaginatio associans “produces a habit in the mind,” (Anth 285) but he seems to consider “habit” a minimally effective storehouse both controlled by the power of imagination and for the power of imagination. (Anth 284) Hence, it seems safe to say, not only that Kant privileges imagination over memory, but Kant even considers association and affinity to derive from imagination, not memory. From the perspective of the 21st century memory research, he was, of course, wrong.

As Wayne Waxman would have it in his *Kant’s Model of the Mind*, thinking of faculties of the mind in regard to unfolding and self-affection, basically all that there is in experience is imagination, and in encountering constraints, space, time, and the law of non-contradiction result; further – following such a ubiquity of imagination reading –, with imagination as pre-discursive apperception, it is as if imagination later imagines itself as you along with your existence.\(^{286}\) Whereas the Aristotelian model of theocentric mind has been characterized as thinking thinking thinking,\(^{287}\) with Waxman it is as if the description of the Kantian model of anthropocentric mind should be imagining imagining imagining.\(^{288}\) Waxman also holds that what otherwise would be thought of as memory is thought of as imagination in Kant’s *Critique*.\(^{289}\)

Such a reading – as Waxman’s – may not be as farfetched as it might initially appear. In his discussion of productive imagination in the *Anthropology* Kant points out that imagination’s “offences” range from the “unbridled” to the “perverse.” Kant, then, provocatively claims, “The inventive power of imagination produces a kind of intercourse with ourselves” which he considers “incurable: except through marriage [Kant’s emphasis].” (Anth 290) What is important here is that Kant clearly thinks powers of the mind can affect themselves – compare the comment regarding apperception from the *Critique* at (CPR B 68). So, toward supporting Waxman’s accentuation of Kant’s privileging of imagination, Kant can be taken to hold a self-activity/self-affection reading of imagination. Yet, importantly, Kant does not consider memory capable of


\(^{289}\) Wayne Waxman, *Kant’s Model of the Mind*, 170.
such self-activity. Moreover, it is in the *Anthropology* where Kant explicitly indicates the difference between memory and the reproductive imagination.\(^{290}\)

Memory is distinguished from the merely reproductive power of imagination in that it is able to reproduce the former representations voluntarily, so that the mind is not a mere plaything of the imagination [Kant’s emphasis]. (Anth 291)

In the language of the 21\(^{st}\) century memory research: Kant is not aware of the power of unconscious memory, i.e. the manner in which memory can affect itself and function without the subject’s awareness. Lastly, of “forgetfulness (*oblìviositas*),” in such a state, Kant claims “the head” is “empty like a barrel full of holes.” (Anth 293)

As I mentioned above both Kant and Martin Heidegger considered the “unknown root” which combines sensibility with understanding to be (a complex performance by the) imagination.\(^{291}\) And, given the comments of the *Anthropology* above, it seems Kant could not have considered memory the “unknown root” responsible for combining the stems of sensibility and understanding. For Kant, imagination “as an original source” “of the conditions for the possibility of all experience” (CPR 1998, A 94/B 127) is necessary prior to the functioning of memory.

This privileging of imagination may be characterized by suggesting: *imagination – for Kant – must convert the sensible products into something which can be remembered*. Ultimately, however, such an understanding of memory is too narrow. Yet, Kant is not the only philosopher to think of the relation between imagination and memory in such a way. Though an exhaustive history including the proponents of this relation between imagination and memory is outside the scope of this dissertation, the

\(^{290}\) Cf. (CPR A 120-121).

pervasiveness of this relation prompted Casey to refer to it as the “classical sequence of ‘first perception-then memory,’” [Casey’s emphases].

Notably, then, before Kant: Aristotle (384-322 BC), Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), John Locke (1632-1704), Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716), George Berkeley (1685-1753), David Hume (1711-1776), Étienne Bonnot de Condillac (1715-1780), and Thomas Reid (1710-1796) amongst others, and in Kant’s wake, Heidegger (1889-1976), Deleuze (1925-1995), and Derrida (1930-2004), amongst others, fundamentally agree with imagination’s priority over memory in the structure of experience. Given the Copernican revolution, Kant’s twist to the classical sequence might read something like “‘first imagination, as a condition for perception, then perception and memory.”

If I may venture a speculative interpretation here, I would suggest that Kant preferred to go with imagination over memory for two reasons. One, it is difficult to separate the notion of memory from ideas of a power used solely for the purposes of storage and looking into past experience. Two, imagination is conveniently ambiguous

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as to where it is grounded. So, you can move up the trajectory of experience in the
purview of the experiential standpoint establishing imagination as a ground, then you can
switch over to the apperceptive view, and because of imagination’s ambiguity, it cannot
be determined whether imagination derives from empirical workings or the self-activity
of being. In comparison, it seems more clear that memory is bound to empirical
workings. This, of course, is neither to say that the power of memory out of empirical
workings does not function to reveal being, i.e. memory as the ground and catalyst of
ontological emergence, nor is it to suggest being is diminished in anyway if memory is in
fact bound to empirical workings.

Addressing the thing-in-itself, then, it is fair to say that Kant’s thing-in-itself is
infamous.302 The thing-in-itself is the most easily, and most frequently, criticized aspect
of Kant’s philosophy, especially by those who do not take the time to understand what
Kant actually says in the Critique of Pure Reason.303 It would take me too far afield to
discuss all the ways which the thing-in-itself has been criticized. Rather, my interest here
is to pinpoint the two commitments due to which Kant posited such a controversial entity.
Or, put another way, what in Kant’s structure of experience required him to talk about the
thing-in-itself? I approach this question with the heuristic of the three standpoints –
experiential, conceptual, and apperceptive. I have already indicated Kant was not the
first to use the expression “thing-in-itself [Ding an sich].” Above I have quoted Leibniz
and Newton, among others, using the same phraseology. Moreover, there is, of course, a
history of thinking in regard to the thing-in-itself. For example, pointing to a Platonic
origin, Giorgio Agamben and Juliana Schiesari declare,

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[T]he expression, “the thing itself” (τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτό) … is a formulation that remained so deterrminate as the indication of the task of philosophy itself, that one finds it again more than two thousand years later, like a watchword passed from mouth to mouth, in Kant, in Hegel, in Husserl, in Heidegger.\(^{304}\) Moreover, this language of “in itself” should conjure for you Plato’s language of καθ’αὑτό and the problem of “looking through” an Idea – both discussed in the Introduction. However, like the history of imagination, Kant’s Copernican revolution – as a new beginning – not only provides a different vista of imagination and the thing-in-itself, but also Kant’s revolution in thinking provides a new vista of the problem of non-being. I address this new vista in the next chapter.

To the thing-in-itself, regarding the structure of the text – compare with Figure 2.1 above – in the final major division of the Transcendental Logic, the Transcendental Dialectic, and specifically in the section titled “Dialectical Inferences of Pure Reason” Kant discusses “The Antinomy of Pure Reason [Der Antinomie der reinen Vernunft].” Antinomy here brings forth the “against” of “anti-” and the “law” of “nomos,” which coupled with the double genitive in “of pure reason,” suggests something of a paradox. It is as if reason, specifically the “demand of reason” (CPR 1996, A 409/B 436) for totality i.e. systematic completeness, transgresses its governing law regarding these antinomies. It is in this way that speculation into unknown matters may seem reasonable, despite exceeding the bounds of (even possible) experience.

This is the way in which the =x as transcendental object becomes equated with the thing-in-itself. As the schema provided by productive imagination to meet the demands of reason for systematicity, the productive imagination provides the thing-in-itself as a transcendental object, i.e. the condition for the possibility of the trajectory of experience

as seen from the conceptual standpoint. This then, is the way to arrive at the thing-in-itself from the conceptual standpoint. Yet, the way to arrive at the thing-in-itself which I am primarily concerned with is from the experiential standpoint.

Having already assumed objects must conform to our knowledge, i.e. the structure by which we come to know an object, Kant refers to any concern for what is “outside” the structure by which we come to know an object as a “cosmological” concern. From the experiential standpoint for instance, beginning at \(=x\), if you attempt to regress back to the origin of the sensation(s) which resulted in your experience of a particular object, you will not be able to proceed beyond the limit of that which allows ultimately for our knowledge in the first place. For Kant, regardless of standpoint, this final frontier is imagination.

Put another way, begin with any object of experience, and reggressively trace the series within that to which it was supposed objects must conform, i.e. to the structure by which we come to know an object. Regressing along this series out to the limit of the cognitive capacity which allows for experience, at the ground you encounter sensibility governed by affinity. Yet, the Grundkraft or fundamental power which performs the apprehension of a manifold out of the synopsis of the sensible manifold is, for Kant, imagination. As we are blind to what initiates the series along the trajectory of experience, the three postulates of origin coincide with the three standpoints in the architectonic. From the conceptual standpoint the postulated initial point is thought to be “noumenal,” as opposed to “phenomenal.” From the experiential standpoint, the postulated initial point is thought to be the thing-in-itself, as opposed to the appearance.
Lastly, from the apperceptive standpoint, the initial point is postulated – following Schelling – as the Not-I or non-being.

Regarding the thing-in-itself, paradoxically, Kant tells us, “what things may be in themselves I do not know – nor do I need to know, since, after all, I can never encounter a thing otherwise than in appearance.” (CPR 1996, A 277/B 333) Kant has already told us imagination is a condition for the possibility of appearances. However, it seems now that dividing imagination out of the appearance leaves us with a remainder – the thing-in-itself. As Nicholas Rescher describes it “To be fully objective and authentic, an appearance must be an appearance of something [Rescher’s emphasis]; there must be an underlying something that does the appearing, that grounds it in a nonphenomenal [my emphasis].”\(^{305}\) Yet, if we need to divide out imagination in order to arrive at the thing-in-itself, then there cannot, of course, be an image of the thing-in-itself.

Likewise, having moved back down the trajectory which must be traversed to experience an object, concepts of the understanding are not applicable, and – what is more – in arriving at the bottom of the structure of experience the sensible intuitions of space and time have been regressively divided out of the appearance as well. So, it cannot be said that the thing-in-itself is in space or time. Despite its name, suddenly, the thing-in-itself seems to be ineffable. Furthermore, for Kant being experienced requires the unity provided for by our experiential apparatus. Since the experiential apparatus has been regressively divided out, about the thing-in-itself it cannot be said that it is, i.e., it is not. Hence, the difficult problem for Kant, i.e. how to describe the origin of experience when that origin lacks being? This, of course, for Kant after Aristotle’s paradigm shift is the problem of non-being.

Now, the apperceptive standpoint may look out over the landscape of conceptuality – using pure reason –, or it may look out over experience – regressively, cf. the A edition Deduction. As I have established above, in both cases, the ground for Kant is some version of imagination i.e. either a product of or the power of imagination respectively. My question can be stated in the following way: *From the experiential standpoint, how does Kant’s decision to make imagination the Grundkraft commit him to the thing-in-itself as his solution to the problem of non-being?*

Wilhelm Wurzer (1948-2009) illuminated thoroughly the imaginal dimension in Kant’s works – so to him I turn briefly to answer the above question. In his *Filming and Judgment* Wurzer posits “filming” to articulate the covering or, to use the phraseology I prefer, “Lêtheic (cf. Λῆθη) flowing” of images whose river like flowing at the ground of experience covers over the thing-in-itself. Wurzer uses an excerpt from the Epicurean Lucretius’ *On the Nature of Things* [*De Rerum Natura*] to punctuate a unification of Kant’s imagination and his own notion of “filming.” Wurzer translates the following from the poem of Lucretius,

… I now begin to teach you about images, so-called. A subject of most relevant importance. These images are like a skin, a film, peeled from the body’s surface, and they fly … Let me repeat: these images of things [*rerum simulacra*] … you might call them film, or bark. (F&J xiii)

Playing again on the double entendre derived from a phonetic focus on the word “site,” Wurzer explains, “Philosophy, suddenly, shall have awakened on a radically different site

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306 Though I was not able to fully articulate my thesis prior to Dr. Wurzer’s death, I was fortunate enough to have shared a good number of conversations with him. I am grateful for those conversations and his influence.


through the medium of film.” (F&J xiii) Note, it is important not to hypostasize this “site,” i.e. equate it with a world such as the penchant of certain French psychoanalysts and phenomenologists. Filming points to the instability of images in regard to becoming, not being. Therefore, though it is correct to speak of standpoints or (virtual) dimensions, it is incorrect to speak of imaginary and symbolic orders or worlds. You may gain access to a standpoint, but the world as constantly becoming, non-discursively exceeds even my designation of it here.

As Wurzer taught, “Filming deconstructs the dialectic empire in the genealogy of metaphysics … it emerges in a philosophical discourse for which judgment is no longer under the spell of the identity of reason and ground.” (F&J 2) In this way, Wurzer is working at describing a moving figure – making a film – casting Kant’s ground of experience by suspending the conceptuality involved in the power of judgment. Notice this is intimately related to one of the ways discussed in the Introduction regarding entering the dialectic (empire). With such an aesthetic suspension of judgment a “shift from an epistemic to an aesthetic spacing allows imagination the freedom to reflect upon a different grounding, one that lets Anschauung be.” (F&J 33) By stopping short of the conceptual standpoint, once again “It is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that existence and the world are eternally justified [Nietzsche’s emphasis].”

Regarding the thing-in-itself from a non-conceptual standpoint, then, Kant’s following remark fully establishes the thing-in-itself as his response to the problem of non-being from the experiential standpoint: “we cannot have cognition of any object as thing in itself [Gegenstände als Dinge an sich selbst], but can have such cognition only

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insofar as the object is one of sensible intuition, i.e. an appearance. [Object der
sinnlichen Aunschauung is, d.i. als Erscheinung.]” (CPR 1996, B xxvi) Hence,
otherwise an absurd proposition would follow, viz. that
there is appearance without anything that appears [my
emphasis].” [Denn sonst würde der ungereimte Satz daraus
folgen, dass Erscheinung ohne etwas wäre, was da
erscheint.] (CPR 1996, B xxvii)
In reference to the distinction between “logical” (conceptual) and “real” (experiential)
negation discussed by Kant in his Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative
Magnitudes into Philosophy (NM 211), the antinomous positing of a thing-in-itself
pertains to the conceptual standpoint and logical negation. The imaginal-re-productive
positing of a thing-in-itself pertains to the experiential standpoint in Kant and real
negation. In this way, then, from the conceptual standpoint Kant’s solution to the
problem of not-being (with a “t”) is the noumenon. From the experiential standpoint,
Kant’s solution to the problem of non-being (with an “n”) is the thing-in-itself.

To sum in concluding, I have shown you the structure and trajectory of experience
in Kant. I have pointed out the three standpoints, i.e. the experiential, the apperceptive,
and the conceptual. I have indicated the purview of these standpoints, and their relation
to negation. I have presented Kant’s distinction between logical and real negation. I
have associated Kant’s types of negation with the conceptual and experiential
standpoints. Thereby, I have precisely located the discussion of the problem of non-
being in regard to Kant’s system generally and his structure of experience specifically. I
have indicated his privileging of imagination over memory. I have shown his
commitment to the solution of the problem of non-being – negation from the experiential

310 Though I will discuss noumena briefly in the next chapter, as this is expressly not my focus, and a full
treatment of noumena would take me too far afield; I will not extensively explore the noumenal aspect of
Kant’s system in the dissertation. Moreover, I have made the distinction sufficiently clear as to preclude
such a treatment of noumena.
standpoint – which results from his privileging of imagination. Therefore, I have shown how the thing-in-itself is Kant’s attempt to solve the problem of non-being.

In the remaining chapters of Part I (the non-being part) of the dissertation, I will show the evolved and compounded reading of Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* which Derrida and Deleuze encounter – Chapter 3. I will then relate Derrida and Deleuze to Kant’s system by indicating from where in the structure of experience they attempt to locate pure difference, i.e. their points of departure. Derrida takes the high ground, as it were, the conceptual standpoint, and Deleuze takes the low ground, i.e. the experiential standpoint. I, then, show how pure difference functions for each of them respectively as a response to the problem of non-being. In the chapters of Part II (the memory part) I will critique pure difference in Derrida and Deleuze by drawing them together with Kant and solving the problem of non-being. I have already indicated above how I will accomplish this. Affinity and association in Kant should refer to memory not imagination.

By my lights memory is the continuous power traversing the structure of experience. Using contemporary memory research, I will show you memory as the *Grundkraft*. And, with memory as the fundamental power in the structure of experience (not imagination), I eliminate the need for not only pure difference but also the thing-in-itself. You should already be able to see not only by the logic of my overall move in looking back on this chapter – so long as I am able to account for memory as the *Grundkraft* – but also by the consistency of my overall argument: I have found the solution to the problem of non-being.
“So we won’t agree with somebody who says that denial signifies a contrary. We’ll only admit this much: when ‘not’ and ‘non-’ are prefixed to names that follow them, they indicate something other than the names, or rather, other than the things to which the names following the negation are applied.”

~Plato, Sophist (257b-c)

“[T]hink through mediation and then give a little credit to the Greeks. The Greek explanation of the theory of being and nothing, the explanation of ‘the moment,’ ‘non-being,’ etc. trumps Hegel.”

~Søren Kierkegaard, Repetition §1

“It is so difficult to find the beginning. Or, better: it is difficult to begin at the beginning. And not try to go further back.”

~Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty §471

Chapter Three: Dialectic and Difference – Apprehending Non-Being

Introduction and Justification for Chapter 3 Sections and Objectives

There are two overarching goals for this chapter. First, I provide standard logical treatment of the various types of propositions as possible ways to state non-being. As you should be able to predict, neither the propositions – piecemeal or whole –, nor their respective logical negations solve the problem of non-being. Second, I provide a reading of G.W.F. Hegel’s dialectic with explicit reference to Kant’s structure of experience from the previous chapter. As if providing the transitional form of Aristotle’s demonstration/dialectic divide bridging the previous two chapters with the subsequent two chapters. This chapter, then, like the Introduction contributes material to the topic which could stand at the beginning of both the Derrida and the Deleuze chapters. I decided to put the material in a separate chapter to decrease redundancy. Hence, on the one hand, this chapter does not require the length of the previous chapter. On the other hand, this chapter is designed to decrease the length of both of the subsequent chapters.

Historically, a number of influential thinkers appear between Kant and Derrida and Deleuze. Though an exhaustive treatment of all the thinkers appearing between them is beyond the scope of my project, I have selected key figures to historically substantiate what the combination of the previous two chapters coupled with the subsequent two chapters, respectively, should logically substantiate. The thinkers with which I will deal in this chapter include: Hegel and Jean Hyppolite. Hegel is important because, as will be clear in the next two chapters, contemporary French philosophy in general, and specifically the philosophy of Derrida and Deleuze, is widely considered a reaction to the philosophy of Hegel. What is more, the reactions of Derrida and Deleuze indicate an attempt to overcome Hegel which is grounded in a return to Kant, specifically Kant’s structure of experience. Hyppolite is important because contemporary French philosophy’s return to Kant was largely fueled by Hyppolite’s book *Logic and Existence* (1952). In regard to my discussion of Kantian standpoints, in their reaction to Hegel’s dialectic Derrida and Deleuze represent unique – “post-structuralist” – returns to Kant’s conceptual and experiential standpoints respectively.

Recall Plato’s two impasses generally coincide with the conceptual and experiential standpoints of Kant’s structure of experience. I read Kant’s Copernican revolution as in itself going far toward overcoming Plato’s first impasse. Yet, ultimately, the strength of Kant’s structure of experience resides in its ability to think non-discursivity. As such, Kant’s structure of experience overcomes Plato’s first impasse. Further, then, I read Kant’s thing-in-itself as his attempt to overcome the second of Plato’s two impasses. However, ultimately Kant’s thing-in-itself falls short of providing a solution to the problem of non-being.
Similarly, I have divided the post-Kantian influences into two groups of two to represent what I see as the post-Kantian oscillation between the two impasses of the problem of non-being. I refer to this movement as an oscillation because it is as if after Kant’s progress to the second impasse of the problem, Hegel’s attempt to sublate Kant’s structure of experience results in a return to the first impasse. I see the work of Derrida and Deleuze, then, as resulting in a return to the second impasse. To make sense of this return to the second impasse I show the movement from Hegel through Hyppolite to Derrida and Deleuze. This chapter, then, further serves as a bridge connecting Kant’s structure and trajectory of experience, the problem of non-being, and pure difference.

Can Non-Being Be Stated Symbolically? – A Thoughtful Experiment

“the ability to contradict [is] the attainment of a good conscience.”\textsuperscript{314}

~Friedrich Nietzsche, \textit{The Cheerful Science} (§297)

Those who ridicule discussing the topic of non-being usually do so by appealing to logic.\textsuperscript{315} On the one hand, they – such as Rudolf Carnap – suggest lacking logical rigor one may lapse into making “pseudo-statements.”\textsuperscript{316} On the other hand, those who resist providing a logical reading – the likes of Martin Heidegger – defend such an approach suggesting, “the nothing is more original than the (logical) ‘not’ and negation.”\textsuperscript{317} Notice how this exchange mimics the so called digressive section of Plato’s \textit{Sophist} and the two impasses indicated there. First, there is the charge that a certain type

of statement should not be made. Second, the final answer provided in the text makes just such a pseudo-statement in suggesting that non-being is (difference). As I contend, correctly solving the problem of non-being shows that *both* Carnap and Heidegger are correct in that pseudo-statements should be avoided, and logical negation cannot assume the appropriate relation from which to reveal non-being. Moreover, it may be suggested that Heidegger merely lacked the contemporary vocabulary with which to provide a non-pseudo-statement solution. In other words, with the solution to the problem of non-being, neither Carnap nor Heidegger loses ground by affirming each other’s statements noted above.

In this brief section, then, I seek to show how the logical negations involved miss the problem of non-being. This discussion hearkens back to Aristotle from the Introduction. Yet, this discussion should be relevantly different as it explicitly engages the problem from a formally logical perspective. In other words, I take Carnap’s challenge seriously. Though I find Heidegger’s style to be excellent and enchanting, by not resorting to pseudo-statements I hope to show I have truly solved the problem. As this section, then, goes toward illustrating that logical negation is insufficient to think non-being, I will begin with straightforward examples from formal logic. That is, I will illustrate various logical negations as they are found in propositional logic. I chose to use propositional logic as it is the approach to investigating symbolization which will be viewed as involving the least amount of smoke and mirrors. Hence, even non-experts in logic should be able to recognize both that this approach treats the topic logically and also fails to account for non-being. In concluding this discussion I will also briefly discuss predicate logic as faring no better on the topic.
I will proceed, quite simply, by showing the different standard form propositions emphasizing their delineation into components, and I will show the various ways to negate the components toward discovering which negation should be associated with non-being. Moreover, it should be noted that it is unnecessary for me to consider paraconsistent logic. As Anscombe’s syllogism stated in the Introduction clearly indicates, neither the problem of non-being nor the (non-pseudo) statement of non-being requires what calls for paraconsistent logic, i.e. taking a contradiction as point of departure. It should be further noted that in saying this I have also breached the difference between my approach and the generally referred to – and perhaps misnamed – “Buddhist” approach to non-being. For example, Graham Priest in his *Towards Non-Being: The logic and metaphysics of intentionality* seeks to indicate the appropriateness of paraconsistent logic to an idea of non-being as expounded in texts generally considered “Buddhist.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Standard Letter</th>
<th>Quantifier</th>
<th>Subject Term</th>
<th>Copula</th>
<th>Predicate Term</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Quality</th>
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<td>S</td>
<td>are</td>
<td>P.</td>
<td>Universal</td>
<td>Affirmative</td>
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<tr>
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<td>No</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>are</td>
<td>P.</td>
<td>Universal</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Some</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>are</td>
<td>P.</td>
<td>Particular</td>
<td>Affirmative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O</td>
<td>Some</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>are not</td>
<td>P.</td>
<td>Particular</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
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**Figure 3.1**

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321 It seems to me that the most salient result – in so far as one may even speak of Buddhism as such – of a comparison with the problem of non-being would be the notion of “momentariness.” However, as an extended comparison is beyond the scope of this dissertation, suffice to say the very reference to time, i.e. “momentariness,” hearkens to the not-being of time as potentiality discussed in the Introduction. In other words, though I do not consider “momentariness” exhaustive of whatever “Buddhism” may mean, as an alternative attempt “momentariness” fails to solve the problem of non-being.
Now then, considering Figure 3.1, there are a number of possible components to be negated, and, this is, moreover, an exercise in the Square of Opposition. Whereas, quantity pertains to what amount of the subject is predicated, quality pertains to whether that which is predicated is predicated affirmatively or negatively of the subject. Put another way, some quantity of S is or is not (affirmative or negative) considered to belong in the group of P. Hence, as you can see, negating an affirmative quality gives you a negative, and negating a negative gives you an affirmative – switching between A and E or between I and O. Yet, since none of the standard letter propositions refer to non-being, negating quality does not yield non-being.

The same is the case with quantity. On the one hand, to perform a complete opposition, i.e. a contradiction, switches between standard letters A and O or standard letters I and E. On the other hand, mere negation instead of contradictory negation refers the letter in question to the two letters other than the contradictory: negating a quantity of A might refer to I or E; negating E might refer to A or O, etc. Notice, this type of negation fails for the same reason. Hence, such a logical attempt to solve the problem of non-being is a dead end. Yet, there are still more components to negate.

Negating the subject and predicate terms themselves is a more fruitful exercise. Other than the terms, only the copula remains to negate. It just so happens that there is a specific way to reference the negation of a term; it is called a “term complement” or just “complement.”322 What is more, you state it by placing “non-” in front of the term to complemented. Hence, the complement of S is non-S. Yet, despite its prefix, its description rules it out in regard to non-being.

The “non-” is actually taken as an attempt to include everything else that is not whatever the “non-” prefixed. This everything else, of course, must be read as referring to logical entities only. In other words, if given the choice of Being, Becoming, or Non-Being and asked to which one should you associate the above iteration of “everything,” then the answer you would give is Being, since – given these options – there are no entities to speak of other than those which are Being. The force of this insight is twofold. First, it mimics Aristotle’s idea of priority in account. That is, the meaning of “term complement” derives from its participation in a language (game). In other words, it is not supposed to refer to any “outside” in regard to its own structure. Second, it shows that the logical notion of being a complement, a fortiori, cannot solve the problem of non-being. Not only is the “non-” of a term complement “within” being, it derives its meaning from its relation to other entities, not from its non-being. It is worth noting that a number of psychoanalysts precisely make this mistake of equating the subject term with Being.

How about negating the copula? Certainly this seems to be the right approach. After all, “the copula” refers to the “is.” Yet, notice that in this context you cannot get the copula by itself in order to negate it. It is as if there is a terminological priority, and you must get outside the terminology. Hopefully you can remember the Introduction well enough to notice that this difficulty is the same as the difficulty which pertains to attempting to, and needing to, look outside or beyond the forms. Hence, turning to logic to attempt to solve the problem of non-being encounters and cannot proceed beyond its own inability to see being.

323 Note that I am talking here neither about time nor being-in-time.
This leaves one lunging from a logical ledge to posit the negation of either the language (game) or logic to arrive at non-being. However, beyond the difficulty of getting fully clear on what negating the totality of language or logic might be like, neither non-linguistic nor non- (or il-) logical successfully state non-being. Recalling the dependency of reckoning with being on reckoning with non-being from the Introduction, formal logic is stalemated by the same issue which stalemated Plato’s forms in the *Sophist*. Oppositions and negations between beings do not result in the opposition or negation of being.

Summarily appropriate, then, is John Neville Keynes’ (1852-1949)

*Definition of Formal Logic* – Formal logic may be defined as the science which investigates those regulative principles of thought that have universal validity whatever may be the particular objects about which we are thinking. It is a science which is concerned with the *form* as distinguished from the *matter* of thought [Keynes’ emphases].

In a reflection on this definition you can see a reference to the regulative use of ideas discussed in relation to both Aristotle and Kant. The solidity which Keynes attributes to these regulative ideas indicates the standard association between logic and demonstration as opposed to dialectic. Further, his reference to the particular objects indicates the manner just discussed in which logic derives its meaning from internal relations and those – in turn – from being. Moreover, further symbolizing Keynes’ definition – moving from propositional to predicate logic – will not succeed at increasing the capacity of logic to indicate the solution to the problem of non-being.

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324 Cf. According to Aristotle, “if ‘this is’ signifies something, one cannot truly assert the contradictory.” (Meta 1995, 1062b10).

Consider standard letter E proposition: No S are P. The symbolic formulation would be: \((x) (Sx \supset \neg Px)\). And, the way it reads clearly indicates what I concluded just above, i.e. “For any x, if x is an S, then x is not a P.” The logical relations between S and P are contingent upon what is being “x.” So the application of formal logic itself displaces the problem to a realm of demonstrative certainty, a specialized discursivity, even further removed from any difficulty of beyond the forms. The more viable approach seems to be dialectic.

Without trivializing the matter, indulge me in a metaphorical expression of the ground just covered. For the metaphorical part of this thought experiment, then, suppose you are in a room and the lights are on. In fact, as long as you can remember the lights have always been on. In this room there are pamphlets and on the pamphlets there is writing. Since the lights are on you can read the writing, and one of the pamphlets reads: “The lights are out.” Now, certainly you will agree that there is a difference between reading this pamphlet and being in a room with the lights out. Yet, suppose another pamphlet to read, “The lights are on.” With this pamphlet, you may think that this proposition is true. Yet, if you have never been in a room with the lights out, then the truth of the proposition is merely mechanical. In other words, you either communicate rightly or wrongly. However, there is a different way to relate to the truth of the statement “The lights are on” when you have been in the dark.

Even beyond speaking to the value of light, a relation results which cannot be captured in a logic of opposition. Loosely stated, it is as if you do not really “know” the light until you have been in the dark, but the demonstrative attempt to pin down the

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meaning of “know” and “true” obscure the message to be communicated. On the one hand, however you come to know the light will depend upon what you can read while in the light. On the other hand, without encountering the darkness, whatever truth you come to know about the light will be both limited and ungrounded – though taking the darkness as ground is, of course, an illicit move if you deny (certainly I cannot here say “the existence of”) such darkness. Hence, were it the case that you could come to notice the light in the room flicker, then you could catch a glimpse of the darkness, and come to better “know” the light.

Pointing to an underlying subject, i.e. \textit{hypokeimenon}, it is as if since $A=A$, $A \land A : \text{Sameness} :: A \land \neg A : \text{Difference}$.$^{327}$ The dialectically provided first principle here of the “law of identity” (A=A) provides the starting point for the demonstration, and the difference internal to the demonstration is, of course, $\varepsilon \lambda \alpha \lambda \lambda \iota \iota$, i.e. logical difference.$^{328}$ Dialectic, then, is more viable, as noted above, because if difference is to find the latch of being, so to speak, it must look to the beginning of dialectic insofar as it is possible without assumption. In fact, some commentators$^{329}$ go so far as to suggest an analogy such that truth : play :: demonstration : dialectic.

Recalling G.E.L. Owen’s “\textit{Tithenai ta Phainomena},” with the Kantian language from Chapter 1, dialectic begins with either conceptual or experiential products.$^{330}$ Hence, the question: can non-being be symbolized? If you do not start the dialectic with an experiential product, then you beg the question. To suppose a conceptual starting point is already to assign a symbol for non-being. In order for the

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$^{327}$ Taking the tilde ($\sim$) here, of course, to mean “not.”
$^{328}$ Cf. Plato (Soph 255e1-3)
$^{330}$ G.E.L. Owen, “\textit{Tithenai ta Phainomena},” \textit{Articles on Aristotle}, 115.
symbol to get its meaning – think Aristotle’s priority of account – a network of symbols is involved. Such a derivation of non-being is, of course, logical, pertaining to ἐναρτίον, and better labeled as not-being. You might say, for example, watching someone try to connect oddly shaped blocks together speaks to the experiential conceptual distinction. Often they will try the same combination of moves repeatedly despite being unsuccessful at completing the combination. This shows them responding more to thoughts than to perception. The situation from the perceptual point of view, so to speak, is experiential, and from thought, conceptual.

Kant’s Attempt to Discover and Demonstrate Nothing

“The man and his wife were both naked, and they felt no shame.”
~Genesis 2: 25

In commenting on Hegel’s work Heidegger notes, “In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant opened up the problem of an ontology of nature,” Heidegger clarifies that this problem entails the question “of how to determine … extant and accessible beings as to what and how they are. The determinations of the being of beings are called ‘categories’.” What Heidegger is articulating is a view of the performance of concept application from the apperceptive standpoint. As already mentioned, this entails the use of the transcendental object, as the productive imagination’s condition for the possibility of objectively unifying a sensible manifold or schematically initiating reflection upon a not currently experienced object. Since Kant worked from multiple standpoints, when he worked from the conceptual standpoint he described the movement of retrospection or sublation for deriving the objective =x as mirroring the alētheatic movement from the

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331 Quest Study Bible, (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2003), 5.
apperceptive standpoint for deriving the subjective =x, i.e. the transcendental unity of apperception.

Kant notes,

The highest concept with which one is accustomed to begin a transcendental philosophy is usually the division between the possible and the impossible. But since every division presupposes a concept that is to be divided, a still higher one must be given, and this is the concept of an object in general [Gegenstande überhaupt]. (CPR 1998, A 290)

And, notice how Kant moves from a “division” – for example, the possible and the impossible –, i.e. of two concepts, to the one concept which they logically presuppose. Kant is here describing the process of sublation. You have already seen this in Aristotle’s supposition of the ὑποκείμενον, i.e. hypokeimenon, from the division into binary opposites of it concepts. Similarly, multiple empirical perceptions sublate to reveal their transcendental unity as the apperceptive I. The difference from the conceptual standpoint is that the sublated concept of an object in general is the =x, i.e. the transcendental object. (Cf. CPR A 290) Hence, Kant employs the hypokeimenal movement “upward” to derive the =x.333

Regarding the =x then, Kant parenthetically states the object in general is “(taken problematically, leaving undecided whether it is something or nothing [my emphasis].)” (CPR 1998, A 290) Here, again, Kant employs the notion of undecidability, and – notice – it is regarding the being or not-being of that which is in question. Kant’s employment of undecidability is important to note because – from the conceptual standpoint – Kant claims the being of the =x, as initial point in conceptual specification, to be undecidable. This claim will prove to be decisive in distinguishing between the positions of various

333 Moreover, though you might not see it until after the next chapter, Derrida has taken this from Kant in order to formulate his Différence.
philosophers, including Kant, in regard to non-being. Kant supports this claim noting, “Since the categories are the only concepts that relate to objects in general, the distinction of whether an object is something or nothing will proceed in accordance with the order and guidance of the categories.” (CPR 1998, A 290)

Now, if Kant just said that the matter of the =x is to be considered undecidable, then why is he now talking about using the categories to guide in the decision as to whether the =x is something or nothing? The answer: From the perspective of conceptuality, it is possible to use the categories to make decisions about the =x. Yet, at the same time, the experiential perspective, which does not extend far enough into conceptuality for such decisions, only knows the =x as determining an object of experience. Hence, whereas within the conceptual perspective the =x is maintained, i.e. it is supposed to persist at least relationally, so as to possibly be reflected upon, from the experiential perspective, the =x flickers. Reflective decisions require access to conceptuality which the experiential standpoint does not have. This conceptuality is the use of the Categories themselves to, as Heidegger noted, determine “the being of beings.”

Notice then, this is precisely why in attempting to determine non-being from the conceptual standpoint that non-being is determined as a concept, i.e. as not-being not non-being. Think of ἐλάληνλ from the Introduction, and logical structure from above. In explicating this concept of not-being, i.e. negation or nothing, using the Categories as a guide Kant constructs a “Table of Nothing [Nichts],” Figure 3.2. It is worth noting that according to the Word Index to Kant’s Collected Works [Wortindex zu Kants gesammelten Schriften] Kant uses the locution “nichtsein,” i.e. not or non being – it is

334 Martin Heidegger, Hegel’s Phenomenology, 102.
also translated at times as “nothing” –, over twice as many times in the Critique of Pure Reason than any of the other (entire) volumes of his Collected Works, i.e. 26 times.335

Now before looking to the Table, it is important to make a few prefatory remarks. It is not due to whimsy that Kant’s Table of Nothing appears in an Appendix immediately before the Transcendental Dialectic. The section of the Critique of Pure Reason in question here is appropriately titled “Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection,” since he discusses the use of concepts to reflectively make decisions about non-conceptual genesis. This is one of two bridging chapters between the Transcendental Analytic and the Transcendental Dialectic. Referring to the Analytic, Kant suggests at the point of beginning the bridging that “We have now not only traveled through the land of pure understanding, and carefully inspected each part of it, but we have also surveyed it, and determined the place for each thing in it [my emphasis].” (CPR 1998, A 235/B 294) Kant makes a point to establish that “This land, however, is an island, and enclosed in unalterable boundaries.” (CPR 1998, A 235/B 294) These bridging sections, then, are meant to clarify the relation between representations and the faculties to which they belong so as to further justify the critique of drawing inferences by highlighting the dependence of these representations upon the faculties from which they originate.

You might recall that this is why Kant required a continuous power – which he deemed imagination – to bridge the gap which already appeared between sense and its synopsis on one side and understanding and its categories on the other. Referring, then, to the critique of using one faculty’s representations to account for the product of a different faculty – such as understanding’s concepts to account for sensibility’s genesis –

Kant explains, “What makes this critique of the inferences from the mere actions of reflection useful above all is that it clearly establishes the nullity of all inferences about objects that one simply compares with each other in the understanding… [my emphasis].” (CPR 1998, A 278/B 334) In other words, since concepts of reflection do not involve sensibility, the emptiness thesis, i.e. the other side of the blindness thesis, is encountered. Remember the two stems of knowledge are sensibility and understanding, “Through the former, objects are [intuitively] given to us; through the latter, they are thought.” (CPR 2003, A 15/B29) And, “Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind [my emphasis].” (CPR 1996, A 51/ B75)

Defining Amphiboly from the section title noted above, Kant explains that a “transcendental amphiboly” is “a confusion of a pure object of understanding with appearance.” (CPR 1996, A 270/B 326) In other words, the fallacy of amphiboly is committed when you fail to recognize that reflective concepts, which are without experiential content, are empty. Kant’s target here is Leibniz, but in regard to amphiboly, it might as well be Hegel also. To this end, then, Kant provides an abstract example of Leibniz’s Law, i.e. the identity of indiscernibles. According to Kant,

Suppose that an object is exhibited to us repeatedly but always with the same intrinsic determinations (qualitas et quantitas). In that case, if the object counts as object of pure understanding then it is always the same object, and is not many but only one thing [numerical identity]. (CPR 1996, A 263/B 319)

Now, the contrary case regarding appearance is one which includes input from sensibility.

But if the object is appearance, then comparison of concepts does not matter at all; rather, however much everything regarding these concepts may be the same, yet the difference of the locations of these appearances at the
same time is sufficient basis for the numerical difference of the object (of the senses) itself [Kant’s emphasis]. (CPR 1996, A 263/B 319)

Whereas in the former case of the conceptual standpoint, difference in time and space is sublated into a pure concept, in the latter case of the experiential standpoint the difference in time and space cannot be sublated by a concept but merely indexed.336 The industry terminology being here: dialectical difference for the former and differential difference for the latter. In other words, “the understanding can a priori never accomplish more than to anticipate the form of a possible experience as such.” (CPR 1996, A 246/B 303)

Hence, it is in the spirit of conceptual anticipation, then, that Kant constructs his Table of Nothing. To take the Table of Nothing map for the territory (of non-being) would be to commit the fallacy of Amphiboly. (Cf. CPR A 270/B326)

It is highly remarkable that having so thoroughly discussed the structure of experience by the end of the Transcendental Analytic, Kant just prior to the Transcendental Dialectic still maintains: “we have no insight whatever into the intrinsic character of things [Kant’s emphasis].” (CPR 1996, A 277/B 333) And with his usual reference to a different kind of mind he justifies this claim stating that “to be able to cognize things” would require “us to be able to intuit [things], even without senses,” an ability “wholly different from the human one not merely in degree but even in its intuition and kind.” (CPR 1996, A 277-8/B 333-4) In other words, “those transcendental questions that go beyond nature we would … still never be able to answer, even if nature were uncovered for us.” (CPR 1996, A 279/B 335) What is most significant, however, is what Kant says next in regard to the human mind. After all his work on the structure of experience, Kant says, “This is so because we have not been given [the ability] to observe

even our own mind,” and specifically “in it lies the secret of our sensibility’s origin by means of an intuition other than that of our inner sense.” (CPR 1996, A 279/B 335)

Kant clarifies what he means by this “secret” in the following highly important passage:

Its relation to an object, and what might be the transcendental ground of this unity [formerly referred to by Kant as original faculty of “sense”], undoubtedly lie too deeply hidden for us, who know even ourselves only through inner sense [from apprehension “up” in the trajectory of experience], thus as appearance, to be able to use such an unsuitable tool of investigation to find out anything except always more appearances, even though we would gladly investigate their non-sensible cause. (CPR 1998, A 279/B 335)

Kant is referring here to the unity of the synopsis. And the unity of the synopsis – remember – is governed by affinity. Yet, Kant laments that the depths of affinity are still too hidden for 18th century eyes. This is tantamount to Kant’s concession that the mind has yet to exceed the velocity of the unreeling which constitutes filming. Hence, filming’s contribution to a barrier of being – for Kant – cannot be broken. It is in this way that Kant arrives at his Table of Nothing. Accordingly, all attempts to conceptually account for what would be the “boom” of breaking the being barrier result in the boomerang action of being merely conceptual. Since imagination performs a “radical displacement” (F&J 33) in regard to non-being, the pure understanding is thrice removed (Cf. Rep 597e) from that which it would call “nothing.”

Kant’s Table of Nothing, then, presents the categorical, i.e. conceptual, determinations of nothing, i.e. not-being. Accordingly, Béatrice Longuenesse declares, “As a pure concept of the understanding, negation is the concept of a ‘privation’ or ‘lack’
of a real determination [my emphasis].” Another telltale sign that the emptiness thesis has been encountered can be seen by the inclusion of the word “empty” in each division of the table. Here then is Kant’s conceptual analysis of nothing, i.e. Figure 3.2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kant’s Table of Nothing [Nichts] (A 292)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Empty Concept without Object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ens rationis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Empty Object of a Concept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nihil privativum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Empty Intuition without object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ens imaginarium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Empty Object without Concept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nihil negativum</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3.2

Kant’s Table illustrates my division of the problem of non-being into two impasses. The first impasse is “II,” nihil privativum, from the perspective of “I,” ens rationis. The second impasse is “IV,” nihil negativum, from the perspective of “III,” ens imaginarium. Notice imagination as the ground here. Also, remember, this second impasse is paradoxical. So, it looks like nihil negativum, or absolute nothing, refers to non-being.

Yet, you must not forget the conceptual standpoint which made this Table possible. In other words, as a discursive, i.e. conceptual, statement of absolute nothing, it is a statement – it is not non-being. This is why in describing his Table Kant distinguishes between “the thought-entity [das Gedankending] (no. 1)” and “the non-entity [Un-dinge] (no. 4)” noting that neither of them are “possible”; and, neither are possible because “the

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337 Longuenesse, Kant and the Capacity to Judge, 303.
thought-entity” is “mere invention,” and “the non-entity” because “as the concept [it] annuls even itself.” (CPR 1996, A 292/B 348) This, again, mirrors the second impasse of the problem of non-being in pointing to the paradoxical nature of thinking that which cannot be thought.

Upon reading Kant’s Table of Nothing, Schopenhauer applaudingly repeats the manner in which “IV” may be thought of as “II” because it is being viewed from the conceptual standpoint. According to Schopenhauer,

> [A]n absolute nothing, a really proper *nihil negativum*, is not even conceivable, but everything of this kind, considered from a higher standpoint or subsumed under a wider concept, is always only a *nihil privativum*. … Even logical contradiction is only a relative nothing… (WWI 409)

It should not be a surprise, then, that from here Schopenhauer immediately sees a connection with Plato’s *Sophist*. Here is Schopenhauer’s rendition of “Plato’s Puzzle” following on the heels of his discussion of Kant’s Table of Nothing:

> [I]f we look for such an example [of non-being], we shall stick to the non-sense as the positive we are just looking for [IV], and skip the sense as the negative [II]. Thus every *nihil negativum* or absolute nothing, if subordinated to a higher concept, will appear as a mere *nihil privativum* or relative nothing, which can always change signs with what it negates, so that that would then be thought of as negation, but it itself as affirmation. This also agrees with the result of the difficult *dialectical* [my emphasis] investigation on the conception of nothing which is given by Plato in the *Sophist* (258d&e). (WWI 409)

Notice from the Introduction, there Schopenhauer cannot help but use Plato’s language of in relation to others, i.e. πρός ἄλλα, as opposed to in itself, i.e. καθ’αὑότο, and this

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338 Recall the Introduction section which associates dialectic and invention as opposed to justification and demonstration.
opposition brings to mind ἐναντίον and ἔτερον respectively. 339 Lastly, then, Schopenhauer is in agreement with Kant’s categorical-logico-discursive analysis of nothing, and all three of us recognize non-being as paradoxically ineffable.

Now because Schopenhauer thinks of conation, i.e. “the will,” as the Grundkraft – neither Kantian sense nor imagination –, Schopenhauer defines non-being as “denial of the will.” 340 Schopenhauer yields “If, however, it should be absolutely insisted,” then he refers to non-being as “that state which is experienced by all who have attained to complete denial of the will”; further referring to this state as “ecstasy, rapture, illumination, union with God, and so on … that cannot further be communicated.” (WWI 410) Whereas Schopenhauer ultimately resorts to metaphors just before retreating to “ineffability,” I can actually “speak of non-being without number,” and provide a way for you to see that you too experience non-being. Though, again, it will take until the end of the dissertation for me to provide a full treatment of the problem.

In sum, at this point you should be able to see the connection between the problem of non-being, as stated in Plato, and Kant’s nihil negativum as discussed by both Kant and Schopenhauer. Kant’s Table of Nothing provides a fourfold nothing in accordance with the conceptual and experiential starting points of dialectic. Further, you should have noticed how Kant and Schopenhauer both describe this nihil negativum, absolute nothing, or non-being in a way following Gorgias. That is, all three recognize that a conceptual treatment of non-being fails to solve the problem. So this is their unanimously agreed upon jumping off point for landing in non-being. Kant has it as

thing-in-itself, and Schopenhauer has it as denial of the will. Neither solves the problem, but both are closer than where Hegel will take it by attempting to sublate the jumping off point.

Conceptually “Stepping Back” – Hegel & the Closure of Discursivity

“The one and only thing for securing scientific progress is knowledge of the logical precept that Negation is just as much Affirmation as Negation.”

~G.W.F. Hegel (SL 64)

Some regard Kant’s Copernican revolution as an admission of his own humility, i.e. he is humble enough to admit he cannot know everything. In particular, he admits he cannot know things in themselves. In fact, Kant’s ascription of cognitive, epistemological and ontological limits as requisite for his system has led commentators such as Karl Ameriks and Rae Langton to speak of “Kantian humility.” Ameriks, commenting on Langton’s book titled *Kantian Humility: Our Ignorance of Things in Themselves*, describes Kantian humility in the following way:

[T]ranscendental idealism can be expressed as not so much a metaphysical extravagance as rather a principle of modesty, as a reminder that things in their intrinsic character need not be the way that our specific modes of knowing must take them to be. With such a “principle,” Kant was able to point out that, despite reason’s inevitable reaching for beyond the sphere of being, such speculation is – without experience – groundless. Speculations regarding such matters, though reasonable, “neither may hope to be confirmed in experience nor need they fear being refuted in it.” (CPR 1996, A 421/B 449) Kant illustrates this claim in regard to the unconditioned “origin of the world” (CPR 1996, A 451/ B 479) with the antinomies of pure reason in the

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Transcendental Dialectic of his *Critique of Pure Reason*. Hence, Kant concluded that such employment of “pure” reason should be critiqued. Hegel, in comparison, was not so modest.

In this section of Chapter 3 I examine Hegel primarily due to his influence on contemporary French thought. Yet, at the same time, since Hegel represents a return to the first impasse of Plato’s puzzle, I show how Hegel’s logic and insistence upon the conceptual standpoint necessitated that he in fact make the return to the first impasse. This, however, does not stop Hegel from speaking as though he has solved the problem of non-being. As Tom Rockmore points out in discussing Hegel’s *Science of Logic*,

> Hegel affirms that ‘Nothing is, therefore, …’ The conclusion that follows is that *pure being and nothing are exactly alike*. They are *exactly the same, without any difference* [my emphases].”

As I will show below, this nothing or non-being as Hegel sees it is *not* a return to the non-discursivity of Kant’s thing-in-itself.

In fact, the terms “discursive,” “discursivity,” and “non-discursive” never appear in Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* [*Phänomenologie des Geistes*] (1807). What is more, of these terms only “discursive” appears in his *Science of Logic* [*Wissenschaft der Logik*] – the Greater Logic – (1812-1816), and it only appears once. Hegel employs this term precisely at the point at which he is disputing the antinomies in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, i.e. specifically Kant’s conclusion (mentioned above) in the Transcendental Dialectic. The dispute, at this point, is about space, and Hegel notes, “[space] is an intuition, that is, according to the Kantian definition, a representation which can only be given through a single object, and is not a so-called discursive concept [my emphasis].”

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Hence, as you will see below, Hegel has little use for the discursive/non-discursive distinction.

What is at stake in the dispute is the justification of supposing the thing-in-itself. Hegel reveals his desire to collapse the hierarchical distinction between intuition and concept – the Kantian distinction which gives rise to the discursive/non-discursive distinction – with the following: “This Kantian distinction between intuition and concept has, as everyone knows, given rise to a deal of nonsense about the former.” (SL 196)

The deal of non-sense – of which Hegel speaks and Schopenhauer affirms – is, of course, the thing-in-itself. Before discussing the details of the dispute below, it is important to note, “the nature of quantity,” Hegel tells us, “gives rise” to this dispute between he and Kant. (SL 196) And in rejecting Kant, Hegel expresses his preference for “the ancient Eleatic school” by which he means “the pure being of Parmenides” and “the flux of Heraclitus [Hegel’s emphasis].” (SL 196) My comments above, then, regarding the Parmenidean statement in Anscombe’s syllogism hold here for Hegel.

Hegel has already stated the entirety of his position with reference to Parmenides and Heraclitus. Hegel wants solid being, i.e. he wants being to be closed. He wants “the One” to cover it all, i.e. be it all. Further, becoming will account for not-being and change. Yet, becoming is enclosed within being. Put briefly, there is no becoming being other than being becoming itself. The consequence for non-being, as Rockmore pointed out above, non-being and being are “exactly the same.”

Now, as I will show below, it will be the “the nature of quantity,” which Hegel takes to be central in his dispute with Kant over the thing-in-itself, and in discussing this dispute I will already be tracing the understanding of difference inherited by Derrida and

Deleuze. Whereas Kant had a mechanism for thinking of difference outside the structure of experience – the “impossible” possibility of nihil negativum –, Hegel has it that all difference is difference within being. The confusion here resembles the difference between looking through a cone from the point of its convergence at what is beyond the cone and looking at the cone from the side to say what is outside the cone – cf. Figure 2.8. Yet, perhaps Bruce Lee (1940-1973) is instructive here since in both cases one may think of the cone as if “It is like a finger pointing a way to the moon. Don’t concentrate on the finger or you will miss all that heavenly glory.” Figured this way, it is as if Hegel takes a quantity of pointing for the moon.

Both Derrida and Deleuze will be working against this Hegelian closure toward a Kantian openness. Moreover, though I dealt extensively with Kant in the previous chapter, recall I focused primarily on what I refer to as the purview of his experiential standpoint, and also in the previous chapter I associated Hegel with the conceptual standpoint. Therefore, though I will be referring below to some material which I covered in the previous chapter, I do so here from the conceptual standpoint. In this way, I am being fair in assessing Hegel’s reading of Kant’s thing-in-itself. In other words, looking at Kant from the conceptual standpoint so as to be fair in evaluating what is at stake between Kant and Hegel on Hegel’s terms, i.e. the composition of a concept. To this end, I quote Kant extensively below. In this way, I intend to clearly show Hegel’s interpretation of Kant’s teaching in regard to the thing-in-itself without merely relying on Hegel. Further quoting Kant provides the background for their dispute, i.e. space, quantity, and discursivity.

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I have already shown that from the experiential standpoint Kant seeks to retain something of the non-discursive which, for him, distinguishes the experiential from the conceptual standpoint. This Kantian humility in the attempt to retain non-discursivity leads him – from an experiential standpoint – to posit a thing-in-itself and – from the conceptual standpoint – to posit a noumenon. As Hegel wishes to avoid the thing-in-itself, Hegel also seeks to avoid non-discursivity. The point of contention, then, is the moment of the objective unity of $=x$ within the conceptual purview. In order to collapse Kant’s discursive/non-discursive distinction, Hegel will seek to provide a reading of the $=x$ which regards any non-discursivity as merely an unclear moment to be clarified in the very process which initially determined it unclear. For Hegel, the moon is the pointing; the difference is merely an experiential confusion to be conceptually clarified. I am referring here to the process of conceptual analysis. So, I will here examine the $=x$ from the conceptual viewpoint to which I only gestured in the previous chapter. And, in looking at conceptual analysis I will begin to show the evolution of the Kantian revolution on its way to the 21st century.

In the first edition (1781) Preface of the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant says,

> As regards distinctness, finally, the reader has a right to demand, first, the discursive (logical) distinctness arising through concepts, but then also an intuitive (aesthetic) distinctness arising through intuitions, i.e. through examples or other illustrations in concreto [Kant’s emphasis]. (CPR 1996, A xvii-xviii)

In regard to space, then, Kant is consistent in saying, “Space is not a discursive or, as we say, universal concept of things as such; rather, it is a pure intuition [my emphasis].” (CPR 1996, A 24/B 39) As befits Kant’s concern for architectonic systematicity, the above quote is taken from the Transcendental Aesthetic of his *Critique*, and the following
quote is taken from the Transcendental Logic, specifically the Transcendental
Analytic. Here, Kant – as his section title suggests – provides a “Guide for the
Discovery of All Pure Concepts of Understanding” stating, “When we bring into play a
cognitive power, then, depending on the various ways in which we may be prompted to
do so, different concepts come to the fore that allow us to recognize this power [my
emphasis].” (CPR 1996, A 66/B 91) However, concepts discovered as such, according to Kant,
reveal themselves in no order or systematic unity; instead they are ultimately only paired according to similarities, and arranged in series according to the quantity of their content, from the simple concepts on to the more composite [my emphases]. (CPR 1996, A 67/B 92)
Now as I indicated in the previous chapter, the Kant quote above points to the excessivity of the non-discursive. For Kant then, conceptual specification, which would be tantamount to systematic unity and order according to categorical analysis, is not the arrangement which derives from the imagination’s association of appearances underlying an experiential quantity of =x. It is important to keep the two different views here of the =x in regard to quantity separate, because from the conceptual standpoint, conceptual specification may in fact be merely unpacking what is already latent in the =x. Yet, from the experiential standpoint, first – and this is the very reason for using the notion of non-discursivity – whether the conceptual specification fully unpacks the experiential content of the =x must remain a matter of speculation. And, by speculation I mean non-verifiable and an idea of pure reason.

It is tempting to suggest the mere difference between thought and sensation itself indicates that conceptual specification does not fully unpack the experiential content of

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=x. This is because if thought could fully unpack the experiential content, then thinking of the content should be experiencing the content. Since, this seems absurd: if thought is to be equated with being, equated here must indicate a sort of mathematically mimetic equation like isomorphism. Yet, retreating to isomorphism opens the door again for Kant to suggest that the form in experience may indeed be imitated by the form in thought with the difference that experience provides more than the form of thought can imitate. How to characterize such excessivity? Kant’s answer is to use the notion of non-discursivity. Keep in mind, then, that Hegel’s description of conceptual specificity may be successful at collapsing the discursive/non-discursive distinction so long as this collapse is understood ultimately in reference only to the conceptual standpoint. That is, a full closure of discursivity can only mean a full retreat into the contemplative state of thought alone.

Just prior to Kant’s celebrated example regarding the judgment “all bodies are divisible,” Kant pushes his discursive distinction again. Kant notes, “the cognition of any understanding, or at least human understanding, is a cognition through concepts; it is not intuitive, but discursive. All our intuitions, as sensible, rest on our being affected; concepts, on the other hand, rest on functions.”347 (CPR 1996, A 68/B 93) And, Kant clarifies, “By function I mean the unity of the act of arranging various representations under one common representation.”348 (CPR 1996, A 68/B 93) Elaborating on my treatment from the previous chapter, the “unity of the act” of arranging derives from the logical form of the judgments employed. These judgments serve to unify experience objectively in the object of experience and – via an alētheatic (cf. ἀλήθεια) reference –

347 Translation modified.
348 Translation modified.
subjectively to the unity of apperception. At this point, the logical structure has already
been imposed upon the object in its determination, i.e. even if only latently in a quantity
= x. Hence, conceptual specification via logical, i.e. discursive, analysis of the quantity
may succeed at fully identifying the quantity in question.

With the imposition of the logical structure, then, it is as if a seed were planted –
just as picking a judgment in the Square of Opposition commits you to various other
forms of the judgment – such that it blossoms in an analytic unfolding on its own. Hegel
similarly suggests,

The bud disappears in the bursting-forth of the blossom,
and one might say that the former is refuted by the latter;
similarly, when the fruit appears, the blossom is shown up
in its turn as a false manifestation of the plant, and the fruit
now emerges as the truth of it instead. These forms are not
just distinguished from one another, they also supplant one
another as mutually incompatible. (PS 2)

In Kantian language, Hegel’s metaphor here is supposed to describe the movement from
the bud of =x to the blossom of conceptual analysis, and finally to its fruition through
dialectic. However, the analogy does not hold when Hegel introduces the description of
disappearance. Despite Hegel’s hope, the non-discursivity inherent in experience does
not disappear as the trajectory of experience enters conceptuality. Experiential non-
discursivity can only be said to disappear during pure (reason) contemplation. That is,
even in the full bloom of an experience where the bud has vanished, the stem of
sensibility remains. Hence, you may pick and enjoy the truth of the fruit, but in regard to
the ground, it is the fruit that has vanished.

Returning to Kant’s description of conceptual analysis, it will be helpful to
reproduce Kant’s Table of Categories here.
Regarding Figure 3.3 – from the conceptual standpoint – Kant holds,

If we abstract from all content of a judgment as such and pay attention only to the mere form of understanding in it, then we find that the function of thought in judgment can be brought under four headings, each containing under it three moments [my emphasis].” (CPR 1996, A 70/B 95)

Remember, it is from this standpoint of abstracting from all content that Kant constructs his “Transcendental Table of Concepts of the Understanding” (Proleg 55), i.e. Figure 3.2. The first heading of which is, of course, “Quantity.” Kant explains, “the only use that the understanding can make of these concepts is to judge by means of them [my emphasis].” (CPR 1996, A 68/B 93) And, again, for Kant the discursive distinction is decisive. Kant continues,

But in such a judging, a concept is never referred directly to an object, because the only kind of representation that deals with its object directly is intuition. Instead, the concept is referred directly to some other representation of the object (whether that representation be an intuition or itself already a concept).³⁴⁹ (CPR 1996, A 68/B 93)

³⁴⁹ I have modified Pluhar’s translation throughout by taking “representation” for “Vorstellung.”
Notice, of course, when Kant refers to intuition above, he is invoking the notion of non-discursivity. Hence, I am repeatedly showing you the difference between Kant and Hegel, i.e. the experiential and the conceptual, regarding non-being.

Further, these three quotes just above are decisive for the issue Hegel will take with Kant. I quote Kant here, then, so that as you read Hegel’s supposed closure of discursivity below, you can recognize the interpretive violence Hegel performs on Kant’s text. Moreover, regarding these quotes, Kant is, in fact, preparing to show how conceptual analysis works. Beginning with the point of an initial judgment Kant is maneuvering to show the relationship between the transcendental object = x and the concepts which explicate it. That is, Kant is attempting to describe the process of deriving further concepts from an analysis of the transcendental object = x. Recall, this = x is produced by imagination, and either schematizes the categories when thinking of an absent object or determines the appearances associated – though not exhaustively – in reproductive imagination when experiencing an object. Furthermore, keep in mind each move involved in explicating the = x is an analytic judgment. It is as if Hegel wishes to make synthetic a posteriori judgments – the judgments which contain the non-discursive for Kant – out to ultimately be analytic judgments.

Consider now Kant’s example: “In every judgment there is a concept that holds for many [representations], and, among them, comprises also a given representation that is referred directly to the objects, e.g. in the judgment, All bodies are divisible [Kant’s emphasis].” (CPR 1996, A 68/B 93) Kant explains his example stating,

[T]he concept of the divisible refers to various other concepts; but among these, it is here referred specifically to the concept of body, and the concept of body is referred in turn to certain appearances that we encounter. Hence,
these objects are represented indirectly through the concept of divisibility. Accordingly, all judgments are functions of unity among our representations. For instead of cognizing the object by means of a direct representation, we do so by means of a higher representation comprising both this direct [intuitive] representation and several other representations; and we thereby draw many possible cognitions together into one. (CPR 1996, A 68-69/B 93-94)

To be sure, Kant thinks he has just described (discursive) thinking. He says, “thought is cognition through concepts; and concepts, as predicates of possible judgments, refer to some representation of an as yet undetermined object.” (CPR 1996, A 68-69/B 93-94) In support of Hegel’s reading, the as yet undetermined object may be taken to refer to the $\equiv x$ as schema merely for thought. However, given my emphases in the lengthier quote prior, non-discursivity does not reside merely in the undetermined nature of the object.

What is more, Kant seems to consider this example within the experiential scope, as if analyzing a synthetic a posteriori judgment. For example, in judging “All bodies are divisible” you recognize a quantity of appearances just as much as you recognize an appearance of a body. In other words, in the categorical judgment “All bodies are divisible” “bodies,” as the subject of the judgment is being used to determine a plurality of appearances. Notice, this explication is now taking place within the purview of the conceptual standpoint, as evidenced by the fact that Kant has entered into the Square of Opposition. He is not talking here about a totality of impressions unified in an appearance, as I discussed in the previous chapter. Rather, this is already a judgment of the “I” type from the Square of Opposition. Therefore, this analytic judgment is vying for objective validity in thinking about the quantity of appearances you have recognized as a body.
Put another way within the Kantian terminology, “body,” here, is heuristic not ostensive. The distinction being that the concept (body) “indicates not what the character of an object is, but how we ought, under this concept’s guidance, to search for the character and connection of experiential objects.” (CPR 1996, A 671/B 699) So, in this case, body – not beings, boxes, spheres, animals, vehicles, etc. – indicates how one ought to search amongst the encountered appearances so as to think about the experience of them. At this point, i.e. without the predicate, of course, the object is still not determined with universal validity – despite the heuristic concept in the subject position of the judgment. The predicate then inserts the object – by being in the predicate position – into the Square of Opposition. In this case, as a categorical judgment of the “A” type, i.e. all bodies are divisible.

Kant, then, shows how further judgments may become involved in the process of conceptual specification by moving the subject term from the initial judgment to the predicate position, i.e. replacing the =x with the concept from the subject term in the initial judgment. Kant illustrates this staying with his example in stating, “Thus the concept of body signifies something – e.g. metal – that can be cognized through that concept. … Therefore the concept of body is the predicate for a possible judgment, e.g. the judgment that every metal is a body.” (CPR 1996, A 69/B 94) From this Kant concludes, “Therefore we can find all of the functions of the understanding if we can exhibit completely the functions of unity in judgments.” (CPR 1996, A 69/B 94) Hence, when in the Transcendental Dialectic Kant addresses the antinomies regarding the “origin of the world” – the material of the dispute with Hegel regarding the thing-in-itself – Kant
will mobilize the fruits of all the above labor to justify his agnosticism toward the thing-in-itself as origin beyond the bounds of experience.

As evidenced by what Kant says (above) about the subject term in a judgment and what Hegel says about Kant’s description of intuitive cognition (also above), Kant and Hegel agree that the act of identification is conceptual. Yet, Kant and Hegel disagree in regard to the work involved in experiential identifications. And, this disagreement is most striking in regard to space – the outer sense and first of the components in the trajectory of experience which may be used to identity an object of experience. What is at stake in regard to experiential identification is the experiential standpoint itself. Put another way, if Hegel succeeds in collapsing the Kantian discursive/non-discursive distinction, then with this leveling a way of seeing in the structure of experience is lost. Without the discursive/non-discursive distinction, the experiential standpoint is just the conceptual standpoint as initially confused. Having, then, discussed Kant above, I will discuss Hegel further below before making my final comparison.

Returning to the *Science of Logic*, Hegel tells us that thinking, “in its reception and formation of material does not go outside itself.” (SL 45) Rather, according to Hegel thinking accomplishes this work by modifying “its own self, it does not result in thought becoming the other of itself.” (SL 45) Invoking Kant, Hegel continues, “In its relation to the object, therefore, thinking does not go out of itself to the object; this, as thing-in-itself, remains a sheer beyond of thought.” (SL 45) Now, Hegel himself was thinking when he arrived at the above conclusions regarding thinking. So, with an inference whose conclusion begs the question (*Petitio Principii*) by being merely the assumption with which he began, Hegel concludes: “such an abstraction as the thing-in-itself is itself
only a product of thought.” (SL 62) And, thereby, Hegel announced the closure of discursivity. That is, any positing of an outside of thought must itself take place within thought; therefore, the outside of thought is inside thought. In reading the following obscure remarks by Hegel, remembering Hegel’s assumption of the so-called closure of discursivity will help provide clarity.

To go further, it might be helpful to go over what Hegel is suggesting by using Kant’s language. Hegel is pointing out that when thinking occurs, concepts do not go outside of the understanding. This claim is essentially tautological, i.e. the concepts of the understanding are in the understanding. Yet, it must be admitted, this claim is also consistent with Kant’s structure of experience, i.e. concepts of the understanding are in the understanding. Since non-discursivity is at stake, consider an example from Kant including non-discursivity: Kant holds that the unity resulting from the productive imagination’s production of the transcendental object $=x$ works in more than one way. On the one hand, the objective $=x$ culminates an object of experience in a judgment of experience, and thereby constitutes the experiential standpoint including non-discursivity. On the other hand, the objective $=x$ initiates conceptual analysis as the subject term in an analytic judgment, and thereby constitutes the totally discursive conceptual standpoint.

Remember, you find the experiential standpoint (1) when the objective $=x$ culminates an object of experience in a judgment of experience; you find the conceptual standpoint (2) when the objective $=x$ initiates conceptual analysis as the subject term in an analytic judgment; and, you find the apperceptive standpoint (3) at the copula of these judgments. The experiential standpoint regards non-being; the conceptual standpoint regards not-being; and, the apperceptive standpoint may regard either non-being or not-
being. Yet in all cases, the =x results from the original source of imagination. Even in an experiential case including non-discursivity – here is Hegel’s point –, whatever you end up thinking about is initially the product of a power of the mind, i.e. imagination. As Hegel would have it, then, thinking does not go outside itself.

Trailing Hegel here to see where he leads, what Hegel has done is to deny Kant’s distinction between different negations. The only negation there can be for Hegel now is logical negation, i.e. discursive negation. In other words, Hegel has barred the use of (Kant’s real) negation upon the notion of discursivity, i.e. there is no non-discursivity, unless you consider the non-discursive to itself be discursive. And, of course, if you do so, then there is no need to speak of non-discursivity. This is how Hegel has closed discursivity. Further, it is in the wake of an assumed closure of discursivity, then, that Hegel is able to make pronouncements about the “identity of identity and non-identity.” (SL 74) And, it is within this context that he is disputing both Kant’s assertions regarding identification and Kant’s humility in regard to the “origin of the world.” For his contribution to the dispute with Kant Hegel states, “When substance, matter, space, time, etc., are taken only as discrete, they are absolutely divided; their principle is the one. When they are taken as continuous, this one is only a sublated one.” (SL 197)

Hegel clarifies his above quote by invoking concepts of the understanding as listed in Kant’s table, i.e. Figure 2.3. According to Hegel,

Quantity [latently] contains the two moments of continuity and discreteness. It is to be posited in both of them as determinations of itself. It is already their immediate unity, that is, quantity is posited as first only in one of its determinations, continuity, and as such is continuous magnitude. (SL 199)
Hegel goes on, “Or we may say that continuity is indeed one of the moments of quantity which requires the other moment, discreteness, to complete it.” (SL 199) What Hegel is rehearsing here is the movement through Kant’s concepts of the understanding in the order of their moments, i.e. Quantity to Quality. However, Hegel’s innovation which makes this movement more Hegelian than Kantian is an operation that precisely imitates what happened to the thing-in-itself in the retroactive motion of the closure of discursivity. In other words, Hegel will have solved the problem of the origin of the world by encountering every objection as if it were merely the other half of a binary opposition which can be traced back to the origin from which the split – into binary opposites – derived. That is, for Hegel, the Quantity =x is conceptual, and as conceptual it is dichastic, i.e. capable of spontaneously subdividing.

If you were to attempt to move from the origin to the binary opposition you might observe this process as Theodor Adorno (1903-1969) described it, “purely observe each concept until it starts moving, until it becomes unidentical with itself by virtue of its own meaning – in other words, of its identity.” Adorno’s description captures what occurs in conceptual analysis, i.e. a concept is taken apart. When predicating the concepts derived from analysis to each other, the result is a tautology. Now, I stressed in Chapter 2 that from the experiential standpoint you must start at the bottom of the categories of Quantity, since experience passes into the categories of Quantity as a totality of impressions. However, Hegel is treating these categories from the standpoint of the conceptual, as evidenced by his consideration of explication from the moment of Quantity in general. Hence, for Hegel, beginning with the =x from the productive imagination, then, means beginning with a Quantity, and – invoking Adorno’s description

here – Hegel observes the bud of Quantity as it dichastically specifies itself blossoming through analysis.

As Schopenhauer accuses, the perplexity here derives from Hegel’s, perhaps purposefully, obscure description. Kant’s language, I think, seeks to be less obscure. Notice, once the =x is analyzed into two concepts the reality of the unity of the Quantity of concepts has changed. You now have plurality by way of negation, i.e. two concepts instead of one. Focusing on the matter this way, you can say the concepts are different from one another – after all they are two. Yet, focusing on the identity of the concept, you can say they are one – after all the two came from one, and their meaning is identical. Here is the “identity of identity and non-identity.” (SL 74) Perhaps this is what Arthur Schopenhauer had in mind when he said,

[Like a man who sits some time in the conjurer’s booth at a fair, and witnesses the performance twice or thrice in succession. The tricks were meant to be seen only once; and when they are no longer a novelty and cease to deceive, their effect is gone.]

On the one hand, Schopenhauer and I take the same issue with Hegel, no matter how that issue is articulated it is ultimately Hegel’s closure of discursivity. On the other hand, Schopenhauer, Hegel and I are all in agreement that the thing-in-itself is unsatisfactory. Moreover, all three of us read the thing-in-itself as a response to the problem of non-being. Following Kant, Schopenhauer and Hegel seem keenly aware that non-being must be accounted for if full systematicity is to be achieved. Yet, and this perhaps accounts for the obscurity of Hegel’s language, Hegel seems to sacrifice all to method. As I will show below Hegel is consistent in his depiction of dichastasis, i.e. spontaneous conceptual analysis. However, the method is a retreat to the pure contemplation of contemplation,

which though perhaps correct about contemplation cannot venture beyond mere pointing and cannot even account for that toward which it points other than by pointing back at the pointing.

So, Schopenhauer’s rants against Hegel highlight the fact that Hegel’s language, whether intentionally or not, seems to cover over not only the fact that Kant already sketched the beginnings of Hegel systematic logic regarding the “concepts of reflection,” but also that Kant already indicated that Hegel’s use of conceptuality is amphibolous. And, as Kant explains “transcendental amphiboly” is “a confusion of a pure object of understanding with appearance.” (CPR 1996, A 270/B 326) Hegel is most certainly guilty of this. As Schopenhauer put it,

[If] the distinction of the phenomenon from the thing-in-itself, and hence the doctrine of the complete diversity of the ideal from the real, is the fundamental characteristic of the Kantian philosophy [as Schopenhauer holds that it is], then the assertion of the absolute identity of these two … was a return to the crudeness of the common view, masked under the imposing impression of an air of importance, under bombast and nonsense. It became the worthy starting-point of even grosser nonsense of the ponderous and witless Hegel. (WWI 418-419)

Hence, Hegel’s controversial move is to work the logic of the ὑποκείμενον, i.e. hypokeimenon, backward. This is, of course, controversial because – it begs the question – the hypokeimenonally revealed “one” was a supposition, but Hegel treats it as evidence.

Consider a passage from Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit which begins with a claim regarding the necessary determination of things in experience and ends with the elimination of all things non-discursive:

§126, “The conceptual necessity of the experience through which consciousness discovers that the Thing is demolished by the very determinateness that constitutes its essence and its being-for-self, can be summarized as
follows. The Thing is posited as being for itself, or as the absolute negation of all otherness, therefore as purely self-related negation; but the negation that is self-related is the suspension of itself; in other words, the Thing has its essential being in another Thing [Hegel’s emphases]. (PS 76)

Die Notwendigkeit der Erfahrung für das Bewusstsein, dass das Ding eben durch die Bestimmtheit, welche sein Wesen und sein Für-sich-seyn ausmacht, zugrunde geht, kann kurz dem einfachen Begriffe nach so betrachtet werden. Das Ding ist gesetzt als Für-sich-seyn, oder als absolute Negation alles Andersseins; daher absolute, nur sich auf sich beziehende Negation; aber die sich auf sich beziehende Negation ist Aufheben seiner selbst, oder sein Wesen in einem andern zu haben.\(^{352}\)

Here Hegel defers the positing of the thing-in-itself to the process of determination, and the process of determination to the conceptual necessity of dichastasis, i.e. both the necessity as spontaneous and the necessity as logical outcome of conceptual specification. From here, the thing-in-itself represents more a Hegelian moment in the process of conceptual analysis than a Kantian relation in the structure of experience. The necessity involved in the dichastasis which posited the thing-in-itself, then, “demolishes” the thing-in-itself as the being posited of non-being. Hence, the being for itself of the thing-in-itself cancels itself in the being of (the Parmenidean) One-being through reflective sublation [Aufhebung].

Now notice, with what Hegel calls the thing [das Ding] above, he correctly identifies Kant’s thing-in-itself as Kant’s structural indication of nihil negativum, i.e. what Hegel here refers to as absolute negation. Hegel, then, much like the Eleatic visitor from Plato’s Sophist points out that in the conceptual determination of experience this non-being is being said, i.e. being posited as a thing-in-itself. Here comes the closure of discursivity again. Hence, as being (posited) this non-being [das Ding] is “being for

itself.” Voilà what Hegel has just accomplished in two sentences is the closure of being along with the closure of non-discursivity.

Put another way, by accentuating the being posited of non-being as being for itself, Hegel moved from III to IV in Kant’s Table of Nothing. He, then, equates IV with II, and steps back to I. See Figure 2.2. The problem with all this is that Hegel misses what I have referred to as the paradoxical nature – or second impasse – of the problem of non-being. That is, regarding Kant’s Table of Nothing, Hegel misses that II can only be equated with IV in thought alone. Hegel’s trick here is the assumption of the closure of discursivity such that IV necessarily becomes II since the difference between the two, i.e. non-discursivity, has been eliminated from the equation. What is more, Hegel’s amphiboly is fortified by being only testable conceptually.

Of this fortification Schopenhauer accuses the “serving up sheer nonsense … such as had previously been heard only in madhouses, [which] finally appeared in Hegel.” (WWI 429) In fact, Schopenhauer found it so detestable he suggested, “If I were to call to mind the way in which Hegel and his companions have misused such wide and empty abstractions, I should necessarily be afraid that both the reader and I would be ill.” (WWI 84) Furthermore, it is worth noting that when Schopenhauer “stoops” to ad hominem attack of Hegel, despite the criticism Schopenhauer sometimes receives for it, he is actually following Aristotle’s direction to the letter.353 That is, given Hegel’s suggestion that the starting point of dialectic can both be and not be, Schopenhauer is within traditional standard bounds when he provides an ad hominem description354 of Hegel’s

354 “There is a principle in things, about which we cannot be deceived, but must always, on the contrary, recognize the truth, ~ viz. that the same thing cannot at one and the same time be and not be, or admit of
philosophy as “empty bombast” and of Hegel as a “repulsive philosophaster.” (WWII 84)

Hence, Hegel’s mistake is not dialectical method itself – as is sometimes suggested – but its misapplication, i.e. mistaking the experiential standpoint for the conceptual.

What is important to recognize in Schopenhauer’s repulsion is that it is possible to make Hegel’s move – perform his trick –, consider it merely in thought – such as Kant (above) in his discussion of the “concepts of reflection” –, and stop short of claiming all non-discursivity to have been demolished. In fact, this is precisely the strategy Schopenhauer suggested, “matter never appears otherwise than with the visible, that is to say, under the veil of form and quality [Schopenhauer’s emphasis]”; as such, “it is never immediately apprehended, but is always only added in thought as that which is identical in all things under every variety of quality.” (WWII 311) This as part of Schopenhauer’s strategy is why these last two quotes from Schopenhauer make him sound like he is in complete agreement with Kant regarding the experiential standpoint – he, of course, is not. Yet, within the pure understanding, i.e. from the conceptual standpoint, both Hegel and Schopenhauer are pushing Kant’s, i.e. Aristotle’s, logic. The problem Schopenhauer takes with Hegel here is that it is as if Hegel’s Grundkraft is the pure understanding. And, as such the circularity of Hegel’s logic collapses the experiential into the conceptual standpoint.

Neither Hegel’s commentators nor Hegel himself seem interested in denying the circularity of his logic or his equating of the experiential with the conceptual. Joseph C. Flay attempts to defend Hegel’s decision to provide such a reading of Kant by quoting Kant himself. Flay conjectures, “As Kant had also said, but Hegel now gives its strongest

any other similar pair of opposites. About such matters there is no proof in the full sense, though there is proof ad hominem.” (Meta 1995,1062a19-22)
interpretation: ‘What the things-in-themselves may be I do not know, nor do I need to know, since a thing can never come before me except in appearance.’ Hence, Flay’s contorting of Kant is as myopic as Hegel’s “strong” interpretation is amphibolous. Another Hegel commentator Richard D. Winfield lists six general features of “The Method of Hegel’s Science of Logic.” Of the six general features of Hegel’s method, the following three are sufficient to support a reading of Hegel as solely working within the confines of the conceptual standpoint: “the form of logical development is in unity with its content,” “the movement of categories is circular, such that the advance from the starting point is equally a regress,” and “the development has its own method as its final result.”

