A Comparative Study of the Factors that Contribute to the Success of Non-Violent Revolutions

Nicholas P. Vucic

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A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO THE
SUCCESS OF NON-VIOLENT REVOLUTIONS

A Thesis
Submitted to the McAnulty College and
Graduate School of Liberal Arts

Duquesne University

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Master of Arts

By
Nicholas P. Vucic

December 2010
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO THE SUCCESS OF NON-VIOLENT REVOLUTIONS

By

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ABSTRACT

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO THE SUCCESS OF NON-VIOLENT REVOLUTIONS

By

Nicholas P. Vucic

December 2010

Thesis supervised by Dr. Daniel Lieberfeld.

What enables some non-violent revolutions to succeed while others do not?

Examining Poland’s nonviolent revolution of 1989 and Serbia’s Bulldozer Revolution in 2000 as case studies, this thesis analyzes the impact of certain factors on the success of non-violent protests. This thesis argues that states are more likely to achieve revolution through peaceful measures if these factors are present prior to revolution. In this research, I examine the impact of these factors in Poland in 1989 and in Serbia in 2000. Additionally, this comparative case study will generate hypotheses about the main factors explaining the outcomes that can be investigated in other cases.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

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Also, a very special thank you to my parents for their continued support throughout all my academic endeavors. Thank you for always encouraging me to do what makes me happy and inspiring me to achieve all that I can.

Lastly, I would like to express my appreciation to my magnificent and very understanding girlfriend, Becca, who has always been there for me, especially throughout the entire Graduate school experience.
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**LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

**Poland**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SOL</td>
<td>Solidarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRI</td>
<td>Rural Solidarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAB</td>
<td>Group Against Job Discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RWD</td>
<td>Movement of Free Democrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZNP</td>
<td>Independent Self-Governing Union of Teachers and Educational Employees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRN</td>
<td>Workers’ National Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROP</td>
<td>Movement for Defense of Human and Civic Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WZZ</td>
<td>Free Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPK</td>
<td>Civic Committee to Build a Monument in Honor of Victims of Katyn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TKN</td>
<td>Society of Scientific Courses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KSN</td>
<td>Clubs in Service of Independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSN</td>
<td>Committee Accord for National Independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMP</td>
<td>Young Poland Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOR</td>
<td>Workers’ Defense Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZNK</td>
<td>The Sign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPN</td>
<td>Polish Independence Accord</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPN</td>
<td>Confederation for Independent Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TGP</td>
<td>Universal Weekly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIK</td>
<td>Club of Catholic Intelligentsia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEZ</td>
<td>Link</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZNA</td>
<td>National Catholic Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZS</td>
<td>Independent Association of Students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPS</td>
<td>Movement of Polish Socialists’ Accord</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holy See</td>
<td>Roman Catholic Church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KCEP</td>
<td>Charitable Commission of the Episcopate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWS</td>
<td>Church World Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LWR</td>
<td>Lutheran World Relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFL-CIO</td>
<td>American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZL</td>
<td>Zeszyty Literackie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTUI</td>
<td>Free Trade Union Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRF</td>
<td>Smith-Richardson Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NED</td>
<td>National Endowment for Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNB</td>
<td>Uncensored Polish News Bulletin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FH</td>
<td>Freedom House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>Catholic Relief Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACCF</td>
<td>Polish American Congress Charitable Foundation, Inc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFE</td>
<td>Radio Free Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>Polish American Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLDF</td>
<td>Polish Legal Defense Fund</td>
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<td>PHWC</td>
<td>Polish Helsinki Watch Committee</td>
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### Serbia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>Democratic Opposition of Serbia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSI</td>
<td>Open Society Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSB</td>
<td>Red Star Belgrade Fans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRI</td>
<td>International Republican Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNN</td>
<td>Cable News Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CESID</td>
<td>Center for Free Elections and Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NED</td>
<td>National Endowment for Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AI</td>
<td>Amnesty International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IWPR</td>
<td>Institute for War and Peace Reporting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FH</td>
<td>Freedom House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USIP</td>
<td>United States Institute of Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLF</td>
<td>Humanitarian Law Foundation</td>
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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Research Overview

What enables some non-violent revolutions to succeed while others do not? In 1989, Poland experienced a successful peaceful political revolution led by the independent trade union Solidarity in the face of repression attempts by the government of Poland. Eleven years later, in 2000, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia led peaceful protests that culminated in the overthrow of the Slobodan Milosevic regime and a non-violent transition to democracy. This thesis is a comparison of the factors that impacted the success of non-violent revolutions in Poland and Serbia.

This research hopes to expand on the research of political scientist Kurt Schock, which analyzes the underlying causes of successful non-violent revolutions, especially with regard to discovering why some turn violent and others resolve peacefully either through democratic elections, political liberalization, or the removal of an non-democratic regime. In order to recognize the causes of success, the move towards a more democratic political system, in non-violent revolutions, it is essential to explore the existing theoretical explanations of success of non-violent movements and the critiques of these theories. Schock explains that there are three factors that are important to the success of non-violent protests: 1) a link between civil society institutions and the challengers, 2) the level of decentralization in the structure of networks of oppositional organizations, and 3) the levels of resilience, the ability to resist repression, and leverage, the ability to mobilize support. According to Schock, each of these conditions
is equally important to the success of non-violent movements and that the factors influence one another.

Three terms that Schock utilizes in relation to his case studies are unarmed insurrection, non-idealised non-violence, and pragmatic nonviolence. Schock uses political scientist Stephen Zunes’s definition, which defines unarmed insurrections as “organized popular challenges to government authority that depend primarily on methods of non-violent action rather than on armed methods.”\(^1\) Additionally, Schock employs political scientist Ralph Summy’s definition of non-idealised non-violence, which states, “In its non-idealised form a nonviolent campaign may extend into other political categories. Though remaining predominately nonviolent, it may contain some actions that are conducted in the conventional sphere, and perhaps even lapse into the violent sphere.”\(^2\) Schock then defines pragmatic non-violence as a “commitment to methods of nonviolent action due to their perceived effectiveness, a view of means and ends as potentially separable, a perception of the conflict as a struggle of incompatible interests, an attempt to inflict nonphysical pressure on the opponent during the course of the struggle to undermine the opponent’s power, and an absence of nonviolence as a way of life.”\(^3\) These terms are important because Schock states that each of his case studies qualifies as an “unarmed insurrection’, and as episodes of ‘non-idealised’ and ‘pragmatic’ nonviolent action.”\(^4\) Additionally, the two case studies for this research, Poland and Serbia, also qualify as unarmed insurrections and episodes of non-idealised and pragmatic nonviolence, which means that these two case studies can utilize a

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\(^2\) Ibid., xvii.
\(^3\) Ibid., xvii.
\(^4\) Ibid., xxvi.
methodology similar to Schock’s, since these cases are comparable to his six case studies in these aspects.

This thesis analyzes the impact on protest outcomes of variables including a link between transnational civil society institutions and the challengers, opposition network decentralization, and degree of leverage and resilience. In order to clarify what is meant by each of the three factors, it is important to define the key terms present in each of the factors, which for this research are “civil society,” “non-governmental organizations,” “challengers,” “leverage,” and “resilience.” In order to enhance comprehension of the concepts and factors that will be presented in this thesis, it is important to define the key terms. In a report titled *Open Government Fostering Dialogue with Civil Society* written by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), civil society is defined as

non-profit and non-governmental organisations, organised by groups of people in the sphere of civil society, working for a cause for the benefit of society, that very often contribute as well to the development of democracy. There are, however, grey areas in this definition, organisational forms, such as political parties and liberation movements that, on the one hand, spring from civil society and, on the other, may end by assuming government responsibility.5

Schock defines challengers as “ordinary citizens engaged in methods of nonviolent action,” which are independent from the state and come “from any and all classes and castes” that are not required to hold any particular “ideological, religious, or metaphysical beliefs.” Political scientist Leslie R Alm states “a *non-governmental organization is defined as a* ‘scientific, professional, business, non-profit, or public interest organization or association, which is neither affiliated with, nor under the direction of a

Additionally, Schock identifies leverage as the “ability of contentious actors to mobilize the withdrawal of support from opponents or invoke pressure against them through the networks upon which opponents depend for their power.”

Furthermore, Schock defines resilience as “the capacity of contentious actors to continue to mobilize collective action despite the actions of opponents aimed at constraining or inhibiting their activities.”

In addition to “civil society,” “political repression” and two relevant terms, “political liberalization” and “reform,” are key concepts for this research, because they are practical terms in the measurement of success for each non-violent movement.

Political scientist Bret Lee Billet defines political repression as actions taken by political authorities to neutralize, suppress, or eliminate a perceived threat to the security and stability of the government, the regime, or the state itself. They include acts of censorship against the mass media and political publications, and the like, as well as restrictions on the political activity and participation of the general public, or specific persons, parties, and organizations.

This research will use the definition of “political liberalization” developed by political scientists Guillermo A. O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead. O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead define political liberalization as “making effective rights that protect individuals and groups from arbitrary, repressive, or...
illegal acts committed by a communist or authoritarian state.”

According to political scientist Michael Bratton, “the release of political prisoners, the lifting of government censorship, and the legalization of banned political parties,” are some recognizable examples of what constitutes political liberalization. Additionally, political scientist John Keeler defines “reform” as “a policy innovation manifesting an unusually substantial redirection or reinforcement of previous public policy.” Finally, it is important for this research to define what is meant by the dependent variable of “success.” For the purpose of this research, success is defined as achieving the deposal of a non-democratic regime and the beginning of a move towards a more democratic political system.

Schock analyzes six cases of non-violent movements in order to discover what factors enable non-violent movements to become successful. Schock examines the success of the non-violent movements in South Africa and the Philippines of the mid-1980s, the failure of non-violent movements in Burma and China in the late 1980s, and the success of the non-violent movements in Nepal and Thailand of the early 1990s. Schock examines the structure of the opposition movement, the ability of the opposition movement to connect with civil society organizations, and the level of resilience and leverage of each movement. From this analysis, Schock concludes that a decentralized opposition network aided the non-violent movement in persisting through repression attempts by the government. Additionally, Schock resolved that a link between civil

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society and the opposition movement also strengthened the ability of non-violent movements to succeed, because the heightened amounts of participation, resources, and media attention were able to enhance support for the movement. Furthermore, Schock concluded that opposition movements that had higher levels of resilience and leverage proved more successful than those with weaker levels of resilience and leverage. An important aspect of Schock’s research on these three factors is that there are various points where these factors overlap and interact with one another. An example of this is that a decentralized leadership structure in the opposition movement contributes to the resilience of a non-violent movement. This research will utilize these concepts to explain how these factors impact the success of non-violent movements in the cases of Poland and Serbia.

1.2 Thesis Structure

This thesis is divided into six chapters. The first chapter supplies an introduction into the research question, the research hypotheses, the methodology that will test these hypotheses, and this thesis’s contribution to research. Chapter two provides a review of the literature on non-violent action and the scholarly debate on the value of non-violent action in the contemporary international political climate. Chapter three analyzes the impact of civil society in Poland and Serbia and their ability to connect with the challengers of the state. Chapter four provides an examination into the structure of the opposition networks present in Poland and Serbia and their consequential ability to resist governmental repression attempts. Chapter five explores the levels of resilience and leverage of the opposition movements in Poland and Serbia. Chapter six presents the conclusions of this study focusing on the impact of Schock’s three factors discussed in
Chapters 3 - 5 on the success of non-violent action in Serbia and Poland, along with providing additional recommendations and hypotheses for future research.

1.3 Thesis Hypotheses and Purpose of Research

In order to discover whether or not the presence of a link between civil society and the challengers, a decentralized opposition network, leverage, and resilience creates the conditions necessary for peaceful revolutions to succeed, there are three principal research hypotheses that need to be explored. The primary research hypothesis (H1) is that in comparing countries, those that have the presence of a link between civil-society institutions and oppressed citizens enable the conditions necessary for the success of non-violent action. The second hypothesis (H2) is that in comparing countries, those that organize a decentralized network of oppositional institutions are more likely to achieve peaceful political transition. The third hypothesis (H3) is that in comparing countries, movements that have greater resilience and leverage are more likely to accomplish success through non-violent action.

The goal of this research is to continue the development of a framework of the factors that enable the success of non-violent action in non-democracies that could provide additional hypotheses for testing. This research also hopes to contribute to the literature on the subject of how non-violent action can succeed in challenging non-democracies. Following Schock’s study, this research examines cases that fall within the third wave of democratization, which could help assess the extent that the factors that enable the success of non-violent action for these modern cases fit within the general spectrum of cases from all three waves. The research of contemporary cases, such as Poland and Serbia, investigates how factors that impact their success compare and
contrast with factors that had impacted the success of non-violent movements historically.

1.4 Research Methodology

Aspects of the methodology for this research project that require further clarification are case study selection, research design, strategy to accumulate data that is relevant to this research, operationalization and classification of variables and terms, the establishment of reliability and validity, and the uses of the findings in future instances. As mentioned in the introduction the two cases that are used in this research project are Serbia and Poland, which will act as cases that will help explain how a country can experience a peaceful revolution. The two cases, Serbia and Poland, were selected due to their political, social, demographic differences, and successful non-violent revolutionary outcomes. These two cases were selected primarily due to different pre-revolution characteristics that existed in those societies, but experienced a similar set of consequences, which follows Mill’s method of differences. This research will test these two cases to discover what characteristics the movements shared and to what extent they contributed to the success of the movement. Furthermore, this research will attempt to determine whether or not Schock’s explanation of the factors that enable success in non-violent action apply to Poland and Serbia. What this means is that this thesis will test Schock’s three factors in two cases that were not explored in Unarmed Insurrections and attempt to determine if Schock was correct or if there are parts of his theory that do not apply to these cases. This study is limited by resource and time considerations, therefore further research in the cases and factors is necessary. Additionally, this research analyzes
two cases through a cross-national comparison that may provide insight that could go unnoticed in a larger-n quantitative study.

This research analyzes the cases of Serbia and Poland during their non-violent revolutionary movements in the context of Schock’s three factors that enable success for non-violent movements. In order to discover the impact of these three factors on the two case studies, this research will examine major non-violent action campaigns and events in each case during the revolutionary period. This thesis will describe the event, the date, the location, the method of non-violence, the participation numbers, participation of third parties, and the leaders/organizers of the event. This research will find this data through examinations of primary and secondary sources consisting of periodicals, academic journals, government records, non-governmental organization records, books, and archived event flyers.

In order to discover the impact of a link between civil society organizations and the challengers, this study will explore the sources to determine major campaigns and events in Poland and Serbia. Once the major campaigns and events are recognized, this study will attempt to obtain the level of non-governmental organizations involved in the non-violent protests and which groups and/or individuals organized and led the events. By finding the level of involvement of civil society institutions in the non-violent events, this thesis can determine whether or not civil society organizations were active in the movement and to what extent. If it appears that barely any third party institutions participated in the campaigns and events, then it could be determined that a link between civil society institutions and the challengers did not exist. Conversely, if the research reveals that multiple civil society organizations were active in a variety of protests, then it
means that these third party institutions were closely connected with the movement. Additionally, by discovering the leaders and organizers of an event or campaign, a more in-depth analysis of the role and impact of third party institutions could be revealed. This is possible, since the civil society institutions could either be at the forefront of the movement, or simply in the background as non-active participants. If it is determined that civil society organizations led and/or organized a large portion of the events, then a link between civil society and the challengers becomes more apparent.

The second factor, the level of decentralization in the leadership structure of the opposition network, is determined through an analysis of the events to discover what groups and or individuals organized and led the events. If it appears that a diverse amount of groups and individuals were at the head of the movement, then it is possible to derive that the movement had a decentralized leadership structure. If a variety of groups and/or individuals led the events and campaigns that would signify that the leadership of the movement is not coming from an individual leader in a hierarchical structure. In addition to analyzing the leadership of major events and campaign, this study will also examine primary and secondary sources that discuss the structure of the movement. Several scholars have already explored the leadership structures in the non-violent movements in Poland and Serbia, so this research will also use these sources to help determine whether the movement’s leadership structure was decentralized.