To cite just enough of the examples from Hegel’s work for a reader to recognize Hegel’s exclusive embrace of the pure understanding; “the object is revealed to it by something alien … it does not recognize itself.” (PS 466, §771) Further, “The understanding [my emphasis] does not, however, realize that all these dissolving distinctions are merely the internal maneuvers of its own self-consciousness.” (PS 518, fn. §771) “Reason conceals the inner necessity of its own proceedings, and locates it in the objects that it is studying. [Yet] … there is a distinction which is really no distinction: teleology is in the organism, and Reason in the thing studied [my emphasis].” (PS 351, fn. §259) Lastly, “The ‘beautiful soul’ is its own knowledge of itself in its pure, transparent unity – the self-consciousness that knows this pure knowledge of pure inwardness as Spirit. It is not only the intuition of the Divine but the Divine’s intuition of itself.” (PS 483, fn. §795)

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The problem with all this is that, as I have repeatedly stressed about the non-discursive, there is an excessivity that conceptuality cannot capture or contain. In regard to experience, the concept of totality requires that a limiting must have already taken place, and this limiting must be non-conceptual. This can be illustrated by combining two negatives which do not make a positive, i.e. the fallacy of amphiboly plus the fallacy of slippery slope: If I were to tell you that I was going to eat every slice of bread in a whole loaf, you might think me gluttonous or underfed. If I were to tell you I was going to eat every slice of bread in a bread store, you might think me misguided or upset with the bread store personnel. If I were to tell you I was going to eat every slice of bread on the planet, you might think me jesting. If I were to tell you I was going to eat every slice of bread ever created from the dawn of bread slices, you might think me a fool. If I, then, explained to you that as sublated spirit I am the eternal bread eating force in the world, and therefore not only have I, as such, already eaten every slice of bread since the dawn of bread slices; but also that you are me and each slice of bread you eat is truly being eaten by me too, then you might think I had been reading Hegel. Yet, if I actually believed this, I would starve to death; though, of course, this death would be a death that is not really death at all, since it is both life and death, etc. Hence, the point of my illustration: even in a simple slice of bread, there is more than can be grasped by the mind, no matter how long you contemplate it.

So, in regard to non-being Hegel has returned to the first impasse since negation in Hegel’s system is only logical, i.e. discursive negation. This is why Adorno claims, “The structure of his [Hegel’s] system would unquestionably fall without the principle
that to negate negation is positive."

When you deny the difference between the – plurality of – the two concepts derived from analysis, then Hegel has it that you arrive back at the one concept from whose analysis the two derived. There is no – what Kant called – real negation. Hegel takes negation to be qualitative and retrospection or sublation to be determinative ostensively, not heuristically. Further, notice how this goes toward the closure of discursivity. The first moment of Quantity, as \( =x \), may seem other than discursive because it is not yet specified. However, the retroactive motion derived from the negation of negation, i.e. the movement from Quality back to Quantity, unifies the product of analysis, i.e. conceptual specification, so as to suggest the origin was always already this unification. See Figure 2.3. On the one hand, support for this conclusion regarding the origin derives from the following notion: Had the origin not been this unification prior to specification, then the specification would not have been such as to lead back to it. On the other hand, notice how Hegel’s movement here is air tight, and the reason the movement is air tight is because it is purely logical. Here, then, is another telltale sign that he has embraced the conceptual standpoint at the cost of the experiential standpoint.

Any lingering obscurity can be further cleared up by discussing the juxtaposition of the following two paradoxical passages. Hegel declares,

The beginning is not pure nothing, but a nothing from which something is to proceed; therefore being, too, is already contained in the beginning. The beginning, therefore, contains both, being and nothing, is the unity of being and nothing; or is non-being which is at the same time being, and being which is at the same time non-being.

(SL 199)

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357 Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, 160.
Now, this can seem quite perplexing until you decode it by applying the movement of the so-called closure of discursivity to it. As such, you see that the first moment is not identified until the third moment or retrospection. According to the logic of specification, then, Hegel is justified in his paradoxical remarks about the undifferentiated origin (first moment) in so far as the analysis of the origin in yielding (second moment) being and its negation, i.e. not-being, must have been both contained in the first moment revealed through retrospection (third moment) by way of the logic of specification. With this in mind listen to what Hegel says next:

[I]n the beginning, being and nothing are present as distinguished [Hegel’s emphasis] from each other; for the beginning points to something else – it is a non-being which carries a reference to being [my emphasis] as to an other; that which begins, as yet is not [Hegel’s emphasis], it is only on the way to being. The being contained in the beginning is, therefore, a being which removes itself from non-being or sublates it as something opposed to it. (SL 73-74)

Here, Hegel is pointing out that the “world” of everyday dwelling is qualitative. Hence, the “beginning” takes place – in accord with Kant’s Categories – regarding the Categories of Quality. This is already – using the above language – at the second moment of explication. That is, the being of your dwelling is specific being – Heidegger might call it “inauthentic” –, and in negating the negation from which your specific dwelling comes forth, you return to the undifferentiated – “authentic” – being which as retrospective third moment is the origin of such grandeur as to contain both being and non-being. Remember, this all works out logically. It is as if Hegel is constructing a map for the fruit to retrace its steps back to the bud. Yet, as the adage goes, the map is not the territory. This non-being “located” – in a loose sense – as always already coupled with
being in the origin, and to which the logical retrospection provides a clearing, remains merely the *thought* of non-being.

To provide an everyday example, then, suppose you are standing in the rain. Now suppose further we start our experiential series at the point of impact between a drop of rain and your skin. The initial impact registers a magnitude =x, a quantity of – *Je ne sais pas* – call it =x. Moving up the series you identify it as wet (it is not dry), cold (it is not warm), and so on in identifying it as rain. Tracing this thought so as to sketch it with the rhetoric of science, I might say – recalling the Adorno description above – you observe the moving concept of quantity specifying-ly split into binary opposites and identify itself. *Hegel’s trick here is like a metaphysical shell game.*

Here, then, is a schematic rendition of Hegel’s metaphysical shell game: Hegel suggests Quantity is the unnoticed – because unidentified and undifferentiated – beginning. And, he uses this suggestion to support his claim that the noticed – because identified and differentiated – beginning is Quality, not Quantity. If you cannot see this yet, you will see it in the way Hegel finishes the passage. Hegel concludes, “that which begins already *is*, but *is* also just as much *not* yet. The opposites, being and non-being, are therefore in immediate union in it; or the beginning is their *undifferentiated unity* [Hegel’s emphasis].”358 “It,” of course, refers to “that which begins” unnoticed in the previous quote. So you see this is what is meant by “the identity of identity and non-identity.” Hence, here is Hegel’s trick *again*, “unity,” is logically correct – despite undifferentiated-ness – since the retrospective move is one of convergence from binary opposites to their origin – playing the logic of the ὑποκείμενον, i.e. hypokeimenon

backward. In this way, Hegel supports the claim that the origin is discursive. So, omniscience – absolute knowledge – is a possibility within the confines of this veritable “intellectual system of the world,” (CPR A 270/B 326) which Kant rejected.

In fact, Hegel’s trick can be applied to characterize Hegel’s reading of Kant to suggest that what Hegel hopes to accomplish is to sublate Kant’s structure of experience. If Hegel can treat the two stems of sensibility and understanding as opposed because they are in the second moment of an analytic movement, then Hegel will be able to justify a claim that the further specification of the sensible stem never leaves the purview of that to which the stems are sublated. By way of the “identity of identity and non-identity” Hegel can justify that despite the fact that he is working in conceptual isolation, for him the conceptual standpoint is identical with the experiential standpoint. It is merely at the qualitative level in which the opposition between sensibility and understanding emerge from the quantitative level of absolute Being (the Parmenidean One-being), and hence, why in the qualitative level “it does not recognize itself.” (PS 103) Strange, who would have thought beatific vision to require so much logical inference?

Before drawing a conclusion and moving on to discuss how pure difference fits into Hegel’s system, I apply the work spent decoding and critiquing Hegel’s system above to a celebrated passage from Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* quoted here at length.

[T]he Understanding experiences only itself. Raised above perception, consciousness exhibits itself closed in a unity with the supersensible world through the mediating term of appearance, through which it gazes into this background. The two extremes, the one, of the pure inner world, the other, that of the inner being gazing into this pure inner world, have now coincided, an just as they, *qua* extremes, have vanished, so too the middle term, as something other
than these extremes, has also vanished. This curtain hanging before the inner world is therefore drawn away, and we have the inner being gazing into the inner world … self-consciousness. It is manifest that behind the so-called curtain which is supposed to conceal the inner world, there is nothing to be seen unless we go behind it ourselves. (PS 103)

I will comment on this quote while also summing my above comments on Hegel. Putting Hegel’s quote another way, the above indicates a number of the points I have already made about Hegel. First, if the understanding experiences only itself, then in Kantian terms, this is not really “experience” at all, rather it is understanding. Perhaps Hegel’s analytic should be characterized as “understanding understanding understanding.” As I suggested above, this is due to leveling the discursive/non-discursive distinction and with it the experiential standpoint. In other words, Hegel’s metaphysical shell game, i.e. Hegel’s trick, transforms Kantian humility into Kantian (put favorably) confusion, but at the cost of the experiential standpoint. Second, the “curtain” in the Hegel quote is to be equated with “appearance” in Kant. As such, we experience both the curtain and appearance first in both Kant and Hegel. Whereas, however, with Kant the thing-in-itself is said to be behind (the curtain of) appearance, Hegel – taking appearance as the level of quality in a series to be extended toward further and further clarity – has it that this “stepping back” behind the curtain, as it were, leads to a fully intelligible, i.e. discursive destination.

Third, since this fully intelligible destination is always being identified retrospectively, as it were, the retrospective determination is a type of contamination. That is, prior to the retrospection this destination enjoys – as Hegel might say – the purity of being undifferentiated. In the process, then, of retrospective differentiation, i.e.

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359 I mean this primarily as mnemonic reference to comments concerning Aristotle and Kant.
returning from the land of identity (on the other side of the curtain), the purity of the undifferentiated gets contaminated by whatever qualities were encountered in the land of identity. Lastly, in regard to the problem of non-being, Hegel’s strategy is to retreat to the first perplexity of the problem of non-being, and – donning purely logical plumes – claim to have solved Plato’s Puzzle. Yet, in regard to Plato’s Puzzle – at best – Hegel has a sophisticated version of nor-being. Hence, neither Hegel nor Kant solved Plato’s Puzzle, and I believe Kant was closer than Hegel to a solution – arriving at the second perplexity of the problem – because he had gained the ground of the experiential standpoint.

Coming to Grips with Hegel

“But it can hardly be doubted that Hegel found in the Parmenides, and to a less extent in the Sophist and Philebus, the basis of his dialectical logic.”

~J. Glenn Gray

The section title – coming to grips361 – comes from a statement attributed to Heidegger from The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. There discussing “the ‘is’”

Heidegger calls for a shift from the conceptual to the apperceptive standpoint noting,

The problem will make no further progress as long as logic itself has not been taken back again into ontology, as long as Hegel – who, in contrast, dissolved ontology into logic – is not comprehended. And this means always that Hegel must be overcome … This overcoming of Hegel is the intrinsically necessary step in the development of Western philosophy which must be made for it to remain at all alive.362

360 J. Glenn Gray, Hegel and Greek Thought, (Evanston: Harper & Row, 1941), 81.
362 Heidegger, The Basic Problem, 178.
This section of the chapter, then, pertains to the 20th century coming to grips with Hegel which will bridge the Kantian thing-in-itself with notions of pure difference. All that remains, then, in regard to establishing the preliminaries is to clarify the notions of language, retrospective differentiation, contamination, and pure difference on the way to Derrida and Deleuze. In order to clarify these notions, therefore, I will briefly examine Alexandre Kojève (1902-1968) and Jean Hyppolite (1907-1968) here, and examine Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) and Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) in the next chapter. I will begin with language. Describing Alexandre Kojève’s reading of Hegel, Daniel Selcer states,

It is the very totality of being that is negated by the discursive gesture of the understanding. Language does not merely negate singularity; it is the negative in general. Thus the labor of the negative is a discursive work; it is language that separates and recombines entities in such a manner as to annihilate the given [Selcer’s emphasis].363 Selcer’s description further emphasizes and clarifies a number of changes to Kant’s trajectory of experience in the writing of Hegel. First, as indicated in the movement from unity (Quantity) to reality and negation (Quality) in the “discursive gesture of the understanding,” language – though “the negative” – remains within being. Selcer’s emphasis of “is” indicates that the negation is not a negation of being. Second, as the labor of the negative is a discursive work, negation cannot access an opening in discursivity, i.e. there is no non-discursivity. Lastly, the discursive gesture of the understanding which moves under the sign of “language” is said to annihilate the given. The given, of course, in the Kantian structure of experience is all that comes before the

understanding, namely the experiential standpoint. Hence, in the writing of Hegel the Kantian experiential standpoint has vanished.

Originally published in 1952, Jean Hyppolite’s *Logic and Existence* [*Logique et existence*] emphasizes Hegel’s elimination of the experiential standpoint; in so far as Hyppolite’s text seeks to make Hegel’s text relevant for more than just thinking.

According to Hyppolite,

> Experience and the Logos are not opposed. The discourse of experience and the discourse of being, the a posteriori and the a priori, correspond to one another and mutually require one another. There would be no possible experience without the presupposition of absolute knowledge, but the path of experience points ahead to absolute knowledge.\(^{364}\)

Notice, the first sentence by Hyppolite in the above quote announces he will be providing a (re)interpretation of Hegel that seems more Kantian than the Hegel I have been depicting so far. In fact, according to Leonard Lawlor, “Hyppolite’s non-reductionistic interpretation of the relation between the phenomenology and the logic effectively ended the simple anthropological interpretation of Hegel popularized by Kojève before World War II.” (LE viii) Hyppolite notes, “Speculative knowledge is simultaneously the intuitive understanding that Kant attributed to God, and the discursive understanding that he reserved for man. Speculative logic is the dialectical discourse which contains these three moments within itself.” (LE 70) In this way, according to Hyppolite, “Absolute thought thinks itself in our thought. In our thought, being presents itself as thought and as sense.” (LE 58) Now, the three moments to which Hyppolite draws the attention of his reader above are: the intuitive, the understanding, and the dialectical discourse. These terms are analogous to other trinities in Hegel’s *Science of Logic*. Notice, in each of the

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following trinities, the third term signifies the difference between the first two. To name just a few of the trinities: (1) Being, Essence, and Concept; (2) Being, Nothingness, and Becoming; (3) Nature, Logos, and Spirit; (4) Identity, Difference, and Contradiction (5) Diversity, Essential Difference, and Absolute (pure) Difference.

According to Hyppolite, “Being, Essence, Concept constitute the three instincts of the Logos, the three circles which reproduce at different levels the same fundamental theme.” (LE 169) In this way, the movement of the Logos is the thinking of “absolute thought” in “our thought.” And, before looking at how Hyppolite describes the movement in the constitution of Logos, a look at what he says about the second trinity is helpful. Hyppolite says,

The Absolute is not a form or a content; if this distinction is maintained, then it is valid only for empirical consciousness which does not grasp each content of thought as the differential of its integral. It is the inadequation of the determinate content that turns it into a moment. Because it contradicts itself it becomes [my emphasis].” (LE 91)

So, already here is the movement of determination through the three moments of the trinity, which ultimately constitutes the retroactive determination of the (undifferentiated) content of the first moment (noted in Hegel above). Starting at the second moment, then, in the first trinity, Essence is the determination of that which distinguishes itself from itself. Retrospectively, that which has distinguished itself from itself gets determined as Being, and the movement which retrospectively determines that which ultimately distinguished itself from itself by moving into Essence is (the dichastic movement of) Concept. Once a term which connotes mobility is used in the third position of the trinity it is, perhaps, easier to decipher. This will be the case with the next trinity, i.e. Being, Nothingness (Non-Being), and Becoming. Remember, this is supposed to be the
description of a beatific vision. What seems like the spontaneous conceptual analysis is supposed to be a vision of the mind of God working.

Absolute – divine (non-discursive) thinking in Kant’s language –, then, is supposed to be thinking in our thinking. Yet, as Hyppolite’s return to the sense of Kant would have it, our thinking is the reflection of God’s thinking as nature. Notice the sudden appropriateness again of quoting William Blake. I might characterize this by saying: what Kant did to Leibniz, Hyppolite and the French are doing to Hegel, and the result may be seen by looking at the world as the unfolding of God’s mind. As such, I would ask: Is there anything sleeping in the abyss? That is, you have seen what Hegel did to the thing-in-itself, how are the French philosophers reading the thing-in-itself at this point? The answers can be found by examining these trinities.

So, when that which distinguishes itself from itself distinguishes itself as Essence it does so by moving into (our) empirical consciousness and back out again. This into and out of our empirical consciousness – according to Hegel and Hyppolite – all takes place within Being and is the movement of Logos. The main difference here between Hegel and Hyppolite is that Hyppolite – in attempting to bring Kantian sensibility back into the trajectory of experience – has this movement occurring through the sensible world on its way to thought. Tracing this movement backward, it is as if one moves out of, i.e. beyond, phenomenology and into the thinking of divine mind – Logos – which is thinking the world of which you are experiencing. Oddly, Plato has returned with a vengeance. The forms in the mind are now thrice removed from the forms in the mind of
God. In fact, Hyppolite’s rendition here is beginning to seem like a materialist rendition of Aristotle’s God, i.e. thinking thinking thinking through matter.365

Consider how Hyppolite describes the Logos,

＞＞ The seed, the initial cell is being, nothingness, becoming. Being is determined only by nothingness. It is itself the nothingness of itself, as that will appear at the level of essence, because essence is the internal negation of the whole sphere of being. (LE 169) ＜＜

In plugging this trinity into my explication above: Being distinguishes itself from itself by moving into an empirical consciousness, but in doing so it contradicts itself by moving from divine to empirical consciousness. Therefore it appears determined as the nothingness – its contradiction – which initiates the trajectory of experience. This is like beginning the dialectical movement of the mind – stated in my Introduction – with an outside of the forms (located in individual mind). Hence, this is a version of the dialectical option I entertained in the Introduction of considering the forms to be non-being, i.e. “Nothingness,” in the language of this chapter.

According to Hyppolite, “essence is appearance. Essence is posited in appearance, that is, negated being, and there alone.” (LE 170) Traversing appearance, Human thought grasps the essence completing this movement of Logos, and again, in order to think the undifferentiated we need to follow the movement which has differentiated it. In doing this, we retrospectively determine the undifferentiated as Being. The nothingness which initiated the trajectory is now being, and as Rockmore (above) put it from a Hegelian perspective, the two – being and nothingness – are “exactly the same.” This divine movement, then, from undifferentiated to differentiated and back is the movement of becoming within being. Notice the trinity here: being,

365 Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* Bk 12, Ch. 7 and Ch. 9.
nothingness, becoming. According to Hyppolite, “Nothingness is an immediate just as being is; the transition from being to nothingness, likewise from nothingness to being, is only a passage, becoming.” (LE 170) The movement from material God through sense in experience into conceptual reflection moves by way of a series of negations. Quoting Hyppolite’s potent passage at length,

Nothingness is an immediate just as being is; the transition from being to nothingness, likewise from nothingness to being, is only a passage, becoming … The sphere of essence, which is the first negation of being – then the negation of itself – is the field of reflection, of diremption. Being opposes itself to itself; it negates itself as being and it posits itself as essence. … Essence is the reflection of being, its appearance and its intelligibility. But this intelligibility, this conception, is simultaneously separated and inseparable from appearance. … This is why reflection reestablishes the first immediacy of being, just as this immediacy had been reflected into essence. Immediacy itself is conceived [my emphasis]. (LE 170)

Notice, Hyppolite has re-inscribed Hegel’s metaphysical shell game into Kant’s trajectory of experience, and now behind appearance there is no longer a thing-in-itself. Behind appearance is God.

Mixing Hegel – retrospectively, as it were – with Kant, Hyppolite reads Logos as a logic of sense.366 Here is the quote where Hyppolite provides this Kantian reading of the Logos.367 “Real actuality,” Hyppolite declares, is there in “the immediacy of being,” “comprehended by means of its essence, as in essence and reflection” and it “is also itself its sense, and this Sense is its being.” (LE 170) Hyppolite has moved from Quantity to Quality and is speaking of the relation of Quality to Quantity from Quality, i.e. without

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366 Following Kant’s notion of reason in the Critique of Pure Reason, “This reason that thinks itself and contradicts itself is the Logos.” Jean Hyppolite, Logic and Existence, Leonard Lawlor and Amit Sen, tr., 76.
367 Cf. Hyppolite, “Logos emerges from itself by remaining itself … It thinks sense.” (LE 102)
retrospectively determining Quantity — yet. And what Hyppolite says next will echo in Deleuze,

Being is reflected in itself, and, in this reflection, it is as sense. The subjective logic, or the logic of the concept, is the logic of sense, but this sense is not a subject opposed to the object. It is the being which is its self-consciousness, its sense, and this self-consciousness, in turn, is being itself, the absolute Idea scattered into nature and into history. In the Logos, being is thought. (LE 170)

Transposing the above language of actuality into the language of (divine) expression: that which is intuited immediately (à la Kant) through sense is the expression of the divine. It is firstly intuited by empirical consciousness — i.e. human being — which as sense indicates the inversion, i.e. displacement into representation, and secondly, conceived as the virtual representation in the understanding of the actual divine structure. Hence, this divine thinking’s return into itself after thinking itself as sense is the rhythm of possible experience as you stand on the perimeter of the mind of God and the Logos passes through you. Note that, despite these innovations and a return to Kantian sensibility, the assumption of a Hegelian closure of discursivity remains in Hyppolite as the categories represent the self-consciousness of God blossoming through the speculative thought of human understanding.368

It is in this way that Hyppolite’s reading of absolute difference in Hegel becomes the pure difference of post-structuralism. According to Hyppolite,

Speculative thought thinks difference as reflected difference, as essential difference, the difference of itself to itself [my emphasis]. … Speculative contradiction is the contradiction of the Absolute itself that negates itself by

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368 Cf. Hyppolite, “Representation, which is characteristic of empirical consciousness as such, is replaced by the concept. There is no longer any substrate. The speculative proposition then has determination of thought – categories – for predicates, categories which are themselves the subject. The categories become dialectically and express the Absolute’s self-consciousness, and no longer express a human consciousness’s viewpoint on an always alien reality.” (LE 150-151)
positing itself; but this meaning of negation, which is not
only subjective but also inherent to being, is the decisive
point of the Hegelian dialectic, the characteristic of
speculative thought in relation to empirical thought.
Empirical thought becomes speculative thought, when it
becomes thought of the universal self in every position, and
remains at the same time dialectical thought, and not
ineffable intuition. (LE 92)

There are three aspects of the above Hyppolite quote upon which I will comment. First,

essential difference is reflected difference. What this means is that essential difference is
difference at the second moment. Now this essential difference in the second moment is
different from that which it (contradictorily) reflects. In this way, by positing itself as
essential difference, essential difference is the difference of itself – in the second moment
– to itself – in the first moment. Second, the movement into essential difference is the
movement of pure difference. Invoking a celebrated Deleuze quote, this is like the
lightning in Difference & Repetition. There, Deleuze says,

[I]magine something which distinguishes itself from itself –
and yet that from which it distinguishes itself does not
distinguish itself from it. Lightning, for example,
distinguishes itself from the black sky but must also trail
behind it, as though it were distinguishing itself from that
which does not distinguish itself from it.  

Lastly, the moment of essential difference takes place in empirical consciousness which –
analogously – makes the movement of pure difference the movement associated with
sense, i.e. intuition in Kant’s trajectory of experience.

Now, given that this is a second moment, and the third moment is a return to the
first, the simultaneous retrospective determination and becoming speculative of empirical
thought means the realm of intuition is no longer “ineffable.” Hyppolite has brought
Hegel back to Kant – Hegel’s shell game to Kant’s trajectory of experience – in the hopes

28. Hereafter cited as D&R.
of regaining the experiential standpoint without the thing-in-itself. Yet, notice pure difference takes essential difference as a peep hole into the abyss. It is as if the qualitative moment in the movement of dichastasis sets the frame for a tile in Leibniz’s game. Whereas the qualitative orbit of essential difference passes through a discursively closed sensibility, pure difference plunges into the peep hole opening through the depths of the mind of God. And, as you might have anticipated at this point, this peering into the abyss exactly coincides with the location of the thing-in-itself in Kant’s structure of experience. Hence, placing emphasis on the differential converging upon the integer of quantity (as Hyppolite indicated above) seeks to avoid hypostasizing a thing-in-itself at the cost of concentrating on the finger instead of the moon, i.e. the relational means of indicating rather than that which is indicated.

In sum, by directing speculative thought into the material world, Hyppolite has brought Kantian sensibility back to Hegel’s systematic logic and combined Kant’s structure of experienced with Hegel’s trick, i.e. Hegel’s shell game. Yet, he has maintained the supposed Hegelian closure of discursivity. As such, the conceptual standpoint is still collapsed onto the experiential. Collapsing the standpoints is convenient for circumventing the blindness thesis in Kant, but will produce some untenable results. All this leaves a couple options in regard to the initial point of the trajectory of experience, i.e. what was considered the thing-in-itself by Kant. Maintaining the first impasse with Hegel you can wield Hegel’s shell game against all who might attempt to say something about that which is not by placing emphasis on the qualitative process of identification. In this way, the quality of identity cannot be inscribed upon a quantity of pure difference. This is precisely Derrida’s strategy, as I
will show in the next chapter. The other option is to plunge into the second impasse and ride the lighting, as it were, into the darkness of pure difference. This is quite like a return to Leibniz through Kant if – following Hyppolite’s cue – you assume that differential calculus can track qualitative change back into the quantitative abyss of pure difference. As I will show, this is precisely Deleuze’s strategy.

Hegel’s Metaphysical Shell Game

“The single occurrence of lightning, e.g., is apprehended as a universal, and this universal is enunciated as the law … Thus the difference qua difference of content, of the thing, is also again withdrawn.”
-G.W.F. Hegel (PS 94-95)

In this final section of the chapter I provide a summary overview of the difficulty confounding the philosophical problem of determining the origin or beginning of experience in post-Hegelian thinking. This section is helpful in understanding Derrida’s resistance to logocentrism discussed in Chapter 4. Further, this section is helpful in understanding Deleuze’s concern to circumvent a major obstacle for his project of describing pure difference. The basic faith one must have in order to play Hegel’s metaphysical shell game is certainly related to his so called closure of discursivity, and is nicely summed up by Hegel himself in his other logic book, i.e. Logic: Part One of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences – The Shorter Logic – (1817), §213:

The Idea is the Truth: for Truth is the correspondence of objectivity with the notion. By that correspondence, however, is not meant the correspondence of external things with my conceptions: … In the idea we have nothing to do with … external things. And yet, again, everything actual, in so far as it is true, is the Idea, and has its truth by and in virtue of the Idea alone. Every individual being is some one aspect of the Idea.370

The basic faith in the above quote is to eliminate the non-discursive in that the initial moment of difference, i.e. the initial undifferentiated/non-identified moment, is taken to be exhausted by the retrospective differentiation of conceptual determination. Yet, it seems to me this logical correspondence should be looked upon as modest eyes look upon a love letter. ⁴³⁷

According to Hegel in the *Science of Logic*, “[Difference] is the unity of identity and difference; its moments are different in one identity and thus are opposites. Identity and difference are the moments of difference held within itself; they are the reflected moments of its unity [Hegel’s emphases].” (SL 424) Granting Hegel, for now, the mirror-correspondence imagery conjured up by the use of “reflection,” so as to show how the shell game works, notice the determination of retrospective differentiation is at work here again. Yet, because the Quantity which will be revealed at the moment of Quality is difference, we now have the unique opportunity to – in thinking Quantity’s opposite – perhaps think the opposite of being, i.e. non-being. However, Hegel is already there waiting to disappoint any attempt to get outside of discursivity.

In other words, according to Hegel, “The positedness of the sides of the external reflection is accordingly a being, just as their non-positedness is a non-being.” (SL 424) So, the moment of Quality indicates being displaced as with all appearances. In other words, in determining whatever is determined we can say at least these two things about the determination *a priori*: first, as soon as there is an identity, then there is the moment or level of Quality – identity being determined by the split of the first moment or level of Quantity into binary opposites. Second, if there is an identity, then there is being – at least in that an identity is being identified. Hence, Hegel is ready to grant that the

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⁴³⁷ Reference to J.G. Hamann’s quote from the previous chapter.
opposite of being is non-being, but the opposition takes place in the position of Quality. And, therefore, as Quantity it already possesses being. So, any hopes at arriving at non-being have been foiled in advance as if in a metaphysical shell game – which one has non-being under it? The answer, of course: None of them!

Admittedly, this is all quite dense. So, I would like to pass back over this for clarity sake, and then to draw one final analogy. I have inserted an illustration to discuss.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level 1 – Quantity</th>
<th>Un-differentiated Moment</th>
<th>Differentiated Moment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level 2 – Quality</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Α</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>ψ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>φ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Ω</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3.4

Figure 3.4 is supposed to represent two moments of the same triangle. As such, “Α” stands for the triangle with an undifferentiated moment of Quantity, and “Ω” stands for the triangle with a retrospectively differentiated moment of Quantity. Correspondingly, “ψ” and “φ” represent the binary opposites which arise upon reaching the level of Quality. “Α” and “Ω,” then, are both the same and different triangles, and this paradox is based on the faith in correspondence such that the retrospective differentiation represents the Quantity as it was prior to the retrospective determinative contamination.

Mapping this movement on a cross corresponding to Figure 3.4, you can follow the numbers as they move counter clockwise around the two triangles. In the upper left hand corner of the cross you find 1, just below it 2, juxtaposed is 3, and above 3 you find 4. In this counter-clockwise movement it would be appropriate to speak of a difference between what is in position 1 and what is in position 2. Hyppolite (above) referred to the
first difference as “pure” and the second difference as “essential.” Remember, I mentioned above that Hegel’s trick is to begin at the level of Quality. Hyppolite (above) noted, “empirical consciousness takes this unity as immediate [my emphasis].”\textsuperscript{372} (LE 114) This is Hyppolite’s way of saying Hegel starts at the level of Quality because though the movement is from 1 to 2, the level of Quantity is undifferentiated and, as such, may be initially described as unnoticed, unconscious, or unidentified.

Now depending upon which of the binary opposites is privileged at the level of Quality you may consider yourself at 2 or 3 – say “$\psi$” for 2 and “$\varphi$” for 3. At 4, then, retrospectively the level of Quantity can be identified as “$\Omega$.” So, you have just completed a movement of retrospective determination in regard to one triangle. Yet, recall the “A” represented the undifferentiated Quantity prior to reflective contamination, and now Quantity is represented differently by “$\Omega$.” So, in completing a movement of retrospective determination, you have identified a different triangle. To sum: first, 1 is different than 2. Second, in 2 “$\psi$” and “$\varphi$” are different from each other. Third, as “$\psi$” and “$\varphi$,” 3 is different than 4. And, fourth, 4 is different than 1. If this is still not clear is will be after the next paragraph.

Now, let’s play the shell game in regard to non-being. Since 1 has undifferentiated and unnoticed being, and you start at 2; you identify being at 2 and non-being at 1. Yet, from 3 in lifting the shell to see 4 – or going back behind the curtain if you prefer Hegel’s \textit{Phenomenology} metaphor – in order to see this non-being that you just determined was there, you (retrospectively) differentiate what was undifferentiated. Thereby, you do not find non-being. You find being, and in recognizing you have arrived

\textsuperscript{372} Jean Hyppolite, \textit{Logic and Existence}, Leonard Lawlor and Amit Sen, tr., 114.
at what was your true starting point – even though you were initially unaware of it – you conclude: being is pure. All is being. The movement to arrive at this conclusion: becoming. Hegel has succeeded in combining Parmenides and Heraclitus.

Hence, this is the shell game in regard to non-being. Yet, true Hegelians can play this game with you – making the weaker argument the stronger and the stronger the weaker – so as to have it come out however they like. This is why when Rockmore says that “Being and Nothing are exactly the same” the undifferentiated can turn out to be being or non-being. So, if you tell a Hegelian that the undifferentiated is non-being by lifting the shell, they can say: “No, it’s being.” And, if you tell a Hegelian that the undifferentiated is being, they can say: “No, it’s non-being.” Further, if you say it is neither, they say it is “both.” If you say it is both, they say it is neither. Notice, every time they refute you, they are correct. Yet, it is technically also the case that you are never wrong. But, since they sit in the booth and move the shells: You lose.

There are two conclusions I want to draw from the above in order to close this section. First, I want to point out an analogy between Kant’s space and time and Hegel’s Quantity and Quality. Second, I want to say how the above analogy will help further illustrate the heritage from Kant through Hegel and Hyppolite to Derrida and Deleuze. By Lawlor’s lights were there no Hyppolite (specifically his text Logic and Existence), then there would be no pure difference in Derrida and Deleuze. (LE xi) Though I agree with Lawlor’s historical observation – it would be counterfactual and against the claims of Derrida and Deleuze themselves to suggest otherwise – still Hyppolite was able to read Hegel as such due to the thinking contained in Hegel’s texts. In other words, I will show that in the process of rewriting Kant, Hegel incorporated Kant’s thoughts on space. Now,
space is, of course, on the experiential, i.e. pre-understanding side of the trajectory of experience. So, despite Hegel’s attempt at the closure of discursivity, his incorporation of Kant’s thoughts on space left an opening to experiential non-discursivity. It is this opening upon which Hyppolite seized providing a more Kantian reading of Hegel. And, it is this more Kantian reading of Hegel that led to pure difference in Derrida and Deleuze.

At the beginning of his text, Hyppolite keenly strikes at the heart of the matter – the thing-in-itself. Hyppolite tells us Hegel’s “logic extends Kant’s transcendental logic by exorcising the phantom of a thing-in-itself … Absolute knowledge means the in principle elimination of this non-knowledge, that is, the elimination of a transcendence essentially irreducible to our knowledge.” (LE 3) Further, Hyppolite wastes no time in expressing the meaning of absolute knowledge in the wake of a closure of discursivity. Hyppolite says, “Absolute knowledge is not different from the immediate knowledge with which the Phenomenology of Spirit starts; it is only its true comprehension.” (LE 4)

Now I have shown above to what this business of immediate beginning and retrospective true comprehension amounts. Namely, Hegel – with conceptual understanding as the threshold of externality – takes Kant’s concept of quantity as the immediate moment of experience to be followed by Kant’s concept of quality. What Lawlor’s historical observation regarding textual influence misses is what following out this analogy brings to light. Mapping Kant’s concepts onto Hegel seems correct. Yet, the influence of Hegel on such a mapping means that Quantity – in regard to experience – maps onto space in Kant. Moving through the trajectory of experience: the combination of space and time – with and by the imagination – amounts to appearance in
Kant. Mapped analogously on to Hegel, Hegel’s first moment is analogous to space and his second moment to time in the determination of appearance. Notice how after this mapping a celebrated quote from Hegel’s *Phenomenology* seems far less cryptic.

This curtain [of appearance] hanging before the inner world is therefore drawn away, and we have the inner being [the ‘I’] gazing into the inner world – the vision of the undifferentiated selfsame being, which repels itself from itself, posits itself as an inner being containing different moments, but for which equally these moments are immediately not different – self-consciousness. It is manifest that behind the so-called curtain which is supposed to conceal the inner world, there is nothing to be seen unless we go behind it ourselves, as much in order that we may see, as that there may be something behind there which can be seen [my emphasis]. (PS 103) [A.V. Miller’s insertions]

*With the closure of discursivity, the thing-in-itself has become the eye of God looking through the bifocals of space and time.* Since our use of concepts to understand this is actually God looking through bifocals into a mirror, what God sees is only one aspect of Hegel’s above double genitive – “vision of the undifferentiated selfsame being.” For us, it is only the vision of God in the sense of (the) power (of vision). The actual vision – as in *image* – has lost something in passing through bifocals.

What is gained by recognizing that Hegel’s Quantity maps on to Kant’s space? Briefly, the answer: Kant understands space as containing infinity within it. It is not until space-time and the advent of continuity that we can think of a continuous infinity. Quite relevant, then, for Derrida and Deleuze, Hyppolite says, “Time is negativity, the pure restlessness of difference.” (LE 188) Hence, the question of how to think the (non-continuous) infinite within pure difference is the question of the thing-in-itself. *In trying to replace the thing-in-itself Derrida and Deleuze are up against the question of non-*
continuous infinity. A number of quotes from the Critique of Pure Reason support this claim. Kant says,

Now the consciousness of the homogeneous manifold in intuition in general, insofar as though it the representation of an object first becomes possible, is the concept of a magnitude (Quant). Thus even the perception of an object, as appearance, is possible only through the same synthetic unity of the manifold of given sensible intuition through which the unity of the composition of the homogeneous manifold is thought in the concept of a magnitude … they must be represented through the same synthesis as that through which space and time in general are determined. … (CPR 1998, A 162/B 203)

In fact, according to Kant, the mapping of Quantity on to space is precisely what allows for the use of geometry a priori in regard to experience. For example,

every appearance as intuition is an extensive magnitude, as it can only be cognized through successive synthesis (from part to part) in apprehension. All appearances are accordingly already intuited as aggregates (multitudes of antecedently given parts) … On this successive synthesis of the productive imagination, in the generation of shapes, is grounded the mathematics of extension (geometry) with its axioms, which express the conditions of sensible intuition a priori … (CPR 1998, A 163/B 204)

Congruent, then, with space and time as outer and inner sense, Kant depicts Quantity as divided into extensive magnitude and intensive magnitude. Further, Kant says, “in [intensive] magnitudes as such we can recognize a priori only a single Quality, viz. continuity, and that in all Quality (the real [component] of appearances) we can cognize a priori nothing more than their having an intensive quantity, viz. the fact that they have a degree.” (CPR 1996, B 218) You can now consider the difference between the two infinities.
Differentiating between the two infinities – infinity in time and infinity in space – Kant launches what also functions as a justification for non-discursivity. According to Kant,

\[ \text{Time is not a discursive [concept] ... it is a pure form of sensible intuition. ... To say that time is infinite means nothing more than that any determinate magnitude of time is possible only through limitations [put] on a single underlying time. Hence the original representation } \text{time} \text{ [Kant’s emphasis added in 1787] must be given as unlimited. ... any such representation must be based on direct intuition. (CPR 1996, A 31-32/B 47)} \]

Recall, limit – according to Kant’s Table of Concepts – is an aspect of Quality not Quantity. This accounts for the (above) splitting of Quantity because with time we can think continuity, and this limit is infinite. Compare this now with what Kant says about space.

\[ \text{Space is not a discursive or, as we say, universal concept of things as such; rather it is a pure intuition.” (CPR 1996, A24-25/B 39) And, here is Kant’s justification: “Space is represented as an infinite given magnitude. (CPR 2003, A24-25/B 39) Kant clarifies that he does not mean space may be represented in an infinite number of possible representations. Rather, Kant says,} \]

\[ \text{[N]o concept, as such, can be thought as containing an infinite multitude of representations within itself. Yet, that is how we think space (for all parts of space, } \text{ad infinitum, are simultaneous) [Kant’s emphasis]. (CPR 2003, A 25/B 40)} \]

How to think this infinity (which as infinite lacks finite being) in conjunction with the Hegelian version of dialectic will be the task which goes under the name of: describing pure difference – Derrida and Deleuze will have different descriptions. Within the framework of the Kantian system, it is as if Hegel puts being in the place of space. In
doing so, he accomplishes the destruction of the discursive/non-discursive distinction but at the cost of retreating to the first moment in the problem of non-being.

In other words, despite Kant’s specific warning in the last block quote above – “no concept can be thought [my emphasis] as containing an infinite multitude of representations within itself [Kant’s emphasis] – Hegel has it that this infinite multitude may be thought as (Parmenidean) being. Again, Hegel’s attempt is amphibolous. Further, notice from Kant’s emphasis that he evidently had Leibniz’s metaphor of the tile game in mind. That is, in denying that the mortal mind can think the infinity within a tile that itself is a limiting of the mind of God, Kant is further justifying that though Quantity is involved in thinking both the object in experience and reflection, these Quantities cannot be the same. Kant’s modesty keeps him from faith in Hegel’s correspondence. The sensible Quantity contains an infinity which cannot be thought. Notice what has been reworded and stated again? The infinite Quantity in sensibility exceeds our ability to think it – voilà the value of the notion of non-discursivity again.

At this point all the general preliminaries are in place to bridge Kant to Derrida and Deleuze. To sum, I have shown that I non-being cannot be stated symbolically, and I have shown Kant was well aware of this limitation by discussing his Table of Nothing in the Critique of Pure Reason. I showed Hegel’s reading of Kant’s thing-in-itself so as to show Hegel’s position in regard to the problem of non-being and Kant’s Table of Nothing. Generally speaking, I argued for a reading of Hegel in relation to Kant such that Hegel collapses the multiple standpoints of Kant’s system to the conceptual standpoint. I included Schopenhauer’s criticisms of Hegel to show an alternative to Hegel’s treatment of Kant. Specifically, Schopenhauer’s work in regard to the problem
of non-being connects Kant with Plato and provides a (non-Hegelian) critique of the thing-in-itself without collapsing Kant’s standpoints.

I then provided a summary of Hyppolite’s Kantian rendition of Hegel such that Kantian sensibility was given a prominent role in Hegel’s system via materialistic speculative thought. In doing this, I highlighted the fact that Hyppolite did not resuscitate Kantian non-discursivity. Hyppolite’s rendition of Hegel is the last of the general influences bridging Kant to Derrida and Deleuze, i.e. the remaining influences are more thinker-specific. Hyppolite provides a view of the altered Kantian conceptual and experiential standpoints which Derrida and Deleuze, respectively, take as points of departure in articulating the ground of experience. In this way, Derrida and Deleuze are working – with an altered framework – on the same problem which Kant sought to solve by positing the thing-in-itself. Hence, at this point you have seen enough of the historical work on the problem of non-being to understand the efforts of Derrida and Deleuze in its regard. Further, you have now seen a further explication of the logical options involved in attempting to solve the problem of non-being. As early as the Introduction I indicated the option which must be taken à la Plato and Gorgias to solve this problem, i.e. looking to experience. As you have seen then, and as you will see, this problem remained unsolved until I pursued the Ancient option differently.

Finally, in Aristotelian language, regarding their strategies for solving the problem of non-being: Kant’s focus pertains to priority of being; Derrida’s focus pertains to priority of account; and, Deleuze’s focus pertains to priority of time. As I will continue to indicate, and as the terms used to describe the priority also indicate, Kant’s focus came closest thus far to solving the problem of non-being. Yet, the innovations
Derrida and Deleuze provide – which I will show as already inherent in Kant’s account – provide an elaboration of Kant’s thought which Kant did not live long enough to perform. Hence, after discussing Derrida and Deleuze, you will see my reading of a return to the Kantian experiential standpoint for the sake of solving the problem of non-being.

“I am ultra-Kantian. I am Kantian, but I am more than Kantian.”
~Jacques Derrida

“And contrary to what phenomenology – which is always phenomenology of perception – has tried to make us believe, contrary to what our desire cannot fail to be tempted into believing, the thing itself always escapes.”
~Jacques Derrida

“Différance, which (is) nothing … (is) the thing itself.”
~Jacques Derrida

Chapter Four: Pure Difference in Derrida – Recognizing Différance

Introduction and Justification for Chapter 4 Sections and Objectives

In this chapter I explicate Derrida’s understanding of pure difference. I have already begun this explication in the previous chapter. The first three sections of this chapter are primarily expository. That is, my objective for these sections is the not without difficulty task of presenting a coherent view of Derrida’s discussion of pure difference and the idea into which it evolves – Différance. The remaining sections of the chapter contain my arguments concerning Derrida’s pure difference in relation to Kant’s thing-in-itself and Derrida’s pure difference in relation to the problem of non-being. Hence, in this chapter, then, I focus on Derrida’s comments concerning pure difference.

In so doing, one immediately sees that shortly after initially discussing pure difference in relation to Husserl, Derrida – realizing the paradoxical nature of referring to

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pure difference as such – shifted to writing about *Différance*. I will argue that this is tantamount to Derrida’s attempt to solve the problem of non-being by making a philosophical position of the problem’s second impasse. Remember, for Derrida, being in Hyppolite’s wake means both returning to Kantian sensibility and maintaining Hegel’s closure of discursivity. Further recall, pure difference is thought as the first moment of undifferentiated Quantity in Hegel’s shell game. In this way, Derrida accepts Hegel’s shell game as an inevitable consequence of attempting to express in language a sensuous being that you mean. Hence, Derrida develops a way of referring to pure difference so as to acknowledge the inability to refer to pure difference.

How might this be seen as a solution to the problem of non-being? By employing the term *Différance* Derrida seeks (paradoxically) to collapse the second impasse – of the problem involved in referring to any thing that lacks a signification – by embracing it. Such a strategy may be of great value toward solving the problem of non-being, but it is completely misplaced by Derrida. This strategy works better – as I will employ it in Part II of the dissertation – if you also allow for non-discursivity. Maintaining the closure of discursivity Derrida is content to conclude his project by returning to Kantian undecidability regarding pure difference. It is in this way that Derrida failed to solve the problem of non-being. Recall, undecidability for Kant pertained to the thing-in-itself. In this chapter, then, I will further illustrate and expand the above.

**Pure Difference ex Priority of Account: Derrida’s Stacked Deck**

“Perhaps what is inexpressible (what I find mysterious and am not able to express) is the background against which whatever I could express has meaning.”

~Ludwig Wittgenstein

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Though Kant is explicit that neither space (CPR A 25-25/B 39) nor time (CPR A 31-32/B 47) is discursive, Hegel’s closure of discursivity furthers what may be thought of as philosophy’s self assuring truth of “the now.” A quote from Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* §§97-98 expresses my claim precisely:

> [I]t is just not possible for us ever to say, or express in words, a sensuous being that we mean. The same will be the case with the other form of the “This”, with “Here”. “Here” is, e.g., the tree. If I turn round, this truth has vanished and is converted into its opposite: “No tree is here, but a house instead.” “Here” itself does not vanish; on the contrary, it abides constant in the vanishing of the house, the tree, etc., and is indifferently house or tree. Again, therefore, the “This” shows itself to be a *mediated simplicity*, or a *universality* [Hegel’s emphases]. (PS 60-61)

Hegel’s move here is tantamount to making space and time discursive since Hegel’s version of the *nunc stans* – standing now – as overlay of the senses allows for reference to the senses through the frame of space and time, i.e. here and now. In this way, Hegel allows for reference to the undifferentiated moment – through space and time – in the explication of experiential meaning without expressing the sensuous being you mean. I do not need to know the name of this pain, so long as I can refer to it as “this pain” “here and now.”

At first this might seem little different from Kant. However, as Hegel hints in the above passage noting, “the truth has vanished and is converted into its opposite,” you already know by the Hegel quote at the end of the previous chapter from the “Shorter Logic” that – consistent with the shell game – of this truth, “The Idea is the Truth … [&] Every individual being is some one aspect of the Idea.”377 Hence, on the one hand, a return to the senses is a return to the ideas. And, on the other hand, Hegel seems to take

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the language pertaining to the standing now to function discursively in the subject
position of judgments such as “Here is a tree.”

Now, Derrida takes the “Here” which “itself does not vanish” to be “presence.”

Derrida declares, “According to a fundamentally Greek gesture, this Hegelian
determination of time permits us to think the present, the very form of time, as
eternity.” Further, “Eternity is another name of the presence of the present.” (MOP 46)

And Derrida explains – as can be seen in the Hegel quote above – “Hegel also
distinguishes this presence from the present as now.” (MOP 46) So, coupled together,
there is a sensuous flowing now and a non-sensuous standing eternal now. The latter,
then, acts as an overlay through which you can identify the sensuous. I will make this
clear for you in a moment, but first I want to show you how this immediate issue
connects with non-being.

Because of what has been said so far regarding time and Hegel, Derrida says,

“Time is not (among beings). It is nothingness because it is time, that is a past or future
now.” (MOP 50) In other words, “time is not (a being) to the extent that it is not
(present).” (MOP 50) Derrida deduces

The mē on, the no-thingness, therefore, is accessible only
on the basis of the Being of time. Time as nothing can be
thought only according to the modes of time, the past and
the future. Being is nontime, time is nonbeing [my
emphasis] insofar as being already, secretly has been
determined as present, and Beingness (ousia) as presence.
(MOP 51)

Beyond being reminiscent of Hegel’s shell game, this language should already indicate to
you that this non-being is internal to understanding. As such, this is what I refer to as

not-being, not non-being, i.e. ἐναντίον not ἔτερον.

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Chicago Press, 1982), 45. Hereafter cited as MOP.
Finally, *Derrida concludes, “Time is indeed the discursive manifestation of negativity.”* (MOP 51) In this way, Derrida has returned to the first line of the large Hegel quote which began this section, i.e. from the *Phenomenology of Spirit* §97, “it is just not possible for us ever to say, or express in words, a sensuous being that we mean.” (PS 60) Recall though Hegel takes the sensuous being as still *being* a part of the Parmenidean One-Being, he will refer to it as “non-being”; yet, this is merely the non-being which his shell game will reveal as ultimately being. Derrida, then, in a Kantian twist, will treat this matter as undecidable, and as such Derrida offers his solution to the problem of non-being, i.e. pure difference which is in-itself undecidable. That which Hegel calls a sensuous being you cannot mean, Derrida takes as the difference which is undecidable, i.e. neither sensible nor intelligible, and as undecidable this difference is pure difference. Applying Hegel’s shell game, Derrida treats this undecidable site between the binary opposites of flowing and standing nows like the *rendezvous* for a Bacchanalian revel.

Recall the comments from Sextus Empiricus in the chapter on Kant. According to Sextus, “If undecidable, we have it that we must suspend judgment; for it is not possible to make assertions about what is subject to undecidable dispute. But if decidable, we shall ask where the decision is to come from [my emphasis].” If you ask the question of Hegel, where is the decision to come from, regarding the *Phenomenology* §98, the answer is time. The standing now reveals the presence of Being in time. Being is decidedly constructed upon the opposition between the flowing and non-flowing of time, and the non-flowing, i.e. standing now of Being, for Hegel is privileged. So, Derrida seeks to deconstruct the foundation upon which Being is erected. Now, this is not to be

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379 Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Scepticism*, 41-42.
taken as a privileging in turn by Derrida; deconstruction does not need a special target. As all Derrida scholars can tell you, no erection is safe with Derrida around. In order to deconstruct the foundation of time, then, upon which Being is erected, Derrida must show that the difference between what amounts to Being and non-being does not point to Being. That is, Hegel’s Parmenidean One-Being has it that the undifferentiated first moment, upon retrospective determination is revealed as (having been all along) Being. If Derrida can make the first moment undecidable, rather than Being, then he “has it” as Sextus might say. In order to accomplish this, of course, Derrida must work on the problem of non-being.

Recall from my discussion of priority in account from the Introduction’s discussion of Aristotle that in *Metaphysics* IX §8 Aristotle argues actuality precedes potentiality in account [λόγῳ] (Meta 1049b12-17), time [χρόνῳ] (Meta 1049b17-1050a3), and being [οὐσίᾳ] (Meta 1050a4-11). Now, by considering the logos [λόγος] as a type of potentiality – think of the many possible descriptions of an entity – Derrida is able to argue for a non-logo-centric priority. Any reckoning, i.e. accounting, to be made of this priority, of course, must invoke the logos to which it is prior. Moreover, notice how this functions as a sophisticated rendition of the thing-in-itself. Derrida is positing pure difference as the actuality prior to the potential logo-centric descriptions, and then claiming that “pure difference” as a description derives from the logos. Hence, he is attempting to further inculcate or enforce Kant’s idea of the non-discursive thing-in-itself by denying non-discursivity, i.e. invoking Hegel’s closure of discursivity, and by also denying priority to the logos. For ease of communication, Derrida will ultimately exchange speaking of pure difference for speaking of this movement to that which though
differing from the logos can necessarily only be identified by deferring to the logos – thus the movement of Différance. However, as there is a good deal yet to discuss toward recognizing Différance, I will return to Différance below.

Returning, here, to Derrida’s reading of presence; notice, Being is nontime, but Being is found – recovered or gathered together – in time. The difference between Being and time, then, is the difference between the standing eternal now and the flowing sensuous now. You may recognize the eternal, here, is much like Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception which persists across perceptions. Yet, here, Derrida is focusing on time, rather than perceptions. So, the form of time, as presence, persists as time flows, and this persisting form of time is Being. It is as if, were there not a standing now, i.e. a place to stand, you could not see time flow past; were there not a place to stand, you could not recognize change – you would be changing too much to be enough you to notice that you are changing. This is why Derrida above says, “the no-thingness” is “only accessible on the basis of the Being of time.” (MOP 51) By Derrida’s lights, the concept of time may be used within Being to indicate non-being, i.e. that which is not (now). So as you can see this non is supposed to refer to Becoming as not Being, and as such this term should be called not-being, rather than non-being. Further, you can see Derrida’s logic as an exploitation of Aristotle’s priority of account. Derrida’s innovation will be to deny a difference in kind between the account which is prior and that to which it is prior.

Thus far, then, I have shown you Derrida’s attempt to solve the problem of non-being with reference to the work of Aristotle and Hegel. And to use the language of Aristotle, what has been said thus far is that Derrida attempts to collapse priority in time.
to priority in account. In the background of this move lurks a Hegelian justification, i.e. despite following Hyppolite Derrida retains the closure of discursivity.\textsuperscript{380} Yet, there is, of course, more to Derrida’s solution. In fact, that he pursues this problem, that he is concerned with it, more than just dismissing the problem as merely arising from the dialectical movement of negativity shows a Kantian influence rustling him in his Hegelian slumbers. Now, perhaps the more standard references to state in regard to Derrida’s innovation here are to the work of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) and Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913). I will use such references, then, to demonstrate the movement in Derrida’s work from pure difference to \textit{Différance}.

I will discuss Husserl by way of two related preliminaries to pure difference: first, what has come to be referred to as “The Metaphysics of Presence,” thanks to Derrida, and second, I will discuss Husserl’s expression/indication distinction. As Derrida notes in \textit{Speech [Voice] and Phenomena [La Voix et le Phénomène]} Derrida tells us,

> And here again we find all the incidences of primordial nonpresence whose emergence we have already noted on several occasions. Even while repressing difference by assigning it to the exteriority of the signifiers, Husserl could not fail to recognize its work \textit{at the origin of sense and presence}. … In this \textit{pure difference} is rooted the possibility of everything we think we can exclude from auto-affection: space, the outside, the world, the body, etc. … We come closest to it [pure difference] in the movement of \textit{différance} [my emphasis]. (SP 82)

It is for this reason that Leonard Lawlor refers to “pure difference” in Derrida’s early work as “the source of the concept of \textit{différance}.”\textsuperscript{381} And, as you can see in the above quote, Derrida does not locate pure difference as much as he locates “its work” “at the


origin of sense and presence.” Hence, notice, Derrida locates “pure difference” by equating it with “origin.” Further, the above quote – by referencing “sense and presence” – situates this thought precisely within the previous discussion regarding Hegel.382

According to Husserl, Husserlian phenomenology stands or falls upon the truth of one principle. Husserl – in Ideas I §24 – calls this principle the “principle of all principles.” And, one is thereby forced to decide whether they accept this principle or not. Especially in light of what has been said concerning Hegel in Chapter 2, and as will be shown below, neither Derrida nor Deleuze accept this principle. Here is Husserl on the so-called principle of all principles.

No conceivable theory can make us err with respect to the principle of all principles: that every originary presentive intuition is a legitimizing source of cognition, that everything originally (so to speak, in its “personal” actuality) offered to us in “intuition” is to be accepted simply as what it is presented as being, but also only within the limits in which it is presented there [Husserl’s emphases].383

This amounts to assuming – contra Hegel – that the experiential starting point is the first moment – not the second moment – of conceptualization, and further this principle assumes nature’s sincerity.384 As such, intuition as the sincere expression of nature outright denies the wisdom of Heraclitus – “Nature loves to hide [φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φύλεται].”385 At the origin, so to speak, for both Derrida and Deleuze is pure difference,

382 Moreover, what I am about to say will, among other things, make sense of why I think of both Derrida and Deleuze as beyond phenomenology or post-phenomenological – at least regarding Husserl’s idea of phenomenology.


and pure difference is different from itself. Hence, for Derrida and Deleuze, it is better to
speak of irony than sincerity in regard to this “origin."

Yet, Husserl believes nature to be sincere. What is more, Derrida shows how
Husserl attempts to immunize himself from Hegel’s shell game by denying the possibility
of some other beginning, i.e. an “abysmal alterity.” In regard to Kant, Derrida’s critique
of Husserl suggests: rather than guttural awareness, there is isomorphic harmony with
nature sincerely revealed at the moment analogous to (the “inner sense” of) time in
Kant’s trajectory of experience. In other words, Husserl is accused of suggesting time
exhausts space, rather than taking time as a way of thinking space in a continuum – the
way Kant thought time (see previous chapter). The following passage, indicated by
Derrida, makes Husserl’s position explicit. I quote it at length, bulleted so as to be able
to discuss it afterward. According to Husserl,

[1] We can now pose the question: What about the
beginning-phase of an experience that is in the process of
becoming constituted? Does it also come to be given only
on the basis of retention, and would it be “unconscious” if
no retention were to follow it? [2] We must say in response
to this question: The beginning-phase can become an object
only after it has elapsed in the indicated way by means of
retention and reflection (or reproduction). [3] But if it were
intended only by retention, then what confers on it the label
“now” would remain incomprehensible. [4] At most it
could be distinguished negatively from its modifications as
that one phase that does not make us retentionally
conscious of any preceding phase; [5] but the beginning-
phase is by all means characterized in consciousness in
quite positive fashion. It is just nonsense to talk about an
“unconscious” content that would only subsequently
[nachträglich] become conscious. Consciousness
[Bewusstsein] is necessarily consciousness [bewusstsein] in
each of its phases. [6] Just as the retentional phase is
conscious of the preceding phase without making it into an
object, so too the primal datum is already intended –
specifically, in the original form of the “now” – without its

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being something objective. [7] It is precisely this primal consciousness that passes over into retentional modification – which is then retention of the primal consciousness itself and of the datum originally intended in it, since the two are inseparably united. If the primal consciousness were not on hand, no retention would even be conceivable: retention of an unconscious content is impossible. Husserl here considers the passing from moment to moment of time to be even less problematic, i.e. more sincere, than Hegel took it (above). Recall from above, Derrida, operating in the wake of Hegel’s closure of discursivity will be skeptical of the Husserlian claim I labeled “6.” In other words, Derrida will not allow Husserl to suppose a sincere flow of the now as a stable ground of time – this move is ultra-Kantian; and, if no longer stable, then Derrida has deconstructed the metaphysics of presence, i.e. with Derrida, philosophy loses the sincerity of its self assuring truth of “the now.”

In regard to the bullet points in the quote: First, [1] this question is, of course, a question about origination, a question of the origin. I have been discussing this question above, especially in regard to Kant and Hegel. Second, [2] here Husserl stands on the shoulders of Kant. “Reproduction” betrays the Kantian origin of the reproductive imagination. In other words, Husserl can be located, in regard to the question of origin, as invoking the Kantian trajectory of experience to support his position. I point this out to further show how Husserl is here participating in the same discussion as the above thinkers, i.e. Kant-Hegel-Hyppolite. Third, [3] here Husserl is arguing against a version of my thesis about memory. Suffice to say at this point, Husserl and I think of memory differently (more on this in the Memory chapter). Fourth, [4] this is the Hegelian thesis – negative dialectic, shell game, etc. Husserl, as will be explicit by the end of his quote, rejects this thesis. Remember, this is the very thesis which allows for a discussion of

pure difference. Fifth, [5] here Husserl is invoking the principle of all principles, and denying the efficacy of Hegelian thesis just mentioned. Sixth, [6] to further support [5] Husserl here appeals to the metaphysics of presence. Lastly, [7] albeit Husserl and I think differently about retention, this claim of his about memory is simply wrong (more on this in the following chapters). 387

Now with the above in place, I can discuss Husserl’s distinction between expression and indication. Derrida’s Différance can be seen to derive from his critique of this Husserlian distinction. Husserl, in Logical Investigations, explains there is a difference between expression and sign. The meaning of a “sign” is the sense that the sign “expresses.” (Sh Log 103) Moving, then, from thing to indication to meaning – think the trajectory of Kant’s structure of experience: in discussing indication Husserl notes, “A thing is only properly an indication if and where it in fact serves to indicate something to some thinking being.” (Sh Log 104) Husserl goes on to say, “From indicative signs we distinguish meaningful signs, i.e. expressions.” (Sh Log 104) He clarifies,

We shall lay down, for provisional intelligibility, that each instance or part of speech, as also each sign that is essentially of the same sort, shall count as an expression, whether or not such speech is actually uttered, or addressed with communicative intent to any persons or not [Husserl’s emphasis]. (Sh Log 104-105) First notice, indicative signs are distinguished from “meaningful” signs. So, there are meaningless signs which express meaningful signs. Further, in the first of these three quotes, Husserl associated a meaningless indicative sign with a “thing.” Husserl then,

387 Albeit Husserl might mean that after the transcendental reduction – epoché – there is no unconscious memory, if so then he has reduced the actual origin out of the problematic of experience. Husserl’s reading of memory is, though sophisticated, fails in so far as it adheres to the phenomenological method, i.e. there is more to memory than the phenomena of memory.
invoking the sincerity of intuition, suggested the meaning of the expression derives from the combination of the thing with the here and now as the “if and where” which intuited the thing as an indication serving to express the meaning of something. Husserl here betrays that such speech is suggestive of believing in an eternality, i.e. a “metaphysics of presence” – whether gradually or spontaneously revealed – in and through which meaning persists. I suppose this is reminiscent of some Platonic heaven. Yet, it would be as if the sentence: “Deleuze’s book on expression was not forged in hell” could be reduced to one stable meaning that persists beyond the particular phrasing. So Derrida will interrogate Husserl’s theory of meaning.

What is left to show before invoking Derrida is Husserl’s descriptions of talking to someone else and talking to yourself. Invoking a perennial trope – the physical and the psychical – Husserl indicates his meaning of the distinction between expression and indication. On the one hand, both literally and figuratively he provides a list of examples of “The expression physically regarded,” including “the sensible sign, the articulate sound-complex, the written sign on paper etc.” (Sh Log 105) On the other hand, invoking the Kantian rhetoric of the reproductive imagination, Husserl says,

> A certain sequence of mental states, associatively linked with the expression, which make it be the expression of something. These mental states are generally called the ‘sense’ or the ‘meaning’ of the expression, this being taken to be in accord with what words ordinarily mean. (Sh Log 105)

Now, though Husserl’s list of examples may illustrate his will-to-description, all the possible meanings of “expression” which he indicates are beyond the scope of my concern. However, his discussion of how the physical side of speech becomes communicative is ideal. Husserl says,
The articulate sound-complex, the written sign, etc., first becomes a spoken word or communicative bit of speech, when a speaker produces it with the intention of ‘expressing himself about something’ through its means; he must endow it with a sense in certain acts of mind, a sense he desires to share with his auditors. Such sharing becomes a possibility if the auditor also understands the speaker’s intention. … What first makes mental commerce possible, and turns connected speech into discourse, lies in the correlation among the corresponding physical and mental experiences of communicating persons which is effected by the physical side of speech. (Sh Log 106)

From Husserl’s pre-death-of-the-author epoch he sees the cathexis or imbuing of the physical with meaning as dependent on the “desire” of the author “to share.” Hence, it is at least clear that for Husserl indication is necessary in the communication of meaning, i.e. the “correlation among the corresponding physical and mental experiences” is “effected by the physical side of speech.”

So as to maintain a distinction between physically acting and mentally imagining, then, Husserl describes the difference between speaker and listener, i.e. first person experience and vicarious experience.

Speaking and hearing, intimation of mental states through speaking and reception thereof in hearing, are mutually correlated. … The hearer perceives the speaker as manifesting certain inner experiences, and to that extent he also perceives these experiences themselves: he does not, however, himself experience them, he has not an ‘inner’ but an ‘outer’ percept of them. (Sh Log 106-107)

On the one hand, then, this seems an adequate description of the conveyance of meaning through speech. On the other hand, Husserl’s theory of the conveyance of meaning through speech might – as Derrida will point out – come into conflict with his thesis of necessary indication in regard to talking to yourself.

Husserl – in further supporting his thesis of indication – provides a description of both communicated and uncommunicated expressions. Expressions used in
communication depend “essentially on the fact that they operate indicatively.” (Sh Log 107) Of uncommunicated expressions, Husserl says, they “continue to have meanings as they had before, and the same meanings as in dialog. A word only ceases to be a word when our interest stops at its sensory contour, when it becomes a mere sound–pattern.” (Sh Log 107) However, Husserl qualifies, “when we live in the understanding of a word, it expresses something and the same thing, whether we address it to anyone or not.” (Sh Log 107) So far no conflict, but next Husserl will describe – what some scholars equate with the transcendental reduction\(^{388}\) – soliloquy, i.e. when “one speaks to oneself, and employs words as signs, i.e. as indications, of one’s own inner experiences.” (Sh Log 108)

Given the structure Husserl has just described, he now has the ontological commitment or the phenomenological commitment, or at least the logical commitment to a counterintuitive description of hearing yourself speak. If indications were necessary for meaning, it follows then that you need to hear yourself before you know what you mean. The other alternative is that you imagine the words in front of you – so as to have an indication of your meaning – as you engage in soliloquy. Husserl decides upon imagination to solve his problem.

In imagination a spoken or printed word floats before us, though in reality it has no existence. We should not, however, confuse imaginative presentations, and the image-contents they rest on, with their imagined objects. The imagined verbal sound, or the imagined printed word, does not exist, ony its imagined verbal sound, or the imaginative presentation does so. The difference is the difference between imagined centaurs and the imagination of such beings. (Sh Log 108)

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What Husserl says here is certainly consistent, i.e. he sticks to what his necessary indication thesis committed him, but such a description does not seem to correspond with experience. It is this flaw in Husserl’s system which Derrida will treat as a *rendezvous* for a Bacchanalian revel.

To sum, whatever you indicate is what you mean. Despite what you might think, if you do not indicate it, then you do not mean it, nor do you communicate it. And notice that this is like the ribbon cutting ceremony at the grand opening of another site to play Hegel’s shell game. Given Husserl’s understanding of physical and psychical, now the psychical depends on the physical, and the physical lacks (psychical) identity. Sound familiar? An undifferentiated, unidentified first moment, which is itself determined as such only retrospectively from a second moment. It is as if, Husserl left an entryway unguarded, and in it Derrida has stuck Hegel’s javelin. Now, in a way to be (further) explained below, Husserl’s system is infected with pure difference. As Derrida will make all too clear, retrospective identification does not ensure nature’s sincerity. In a post-Hyppolite ultra-Kantian innovation – the motor force of which being Hegel’s shell game – Derrida will replace Husserl’s decision regarding nature’s sincerity with undecidability. And, to do so Derrida will invoke Saussure.

Another celebrated influence on Derrida, then, Ferdinand de Saussure’s seminal text *Course in General Linguistics [Cours de linguistique générale]* (1916) provides a description of meaning which can be read as rival to Husserl’s description. Recall Husserl’s description of language required one to hold a counterintuitive notion of communication in solitude. Yet, both Husserl and Saussure consider expression dependent upon indication; so, what is the difference which makes all the difference for
Saussure? Thought through the vocabulary of Saussure: the material – the physical sound patterns or written signs – is prerequisite for the psychical element of meaning.

Saussure, embracing the dependence of expression upon indication, provided a way to think of meaning as itself constituted by indication, rather than by meaning intention, i.e. rather than by imbuing the physical with psychical meaning. According to Saussure, the differences between indications – the physical aspects – could account for the production of meaning. For example, regarding the physical construction of the following words, a bat is a bat because it is not (it is different from) a cat, or a car, or a bar, etc.\textsuperscript{389} Hence, material difference makes all the difference much like a condition for the possibility of meaning for Derrida, though it is grounded in priority of account.

As explained by Saussure, the “First Principle” of General Linguistics amounts to: “The bond between signifier and signified is arbitrary.”\textsuperscript{390} What this means is that every sign may be thought of as composed of a physical side and a psychical side.

Staying with speech for the moment, what Saussure calls the “sound image,” [image-acoustique] would be the physical side, i.e. the signifier [signifiant]. And, what Saussure calls the “concept” would be the psychical side, i.e. the signified [signifié].\textsuperscript{391} Now, Saussure is able to say this and acknowledge that, insofar as meaning is psychical, even the “physical” side is recognized by the psychical. What this means is – as I already rehearsed above with Husserl – you cannot mean the matter because what would be “the matter” (physical) is external to all meaning (psychical). This is the reason for speaking about the “side” of a sign. Remember, generally speaking – as exemplified by Hyppolite

\textsuperscript{389} Notice this version immediately solidifies itself against any charge of a Cartesian inspired solipsism.
\textsuperscript{390} Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, Wade Baskin, tr., (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959), 67. Hereafter cited as CGL.
\textsuperscript{391} Ferdinand de Saussure. Cours de linguistique générale, (Paris VI: Gran Bibliothèque Payot, 1995), 99.
– these French thinkers have employed Kant against Hegel. In other words, something may be functioning like the thing-in-itself, though you – of course – cannot express its meaning. Saussure says,

> The linguistic sign unites, not a thing and a name, but a concept and a sound-image. The latter is not the material sound, a purely physical thing, but the psychological imprint of the sound, the impression that it makes on our senses. The sound-image is sensory, and if I happen to call it “material,” it is only in that sense, and by way of opposing it to the other term of the association, the concept, which is generally more abstract [my emphasis]. (CGL 66)

Hence, here, Saussure provides a theory of meaning which functions by way of the basic pattern outlined by Kant. Transposing into the Kantian key – it is as if the senses pick up the “purely physical thing” without ever being able to mean it. Further, this sensory sound image is conventionally, i.e. arbitrarily, associated with the concept under which it is subsumed. Thing + sense, + concept ≈ Thing + signifier + signified, and, separately, both equal the “sign.”

In this way, every sign is composed of a signifier and a signified to which the signifier points. (CGL 67) Now the importance of what we might call Saussure’s principle of all principles is to recognize that the relation between a signifier and the signified to which it points is both arbitrary and fixed. This requires nuance. According to Saussure,

> The signifier, thought to all appearances freely chosen with respect to the idea that it represents, is fixed, not free, with respect to the linguistic community that uses it. The masses have no voice in the matter … This fact, which seems to embody a contradiction, might be called colloquially “the stacked deck.” … No individual, even if he willed it, could modify in any way the choice which has been made; and, what is more, the community itself … is bound to the existing language. (CGL 71)
This is why – above – I referred to the conventionality of the association between sensory sound image and concept. Further, Saussure’s use here of a gaming metaphor – “stacked deck” [la carte forcée]392 is significant because the community of Kant scholars at times associates the thing-in-itself with the signifier “wild card.” This seems proper, i.e. I would not change this association if I could. So, the relation between signifier and signified is arbitrary – it could have been otherwise – but fixed – it is not otherwise. Using a phrase I used with Husserl: you can only express what you indicate. And, physical indication is arbitrarily tied up in conventionality.393

The last piece to take from Saussure on the way to understanding Derrida’s pure difference involves Saussure’s second principle. Whereas the first principle is the arbitrary nature of the sign, the second principle is the linear nature of the sign. Of this principle, Saussure says, “The signifier, being auditory, is unfolded solely in time from which it gets the following characteristics: (a) it represents a span, and (b) the span is measurable in a single dimension; it is a line.” (CGL 71) Of this linearity Saussure suggests, “it is fundamental, and its consequences are incalculable. … the whole mechanism of language depends upon it.” (CGL 71) Beginning with “auditory signifiers,” Saussure concludes that these signifiers have at their command only the dimension of time. Their elements are presented in succession; they form a chain. This feature becomes readily apparent when they are represented in writing and the spatial line of graphic marks is substituted for succession in time. (CGL 71)

Hence, paraphrasing Saussure here by stringing together the vocabularies of Aristotle, Kant, and Derrida I would say: Saussure has located pure difference (Derrida) as the

392 Ferdinand de Saussure. Cours de linguistique générale, 99.
393 Cf. Aristotle’s priority of account.
remote matter (Aristotle) in the intuitive slot designated for space in the (Kantian) structure of experience. In order to better understand this principle, then, think of it as a principle of animation or motivation – a motivation indicatively, not expressively generated. To do so, it helps to consider what Saussure says later in the text when, in clarifying the first principle, he distinguishes between radical and relative arbitrariness.

According to Saussure, “The fundamental principle of the arbitrariness of the sign does not prevent our singling out in each language what is radically arbitrary, i.e. unmotivated, and what is only relatively arbitrary.” (CGL 131) Radical and relative arbitrariness are distinguished in terms of motivation or animation, there are degrees between absolute and relative arbitrariness: “the sign may be relatively motivated.” (CGL 131) For example, “The English plural ships suggests through its formation the whole series flags, birds, books, etc. while men and sheep suggest nothing.” (CGL 132) Saussure means that each sign, dependent upon its degree of arbitrariness, seems to point forward – in line – to the next sign. This internally motivated movement from sign to sign may be thought of as a sliding from sign to sign. And this sliding can be accounted for indicatively. Recall, every sign is composed of different elements, i.e. a signifier and a signified.

Saussure himself refers to these as the acoustic image of the signifier and the concept to which is points as the signified. Image and concept, it should not escape you, were the two components which Kant’s Transcendental Deduction sought to combine via the condition for their possible combination, i.e. the =x. Recall that an image in a judgment of perception in Kant’s structure and trajectory of experience was not a fully determined object of experience, i.e. it was not an object of a judgment of experience. In
order to be a determined object of experience, the three-fold synthesis was required to culminate in the recognition under a concept such that the Square of Opposition, i.e. universality, was entered. Similarly for Saussure, the combination of a sound image with a concept is the combination of a noise with the “stacked deck” of meaning agreed upon through use by a community of language users. Yet, just as the image could be determined in different ways – limited in different ways –, so too can a signifier be combined with different signifieds. For example, “Hey, that’s one of the Socrates twins”; “Hey, that’s Socrates”; or “Hey, that’s my toga!” Put another way, because of the internal difference between image and concept, the coupling of one image and concept may slide into a coupling of said image and a different concept or an associated image and prior concept, etc. with each coupling constituting a sign.

Lastly, then, in a phrase which will function as a sign of what is to come in Derrida, Saussure, in regard to this sliding makes the following statement. “This is not the place to search for the forces that condition motivation [or animation] in each instance,” rather these forces are themselves indicated in the “ease” of sliding and the “obviousness” of the meaning of “the subunits.” (CGL 132) For example, when one signifier slides from within one sign to couple into another, Derrida will refer to this movement of supplementation as the “logic of supplementarity.” In other words, notice what is being said: all indications seem to suggest ἐναντίον is grounded in ἔπερον; however, in so far as ἔπερον is to be meaningful, it must always reduce, “upward,” so

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394 I, of course, mean upward in regard to Kant’s structure of experience.

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to speak, to ἐλαλίνειν. Hence, Derrida will consider pure difference (in-itself) merely “a
dream.” 395

Derrida’s Doctrine of the Sign – “The Logic of Supplementarity”

“[A]ppearance draws into the concept of the thing a certain mixture of supplementary representations
that the understanding knows how to separate from it.”
~Immanuel Kant (CPR 1996, A 271/B 327)

Jean Paul Sartre (1905-1980) in his The Imaginary: A Phenomenological
Psychology of the Imagination [L’imaginaire: psychologie phénoménologique de
l’imagination]396 published in 1940 suggests French philosophy by that time had acquired
the habit of posing “philosophical questions in the Kantian perspective.”397 Beyond even
Sartre’s musings, Derrida’s logic of supplementarity is still haunted by a certain Kantian
perspective. In his 1967 publication Of Grammatology [De la grammatologie],398
Derrida declares, “Maintaining it for convenience, let us nevertheless say that the space
of writing is purely sensible, in the sense that Kant intended.”399 Further, recall Kant’s
discussion regarding “amphiboly,” which I discussed in the previous chapter. Kant
explains that a “transcendental amphiboly” is “a confusion of a pure object of
understanding with appearance.” (CPR 1996, A 270/B 326) Expanding this notion Kant
explains,

[T]he principle that realities (as mere affirmations) never
logically oppose each other is an entirely true proposition
about the relations of concepts, but signifies nothing at all

396 Jean Paul Sartre, L’imaginaire: psychologie phénoménologique de l’imagination, (Paris: Gallimard, 1940)
either in regard to nature nor overall in regard to anything
in itself (of this we have no concept) [my emphases]. (CPR
1998, A 273/B 329)
Now, it might take the remainder of the chapter to illustrate, but this quote from Kant explains what Derrida is up to. First, substitute pure difference for “nature” and any “thing in itself.” Next, since Kant suggests here signification falls short of signifying “nature,” take nature to be a regulative idea – not a constitutive idea. (CPR 1998, A 179/B 221-222) In other words, the signification “nature” is not meant to constitute a truth about things, e.g. that things are “natural,” but rather it is to function so as enable discussion of various aspects of experience for which “we have no concept.” Combining this qualification with pure difference, then in regard to Derrida, you may substitute Différance instead for nature, i.e. pure difference.

Notice the similarity between the preceding and the following block quotes:

according to Derrida,

The concept of origin or nature is nothing but the myth of addition, of supplementarity annulled by being purely additive. It is the myth of the effacement of the trace, that is to say of an originary différance that is neither absence nor presence, neither negative nor positive [my emphases].
(OG 167)

On the one hand, Derrida embraces Kant’s warning against amphiboly. Supplementation entails a form of alienation. On the other hand, Derrida pushes the idea further suggesting any reference at all to that from which the understanding alienates must employ the understanding, and thereby deserves distrust. In other words, the “concept” – and this is a concept because that is what Kant’s power of understanding employs – of “origin” or “nature” is already not to be believed. For example, if you believe in these concepts, then you might think it correct to refer to the understanding itself as “non-natural” or unnatural. Notice how this should be problematic because Kant and Derrida
both acknowledge that “we have no concept” and were led to “nature” by invention, i.e. “nature” regulative was meant to function like a place holder in the structure of experience.

This problem points back to Kant’s Transcendental Deduction and the manner in which he considered the structure of experience to include heterogeneous stems combinable by imagination in a process of connecting apprehended pure intuitions with pure concepts. In other words, even though you do not have concepts for what you are sensing, you are able to refer in time to “This” – here and now – as “a tree.” Derrida addresses the heterogeneity part noting, “The paradox is that one annuls addition by considering it a pure addition”, and the temporal part suggesting, “Speech comes to be added to intuitive presence.” (OG 167) On the one hand, Derrida is calling into question why the concept “pure” should be allowed to extend into sensibility and remain homogeneous to concepts. On the other hand, Derrida is calling into question why discursivity is to be thought of as supplementing something non-discursive when “we have no concept” for what is supposedly being supplemented. Rather, it seems like discursivity is supplementing itself. Whereas, the logic of identity would have a concept identify something non-conceptual, the logic of supplementarity would have concepts supplement each other without ever leaving the realm of discursivity.

For these reasons, I refer to Derrida as occupying the conceptual standpoint in Kant’s structure of experience. Just as concepts relate to other concepts in constellations populating the understanding, Derrida will consider all (conceptual) pointing to take place within the understanding – it is a myth to think that there is an “outside” of thought to think about. Notice, Derrida thereby is perpetuating Hegel’s closure of discursivity.
In this way, Derrida will not accept that you can get “outside” of the terminological constellations, neither to provide identity to a “sensation” nor to solve the problem of “non-being.” Hence, I refer to Derrida as remaining at the second impasse of the problem of non-being and failing to solve it. After discussing Différance in Derrida below I devote a section to Derrida and the problem of non-being. So, as you read the rest of the chapter, remembering how Derrida relates to the Kant passage above and Hegel’s closure of discursivity will help you navigate his tricky locutions.

To understand Derrida’s doctrine of the sign, then, think – with Hegel and Hyppolite – of Derrida as if he is waiting at the second moment in Kant’s trajectory of experience (after Hegel’s closure of discursivity) with essential difference to repeatedly show the inherent instability of meaning in attempting to refer to pure difference. Derrida is able to do this because he plays the Hegelian shell game, and Derrida is a thimblerigger – Derrida’s “Hegelianism without reserve.” (MOP 19)

Remember I suggested above that one way to think of what Hegel was up to, his shell game, is to imagine the incoming Absolute as the expression of the Absolute. If this were the Absolute’s expression, you could only think it by what it indicates, and what it indicates is a Quantity of sense. It is only at the moment of Quality, then, that identification takes place, and all determination of identity suffers from this same fate of secondariness.

Since recognition of some possible first moment is always from a second moment, it becomes impossible to pin down meaning because the meaning of every

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401 A thimblerigger is a back alley version of the house in a shell game, i.e. house : casino :: thimblerigger : shell game.
expression depends on an inexpressible indication. The indication is inexpressible because its relation to the sign which marks it is either arbitrary or dependent upon relations of a different kind, i.e. relations of signs not indications. As such, for example, it is impossible to know whether the indication is a component or whole. One is tempted to suppose indications can be compared, but it is rather the case that indications indicate due more to human experiential capacity limitations than any hoped for identity of the indication(s). Indeed, the rhetoric of Kantian non-discursivity is being broached here, but certainly not to defend the non-discursive excessivity of the thing-in-itself. Derrida will ensure his pronouncements safely pertain to that which is always already supplementary, i.e. Derrida will not engage in any attempt to identify an indication as non-sign.

Describing what animates Derrida’s words by way of Saussure: All signs are composed of a signifier and a signified, signifiers pointing to signifieds, and the movement from one sign to then next sign derives from within the sign itself in accordance with the rules of the stacked deck. Since the relation between signifier and signified is arbitrary, it is as if – animated from within – signifiers as indications express themselves. Every expression is unstable in so far as, on the one hand, the expression is an arbitrary association between indicative signifier and the signified it is taken to mean relative to a community of language users. On the other hand, because the generation of the “sliding” from sign to sign is internal to indication, any decision to stop the sliding must also be relative to either the indication or the community of language users. Recall Saussure’s example comparing “sheep” with “ships.” In both cases, the decision itself is ultimately arbitrary – rooted in the degree of arbitrariness found in the sign or the community. The choice of sign derives from the stacked deck, and the sliding is
governed by the stacked deck. This is why paraphrasing Derrida in a discussion of Heidegger, Richard Rorty concludes: we do not speak the language, “the language speaks us.”

Going further by returning to the notion of the Absolute, we can combine a Hegel-Hyppolite way of describing Derrida with a Husserl-Saussure way of describing him. As such, the Hegel-Hyppolite discussion illustrated how the Logos was to be thought of as a logic of sense. Including Husserl-Saussure, any attempt to stabilize the meaning of what is indicated in sense requires, first and foremost, an ability to stabilize meaning. Language cannot be thought to accomplish this feat since the relation of a signifier to the sensuous being it is supposed to mean is arbitrary, i.e. sounds refer to concepts not “material.” Moreover, any attempt to pin down the meaning with further precision invokes a sliding through the stacked deck which itself was arbitrarily established by language users. As such, indication remains the indicating of a signifier, and the possibility of indication itself referring to a transcendental (signified) Logos vanishes, absorbed in the fluid undertow of the sliding. No signifier will be allowed the status of a signified which can stand outside signification as a condition for the possibility of meaning, i.e. constituting once and for all the relation of a signifier to what it signifies. The community of language user, i.e. agreement, and differences internal to the signs, i.e. cat is not bat, etc. are the (internal) conditions from which meaning derives – so much for Hegel’s Absolute Idea and Husserl’s principle of all principles.

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402 I am thankful for the influence of Michael Byron who was the first to point this out to me. Richard Rorty, *Truth and Progress*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 95.

403 Notice the “strange bed fellows” here with Derrida are the logical positivists. Ultimately, it is the inability to verify any connection of a sign from “inside” understanding with something “outside” understanding which motivates Derrida to logically (!) eliminate Hegel’s retroactive determination.

For the purpose of either understanding Derrida’s style of dealing with other philosophers or the purpose of understanding his relation to the problem of non-being, it is unnecessary to discuss every term Derrida ever employed. In fact, I have already described what he will refer to – following Heidegger’s notion of destruktion – as “deconstruction.” That is, Derrida’s version of Hegel’s shell game, which I will more explicitly describe below, amounts to a general formulation of what to expect from Derrida’s encounters with others. Yet, to enter further into Derrida’s terminology, considering a quote from Derrida’s “Letter to a Japanese Friend” is quite helpful.

The word “deconstruction,” *like all other words*, acquires its value only from its inscription in a chain of possible substitutions, in what is too blithely called a “context.” For me, for what I have tried and still try to write, the word has interest only within a certain context, where it replaces and lets itself be determined by such other words as “écriture,” “trace,” “différance,” “supplement,” “hymen,” “pharmakon,” “marge,” “entame,” “parergon,” etc. By definition, *the list can never be closed* and I have cited only names… What deconstruction is not? Everything of course! What is deconstruction? Nothing of course! [my emphases]

To begin with, it is important to understand what Derrida means by “this list can never be closed.” The beginning of his quote echoes the Saussurian principles noted above, i.e. the signified is arbitrarily associated with the signifier which, further, points beyond the signified to other signifiers in an inherently motivated sliding. Derrida prefers terms like iteration and inscription. So, the chain of signifiers ensures infinite repeatability or iterability at the site where meaning is to be inscribed. The list of words Derrida provides above is supposed to suggest – consistent with what has just been said – that none of these words stop the sliding or close off the possible extension of the list.

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The “list” of signs in the stacked deck “can never be closed” precisely because discursivity is already closed, i.e. signs only relate to more signs. Whereas the logic of identification would have it that to an indication which begins an experience in the first moment a signifier from the stacked deck of language is applied in the second moment, Derrida’s logic of supplementarity would have it that the first moment is itself already derived from the stacked deck. It is as if Derrida, in denying Kant the subjective side of the Transcendental Deduction in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, holds that no concept can identify the $=x$. Recall in the trajectory of experience, the $=x$ exceeds the ability of language to mean it; if $=x$ only pertained to one concept, it certainly could not be a condition for the possibility of conception. In other words, the strength of any identification, i.e. objective conceptual determination will derive not from a correspondence of understanding to the imagination’s $=x$, i.e. of sign to the sensible indication, but in the network of supplements through which every sign must slide if it is to have meaning.

In other words, Derrida has ratcheted up Hegel’s shell game, and there is now no possible way to even refer to “non-being,” i.e. every shell that is lifted is a shell that is shifted. Recall, this is exactly how I described the second impasse of the problem of non-being. There I noted: it is as if the Eleatic visitor is asking: *What are we discussing if non-being cannot be discussed?* Derrida is pushing the same question and accentuating that it is a logic of supplementarity which is invoked, not a logic of identity, when attempting to answer the question. What are we discussing? We are discussing whatever we think we are discussing – discursivity is closed. You do not get back to and identify the first moment, as Hegel would have it, you simply heap supplement upon supplement
from the stacked deck, covering the first moment which was itself already indicated within the stacked deck. The first moment is not Hegel’s pure difference, but a sign which contains pure difference.

Another way to see how the logic of supplementarity works for Derrida is to consider the overlap of space and time with Quantity and Quality which I discussed in closing the previous chapter. Think of an infinite opening in the first moment which resembles the infinity of space and allows for the arbitrariness of indication itself. The infinity of the second moment, then, is the infinity of a sliding continuum. And, you can already see the analogies with which I have been working realized in Derrida’s articulation of pure difference. The first moment, though Hegel’s, by way of Hyppolite has become fused with Kant’s first moment in the trajectory of experience – space.

Remember Kant tells us space has its infinity “within it.” So, in the first moment the word, i.e. sign, supposed to correspond to an indication is arbitrary, and in the second moment the sign from the first moment slides along an infinite continuous list which can “never be closed.” It is, then, this second moment of Quality – just as it is for both Kant and Hegel – which can identify the first moment retroactively. And, though it is beyond sense, it is consistent with Kant’s trajectory of experience to say that the thing-in-itself and pure difference are tied up in the infinity of space, in the first moment. Derrida’s difference is to have this infinity already enclosed in a sign, as if in a tomb or pyramid.\(^{406}\) Retroactive determination is still required to more fully identify and determine the sense of the sign in the first moment, but the (pure) difference internal to every sign always remains untouched. In this way, you can see how pure difference would be Derrida’s

replacement for the thing-in-itself. Yet, Derrida, taking Hegel seriously indeed, never allows for reference outside of discursivity, not even for a (first) moment.

To sum, then, in regard to Derrida’s doctrine of the sign, pulling together a number of terms, it is as if Différance for Derrida stands for the combination of pure difference and the logic of supplementarity. According to Derrida,

“presence without difference,” conforms to the logic of identity and to the principle of classical ontology (the outside is outside, being is, etc.) but not to the logic of supplementarity, which would have it that the outside be inside, that the other and the lack come to add themselves as a plus that replaces a minus, that what adds itself to something takes the place of a default in the thing, that the default, as the outside of the inside, should be already within the inside, etc [my emphasis]. (OG 215)

You should now be able to recognize that what Derrida means by saying “the outside be inside or that lack come to be added”: as significations, i.e. “outside” and “lack,” the meanings of these terms derive from and pertain to a network of signs – like the constellations of concepts in Kant’s understanding. “Lack” cannot mean at all “outside” language. In fact, that it even seems like there can be an “outside” of language is an effect of language itself. Whereas the “default” status for Kant pertains to supposing the thing, the default for Derrida pertains to the thing’s supplementation. In this way, Derrida is ultra-Kantian by attempting to fend off in advance any effect of language which would send one looking for the “outside” or “underside” of language.

Whereas Kant’s regulative term “nature” regulates positionally, it does not regulate interpretationally. Derrida is attempting to create a sign which both indicates its position in the structure of experience and limits the way in which it may be interpreted so as to guard against amphiboly or transcendental illusion. By the time Derrida decides to use the term Différance, then, he has already built both Hegel’s and Saussure’s
movements into the manner in which Kant thought of the thing-in-itself. On the one hand, at the site of Kant’s infinity of space words differ, i.e. infinite (pure) difference. On the other hand, at the site of Kant’s infinity of time words defer, i.e. infinite (sliding) deference. As such, Différance is a more sophisticated term than pure difference. And, by more sophisticated I mean Différance participates in Hegel’s shell game without supposing any identification to be – in Kant’s sense of the term – real, i.e. other than the “relationship of mutual and incessant supplementarity or substitution [which] is the order of language.” (OG 235) In Derrida’s view, pure difference encountered the problem that even if different from itself, the difference must always be difference internal to – Kant’s understanding – the stacked deck. As a result, Derrida coined a term to encompass both infinities, i.e. “Différance.”

Jacques the Fatalist and his Différance

“Jacques, my friend, you are a philosopher, and I am genuinely sorry for you.”

~Denis Diderot

Were I to produce an image of my beginning to this section of the chapter I would suggest you imagine the “Exergue,” to Derrida’s Margins of Philosophy as a pond. Analogously, the words of the following few paragraphs would be like the skimming of the water with a writing stone. Though, as Derrida would have you believe, the depths of the pond are perhaps imponderable, it is my hope to come full circle, as it were, and illustrate to you Derrida’s trick. Certainly you may test me on this. If what you read here allows you to predict the next turn from up Derrida’s sleeve, then I will have decoded his play, revealed his secret, and refused his gift. Though I believe his Différance to have

407 Denis Diderot, Jacques the Fatalist and his Master, David Coward, tr., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 63.
some efficacy in the structure of experience, it is contra Derrida, not in regard to the
ground. To begin, then, a brief reference to Hegel, and to conclude, I will tie my
discussion in with Hegel’s shell game.

Recall the *Phenomenology of Spirit* §97 quote: “it is just not possible for us ever
to say, or express in words, a sensuous being that we mean.” (PS 60) It is possible to use
Derrida’s *Différance* to show his reading of pure difference; Derrida can be seen in
agreement with Hegel regarding the inability to think undifferentiatedness without
language. Hegel, elsewhere, put the matter as such,

To want to think without words as Mesmer once attempted
is, therefore, a manifestly irrational procedure which, as
Mesmer himself admitted, almost drove him insane. But it
is also ridiculous to regard as a defect of thought and
misfortune, the fact that it is tied to a word; for although the
common opinion is that it is just the *ineffable* that is the
most excellent. Yet this opinion, cherished by conceit, is
unfounded, since what is ineffable is, in truth, only
something obscure, fermenting, something which gains
clarity only when it is able to put itself into words. (PS 60)

Recall, in terms of language, that which is purely – not merely essentially – different,
then, differs from whatever signifier is used to indicate it, and defers to an other sign
sliding along the chain in a “list” which “can never be closed.” In this way, Derrida is
not so much attempting to think without words, as he is attempting to show that neither
words nor thoughts capture the thing. In terms of experiential appearance what is
apprehended *differs* from that which is supposed to be appearing, and *defers* to an endless
list of *associated* appearances. In this way, you can see Derrida as returning to
Hyppolite’s Kant, i.e. taking up Kant’s structure of experience with the experiential and
Taking *Phenomenology of Spirit* §97, then, as one way to refer to the starting point of Hegel’s shell game, “it is just not possible for us ever to say, or express in words, a sensuous being that we mean.” (PS 60) Derrida supposes,

perhaps difference is older than Being itself. There may be a difference still more unthought than the [ontological] difference between being and beings. We certainly can go further toward naming it in our language. Beyond Being and beings, this difference, ceaselessly differing from and deferring (itself), would trace (itself) (by itself) – this *différance* would be the first or last trace if one still could speak, here, of origin and end. (PS 60)

Derrida asks, “How can we make this *sensible* except by metaphor? [Derrida’s emphasis]” (MOP 209) Derrida avers, “Each time that a rhetoric defines metaphor, not only is a philosophy implied, but also a conceptual network in which philosophy itself has been constituted.” (MOP 230) As such, for Derrida, “What is defined, therefore, is implied in the defining of the definition.” (MOP 231) Notice Derrida is merely invoking the unavoidability of the stacked deck if there is to be meaning at all. Hence, Derrida maintains Hegel’s closure of discursivity – he is not attempting to think without words; yet, he also maintains an opening in the structure of experience at the starting point of the dialectic. Recall for Kant, this is the thing-in-itself.

Derrida himself makes the connection between his thinking and that of Aristotle’s. This, then, is consistent with Derrida’s attack on the signification of the ὑποκείμενον, i.e. *hypokeimenon*. Since, “There is a code or a program – a rhetoric, if you will – for every discourse on metaphor,” Derrida quotes from Aristotle’s *Poetics* (Poet 1457b6-9), “Metaphor (*metaphora*) consists in giving (*epiphora*) the thing a name (*onomatos*) that belongs to something else (*allotriou*).” (MOP 231) Notice, this “belonging” to something else points to the difference in kind between the stacked deck
and pure difference. In regard to the hypokeimenon as purely different, then, Derrida wants to establish that whatever term from the stacked deck is used to refer to “pure difference” it ultimately functions metaphorically.

Moving from Aristotle to Pierre Fontanier (1765-1844) Derrida notes, “all kinds of words can give rise to metaphors,” following it up with a quote from Fontanier, “Tropes by resemblance consist in presenting an idea under the sign of another idea that is more striking or better known, and which, moreover, has no other tie to the first idea than that of a certain conformity or analogy [Derrida’s emphasis].” (MOP 235) Finding a way next to discuss resemblance through Aristotle, Derrida notes: “Mimēsis is never without theoretical perception of resemblance or similarity, that is, of that which always will be posited as the condition for metaphor [Derrida’s emphasis].” (MOP 237) And, Derrida concludes this metaphorical excursion stating, “The power of truth, as the unveiling of nature (physis) by mimēsis, congenitally belongs to the physics of man, to anthropophysics. … such is the natural origin of metaphor.” (MOP 237)

In fact, “metaphor indeed belongs to mimesis, to the fold of physis, to the moment when nature, itself veiling itself, has not yet refound itself in its proper nudity.” (MOP 237) This last image should bring to mind the Heraclitus mentioned above – “Nature loves to hide [φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεί].”409 Again, these Derrida quotes thus far are exploring the way in which choosing an initial metaphor from the stacked deck leads to a constellation which may be used to explore the first metaphor. Yet, there are still more quotes to examine before grasping what this “difference … older than Being itself” might be like.

Derrida solidifies the link with my discussion of Aristotle in the Introduction as he declares, “Analogy is metaphor par excellence.” (MOP 242) Noting, however, that as “Aristotle remarks, there are cases in which one of the terms [in an analogy] is missing.” (MOP 242) In such cases, “The term has to be invented then” (MOP 242) such that it is possible the term “would be metaphorical in all its aspects.” (MOP 243) In fact, “within language the analogy itself is due to a long and hardly visible chain whose first link is quite difficult to exhibit, and not only for Aristotle”; (MOP 243) “Which refers, in any case, in Aristotle’s text, to the problem of the proper name or the analogy of Being.” (MOP 244) Hence, Derrida can be seen here emphasizing the assumptive nature of discovery or invention; “Like mimēsis, metaphor comes back to physis, to its truth and its presence.” (MOP 244) Derrida is supposing an intrinsic resistance to signification for the ὑποκείμενον, i.e. hypokeimenon, as that which is purely different from the stacked deck. As such, there can be no correspondence, no mimesis, in regard to this first term. In other words, there is no stable ground for the Law of Identity in regard to pure difference.

Hoping to avoid refuting himself, Derrida will speak of this intrinsic resistance as the movement of Différance. He again quotes Aristotle, “the greatest thing by far is to be a master of metaphor,” so as to “know better than others to perceive resemblances and to unveil the truth of nature.” (MOP 244) Such a “genius of mimēsis, thus, can give rise to a language, a code of regulated substitutions, the talent and procedure of rhetoric, the imitation of genius, the mastery of the ungraspable.” (MOP 245) Derrida asks, perhaps rhetorically, “Under what conditions would one always have one more trick, one more turn, up one’s sleeve, in one’s sack?” (MOP 245) Derrida will revel in these conditions so as to undermine any signification of the ὑποκείμενον.
As if answering the question himself, Derrida claims, “Philosophy, as a theory of metaphor, first will have been a metaphor of theory.” (MOP 254) And moving from Plato through Kant to Hegel, Derrida maintains, “Doubtless, Hegel’s Idea, for example, is not Plato’s Idea,” and this is because, “doubtless the effects of the system are irreducible [my emphasis] and must be read as such. But the word Idea is not an arbitrary [=] X, and it bears a traditional burden that continues Plato’s system in Hegel’s system.” (MOP 254)

From here Derrida provides an analysis of “catachresis.” Referring again to Fontanier and his text *Supplement to the Theory of Tropes*, Derrida reports, “The Supplement concerns first the violent, forced, abusive inscription of a sign, the imposition of a sign upon a meaning which did not yet have its own proper sign in language.” (MOP 255)

Derrida quotes Fontanier as referring to a supplement as a “secondary origin.” (MOP 255) Further, according to Fontanier – as Derrida quotes him – “Catachresis, in general, consists in a sign already affected with a first idea also being affected with a new idea, which itself had no sign at all.” (MOP 255) Hence, the supplement is of a code which “traverses its own field, endlessly displaces its closure, breaks its line, opens its circle, and no ontology will have been able to reduce it [my emphasis].” (MOP 271) Derrida concludes, “Metaphor is less in the philosophical text (and in the rhetorical text coordinated with it) than the philosophical text is within metaphor.” (MOP 258) That is, “Henceforth the entire teleology of meaning, which constructs the philosophical concept of metaphor, coordinates metaphor with the manifestation of truth, with the production of truth as presence without veil.” (MOP 270)

*It should be remembered that the three-fold synthesis is one synthesis with three parts.* So, given Derrida’s quotes above, it is as if imagination’s apprehension is the
beginning of a threefold process of invention. The result of this process, i.e. \( =x \), is meaningful in its relation to the constellation of concepts which are activated by its invention. I say “activated” here because for both Kant and Derrida imagination’s act of construction by way of the three-fold synthesis results in the experienced first term toward identifying experience in a chain of thinking about experience. What imagination produces, then, is a simulacrum – copy without an original. Though imagination may attempt to mimic sensibility given Kant’s discussion of the excessivity of non-discursivity, imagination cannot correspond to sensibility. This is what makes imagination’s product metaphorical and simulacral. Hence, it is possible to speak of genesis perceptually, i.e. of an appearance, and experientially, i.e. of an object of experience; yet, these products of imagination are simulacra since there is no original which they can be said to mimic.

Recall Kant’s structure and trajectory of experience first registers sensation on the way to appearance, and the product of the productive imagination just prior to conceptual and linguistic determination is \( =x \). As I have already mentioned the conceptual standpoint pertains to understanding, judgment, and reason such that (from the conceptual standpoint) \( =x \) is merely regarded as what these powers can construct with it. In other words, these powers cannot see beyond it. Other views require other vantage points such as the apperceptive or experiential. In so far as meaning derives from conceptual and linguistic determination, here is a way to restate the problem of retroactive determination within Kant’s structure and trajectory of experience (from the conceptual standpoint), i.e. it is just not possible for you to ever say an \( =x \) – a sensuous being – that you mean.
With all I have said thus far, you could, of course, recognize what I am writing about here. However, I will make the analogical relation explicit. It is the $\equiv x$ which animates the self-enclosed writing machine. For Derrida the $\equiv x$ always already comes with a sign – as the difference internal to a sign –, so the animation of the sliding which constitutes writing, on the one hand retroactively determines the $\equiv x$ by relating the initial sign in the first moment of Quantity to the subsequent writing which emerged from it. And, on the other hand, the writing does not retroactively determine the $\equiv x$ because the $\equiv x$ is internal to the sign; so the $\equiv x$, for Derrida, is never touched or seen nude.

Schematically speaking in regard to Kant’s structure of experience, being inside the writing machine is like being inside the understanding. On the one hand, you encounter the emptiness thesis without the intuitive input of $\equiv x$. On the other hand, the entire problem of the Transcendental Deduction derives from the change of registers from sensibility to understanding. So, it is possible to think of the concepts or the words being used to describe $\equiv x$ as not entirely homogeneous with $\equiv x$. As such, $\equiv x$ is different than the concepts or words being used to describe it, and the $\equiv x$ as the irreducible difference standing in for sensibility on the horizon of the understanding – writing machine. In fact, reading $\equiv x$ as a concept or sign ensures that $\equiv x$ is even different from itself. This is because $\equiv x$ is supposed to be a sign for the product of sensibility which is of a different kind than signs. Hence, whatever sign is used it must be thought to include an irreducible difference.

Further – and here is Derrida’s point –, if it requires concepts or words to express difference, then “pure difference” gets its meaning not from a homogeneity with the product of sensibility, i.e. a sensuous being or $\equiv x$, but from within the writing machine,
i.e. by its position in the constellation of concepts or words which are also not
homogeneous with \( =x \). Derrida’s argument would be self-refuting were he to claim \( =x \) is
“pure difference” because he cannot assign a sign to \( =x \). Therefore, he suggests pure
difference is “a dream …” (W&D 151) And, he refers instead to the inability to say the
\( =x \) that you mean by referring to the internally motivated movement of the writing
machine in its differing and deferring, i.e. \textit{Différance}.

Now, at this point, since Derrida and Hegel occupy common ground, Derrida can
exploit this much of Hegel’s shell game. Recall in discussing Hegel above Derrida
stressed that neither the Platonic nor the Hegelian Idea is an “arbitrary \([=]\) X.” Here is
the use value of Derrida’s discussion of Aristotle and metaphor. Derrida claims the
mastery of this – playing on the grasp/concept of the German \textit{Begriff} – ungraspable \( = x \)
requires metaphor. Just as the Eleatic visitor from Plato’s \textit{Sophist} seems to be asking,
“What are we discussing if non-being cannot be discussed?” So, in Derrida’s question,
“How can we make this \textit{sensible} except by metaphor? [Derrida’s emphasis]” (MOP 421)
The “this” is supposed to refer to the \( =x \), and the sign “sensible” is to be thought of as the
metaphor which “consists in giving (\textit{epiphora}) the thing a name that belongs to
something else [Aristotle’s (Poet 1457b6-9)].” (MOP 231) That is, “\textit{presenting an idea
under the sign of another idea that is more striking or better known, and which,
moreover, has no other tie to the first idea than that of a certain conformity or analogy
[Derrida’s emphasis].}” (MOP 235)

Kant’s \( =x \) is \textit{like}, or it is \textit{as if} the \( = x \), is a case where the term in an analogy is
“missing.” And, recall that in such cases Derrida claims, “The term has to be invented
then” (MOP 242) such that it is possible the term “would be metaphorical in all its
aspects.” (MOP 243) As Paul Ricoeur put it, “Henceforth, to revive metaphor is to unmask the concept.”410 The metaphor as supplement to the =x resembles a “secondary origin.” (MOP 255) Derrida explains that this refers “in Aristotle’s text, to the problem of the proper name or the analogy of Being.” (MOP 244) This is precisely how Derrida will be critical of Hegel noting, “This is why classical thought concerning structure could say that the center is, paradoxically, within the structure and outside it.” (W&D 279) In other words, Derrida is accusing philosophers and philosophy of believing the invented metaphor somehow corresponds to the non-metaphorical, i.e. non-linguistic.

Recall the philosophical notion he discussed above which holds an idea fits an analogy because it was invented to resemble – in accordance with the stacked deck – what is outside the analogy. Like “looking through” an Idea, for Derrida you cannot help but see, not what is not the Idea, but what the Idea is. Further, what the Idea is depends on its relation to other Ideas – again, ἐναντίον not ἐντέρυ. That is, “The center is at the center of the totality, and yet, since the center does not belong to the totality (is not part of the totality), the totality has its center elsewhere. The center is not the center [Le centre n’est pas le centre]411.” (W&D 279) Though this accusation does not work as well against Kant, with this accusation Derrida is able to appropriate the mechanism of Hegel’s shell game412 and deny its ability to totalize – all this without affirming non-discursivity – by positing pure difference as the irreducible difference internal to the starting point in Hegel’s shell game. Hence, here is where Derrida and Hegel no longer occupy a common ground. Consider Hegel’s shell game and Figure 4.1.

Derrida himself precisely places *Différance* in relation to Hegel’s shell game.413

Recall the Hegelian sublation [*Aufhebung*] is the logical mechanism for retrospectively differentiating – (un)covering the first moment – the undifferentiated first moment of sense as idea, i.e. at the point when 4 is equated with 1 for Hegel. Derrida declares,

If there were a definition of *différance*, it would be precisely the limit, the interruption, the destruction of the Hegelian *relève wherever* it operates. What is at stake here is enormous. I emphasize the Hegelian *Aufhebung*, such as it is interpreted by a certain Hegelian discourse, for it goes without saying that the double meaning of *Aufhebung* could be written otherwise. Whence its proximity to all the operations conducted *against* Hegel’s dialectical speculation [*Derrida’s emphases*].414

His reference to a “certain Hegelian discourse” signals that the logic of the speculative logic is internal to itself. Derrida seeks to have the sublation written otherwise, then, by taking the totalizing closure which Hegel’s sublation [*Aufhebung*] performs in the recognition of 1 as 4 to indicate 1 as invention and the 1 thru 4 cycle as insufficient to bring non-identity into the light of identification. Remember, it was a negation of Quantity which moved to Quality, and a negation of the negation which resulted in the

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positive recognition of Quantity. Hence, Derrida causes Hegel’s structure to fall by maintaining that to negate negation is negative.\footnote{Cf. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 160.}

This realization was not lost on Jürgen Habermas. According to Habermas, Adorno’s “negative dialectics” and Derrida’s “deconstruction” can be seen as different answers to the same problem. The totalizing self-critique of reason gets caught in a performative contradiction since subject-centered reason can be convicted of being authoritarian in nature only by having recourse to its own tools. The tools of thought, which miss the “dimension of nonidentity” and are imbued with the “metaphysics of presence,” are nevertheless the only available means for uncovering their own insufficiency.\footnote{Jürgen Habermas, “Excursus on Leveling the Genre Distinction between Philosophy and Literature,” Philosophical Discourse on Modernity, Frederick G. Lawrence, tr., (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990), 185.}

By using the tools of thought and destroying the Hegelian sublation Derrida suggests the undifferentiated never was (fully) present in the movement from 1 to 4 in Hegel’s shell game. As such, all moments of the shell game (1 thru 4) are on equal footing for Derrida. This is not because of a Hegelian sublation which reveals 1 as 4 but because 1 was always already an invented sign in the analogical chain of signs. This, according to Derrida, is precisely why 4 can be equated with 1, i.e. because the structure of differences – what can and cannot relate to this invented metaphor “1” – are disseminated into the other terms (2 thru 4) determining whether they appropriately “fit” with the first term or not. “The ineffable” “=x” (of the) “undifferentiated” “first moment” never was present/absent. In other words, conceptual determinations of presence and absence pertain to products of the understanding not products of sensibility.

What Derrida’s version of Hegel’s shell game hopes to accomplish is to persuade you to think of whatever sign is associated with the =x as already a metaphor. A metaphor for what, you ask? And, Derrida has it. He cannot say, of course, or he would
be showing you how to win the shell game, but his references to Aristotle point out clearly enough that the “this” which has been “made sensible” by metaphor was the missing link in an analogical chain. Hence, a purely metaphorical term must be “invented.” Derrida’s invention is Différence.

Now, Différence, just like all inventions, once invented must suffer the fate of “textual drift,” i.e. the sliding of meaning along a chain of signifiers befitting all words. According to Derrida,

I would say, first off, that différance … strategically seemed to me the most proper,” [and] “by decision and as a rule of the game, if you will, turning these propositions back on themselves, [moving from 4 to 1 in Figure 4.1] we will be introduced to the thought [mirroring Hegel’s movement to idea/thought] of différance … by means of this solely strategic justification. (MOP 245)

Différence is not meant to replace Being. Rather, Différence is meant to capture the fact that a term had to be invented, and whether, as invention, it pertains – it is appropriate – to its experiential provocation for invention as adequation or imitation depends not on a correspondence between invention and provocation, but on the relation between invention and the network of terms from which the invention derives its meaning. The provocation for invention is, of course, heterogeneous to this network. A sensation only makes sense metaphorically, and you still cannot say a sensuous being that you mean. Hence, Derrida has made Hegel’s shell game his own, and these are the conditions with which “one always [has] one more trick, one more turn, up one’s sleeve, in one’s sack.” (MOP 245)

Taking a moment, then, to refer directly to Figure 4.1, it is as if, suddenly, Figure 3.1 takes on the paradoxical nature of Kant’s Table of Nothing. Recall Kant’s Table of

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Nothing shows *nihil negativum*, i.e. non-being; yet, his table is not the solution to the problem of non-being because it itself is a representation. So too, =x was thought to be an unrepresented starting point, but Derrida has shown that as unrepresented, neither “=x” nor “Being” are appropriate. What is wickedly wiley about Derrida’s shell game: You start playing the game with the idea that you understand the starting point as a point which cannot be understood, but if you cannot understand it, then – what are we discussing here? – Derrida shows that the triangle of the undifferentiated first moment is the triangle of the differentiated moment. They are the same not because of the sincere revelation via retrospective determination à la Hegel, but because the undifferentiated first moment with its pure difference “is a dream.” (W&D 151) What you thought you understood as the starting point at 1, in Figure 4.1, you recognize as undecidable at 4. Whereas Hegel has you return to affirm your assumed starting point, Derrida has it that you negate your starting point to such an extent that you cannot be certain to call it “a return.” For Derrida, the (Kantian) understanding is like a “labyrinth which includes in itself its own exits (S&P 104) [*le labyrinth qui comprend en lui ses issues*],” which, of course, means “no exit.” This is why I replaced the “W” from Hegel’s shell game with the universal sign for “chaos” in Derrida’s shell game.

Lastly, regarding Figure 4.1, notice that whether the “A” is decidable or not presupposes participation in Kant’s structure of experience. Despite all this talk about rhetoric, this conversation is taking place in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of psychology. Derrida points to Jean Jacques Rousseau’s (1712-1778) *Essay on the Origin of Languages* (1781) noting as “a general theory of the forms and substances of

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418 This is not intended *ad hominem*.

signification[,] [t]his theory is inseparable from a psychology of the passions” – quoting Rousseau, “the first invention of speech is due not to need but passion.”420 Further – quoting Rousseau –, “As a man’s first motives for speaking were of the passions, his first expressions were tropes. Figurative language was the first to be born. Proper meaning was discovered last.” (MOP 269) This suggests that at the level of Quality in Figure 4.1, the level of Quantity is revealed as having always already been itself the level of Quality. This is not new territory, Nietzsche was already here – Beyond Good and Evil §138 – “When we are awake we also do what we do in our dreams: we invent and make up the person with whom we associate – and immediately forget it.”421 In fact, Derrida has come full circle back to the Copernican revolution with Kant. Whereas Kant – despite undecidability – posited the thing-in-itself at the “bottom” of the structure of experience, Derrida is merely accentuating the undecidability (of the thing-in-itself).

kNOw Irony, kNOw Derrida

“First of all, I take irony seriously … you can’t do this without irony.”422

~Jacques Derrida

Richard Rorty once asked, “How does one decide whether [Derrida] is really a much-misunderstood transcendental ‘philosopher of reflection,’ a latter-day Hegel, or really a much-misunderstood Nominalist, a sort of French Wittgenstein?”423 There are three main strategies standardly employed to answer this question regarding Derrida. The three strategies involve: (1) a focus on logic; (2) a focus on history; (3) a focus on deconstruction. Notice, Rorty’s question is calling for a general statement to cover

420 Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, Alan Bass, tr., 150.
421 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 88.
particular instances of Derrida’s writing. In fact, Rorty notes that passages from Derrida may be cited to support either of the options – latter-day Hegel or French Wittgenstein. Still, Rorty, choosing the latter, argues, “The Idea that there is some neutral ground on which to mount an argument against something as big as ‘logocentrism’ strikes me as one more logocentric hallucination.” Rorty, here, employs the first strategy, and by employing logic, notice he does not need to look at an abundance of Derrida’s writings. In this way, Rorty suggests perhaps Derrida is something of a “Nominalist” noting, “Nominalists like myself – those for whom language is a tool rather than a medium, and for whom a concept is just the regular use of a mark or noise.” Rorty’s use of the word “regular” like normal, or normative, is another way of saying: however the community of language users happens to use the marks or noises in question. Certainly there is something of this to be found in Derrida, but perhaps not enough to equate Derrida and Rorty.

Responding to Rorty, John Caputo employs the second strategy in answering Rorty’s question. First, Caputo gives his reason for suggesting that the first strategy for reading Derrida will not work. That is, per Caputo’s description, Derrida supplies “the presuppositions for thinking that whatever sense language does make will also be unmade, that the things we do with words will come undone [Caputo’s emphases]. This reason, as I will show below, is not sufficient for denying the application of (the) logic (of identity) to Derrida’s writings, but it is an accurate general statement in regard to Derrida’s writings. Caputo then suggests a standard reading of Derrida’s texts in

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chronological order such that reveal a progression in his thinking from an apocalyptic to an ironic tone,\textsuperscript{427} i.e. from a latter-day Hegel to a French Wittgenstein. According to Caputo,

\begin{quote}
Still, there is a side of Derrida that Rorty does not admire, and that is the side where Derrida gets serious … That is the side of Derrida which argues for philosophical ideas like \textit{différance}, \textit{archi-écriture}, supplement, undecidability, etc. … [I]n his early writings, Derrida even adopted an unmistakeably apocalyptic tone about these quasi-entities, announcing the end of the age of the book and the beginning of writing. While Derrida has shaken that particularly bad habit, he still talks like “metaphysics” is an inescapable, encompassing something or other which has a hold on us which is deeper than we can say.\textsuperscript{428}
\end{quote}

Lastly, then, the third strategy for deciding upon the difference between latter-day Hegel and French Wittgenstein is a focus on deconstruction which treats these opposites with the logic of supplementarity – emphasizing the difference over the decision.

A clear example of the third strategy, then, can be seen in Derrida’s own response to John Searle in \textit{Limited Inc}. There, Derrida points out that the work which is titled “Reply to Derrida” and “signed” by John R. Searle itself admits – in its margins, as it were – a debt to a number of others. Derrida suggests, then, these “authors” should also be included in the meaning of the sign “Searle.” Having indicated two other authors already, Derrida proposes “three +n” as the appropriate signature for “Reply to Derrida.”\textsuperscript{429} He, then, says, “Let’s be serious.” And, you might think his word “serious” should be in quotation marks, not because he is being either serious or non-serious, but because Derrida does not trust the word. He follows it by noting,

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Faced with this speech act (“let’s be serious”), readers may perhaps feel authorized in believing that the presumed signatory of this text is only now beginning to be serious, only now committing himself to a philosophical discussion worthy of the name, and thus admitting that what he has previously been engaged in was something entirely different. (LI 34)

Notice what Derrida is attempting to highlight here. Between the commas, as it were, Derrida is playing on “author” in “authorized” which is still in question, questioning the synonymy between serious and philosophical – a Nietzschean move –, and suggesting the falsity of the retroactive determination of this speech act’s other as its binary opposite – which the speech act itself suggests, i.e. what was previously engaged in was “something entirely different [my emphasis].”

The thread I am treating here as illustrative of the third strategy in this deconstructive response which deconstructs “Searle” culminates in Derrida’s move from “Searle” to “three + n” to “Society with Limited Responsibility (or Limited Liability) [Société à responsabilité limitée].” (LI 36) Now, Derrida “justifies” naming this society – in this context\(^4\) – since, he notes, the other authors indicated by “Searle” have neither consented nor are aware of their inclusion in the signature for “Reply to Derrida” – hence, the “Limited Liability.” (LI 36) Noting the excessive length of the sign, Derrida abbreviates it to “Sarl,” and voilà. Derrida, now, can refer to “Sarl” instead of “Searle” and intend not only the same meaning which Searle himself is supposed to intend but also the supplemental marginalia which the logocentric relation to the sign “Searle” renders underprivileged. Hence, Derrida may be described as arguing with Searle by “performing” the logic of supplementarity for which he is advocating. In other words, Derrida is illustrating that even the meaning of the sign “Searle” is unstable and slides

\(^4\) It is beyond the scope of my concern here to discuss the other possible references involved.
through various significations such as “Sarl.” This is supposed, of course, to call into question the ability to make decisions – logical or historical – based on the meaning of the signs involved.

Now, this third (focus on deconstruction) strategy is, as Derrida lamentingly admits, inextricably bound to the “context” in which it is employed. (Psyche 5-6) As Claire Colebrook puts it, “certain located speech acts within a context can prompt us to think the very emergence or creation of contexts.” (Psyche 5-6) These “located speech acts” are the invented first terms Derrida spoke of above, and different contexts emerge from the combination of the context, provided by the sign, and the internal difference of the sign which motivates the analogical sliding. For example, the way in which Derrida was able to conjure reference to other contexts while seemingly maintaining a tie to the first term by a logical thread. So, where the third strategy for reading Derrida meets back up – retroactively, as it were – with the first strategy, what is at stake is the irony of irony.

How to think the irony of irony? Does the negation of a negation equal a positive? Derrida is not coy on the subject:

First of all, I take irony seriously; I take the problem of irony very seriously. And we need some irony that is something which challenges the common sensical concepts, and you can’t do this without some irony. So there is no doubt some irony.\(^{431}\)

The way to think the irony of irony is what links all three of these reading strategies for Derrida. That is, treating the sign “irony” ironically illustrates the logic which Rorty hopes to use to ground his reading, and reveals a progress of singularly moving from common sensical concept to concept – which Caputo highlighted – in a deconstructive movement which requires irony without allowing irony to become a transcendental

signified, i.e. not allowing irony to be present as a context for determining “everything.”

Given these three strategies for reading Derrida, I will now provide my reading of Derrida by affirming all three strategies – a sort of yes, yes, yes.

My concern with Derrida in this chapter pertains to his relation to Kant’s thing-in-itself and the problem of non-being. So toward concluding this chapter, as I show my reading of Derrida I will do so by further indicating his relation to Kant’s thing-in-itself and the problem of non-being. Quoting Derrida’s early work “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences” at length here, you see what Caputo might refer to as Derrida’s attempt to break the habit of an apocalyptic tone, but equally, you see Derrida privileging concepts to be later played off against other concepts. According to Derrida,

We cannot do without the concept of the sign, for we cannot give up this metaphysical complicity without also giving up the critique we are directing against this complicity, or without the risk of erasing the difference in the self-identity of a signified reducing its signifier outside itself. For there are two heterogeneous ways of erasing the difference between the signifier and the signified: one, the classic way, consists in reducing or deriving the signifier and signified, that is to say ultimately in submitting the sign to thought; the other, the one we are using here against the first one, consists in putting into question the system in which the preceding reduction functioned: first and foremost, the opposition between the sensible and the intelligible [My emphases]. (W&D 281)

Upon reading this quote, one immediately sees at its conclusion a reference to Kant, i.e. the opposition between the sensible and the intelligible. Derrida’s project, of course, is to maintain the irreducibility of the difference between the sensible and the intelligible. Such a reduction he notes is a way of “erasing the difference between signifier and signified.” How is that the case?
It is the case because “sensible” is a sign just as much as “intelligible” is a sign. In this way, the difference between the signs is a product of the difference internal to every sign à la Saussure, i.e. the difference between signifier and signified. It is, of course, tempting here to play Derrida against Derrida suggesting, “signifier” and “signified” are signs too. Yet, here is the so-called quasi-transcendental feature of Derrida or his “complicity” with which he began the quote above. He “cannot do without the concept of the sign.” In this way, the concept of the sign is a sign in general, and that means the concept of the sign plays the role of the = x, the transcendental object in Kant. What Derrida does not say is that in allowing him the sign to play the role of the = x, you have also allowed him pure difference and the thing-in-itself by allowing him the unrepresentable difference internal to every sign, i.e. the difference between signifier and signified. Hence, this internal difference stands for the contribution from sensibility which is irreducibly different in kind from signs – pure difference as the thing-in-itself.

Recalling Hyppolite’s influence on Derrida’s reading of Kant, sense and understanding are collapsed and discursivity is closed. In this way, the difference internal to the transcendental object is the difference which should have been beneath imagination as a source separate from the understanding. As such, the internal difference of the = x is the thing-in-itself. Now, just as all transcendental a prioris must be pure, this internal difference is pure difference. Hence, on the one hand, Derrida’s dialectic privileges the Kantian inheritance from where it derives, revealing pure difference as reiterating the thing-in-itself.

On the other hand, Derrida will treat “pure difference” as a sign, recalling the quote above from “Letter to a Japanese Friend” – even though Derrida does not dream of
treats “the irreducible difference between signifier and signified” as sign. Pure difference, then, according to Derrida receives the status of a dream, and the difference internal to every sign – what would be ἕτερον – is replaced with the combination of “undecidability” to capture the differing of internal difference from whatever sign it wears as a mask, and the “logic of supplementarity” to capture the deferring which motivates the signifiers sliding which invokes other signs connected to the first as a supplement. (W&D 151) This differing and deferring is captured by Derrida’s famous Différance, and ἕτερον is thereby reduced upward in Kant’s structure of experience to ἑναντίον.

Lest he further his “complicity” with metaphysics, Derrida will “refuse the term,” i.e. any term, other than the metaphysical concept of sign. Indeed, this progression from pure difference to Différance indicates the irony which emerges as Derrida “deconstructs” all other metaphysical concepts such as the thing-in-itself and non-being. Hence, this constitutes my reading of Derrida. I agree with the readings of Rorty, Caputo, and Derrida in regard to Derrida, and I take the inner workings of Derrida’s system to be in dialog with systems outside his system such as Kant, Hegel, Hyppolite, Husserl, and Saussure. After illustrating, explicitly relating, and expanding my reading of Derrida in regard to non-being below, I will draw together, support, and conclude my claims regarding Derrida, the thing-in-itself, and the problem of non-being.

Remembering What Virtually Has not Been Said

At this point in the chapter there have been four (4) sections. The first discusses pure difference, and in that section I pointed to Derrida’s Kantian inheritance of the thing-in-itself; the second section discusses Derrida’s application of the logic of
supplementarity to pure difference; the third discusses the transformation of pure difference into *Différance* due to Derrida’s application of the logic of supplementarity to pure difference; and, the fourth section showed how Derrida’s *Différance* – not pure difference – avoids being equated with Kant’s thing-in-itself. That is, with Derrida, “The thing itself is a sign.” (OG 49) Across these four sections, then, I have written a vista to the first strategy for reading Derrida, i.e. a view to the logic of his textuality – especially the first two sections of the chapter. Next, I engaged the second strategy for reading Derrida’s texts, i.e. taking Derrida’s writing as a sign of what he meant – especially the third section of this chapter. What remains prior to a concluding section, then, is to (further) dispel a reading of Derrida which takes him to be a “realist,” i.e. (in any non-“private” language version of the term) any reading of Derrida which attempts to position him in the experiential standpoint. As I have repeatedly stressed, Derrida revels in and at the conceptual standpoint. Recall, the negation which pertains to the conceptual standpoint, according to Kant, is *logical* negation, i.e. *ἐλαλητικόν*, not *real* negation. To be frank, Derrida is not a realist.

The Fallacy of *Reductio ad rem*

“[T]he ‘realist’ turn … is a further excess of irony.”432

~ Jacques Derrida, *Khōra*

As the title of this section of the chapter indicates, I am concerned here to dispel a reading a Derrida which suggests deconstruction may be used as a method to “reduce” an experience, or an object of experience, to the thing-in-itself. Notice, not even Kant would have held such a position. Kant followed a “regression” of the trajectory of experience,

not a reduction of the object of experience, positing the thing-in-itself in relation to the understanding, as transcendental object \( = x \), and to the imagination as the thing-in-itself. In fact, Derrida himself attacks the project of reading deconstruction as a method for reducing to the thing. The target of Derrida’s criticism was the project described in Jean-Luc Nancy’s *Corpus*. Though Nancy did not refer to his project as such, Derrida *derogatorily* deemed such a project a “post-deconstructive realism.”

As Derrida points out in *On Touching, Jean-Luc Nancy*, this “realism” cannot be reduced to any of the traditional realisms. How does Derrida arrive at this name then? Of the three words in this phrase, “post-deconstructive realism,” the word internal to the phrase is the key, i.e. “deconstructive.” Nancy’s project is supposed to be deconstructive in that it takes deconstruction as a starting point. Nancy’s project is, then, supposed to be “post” this deconstructive starting point in that, after applying deconstruction as a method, Nancy draws conclusions regarding what is “real,” despite the fact that deconstruction does not allow for these conclusions. From this description alone you should recognize Nancy’s conclusions do not follow from his premises. In other words, Derrida meant the phrase “post-deconstructive realism” ironically. In fact, Derrida meant both parts in the phrase “post-deconstructive” “realism” ironically. That is, in Derrida’s wake, there can be neither. Hence, whereas the phrase is ironic, treating this irony as ironic is “an excess of irony.”

Despite all this, however, there are some theorists who wish to advocate for a post-deconstructive realism. I take the discussion, then, in this section of the chapter to

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435 Derrida, *Khôra*, 123.
be valuable because if it is possible to make Derrida into a realist – unless “realist” is meant idiosyncratically, on the verge of a private language –, then my claim that he is working from the conceptual standpoint would be wrong. I claim Derrida first posited pure difference to solve the problem of non-being – the equivalent to Kant’s thing-in-itself –, but then quickly moved to *Differance* as the (non)solution to the problem of non-being. If it turns out after all that Derrida believed the thing-in-itself to be *real*, then there could be a way – perhaps similar to a negative theology – to reduce to these real things.

In the context of this section, then, my claim is that the reasoning which animates the use of deconstruction as a method for reducing to a so called real thing, i.e. post-deconstructive realism, is fallacious. I will support my claim by touching on two aspects which figure largely in post-deconstructive realism. First, I argue post-deconstructive realism is predicated upon an incorrect reading of deconstruction. Second, the logic involved in formulating post-deconstructive realism is fatally flawed. I argue the starting point of deconstruction itself, i.e. a sign or a concept of a sign, precludes the possibility of reducing (a sign or a concept) to a real thing. There are two fallacies traditionally used to refer to such attempts to reduce a sign or a concept to a thing – Austin’s “descriptive fallacy” and Russell’s “fallacy of verbalism.” What is more, post-deconstructive realism is both amphibolous and a transcendental illusion. All these fallacies are in play because a blatant misreading of Derrida’s logic produces the illogical position of post-deconstructive realism.

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In the preface to Derrida’s work of *Dissemination*, Derrida reveals his skeptic proclivities. Derrida explains,

> To put the old names to work, or even just to leave them in circulation, will always, of course, involve some risk: the risk of settling down … into the system that has been, or is in the process of being, deconstructed.\(^437\)

Recall the comment from Kant’s preface to the *Critique of Pure Reason* in which he noted the “nomadic” skeptics prefer undecidability to any “permanent cultivation of the soil.” (CPR 1998, A ix) As such, there is a trace of these quotes noticeable in *The Work of Mourning* by Derrida for Gilles Deleuze titled, “I’m Going to Have to Wander All Alone.”\(^438\) Notice, of this “wandering” that I am tracing in this paragraph given – that I was not (until now) talking of “ships” or “sheep” – the largeness of the topics in play, i.e. Kant, Derrida, Deleuze, skepticism, mourning, tracing, linguistics, Saussure, prefacing, undecidability, cultivation of soil, etc. you should be able to think of this paragraph as yet another indication of what Derrida – quoted above – stated in his description of deconstruction in his “Letter to a Japanese Friend.” According to Derrida, “The word ‘deconstruction,’ like all other words, acquires its value only from its inscription in a chain of possible substitutions” and “By definition, the list can never be closed [my emphases].” (Psyche 5-6) So, where does deconstruction end? The answer: In the same place that it begins. Where is that? Welcome to the shell game.

To be, a bit more, clear: If you accept the premises of deconstruction, then there can be no end to deconstruction. If there can be no end to deconstruction, then there can be no post-deconstruction. Once inside deconstruction “those who resist it are

\(^{437}\) Derrida, *Dissemination*, 5.

Therefore, if you are employing deconstruction, then you must adhere to its logic (of supplementarity) which means you cannot take any constellation of the remains of deconstruction as a non-deconstructive conclusion. There is a logic (of supplementarity) involved. If you do not follow Derrida’s logic in employing deconstruction, then of what you are employing – it is not deconstruction – Searle’s complaint is correct. Searle complains that with deconstructive “methods of reasoning one can ‘prove’ absolutely anything.” Hence, any attempt to appropriate the “method” of deconstruction for non-deconstructive or post-deconstructive conclusions fails on the grounds of the logic internal to deconstruction.

Specifically regarding the starting point of deconstruction, then, recall Derrida’s claim, “We cannot do without the concept of the sign.” (W&D 281) This, he goes on, means the signifier and the signified, along with their difference which is internal to “the concept of the sign.” In this same passage, which I quoted above, Derrida explains there are “two ways” of “erasing the difference between the signifier and the signified,” and the first, “classic way” of which Derrida is critical, “consists in reducing [à réduire] or deriving the signifier and signified, that is to say ultimately in submitting the sign to thought [my emphasis].” (W&D 281) The second – which is accomplished by way of deconstruction – “consists in putting into question the system in which the preceding reduction [réduction] functioned.” (W&D 281) There are, of course, multiple kinds of reductions in philosophy. For example, under the genus reduction, there are the species of methodological, theoretical, and ontological. Further, transcendental, phenomenological, physical and psychological may, of course, be even further

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specifications of those prior species. Derrida’s point is that *none of them* consist in
deconstruction.

What Derrida derogatorily referred to as Nancy’s realism, Nancy attempts to
articulate as an “order of touch.” According to Nancy,

> What touch communicates is not *res* (or *réal*) but of the
 order of touch, which itself is real without being *réal*: it’s
 an impulsion or a drive, a pressure, an impression or
 expression, an unhinging. The union is made in the order
 of the movement: it is that in which, or as which, one of the
 soul’s movements is transmitted to the body, or one of the
 body’s movements to the soul.\footnote{Jean-Luc Nancy, *Corpus*, Richard A. Rand, tr., (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 141.}

To be clear Nancy also suggests, “That the thing itself would be there isn’t certain. *Here*,
where we are, amounts to nothing more, perhaps, than a reflection…”\footnote{Nancy, *Corpus*, 5.} Notice, touch,
then, is not taken statically here. Touch is not equated with a moment of touching.
Rather, the order of touch is to be the accumulation of touchings maintaining a reduction
across these touchings. Suppose each first moment of Hegel’s dialectical movement, i.e.
the moment of the “sensuous being,” to be a touch. Then, instead of going through the
movement, connect the first moment of this movement, i.e. this touch, with the first
moment of the next touch, i.e. the beginning of the next movement. The idea is to stay at
the level of impression and attempt to derive a haptic reading through the connection of
the touches without conceptuality. The post-deconstructive realist project, then, supposes
the connection across the touches to be more *real* than the connection of the touches plus
conceptuality. In other words, the touching with conceptuality is *reduced* to mere
touching.

The sentiment of Nancy’s project works toward inverting Husserl’s
phenomenological reduction. As Derrida put it, “the phenomenological *epochê* is a
reduction that pushes us back toward meaning.” (W&D 281) And, one way of describing Nancy’s reduction is “of the frame, or of the layers of sense enframing things [my emphasis].”

So, if a repetitive reduction were needed with each touch, you might say the real resides in the remains of the reducing. When this “reduction stumbles upon something irreducible” this is the touching that bringing forth the thing. Further, “enframing” is a Heidegger derived term which is absolutely appropriate here because the concern is not to frame one touch, but to have a frame which remains open so as to gradually reveal what one might say is brought-forth and seen in this dynamic framing. Also, enframing is intended to communicate that this moving is sub-essential, i.e. sub the (second) level of the dialectal movement which is associated with essence. The thing is supposed to be associated with touching, then, because touching has a sort of blind-sight. Like the old fable of a bunch of men groping an elephant and taking pleasure in guessing what it is they are touching, in the “sight” of this “touching,” and in the site/sight of the remains of this touching, touching remains blind. In other words, you do not know what it is you are touching upon.

The way this is supposed to be deconstructive, then, is by considering that which is moving through the frame as the connections of internal differences between and in the sliding of signs in a deconstruction. In other words, in the sliding of signs – concerning just the internal differences from sign to sign – the movement of Différance is described as movement along the traces from internal difference to internal difference. At this point, the post-deconstructive realism project still seems plausible, but this is as far as it will get. The problem occurs as soon as this touching is considered “real.”

443 Michael Marder, The Event of the Thing, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 87.
444 Marder, The Event of the Thing, 137.
I have already established that the traces are between signs. And, here is where – invoking the Derrida quotes above in regard to reduction – the post-deconstructive realists submit “the sign to thought” (W&D 281) which is indicative of the “classical way” Derrida noted above, and precisely deemed a non-deconstructive activity. In other words, it is logocentric to non-ironically think of the “trace” as a “material trace [my emphasis].”445 Moreover, to non-ironically say “the ‘product’ of this reduction leads a life of its own”446 is a dream. On a much simpler note, consider how this realist trace also gets described: “As a trace of psychic animation trapped in the impenetrable materiality of the body.”447 If the “materiality” is “impenetrable,” then how did anything get “trapped in”?

Within Nancy’s sense of touch, if there is not an assumption of sincerity à la Husserl, then you cannot “submit it to thought,” e.g. how is one to know whether what you are touching is not changing faster than your touch can register? And, if there is an assumption of sincerity, then the project is not deconstructive. Either what is enframed is on the “linguistic side” of experience, in which case it is neither thing nor real, or if it is “outside” language, i.e. discursivity, it certainly cannot be associated with Derrida. Kant would call such an inference a transcendental illusion of the cosmological kind. The best such a project should be able to hope for is the identification of touching without interpreting the touching. Nancy’s project follows the wisdom of taking one obscurity and associating it with another. The order of touch is real. To the lady on the street this should seem too obvious to state. To a philosopher Nancy’s project is philosophically

445 Marder, The Event of the Thing, 137.
446 Marder, The Event of the Thing, 120.
447 Marder, The Event of the Thing, 42.
interesting, but it does not resonate with Derrida’s deconstruction – no matter how much terminology is used to mask its fallacies.

The Derrida of *Dissemination* might suggest that what the post-deconstructive project is actually touching is the “excrement of philosophical essentiality.” As I noted above, the essential excrement is not so much in the touching, as it is in the interpreting of the touching which renders it the touching of the “thing” and “post-deconstructive.”

As Derrida explained,

> The gossipy small talk of history reduces the thing itself … to the form of a particular, finite object, the sort of object that determine modes of knowledge – empirical descriptions or mathematical sciences – are incapable of producing spontaneously through their own workings and must therefore, for their part, introduce [invent] from the outside and define as a given.\(^{449}\)

Notice, the first target in Derrida’s list is the “form” of a particular. If enframing in this context constitutes the form of the post-deconstructive thing itself, then Derrida already deemed it non-deconstructive. Moreover, it is as if Derrida is, in the above quote, sketching a view of the realist position in question as a sensual embrace of Kant’s blindness thesis – an exchange of “haptic” for “speculative” in Hegel’s logic. Further, it is not clear that such a realist position is not a transcendental amphiboly, i.e. mistaking a haptic appearance for a pure object of the understanding. For example, if a reduction is necessary along each “touch,” then perhaps it is the very entrance into the understanding which combines sensibility with understanding to identify the sense as “touch” dragging a *trace* of the understanding along in the reduction. After all Derrida thought that

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\(^{448}\) Derrida, *Dissemination*, 11.

\(^{449}\) Derrida, *Dissemination*, 10.
recognition “gives back, in the place, let us say, of the thing itself, a symbolic equivalent.”

Lastly, reductio ad rem, i.e. reduction to the thing from the starting point of a sign, i.e. a deconstructive starting point, is always already fallacious in itself. Recall that in his 1923 paper on “Vagueness,” Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) referred to “the fallacy that consists in mistaking the properties of words for the properties of things” as the fallacy of verbalism. Moreover, in J.L. Austin’s (1911-1960) How to do things with words (1955) he described the “descriptive fallacy” as “the mistake of taking as straightforward statements of fact,” i.e. as real, “utterances” that are either “nonsensical” or “intended as something quite different,” i.e. ironic.

I will now address the putative “reality” of the post-deconstructive thing. In order to think of deconstruction as performing a reduction to the thing, then, one should ask: Is this “thing” real or merely relational? If the former, then Derrida looks like John Locke, and if the latter, Derrida looks like Kant. I have extensively discussed Kant above, so I will briefly mention John Locke. According to Locke,

> Whatsoever the mind perceives in itself, or is the immediate object of perception, thought, or understanding, that I call “idea;” and the power to produce any idea in our mind, I call “quality” of the subject wherein that power is. … “ideas,” if I speak of them sometimes as in the things themselves, I would be understood to mean those qualities in the objects which produce them [ideas] in us. (Bk I, §8)

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454 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Alexander Campbell Fraser, ed., 76.
Locke goes on to make his famous distinction between primary and secondary qualities. “Primary” qualities are “utterly inseparable from the body, in what estate soever it be; such as in all alterations and changes it suffers, all the force can be used upon it, it constantly keeps;” these, then are “original or primary qualities [Locke’s emphases].”455 Secondary qualities “are nothing in the objects themselves, but powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities.”456 Lastly, Locke notes,

Ideas of primary qualities of bodies are resemblances of them, and their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves; but the ideas produced in us by these secondary qualities have no resemblance of them at all. There is nothing like our ideas existing in the bodies themselves [my emphasis].457

So, for Locke qualitative inscriptions of the secondary kind can be reduced away so as to get at the thing-in-itself which – for Locke – exists independently of the mind. Put another way, the thing-in-itself may be described – in a kind of negative theology – by way of negatively judging its mind dependent secondary qualities. The thing-in-itself is not (the secondary quality) blue, etc.

It might be tempting, then, to associate the “second origin” from Derrida, noted above, with Locke’s secondary qualities, since Derrida’s second origin is an “origin” metaphorically. On the one hand this works if we agree the signs, as secondary, pertain to the thing as primary, but the latter part is problematic. On the other hand, the negative theology present in Locke does not seem to be able to work in Derrida. So, here are two significant problems already if one is to suggest the infinite play of signification can be reduced to something real. If a thing is to be taken as real, perhaps not exactly like John Locke’s thing-in-itself but in a related way, then Derrida’s thing should have either

455 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 76.
456 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 76.
existence or mind independence. We could muddy the water by deconstructing “mind,” and try to make what remains real. Yet, this does not seem to help; Derrida says, “The thing itself is a sign.” (OG 49) And, “To exist is to be, to be an entity, a being-present.” (OG 167) So, it seems rather like I noted above, there are no remains from deconstruction which remain.458 Ultimately, for Derrida, no term can remain un-turned—not even “event” or “time,” etc. Moreover, an event internal to the discourse is only ironically real.459 Recall how Derrida boasts,

I would say that the difficulty of defining and therefore also of translating the word “deconstruction” stems from the fact that all the predicates, all the defining concepts, all the lexical significations, and even the syntactic articulations, which seem at one moment to lend themselves to this definition or to that translation, are also deconstructed or deconstructible, directly or otherwise, etc. And that goes for the word, the very unity of the word deconstruction, as for every word. (Psyche 5)

Ultimately, then, there will not be a “touch” or a “thing” or a “real” — for Derrida — beyond the infinite play of signification. “[C]onstantly” “moving”; “If words and concepts receive meaning only in sequences of differences, one can justify one’s langauage, and one’s choice of terms, only within a topic and an historical strategy.” (OG 70) It is fantasy to privilege a realm of “anonymous” things left over after deconstructing — as if these things are “underneath” their logocentric identification.

Take for example Simon Critchley’s claim: “Wherever Derrida is read, he is not dead. … Here and now, in the present that holds within itself the promise of the future, the dead live.”460 Of course, Critchley is not speaking realistically; he is speaking metaphorically. For Derrida, the thing — like pure difference — is a “dream of a purely

458 Cf. Marder, The Event of the Thing, 137.
459 Cf. Derrida, Khôra, 123.
heterological thought” at the “source” of empiricism. (W&D 151) When post-deconstructive realists make claims like “in the act of reading, the text reads us before and while we face it,” certainly they do not mean that a text really reads us. Hence, reductio ad rem is fallacious if you attempt to apply it to anything which is not ideal or mind dependent. Moreover, reducing to the thing, what you have is another sign whose deconstruction is yet to come.

Lastly, the logic invoked to support post-deconstructive realism is fatally flawed. The logic of the thing in post-deconstructive realism depends upon what is posed as “Derrida’s logic that opposes opposition.” As such this logic is based on four (4) sentences from the entire oeuvre of Derrida. What is more, these four sentences are misrepresented. In the way in which these four sentences are advertised, you can see what is attempting to be accomplished: “The annulment of opposition between the thing and its other.” (W&D 151) Before showing what is supposed to be “Derrida’s logic that opposes opposition, consider the following from Derrida in regard to this language of “the thing and its other.”

Derrida asks, “But how can the ‘Other’ be thought or said without reference – we do not say reduction – to the alterity” in a binary opposition? (W&D 127) So, before even looking at the logic behind post-deconstructive realism, notice, the problem is not so much the use of “thing,” i.e. the content, the problem is the form of the relation. If this opposition is “annulled” due to the “logic that opposes opposition,” then why not use this on all of the opposites Derrida considers? Suddenly, despite the disclaimer that “it does not amount to the disappearance of difference,” not only does it amount to the disappearance of difference but negation goes out the window too. By saying that some

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461 Marder, The Event of the Thing, xiii.
thing is not A, I have expressed opposition, and therefore, by post-deconstructive logic not A is A. (Huh?) Such wrongheadedness can be resolved quite easily. The fact of the matter is, there is no such thing as “Derrida’s logic that opposes opposition.” The logic is supposed to come from the *Politics of Friendship*; and, I will now show this to you.

The four sentences come from Derrida’s Chapter 5, “On Absolute Hostility: The Cause of Philosophy and the Spectre of the Political.” The question Derrida has posed just prior to the section under discussion: “What is said here of the enemy cannot be indifferent to what is said of the friend, since these two concepts co-determine one another. But the correlation can formally follow three logical chains: [Derrida’s emphasis].” So, the determination of the enemy is under discussion, and Derrida invokes the binary opposite of the enemy, i.e. the friend, noting that “these two concepts co-determine one another.” As you should be able to predict, this scenario will not turn out differently than the other binary oppositions Derrida faced.

In the attempt to work out the determination of the enemy/friend, then, Derrida says “the correlation can formally follow three logical chains.” He intends to work through all three, and then draw a conclusion. Not to pick the second of the three out and represent it in isolation as a logic-in-itself which annuls opposition. As predicted, the first “logical chain” treats enemy and friend as “symmetrical,” the second opposes the opposition of the first, i.e. the opposition being opposed is not opposition in general or opposition in regard to the thing-in-itself, it is the opposition just posed in the first option of three possible options for determining the concepts enemy and friend. The third option, then, points to some third which “endlessly binds or opposes [Derrida’s

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emphases]” – Derrida’s predictable solution – in this case it is “the political,” and such “metonymization of the political” is considered as a third option. Therefore, Derrida, of course, declares in the light of all three of these options that “we must be patient at the crossroads and endure this undecidable [Derrida’s emphasis].” (PF 123) Hence, Derrida does not deem the second option to have “annulled opposition.”

So, as you can see, despite so called post-deconstructive realism, logical negation was not “annulled” in 2007. The misquoted, taken out of context, four sentences which allow for post-deconstructive realism to consider the thing real is a misreading. As such, post-deconstructive realism is fallacious on multiple counts, and, furthermore, represents a blatant and severe misreading of “deconstruction.” Rather, it is the case, as I have differently and repeatedly expressed above, Derrida treats the thing as a sign, and deconstruction treats of signs. Derrida is operating within a closure of discursivity and at the conceptual standpoint in Kant’s structure of experience. For Derrida, there is no post-deconstruction, and the thing is not real, it is a sign.

Derrida’s Response to the Problem of Non-being: The Conceptus Logico-Discursivus Standpoint

To the conditioned reader Derrida’s Différance and deconstruction read like melodrama. Derrida’s formulaic is always already on the verge of being a one trick pony. His wild lust to beat Hegel at his own game can be stopped by not starting. Just refuse to play Derrida’s shell game. On the one hand, I would say there certainly is something brilliant about such a rigorous commitment to circuitous logic. On the other hand, the deep problem with Derrida’s philosophy is the shift from a merit based logic to

a logic of cronyism. Since there is no real criteria for determining which terms should avoid deconstruction in Derrida’s wake, philosophy becomes politics. Yet, philosophy as politics is not real politics because there is far less money and power involved. The metaphorical politics of philosophy is the politics of vanity. Even if Derrida’s use of the logic of cronyism may be shown to be “fair,” the shift itself is regrettable in the extension of its sovereignty because ultimately it depends upon the hospitality of the tyrant. This is a truth of finitude, whether you can sign it or not.

Or, perhaps Derrida is attempting to illustrate this very issue. As such, Derrida’s formulaic should be lauded and applied so as to unmask the logic of identity as always already a logic of cronyism. In this way, Derrida’s philosophy looks like a therapeutic for each singular agent. The question is meant to ask: You – who is now in the “world” of mere “signs” – how will you be just? How will you conduct yourself in accordance with Justice? Suddenly, an overcoming of Platonism this is not – not that there ever was a “Platonism.” You are situated squarely and perpetually at the beginning the Republic, and Derrida refuses to allow you to defer to the authority of a text as he interrogates you. You are here. You are in the world. What is justice?

Of course, to be frank, this is a reading of Derrida. Must I really say it at this point? The matter for Derrida must remain “undecidable.” However, not to spite but despite Derrida; his position within a network of philosophical discussion can be identified. As such, Derrida clearly has a Kantian (and Hegelian) heritage. And such a trace should not be overlooked for the identity of something which goes under the sign of “Derrida’s philosophy.” In this way, Derrida does have a response to traditional philosophical problems. What I have been working toward, which should be able to be
seen at this point, is that Derrida has replaced Kant’s thing-in-itself with pure difference. Further, Derrida has a response to the problem of non-being, and it is not novel. It is precisely the response of the Eleatic “visitor” in Plato’s *Sophist*. I have already discussed Derrida’s reading of the “thing” as a sign. So, as I conclude this chapter I will point to Derrida’s comments on non-being. Derrida, predictably, treats “non-being” the same as every other term he considers a “sign.” Yet, so as to “show the work,” so to speak, I conclude this chapter as such.

In showing Derrida’s comments on non-being, I will be summarizing this chapter. I will show you three instances where Derrida is providing a response to the problem of non-being. And, the conclusion – when non-being proper is treated, i.e. supposed as non-sign – is that Derrida posits *Différance* as the undecidable solution to the problem of non-being. Otherwise, Derrida treats non-being as a sign, reserving the most non-sign for the irreducible difference contained within every sign. The irreducible difference of the thing-in-itself or non-being is the irreducible difference of pure difference which Derrida locates internal to every sign. As such, pure difference may be seen as Derrida’s replacement for the thing-in-itself, and his solution to the problem of non-being. However, quite early in his life of letters, Derrida thereafter moves away from writing about pure difference, shifting the focus to *Différance*, and more tightly closing discursivity by suggesting his only “metaphysical complicity” to be the concept of “sign.” So, *Différance* is as close to a decision that the later Derrida will provide regarding a response to the problem of non-being. As I indicated both in the Introduction and in Chapter 2, this focus on always already being within language as the inability to

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solve the problem of non-being is a further embrace of the second impasse to the problem.\textsuperscript{465}

It should be clear, then, that there is no negative theology with Derrida. As Derrida put it, “No, what I write is not ‘negative theology.’”\textsuperscript{466} Yet, Derrida, and especially Derrideans, seem at times to entertain various other terms, as if these terms refer to the internal difference which for deconstruction to work must be located within signs. One such term revolves around negative theology, and invokes a notion of non-being. So, it is worth considering this term “\textit{khōra}.” Attempting to supplant \textit{Différance} with “\textit{khōra},” Derrideans befittingly beg the question declaring, “Neither being nor nonbeing, the \textit{khōra} involves a negativity that escapes both the positive and negative theological register.”\textsuperscript{467} Notice, it behooves them, of course, to \textit{not} consider non-\textit{khōra} or the difference which magically appears between these two binary opposites when they do. After all, \textit{khōra} is good and \textit{non}-word, and binary opposites are bad, right? In this example, then, notice being and non-being – as words, i.e. signs – have been relegated to the Qualitative level of binary opposition, and it is here that the (Hegelian) negativity which points “back” to – what in this case gets called – \textit{khōra} is supposed to be something philosophers have yet to set their eyes or fingers upon. And, this is precisely the question. On the one hand, in the context of negative theology \textit{khōra} gets discussed as void which could not be seen or touched. On the other hand, the \textit{khōra} of negative theology is supposed to be located deconstructively.

\textsuperscript{465} Cf. Leonard Lawlor, Thinking Through French Philosophy, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), 46-47. \textit{Différance} “\textit{refers} to an absolute non-being [my emphasis].”
If negative theology is to be thought within deconstruction, then it must take place at the Qualitative level between binary opposites so that the term with the “non” in front of it could be privatively identified from the other term. Why is it not possible to locate negative theology within deconstruction such that the negation or remotion moves from the Qualitative to the Quantitative? Such a placement would seem more consistent with Derrida’s predecessors. The answer: It is because, we are told, “This form of negation, according to Derrida, is a (quoting Derrida here) ‘negativity without negativity.’”\textsuperscript{468}

Now, such an equation of the non-word \textit{kho}ra, which is suddenly older than both being and non-being, should be problematic in light of Derrida’s declaration of “everything” as “discourse.” I quote him here to contextualize this notion. According to Derrida,

Henceforth, it was necessary to begin thinking that there was no center, that the center could not be thought in the form of a present-being, that the center had no natural site, that it was not a fixed locus but a function, a sort of nonlocus in which an infinite number of sign substitutions came into play. This was the moment when … \textit{everything became discourse} – provided we can agree on this word – … The absence of a transcendental signified extends the domain and the play of signification infinitely [my emphasis]. (W&D 280)

I am here stating, then, the questions which I will pursue to show you what Derrida is doing in the previous quotes. First, how can there be negativity without negativity? Second, what sort of “necessity” is involved in thinking that “the center” has no “natural site?” Third, how does Derrida arrive at “an infinite number of sign substitutions,” why not 9 or 42? Lastly, why does Derrida qualify his claim that “everything became discourse” with “provided we can agree on this word?”

All of these questions have actually already been answered. If you recall Kant’s Table of Judgments, “Universal, Particular, and Singular” judgments pertain to Quantity,
and “Affirmative, Negative, and Infinite” judgments pertain to Quality. So, the $=x$, internal difference, pure difference, or in this case, $khōra$ pertain to the Quantitative level. Now if either a Universal or a Particular judgment is made, then the Square of Opposition is entered. Therefore, the judgment regarding this Quantitative level must be Singular. Similarly, then, at the Qualitative level, the Quality of this Singular judgment is Infinite. Such a judgment is supposed to sound like “This is $=x$” or “Wow, this is $khōra$.” The “Wow” is appropriate because it expresses a sense of wonder, not affirmation or negation. Expressing affirmation or negation requires identifying the Quantity within a logic, i.e. perceptual judgments need not identify “that” which is judged. Hence, whichever term can be entertained here – and this is the very question under consideration – it must pertain to a singular infinite judgment. (This answers the first and third questions I asked above.) And, this is exactly the type of judgment which contained non-discursivity for Kant. Whereas the infinity of space exceeds even a limiting into the infinite chain-like continuity of time, each of these infinities was apprehended sequentially by imagination. And the regression back down the series though leading to an unimaginable vastness (for Kant) is a form of negation. Therefore, what Derrida must mean by negation without negativity is negation without logical negativity. As such, this is Kant’s real negation which pertains to the experiential and points to what he refers to as the thing-in-itself.

Put another way, the block quote above from “Structure, Sign, and Play,” is Derrida’s quick version of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction.⁴⁶⁹ Instead of attempting to solve the heterogeneity problem, Derrida retreats to the “function” of combination. This is tantamount to siding with Kant’s second edition Transcendental Deduction over his

first edition Deduction. The “necessity” of thinking “the center” has no “natural site” is a restatement of the unknowable nature of the thing-in-itself. Either you determine its nature – eliminating the need to speak of the thing-in-itself – like Hegel by “going behind the curtain” to see yourself, or you point to something you are not supposed to be able to even say, i.e. the thing-in-itself. Derrida is adding a third option by focusing on the unknowable nature of the first moment of Quantity. Since repetitive experience amounts to singularly experiencing infinity – due to the limiting of human experiential apparatus – , and no signification is sufficient – sufficiency pertaining to relations higher up in the structure of experience –, then no amount of sign substitutions will ever arrive at a correspondence.

Elsewhere Derrida referred to this process noting: “To comprehend [Derrida’s emphasis] the structure of becoming, the form of a force, is to lose meaning by finding it. The meaning of becoming and of force, by virtue of their pure [and different], intrinsic characteristics, is the repose of the beginning and end.” (W&D 26) Derrida cannot speak of this “pure” difference without invoking its other, i.e. meaning, so he asks the community of language users if they will allow him his use of the Saussurian stacked deck in such a way as to refer to the sign substitutions as “discourse.” This is the second of the four questions I am pursuing in regard to Derrida’s Transcendental Deduction. If, they – you, i.e. the community of language users – consent, to this initial term, a slew of terms will follow, but the network connections amongst the terms to come will never correspond to the infinite connections (in perception) “under” or “outside” of experience – as if the mind could mirror the “universe” – because the connections can never be taken up all at once into the human experiential apparatus. Even Leibniz’s assumption of
mathematics – God as divine geometer – as a Universal judgment must remain an assumption. Signaling his shift from the “mineness” of a Heideggerian focus on the apperceptive standpoint to Hegel’s speculative and parasitic logic of the conceptual standpoint, in *Monolingualism of the Other*, Derrida notes, “I have only one language; it is not mine.” In other words, because Derrida’s perspective originates on the conceptual *logico*-discursive side of Kant’s structure of experience, it is within the understanding – and constantly thwarted in – attempting to look “out.”

So, it is not Kant who has not escaped Derrida; it is Derrida who has not escaped Kant. The difference between Derrida and Kant here: Kant posits a solution to the problem of *not being* able to look “out,” which is the problem of non-being, and Derrida is content to merely return to the second impasse of the problem, after having escaped Hegel’s dialectical grasp, at the first impasse. Derrida’s irony here pertains to either the insincerity of accepting a first term or the sophistry of applying a “method” that you know ahead of time produces results just as metaphorical as the stacked deck you ingeniously exposed as metaphorical. Perhaps David Farrell Krell’s text on Derrida *The Purest of Bastards* is on to something. Returning, then, to the term under discussion currently, “*khōra,*” and the topic of negative theology, it seems as though *khōra* just happened to be the *word* that the community of language users gathered at the time of Derrida’s writing in the above quotes agreed upon to apply to the Quantitative level of experience.

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470 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 68.
Just as Derrida requires your agreement as to what counts as a word; he requires your agreement as to what does not count as a word. (This answers the fourth question I asked above in regard to Derrida’s Transcendental Deduction.) The sliding along the chain of signification never stops, Derrida’s liberal difference is that he asks you to vote on which term should be privileged, but, make no mistake, the term of the term, as it were, is always a singular event. When the conference is over, the term is no longer privileged. Imagine that: it’s different every time. I am reminded of a story Thomas Szasz is fond of telling about Voltaire (1694-1778): “Asked by his secretary what he would have done had he lived in Spain under the Inquisition”; Voltaire is said to have replied, “I would have worn a big rosary, and gone to mass every day and kissed all monks’ sleeves, and tried to set fire to all their monasteries.”

There are no remains from deconstruction which remain. Deconstruction is one of those sophistical “games” which you can play reminiscent of the skeptic Carneades (c. 219- c. 129 BC) who gave public lectures in Rome in 155 BC and “argued for and against justice on successive days, stunning audiences and incurring the displeasure of Cato the Elder, who convinced the Senate to throw the philosophers, for a time, out of the city.” In other words, neither negative theology in its relaxed form nor in its most rigorous sense can stop the thimblerigger “genius of metaphor” Derrida from having one more signification from the stacked deck up his sleeve.

476 Marder, The Event of the Thing, 43.
In sum, this chapter began by showing Derrida identify non-being with time. This is why Derrida above says, “the no-thingness” is “only accessible on the basis of the Being of time.” (MOP 51) What is not the standing now of Presence, is not. In other words, though Derrida is critical of the “Metaphysics of Presence,” his solution to the problem of non-being is the same as those in Hegel’s wake. Just as non-being is internal to being, for Hegel, non-being is internal to language for Derrida. Moreover, if you switch registers or modes from the logic of identity to deconstructive logic of supplementarity, then irreducible difference is internal to signs and sign use. Derrida revels in the circuitous logic indicating every attempt to identity the difference internal to a sign as the sliding movement into another sign. Non-being as that which is supposed to be “outside” any system is the difference irreducible to that system. *When* it is called “non-being” Hegel reads it as within being, and *when* it is called “non-being” Derrida reads it as within language. The repetition is there in both the previous sentence and the thought of Hegel and Derrida. Kant truly attempts to think non-being by positing the thing-in-itself outside the structure of experience. Yet, both Hegel and Derrida are quick to make hay with the discursive nature of such a positing. As Plato’s Eleatic visitor might put it, when you say non-being, non-being is being said. But of course, Kant is not ignorant to the discursive nature of his positing. Hence, Kant discursively articulated this “non-being” in multiple ways such as *nihil negativum* in his Table of Nothing.