The third factor, the leverage and resilience abilities of the non-violent opposition movement, is measurable through an examination of three characteristics of the major campaigns and events of the movements. The three characteristics that this thesis will explore to determine the leverage and resiliency of a movement are the location where
the event is held, the non-violent method utilized at the event, and the numbers of participants in the event. The location of the event is important, because it can show the ability of the movement to mobilize support throughout the country, which signifies that the more locations that events are held, the greater the leverage ability is in a movement. Additionally, the method of non-violent action can help determine the leverage and resilience capacity of a movement, because it displays the ability of a movement to innovate and develop strategies that make it more difficult for the regime to repress. If a movement implements a diverse variety of methods, the leverage ability increases, since more people are able to participate due to the likelihood that non-violent techniques are more easily employed by a greater variety of people. Furthermore, the implementation of a variety of non-violent methods increases the resilience capability of the opposition movement since the regime would be unable to target a specific technique or action to prohibit. The participation numbers of an event help to determine the leverage ability of a movement since the more people at an event signifies that the movement has the ability to mobilize high numbers of participants. Additionally, the greater amount of participants at an event means that the regime is less capable of repressing the movement; since the regime would not have the resources to successful repress that number of people. In other words, it is easier for the regime to repress a few hundred protesters as compared to a few thousand protestors.
Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1 Chapter Overview

What factors enable success in cases of non-violent action? Scholars present a variety of theories on factors that enable success in non-violent revolutions. This chapter explores the three factors that enable success in non-violent movements as described by political scientist Kurt Schock and what other scholars believe about each factor.

The chapter begins with how scholars have defined non-violent action. The next three sections discuss Schock’s theories regarding the role of civil-society institutions, the structural composition of the opposition network, and the leverage and resilience abilities of the opposition network in the success of non-violent movements. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the areas of the literature that are limited in their description of the factors that enable success for non-violent action and how the literature reviewed relates to this thesis.

2.2 Non-violent Action

With an increase in non-violent movements internationally, the debates between various schools of thought has also increased, creating a variety of a discussion on multiple aspects and characteristics of non-violent action. A comprehensive definition of non-violent action is provided by Schock in *Unarmed Insurrections*, which draws on political scientists Ronald M. McCarthy, Douglas G. Bond, and Gene Sharp. Schock compiles a variety of existing definitions to define non-violent action as action that involves activity in the collective pursuit of social or political objectives. More specifically, nonviolent action involves an active process of bringing political, economic, social, emotional, or moral pressure to bear in the wielding of power in contentious interactions between collective actors (McCarthy 1990, 1997; Sharp 1973, 1990, 1999). Nonviolent
Nonviolent action occurs through (1) acts of omission, whereby people refuse to perform acts expected by norms, custom, law, or decree; (2) acts of commission, whereby people perform acts that they do not usually perform, are not expected by norms or customs to perform, or are forbidden by law, regulation or decree to perform; or (3) a combination of acts of omission and commission (Sharp 1973). Rather than being viewed as half of a rigid violent-nonviolent dichotomy, nonviolent action may be better understood as a set of methods with special features that are different from those of both violent resistance and institutional politics (McCarthy 1990).\(^{13}\)

In addition to the inclusive definition provided by Schock, this thesis will use a more concise definition of non-violent action. For the purpose of this study, non-violent action is defined as the use of methods that do not utilize violence in order to place pressure on the target to achieve political, social, or economic goals. Additionally, this study breaks non-violent action down into the three categories of non-violent methods described by Sharp: protest and persuasion, methods of noncooperation, and methods of non-violent intervention. This thesis utilizes Schock’s summary of Sharp’s three categories of non-violent methods to categorize the different types of non-violent action, which states

Methods of protest and persuasion are used to reveal a problem, illustrate the extent of dissatisfaction, rouse public support or the support of third parties, overcome fear and acquiescence, and expose the state’s illegitimacy. They include methods such as protest demonstrations, marches, rallies, public speeches, declarations, the collective display of symbols, and vigils. Methods of noncooperation are used to disrupt the status quo and undermine the state’s power, resources, and legitimacy. They include methods such as boycotts, strikes, open refusal to pay taxes or enter the military, and other forms of civil disobedience. Methods of nonviolent intervention are used to disrupt attempts at continued subjugation. They include methods such as sit-ins, nonviolent sabotage, pickets, blockades, hunger strikes, land occupations, and the development of parallel or alternative institutions.\(^{14}\)

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\(^{14}\) Ibid., p. 16.
Sharp’s three categories of non-violent methods are useful for this thesis to help differentiate between the types of non-violent action used and the intent behind using different non-violent methods. For example, the American civil rights movement employed a variety of non-violent methods, such as sit-ins, marches, and boycotts, which were intended to disrupt continued oppression, expose the state’s illegitimacy, and disrupt the status quo, respectively.

2.3 The Politics of Nonviolent Action

In 1973, Sharp wrote *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, which attempted to explain how non-institutional actions and non-violent methods could drive political transition. This groundbreaking work analyzed examples of non-violent political transition, developed the concept of pragmatic non-violence, as spiritual non-violence was the prominent concept at the time, and explained the means that cause non-violent movements to generate political transition. Sharp’s non-violent-action theory asserts

> when people refuse their cooperation, withhold their help, and persist in their disobedience and defiance, they are denying their opponent the basic human assistance and cooperation which any government or hierarchal system requires. If they do this in sufficient numbers for long enough, that government or hierarchical system will no longer have power.¹⁵

Sharp’s analysis centers on the balance of power between the government and the people, since the government’s power originates from the obedience and cooperation of the people. Once the people become disobedient and stop cooperating with the government’s desires, then it can no longer effectively govern those people. Sharp contends

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if the subjects deny the ruler’s right to rule and to command, they are withdrawing the general agreement or group consent, which makes possible the existing government. This loss of authority sets in motion the disintegration of the ruler’s power. That power is reduced to the degree that he is denied authority. Where the loss is extreme, the existence of that particular government is threatened.\footnote{Ibid., p. 13.}


With an advantage in the power relations, political transition is produced through one of four mechanisms of change, which Sharp identifies as conversion, accommodation, nonviolent coercion, and disintegration. Conversion occurs when “the government…adopts the challenger’s point of view and concedes to its goals.”\footnote{Schock, Kurt. Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements In Nondemocracies. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004. p. 41.} Accommodation happens when “the government grants concessions to the challengers even though it is not converted to the challengers’ point of view, is not forced to concede by the challengers’ actions, and has the capacity to continue the struggle.”\footnote{Ibid., p. 41.} Sharp states that nonviolent coercion, which is change that is “achieved against the government’s will as a result of the challengers’ successful undermining of the government’s power, legitimacy, and ability to control the situation through methods of nonviolent action” is
typically the most successful mechanism of change in non-democracies.\textsuperscript{21} Sharp defines disintegration as “when the government breaks down in the face of widespread nonviolent action.”\textsuperscript{22} These mechanisms of change are important for this research since they help explain the ways non-violent action could produce political transitions, which introduce a framework that helps explain why some non-violent movements succeed. Sharp’s four mechanisms of change explain how political change occurs when non-violent action is used, which helps identify the process that Schock’s three factors enable success in non-violent action.

Some scholars present theories that contend that the non-violent action theory is limited in its explanation of the structural aspect of political transition, especially regarding the impact of political opportunities. For example, sociologist David S. Meyer argues that “ongoing interactions between challengers and the world around them determine not only the immediate outcomes of a social movement, but also its development and potential influence over time.”\textsuperscript{23} In other words, changes in the political landscape, such as elections and economic crises, can open or close political opportunities for the opposition networks. The significance of this criticism is that although neither theory claims to completely explain all aspects of non-violent action individually, it is important to utilize concepts from each to develop a more comprehensive theoretical framework. Sharp’s conclusions are limited by minimizing the impact of structural considerations, such as the impact of different administrations or

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., p. 42.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., p. 42.
upcoming elections. On the other hand, the non-violent-action approach’s attention to methods and mechanisms and movement outcomes provides a solid foundation, as it explains the role of certain factors and their influence on political change, which Schock expands upon.

2.4 Civil-Society’s Role in Non-violent Action

The principal assertion of Schock’s *Unarmed Insurrections* is that three factors enable success in non-violent movements. This section discusses Schock’s first factor, the role of the link between civil-society organizations, primarily transnational institutions, such as Amnesty International and Freedom House, and the challengers of the regime, such as the Indian people led by Gandhi. Schock states “the global processes that intensified at the end of the twentieth century created networks linking oppressed and intermediary groups, thereby increasing the potential for challengers to invoke the support of third parties [civil-society institutions].” Furthermore, Schock asserts “the support of challengers by third parties may be crucial in providing them [challengers] with greater leverage or in tipping the balance of power in their [challengers] favor” which signifies that “nonviolent action by the oppressed [challengers] may have a greater likelihood of succeeding where these networks are involved.”

This means that domestic and international civil-society institutions provide opposition movements with financial and material resources, media coverage, and general support that help strengthen the protest and resistance abilities of the movement, making the non-violent action more likely to succeed. Domestic NGO’s are civil-society institutions that develop and operate in the country of the conflict, whereas international

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NGO’s are civil-society institutions that are headquartered in countries outside of the one where the conflict is occurring. Third parties refer primarily to international or domestic organizations independent of government influence and/or support, such as civil-society institutions like international rights organizations, labor unions, and political parties. Schock concludes that the introduction of civil-society organizations into non-violent movements strengthens the capabilities of the opposition network to not only resist repression efforts by the regime, but also to more easily organize and protest. As a result of a stronger opposition network, with increased funding, support, and operational capacity due to the inclusion of civil-society institutions, the potential for the success of the non-violent action increases.

According to Schock, the informal alliance between civil-society institutions and the challengers in a non-violent movement can transform multiple aspects of the movement, especially the movement’s potential success. Schock contends that the influence and power of domestic and transnational civil-society institutions is used to attract international attention that pressures the regime to resolve the conflict or topples the regime. Since non-governmental organizations already have formal institutions and a supply of resources, such as funds, contacts, leaders, and access to the media, it is easier for these civil-society institutions to provide the movement with access to these resources. Schock states that the addition of these organizations into the movement makes the movement instantly stronger, with improved capacity to resist repression and

25 Ibid., pp. 54-55.
26 Ibid., p. 54.
mobilize support, as the movement gains experience and access to greater resources from the non-governmental organizations.  

Both domestic and transnational civil-society institutions connected to challengers can have a deep impact on the success of that movement. Transnational civil-society organizations usually become interested in non-violent action due to some aspect of the movement that relates to their philosophy and/or objectives. These groups often include global human-rights organizations, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, but also typically include other political groups, such as the Open Society Institute, economic groups, such as the Aurora Foundation, social groups, like the Red Star Belgrade fans, cultural groups, such as POLCUL, environmental organizations, such as Greenpeace, and religious rights groups, such as Lutheran World Relief. The inclusion of a variety of civil-society organizations means that the movement can implement strategies that they would not have previously considered. Conversely, domestic civil-society institutions develop primarily for social, non-conflictive reasons, but governmental repression can create a large number of these groups or increase the power and support of the pre-existing groups, because during repression, societal consciousness is raised and participation in civil-society institutions increases. 

Although the domestic civil-society institutions typically lack movement experience, knowledge, and resources, they are able to provide resources to the movement that transnational civil-society organizations cannot.

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Schock explains that the most important benefit of establishing a link between civil-society institutions and the challengers in a state is that it provides the movement with greater leverage and resiliency abilities, which is discussed in detail in Chapter 5, which help to shift the balance of power in the relationship between challengers and the regime.\(^{29}\) This shift in the power relationship is especially important in context of the obedient and cooperative relationship that the people have with the regime, since once the people stop obeying and cooperating with the regime, the regime loses its ability to govern.\(^{30}\)

Prior to testing whether the link between civil-society institutions and the challengers enabled success in the cases of the non-violent movements in Poland and Serbia, I will summarize Schock’s own findings on his six cases to better understand how civil-society institutions could impact a movement. In South Africa, Schock discovers that the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) coordinated a variety of other civil-society institutions, like the National Education Crisis Committee, which was designed to teach people about the current situation, and helped transfer power to the challengers.\(^{31}\) Similarly, two civil-society institutions in the Philippines, the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan) and the United Democratic Opposition (UNIDO) organized the other civil-society groups to fight against the Marcos regime. As a result of the link between civil-society institutions and the challengers in the Philippines, the non-violent movement was able to effectively implement a variety of non-violent methods, such as economic boycotts and

\(^{29}\) Ibid., pp. 143-154.
\(^{30}\) Ibid., pp. 44-46.
\(^{31}\) Ibid., pp. 56-90.
transportation strikes, innovate their strategy when necessary, and mobilize even more people and resources to the anti-Marcos cause.

In the other two successful instances of non-violent action, Thailand and Nepal, Schock credits civil-society institutions with overcoming differences and working together with the challengers to enhance the capability of movements to efficiently pressure the regimes to transition to a more democratic government.\textsuperscript{32} Conversely, in Burma and China, Schock cites the lack of an active domestic civil-society and the isolation of both countries in preventing transnational civil-society institutions from working with the challengers as part of the reason that both cases ultimately proved unsuccessful.\textsuperscript{33}

A link existed between international and domestic civil-society institutions in the four successful non-violent movements Schock studied, but did not exist in the unsuccessful non-violent movements in Burma and China. In the successful cases, a link between civil-society institutions and the challengers helped supply the pro-democracy movements with greater resources, additional leadership, and international attention, which aided in the movements’ success.

The Boomerang Pattern developed by political scientists Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink supports Schock’s concept that a link between civil-society organizations and the challengers enables success in non-violent action. Keck and Sikkink developed a model (Appendix 5) that explains how transnational advocacy networks (TANs), which are networks of protesters and transnational non-government organizations, work together to surmount repression attempts by the state. In the

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., pp. 120-141.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., pp. 91-119.
Boomerang Pattern, International Non-governmental organizations (INGOs) aid challengers in an oppressive state by circumventing the blockage by using their international support and resources to pressure other states and the repressive state to produce positive political change.\textsuperscript{34} The Boomerang Pattern is a prime example of how third party institutions act to strengthen and support opposition movements, in order to produce political change, which could include regime transition. For example, Keck and Sikkink cite the case of the rubber tappers in the Amazon region of Brazil, who successfully implored the National Council of Rubber Tappers, the Catholic Church, and U.S. environmentalists to use their resources and power to place pressure on the Brazilian government to stop encroachment by cattle ranchers.\textsuperscript{35}

2.5 Decentralized Leadership Structure in Non-violent Movements

This section discusses Schock’s second factor that enables success for non-violent action: the importance of a decentralized leadership structure in the opposition network. In addition to exploring the role of transnational civil-society institutions in non-violent movements, Schock asserts that movements are more likely to succeed through peaceful means if the opposition network challenging the regime has a decentralized structure. A decentralized opposition network structure means that the challenging movement of activists and non-governmental agencies cooperate to form a network that leads as a whole, as opposed to a centralized structure in which leadership comes from an individual or a single organization. Schock contends that a decentralized

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\item \textsuperscript{34} Keck, Margaret E, and Sikkink, Kathryn. \textit{Activists Beyond Borders}. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998. pp. 1-38.
\end{itemize}
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network is more able to resist governmental repression, predominantly as a result of preventing the regime from targeting a specific individual or organization for repression.

The organizational structure of the opposition network in a non-violent movement can affect numerous aspects of the ability of non-violent action to succeed. In *Unarmed Insurrections*, Schock explains that “decentralized, yet coordinated organizational networks” enhance the ability of the movement to resist repression and increase operational capacity, which increases the potential for the non-violent action to accomplish its objectives.\(^{36}\) Additionally, Schock asserts that

A decentralized challenge, however, requires a significant degree of coordination and aggregation. Umbrella organizations or federative structures are useful in this regard, as they may facilitate the brokering of diverse groups, promote the flow of information and the aggregation of resources, coordinate local networks and struggles into national political challenges, and magnify the resources and power of a challenge. Umbrella organizations or federative structures also facilitate the forging of broad alliances of diverse groups that are necessary for effective campaigns of protest and noncooperation.\(^ {37}\)

What Schock means is that an umbrella organization or a federation of the political opposition allows the movement to act through coordinated measures, which means that the distribution of resources, the delegation of duties, and the spread of information are made easier. These tasks are made easier because the umbrella organization or federation has standardized methods and processes already in place and the other members of the opposition movement follow these standards and process, streamlining the ability of the movement to carry out these duties.

Schock explains that a decentralized structure in a non-violent movement helps the network resist repression for five main reasons. Because of the nature of


\(^{37}\) Ibid., p. 144.
decentralized leadership in the network, states are less able to focus repression efforts on individual groups and/or leaders. Additionally, Schock contends that “the devolution of leadership inhibits the disruption of movement activities when movement leaders are imprisoned or murdered,” which means that the opposition movement can continue their non-violent action without having to completely recuperate.\(^{38}\) Furthermore, Schock contends that as a result of the inclusion of numerous organizations and individuals, decentralized networks are typically more democratic, ensuring that every institution or individual has a voice in the direction of the movement. Another benefit of a decentralized structure in an opposition network is that it allows for the development of a common goal, which helps to minimize conflict between diverse organizations and individuals. Lastly, Schock claims that decentralized networks are organized in a manner that enhances “flexibility and the capacity for horizontal information flow,” which permits the movement to innovate strategically and implement a greater variety of methods more easily than “more bureaucratically structured and ideologically rigid” movements.\(^{39}\) Additionally, the decentralization of the opposition network allows for peaceful resolutions when conflicts arise between network leaders and/or organizations. The democratic nature of decentralized leadership signifies that when conflicts among leaders and/or organizations happen that the entire organization or movement works towards the resolution of the issue.

Schock concluded that decentralized leadership benefits the resilience of a movement by examining the organization of opposition networks in South Africa, the Philippines, Nepal, Thailand, Burma and China. In South Africa, Schock discovered that

\(^{38}\) Ibid., p. 52.

\(^{39}\) Ibid., pp. 143-144.
the United Democratic Front (UDF), coordinated several opposition movements at a local level to develop a nationwide movement. This signifies that the UDF created a nationwide anti-apartheid movement by simply managing a variety of local opposition networks, which made it difficult for the regime to repress the movement, since it was divided among multiple organizations.\textsuperscript{40} The movements in the Philippines and Thailand both had groups, Bayan and the Campaign for Popular Democracy (CPD) respectively; act as nationwide umbrella organizations that were each able to consolidate diverse institutions into a single collective opposition movement.\textsuperscript{41} In Nepal, the non-violent movement formed a federation of political opposition institutions that worked together to produce political transition. These four instances of decentralized structure in non-violent movements showed that distributed leadership provided numerous advantages that increased the potential for the success of the non-violent action.\textsuperscript{42} Conversely, the non-violent action in Burma and China lacked an organized, but decentralized structure in the opposition network, which allowed for the regimes to efficiently repress individual movements, organizations, and activists.\textsuperscript{43}

Relevant to Schock’s analysis of decentralized networks in non-violent movements and the consequential impact on their outcomes is Keck and Sikkink’s Boomerang Model, discussed in last section. An important aspect of the Boomerang Model is that the transnational protests are not led by a single group or individual, but typically by Transnational Advocacy Networks, which consist of individuals, non-
governmental organizations, and sometimes other states.\textsuperscript{44} This implies that non-violent movements supported by non-governmental organizations are more likely to have decentralized leadership within the network, since there are multiple organizations participating in the movement. For example, the rubber tappers in the Amazon case displayed a decentralized TAN that consisted of the local rubber tappers, the National Council of Rubber Tappers, other local and international labor unions, the Catholic Church, and American environmentalists, all of which shared leadership responsibilities for the movement.\textsuperscript{45} In line with Schock’s theory, Keck and Sikkink attribute the success of transnational protests to the ability of TANs to organize and to apply pressure on the restrictive state from outside the domestic arena. Additionally, it is important to note that in cases of successful non-violent action that although a particular organization or individual may initiate the movement, the leadership typically becomes more decentralized with the addition of other individuals and organizations. The leadership of the opposition network undergoes decentralization as a result of the tendency of non-violent movements to be more democratic in nature, which signifies that new members to the opposition network are given the opportunity to influence the direction of the movement.

\textbf{2.6 Leverage and Resilience in Non-violent Revolutions}

The third factor that Schock presents that enables success in non-violent revolutions is the leverage and resilience abilities of the movement. As mentioned in the first chapter, leverage is the “ability of contentious actors to mobilize the withdrawal of


Schock describes resilience as the ability of non-violent movements to persist in the face of consistent repression efforts by the restrictive regime. These concepts relay the importance of the balance of power in the relationship between the regime and the citizens in a state, because a more vulnerable regime pressured by opposition networks with raised leverage and resilience capabilities is more likely to enable success.

“The probability that an unarmed insurrection will tip the balance of power in favor of the challengers is a function of its leverage and resilience,” states Schock, regarding the impact of leverage and resilience on the success of non-violent action. Schock contends that leverage and resilience directly influence the power relationship between the government and the opposition network, with the ability to shift power to either party. Schock’s principal assertion is that if a movement has enhanced leverage and resilience capabilities, non-violent action is more likely to succeed, since the opposition network is capable of withdrawing support of the regime making it unable to effectively operate.

One of the two concepts that comprises Schock’s third factor that enables success in non-violent movements is the concept of leverage. This “refers to the ability of contentious actors to mobilize the withdrawal of support from opponents or invoke pressure against them through the networks upon which opponents depend for their power.”

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48 Ibid., pp. 142-143.
support from the government, especially from international and domestic civil-society institutions, the balance of power can shift in favor of the opposition network. The shift in the balance of power between the government and the pro-democracy movement enables the opposition network to slow or halt government operations, as the government is not able to rule without the obedience and cooperation of its citizens.

The second concept of Schock’s third factor that enables success in non-violent movements is resilience, which “refers to the capacity of contentious actors to continue to mobilize collective action despite the actions of opponents aimed at constraining or inhibiting their activities.” This concept emphasizes the ability of a non-violent movement to overcome repression attempts by the government, which acts to “tip the balance of power in favor of the challengers.” The resilience of a non-violent movement is directly related to its leverage capabilities, as Schock states “the more resilient a challenge, the greater the likelihood that it will be able to mobilize the withdrawal of support or generate pressure against the state through networks upon which the state depends for its resources and legitimacy.”

One factor that can influence the resiliency of a non-violent movement, discussed in Chapter 4, is the level of decentralization in the leadership structure of the opposition network. Decentralized leadership in a non-violent movement signifies that the government is unable to target a specific individual or organization, which also means that the opposition network is able to continue normal operations when leaders are imprisoned or assassinated. This signifies that Schock’s second factor, the ability of an opposition network to decentralize its leadership, directly influences the leverage and resilience abilities of a non-violent movement.

49 Ibid., p. 144.
In addition to the level of decentralization of the opposition network, the ability to implement multiple non-violent techniques from across the three methods of non-violent action, the ability to implement methods of dispersion as well as methods of concentration, and tactical innovation are also factors that affect the leverage and resilience abilities of a non-violent movement. Schock claims “the implementation of a diverse range of actions across the various methods of non-violent action diffuses the state’s repression, thereby lessening its effectiveness.” Furthermore, “incorporating multiple methods of non-violent action also makes it easier for the challengers to shift the emphasis from one set of methods to another when the state focuses its repressive capacities on a particular set of actions.” Additionally, the ability to shift between methods of dispersion and methods of concentration means that the government is unable to focus its police and military forces on a certain event or place, as the opposition network could mobilize its people in at a different event or place. The ability of a non-violent movement to shift its resources and people from one event and place to another means that not only does it help limit the effect of the repression attempts by the government, but the government’s power is weakened since its resources are exhausted trying to repress these protests in a variety of locations. The ability of an opposition network to tactically innovate “keeps the authorities off balance and prevent the challenge from stagnating” by not allowing the state to adapt to and counter certain methods.  

In order to understand the impact of leverage and resilience on the success of the non-violent movements in Poland and Serbia, I will examine Schock’s findings regarding the relationship between the leverage and resilience abilities in his six cases and the

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50 Ibid., p. 144.
potential success of the six movements. Schock determined that in South Africa, the non-violent movement, primarily led by the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), enhanced its leverage and resilience capacity through the utilization of a decentralized leadership structure, the employment of “a wide range of actions across the three methods of nonviolent action,” and the implementation of methods of dispersion and concentration. The improved leverage and resilience abilities of the non-violent movement in South Africa “stripped the regime of legitimacy, contributed to the condemnation of the apartheid regime by third parties, and triggered increased international sanctions.”

In the Philippines, Schock found that Bayan used a “range of methods” and “responded innovatively to government repression,” along with the implementation of a method of dispersion called the welgang bayan, resulted in enhanced resilience and leverage abilities that contributed to the success of the non-violent action.

In Nepal, the non-violent movements increased its resilience and leverage capabilities by utilizing “a range of actions across the three methods of nonviolent action” and “innovatively responded to government repression through techniques such as blackouts and lightning demonstrations,” which contributed to the undermining of the state’s “resources, legitimacy, and ability to rule” that “were effective in overthrowing the regime.” Similarly, Schock discovered that the leverage and resilience capacity of the non-violent movement in Thailand was boosted by a “decentralized leadership structure and tactical innovation,” which contributed to the success of the non-violent

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51 Ibid., pp. 145-146.
52 Ibid., p. 146.
53 Ibid., pp. 146-147.
action.\textsuperscript{54} Conversely, the non-violent movements in Burma and China failed to implement a range of non-violent actions, methods of dispersion and concentration, and a decentralized leadership structure. Consequently, the two movements were unable to overcome repression and international isolation, which contributed to the failure of the non-violent action.\textsuperscript{55}

In the six cases that Schock tested in \textit{Unarmed Insurrections}, the four successful non-violent movements were able to enhance their leverage and resilience capabilities, while the unsuccessful non-violent movements in Burma and China did not. In the four successful cases, the non-violent movements implemented a range of actions across the three methods of non-violent action, utilized a decentralized leadership structure, employed methods of dispersion and concentration, and tactically innovated. The next two sections will examine the non-violent movements in Poland and Serbia to determine if a link was present between civil-society institutions and the challengers and the consequential impact on the success of the non-violent action. By practicing these techniques and strategies, the non-violent movements in South Africa, the Philippines, Nepal, and Thailand were able to greatly enhance their leverage and resilience capabilities, which contributed to the success of the non-violent action.

Another factor that Schock argues could impact the leverage and resilience of a non-violent opposition network is the ability to implement “political jiu-jitsu:”\textsuperscript{56} to turn repression efforts by the regime into increased support for the opposition movement. Sharp states that “exposing the violence of the state in contrast to the nonviolence of

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., pp. 147-148.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., pp. 148-150.
protesters casts the state in a negative light and may lead to shifts in opinion that alter power relations.”

“Political jiu-jitsu” acts to increase the regime’s sensitivity to pressure, which results in a shift in the power relationship between the challengers and the regime. Keck and Sikkink parallel this concept, as they claim that support for an opposition movement could increase its effectiveness if the repression by the regime is exposed internationally, which could potentially attract transnational support that could provide the movement with valuable resources and support. The resources and support provided by international governments and non-governmental organizations to non-violent movements strengthen the resistance capabilities of the movement and lessen the ability of the authoritarian regime to continue repression efforts. Additionally, negative international attention could result in political and economic sanctions that would weaken the regime’s capacity to remain unaffected by pressure from the opposition.

2.7 Conclusion

The literature on the factors that enable success in non-violent action from a range of fields may provide the thesis with a more comprehensive theoretical background, but also signifies that theory on the factors that enable success in non-violent movement is still limited its in ability to encompass all internal and external factors that impact the ability of non-violent action to succeed. This chapter has discussed literature from Schock and other scholars relevant to the three factors that this thesis will test. Another limitation of the literature is that it lacks additional case studies testing Schock’s conclusions. This thesis tests two new cases that supplement the six cases that Schock tested in *Unarmed Insurrections*.

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57 Ibid., p. 43.
58 Keck, Margaret E, and Sikkink, Kathryn. *Activists Beyond Borders*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
Furthermore, Schock’s theory that a link between the challengers and civil-society institutions, along with Keck and Sikkink’s Boomerang Pattern, displays the importance of domestic and international NGOs developing a connection with the challengers in enabling success in non-violent action. Schock’s leadership decentralization theory focuses more on the operational aspect of the non-violent action, as it explains the significance of cooperation among the different civil-society institutions that are present in an opposition network in enabling success. Schock’s third hypothesis, which asserts that the leverage and resilience abilities of a non-violent movement can enable success, builds on concepts taken from his other two theories. For example, Schock argues that a link between civil-society institutions and the challengers and a decentralized leadership structure are some of the factors that contribute to the movements’ ability to increase their leverage and resilience capabilities. Schock’s three hypotheses, along with Sharp’s non-violent action theory, create a theoretical framework that explains how and why political structures, non-governmental organizations, a link between civil-society and the challengers, a decentralized leadership structure, and the leverage and resilience abilities of a movement enhance the potential of non-violent action to succeed. The next three chapters will test Schock’s three factors in the cases of Poland and Serbia to determine if the three factors enabled the non-violent action to succeed.
Chapter 3: Civil Society’s Role in Non-violent Revolutions

3.1 Chapter Overview

In order to assess the role of civil-society institutions in enabling success in non-violent action, it is necessary to examine the impact of civil-society organizations in the non-violent revolutions in Poland and Serbia. This chapter looks at how civil-society institutions were involved in the opposition movements in Poland and Serbia and what impact they had on the success of the movement. In both these movements, civil-society institutions, such as religious organizations, independent trade unions, and student groups, helped pressure the regimes to democratize by providing additional resources to the movement and attracting international attention that galvanized support. The next section of this chapter outlines Schock’s theory, as it pertains to non-violent revolutions in general, and the role it played in the six cases that he analyzed in Unarmed Insurrections.

Following the overview of Schock’s assessment of the contributions of civil-society institutions to successful democratization movements, this chapter details the participation of civil-society organizations in the pro-democracy movement in Poland from 1980 through 1989. The next section explores the impact of civil-society institutions on the non-violent uprising in Serbia starting in 1999, and concluding with the resignation of Slobodan Milosevic in October, 2000. These sections examine the leadership and organizers of the major campaigns and events of the movements and the level of participation of civil-society organizations to discover how civil-society institutions aided the movement. The leadership of the movement is important to examine because it shows the level of involvement of domestic and transnational civil-
society institutions in the major non-violent campaigns and events. By focusing on leadership, this research will determine what individuals and/or organizations were primarily responsible for the major non-violent campaigns and events and how such events contributed to political outcomes. The chapter concludes with an overview of civil-society involvement in the revolutions in Poland and Serbia and whether Schock’s theory, which links civil-society institutions and challengers’ success, holds true for the two cases.

3.2 The Link Between Civil-Society Institutions and Challengers in Non-violent Action

The link between civil-society institutions and the challengers, according to Schock, is the development of an informal alliance between non-governmental organizations and the challengers, which is responsible for the pooling of resources, information sharing, coordinating non-violent action, and even providing additional leadership to the movement.59 Schock contends that a link between civil society and the opposition movement strengthens the ability of non-violent movements to succeed, because of the heightened amounts of participation, resources, and media attention were able to enhance support for the movement. The next two sections will investigate the extent of the development of a link between civil-society institutions and the challengers in Poland and Serbia to determine whether Schock’s first dependent variable contributed to their success.

3.3 The Role of Solidarity and Other Civil-Society Institutions in Poland 1980 – 1989

In Poland, between 1980 and 1989, workers’ unions and other civil-society organizations rose up against the regime. The non-violent movement in Poland in the 1980s saw the development of multiple civil-society institutions, especially Solidarity (SOL) founded in late 1980.\(^{60}\) These organizations helped shift the balance of power between the opposition and the regime in favor of pro-democracy movement through aiding the ability of the movement to resist repression attempts and to help mobilize more resources and people to organize larger protest events more often.\(^{61}\) Starting with an introduction into pre-movement Polish civil-society, this section explores the participation of civil-society institutions in the major campaigns and events throughout the movement and, consequently, what impact the link between these organizations and the challengers had on the success of the movement.

*Pre-Solidarity Civil Society in Poland*

Prior to 1980, civil-society institutions were typically government front organizations or were weak to the point of inaction. Any civil-society institution, such as religious groups and trade unions, were powerless, especially in any attempt to challenge the regime. The Henryk Jabłoński regime, from 1972 to 1985, was able to effectively limit the operational capacity of any opposition organizations, primarily through repression and isolation, up until the beginning of 1980.\(^{62}\) In the mid-1970s, the first wave of strikes by factory workers broke out across Poland protesting a rise in food

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prices, but was only moderately successful, in that the Soviet Union forced regime
resignations and reversed policy that only temporarily stabilized food prices and
unemployment rates. In the next year, any further strikes by factory workers were
quelled by government repression and by a lack of organization by the factory workers,
resulting in the return to the policies that had caused the first wave of strikes.63 Towards
the beginning of the 1980s, continued repression, decreasing wages, and further price
increases resulted in the formation of an opposition movement, which consisted of the
civil-society institution Solidarity, which also acted as an umbrella organization for
twenty-three civil-society institutions, pro-democracy activists, who were primarily non-
labor-industry individuals, such as students and the unemployed, and international civil-
society institutions, like the American Federation of Labor and Congress of International
Organizations (AFL-CIO). The next section examines the link between these civil-
society institutions and the challengers in Poland from 1980 through 1989.