In shifting to *Différance*, then, Derrida does not sever his Kantian heritage. If as Sartre noted, “Kant had already shown the irreducible difference between sensation and thought,”477 then Derrida sought to fortify Kant’s language so no one would ever attempt to reduce the difference again. To fortify this pure difference, Derrida, then, discusses

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**Différence.** In other words, by maintaining that pure difference is internal to signs such that a sign may be different from itself in that its meaning is arbitrary, Derrida preemptively denies that a relation of difference pertains to any non-signs.

Recall, it was the Hegelian reading of Kant which rendered the difference between sensation and thought as the pure difference internal to the concept of experience. It was the retroactive determination which revealed the pure difference as conceptual. So, I am supporting my claim by a sort of genealogy. Yet, at the same time, it is only a merely genealogical support, *if* you side with Derrida. If you do not support Derrida’s reading of pure difference, then the question becomes what is the irreducible difference that Derrida appropriated? And the answer, as Sartre noted above, is Kant’s difference between sensation and thought. Derrida is functioning at the conceptual standpoint, and this is what accounts for his “contextuality.” Deconstruction works on texts “from within.” Recall it was the submitting of “the sign to thought” above that allowed for the philosophical tradition’s hierarchical structure which occluded the self-writing of *Différence*. On the contrary, then, deconstruction accentuates the irreducible and undecidable difference already at work in the work due to the very nature of the sign(s).

In a celebrated quote worth rendering at length, Derrida famously explained:

> The very condition of a deconstruction may be at work, *within* the system to be deconstructed; it may already be located there, already at work, not at the centre but in an excenric centre, in a corner whose eccentricity assures the solid concentration of the system, participating in the construction of what at the same time threatens to deconstruct. One might then be inclined to reach this conclusion: deconstruction is not an operation that supervenes *afterwards*, from the outside, one fine day; it is always already at work in the work; one must just know
how to identify the right or wrong element, the right or wrong stone – the right one, of course, always proves to be, precisely, the wrong one. Since the disruptive force of deconstruction is always already contained within the architecture of the work, all one would finally have to do to be able to deconstruct, given this *always already*, is to do memory work. Since I want neither to accept or to reject a conclusion formulated in these terms, let us leave this question hanging for a while [Derrida’s emphasis].

I am fond of this statement of deconstruction by Derrida precisely because he not only describes deconstruction, but he denies, for the sake of maintaining undecidability, that memory is somehow outside sign systems. As you should be able to see by this conclusion, Derrida treats “memory” as a sign, and as such, he wants “neither to accept or to reject a conclusion formulated” in terms of memory. Decidedly, the matter is undecidable for Derrida. Just as the $x$ was required to be added to the understanding for an experience, yet the $x$ was from an origin other than the understanding, so too, Derrida – maintaining his position at the conceptual standpoint and the closure of discursivity – requires an encounter which changes the signs with which he is presented. On the one hand, this change, for Derrida, can never be identified because he is always already within a sign system. On the other hand, by acknowledging “signs” as such, from his perspective it is the difference internal to the signs themselves which animate a movement and meaning throughout a system of signs.

It should be clear, then, that Derrida has taken a discursive standpoint. Further, in so far as non-discursivity would be tantamount to “outside” of language, *Derrida denies that non-discursivity, the thing-in-itself, pure difference, or non-being, can be outside of language. He accomplishes this by considering each of the terms to be always already a sign.* In this way, Derrida has a tautologically grounded argument. If you are

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using language, then you are already “within” language. As such, any attempt to express something “outside” of language with language remains inside language. As John Caputo puts it, “In Derrida’s terms, it is always too late to assert our superiority over, our transcendental mastery of, language, for we are always already speaking and drawing on its resources.”

Caputo’s quotation should remind you of Hegel’s closure of discursivity: any attempt to think what is outside of thought must remain inside thought. Now, Hegel wanted to allow for an undifferentiated or first moment of pure difference to capture Kant’s non-conceptual =x which initiates reflective thought or does the work of combining sensibility and understanding in completing an experience. However, so as to remain consistent with his own closure of discursivity, Hegel had this first moment of pure difference be revealed by a retroactive determination of sublation as itself discursive, i.e. the idea. Embracing Saussure Derrida takes the initial pure difference of Hegel’s system and locates it in the difference between a signifier and a signified internal to every sign. In this way, there can be no retroactive determination, and no non-linguistic way to refer to this difference.

Ultimately, then, this will be Derrida’s strategy for denying any outside of language – outside of sign systems. There a number of places where Derrida mentions non-being, and in each case non-being is taken to be internal to language, and the identity of internal difference as not non-being but undecidable. And of this undecidability, Derrida notes, “undecidability is not indeterminacy. Undecidability is the competition

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between two determined possibilities or options.” As I showed by way of Sextus Empiricus in Chapter 2, when the Pyrrhonian skeptics arrived at undecidability, there was something about which judgment was to be suspended. The agreement between the skeptics and the stoics extended far enough for reference to that thing about which there is dispute. Highlighting the second impasse of the problem of non-being, Derrida would have it that non-being derives its meaning just as being derives its meaning, i.e. from the network of supplementation – not from any outside-text; (OG 158) or, as Derrida puts it in *Dissemination*, “There is nothing before the text: there is no pretext that is not already a text,” As such, there is no “undecidable” that does not derive its undecidability from the text, not whatever we might *dream* to be undecidable “outside” the text. Tracing this undecidability throughout a text is the work of deconstruction.

In *Acts of Literature* Derrida ventriloquizes Plato’s *Sophist*. As such, you find more of the same looking different from Derrida. According to Derrida, “It is impossible to pin mimesis down to a binary classification.” Suddenly “Sophist” seems like it is standing in for *Différance* in this context, Derrida unsurprisingly concludes that in the hunt for the Sophist, it is the “organized manner” itself which bars Theaetetus from finding the sophist’s secret hide-out. The covering cannot be rolled aside for Derrida because the “Sophist is capable of ‘producing’ ‘likeness and homonym’ of everything that exists.” Describing this “logic” of the Sophist Derrida suggests, *Mimēsis* produces a thing’s double. If the double is faithful and perfectly like, no qualitative difference separates it

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481 Derrida, *Dissemination*, 328. Cf. “There is nothing outside of the text [there is no outside-text; il n’y a pas de hors-texte].”

from the model. Three consequences of this: (a) The double … is worth nothing in itself. (b) Since the imitator’s value comes only from its model, it is good when the model is good [and vice versa] … (c) If mimēsis is nothing and is worth nothing in itself, then it is nothing in value and being – it is in itself nothing, and is worth the nothing in itself, then it is nothing in value and being – it is in itself negative.483

This description is exactly like the description of the rhetorical invention of metaphor for the missing link in an analogically connected chain of terms from Margins of Philosophy quoted in the second section of this chapter. In other words, the question of metaphor in philosophy is answered with philosophy as metaphor. This supposed to lend support to the gesture which regards all philosophical concepts as signs. That is, exempting the metaphysical concept of sign-in-itself. It is as if Derrida’s system is the double of the philosophical system. You should be tempted to treat “Derrida’s system” as a sign which is the negation of the sign “philosophical or metaphysical system.” And, in the retrospection to the first moment determine the thing-in-itself from Kant’s system as the “in-itself” of Derrida’s system which is in itself (as) language.

Hence, after examining Derrida’s multiple iterations of non-being it is clear that he treats the logic of supplementarity as primary. That is, the attempt to derive pure difference, the thing-in-itself or non-being from any system derives from the construction of the system itself. And, since – according to Derrida – these systems are weaved together by the logic of supplementarity, every system and its determination of the ground can be deconstructed. Put another way, by reveling in these conditions Derrida seeks to undermine any signification of the ὑποκείμενον, i.e. hypokeimenon. As such, Derrida treats non-being as yet another sign whose meaning – as a problem or otherwise

– is propped up on a system. What such a reading of non-being shows, then: *Derrida failed to solve the problem of non-being.*
“[O]f the professed Heracliteans, such as was held by Cratylus, who finally did not think it right to say anything but only moved his finger, and criticized Heraclitus for saying that it is impossible to step twice into the same river; for he thought one could not do it even once. But we shall say in answer to this argument also, that there is some real sense in their thinking that the changing, when it is changing, does not exist. Yet, it is after all disputable; for that which is losing a quality has something of that which is being lost, and of that which is coming to be, something must already be. And in general if a thing is perishing, will be present something that exists; and if a thing is coming to be, there must be something from which it comes to be and something by which it is generated, and this process cannot go on ad infinitum.”

~Aristotle (Meta 1995, 1010a11-1010a23)

“One thunderbolt strikes root through everything.”

~Heraclitus

“[T]his world … pre-exists its expressions. It is nevertheless true that it does not exist apart from that which expresses it.”

~Gilles Deleuze

Chapter Five: Pure Difference in Deleuze – Expressing Difference Differently

Introduction and Justification for Chapter 5 Sections and Objectives

In regard to the organization of this chapter, though each of the sections has the potential to express more than this introductory “justification” can say, I have three objectives for this chapter. First, I seek to I explicate Deleuze’s idea of pure difference. Of course, I will accomplish this by referring to that which has been produced thus far in the other chapters. Second, I discuss Deleuze’s justification for his reading of pure difference and examine the ontological commitments of his account. Lastly, I provide Deleuze’s solution to the problem of non-being emphasizing how and why it fails to solve the problem of non-being. The first two objectives, then, provide support for my conclusions regarding Deleuze and his attempt to solve the problem of non-being. What is more, the first two objectives will also contribute to ideas yet to come, i.e. ideas discussed in Part II.

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Recall that I consider the first three chapters preparatory to both the Derrida and Deleuze chapters. The focus of this chapter, then, is really Deleuze’s *Difference & Repetition* [*Différence et répétition*] (1968). Yet, a famous quote by Alain Badiou regarding Deleuze’s overall style of thinking is appropriate here:

> It is therefore perfectly coherent that, in starting from innumerable and seemingly disparate cases, in exposing himself to the impulsion organized by Spinoza and Sacher-Masoch, Carmelo Bene and Whitehead, Melville and Jean-Luc Godard, Francis Bacon and Nietzsche, Deleuze arrives at conceptual productions that I would unhesitatingly qualify as monotonous, composing a very particular regime of emphasis or almost infinite repetition of a limited repertoire of concepts, as well as a virtuosic variation of names, under which what is thought remains essentially identical.  

Though I would have preferred Badiou’s quote to conclude with reference to the repetition of a structure, rather than invoke essence and identity, as an appropriate paraphrase: it is possible to read Deleuze as if each of his books on other thinkers were an attempt to ventriloquize the thinker in question so as to express a repetition of Deleuze’s structure or system by using the other thinker’s vocabulary. This is perhaps the most rewarding and frustrating aspect of Deleuze’s style. And, this is another reason I favor *Difference & Repetition*, because I take it to verge upon the key with which to decode Deleuze’s other books.  

> Despite the complexity of Deleuze’s thought, then, each repetition of his thought encompassed in a different book may be taken as so many signs with univocal reference to this structure as key. So, the focus of this chapter is, of course, Deleuze and *Difference & Repetition*. However, the breadth of Deleuze’s thought forces me – to at least once

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487 Cf. “All that I have done since is connected to this book.” (D&R xv)
each—refer to Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677), Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), Marcel Proust (1871-1922), Henri Bergson (1859-1941), and Francis Bacon (1909-1992) which means briefly engaging the relevant texts as needed. For example, these figures help illuminate the ways in which Deleuze’s thought both follows and differs from the thought of Aristotle. And, it is the ways in which Deleuze differs from Aristotle and Hegel\textsuperscript{488} that provide the novelty to his otherwise Kantian solution to the problem of non-being. 

The purpose for writing this chapter, then, is to provide Deleuze’s reading of pure difference, and provide support for my claim that Deleuze indirectly attempts to solve the problem of non-being with his new concept of difference as pure difference. You will understand why I use the word “indirectly” here by the end of the chapter. In sum, on the one hand, Deleuze—following Bergson—wants to treat non-being as a “pseudo-problem.” On the other hand, Deleuze re-writes the problem and offers “?-being” as its solution. In regard to Deleuze’s new concept of difference as pure difference, it should be noted that this new concept is actually an Idea in Kant’s sense of the term. Yet, as Kant also holds, these ideas, as problematic, are unhinged concepts. (CPR 1998, A 508/B 536)\textsuperscript{489} Consider how Kant refers to the unconditioned – thing-in-itself – in discussing pure concepts.

Now since the unconditioned alone makes possible the totality of conditions, and conversely the totality of conditions is always itself unconditioned, a pure concept of reason in general can be explained through the concept of the unconditioned, insofar as it contains a ground of synthesis for what is conditioned. (CPR 1998, A 322/B 379)

\textsuperscript{489} Cf. CPJ 128.
Deleuze acknowledges he is aware of Kant’s distinctions in both his commentary on Kant\(^{490}\) and his article on Kant’s *Third Critique*.\(^{491}\) Hence, providing Deleuze’s reading of difference will ultimately entail comparing his structure of experience with that of Kant’s.

First, a judgment of the sublime is tantamount to the unhinging of a concept of the understanding because the sublime exceeds our ability to recognize it with a concept of the understanding. (CPJ 128) The sublime is thereby made sense of in relation to an idea – as an unhinged concept –, rather than a concept with which it is supposed to be equal (\(\equiv x\)). As you know, this unhinging is signaled by the “free play” of imagination. (Cf. CPJ 192-195) Second, a judgment of the beautiful provides a different conception of harmony. (Cf. CPJ 198) Whereas harmony can be, and perhaps usually is, thought of as synonymous with equality, Kant’s *Third Critique* provides a more musical version of the soul. In other words, harmony is determined by the resonance of the faculties – the soul as aesthetic tuning fork. As aesthetic this harmony is not derived from engaging identical concepts of the understanding. Rather, it is the harmony between sensibility and the understanding broadly designated. Hence, from Kant’s *Third Critique* Deleuze is able to think a concept – a regulative Idea in the language of Kant’s *First Critique* – of difference other than the perhaps more traditional identical concept of difference. In this way, the identical concept of difference may be called “identical” because it derives from relations grounded in – invoking Plato – the Idea of the Same, i.e. \(\equiv x\). As such an identical concept of difference functions as a constitutive Idea in the language of Kant’s


First Critique, and is determined by negation – ἐναντίον à place de ἐτερον. Deleuze then is able to justify this concept of pure difference, despite what I refer to as its “fractal simulacral” character, by looking to the difference of which pure difference is supposed to be a concept as if it were the power of the psychic tuning fork’s resonating.

The claim which Deleuze wrote Difference & Repetition to support: there is a different concept of difference, and this concept is of “pure difference,” i.e. the unhinged Idea of Difference in itself. This, of course, reaches all the way back to Plato’s Sophist. Deleuze is attempting to realize Plato’s project of thinking Difference in itself, i.e. ἐτερον. The value of this project, as Plato’s dependence of reckoning thesis (discussed in the Introduction) emphasized, derives from the difficulty of thinking being in itself. On the one hand, recall that providing an account of being depends upon providing an account of non-being. On the other hand, recall that the Sophist concludes by – ironically in my opinion – equating non-being with Difference in itself, i.e. ἐτερον. Hence, what hangs in the balance of Deleuze’s advocacy for the concept of pure difference is both being and non-being. Deleuze’s concern – as established by Plato – is with being. In other words, Deleuze is attempting to think nothing less than being in itself by thinking difference in itself.

I have already made my position on this clear. I believe there is enormous value in Deleuze’s ontology; however, I believe it is ultimately flawed in its account of non-being. Therefore, in concluding this chapter I will address Deleuze’s account of non-

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being directly. Elsewhere I address the area where the flaw in Deleuze’s ontology appears most prominently, i.e. in his ethical theory.493

I begin to address Deleuze’s ontology, then, by directly discussing Deleuze’s concept of pure difference. I, next, discuss Deleuze’s pure difference as it relates to Kant’s structure of experience, and this discussion includes Deleuze’s famous “syntheses of time.” Moving in the following section to a higher level of generality, I will discuss Deleuze’s notion of “Transcendental Empiricism” as it relates to what has already been stated. In the final sections of the chapter I address what I see as the flaw in Deleuze’s ontology, and I directly address Deleuze’s comments regarding non-being from *Difference & Repetition*.

The Recursive Fractal Character of Pure Difference

“Whereas pure difference in Derrida thinks recursion as the ‘recursive discursive,’
    pure difference in Deleuze thinks non-discursive recursion ‘fractal-like.’”
    ~Frank Scalambrino, *Non-Being & Memory*, I.5

“Everything starts out in the abyss,”494 exclaimed Deleuze. Yet, what does “abyss” [*l’abîme*] mean here? On the one hand, this is a question regarding how to identify the abyss. On the other hand, this is also a question regarding method in relation to identifying the abyss. To start with the former, in the *Logic of Sense* (1969) [*Logique du sens*] Deleuze makes a distinction between an abyss with differences and an abyss without differences. In fact, he makes this distinction while denouncing the alternatives

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to his penchant for a valorized chaos. These alternatives are “common to metaphysics and transcendentalist philosophy.” (LOS 106) They are:

*either* an undifferentiated ground, a groundlessness, formless nonbeing [non-être], or *an abyss without differences* [“abîme sans différences,” my emphasis] and without properties, *or a supremely individuated Being* and an intensely personalized Form. Without this Being or this Form, you will have only chaos [le chaos]. (LOS 106)

So this quote is supposed to address the foundational Aristotelian and self-referential Kantian alternatives to what Deleuze refers to as “Nietzsche’s discovery.” According to Deleuze, Nietzsche “explored a world of impersonal and pre-individual singularities, a world he then called Dionysian or of the will to power, a free and unbound energy.” (LOS 106) Deleuze’s further description is more salient, as he notes:

This is something neither individual nor personal, but rather singular. [*Quelque chose qui n’est ni individuel ni personnel, et pourtant qui est singulier*] Being is not an undifferentiated abyss, it leaps from one singularity to another, casting always the dice belonging to the same cast, always fragmented and formed again in each throw. It is a Dionysian sense-producing machine, in which nonsense and sense are *no longer found in simple opposition* [my emphases]. (LOS 107)

Discussing the juxtaposition of these two block quotes, then, will help to explicate the different abysses and indicate Deleuze’s method involved in doing so. The quotes themselves show the movement from Aristotle to Kant to Deleuze in regard to beginnings.

So the abyss in which everything starts out is – for Deleuze – an abyss with differences. In other words, here is Deleuze’s version of what I refer to as the

496 Recall the discussion from the Introduction regarding the inability to determine “Plato’s position,” otherwise I would put Plato’s name here with Aristotle. Certainly Deleuze writes as though Plato’s name should be placed here given his references to the “overturning of Platonism.” More importantly, however, Deleuze is denouncing the responses of his predecessors as possible, but mistaken, alternatives to chaos.
contemporary French critique of Hegel’s dialectic.\textsuperscript{497} There is already difference internal to the starting point – an abyss with differences in this case. Recall that so far this is also Derrida’s strategy for critiquing Hegel’s dialectic. However, whereas Derrida thinks of the difference internal to the starting point as recursively warding off all attempts to “see” “outside” discursivity, i.e. the non-discursive, when Deleuze looks into the abyss he sees overflowing non-discursive joy and dancing abundance.\textsuperscript{498} This is, of course, a question of how to characterize the ground. Deleuze in the above first block quote accuses Aristotle and Hegel\textsuperscript{499} of “starting” with an undifferentiated ground. Kant’s ground gained over the strategies of Aristotle and Hegel derives from his ability to think of the ground as difference, not quite difference in itself but the thing-in-itself as different. Though Kant thinks difference differently (than Aristotle and later Hegel) via self-reference to his structure of experience, Deleuze thinks Kant still falls short of thinking difference in itself.\textsuperscript{500} Hence, of the two questions with which I began this section, the above goes as far toward identifying the abyss – the first question: as possible without addressing the latter of the two questions – what is the method involved in identifying the abyss?

To start answering the second question then, consider two more aspects of the above two block quotes. Deleuze uses the term non-being, i.e. non-être. To what is he referring here? Deleuze is referring to Aristotle’s arsenal of logical distinctions, the same logical distinctions with which Aristotle put forth his response to the problem of non-

\textsuperscript{499} Cf. Chapter 3 above, and D&R 7 and 10.
being. In other words, this non-being – which is really not-being – pertains to ἐναντίον. The piece to highlight in juxtaposition here from the second block quote is Deleuze’s comment, “Being is not an undifferentiated abyss.” Notice, on the one hand, Deleuze’s concern is different than Aristotle’s, i.e. Deleuze is interested in ἐτερον. Yet, on the other hand, Deleuze is talking about being. Why is he not talking about non-being? The answer is because Deleuze treats Plato’s dependency of reckoning thesis from the Sophist quite seriously. Whereas Kant seems to be treating difference as pointing to non-being, Deleuze – by way of Plato’s thesis – treats difference as pointing to being. And, this speaks directly to method.

What is at stake here should remind you of the constitutive regulative distinction in Kant and the demonstration dialectic, or justification discovery, distinction in Aristotle. In discussing this distinction in Aristotle recall that I used the locution to “look through” in the attempt to describe thinking the Idea of Difference in itself, i.e. ἐτερον, as contrasted with difference in relation to others, i.e. ἐναντίον. The suggestion by the end of the Introduction was that Aristotle mistakenly subsumed Plato’s ἐτερον as a question of ἐναντίον. Whereas Kant’s structure of experience, with its account of non-discursivity, points to ἐτερον from an ἐναντίον governed ground, Deleuze seeks to return to ἐτερον as Difference in itself. Now, recall further that this looking through was supposed to be a way to see outside the forms. So here is the point of intersection, then, where the first question which began this section (how to identify the abyss) can be fully answered by fully answering the second question (what is the method involved in identifying the abyss). It is clear thus far that Deleuze takes the starting point of dialectic to be a differentiated abyss – a starting point with internal difference. Throughout the
dissertation you have seen that there are two ways to start the dialectic. The dialectic begins with either experience or with thought, with perceptions or with ideas. With Kant to thank, pure difference is supposed to be the non-discursive which exceeds – overflows – its process of becoming discursive, whether it be through perception or conception.\(^{501}\)

Finally, then, regarding Difference in itself as the differentiated abyss by way of the two starting points of dialectic, when Deleuze looks into this abyss, what does he “see”?

Answering this question of the abyss speaks directly to the relation between pure difference, Kant’s thing-in-itself, and the beginning of Hegel’s dialectical movement. Recall Aristotle in regard to the hypokeimenon and especially Chapter 3 regarding dialectic, the opposition found in the second moment points back to the underlying first moment which the (Nietzschean) critics of Hegel (and Aristotle by proxy) consider already to include an internal difference. So, the second moment occurring in thought produces the opposition between difference and identity, i.e. ἐναντίον. Yet, Deleuze is concerned to emphasize the first moment – like an abyss with differences – as already containing a difference more profound than that identified in the second moment, and that difference is pure difference, i.e. ἐξενέφ. If you consider the difference between moments, the first moment pertains to a Quantity of pure difference and the second moment pertains to its identity through Qualification. Since the non-discursivity of pure difference eludes discursive (identical) difference thought through opposition in the second moment of dialectical movement, Deleuze hopes to show the second moment as a repetition of the first when regarded from the point of view of Difference in itself. In this way, Deleuze is like the true apologist for Kant in Hegel’s wake. Whereas Hegel’s

\(^{501}\) Sometimes I metaphorically describe this overflowing as extra-dimensional by referencing Edwin Abbott Abbott’s (1838-1926) 1884 classic *Flatland*.  

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dialectic accomplished the closure of discursivity, and thereby excluded both non-discursivity and Kant’s thing-in-itself from the dialectical movement, Deleuze has recovered non-discursivity as pure difference and hopes to show it permeating the dialectical movement by way of repetition.

Hegel held that “Difference in itself is self-related difference; as such, it is the negativity of itself, the difference not of an other, but of itself from itself; it is not itself but its other,” and as such concluded, “Difference is therefore itself and identity.” (SL 417) Recall this is also how Hegel – as indicated by Tom Rockmore in Chapter 3 above – argues for the equation of being and non-being in the first moment of the dialectic. According to Hegel difference “is mediated with itself by the non-being of its other … Difference as such is already implicitly contradiction [Hegel’s emphasis].” (SL 431) In the context of the language I have been using, ultimately Deleuze accuses Hegel of following Aristotle in reducing Plato’s ἐξεχνιεῖ to ἐλαλεῖν. Whereas Hegel uses difference as the negativity, the op-positivity, consistent with ἐλαλεῖν to connect the first and second moments of dialectic, Deleuze will use the positive difference of ἐξεχνιεῖ to connect the first and second moments.502 Further, whereas for Hegel difference leads to equating being and non-being, for Deleuze the being of pure difference as positivity will be the motor force of the dialectic hoping to arrive at an Idea of itself.503 The question for Deleuze becomes how to indicate the positivity of difference in itself.

In order to approach an idea of positive difference in itself, consider the following:

502 Note that the Hegel quote which begins this paragraph refers to difference as “the negativity of itself [my emphasis].” It is as if Deleuze is concerned with difference as the positivity of itself.

503 A good deal of discussion will occur by the end of the chapter to explain Deleuze’s rendition of non-being, but suffice to say the immediate previous statement in regard to Deleuze and non-being is analogously accurate with Hegel’s use of the term non-being
What is different from difference can be difference in itself, since difference in itself is different from itself. According to Deleuze, “Difference must be shown differing [Deleuze’s emphasis].”

(D&R 56) So, what does Deleuze see when he looks into the abyss? He sees that which is different than what he sees. And, what is this that is different from itself? It is difference. What is this difference? Difference is that which is different from itself. Since this movement in the abstract could continue indefinitely: first, notice that this is ἕτερον without the oppositional thinking of ἐναντίον. Next, notice that this movement is more than circular. This is the recursive fractal character of pure difference. It does not run in a circle; the dialectic runs in a circle. (Cf. D&R 273) As Deleuze would have it then, the dialectic produces an Idea to match the starting point of the dialectic, and both are the Idea of Difference in itself. Each completed movement of the dialectic produces the Idea of Difference.

The circular movement which brings about the Same, again and again, traces the trajectory of something other. Since with each return of the dialectic the movement is the same, there can be uniformity in this thinking. Yet, precisely the reason why you cannot determine if the end corresponds or exhausts the start is that the Idea of Difference in itself contains an internal difference – it is different than itself. As the return of the Same is driven and dragged along the trajectory of pure difference, the trajectory takes on the character of a recursive fractal. Fractal-like because each movement of the dialectic is the same as the next and recursive because the dialectic procedure is applied repeatedly so long as the power of pure difference allows for it. In this way, “Difference is the

504 I use the word “than” here, instead of “from,” because than is supposed to invoke a notion of Quantity and dynamize the – otherwise static seeming – difference.

505 Though perhaps only marginally correct English to use the word “than” instead of “from” with different, I prefer the use of “than” in this context as it seems to invoke the grammar of “more than.” Such is appropriate for the excessivity of non-discursivity and the positivity of difference.
genuine beginning,” and so it is that the abyss with which everything begins is differentiated.

Recall, again from Chapter 3, Hegel’s overly narrow consideration of difference as ἐλαλήνλ was not the only problem with his dialectic. The other problem pertained to Kant’s discussion of amphiboly. The question Deleuze must answer then, if he is to avoid this second problem: how might pure difference as positivity appear in experience? This question, of course, pertains to the experiential component of Kant’s structure of experience. What is more, as I will show below, it is in this way that pure difference functions to replace the thing-in-itself as difference-in-itself. Recall from Aristotle’s discussion of dialectic: the way in which individuals process experience is precisely the way in which they begin the dialectic perceptually. Again, I will discuss the way Deleuze thinks through Kant’s structure of experience in depth below. Suffice to say for now, Deleuze distinguishes between “the original and the copy” and “the model and the simulacrum,” so as to characterize two different types of relations in regard to the perceptual catalyst of the dialectic.

Recall from the Introduction, in discussing Aristotle I concluded that both demonstration and dialectic begin with assumptions. Yet, the assumptions which begin a demonstration are supposed to be on more solid ground. As a result, the relation between the assumptions and what follows from those assumptions in a demonstration is thought

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507 Here is an experiment you can perform: Put your face up to a mirror but not too close that you cannot see your own eyes. Now, look into your own eyes and see the reflection of your own face on the pupils of your eyes. If it helps, just look into one eye. So, at this point, you have the physical eye, the image of the eye on the mirror, and the image of your face in the image of the pupil of the eye on the mirror – three eyes. Now, think how this recurrence could recur out far beyond your ability to physically see it recurring – in every eye you look to the pupil to see another eye…
to be different from the relation between the assumptions and what follows from those assumptions in a dialectic. Whereas the copy is, thereby, supposed to be demonstratively the Same, the simulacrum is avowedly Different. Hence, the connection between Deleuze’s two types of relations and dialectic. The original copy relation allows for a relatively straightforward puzzle which excludes non-discursivity; with this relation you can support the claim that the starting point of dialectic has an identity. This is the case even if you follow Hegel and postpone identification until the third moment of the dialectic, i.e. the dialectical ubiquity of ἐλαλήτησιν allows for the identification of the starting point of dialectic as a copy of the (original) Idea which identifies it. The more difficult puzzle figures discursivity as enveloping the non-discursive positive difference; with this relation you can support the claim that the discursive (envelope) repeats, and thereby evidences, non-discursive difference. Therefore, not to follow what he implicitly accuses the history of Western philosophy as thinking of being the Same, Deleuze pursues the simulacral – à la recherche of the perceptual catalyst.

What is more, notice that both of these types of relation pertain to thought. The solidity of the ground between assumptions and what follows in a demonstration is a ground of thought, not experience.\(^{509}\) That there is experience with which to compare thought accentuates the very necessity of assumption, whether beginning demonstration or dialectic. This does not mean that demonstrations are necessarily wrong. Rather, it means that whatever we take as a starting point in experience, you can speak of the strength of its product’s relation to it; though it would be further assumptive to think a correspondence between what is producing or causing perception and what is perceived. So this is the long hand version with which Deleuze avows his debt to Kant. What

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\(^{509}\) Deleuze, “Plato and the Simulacrum,” 48.
Deleuze is thinking through here is the excessivity of the non-discursive as it moves along the limiting trajectory of the structure of experience on its way into the dialectic.

Having stated the above, then, you should be able to recognize that despite the image with which the perceptually originated dialectic begins, the image is different from that which produced it. So, which of the two types of relation noted above better describes the relation between image and that which produced it in experience prior to the image’s ascent onto the organizing (reflective) thought ground of dialectic? The relation, of the two noted above, which applies here is the simulacral. This is not to claim that the image’s relation to that which produced it cannot be organized into a relation of original and copy. Nor is it to claim that the image is not an image. Rather, it is to claim that prior to the dialectical organization, the image’s relation to that which produced it is simulacral. This is of the utmost importance if you are examining the beginning and not what it becomes.

Without relying upon what Aristotle called priority in being or Saussure’s stacked deck, the image is at best the copy of a copy in a limitless line of copies. Yet, “If we say of the simulacrum that it is a copy of a copy, an endlessly degraded icon, an infinitely slackened resemblance, we miss the essential point: the difference in nature between simulacrum and copy.”\(^{510}\) It concerns Deleuze that you not miss “the difference in nature” because,

The simulacrum implies great dimensions, depths, and distances which the observer cannot dominate. It is because he cannot master them that he has an impression of resemblance. The simulacrum includes within itself the differential point of view … In short, folded within the simulacrum there is a process of going mad, a process of

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\(^{510}\) Deleuze, “Plato and the Simulacrum,” 48.
limitlessness … always simultaneously more and less, but never equal [my emphasis].\textsuperscript{511}

According to Deleuze “the depths” which “the observer cannot dominate,” speak to the “aggressiveness of the simulacra,” (Cf. D&R xx) their “phantasmatic power,”\textsuperscript{512} and as they barge their way into Kant’s understanding broadly designated, the power upon which these images ride reaches all the way into the dimension of Ideas.\textsuperscript{513} For these simulacra “it is not a matter of reproducing or inventing forms, but of capturing forces.”\textsuperscript{514} Hence, Deleuze speaks of “the coupling of forces, the perceptible force of the scream and the imperceptible force that makes one scream.” (FB 52) In other words, the imperceptible force is the internal difference of the perceptible force, and their coupling is the simulacrum that is different than itself, i.e. an image with internal difference.

As Deleuze would have it, then, the image which perceptually, i.e. experientially, starts the dialectic is also different than itself, since it is the power of pure difference itself through which the image initiates the dialectic. Put in more Kantian language, “The violence of that which forces thought develops from the sentiendum to the cogitandum.” (D&R 141) Since the perceptual catalyst of the dialectic is simulacral, the structural syntheses receive their descriptions from the vocabulary of the hermeneutic of suspicion. The descriptors which now apply to descending Kant’s three-fold synthesis: the recognition that hides, the reproduction that masks, and the apprehension which repeats.\textsuperscript{515} Descending further you arrive at the thing-in-itself which has become pure difference. What is more, the sense of pure difference which I am attempting to capture

\textsuperscript{511} Deleuze, “Plato and the Simulacrum,” 49.
\textsuperscript{512} Deleuze, “Plato and the Simulacrum,” 51.
\textsuperscript{513} Deleuze, “Plato and the Simulacrum,” 52.
\textsuperscript{514} Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, Daniel W. Smith, tr. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 48. Hereafter cited as FB.
\textsuperscript{515} Cf. Keith W. Faulkner, Deleuze and the Three Syntheses of Time, (New York: Peter Lang, 2006), 3. I discovered this language in my years of studying Freud, i.e. independently of Faulkner. However, I am aware of and affirm Faulkner’s descriptions.
is, in many ways, dispersed throughout the early works in Deleuze’s corpus. Given the complexity, then, and the decisive – for the overall dissertation – nature of the following discussion, I devote an entire section for its sake. However, for the sake of comprehensibility, i.e. so as to make the comparison between Kant and Deleuze understandable, I devote the next section to a more general discussion. The more general discussion, regarding what Deleuze referred to as his “transcendental empiricism” should help contextualize the sustained comparison which follows it between Deleuze’s structure of experience and Kant’s.

Transcendental Empiricism: The Pure Difference that Makes a Difference

[Imagine something which distinguishes itself from itself – and yet that from which it distinguishes itself does not distinguish itself from it. Lightning, for example…”]

~Gilles Deleuze (D&R 28)

Given the work of the preceding chapters, there are two ways to express how Deleuze overcomes Hegel’s closure of discursivity. On the one hand, it can be expressed through Aristotle’s four causes. On the other hand, it can be expressed through Kant’s distinction between constitutive and regulative ideas. In regard to Aristotle’s four causes [ἀτίτια]. Recall, the four causes: (1) the agent or initiator of change [ἀρχή], i.e. the efficient cause; (2) the essence, “the whole or synthesis or form” [ὁλὸν καὶ ἡ σύνθεσις καὶ τὸ ἔδος], i.e. the formal cause; (3) “the for the sake of which” [τέλος], i.e. the final cause; and, (4) the “substratum” [ὁποκείμενον], i.e. the material cause. One way I could succinctly express Deleuze’s overcoming of Hegel’s closure of discursivity is to distinguish between two different ways of viewing Aristotle’s four causes. These two ways would pertain to viewing the causes as though they correspond to two of Plato’s “five great kinds” from the Sophist (251a5-259d8): Sameness [ταὐτόν] and Difference
Suppose Aristotle’s notion of the causes in so far as it pertains to discursivity to thereby pertain to the form of the Same, and in so far as it pertains to non-discursivity to thereby pertain to the form of Difference. What changes?

Most importantly, the “for the sake of which” becomes “for the sake of itself.” If the τέλος cannot be justified by reference to any discursive features of an object, then the τέλος of an object refers to the very power which is causing the unfolding of the object. The formal cause, in so far as formality itself is discursivity can only be thought of as de-formed, and as de-formed points to, on the one hand, the material cause – the ὑποκείμενον, i.e. the hypokeimenon; and, on the other hand, the excessivity of all the potential objects which could become actual objects through the matter form combination. Without recourse to discursivity, i.e. without engaging Aristotle’s logical apparatus, this ὑποκείμενον of an object – just like the τέλος – refers to the object’s power to appear prior to identification in the form. Moreover, since the ὑποκείμενον as non-discursive is both excessive and not yet an identified unit, it is consistent to think of the ὑποκείμενον as a cluster of (object) fragments. Further, the power involved here should be thought of as intensity, not extensity, since extensity already entails a matter form combination. To grant Aristotle his further distinction in regard to matter would be to posit a virtual realm as proximate matter prior to actualization by discursive in-formation, and to posit the underlying power, i.e. intensity, as remote matter. Lastly, as the non-discursive initiator of change, the efficient cause, cannot refer to the form, and thereby – nothing remains – it must refer to this remote matter, i.e. intensity. In fact, the difference in kind between the particular constraints on an expression and the power of expression itself accounts for the difference between the virtual dimension, and intensity.
though neither are discursive. Hence, thinking Aristotle’s causes through Plato’s
distinction between the Same and the Different reveals a set of causes different from
Aristotle’s, and the non-discursive of these causes all refer to power. Lo and behold: a
swarm of power – an abyss – with differences. (Cf. D&R 277) See Figure 5.1 (the “E”
stands for extensity – by way of Sameness – and the “I” stands for Intensity – by way of
Difference).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aristotle’s Four Causes</th>
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<tr>
<td>E</td>
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<td>I</td>
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**Figure 5.1**

Before discussing Deleuze’s overcoming of Hegel’s closure of discursivity
through the vocabulary of Kant’s constitutive regulative distinction, I would like to
briefly draw your attention to a subtle distinction which Deleuze – it may turn out –
misses. Notice, in constructing the above chart: rather than negate Aristotle’s causes in
order to arrive at the non-discursive, I triangulated the causes, so to speak, through
Plato’s “great kinds.” On the one hand, the difference between the forms is the
difference which allows for participation in the forms, i.e. ἐννοήματα. On the other hand, I
did not derive the non-discursive causes by suggesting that they participate in the
discursive form of Difference. What am I saying? Whether this is an instance of
“looking through” the form of Difference, i.e. ἐπειρομενον, or not matters less than the fact that
I did not derive the “non” of non-discursivity from ἐννοήματα, i.e. any opposition or
negation of Aristotle’s causes. This will be most relevant at the end of the chapter where
I provide Deleuze’s discussion of the non of non-being. However, since I will reference
the above as support for my claim against Deleuze below regarding the non in non-being,
it is relevant to point it out to you now.
In regard to Kant’s vocabulary, Deleuze’s innovation is not to suggest that thought occurs without concepts;\textsuperscript{516} rather his innovation is to think of discursive experiential concepts as referring to the non-discursive forces which express them, i.e. of which they are expressions. The way he overcomes the Hegel-Derrida claim that a concept as such only derives its meaning from its participation in a constellation of concepts – Saussure’s stacked deck – is to distinguish between open ended and closed concepts. Now then, this distinction was already made by Kant, i.e. the distinction between constitutive and regulative, in regard to concepts. Whereas a constitutive idea is taken to constitute an object through its recognition in the $= x$, a regulative idea, as indicated above, is not thought to state the whole of that to which it refers. The examples, of course, being God, the soul, and freedom announced in Kant’s \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}. (Cf. CPR A 509-510 /B 537-538 and A 684-687/B 712-715) Since I will focus in the next section explicitly on the relation between Kant and Deleuze, suffice to say for now: Deleuze employs Kant’s notion of a regulative idea in regard to practical experience. In other words, Deleuze overcomes the difficulty which holds that as discursive the concept cannot express the non-discursive by holding that an open ended concept is able to delimit without attempting to exhaust the non-discursive forces which express it. Because Deleuze is thinking about experience he is able to suggest that the experiential forces involved are themselves expressing that which only an open ended idea can discursively do justice. Hence, the condition for the idea is itself within experience – transcendental empiricism.

Identifying himself with traditional philosophical terms, in the Preface to the English edition of \textit{Dialogues II}, Deleuze declares, “I have always felt that I am an

empiricist, that is, a pluralist.”

Explaining further, of empiricism Deleuze notes, “[T]he aim is not to rediscover the eternal or the universal, but to find the conditions under which something new is produced (creativity).” Accordingly, Deleuze’s Empiricism starts with a completely different evaluation: analyzing the states of things, in such a way that non-pre-existent concepts can be extracted from them. States of things are neither unities nor totalities, but multiplicities. The abstract does not explain, but must itself be explained.

Notice, Deleuze prefers to think of Kantian sensibility – the states of “things” – using a notion of plurality, i.e. “multiplicity,” rather than concepts such as unity or totality. This, of course, speaks to Kant’s Table of Concepts of the Understanding according to Quantity. On the one hand, Deleuze’s decision here pertains to the “Empiricism” piece of transcendental empiricism. On the other hand, notice Deleuze above announces his concern to “find the conditions under which something new is produced.” This concern refers to the “Transcendental” piece of transcendental empiricism. Hence, transcendental empiricism for Deleuze locates the conditions for production of the new within the elements of experience themselves. In this way, as Deleuze declares in *Difference & Repetition*, he shifts the eminent concern – from that which he sees in Kant as the “domain of representation” – “to become ‘experience’, transcendental empiricism or science of the sensible.” (D&R 56) Lastly, as “non-pre-existent” indicates, Deleuze holds that concepts and ideas themselves may be open ended and created anew. That is, the generation of newness pertains to the conceptual as well as the experiential for Deleuze.

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Precisely indicating his reading of “things,” Deleuze further ties the notions of transcendental and empirical together in this quote,

It is not just that there are several states of things (each one of which would be yet another); nor that each state of things is itself multiple (which would simply be to indicate its resistance to unification). The essential thing, from the point of view of empiricism, is the noun multiplicity, which designates a set of lines or dimensions which are irreducible to one another. Every ‘thing’ is made up in this way.\(^{520}\)

By suggesting each thing is made of “irreducible” lines or dimensions, and multiplicity as referring to a block or a set of these lines, Deleuze indicates that from which these lines derive as the ultimate conditions for the production of novelty, i.e. the new. Moreover, the possibility of a one-to-one correspondence between concepts and experience must be excluded since the experiential features of things are so many “multiple” lines. Even if a one-to-one rendering of language and things were possible – which it is not –, there can be no correspondence between things and the multiplicity expressed as things. What is more, since Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism entails such a multiplicity of lines or forces expressing things, once expressed no signification can ever exhaustively identify the thing. In other words, Deleuze has renamed Kantian non-discursivity as multiple lines or dimensions. Recall that this renaming is consistent with both the thinking of Leibniz and of Kant on the matter. It is as if these lines or dimensions expressing things may be placed first in – what I refer to as – a limiting trajectory toward the identification of the things as such.\(^{521}\)


\(^{521}\) Cf. Chapter 1, esp. regarding non-discursivity.
Discussing David Hume’s “empiricism,” Deleuze suggests the “history of philosophy has more or less absorbed, more or less digested, empiricism.” By this Deleuze suggests the history of philosophy overlooks the “secrets” empiricism “harbors.”

(PI 35) Deleuze further suggests it is the secrets of empiricism that Hume “pushes the furthest and fully illuminates,” accordingly,

His empiricism is a sort of science-fiction universe avant la lettre. As in science fiction, one has the impression of a fictive, foreign world, seen by other creatures, but also the presentiment that this world is already ours, and those creatures, ourselves. A parallel conversion of science or theory follows: theory becomes an inquiry. (PI 35)

Notice this empiricism, for Deleuze, describes a “seemingly fictive world.” This should remind you of comments made by both Aristotle and Kant. As Aristotle clearly points out, an assumption is not synonymous with a “lie.” Whereas “lie” tends to indicate the failure of an assumption, thinking about experience nonetheless requires assumptions. Hence, on the one hand, the failure of an assumption means the shift to a different assumption. On the other hand, the assumptive nature of dialectical and demonstrative beginning for Aristotle allows Deleuze to refer to the experiential “world” as fictional. Kant’s way of suggesting as much was to refer to the non-discursive as excessive in relation to the conceptual apparatuses which attempt to identify it.

Recalling my comments, then, in the “Copernican Revolution” section from Chapter 2, Deleuze, of this empiricism, concludes, “The result is a great conversion of theory to practice.” (PI 36) Following Hume and functioning as a sort of mid-wife Deleuze asks the following questions:

To establish possession of an abandoned city, does a javelin thrown against the door suffice, or must the door be

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touched by a finger? To what extent can we be owners of the seas? Why is the ground more important than the surface in a juridical system, whereas in painting, the paint is more important than the canvas? (PI 36)

Deleuze concludes, “It is only then that the problem of the association of ideas discovers its meaning.” (PI 36) And, for Deleuze, “What is called the theory of association finds its direction and its truth in a casuistry of relations.” (PI 36) This charge of a “casuistry of relations” – like agreement among language users which establishes Saussure’s “stacked deck” – points back to the identity of the world as “fictive.” Pointing to the anthropomorphic determination of relations, which subsequently gets considered “natural” through a process of association, Deleuze highlights the excessivity of experience. In other words, multiplicity should be thought over “natural” unity in regard to experience since the determination of things and of relations among things is never the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

As such a description of the experiential world emphasizes, one cannot expect to refer to experience, i.e. provide a description of “the world,” in an exhaustive way. The principle to be drawn here is that what is at work in “experience” produces the things and relations which conceptual identification further limits. Deleuze’s emphasis on the assumptive fictive nature of conceptuality is an attempt to highlight conceptual identification as necessarily open ended. This insight finds its metaphysical expression in Deleuze’s idea of an abyss with differences noted above. This is different than Derrida’s account because Deleuze – as affirming Kantian non-discursivity – is able to think of an experiential abyss as excessively overflowing, and thereby as positive. The difference

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523 I return to and focus on this issue by the end of the dissertation. Suffice to say for now that I am not making an absurd claim like water is not water, etc. Rather, I am rehearsing Deleuze’s version of Kant’s reading of non-discursivity.
being that, *despite the fictive character*, Deleuze is able to further describe the multiplicity involved in his transcendental empiricism noting,

> There is something wild and powerful in this transcendental empiricism that is of course not the element of sensation (simple empiricism), for sensation is only a break within the flow of absolute consciousness. It is, rather, however close two sensations may be, the passage from one to the other as becoming, as increase or decrease in power (virtual quantity). (PI 25)

It would be as if to view such wild multiplicity stereoscopic mind with its discursive categories should become kaleidoscopic mind so as to not privilege the fiction over the very force which it seeks to describe. Perhaps such a becoming in the mind might verge upon a correspondence to the ontogenesis, i.e. experiential becoming, upon which conceptuality rides. In lieu of such a kaleidoscopic conversion, Deleuze – as indicated by the last two words of the above quote – resorts to the term “virtual.” Since one cannot expect to refer to experience or the world in an exhaustive way, virtual is both the qualifier describing these powers devoid of discursive domestication, and the term for Deleuze’s anticipatory mental mechanism regulating the identification of things.

A conversion of theory into practice, then, for Deleuze treats the two terms “theory” and “practice” as always already mutually informing one another. In the course of explication the relation between Deleuze’s thought and Kant’s three-fold synthesis of imagination becomes clear. At this point, notice for Deleuze: judgments made about the world entail making judgments about judgments already made. It is as if experience has judged, conceptuality has judged, and Deleuze is advocating not so much for a different judgment as he is for the fact that you have the *capacity* to judge differently. Recall Kant does not deny a subliminal, i.e. prior to conceptual, limiting process of experience. Rather, Kant further acknowledges it by calling it “blind” – think of the “blindness
thesis” from the *Critique of Pure Reason*. With Sigmund Freud in the interim, Deleuze refers to such a process as “unconscious.” And, as it is unconscious, as we are blind to it, each thing has already been determined through what retrospectively – given Deleuze’s emphasis on the excessivity of non-discursive experience – must be a casuistical categorical judgment. What is supposed to be *all of* x such that x is defined by some function f(x), necessarily limits x in ways which not logic, but blind minds determine – in other words: blind, unconscious, or habitual processes. Hence, consistent with Kant’s structure of *experience*, logic works out the relations upon the culmination (=x) of a blind limiting process which leads to identification.

Attempting to reference things as dynamic, i.e. without a static identity, Deleuze describes a “Harlequin world” of *experience* through disjunctive judgments. Though inclusive – this or this or this – disjunctive judgments are also limiting because they take associations to be determined relations. In other words, whatever you determine x to be, in the determination you must limit the potentiality of x, so attempting to explain the dynamic state of x prior to identification, you cannot access the potentiality by thinking the relation between x and the potential to be x through the idea of privation. Privation merely directs you back “down” the categorical judgment which determined x. It does not access the potentiality as potentiality. It is casuistical reasoning that thinks the potential which was limited in deriving x may be accessed by a return from x. Whereas Deleuze’s disjunctive judgments function as corrective by reminding you that categorical judgments contingently – if it helps, think contingent because contextual – limit potentiality, forming a disjunctive set of judgments does not solve the problem of how to translate the potentiality involved in the genesis of x into discursivity. One way to make
the attempt is to note that the difference between “this is x” and “this can be x or y or z,” is not the most original designation of difference in the disjunctive series attempting to describe the potentiality generating – and passing through – x or y or z, etc.

Notice this is Deleuze’s re-writing of Kant’s avowal of the inability to use discursivity to describe the non-discursive. Judging a perception, the appearance may be determined as different objects of experience, e.g. “this is Socrates” or “this is the gadfly of Athens” or “this is Plato’s teacher,” or “this is the torpedo fish/midwife,” etc.524 Hence, reflecting upon the “this” regressively from what I might call the disjunctivity of appearance produces ideas – in the (broadly designated) understanding – which in turn fall short of exhausting the “this,” i.e. the harlequin world of experience. You might like to think the “this” is “Socrates,” but “Socrates” is merely one determination of the “this.” So regressing back to the “this-in-itself,” so to speak, one must regress back from all the determinations, not just one. Whereas the determinations are disjunctive, the ideas produced from such a regression are conjunctive. Suddenly the “this” is pronounced multiple: “this” is “Socrates” and “the gadfly of Athens,” and, etc. Notice, still the ideas must fall short of telling the whole story of the “this-in-itself.” Further, this mimics Kant’s rendition of non-discursivity. What is more, as indicated at the beginning of the current section, this is Deleuze’s re-opening of discursivity in Hegel’s wake.

In fact, this is what Deleuze means in making a technical matter of “learning.” According to Deleuze, you non-discursively encounter problems in the context, i.e. environment. For example, consider the problem of the motion of the ocean as you learn how to swim in it. (Cf. D&R 165 and 192) Different Ideas result from the non-discursive

524 Though for simplicity sake in this example I allow the determination of at least “Socrates” out of the environment in which he is experienced, I could, of course, include various aspects of the environment as well – all toward indicating your capacity to judge differently.
intense encounters in the water. Hence, it is as if the forces involved in the learning process developed the idea you now have of how to swim in the ocean. This links with the above paragraph by noting: you develop an Idea of “Socrates” through your encounter(s). Moreover, the fact that these Ideas can evolve indicates their open-endedness.

Though Deleuze’s explanation of the process involved in identifying an experience regrettably invokes a notion of “consciousness,” the logic of his argument is still quite tenable. Hence, the terminology Deleuze invokes to formulate his argument fits into a dialectical movement. Deleuze contends “relations are external and heterogeneous to their terms” whether these terms be “impressions or ideas.” (PI 37-38) As such the “real empiricist world” “is a world of exteriority, a world in which thought itself exists in a fundamental relationship with the Outside.” (PI 38) Considering the relation, then, between the world exterior to consciousness and the world interior to consciousness, Deleuze explains exteriority as “a world in which the conjunction ‘and’ dethrones the verb ‘is’; a harlequin world of multicolored patterns and non-totalizable fragments.” (PI 38) Notice, Deleuze is not suggesting he can exhaustively describe intensity – the discursive and the non-discursive remain heterogeneous. The Deleuzian starting point to dialectic will affirm the difference in a fundamental relationship with exteriority by allowing an open ended discursive concept as regulative to affirm the “Outside” as initiating the dialectic. Recall that transcendental empiricism holds the conditions for the generation of the non-discursive force to originate in experience. Deleuzian dialectic will affirm the link between first and last moments, between
experience and ideas, but Deleuze does not want a discursive last moment to eliminate the non-discursivity of the other (à la Hegel).

The discussion of transcendental empiricism in this section, then, should provide the wider context in which to understand the following section which explicitly compares Deleuze with Kant. Further, you should now understand the general mechanism involved in Deleuze’s enunciation of pure difference. For example, you should understand Deleuze’s inclusive “or” between “the pure concept [le concept pur de la différence]” of difference and the “Idea [l’Idee]” of difference. The pure concept of difference is the Idea of difference, i.e. ἔναντιον; it is not functioning to determine the difference between forms – ἐλαλίναντιον. Now then, since “looking through” such an idea for Deleuze reveals the very fractal simulacral character of pure difference recurring through experience, the pure concept of pure difference as a regulative idea is supposed to refer to the expressive ontogenetic surge of intensity flowing in experience. This intensity is, of course, non-discursive. Hence, that to which this pure concept of difference is supposed to refer, as purely different, is pure difference. (Cf. D&R 222)

Deleuze’s Structure and Trajectory of Experience

“In Oklahoma, Bonnie and Josie, Dressed in calico, Danced around a stump. They cried, ‘Ohoyaho, Ohoo’ … Celebrating the marriage Of flesh and air.”
~Wallace Stevens, Life Is Motion

The purpose for this section of the chapter is to show Deleuze’s structure and trajectory of experience. This is valuable because moving from a schematic

representation of Deleuze’s structure and trajectory of experience I am able to regressively focus in, as it were, on Deleuze’s discussion of the ground of experience. So, though it is not as simple as merely replacing Kant’s name with that of Deleuze’s, noting the structural similarities between Kant and Deleuze has become a hallmark of Deleuze scholarship.\(^{526}\) To begin, then, recalling the constitutive regulative distinction noted above,

As early as his first book, *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, Deleuze rejects the idea of total unities, and works to analyze how things which are practically speaking unified – like human being, societies and ideas of God and the world – come to be so.\(^{527}\) So, where in Kant’s structure of experience has Deleuze discovered an opening for pure difference? Pure difference as a pure concept of difference is open as a regulative idea, and pure difference as the non-discursive fractal simulacral power seen by “looking through” pure difference as a concept is pure difference as an open version of the thing-in-itself. (D&R 222) Hence, whereas Daniel W. Smith’s celebrated claim “From the viewpoint of the theory of Ideas, *Difference and Repetition* can be read as Deleuze’s *Critique of Pure Reason*,”\(^{528}\) speaks to the first opening, I will examine the second opening in this section of the chapter.

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Whereas Kant’s Category of Quantity regards plurality, i.e. “magnitude,” (CPR 1998, A 166/B 207) as pertaining to extensive quantity, Deleuze is concerned to discuss plurality as intensive quantity. The question to ask, then, is: What might such plurality as intensive quantity look like in Kant’s structure of experience? Since Kant’s system does not have a concept of intensive quantity, Deleuze must create a concept for it. This concept is the concept of pure difference. In order to learn Deleuze’s concept, it is important to discuss Kant’s structure of experience from Deleuze’s point of view. Fortunately, and perhaps surprisingly, Kant had already gestured toward the project. According to Kant, “In all appearances the real that is an object of sensation has intensive magnitude, i.e. a degree [Kant’s emphases]. [In allen Erscheinungen hat das Reale, was ein Gegenstand der Empfindung ist, intensive Grösse, d.i. einen Grad.]”

(CPR A 166/B 207) Strikingly, in Prolegomena §24, Kant refers to this very intensity as “a difference [ein Unterschied] that has a magnitude.” (Proleg 58) In fact, it is clear that Kant contrasts intensive with extensive magnitudes: “the real does have a magnitude, but not an extensive one.” (CPR 1996, A 168/ B 210) What is more, Kant suggests intensive “magnitudes may also be called flowing [fließende] magnitudes [Kant’s emphasis].”

(CPR 1996, A 170/B 211)

It is in Kant’s discussion, then, of freedom and the individual being as free that he makes a connection between intensive being and the thing-in-itself. According to Kant, “Only two kinds of causality can be conceived in regard to what occurs, viz. either a

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529 Cf. J.A. Smith, “Is There a Mathematics of Intensity? Multum non multa,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 18, (1917), 121-137; I believe I am the first person to discuss this in the literature, i.e. I have yet to find anyone else who discusses this aspect of the relation between the Critique of Pure Reason and Difference & Repetition. Hence, we must fault Faulkner for suggesting Kant “overlooks” intensive magnitude. Cf. Keith W. Faulkner, Deleuze and the Three Syntheses of Time, (New York: Peter Lang, 2006), 15.
causality according to *nature* or one from *freedom*”; and, Kant clarifies that by “freedom” “in the cosmological sense of the term, I mean the power to begin a state *on one’s own* [Kant’s emphases].” (CPR 1996, A 533/B 561) Further, “regarding such a subject’s power we would frame an empirical as well as an intellectual concept of its causality, these concepts occurring together in one and the same effect.” (CPR 1996, A 538/B 566)

Hence, *Kant makes the same claims that Deleuze will later make in regard to what is dynamic in experience and found along with appearances.*

That is, the extensive pertains to the faculty of understanding, and the intensive pertains to reason. (Cf. CPR 1996, A 531/B 559) Hearkening back to Aristotle Kant suggests “Any efficient cause” will have a “character,” and “in a subject of the world of sense [*Subjekte der Sinnenwelt*] we would have, first an *empirical* character [empirischen *Charakter*] … [second] an *intelligible* character [intelligibelen *Charakter*; Kant’s emphases].” (CPR 1996, A 539/B 567) In regard to this “subject of the world of sense,” whereas the first character is to be associated with intensity, the second character is to be associated with extensity.530 Finally, Kant makes clear that in regard to the world of sense, “The first character could also be called the character of such a thing in appearance, the second the character of the thing-in-itself [*den Charakter des Dinges an sich selbst*].” (CPR 1996, A 539/B 567) Hence, since Kant holds that “if appearances are things in themselves, then freedom cannot be saved” (CPR 1996, A 536/ B 564), a three term relation emerges: the thing-in-itself, intensity, and freedom at once both dynamic and pertaining to the “subject of the world of sense.” (Cf. CPR 1996, B xxvii-xxviii)

Synonymous with this statement Deleuze maintains that “Difference is not phenomenon

530 Don’t forget we are post Kant’s Copernican revolution here.
but the noumenon closest to the phenomenon.” (D&R 222) The above comments should prove helpful as you move through Deleuze’s structure of experience.

The Table of Contents from *Difference & Repetition* is a good place to start this comparison, then, between Kant’s and Deleuze’s structure of experience. Consider Figure 5.2.

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<tr>
<td>Chapter 2</td>
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<td>Chapter 3</td>
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<td>Chapter 4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chapter 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notice the TOC begins and ends with repetition. Considering the endpoints of the TOC – the Introduction and the Conclusion – illustrates the change which traversing the structure is supposed to perform – from repetition and difference to difference and repetition. Yet, the structure itself begins with difference (-) in (-) itself. Recall the thing-in-itself begins Kant’s structure of experience, and yet, you are not to think the structure as such – you do not notice the thing-in-itself – until you are able to ( regressively) look back across the structure. So, the treatise starts with repetition, the structure starts with difference, and by the end of the treatise you can think of difference as antecedent to repetition. This is further supported by noticing the place of imagination in the TOC.

Given the place at which the “Image” of thought appears, continuing the comparison with Kant’s structure of experience, you might assume difference in itself and repetition for itself respectively indicate the intuitions of space and time. However, this is not the case. Rather, the relation between difference in itself and repetition in itself follows Aristotle’s apparatus for indicating the *hypokeimenon* (ὑποκείμενον). To be

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clear, what I am suggesting is that the logic, i.e. the method, for deriving difference in itself follows that employed by Aristotle. Consider the explanation Deleuze offers prior to beginning his treatise,

Two lines of research lie at the origin [l’origine] of this book: one concerns a concept of difference without negation [un concept la différence sans négation] … the other concerns a concept of repetition in which physical, mechanical or naked [nues] repetitions (repetition of the Same) would find their raison d’être in the more profound structures of a hidden repetition in which a ‘differential’ is disguised and displaced. These two lines of research spontaneously came together, because on every occasion these concepts of a pure difference and a complex repetition [ces concepts d’une différence pure et d’une répétition complexe] seemed to connect and coalesce [Deleuze’s emphasis].

Note that this is the first of five (5) times the term “pure difference” (D&R xx, 42, 60, 125, and 144) appears in Difference & Repetition – it occurs only once in The Logic of Sense. (LOS 289) The double entendre involved here, of course, is that Deleuze is already implementing his thought regarding divergent series – “two lines … which spontaneously came together” – in regard to origination. As I have already discussed pure difference as a pure concept above, I will continue to focus on pure difference as an open dynamic version of the thing-in-itself. Now then, the revelation of this other difference – pure difference – is tied up with repetition. As Deleuze noted, this repetition is “complex.” What he means by this is that the repetition is twofold, and these two repetitions are opposed to one another. Hence, from two opposed terms, so to speak, Deleuze derives the underlying subject of “pure difference.” “Difference lies between two repetitions [Deleuze’s emphasis].” (Cf. D&R 76) This is the difference which –

531 Translation modified, i.e. I substituted “naked” for “nues.”
though disguised by repetition – initiates Deleuze’s structure of experience. Pure difference is (the) difference (-) in (-) itself. (Cf. D&R 125 and 144)\textsuperscript{532}

Pure difference is the “hidden differential;” it is “disguised and displaced;” (D&R xx) and, it is located prior to imagination in Deleuze’s structure of experience. In this way Deleuze indicates the difference internal to the images which appear to be perceptual catalysts for the dialectic. “All identities are only simulated, produced as an optical ‘effect’ by the more profound game of difference and repetition.” (D&R xix) As regards these “simulated identities,” “In simulacra, repetition already plays upon repetitions, and difference already plays upon differences.” (D&R xix) This “play” which is located in the ground of experience, accounts for the flowing intensity of animation.

Now, it seems to me there are two ways that Deleuze can justify such a structure in which non-discursivity is supposed to inhere, and he need not distinguish between them. On the one hand, he could consider the first difference as the third in a descending line of four terms and suppose the fourth term to refer to the non-discursive “term” pure difference. To do so would be like Aristotle’s use of analogy, but in regard to the intensive. On the other hand, he could just arrive at Difference in itself by thinking of it as indicated by the (disguised) repetition of the complex repetition thought as Repetition for itself. In either case you get Difference in itself by itself, as it were, and the

unraveling of the simulacrum – discussed in the first section of this chapter – can be considered to indicate the sensational power flowing through perception. In this way, rejecting the idea of total unities, an open idea of flowing pure difference replaces the thing-in-itself.

Consider that, according to Deleuze, “The privilege of sensibility as origin appears in the fact that, in an encounter, what forces sensation and that which can only be sensed are one and the same thing, whereas in other cases the two instances are distinct.” (D&R 145) This distinction is precisely the difference between the starting points of dialectic. So, despite the non-discursivity of the force of pure difference, Deleuze takes phase changes in experience to be so much supportive evidence for the persistence of force – signs of a flowing path of force, i.e. along the trajectory of experience. The sensational force of pure difference is the perceptual catalyst, i.e. the experiential starting point, to the dialectic. As experiential, this relates to Deleuze’s discussion of Kant’s threefold synthesis of imagination – the trajectory of experience from the thing-in-itself through sensibility and imagination en route to the understanding.

To finish with the discussion of Deleuze’s TOC: Chapters 1 and 2 of Difference & Repetition pertain to Kant’s discussion of apprehension; Chapter 3 pertains to Kant’s discussion of – the second fold of imagination’s threefold synthesis – reproduction in imagination; Chapter 4 – with its “Ideal synthesis” pertains to recognition in a concept; and, lastly, Chapter 5 points to an asymmetrical synthesis that pertains in general to Kant’s distinction between constitutive and regulative ideas in the Critique of Pure Reason, and in particular to reflective judgment in the Critique of the Power of Judgment. The movement in Kant’s case goes from the repeated application of the structure of
experience to the thing-in-itself, and thereby producing different objects of experience. The movement in Deleuze’s case considers non-discursive pure difference to be prior to the structure which repeatedly marks its movement – the difference between the Introduction and the Conclusion of *Difference & Repetition*.

I begin here a consideration of what may be called: Deleuze and the Standpoints of Architectonic. Now then, Deleuze following Leibniz’s influence on Kant also thinks of various standpoints – points of view with different perspectives – along the trajectory of experience. Recall that in my chapter on Kant I indicated three standpoints in regard to Kant’s structure of experience: the experiential, the apperceptive, and the conceptual. In so far as the conceptual pertained to what Kant calls “the understanding broadly designated,” Deleuze maintains each of the standpoints I already enumerated and includes another. Deleuze’s fourth standpoint is that of Reason, in particular the Ideas of Reason. (Cf. KCP 51) So, as you can see, this fourth standpoint may be arrived at by merely considering Kant’s third conceptual standpoint as pertaining to the understanding not broadly, i.e. narrowly, designated and adding a standpoint to account for that which the narrowing subtracted out. This distinction between the third and fourth standpoints, then, is analogous to the distinction between constitutive and regulative Ideas in Kant.

Deleuze following Spinoza thinks of these standpoints along an expressive continuum. In other words, the trajectory of experience traverses the standpoints of the structure of experience dependent upon the intensity of power or the force in question. As univocal expressions of being, these forces indicate the power of which they are an expression dependent upon the standpoint they are capable of reaching. In this way, pure difference as the force animating the structure of experience may find its idea in the
fourth standpoint if it is capable of surpassing the other standpoints. In surpassing the other standpoints, the force awakens the standpoint of regulative ideas, and sees itself in the concept it created. As Deleuze puts it, “We become completely expressive [Deleuze’s emphases].”\textsuperscript{533} In order to accomplish this, the second and third standpoints must both be overcome. Overcoming these standpoints respectively amounts to overcoming both the “death of man” and the “death of God.” I will pick this thread back up below in discussing Deleuze’s reading of the Eternal Return.\textsuperscript{534}

This is why Deleuze, in \textit{Difference & Repetition}, says, “There is a beatitude associated with passive synthesis, and we are all Narcissus.” (D&R 74) Recall passive synthesis in Kant’s structure of experience pertains to the synthesis of apprehension. Recall further, the thing-in-itself is prior to the synthesis of apprehension in Kant’s structure of experience. Thinking of the thing-in-itself as productive, Deleuze has replaced the thing-in-itself with pure difference. This pure difference is the intensive force located in the ground of each individual being. Deleuze’s construction here runs parallel with Aristotle by thinking individual beings as related univocally, (Cf. EP 37) i.e. related by way of focal meaning, to \textit{being}. Deleuze, then, thinks of the Idea of Difference, ἐτεῖπον, as the pure concept of pure difference, and pure difference as the intense being of individual beings expressing being as expressions of being. Notice, this is Deleuze’s version of “looking through” an Idea. Moreover, you further see the relevance of the fractal simulacral character of pure difference now: as a singularity, its trail connects each individual being with being. It traverses the heterogeneity otherwise found in the \textit{problem} of ontological difference. Hence, looking to the passive synthesis

\textsuperscript{533} Gilles Deleuze, \textit{Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza}, Martin Joughin, tr. (New York: Zone Books, 1990), 315. Hereafter cited as EP.

of apprehension by looking though the regulative Idea pertaining to beyond apprehension
“we are all Narcissus” gazing at ourselves and over the fractal simulastral bridge of
ontological difference – beatitude.

Despite four standpoints, Deleuze will speak of – what amounts to – three phases
in the traversing of the structure of experience. These three phases correspond to activity
along the trajectory of experience, i.e. to the three active syntheses, of the imagination,
understanding, and reason. Put another way, Deleuze takes the overcoming of each of
the original powers to extensively be productive of a mode of representation or
knowledge and intensively to be productive of a mode of existing. Recall Kant’s three
original powers (transcendental faculties). According to Kant there are

three original sources (capacities or faculties [or powers] of
the soul), which contain the conditions of the possibility of
all experience, and cannot themselves be derived from any
other faculty [or power] of the mind, namely sense,
imagination, and apperception [Kant’s emphasis]. (CPR
1996, A 94/B 127)

First, at the level of apprehension Deleuze encounters sense to be productive of affects.
Second, traversing Kant’s threefold synthesis of imagination, the product of imagination
is the =x. Recall, the =x, whether subjective or objective, marks the spot of the narrowly
designated understanding in Kant’s structure of experience. So, Deleuze’s third phase
pertains to the overcoming of the narrowly designated understanding – movement from
the third standpoint to the fourth. Overcoming the standpoint of the narrowly designated
understanding, then, the animating force creates the concept – as regulative Idea – of
itself and enters into the third phase of the Eternal Return. This may be pictured in the
imagery of overcoming life so as to eat from the tree of eternal life.\footnote{There is life in each phase. Yet, pushing beyond all these phases of life, you yourself become the fountain of life – the abyss is staring into itself.}

Hence, the
epigenesis of knowledge and existence may be parsed into parallel phases of ontogenesis. Overcoming the standpoint of the understanding in the ontogenesis and the form of the same in the epigenesis, the becoming being – the being which is becoming – enters into a relation of (eternal) recurrence with itself.

In order to make sense of this recurrence: along the trajectory of Kant’s structure of experience, Deleuze assigns “different kinds of knowledge,” “different ways of living, different modes of existing” (EP 289) to each of these phases of ontogenesis. In a passage worth quoting at length, Deleuze declares:

The first kind of knowledge has as its object only encounters between parts of bodies, seen in terms of their extrinsic determinations. The second kind rises to the compositions of characteristic relations. But the third kind alone relates to eternal essences: the knowledge of God’s essence, of particular essences as they are in God, and as conceived by God. (We thus rediscover in the three kinds of knowledge the three aspects of the order of nature: [1] the order of passions, [2] that of the composition of relations and [3] that of essences themselves. (EP 303)

Deleuze indicates the first kind pertains to “imagination” and “passive affections.” (EP 289) The second kind pertains to a “constitutive state” of reason or “of understanding.” (EP 290-291 and cf. EP 296) Finally, the third pertains to the next state of reason where “God’s existence is thus known to him through itself.” (EP 301) As I noted above, difference bridges any heterogeneity in the ontological difference by being the bridge of heterogeneity. This is the pure concept of pure difference; this is Difference in itself; this is “looking through” ἐπεμορ or gazing into an abyss with differences. Hence, “in the third kind of knowledge the idea of God is, in its turn, the material cause of all ideas.” (EP 305) Recall Figure 5.1, in regard to intensity and the form of the Different the final cause and the material cause enter into a loop with one another. This is the major difference
between Kant and Deleuze, Deleuze shifts the placement of the *alētheatic* \(^{536}\) operator in of the structure of experience from apperception (in Kant) to the becoming active being’s intensive loop.

Put into more Kantian language: Though you cannot understand the thing-in-itself, you can think it with a regulative Idea. In this same way, moving through the phases you do not *return* to the ground of the force expressing the phases along the trajectory until you arrive at the third phase and think the groundlessness of the ground. This return is the Eternal Return, and it is not the “mythic circle” of the return of the Same. The Eternal Return is the return of the different as the (regulative) Idea of (the) Difference (-) in (-) itself. This is supposed to be the height of a looping trajectory. Now you might want to object that the Idea is *different* from the force of difference of which it is supposed to be an Idea. Yet, by pertaining to the form of the Different and not the form of the Same – ἐπερον not ὑπαντον –, the difference between the Idea of difference and the force of difference is a productive bridging heterogeneity. It is not an identical difference derived from negation. In regard to the fractal simulacral,

What is different from difference can be difference in itself, since difference in itself is different from itself. So, the Idea of Difference in itself is different from difference; and, Deleuze’s thing-in-itself, according to the form of the Different, enters into a recursive loop with itself. This will have interesting ramifications for the thing-in-itself as a solution to the problem of non-being.

Deleuze retains within his philosophy *my favorite* concept from psychoanalysis, and this concept will help bridge the final gap needed before comparing Kant’s and Deleuze’s structure of experience. That concept is the concept of “cathexis.”

\(^{536}\) Apparently, the term “Alethic” has already been appropriated into a linguistic context.
was birthed into philosophical vocabulary by James Strachey (1887-1967), whom you should recall as providing the English speaking world with Sigmund Freud’s work in translation. In order to translate Freud’s use of the German word “Besetzung,” Strachey used the Ancient Greek κάθεξις, i.e. cathexis, meaning to “hold,” “restrain,” or “retain,” as in the sense of “holding your bladder.” Here is Freud’s German:

Wir bilden so die Vorstellung einer ursprünglichen Libidobesetzung des Ichs, von der später an die Objekte abgegeben wird, die aber, im Grunde genommen, verbleibt und sich zu den Objekt-besetzungen verhält wie der Körper eines Protoplastmatierchens zu den von ihm augesichichten Pseudopodien [my emphases].

And here is Strachey’s translation:

Thus we form the idea of there being an original libidinal cathexis of the ego, from which some is later given off to objects, but which fundamentally persists and is related to the object-cathexis much as the body of an amoeba is related to the pseudopodia which puts it out [my emphases].

The value of this concept in the context of Deleuze’s philosophy regards the pseudopodic movement by way of contraction and extension. Yet, all you really need to know about “pseudopodia” in this context is that it refers to the contraction-extension movement mechanism of an amoeba. Pseudopodia, meaning “false feet,” is used here to capture the fact that the contracting and expanding moves the amoeba as though it reached out with feet and walked – though more like a rhythmic pulling itself along than a scuttling.

537 Liddell and Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, 852; Strachey should be commended because his choice of Greek nicely links with Aristotle’s notion of incontinence from the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book VII.


You can think of this rhythmic movement of contraction and extension physically, virtually, i.e. mathematically, or metaphysically.\(^{540}\) Interestingly these ways of thinking about the movements coincide with ways of reading Freud’s noun form \textit{die Besetzung} or the verb form \textit{besetzen}. Physically the verb \textit{besetzen} means “to occupy” physical space; virtually it means “to fill” a virtual structure, and metaphysically it means to psychically charge a territory with intensity. If it helps you to recognize the difference between the physical and the metaphysical, think of the duo as analogous to the literal metaphorical distinction here. Given that the ontogenetic movement of intensity passes through these points on its way to discovering its Idea of itself, it is possible to construct a graphic illustration. To create the following series of figures, I combined three of Deleuze’s graphics together with one from Henri Bergson for the sake of illustrating a direct comparison with Kant’s structure and trajectory of experience. I begin the series with Figure 5.3.

\footnotesize{\cite{del}}

\footnotesize{\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{c}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\node (S) at (0,0) {S};
\node (A) at (3.5,3) {A};
\node (A') at (3.5,2) {A'};
\node (B) at (5.5,3) {B};
\node (B') at (5.5,2) {B'};
\node (B'') at (4.5,1) {B''};
\node (B') at (4.5,0) {B'};
\node (B'') at (3.5,0) {B''};
\node (P) at (0,2) {P};
\end{tikzpicture}
\caption{Bergson’s Memory Cone (turned on its side)}
\end{tabular}
\end{center}}

\footnotesize{\(^{540}\) Cf. Gilles Deleuze, \textit{The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque}, Tom Conley, tr., (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 23.}
As you can see, Figure 5.3 provides an illustration of Henri Bergson’s “memory cone” turned on its side. The labels being as follows: P stands for the plane of action; S stands for the contraction of singularities; the various AB combinations as virtual levels along a trajectory of actualization. As Bergson put it,

> between the sensori-motor mechanisms figured by the point S and the totality of the memories disposed in AB there is room … for a thousand repetitions of our psychical life, figured by as many sections A'B',A"B", etc., of the same cone. We tend to scatter ourselves over AB in the measure that we detach ourselves from our sensory and motor state to live in the life of dreams; we tend to concentrate ourselves in S in the measure that we attach ourselves more firmly to the present reality.

Given Bergson’s description, you can see why the graphic is referred to as Bergson’s “memory cone.” That is, the cone illustrates the presence of memory, and as memory, it is the presence of the past. To consider these various AB plateaus of actualization, then, and S as the point of sensory motor contraction, is to notice the relation between Bergson’s memory cone and Kant’s structure of experience. Such is my general strategy for moving through the series of illustrations. At this point, I would like to use Figure 5.3 to discuss Deleuze’s distinction between extensity and intensity.

According to Deleuze, “intensity is an implicated, enveloped or ‘embryonized’ quantity.” (D&R 237) “Within intensity, we call that which is really implicated and enveloping difference; and we call that which is really implicated or enveloped distance [Deleuze’s emphases].” (D&R 237) This distance, then, can be illustrated as distance from S in Bergson’s memory cone to the AB plateau. Now, since an “intensive quantity

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may be divided, but not without changing its nature,” “the acceleration or deceleration of [forced] movement defines within it intensive parts.” (D&R 237) Hence,

difference in depth is composed of distances, ‘distance’ being not an extensive quantity but an indivisible asymmetrical relation, ordinal and intensive in character, which is established between series of heterogeneous terms and expresses at each moment the nature of that which does not divide without changing its nature. (D&R 237-238)

How might this be a description of Figure 5.3? The terms AB indicate extensities along an intensive trajectory; each section (moving left to right in Figure 5.3) between plateaus, for example the distance between A'B'' and A'B', may be thought of as an intensive part of the trajectory. The distinction between extensity and intensity is the distinction between, on the one hand, up and down and, on the other hand, left to right in Figure 5.3.

Notice, then, the memory cone illustrates a contraction (S) expansion which draws intensity into the structure of experience where it derives its explicit identity through an association with extensity. This is quite similar to the notion of cathexis, i.e. intensity and extensity are coupled together along a trajectory which traverses the structure of experience in a manner dependent upon the power of the involved intensity. “[E]xtension being precisely the process by which intensive difference is turned inside out and distributed in such a way to be dispelled, compensated, equalized and suppressed in the extensity which it creates.” (D&R 233) In fact, I think of the three levels – the three repetitions – shown on the memory cone as the levels of Quantity, Quality, and Idea. (D&R 239) In this way Bergson’s memory cone and Deleuze’s structure of experience provide a mechanism to compare Deleuze’s intensive dialectic of pure difference with the graphic I originated regarding Hegel’s shell game. Hence, what was
the undifferentiated starting point in Hegel is now the differentiated as intensive abyss of Difference starting point in Deleuze.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level 1 – Quantity</th>
<th>Abyss with Differences</th>
<th>Idea of Pure Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level 2 – Quality</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>ψ</th>
<th>θ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Figure 5.4

On the one hand, the entire next section of the chapter may be read as expounding upon Figure 5.4. On the other hand, and what is sufficient for you to grasp at this point: whereas Hegel’s dialectic illustrates a version of what Deleuze might call an extensive version of dialectic, Deleuze’s dialectic illustrates an intensive version. (D&R 232)

The major claim illustrated by Figure 5.4 being that the difference supposed to be internal to the first moment of dialectic – the contemporary French critique of Hegel’s dialectic – traverses the dialectic and returns to itself. It is as if Deleuze accuses Hegel of conflating the dialectic of Sameness – of extensity – with the dialectic of Difference – of intensity – upon which it is actually parasitic. Recall from the Deleuze quote in the above paragraph, intensity creates extensity. Hence, Deleuze’s dialectic begins with non-discursivity, as intensity, i.e. non-discursive intensity, and culminates in an open Idea of Difference; ἑξεξνλ instead of ἐλαλείνλ, it is as if Deleuze has reverse engineered “looking through” the Idea of Difference. This difference which permeates the intensive dialectic is pure difference.