*The Introduction and Development of an Active Civil Society in Poland*

What this study found throughout the research was that after the mostly
unsuccessful protests in the 1970s, the workers in Poland learned that uncoordinated
responses and violence were ineffective. In September 1980, after years of continued
repression, especially with regards to labor, the workers at a shipyard in Gdansk founded
Solidarity, whose official name is the Independent Self-governing Trade Union. The
founding of Solidarity, a local trade union, independent of government control, signified
the real beginning of an active civil society in Poland. Independent trade unions rapidly
spread and, by the end of 1980, Solidarity represented trade unions in 37 different regions

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63 Ibid., pp. 117-168.
across Poland. Participation in Solidarity aided in the development of the link between
domestic civil-society institutions and the challengers nationwide.\textsuperscript{64} By acting as an
umbrella institution for all independent trade unions, Solidarity was able to spread
information and innovate strategically, such as by shifting protest methods from strikes
alone to using over one hundred vehicles to blockade Warsaw in August, 1981,\textsuperscript{65} and to
boycotting the 1985 parliamentary elections.\textsuperscript{66}

In researching the major campaigns and events of the Polish non-violent
movement between 1980 and 1989, this study discovered that although Solidarity
originated as a workers’ organization, it was able to work together with civil-society
institutions from different ideological and social backgrounds, such as academic
organizations, religious organizations, and political organizations.\textsuperscript{67} The collaboration
between these civil-society institutions was possible because the groups were able to
focus on a common goal of instituting a more democratic political system, instead of
targeting different objectives.\textsuperscript{68}

Towards the end of 1980, civil-society organizations gradually became more
engaged in the collection and mobilization of event-planning information and counter-
intelligence, resources, and people. The initial success of Solidarity during the labor

\textsuperscript{64} Ibid., pp. 117-168
\textsuperscript{67} Osa, Maryjane. \textit{Solidarity and Contention: Networks of Polish Opposition}. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003. pp. 163-168. Some of the organizations involved were the Club of Catholic
Intelligentsia (KIK), which provided a forum for intellectual events, discussions, and courses, since the Polish government restricted open discussion of controversial topics, and The Sign (ZNK), which published
a literary journal, and the Polish Independence Accord (RPS), which provided protesters, financial and
publishing resources, and technology.
\textsuperscript{68} Ibid., pp. 163-182.
strikes of the early-1980’s helped to inspire increased development and engagement of civil-society institutions into the non-violent movement.\(^{69}\) The first key instance of a link between civil-society institutions and the protesters was on January 24, 1981, when the largest of the Free Saturday strikes occurred, in which workers stayed home as opposed to going to work. Although this was the third of the Free Saturday strikes, civil-society institutions, such as the organizations consolidated under Solidarity, acted as a liaison between the different factories, shipyards, and plants nationwide spreading information regarding strategy, methods, and leadership decisions. The third Free Saturday strike was far more coordinated than the previous two Free Saturday strikes and as a result, it was estimated that over seven million workers participated, meaning that many industries nationwide were incapable of functioning normally.\(^{70}\) After the success of the third Free Saturday strike, the movement organized a wave of general strikes lasting from January 28 through February, led by Solidarity and a few other domestic civil-society institutions, with participation peaking at 250,000 for a few of the events.

In August 1981, another wave of protests broke out in Warsaw, but in addition to the typical use of strikes, these protests utilized vehicles, people, and other objects to form a blockade around the city center. Approximately 100,000 people participated in the blockade, which basically resulted in the city government halting operations.\(^{71}\) A significant aspect of the blockades and protests was the role of domestic civil-society institutions in organizing the people and events and implementing new strategies to


prevent the police and military from stopping the non-violent action. These domestic civil-society groups provided the movement with vehicles, people, and other resources that made the blockade possible, since the individual challengers and activists were unable to provide such resources. An instance of domestic civil-society organizations providing resources where the challengers could not occurred at the city center blockade protest, when groups like the Charitable Commission of the Episcopate (KCEP), the domestic representative of the Roman Catholic Church, provided large vans to the challengers, which were typically used for transporting the elderly around the community and turned them into sizeable roadblocks.\textsuperscript{72}

\textit{Martial Law and the Impact of Transnational Civil-Society Institutions}

As a result of increased non-violent campaigns and protests, aided by the participation of domestic civil-society organizations, the Jabłoński regime declared martial law and banned the operation of most domestic civil-society institutions, especially Solidarity. At this time, civil-society institutions were forced to operate underground if they wanted to continue their non-violent action. In order to survive and operate underground, domestic civil-society groups maintained their relationships with one another through secret meetings, conversations, and coded messages, but the underground movement was largely sustained by assistance from international non-governmental organizations, which took over some of the responsibilities of the challengers, such as resource collection and protest organizing that allowed the domestic opposition network to remain out of the government’s spotlight. International non-

governmental organizations organized protests in Poland by communicating information and needs to the underground domestic groups and their supporters, pooling international resources for the events, and spreading the word throughout the opposition network. For example, international civil-society institutions, like Pomost and the Polish-American Congress, held repeated demonstrations in Chicago and raised over a million dollars that was sent to the opposition network in Poland through intermediaries.\(^7\)

With the prohibition of domestic civil-society institutions in Poland, support from a wide variety of international organizations and locations enabled the pro-democracy movement to continue its progress. Although the Roman Catholic Church had already been instrumental in the movement, numerous other international civil-society institutions joined the movement. American religious organizations, such as Church World Services (CWS) and Lutheran World Relief (LWR), sent blankets, quilts, clothing, soap, and water cleansing pills to Solidarity.\(^4\) In addition to providing funds for office and publishing supplies, the AFL-CIO also sent Solidarity cassette recorders, radios, base-station antennas, and other electronic equipment.\(^5\)

Although the protests and strikes gained international attention, the declaration of martial law by the Jabłoński regime attracted even greater interest from international organizations, other states, such as the United States and the Vatican, and transnational civil-society institutions.\(^6\) International civil-society institutions, especially those related directly to the Roman Catholic Church, like the National Catholic Union (ZNA), formed

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an underground network with Solidarity and other domestic groups that allowed the movement to persist in the face of repression attempts by the government. Another important addition to the opposition network in late-1981 was Rural Solidarity (SRI), which incorporated a large portion of Polish farmers.

One of the most significant features of the underground opposition network was that it was able to form parallel political, social, and economic institutions, such as an underground newspaper and radio broadcast, which acted as the media representative for the opposition movement, since the official media were government-run. This meant that the opposition network had structured institutions that paralleled the government-run institutions. Additionally, Solidarity had a coordinating office, which handled the institutional operations of the organization, such as the collection and disbursement of donations. Furthermore, since protesters and strikers were occasionally arrested, the opposition network, through the assistance of international non-governmental organizations, such as the Polish Legal Defense Fund, provided legal aid that was typically denied by the state.

These institutions allowed the movement to delegate event planning and fundraising to different organizations and groups, which meant that the opposition network could focus on the non-violent action instead of concerning itself with administrative matters. Also, these parallel institutions made it possible for funds and


<http://books.google.com/books?id=wEL8CUlPhrwC&dq=%22Polish+Legal+Defense+Fund%22&hl=en&ei=z1b4S_ztN4e8I4ezmoy_CA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=2&ved=0CDUQ6AEwAQ>
supplies coming into Poland to reach the opposition network more easily, because the resources no longer needed to pass through government entities that would typically confiscate them.\textsuperscript{79}

Between 1982 and 1985, domestic civil-society institutions grew marginally, but the influx of transnational civil-society institutions to the opposition network allowed the network to grow by providing additional resources, ideas, and leadership to the movement.\textsuperscript{80} Even though the opposition remained underground, the movement was able to continue to function normally and organized and led several pro-democracy protests, with an estimated 60,000 protesters at some events.\textsuperscript{81} The introduction of liberal reforms in the Warsaw Pact countries and the continued non-violent protests in Poland in 1984 through 1985 placed enough pressure on the Jabłoński regime that the Council of the State of Poland chose Wojciech Jaruzelski to replace Jabłoński as chairman in 1985, because the council believed that Jaruzelski would use greater military force to stabilize Poland’s political situation.\textsuperscript{82}

\textit{The Jaruzelski Regime and Political Transition}

The appointment of Jaruzelski had numerous implications for the role of domestic and international civil-society institutions as part of the non-violent opposition movement. A major point of divergence between Jabłoński and Jaruzelski was that Jabłoński came from an academic background, whereas Jaruzelski was a career military

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{81} Francisco, Ron. "Poland 80-81." \textit{European Protest and Coercion Data}. Kansas University. <web.ku.edu/~ronfran/data/Poland80-81.xls>.
\end{itemize}
officer and was thus much more militant toward protests and resistance. The opposition
movement, if it wanted to continue to pressure the regime, had to forge a stronger
network of civil-society organizations and challengers. The ability of the movement to
persist in the face of more extensive repression efforts by the regime is displayed through
increased participation by civil-society organizations after 1985. Strikes, protests,
student sit-ins, and media campaigns could continue normally, as a result of the growth
and inclusion of domestic and transnational civil-society institutions in the movement.83

By 1988, the movement was at its most powerful, enacting protests, campaigns,
and other events daily, with participation well in the thousands per event. From 1985 to
1988, the majority of domestic civil-society groups operated underground, but
transnational civil-society organizations took a prominent role in the movement, even
bringing in support from the Roman Catholic Church at its highest level, as the Pope
spoke in favor of the opposition movement. The Pope’s visit to Poland in 1987 and the
support he gave the Solidarity movement raised morale and inspired a large number of
Polish citizens to participate in the movement.84 Outside of the domestic civil-society
organizations, like Solidarity, Rural Solidarity, and the Workers’ Defense Committee
(KOR), transnational civil-society institutions, like Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Project
Hope, supplied the movement with moral support, along with financial support, gathered
primarily through international donations, and medical supplies to the challengers. Since
Solidarity’s ideological perspectives, such as dedication to the common good and the
interconnectivity of all people, were derived from Catholic Social Thought, this meant

that religious civil-society organizations, such as those related to the Roman Catholic Church, were more likely to support the movement.\textsuperscript{85}

An additional benefit of the involvement of transnational civil-society institutions was that since they were previously connected to the Polish people, the challengers were typically more accepting of the leadership, ideas, and strategy of these groups. In other words, prior familiarity with these organizations made it easier for people to trust and identify with these groups, making it easier for these groups to mobilize people and resources when they became involved in the opposition network.\textsuperscript{86} Notably, the Roman Catholic Church had a deep connection with a large number of Polish citizens prior to the opposition movement, which meant that when the opposition movement began, the challengers already had familiarity with the Catholic civil-society institutions making it easier for the challengers to know how to communicate and work with the organizations. Even after the legalization of Solidarity and other groups during the roundtable talks with the Jaruzelski regime in 1989, civil-society institutions continued to collaborate closely with non-affiliated pro-democracy individuals and activists, through the same channels used during the underground years, until the political transition was complete.

The pro-democracy movement in Poland in the 1980s was not isolated from external and internal political and economic factors, but these factors only supplemented the development of a link between civil-society institutions and the Polish challengers. As Poland experienced after the increase in meat prices, economic crises caused people who were previously inactive in the movement to become rapidly radicalized and joined civil-society institutions, like Solidarity and Group Against Job Discrimination (GAB), or

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., p. 176.
formed their own organizations. Additionally, the replacement of Jabłoński with a more militant leader in Jaruzelski implied that the regime would order more aggressive repression efforts. This brought more people into the movement, since people became increasingly outraged with the force that the government used to respond to the non-violent action.\textsuperscript{87} The economic recession and the regime transition in Poland provided “political opportunities” that the non-violent movement used to strengthen the opposition network, while weakening the Polish government’s repression abilities. The relationships among political elites were fractured on multiple levels, as leaders in the Polish United Workers’ Party and the Soviet Union were split on the recent regime transition and how to handle the recession.\textsuperscript{88} The instability of alliances among the political elites weakened the political system’s underlying power relations that created a “political opportunity structure” that the non-violent movement capitalized on.\textsuperscript{89}

In the 1980’s, international and domestic civil-society institutions developed a link with the challengers in the pro-democracy movement in Poland that contributed to the success of the non-violent action. Independent labor unions, like Solidarity, and international non-governmental organizations, like Pomost and the KCEP, and government-funded organizations, like the National Endowment for Democracy, provided funds and leadership to the opposition network, which succeeded in implementing democratic institutions and features, such as pluralism, which is the development and active participation of competing political parties and interest groups in

\textsuperscript{88} Ibid., p. 258.
the political system. Although domestic civil-society institutions, especially Solidarity, were the foundation of the movement from 1980 until 1989, international civil-society institutions supplemented the opposition network financially and physically, especially during the prohibition of domestic civil-society institutions from 1982 to 1988. The domestic and international civil-society institutions connected with the challengers to strengthen the non-violent movement in Poland that contributed to the success of the non-violent action by providing additional resources, participants, and international attention, which helped strengthen the movement’s operational and persistence abilities.\(^\text{90}\)

3.4 Civil-Society Institutions in the Serbian Transition to Democracy 1999 – 2000

The non-violent action in Serbia from 1999 to 2000 that resulted in the overthrow of the Slobodan Milosevic regime was characterized by the overwhelming influence of domestic and civil-society organizations. In a manner similar to Poland in the 1980s, civil-society groups played a direct role in the ability of the non-violent movement to mobilize and to resist severe repression attempts from the Milosevic regime. In addition to leadership from the youth organization Otpor! (Resistance! in English), the opposition network consisted of several international non-governmental organizations, primarily from the human rights sector, and the Democratic Opposition of Serbia, a coalition of opposition political parties.\(^\text{91}\) Through an analysis of the major campaigns and events of the non-violent movement, this section details the role of both domestic and international civil-society institutions in the non-violent movement and consequentially what impact they might have had on the success of the action.


Before 1999, there was a wave of non-violent protests in Serbia in response to widely disputed election results that kept the Milosevic regime in power. In November 1996, students in Niš began a series of protests against a new government policy that made the state responsible for the appointment of all university professors and were quickly joined by other students from all of Serbia, especially in the capital, Belgrade. These protests were easily repressed by the Milosevic regime, due primarily to the inability of the students to form a network among themselves, and with Zajedno (Together, in English), which was a network formed by the political opponents of the regime. The inability of the protesters to form a network was primarily the product of a lack of protest experience and knowledge of protest strategies and techniques among the students and the Zajedno coalition. This lack of cooperation among the opposition, combined with a lack of international support from non-governmental organizations severely limited the operational capacity of the pro-democracy protesters. The majority of international non-governmental organizations, such as the Open Society Institute and Freedom House, did not become involved in the pro-democracy protests at this point, since the Milosevic regime managed to isolate Serbia from international attention. As a consequence of civil-society institutions not participating in the movement, the student movement and Zajedno had difficulties collecting and mobilizing resources and people, sharing information, and developing strategy. These problems allowed the Milosevic

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regime to easily divide the movement, imprison the leadership, and use military and police forces to effectively shut down any attempted protests.\(^{94}\)

*Domestic Civil-Society Institutions and the Non-violent Movement, 1999-2000*

After the failed non-violent protests from 1996 through 1997, opposition in Serbia was quieted, but in 1998, Otpor! was founded in opposition to a series of restrictive laws at the University of Belgrade that limited freedom of press and speech. Although this student organization was founded because of problems at the university, the movement quickly refocused its efforts towards the Milosevic regime as the origin of the majority of problems in Serbia. As with the previous attempt at non-violent action, Otpor! lacked organization and leadership, which threatened the success of the movement from the beginning, as early pro-democracy protests were troubled by weak mobilization and resilience abilities. Starting in June 1999, the anti-Milosevic regime protests, led by Otpor!, had poor participation and was once again easily limited by repression.

Following a reorganization process that included a more democratic leadership structure, development of its own media institutions—including a paper and a variety of other printed material—and a revised strategy, developed directly from the *Politics of Nonviolent Action* by Gene Sharp, Otpor! became increasingly active in the pro-democracy movement.\(^{95}\) By instituting a more democratic leadership structure, the pro-democracy movement enhanced its ability to avoid government repression, a process examined in greater detail in the next two chapters.