543 Cf. Chapter 3.
Consider Deleuze’s distinction between differentiation and differenciation or different/ciation with regard to Figure 5.3. (Cf. D&R 279) Whereas differentiation pertains to the difference between each A and B, the difference of distance from S through the AB levels to the top of the cone (far right in Figure 5.3) is differenciation. In fact differen/ciation links with the virtual actual distinction: “Virtuality exists in such a way that it actualizes itself as it dissociates itself; it must dissociate itself to actualize itself. Differentiation is the movement of a virtuality actualizing itself.” (DI 40) Further in “Bergson’s Conception of Difference,” Deleuze notes, “Differentiation certainly comes from the resistance life encounters from matter, but it comes first and foremost from the explosive internal force which life carries within itself [my emphases].” (DI 40) In order to help illustrate this point, I have added the labels of Bergson’s memory cone to Deleuze’s “Diagram of Differentiation.” In this way, think of Deleuze’s summary diagram as embedded within the above cone. Hence, the combination should capture the embedded branching aspect of Deleuze’s structure and trajectory of experience.

Figure 5.5, then, provides a good illustration of the development of an “embryonized” or “enveloped” difference of intensity as it actualizes itself along a trajectory. Also Figure 5.5 provides textual evidence for the dialectical movement linking first and last moments into a loop – as seen in Figure 5.4. For example, notice that the bottom right hand corner (also consistent with the left to right movement of Figure 5.3) of Figure 5.5 indicates the “understanding of life,” and it is “Life” which – just beyond the S – indicates the beginning of a line which ends with an Idea of itself.

Finally, Figures 5.3 through 5.5 should help you understand Figure 5.6 as a direct comparison between Kant’s and Deleuze’s structure of experience.

Recall the words of the late President of the French Society for Philosophy Jean Wahl (1888-1974) announcing the beginning of the question answer section of Deleuze’s “Method of Dramatization” presentation: “I’m not going to say system, but an attempt to peer through the lens of differentiation, understood as twofold, giving us a world
I created Figure 5.5, then, by combining (Figure 5.3) Bergson’s memory cone (M&M 211) (Cf. Berg 60) with Deleuze’s “Summary Diagram of Differentiation” (Berg 102) found in his book on Bergson. In fact, it is with such an upward – as opposed to the downward movement of genus and species – branching movement which Deleuze will use as support for his solution to the problem of non-being. Of course, the branching Deleuze’s graphic illustrates begin with intuition. This claim finds its support in Deleuze’s discussion of intuition as method for Bergson. According to Deleuze, “Thus intuition does form a method with its three (or five) rules. This is an essentially problematizing method (a critique of false problems and the invention of genuine ones), differentiating (carvings out and intersections), temporalizing (thinking in terms of duration) [Deleuze’s emphases].” (Berg 35) Lastly, in noting the “two fundamental characteristics of duration; continuity and heterogeneity,” Deleuze further supports the reading I gave above regarding difference as bridging the ontological difference, i.e. duration as the continuity of heterogeneity. The last section of this chapter will address Deleuze and the problem of non-being directly. Here, then, I will culminate a comparison between Kant’s and Deleuze’s structure of experience with Figure 5.6.

As you can see, I took Deleuze’s graphic of the “Baroque House”  and turned it on its side – just as I did Bergson’s memory cone in Figure 5.3. (Cf. Berg 35) The following, then, is the key for Figure 5.6: (1) Differential elements within the Idea of Difference, i.e. singular points, which coupling and resonating force singular movements upward along the trajectory of Kant’s structure of experience (Cf. FB 60-61) (Cf. D&R 117) – this corresponds with Kant’s synopsis. Section 1, of course, is non-discursive. This is why I am fond of saying: were Deleuze to move back “down” the trajectory in the structure of experience, upon “breaking the being barrier,” the sonic boom would be non-discursive. Now, as “Matter” in Figure 5.5 shows, “m” stands for those forces which do not participate in differentiation.  (2) “S,” as a contraction, is the contraction of

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547 It is worth noting, that in reading the primary and secondary sources, I have never encountered anyone who has attempted such a reading of Deleuze’s graphics. However, I am aware of and affirm Fred Evans’ multiple graphics related to *Difference & Repetition* and *A Thousand Plateaus*. In general – as you may have noticed by this point in the dissertation – I believe graphics can function as excellent teaching tools.

apprehension — this corresponds to Kant’s first fold of the three fold synthesis of imagination; (3) the expansion of this contraction expresses in the upward direction of Kant’s trajectory a “memory immediately consecutive to perception” — this pertains to the second fold of Kant’s threefold synthesis of imagination. (4) This further differentiated phase corresponds with Kant’s third fold of the threefold synthesis, i.e. the $=x$ of (both or either) recognition or apperception. Finally, (5) pertains to the bottom right hand corner of Figure 5.5, and the “4” in the upper right hand corner of Figure 5.4. Notice, then, if the trajectory of the intensity involved (the soul power for it) is sufficient, the intensity will climb further, “upward,” along the trajectory of Kant’s structure of experience, and in expressing the Idea of itself, (5) enters into a non-discursive loop with itself – this corresponds to the thing-in-itself initiating an experience which culminates in thinking of the cosmological Idea of the thing-in-itself. In this way, (5) may also, recursively as it were, correspond with Figure 5.6 as an expression of the Idea containing the singular points which correspond to the singularities forced out of the Baroque House. Hence, “The violence of that which forces thought develops from the sentiendum to the cogitandum.” (D&R 141)

It is as if “S” represents the attempt to step once in the proverbial river of flux. Just before the initial bracket of (2) you find an abyss with differences – this “groundlessness” “swarms” with “differences.” (D&R 277) In fact, the hypokeimenal derivation of pure difference can be seen by considering the S as complex. The S as blind apprehension of perception – like lightning – distinguishes itself from pure difference. It does this not by making pure difference discursive but by indicating the

$^{550}$ Deleuze, *Cinema II: The Time-Image*, 289.
$^{551}$ Cf. My discussion of Socrates’ art of midwifery from the Introduction.
movement of non-discursive (intense and pure) difference. Apprehension has the capacity to perform such a function because it is actually difference which is forcing, i.e. performing, apprehension. Recall the distance traversed of the structure of experience is directly (and positively) correlated with the intensity creating extensity by actualizing itself. Hence, you should be able to see now the manner in which Deleuze has appropriated Kant’s structure of experience.

Deleuze has taken Hyppolite’s cue – noted in Chapter 3 – to the extreme, i.e. Deleuze has returned to Kant in order to rework Hegel’s dialectic. As such, Deleuze has replaced Kant’s thing-in-itself with pure difference by – following Kant – focusing on intensive magnitude over extensive magnitude. Associating extensity with the Platonic form of the Same and intensity with the form of Difference, by way of Plato’s dependency of reckoning thesis Deleuze is working toward a solution of the problem of non-being by working toward an account of being. I will continue referencing Figure 5.6 in the next section.

Pure Difference ex Priority of Time: Deleuze’s Paradoxes of Time or The Epiphenomenal Emergence of the Idea of Persistence

“[B]y comparing a quality common to two sensations, we succeed in extracting their common essence and in reuniting them to each other…”

~Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time

In this section I will provide further support for my claim regarding the overlap between Kant’s and Deleuze’s structures of experience. I illustrated this claim with Figure 5.6 above. I will provide further support by showing you how my reading of Deleuze’s structure of experience accurately describes his “Three Syntheses of Time.” In order to

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accomplish this task I will discuss the syntheses and discuss the series of figures above. I will then use this discussion as support for my further claim regarding persistence. My claim regarding persistence is important because I will rely upon it to criticize Deleuze in the following chapters and support my ultimate claim regarding non-being. My claim regarding persistence: persistence must always only be an assumption regarding intensity in Deleuze’s structure of experience. The assumption emerges with the idea of pure difference due to the “repetitions” which indicate its trajectory. (Cf. D&R 1) Deleuze expresses the persistent aspect of pure difference with notions such as “the chain of force [chaîne de force].” (D&R 140) However, these repetitions as discursive indications of non-discursive difference depend upon discursivity to support a claim of persistence.

From a merely argumentative perspective, you might suggest that all claims regarding the non-discursivity of difference must depend in some way upon discursivity. Therefore, if this is a problem for Deleuze it will be a problem for everyone. Yet, and here is the importance of my upcoming conclusion to the dissertation, the specific discursivity in question is such that it covers over its own gaps in processing. It is not mere discursivity in general, but the generation of discursivity through experience which is at stake. Hence, the non-discursive power pulses its discursive indications which discursively span the trajectory – from discursive indication to discursive indication. On the one hand, Deleuze can still have his overall claim regarding intensity and being, despite my argument which undermines his claim of persistence. On the other hand, the ramifications of this change to his structure and trajectory of experience are tremendous.

regarding how to think about being. I will culminate this thread below by culminating the dissertation.

To begin then, I will prove my depiction of Deleuze’s structure and trajectory of experience by showing how it accurately describes what he refers to as the three syntheses of time. Put generally – and recalling the Introduction which explains the title of this section – these syntheses of time are taking place within Aristotle’s discussion of the priority of time with which he attacked Zeno. Recall from Chapter 4, in my discussion of Derrida regarding time I used the following language: coupled together, there is a sensuous flowing now and a non-sensuous standing eternal now. Further I showed you Derrida considers that this standing “Eternity is another name of the presence of the present.” (MOP 46) As such it is possible to distinguish “this presence from the present as now.” This is reminiscent of Husserl’s Kantian inspired distinction between transcendent and immanent time, and as such the time of the transcendent is time of the “pure hyletic [my emphasis].” Recall Derrida concluded, “Time is not (among beings). It is nothingness because it is time, that is a past or future now.” In other words, “time is not (a being) to the extent that it is not (present).” Now, since Derrida refused to acknowledge non-discursivity, by acknowledging non-discursivity Deleuze will be able to affirm the above Derridean conclusion while also affirming the non-discursive force of intensity expressing this “not” of time. Perhaps,

then, non-discursivity is what Deleuze had in mind when he noted: “I think Husserl has let something slip away.”

In regard to Figure 5.6, then, I am looking at the section I labeled “2.” The contraction S indicates the inception of immanent time or, what Derrida would call, the presence of presence. Therefore, to the left of S – just prior to S – is the thing-in-itself, hypokeimenonal remote matter, or pure difference. Both Derrida and Deleuze would agree with locating pure difference as such. However, recall Derrida rejects any use of a sign to signify that which would be left of the S in Figure 5.6. Derrida justifies this rejection be pointing out that discursivity takes place in the sections I labeled “3-5.” Now, Deleuze can be seen agreeing thus far with Derrida’s reading of Figure 5.6. Yet, think back to what I said above regarding Figures 5.3 through 5.5. Hence, Deleuze affirms what is to the left of S as the non-discursive pure difference traversing the sections of the structure of experience I labeled 1 to 5. So discursivity is needed to identify the work of the non-discursive, and just as moment 1 links with moment 4 in Figure 5.4, what is left of S – for Deleuze – can be identified as pure difference.

So, the question becomes: how does Deleuze think of this non-discursive pure difference as traversing the structure of experience? Notice that once you are able to ask this question, then you immediately see why I constructed this section as such. That is, the three syntheses of time are the discursive indicators along the trajectory of experience – up/across the differentiating cone – which indicate the persistence of pure difference, i.e. “Difference inhabits repetition.” (D&R 76) What is more, Deleuze is able to think pure difference as such, despite Derrida, not due to the assumption of persistence but due

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to the assumption of difference as expressive. It is the thought of difference as expressive which accounts for the forced movement out of the Baroque House chimney and into the Bergson cone. Hence, difference as expressive need not entail an isomorphism between non-discursive force and discursive indicator. For example, even Gabriel de Tarde’s (1843-1904), “Imitation is generation at a distance”\(^\text{560}\) can be thought of without a filled duration of the same, so to speak, across the distance. In fact, the movement could work more like a sign signal telegraph system than a pony express delivery system.\(^\text{561}\)

The answer to the question, then, thinks of the chain of force as an unfolding which forces the syntheses of time. Consider what Deleuze says in *Proust & Signs*:

> What forces us to think is the sign. The sign is the object of an encounter … There are only meanings implicated in signs; and if thought has the power to explicate the sign, to develop it in an Idea, this is because the Idea is already there in the sign, in the enveloped and involuted state, in the obscure state of what forces us to think [my emphases].\(^\text{562}\)

This quote not only repeats – in Deleuze’s words – what I have already stated above in regard to the movement from left to right in Figure 5.6, but it also links to the conclusion of *Difference & Repetition* in a way which refers to the five (5) sections of Figure 5.6. That is, Deleuze refers to the states of the unfolding with the following “pli” related terms: (1) perplication, (2) complication, (3) implication,\(^\text{563}\) (Cf. D&R 168) (4) explication, and (5) replication. (D&R 280-281) Moreover, since according to Deleuze,


\(^{561}\) What I hope to capture with this analogy is that in a pony express system, the force of the traveling and the message being carried are constantly coupled. In a sign signal system the force sending the message can actually be broken without interrupting the message. Hence, in regard to the latter, the assumption of persistence would be justified in regard to the message but not the force upon which the message is supposed to be riding.


\(^{563}\) Recall implication’s function in the discussion of simulacra noted above.
“Kant never ceased to remind us that Ideas are essentially ‘problematic’. Conversely, problems are Ideas.” (D&R 168) These Ideas “are Deleuze’s equivalent of ‘regulative ideas’ in Kant. … the regulative idea works problematically, to establish the condition out of which solutions, or ‘decisions,’ can emerge.”

Hence, replication of the perplication expresses the explication of the Idea implied in the problem-Idea complex.

In regard to differentiation, then, the developing of extensity is the enveloping of intensity – consider Figure 5.5. This is important to notice because this is how – contra Derrida – Deleuze is able to think non-discursivity alongside with discursivity in phases of the structure of experience which should be merely discursive, e.g. the understanding broadly designated. Moreover, the distance traversed across the structure of experience is what determines the intensity expressed as envelope; so, Deleuze is able to think of various determinations as blocking intensity from entering into a circuit with itself. Ultimately these are determinations which associate being with extensity or attempt to think of being with, i.e. by looking through, the Idea of the Same. Rather, for Deleuze – notice the nearly exact position here in regard to Plato’s Sophist – it is through the Idea of Difference that you are able to think being. Hence, this being is the being of intensity, not extensity. (D&R 229) This is why, for Deleuze, “it is being which is Difference.” (D&R 39) And, be sure not to forget my claim that pure difference is Deleuze’s replacement for Kant’s thing-in-itself: “Being is the difference itself of the thing.” (DI 25)

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Lastly then, before discussing the three syntheses of time, notice that taking section 1 of Figure 5.6 as the physicality (D&R 76-77) of which the mind necessarily must be – to use Kant’s terminology – blind, makes section 2 refer to the complex repetition which hypokeimenally reveals section 1. (Cf. NP 5) Deleuze points this out with what he refers to as “Hume’s famous thesis”: “Repetition changes nothing in the object repeated, but does change something in the mind which contemplates it.” (D&R 70) In order to see how this indicates the initial upward movement of difference in regard to the structure of experience, consider Kant’s description of the thing-in-itself.

“For, of course, it is understood that a thing-in-itself is of a different nature from the determinations that make up merely its state.” (CPR 1996, A 360) In fact, Deleuze describes the movement precisely as Kant would – noting the place of imagination – in regard to the structure of experience: “Between a repetition which never ceases to unravel itself and a repetition which is deployed and conserved for us in the space of representation there was difference, the for-itself of repetition, the imaginary.” (Cf. D&R 76) Hence, “The movement that changes the nature of things must be founded in things themselves” (DI 23) Moreover, recall this “repetition which never ceases to unravel” points to the recurring fractal simulacral character of pure difference, i.e. the pure difference hypokeimenally (DI 24) revealed as – regarding Figure 5.6 – in section 1 from section 2.

In sum, Deleuze is working with Kant’s structure of experience. Yet, he is concerned with intensive, not extensive, quantity. However, Deleuze also recognizes that one comes with the other, i.e. intensity is the force that animates extensity. This is how Deleuze replaces Kant’s thing-in-itself with pure difference. In other words, Deleuze

565 Deleuze states it negatively: “not physically…”
thinks “the thing itself, according to what it is, in its difference from everything it is not, in other words, in its internal difference.” (DI 32) Notice already the distinction between discursive and non-discursive at work here. The difference that makes all the difference for Deleuze being the non-discursive which traverses the trajectory and the entirety of the structure of experience. Hence, Deleuze is able to consider the two different, though coupled, trajectories of intensity and extensity, and the trajectory of intensity as the trajectory of pure difference. Now, since Deleuze takes Plato’s dependency of reckoning thesis seriously, he thinks difference is being. And – you anticipated it – extensity will end up as a type of not-being. Though before discussing non-being below, it is important to understand how Deleuze thinks of the selection involved such that ontogenesis may either enter into a non-discursive loop with itself in the Eternal Return or lose itself in extensity.

Recall according to Gilbert Simondon (1924-1989), “Looking for the principle of individuation in a reality that precedes individuation itself means considering the individuation as merely ontogenesis [Simondon’s emphasis].” The principle of individuation, then, for Deleuze is difference, and it is through the selection of difference that the being as intensity of ontogenesis is realized – think Plato’s dependency of reckoning thesis here. In other words, if you understand my summation just above, then in regard to Deleuze’s consideration of the Eternal Return, you understand, for example:

The eternal return does not bring back ‘the same’, but returning constitutes the only Same [le seul Même] of that which becomes. Returning is the becoming-identical of becoming itself. Returning is thus the only identity, but

identity as a secondary power; the identity of difference, the identical which belongs to the different. (D&R 41)

Notice Deleuze’s capitalization of the Same recalls Plato’s Sophist, i.e. the form of the Same. Whereas becoming identical is “of becoming itself,” identity “belongs” to the different. So, you see that “It is no longer a question of selective thought but of selective being; for the eternal return is being and being is selection.” (NP 71) Selecting the Eternal Return, then, amounts to looking through Difference – and seeing the fractal simulacral trail – as the beatitude of being, i.e. the beatific vision. See that which you are – the being of being-in-the-world – as the expression of the power of the supreme being, God. (EP 309-310)

According to Deleuze, “It is not being that returns but rather the returning itself that constitutes being insofar as it is affirmed of becoming and of that which passes.” (NP 48) In the epigenesis, then, of intensity and extensity, affirmation of Difference – not affirmation of the Same – affirms intensity in a process of ontogenetic selection.

Consider Nietzsche’s warning from the Cheerful Science to describe the outcome of selecting the Same:

Sigh. – I caught this insight on the way and quickly seized the rather poor words that were closest to hand to pin it down lest it fly away again. And now it has died of these arid words and shakes and flaps in them – and I hardly know any more when I look at it how I could ever have felt so happy when I caught this bird. 568 (§298)

It is through affirming extensity that intensity is pinned down, and through affirming Difference that the Eternal Return of intensity is selected; via this recurrence, i.e. non-discursive loop, the being of ontogenesis emerges selected through affirming Difference. (NP 9) Understandably, you might want to attribute the “sort of boldness which animal

tamers show, or people who live with a madman and are not afraid of provoking him”569 to extensity; yet, it is rather the case that extensity must borrow its power from intensity – the courage of provocation as itself a type of unraveling, i.e. fractal simulacral, madness. Affirmation as selection, then, leads directly into a discussion of the synthesizes of time, since “the eternal return must be thought of as a synthesis.” (NP 94)

To affirm difference, then, the (will-to-) power (Cf. NP 49) of difference must overcome the third synthesis in Kant’s structure of experience, if it is to enter into a recurring circuitous loop with itself – replicating the explosive perplicating. As such, entering this loop entails overcoming both the death of (the identity of, the extensity of, the Same of the becoming of) God and the death of man, and recall this loop is non-discursive. In this way you can understand the, perhaps, otherwise difficult to understand locutions of Deleuze reminiscent of Proust’s, “Very well: had I been obliged, the next moment, to hurl myself out of the window, I should still have preferred such a fate [my emphasis].”570 The exemplary quote I have in mind by Deleuze: “Intensity is suspect only because it seems to rush headlong into suicide [my emphasis].” (D&R 224) Given Deleuze’s philosophy, suicide seems to refer to becoming extensity, i.e. the death of man as extensity, and extensity as “a force separated from what it can do.” (Cf. NP 123) In fact, as extensive these are “repetitions that have become mechanical because they are external, frozen differences that revert to a substance that they can no longer make light and spiritual.” (P&S 49-50) Hence, by thinking through the synthesizes of time you see

that even suicide can be overcome through the Eternal Return. The end of the Same is not the same as being’s ceasing to express itself as Difference.

Lastly, then, consider Deleuze’s description of the three syntheses of time, and the corresponding four paradoxes as evidence for my interpretation of his structure of experience. The first synthesis (of habit): “Although it is originary, the first synthesis of time is no less intratemporal. It constitutes time as a present, but a present which passes.” (D&R 79) This synthesis is “the foundation of time.” (D&R 79) Regarding both Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.6 this synthesis pertains to apprehension as the “S” contraction, i.e. section 2 in Figure 5.6. In *Difference & Repetition* Deleuze refers to the corresponding first paradox as the paradox of the “contemporaneity of the past with the present that it was.” (D&R 81) In *Bergsonism* Deleuze refers to the first paradox as the “paradox of the leap” (Berg 61): “to constitute time while passing in the time constituted.” (Berg 61) Hence, the contemporaneity pertains to the manner in which the contraction at “S” hypokeimenally reveals the combination of sections 1 and 2 from Figure 5.6; and, the leap pertains to the leap from section 1 into section 2. This is also a rehearsal of transcendent time as contemporaneous with immanent time at the “S” with which I began this section of the chapter, i.e. referring to Husserl and Derrida. As noted above in discussing Figure 5.6 this corresponds to apprehension in Kant’s structure of experience.

The second synthesis (of memory): “Memory is the fundamental synthesis of time which constitutes the being of the past.” (D&R 80) And, “It is memory that grounds time.” (D&R 80) In both *Difference & Repetition* and *Bergsonism* Deleuze refers to the second paradox as the paradox of coexistence (Berg 61): “all of the past coexists with

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571 For an interesting relevant discussion of grounding memory and Bergson see: Bertrand Russell, *Analysis of Mind*, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1921), 94.
the new present in relation to which it is now past.” (D&R 81-82) Notice, at this point in the trajectory traversing Deleuze’s structure of experience – as illustrated in Figure 5.6 – the virtuality of the cone has been entered. So, “all of the past” coexists with the new present *virtually*. It should be of no surprise, then, that Deleuze calls this synthesis, what is section 3 in Figure 5.6, “memory.” This is also how I referred to section 3 of the illustration above, and in regard to Kant, the synthesis is the second of the threefold, i.e. reproductive imagination or memory.

The third synthesis, then, is “the empty form of time” (D&R 88): “The form of time is there only for the revelation of the formless in the eternal return. The extreme formality is there only for an excessive formlessness.” (D&R 91) In *Difference & Repetition* Deleuze refers to the third paradox as the paradox of “pre-existence”: “the pure element of the past *in general* pre-exists the passing present [my emphasis].” (D&R 82) In *Bergsonism* Deleuze refers to this (third) paradox as the “paradox of Being” (Berg 61): “There is a difference in kind between the present and the past.” (Berg 61) On the one hand, my emphasis of the term general [*l’élément pur du passé en général*], on the other hand the difference between the present as sensibility and the past as understanding, should indicate to you Kant’s synthesis of recognition. The pure form is the =x, i.e. the object in general. The third synthesis is the understanding – which as I noted for Deleuze is – narrowly designated. Hence, this is what I referred to in Kant’s structure of experience as the conceptual standpoint. In Figure 5.3 this would be the A'B' plane; in Figure 5.6 this is section 4.

The fourth paradox, then, is called the paradox of “repetition within a life” (D&R 83) in *Difference & Repetition* and the paradox of “psychic repetition” (Berg 61) in
Bergsonism. You should already know from what I stated prior to explicitly examining these syntheses that this pertains to the Eternal Return, the AB plane in Figure 5.3, and section 5 in Figure 5.6. Hence, in regard to Kant’s structure of experience the Ideas of reason have been reached. I referred to this as Deleuze’s fourth standpoint. Here is where you can learn the Idea of pure difference from experience, and as the process of ontogenesis enters here into a non-discursive loop, intensive being as pure difference is revealed. Just as the “present is always contracted difference,” (D&R 84) the Idea envelops this pure difference so as to – replicate the perplication – reveal its recursive fractal character. This is the Idea of Difference which conditioned the ontogenesis – notice the loop – just as Kant’s thing-in-itself can be thought of as a cosmological Idea.

To sum the syntheses, then, the first synthesis pertains to the living present as foundation; the second synthesis pertains to the pure past – “the past which was never present,” as ground; and, the third synthesis pertains to the future, i.e. the eternal return, as groundlessness – the intensity of an abyss with difference looking into itself.

In concluding this section of the chapter, I will address Deleuze’s assumption of persistence. Notice, despite Deleuze’s trajectory of experience, no aspect of it necessitates a “filled” persistence. As you recall my comments above about the pony express you also notice that the importance of my use of the metaphor above has persisted – you are further along in this text, and it has meaning here too. Its meaning is repeated here in difference words. Yet, if you look on each of the pages between the iteration just above of pony express and the iteration further above, you will notice the word does not appear on each page between here and there. This is a good example of a non-filled duration. In other words, because the context (on this page) called for you to
recall the meaning, you did so. It is perfectly consistent with the meaning of persistent to suggest, then, that the meaning persisted; however, the evidence cannot support stretching the claim so as to suggest the meaning was present throughout the interim or that its presence persisted.  

Hence, persistence must remain merely an assumption for Deleuze, though the idea of it certainly may emerge with extensive phenomena along the trajectory across repetitions.

Though I could have – as Deleuze does in Difference & Repetition – dwelled longer in discussing the three syntheses of time and the four paradoxes, I believe the above is sufficient evidence to conclude the accuracy of my interpretation of Deleuze’s structure of experience. Moreover, in considering my multiple comparisons between Kant and Deleuze throughout this chapter, I believe I have sufficiently established that pure difference is Deleuze’s intensive replacement of Kant’s extensive thing-in-itself.

All that remains is to provide Deleuze’s reading of and attempt to solve the problem of non-being. On the one hand, I have already indicated Deleuze considers the problem of non-being a “pseudo-problem.” Yet, it does not stop him from attempting to solve this so-called pseudo-problem. On the other hand, I have already provided above for you Deleuze’s strategy for solving the problem. That is, Deleuze associated intensity with being and extensity with non-being; however, a number of subtleties need worked through in order to provide Deleuze’s solution to the problem, i.e. ?-being.

572 I could, but need not invoke Derrida here – at least not any further than I just did (There is even un-filled duration in the obvious persistence of this point I am making – this time regarding the persistence of “Derrida.”).
573 I realize using “extensive” here with thing-in-itself is contradictory. I state it this way to draw a succinct conclusion for you.
Deleuze’s Response to the Problem of Non-Being: ⊸-being

“Being is the difference itself of the thing.”
~Gilles Deleuze (DI 25)

In this final section of the chapter I pick back up the thread I was discussing at the end of the above section. Put another way, I examine the manner in which Deleuze considered the intensive being of the eternal return to be free. This – again – directly links Deleuze with Kant. This free intense being emerges when the intensity of the force that animates you becomes sublime, i.e. when its intensity is of sufficient power, becoming enters the phase of eternal return – the becoming active of being. This being will contrast with different types of becoming – including the fractal-like becoming upon which it rides –, so as to reveal by contrast Deleuze’s response to the problem of non-being.

In 1963 after publishing the short book titled Kant’s Critical Philosophy [La philosophie critique de Kant], Deleuze published an article in Revue d’Esthétique titled “The Idea of Genesis in Kant’s Aesthetics” [“L’idée de genèse dans l’esthétique de Kant”]. A brief examination of Deleuze’s reading of Kant’s critical philosophy here will provide a point of departure for grasping the relations amongst extensity, non-being, and ⊸-being. As I mentioned in Chapter 1, it is possible to specify the different types of judgment in Kant by thinking through his Transcendental Deduction in the Critique of Pure Reason, i.e. by considering the possible outcomes of the process which combines sensibility to understanding. First, the intuitive product of sensibility may be determined in general with merely subjective validity. This is what Kant refers to as a judgment of perception in the Prolegomena. (Proleg 130) Second, the intuitive product of the sensibility may be determined in such a way as to yield objective validity. This is what
Kant refers to in the second edition Preface of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (CPR 1998, B11-12) and in the *Prolegomena* (Proleg 130) as a judgment of experience. Lastly, the intuitive product of the sensibility, if the understanding “has no concept ready for the given intuition,” (CPJ 26) may be paused *in its relation* to the concept of an object in general, i.e. without being determined by it. This is what Kant refers to in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* as a reflecting judgment or a judgment of reflection. (CPJ 26)

The “power of judgment,” according to Kant, “holds the imagination (merely in the apprehension of the object) together with the understanding (in the presentation of a concept in general) [my emphasis].” (CPJ 26)

Now Kant further specifies reflective judgments as either aesthetic or teleological. To see how these reflective judgments differ from determinative judgments notice reflective judgments treat “nature as art,” which “does not, any more than logic, contain cognition of objects and their *constitution* [my emphasis].” (CPJ 10) Rather, reflective judgments provide a means for “the investigation of nature” with which “to observe nature and hold its forms together.” (CPJ 10) As such, the appearance of “lawfulness” is “contingent;” meaning the lawfulness which “the power of judgment presumes of nature and presupposes in it (only for its own advantage), is a *formal* [my emphasis] purposiveness of nature, which we simply *assume* in it [Kant’s emphasis].” (CPJ 10) In other words, because the understanding only has the concept of “an object in general” to contribute to identifying the experience of nature, a regulative idea of reason must be applied heuristically in the identification of nature. Hence, reason steps in while the understanding is perplexed and thereby satisfies the power of judgment merely by providing the ideas with which to complete (the form of) a judgment about nature.
These judgments are problematic, of course, because what you suppose is intimately related to what you experience. This is a sensitive matter which I think requires nuance. There are three points, then, which I hope to stress about reflective judgments in general before further discussing the difference between the kinds of reflective judgment. First, a strict division must be maintained, following Kant, between determinative and reflective judgments. Lest you find yourself arguing that the human ability to make a computer has some apodictic claim to the meaning of life or nature. Second, it is a mistake to think that reflective judgments pertain merely to the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* and have no place in the *Critique of Reason*. In fact, as I discussed in Chapter 2 and mentioned again in Chapter 4, regulative ideas function heuristically. So, to take the application of a regulative idea as identifying something beyond experience is to embrace a transcendental illusion – such as thinking you can know God. Lastly, combining the previous two points, in your struggle – if that is how you like to think of it – with non-discursivity, what takes center stage is not non-discursivity but your capacity to create concepts. Nietzsche is the champion of this *Kantian* view, but Deleuze systematizes this point and follows suit.

Kant stresses that whereas determinative judgments function “schematically” and “mechanically;” reflective judgments function “technically” and “artistically.” (CPJ 17) So when Deleuze, following Nietzsche,\(^574\) suggests philosophy is the creation of concepts,\(^575\) this is neither an attempt to debunk logic nor an attempt to deny the products of physical science such as digital cameras. Concepts and ideas in the latter cases pertain


to determinative judgments, and philosophical concepts pertain to reflective judgments. In other words, philosophy teaches how to think about the world and objects in it. This is why ethics is always already within the purview of philosophy, i.e. you must think to do ethics. A machine can make more machines, but the technique and artistry involved in making concepts of the world and others which the world and others will live into and through requires thought in its freedom.

One of Kant’s many achievements, then, with his concept of reflective judgments was to show, i.e., determine, the non-discursivity of “nature” as a field of infinite freedom – the abyss where some potential always remains asleep. Looking into such an abyss, it is your “presuppositions” which both create and guide you in what Kant referred to as the “labyrinth of the multiplicity.” (CPJ 17) This is why Nietzsche’s insight “when you look long into an abyss, the abyss also looks into you” provides a Kantian foil to the Hegelian dialectic. Certainly when you go behind the curtain you may see yourself behind the curtain. Yet, thinking that this constitutes the ultimate ground either mistakes a regulative idea for a constitutive one, or lacks in creativity. As Kant put it, the necessary and heuristic presupposing of concepts in reflective judgments “is appropriate to the experience of the causality of our own capacity.” (CPJ 35) It seems to me, those who argue against the efficacy of philosophy either overestimate the power of determinative judgments or lack the ability to recognize they are always already operating within a reality constellated by regulative ideas. Hence, Deleuze’s use of ideas of intensity and power to communicate what Kant – just above – referred to as the “causality of our own capacity.”

577 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 89.
Neither reflective judgments nor regulative ideas are merely some eccentric extravagance of the aging Kant to be found merely in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. On the contrary, both reflective judgments and regulative ideas appear in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Of course, Kant does not overly dwell on these topics because, there, he is not providing a critique of the power of judgment. For example, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant explains,

Reflection (*reflexio*) does not have to do with objects themselves, in order to acquire concepts directly from them, but is rather the state of mind in which we first prepare ourselves to find out the subjective conditions under which we can arrive at concepts. (CPR 1998, A 261/B 317)

There is, at least, no deviation in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* regarding reflective judgments from this statement in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The “subjective conditions” reference queries from where the determination hails, i.e. the understanding (narrowly designated) or reason. Kant contends that though “all comparisons, require a reflection, i.e. a distinction of the cognitive power to which the given concepts belong,” often “Many a judgment is accepted out of habit, or connected through inclination.” (CPR 1998, A 261/B 317) In other words, often life is lived unreflectively, and you do not consider whether what you take to be real is logically determined or the outcome of presumption. Thus Nietzsche declares, “Cynicism is the only form in which base souls approach honesty.”[^578] It is as if a significant amount of life is make-believe. In fact, for Kant “nature” functions much like “thing-in-itself” in that the term derives its referring power relationally in regard to the structure of experience. That is, there can be no nature in itself. Kant does not belabor this point in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, but he clearly holds such a position already as can be seen in his discussion of the soul and regulative

[^578]: Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 89.
ideas. Here you hear an echo of Aristotle on assumptive beginnings for both
demonstration and dialectic.

A phrase perhaps rarely quoted from the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant claims,
“For in that which we call the soul, everything is in continual flux.” (CPR 1998, A 381)
As if anticipating so called psycho-analysis, Kant’s 1781 discussion of the soul pre-
figures Freud as a “clown without shame” by invoking the critical insight derived from
the power of reflective judgment. According to Kant,

> But if a psychologist takes up appearances for things in themselves, then as a materialist he may take up matter into
> his doctrine, or as a spiritualist he may take up merely thinking beings (namely, according to the form of our inner
> sense) as the single and sole thing existing in itself, or as a dualist he may take up both; yet through misunderstanding
> he will always be confined to sophistical reasonings about the way in which that which is no thing-in-itself, but only
> the appearance of a thing in general, might exist in itself. (CPR 1998, A 380)

Why must such a thinker be confined to “sophistical reasonings”? Because – like trying
to say non-being from within being – he takes the relations his reason works through to
necessarily pertain to the thing-in-itself, i.e. he “hypostasizes what exists merely in
thoughts.” (CPR 1998, A 384) Kant invokes the same language in the *Third Critique*
noting one can “use the concept of a natural end in an objective sense;” yet, “whatever
may be found in experience to belong to teleology contains merely the relation of its
objects to the power of judgment,” and such a use is “already sophistical” because any
principle derived from such concepts “is legislative for itself (not nature), namely as a
reflecting power of judgment.” (CPJ 35) Compare also Kant’s description in Sections:
§61; §84; §91 of the *Critique of the Power of Judgment.*

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579 Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 89; cf. Edmund Husserl, *Phantasy, Image, Consciousness, and
Put in the language of Kant’s regulative/constitutive distinction among Ideas of reason it is worth quoting at length,

I assert: the transcendental ideas are never of constitutive use, so that the concepts of certain objects would thereby be given, and in case one so understands them, they are merely sophistical ... however, they have an excellent and indispensably necessary regulative use, namely that of directing the understanding to a certain goal respecting which the lines of direction of all its rules converge at one point, which, although it is only an idea (focus imaginarius) – i.e., a point from which the concepts of the understanding do not really proceed, since it lies entirely outside the bounds of possible experience… (CPR 1998, A 644/B 672)

Recall, as beyond possible experience the transcendental ideas relate to cosmology, psychology, or theology. So, the concept of nature, like the thing-in-itself, is a transcendental idea regarding cosmology. Concepts of the understanding determine objects of experience; ideas of reason function regulatively in relation to what is always already a “fictive” “harlequin” “exteriority.” Hence, in their regulative use reflective judgments treat determined relations sophistically for Kant and such judgments point to a “casuistry of relations” (PI 36) for Deleuze.

Now then, how is Deleuze’s idea of ?-being to be thought of as a solution to the problem of non-being, given what has been said above? It is as if this chapter itself enters into a loop with itself. Recall I began this chapter by claiming a judgment of the sublime is tantamount to the unhinging of a concept of the understanding because the sublime exceeds our ability to recognize it with a concept of the understanding. (CPJ 128) It was this unhinging which signaled the “free play” of imagination. (Cf. CPJ 192-195) I also pointed out that a judgment of the beautiful provides a different conception of harmony (Cf. CPJ 198) – a more musical version of the soul, i.e. the soul as aesthetic tuning fork. Hence, the value of discussing Kant’s *Critique of the Power of Judgment*
pertains to the vision it provides of a – sublime – power which produces Ideas by resonating with itself – entering into a loop with itself.

Thinking this power through the Idea of Difference as intense difference reveals the resonating “soul” itself as the powerful intense individuated (as expressed) being of difference. Suddenly thinking itself belongs to this intense power of difference revealed through the Idea of Difference. Thinking through the Idea of the Same, then, provides a vision of extensity – the so called Other structure. Hence, on the one hand, Deleuze thinks the intense being as more primordial, and thereby it participates in being itself. On the other hand, extensity participates in the form of the Same, and as a reactive displacement of the intense power of difference extensity is associated with non-being. All that remains to be seen, then, is how Deleuze figures non-being as ?-being.

To conclude this section on non-being and Deleuze, then, consider a perennial joke regarding mathematics from a source which – as the reference indicates – is unknown. I quote the joke in its entirety here not for any mathematical significance; rather, I quote it in full for its ability to illustrate a (metaphysical) point.

An engineer, a physicist, and a mathematician are shown a pasture with a herd of sheep, and told to put them inside the smallest possible amount of fence. The engineer is first. He herds the sheep into a circle and then puts the fence around them, declaring, “A circle will use the least fence for a given area, so this is the best solution.”

The physicist is next. She creates a circular fence of infinite radius around the sheep, and then draws the fence tight around the herd, declaring, “This will give the smallest circular fence around the herd.”

The mathematician is last. After giving the problem a little thought, he puts a small fence around himself and then declares, “I define myself to be on the outside!”

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In so far as I am identified by extension as the (apperceptive) I which I think I am, then in regard to the forces upon which this I is posed, I am on the outside – the Same is on the outside. Recall, “We do not contemplate ourselves, but we exist only in contemplating – that is to say, in contracting that from which we come.” (D&R 74) Hence, Difference as the form of the (non-discursive) inside becomes less associated with the mind as a privileged inside than with the intense creative forces to which I am blind, i.e. unconscious. These non-discursive forces refuse to bear the mark of identity. As Deleuze would have it, to affirm that the discursive apperceptive I is a momentary expression of the creative non-discursive me (moi) is to affirm, and thereby not to impede, the flow of intensity which is most me. Though I stand outside – as an extension – of this flow, I become aware of it through disguised affects – the sublime surges of intense power of each is me, and me is always a prerequisite for I, i.e. I is on the outside.

By considering non-being a pseudo-problem (Berg 17), then, Deleuze not only aligns himself with Bergson, but also with Derrida. It is as if Deleuze is suggesting that from the perspective of non-discursive intensity, “non-being” must be discursive to have meaning. In this way, Deleuze is emphasizing the second impasse of the problem of non-being. Yet, this is Deleuze’s mistake. Reading the problem as such, Deleuze embraces Aristotle’s paradigm shift by returning to a priority of account perspective. Consider Deleuze’s comments, “Being or nothing, being or non-being, are equally undifferentiated: the two conceptions [my emphasis] come together in the idea of becoming having a final state, ‘In metaphysical terms, if becoming could end in being or nothing …’ [Etre ou néant, être ou non-être également indifférenciés: les deux

582 Deleuze, Le bergsonisme, 6.
conceptions se rejoignent dans l’idée d’un devenir ayant un étant final. «En termes métaphysiques, si le devenir pouvait aboutir à l’être ou au néant…»[583] (NP 46) This is a mistake because Deleuze had already enunciated non-discursive being. What I would rhetorically ask Deleuze, were he alive today: if being can be non-discursive, why can’t non-being pertain to non-discursivity?

My hope in asking Deleuze such a question would be to highlight his assumption of persistence in regard to this intense non-discursive being he has enunciated. Notice — though Deleuze failed to solve the problem of non-being —, all he had to do was articulate a way to highlight a break in the intense flow of being. As such the break in the flow would indicate non-being. What is more, the whole business of debating whether this break in the flow of being is a logical or non-logical negation would be a sham. There need be no discussion of “negation” in regard to a break in the intensity. Hence, I believe Deleuze progressed further toward solving the problem of non-being than Derrida by highlighting non-discursivity; however, ultimately, his innovations to Kant’s structure of experience failed to reveal sensibility’s secret origin. As such, notice how Deleuze lapsed into a rejection of the problem of non-being by overly focusing on negation.

In a way Deleuze did, in fact, articulate a break in the flow of being. Deleuze articulates extensity as a break in the flow of intense being, i.e. in the epigenesis of extensity and intensity. As can be seen in my quotation above from his Nietzsche & Philosophy, Deleuze thinks of non-being as the “terminal state” of ontogenesis. Eternal return is being, falling into representation, etc. is non-being. However, as such when the ontogenesis breaks it falls into becoming, and when its flow loops it is. Notice, like Aristotle, Deleuze has reduced Plato’s trinity of Being, Becoming, Non-Being to Being

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and Becoming. This is another way to recognize Deleuze failed to solve the problem.

And, whereas in regard to Derrida – noted in the above paragraph – Deleuze progressed further toward solving the problem, this reduction of Plato’s trinity proves Deleuze did not advance as far as Kant toward solving the problem.

So, what is Deleuze’s justification for shifting from non-being to ?-being? Given the passage’s relevance, I quote at length. According to Deleuze,

we must consider whether or not the celebrated thesis of the *Sophist*, despite certain ambiguities, should be understood as follows: ‘non’ in the expression ‘non-being’ expresses something other than the negative. On this point, the mistake of the traditional accounts is to impose upon us a dubious alternative: in seeking to dispel the negative, we declare ourselves satisfied if we show that being is full positive reality which admits no non-being; conversely, in seeking to ground negation, we are satisfied if we manage to posit, in being itself or in relation to being, some sort of non-being (it seems to us that this non-being is necessarily the being of the negative or the ground of negation). (D&R 63)

Since you are reading this in Chapter 5, Deleuze has stated nothing new, i.e. nothing that you cannot recollect from above. The quote goes toward justifying my reading of Deleuze’s reading of the problem of non-being as I have been articulating it throughout this chapter. Yet, what he states parenthetically in the above quote is important. With parentheses, as it were, Deleuze expresses his reduction of Plato’s trinity. Deleuze is entangled and forced to produce such a reduction because he attempts to solve the very aspect of the problem which he considers “pseudo,” i.e. how can “non” be a form of negation?

Notice Deleuze’s retreat to Aristotle’s heavy logical hand as he sums the passage I quoted above:
The alternative is thus the following: either there is no non-being and negation is illusory and ungrounded, or there is non-being, which puts the negative in being and grounds negation. Perhaps, however, we have reasons to say both that there is non-being and that the negative is illusory.

(D&R 63)

With Deleuze’s summation he has bolted the question of negation to the problem of non-being. And, such an extensive explication should be counter to Deleuzian intuition, i.e. counter-intuitive given Deleuze’s “system.” Hence, it is not wrong for Deleuze to invoke ἔτερον and ἐναντίον in concluding the above; however, he should recall Kant’s real negation as pertaining to what is accessed by looking through ἔτερον, instead of considering ἔτερον as real negation.

It is by invoking ἔτερον and ἐναντίον, then, that Deleuze makes sense of his use of “( )” and “?” in regard to non-being.

Being is also non-being, but non-being is not the being of the negative; rather, it is the being of the problematic, the being of problem and question. Difference is not the negative; on the contrary, non-being is Difference: heteron, not enantion. For this reason non-being should rather be written (non)-being or, better still, ?-being [Deleuze’s emphases]. (D&R 64)

Strangely gesturing toward Rockmore’s comment in Chapter 3 regarding Hegel, Deleuze sounds as though he is equating being and non-being.\(^584\) Yet, Deleuze here, of course, thinks being as embedded within its own internal difference, i.e. as fractal simulacral, and thereby Deleuze is still anti-Hegelian with this “Being is also non-being.” Hence, Deleuze claims “non-being” without the parentheses stands for contradictory negation, (D&R 68) and ?-being or (non)-being, stating the “non” parenthetically, stands for “the

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\(^{584}\) This is what Slavoj Zizek attempts to use as evidence for claiming Deleuze is ultimately Hegelian. However, as is characteristic of Zizek’s fool-hardy claims propped up on sparse evidence, his wrongheaded claim(s) about Deleuze truly should be disregarded and dismissed. Cf. Slavoj Zizek, *Organs without Bodies: Deleuze and Consequences*, (London: Routledge, 2004).
differential element in which affirmation, as multiple affirmation, finds the principle of its genesis.” (D&R 64)

I will conclude this chapter, then, by discussing two last Deleuze quotes. First, on the one hand, Deleuze holds, “the two forms of negative non-being [le deux formes du non-être négatif],” are: “a non-being of logical limitation [un non-être de limitation logique]” and “a non-being of real opposition [un non-être d’opposition réelle].” (D&R 108) Deleuze’s position here is, of course, ultra-Kantian. Yet, he considers the real opposition to necessarily mean opposition between two beings. Rather, here in the structure of experience is precisely where he should have located the break in being. On the other hand, Deleuze holds,

As for negation, this is only the shadow of the highest principle, the shadow of the difference alongside the affirmation produced. Once we confuse (non)-being with the negative, contradiction is inevitably carried into being; but contradiction is only the appearance or the epiphénomeron, the illusion projected by the problem, the shadow of a question which remains open and of a being which corresponds as such to that question. (D&R 64)

In order to draw a conclusion, then, regarding what has been said thus far, it is possible to speak of three terms here: (1) pure becoming, (2) pure being as pure difference, i.e. the becoming active of being or the intense being of the eternal return, and (3) ?-being as (non)-being, i.e. becoming reactive. Whereas 1 is associated with ontogenesis, 2 and 3 are associated with the epigenesis of ontogenesis. Further, 1 is associated with non-discursivity prior to apprehension, 2 is associated with non-discursivity and intensity, and 3 is associated with discursivity and extensity. Hence, 3, i.e. ?-being is Deleuze’s response to the problem of non-being.
The problem with Deleuze’s response: on the one hand, you might like to associate the three terms with Becoming, Being, and Non-Being. However, despite the fact that the terms are three in number, Deleuze is only discussing Becoming and Being. This is why in *Nietzsche & Philosophy* he can consider 2 and 3 becoming active and becoming reactive, respectively; “The eternal return teaches us that becoming-reactive has no being.” (NP 72) Recalling Figures 5.3 and 5.6 This in itself is sufficient to prove Deleuze has failed to solve the problem of non-being. On the other hand, notice Deleuze thinks “problems and questions in their difference in kind from answers-solutions: the (non)-being of the problematic which rejects equally the two forms of negative non-being.” (D&R 108) Now here, you might like to question why and how ?-being can refer to both 1 and 3. This is because Deleuze is associating the ?-being with becoming, and as such ?-being in 1 is pure becoming, in 2 it is becoming active being and of Difference, in 3 it is becoming reactive and of the Same. Hence, Deleuze’s Hegelian sounding association of being and non-being refer to 3. In sum, *Deleuze’s non-being, i.e. (non)-being or ?-being, is* – as you should see by its association with becoming – *a type of not-being.*
“[Kant] simultaneously gave us a history of our subject, fixed its problematic, and professionalized it (if only by making it impossible to be taken seriously as a ‘philosopher’ without having mastered the first Critique).”  
~Richard Rorty

“Seeing into darkness is clarity; knowing how to yield is strength; use your own light and return to the source of light; this is called practicing eternity.”

~Laozi

Chapter Six: Part I Summary

In order to provide a concise summary of Part I, I will indicate what I believe to be some of the main ideas in each of the chapters. This summary is not intended to be an exhaustive list of every claim made in Part I. Rather, this summary is intended to remind you of some of the more salient aspects of Part I prior to entering Part II. Recall I began the Introduction by claiming that the topic of this dissertation is the problem of non-being, and announcing I would address this topic in order to criticize the contemporary readings of “pure difference” put forth by Derrida and Deleuze. Since I indicated the method for addressing this topic could be divided into two treatments, this summary indicates the culmination of what I referred to as the first “negative” treatment. Of course, then, Part II will indicate the culmination of the positive treatment, and provide my solution to the problem of non-being.

In the Introduction, then, I introduced you to the problem of non-being by teaching you the criteria Plato enunciated for its solution in the Parmenides and the Sophist. I also discussed the value of solving the problem of non-being. According to Plato, the problem needs to be solved to determine the relations amongst Being, Becoming, and Non-Being. In other words, Plato’s dependency of reckoning thesis

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holds: you cannot recognize being until you recognize non-being. I, then, pursued Plato’s distinction between “ἐναντίον” (enantion) and “ἑτερον” (heteron). The value of the distinction can be found in Plato’s discussion of ἑτερον as Difference-in-Itself, or the form, i.e. Idea, of Difference itself. Further, I discussed the manner in which “looking through” the Platonic Idea of ἑτερον was supposed to provide a solution to the problem of non-being. Hence, the discussion spoke directly to both establishing the criteria and context for the problem and establishing the origin of the attempt to solve the problem of non-being by using the Idea of Difference.

The lineage here, of course, being from Plato’s Idea of Difference to Derrida and Deleuze. However, recall, just as I consider the suggestion of Difference as merely an ironic solution to the problem of non-being in the Sophist, neither Derrida’s nor Deleuze’s revaluation of Difference solves the problem. As I also highlighted above, this does not mean the strategy in regard to dialectic is untenable. Rather, the Idea of Difference can be used to point outside the dialectic. Though ultimately what is being pointed to, as such, is the experiential standpoint of Kant’s structure of experience. Recall that there were a number of ways to posit a version of not-being beyond the experiential standpoint; however, they generally fit into one of two categories corresponding to Kant’s justifications for the thing-in-itself.

Warranting the claim of beyond the experiential standpoint, philosophers either appeal to logic or some peculiarity of the power, i.e. faculty, of the mind functioning at the level of the structure of experience in question. Though Kant employs both means for justifying the thing-in-itself, Aristotle stands as the champion of appeal to logic. In other words, recall what I referred to as Aristotle’s arsenal with which he accounted for
opposition and change within being. With his matrix of opposition and the logic of the ὑποκείμενον, i.e. *hypokeimenon*, Aristotle also provided a method for arriving at remote matter which would be equivalent to an outside of dialectic, and perhaps even – regarding Kant’s structure of experience – what may be referred to as Aristotle’s thing-in-itself. Yet, as I stressed multiple times: given that the employment of logic depends upon the activity of the mind, i.e. *a fortiori* being, such justifications for claiming a beyond fail to solve the problem of non-being. It is not that they are illogical, they may be perfectly logical. Rather, they fail to overcome the first impasse of the problem – “you may not and ought not to attribute being to not-being … it is unthinkable.”

The regulative idea of Kant’s Copernican revolution, then, functions in place of Aristotle’s *hypokeimenal* logic – the specific indication of the ὑποκείμενον derived by regressing from the object of experience. So regression from the object of experience to the thing-in-itself counts as a method for logical, i.e. structural, indication. Most importantly, again, as logic driven, it fails to solve the problem of non-being. Negating that which is indicated – as all the above thinkers were quite eager to point out – itself indicates more logic, i.e. *not*-being. Hence, Derrida’s logic of supplementarity holds in regard to such a method for solving the problem of non-being. That is, whatever the solution appears to be, it is always a supplement to the non-being for which it was posited.

Derrida’s logic of supplementarity, i.e. the movement of *Différance*, is – I think – best explained by discussing discursivity. Derrida, of course, would not have approached the issue as such, since he does not affirm the meaningful use of “non” in regard to non-discursivity. In this way, a tangent can be seen running from a merely logical reading of

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Plato’s *Sophist* to Aristotle through the higher faculties in Kant’s structure of experience through Hegel to Derrida. Hence, this tangent connects any number of articulations, then, which fail to overcome the first perplexity or impasse of the problem of non-being. On the one hand, like Theaetetus, these thinkers either fail to remember the criteria of ineffability, or they deny it. On the other hand, as Chapter 3 illustrated, logic as a method cannot overcome the first perplexity or impasse of the problem.

The second method, then, for solving the problem reveals a different tangent line. This tangent line would run from reading the solution to the problem of non-being in Plato’s *Sophist* as ironic to Gorgias’ distinction between conceptual and perceptual negation through the lower faculties of Kant’s structure of experience to Deleuze’s reading of pure difference as a quantity of intensity in an eternal non-discursive loop with itself. Hence, the second method is precisely the second justification Kant provides for positing the thing-in-itself, i.e regarding the faculties or powers functioning along the trajectory traversing the structure of experience. In other words, negating *not the place* or location within the structure of experience, rather negating the power functioning at the ground of experience.

Hearkening back to my discussion of what I refer to as the Socratic schools, i.e. stoicism, skepticism, hedonism, and cynicism, a defining difference between the two methods I am discussing can be seen in the *prolēptic* which emerges from applying each of the methods. Recall in Chapter 2 I referred to the two different kinds of *prolēptic* as conceptual and perceptual, respectively. Whereas the first method leaves its practitioner looking in thought, the second method leaves its practitioner looking for evidence of a flicker in the power at the ground of experience. Hence, not only is the second method
the better method for solving the problem of non-being, it also provides the most appropriate anticipations for its practitioner. Of course the solution to the problem of non-being will not be “in” the writing. The writing – this writing you are reading – as clearly being writing must function as proleptic in regard to the power functioning at the ground of experience. This is precisely the thinking at work in Part II below.

Differences along the tangent line, then, are differences regarding the power functioning at the ground of experience. These differences may be large in scope, such as disagreeing which power is functioning at the ground of experience, or these differences may be more narrow in regard to specific aspects of the grounding power. In either case, being in Kant’s wake means this ground is the elusive kaleidoscopic (so called) “latch” of being. From Aristotle onward philosophers have regarded the power functioning at the ground of experience to be imagination. Even those who take the second fold of Kant’s threefold synthesis of the imagination as forming the foundation (I mean “foundation” here technically, as Deleuze thinks it) of experience, believe imagination prerequisite lest you be snagged on Kant’s blindness thesis. Hence, the brilliance of Wurzer’s notion of filming. Lifting the veil means imagination’s opening on to itself – its memory – developing, i.e. gaining, sight. On the one hand, a notion with which Hegel was happy to make hay: the ground acts like a chameleon in regard to retrospective thought. On the other hand, thinking imagination as power of the ground, from the second perplexity of the problem of non-being, the ground dances like an abyssmal kaleidoscope – filming’s filming functions by un-realing.

As a large in scope difference, then, and, by allowing hypokeimenonal logic to regress to the ground, Deleuze thinks the power of the ground of experience as sense. In
this way he follows Kant by choosing the first of Kant’s three original faculties of experience, and by allowing the hypokeimenal logic to fully regress into what he sees as the fractal simulacral character of the ground. Notice this is a peculiar mixture of Aristotle with Kant. Deleuze’s assumption of a seamless phase change from becoming to being through a logic of sense follows Aristotle through Hyppolite’s Hegel so as to overcome Kant’s blindness thesis. Hence, Deleuze applies the second method and arrives at the ground as multiplicity. Think of the resonating differential elements on the ground floor of the Baroque House illustration.

Now here is the final distinction I wish to draw in regard to Part I. I draw this distinction to support my claim that Kant advanced further than any of the prior thinkers – Plato excluded for reasons noted above – toward solving the problem of non-being. I might paraphrase this distinction by suggesting: whereas Kant remains skeptical in regard to the thing-in-itself, Deleuze takes a more stoic stance in regard to pure difference. Put another way, just as in Chapter 2 I discussed the reconciling of “the metaphysics of metaphysics” with “the end of metaphysics,” it would be incorrect to posit the thing-in-itself as either being or becoming. However, Deleuze is comfortable positing pure difference upon which the structure of experience is riding, i.e. structurally prior to repetition or contraction, as becoming.

If it helps here, think of Kant’s Table of Nothing. On the one hand, Kant recognizes the “Tableness” as discursively barring a recognition of non-discursivity – filming’s filming functions by un-realizing. Kant’s strategy for post-sense pre-apprehension, i.e. blind synopsis, is to think of non-discursivity – à la Leibniz – as excessive. Another way to put the point: Kant showed the appropriate relation to
Aristotle’s priority of being. The value of pointing to this excessivity is not that it itself solves the problem of non-being. Rather, on the other hand, the value of locating non-discursivity functions along with the value of the Table of Nothing. That is, both provide a subtle discursive way to paradoxically discuss the ground of experience and its negation, i.e. the nihil negativum of non-being, as sub-discursive. These depictions of the ground of experience remain true to the tangent line of the second strategy and to Plato’s puzzle, i.e. the problem of non-being.

I, too, follow the second strategy for solving the problem of non-being. Recall Kant believed “affinity” to govern the multiplicity of non-discursive sense. Kant was more correct than he was even able to see. Affinity does, in fact, govern sense, and, what is more, affinity is itself a product of the power of memory – the memory of the real. As such, memory – to use Kant’s language – is “the secret of our sensibility’s origin.” (CPR 1996, A 279/B 335)

So, following the second strategy I differ from Kant and Deleuze because I think the ground of experience as the power of memory. Part II of the dissertation will provide support for this claim by looking at contemporary memory research.

Here, then, is how I refer, in an abbreviated fashion, to the power grounding experience: memory as play-ground and memory as psychic circuit breaker. Especially for those who are not familiar with the research, it will require Part II below to flesh out what I mean here. On the one hand, by mapping the above visions of pure difference from Derrida and Deleuze onto the structure of experience, in light of contemporary memory research, I culminate the negative part of my critique of pure difference. In this way, I am granting Derrida and Deleuze their theses; however, I argue their theses are

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588 I am grateful to Dr. Selcer for encouraging me to maintain this phrasing.
misplaced in regard to the structure of experience and fail to meet Plato’s criteria for the solving the problem of non-being. On the other hand, with the support of contemporary memory research in regard to the structure of experience I solve the problem of non-being. In this way, I will discuss what contemporary memory research has uncovered regarding what Kant called “affinity.” Because the ground of experience is non-discursive, it is better to refer to “play” than “truth” regarding this ground – hence, play-ground. And, because I take exception to Deleuze’s assumption of persistence, I will argue against persistence of being – hence, psychic circuit breaker. In other words, Part II will demonstrate that your being does not persist, it pulses; and, since memory accounts for what is standardly considered the persistence of being, non-discursive breaks in the play-ground reveal non-being. Hence, I critique pure difference with Non-Being & Memory by solving Plato’s puzzle, i.e. the puzzle pure difference was supposed to solve.
“Habit is a second nature that destroys the first. But what is nature? Why is habit not natural? I am very much afraid that nature itself is only a first habit, just as habit is a second nature.”

~Pascal, Pensées §126

“Suppose someone were to ask:
‘Is it really right for us to rely on the evidence of our memory (or our senses) as we do?”

~ Wittgenstein, On Certainty §201

“A parting word?
The melting snow
Is odorless.”

~ Bokusui Wakayama, Japanese Death Poems

Chapter Seven: Part II – Introduction: Memory, Propaedeutic to a Solution

Introduction and Justification for Chapter 7 Sections and Objectives

Here is a succinct statement of the manner in which I am going to conclude this dissertation: I will show you that Kant’s standpoints of the structure of experience pertain precisely to the standpoints adopted as memory loci in contemporary memory research. By re-articulating, so to speak, Kant’s structure of experience in light of contemporary memory research, I am able to help Kant overcome Aristotle’s paradigm shift in the problem of non-being. Put another way, using contemporary memory research to support my claims regarding the structure of experience, I will solve the problem of non-being.

The three standpoints of Kant’s structure of experience should be thought of as standpoints of memory. As such, Kant’s sensibility pertains to the experiential standpoint of contemporary memory research; Deleuze’s pure difference as it enters into a circuitous loop of the Eternal Return pertains to the performative standpoint of contemporary

591 Yoel Hoffman, ed. Japanese Death Poems: Written by Zen Monks and Haiku Poets on the Verge of Death, (Boston: Charles E. Tuttle Publishing Co, 1986), 146. If you’re ever interested, feel free to ask me about: how I collected what I took to be all the best death poems I could find in a given period of time, and then shared them with Dr. Wurzer. After he read them we briefly discussed them together. I would be grateful to relive those moments so as to tell you such stories.
memory research; Derrida’s logic of supplementarity – his doctrine of the sign – pertains to recollective memory, i.e. the contemporary memory research’s idea of the movement of working memory forcing recollections upon entering the conceptual standpoint from “beneath.” Hence, my innovation is to think through the consequences of rethinking memory in Kant – particularly sensibility and what he referred to as “affinity” in the Critique of Pure Reason – in light of contemporary memory research.

This chapter, then, briefly examines Plato to situate a discussion propaedeutic to 19th, 20th, and 21st century thinkers regarding memory. In this way, recalling Kant’s structure of experience, I am able to show continuity from Plato through Kant to contemporary memory research. On the one hand, then, in this chapter I trace the philosophical roots of the contemporary memory discoveries with which I solve the problem of non-being. On the other hand, I provide a historical reading of the research most salient for the sake of solving the problem of non-being.

Anamnēsis: Dismembering and Remembering … Memory

“It is quite true what philosophy says, that life must be understood backwards. But that makes one forget the other saying, that it must be lived – forwards. The more one ponders this, the more it comes to mean that life in time is never properly intelligible, for the very reason that at no point can I find complete repose in which to take up the position – backwards.”

–Søren Kierkegaard, The Diary of Søren Kierkegaard

§1 Mnemosyne – “Mnemosyne,” names “a power” which can “decipher the invisible.” And, of origins, Hesiod (circa 8th century BCE) recalls in Theogony, Mnemosyne was the mother of the nine Muses. Plato reiterates the genealogy in his

Theaetetus (191d), and for reasons which I shall make clear shortly, this passage amongst others regarding memory from Plato are worth considering. I.M. Crombie suggests, “Everybody who has heard of Plato has heard of the doctrine of anamnēsis (ἄναμνησις) or recollection. It is indeed an essential part of Plato’s philosophical outlook. It is however not quite so easy to say what precisely the doctrine is.”595 Fortunately, I am not concerned to precisely state Plato’s doctrine of anamnēsis here. Rather, I am concerned to make one simple claim about memory as it appears in Plato and to provide textual support for my claim. My claim is that whatever Plato thought of memory, his texts discuss multiple processes which function similarly enough to all be referred to as processes of memory. In other words, Plato discusses memory as multiple. Just as something of Mnemosyne resides in the Muses in accord with which we may call her their mother – call it, reminiscent of Wittgenstein, a family resemblance. So to, the multiple processes and functions dispersed throughout experience may be referred to as the work of the power of memory. The passages I have picked come from the following dialogs: Theaetetus, Phaedrus, Phaedo, Republic, and Meno.

§2 Plato’s Three Metaphors for Memory – Contemporary memory researchers seem quite concerned to identify which thinker(s) was the first to conceive of a particular model or conception regarding memory. I am reminded of Alfred North Whitehead, “The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato.”596 When I articulate what I will refer to as the “Contemporary Memory Canon” below, I will indicate the widely accepted first thinkers and their corresponding texts. However, a brief consideration here of the possibility that

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Plato may have thought of memory as multiple will be fruitful. Plato’s *Theaetetus* provides two highly celebrated metaphors for memory. The first of which is the “block of wax.” According to Socrates,

I want you to suppose, for the sake of the argument, that we have in our souls a block of wax, larger in one person, smaller in another, and of purer wax in one case, dirtier in another; in some men rather hard, in others rather soft, while in some it is of the proper consistency. … We may look upon it, then, as a gift of Memory, the mother of the Muses. We make impressions upon this of everything we wish to remember among the things we have seen or heard or thought of ourselves; we hold the wax under our perceptions and thoughts and take a stamp from them, in the way in which we take the imprints of signet rings. Whatever is impressed upon the wax we remember and know so long as the image remains in the wax; whatever is obliterated or cannot be impressed, we forget and do not know. (Theaet 191c-191e)

The second celebrated image of memory from the *Theaetetus* is that of the “aviary.” According to Socrates,

Suppose a man were to hunt wild birds, pigeons or something, and make an aviary for them at his house and look after them there; then, in a sense, I suppose, we might say he ‘has’ them all the time, because of course he possesses them. … But in another sense he ‘has’ none of them; it is only that he has acquired a certain power in respect of them… Then using our image of possessing and hunting for the pigeons, we shall say that there are two phases of hunting; one before you have possession in order to get possession, and another when you already possess in order to catch and have in your hands what you previously acquired. (Theaet 197c-198d)

That Plato has Socrates reject both of these accounts does not change the fact that these metaphors continue to be celebrated in the contemporary literature. The metaphors are similar in that they both account for the banal memory activities of encoding, storing, and retrieving. Yet, the significant difference between these two accounts, regarding memory, highlights the aviary’s improvement over the block of wax. Whereas, the wax
accounts only for the process of memory known as association, the aviary accounts for the process of association and recollection.

So far, then, Plato has considered two different memory models – a wax model with one memory process and an aviary model with two memory processes – and rejected them both. I will now examine the celebrated metaphor of the chariot driver from the

*Phaedrus*. Plato has Socrates explain the following:

But since we have found that a self-mover is immortal, we should have no qualms about declaring that this is the very essence and principle of a soul, for every bodily object that is moved from outside has no soul, while a body whose motion comes from within, from itself, does have a soul, that being the nature of a soul; and if this is so – that whatever moves itself is essentially a soul – then it follows necessarily that soul should have neither birth nor death. That, then, is enough about the soul’s immortality. Now here is what we must say about its structure. … Let us then liken the soul to the natural union of a team of winged horses and their charioteer. … To begin with, our driver is in charge of a pair of horses; second, one of his horses is beautiful and good and from stock of the same sort, while the other is the opposite and has the opposite sort of bloodline. (Phaedr 245e-246b)

At this point we have an immortal soul which acts upon itself, and an image to describe the soul as a chariot driver and two horses of hierarchically different natures, i.e. one is more pure than the other. As the parable goes, the soul with the most god-like, i.e. disciplined, horses is able to rise high enough after separating from its earthly body, i.e. physical death, to glimpse “Reality” or what is really real. The undisciplined horse, of course, pulls the charioteer back toward the earthly, spoiling the view. Once reincarnated, i.e. returned into an earthly body, an (immortal) soul is capable of recollecting the heavens of which it caught a glimpse. The goal here being to live a life
good enough to escape the cycle of birth and rebirth – reincarnation. Hence, Socrates explains,

For just this reason it is fair that only a philosopher’s mind grows wings, since its memory always keeps it as close as possible to those realities… A man who uses reminders of these things correctly is always at the highest, most perfect level of initiation … He stands outside human concerns…

(Phaedr 249c&d)

Differing from the wax or the aviary metaphors, then, the charioteer brings forth another difference.

What is the same across the three metaphors is that all three of them discuss memory. Unquestioningly each metaphor accounts for encoding, storing, and retrieving information. Yet, whereas the relationship between impressions and the wax in the wax example seem to flatten the distinctions between encoding, storing, and retrieving, i.e. if the impression is in the wax – so long as you have the wax – then you have all three of the memory aspects, the aviary example seems to accentuate the distinctions amongst the three aspects of memory – the aviary requires an agent and clearly separates between encoding and storage (catching the birds and storing them in the aviary). What is more, the charioteer example suggests these aspects of memory function in a way not discussed in the other two examples. In other words, this third metaphor is introducing a third process of memory. This process of memory “keeps the mind as close as possible to those [most real] realities.” In the order in which I have examined them, then, the wax metaphor is most dependent upon the earthly physical realm, the aviary metaphor acknowledges a non-physical or less earthly realm, and the charioteer metaphor acknowledges the least earthly, i.e. non-physical, realm. Though each of these realms
calls for encoding, storing, and retrieving information, clearly memory is different in each of the realms. Hence, *Plato discusses memory as multiple*.

Before briefly examining examples across three other Platonic dialogs, I want to stress a few aspects of the hierarchical description which can be seen across the above examples. First, recall how the wax example discussed the relationship between memory and other psychic functions. Socrates described the wax as other than our “perceptions and thoughts” and as taking “a stamp from them.” On the one hand, the physicality of an impression in wax scarcely requires an agent to perform the act. What the wax comes into contact with leaves an impression on the wax. On the other hand, Socrates gives no justification of differences amongst the wax tablets across souls. It is as if the wax tablets were just doled out, reminiscent of a lottery. Second, the aviary example seems to require more agency than the wax example. More reminiscent of disciplining the horses from the charioteer example than the passivity of the wax example, recall that the aviary requires the man to “look after” the birds. He has “acquired a certain power” in relation to the birds due to his care for the aviary – no aviary no power over the birds. Here, then, a degree of separation between memory and that within which a memory is stored has been achieved. Third, and lastly, another degree of separation has been achieved with the charioteer. The concern has shifted to the proper organization, i.e. relations amongst, the encoding, storing, and retrieving of perceptions and thoughts. And, whereas concern in the aviary example provided for an awareness of agency, concern in the charioteer example, beyond awareness, provides a benefit for the agent. Looking at the examples from the other Platonic dialogs provides a clearer example of how memory accompanies psychic activity, and memory processes appear almost like rungs on a ladder.
§3 Plato’s Theory of Recollection – In regard to the following, the passage from the *Phaedo* is relevant because it speaks of recollection and principles of organization both of which point to passages in the *Meno* and *Republic* (Cf. Phaedo 70a-71a). Socrates, delivering his swan song (Cf. Phaedo 84e) as it were, is awaiting the death to which he has been sentenced. Discussing death with Cebes and Simmias, Socrates touches upon the immortality of the soul and what Crombie has called the doctrine of *anamnēsis*. Socrates ties these two topics together with a discussion of opposites, i.e. opposing processes and the general form of the principle(s) with which to identify the opposites as a unity.

I pick the passage up where Cebes is lamenting the difficulty involved in believing “the soul still exists after a man has died and that it still possesses some capability and intelligence.” As a result, Socrates agrees to examine the question: “whether the souls of men who have died exist in the underworld or not.” Taking the wheel of birth and re-birth as his point of departure, Socrates begins by noting,

> We recall [my emphasis] an ancient theory that souls arriving there come from here, and then again that they arrive here and are born here from the dead. If that is true, that the living come back from the dead, then surely our souls must exist there… (Phaedo 70b&c)

After articulating this theory of the immortality of the soul, Socrates – examining the reincarnation component of the theory – asks, “if something worse comes to be, does it not come from the better, and the juster from the more unjust?” (Phaedo 71a) Along this line of questioning Socrates concludes “all things come to be in this way, opposites from opposites.” (Phaedo 71a) Socrates further explicates his theory of opposites noting that if living and being dead “are opposites, they come to be from one another, and there are two
processes of generation between the two.” (Phaedo 71c) The two processes, then, are dying and being alive.

This discussion culminates in the following two points: first, “coming to life again in truth exists, the living come to be from the dead, and the souls of the dead exist,” and, second, “such is also the case if that theory is true that you [Socrates] are accustomed to mention frequently, that for us learning is no other than recollection.” (Phaedo 72d&e) For a proof of recollection readers are pointed to Meno (81e), and provided an example of what – over 2000 years later – is often called “declarative memory,” or more specifically a “cue dependent” “episodic memory.” Experiencing an object tends to remind, or bring forth, information which may otherwise seem non sequitur. Socrates’ example is akin to the following: when you experience an object that reminds you of someone for whom you care, you may experience thoughts and feelings associated with that person. In this respect the object acts as a cue from which further information is declared (to you). Since this information explicitly involves episodes from your life, the memory is referred to as “episodic.” Had the information been of a less personal form, e.g. the chemical composition of the object you are experiencing, the memory would have been referred to as “semantic,” rather than episodic. Further, since a significant amount of time may have passed from the time of the episode from which information was brought forth, the activity in question is considered a function of the memory process called “Long-term Memory.”

An example pushed further should tie all the above on Plato together. Suppose you were to go to the grocer’s to acquire ingredients with which to prepare a meal. While

597 Cf. Yadin Dudai, Memory From A to Z: Keywords, Concepts, and Beyond, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
at the grocer’s you see someone who reminds you of the person for whom you are preparing dinner, and you leave the grocer’s following that person without acquiring any food or returning home. In some ways this example is absurd, but why? First, notice there is a difference between the cue and that which it recalls. Though cues need not be physical, in this case the cue is physical and what is recalled is not. Second, memories— and memory cues— may be multiply instantiated. It seems correct to say that in some ways we are reminded of what may be called “universals” across physical change. For example, though your friend ages, and, accordingly, you perceive your friend differently, you still recognize your friend. In this way, memory provides access to that which persists despite physical change. Moreover, your friend’s arm or a sporting event not attended by your friend may both bring forth the same memory. Third, and lastly, Plato’s example of the charioteer— whatever else it may recall— seems to express an important idea about memory. Namely, memory organizes, and experience is somehow structured by this organization.

Were the unruly horse to pounce on every physical instance recalling the beloved, the charioteer would be dragged into being more intimate with the multiple and physical which changes than that which is recalled by the physical instances. Such would be the absurd result, noted above, of wandering out of the grocer’s. In fact, it is congruent with the Long-term Memory (LTM) forgetting curves constructed by Hermann Ebbinghaus to suggest that the reinforcing feedback loop created from the unruly horse’s repeated physical pouncing diminishes the reality of that which was previously remembered. In

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598 This example is reminiscent of Socrates’ recounting of the “Diotima discourse” in the Symposium (201d-212c), specifically the Scala Amoris – “Stairway of Love” – at 210a6.
other words, taking the cue for that which is recalled diminishes the potency of intricate recall because associations with the cue are replacing what the cue previously recalled before such repeated exposure to the cue(s). To put it in a phrasing reminiscent of the *Euthyphro* – Do I like this scent because it reminds me of her, or do I remember her because I like this scent? By siding with the disciplined horse the charioteer obtains a degree of freedom in relation to the flux of cues passing through experience. (Cf. Rep 479c & 485b) And, in the language of hierarchical organization – supported by the experience of persistence across change, rather than being pulled toward constant change and becoming – the charioteer seems now to be associated with a level higher up in the organization of memory. (Cf. Phaedr 249c)

Though, of course, not made explicit by Plato, perhaps what *anamnēsis* might ultimately reveal is merely the structure of being. In this way, *anamnēsis* might be thought of as further using the structural revelation to move up the organization, as it were. “And is not finding knowledge within oneself recollection?” (Meno 85d)⁶⁰⁰ Recall this question from Plato’s the *Meno* (85d). Whereas it is tempting to cite mathematics – geometry, i.e. moving up a triangle or logic tree division, i.e. 4 to 2 to 1 – recall that *this trajectory is nowhere other than in memory*. Hence, already *anamnēsis* speaks to the importance of discerning memory in the relations amidst Being, Becoming, and Non-Being. “Let us not then enroll a forgetful soul among those adequate to pursue philosophy. Let us require a good memory.” (Rep 2006, 486d)

In sum, I take my work on Plato in Part II to show, at least, the following: (1) Plato discussed memory as multiple. In fact, Plato’s dialogs nicely illustrate how memory processes working in different realms and resulting in different products may be

⁶⁰⁰ This passage translated by G.M.A. Grube.
thought of as united – in a single power of memory. (2) Plato’s discussion of memory provides an example of how to think of memory as organized, and how to think of that organization as intimately structuring experience throughout. (3) Plato’s charioteer example, at least, foreshadows – if not, to put it more strongly, indicates – the standpoints from which modern and contemporary investigations of memory ensue. In Kant’s language, the unruly horse caricatures sensibility, the disciplined horse represents understanding, and the charioteer illustrates the apperceptive I. (4) Ultimately I take Kant’s work on the sensibility standpoint and poststructuralism’s work on the standpoint of the apperceptive I to be not only improvements but necessary improvements for recognizing the role of memory in experience, and the extent to which these improvements deviate from Plato’s position – given his dialogic style – is undecidable.

Inception of the Contemporary Memory Canon

“How odd are the connections; of human thoughts, which jostle in their flight!”

~Lord Byron

§4 Punctuating Plato/Recollecting Footnotes – Looking at contemporary memory research, one immediately senses its immensity. Imagine entering the term “memory” into a search engine with access to every contemporary academically minded journal. Yet, despite this immensity there are two aspects of memory about which after 1970 the research would be in unanimous agreement. The first is that memory is multiple. The second is reminiscent of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s celebrated quote, “It is there – like our life.” That is, memory, in one process or another, seems to be perpetually laboring, or

– in more Nietzschean rhetoric – celebrating, along the trajectory of the structure of experience.  

There are many ways to parse memory, as evidenced by the vast vocabulary disseminated in contemporary memory research. Though some aspects of memory are less relevant depending upon the focus of the research, organizing aspects of memory in relation to the three main standpoints from which memory researchers tend to ground their examinations is sufficient to exhaust the vast vocabulary involved across the research. The three standpoints are (1) Experiential, (2) Recollective, and (3) Performative. Indeed, there are ways in which these standpoints overlap. For example, it is possible to think of (1) and (2) as a kind of (3) or (3) as a kind of (1) or (2), etc. However, as I will show, from the perspective of (1) there are aspects of (2) and (3) which generally do not get discussed, etc. mutatis mutandis, despite the fact that all of these aspects are of memory. Hence, in this way, the common understanding of memory seems far too narrow.  

The following table, then, represents the continuity of philosophical organization from Plato to Kant with which I organize memory research. The table represents the tri-partite idea with which I organize various historical discoveries and taxonomies pertaining to memory. Notice, in this way, you can see how I have maintained Kant’s

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idea of the structure of experience throughout, and in this part, i.e. Part II, of the dissertation I will use contemporary memory research to correct Kant’s structure of experience by correcting his understanding of memory.

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<th>Platonic</th>
<th>Kantian described by</th>
<th>Contemporary</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Dark (unruly) Horse</td>
<td>Sensibility (Experiential)</td>
<td>Experiential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Charioteer</td>
<td>Apperceptive “I”</td>
<td>Performative</td>
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<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Light (disciplined) Horse</td>
<td>Understanding (Conceptual)</td>
<td>Recollective</td>
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**Figure 7.1**

The value of following the above tri-partite idea, in large part, goes to maintaining a dialog between the disciplines of philosophy and psychology (including neuroscience). Memory research hangs together, of course, because memory is being researched. However, there is often a distinction to be made by the types of journals which publish the research, rather than the research’s avowed link to an aspect, i.e. standpoint, of experience. For example, journals dealing with “psychophysics” tend to address memory at the experiential standpoint, and journals dealing with “cognition” tend to address the recollective standpoint. In other words, as can be seen by examining the specializations of a number of contemporary journals, memory research implicitly adheres to its philosophical roots. Therefore, as I address the list of discoveries in memory research, both leading up to and composing the “Contemporary Memory Canon,” I will seek to remind you of the standpoint of experience to which each discovery pertains.