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An important aspect of the composition of the Serbian opposition network was that although there were only a few domestic civil-society organizations involved in the network, they were deeply connected to the challengers throughout the entire movement. Even non-politically oriented groups, such as the fan club of the Red Star Belgrade soccer team, provided the protesters in Belgrade with electronic devices to monitor police radio transmissions.\textsuperscript{96} Additionally, the Open Society Institute’s Belgrade office taught students and other ambitious activists about non-violent methods, global democracy movements, and past human-rights campaigns.\textsuperscript{97} The link between civil-society institutions and the pro-democracy challengers is relatively apparent, since the majority of resources, people, information, strategy, and action originated from Otpor!. This indicates that not only was Otpor! a key member in the opposition network, but also that prior to the arrival of international civil-society institutions that it was the principal force behind the movement. From late-1999 on, domestic civil-society institutions, especially youth organizations, would continue to connect with the regime challengers, but would gain assistance from several international organizations.\textsuperscript{98}

\textit{The Role of Transnational Non-Governmental Organizations in the Opposition Network}

In the first few months of 2000 an international dimension was added to the opposition network, as a multitude of transnational civil-society institutions entered the movement, including human rights organizations and election monitoring groups, like the Center for Free Elections and Democracy (CESID). Excluding the rock concert rally in November 1999, international civil-society organizations were essentially not involved in

\textsuperscript{96} Ibid., p. 46.
\textsuperscript{97} Ibid., pp. 24-41.
\textsuperscript{98} Ibid., pp. 22-31.
the movement until April 2000, when they took a direct role in the mobilization of people and resources for the pro-democracy protests. From April 2000 through September 2000, transnational civil-society institutions, such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, formed a network with Otpor! and an alliance of opposition political parties, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) that was responsible for the coordination of most protests, events, and media campaigns.\(^9^9\) The contributions of the international non-governmental organizations were crucial to the success of the non-violent action, since they were able to attract international attention that would focus global pressure on the Milosevic regime, without experiencing the same level of repression as the domestic groups. The global pressure that was focused on the Milosevic regime in Serbia included political and economic sanctions, official denunciations, and increasingly negative international press.

One of the largest benefits of the inclusion of transnational civil-society organizations was that they provided the opposition network with greater communication and press capabilities. Although the domestic opposition network was able to develop parallel media institutions, such as a newspaper, the *Drevni Telegraf*, their ability to reach wider audiences outside of Serbia was extremely limited. After joining the non-violent movement in Serbia, transnational civil-society institutions were rapidly able to attract greater international attention to the situation, which in return helped minimize the attempts of the Milosevic regime to isolate the country, especially from the United States and Western Europe. Organizations like the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Freedom House, and Human Rights Watch amplified the voices of the movement with a

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continuous supply of reports on the non-violent action to the international community. It was important to the Milosevic regime to attempt to isolate Serbia because it would allow the regime to continue repression without criticism from the international community, especially from political and economic allies like Russia, due to the government’s violations of civil and human rights.\(^\text{100}\)

In the Serbian non-violent movement against the Milosevic regime, transnational civil-society institutions developed operational links with both the domestic civil-society organizations and the challengers. On September 27, 2000, the direct connection between these international groups and the challengers was seen as these transnational civil-society institutions, especially CESID, provided transportation and other resources necessary to create a strong protest against the election outcome in Belgrade.\(^\text{101}\) Over one hundred thousand people participated in the pro-democracy protests, including approximately 30,000 election monitors from both domestic and international civil-society institutions, such as CESID, Exit 2000, DOS, and Otpor! In addition to supporting a “Get Out the Vote” campaign across Serbia prior to the election, human rights groups and election monitoring NGOs also participated heavily in the post-election protests after Milosevic claimed a successful re-election.\(^\text{102}\)

In the beginning of October, citizens across Serbia took part in protests and workers went on mass strikes nationwide, most notably the workers at the Kolubara mines, which were previously strong supporters of the Milosevic regime. Since non-

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\(^\text{102}\) Ibid., pp. 49-60.
government unionization was rare in Serbia, these workers coordinated protests, campaigns, and economic boycotts with DOS and Otpor! in order to ensure that the strikes would effectively pressure the regime. Since both Poland and Serbia were heavily industrialized countries, the economies of both countries depended on factories and mines operating normally. In both Poland and Serbia, the industrial nature of the countries signifies that strikes could more effectively impact the economy, pressuring the government to resolve the conflict.

Unlike the laborers in Poland, the mineworkers in Serbia were not responsible for the commencement of the movement, but joined towards the very end of the movement to provide a final blow to the regime. In the beginning of October 2000, industries across Serbia were all on strike, students continued protests in most cities, and transnational NGOs continued to help focus international attention on the situation. By October 5, 2000, the opposition network was basically able to freeze normal activity in Serbia, including a full-scale blockade in Belgrade, which gained notoriety for having a bulldozer at the protests that quickly became a symbol for the movement. In addition to the opposition network’s connection with the challengers, a large portion of the domestic police and military forces joined the movement in the first week of October 2000. This signified that the movement had become so powerful that it was even able to convince the regime’s forces, which had previously followed orders, to join the movement. The connection between the challengers and domestic and international

103 Ibid., pp. 52-55.
civil-society institutions meant that the opposition network was more able to successfully mobilize, resist repression, and garner international support.

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter compared the non-violent movements in Poland and Serbia and whether these movements follow Schock’s explanation of the link between civil-society organizations and the challengers and movement success. This research is not able to definitively conclude that a link between civil-society institutions and the challengers determines whether non-violent action will succeed, but civil-society institutions, ranging from religious groups to student organizations, were heavily involved in the opposition network, and this involvement increased the potential for success in these two movements. This is because the civil-society groups provided the opposition network with funding, additional leadership, material resources, technology, publishing materials, and international attention that enhanced the ability of the movement to organize events, mobilize protesters, and avoid repression.

While the link between civil-society institutions and the challengers supplied the pro-democracy movement in Serbia with enhanced resilience there were other factors, such as the declining economy and the war involving Serbia, as they providing a political opening that the non-violent movement utilized to its benefit. The economic crisis and war divided political leaders within the Serbian government, which impaired the government’s ability to quickly respond to the non-violent action. Like the Solidarity movement in Poland, the non-violent movement in Serbia benefited from a downturn in the economy and political crises that provided additional challengers to the opposition network. The economic downturn in Serbia in early-2000 frustrated thousands of
individuals, especially those who became unemployed and then entered the movement by joining civil-society institutions to voice their dissatisfaction.

Another factor that played an important role in the mobilization of thousands into the movement was the ongoing war that Serbia fighting over the Kosovo region that led to human rights violations and the bombing of Serbia by NATO forces in 2000, which the Milosevic regime was largely blamed for as the war was unpopular among the Serbian population. As a result, people grew increasingly frustrated with the government actions and felt that a democratic political system might prevent the continuation of these events. Although the NATO bombing of Serbia and the economic recession were highly influential in the development of a more active citizenry, the main impact was that these factors simply aided the development of a link between civil-society institutions and the challengers, as they helped increase the involvement of people in the non-violent movement.

In Poland, the non-violent movement was able to efficiently mobilize thousands of protesters and strikers, rapidly share strategy and information among the opposition network, and resist repeated repression attempts. A significant factor in its ability to accomplish these actions was that both domestic and international civil-society institutions were able to develop a stable link with the challengers in Poland. This link not only helped in the recruitment of additional protesters and organizations, but it also increased the operational and resistance capabilities of the movement in a variety of ways, such as improved fundraising and decentralizing the movement’s leadership. Since

the network consisted of more than just individuals, other groups and individuals were able to feel more comfortable with entering the movement, because increased international participation implied that it was more difficult for repression and isolation efforts to succeed. Additionally, by introducing civil-society institutions with existing organizational leadership structures and democratic features to the movement, the opposition network began to become more democratic and was able to develop more experienced leadership teams throughout the movement.108

Another important aspect of the role of civil-society institutions in the movement was that during this period, Poland experienced exponential growth in the development of domestic civil-society institutions, inspired by the success of Solidarity. In other words, the civil-society institutions were able to help enhance the capabilities of the movement, but were also crucial to the development of other civil-society institutions that would eventually join the movement.109 Although domestic civil-society institutions, such as Solidarity, were instrumental to the success of the movement, international NGOs were also vital to the survival of the opposition network, especially during the underground years. International NGOs provided the movement with international support, greater financial and material resources, and an influx of new strategy, such as the vans and protesters that civil-society institutions related to the Roman Catholic Church provided for the blockade of Warsaw in 1981.

In Serbia, domestic and transnational civil-society institutions were able to build a direct link with the anti-Milosevic regime challengers, which resulted in the increased

operational and resistance capacity of the opposition network. One of the major
differences between the non-violent action in Poland and Serbia was the composition of
the opposition network in terms of institutions and individuals. There was minimal
development of new domestic civil-society institutions in Serbia before and during the
movement. This meant that the majority of individuals wishing to participate in the
movement did not join another group, which then merged with the opposition network,
but directly joined the movement. The pro-democracy movement in Serbia provided an
umbrella organization in the opposition network for anyone who desired to participate in
the non-violent action. The link between non-governmental organizations and the
challengers aided in the recruitment and mobilization of thousands of Serbian protesters,
including individuals from a diverse background, with a sizeable portion from outside the
youth organizations.

Finally, the involvement of transnational NGOs in the movement meant that, like
Poland, the opposition movement in Serbia was able to attract greater international
interest and increase its power. International human-rights organizations and domestic
and international election-monitoring groups provided additional support to the
opposition network that helped the movement gain greater international attention by
releasing reports regarding human rights violations and the fraudulent elections.

The non-violent movements in Poland and Serbia both display a link between
civil-society institutions and the challengers, which impacted their potential for success.
In both movements, assistance from domestic and international civil-society institutions
provided the opposition network with increased mobilization, operation, and resistance
capabilities. The organizations did this by providing additional leadership, financial
support, campaign resources, new strategies, international attention, and greater participation. By supplying the movements in Poland and Serbia with these resources, the leverage and resilience abilities of the movement were greatly increased, which is discussed further in Chapter 5. The movements, with help from civil-society institutions, were more easily able to resist repression and assemble support nationwide in a matter of hours by email communications.¹¹⁰

Other structural factors, such as economic crises, war, and human rights violations, were essential to the success of the movement, but only in the sense that they provided supplementary support to the opposition network by increasing the number of challengers and participation in civil-society institutions. The rise in support for the pro-democracy movement is explained by the political-opportunity-structure theory,¹¹¹ which would emphasize that the opposition network capitalized on the outrage of Serbian citizens over the war, human-rights violations, and the economic crisis to gain support for the pro-democracy movement. The war, human-rights violations, and the economic crisis made the Serbian citizens more inclined to institute a more democratic system, which created a political opportunity that the pro-democracy movement used to its advantage. With regard to Schock’s explanation that a link between civil-society institutions and the challengers impacts the success of non-violent action, it is possible to conclude that a link between civil-society institutions and the challengers enhanced the ability of the movements in Poland and Serbia to resist repression, share resources, and mobilize

thousands of pro-democracy protesters. The pro-democracy movements in Poland and Serbia capitalized on political opportunities created by regime transition, economic crises, and war, which aided the development of the link between civil-society institutions and the challengers.
Chapter 4: Leadership Structure of Opposition Networks is Non-violent Movements

4.1 Chapter Overview

The second factor that this study analyzes is the leadership structure of the opposition network in non-violent movements and if a more decentralized structure can increase the potential for the success of non-violent action. This chapter examines the structural composition of the leadership in the non-violent movements in Poland and Serbia to determine whether either had a decentralized structure that consisted of multiple leaders or leadership teams, working through democratic processes. Additionally, this chapter explores the consequential effects of a decentralized leadership structure on the ability of the non-violent action to succeed in these two cases. The next section of this chapter summarizes Schock’s theory, as it relates to non-violent revolutions in general, and the impact it had in the six cases that he analyzed in *Unarmed Insurrections*.

Following an outline of Schock’s second factor, this chapter analyzes the leadership structure of the Solidarity movement in Poland between 1980 and 1989 to determine whether the leadership in the movement was divided among different groups and individuals. Then, the next section illustrates the organization of the leadership of the pro-democracy movement in Serbia. Both of these parts explore the leadership in the major campaigns and events of the movements and any descriptions of the configuration of the movements’ leadership detailed in primary and secondary sources. The chapter concludes with an overview of the decentralization of leadership structures in the revolutions in Poland and Serbia and whether Schock’s theory, which asserts that decentralized leadership in non-violent action is necessary, but not sufficient in enabling success, is accurate for these two cases.
4.2 Decentralization of the Leadership in Opposition Networks

According to Schock, a decentralized leadership structure signifies that a network shares leadership responsibilities among the different individuals and organizations of that network.\textsuperscript{112} Schock contends that a decentralized network aids the ability of the non-violent movement to succeed for five reasons: the inability of the government to focus repression efforts on a specific target; it allows for progress when leaders are imprisoned or eliminated; the movement becomes increasingly democratic in nature, which promotes cooperation and ensures that all members of the movement have a say in the direction of the movement; it allows the movement to focus on a common goal, which allows for diverse groups to work together while minimizing conflict; and it enhances the ability of the movement to innovate strategically, since the organization of the movement enhances “flexibility and the capacity for horizontal information flow” and to implement a greater variety of methods more easily than “more bureaucratically structured and ideologically rigid” movements.\textsuperscript{113} The next two sections investigate the extent of the decentralization of the leadership structure of the non-violent movements in Poland and Serbia to determine whether Schock’s second dependent variable was necessary, but not sufficient for their success.

4.3 Organizational Leadership in the Non-Violent Movement in Poland, 1980 – 1989

The Solidarity movement in Poland, starting in Gdansk in 1980, eventually achieved a peaceful political transition in 1989, because the independent trade union, Solidarity, acted as an umbrella organization that coordinated the protest efforts of all


\textsuperscript{113} Ibid.
pro-democracy strikers. This section explores the leadership structure of the non-violent movement in Poland in the 1980s, through two main methods. First, this study explains leadership throughout the movement, as seen through the major non-violent campaigns and events. Second, this section evaluates the level of decentralization in the leadership structure of the opposition network in Poland, by studying primary and secondary sources to discover a more in-depth description provided by a variety of authors.

**Leadership in Major Non-violent Campaigns and Events**

The non-violent action in Poland that took place throughout the 1980s was primarily led by Solidarity, but that is only the case because Solidarity acted as an umbrella organization for a variety of institutions from the civic, labor, liberal, nationalist, religious, nationalist, agricultural, and youth sectors. Under Solidarity’s umbrella, the spectrum of organizations included religious institutions like the KIK, KCEP, and ZNK, student groups, like the Independent Association of Students and Young Poland Movement, leftist groups like RPS, and civic groups like the Civic Committee to Build a Monument In Honor of Victims of Katyn (KPZ). Even prior to the founding of Solidarity in 1980, the burgeoning movement still had a decentralized leadership structure, but was less organized and unable to coordinate diverse protests. Until the meat price strikes in the summer of 1980, the movement had yet to develop a leadership structure of any kind, but on August 16, 1980, the Inter-factory Strike Committee formed, which would act as the first real organizer and leader of the pro-

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115 Ibid., p. 165.
democracy protests. Although Lech Walesa, a former employee in the Lenin (Gdansk) Shipyard who was fired, initially took leadership of the protests, it was not only Walesa, as other activists from that factory joined him as leaders of the strikes, including Lech Kaczyński and Anna Walentynowicz. From 1981 through 1982, all of the major non-violent campaigns and events were led by Solidarity, which does not display any level of decentralization in the leadership structure. This does not signify that the leadership structure of the opposition network was decentralized, but does require this study to investigate first and second-hand accounts of the Solidarity movement, which more accurately describes the structure of the network.

Starting in 1982, the prohibition of independent trade unions and other civil-society institutions, through the imposition of martial law, forced the movement underground, which is where the protests would continue to originate from until 1988. Throughout this time, Solidarity still acted as the leadership for the movement, but with assistance from other groups, especially related to the Roman Catholic Church. Although it is difficult to ascertain the level of decentralization in the structure of the opposition network throughout this time through these events, this study also needs to examine other perspectives to show a clearer explanation of the organization of the movement. After the reemergence of Solidarity and other banned groups in the late-1980s, the movement primarily stayed under the direction of a single organization, but that is only as a result of the consolidation of all the other organizations under a single institution, which is shown through an examination of additional sources in the next part.

116 Ibid., p. 165.
117 Ibid., pp. 143-154.
118 Ibid., pp. 59-60.
Decentralization of the Leadership in the Solidarity Movement in Poland

Since it was difficult to determine whether the leadership structure of the non-violent movement was decentralized, it is necessary to analyze what authors have described about the organization of the opposition network. Sociologist Maryjane Osa provides insight into the organizational ties in the Solidarity movement between 1980 and 1981 by constructing a network connection figure that shows how the movement quickly decentralized its leadership among a total of twenty-three different institutions. Osa’s interconnectivity graph (Appendix 6) shows the interconnectedness of organizations across the network, which includes a variety of organizations, especially Solidarity, the Worker’s Defense Committee (KOR), and the Sign organization (ZNK). The interconnectedness among the diverse organizations implies that although they may have consolidated into the Solidarity movement, they were still autonomous institutions that each played an important role in the non-violent action. In other words, the opposition movement was led by Solidarity, but Solidarity was not only an individual entity, but also a collective of assorted organizations and groups. By acting as an umbrella organization, Solidarity was primarily responsible for the organization and coordination of protest efforts, but a variety of groups under the Solidarity movement were responsible for numerous duties, including leading local, regional, and national protests. One example of the duties undertaken by organizations under Solidarity’s umbrella is that organizations, like the Movement for Defense of Human and Civic Rights (ROP) and the Sign (ZNK), published periodicals that provided a wide array of information for protesters and

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119 Ibid., p. 165.
120 Ibid.
international spectators, such as meeting times, protest information, and descriptions and results of the latest events.\textsuperscript{121}

Throughout the following decade, scores of civil-society institutions began to develop and join the Solidarity movement, each taking a unique role in the leadership of the movement, further decentralizing the leadership structure in the opposition network. As a result of the continual addition of new and diverse organizations, it was essential for the Solidarity movement to ensure that each group was able to take an active role in the leadership of the non-violent action. One manner that the pro-democracy movement attempted to democratize aspects of the movement was the creation of groups of leaders from different organizations that would work together to come up with solutions. Although Lech Walesa and the Solidarity institution were the leading voice behind the opposition network, Walesa was supported by several other organizations from numerous areas, especially from the Workers’ Defense Committee (KOR) and the Movement of Free Democrats (RWD).\textsuperscript{122} An important representation of the level of decentralization in the leadership structure in the opposition network was that in 1981 Walesa was arrested after the declaration of martial law, but the movement continued to strike. Although some scholars, such as sociologist Boris Kagarlitsk, claimed that the Solidarity movement was successful primarily due to its charismatic leader, Walesa, the movement persisted throughout his imprisonment.\textsuperscript{123} Since even communication with Walesa was limited during his time in prison, the movement still organized a number of protests and strikes nationwide.\textsuperscript{124} This implies that Walesa was an important leader for

\textsuperscript{121} Ibid., pp. 163-165.
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid., p. 157.
the movement, but the leadership structure in the opposition network was decentralized enough to allow for continuation of the non-violent action during his arrest. While underground, the movement became even more decentralized, because of the prohibition of Solidarity, which saw the opposition network work through a much looser structure. The movement did this in order to allow for groups that were banned, like Solidarity, to operate, but avoid further repression by the government.\textsuperscript{125}

The development and consolidation of new organizations into the Solidarity umbrella continued throughout all of the 1980s, resulting in an extraordinarily large opposition network consisting of over a hundred different groups. Sociologists Grzegorz Ekiert and Jan Kubik provide insight into the level of decentralization of the Solidarity movement towards the end of decade by listing the number of different organizations that were responsible for sponsoring or leading protests in 1989. Ekiert and Kubik find that out of the 314 total non-violent protest events that took place that year over half of the events were led or sponsored by a total of at least 156 different organizations.\textsuperscript{126} Although the data was unavailable for over half the events in 1989, the other half were led by a mixture of political parties, labor unions, peasant/farmer organizations, interest groups, social/political movements, and other miscellaneous organizations. The total number and range of these organizations implies that although they acted under the Solidarity movement, that the structure of the network was highly decentralized, but coordinated.\textsuperscript{127}


\textsuperscript{127} Ibid., p. 120.
4.4 Leadership Structure in the Serbian Transition to Democracy, 1999 – 2000

The pro-democracy movement in Serbia towards the end of the twentieth century also had a decentralized leadership structure that increased the ability of the movement to resist repression and consequently enhanced their potential to achieve a peaceful political transition. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the protests in Serbia in 1996 and 1997 were unsuccessful, as they were easily dispersed by the Milosevic regime. One of the main factors that contributed to the failure of these protests was that student groups, political opposition institutions, and other pro-democracy organizations remained separate throughout their protests, even when rallying against the same issues in the same location.\(^{128}\) The complete lack of cooperation among these groups made it easy for the Milosevic regime to target the leaders and organizers of each event and either arrest them or shut down the protest. This section investigates the degree of collaboration among organizations in the pro-democracy non-violent movement between 1999 and 2000 to determine the level of decentralization in the leadership structure of the opposition network.

*Diverse Leadership in the Pro-democracy Non-Violent Movement*

Between June 1999 and October 2000, the opposition movement in Serbia assembled numerous events of non-violent action that were designed to place the maximum amount of pressure on the Slobodan Milosevic regime. The major non-violent campaigns and events in this movement display a variety of different leaders, from different areas of society in Serbia, especially the student, political, and labor sectors. After the failures of the earlier protests in 1996 through 1997, the opposition network in

Serbia, initiated by the actions of the student group, Otpor!, quickly coordinated and organized protest efforts across the country. In 1998, Otpor! began to organize and coordinate other student groups at the University of Belgrade, as a result of increasingly restrictive university policies.\textsuperscript{129}

In June 1999, Otpor! initiated and led the first major non-violent event against the Serbian government, but was not limited to participation by students only, as disillusioned voters and other pro-democracy protesters joined in the protest. Two months later, in August 1999, Otpor! held a mock “birthday party” for Milosevic, which ridiculed the politics, personality, and possible fate of the Serbian dictator. Additionally, other large non-violent events were held between September and November, highlighted by nationwide rock concert rallies that were coordinated and directed by the ANEM media network.\textsuperscript{130} These events indicate that the burgeoning opposition network was minimally coordinated, but that the movement as a whole was moving closer to developing a united front against the regime, as the bombing of Serbia by NATO forces became larger and more frequent, which furthered anti-Milosevic sentiment among the Serbian population. The swell of support from Serbian citizens and organizations like the ANEM network and local radio stations, such as Rock Volieb, signified that the movement was starting to gain groups and individuals from diverse organizations and segments of society and that these new groups were beginning to play a role in the movement.\textsuperscript{131}

\textsuperscript{129} Ibid., p. 14.
In early-2000, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) was developed, which initially consisted of the eighteen major opposition political parties. The Democratic Opposition of Serbia would play a crucial leadership role, alongside Otpor! in a majority of the key events leading to the resignation of Milosevic. Otpor! and DOS each played a specific role in the movement, as DOS handled the political aspects of the movement, such as providing opposition candidates and holding more formal political rallies, while Otpor! organized unique and creative non-violent campaigns and protests, such as holding rock concert rallies and using t-shirts and bumper stickers to spread slogans and messages. From April 2000 to late-September 2000, Otpor! and the DOS worked together at the forefront of every major campaign and event, excluding the “Face of Serbia” campaign, which was predominately organized and executed by only Otpor!.\(^{132}\)

An important aspect of the DOS joining the leadership ranks of the movement was that they were able to help increase participation numbers for each event, as the political parties were already developed institutionally and also had additional resources that helped strengthen the movement. During this time period, participation numbers for the major non-violent campaigns and events averaged between 20,000 and 100,000 protesters, which not only shows the benefits of adding new leadership to the movement, but also helps show how protests became harder to break up, since the protesters greatly outnumbered government forces at most events.\(^{133}\) In addition to the leadership provided by Otpor! and DOS, workers began to mobilize and strike nationwide, as laborers in

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multiple industries joined the movement, most notably the miners at the Kolubara mines.\textsuperscript{134}

What these events display is that at the beginning of the movement, there was not much of a well-coordinated opposition network, instead there were loosely affiliated organizations protesting the same government and issues. Throughout the earlier events, Otpor! acted as a semi-umbrella organization, that consolidated the efforts of individuals, even non-students, into a single more efficient movement. The introduction of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia into the non-violent movement as a large coalition of organizations and individuals meant that Otpor! was no longer responsible for the sole management of the movement. The pro-democracy network became further decentralized with the inclusion of DOS, since they provided equal leadership in the network to Otpor!. At this point, the opposition network in Serbia consisted of two large umbrella institutions that coordinated efforts to help increase the general abilities of the movement. The major non-violent campaigns and events also show that towards the end of the movement, greater decentralization in the opposition network occurred with the addition of labor unions, which took a strong leadership role, working closely with both Otpor! and the DOS. Between the beginning and the end of the non-violent movement, the opposition network increased in size, with the additions of the DOS and the labor unions, which also meant that the leadership structure of this group became increasingly decentralized.

\textsuperscript{134} Ibid., p. 53
Supplemental Descriptions of the Leadership Structure in Serbia

Although the major non-violent campaigns and events provide good insight into the structure and interaction of leadership in the opposition network in Serbia, it is also necessary to look at supplementary sources to provide additional perspectives into the leadership structure. First, foreign media correspondent Matthew Collin investigates the pro-democracy movement in Serbia, starting in the late-1990s, and provides a detailed analysis of the coordination between groups in the opposition network, especially Otpor! and the Democratic Opposition of Serbia. Next, this section reviews political scientists Ramet and Pavlakovic’s *Serbia Since 1989*, which describe the methods of leadership in the non-violent movement.

In *The Time of Rebels*, Collin details the non-violent movement in Serbia that eventually produced a successful political transition, but he also provides first and second-hand accounts of the interaction and coordination of the leadership in the movement. Prior to the inclusion of the DOS to the opposition network in early-2000, Collin states that Otpor! was the sole leader of the movement, but within the institution, there were several different branches and leaders. Even early in the movement, Otpor! democratized most aspects of the organization, such as creating a leadership branch, which handled the organization and operation of the events and the development of a media campaign branch that was responsible for the printing and spreading of pro-democracy print materials.¹³⁵ Once the Democratic Opposition of Serbia joined the opposition network, Collin describes that the majority of leadership responsibilities was shared between both organizations. The two institutions collaborated on the organization of events, the mobilization of resources and people, and decisions affecting the direction

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¹³⁵ Ibid., p. 49.
of the movement. Since the DOS leadership was highly decentralized, as a result of the nature of political parties in general, the ability of the two groups to join forces produced devolution of leadership in the movement. In other words, both Otpor! and the Democratic Opposition of Serbia were largely decentralized organization prior to their alliance, which implies that the leadership in the Serbian opposition network was not only spread across the network, but also throughout each organization.\footnote{Ibid., p. 41.}

Chapter 3 discussed the role of transnational civil-society institutions in the movement. Although international groups helped lead some of the protests and events, and were especially responsible for the general strength of the movement, the leadership of the movement remained predominately between Otpor! and the DOS. In \textit{Serbia Since 1989}, Ramet and Pavlakovic describe the interplay of international organizations with the leadership of the opposition network. They explain that the international organizations, such as Amnesty International and United States Institute of Peace, provided support to the movement, but primarily by attracting international attention to the movement, while the domestic opposition network organized the actual non-violent action.\footnote{Ramet, Sabrina P. and Vjeran Pavlakovic, ed. \textit{Serbia Since 1989: Politics and Society Under Milosevic and After} \textit{(Jackson School Publications in International Studies)}. New Ed. ed. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005. Pp. 32, 34.} The connection between the leadership structures of international institutions and the domestic opposition network also indicates that neither domestic nor international organizations were dominant in the movement, signaling a highly decentralized structure in the leadership of the movement, as all groups were able to take an active leadership role in one way or another.
4.5 Conclusion

In the non-violent movements in Poland and Serbia, strong opposition networks with highly decentralized leadership structures were responsible for the organization and coordination of nationwide non-violent action events and campaigns. The movements in Poland and Serbia share numerous similarities regarding the level of decentralization in the leadership structure of the opposition network, such as the use of umbrella organizations and involvement of international non-governmental organizations. Although both networks had some similarities, they also had several differences, such as the composition and role of the umbrella organizations, which were not influential enough to impact the success of either movement.

The Solidarity movement in Poland during the 1980s was responsible for the coordination and organization of a sizeable portion the major non-violent campaigns and events that contributed to successful political transition. Although it appeared that Solidarity was the principal leader in the movement, because of their leadership in the major campaigns and events, the reality was that the opposition network consisted of leadership from various institutions and individuals, such as Solidarity, Rural Solidarity, and Union of Young Democrats. In Poland, the beginning of the Solidarity movement had a moderately high level of decentralization in the leadership structure compared to the other non-violent movements that Schock studied, which was evident in the interconnectivity of the twenty-three organizations in the opposition network in 1981. From 1981 to 1989, the level of decentralization increased in the opposition network as

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the Solidarity movement inspired the development and collaboration of new institutions that eventually grew to include over a hundred different institutions, which took a direct role in the leadership of the movement.

Similar to the cases that Schock analyzed with umbrella organizations that led the movement, such as Bayan in the Phillipines, the Solidarity movement in Poland was able to increase their abilities to resist repression. The decentralization of leadership in the opposition network in Poland meant that the Jabłoński and Jaruzelski regimes were unable to target a single group for repression, which is displayed in the attempt to shut down the city blockade in Warsaw by the Jaruzelski regime in 1988 that failed since protesters would simply replace removed protesters with new protesters in a continual cycle. Additionally, the decentralized structure in the non-violent movement permitted the network to continue to pressure the regime even after the imprisonment of some of its leadership, like after the arrest of Walesa in 1982. Furthermore, the opposition network became increasingly more democratic with the consolidation of new groups, which also aided in the collaboration of diverse groups, since they were no longer focusing on specific objectives, but a common goal. An example of this is the collaboration of two groups with contradicting ideologies, like Christian and secular groups, such as the Club of Catholic Intelligentsia and the Movement of Polish Socialists’ Accord, respectively.\(^{140}\)

By developing a more democratic network, which worked towards a shared purpose, the regime was unable to fracture the movement on ideological divisions.

The pro-democracy movement in Serbia also enhanced its resiliency by implementing a decentralized leadership network that relied on a diverse group of individuals and institutions for the coordination and organization of the major non-violent

\(^{140}\) Ibid., pp. 157-165.
campaigns and events. The organizers and leaders of events, like the September 27, 2000 protest in response to the release of election results that were in favor of Milosevic, were drawn from an assortment of civil-society institutions, such as the student movement, Otpor!, and the Centre for Free Elections and Democracy. The pro-democracy movement in Serbia in 2000 was consolidated predominately into a coalition of a few civil-society institutions, such as the Democratic Opposition of Serbia, Otpor!, and the Open Society Institute, and international rights advocacy groups, like the International Republican Institute. Unlike the Solidarity movement in Poland, the opposition network in Serbia consisted of fewer civil-society institutions, as the development of new organizations was still limited, which led to pro-democracy individuals joining one of the more general existing civil-society institutions, instead of participating or creating in a more focused organization. Although there were typically fewer civil-society institutions involved in the movement, the leadership responsibilities were divided equally between each of these groups, which also decentralized leadership within the structure of each organization. Basically, the leadership of the pro-democracy movement in Serbia was decentralized on two levels, in the movement as a whole and throughout each organization.

The high level of decentralization of the leadership in the pro-democracy movement in Serbia meant that the opposition network was able to more effectively resist repression efforts by the Milosevic regime. The decentralized nature of the opposition network did not permit the Milosevic regime to efficiently focus repression on a particular group, as attempts at targeting the leaders and supporters of Otpor! did not

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successfully prevent non-violent action from continuing. Additionally, the imprisonment of members of the opposition network, especially some of the prominent members of the opposition political parties that were part of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia, had minimal impact on the ability of the pro-democracy movement to persist. This was possible since other and new leaders in the opposition political parties and civil-society institutions took over the leadership responsibilities of the detained leaders, which allowed the movement to continue non-violent action against the regime.

The cases of the non-violent movements in Poland and Serbia indicate that decentralization of the leadership structures in opposition network can occur in different ways, but still enable success. In Poland, the Solidarity movement consisted of numerous civil-society institutions from both the international and domestic realms, working closely together for a common objective. The pro-democracy movement in Serbia combined a smaller number of civil-society institutions with a greater number of individuals under each of those organizations. The decentralization of the leadership structure in the two opposition networks was one of the three factors that helped enable success in both of the cases of non-violent action. This signifies that Schock’s hypothesis, which contends that non-violent movements that organize a decentralized network of oppositional institutions are more likely to achieve peaceful political transition holds true for the cases of Poland and Serbia, but only as one of the three necessary, but not sufficient factors that enable success in non-violent action.
Chapter 5: Leverage and Resilience in Non-violent Revolutions

5.1 Chapter Overview

The third factor that impacts a non-violent movement’s success is the leverage and resilience capabilities of the opposition network, as it relates to the balance of power between the movement and the government. This chapter looks at the leverage and resilience capabilities of the non-violent movements in Poland and Serbia and what impact they had on the success of the movement. In both these movements, the leverage and resilience abilities of the opposition network helped resist repression efforts by the government and pressure the regimes to democratize.