Lastly, an exhaustive treatment of the history of memory is, of course, beyond the scope of my project. For an excellent account leading up to the 20th century, I recommend W.H. Burnham’s “Memory, Historically and Experimentally Considered”
published in two parts by The American Journal of Psychology in 1888. Therefore, in regard to my project, I have limited the historical treatment to texts which by way of their introduction of a distinction regarding memory are relevant to my re-reading of Kant’s structure of experience. And, this is, of course, for the sake of solving the problem of non-being and critiquing the solutions put forward by Kant, Derrida, and Deleuze.

§5 The claim that memory spans the trajectory of experience – François Maine de Biran (1766-1824) is widely credited by contemporary memory theorists as the first thinker to discuss memory as multiple. Often referred to merely as Maine de Biran, he was awarded a prize by the “Class of Moral and Political Sciences in the National Institute” for his book titled: Influence de l’Habitude, published in Paris in 1803. The question which Maine de Biran’s book was written to answer – and for which the prize was offered – was: What is the influence of habit on the faculty of thinking? Further, describing the philosophical climate within which Maine de Biran was writing, French historian George Boas states, “The feeling that somehow or other the Idéalogues had reduced man to a state of utter passivity was fairly widespread in France after Napoleon had made it fashionable to ridicule them.” Boas quotes Maine de Biran as saying in 1794, “I should like, if ever I were capable of undertaking anything continuous, to see how far the soul is active, how far it can modify external impressions, augment or

diminish their intensity by attention it gives them, examine to what extent it is master of
attention.”

Maine de Biran is known, then, as a French philosopher of the will, and historians
situate him given his criticisms of Descartes, Étienne de Condillac (1715-1780), Pierre
Jean Cabanis (1757-1808), and Thomas Reid (1710-1796). Whereas Descartes said,
“Je pense, donc je suis,” Maine de Biran said, “Je veux, donc je suis,” quips the historian
Benjamin Burt. Championing the will against such reduction to “utter passivity,”
Maine de Biran promotes a model of experience divided into both active and passive
features dependent upon the involvement of the will, with memory spanning the model—
active and passive habitudes. He is credited with the following innovations: (1) He
considers memory—habits—to span the entirety of the model, and (2) he takes the
understanding to be an effect of habitude, i.e. the process of forming habits produces the
further capacity to understand. Lastly, Maine de Biran’s emphasis, in particular, on the
will and the emergence of understanding from out of the power of memory nicely
illustrates—well before poststructural accounts of experience or identity—how both the
understanding and the even the “I” itself may emerge in such a way so as to make their
origin completely opaque to phenomenology.

§6 Canonical Prelude – At this point, then, I want to show a cluster of
reciprocally related texts by citing title, author, and year of publication. I take all of these

de France, 1954), §1.
615 Burt, A History of Modern Philosophy, 294; Daniel L. Schacter and E. Tulving. “What are the Memory
1994), 4; Daniel L. Schacter, Anthony D. Wagner, and Randy L. Buckner, “Memory Systems of 1999,”
The Oxford Handbook of Memory, E. Tulving and Fergus I.M. Craik, eds., 627.
texts to be precursors, in one way or another, to what I will refer to as the “Contemporary Memory Canon.” What do I take to be the value of such a cluster of texts? I have already shown a number of possibilities, considered historically, across the standpoints to be that which unifies the standpoints. For example, I have considered the possibility of the will, the apperceptive I, a.k.a. the transcendental ego, or a conceptual movement of the understanding. Notice, each of these candidates champions the experiential, performative, and recollective standpoints respectively. With the perhaps most obscure of these standpoints being the experiential, a number of candidates other than the “will” have also been historically considered. The value, then, of the following cluster of texts is primarily to show the different candidates for unifying all of the standpoints by pointing to the texts which champion the candidates. And, again, given the obscurity and complexity of the experiential standpoint, I attend more to the experiential standpoint than the other two. Lastly, the value of considering these different candidates can be seen in the fact that depending upon that which performs the unifying, the question of the thing-in-itself “beyond” or “outside” the standpoints is at stake.

As I mentioned above, memory researchers are quite concerned to note who was the first individual to make a particular distinction, in what text, and when, regarding memory. Therefore, the documentation is available, and I am able to indicate the major memory distinctions, discoveries, etc. which contribute to the “Memory Canon.” Further, I am able to organize the distinctions of the Memory Canon by way of the standpoints, and thus constitute a taxonomy of memory. Recalling the Kantian standpoints of Chapter 2, for example, I might say Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775-1854), and G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831): Fichte with his
Foundations of the Entire Science of Knowledge – Grundlage der gesamten
Wissenschaftslehre (1794/5), Schelling with his System of Transcendental Idealism –
System des transcendentalen Idealismus (1800), and Hegel with his Phenomenology of
Mind/Spirit\textsuperscript{616} – Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807) champion the performative,
 experiential, and recollective memory standpoints respectively.

I begin here, then, with the experiential standpoint – the standpoint I will here
dwell upon most due to its obscurity. According to historian Mark Altschule, “It is
difficult – or perhaps impossible – to find a nineteenth-century psychologist or
psychiatrist who did not recognize unconscious cerebration as not only real but of the
highest importance.”\textsuperscript{617} Following the use of the unfortunate term “unconscious,” that
which is unconscious in experience may be thought of in many ways. Cerebral, i.e.
neuronal activity is certainly – to some degree – active without conscious awareness of
the activity as such.\textsuperscript{618} Other suggestions include the will, biological factors, hereditary
factors, or physiological factors. In fact, all of these other factors may be unconsciously
involved in an experience. Perhaps as exemplified by Caspar David Friedrich’s (1774-
1840) The Monk by the Sea – Der Mönch am Meer (1809) – or his Wanderer Above the
Mist – Der Wanderer über dem Nebelmeer (1818) – the nineteenth-century saw an
explosion of publications both regarding the obscurity of – and attempting to dispel the
obscurity from – the experiential standpoint.

\textsuperscript{616} Rather than alienate any group by choosing the term “Mind” over “Spirit,” here, I have included them
both along with the original German title.


\textsuperscript{618} Even granting an “eliminative materialist” vocabulary like the project suggested by the Churchlands,
there is still obscure neuronal activity known as the “Dark Energy” of the mind for which we have yet to
account.

It was in such a textual climate that Hermann Ebbinghaus (1850-1909) – who is considered the father of experimental memory research – published his *On Memory – Über das Gedächtnis* in 1885. Around this time – between 1870 and 1906 – Karl Ewald

Hering (1834-1918) delivered his lectures compiled and titled in English as *Memory: Lectures on the Specific Energies of the Nervous System*. The first chapter and lecture of which was titled, “Memory as a general function of organized matter” – *Über das Gedächtnis als eine allgemeine Funktion der organisierten Materie*. It was in 1880, then, that Samuel Butler (1835-1902) published *Unconscious Memory* in which he compared Hering’s writings on memory with that of von Hartmann’s. Studying unconscious perception, philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) and the psychologist credited with the “Duck-Rabbit Illusion” Joseph Jastrow (1863-1944) published “On small differences in Sensation” in 1884. It is perhaps too often overlooked that in the midst of these publications Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) published *The Cheerful Science – Die fröhliche Wissenschaft* (1882) – and *Beyond Good and Evil – Jenseits von Gut und Böse* (1886). In 1887 Francis Galton (1822-1911) and Joseph Jacobs (1854-1916) published their respective works on “Prehension,” i.e. short term memory span. Further, in 1890 William James (1842-1910) published his two volume: *Principles of Psychology* where he discussed, *inter alia*, primary and secondary memory, i.e. short and long term memory. In 1891 Jean-Marie Guyau (1854-1888) published *Education and Heredity – Education et Heredite*. Also in 1891 Pierre Janet (1859-1947) published “Study of a Case of Fixed Ideas and Aboulia” – “*Etude sur un cas d'aboulie et d'idées fixes.*” He followed this in 1892 with *The Mental State of Hysterics – L'état mental des hystériques* – where he discussed *unconscious* fixed ideas, and in the same year Jean-Martin Charcot (1825-1893) presented the notion of unconscious fixed ideas in his theatre at the Pitié-Salpêtrière Hospital in Paris.

The following publications should also be noted. However, I see them as championing a different standpoint than the experiential. In 1874 Franz Brentano (1838-1917) published *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint – Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkte*. In 1892 Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) published “On Sense and Reference” – “Über Sinn und Bedeutung.” In 1910 Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961) published “The Association Method.” Lastly, Edmund Husserl’s (1859-1938) lectures and sketches from 1898-1925 have been published posthumously as *Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory*. Hence, in one way or another, all the above publications...
speak to a concern perhaps best exemplified by Maine de Biran’s words: “to see how far”
memory extends.

Before proceeding to the twentieth-century texts, and the “Contemporary Memory
Canon” in the next chapter, it is useful to make a few comments about the above.

Depending upon which standpoint privileged, a different approach to describing
experience ensues. Four approaches may be developed from the standpoints. Coinciding
with the recollective and experiential standpoints the approaches of structuralism and
poststructuralism may be developed. Further, if you think of agency along what may be
described as a continuum of will spanning from the experiential standpoint to the
apperceptive I, then broadly two approaches result. Following Wundt’s Outlines of
Psychology – Grundriss der Psychologie – published in 1896, on the one hand,
“voluntarism” describes an approach which treats the will as spanning from apprehension
– which can be, at least, studied experimentally – through various depictions of ego “up,”
as it were, to apperception, i.e. the transcendental ego. This approach favors acts of will
in “decision” and “choice.” On the other hand, if you think of the will variously as
“down” the continuum, then the approach becomes that of a more involuntary nature akin
to that of Schopenhauer’s will or Freud’s unconscious. Yet, of these approaches, in my
opinion, it is poststructuralist thought that has best handled, and I might add taken
seriously, the un-graspable nature of the thing-in-itself.

Notice the unconscious, the will, physiological, biological, and hereditary factors
fit under the experiential standpoint since each is an attempt to explain aspects of
experience – of which you are aware – from aspects of experience of which you are not
aware. Further, these attempts share a concern to describe experience as unified by

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620 Boas, “Maine de Biran,” The Philosophical Review, 477. I noted this locution above.
neither transcendental ego nor logical necessity. So, the work of Maine de Biran has already shown the way to indicate, at least, the recollective standpoint as an effect of or dependent upon the experiential standpoint. What is more, Kant himself – as emphasized by the poststructuralists – has shown the way to indicate the transcendental ego as the result of a performance or as an effect. With the concerns of the nineteenth-century, then, the experiential standpoint can be thought of as permeated with memory – including what aspects of the standpoint may be “unconscious.” Hence, in what follows, the contemporary memory research will show the power of memory permeates the standpoints to such an extent as to exhaustively account for the question of the thing-in-itself “beyond” or “outside” all standpoints. Summing these insights, as it were, I will critique pure difference, i.e. there is no longer a need to posit – affirmatively or negatively – a thing-in-itself or pure difference.
Chapter Eight: Memory as Play-Ground – Contemporary Memory Research

Introduction and Justification for Chapter 8 Sections and Objectives

This is the chapter in which I solve the problem of non-being. The previous chapter provided the historical background to the memory research with which I solve the problem, and the following chapter contemplates the value of the solution. This chapter contains two sections. Further, each of the sections is divided in accordance to the theses put forth. In other words, the first section of this chapter puts forth 20 theses derived from contemporary memory research. The second section, then, shows how I apply contemporary memory research to Kant’s structure of experience and, thereby solve, the problem of non-being.

I chose the theses in the second section of this chapter to make my solution to the problem of non-being explicit. Put generally, Kant’s structure of experience from the *Critique of Pure Reason* required two corrections from the perspective of contemporary memory research. The first correction involves the second of Kant’s justifications for positing the thing-in-itself. Because Kant believed sensibility’s origin to be a “secret,” he considered the grounding power available for negation to be imagination. This was a focus of the Kant chapter above. Whereas Kant thought of productive imagination as an

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original source of the mind, contemporary memory research reveals productive imagination as rooted in memory. Hence, the primacy of imagination regarding experience in Kant should be replaced with memory.

The second correction to Kant’s structure of experience pertains directly to the ground of experience. For Kant, the ground of the structure of experience pertains to sense, i.e. sensation grounds experience. Just as imagination is the second of Kant’s three original powers of the mind, “sense” is the first (CPR 1998, A 94/B 127). However, because intuitions are blind prior to the application of concepts higher in the structure, despite deeming the power “sense,” Kant cannot reveal the structure of experience’s secret origin. Yet, he was able to discern that the power is governed by “affinity.” Re-reading affinity, then, by way of contemporary memory research discoveries such as “priming,” provides evidence with which to reveal sensibility’s secret origin. Hence, the ground of the structure of experience is not “sense” but “sensory memory.”

First and foremost, this is the solution to the problem of non-being precisely because it meets Plato’s criteria for solving the problem. Secondly, this eliminates two assumptions built into Kant’s structure of experience – assumptions pertaining to aspects which, for Kant, were avowedly “blind” and “secret.”624 And if we take what I refer to as Plato’s “dependency of reckoning with being upon reckoning with non-being” thesis seriously, these assumptions, then, should be eliminated from our understanding of being.

The first assumption is that a thing-in-itself needs to be posited from the experiential standpoint of the structure of experience when performing an ontological negation. This pertains to his second justification for positing the thing-in-itself, i.e. his mistake pertaining to imagination. At times above I stated this generally saying: Kant

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624 Kant’s structure of experience, of course, had been the best solution/status quo prior to my solution.
considered imagination more powerful than memory. By way of contemporary memory research I argue you should think of it this way: We can say that what we experience is of an “external world.” Yet, following the Kantian division of the structure of experience into sensibility and understanding, we must remember that what we have of this external world is either an idea from or the content of experience. And, in the experiencing itself, the power which must be present to experience is ultimately memory, before, during, and after imagination.

The second assumption is the assumption of ontological persistence. In other words, the ground of experience as memory reveals ontological filled duration as illusory. That is, sensory memory as the power at the ground – instead of sense – indicates a cycling of memory as the structure of experience functions along a structurally ascending trajectory of object formation. Hence, because the ground is memory, therefore cycling (second correction to Kant noted above); notice memory’s cycling functions tantamount to Kant’s negating of imagination (first correction to Kant noted above); because cycling, therefore gaps in being; because gaps in being, therefore non-being.

Mnemo-Psychography: 20 Theses toward Sensibility’s Secret Origin

Juxtaposing the two following quotes, one from 1792 and one from 2009, provides a good point of departure for examining the major and lasting changes in the study of memory across the 19th, 20th, and 21st centuries. In 1792 Dugald Stewart (1753-1828) wrote:

Memory itself is an ultimate and inexplicable fact.

[Stewart’s emphasis] – It is hardly necessary for me to add, that when we have proceeded so far in our inquiries concerning Memory, as to obtain an analysis of that power,

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625 The section title is an intended reference to: (CPR 1996, A278/B 334).
and to ascertain the relation in which it stands to the other principles of our constitution, we have advanced as far toward an explanation of it as the nature of the subject permits. … Such, indeed, is the poverty of language that we cannot speak on the subject without employing expressions which suggest one theory or another…

Now, published in 2009, Jonathan K. Foster in a chapter titled “You are your memory,” from *Memory: A Very Short Introduction* quotes celebrated memory researcher and neuroscientist Michael Gazzaniga stating, “Everything in life is memory, save for the thin edge of the present.” Have memory researchers in 2009 overcome the “poverty of language” of which Stewart speaks? In what follows I hope to show the significant innovations relevant to my project from the “analysis of that power” which the past two centuries of memory researchers have been able to produce.

I will apologize at the outset for the list/textbook-like presentation of the following material. This choice of stylistic approach seems justified in that when you understand the following, you will understand my position, and the following is highly technical. “In the twenty-first century, we know more about memory than ever before.” And, my choice of stylistic approach squares the two needs of presenting a large amount of technical information and structuring my argument for an audience relatively unfamiliar with the contemporary memory research. Compounding the difficulty, as three contemporary theorists put it, “Memory is a single term, but refers to a multitude of human capacities … a universally accepted categorization scheme does not exist. There is no periodic table for types of memory.” The purpose for this section of
the dissertation, then, is to show the major memory distinctions, features, and insights which should be considered by, at least, philosophers concerned with issues in the philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, and experience in general. Since a number of the following features of memory are, perhaps, best understood through a relation or juxtaposition with other features of memory, I set out to be as reader friendly as possible, i.e. clear without presenting too much or too little information.

Hence, I have organized this section in the following way: (1) and (2) describe the major paradigms through which memory research was conducted post 1960 into the 1990s. I treat the current memory paradigm in the penultimate position (19). Next, (3) through (16) are significant distinctions and discoveries widely acknowledged as major contributions to the study of memory in the 20th century, (17) and (18) provide two distinctions, not discussed above, from 20th century philosophy which will help me articulate my thesis more concisely. Further, (19) indicates the widely acknowledged current paradigm in regard to memory research. Lastly, (20) represents a phrasing of my thesis in the wake of these above innovations. The contemporary paradigms of the 60’s and 70’s are: (1) the Modal Model/Memory Stages Paradigm and (2) the Levels of Processing Paradigm. The contemporary distinctions and features of memory include the following: (3) Implicit v. Explicit Memory, (4) Verbal v. Nonverbal Memory, (5) Episodic v. Semantic Memory, (6) Procedural v. Declarative Memory, (7) Chunking, (8) Working Memory, (9) Context Dependence, (10) Mood and State Memory Dependence, (11) Saccadic Memory, (12) Multiple Object Tracking, (13) Priming, (14) Automaticity,

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631 Furthermore, the texts from which these distinctions derive may be thought of collectively as the “Contemporary Memory Canon.”
(15) Retroactively Effective Memory, and (16) Attention/Intention as a Process of Working Memory. The contemporary philosophical innovations include the following: (17) Qualia and (18) Satisficing and Bounded Rationality. The current contemporary memory paradigm is referred to as (19) the Parallel Distributed Processing Paradigm. Within the context of these innovations, then, my thesis may be described as (20) Being Memory Bound.

§1 Modal Model/Memory Stages Paradigm (SM, STM, LTM) – I begin by showing a shift across paradigms beginning in the 1960s. From the perspective of the memory standpoints, the shift illustrates the trend toward diminishing agency and increased automaticity. In other words, the shift indicates a poststructural coupling of the will and the experiential standpoint. In fact this shift informed my discussion of the performative standpoint. In 1968 Richard C. Atkinson and Richard M. Shiffrin published “Human Memory: A proposed system and its control processes” conceiving the relation amongst sensory (SM), short-term (STM), and long-term memory (LTM) like that amongst consecutive stages in the processing information. The shift from the 1960s to the 1970s is characteristic of the shift in thinking about memory less narrowly, i.e. a shift from thinking of memory solely as storehouse or for storage to memory as processing and storage.

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As an improvement over simply thinking of memory as a storehouse, Figure 8.1 illustrates a model of memory which spans the structure of experience. In addition, Figure 5.2 illustrates an early version of the memory standpoints. As such, “sensory registers” which include, of course, the five senses points to the experiential standpoint and Kant’s sensibility. The short term memory store (STS) functions as an early version of working memory, and, thereby, indicates a version of the performative standpoint. The more advanced version of the performative standpoint will think of the performative as itself spanning the structure of experience – more on this below. The long term store (LTS), then, points to the recollective standpoint and Kant’s understanding broadly designated. Notice – as the names “registers” and “store” indicate – the Modal

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Model/Memory Stages Paradigm still emphasizes the storage and encoding aspects of memory over the manner in which retrieval is tied up with performance.

§2 Levels of Processing Paradigm – With the 1970s, the “Memory Stages Paradigm” shifted into the “Levels of Processing Paradigm” (LOP) when in 1972 Fergus I.M. Craik and Robert Lockhart published “Levels of Processing: A framework for memory research.”

Although the modal model [Memory Stages Figure above] faded away largely through neglect, there was one major precipitating factor, namely the development of what appeared to be a very promising alternative framework, that of Levels of Processing. The modal model was essentially structural in nature; it did have functional aspects such as control processes and encoding activities, but these were conceptually subsidiary to the underlying structural distinctions. Craik and Lockhart reversed this emphasis by de-emphasizing structure and stressing processing, suggesting that trace durability was a direct consequence of the processes of encoding, with deeper and more elaborate encoding leading to more durable memory traces.

With the paradigm shift came a shift in focus from storage to processing. Though processing was involved in the early stage model, LOP thinks of memory along a continuum of processing. In other words, LOP accounts for a memory’s “location” in SM, STM, or LTM depending upon the amount of processing the memory has undergone, i.e. from maintenance to elaboration. In fact, consistent with my discussion of memory as a “power,” the term “store” is often substituted in the research for the term “memory” resulting in a different phrasing, e.g. discussion of the short-term store of memory. Moreover, it should not escape the reader who has a good memory that the LOP

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continuum of memory is thoroughly Kantian. Specifically, the trajectory of this continuum of processing in memory moves from structural cognizance to term of store (short or long) to semantic cognizance. This is accomplished across two stages – looking conspicuously like sensibility and understanding – the processing from structure to store is referred to as “maintenance rehearsal” and the processing from store to semantic “level” is referred to as “elaboration rehearsal.” The extent to which some memory has been processed may be referred to as the extent of elaboration. As noted above, each of these shifts further illustrates the trend toward diminishing agency and increased automaticity, and with the LOP Paradigm theorists arrived at a way to describe some of the control processes – intentional, voluntary, enactments of will – as automatic. See Figure 8.2.

Figure 8.2

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An improvement over the Memory Stages Model above, Figure 5.3 – as an illustration of Levels of Processing Paradigm – better captures the connectedness of memory spanning the structure of experience. On the one hand, the “processing” piece of this paradigm is further acknowledging the performative power of memory. On the other hand, the “forgetting” piece of this paradigm indicates the manner in which the organized power traversing the structure can fall out, so to speak, at various points along the trajectory. The “rehearsal” components indicate the manner in which – think of Kant and Deleuze here – the sensory information is being (actively) elaborated into conceptual content. In other words, Figure 5.3 matches the other figures regarding the structure of experience above, i.e. from left to right sensibility to understanding.

The primary shortcoming with this model – in regard to what the current contemporary model corrects – may be found by looking at the “retrieval” arrow. The Levels of Processing Paradigm has yet to think the fullness of the power of memory associated with sensibility, i.e. the experiential standpoint. Daniel Dennett in his *Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology*, notes “Any psychology with undischarged homunculi is doomed to circularity or infinite regress.” Though the term “homunculi” tends to be pejorative, for sake of staying with his terminology, it is as if – within the Levels of Processing Paradigm – the discharge of the homunculus takes place from Short-term memory “up.” As such the model is consistent with Kant’s blindness thesis. It does not attempt to look into the abyss of sensibility. Locating retrieval as it does indicates the possibility of backward “looking” to the point of Short-

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term memory. That is, from the conceptual and apperceptive standpoints to as far as the un-realing of imagination’s filming can provide.

§3 Implicit v. Explicit – The distinction between implicit and explicit memory speaks to a cluster of ideas about memory such as habit, habituation, and de-sensitization. And, as I will use the implicit/explicit distinction as heuristic in what follows, I have decided to begin with it. Now the progenitor of what was to be further specified in 20th century memory investigations as habituation and de-sensitization was Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716). In §33 of his Discourse on Metaphysics – Discours de Metaphysique – published in 1686 Leibniz notes,

It is almost like the confused murmuring heard by those who approach the seashore, which is the combined effect of innumerable waves. Now if many perceptions fail to merge into one, yet no one of them rises above the others and they all make impressions about equally strong or equally capable of holding the attention of the soul, they can be perceived only confusedly.\[^{640}\]

Leibniz, here, provides an image of someone submerged in sensation – surrounded by a constant and large amount of stimulation. Yet, these sensations are perceived confusedly. Put another way, the sensations are not perceived as the “innumerable waves” which Leibniz suggests they are. Using the term “liminal” in the sense of “threshold,” given Leibniz’s comment that no one of the perceptions rises above the others to become clear, Leibniz may be interpreted as having provided a theory of subliminal perception. The information in these subliminal perceptions is only implicit (confused) unless it rises above the threshold and becomes explicit (clear).

What is more, despite the constancy of the subliminal confused perceiving, it does not follow that the perceiver must be either constantly in a state of full confusion or

unable to focus any of the confused perceptions into clear perceptions. These latter aspects relate to what in the 20th century literature is called habituation and de-sensitization, both of which are involved in habit. De-sensitization refers to the fact that though you are exposed to a large and constant amount of stimulation, you are not “sensitive” to the stimulation. Habituation is often described as “The gradual diminution of the response to a stimulus following the repeated presentation of the same, or a similar, stimulus.”641 In this way, it is possible to be in the habit of “paying attention” to aspects of the environment while ignoring others. Habituating to some aspects of the environment does not mean you are not stimulated by them. Rather, habituation and de-sensitization point to the fact that memory is operable, i.e. functions, subliminally buffering sensation.

Also, in New Essays on Human Understanding – Nouveaux Essaies sur l’Entendement Humain – written circa 1704 Leibniz speaks directly in regard to memory. In the form of a dialog between “Theophilus” and “Philalethes,” Leibniz, at §20, has Philalethes suggest, “If there are innate ideas in the mind without the mind’s being actually aware of their presence, they must at least be in the memory.”642 In response, after invoking Plato’s notion of anamnēsis and Locke’s notion of tabula rasa, Theophilus states, “And often we have an extraordinary facility of conceiving certain things, because we formerly conceived them, without remembering them.”643 These statements are taken – for example, by the researcher credited with popularizing implicit memory in the 20th

641 Dudai, Memory from A to Z: Keywords, Concepts, and Beyond, 112.
643 Leibniz, New Essays, 106.
century, Daniel L. Schacter – to represent the birth of implicit memory. The distinction between implicit and explicit memory, then, is determined by awareness. Explicit memory is memory of which you are aware that you remember, and implicit memory is memory of which you are not aware that you remember. Implicit memory usually refers to habits and skills, both of which involve habituation and de-sensitization. Lastly, of implicit memory *qua* implicit memory, Bergson’s remark from *Matter and Memory* regarding memory for habits and skills is appropriate: such memory has “upon it no mark which betrays its origin.” Hence, of implicit memory which has become explicit, discussion of origins seems relevant, but the memories of which you are unaware you remember do not yield to an interrogation regarding origins.

§4 Verbal v. Nonverbal—In 1971 Allan U. Paivio published *Imagery and Verbal Processes.* This book is widely credited with the scientific distinction between verbal and nonverbal memory. Paivio’s distinction was given further clarification with his 1986 publication of *Mental Representations: A Dual Coding Approach.* According to the latter text, Paivio distinguishes between two memory systems – verbal and nonverbal, and three memory processes – representational, referential, and associative. The nonverbal system of coding encompasses “other sensory modalities in addition to visual,

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and the “language-specialized system will be referred to as the verbal system.”

Considering the two systems to be structurally and functionally distinct, Paivio notes,

Structurally, they differ in the nature of representational units and the way the units are organized into higher order structures. Functionally, they are independent in the sense that either system can be active without the other or both can be active in parallel.

Yet, at the same time, the verbal and nonverbal memory systems are “functionally interconnected” meaning activity in one system can invoke activity in another system.

Moreover, as Paivio indicates, these structural and functional differences “produce qualitative differences,” and the qualitative differences account for the fact that the verbal and nonverbal systems differ in the kinds of processes in which they specialize.

Now, “specialize” is Paivio’s term, and it illuminates how the term “process,” e.g. representational process, can be used in regard to both the verbal and the nonverbal memory systems despite different representational products. Paivio explains,

there are always two sources of information that contribute to performance in any memory task [my emphasis], one external and one internal. The external source is the memory material presented to a subject. The internal source consists of the long-term memory representations and processes that are activated by the presented material and the context in which it occurs. … the internal source “contains” (can make available) two types of representational information, one being information that cannot be attributed to a particular external episodic source and the other, information that can be attributed to such a source.

I wish to briefly indicate the Kantian structure of experience implicated herein. On the one hand, construction of an image(s) during an experience is produced within the nonverbal memory system, and the image is produced by way of a representational process.

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process which, in Kantian terms, involves sensibility. This Paivio claims is “external.” On the other hand, construction of meaning during an experience is produced within the verbal memory system, and the meaning is produced by way of a representational process which, in Kantian terms, involves understanding. This Paivio claims is “internal,” i.e. verbal and nonverbal. Hence, Paivio provides one process across two systems yielding qualitatively different products.

The other processes are similarly described. “Free verbal associating requires verbal representational processing and then verbal associative processing, although it could also involve referential processing (e.g. the word knife elicits an image of a knife, which evokes a fork image as well, which then elicits the verbal referential response, ‘fork’).” ⁶⁵²

The matrix of Paivio’s processes may be worked out mutatis mutandis. More important for my purpose here, notice the trajectory of experience is considered here as a trajectory of memory. Further, this is considered a trajectory of memory despite the products being images and thoughts or words. Put another way, the images and thoughts or words developed in the structure of experience ride on a trajectory whose motor force is memory. This is tantamount to replacing intensity in Deleuze’s structure of experience with memory.

§5 Episodic v. Semantic – In the year 397, Aurelius Augustinus, the Catholic bishop of Hippo noted the following about memory in his Confessions,

I come to the fields and vast palaces of memory, where … all the various things are kept distinct and in their right categories. … And in memory too I meet myself – I recall myself, what I have done, when and where and in what state of mind I was when I did it. ⁶⁵³

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⁶⁵² Paivio, Mental Representations: A Dual Coding Approach, 70.
Now it was not until over 1,500 years later that experimental psychology would reiterate Augustine’s comments in a more scientific register. A major step for experimentally and scientifically describing Augustine’s insights came in the form of the distinction between “episodic” and “semantic” memory systems.

In 1972 Endel Tulving published a paper titled, “Episodic and Semantic Memory.” This paper is widely considered the harbinger of the distinction between episodic and semantic memory systems. Yet, Tulving himself credits the unpublished PhD dissertation of M.R. Quilliann titled *Semantic Memory* as a major influence. As Tulving notes in his influential paper, “The distinction between episodic and semantic memory systems should not be construed as representing the beginning of some new theory of memory.” (OM 384) At the same time, Tulving’s article makes use of a number of elementary distinctions which I will discuss here with the help of Tulving’s article. These distinctions include the commonplace concepts of “encoding (acquisition),” “storage,” and “retrieval” – often referred to as “phases” of memory – found in nearly all contemporary discussions of memory. The differences between the episodic and semantic memory systems largely reside in differences across the conceptualization of these three phases. For example, Tulving thinks of the “taxonomic distinction between episodic and semantic memory as two parallel and partially overlapping information processing systems” (OM 401) which can variously receive, retain, and send information from “perceptual or other cognitive systems.” (OM 385)

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Episodic and semantic memory processes are similar in that they are both considered explicit rather than implicit processes. In contrast, Tulving notes, “The two systems [episodic and semantic] differ from one another in terms of (a) the nature of stored information, (b) autobiographical versus cognitive reference, [and] (c) conditions of retrieval.” (OM 385) Furthermore, Tulving states, “Semantic memory is the memory necessary for the use of language.” (OM 386) Beginning with (a), then, and quoting extensively from Tulving, the episodic memory process storage is tied up with a person’s identity. According to Tulving,

A person’s episodic memories are located in and refer to his own personal past. Most, if not all, episodic memory claims a person makes can be translated into the form: “I did such and such, in such and such place, at such and such time.” Thus, an integral part of the representation of a remembered experience in episodic memory is its reference to the rememberer’s knowledge of his personal identity. (OM 389)

Given the close tie to a meaningful identity, after the following Tulving comment distinguishing the episodic from the semantic process, I will point to an area of overlap.

In regard to the semantic process,

Inputs into the semantic memory system are always referred to an existing cognitive structure, that is they always have some cognitive reference, and the information they contain is information about the referent they signify rather than information about the input signal as such. … semantic memory information can, although it need not, be recorded indirectly or in a piecemeal fashion. (OM 389)

The above quotes indicate a clear distinction between the kind of memory stored in the episodic system and the kind of memory stored in the semantic system. By being associated with existing information stored, it is as if the semantic memory system builds a structure of meaning with experiences contributing to meaning both locally and globally in the cognitive structure. This would be like interpreting AB in Bergson’s
memory cone. In contrast, the episodic system incorporates information associated with personal identity and, as such, offers an alternative way to make perception explicit. Yet, the episodic and semantic processes cannot be fully distinct or without overlap, since it is by way of semantic content in regard to personal identity that episodic content is meaningfully organized. Hence, semantic memory will play a role in both the storage and the retrieval of episodic memory.

The issue of episodic and semantic overlap may be elucidated by further examining the process of encoding, especially in regard to episodic memory. According to Tulving, A person not familiar with English is likely to organize HAT, CAT, and MAT into a group, but not CAT, LION, and TIGER. Since acoustic coding is less dependent upon the semantic coding system than is semantic coding, it can be considered to be more direct… [Moreover] acoustic encoding requires less time. (OM 398)
The above example tangibly illustrates the difference between an episodic and a semantic encoding strategy. History as relying on discursivity, that is meaningful or to be explicitly stored as such. For example, “We drank wine in Paris before dancing in Amsterdam,” relies upon the meaning of before and after, etc. in order to state a personal history; similarly, “I have become de-sensitized to suicidal ideation.” So here you can see the pattern perceiving associative power of the empirical sense perceiving subject as episodic contrasted with the more semantically related apperceptive I.

What is consistent with the above and more, Tulving reports, “The episodic memory system does not include the capabilities of inferential reasoning or generalization.” (OM 390) However, “Inferential reasoning, generalization, application of rules and formulas, and use of algorithms … represent important methods of utilization of information stored in semantic memory.” (OM 390) In fact, reminiscent of Plato’s
anamnesis, Tulving notes, “By relying on his semantic memory, it is literally quite possible for a person to know something he did not learn.” (OM 390) Lastly, recall the memory stage paradigm with the Atkinson-Shiffrin Model of memory (Figure 8.1) The model begins with sensory memory and moves toward long-term memory. Reading the results of Tulving’s experiment across the Atkinson-Shiffrin Model, it is as if semantic memory favors long-term storage with its multi-associated structure, and episodic memory favors short-term storage with its close tie to the sensory – acoustic, visual, and haptic – register. Tulving’s results corroborate this interpretation – “forgetting appears to be more readily produced in the episodic than in the semantic system.” (OM 392)

At this point, I have discussed storage and encoding across episodic and semantic memory. However, the differences in regard to retrieval are perhaps most interesting. Two theses emerge in regard to retrieval. First, Tulving explains, “the act of retrieval from either system may, and usually is, entered as an episode into episodic memory. Retrieval as feedback [my emphasis] into the episodic system may lead to changes in the contents, and the retrievability of these contents, of episodic memory.” (OM 391) Second, Tulving provides two lists of sentences, the first pertaining to episodic memory, and the second pertaining to semantic memory. Summarizing the first (episodic) list Tulving says the sentences describe autobiographical events “describable in terms of their perceptible dimensions or attributes and in terms of their temporal-spatial relations.” (OM 386-387) Summarizing the second (semantic) list Tulving writes, “Although some of these statements refer to the speaker’s ‘knowledge’ rather than his ‘remembering,’ all of them can be regarded as memory statements in that their content clearly depends upon information entered into the semantic memory [my emphasis].” (OM 387) In other
words, “remember responses reflect retrieval from the episodic system and know responses reflect retrieval from the semantic system.” For ease of reference, I will refer to the first thesis as the “retrieval as feedback thesis” and the second thesis as the “all knowledge is grounded in semantic memory thesis.”

These two theses are worth a brief second look here. The “all knowledge is grounded in semantic memory” thesis suggests that to set out looking for origins first necessitates semantic memory for an awareness of “origins.” Yet, said semantic memory, as evidenced by the “retrieval as feedback” thesis, itself stands upon a ground of episodic memory. Though both episodic and semantic memory processes are considered explicit, rather than implicit, it turns out episodic memory is more closely associated with the dimension of sensory origins. Hence, “an analysis of the power of memory,” to borrow Stewart’s phrasing from above, discloses a difference in kind and a retrieval process – with a sort of closure upon itself – that frustrates further examination into its ground. Put another way, engaging episodic memory changes it, and, therefore, attempting to represent it inevitably misrepresents it. This should remind you of Derrida’s logic of supplementation, i.e. the movement of Différence – I will further explicate these associations below.

§6 Procedural v. Declarative – Related to each of the previous distinctions discussed thus far is the distinction between procedural and declarative memory. Whereas both episodic and semantic were explicit memory processes, the two “major forms” of implicit memory are “priming” and “procedural memory.” I discuss procedural memory here, and priming below. Procedural memory is often coupled with

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and distinguished from the explicit memory process called declarative memory. Procedural memory “generally refers to memory for knowing how to do something. The knowledge in procedural memories is not accessible to awareness, but rather is manifested only through performance of a task.” Hence, as procedural memory is implicit memory for knowing how, and declarative memory is explicit memory for knowing that and what.

A relevant example from philosophy, the distinction between “knowing how” and “knowing that,” was famously discussed by Gilbert Ryle (1900-1976) in his *The Concept of Mind*. To begin with, then, perhaps Ryle is instructive in noting, “Efficient practice precedes the theory of it.” Ryle’s colorful example,

> The cleverness of the clown may be exhibited in his tripping and tumbling. He trips and tumbles just as clumsy people do, except that he trips and tumbles on purpose and after much rehearsal and at the golden moment and where the children can see him and so as not to hurt himself.

Ryle is concerned to indicate a difference between “knowing how and knowing that” where “knowing how” is skillful and “knowing that” is factual – “learning how or improving in ability is not like learning that or acquiring information [Ryle’s emphasis].” Similarly, procedural memory pertains to how a task is performed and declarative memory pertains to the task’s identity.

Théodule Ribot, noted above, is credited with distinguishing between skill memory or procedural memory and declarative memory in his 1881 publication *Les Maladies de la Mémoire*. According to Ribot, “In cases belonging to this morbid group

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neither the habits nor skill in any handicraft, such as sewing … disappears. The
destruction of memory in these cases affects only its highest and most instable forms,
those personal in character…” Seeking a physiological explanation and in discussing
the degeneration of memory and amnesia, Ribot – given its relevancy I quote him at
length – remarked,

This law, however universal it may be with regard to
memory, is but a particular expression of a still more
general law – a biological law. It is a fact well known in
biology that the structures that are latest formed are the first
to degenerate. … Hughlings Jackson [1835-1911] was the
first to prove in detail that the higher, complex, voluntary
functions of the nervous system disappear first, and that the
lower, simple, general and automatic functions disappear
latest. We have seen both these facts verified in the
dissolution of the memory: what is new dies out earlier than
what is old, what is complex earlier that what is simple.
The law we have formulated is therefore only the
psychological expression of a law of life.\footnote{Ribot, The Diseases of Memory, 482.}

was unable to form long-term memories also describes the distinction between procedural
Mistook His Wife for a Hat and Other Clinical Tales published by Oliver Sacks in
1970,\footnote{Oliver Sacks. The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat and Other Clinical Tales, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1970).} H.M. was able to learn skills without remembering the practice it took to require

\footnote{Théodule Ribot, The Diseases of Memory, J. Fitzgerald tr. (New York: Humboldt Library of Popular Science Literature, v. 46, 1883), 473.}
the skill.\textsuperscript{668} Also, the distinction was further popularized by John R. Anderson with his 
*The Architecture of Cognition* published in 1983.\textsuperscript{669}

To sum: analogously, the movement from knowing how to knowing that is like the movement from procedural memory to declarative memory, and both involve a change in register. Whereas procedural memory is implicit, declarative is explicit. Furthermore, just as episodic memory – the retrieval as feedback thesis – resisted full explication of its ground, the further requirement of register change makes procedural memory even more resistant to explication. Lastly, it is worth noting, as its name should imply, procedural memory is tied up with performance.

§7 Chunking – In 1956 George Armitage Miller published a now famous paper titled, “The Magical Number Seven, plus or minus two: Some limits on our capacity for processing information.”\textsuperscript{670} Now, Miller’s article seems most concerned with common notions of memory or memory at higher levels of elaboration, e.g. long-term memory and semantic memory. However, given the historical significance of Miller’s publication, I will mention two relevant notions which he discusses – recoding and chunking. According to Miller, “The process of memorizing may be simply the formation of chunks, or groups of items that go together.”\textsuperscript{671} He distinguishes between chunks and bits; bits compose chunks. The distinction is important because it was in this way that he was able to discuss recoding. Miller was concerned to understand how mnemonists are able to remember and recall items in such large numbers. He notes,
It is a little dramatic to watch a person get 40 binary digits in a row and then repeat them back without error. However, if you think of this merely as a mnemonic trick for extending the memory span, you will miss the more important point that is implicit in nearly all such mnemonic devices. The point is that recoding is an extremely powerful weapon for increasing the amount of information that we can deal with. In one form or another we use recoding constantly in our daily behavior [my emphasis]. 672

Here, Miller is approaching what will 20 years later be known as a theory of elaboration – noted above. Recoding, then, amounts to receiving bits of input – always already in the form of a code – and changing the code by chunking the bits. Also, his comments on recoding may be seen as a nascent form of the “Generation Effect,” which suggests information is more easily remembered if it is generated – paraphrased/elaborated – rather than simply encountered – heard/read. 673,674

His paper receives its title because he suggests the optimal number of chunks is 7 ± 2. Though recent research suggests Miller may have been overly optimistic with his optimal number,675,676,677 his publication is still considered highly influential in popularizing the notions of recoding and chunking and helping to usher in the Levels of Processing Paradigm with its focus on levels of elaboration. More to the point, by way of chunking and working memory, I will appropriate Derrida’s movement of Différance as shorthand reference.

§8 Working Memory – Though there may be dispute as to who was the first person in print to use the term “working” with the term “memory,” credit is given to Alan D. Baddeley for congealing the first model of working memory and popularizing the term. Together Baddeley and Graham J.L. Hitch published “Working Memory” in 1974. Subsequently in 2000 Baddeley added a component to his model of working memory. I provide illustrations below when dealing more extensively with working memory. At this point, it is important to recognize the inception of the working memory model, and the motivation which led to its construction. That motivation derived from the need to incorporate ideas of agency, attention, and autonomy – in other words, “control,” – into the memory models which were ever increasing in specificity. According to Baddeley, he and Hitch were motivated to rethink short-term memory as more than just a storage system.

§9 Context Dependence – In 1932 Frederic Charles Bartlett published *Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology*. In the “Introduction” to the 1987 publication, professor of psychology and neuroscience Walter Kintsch notes, “If I had to name the three historically most influential publications in the psychological study of memory, I would pick Ebbinghaus’s ‘On Memory,’ in 1885, Bartlett’s *Remembering* in 1932, and [George Armitage] Miller’s ‘Magical Number Seven’ in

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Bartlett’s studies of memory are largely considered influential given his concern to look into everyday uses of memory. As such, Bartlett’s reading of the relation between “interest” and memory accentuated the everydayness of memory. According to Bartlett,

\[ T \]hough we may still talk of traces, there is no reason in the world for regarding these as made complete, stored up somewhere, and then re-excited at some much later moment. The traces that our evidence allows us to speak of are interest-determined, interest-carried traces. They live with our interests and with them they change.\(^{684}\)

In this way, Bartlett provided an understanding of memory as “contextual” – context as memory cue and memory as dependent upon context.\(^{685}\) This may be seen as part of the general trend – which I am illustrating with this section of the dissertation – to think of memory less in terms of its being stable than in terms of its being stabilizing. Put another way, the trend has been since 1960 to think of memory less as stagnant storehouse and more as a lively autonomic process.

At a higher level of abstraction, context dependence, like mood and state dependence below, may be thought of under the rubric of cue dependence. In other words, put generally, something – some cue – sparks memory’s retrieval bringing forth both implicit and explicit information in the form of senses, images, and symbols. Put figuratively, it is “To see a world in a grain of sand, and heaven in a wild flower, hold infinity in the palm of your hand, and eternity in an hour.”\(^{686}\) Cue related retrieval may be both involuntary and voluntary, and it may be conscious or unconscious.

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\(^{683}\) Bartlett. *Remembering*, xi.

\(^{684}\) Bartlett. *Remembering*, 211-2


§10 Mood and State Memory Dependency – Though closely related to memory’s relation with context, it is worth noting memory’s relation with moods and states. 687 Sometimes referred to as mood or state dependent memory, ideas regarding such memory have been popular at least since the work of Ivan P. Pavlov and Sigmund Freud noted above. 688 To employ a trope which will break down later, I might describe the difference between context and mood or state dependent memory as one of degree relative to the objective and subjective aspects of experience. It should be common knowledge that the animals whom the behaviorists studied were kept in states of deprivation, i.e. starved. 689 Pairing tones with the presentation of sustaining stimuli of which the subjects were deprived – e.g. food or water – resulted in pleasure, among other things. 690 In this way, animals in the deprived states remembered what to do in order to reduce the deprivation. 691

Arguably, noticing that memories may persist dependent upon the episodes of various moods and states to which they refer led Freud to hypothesize a mechanism resembling an unconscious homunculus, i.e. “the Unconscious,” to control recall and retrieval of memories. 692 For example, A.A. Sharp in 1938 published “An Experimental test of Freud’s doctrine of the relation of hedonic tone to memory revival.” 693 Sharp notes, “Freud assumes that unpleasant experiences are less likely to be revived than are

neutral experiences and neutral experiences less likely than pleasant experiences.”\textsuperscript{694} Sharp and his experimental results concurred with the idea that unpleasant memories may be more difficult to recall than pleasant memories.\textsuperscript{695} Hence, you can recognize the state and mood dependent aspects of memory.

§11 Saccadic Memory – It is in understanding the physiological relation between the fundamental elements of sensation and persistence that memory, perhaps, first appears as a principle of animation. The term which captures those two fundamental elements is “saccade.” Saccades are one of the two ways humans can voluntarily move their eyes; the other being “smooth pursuit.”\textsuperscript{696} Smooth contrasts nicely with jerk or twitch, and smooth pursuit, for example, can be noticed by following the trajectory of a ball as it falls through the air. Otherwise, if you intend to move your eyes in an arching trajectory through the air without an object to pursue, you will not be able to move them smoothly.\textsuperscript{697,698} That is, you will notice a twitching.

Historians Nicholas Wade and Benjamin Tatler credit the origin of the word to Louis Émile Javal.\textsuperscript{699} According to Wade and Tatler,

The word saccade derives from the old French saquer or sachier meaning “to pull” and at the time of Javal, translated as “jerk” or “twitch.” It was first used by Rabelais in the 16\textsuperscript{th} Century to refer to certain rapid movements of a horse…\textsuperscript{700}

\textsuperscript{694} Sharp, “An Experimental Test of Freud’s Doctrine,” 295.
\textsuperscript{700} Wade and Tatler, The Moving Tablet of the Eye, 140.
Saccadic eye movements, then, refer to twitches and jerks of the eye. Though sometimes differently termed in the literature the three types of saccade are referred to as “prosaccades,” “antisaccades,” and “memory-guided saccades.” The fact that one type of saccade is named memory-guided seems to imply the other saccades are somehow separate from memory. However, both of the two voluntary eye movements: smooth pursuit and saccadic are rooted in memory, though in different ways – so too with all three types of saccades.

Memory-guided saccades are referred to as such because they describe moving the eye back to the location where the no longer present stimuli presented. In this way, memory-guided saccades are rooted in memory since memory is required for the eye to return to a previous location in the absence of the stimuli. Prosaccades refer to targeting an object, especially when the object’s trajectory is erratic or its velocity is too great for smooth pursuit tracking. The perennial example is hitting a baseball.

Within less than half a second the batter has to judge the trajectory of the ball and formulate a properly aimed and timed stroke. The accuracy required is a few cm in space and a few ms in time. Half a second gives time for one or at the most two saccades, and the speeds involved preclude smooth pursuit for much of the ball’s flight. How do practitioners of these sports use their eyes to get the information they need? … anticipation. … The saccade that effects this is interesting in that it is not driven by a “stimulus,” but by the player’s estimate of the location of something that has yet to happen.

The anticipation involved strengthens with practice because the prosaccadic movement is rooted in memory. With the repetition of practice the memory of where and when to jerk the eyes in anticipation strengthens and refines the movement. The same goes for the prosaccadic movement in more everyday situations like washing hands. For example, when you wash your hands your eyes jerk about toward the soap, water, on/off handle, etc. and not just before you reach for the entity in question, so while you lather and perform one activity your memory is accumulating information for what might eventually come next through prosaccadic eye movements.

Lastly, antisaccades correct for the reflexive twitching which would otherwise occur, this is commonly seen in activities such as reading and scene recognition. Reading shows a complex mixture of antisaccades, prosaccades, and memory-guided saccades – e.g. focusing on a word or phrase, skimming a section, and returning to an earlier passage. Similarly, when we come to recognize a scene it is not as if we stare straight ahead and the picture of the scene is wholly consumed for us to remember. Rather, we construct the scene in our memory by combining a series of twitches – all

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three types of saccades again – and the recipe including which combination of saccades to use is determined by the connection between your purpose for gazing at the scene and the amount of practice you have at scene recognition. That is, memory is involved in the task on multiple levels – higher purpose driven recall and maintenance and lower level twitching. And, both of these levels go toward illustrating the manner in which memory controls eye function.

In fact, the constructed scene engages memory in yet another way. The constructed scene requires what is referred to as “transsaccadic memory.” Just as its name implies, transsaccadic memory is memory held across saccades constructing a scene for perception out of the recipe of eye twitches involved. Research shows that following the eye movements of two different people, telling one to memorize as much as possible in a scene for later recall, and telling the other to search for a specific object in the scene yields different patterns of saccades.

§12 Multiple Object Tracking – Saccadic activity has both costs and benefits for being alert and aware in the world. The cost is “change blindness” and the benefit is

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“Multiple Object Tracking (MOT).” Though I will discuss change blindness more extensively below, it is valuable to note a few salient points here. According to Alva Noë in *Out of Our Heads: Why You are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons from the Biology of Consciousness,* “Change blindness was first discussed in print in a series of articles” from 1996 to 1997. The seminal article of which concluded: “Thus, just as the perception of a scene is mediated by a rapidly-shifting fovea of limited area, so is it also mediated by a rapidly-shifting attentional mechanism limited in the number of items it can handle at any time.”

There are two different types of change blindness. On the one hand, you are blind to stimuli appearing between saccades. On the other hand, if throughout the process of saccadic scene recognition, aspects of the scene are changed faster than the eye can attend to the changes, then you are blind to the changes. The “flicker” phenomenon being exploited here is the same which allows for a sense of flowing action when watching a film or the sense of animation when flipping through a book which has different images drawn on the pages. As this section on MOT and the above section on saccades together should show, it is as if the speed of becoming is faster than your memory can process, so you see a world (instead of becoming) and you are vulnerable to change blindness. For a collection of excellent color graphics representing saccadic

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724 R.A. Rensink, J.K. O’Regan and J.J. Clark, “To see or not to see: the need for attention to perceive changes in scenes,” *Psychological Science,* 8.5, (1997), 368.
725 This will be clear(er) by the end of the dissertation.
processes and discussing change blindness see “Visual Stability Based on Remapping of Attention Pointers.”

Now, a benefit indeed of saccadic activity is Multiple Object Tracking (MOT). MOT has received attention in part because, easily noticeable in humans, MOT is evidently difficult to reproduce in artificial intelligence, i.e. in a robot. According to Susan Carey, MOT originated when in 1988 Zenon Pylyshyn and Ron W. Storm published “Tracking Multiple Independent Targets.” In their publication, Pylyshyn and Storm coin a key neologism. They speak of a FINST and FINSTing, and they metaphorically describe a FINST as a “sticky index.” In my opinion, the best way to understand MOT is to discuss FINSTs first, and an excellent account of FINSTing may be found in Lana M. Trick’s “A Theory of Enumeration that Grows out of a General Theory of Vision: Subitizing, Counting, and FINSTs” found in The Nature and Origins of Mathematical Skills.

Trick uses Pylyshyn and Storm’s FINST model to explain an experimental result which is – no doubt – commonly seen in everyday experiences. Examining the task of “enumeration,” i.e. assigning a numerical value to describe the quantity of objects being considered, Trick points out that it takes much less time, and you have a much higher rate of accuracy, when enumerating a set of objects less than 5 in number. For each object

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up to four enumerating takes between 40-120 ms increasing at a constant rate up to four. In other words, one object may take 40 to 120 milliseconds; two objects may take 80 to 240 milliseconds; etc. However, once the quantity is higher than four, the rate remains constant but the average time span becomes 250 to 350 milliseconds per object. Following a 1949 study, Trick called the faster process “subitizing” and the slower process “counting.” (TEG 258-259) According to Trick FINST stands for “Fingers of INSTantiation” which “are tokens that are used to individuate a small number of items before the serial, area by area processing that characterizes spatial attention [emphases added].” (TEG 257)

Whereas counting involves “moving the attentional focus from location to location in the image,” subitizing is the enumeration that results from “moving up” the trajectory of experience from iconic memory construction toward a semantic level of processing. (TEG 257) The “fingers” metaphor is used here to capture the idea of indexical “pointing,” the fingers are “sticky” in that the fingers seem to remember or “stick” with the objects – in this case being enumerated up to 4 –, and “instantiation” in that the fingers themselves are representative of the quantity in question. (TMI 181) Do not forget what I said above about scene recognition. Certainly, there are many things in your field of vision which may be enumerated, and it is in this way that FINSTs may be seen as aspects of memory. Pylyshyn and Storm are careful to note the following,

FINSTing can occur independently and in parallel at several places in the visual field. In this sense it is a

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preattentive operation, although the selection of some
subset of these automatically indexed places for further
processing or tracking may involve deliberate cognitive
intervention. … [Moreover, if] the hypothesis that we can
assign a limited number of “sticky” indexes (FINSTs) to
features in a visual display is correct, subjects should be
able to track a subset of visually identical and randomly
moving objects, providing the target subset is somehow
identified at the start of the trial [my emphasis]. (TMI 181)

In other words, memory must maintain that you are actually performing a task so that
your visual field may be pre-attentively organized for the purpose of tracking or
enumerating.735 Pre-attentively should be emphasized here because – as this chapter will
repeatedly indicate – these processes are implicit and bypass the need to hypothesize an
intending ego. This is tricky because it seems like intention is required to “go into” the
visual field and, for example, subitize. Yet, these pre-attentive activities cannot be
directly controlled by intention; though their efficiency can be enhanced, i.e. improved
with practice.736

I want to push this a little further before moving on. Imagine placing on your eye
a contact lens with a grid on it so that looking around would be like looking through
transparent graph paper. In so far as the contact lens would move with your eye, the
saccadic movements would jerk the graph along with it in a kind of “frame-dragging.”
Were you wearing glasses, however, with a grid on the lenses of the glasses, saccadic
movements could be tracked by numbering each of the grid boxes and indicating where
the retina – specifically the central line of sight, i.e. the fovea – passes at t1, t2, etc. An
interesting aspect of visual sensation may be described within this context. The grid on
the lenses, for example, would allow discussion of North, East, West, and South

735 In Lockean language it is as if memory must organize primary qualities out of flux, and in a Kantian
sense this is the beginning of object formation.
736 C. Green and D Bavelier. “Enumeration versus multiple object tracking: The case of action video game
movements “within” the grid. What is more, researchers describe an inside and outside of the grid. In other words, still maintaining this thought experiment of looking through a grid, transsaccadic memory is capable of forming an “icon” either “inside” the grid or “outside” the grid. This distinction is also referred to as retinotopic space v. non-retinotopic space or retinotopic v. spatiotopic.\(^\text{737}\) Moreover, “[w]e might think of these two alternative ways of representing the visual world as being either world centered, with the map being invariant to where one fixates at any one moment, or eye centered, with the map representing the moment-by-moment location of the item on the retina.”\(^\text{738}\)

Visual memory – implicit due to its operation below a threshold of awareness – tracks object movement and organizes environmental shifting seamlessly between these “ways of representing the visual world” in such a way that the object’s actual appearance alternates between these maps without your awareness. Referring to the trajectory of an object alternating between maps Pylyshyn at times speaks of a “space-time worm.”\(^\text{739}\)

In my opinion, here is where MOT is most interesting. MOT is capable of tracking objects across the distinction between retinotopic and non-retinotopic space. What is more, this level of sensation is more like raw memory than it is like sensation. What I mean by this is that the memory of what to track needs to be maintained, and it is not until after the tracking of multiple objects that the person, for example, tracking the objects is able to perform certain other tasks on the objects, such as counting the number of objects that were just being tracked. Such insights have led researchers such as John


Kevin O’Regan to discuss “The World as an Outside Iconic Memory.” Hence, consider the following example: while I was sitting in the Jardin du Luxembourg I decided to attempt to see, so to speak, what these researchers are discussing. It was possible for me to maintain visual contact with an area of flowers, track the flight of a butterfly and the crawling of another insect all the while without fixing my fovea to any of the moving “objects.” I report here, of course, on just the visions I was experiencing, but I was also aware of the sounds, colors, smells, and feel, i.e. the breeze and the pleasantness of being in the Parisian garden.

Another interesting feature of these micro-aspects of vision, despite the saccadic activity across retinotopic and non-retinotopic space, movement sensed visually is not “smeared.” Researchers have discovered what they believe to be a difference in time signature between non-retinotopic and retinotopic space, and – most remarkably – these time signature differences derive from the activity of the working short-term store of visual memory, i.e. iconic memory.

In their words,

Although the visual system can achieve a coarse classification of its inputs in a relatively short time, the synthesis of qualia-rich and detailed percepts can take substantially more time. If these prolonged computations were to take place in a retinotopic space, moving objects would generate extensive smear. However, under normal viewing conditions, moving objects appear relatively sharp and clear, suggesting that a substantial part of visual short-term memory takes place at a non-retinotopic locus. …

[O]ur results indicate that the visual system can accomplish

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temporal integration of information while avoiding smear by breaking off sensory memory into fast and slow components that are implemented in retinotopic and non-retinotopic loci, respectively [my emphases].

Notice, the association of visual short-term memory with the non-retinotopic space corresponds to the space of FINSTing discussed above by Pylyshyn, Storm, and Trick. Here, then, beyond the fact that repetition and practice – not intention – have the capacity to strengthen within limits this aspect of sensation there is more evidence for the fact that this process is a process of memory. It is in this way that memory is the condition for the possibility of being aware and alert in the world. Despite the speed of things in the world, the eye is able to buffer against smear by creating an icon through a twofold process of – consistent with the Levels of Processing (LOP) Paradigm noted above – slower maintenance coupled with faster elaboration in the formation of a visual icon which is itself maintained by memory for the possibility of synthesis into a semantic judgment. In sum, the physiology itself requires organization and direction. Whereas, the latter of the two seems more difficult to recognize as a function of memory, organization and direction are inseparable at the level of visual apprehension because what is there and what is there for you to see are one and the same – a construction of iconic memory.

§13 Priming – Priming is, in my opinion, one of the most fascinating aspects of psychology and of the mind. Here, I will discuss different types of priming, indicate the different aspects of memory in which priming occurs, and provide an example of conceptual priming. In regard to breadth of publication, number of memory related experimental discoveries, and influence, two of the most famous contemporary memory

researchers are (in alphabetical order) Daniel L. Schacter and Endel Tulving. Fortunately, of the five articles they have written together, two are on the topic of priming. One could scarcely do better than these two articles in gaining an understanding of priming. I will draw largely from their work, supplementing as needed with more recent research, to describe priming. The first of these two articles was published in the January 1990 issue of *Science*. The second article is an entry on priming in the *Encyclopedia of Neuroscience* published in 1992. As noted above, priming is considered one of the two major types of implicit memory – with procedural memory as the other. According to Schacter and Tulving, “Priming is a type of implicit memory; it does not involve explicit or conscious recollection of any previous experiences.” (P&M 301) As implicit it is best known by its effects, and may best be described metaphorically as an aspect of memory “flowing” beneath the threshold of awareness. This flowing implicit aspect of memory is influential in experience, and is sometimes described as the “thread” in models which speak of “threaded” or “weaved” cognition. In this way discussions of priming speak toward accounting for the contingent connections which populate the flow of experience.

It is important to begin with a few terminological comments. According to Schacter and Tulving, “The juxtaposition of its surmised ubiquity in human cognition and the lateness of its discovery, together with its nonconscious nature, have inspired an

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intense experimental and theoretical interest in priming.” When discussing priming which occurs outside of a laboratory setting or in a laboratory setting, the language may slightly vary. Priming outside a laboratory setting may be referred to as “repetition priming” or “automatic priming,” and priming in a laboratory setting may be referred to as “repetition priming” or “direct priming.” Generally speaking, repetition priming is synonymous with practice. Now, the binary opposite of direct priming is “indirect priming” or “subliminal priming.” Whereas it is appropriate to speak of subliminal priming occurring outside of a laboratory, subliminal priming is not the binary opposite of automatic priming. In regard to repetition priming, researchers speak of positive and negative priming. Generally speaking, positive and negative priming are synonymous with activation and inhibition respectively – I will clarify this further below. Priming pertains to affection, sensation, perception, conation (desire or

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will, conception, and semantic memory (P&M 304) – I will clarify any obscurity as to why conception and semantic both appear here below. Moreover, “Priming effects are ubiquitous in sensation, perception, comprehension, and action.” In fact, priming can also be used to impact decision-making processes. Lastly, in a laboratory setting, researchers speak of “forward” and “backward” priming. In particular, researchers speak of “prime” and “target” when discussing conceptual and semantic priming experiments – though the word “target” is used variously and loosely, especially in non-conceptual and non-semantic priming experiments. Hence, there are different types of priming.

Before providing an example of semantic priming, it is useful to comment on the conceptual/semantic distinction. On the one hand, conceptual refers to the distinction between perceptual and conceptual, and in this way can describe the difference between priming the perceptual shape of a word – e.g. as drawn with ink or captured in the font – and the conceptual meaning of the word. Furthermore, “Conceptual repetition priming

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is largely unaffected by changes in the perceptual qualities of a stimulus between study
and test.”765 That is, presenting stimuli in different fonts, for example, alters the
perceptual, but not the conceptual, priming. On the other hand, the conceptual/semantic
distinction refers to the episodic/semantic distinction in that conceptual is the wider term
this is reminiscent of Kant’s use of the term concept to refer to the understanding broadly
designated. So, conceptual encompasses both episodic and semantic, and the semantic
merely encompasses the semantic.766 To familiarize the reader with priming, I discuss an
example here of semantic priming.

In a semantic priming experiment two words may be related as “prime” to
“target,” and the relation may be asymmetrical. That is, whereas A may tend to bring to
mind B, B may not tend to bring to mind A as often or as quickly. “Backward priming
refers to the situation in which the association from prime to target is weak, but the
association from target to prime is strong.”767 This may be changed through repetition
priming, i.e. practice. One is reminded here of the Pascal quote with which I began Part
II, “Habit is a second nature that destroys the first. But what is nature? Why is habit not
natural? I am very much afraid that nature itself is only a first habit, just as habit is a
second nature.”768 For example, when presented with the prime “baby” English speakers
may arrive at the target “stork.” However, the relation is stronger for the prime “stork” to
arrive at the target “baby.” In an asymmetrically primed relation, then, when prime to

765 Timothy P. McNamara and Jon B. Holbrook. “Semantic Memory and Priming,” Handbook of
Psychology: Experimental Psychology, Irving B. Weiner, Alice F. Healy, Donald K. Freeheim, and Robert
W. Proctor, eds. (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2003), 468.
766 Timothy P. McNamara and Jon B. Holbrook. “Semantic Memory and Priming,” Handbook of
Psychology: Experimental Psychology, Irving B. Weiner, Alice F. Healy, Donald K. Freeheim, and Robert
W. Proctor, eds. (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2003), 466.
767 Timothy P. McNamara and Jon B. Holbrook. “Semantic Memory and Priming,” Handbook of
Psychology: Experimental Psychology, Irving B. Weiner, Alice F. Healy, Donald K. Freeheim, and Robert
W. Proctor, eds. (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2003), 459.
768 Pascal. Pensées, 32.
target is weaker than target to prime (e.g. baby-stork v. stork-baby), the relation is referred to as “backward priming,” and it is referred to as “forward priming” when prime to target is stronger than target to prime (e.g. stork-baby v. baby-stork).\textsuperscript{769}

Now, you might ask what the benefit of this distinction may be in so far as it is relative to whichever term you take to be prime – why not just switch words? The distinction is valuable because through repetition priming, the asymmetrical relation can be made symmetrical, and the distinction helps in describing the change. What is more, the asymmetry can even be reversed through repetition priming – turning backward priming into forward priming.\textsuperscript{770} In this way, given a specific prime-target relation, a subject who enters a laboratory with backward priming can be primed to leave with forward priming.\textsuperscript{771} The process might involve training the subject to associate baby to stork and stork to pork, for example.\textsuperscript{772} Hence, you can see the relation with the Pascal quote.

Whereas the above example uses one whole word as prime, word fragments or strings of words may also be used. For example, when you see the following word fragment: ele___, what word “comes to mind”? Without controlled priming before being presented with the above word fragment, it is still appropriate to say that whatever word comes to mind you were primed to see that word. No matter how many times you

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{772} I should, perhaps, note: this is not behaviorism. Though an extensive discussion of why priming is not an example of behaviorism would be outside my current scope of discussion, it is, perhaps, sufficient to note there is no overt reward or conditioning involved. Rather, priming illustrates the result of unadulterated exposure to stimulation with or without reward.
\end{itemize}
look at the word fragment, the word which comes to mind (unless of course for you “ele” is a word, or has specific meaning, e.g. your initials, etc.) is not actually there. So, why do some readers think of the word “element” and other readers think of the word “elephant”? The answer has to do with the chain of events, perhaps both remote and recent, prior to the encounter with the word fragment.

A, perhaps, more explicit illustration of semantic priming then can be seen when the prime is a string of meaningful words. For example, below you will find two lists of words both of which contain the same number of words and both of which begin and end with the same word. After each list of words ask yourself what word(s) or thought(s) come to mind.

List 1: Apple, Teacher, Chalkboard, Recess, Yellow:

List 2: Apple, Grapes, Orange, Pear, Yellow:

Notice, the lists are not complete sentences. So, it would be artificial to speak here of “predication,” and it would be artificial to speak here of “grammar.” Often after List 1, respondents will say “bus.” Often after List 2, respondents will say, “banana” or “lemon.” A less laboratory, or controlled situation, further illustrates the work of priming: Imagine you are constantly trying to finish the sentence of the person who is talking to you. Of course, you are not the one uttering the sentence. In other words, some would differentiate between you and the speaker of the sentence by saying the speaker of the sentence possesses an “intention” (to finish the sentence in some way), and you are not aware of that intention, at least not in the same way as the speaker. Yet, at times you certainly are able to finish the sentences of others.

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773 Or, for example: “electric,” “elenchus,” or “Eleusinian Mysteries.”
774 McNamara and Holbrook. “Semantic Memory and Priming,” Handbook of Psychology, 462.
The above whole word, word fragment, string of words, and everyday sentence completion activities are examples of positive priming, and are often accounted for by discussing the manner in which – through memory – the targets were variously “activated.”\(^{775}\) Sounding a bit like a “web of belief” expounded by Willard Van Orman Quine (1908-2000),\(^{776}\) it may be suggested that given similar backgrounds (cultural or otherwise), language exposure, etc. the metaphorically “underlying connections,” labyrinths or webs of possible target words or sentences which might come next for you or your interlocutor are similar enough to allow accurate predictions of the target in question. It is as if a performative aspect of memory functions like a self-rearranging organism variously activated. Across these webs or through these labyrinths, priming is described as spreading activation or a cascade of activation where what is doing the activating is the work of priming, and what is activated is memory. In this way, when Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) noted, “When a man thinketh on anything whatsoever, his next thought after is not altogether so casual as it seems to be. Not every thought to every thought succeeds indifferently,”\(^{777}\) in his Chapter titled “Of the Consequences or Train of Imaginations,” of *Leviathan* (1651), he was already aware of priming. However, he was mistaken to deem the performance of such connecting to be an aspect of imagination. As mentioned above, as this work of priming cascades toward a target, the activation has an inhibiting effect referred to as negative priming.

Priming can be overt or covert, i.e. accomplished with the subject’s awareness of the prime or accomplished subliminally. Also, priming effects can be momentary, “they


can last at least as long as a conversation, and … some contexts triggered by conscious experience may last for years. … Even a single conscious experience may trigger a short-term change in context [e.g.] in the case of traumatic experiences the effects can last for years.”

As early as 1988 Bernard Baars had the following to say about “conscious” priming:

In general, a conscious priming event:
1[-] decreases reaction time to similar conscious events;
2[-] lowers the threshold for related material that is near the perceptual threshold, or is ambiguous, vague, fleeting, degraded, badly understood, or isolated from its surround.
...
3[-] a prime increases the likelihood of similar events emerging in memory through free association, cued recall, and recognition tasks; and
4[-] finally, a conscious prime increases the probability of actions and speech related to the priming stimulus.

Since 1988, as noted above, researchers now know the prime need not be “conscious.”

Subliminal presentation of a prime can still produce the target, i.e. though the subject remains unaware of the prime, they become aware of the target. This is shown even in the case of sensation where, “the presentation of an accessory stimulus facilitates response activation processes because of the participants enhanced level of preparation for stimulus processing.”

Still more remarkable, subjects have shown priming effects despite introduction of the prime during “anesthetic-induced unconsciousness” and “the subject does not have any post-operative memory of the priming stimuli.”

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Hence, priming is an aspect of memory which is not equipped with an “off switch.” In other words and in sum, priming spans all of the modes of memory, and priming is the activity which accounts for fluency, automaticy, or flow. Priming may be thought of then as a performative aspect of memory in so far as its “flowing” is also a “pulling along.” Memory’s feedback-control-loop is performed by priming across its modes of coding, storage, and retrieval, running through its levels of implicit and explicit memory – procedural, episodic, semantic, and autobiographical memory – spanning the trajectory of experience, e.g. affection, conation, sensation, perception, conception, and decision making.

§14 Automaticity – Fluency is generally taken to signify the faster or more efficient processing of stimuli which seems to develop from repeated processing.

Considered a landmark study regarding memory and fluency, in 1981 Larry L. Jacoby and Mark Dallas published, “On the Relationship between Autobiographical Memory and Perceptual Learning.” Fluency, much like automaticity from which I will distinguish it below, involves nonconscious aspects of memory and is found in various performances. In other words, performing a piano piece, speaking a foreign language fluently, or chewing bubblegum while riding a bike all entail a degree of nonconscious memory, and

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786 See my extensive citation of articles at the beginning of the priming section above pertaining to these aspects of experience.
the performances may be referred to as “automatic” or “fluent.” Wittgenstein is perhaps instructional here:

Isn’t it like this? First of all, people use an explanation, a chart, by looking it up; later they as it were look it up in the head and finally they work without the chart, as if it had never existed. In this last case they are playing a different game. For it isn’t as if the chart is still in the background, to fall back on; it is excluded from our game, and if I “fall back on it” I am like a blinded man falling back on the sense of touch.\(^788\)

Wittgenstein’s description is just one of the ways in which we may describe how fluency occurs. Yet, Wittgenstein’s way is appealing in that it seems to be an ordinary description of how people tend to think of developing a performance to the point of fluency.

The development of one’s performing ability up to and beyond the point of fluency can be evaluated by looking for the “effects of fluency.” Summarizing research regarding the effects of fluency on sensation and perception, Jeffrey P. Toth reports

fluency can increase the apparent fame of nonfamous names (Jacoby, Woloshyn et al., 1989), can lengthen the apparent exposure duration of a briefly flashed word (Witherspoon & Allan, 1985), [and] can lower the apparent loudness of background noise (Jacoby, Allan, Collins, & Larwill, 1988).\(^789\)

On the one hand, it seems, perhaps, odd to think of yourself or someone else as a fluent seer of X. However, and keep in mind here what was said above about priming, memory research seems to indicate given your various fluencies and primings you will experience circumstances differently than someone else. On the other hand, this idea – minus the technical terminology – seems to be almost commonplace. That is, your background


experiences, e.g. cultural or socio-economical, will influence how you respond in observably different ways in various situations from others who have had different background experiences. Furthermore, considering tasks you perform repeatedly with high frequency every day, not only are you a fluent seer of X, but you are also fluent in performing many other tasks – tasks which it would require more effort for you to enumerate than to perform. In fact the performance of these tasks may be considered “automatic.”

The difference, then, between automaticity and fluency may be thought of as a matter of degree ranging from performances least accessible to cognitive intervention to performances most accessible to cognitive intervention; automaticity tending toward performances with least potential intervention, and fluency tending toward performances with a higher degree of potential intervention. Similar to Wittgenstein’s description of fluency acquisition above,

Automaticity is attained when a skill or procedure is mastered so well that it no longer requires conscious, effortful cognitive processing. The burden on working memory is greatest in the early stages of skill development… The principle of automaticity also applies directly to working memory functions themselves. More resources are freed up as working-memory routines and strategies, such as subvocal rehearsal and chunking, become automated. In fact, chunking may be the primary process that underlies automaticity.\footnote{Milton J. Dehn. Working Memory and Academic Learning: Assessment and Intervention, (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2008), 122.}

It is important to address fluency/automaticity because the distinction – as is illustrated in the above quote – brings together three ideas: memory, performance, and control.

Working memory, as its name implies, involves the performance of tasks, and as such indicates and illustrates a degree of agency pertaining to memory. Specifying this degree
of agency pertaining to memory entails questions regarding control and questions regarding fluency and automaticity of performance. Primed with the contemporary vernacular, it is nearly impossible to broach the topic of automaticity and free-will without mentioning intention and attention. Hence, recognizing memory’s role in conation and intention is tantamount to recognizing the performative standpoint. I will address these issues below.

The perhaps most primarily philosophical issue involving fluency/automaticity pertains to what I prefer to call the myth that automaticity entails determinism. In order to address this myth, I will provide some examples to support my claim that automaticity and free-will are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Hence, automaticity is not like teaching your buddy to ride a bike and, then, having her deliver the newspaper for you. Consider that just because you are fluent in English neither means your language abilities are limitless nor does it mean that you cannot choose freely what next to say.

One way to characterize this issue, there seems to be a tension between limits and rules on the one hand, and the ability to improvise on the other hand. I like Wittgenstein’s way of characterizing this issue in *On Certainty*, §464.

My difficulty can also be shown like this: I am sitting talking to a friend. Suddenly I say: “I knew all along that you were so-and-so.” Is that really just a superfluous, though true, remark? I feel as if these words were like “Good morning” said to someone in the middle of a conversation.\(^{791}\) It is not the case that if you attempt to say “Good morning” in the middle of a conversation you will find yourself restrained by some invisible force as it were. Yet, it is as if saying “Good morning” in the middle of a conversation is like breaking an implicit rule or like taking an unusual route on a map. Perhaps the golden mean here can

be found in Alfred Korzybski famous dictum, “The map is not the territory.” Hence,
your ability to control your utterances in a verbal exchange participates somewhere
between resisting the so-called (invisible) “force of habit” and remembering you are free,
i.e. able to make utterances independent of conventional rules.

Michael S. Gazzaniga addresses this issue specifically in his book *The Ethical
Brain: The Science of our Moral Dilemmas*, specifically in the section he titled, “My
Brain Made Me Do It.” According to Gazzaniga,

> The time between the onset of the readiness potential and the moment of conscious decision-making was about 300 milliseconds. If the readiness potential of the brain begins before we are aware of making the decision to move our hand, it would appear that our brains know our decisions before we become conscious of them.  

Now, even though Gazzaniga’s use of technology is special, the argument involved here
is directly analogous to Wittgenstein’s argument against William James in *Zettel*.
According to Wittgenstein,

> William James: The thought is already complete at the beginning of the sentence. How can one know that? … [Perhaps] the intention of uttering the thought may already exist before the first word has been said. [Wittgenstein’s emphasis] … I tell someone: “I’m going to whistle you the theme …”, it is my intention to whistle it, and I already know what I am going to whistle. It is my intention to whistle the theme: have I already, in some sense, whistled it in thought?

Here, then, it is as if, Scalambrino : Gazzaniga :: Wittgenstein : James. If it were the case
that the tune had already been “whistled in thought,” then an unconscious, or perhaps
“neuronal” determinism could ensue – “our brains know our decisions before we become conscious of them.” Yet, Gazzaniga’s term “readiness potential,” which may be

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retrospectively referred to as “intention,” betrays the non-deterministic sense of the activation. Practice at whistling tunes or speaking languages leaves a speaker primed for such activities, and readiness potential refers to the spreading activation by unconscious, i.e. implicit procedural and priming, memory that prepares one for moving a hand, whistling a tune, or uttering a phrase.

Because the sight of a soccer ball may activate and ready your feet instead of your loins, a certain amount of selection and discrimination may be attributed to the unconscious, i.e. implicit, activity of memory. However, readiness potential does not mean the fully formed or polished product of the fingers or lips is somehow “in the brain.” There are two fundamental problems resulting from the type of thinking exemplified in the above James and Gazzaniga quotes. First, Gazzaniga and James may be guilty of fallacious thinking on two counts. They may be guilty of what in “Is Consciousness a Brain Process?” U.T. Place refers to as the “phenomenological fallacy,” i.e. “the mistaken idea that descriptions of the appearances of things are descriptions of the actual state of affairs in a mysterious internal environment.” And, they may be guilty of the informal (linguistic) “fallacy of division.” In other words, they reason mistakenly from the attributes of a totality to the attributes of the parts of the totality, and in doing so they level the very real difference between implicit and explicit memory. Second, their fallacy of division obscures the notion of agency sending us on a wild “ghost in the machine” chase.

As if revealing the previously unlisted address for the homunculus family, Gazzaniga bolsters his neuronal determinism by introducing what he refers to as the

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brain’s “left-hemisphere interpreter.” Describing patients with a particular brain disorder, i.e. a particular brain damage, and narrating for “the brain,” Gazzaniga explains,

The left-hemisphere interpreter would recognize that damage to nerves of the limb meant trouble for the brain and that the limb was paralyzed; however, in this case the damage occurred directly to the brain area responsible for signaling a problem in the perception of the limb, and it cannot send any information to the left-hemisphere interpreter. The interpreter, must, then, create a belief to mediate the two know facts “I can see the limb isn’t moving” and “I can’t tell that it is damaged.” When patients with this disorder are asked about their arm and why they can’t move it, they will say “It’s not mine” or “I just don’t feel like moving it” – reasonable conclusions, given the input that the left-hemisphere interpreter is receiving. The left-hemisphere is not only a master of belief creation, but it will stick to its belief system no matter what. (EB 149)

So, on the one hand, supposedly your brain is aware of the decision being made before you, i.e. consciousness, the ego, intention, or whatever term generally taken to refer to agency and control. On the other hand, the “brain creates belief,” according to Gazzaniga, which complicates matters because the brain, in essence, covers for itself. That is, Gazzaniga’s model launches an attack on free-will by suggesting your brain automatically determines your course of action, and then your brain produces lies to protect itself from being blamed for the decision(s).

The counterpoint to this thought from Gazzaniga may be found in Gordon D. Logan’s *Unintentional Thought*. According to Logan,

The conclusion that automatic processing can be controlled does not deny the existence of automaticity … Automatic processing is often facilitative, providing a path of least resistance, well worn by habit, for us to follow. The path may be difficult to resist, and it may still influence us if we
resist it, but we can resist it at will and minimize its influence.\textsuperscript{795}

The points I have decided to emphasize in Logan’s quote involve his terms: “facilitative,” “path of least resistance” and “at will” “resistance.” Logan’s account, esp. his above three terms, is reminiscent of Aristotle’s discussion of “vice” in the \textit{Nicomachean Ethics}, esp. Bk. III and Bk. VII. Both Aristotle and Logan note the importance of habit in ethical decision making. In fact, Logan’s ideas pertaining to resistance nearly echo Aristotle, and I would like to use Aristotle here along with Logan to counterpoint Gazzaniga and argue against the myth that automaticity entails determinism – emphasizing the ground of memory with each step.