After an overview of Schock’s evaluation of the influence of leverage and resilience in pro-democracy movements, this chapter examines the role of leverage and resilience in the non-violent revolution in Poland from 1980 through 1989. The following section analyzes the pro-democracy movement in Serbia, in terms of its leverage and resilience abilities and the consequential impact on the movement’s success. These sections explore the location, the non-violent method utilized, the level of participation, and the leadership of the major non-violent campaigns and events to determine the leverage and resilience capacity of each movement. The chapter concludes with an overview of the impact of the leverage and resilience abilities of the non-violent revolutions in Poland and Serbia and whether Schock’s theory, which attributes success in non-violent action in part to enhanced leverage and resilience capabilities, holds true for the two cases. The leverage and resilience abilities of a movement are determined by numerous factors: the ability of the opposition network to coordinate and hold protests and events in a range of locations, because it shows the ability of the movement to
mobilize support throughout the country; the capability of the movement to utilize an array of non-violent methods and techniques, which prevents the government from targeting a specific method for repression; the capacity of the opposition network to mobilize and coordinate large numbers of protesters at multiple places and events; and the diversity of the leadership in the movement, in terms of supporters from different organizations sharing leadership duties and responsibilities, which signifies that the government is unable to target specific individuals in hope of disrupting the movement.

5.2 Leverage and Resilience Abilities of Non-violent Movements

According to Schock, leverage is the ability of the non-violent movement to mobilize or withdrawal support in favor or against the government, while resilience is the ability of the non-violent movement to resist continued repression efforts by the government.¹⁴² Schock contends that the level of decentralization of the opposition network, the ability to implement multiple non-violent techniques from across the three methods of non-violent action, the ability to implement methods of dispersion as well as methods of concentration, and tactical innovation are factors that affect the leverage and resilience abilities of a non-violent movement. Schock contends that leverage and resilience directly influence the power relationship between the government and the opposition network, with the ability to shift power to either party. Schock’s principal assertion is that if a movement has enhanced leverage and resilience capabilities, non-violent action is more likely to succeed, since the opposition network is capable of withdrawing popular support from the regime making it unable to effectively govern.¹⁴³

¹⁴³ Ibid., pp. 38, 44-46.
The next two sections will investigate the extent of leverage and resilience in the non-violent movements in Poland and Serbia to determine the extent to which Schock’s second independent variable contributed to their success.

5.3 The Impact of the Leverage and Resilience Abilities of the Solidarity Movement in Poland

The non-violent movement in Poland during the 1980’s was the target for a variety of repression efforts by the government that included the imprisonment of different leaders, a declaration of martial law, and the prohibition of domestic civil-society institutions. In order to survive and prosper in spite of these repression attempts, the non-violent movement in Poland implemented a variety of techniques and strategies that enhanced its leverage and resilience capabilities. Starting with an overview of the leverage and resilience capacity of the opposition network in Poland prior to 1980, this section investigates the major non-violent campaigns and events to determine the ability of the movement to implement strategies and techniques to enhance its leverage and resilience abilities. By discovering the degree that the non-violent movement in Poland was able to enhance its leverage and resilience capabilities, this section will explore the impact of leverage and resilience on the success of the non-violent action.

Leverage and Resilience Abilities of the Polish Opposition Movement Prior to 1980

In December 1970, factory workers in Gdansk, Poland protested a sudden price increase in food and other common items, which quickly spread to neighboring cities in Northern Poland. The strikes lasted relatively briefly, but the government responded by sending in the government military forces, the Polish People’s Army and the Citizen’s Militia, which opened fire on the protesters, killing approximately 40 and wounding
Although the strikes turned violent and civilians were killed, multiple Polish officials were forced to resign in order to prevent a nationwide outbreak of riots and protests. Edward Gierek replaced Władysław Gomułka as the Polish United Workers' Party leader, which resulted in a reversal of policies by the Polish government that included lowering meat prices, raising worker wages, and more changes were promised. The workers who protested the raising of meat prices and wage decreases mainly held their strikes in only a few areas, limited to Northern Poland, and did not implement a variety of non-violent methods. The leadership of the protests was decentralized, but only as a result of mass disorganization on the part of the strikers, which allowed for the Polish government to eliminate the leaders in an attempt to stop the movement. Although the government was successful in destroying the already disorganized leadership of the protesters and halting the strikes, the protesters were successful in temporary improving their situation. The protesters leverage and resilience abilities were severely limited and the political change that was produced was shallow in the sense that the results only improved the conditions in Poland for a short time period.

Six years later, in June 1976, the economy in Poland was in a more dire situation than it was in December 1970, resulting in the announcement that the prices of all basic food items would be raised a considerable amount, since the prices were frozen after the 1970 strikes. The announcement by Prime Minister Piotr Jaroszewicz resulted in nationwide outrage that led to strikes, looting, and violence across different cities in Poland. Strikes were largely concentrated in Radom, Ursus, and Plock, but also took place in Warsaw, Poznan, and Gdansk. An estimated 75,000 protesters in approximately

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145 Ibid., pp117-159.
100 factories across Poland took place in the June 1976 strikes, which resulted in shallow political change similar to the aftermath of the 1970 strikes. Although the protesters were able to mobilize a relatively large number of strikers in a short amount of time, the opposition movement still had limited leverage and resilience capabilities, as a result of the protests turning violent that ultimately resulted in a loss of credibility and support for the movement. Throughout the rest of the 1970’s, the opposition movement continued to build support structures, coalitions, and civil society institutions, while the Polish government was content to simply avoid confrontations with the workers.

Employment of Methods of Dispersion and Concentration by the Solidarity Movement

In 1980, the pro-democracy movement in Poland implemented widespread non-violent action in response to another increase in food prices and a decrease in worker wages. The opposition movement organized and coordinated hundreds of thousands of pro-democracy protesters at different events in cities all over Poland, especially in Gdansk, Warsaw, and Lublin. Between July 1980 and December 1981, five major non-violent events and campaigns took place nationwide, with participation ranging from 1,000 in the earlier strikes in the smaller cities to seven million during the third and most successful Free Saturday strike on January 24, 1981. Even after the imposition of martial law on December 31, 1981, which prohibited independent trade unions until 1985, the pro-democracy movement organized multiple strikes, protests, and other non-violent action nationwide. From 1985 until 1989, the Solidarity movement frequently organized numerous major non-violent campaign and events nationwide, with

146 Ibid., pp160-168.

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approximately 100 to 60,000 participants per event per city. Although the protests were focused in Warsaw, the movement also mobilized large numbers of strikers, protesters, and organizations to employ non-violent action in other Polish cities, such as Gdansk, Szczecin, and Krakow.

The Implementation of a Range of Actions Across the Three Methods of Non-violent Action

Between 1980 and 1989, the pro-democracy movement in Poland employed non-violent action across all three methods of non-violent action, which are protest and persuasion, noncooperation, and disruptive non-violent intervention. Between July 1980 and August 1981, the opposition movement implemented non-violent methods mostly in the protest and persuasion and noncooperation categories. Labor strikes, social disobedience, speeches, petitions, journals, newspapers, picketing, prayer, singing, marches, and refusal of public support for the government were just some of the non-violent methods utilized during this time. From 1981 through 1989, the Solidarity movement employed non-violent action evenly from all three methods. In addition to the methods listed above, the pro-democracy movement utilized marches, election boycotts, economic boycotts, sit-ins, hunger strikes, blockades, and civil disobedience against the Jabłoński and Jaruzelski regimes.


Decentralized Leadership and the Ability to Innovate Tactically

As discussed in Chapter 4, the pro-democracy movement’s leadership structure became increasingly decentralized throughout the 1980’s, resulting in a highly decentralized, yet organized leadership structure. The level of decentralization of the Solidarity movement towards the end of decade is displayed through the number of different organizations that were responsible for sponsoring or leading protests between 1980 and 1989. For example, in 1989, 314 total non-violent protest events took place that year and over half of the events were led or sponsored by a total of at least 156 different organizations. The leadership of the movement was divided among numerous political parties, labor unions, peasant/farmer organizations, interest groups, social/political movements, and other miscellaneous organizations. Additionally, the pro-democracy’s decentralized leadership structure was able to strategically adjust their practices to stay a step ahead of the government. The Solidarity movement continually innovated their protest tactics and techniques, such as utilizing civil-society institutions, like the Charitable Commission of the Episcopate (KCEP), to receive equipment and supplies without the government’s knowledge or inspection.

Persisting in the Face of Repression to Achieve Peaceful Political Transition

The opposition faced a variety of different challenges from the government in its quest for a peaceful political transition. The government’s repression tactics included a special paramilitary task force, anti-assembly legislation, a declaration of martial law, and the official military and police forces tasked with suppressing any opposition campaigns.

or protests. In addition to multiple arrests, attempted assassinations, and mass factory firings, the government attempted to ban the development and operation of all independent trade unions.\textsuperscript{153} Through tactical innovation and a decentralized leadership structure, the pro-democracy movement in Poland was able to overcome numerous obstacles, including multiple years spent underground. Furthermore, by resisting repression attempts by the government, the pro-democracy movement in Poland gained support by exploiting the government’s abuse through the independent and international media.

Conclusion

The ability of the pro-democracy movement to employ methods of dispersion and concentration, implement a range of actions across the three methods of non-violent action, share leadership responsibilities, tactically innovate and persist in the face of repression indicates the Solidarity movement’s leverage and resilience capabilities. Since the pro-democracy movement had advanced leverage and resilience abilities, it was able to overcome and overwhelm the government through non-violent action. The opposition movement’s leverage and resilience capacity meant that the government was unable to target a specific group, location, action, or method, which meant that the government could not respond accordingly to the non-violent action. The leverage and resilience capabilities of the pro-democracy movement directly contributed to the success of the non-violent action in Poland.


\textless\texttt{http://books.google.com/books?id=wEL8CUPNhrwC&q=%22Polish+Legal+Defense+Fund%22&dq=%22Polish+Legal+Defense+Fund%22&hl=en&ei=z1b4S_ztN4e8lQezmoy_C&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=2&ved=0CDUQ6AEwAQ}\textgreater
5.4 The Role of Leverage and Resilience in the Pro-democracy Movement in Serbia

The pro-democracy movement in Serbia was met with a great deal of government resistance, as the Milosevic regime utilized police and military forces, restrictive legislation, and assassinations in attempts to repress the burgeoning movement. The pro-democracy movement employed an assortment of methods and strategies that boosted its leverage and resilience capacity, in order to succeed in the face of the government’s repression efforts. The next section provides an overview of the leverage and resilience capabilities of the opposition network in Serbia before 1999. The following section investigates the major non-violent campaigns and events to determine the ability of the movement to use methods of dispersion and concentration, non-violent action from all of the three methods of non-violent action, a decentralized leadership structure, and to tactically innovate in order to enhance the opposition network’s leverage and resilience abilities. By determining the ability of the non-violent movement in Serbia to improve its leverage and resilience capabilities, this section will examine the contribution of leverage and resilience on the success of the non-violent action.

Leverage and Resilience Abilities of the Serbian Opposition Movement Prior to 1999

Following the 1996 local elections in Serbia, the Zajedno coalition and university students took to the streets claiming that the results of the election were fraudulent. Although the protests achieved minor success through the official acceptance of the election victories of the opposition parties, the coalition’s leadership was severely fractured, which resulted in the dissolution of the group and any further protests at that time. Additionally, the university students and the Zajedno coalition held all protests and non-violent action separately, which meant that it was easier for the government to
disperse, since the events were divided in participation numbers and generally less organized.154 Prior to the beginning of the 1999 protests, the pro-democracy movement’s leverage and resilience abilities were nominal, as a result of the disbanding of the Zajedno coalition and the lack of organization and leadership among the university students.155 This meant that the pro-democracy movement in Serbia was unable to implement methods of dispersion and concentration and tactically innovate, as the action and mobilization orders often conflicted with one another, as they were from a variety of sources.

Employment of Methods of Dispersion and Concentration by the Pro-Democracy Movement

After the institution of new hiring policies for the universities that required government approval of all professor appointments in late-1998, Otpor! and other student groups formed and began to communicate with other newly developing domestic civil-society institutions. In mid-1999, the first few major non-violent campaigns and events were primarily concentrated in Serbian cities with large student populations, such as Nis and Belgrade, with approximately one-thousand participants per event. In September 1999, after a downturn in the economy, protests erupted in over twenty cities with upwards of 15,000 participating in each city, which were primarily sponsored and led by

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Otpor! and the different opposition political parties that would eventually form the Democratic Opposition of Serbia.\textsuperscript{156}

Between October 1999 and September 2000, most of the major non-violent campaigns and events were held in or around Belgrade, with participation numbers ranging from 1,000 to 100,000 at each event. Although the protests primarily took place in Belgrade, the pro-democracy movement managed to continually mobilize supporters in a variety of locations in Belgrade simultaneously. During the last week of the protests, between September 27 and October 5, DOS, Otpor!, and several other domestic and international non-governmental organizations coordinated protests, strikes, and other forms of non-violent across all major cities in Serbia. Approximately 10,000 to 100,000 people attended each event, with the total rising to 500,000 on October 5, 2000, when the pro-democracy movement implemented waves of general strikes, sit-ins, and marches, which resulted in a complete shutdown of official operations, including official police and military forces. The varying locations and high participation numbers display the ability of the pro-democracy movement in Serbia to employ methods of dispersion and concentration.\textsuperscript{157}

\textit{The Implementation of a Range of Actions Across the Three Methods of Non-violent Action}

The pro-democracy movement in Serbia organized and led a variety of creative non-violent campaigns and events that contributed to the peaceful ousting of President


Slobodan Milosevic. Otpor! developed innovative and interesting non-violent campaigns and event that not only gained the media and the public’s attention, but also the attention of the government. The pro-democracy movement utilized unique events, such as a mock birthday party for Milosevic that included gifts designed for his inevitable incarceration and rock concert rallies and tours that helped spread the pro-democracy message to the Serbian youth.\textsuperscript{158} Additionally, Otpor! used new technology and diverse mediums, such as websites, email, t-shirts, stickers, posters, and banners to circulate announcements, messages, slogans, and plans. In addition to the more unique non-violent methods utilized, the pro-democracy movement in Serbia also used traditional non-violent action, such as rallies, marches, protests, demonstrations, strikes, and sit-ins.\textsuperscript{159} Throughout the non-violent campaign against the Milosevic regime, the pro-democracy movement in Serbia implemented non-violent action from the protest and persuasion, noncooperation, and disruptive and creative non-violent intervention classifications of non-violent methods. Since the pro-democracy movement in Serbia used both new and traditional non-violent methods, the government was unable to target a particular method or event to focus its repression efforts on.

\textit{Decentralized Leadership and the Ability to Innovate Tactically}

The pro-democracy movement in Serbia enhanced its resiliency by implementing a decentralized leadership network that relied on a diverse group of individuals and institutions for the coordination and organization of the major non-violent campaigns and events. The organizers and leaders of events, like the September 27, 2000, protest in

\textsuperscript{159} "OTPOR." \textit{OTPOR}. <http://otpor.com> and "Serbian Case." \textit{Canvas}. <http://www.canvasopedia.org/>
response to the release of election results that were in favor of Milosevic, were drawn from an assortment of civil-society institutions, such as the student movement, Otpor!, and the Centre for Free Elections and Democracy. The pro-democracy movement in Serbia was consolidated predominately into a coalition of a few civil-society institutions, such as the Democratic Opposition of Serbia, Otpor!, and the Open Society Institute, and international rights advocacy groups, like the International Republican Institute.\footnote{Collin, Matthew. The Time of the Rebels: Youth Resistance Movements and 21st Century Revolutions. New York: Serpent's Tail, 2009. p. 26-27.}

Although there were typically less civil-society institutions involved in the movement, the leadership responsibilities were divided equally between each of these groups, which also decentralized leadership within the structure of each organization. The decentralized nature of the opposition network did not permit the Milosevic regime to efficiently focus repression on a particular group, as attempts at targeting the leaders and supporters of Otpor! did not successfully prevent non-violent action from continuing. Additionally, the imprisonment of members of the opposition network, especially some of the prominent members of the opposition political parties that were part of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia, had minimal impact on the ability of the pro-democracy movement to persist.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 38-46.} This was possible since other and new leaders in the opposition political parties and civil-society institutions took over the leadership responsibilities of the detained leaders, which allowed the movement to continue non-violent action against the regime.
Persisting in the Face of Repression to Achieve Peaceful Political Transition

The opposition movement in Serbia faced multiple obstacles from the Milosevic regime that it needed to overcome to achieve a peaceful political transition. The Serbian government utilized several repression methods and policies to control the non-violent action, including imprisonment, blackmail, harassment, and restrictive curfew and assembly laws. In addition to multiple arrests, attempted assassinations, and mass university expulsions, the government attempted to ban the organization of new domestic civil-society institutions. Through tactical innovation and a decentralized leadership structure, the pro-democracy movement in Serbia was able to succeed in the face of repression. Furthermore, by resisting repression attempts by the government, the pro-democracy movement gained support by exploiting the government’s cruelty through international media and organizations.