In Book III Chapter I of the \textit{Nicomachean Ethics} Aristotle provides a negative definition of voluntary action. “Things that happen by force or through ignorance are thought to be involuntary (NE 1110a).” Yet, in Chapter V Aristotle explains, “Not everything that is voluntary is an object of rational choice (NE 1112a).” Squaring the above two claims, Aristotle responds to a possible objection to his account of virtue and vice as voluntary.

But suppose somebody argues: “Everyone aims at what appears good to him, but over this appearance we have no control; rather, how the end appears to each person depends on what sort of person he is. So, if each person is in some way responsible for his own state, he will also be in some way responsible for how it appears. If he is not, however, then no one will be responsible for his own wrongdoing, but he will do these things through ignorance of the end…” (NE 11141-b)

The possible objection highlights the notion of “character.” Whereas, Aristotle wants to highlight that a vicious character does not appropriate a situation in such a way as to provide a clear path to the virtuous action, he also wants to highlight that character

formation is voluntary and itself worthy of praise or blame. Aristotle responds to the possible objection noting,

virtues are voluntary (because we are in some way partly responsible for our states of character, and it is by our being the kind of people that we are that we assume such and such as our end), vices also will be voluntary; they are on the same footing. (NE 1114b)

Aristotle is able to maintain, then, that voluntariness of action is compatible with an influential locus of tendency, i.e. character, by appealing to memory, i.e. habit. In this way, virtue is not compelled; it derives from rational choice; and it proceeds from a disposition, i.e. habit, to choose virtuously (NE 1105a) – one virtuous action does not a virtuous person make.

Whereas, Logan speaks of “path of least resistance” and “at will” “resistance,” Aristotle speaks of “continence” and “incontinence.” Yet, both acknowledge automaticity as an influential ground determined by memory in regard to voluntary actions. Moreover, the malleability of this automaticity and the effects of training indicate though automaticity may range from obligatory to facilitative, it does not necessitate determinism. Even the feeling of being “dragged about,” Aristotle suggests, comes more from ignorance than from physical mechanisms beyond our control. It turns out the philosophical study of ethics has value even if no ethical theory can be “proven true.” As a sort of “way of seeing” defense for ethics, seeing a situation so as to be able to consider a best possible ethical action requires the automaticity and priming which come from the study of ethics. Hence, in experiencing a situation, automaticity provides a path of least resistance; recollection of knowledge regarding such situations allows for deliberation; and, performing – a voluntary action in relation to the situation – itself

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796 Cf. (NE Bk. VII).
requires the synthesis of the perceived situation with the stored knowledge, and just as
children are not born rational deliberators, this synthesis requires practice.

Is it the case then, that there are no strict constraints, i.e. a constraint that you
cannot – upon encountering it – immediately overcome with will? No, in fact, the
constraint your will cannot immediately overcome, i.e. the, perhaps, most important
constraint, is the constraint of your memory. *Stimuli do not speak for themselves*, i.e.
“automaticity is not driven by stimuli separately from skills.”\(^797\) If you are not trained or
prepared to perform an action, then your will cannot overcome the limit of your memory.
This may be thought of, for example, in terms of muscle memory and conceptual
memory. To hearken back to the Wittgenstein example, if you have never been exposed
to a foreign language, then though you can say “Good morning” in the middle of a
conversation, you cannot say, for example, “*Guten Tag*” or “*Bon jour.*” Hence, some
constraints can be broken, e.g. “Good morning,” others cannot, e.g. 非正 & 记忆.\(^798\)

§15 Retroactive Change – Retroactive memory change is quite simple to describe,
and it is equally as easily overlooked as a mechanism of memory. Suppose you have
some experience, and if you remember it at all, you believe some account of your
experience to be true. You believe the account to be true because you learned it as such.
Or, perhaps you are ignorant of its actual truth value, but it “sounds” accurate to you. In
either case, suppose you later learn differently, either by experiencing for yourself or
being persuaded by a different account. For a concrete example, perhaps you experience
the failure of your telephone to work, and you arrive at some account of its failure to

\(^797\) Larry L. Jacoby, Diane Ste-Marie, and Jeffrey P. Toth. “Redefining Automaticity: Unconscious
influences, awareness, and control,” *Attention, Selection, Awareness, and Control: A tribute to Donald
Broadbent*, Alan D. Baddeley and Lawrence Weiskrantz, eds. (London: Oxford University Press, 1993),
261.

\(^798\) This example, of course, only works if you have not learned to read Chinese.
work. What is most important to note here is that, regardless of whether any of the accounts in question are true or can even ever be proven true, the changes described above occur within your memory. Furthermore, these changes are referred to as “retroactive changes” because you are retroactively changing the content of your memory. Whereas, more specifically it may be said you have discovered the truth or are learning from your mistake, more generally, it should not be overlooked that the retroactive changes take place in memory. Looking at the process with a more technical lens uncovers the processes of “consolidation,” “retroactive inhibition” or “perseveration,” and “retrograde facilitation.”

In 1900 Müller and Pilzecker, noted above, published Experimental Contributions to the Science of Memory introducing the notion of perseveration to account for “retroactive inhibition” when learning. What is important regarding retroactive inhibition is what relates it to the notion of consolidation. Müller and Pilzecker showed experimentally that memory continues to work beyond the intention to remember information. In other words, what is referred to as a period of consolidation occurs after the period of exposure to the information which was intended to be remembered. Consolidation may be thought of, then, as the movement from short-term memory to long-term memory, and, as such, may be enhanced with elaborative rehearsal.\textsuperscript{799} Exerting an amount of effort during the period of consolidation toward other mental tasks inhibits the consolidation, retroactively as it were, of the to-be-remembered information from short-term memory to long-term memory.\textsuperscript{800}

Looking back to automaticity for a moment. Whereas, automaticity is tied up in the notion of obligatory memory, i.e. encoding and retrieval, storage is dependent upon rehearsal. This is tantamount to saying that to which you are exposed is always already being taken up into short term memory, as if memory has this obligation, and has the further potential to be stored long-term depending upon consolidation. Retroactive inhibition, then, refers to the inhibition or disruption of consolidation; by continuing your exposure, short-term and working memory may be overloaded and fail to consolidate information to long-term storage. So, notice that memory continues to work beyond the encounter with the to-be-remembered information, and memory consolidation may be retroactively inhibited.

In 1932, then, Edward Lee Thorndike (1874-1949) published *The Fundamentals of Learning*. Thorndike was concerned not with inhibiting memory consolidation but with enhancing it. In what hearkens back to the studies noted above regarding mood and memory, Thorndike experimentally illustrated “retrograde facilitation” by providing rewards during “the critical post-encoding period.” These rewards – emotions and pleasures – helped facilitate consolidation. In other words, grammar school repetition coupled with praise should lead to a further solidification of habits and long-term storage of information. The rewards occur after the exposure to the to-be-remembered information. Hence, the enhancing action is retroactive. The points I hope to stress most of all by mentioning retroactive memory change: first, changes and corrections in beliefs systems are changes taking place within memory; second, memory continues to work beyond the intention to remember information.

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Attention/Intention as a Process of Working Memory – A new reading is emerging in the 21st century which thinks attention and intention as grounded in and deriving from working memory. The claim is that working memory is the condition for the possibilities of attention and intention. Wittgenstein states the problem roughly in his Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology (§837), “But where does memory belong, and where attention [Wittgenstein’s emphases]?”

To begin with, the idea of attention as a spotlight into the world has been eroding for some time now. The idea first gave way to the idea of multiple spotlights into the world, and then to the idea of multiple spotlights into an image known as the world that is maintained by memory. A number of the above entries (theses) have highlighted the idea of the world as an image maintained, i.e. constructed, by memory. Notice, of the image being maintained, since a comparatively small amount of possible contributions are retrieved, so to speak, from the flow of possible sensation, it is correct to call the maintenance rehearsing of memory a construction. Discussing attention as a function of memory, then, I will highlight here two different ideas. First, I will discuss the idea of selective attention as a mechanism functioning at the crossroads of working memory capacity limitations, procedural routines, and “higher level” recollection, i.e. contributions from episodic and semantic memory. Second, I will discuss how it is that what there is to pay attention to is already a construct of memory. Put generally, “awareness is a prerequisite for intentional

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control,” and – as should have been firmly established at this point – awareness is impossible without memory.

In *The Principles of Psychology* William James described attention in a way which was unfortunately practical for 1890. According to James,

Everyone knows what attention is. It is the taking possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of what seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought. Focalization [;] concentration, of consciousness are of its essence. It implies withdrawal from some things in order to deal effectively with others, and is a condition which has a real opposite in the confused, dazed, and scatterbrained state…

One of the things the 21st century can see, which James could not, is that this “taking possession by the mind” is itself a procedure. As a procedure it may be separated from the object, i.e. the object’s construction, to which it contributes. Further, whereas James discusses focalization as a kind of withdrawal, he implies an obscure notion of choice. The tendency followed, of course, to look for the agent doing the choosing, and James points to the agent by perpetuating another unfortunate tendency, i.e. talking about “consciousness.” Of course, there is a difference between the formation of the object, on the one hand, through sensation and perception and the judgment, on the other, which bestows an identity to the object. Rather than either of these aspects of experience, attention refers more to the performance which runs through object formation, judgment, and the synthesis of the two. In other words, attention pertains to the performative aspects of memory. Not to consciousness. However, James was little aware of unconscious attention in the form of multiple object tracking or priming.

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It is insufficient, then, to think of attention as performing discrimination, selection, or focus. On the one hand, it is insufficient because these activities are sometimes performed without attention, i.e. unconsciously. I have already discussed how memory is involved unconsciously in discrimination, selection, and focus in discussing habituation/de-sensitization, FINSTing, and priming above. On the other hand, it is insufficient to think of attention as performing discrimination, selection, or focus because task performance is not one-dimensional. Rather,

When people hold several objects (such as digits or words) in working memory and select one for processing, switching to a new object takes longer than selecting the same object as that on the preceding processing step. Similarly, selecting a new task incurs task-switching costs.

The above quote from an article titled, “Selection of Objects and Tasks in Working Memory,” highlights the multi-dimensional quality of task performance. Whereas, memory can account for this difference of cost incursion, attention cannot. If task performance were one-dimensional – involved performing a task upon whatever is being attended – and attention were a spotlight peering into whatever the agent intended, switching to a new object upon which the same task is to be performed should incur no more cost than attending to the same object because the only process changing would be the same in each case – attention. For example, look back at the word attention. Now, look back at the word attention. It is not the case that the mind shuts down waiting only to repeat the last task, e.g. it could not be sure the next task would be a repetition of the last. Hence, if task performance were one-dimensional, the cost should be the same whether attending to the same object or a different object, so long as the task is the same.

However, because task performance is multi-dimensional, i.e. involving the spreading activation of procedures applied to maintained objects in a current of priming moving through a sea of sensitization, the selection of objects and tasks in working memory incurs differing costs dependent upon the amount of memory activation required by working memory.  

Similar to a kind of frame-dragging, working memory is capable of dragging a task-to-be-performed across stimuli maintained for the sake of potentially having the task performed upon them. Or, put in a vocabulary more consistent with folk psychology, I can pay attention to a number of things with which I can intend to do something. Maintaining the task to-be-performed is the repeatedly retrieving, or repeating the retrieval, from procedural memory of the procedure for performing the task. On the one hand, priming and practice make activities more efficient even across tasks, e.g. practice at juggling balls and bowling pins increases your ability to catch cups and containers falling unexpectedly out of overstuffed cupboards as you open them. On the other hand, task switching entails the performance of a procedure coded differently relative to the different task. Hence, the task-switching cost noted above. The psychological literature pertaining to “scripts” provides some useful insights and a useful vocabulary for discussing attention as a function of memory.

When you have performed a routine enough times to have come to associate the routine with cues which may be noticed, for example, within a context or a mood, were you to transcribe the words and actions involved, you would have a “script” for the

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Psychologists use this way of talking about repetitive human activities to account for a number of predictable aspects regarding these activities. For example, you may variously have scripts for “ordering a pizza for delivery,” “ordering food or drink at a restaurant,” or “asking a question in a classroom.” The men credited with, at least, popularizing the notion of scripts Roger C. Schank and Robert P. Abelson refer to the “restaurant script.”

Put generally, scripts are universalized and normalized in many cases to such an extent that when amidst cues which may be appropriate for a range of scripts, if the script employed sufficiently deviates from any of the scripts considered appropriate, the activity, i.e. the employed script, will probably be considered deviant – thereby activating a different range of scripts. Put more specifically, if you phone an establishment which delivers pizzas, there is a numerical range of appropriate questions to ask and there is an appropriate range of topics about which to ask before your interlocutor might think you are a prank caller – thereby hanging up on you or calling the police, depending upon the script they employ when, for example, they encounter the cues suggesting “prank caller.”

Consider another aspect of scripts. Suppose you recognize the cues you associate with being thirsty and encountering a coffee shop. Though you have never been inside the coffee shop you have encountered nor do you know any of the individuals inside the coffee shop, entering the coffee shop and employing your script for ordering at a restaurant you will most likely be successful at receiving a beverage to quench your

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thirst.\textsuperscript{812} I am attempting here to accentuate something akin to the surprise of Salvador Dalí, “I do not understand why, when I ask for a grilled lobster in a restaurant, I am never served a cooked telephone…”\textsuperscript{813} In a slightly more technical register, the individuals involved may be described as participating in a process of anchoring upon the cues so as to judge the situation and identify the possible scripts appropriate to employ. Though the scripts involved and the process of recognition are ultimately learned – acquired through practice – individuals involved may or may not be aware, i.e. conscious, of the process of selection upon which the identity of the coffee shop and their respective identities as employees or customers rest.

Beyond the identities, then, scripts may be deferred to in order to account for the expectations of the individuals involved. Reminiscent of Nietzsche’s insight from \textit{Beyond Good and Evil}, §138 “When we are awake we also do what we do in our dreams: we invent and make up the person with whom we associate – and immediately forget it.” (BGE 88) Hence, scripts are like learned procedures resulting in the selection of cues upon which to anchor expectations and from which to further employ scripts, and within this framework individuals self-regulate and “pay attention” so as to perform tasks. I might summarize this by saying: globally, attention may be accounted for along the lines of cue dependent recollection of scripts which dictate not only the identities involved but also the expectations involved. Though these scripts are learned and need to be retrieved from memory, as is the case with procedural memory, these scripts are employed without

\textsuperscript{812} Even if you wish to interpret this in an overly literal way and suggest our imaginary customer to just sit at a table – like at a restaurant – in a place where you need to order at the counter, eventually someone tidying up or working security – like the pizza delivery place encountering some odd number of questions – will seek to correct the oddities of the script by informing the customer to approach the counter – or asking if they are going to order a pizza.

awareness – the agent lives into the script. Locally, attention may be accounted for along the lines of applying a globally primed procedure in the performance of a task upon objects maintained within a global framework by working memory – global expectation means motivation regarding objects locally.

So far, then, in order to argue for rethinking the notion of attention as a function of memory, I have discussed how memory is involved in the overarching framework which dictates attention globally. I have discussed how memory is responsible for providing the material which may be attended to locally. Further, I have discussed how performance, for which attention is usually taken to be a prerequisite, can occur in the absence of awareness – and therefore without attention. Also, I have discussed how performance involves the application of a procedure selected from memory, and how memory may be responsible for the selection of the procedure, e.g. by way of cues. A nice example of this may be found in an article by Andy Clark and David J. Chalmers, “The Extended Mind.” Though Clark and Chalmers are not explicitly making this point, they provide an example of applying, i.e. remembering, a procedure to assist in the performance of a task. According to Clark and Chalmers, “These may incorporate bodily actions into cognitive processes, as when we use our fingers as working memory in a tricky calculation.”

In sum, what was taken to be attention seems bound by memory on the one hand, and performed by memory on the other. And, now I will discuss one further aspect of memory and attention regarding task-switching by referring to a series of studies – related to scripts – on expectation and expertise.

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The majority of research on memory is concerned with recollective memory, and specifically memory for events is often studied in relation to expectation.\textsuperscript{815} As may be expected, this inevitably brings into the conversation the work of Robert Rosenthal and the “Pygmalion Effect.”\textsuperscript{816,817} The Pygmalion effect has been characterized as the self-fulfilling prophecy embedded within or related to one’s expectations.\textsuperscript{818} In other words, how do one’s present expectations influence one’s account of the past?\textsuperscript{819} Myriad experiments have been conducted for the sake of understanding “eye-witness testimony,” for example.\textsuperscript{820} Elizabeth F. Loftus who has published numerous articles on the topic interestingly had the following to say in 1978, “Almost two centuries ago, Immanuel Kant spoke of the human tendency to merge different experiences to form new concepts and ideas. That tendency has crucial implications for one’s ability to report his or her experiences accurately.”\textsuperscript{821} And, regarding accurate reporting, studies have shown that subject’s expectations may be influenced by features of the experiment in multiple ways: the knowledge base of the observer,\textsuperscript{822} the wording, i.e. phrasing, of the questions posed,\textsuperscript{823} the subjectively experienced relational aspects with the experimenters,\textsuperscript{824} e.g. do

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{817} See Robert Rosenthal and Lenore Jackson. \textit{Pygmalion in the Classroom: Teacher expectation and pupils’ intellectual development}, (New York: Rinehart and Winston, 1968), 166.
\end{itemize}
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the subjects want to see the experimenters succeed, etc. Barbara Tversky and Elizabeth J. Marsh examined the effects of “post-event reorganization of events on memory for the original events.” They hold, for example, that “When people retell events, they take different perspectives for different audiences and purposes.” These factors then, among others, related to experimenter bias or experimenter expectancy effect have been shown to influence what subjects remember, i.e. recollect. It is important to note the subjects need not be “lying.” In fact, many subjects, though influenced into providing inaccurate accounts of what they have witnessed, believe they are providing an accurate account — by way of recollection, of course.

I mention here these studies in relation to recollection to gesture by way of analogy into the influence of expectation regarding experiential aspects of memory. Recognizing the role of expectation in experience, and specifically task performance, further indicates the functioning of memory within the putative purview of attention. For example, when you compare the two tasks of setting a cup down or tapping a cup on a flat surface, until the cup is either released or begins its ascent the two tasks are indistinguishable, i.e. the difference is undetermined. Newtson, et al, refer to the aspects of a task which accomplish a differentiation from other tasks as “breakpoints.” Further, when an individual is placed in a highly novel environment and situation, asked to observe a task, and report the breakpoints, there is a high correlation between physical

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change and reported breakpoints. When an individual is placed in a highly non-novel environment and situation, less breakpoints are reported, and the breakpoints tend toward a higher level of abstraction, i.e. as opposed to tracking physical change.\textsuperscript{829} Hence, different participants parse action into meaningful segments differently,\textsuperscript{830} and the difference is related to (positively correlated with) the degree of prior instruction received and the ability of the participants ability to predict the action sequence.\textsuperscript{831} These results are taken to suggest that individuals trained regarding the task “pay less attention” to the task than those for whom the task is more novel.\textsuperscript{832} In other words, experts, e.g. those who are well practiced at a craft, pay attention differently.

Regarding these studies, then, there is the predictable and, yet remarkable, point that expectations derive from – that is correct – memory. Given the influence of memory by way of expectation, it is correct to speak of selective encoding, selective retrieval, and selective reconstruction, for example, in discussing the biases of eye-witness reports in recollective studies. Similarly, in paying attention differently than novices, the same may be said of experts regarding the experiential (and recollective) aspects of task performance and observance. Yet, the point of most relevance is the selective construction – not reconstruction – of experts. In other words, pertaining to their purview experts do not experience a situation the same as a novice, i.e. experts do not construct the same experience. Now, it may be said – the differentiating factor – experts do not pay attention to the same things to which novices pay attention. However, it should now

be clear that what is meant here by attention is wholly a function of memory. On the one hand, experts have different expectations, and derivatively, on the other hand, experts select different breakpoints in action sequences by reading, as it were, the action sequence from a higher level of abstraction, i.e. a different mapping. Not only does the reduction in change tracking requirement “free up” experts to pay attention elsewhere, but also experts may tend toward higher refinement and efficiency regarding relevant scripts.

In recognizing, then, that it is insufficient to think of attention as performing discrimination, selection, or focus, you can recognize attention as a privileged level of memory processing. Memory differentiates experts from novices, and experts construct their experience differently by paying attention differently. In fact, contemporary researchers who regard attention as a function of memory processing tend to point specifically to working memory. Operating between the memory processes of maintenance and elaboration, the functions of working memory referred to as “selection and enhancement” otherwise describe the activity of attention. Looking back, then, across the, so to speak, different layers – think the structure of experience –, as I mentioned above, attention names the processing of memory occurring at the crossroads of working memory capacity limitations, procedural routines, and “higher level” recollection, i.e. contributions from episodic and semantic memory.\(^{833}\) And, unconscious processing occurs “below” attention, e.g. at the level of sensory processing. In order to discuss these different layers of experience, contemporary researchers sometimes split working memory and refer to the lower portions as “perceptual store” and the upper

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portions as “executive control.”\textsuperscript{834,835} Processing that takes place below the threshold of attention may be taken up into the perceptual store of working memory. However, strictly speaking, working memory is not involved in the, e.g. sensory, processing which contributes to its perceptual store. To focus, then, on attention in itself is to recognize attention as a cluster of procedural routines. In paying attention to something, you perform a procedure upon that image of the world selected, maintained, and enhanced by memory.

Before concluding this section with a brief – non-exhaustive – tracing of my claim’s textual history, I want to remind the reader by returning to the sentiment with which I started this section. I suggested above that a new reading is emerging in the 21st century which thinks attention and intention as grounded in and deriving from working memory. More specifically, the claim is that working memory is the condition for the possibilities of attention and intention. As you will now see, such is actually a more conservative version in comparison with the memory researchers who equate attention and intention with working memory.

In studies examining human behavior and performance, “attention has been a central topic since the publication of [Donald] Broadbent’s \textit{Perception and Communication} in 1958.”\textsuperscript{836} Whereas, “Traditionally, \textit{selective attention} has been seen as a function of activation [emphasis by Houdé],”\textsuperscript{837} additionally in the 21st century


\textsuperscript{835} Compare with my brief section on working memory above.


“Attention has been described as the selection of stimuli for higher-level processing.”

Beginning in 1990 and following the work with brain damaged patients regarding procedural memory Michael I. Posner discussed the familiar notion that “Performance can reveal successful storage when due to brain damage of various kinds a patient cannot consciously retrieve information.” The innovative shift came by noting the role of attention in performance. Procedures were learned; tasks were performed; recollective memory was impaired, short-term and working memory systems were not; and, an intact focus of attention allowed for the consideration of alternatives. How was this possible? By 1993 Clifford R. Mynatt was discussing focus of attention as working memory.

In 1995 Nelson Cowan began referring to the “integrated framework” of “attention and memory.” In 1996 Brian Ross referred to “attention as memory.” In 1998, Neil W. Mulligan was concerned to investigate, “The Role of Attention During Encoding in Implicit and Explicit Memory.”

Finally, in the year 2000, Nelson Cowan reported the following:

Given the usual strong distinction between attention and memory, the suggested equivalence of the focus of attention and the capacity-limited portion of STM [Short-Term Memory] may require some getting used to by many readers. [my emphasis]

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Referring to sensory memory as the “aspects of memory representation,” i.e. the lower component of working memory, the perceptual store (noted above) determines “what chunks will be most prominent (relative to the available retrieval context)” and the capacity-limits of short-term memory “determine how many of the most prominent chunks in the representation can be attended at once.” In this way, when “information is activated it stays activated automatically for a short period of time … unless it is reactivated during that period of time.” component of working memory

In 2003, William J. Macken sought to distinguish the automatic procedures of auditory sensory memory from attention by examining, “Evidence from attentional selectivity in short-term memory.” In 2004, then, Patrick Cavanagh’s publication, “Attention Routines and the Architecture of Selection” pulls together the idea of attention as composed of routines, and as grounded in memory these routines are meant to encompass the work – mentioned above – of recognizing breakpoints, scripts, and activating procedures. In this way, “Attention routines that begin and end with a reportable state divide the flow of mental activity at its boundaries where the content of awareness changes…” In 2005 Gustavo Deco can be seen referring to “A unified model of attention and working memory,” and, also in 2005, John Towse, et al, noted, “A family of tasks known as working memory span are thought to capture the dynamic between memory and ongoing mentation, in that they all require temporary maintenance

of information during a processing activity such as counting, reading, or arithmetic.”

Re-inscribing the gains from experiments on retroactive memory inhibition, Jeffrey P. Lozito, in 2006, confirmed the detrimental effects on attention of increased memory load during encoding and retrieval noting, “Consistent with this view are the numerous studies showing that dividing attention during memory encoding reduces later memory performances.” Finally, in 2007 Martha Ann Bell follows the trend while looking at the relation of memory and attention from the perspective of learning to self-regulate. Hence, though this list is not exhaustive it does indicate the textual history and indicate the trend to think of attention and intention as functioning at the crossroads of sensory memory, working memory, and implicit memory.

§17 Qualia – Credit for coining “qualia” should go to C.I. (Clarence Irving) Lewis (1883-1964) from his 1929 publication of Mind and World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge. In understanding qualia, it helps to keep in mind that C.I. Lewis’ work is avowedly within the Kantian structure of experience. I will have C.I. Lewis, then, indicate what he meant by qualia.

There are recognizable qualitative characters of the given [Lewis’ emphasis], which may be repeated in different

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experiences, and are thus a sort of universals; I call these “qualia.” But although such qualia are universals, in the sense of being recognized from one to another experience, they must be distinguished from the properties of objects. Confusion of these two is characteristic of many historical conceptions, as well as of current essence-theories. The quale is directly intuited, given, and is not the subject of any possible error because it is purely subjective [my emphasis]. The property of an object is objective.\textsuperscript{855} Lewis clarifies that by “universals” he does not mean the “‘universals’ of logic.”\textsuperscript{856} Lewis was also concerned to note that qualia “have no names.”\textsuperscript{857} Further, Lewis contrasts qualia with properties, and in particular the property of time. So, “The qualia of sense as something given do not, in the nature of the case, have such temporal spread.”\textsuperscript{858} In this way, Lewis has indicated the Kantian domain for qualia is that of sensibility. Lastly, the contemporary texts credited with maintaining the issues of qualia in the literature are Thomas Nagel’s 1974, “What is it Like to Be a Bat?”\textsuperscript{859} Joseph Levine’s 1983 “Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap,”\textsuperscript{860} and Frank Jackson’s 1986, “What Mary Didn’t Know.”\textsuperscript{861}

The question of qualia, then, revolves around a sort of riddle: What is a product of the subject, not a property of an object, and yet repeatable in experiences? Considered still unsolved in 2009, this is not only a problem for the philosophy of mind; it is regarded as “the hard problem [my emphasis],” to be contrasted with the easy problems.\textsuperscript{862} The answer? Well, you certainly have been primed for the correct answer:

\textsuperscript{855} C.I. Lewis. \textit{Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge}, 121.
\textsuperscript{856} Lewis. \textit{Mind and the World Order}, 61.
\textsuperscript{857} Lewis. \textit{Mind and the World Order}, 61.
\textsuperscript{858} Lewis. \textit{Mind and the World Order}, 61.
Memory(!). Though this problem is not the target of my dissertation, here is a powerful example of the use of contemporary memory research – particularly, research on the topics of sensory memory, automaticity, and attention as a working memory process – to solve problems in the philosophy of mind.

In the philosophy of mind, thinkers who refuse to accept that the mind can be reduced to physical brain states point to qualia as that which is untranslatable into the register of whatever may be found in the physical brain states. Again, memory fits the bill. No apparatus will ever be able to – in extracting across brains – account for the (memory of the) smell of aunt Florence’s pepper sandwiches, even if universally the human brain section Z fiber P is activated when peppers are experienced. Hence, this discussion of qualia is important, for example, because it need not divide neatly across Deleuze’s intensity extensity distinction. *It can be seen as a more or less residual aspect of the constructive power of memory spanning the trajectory from sensation to ideas.*

Notice the Differance at work?

Given the conversion power of the working memory, in Kantian language you could say it functions as the threefold synthesis of imagination. Rendering the non-discursive discursive, working memory cannibalizes itself at a span rate of 7±2. “Cannibalize” is a good word to use here because it captures the sense in which memory spans do not appear to have gaps – memory eating memory. Through the language of Deleuze’s emphasis on intensity in Kant’s structure of experience: you *remember* the last

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memory in such a way that the idea of flowing consecutiveness develops. Hence, I think of this movement as following the logic of supplementarity, i.e. Derrida’s *Différance*.

§18 *Satisficing* – The idea of satisficing is intimately related with the idea of bounded rationality. What I am hoping to illustrate by discussing the idea of satisficing, then, is the agent’s relation with the choices she is contemplating in a satisficing situation. By way of a theory of memory as play-ground cues from the environment, cues from your mood, cues from your habits (ethos), cues from recollection, cues from these aspects of the prior pulse of being and the cross-cuing involved as well – to name just a few of the “connections” – the ground seems full from within the fullness. However, there is a gap between the pulses of being to which the fullness is blind. Being’s capacities are bound by being itself. Non-being is none of the negations of oppositions within being; hence, we say “non-being” to refer to the gap which we cannot experience.

The idea of satisficing makes an excellent point of departure, then, because it reminds you that your rationality is not total, i.e. boundless. And, it reminds despite the seeming completeness or totality of options you can consider. On the one hand, it can function analogously in regard to ontology. On the other hand, because your capacity to recognize options is multiply grounded in memory, considering choices is both tied to your *proléptic* capacity in regard to outcomes, and to your capacity to experience the environment in such a way as to direct your agency at non-sensical and non-discursive clusters and experience them as options. In other words, taking satisficing as a point of departure, you are reminded that your capacity to experience, and to relate your current experience with the past, is grounded in memory. I think this ground of experience
discursively barred by a logic of supplementarity, and I think the play of this ground as proof that the power is memory.

Suffice to say, then, in regard to satisficing as support for my analogy: according to Michael Byron,

> It is testimony to the breadth of thought of Herbert Simon, the man who conceived the idea of ‘satisficing’, that the concept has influenced such a wide variety of disciplines. To name a few: Computer science, game theory, economics, political science, evolutionary biology, and philosophy have all been enriched by reflection on the contrast between choosing what is satisfactory and choosing what is best.\(^{863}\)

Therefore, I am warranted in applying this idea outside of economics, i.e. in regard to ontology, epistemology, and (philosophy of psychology) memory. Though Herbert Simon deserves the credit of coining such a “handy blended word [by] combing satisfy with suffice,”\(^{864}\) in regard to an idea of bounds, in deontological terms Kierkegaard was similarly seeking to be mindful of such a Kantian humility; “it is the duty of the human understanding to understand that there are things which it cannot understand.”\(^{865}\)

Further Byron writes, “The fecund and appealing idea of choosing what is satisfactory finds a place in the theory of practical reason, or thinking about what to do.”\(^{866}\) Hence, just as the older paradigm, “granted homo œconomicus an absurdly omniscient rationality,”\(^{867}\) this omniscience is analogous to the belief that individual being – despite the gap of ontological difference, the not-being of becoming, and the pulsing of the force that animates you – is boundless, total, and complete. So, whereas

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satisficing emerges as a regulative idea of practical reason indicating practical reason’s limitedness, my idea of memory emerges as a regulative idea indicating memory’s incapacities as producing gaps in your being. These gaps, then, at the sensory memory section of the structure of experience precisely point to non-being. The gaps are not the gaps which allow for the flux upon which being floats and flows, i.e. Becoming. The flowing occurs through and beneath the non-gaps, and this flowing is becoming. Rather, these openings within being are the latches through which Plato’s puzzle of the trinity is solved.

§19 Parallel Distributed Processing Paradigm – With the 1980’s, the Levels of Processing Paradigm (LOP) shifted into the Parallel Distributed Processing Paradigm (PDP) when in 1986 David Rumelhart and James L. McClelland published the collection of articles they edited under the title: Parallel Distributed Processing: Exploration in the Microstructure of Cognition.868 Regarding PDP, they suggest, “These models assume that information processing takes place through interactions of large numbers of simple processing elements called units, each sending excitatory and inhibitory signals to other units.”869 Notice in Deleuze’s language: take the differential elements resonating, coupling and forcing a pulse up the structure of experience, then each unit includes the differential elements the forced intensity and the developed extensity. Hence, though the authors refer to these units variously as “scripts,” “frames,” “schemata,” or “knowledge structures,” these units include the sensory elements upon which they depend if they are to be experiential at all. In fact, including the experiential part of the structure does not

hinder thinking the units collectively in a manner reminiscent of Pierre Bourdieu’s (1930-2002) notion of “habitus,” and John R. Searle’s notion of “the Background.”

Consider the following at length quotes which distinguish between PDP and the older paradigms. Toward the purpose of modeling experiential processes, PDP has the following to say explicitly about memory:

What is the stored knowledge that gives rise to that pattern of activation? In considering this question, we see immediately an important difference between PDP models and other models of cognitive processes. In most models, knowledge is stored as a static copy of a pattern. Retrieval amounts to finding the pattern in long-term memory and copying it into a buffer or working memory. There is no real difference between the stored representation in long-term memory and the active representation in working memory. In PDP models, though, this is not the case.

The distinction I hope to highlight being the PDP paradigm’s ability to overcome the assumption of persistence. The conclusion of the quote speaks directly to this.

In these [PDP] models, the patterns themselves are not stored. Rather, what is stored is the connection strengths between units that allow these patterns to be re-created [my emphasis]. … there is an instance unit assigned to each individual, but that unit does not contain a copy of the representation of that individual. Instead, it is simply the case that the connections between [one unit] and the other units in the system are such that activation of the unit will

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870 In response to the interview question: “What was the principle behind your doubt about structuralism?” Pierre Bourdieu, *In Other Words*, Matthew Adamson, tr. (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1990), 9-10. replied, “This word, strategies, evidently has to be stripped of its naively teleological connotations: types of behavior can be directed towards certain ends without being consciously directed to these ends, or determined by them. The notion of habitus was invented, if I may say so, in order to account for this paradox.” Cf. Pierre Bourdieu. *Pascalian Meditations*. Richard Nice, tr. (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2000), passim.


cause the pattern for the individual to be reinstated on the property units.\textsuperscript{873}

These quotes directly address a primary support for the claim that experiencing being does not suffer interruptions. In other words, it is possible to think that storage itself means persistence. However, given the constraints on encountering and recognizing evidence for persistence – as the quotes above point out – PDP thinks each sphere within which to find the evidence as a creation. Hence, though the patterns or structures within the creations – both discursive and non-discursive – are causally connected, between these creations are gaps. Again, an easy way to think of this is to imagine an observer watching you whose power of observation moves at a faster rate than you are experiencing. That is, to a being observing at a faster rate than you, what you experience as a full uninterrupted light by which you read, they experience as a strobe light. See Figure 8.3.

Notice how the PDP paradigm attempts to show the experiential and the performative as blended. On the one hand, this is not in violation of Kant’s blindness thesis. In fact, it actually approaches a way to articulate the excessivity of the non-discursive. On the other hand, the PDP paradigm thinks the entirety of the trajectory as discharged. In other words, the PDP paradigm is consistent with the researching regarding priming, and it seeks to articulate the manner in which the excessivity of the primed factors surge with the burst as the structure of experience itself is discharged. This should remind you of an attempt to overcome the difficulties facing philosophers who attempt to think of memory which Dugald Stewart expressed at the beginning of this section. Hence, with the PDP paradigm, the experiential is performed just as much as the

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performance is experience. It is from within the recollective standpoint that this intimacy gets muddled.

Collectively, then, and from standpoints higher up in the structure of experience, the PDP paradigm contends these units interact with one another like a series of cascades\(^{875}\) spilling over into the next pulse with various tributaries participating in the falling flow. A movement supposedly captured in the term “spreading activation.” As an agent continually adjusts in a diverse environmental feedback loop, a large amount of the adjustment occurs below the discursive threshold of the structure of experience. A favorite example in the literature: consider how kicking a soccer ball to advance to a better position in relation to the goal while navigating defenders and overcoming field conditions requires many adjustments which are agent specific without the agent’s ability to take the time required to make discursively informed decisions regarding these adjustments. Moreover, that the non-discursive adjustments can occur; that non-discursive adjusting can change, i.e. non-discursive learning happens; and, that these adjustments and changes are not instantaneous together warrant the following two claims. On the one hand, the power traversing the sub-discursive threshold section of the structure of experience alternates between – being occupied and recovering – excitation and inhibition, i.e. in regard to its non-discursive adjustment or engagement. On the other hand, this power is never raw, i.e. this power is always a power of memory – stabilized by memory; structured by memory; and, related across engagements and

adjustments by memory. Hence, from higher up in the structure, i.e. within the cascade, experience seems complete, total, or full; yet, as considering the non-discursive constraints reveals, experience depends upon a surging power the forced movement of which traverses the structure of experience as the structure of experience.

§20 Being Memory Bound – Individual being is grounded in, and thereby bounded by, memory. On the one hand, bursts into the structure of experience determine the intensity and extensity along the trajectory of experience. On the other hand, because memory spans – is distributed throughout – the structure of experience, individual being is bounded producing a situation analogous to that of bounded rationality. Though being appears to persist – from within the discursive cascade –, the resonating allowed for by sensory memory results in the FINSTing-like forced movement, i.e. the pulsing power, of memory ascending the structure of experience. Put another way, memory is that which structures the structure of experience. Hence, following this description of the power of memory animating the structure of experience as it traverses it, the gaps between pulses is where to find non-being.

Being bound, and thereby within, the discursive cascade of the higher memory functions, episodic, semantic, and verbal memory constitute an illusory panorama propped up on the filming of working memory’s un-realizing. With the performance of priming wielding a logic of supplementarity through working memory permeating the standpoints correlative to its power and automaticity emerging as a mask of memory’s play, the illusion of a “filled duration” prompts you to posit being’s persistence. Hence, if there is to be a sign of non-being, it must occur within being and be the result of the

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876 Cf. P.A. Byrne and J.D. Crawford, Cue reliability and a landmark stability heuristic determine relative weighting between egocentric and allocentric visual information in memory-guided reach,” Journal of Neurophysiology, 103.6, (2010), 3054-3069.
non-surge, i.e. some degree of failure to bridge the gap, between surges of being. Because the force animating the structure is the power of memory, the non-surge is revealed when memory’s capacity to cascading-ly cover, i.e. retroactively and otherwise, the non-surge fails to some degree. In other words, the “Empty Object without Concept,” the nihil negativum appears under the sign of “forgetting” as memory’s surge fails to produce a filled duration illusion.

Notice that forgetting moves along a trajectory of diminishing emptiness as memory’s cascade fills-in for “what is forgotten” – even if this cascade is primarily just the automaticity or your script for coping with being forgetful. Recall, “Even critics grant a role for automaticity or habit in the form of effects on performance without awareness of the source of those effects.” Yet, make no mistake, there is no “what is forgotten.” “What is forgotten” is supposed to stand in for what is missing. However, like the results of the logic of supplementarity, within the stacked deck surge of memory all expressions are positive as expressions, even when an expression expresses itself as not a positive expression. Hence, there is no such thing as what is forgotten, and what is forgotten is not something different than what is remembered.

Rather, what is forgotten is the attempt of what is remembered to cover over non-being. The experience of forgetting is an experience within being of being’s failure to fully cover over with memory the gap between the pulses of being. The gap is non-being; altering your regulative idea, altering your script in the way which I have advocated for throughout this dissertation provides the necessary proléptic for solving the problem of non-being. So, the experience of forgetting is the indication of an individual

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being’s pulsing, and the pulsing reveals non-being. Though I will be even more explicit just below, at this point, I have taught you how to encounter non-being. Hence, I have solved Plato’s puzzle, i.e. the problem of non-being.

Scalambrino’s Structure and Trajectory of Experience

“I cannot cognize as an object itself that which I must presuppose in order to cognize an object at all.”
~Immanuel Kant (CPR 1998, A 402)

Of all that could be said under the heading of this section, in order to understand what I do say, consider that Part II of the dissertation is composed of Chapters 7, 8, and 9. Whereas Chapter 7 provides background for my use of memory to solve the problem of non-being, Chapter 8 provides the memory research with which I solve the problem, and Chapter 9 discusses the solution of the problem. Since the first section of this chapter stated the solution by way of contemporary memory research, in this section I discuss the solution specifically as it relates to Kant’s structure of experience. Hence, this section should further clarify the solution to the problem by further explicating the philosophy of the above presented psychology.

§21 Three interpretations of “not” as approaches to the problem of non-being –

The three interpretations of not at work in regard to the problem of non-being are the following: (1) The idea of non-being via the idea of privation. (2) The idea of non-being via the idea of binary opposition. (3) The idea of non-being via the idea of experiential negation. Whereas the first two are conceptual, the third is experiential. Conceptual means either in reflection or recognition, i.e. “upward” enough in the structure of experience to be conceptual, and experiential refers to the (ontological) realization which indicates a non-conceptual ontological emergence. I would like to note that though the idea of privation allows for not to be meant along degrees, and thereby correspond with a
spectrum of destruction – as it does in Aristotle via his matrix\textsuperscript{878} –, none of these
destructions need refer to non-being; just because all destruction is not the same does not
mean that one of those types of destruction solves the problem of non-being. Hence,
because the solution to the problem of non-being cannot be merely reflective or
cognitive, only the third interpretation of not can provide a solution to the problem of
non-being.

§22 The road up is the road down – so long as you’re on it – In regard to the
relations amongst Being, Becoming, and Non-Being and following the third
interpretation of not noted above, from Becoming to Being indicates a process of
ontological emergence. However, Being to Becoming – making way for the next
connectively originated burst of Being – produces a gap before the next emergence. So,
the road up the structure of experience is the road down the structure of experience as
long as the structure of experience is maintained within a particular ontological
emergence.

So, we can structurally freeze frame a being. Yet, in doing so, we engage the
procedure of grasping and maintaining a regulative idea – the structure of experience.
Being in this procedure, working memory can mask any gaps occurring in the
performance of the procedure. In fact, so long as the gaps are not too excessive, the gaps
may also be masked to the eye of an outside observer, i.e. a being’s audience. Also, we
tend to have default, i.e. habitual, scripts with which to deal with any ontological ruptures
in our performance of a procedure. Notice, structural freeze framing, then, is made
possible by and re-emphasizes the value of distinctions such as those between logical and

\textsuperscript{878} Again, just because Aristotle has degrees or a matrix of opposition, and thereby negation, does not mean
his distinctions encompass, for example, Kant’s experiential negation. In other words, non-discursive
opposition eludes Aristotle.
real negation and discursivity and non-discursivity. However, it itself – we must remember – is the fruit of a procedure riding on an organization maintained by memory.

§23 Memory’s jurisdiction – If all at once I had a finger in Pittsburgh, a finger in Paris, a finger in Chicago, and a finger in New Philadelphia, I would sense temperature differently than I currently do with my hand. However, memory would, of course, be required to maintain the different senses and allow for cognitive elaboration of the senses in order to have said different sense of temperature. On a more subtle level, this is precisely how you process a sense of “your” temperature currently. In other words, you require memory. Hence, memory’s jurisdiction includes the entirety of the structure of experience from sense to ideas – even though you can cognitively isolate any aspect of the structure and reflect upon it in a way such that memory seems to not be a part of your concept of sensation.

Indeed, Kant was well aware of the difficulty here, i.e. discerning memory’s jurisdiction; it is the difficulty of thinking space without time. Connecting, i.e. coordinating, space(s) means remembering one space with another space, proximal or not. And though you might say that a “receptor” is required in physical space, such a determination is retrospective. You did not strategically, i.e. cognitively or reflectively, place your fingers on your body such that they are wherever they happen to be. Yet, retrospectively you give credit to your fingers for growing strategically in such a place to sense as they do. The problem with thinking of sensation in such a way is that it overlooks the primordial connective power of memory, i.e. it reduces memory’s jurisdiction.
§24 Why call it “pulsing”? – As I discussed in both the Kant, the Derrida, and the Deleuze chapters, in Kant’s structure of experience space is prior to time such that space contains infinities unthinkable because non-continual. Within the continuity of time we can think of infinity. Also in Kant’s structure of mind – I discussed this in the Kant chapter when honoring Fichte for highlighting this – imagination is responsible for the time dimension when ascending the structure, i.e. traversing the trajectory of the structure. So, it is the sensory manifold that is responsible for space. Hence, the question becomes: How should we think about a power of the mind that is located in space without time.

The way to think of this power is to think of it as connective – recall Kant calls it “coordinating” (B 112). Retrospectively we tend to speak of one space, and we tend not to use Kant’s language of space’s infinities which are too excessive to think as such. However, sticking with Kant – and I might add that this argumentative move I am making, it seems to me, is a defining feature of post-structuralism – the ability to connect either entails a constant grip on all of the infinities or it entails a disconnecting for the sake of re-connecting differently. Despite the former being reminiscent of various mystical doctrines which could be interpreted as involving memory, I do not follow it. Rather, I follow the latter. Hence, at the structural level of space – in the structure of experience – there is a connecting and disconnecting which allows for the coordinating, and as the trajectory moves “up” such that an experience (in space and time) emerges out of this connecting and disconnecting, the trajectory of the structure takes on the character of a pulsing. The pulse in experience, then, is an experience in one space, and the next pulse in experience is an experience in a different – ly connected – other one space.
Moreover, since space as the “bottom” of the structure of experience means the first indication of ontological emergence, the ontological emergence pulses, i.e. being emerges pulsing-ly.

§25 Why memory and not time – Keeping in mind what was just said about the ontological binding which occurs in the performance of a task, when applied to the performative aspect of the power of memory, each ontological burst has its own past, so the idea of persistence or connectedness across these ontological bursts which emerge is just that, an idea or a change in the weighting of a cue; both of these reveal – as you should be able by now to see without me pointing it out – their roots in memory, though in different ways. First, through storage, i.e. recollective or sensory. Second, through an altered capacity for performance.

The connecting power of memory is not limited to linearity, as is the case with the connective power of time. These connections at the structural level of space may be thought of as excessively related to the structural level of time – remaining faithful to the multiple-infinites aspect of space in Kant’s structure of experience. It is difficult to think of this level apart from memory, specifically memory’s connective functions such as “instantiating” and “priming.”

Instantiating refers to “connection weight” across spatial-level combinations. In other words, increasing the frequency of the connection, say A-follows-B, increases the weight of that connection while reducing the weight of others, viz. non-A-followed-by-B connections. Priming’s method is automatic and multi-layered. What is more, priming can shuffle multiple types of input through instantiation, e.g. images, scents, textures, tastes and ideas simultaneously. Notice this simultaneity refers to the unity of what
emerges to the structural level of time. Depending, then, on the strength, i.e. weight, of the cues involved in a particular connecting of space, various objects, moods, and interpretations emerge to identify space – forgetting it is limited both physically and psychically.

Consider the example of shaking dice. The power governing, i.e. binding, the procedure of shaking dice is memory. On the one hand, if controlling the shake of the dice helps influence the correctness of predicting the outcome of a dice throw, then notice how memory must be involved to match each shaking of the dice across a number of tosses. On the other hand, notice how shaking dice is itself a procedure. So, here too, memory is intimately involved at every carnal movement to keep the shaking hand from performing a different procedure such as throwing the dice, punching the table, squeezing too tightly, etc.

In sum, it is as if each cue at the structural level of experience contains its own past by way of being dragged along a network of cues and weighting its path. Whereas memory in space is able to capture this amount of complexity, time cannot. The trajectory’s momentum from space to time is reflected in temporal infinity as a limit – an already delimited expression of an emergent being. It is as if time were the structure’s awareness of its trajectory’s delimiting momentum. This is why time does not solve the problem of non-being.

Temporal negation seems as though it should apply to experience. Time seems to overlay the conceptual and experiential levels of Kant’s structure transparently. However, notice that the negation involved is a type of not-being; it negates within the ontological structure, it does not negate the structure. Only when thinking in time, do I
reason that time goes on infinitely – even without me to think it. And to say this is essentially to repeat that space contains infinities too complicated to be reproduced in time, since production itself requires selection amongst the infinities. Hence, temporal negation is necessary but not sufficient for ontological negation.

Only a negating of the power that is allowing for and binding emergent being will negate the emergent being. So, this is why negating memory solves the problem of non-being and negating time does not, i.e. the negation must include the structural level of space. Whereas memory functions as a principle of organization, time is an aspect of the experience being instantiated and primed by memory.

Lastly, Kant himself indicated in a footnote to the second Preface of the Critique of Pure Reason (B xl),

Therefore this consciousness of my existence in time [my emphases] is linked, by way of identity, with the consciousness of a relation to something outside me; and hence what inseparably connects what is outside [my emphasis] me with my inner sense [i.e. time] is experience rather than invention, sense rather than my power of imagination [my emphasis]. (CPR 1996, B xl)

Whereas Derrida presses the “by way of identity” piece of this quote to suggest time is discursive (cf. Ch. 4), I want to press “what inseparably connects what is outside me with my inner sense,” and that – as the above Kant quote points out – is at the level of “sense” in, i.e. at the bottom of, Kant’s structure of experience. Of course, this level of the structure of experience is supposed to be non-discursive, so there are two questions which arise: Why call it “sense”? and What is Kant doing talking about the “outside”? I will answer both of these questions in the next section. Hence, the next section is a continuation of this discussion: Why memory and not time?
§26 The cosmological concern of the “outside” – Having already assumed objects must conform to our knowledge, i.e. the structure by which we come to know an object, Kant refers to any concern for what is “outside” the structure by which we come to know an object as a “cosmological” concern. Now, to be fair, solving the problem of non-being does not require that I discuss the “outside.” However, discussing the outside is a faster way of communicating the ramifications of the solution to the problem of non-being, and it is also consistent with Kant’s work. Hence, though I follow Kant in using the problematic term of the “outside” for the sake of efficiency, solving the problem of non-being does not depend on explaining “the outside.”

In fact, discussing the outside is yet another way to highlight the illicit nature of the reduction of Becoming, Being, and Non-Being to Becoming and Being. In the case of the latter, the outside is forced to refer to Becoming. In the wake of my solution to the problem of non-being, “outside” can be meant in at least two, if not multiple, ways. In order to get a grip on this term “outside” it is perhaps best to return to the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant repeatedly uses the term “outside” when discussing the mind independent features of – what he contextualizes as – cosmology (Cf. A 672/B 700).

In the second Preface, Kant suggests the following clarification to the first edition of his work:

[T]his persisting element cannot be an intuition in me. For all the determining grounds of my existence that can be encountered in me are representations, and as such they themselves need something persisting distinct from them, in relation to which their change, and thus my existence in the time in which they change, can be determined. (CPR 1998, B xxxix)

Kant then supposes a counter response to his clarification: One “will perhaps say: I am immediately conscious to myself only of what is in me, i.e. of my representation of
external things [my emphasis]; consequently it still remains undecided [my emphasis; cf. Derrida] whether there is something outside me corresponding to it [i.e. my representation] or not.” (CPR 1998, B xxxix) Notice, this counter response which Kant supposes is a critique of the “outside.” On the one hand, though I will merely refer readers back to the Introduction, Chapter Three, and Chapter Five here to find support for this claim, the problematic of the outside is itself tied up with the question of outside the forms and outside the dialectic. On the other hand, Kant’s subsequent clarification to his supposed counter response accomplishes three goals: (1) it explains why the solution to the problem of non-being – because it involves the ground of the structure of experience – involves outer sense and not inner sense, i.e. space and not time; (2) it explains how Kant thinks of the outside, outer sense, and inner sense as a chain of conditions, e.g. outer sense as a condition for inner sense or space as condition for time; and (3) it legitimates the use of the term “outside” in regard to cosmology, i.e. the relations amongst Becoming, Being, and Non-Being.

Here, then, is Kant’s subsequent clarification to his supposed counter response:

This consciousness of my existence is thus bound up identically with the consciousness of a relation to something outside me, and so it is experience and not fiction, sense and not imagination, that inseparably joins the outer with my inner sense; for outer sense is already in itself a relation of intuition to something actual outside me [my emphasis]; and its reality, as distinct from imagination, rests only on the fact that it is inseparably bound up with inner experience itself, as the condition of its possibility. (CPR 1998, B xl)

First, then, notice, despite the faculties lining the structure of experience in Kant’s first edition Transcendental Deduction, “sense and not imagination … joins the outer with my inner sense.” Second, the area of overlap between outside and inside is space, i.e. outer
sense. Kant claims, “outer sense is already in itself a relation of intuition to something actual outside,” and the reality of outer sense is the condition for the possibility of “inner experience.” This, of course, invokes three terms: the outside, outer sense, i.e. the intuition of space, and inner sense, i.e. the intuition of time. Third, and lastly, these three terms encompass an ontological emergence from Becoming to Being (Cf. A 478/B 506). Hence, Kant will later say, “I am just as certainly conscious that there are things outside me to which my sensibility relates, as I am conscious that I myself exist determined in time.” (CPR 1998, B xli)

§27 Emergence with (retrospectively identified) contingency not correspondence
– The following two Kant quotes precisely show the trajectory along the structure of experience for our being’s ontological emergence. After sharing these two quotes with you, I will discuss them. First, according to Kant,

The effect of an object on the capacity for representation, insofar as we are affected by it, is sensation. That intuition which is related to the object through sensation is called empirical. The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called appearance [Kant’s emphases]. (CPR 1998, A 20/B 34)

Second, “All our cognition starts from the senses, goes from there to the understanding, and ends with reason, beyond which there is nothing higher to be found in us to work on the matter of intuition.” (CPR 1998, A 298/B 355) Hence, it is in this way that reason “never applies directly to experience or to any object but instead applies to the understanding.” (CPR 1998, A 302/B 359)

That reason does not apply directly to experience ensures that the identity of an ontological emergence must relate contingently – and not correspond directly – to the Becoming out of which it emerged. In my opinion, this is already contained in Kant’s
innovative discursive/non-discursive distinction; however, above is Kant deducing contingency from the structure of experience itself. Notice it is not accurate to make the logical quip here that – as Trendelenburg attempted with Kant (Cf. Ch. 2) – it may be possible for Becoming and Being to “line up” so as to correspond to one another; this can never be the case because the structure of experience, i.e. the ontological emergence is already a delimiting. Hence, Becoming exceeds Being. So, Being’s relation to Becoming must be a contingent relation.

Now, it is possible to alter Kant’s structure of experience by correcting his misunderstanding of “affinity.” Following contemporary memory research, notice the anticipations of procedurally organized activity are, necessarily, organized and maintained by memory. Put another way, a being’s dependence on memory can already be seen by analyzing the notion of procedure. Further, even passively, sensory identification can be controlled by way of practice to the point of inapprehension. Beyond the point of inapprehension, of course, there is nothing to discuss. For example, these observations do not deny skin’s ability to transfer temperature, by Being in, i.e. emergent out of, Becoming, you are immersed in temperature; rather these observations suggest the organization of that in which you are immersed so as to allow for sensing temperature depends on memory.

§28 That it is v. What it is – It might add clarification to invoke two perennial philosophical sets of distinctions. The first distinction is between “that it is” and “what it is,” and the second is the distinction between “subject” and “object.” Being in the wake of Kant’s Copernican revolution means the ground of the structure of experience is the ground of the subject. Objects conform to mind. So, if the power at the ground of
experience, i.e. at the ground of the subject, is non-discursive, then the question guiding this clarification: Why call it memory – recall Kant calls it sense?

In order for us to say that an entity is for a subject, the subject must process an experience of the entity in question. This does not deny that there are objects in the world. There may be a chair in the kitchen; however, we are talking about experience, and that the chair is for a subject means the subject is experiencing the chair. Hence, that an object is for a subject requires the subject to process an experience of the object.

In order to say what an entity is for a subject, the subject must further elaborate the experience of that the entity is for the subject. Notice this means maintaining that it is in order to elaborate that into what. I emphasize these two terms because they are the terms that contemporary memory researcher – discussed above – employ to discuss the process of memory in experience. If you do not maintain that an entity is in experience, it would be as if you would forget why you were trying to think of the word “chair.” That is something I just bumped into. What is it? It is a chair.

So, there are objects in the world to be encountered that we refer to as “chairs.” This does not mean that you are constantly experiencing a chair. In fact, even if you are always sitting, it does not mean that you are constantly experiencing a chair. Hence, the subject processes different objects through experience.

The object of experience, then, can be divided into that it is and what it is. The object of experience can be divided as such because we are talking about experience, and “experience” means an experiencing subject. We are not talking about the number of chairs in the world at any given point in history. Rather, we are talking about the process of experiencing what we conceptualize as a “chair.” The shorthand I have been using
throughout the dissertation to discuss this is to say: encountering the – *that it is* – chair engages the lower part of the structure of experience, and conceptualizing what it is, i.e. a “chair,” engages a higher part of the structure of experience. I have Kant to thank for the ability to talk about the process of experience in this way.

Keeping with the above discussion of the structure of experience as a “vertical” process, e.g. “lower” or “higher” in the structure, there are, then, two major kinds of change to discuss in regard to the subject of experience. First, there is the change which moves from that it is to what it is or what it is to that it is *regarding the same object* – for ease of reference call this “vertical change in regard to the subject of experience.” Second, there is the change from either a that to a different that or a different what or different that – for ease of reference call this “horizontal change in regard to the subject of experience.” These then, in regard to the experiencing subject, are the major kinds of change. Notice, I say “major” because the difference between touching a chair and seeing the same chair belong to the *that it is* part of the structure of experience.

Now that the distinctions are in place, we can use them to talk about the relations amongst Becoming, Being, and Non-Being. When we say that it *is*, notice we are making a type of ontological claim. We are saying that some entity is. Yet, whenever we invoke change, it is essentially unanimous that we are invoking Becoming. So, does this mean that discussing horizontal change in regard to the subject of experience is a discussion of Becoming? And, if so, then what does this say about Being – recall horizontal change is across different entities, i.e. beings? To answer both questions at once: Yes, Becoming is
tied up with Being in regard to horizontal change. So, what about vertical change in regard to the subject?

Because we are subjects, it is by way of vertical change that we can discuss Becoming as not tied up with Being. In order to discuss Becoming as not tied up with Being we must look to the that it is part of the structure of experience while keeping in mind that the trajectory of experience, i.e. the upward direction in the structure, is a narrowing trajectory. What I mean by “narrowing” is exactly what Kant meant. In other words, that it is exceeds what it is because that it is can be multiple whats. For example, a chair can also be a stepping stool, a family heirloom, kindling for a fire, a lion taming device, a radio stand, etc. Hence, moving further upward, i.e. away, from the ground of experience and deeper into conceptuality is a narrowing, and moving further downward, i.e. toward the ground of experience is a broadening.

At the ground of the structure of experience, then, there is a large amount of potential thats within sensible proximity to the subject. To think any cluster of this potentiality is to zip it up the structure of experience and into the realm of whats. Hence, were we able to think this ground of sensible proximity to the subject, we would be able to think of Becoming that is not tied up with Being. Most philosophers, it seems to me, forget to think about this ground of sensible proximity to the subject.

To conclude: In order for us to have an experience of that it is, aspects of this Becoming, i.e. aspects of the ground of sensible proximity to the subject, must be connected to one other. After all, you differentiate between the smell of the pie and the feel of the chair, though they both occur in the kitchen. Further, once connected, these aspects must be maintained in order to be elaborated from that it is to what it is. You
might recall: Contemporary memory research suggests both that sensory memory is
instantiating by being connective and that the process of maintenance and elaboration
depend on memory. Moreover, this is how memory binds the being of the subject.

So: Why call it memory – recall Kant calls it sense; moreover it is a non-discursive power? The answer: Memory accounts for, i.e. memory allows for, both the
processing at each level of the structure of experience and the continuity “up” the
structure of experience. The problem of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction is precisely
the problem of the continuity of the structure of experience, i.e. how to account for the
structure’s trajectory. Maintenance and elaboration – terms I borrow wholesale from
contemporary memory research – account for the structure’s trajectory. Imagination does
not combine sensibility and understanding – imagination does not combine that it is with
what it is. Rather, memory’s maintenance allows for the elaboration of that which is
maintained into what is maintained. This is why the power at the ground of the subject
should be thought of as memory.

Now, since memory allows for a movement from, i.e. a stabilization of,
Becoming, i.e. the ground of sensible proximity to the subject, into Being, we can focus
specifically on the connective aspect of the ground of experience. Notice, this precisely
overlaps with the discussion above regarding the coordinating – Kant’s language – of
space’s multiple infinities. Because the power (of memory) at the ground must be
connective, it must also be dis-connective. In other words, in order to connect some
aspects of the ground, i.e. unify some aspects into a that it is, it must disconnect other
aspects. Since, we tend to think in time, let me state it in temporal language for ease of
understanding: Connecting some aspects of the ground means disconnecting the
previously connected aspects. The connecting and disconnecting constitute – voilà – the beginning of an ontological burst for, i.e. of, the subject. Your being is not persisting; it is pulsing.
“In order to comprise all the preceding in one notion, it is first of all necessary to remind the reader that the discussion here is not about the genesis of experience, but about that which lies in experience. The former belongs to empirical psychology…”

~Immanuel Kant

“When I awoke … not knowing where I was, I could not even be sure at first who I was … but then memory – not yet of the place in which I was … would come like a rope let down from above to draw me up out of the abyss of non-being…”

~Marcel Proust

“All is ephemeral, the one remembering and the one remembered.”

~Marcus Aurelius, The Meditations, Bk IV, §35

Chapter Nine: Conclusion – A Critique of Pure Difference

Introduction and Justification for Chapter 9 Sections and Objectives

There are only two sections to Chapter 9. As promised at the beginning of this dissertation, after presenting my solution I planned to discuss the different vista of being the solution provides. I also suggested the perhaps largest impact of the solution might pertain to ethics. Keeping in mind the material in this chapter is supplementary to the work of solving the problem of non-being, then, there are two words I would use to describe this chapter: figurative and indicative. Yet, this chapter should further familiarize you with the solution to the problem since I will explicitly show you how my solution meets Plato’s criteria for solving the problem, i.e. how I overcome the two impasses of the problem. Hence, in the first section of this chapter I provide a figurative statement of the solution to the problem of non-being with explicit reference to meeting Plato’s criteria for solving the problem, and in the second section of this chapter I initiate a discussion of what may be the value of solving the problem of non-being.

879 Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, §21a, 55.
Think through this with me: On the one hand, memory is, of course, self-evident. On the other hand, memory is a mask. Let me begin with “self-evident.” You should know when you grasp an object that your practice at grasping objects and the technique with which you grasp objects, including the floating identity of the object you grasp, depend upon memory. I use the word “grasp” here to speak both parts of its double entendre simultaneously, i.e. conceptual and experiential grasping. I use the word “floating” here to remind you of the relational play-ground of the object’s identity. In other words, there are aspects of the object grasped which depend upon the dexterity with which you grasp objects, and the other prerequisites for grasping an object can also be ordered along the descending trajectory of experience. As such, these prerequisites cluster around the respective memory standpoints of the structure of experience. Hence, memory is intimately involved in all aspects of experience, and, as such, should be self-evident.

Yet, memory is also a mask because it operates according to the logic of supplementarity. You simply cannot experience an object without engaging memory. And, this is the correct context in which to regress an object to the thing-in-itself. The regression “down” the trajectory of experience, in this context, then means regressing down the memory standpoints. Recall Chapter two’s quotes from Leibniz and Malebranche and the failure of Kant’s 18th century eyes to read “affinity” as a function of memory. On the way down the trajectory of experience Derrida’s Différance is

encountered at the level of the working memory – a performative aspect located just beneath the recollective/conceptual standpoint. Derrida provides an accurate account of what happens when you try to lift the discursive mask riding memory’s performance. Recall, “Most of the cognitive and linguistic patterning and structuring of experience is taken for granted rather than actively registered or interpreted. Our understanding and our application of concepts, for example, are processes that generally occur ‘on automatic.’” In fact, Nietzsche’s celebrated quote is appropriate here:

Alas, what are you after all, my written and painted thoughts! It was not long ago that you were still so colorful, young, and malicious, full of thorns and secret spices – you made me sneeze and laugh – and now? You have already taken off your novelty, and some of you are ready, I fear, to become truths … What things do we copy, writing and painting, we mandarins with Chinese brushes, we immortalizers of things that can be written – what are the only things we are able to paint? … always only birds that grew weary of flying and flew astray and now can be caught by hand … And it is only your afternoon, you, my written and painted thoughts, for which alone I have colors, many colors perhaps … but nobody will guess from that how you looked in your morning, you sudden sparks and wonders of my solitude, you my old beloved … thoughts! (BGE 236-237, §296)

Taking “afternoon” to refer to the mid-point of the structure of experience – constellations of Ideas occurring in ἐναυτίον’s starry night – and “can” indicating discursivity as the adjustment of waking from ἑξερόν’s morning, Nietzsche’s quote colorfully echoes Kant’s excessivity of non-discursivity as an epitaph for any correspondence theories regarding experience. Hence, memory is also a mask; and, beneath the mask? Another mask – this is why I stated numerous times above that Derrida’s innovation of Différance is valuable, but not in the way he intended it.

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Beyond memory’s self-evidence and memory’s logic of supplementarity, the ground of experience is memory at play – memory as the play-ground of experience. Without artificially confining the performance of memory, e.g. in laboratory settings, memory’s performance is too complexly primed to predict its bloom, e.g. think retroactively effective memory and Multiple Object Tracking. Moreover, the priming is intertwined with the other major aspect of implicit performative memory involved, i.e. procedural memory.

What I mean is that, once activated, the performance of various procedures influence further activations; recall my example of tapping a cup on the table – various procedures activate other procedures with differing “break points.” Complicating matters to the point of seeming paradoxical, given the influence of context, mood, and the agent’s tendencies in regard to chunking, experience can seem as boundless as you wish it to be. Yet, this seeming infinity is, of course, an aspect of finding another mask beneath every mask. Hence, memory’s self-evidence and putative boundlessness require the play of memory from “beneath” in order to be activated. Think of my rendition of Deleuze’s Baroque House graphic (Figure 5.6) and the PDP graphic above (Figure 8.3). There are two aspects of what I am currently discussing which I will further flesh out below: first, the extent to which what I am describing in regard to contemporary memory research is a re-description of the work shown above by Kant, Derrida, and Deleuze, and, second, the consequences of incorporating the play-ground of memory into a regulative idea regarding memory’s self-evidence.

885 In regard, of course, to the structure of experience.
The factors which function in the play of memory, then, make non-discursive memory too excessive to be regressively identified. This is the same problem that Kant, Derrida, and Deleuze acknowledge, and it is also the perplexity associated with the second impasse of the problem of non-being. On the one hand, how can you accurately depict excessive non-discursive functioning occurring beneath the threshold of discursivity? On the other hand, if such non-discursive functioning cannot be depicted, then how can you indicate the (real) negation of the functioning so as to solve the problem of non-being? Hence, Gorgias’ strategy enhanced by Kant, Derrida, and Deleuze can advance only this far – as exemplified by the above two questions.

Deleuze’s innovation was to think of the ground – the play of memory from beneath, in this case – as expressing a power which could – depending upon its intensity – traverse the structure of experience. I do not take issue with this aspect of Deleuze’s innovation. Rather, I take issue with Deleuze’s assumption of persistence. So, by thinking memory as the power traversing the structure of experience, and the higher aspects of the power as expressly connected with the lower – I, of course, mean higher and lower here in regard to the structure of experience –, then, each expression, each burst can be thought of as a solidified expression of being memory bound. Further, notice that this speaks directly to the importance of changing the regulative idea, i.e. the memory script, involved when encountering memory’s self-evidence – recognizing that your recognizing depends on memory is not yet sufficient. Rather, a distinction must be made between what is not the agent and what is the agent, in order to see experience as bound by memory and experience as memory “all the way down.” Hence, Deleuze’s innovation accounts for a power spanning the trajectory of experience, and Deleuze’s...
extensity intensity distinction can be coupled with a distinction between the physicality of the environment and the physicality of the agent to conclude the list of necessary distinctions.

Contemporary memory research teaches that memory systems function differently than physical systems. The idea you have of how an object interacts with another object in physical space does not provide an accurate account of the interactions between “memories.” First and foremost, the physical account cannot accurately account for the activity of memory because it is merely convention (a language game) to speak of “memories” as such. In other words, there are no isolated “memories” which can be placed in storage and retrieved intact later. The easy justification here would be the verifiability, or lack thereof, factor; however, the justification that the memory in question is not a physical object should be just as clear. These two justifications pertain to the conceptual standpoint. Moreover, in regard to the apperceptive standpoint, the “you” who “looks back” is either looking at images and ideas predicated upon experiential factors or is in a mode of reflection. Hence, the conceptual and apperceptive standpoints may be seen depending upon memory’s complicated cuing, i.e. not like a physical system of correspondences.

Yet, the sliding from solidified sphere of experience to solidified sphere of experience is certainly constrained, e.g. image to image, thought to thought perception to perception, etc. What is more, the constraints cannot be reduced to the physical. The most relevant difference here, then, between the two types of accounts: you cannot look to the content of the memory system in order to discover its constraints. The constraints of the memory system derive from the play which, though producing the “memory,”

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eludes the content of the memory. Recall, memory is the power stabilizing the physical factors involved regarding the agent’s experiential standpoint, e.g. saccadic sensory memory. Hence, the constraints pertain to the power producing the content of experience.

Finally, then, combine the constraints piece with the solidified sphere piece. I use the term “solidified sphere” of experience in order to refer to the bound content whatever that content happens to be. Recall that from within the bound content, the sliding from content to content – burst to burst – appears seamless. Contemporary memory research refers to the appearance of seamlessness as “the filled duration illusion.” Moreover, recognition takes place within the bound content. However, since the constraints do not appear as such within the content, the constraints pertain to the non-discursive power of memory – from experiential standpoint “up” – binding the content. Recall, according to contemporary memory research, the traversing of the structure was referred to as the “maintenance” of the power, and the upward movement referred to as the power’s further “elaboration.” Lastly, as countless examples illustrate, even in regard to the non-discursive automaticity and fluency, the power of memory is not perpetual. Yet, the gaps between memory’s discharge and recovery are concealed by the bound content. Hence, each (non-discursive) gap (non-discursively) constitutes the (non-discursive) absence of being.


888 Think of the celebrated “kicking a soccer ball” example.
Thus I have been describing the regulative idea with which to recognize non-being, i.e. providing you with a proléptic. The solution to the problem of non-being is found in the gaps between memory’s bindings. Yet, these gaps cannot be a part of experience. So, as I explained in Chapter 8 above, you must look for a sign within a bound memory experience indicating the failure of memory to fully recover from the gap of non-being. By “fully” here I mean sufficiently such that you do not notice the seemingly seamless sliding has been interrupted. Since the power involved here is memory, the indication of the gap comes with the adjustment within a memory bound experience to forgetting. Forgetting – as such and in regard to shifting and cycling of procedures – functions as an indication of memory’s failure to fully recover from the gap. Not the idea of forgetting as non-being, and not the idea of non-being as non-being; rather, it is the regulative idea which recognizes forgetting as being’s coping with a glitch in its coping with non-being that allows for the proper relation, i.e. anticipation, to encounter non-being (with/while being). I will show you, then, in regard to Plato’s puzzle of the Sophist, that I have solved the problem of non-being.

In the Introduction I summarized that a successful strategy for solving the problem of non-being would: involve looking for non-being in experience, and would involve an awareness of the (experiential) structure which allows for being. This is precisely what I have done by critiquing Derrida and Deleuze in regard to pure difference. I have incorporated their innovations in regard to the experiential standpoint, i.e. experience, and I have critiqued their thoughts regarding the aspect of experience which they supposed to indicate non-being. Ultimately the downfall of their attempts can
be traced to Kant, and his excusable mistake of not recognizing affinity as an indication of the power of memory.

Also in the Introduction I indicated that following Gorgias the inapprehension occurring within experience which indicates non-being would need to be described so as to make it clear what this inapprehension might look like in experience. I have succeeded in making this inapprehension clear without falling victim to the other impasse. In other words, notice my solution to the problem of non-being does not violate Plato’s criteria:

[W]e maintain that you may not and ought not to attribute being to non-being? … Do you see, then, that not-being in itself can neither be spoken, uttered, or thought, but that it is unthinkable, unutterable, unspeakable, indescribable?\[889\] (Soph 1895, 238c)

[Συννοεῖς οὖν ὡς οὔτε φθέξασθαι δύνατον ὁρθῶς οὔτ’ εἶπεν οὔτε διανοηθῆναι τὸ μὴ ὁ ν αὐτό καθ’ αὐτό, ἄλλ’ ἐστιν ἄδιανούτων τε καὶ ἄρρητον καὶ ἄφθεγκτον καὶ ἄλογον.]\[890\]

I too maintain being cannot be attributed to the gap between memory’s bursts which bind being. Also, I maintain that the gaps of which I speak are non-discursive, i.e. unutterable, unspeakable, and indescribable. Notice, I am not describing the gaps directly. This is why I used the language of “indirectly” in the Introduction. I am describing the way the regulative idea needs to be constructed in order to accurately depict the power allowing for and traversing the structure of experience. Making the further distinction between the physicality of the environment, at the command of your being, and the non-physical power of memory, I was able to describe the power – not the gap – as pulsing. After you incorporate this thinking into your regulative idea, you can then notice a difference within your being indicating the lingering of the inapprehension. Once this is a part of your memory script, then, from within being you can recognize “your” non-being. The

\[889\] Taking non-being for μὴ ὁν.

recognition is not non-being; the recognition is of the inapprehension in experience from the gap in memory, i.e. non-being. In this way I have solved the problem of non-being.

Non-Being & Memory: Your being is not persisting; it is pulsing

“in the scent of chrysanthemums, climbing through the dark at festival time”\(^{891}\)
~Bashō, *Hokku*, §713

“Thence we came forth once more to see the stars.”\(^{892}\)
~Dante Alighieri, *Inferno*, Canto XXXIV

So what might the value of solving the problem of non-being be? I believe the consequences of solving the problem of non-being are wide reaching. On the one hand, in regard to the philosophy of mind and philosophy of psychology, I hope to have shown the value of discussing memory, not mind. I am reminded of Ed Casey’s comment here:

the rooting of the word “memory” in *memor-* (mindful) – and ultimately of “remembering,” “reminding,” and “reminiscing” in *mens* (mind) – bespeaks the same ingrediency, as does the striking fact that *gemynd* in Old English means equally “memory” or “mind.”\(^{893}\)

Elsewhere I pursue these insights more fully. On the other hand, I believe the solution to the problem of non-being should be employed toward rethinking a number of our ontological and epistemological commitments – these may be explored by further examining the way my solution critiques the solutions put forward by Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Derrida, and Deleuze. However, the commitments I am interested in discussing here are the ethical ones.

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In the attempt to announce my approach to discussing the ethical consequences, I might suggest the consequences generally pertain to death and the connection between being and history. If my solution to the problem of non-being is correct—and given Plato’s criteria, it is correct—then your being is not persisting; it is pulsing. What this means is that an incorrect valuation has become attached to the physical vessel for your being. A number of thinkers attempt to confront this overvaluation by attacking the issue of identity. However, the issue of identity does not sufficiently address the heart of what is at stake, i.e. being. The solution to the problem of non-being shows your being entering and leaving, so to speak, its physical vessel repeatedly throughout what appears to be a continuous, i.e. seamless, life.

In regard to death, the solution to the problem of non-being seems, at least, to suggest that physical death will not be the first time you cease to be. I am reminded of Epicurus: “Death is nothing to us.” The extent to which you think this speaks to the immortality of your being may be the extent to which you think of your being as a non-personal force of change in the physical world. However, to ask the question of “where” in regard to this pulsing should seem like a misplacement of discursivity. Recall, a significant amount of maintenance and elaboration must occur in order to traverse from the play-ground of memory to the recollective standpoint and the emergence of personal identity. Hence, perhaps history need not be tied to individual being in such a literal, or even physical, way.

894 It, of course, doesn’t really make sense to speak of “physical vessel,” if you understand what I’ve been saying. But I’m trying to quickly communicate the value of the solution in regard to the formation of an ethics.
896 This is also the problem with using the term “physical.”
If I think that my life is my history from birth to death, then goals such as extending my life and enhancing the narrative of that history may seem reasonable. If I think of my life as the pulsing of a power into a physical realm, then goals such as better preparing this realm for the return of being(s) may seem satisfactory and sufficient. The link between being and the narrative regarding the course of physical change may be more tenuous than we would like to admit. Since, per my view, memory goes “all the way down” the rupture called “forgetting” is truly an opening “all the way down.” Experientially, the loss in forgetting is total.

If you never remember “again,” then from the perspective of others, “you are gone.” It is as if without the sufficient escape velocity (from non-being “back” into being), you do not even get the chance to say “good bye.” Yet, what I take to be one of the best aspects about this view is that it is impossible to be Romantic about the loss. What I mean is that despite my descriptive use of metaphors, in light of the solution to the problem of non-being, solidarity revolves around being itself. Other individual beings should not look upon your non-return to being as something to fill them with anxiety because it too will someday happen to them – à la existentialism. Rather, they should recognize it is already happening to them.

Arguably Plato and Kant both attempted to think ethics as inseparable from ontology. A recurrent obstacle to thinking ethics and ontology together seems to be the question of how to account for difference across agents. In other words, if an ethics is to hold universally across beings in virtue of their being, then how do we account for the seemingly vast difference across agents in regard to their ethical comportment?

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897 Cf. The Parallel Distributed Processing (PDP) paradigm from Chapter 8 above.
Following physical difference, some ontological accounts – sometimes called “naturalistic” – embrace difference and find it impossible to then arrive at universality. Indeed, it is perhaps not unlike a shell game. Aristotle’s virtue ethics seemed to have negotiated a compromise between biological diversity and universality by invoking the process of disposition predicated upon training, i.e. the learning of ethical principles early in life. Notice Aristotle’s implicit reliance there upon memory. Yet, the problem, of course, remained in that being vicious is still an ethics, so such an account of difference across agents deems the virtues relative – not universal. My diagnosis: Aristotle did not fully realize the value and the role of memory in regard to ontology.

In the wake of my solution to the problem of non-being, perhaps it is possible to both have a universal ethics grounded in being and account for the lack of necessity that agents recognize the universality. Even if the so called naturalists remain committed to attributing mindlessness to the physical by seeking a physical account of mind as “information processing,” the information processing – per my vista – becomes an aspect of being – accounted for by memory – not an aspect of, what per my vista would be the idea of, the physical. Hence, the solution to the problem of non-being may, in fact, have an impact on ethics, e.g. regarding agency.

The solution to the problem of non-being does not suddenly make pleasure non-pleasure. Yet, it should make you aware that forgotten pleasure is no pleasure at all. And, forgotten power is no power at all. The time frames involved regarding these statements are precisely the time frames involved regarding the experience of pleasure and power. Extending your life does not expand the cycling frame of opportunity for

898 It is as if Aristotle thinks the subject’s being as a concept, and not noticing its ground in memory, he literalizes the plant metaphor, i.e. downplays entelechy’s dependence on memory.
being to indulge its individual physicality. And outside the – already limited because cycling – frame of experience sends one further removed into the recollective standpoint. Hence, perhaps Plato thought the solution to the problem of non-being could work toward removing the impediments to justice and goodness.

Your being is suspended in non-being by the power of your memory. That is all. It is not that you die if you forget – Alzheimer’s patients continue to wander hallways; but your being vanishes with the diminishing power of your memory. (Your) Memory is the ground of (your) being. There is not a group of people looking over your shoulder with whom you confer to determine the meaning of this sentence, and it is impossible to separate memory out from the process of indication – sensual, perceptual, linguistic, or otherwise. Yet, adjustments being made due to the inability to perpetually maintain an experience reveal the pulsing character of being despite the illusion of (filled-duration) persistence. When we consider the consequences of this realization, then that which “is there – like our life” looks different. Due to the waxing and waning of the power of memory, being pulses within becoming. Hence, non-being is not the not-being of becoming; rather non-being, as the ontological, i.e. what Kant calls “real,” negation of being, is neither being nor becoming.

Lastly, here is yet another way to put the solution to the problem of non-being. I would like to state it one more time in visual terms for those who feel as though Heidegger’s Being and Time helped them gain an appreciation of individual being, i.e. Being-in-the-world. The working memory (of Dasein) is like a film projector running on the logic of supplementarity. At the limit of the subject’s being is non-discursive sensory

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899 My emphasis. Wittgenstein, On Certainty, §559, 73.
900 Thus Plato’s trinity is completed. Aristotle’s paradigm shift has been overcome; you no longer must consider just being and becoming.
memory. So, rather than call this aspect of the subject a “receptor” which would commit us to re-positing a thing-in-itself, the memory research supports calling this an abysmal ground governed by play, i.e. the limit of the subject as memory maintaining the playground such that a (non-physical) swelling overflows as a groundless fountain. And, “play” is the correct word to use here because, whatever the logic according to which the fountain is running, the source of the fountain is discursively inaccessible. Further, it is inaccessible – the fountain seems groundless – because accessing it would be tantamount to applying all the apparatuses for accessing it merely within an enclosed vision.901

What this means is that whatever you can imagine or think is, on the one hand, dependent upon the power which provided (1) the images or thoughts and (2) the context with which they are correlated.902 On the other hand, the power providing both these aspects of experience is the power of memory which – continuing with the language of this figurative statement – composes the fountain itself, i.e. the fountain is a fountain of memory. So, when the source of the fountain pulses, the fountain itself pulses – like shutting it off and then turning it back on again –, and a new self enclosed vision arises. In this way, then, to think in one enclosed vision of its relation to another “enclosed vision” is to merely engage the relationality within rationality. Despite using the relationality of rationality, it would be amphibolous – taking place merely within reflection – to relationally think the “outside” of an enclosed vision. In other words, doing so would be measuring within a vision correlative to the context constructed and propped up – along with and within a particular enclosed vision – by the power of

901 This idea can then be used to think ethics as inseparable from ontology because ontology no longer need be grounded an idea of the physical. Yes, it’s still an idea, but it is the correct idea because it solves the problem of non-being, which is what the “physical” is supposed to refer to anyway.
memory. Hence, the way to notice the pulse, or (as I sometimes refer to it) the flicker, is to notice how the power of memory itself pulses or flickers, i.e. the flicker of the power providing the vision.

In other words, noticing the flickering Grundkraft of memory derives neither from the conceptual standpoint nor from reason. Rather, the flickering derives from – think of Gorgias’ strategy here – the negation of the power which conditions sense perception, i.e. memory. It is as if awareness of the flicker comes when you “wake up,” so to speak, in a vision having the experience of forgetting what usually leaps over from the previous pulse – the “previous” flicker of the power of memory. Think about how you react to not being able to think of “what you were going to say.” Your reaction is itself a procedure, i.e. an automatic engagement of procedural memory covering over the “gap.” The power is attempting to recover from a lapse, and since discursivity is secondary to the power, i.e. higher up in the structure of experience, the terms used to describe a lapse of the more primary power of memory necessarily always fail to function as an appropriate signification.

Yet, you do not spontaneously engage in the procedure of reacting to forgetting unless you enter into a mode of recovery. Hence, ask yourself: From what are you recovering? You are recovering from the forgetting, i.e. the gap in the power of memory, and with memory as the ground of the structure of experience, the experiential inapprehension referred to here as a “gap” is the solution to the problem of non-being. Plato’s criteria are met. Though you still cannot say non-being, i.e. your enunciation of non-being is a part of memory’s recovering, and this recovering derives from default procedural memory engaging your habitual scripts, i.e. eclipsing memory’s “gap” of non-
being with discursivity, the solution to the problem of non-being – think Plato’s dependency of reckoning thesis here – provides a different vista of being.

Put another way, this is how you feel the break of the connection – sensory memory as a psychic circuit breaker – and recognize the gap between being in the pulses. Previous and gap – just like “what you were going to say” – must be in quotes above, but you need not runaway with Derrida and “refuse to accept the terms.” For example, consider what is referred to as being blindsided, i.e. struck from behind by a large speeding object. On the one hand, if you are never able to identify the object which struck you, you still engage in a struggle to identify whatever happened precisely because you were in fact struck. Identifying the object is a separate issue, and it cannot have primacy over being blindsided. That is, not being able to identify the object which struck you does not mean that you therefore were not struck. On the other hand, though post-blindsided deliberation will use terminology relative to what may be terminologically undecidable, the motor force of the deliberation itself does not involve a decision. Decisions take place within the automatic response which you notice because – and that means after – it has already been engaged. So, of course, decisions regarding origin are thrice removed taking place within memory’s cascading recovery from non-being. Therefore, I avoid the Derridean fate of having the terms involved deconstructed because the meaning of these terms is generated – thank you Deleuze – not relative to the stacked deck of discursivity but relative to the non-discursivity necessitating the occurrence of the discursive construction.

Yes discursivity falls short of signifying the “gap,” but discursivity is directed as such, i.e. toward the gap, because of the “gap” or whatever term we language users agree
to use in responding to memory’s failure. I am not concerned with the fool’s errand of naming it. Rather, what I am concerned to show you is that this is the solution to the problem of non-being. And, since the duration of being or, in more Heideggerian terminology, a “vision” depends upon the power maintaining it, the duration – across gaps, as it were, – is not filled. The power waxes and wanes even when the gap is unnoticeable. Hence, your being is not persisting; it is pulsing.
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Appendix I: Curriculum Vitae (2011)

FRANK SCALAMBRINO

Contact Information
E-mail: Scalambrinof9@gmail.com

Education
Duquesne University 2006-2011  Ph.D., Philosophy
Kent State University 2000-2003  M.A., Philosophy
Kenyon College 1994-1998  B.A., Psychology

Ph.D., Duquesne University, Philosophy – Dissertation Defense Date: April 15th 2011
Comprehensive Examination Test Area: History of Philosophy, 2008
M.A., Kent State University, Philosophy, 2003
Concentration in Ethics/Practice
B.A., Kenyon College, Psychology, 1998
Concentration in Learning/Memory

Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Psychology, Contemporary Continental Philosophy

Areas of Concentration
Value Theory (Ethics), Kant, Philosophy of Mind

Additional Areas of Teaching Competence
Critical Thinking, Introduction to Logic, History of Philosophy, Existentialism

Dissertation
- Title: Non-Being & Memory: A Critique of Pure Difference in Derrida and Deleuze
- Committee: Daniel Selcer (Chair), Fred Evans, Ronald Polansky

Master’s Thesis
- Title: Psychotherapy: Speaking Philosophically
- Committee: Michael Byron (Director), Polycarp Ikuenobe, Deborah Barnbaum
Publications


Conferences & Presentations

- “The Ubiquity of Interpretation: Truth and the Unconscious,”
  o Ohio Philosophical Association Annual Meeting, April, 2008.
- “Commentary on ‘The Skill of Virtue’”
  o Ohio Philosophical Association Annual Meeting: April, 2006.
- “On Suicide”
  o Hospice of Tuscarawas County (Dover, OH) Annual Meeting: January, 2004.
- “Commentary on ‘Embryos in the Original Position’”
  o Ohio Philosophical Association Annual Meeting: April, 2003.

Teaching Experience

Adjunct Instructor (full responsibility for course)

{2004-2005}
- Introduction to Philosophy (Kent State University – Stark Campus: Spring 2004)
- Introduction to Philosophy (Kent State University – Tuscarawas Campus: Fall 2004)
- Principles of Thinking (Kent State University – Tuscarawas Campus: Fall 2004)

{2005-2006}
- Introduction to Philosophy (Kent State University – Stark Campus: Spring 2005)
- Introduction to Philosophy (Kent State University – Stark Campus: Fall 2005)

{2006-2007}
- Introduction to Ethics (Kent State University – Tuscarawas Campus: Spring 2006)
- Principles of Thinking (Kent State University – Tuscarawas Campus: Spring 2006)
- Introduction to Philosophy (Kent State University – Geauga Campus: Spring 2006)
- Principles of Thinking (Kent State University – Stark Campus: Spring 2006)
- Principles of Thinking (Kent State University – Tuscarawas Campus: Summer 2006)

{2007-2008}
- Philosophical Roots of Psychology (Duquesne University: Summer 2007)
- Basic Philosophical Questions (section 1) (Duquesne University: Fall 2007)
- Basic Philosophical Questions (section 2) (Duquesne University: Fall 2007)

{2008-2009}
- Philosophical Roots of Psychology (Duquesne University: Summer 2008)
- Principles of Thinking (Kent State University – Trumbull Campus: Fall 2008)
- Introduction to Philosophy (Kent State University – Trumbull Campus: Fall 2008)
{2009-2010}

- *Post-Structuralism – Concentrated Reading/Independent Study* (Duquesne University: Spring 2009)
- *Introduction to Logic* (Kent State University – Trumbull Campus: Spring 2009)
- *Principles of Thinking* (Kent State University – Trumbull Campus: Spring 2009)
- *Principles of Thinking* (Kent State University – Geauga Campus: Spring 2009)
- *Basic Philosophical Questions* (Duquesne University: Fall 2009)

{2010-2011}

- *Introduction to Ethics* (Kent State University – Tuscarawas Campus: Spring 2011)
- *Principles of Thinking* (Kent State University – Tuscarawas Campus: Spring 2011)

**Honors**

- Kent State University Tuscarawas Campus Distinguished Teaching Award Nomination, 2011.
- UPMC Braddock “Above and Beyond” Award, Emergency Department Employee, 2009.
- Duquesne University Philosophy Department Graduate Student Teaching Award, 2008-2009.
- Teaching Fellowship Duquesne University, 2007.
- Kent State University Tuscarawas Campus Distinguished Teaching Award Nomination, 2006.
- Kent State University Stark Campus Distinguished Teaching Award Nomination, 2005.
- Tuscarawas & Carroll Counties (of Ohio) Mental Health Employee of the Year (The “Bill Haney”) Award, 2003.
- Brain Injury Association of Ohio Outstanding Community Service Award, 2003.
- Chi Sigma Iota, Counseling National Honor Society, inducted 2003.

**Language Skill Level**

- Ancient Greek – Reading (Duquesne University)
- German – Reading (Duquesne University)
- French – Reading (Alliance Française - Paris)

**Service**

- McGraw-Hill webinar by invitation to review online Critical Thinking components, 2011.
- Duquesne University Graduate Students in Philosophy (GSIP), 2006.
Other Professional Experience

- 2006 – 2010: Behavioral Health Admissions Coordinator, University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC) Braddock Hospital Emergency Room, Braddock, PA.
  - Conducted Behavioral Health/Lethality Assessments.
  - Facilitated psychiatric and detoxification admissions.
  - Pre-certified insurance (public & private) authorization.
  - Responded to hospital wide crises, de-escalated, or (as last resort) facilitated therapeutic restraint.
  - Provided therapeutic interventions for suicidal individuals and those experiencing psychosis.

  - Created over 25 new professional jobs for the community.
  - Operated within budgetary requirements, i.e. without raising taxes or requesting a new levy.
  - Acquired licensure from the Ohio Department of Mental Health for Crisis Stabilization Unit Beds in Tuscarawas and Carroll Counties, a first for these communities.
  - Prepared for and acquired certification for Hotline Services, 24 Hour Crisis Intervention/Psychiatric Hospitalization Pre-screening, Crisis Stabilization Services, and Community Psychiatric Support Services.
  - Developed policy, procedure, budget, staffing, and structure for 24 Hour Crisis and Community Psychiatric Support Services.
  - Prior to service provision startup: interviewed, hired, and trained entire crisis and support staff. After startup: directed daily operations of departments including hospital bed day use at State and Private (Contract and Non-Contract) Hospitals.

- 2001 – 2003: Manager, Community Services, Alcohol, Drug Addiction & Mental Health Services Board of Tuscarawas & Carroll Counties, New Philadelphia, OH.
  - Managed operation of mental health and substance abuse services in two Ohio counties.
  - Worked with agencies in planning and program development.
  - Reviewed expenditures for psychiatric and detoxification treatment admissions.
  - Performed program audits and Utilization Review.
  - Performed duties as Client Rights Officer, Community Substance Abuse Service Provision Planner, Forensic Monitor, and Privacy Officer.
Other Professional Experience (cont.)

- 1999 – 2001: Certified Chemical Dependency Counselor, Tuscarawas & Carroll Counties Alcohol & Addiction Program, Tuscarawas County Health Department, Dover, OH.
  - Provided assessment, treatment planning, individual counseling, group counseling.
  - Facilitated Intensive Outpatient therapy.
  - Facilitated Prevention/Diversion programming.
  - Performed duties as Client Rights Officer.

  - Provided community support, referrals and suggestions via hotline.
  - Conducted lethality assessments, crisis interventions, and hospitalization screenings

Certifications (“Shelved” status currently)

- Chemical Dependency Counselor I, Ohio CDP Credentialing Board, March 2000.
- Health Officer, Tuscarawas-Carroll Alcohol, Drug Addiction, and Mental Health Board, July 2000.

Professional Memberships

- American Philosophical Association
- Society for Philosophy and Psychology
- Friedrich Nietzsche Society
- Vladimir Nabokov Society
- International Deleuze Society
- Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
Appendix II: Transcription of Dissertation Defense

The following is a transcription of the Dissertation Defense which took place on April 15th 2011 in the Simon Silverman Phenomenology Center of Duquesne University’s Gumberg Library beginning at 1:30pm.

The transcript is divided into the following four sections: §1 Introductory Comments; §2 Twenty-Minute Presentation of Dissertation; §3 Questions from the Committee; §4 Questions from the Audience.

§1 Introductory Comments –

Dr. Selcer: Welcome to Frank Scalambrino’s dissertation defense. Frank has written an extremely ambitious project that sets out to do not just what his title indicates: critiquing the idea of pure difference in Derrida and Deleuze through attention to the problem of non-being and the structure and function of memory, but also to, I would say: (a) solve what he takes to be the most important problem of all of ontology; (b) develop an entirely new philosophical psychology; (c) justify all this historically with respect essentially to the entire history of philosophy, specifically Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, Heidegger, Bergson, Hyppolite, Derrida, Deleuze, and a slew of cognitive psychologists and scientists; and (d) develop what is essentially an entirely new philosophical account of memory. All in one dissertation – so, it’s a really ambitious project that deals very rigorously with a really wide range of figures and texts and philosophical problems.

The way we usually proceed is with around a 20 minute presentation of the person defending the dissertation, then questions from the committee, and then questions from everyone else. So, take it away Frank.

Mr. Scalambrino: Thank you. Thank you all for being here. Also, I would like to say, I feel as though Dr. Wurzer is here with us in spirit, and I am thankful for that as well.

§2 Twenty-Minute Presentation of Dissertation –

Mr. Scalambrino: I picked the problem of non-being to work on; and, the problem of non-being is a very difficult problem, a very perplexing problem, in so far as there are a large number of philosophers who suggest it is not even a real problem.

So, the way in which I thought I would begin would be to quickly contextualize the problem both historically and, then by contextualizing it, logically; I will have
already begun dealing with the problem. There are a good number of philosophers that I either touch on or devote a chapter to, and that’s primarily because of the perplexing nature of the problem. I wanted to further legitimize the fact that this is a real problem. And looking at Plato, and a number of these other philosophers as well, it seems as though it is important in regard to ontology, in so far as until you solve the problem of non-being, you do not fully understand being.

After solving the problem of non-being, then, I put forward an attempt to paraphrase the solution. I do this to suggest how we might think differently about being in the wake of having solved this problem.

So, historically, there are a large number of respected Ancient scholars who have commented on and discussed the problem of non-being. For example, and this is just to name a few, G.E.L. Owen, Francis Cornford, Stanley Rosen, G.E.M. Anscombe, Martha Nussbaum, Ronald Polansky, and John McDowell. These individuals have all commented on this problem.

Also, some philosophers who avowedly attempt to solve this problem are Plato; Aristotle, you might recall the numerous comments about this in the Metaphysics, i.e. Aristotle’s Metaphysics; Kant, for example, one of the things I found very interesting about the Critique of Pure Reason that tends to be overlooked is that Kant devotes a section and a graphic to what he calls, “The Table of Nothing” – the Table of Nothing: What’s Kant doing talking about the Table of Nothing in the Critique of Pure Reason? In addition, then, to Kant we have: Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Derrida, Deleuze, Lacan, and Badiou. Just to name a few.

Also, I, of course, took Dr. Evan’s Difference & Repetition class, and the paper I wrote for that class was on Deleuze and Badiou on non-being. And, when I took Dr. Polansky’s Metaphysics class, I wrote some of the shorter papers on non-being in there as well. I can say my reading of non-being in Aristotle has changed drastically since the days of taking Metaphysics with Dr. Polansky.

Okay, so then in order to contextualize the problem logically, then, what I put together here [pointing to Dissertation Defense Handout] – because the dissertation is a large document; as I moved through this problem, I continued to step back in order to get a better look at the problem. It increased the number of philosophers I was looking at; I
did not want to spend so much time with Aristotle, and then I just felt that if I did not spend enough time with Aristotle, I wouldn’t do this problem justice – so what I’ve done [pointing again to the dissertation handout] is put together a very fast moving, a very quick, flowchart of what Kant might refer to as the regulative idea I’ve constructed for you, in order to solve the problem of non-being. So, if I could pass this out to you [dissertation handout]… There’s really only – if you count the starting point as a step – there are really only 8 steps to this, and I think it actually moves pretty fast. And, that should help you get a handle on it, as opposed to getting through so many pages [in the dissertation].

Alright, so we start off here with the problem of non-being, and I’ve already told you that what I take to be at stake, what I take to be the value of solving the problem of non-being, is, according to Plato in the *Sophist*, to get a better understanding of being itself. So, if we just have these three steps here [within the first step of the flowchart], the first being the question:

What is non-being? And when you attempt to answer that question you move to what I refer to as the first aporia or the “complicated nature” of the problem of non-being. For example, when you move over here to beta from alpha we have: Non-being cannot be thought, experienced, or described. So, some people are content with that, and the way I read this is that if they are content to take that as an answer to the problem of non-being, then they really haven’t overcome that aporia – they haven’t overcome the first aporia.

When we follow through the *Sophist*, for example, the Eleatic visitor is talking to Theaetetus and between the two of them they seem to offer up this as a response to the problem of non-being: well, non-being cannot be thought, experienced, or described. If you’re actually reading the dissertation I take a look at this in the *Parmenides*, as well, and provide a logical rendition of it too.

So, after Theaetetus seems to agree to this, to assent to this, then the Eleatic visitor complicates matters even further by moving to the next aporia. And, showing Theaetetus the next aporia, which is: If it is the case that non-being cannot be thought, experienced, or described, then: what is it that we are asking about? Then, what are we even asking about? Isn’t it the case that we have thought of something or that we are describing something when we were providing this answer? I refer to this second aporia
as the “paradoxical nature” of the problem of non-being. So, that’s the start. This is the start.

We move to step one then. If you follow Plato and Kant, it seems as though their attempt to resolve this problem is to move by way of the structure of experience and to distinguish between two types of opposition. Okay. This means distinguishing between participation in the form of difference. And, here is where we start talking about difference now. So, we have participation in the form of difference, enantion, and difference in itself or heteron. Okay. So we have this distinction, and then what I have here is this conceptual v. experiential [distinction], if you’re following along here [pointing to the flowchart] you can see it moves along with the Critique of Pure Reason: Ideas and Concepts in the Understanding broadly designated and Perception and Sensation pertaining to experience.

Step two, then, would be [pointing to flowchart] one of the ways to keep this straight and make it move faster. Hence, we could say not-being with a “t” and non-being with an “n” respectively. So, not-being pertains to logical negation, and non-being pertains to experiential negation. It seems as though, then, if we are going to solve the problem of non-being, then it has to be something other than the use of just logic or ideas. So, this is helping us figure out where we are going to look. Somehow we have to look in experience to solve this problem.

Moving to the third step, then, I analyze this problem in the dissertation both logically and historically by looking at the way in which a number of philosophers have attempted to solve this problem. And, so, here are six different positions in relation to this problem [pointing to flowchart].

Let’s move to step four. In step four, what are the solutions from step three? So, as quickly as possible as I tried to state what I take each one of these thinkers to be putting forward as a solution to the problem of non-being. So, we have this notion of hypokeimenal destruction or death, and this is where I believe that non-being gets incorrectly equated with death. If it’s the case that non-being is incorrectly equated with death in Aristotle, then, it makes this solution all the more interesting, in my opinion. With Kant, Kant posits a non-entity, the Undinge, the nihil negativum of the thing-in-itself, and here in a moment you’ll see what he means by nihil negativum. Hegel, of
course, talks about non-being as an internal moment in a dialectical movement. Now both Derrida and Deleuze talk about pure difference, and it is by way of talking about pure difference that you can extract their solutions to the problem of non-being. For Derrida, we have pure difference and the logic of supplementarity, and ultimately we end up with *Différance*. And, with Deleuze, difference as Being becoming active versus “?-being.” Deleuze explicitly puts forth question mark being as his solution to the problem of non-being. My solution: as you’ll see this won’t make full sense until I reach the last step [in the flowchart], there are gaps between the memory that is at the ground of experience. So, I’m following Plato and Kant in making this distinction between two types of opposition, looking into experience, and suggesting that it is possible to recognize these gaps, after the fact, in experience; and, that these gaps constitute the solution to the problem of non-being. Okay.

The fifth step, then, in order to deal with this massive amount of information is to group these solutions. So, I’ve grouped these solutions into two groups. In the first group I put Kant, Deleuze, and my attempt to solve this problem. In the second group I put Aristotle, Hegel, and Derrida. My suggestion here is that – and again I tried to thoroughly support these claims in the dissertation – Aristotle, Hegel, and Derrida are unable to overcome the first aporia. This is because they don’t follow this broadly distinguishing between two types of opposition. Those in the first group overcome the first aporia.

Second to the last step, then, the sixth step, says this is a further fleshing out of the solutions, [i.e.] the attempts to solve the problem of non-being. I’m grouping together Aristotle’s *hypokeimenal* logic, what I refer to as Hegel’s “metaphysical shell game,” and Derrida’s *Différance*. And if you notice, this is again for group two, there is a dependence of identifying the first step here [pointing to the flowchart] “L” on the next step whether it be “M” or “N.” So, Aristotle takes the destruction of this underlying *hypokeimenon* or “L” – there’s a significant amount of references that I make in the dissertation to all of these responses, so, if you’d like I can flip it open (I have the page numbers written down) and we can look at the text if you like – this is where I’m suggesting that Aristotle takes non-being to be death. You especially find this when you look at his difference kinds of change. Again, Hegel takes non-being to be a moment
within this dialectical movement of identification. And, Derrida takes the being or non-being of the hypokeimenon as pure difference to be undecidable – ultimately [pointing at the flowchart]. So, ultimately he takes it to be undecidable, and this, of course, is due to the logic of supplementarity. So, by saying that something is “not,” you’re merely just adding – you’re supplementing – that being. You’re supplementing its being to begin with. Hence, there is a sense in which you could say that whatever the underlying undifferentiated first moment in the dialect might be that for all of these thinkers it is always already being, i.e. always already a being. In that sense, I read them as not overcoming the first aporia of the problem. Okay.

So, now we move to the bottom of this page. So, the group one thinkers … We can see this with Kant’s Table of Nothing – I’ve reproduced Kant’s Table of Nothing for you. You can see it comes from A 292 in the Critique of Pure Reason. You can notice that when you look at Kant’s Table the Table follows the division of the structure of experience that I noted in steps one and two on the first page [of the flowchart]. What I mean by that is: the conceptual negation moves from – in this Table of Nothing – from numeral I to numeral II; experiential negation moves from III to IV. In this way, now we have a way to use this other type of opposition, this other type of negation, and notice we are zeroing in on non-being [(Cf. A 575/B 603)]. Okay.

If you flip over, then, to the last page, i.e. the last step of this movement. With this step, then, what I want to do is to differentiate my attempt to solve this problem from their attempts to solve this problem, and when I say “their attempts to solve this problem,” I mean Kant and Deleuze. Okay, so, from the Critique of Pure Reason – again – Kant emphasizes a passive, i.e. apprehension of synopsis, relation to the ground as abyss. And, just as the second of Kant’s justifications for positing the thing-in-itself depends on imagination, so he derives nihil negativum through an experiential negation involving imagination. Now, even when you look at the Table of Nothing, you already see this. You can already see this just by looking at the Table of Nothing.

Despite suggesting that nihil negativum is arrived at by an experiential negation which involves imagination, Kant claims that the ground of being involves sense, and it is governed by what he calls “affinity.” Okay. So, now… In the twenty-first century, when we look at this contemporary memory research, it seems pretty clear and straight forward
that they now think of affinity as pertaining to memory. So, affinity is an aspect of memory. You’ll see this as we get a little further down, how this makes sense.

Now, concerning Deleuze, Deleuze emphasizes the ground as active, as intensive expressive abyss; this is as opposed to Kant. And, following a model of ontogenesis or ontological emergence from Becoming, I read Deleuze … Deleuze considers difference as Being, i.e. as Becoming’s being active, and question mark being as non-being, i.e. Becoming’s being reactive. This is largely coming out of Nietzsche & Philosophy and Difference & Repetition – where he is talking about this being active and being reactive. In this way, Deleuze follows Bergson, and he considers the problem of non-being to be a pseudo problem. So, here I suggest that Deleuze reconvenes with group two, and that he ultimately reduces Being, Becoming, and Non-Being to Becoming and Being. Hence, he misses non-being, and he considers it ?-being; and, by considering it ?-being, you can already see he thinks of non-being as a type of being. This is why I say he reconvenes with group two.

So, all throughout the dissertation, I continue to return to this comment that I like to make that it seems to me Kant was the person who advanced the furthest on the problem of non-being. So, then, my hope was to … I had always – as some of this past stuff shows you – been interested in the problem of non-being, and I thought that I was leaving it behind; and I was going to do some work on memory instead, and as I’m looking at all these memory articles, suddenly it just hit me. I was like, “Oh, this is the way to solve the problem of non-being.”

So, then, looking again at the ground of being by way of the Critique of Pure Reason, I am emphasizing that the abyss or the ground of being is actually a play-ground; it is governed by play. It is the play-ground of memory, i.e. memory as being’s play-ground. So, following Deleuze in a sense, I have ontological emergence from an active ground, and this is accounted for in the contemporary memory research by sensory and procedural memory. Then, following and aspect of Différance from Derrida, there are projective and retrojective gap masking effects, and this is one of the reasons … this non-being – as Plato indicated initially – is unable to be at all. Let’s see. And, if you’d care for me to elaborate on priming, for example, I’d be happy to do so.
So, then, rounding this off… No longer being at all; the gaps between the pulses of ontological emergence, they constitute my solution to the problem of non-being. To round this off: I’m following contemporary memory research regarding the experiential ground of being, and that means the second of the two oppositions, that the experiential ground of being is governed by memory. It is a ground of memory. Sense is, then, grounded in sensory memory. Productive imagination … I’m following along with the *Critique of Pure Reason*, by the way, right now. Sense is grounded in sensory memory; productive imagination is grounded in working memory; reproductive imagination is grounded in short term and long term memory; and, then, this is a point of contention I thought I would just make explicit, contemporary memory research does not deny an outside world, rather it suggests that the flowing change of Becoming is too fast and excessive to effect being directly. In other words, memory is a buffer – we could say. Memory is the buffer because of which there is an ontological emergence, and then connective and instantiating – these are buzz words in the memory research – memory allows for ontological emergence. I’m using a couple quotes here [cited in flowchart and dissertation]: “Stimuli do not speak for themselves.” “Automaticity is not driven by stimuli separately from skills.” “These patterns themselves are not stored. What is stored is the connection strengths,” this is another buzz word, “connection strengths between these units that allow for the patterns to be recreated.” And, notice my emphasis that it is a continual re-creation.

Though of all the people I do deal with, I do not deal with Nietzsche [in the dissertation]. But, for those of you versed in Nietzsche, you can’t help but hear Nietzsche in the background here. Lastly, then, the trajectory of experience is grounded in an engagement of procedural memory, and the gaps between memory’s cycling and shifting engagements of procedural memory are covered over by priming and habitual scripts. So, then, these … It is my suggestion that these gaps solve the problem of non-being. So, one of the ways I would paraphrase this to you in order to suggest what is the value of this … I turn this phrase: Your being is not persisting; it is pulsing.

Lastly, if you just want to look at this last page. I tried to give you a graphic representation [chuckle chuckle]. On the left hand side, it follows along with the *Critique of Pure Reason* really, and I borrowed this [portion of the] graphic from contemporary...
memory research. You have the Necker cube. The Necker cube emerging within being, we could say. The Necker cube emerging within being. I like the use of the Necker cube because you can see it in different ways. Then, underneath we have Becoming, and between the flickering, we might say, the flickering of being, you have these gaps. So, you can see I have the null symbol there in order to indicate where one would locate non-being. So …

So, that’s the flowchart of the regulative idea that I constructed in order to try to solve the problem of non-being.

[Pause for applause.]

§3 Questions from the Committee

Dr. Selcer: So Frank, I’m going to start. I have some general questions, and then I have Kant on the brain these days, so I’m going to proceed that way.

My first and most general question about your dissertation is one I’ve been asking you since you first came to me with a version of a proposal for this. So, let me ask it in a longer way than I initially asked it. You make in the dissertation a distinction between not-being as logical negation, as I understand it, and non-being as an ontological negativity that you explain in terms of this problem of the ground of experience.

And, I think that was very clear in your dissertation and, in fact, you managed to successfully translate that out of the Platonic Aristotelian context into the rest of the history of philosophy very well.

Mr. Scalambrino: Thank you.

Dr. Selcer: But what you mean, I still think, by non-being remains a bit of a mystery to me. So, as far as I can tell, the closest you come in the dissertation to actually stating what you take the problem of non-being to be, which is a problem your dissertation presents as having fundamentally structured the entirety of the history of metaphysics and philosophical psychology from Plato to Deleuze and Derrida is when you claim that even asking what the problem is invokes a kind of paradox. Right? At some point you say, since when you answer the question what is non-being, an answer is being given, the answer cannot refer to non-being – as you went through today also in your chart.
You said in the dissertation several times, and you said earlier today, we shouldn’t make the mistake of thinking that this renders the problem of non-being a pseudo problem, and I guess my question is: Why not?

Why isn’t it a terminological conundrum with which maybe Plato’s *Sophist* and then your project falls because you want to insist that we do in fact have to ask what your dissertation seems to actually argue is an unanswerable question. Right? That is to say, a question that could only be framed in terms of logical negation, but that wasn’t supposed to be about logical negation at all. Instead it was supposed to be this experiential negativity.

So, let me put this a different way. It’s one thing… And I think you provide a good argument that we ought to resist giving a direct answer to the question: What is non-being? You have to give an indirect answer that takes a series of detours through memory and so on and so forth. So, it’s one thing to resist that by arguing the nature of the question makes a direct answer impossible and requires instead this indirect detour through the problem of memory. But it seems like it’s another thing in the wake of that response to claim that the *problem* of non-being is one you can’t explain. And, that the whole of the history of philosophy has grappled with it. Right? So, I’m not asking you to provide an answer to the question: What is non-being. But, I do want you to answer the question: What is the problem of non-being?

*Mr. Scalambrino:* Okay. So, it seems to me, and again, I would follow along through the dialog between the Eleatic visitor and Theaetetus to get a solid feel for this. It seems to me that if it’s the case that we understand what being is. And, I would go so far as to suggest that this engages Heidegger [also]. So, even if we want to take some sort of analogous to a ready-to-hand engagement such that being is non-discursive, or something like that, still there is a sense in which we then think we understand being. And, so, it seems to me, again this is the value of – and, I’m answering your question – the value of non-being is that if we think we understand being, we don’t really understand being until we understand non-being. And, so, then this gives birth to the problem of non-being, and the problem of non-being is just: What is non-being? What is non-being, then, because we think we understand being, and we set out to understand being; but, until we understand non-being we don’t really understand being.
Dr. Selcer: And, we can’t understand non-being directly. That’s the problem?

Mr. Scalambrino: No, I’m saying that the problem is: What is non-being? And that in order to understand being we must understand non-being. So, I’m saying that’s the problem. So, the perplexity, we would say, of the problem is that when you actually step in and try to solve the problem of non-being that’s when you find yourself sort of running in circles.

Dr. Selcer: Okay. So, then, why … To use an example that you actually pointed to earlier today: What’s wrong with the reductive solutions? What’s wrong with the solutions that essentially neutralize – right – the problematic of trying to give a direct account of non-being by reducing it – as you argue Deleuze does – to Being and Becoming? Why is that not a solution to what you identified as the problem of non-being? If that is a path to actually being able to think Being as Becoming, or to think Being as pure difference, for Deleuze, what’s wrong, then?

Mr. Scalambrino: Okay. So, there are two parts to this. What I think is really wrong with that is that it follows Aristotle too much. This is why I stepped back, and I had to write so much about Aristotle. I didn’t really want to do that, but I just thought that this is coming out of Aristotle’s reading of non-being. So, in reducing Being to Becoming, and this is why start off with [in the dissertation] this [section titled]: What is the relationship between Being, Becoming, and Non-Being? We would say something like both Becoming and Non-Being are non-discursive. However, the difference between the two might be that you can have an idea of Becoming that is not directly in contradistinction to becoming as non-being is [to any idea of Non-Being].

So, it seems to me, the problem is that when you reduce the relationship between Being, Becoming, and Non-Being to just Being and Becoming, suddenly it does seem as though the assumption of persistence is carried in, and you become committed to persistence. This is why, for example, even in the philosophy of mind, it seems to me that there is a sort of naïve reading of Physicalism. A naïve reading of Physicalism in so far as my being becomes equated with – what would have to be the idea of – my physical being, and so then non-being ends up being death.

Dr. Selcer: But I have to ask, this may be just too big a question for a project this big, but what is the ground and what is the consequent here? It seems like sometimes you’re
arguing that the thesis of the persistence of being is false, therefore my solution to the problem of non-being is true. And, other times, you’re arguing my solution to the problem of non-being is true, therefore the thesis of the persistence of being is false. Which is it? Do you begin by asserting the punctual pulsating nature of being, and then develop your solution to the problem of non-being on that ground? Or is it the other way around?

Mr. Scalambrino: I gotta tell ya. Sincerely, I think that’s a fabulous question. And, I asked myself that question over and over again because I was sincerely asking the question: Am I begging the question? So, am I begging the question?

But really, the way I approached this problem was sort of: Hey, what’s Plato doing talking about this? That’s how I came to this. So, I had always been told, the Parmenides and the Sophist are really difficult dialogs. So, then, I was like: I want to go read those dialogs and see what’s being said in there. Then, you come to those dialogs, and… Why are they talking about non-being? And, so it seemed to me that… So, here’s this problem, this problem of non-being, and what happens if we were to meet the criteria for solving that problem. And, it seems to me that when you meet the criteria for solving the problem, it really highlights the sense in which persistence is merely an assumption.

So, that’s how I came to it. Because I asked myself several times… over and over… but I really don’t think that I am because… Plato’s putting forward this problem, and I’m trying to meet the criteria for solving it; but, not just fantasizing a solution. Rather, for example, all these contemporary memory research articles that I’m looking at… They’re talking about the ground of being in such a way that, for example… So, there are several different ways that we could talk about this.

It’s a naïve version of Physicalism to think that your eyes are open, and then you’re just taking in the physical world as it is. That’s a naïve version of Physicalism. It’s rather the case – I like to talk about this with a poetical reference to Dionysian – that your eyes are “shooting” around. Your eyes are “shooting” around. What they refer to as “scene recognition” in the contemporary memory research, it’s not the case that your eyes are open and you’re just taking in the room. Rather, your eyes are shooting all over the place, and you’re constructing the scene. But in order for you to be able to construct the scene, you have to hold it in memory. So, what I’m saying is that there is sort of all this
change occurring. What I try to fall back into this Ancient stuff as talking about this flowing flux of Becoming, all this change. And, there is this jutting around going on, if we’re just talking about vision, and out of that emerges the scene. And, that’s just one way to do it.

They also talk about the difference between spatiotopic and retinotopic in order to track multiple objects and in order to stabilize – if you will – to stabilize all this change and to sort of “hold it” in being. So, yeah …

Dr. Selcer: This is just sort of speculative on my part, it isn’t something I’ve prepared, but would it be right to say that you’ve essentially proposed a strangely Kantian Copernican revolution with respect to a Bergsonian account of perception. I mean: Bergson’s got a pretty well established critique of the kind of cinematographic account of perception, in so far as it implies a set of ontological premises about the nature of the external world. And, it’s as if you’ve taken that Bergsonian critique but moved it away from the question of objects, and you’ve moved it to the interior of the subject such that a cinematographic form of perception constructs continuous flux or continuous flow in a external world; but, that perceptual construction gives rise to exactly what you want to talk about in your dissertation as being. Does that make sense?

Mr. Scalambrino: I think it does. I guess what I would add to it is that: Ultimately, this is Kantian, as I follow through it here [pointing to flowchart]. And then, what I’m asking is that Kant seems to have the ground of being, the ground of the structure of experience, for example, is sensory, so the question is really… What I’m trying to show is that contemporary memory research is talking about this as suggesting that really… When they talk about FINSTing and the difference between subitizing and counting… So, just…quickly … If there are a number of objects that you are trying to count and it’s under five, then you’re able to count much quicker, just by looking at it, and they are suggesting that it is in this way that memory is instantiating. So, I can’t follow that, it would take me too far afield.

So, what I’m doing, is just taking that as evidence for my claim that the ground of the structure of experience is memory. It’s not sensation, or that would lead us into a naïve Physicalism.
Dr. Selcer: Alright, let me ask you a couple questions about Kant, and then I’m going to turn it over to the other folks on the committee. So, the first one might be not a serious question. Because it may just be a question of how you’re using a certain bit of terminology. Or, it may be central to your argument. I’m not sure.

Mr. Scalambrino: Okay.

Dr. Selcer: So, already today, and throughout the dissertation, one of the major sets of terminological distinctions on which your argument is built is the distinction between the discursive and the non-discursive. This is particularly the case when you’re discussing Kant. But it’s not clear to me whether you’re using discursivity in the sense that Kant is using discursivity, or if you’re taking a post-Kantian notion of discursivity and using it to interpret the Kantian project.

Kant’s really explicit about his distinction between concepts as discursive cognitions or mediate representations in distinction from intuitions as non-discursive, immediate representations. But, when you talk about the non-discursive, you seem to want it to refer to everything that is not constructed as a concept through the application of the categories to what’s given intuitively through the pure forms of space and time. So, for Kant, the non-discursive is not the thing-in-itself, it’s the Gegenstand, it’s the object of experience formed by spatiality and temporality as the \textit{a priori} structures of intuition – but not yet cognized, because not yet constructed as conceptual.

In Kant’s distinction, intuitions are non-discursive and conceptuality is discursive. For you it seems like, anything that is an object, either of intuition or conceptuality is discursive, and the non-discursive is whatever got apprehended. Whatever was given to sensibility and understanding in the first place. My question is: Are you deriving your sense of discursivity and non-discursivity from Kant? And, if so, can you talk a little bit more about how it maps on to Kant’s distinction between concepts and intuitions. Or, are you deriving it from somewhere else and using it, if you like, as an interpretive lens through which to read the Kantian account of the relationship between sensibility and understanding – in your very nice readings of the A and B Deductions?

Mr. Scalambrino: Okay. Thank you.

So, if I could start by saying that, again, I believe that Kant got closest – we could talk about whether or not I take Plato to have provided a solution at all, or to have solved
this problem – and the reason I think Kant got closest is because he was able to suppose this non-entity, the thing-in-itself. So, really what I’m most interested in doing is just stressing the value of this distinction between the discursive and the non-discursive.

By stressing the value of the distinction between the discursive and non-discursive this is one of the ways in which we can keep in mind the, what I would refer to as the, “excessive nature” of both intuition but also the sense in which Becoming exceeds Being. So, there is a sense in which the ontological emergence is already a delimiting or a limiting.

So, let’s see… Yeah… So, this would be one of the way in which we could also account for things like [quoting Leibniz] there’s something always “still sleeping in the abyss.” Right? So, really I wanted to stress the distinction between discursivity and non-discursivity is one of the ways in which I engage the perplexity of the problem of non-being in order to try to stress this sense in which I think Kant is right to make the conceptual experiential distinction.

Dr. Selcer: I’m still not clear whether you take the non-discursive to be what’s given to intuition or intuitive representations themselves. So, for Kant, intuitive representations are non-discursive. The non-discursive doesn’t refer to, the way I understand it anyway, the non-discursive does not refer to the noumenal and does not refer to what is given, what appears in appearance. Immediate intuitive representations are non-discursive; mediate conceptual cognizable representations are discursive. But, you seem to want to broaden the sphere of non-discursivity to include both the operations of the faculties of sensibility, and the objects…

Let me put it a different way, because there is another question I wanted to ask you, and it was bound up in the kind of answer you gave here. Not just in the chapter which is explicitly on Kant, but throughout the dissertation when you refer back to the Kantian project – and I will say that I really appreciate your hyper-Kantian reading of … especially Deleuze, which I think is right…

Mr. Scalambrino: Thank you.

Dr. Selcer: But, what exactly do you mean in the dissertation when you repeatedly claim that Kant posits the thing-in-itself?
So, as you rightly point out, he’s careful not to endow *ding-an-sich* with existence, and he’s certainly not a philosopher who would endow something we’re forced to think about with truth value. Otherwise, the Transcendental Dialectic would be a logical truth and not a logical illusion. So, on your reading, if Kant’s thing-in-itself neither exists nor is the object of a true judgment, then what do you mean when you say he “posits” it.

*Mr. Scalambrino*: Okay. Thank you.

Your second phrasing of the question helped me get a grip on it. When we are talking about the structure of experience, it depends if we are talking about the object of experience and regressing backward or talking about the structure of experience on the way up from Becoming. So, we could say, on the way up from Becoming, the sensory manifold is non-discursive, certainly. But, then, on the way down, what I want to say is: what is non-discursive is even more than the sensory manifold because Becoming must be non-discursive as well. So, perhaps, it depends upon which angle you’re approaching non-discursivity from (Cf. A 685/B 713). And, let’s see… Forgive me… The last bit of your second question…

*Dr. Selcer*: Positing…

*Mr. Scalambrino*: Yes, positing. That’s right. Thank you…

Okay. I feel as though is paying the debt for the Copernican revolution, in a sense, with this sort of “positing” of the thing-in-itself. So, what we end up with is this idea that since in the beginning, we have assumed: Objects don’t conform to mind; mind conforms to objects… The Copernican revolution…

*Dr. Selcer*: It’s the other way around.

*Mr. Scalambrino*: Oh, yeah… Right, help me out here… Yeah. You’re right; it’s the other way around. For Kant, the mind doesn’t conform to objects, objects conform to mind. So, if it’s the case that objects conform to the mind, then there is a sense in which we can’t know these things, of course, *things*. But at the same time, we’re going to have to talk about them —right? — because we made this move. So, we have to pay that debt.

So, in order to pay that debt, there are two ways to pay it. We can pay it from the conceptual aspect of the structure of experience, or we can pay it from the experiential part of the structure of experience. When you pay it from the conceptual, this is when
you posit the distinction between phenomena and noumena, but this is a logical situation. However, from the experiential we have to pay that debt. In order to pay that debt from the experiential, *Kant can’t say what it is*, but at the same time he still has to somehow be able to pay that debt.

So, in order to do this, we are really pressing the A Deduction of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. And, what we have then, if you just follow through the list of faculties that are lining the structure of experience, when we start to get a representation we have the threefold synthesis of imagination. This is the apprehension of the synopsis. So, because the threefold synthesis is a synthesis of imagination – and, again, I think this is the one place where, well, if Kant could have seen it the way these twenty-first century memory researchers can see it, Kant wouldn’t have said these things – because the ground of the representation is the threefold synthesis of imagination, somehow we need to negate imagination in order to pay the debt for the Copernican revolution. Kant explicitly says, it must be an image of something. It has to be an image of something. So, that’s why I say he *posits* the thing, because there has to be an image of something. Now, of course, it’s excessive; it’s non-discursive; it’s the sensory manifold; etc.

*Dr. Selcer:* But… This will be my last question…

*Mr. Scalambrino:* Oh, that’s okay. These are great questions. Thank you.

*Dr. Selcer:* There’s a sense in which what really does the work of connecting the way you seem to be framing the realm of discursivity and the realm of non-discursivity in Kant is not, if you like, the result of the threefold synthesis but instead the schematism where Kant explicitly says schemata are not images but rather rules – rules for the production of images of concepts. So, it’s really that schematization of the categories with respect to an attempt to conceptualize the pure forms of intuition from sensibility that would get you the non-discursive in the way… Getting you the non-discursive is the Kantian version of solving the problem of non-being, right? So, why is that not right?

You really want to emphasize the role of… the tight connection between images and imagination partly because it allows you to argue on the basis later of contemporary memory research and what Derrida and Deleuze have done to Kant that it should have been memory here and not imagination. Right?
Mr. Scalambrino: Right. However, what is actually going on here is that it should have been memory at the level of the sensory…

Dr. Selcer: Ah.

Mr. Scalambrino: At the level of the sensory manifold. So, this is why in step seven [of the flowchart] I say, Kant emphasizes a passive apprehension of synopsis relation to the ground [of experience] as abyss. So here we have the ground as abyss, and then the passive relation is the “bottom of,” I’ll use “bottom” so as to not confuse the terminology, the bottom of the threefold synthesis of imagination. And, so, in so far as it is the bottom of the threefold synthesis of imagination, Kant thinks that in order to pay the debt for the Copernican revolution he has to negate imagination.

What I would suggest is that Deleuze actually has this right. Deleuze suggests we need to go right from the ground. And, he’s right, in my opinion. And, also, the ground is active; it’s an active abyss. This again… So, Nietzsche, “When you stare into the abyss, the abyss stares into you.” There is a sense in which Kant is suggesting that we are abysmal beings … that when we try to see into our very ground, we are looking into an abyss.

So, then, my question is: What governs the activity of that abyss? And, if it’s the case, as it seems as though contemporary memory research actually suggests, if it’s the case that the activity of the abyss at the ground of being is governed by memory, then there might be a way in which – though, again, it’s not the idea of it – there might be a way in which we can notice the movement of this ground such that we can actually provide a solution to the problem of non-being.

Dr. Selcer: Okay. Thank you.

Dr. Evans: Some of my stuff will follow up on Dan’s. Although actually I wanted to start with a question on Plato, first I wanted to say in terms of the pros and cons in a general way of the dissertation: In terms of the pros, it’s an incredible amount of scholarship that you put into this Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Derrida, Deleuze, and also the empirical memory research. I think it really shows a strong knowledge of the history of philosophy and of psychology; there were some lovely graphs; and, there were some nice turns of phrase throughout; and, clarity, on pretty much everything that you were
articulating in there, you did it in a very clear way; then, second of all, your originality. You use all of this to come up with your own theory. And, I think that’s very good and remarkable thing to do, as well. Seconding pretty much what Dan said here.

In terms of problems: in the most general sense, now, I’m thinking of when you want to turn this into something you want to publish. And, of course, the immediate thing that comes to mind is that it’s very very long. And most publishers, unless you already have a big name, they’ll have problems with that. More important, it isn’t so much the length. I thought at times there was almost too much complexity. It wasn’t whether all of it fit one way or the other, but there was so much of it that some of it seemed unnecessary for the major points were going to make. And, therefore, it meant the reader has to battle through that to get to those major points. I thought of it as kind of underbrush. It’s a very good underbrush, but nonetheless underbrush in the sense that it blocked the person from getting to the points as quickly as they might have.

This shows up in a particular way, there are a huge number of recalls. You’re asking your reader almost every other page to recall what was said a little earlier, a little earlier. When you do revise it to cut it down to get it into something you can publish, one little test you can do is to ask how many of those recalls can I get rid of and have it still seamlessly flow to the points that I’m making. … So, that, just in terms of… but, it’s a really excellent work.

Mr. Scalambrino: Thank you.

Dr. Evans: What I wanted to start out with… You’ve already summarized very well the question of non-being and why you’re at it. In Plato, you use his form of Difference, and you want to say his form of Difference points to non-being, right? And, it is as if it itself – Difference – is beyond Being, right? The form of Difference in itself is non-being?

Mr. Scalambrino: I suggested the form of Difference in itself is one of the ways we could point beyond the forms. So, for example, unless we want to say that the form of Being is being itself, then there must be a way in which we can somehow point outside of the forms. And, so what I am trying to do here is to explicate why Plato is saying we need to solve this problem anyway, and it seems as though it’s because when you are just considering the form of Being itself, then there is a sense in which it [being] is sort of eclipsed, right. So, you can’t see outside of the forms that way.
So, when you’re considering Difference in itself, there is a sense in which Difference in itself is different from itself, and we get what I refer to in Deleuze as this recursive fractal version. Following this recursive fractal out gets you outside the forms. But, I ultimately suggest I don’t think the answer is difference because I think Derrida and Deleuze are attacking *heteron* and trying to rewrite *heteron* in order to say that well, difference is the answer, but you must understand difference in this way. But I don’t think that is actually the right way to approach it. I think that Kant actually had the right way to approach it, and we just needed to clear up how he thought of the ground.

*Dr. Evans:* Well, for this question, I’m going to follow up a bit on it, and the next one will be on Deleuze. But, I’m mainly just trying to get clarified on this idea of the problem of non-being and the possible solutions to it. And, my last questions will be on your answer to it; and, those will be, perhaps, a little more critical.

What I was wondering is that Plato also says the Good is not being but something yet beyond and superior to it in rank and power. You were using the form of Difference to point to what might be non-being or indicate in the direction. In a sense Plato is also saying, the Good is beyond Being too. So, how would that enter into the problematic that we’re setting up here about non-being?

*Mr. Scalambrino:* Okay. In the *Republic*, and I had tried to make reference to the *Republic*; but I didn’t want to make this thing any bigger than it was already, but I do think you can make reference to the Cave Allegory here. During this discussion in the *Republic*, non-being is this extremely dark place but being is too bright, so just like our eyes must adjust on the way up and back down… What I found interesting was… Forgive me; I keep jumping to Deleuze with you… What I found interesting was Deleuze tried to turn this upside down, so that it was a sense in which by going deeper into the cave we are going into greater and greater being as opposed to going out of the cave. So, if I’m understanding your question correctly…

*Dr. Evans:* Plato says that the Good is beyond Being. Is that the same as saying it’s non-being?

*Mr. Scalambrino:* That’s an excellent question.

*Dr. Evans:* Let me add one more thing to it. If we want to talk about whether you can describe the Good, Plato says, well, you have to go through the child of the Good, you
have to do it through the analogy of the Sun. So, would that be indirect enough, then that you’d be describing the Sun, but you’d be using that indirectly – like those pulses you’re going to talk about – to point to something that’s related to them; but, you’re not saying what it is directly, the Good in this case. You’re just talking about the Sun Analogy the same way you’re talking about pulses that indirectly point to, in an inapprehensible way, the gaps.

*Mr. Scalambrino:* That’s very interesting. If I could paraphrase this, is it the case that solving the problem of non-being, in so far as it helps us get an understanding of being, does it also help us get an understanding of the Good? That’s a really interesting question. Now, in so far as I didn’t pursue that in order to solve the problem of non-being, I don’t know that I addressed it in there. But, it’s an excellent question.

*Dr. Evans:* It’s an offering for the book.

*Mr. Scalambrino:* Yeah, right. That’s great. I’m definitely going to think some more about that. That’s an excellent question.

*Dr. Evans:* A similar thing comes up with respect to Deleuze in a way. What I sort of understood in the end is that the particular way that Deleuze himself talks about non-being, where he converts it into question mark being or non in parentheses being, in that case you criticism as well is that you’re really not giving us non-being, you’re giving us becoming. With Plato we have Being, Becoming, and Non-Being, and that’s really the basic criticism you have against his own offering.

*Mr. Scalambrino:* Yes.

*Dr. Evans:* What I want to do is to say, maybe there’s another way – just like we did with Plato there – that with Deleuze we can get another avenue into non-being that fits the criteria you’ve set up for what has to constitute a good proper answer, a solution to non-being question.

Deleuze also makes the distinction between Cosmos, Chaos, and Chaçmos. Cosmos consists of series that are ordered by the Same. For instance, say the unmoved mover in Aristotle, Plato’s form… So, Cosmos is basically order. Then there is Chaos, and the way he puts it here is Chaos is absolute divergence in the sense that any series of elements that we might be talking about completely exclude one another – hence, diverge; but also, *they in no sense communicate with one another and in no way compose*
a unity. And, if we could think of Cosmos as Being, and we could think, perhaps here, of Chaos as non-being. Now we go to Chaosmos which is going to be Becoming.

And here Deleuze says we have the divergent series again, but they do communicate with one another. Now the problem is that when we say they do communicate doesn’t that mean you need some sort of Sameness that makes them communicate? His answer is no. The communication is always the production of difference – always another difference. So, we’ve got these three. Couldn’t we say, then, that non-being, Chaos, and because we live in Chaosmos – that’s what’s around us, that’s what we experience – that it indicates Chaos; and Chaos is ineffable in the sense that when we do give this description that there are these series that absolutely diverge from one another and in no way communicate, we’ve given something that really doesn’t make much sense. It’s indicated; it’s a bit like those gaps again. So, would this be a way that we could have Deleuze using his notion of difference give us a solution to the problem of non-being?

Mr. Scalambrino: I like that.

You know, when Dr. Polansky and I were talking about this project, I said, my suggestion to people would be [echoing Dr. Polansky’s suggestion from years prior], because I think it’s a good suggestion, that they should write a commentary for their dissertation. And, he asked me: Well, what book would you write a commentary on? And without even taking a breath, I said, “Difference & Repetition.” You know, when I took your Difference & Repetition class it was the first time I ever really engaged Deleuze, and I just went wild for Deleuze. I think Deleuze is great. I’d like to see us right up there with the University of Edinburgh.

But, in either case, yes. I think that’s excellent. So, I guess I would say something like: If it’s the case that being emerges from becoming, perhaps there’s some way that by paying attention to these things we are sub-merging back into the chaotic nature of the self, or something like that. And, that by sub-merging back into the chaotic nature of the self we are able to start recognizing these gaps. Yeah… Yeah. That’s neat… That’s neat.

Dr. Evans: By the way, in reading this it really caused me to do a lot of thinking, so I have a lot of thank you for it too.
Mr. Scalambrino: Well, thank you… Thank you.

Dr. Evans: Going to the last part now – memory itself… Well, I’ll tell you where I want to go to. I want to suggest memory isn’t as foundational as you say, but time actually is more foundational.

Mr. Scalambrino: Okay.

Dr. Evans: And time always involves the future, and that’s the thing. But, let me build up to it a little bit. Although I think actually what I was going to do, you already did for me [pointing to the flowchart] when you summarized your view. I was going to go through it step by step with you to make sure I understood it correctly, but I think what I have here pretty much paralleled what you were saying, so maybe I can cut a lot of that out because you’ve already done it for us.

We’ve already talked about the gaps and the pulses and the way the gaps are the solution to the problem of non-being in your theory. And, you want to say that these pulses are really memory, and you can describe them; but that’s describing the power of memory, and it’s not describing the gaps. You only get the gaps because… In a sense actually built into the notion of pulse there’s going to be a gap because the pulse is [snapping fingers], so it’s just built into it you’ve already got gaps. So, there is a sense in which… Or you want to claim you’re not apprehending the gaps, that they are inapprehensible. I’m not so sure about that, but let that one dangle for the moment.

Now, what I want to claim following both Derrida and Deleuze, Merleau-Ponty and a lot of other thinkers. I want to say, isn’t time more basic than memory? Time always involves both the future and the past because the present, as the present, disappears at the same time that it opens itself to the future. It has already always happened and is not yet. It is becoming, rather than being. In a sense time is becoming. And, everything which embodies time, which is pretty much everything – maybe everything in life –, then is going to be becoming.

Deleuze fits into this nicely where he talks about the three stages of time. You went through those nicely in your dissertation. He basically wants to claim that the Eternal Return which is the third synthesis of time – of the three syntheses of time. He claims the Eternal Return makes a condition out of the past, a past that never was present. In other words, this is what he calls memory. And, it makes an agent out of the present or
an imminent future. He says this empty form of time, the Eternal Return, effaces the latter two determinations – the memory and the present, the past and the present – in its and the event’s becoming. So, only a new becoming, or difference, returns.

So, it’s clear in Deleuze that with the Eternal Return that this time which involves the future is more basic than memory itself because after all it effaces them and makes a condition out of them. So, they serve, you might say, at its orders. And, this is exactly what being itself does as a becoming. Being as becoming is the production of difference, as a continuous division of itself, a differentiating of itself. So, either the pulses and memory are future oriented, in which case memory is subordinate to time, or they are not, in which case they are not time; and, hence, can’t qualify as memory, so long as the latter – memory – has any temporal meaning at all. That’s sort of the argument, and I wanted to have you respond to that.

That’s a lot. We can break this down…

*Mr. Scalambrino:* No, that’s good stuff. That’s good stuff.

When I was leaning on Derrida a little bit in the Derrida chapter, I was trying to – and this brings up the distinction between the discursive and the non-discursive – to press this idea of time as discursive. So, in so far as time is discursive, we could ask ourselves, are we talking about the concept or the notion of time, or are we talking about time as a force. And so, for me, what I’m trying to get at is more this idea that it’s memory that is accounting for a pulse out of becoming, or we could say from becoming, rather than memory as merely storage.

I don’t know if that gets right at the heart of what it is you’re saying there.

*Dr. Evans:* It depends on the character of that pulse. Does it have past, present, and future? Is it a pulse that is like the Eternal Return?

*Mr. Scalambrino:* Okay. Interesting. Yeah. Alright. Forgive me, this is bringing up so much. I wanted to say something like… I wanted to keep Nietzsche out of this. I’m trying to keep Nietzsche out of this for now. In so far as we have being that lacks identity. So, that we are being, and then we don’t gain an identity until we are higher up in the structure of experience. But, still we might want to say my being is participating in this entire pulse – or sometimes I refer to it as a fountain out of becoming – then there is a sense in which prior to arriving at an identity, or prior to the content of the identity I
arrive at, then there is a sense in which it is just the repetition of being. And, so if we ask
this question of Sameness in regard to the structure of experience it seems as though we
could say that it is the repetition of being so that once we add identity to it, then we might
slide into questions of things like reincarnation. I don’t know if that’s where you’re
headed with this.

*Dr. Evans*: No.

*Mr. Scalambrino*: Okay. But, we’re asking, is the being the Same? Is the being the same
within each pulse?

*Dr. Evans*: For me, more it’s, is this pulse temporal?

*Mr. Scalambrino*: Is this pulse temporal?

*Dr. Evans*: Is it time? And if it’s time does that mean that you have the future, the
present, and the past?

*Mr. Scalambrino*: If I press the structure of experience, and in so far as time comes after
space, and space is coming out of the bottom of the pulse, then I would say it …

This is going to get us… I hear the paradox coming: Does the pulse take time to
get to the intuition of time, but I what I would say about that is that we are doing this
within conceptuality. So, we have to think about this conceptually. I want to say that it’s
not… How about, I would say that perhaps the best way to get at it is not through time.

Whether or not the pulse itself is occurring within time, it seems as though you
must be within the pulse and, perhaps, even higher up within the pulse in order to be able
to make a claim like that.

*Dr. Evans*: But wouldn’t that then also apply to all the claims your making about memory
and the pulses too – that you’re doing it conceptually, if I’m doing it conceptually?

*Mr. Scalambrino*: No, that’s true. Yes, that would be true as well. So, for example, I
would fall back on this memory research. They certainly use time. They say things like,
if it’s the case that the eye is “shooting around,” i.e. the difference between the
antisaccades and the prosaccades, they say, you only have so much time to hit a baseball.
So the baseball’s coming in, you see the baseball, and you need to be able to project your
eyes out in front of it to be able to hit the baseball, etc. And, they certainly use time
because they are using time in order to *measure* movements of the eyes and the objects
that are moving as well. However, it seems as though they are talking about time as an
after the fact because memory is required in order to provide the organization. So, if I were to fall into some Aristotelian language, I would say memory functions as the principle of organization.

Dr. Evans: Memory? And, then, would it be memory more, or would it just be, in fact, a structure that we don’t call memory or anything else, it’s just a structure? Because if its memory doesn’t it have to involve time in some way to even call it memory? And if it does involve time, then, we have the future coming back in, again.

Mr. Scalambrino: Oh, okay; I see what you’re saying. So, this power at the ground of experience, should we really even call it “memory”? That’s an excellent question. It seems like we’re committed to saying something like, it’s non-discursive. It’s got to be a non-discursive power. If it’s the power that is the – I don’t want to say – “the condition for the possibility of,” but if it is the power that is allowing for the emergence of being, then certainly we’d have to say in so far as it’s a condition… I won’t go there it would take too much time, but there is an excellent quote in the Critique of Pure Reason, where Kant says, “I cannot cognize as an object itself that which I must presuppose in order to cognize an object at all.” (A 402) So, then, if that’s the case, then why call it “memory”?

Dr. Evans: Yeah.

Mr. Scalambrino: Okay.

Dr. Evans: One other thing. If we’re going to look at memory research, there’s a bigger question that comes up. Think of all the philosophy of science that’s been done around scientific experiments. In other words, when the scientist does their work, when they set up their problematic, their problematic is a particular way of viewing the world from the get go. For one thing, you’re doing experimental stuff, you have to be able to divide up your terrain into independent and dependent variables, or else you won’t be able to conduct an experiment and use that as a way of proving one hypothesis over another.

So, already from the beginning there is a way of conceptualizing the field. I call it “analytic discourse” as opposed to “organic discourse” that we get in phenomenology and other ways. So, already there is a prior question as to the value of all that research. If it’s working within a particular framework, there is a prior question of whether that framework should be the framework or not. And, that was one thing I thought, too, you might have to deal with when you justify… I mean you can use the scientific research
that you did to say this is suggestive, but I’m actually making my point on philosophical grounds not empirical grounds. I’m not using it to prove my hypothesis; I’m using it, rather, to illustrate it, and it’s suggestive. And, it does make some interesting differentiations that I can pull out of it and include in my philosophical articulations.

Mr. Scalambrino: Okay. So, forgive me. Let me see if I can paraphrase this: What I hear is… Well, I’ll just go right to it. The language that you use in *Psychology & Nihilism* against the equating of the mental with the computer model, I feel as though there is a bit of that in the background. And, I’m actually on board with that. In fact, what I’m suggesting is something like: let’s take their research, right? Let’s take their research, and let’s show them that their research actually provides a result that, therefore, they’re not going to be able to get where they want to go with their research.

There *is* a level of automaticity. They love talking about fluency and automaticity, automaticity. It seems as though… And, I’m only moving this fast because of time, so forgive me. Yeah, because of *time*, right?

Dr. Evans: You hope.

Mr. Scalambrino: Yeah, right.

So, because there is this level of automaticity and priming at the level of automaticity such that, [to the crowd] if you don’t know what “priming” is, you should definitely look it up. Priming is an amazing idea. It’s an amazing concept, in my opinion. But, in either case, what we find is that there is a *sense* in which it’s automatic, so to speak, the power at the ground is automatic, and it’s at play. So, it seems to me, that – and I’m speculating here, right – if they want to make a computer model of the mind, then they’re going to have to make a computer that just has a whole bunch of thoughts that only some of them, then, it grabs hold of.

One way we could argue: are they creating a sense of desire? Because, I might be sitting here – I’m not sitting here – but, I might be standing here and having all sorts of thoughts about the pizza I might have later or how well I slept last night, and all these things are just “shooting around” inside my head, but I don’t organize them or grab hold of them. So, I would suggest we take their research and actually head them off at the pass.

Dr. Evans: And, I agree with that.
Mr. Scalambrino: Okay.
Dr. Evans: Thanks.
Mr. Scalambrino: Thank you. Yeah. Yeah.
Dr. Polansky: So, I’ll just ask some picky sort of things. You say: Aristotle equates non-being with death. Why’d you do that?
Mr. Scalambrino: Okay [looking up a passage in the dissertation].
Dr. Polansky: One would assume only living things can die.
Mr. Scalambrino: Right. I specifically wrote this down – there it is. I specifically wrote this down in case we’d have to go there. On pages 53 & 54 of the dissertation, yeah. What I suggest is that, looking at a couple different Aristotle texts here… Forgive for quickly paraphrasing, and sort of reading this to you:

Whereas at *Categories* §14 Aristotle distinguished between “six kinds of change” (15a14-15) – those being: generation, destruction, increase, diminution, alteration, and change of place –, in *On Generation and Corruption*, Aristotle distinguishes between “unqualified” and “qualified” “coming-to-be and passing-away” (318b13-318b17). The first two of the six kinds of change, then, from *Categories* §14 pertain to *unqualified* coming-to-be and passing-away, and the last four kinds of change pertain to *qualified* coming-to-be and passing-away. And, in *Physics* Book I §7 (190a33) since he is discussing “becoming,” Aristotle brackets destruction and separates the other kinds of change into “absolute becoming” which is generation or “coming into existence,” and the other kinds of change as “coming to be this or that.”

So, there’s a sense in which, if it’s coming to be this or that, then it already is. So, we have to fall back into this other grouping of generation and destruction, in order to get at this unqualified not-being. And so, in that way, it’s not generation, so it would be destruction.

Dr. Polansky: So, all destruction is death?
Mr. Scalambrino: Oh. Okay. No. I’m not trying to suggest that all destruction is death.
Dr. Polansky: In the discussion of Being, Becoming, and Non-Being – are you familiar with the *Timaeus* at all?
Mr. Scalambrino: A little bit. Not as well as you.
Dr. Polansky: Yeah, but Plato, when you do Being, Becoming, and then the third thing would seem to be necessity or receptacle. Or…

Mr. Scalambro: Okay. Khôra?

Dr. Polansky: Khôra. So, is that non-being? Or non-being? Sorry.

Mr. Scalambro: I take this to be a question similar to the question that Dr. Evans asked. How do we want to interpret the gap? So, I can’t make an argument with you right now about the Timaeus. I could take a look at the Timaeus again later, and try to make that argument with you about the Timaeus. However, in the Derrida chapter I talk about Khôra. The question is: To what extent can we equate Différance with Khôra? And, it seems to me that… How to interpret these gaps… My mission here was just to indicate that there are gaps.

I’d have to re-read the Timaeus to see if I would want to go so far as to say that Plato is talking about these [gaps] when he’s talking about Khôra. [Waving to Mr. Cimakasky who had just arrived] Maybe we can ask Joe.

May I ask you a… Do you think that Plato already had… Do you think that Khôra is Plato’s solution to the problem of non-being?

Dr. Polansky: It’s possible.

Mr. Scalambro: Okay. Alright.

Dr. Polansky: Well, in the Sophist that you’re talking about, non-being seems not to be absolute non-being but otherness or difference, as you called it. And the Khôra just seems to be difference at the level of sensible things … that Becoming is in.

Mr. Scalambro: Okay. So, if I could go to this graphic [pointing to graphic from flowchart]. If we would say that this is [point to inverted cone part of the flowchart graphic] the receptacle, and that the receptacle is Becoming where being is emerging out of; then I would have to say that non-being is not the Khôra because non-being is outside the receptacle.

Dr. Polansky: Okay. Yeah, so then, my next question is about all your talk about the “outside.” That’s strange talk. Outside the forms; outside the dialectic; you have outside all over the place. What’s that mean?
Mr. Scalambrino: Yeah. Right. This is the problem with... We could push this into the philosophy of mind and the mind/body problem; this is going on in Hegel, and this “There is no outside the text,” is going on with Derrida as well. Yeah.

In so far as non-being can’t be thought, then I wouldn’t say that I’m saying that non-being is the “outside.” Because, to go back to something I had said earlier, that would be to handle it in a conceptual way with the assumption that that exhausts it, and I don’t think that that exhausts it. So, if we take it as the caveat that is non-being outside of being? I mean, I would assent to something like that, but the real work needs to be how do you interpret the use of “outside”?

Just like we would want to say: It is actually true, for example, at the very beginning here [pointing to first step of the flowchart] when we say non-being cannot be thought experienced or described, we would want to assent to that actually. But, that doesn’t solve the problem. We can overcome that aporia, but we must go to the next aporia also and ask: Well then, what are we talking about?

So, if I want to say it’s “outside,” well then, how could it be outside because aren’t I inside, right now? Yeah, right. That’s problematic.

Dr. Polansky: Okay. So on this [pointing to flow chart] and in here [pointing to the dissertation] you do ἐλαλήσιον. That seems to be contrary, but you seem to treat it fairly peculiarly. On this chart you have ἐναντιόν is difference, and then difference in itself is ἔτερον. That seems strange. What do you understand contrariety to be? Because you say somewhere that: “contrariety is the greatest opposition”...

Mr. Scalambrino: Okay. That’s a direct quote out of Aristotle (Metaphysics X §4, 1055a5). So, if we’re doing Aristotle here, I was trying to look at the different types of opposition that Aristotle talks about, and then to actually look [further] to see what he was doing with enantion and what he was doing with heteron in the actual text.

But I would say, first and foremost, this enantion/heteron business I’m borrowing from Heidegger. So, Heidegger’s commentary on the Sophist... I’m borrowing Heidegger’s reading of the Sophist in order to make this move a little faster, but it does seem as though, for example, in the Aristotle quotes that I provided [in the original Greek], it does seem as though it pertains in so far as Aristotle seems interested more in conceptual contrariety. Which is why immediately with Aristotle, if we’re talking about
non-being, then suddenly we're talking about the principle of non-contradiction. But see, this is why I didn’t want to do Aristotle because I don’t … I wouldn’t follow him there. I don’t think that necessarily I’m trying to refute the principle of non-contradiction or the law of non-contradiction.

*Dr. Polansky:* Okay. Let’s let the audience ask questions.

*Mr. Scalambrino:* Okay. Thank you.

### §4 Questions from the Audience –

*Mr. Scalambrino:* Okay. So, [to the audience] what questions do you have?

*Mr. Scalambrino:* Okay. Jim.

*Mr. Bahoh:* Well, I haven’t read your dissertation, so I don’t understand the details of it. But, several years ago we had many conversations about memory and your interest in the topic of memory. And, I want to ask you or provide a prompt for you to expand on that a little bit. I’m curious about the role that concept of memory is playing in your overall project. I’m interested in what your concept of memory is but especially in what its role is.

Particularly in so far as you mentioned that Nietzsche is in the background. And you also mentioned that you don’t want to engage Nietzsche at this point. So, I want to ask you to engage with Nietzsche, and you don’t have to, you can tell me my question …

*Mr. Scalambrino:* No. No. I appreciate it.

*Dr. Selcer:* Before you start to answer that, because I’m going to have to go catch a plane fairly soon, we’re just going to go deliberate in the other room. While you continue to take questions and answer them.

*Mr. Scalambrino:* Okay. Thank you.

*Mr. Bahoh:* So, this is my question. You’re saying in the outline you gave us all that you use this concept of the abyss being the play-ground of being. And, I like this image. I like this way of phrasing it. And, the image immediately invokes childhood.

*Mr. Scalambrino:* Okay. Yes, and the Nietzschean Child.

*Mr. Bahoh:* Right. So, Nietzsche brings *Zarathustra* with the Three Metamorphoses, and the third metamorphosis is the child. And, the child is specifically the one who can forget.
Mr. Scalambrino: Okay. Interesting, yeah, I think this was Fritz’s initial reading as well [from Dr. Wurzer’s Graduate Seminar on Nietzsche].

Mr. Bahoh: So, I’m curious as to what the role of memory is in your project, particularly with respect to this idea of play-ground of being, memory being the play-ground of being or the abyss – because in the Nietzschean context, the ability to really play or the ability to do the Gay Science is contingent upon the ability to forget.

Mr. Scalambrino: Okay. Right. Excellent question. Okay. Let me share this with you because this is an example of “priming.” I’m answering your question.

So, priming, it’s essentially unanimous, go look this stuff up on your own, I truly encourage you: the suggestion is that priming permeates memory. So, there are all different types of priming. There’s conceptual priming; there’s semantic priming; and there’s even perceptual and sensory priming. Okay, so let me give you an example of conceptual priming, so that analogously you can recognize what else is going on.

I’m going to give you five words. I’m just going to say five words to you, and watch what is at play here. There are two different sets of five words. The first set goes like this:

Apple, Teacher, Chalkboard, Recess, Yellow

And, when people are asked: What is it that you’re thinking of? Usually it’s pretty close to being a school bus. Right? Apple, Teacher, Chalkboard, Recess, Yellow; usually people respond with “School Bus.” Now let me give you the second list:

Apple, Grapes, Orange, Pear, Yellow

Most people say “Lemon” or “Banana.” Now, what’s interesting about these two lists: They both start with “Apple,” and they both end with “Yellow.” There’s only three in between that are different, and what this means is that we are “primed” to arrive at a certain target.

Well, if you do this analogously, to suggest on a sensory level: Well, if I’m sensing this; I’m sensing that; then, I’m primed in my sensory pursuit of what it is I’m going to gain out of the environment next. I’m primed for that. And, we could say on a Nietzschean level: [I’m primed as to] how I’m going to interpret that [what comes next].

So, that’s a conceptual example, but when you look at it on the level of perceptual, it seems to me that it’s an example of how it is a play-ground. It’s an
example of how it is a play-ground because it’s moving on its own. And I should have used this when he [Dr. Evans] was talking with me. *It's moving on its own, and it must be memory because it’s being altered as it moves.* So, just like both lists start off with “Apple,” then once they go to either “Teacher” or “Grapes,” it’s starting to move. Now, it’s playing on its own, but it is remembering the ground that it is covering. So, it’s in that way that I would say the ground is governed by play.

Now, when you read the *Critique of Pure Reason* there is really only a page on what Kant calls “affinity.” So, there is a sense in which he just blows right by this, and doesn’t spend much time on it. But he suggests, somehow at the level of the sensory manifold – the synopsis of the sensory manifold – somehow the connection between the… What is unfolded in the sensory manifold, somehow these things are connected to one another. And, he claims that it’s governed by “affinity.” This is all in the Dissertation Abstract. He says it’s governed by affinity, but he thinks that affinity is ultimately an aspect of sense, of just pure sensation. But see, that leaves too much up to chance in the sense that we just don’t understand how it works. But, when you ground it in memory governed by priming, then, suddenly you’re able to understand how it plays.

Any other questions? Okay, Chris.

*Mr. Mountenay:* I keep thinking of, and it’s either in the end of the first or the beginning of the second book of *The World as Will and Representation* by Schopenhauer, where he brings up the problem that… He’s separated the world into will and representation, and I think he’s one of the first philosophers who exists at a time when science is saying, you know on the grand scale of things, human existence hasn’t been that long. We’ve been around for just a fraction of geologic time, and so he asks the question, is there representation before there is something to be represented to?

I think he says, it was probably some primal creature, 500 million years back or so… So, I guess my question – a truncated version: Is there such a thing as pre-Cambrian non-being? I mean, before there are creatures who have enough going on to have memory, cause let’s say memory goes back to vertebrates – let’s say vertebrates were able to have memory – is there non-being before that, or is that even a non-question?

*Mr. Scalambrino:* Okay. So, this is invoking one of the Skeptical Tropes or the Skeptical Modes.
Mr. Mountenay: It’s the first one.

Mr. Scalambro: Right. And, I was expecting Dr. Polansky to throw this at me as well. So, the way I would respond to this via Schopenhauer is that Schopenhauer is a good example of an attempt to solve this problem post-Kant. What Schopenhauer is suggesting that the ground is actually “Will.” He comes right out and says it, and he even points back to the Sophist; he says the solution to the problem of non-being is the denial of the will.

So, you see how this works. The people who are trying to solve this problem say, there is the structure of experience, and whatever it is that is governing the ground of experience, we must deny [i.e. negate] that. Then we get a solution. He says, it’s will, and I say, it’s memory.

Mr. Scalambro: Good question. Patrick.

Mr. Reider: I actually wanted to return to the question that Dr. Evans posed earlier. I was curious about this question of time. Are we talking about an ontological question? Or, are we talking about what is logically prior? It seems to me that if we are going to address this problem from what is logically prior, in the sense that we are dealing with this question of how we can arrive at a resolution of it, we need to start with what factors are available to us, and that’s not going to immediately be the ontological question. It’s going to be memory, which seems to me to allow for the experience of time. And, so, in that sense, could say that memory is primary, rather than time – as being logically prior but not ontologically prior?

Mr. Scalambro: Yeah, so, again, I take this to be a heavy heavy paradoxical response. This idea, for example, I think this hearkens back to: Does God create in time? Did it take God time to create the world, etc? Is God in time or outside of time? That sort of stuff… That’s heavy. That’s very heavy.

I, again, I tried to follow the path that these other philosophers were following, in order to solve this problem. So, for example, as Chris brings up, Schopenhauer is another good example because he’s post-Kant. And, so, [the path seems to be] let’s look at the structure of experience – this is why the flowchart is set up as it is – what’s at the ground of the structure of experience? How would we negate that? What would it look like if we were to negate it?
So, when I follow that path, and I arrive at the ground as memory, then the negation is providing us with this gap. And, it meets the criteria.

I would have to go back and look to see, if we worked with this idea of time, does it meet the criteria? And, to what extent would it be different from Heidegger’s *Being & Time*? Or, to what extent is there an overlap between my project and Heidegger’s.

*Dr. Evans:* If we’re talking ontologically, then we’re saying ontologically time exists, time is the unfolding of everything, and memory is just part of it. And, if memory is taken apart from that, then do we still call it “memory” anymore? If we are talking about experiential time, then “memory” is a bit misleading; it’s reifying because really re-membering is what’s going on, and remembering does involves time.

*Mr. Scalambrino:* So, briefly, one of the ways we could do this is to say: Within the pulse, it is as if within the pulse you are remembering from inside the other pulse, but really it’s the case that the pulse contains memory. So, that you’re really remembering within the pulse, but it seems like you’re remembering within the “prior” pulse. Then, once we try to start talking about it, you have to use time, because I have to start saying the “prior,” the “next,” etc.

It’s a good question. Again, though, I still think following the path of these other philosophers, really the last key was: What is the ground? And, then, looking at the empirical memory research in order to enunciate the ground, if in fact it is memory this would be the outcome. Does that outcome meet the criteria? I think it does.

*Dr. Selcer:* Frank, I’m going to have to go.

*Mr. Scalambrino:* Okay. Cheers.

*Dr. Selcer:* I just wanted to say: Congratulations, we signed off on the paper.

[Pause for applause]

*Dr. Scalambrino:* Thank you. Thank you very much.

*Dr. Selcer:* So, there’s no reason the conversation can’t continue, but unfortunately I won’t be here for it.

*Dr. Scalambrino:* Thank you. Thank you everyone for being here.