Conclusion

The ability of the pro-democracy movement to implement methods of dispersion and concentration, utilize a range of actions across the three methods of non-violent action, lead cooperatively, tactically innovate and persist in the face of repression displays that the pro-democracy movement in Serbia had enhanced leverage and resilience capabilities. Since the pro-democracy movement had an advanced leverage and resilience capacity, it was able to overcome and overwhelm the Milosevic regime through non-violent action. The opposition movement’s leverage and resilience capabilities signified that the regime was unable to target a specific organization,

location, event, or technique, which meant that the government could not respond accordingly to the non-violent action. The leverage and resilience capabilities of the pro-democracy movement directly contributed to the success of the non-violent action.

5.5 Conclusion

The pro-democracy movements in Poland and Serbia both improved their leverage and resilience abilities, which directly contributed to the movements’ success. The non-violent movements in Poland and Serbia strengthened their leverage and resilience capabilities by implementing methods of dispersion and concentration, employing methods from all the three categories of non-violent action, decentralizing leadership, tactically innovating, and by mobilizing and/or withdrawing support for the government. The enhanced leverage and resilience capacity of the non-violent movements in Poland and Serbia aided the ability of the opposition networks to avoid and/or overcome government repression efforts. The governments were unable to effectively target military and police forces, policies, and other repression efforts on a specific event, location, organization, or non-violent method. Since the non-violent movements in Poland and Serbia avoided direct pressure from the governments, the opposition networks in both countries grew larger and more powerful. The Solidarity movement in Poland and the pro-democracy movement in Serbia used anti-government sentiment due to other social and economic factors, especially from the price increase on food in Poland and the NATO bombing of Serbia, to gain momentum and greater support from citizens and international and domestic non-governmental organizations. The growing anti-government sentiment in Serbia contributed to halting the governments’
operation because the citizens were becoming less obedient to the regimes, signifying that the governments no longer had enough support to enforce their policies.\textsuperscript{163}

The cases of the non-violent movements in Poland and Serbia demonstrate that enhanced leverage and resilience ability enable success in non-violent revolutions. In Poland, the Solidarity movement held campaigns and events in a variety of locations, utilized diverse non-violent methods, especially factory sit-ins and the Free Saturday strikes that brought the entire country to a standstill. Additionally, the pro-democracy movement in Poland shared logistical and planning responsibilities in order to prevent the government from successfully targeting an individual or an organization and used its power to mobilize or withdraw support from the government by eliminating the obedience of the citizens that the government relied on. Similarly, the pro-democracy movement in Serbia organized nationwide campaign and events, used unique and creative non-violent techniques, decentralized leadership, and capitalized on current events, like the NATO bombing of Serbia and the economic crisis, to place overpowering political pressure on the Milosevic regime. The enhanced leverage and resilience capacity of the opposition networks was one of the three factors that helped enable success in both of the cases of non-violent action, which means that Schock’s hypothesis holds true for this factor in the cases of Poland and Serbia.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

6.1 Findings

This thesis examined the non-violent revolutions in Poland in 1989 and Serbia in 2000 in context of the three factors that political scientist Kurt Schock hypothesized as enabling success in non-violent action: links between domestic and international civil-society institutions and the opposition network, decentralized leadership in the opposition network, and enhanced leverage and resilience capabilities. To determine whether or not these factors aided the success of the non-violent revolutions in Poland and Serbia, this study investigated factors including the role of non-governmental organizations in the pro-democracy movements, leadership of the major non-violent campaigns and events, and the ability of the opposition network to enhance its leverage and resilience capacity through tactical innovation, avoiding repression, and utilizing diverse non-violent methods.

In the cases of the non-violent revolutions in Poland and Serbia, domestic and international civil-society institutions provided valuable financial support, international media attention, and additional participants to the pro-democracy movements. In Poland, domestic organizations like Solidarity, the Charitable Commission of the Episcopate (KCEP), and the Workers' Defense Committee (KOR), along with transnational non-governmental organizations, such as the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), the Polish-American Congress (PAC), and Pomost, contributed money, technology, and other resources that strengthened the operational abilities of the opposition network.\footnote{Osa, Maryjane. Solidarity and Contention: Networks of Polish Opposition. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003. pp. 95, 130.} Similarly, in Serbia, domestic civil-society institutions, such as Otpor!, the Open Society
Institute and Center for Free Elections and Democracy (CESID), in addition to international NGOs like Amnesty International, Freedom House, and the International Republican Institute (IRI), provided training, financial and material resources, and real-time reports of the non-violent action and the Milosevic regime’s responses. The support provided by domestic and international civil-society institutions enabled the non-violent movements in Poland and Serbia to hold major non-violent campaigns and events that helped pressure the governments.

The pro-democracy movements in Poland and Serbia shared logistical and planning responsibilities among a variety of individuals, organizations, and coalitions, which made it more difficult for the government to target a specific person or group for banishment, imprisonment, or even assassination. The non-violent movement in Poland utilized a decentralized leadership structure in the form of an umbrella organization, Solidarity, which acted as the primary coordinator for several autonomous domestic and international organizations. The Serbian non-violent movement also used decentralized leadership, but in the form of a few civil-society institutions, such as Otpor! and the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS). The non-violent movements’ decentralized leadership structures helped the opposition networks avoid government repression efforts, as the governments were unable to target specific individuals or organizations. When leaders such as Lech Walesa were imprisoned, or groups such as Solidarity prohibited, the non-violent movements persisted underground due to financial and material assistance provided by international organizations, such as Pomost. The ability of the pro-democracy movements in Poland and Serbia to continue normal operations by

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persisting through the imprisonment, blacklisting, and/or assassination of their leaders signifies that the use of decentralized leadership structure of the movements contributed to the success of the non-violent action.

The opposition networks in Poland and Serbia actively enhanced their leverage and resilience abilities by employing methods of dispersion and concentration, implementing non-violent action from each of the three categorizations of non-violent methods, using decentralized leadership, and persisting in the face of repression. The Solidarity movement coordinated major campaigns and events throughout Poland, implemented a wide range of non-violent methods and strategies, decentralized leadership, and overcame repression by the Jabłoński and Jaruzelski regimes. In Serbia, the pro-democracy movement held non-violent action in cities across Serbia, employed creative and unique forms of non-violent action, decentralized leadership, and continued to pressure the Milosevic regime, even after numerous imprisonments and assassinations. These steps taken by the Polish and Serbian opposition networks enhanced their leverage and resilience abilities, which made it difficult for the governments to respond accordingly. The enhanced leverage and resilience capabilities of the pro-democracy movements in Poland and Serbia provided the opposition networks with the strength to increase pressure on the government, bringing government operations, including economic institutions and legislative bodies, to a standstill.

Schock’s three factors, a link between civil-society institutions and the challengers, a decentralized leadership structure, and leverage and resilience abilities, each played an important role in enabling success in non-violent movements. Schock’s first two factors, a link between civil-society institutions and the challengers and a
decentralized leadership structure, are the two largest contributing factors in terms of the non-violent movements enhancing their leverage and resilience. Additionally, each of the factors were necessary to enable success in non-violent action, but not sufficient to enable success independently. Furthermore, Schock’s first factor, a link between civil-society institutions and the challengers in a non-violent movement was directly connected to Schock’s second factor, a decentralized leadership structure, because the addition of domestic and international non-governmental organizations to the non-violent movements aided the decentralization of the opposition networks in Poland and Serbia, as detailed in Chapter 4. In addition to the connection between Schock’s first and second factors, the second factor, a decentralized leadership structure is directly connected to Schock’s third factor, leverage and resilience, because decentralized leadership structures enhanced the leverage and resilience capabilities of the non-violent movements in Poland and Serbia. The use of decentralized leadership structures in Poland and Serbia signifies that the governments were unable to target a specific individual or organization, which also meant that the opposition networks were able to continue normal operations when leaders were imprisoned or assassinated. Schock’s third factor, leverage and resilience, seemed to have the greatest impact comparatively, as Schock’s first and second factors helped improve the leverage and resilience abilities of the non-violent movements in Poland and Serbia.

This thesis concludes that in the cases of the non-violent movements in Poland in 1989 and Serbia in 2000 that a link between civil-society institutions and the challengers, a decentralized leadership structure, and enhanced leverage and resilience capabilities enabled success for the non-violent action. The pro-democracy movements utilized these
factors to overpower the governments’ military and police forces, restrictive policies, and resources to produce political transition. Although the non-violent movements in Poland and Serbia capitalized on the political, economic, and social crises that were plaguing both countries, the main impact of these factors was that they increased participation and support for the pro-democracy movements. Schock’s hypothesis that a link between civil-society institutions and the challengers, a decentralized leadership structure, and enhanced leverage and resilience abilities enables success in non-violent action proves true for the cases of the non-violent revolutions in Poland and Serbia.

6.2 Limitations

Schock’s three factors that were examined in this research, in context of the non-violent movements in Poland and Serbia, are considered necessary, but not sufficient factors in enabling success in non-violent action. This signifies that links between civil-society institutions and challengers in a non-violent movement, decentralized leadership structures, and resilience and leverage were not influential enough to enable success individually, but their presence was required as a whole for non-violent action to succeed. In other words, this thesis discovered that Schock’s three factors were necessary, but not sufficient causes only in the cases of the non-violent movements in Poland and Serbia, which means that this research is unable to prove if any of the three factors are adequate to enable success on their own for all cases. Findings in this research and Schock’s Unarmed Insurrections can only indicate that in non-violent action, a link between civil-society institutions and the challengers, a decentralized leadership structure, and enhanced leverage and resilience abilities are more likely to be found in cases of successful non-violent action. These two cases, combined with Schock’s six cases
display that assistance from external factors and political opportunities is also beneficial in enabling success, but it is difficult to assess to what extent it plays a role.

The main limitation of this study is that it only tested a small number (n) of cases, as a means of providing insight and supplying further hypotheses for testing, as opposed to proving or disproving a certain theory. Due to time and resource limits, this study investigated two successful cases of non-violent action, instead of a multitude of cases involving successes and failures. This small-n study does not attempt to prove Schock’s hypothesis true for all cases of non-violent action, but that they were present and/or influential in the cases of Poland and Serbia, which can add to the six cases that Schock tested in his research. Two successful cases of non-violent action were chosen since this research is designed to explore whether Schock’s factors, if present, enable success, as opposed to determining whether they also cause failure when absent. This signifies that this research is unable to prove whether these factors are necessary for success in all cases of non-violent action. This research hopes that other contemporary and historical cases of non-violent action, both successful and unsuccessful, will be analyzed in terms of Schock’s hypothesis. Further research is necessary to provide a definitive answer to whether Schock’s hypothesis proves true for all cases of non-violent action, which could provide an important framework for enabling success in non-violent movements.

6.3 Implications for future research

In addition to providing insight into whether Schock’s hypothesis proves true in the cases of the non-violent action in Poland and Serbia, this thesis was also designed to help suggest further hypotheses for testing. While researching for this thesis, I discovered an intriguing aspect of non-violent opposition networks, which fits with
Schock’s first factor, a link between civil-society institutions and the challengers. I discovered that several non-violent opposition organizations have aided other non-violent organizations in different countries, providing resources, literature, and hands-on non-violent training. The intriguing aspect of this discovery is that non-violent opposition networks appear to act similarly to global terrorist networks, but with different motives, as terrorist groups provide training and materials for financial benefit, whereas non-violent groups like Otpor! are primarily interested in eliminating authoritarian regimes. For example, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) has been involved in providing material resources and training to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), while non-violent groups like Otpor! (now CANVAS) have provided training and resources to other international pro-democracy movements, such as the anti-Chavez movement in Venezuela in 2002. This thesis suggests that further research could test the contribution of experienced non-violent institutions and leadership to new non-violent movements.

Another interesting aspect of the non-violent action in Poland and Serbia was the difference in the average age of the movement and the types of non-violent methods utilized by each group. The Solidarity movement was primarily comprised of middle-aged working-class people and employed more traditional methods of non-violent action, such as strikes and sit-ins, while the pro-democracy movement in Serbia, which was primarily youth-based, used creative methods of non-violent action and technology more

frequently. This thesis suggests that further research could also test whether the age of the movement influences the types of non-violent methods used by that group.

6.4 Conclusion

According to Schock, “we need an accurate understanding of what non-violent action is, and we need social scientific analyses of non-violent action that neither romanticize it, on the one hand, nor dismiss its power and potential, on the other.”

Schock’s three factors; a link between civil-society institutions and the challengers, decentralized leadership, and enhanced leverage and resilience abilities enabled success for the non-violent revolutions in Poland and Serbia. Although it is still only a beginning, this research could be used as part of a more comprehensive study that could discover a definitive answer on the impact of Schock’s three factors on enabling success in non-violent action.

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## Appendix 1: Organizations involved in the non-violent movement in Poland, 1980-1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Type (International or Domestic)</th>
<th>Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity</td>
<td>SOL</td>
<td>Domestic (Poland)</td>
<td>Responsible for the coordination and organization of the opposition, as most opposition groups cooperated with them. They were responsible for the leadership, as a collective entity, for the domestic leadership of most of the major sit-ins, strikes, demonstrations, and blockades. Also responsible for the management of all funds received from domestic and international donors that was used for a variety of purposes, from printing resources to medical aid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Solidarity</td>
<td>SRI</td>
<td>Domestic (Poland)</td>
<td>Organized and led strikes and sit-ins by the Polish farmers, also worked with Solidarity to publish pro-democracy papers and posters to spread information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group against Job Discrimination</td>
<td>GAB</td>
<td>Domestic (Poland)</td>
<td>Under Solidarity's umbrella, worked to protect Polish citizens against being discriminated for jobs if they were not sympathizers of the Polish regime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement of Free Democrats</td>
<td>RWD</td>
<td>Domestic (Poland)</td>
<td>Under Solidarity's umbrella, held Poland government accountable for policies agreed upon in Helsinki Accords, reported and organized protests for this cause.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Self-Governing Union of Teachers and Educational Employees</td>
<td>ZNP</td>
<td>Domestic (Poland)</td>
<td>Under Solidarity's umbrella, Teacher's group that formed to protect the interests of Teachers and educational employees, since the Polish government was trying to gain greater control over school system, organized and coordinated teachers and other employees across all of Poland to protest/strike against the regime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers' National Movement</td>
<td>RRN</td>
<td>Domestic (Poland)</td>
<td>Under Solidarity's umbrella, working-class group, anti-Soviet nationalists, brought new and more members into the movement, as it was first truly nationalist group in Solidarity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement for Defense of Human and Civic Rights</td>
<td>ROP</td>
<td>Domestic (Poland)</td>
<td>Under Solidarity's umbrella, contact with Poles abroad, published 3 movement periodicals and acted as grassroots organizers, and created &quot;free discussion&quot; clubs to get students and other people involved in the movement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Trade Unions</td>
<td>WZZ</td>
<td>Domestic (Poland)</td>
<td>Created prior to Solidarity, then merged under Solidarity's umbrella, but leader of 1980 Lenin Shipyard strikes, produced papers and organized workers against the government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Committee to Build a Monument in Honor of Victims of Katyn</td>
<td>KPK</td>
<td>Domestic (Poland)</td>
<td>Under Solidarity's umbrella, nationalist group that added general assistance to the movement, such as providing protesters and spreading information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Society of Scientific Courses</td>
<td>TKN</td>
<td>Domestic (Poland)</td>
<td>Under Solidarity's umbrella, hosted courses designed to &quot;stimulate unfettered discussion on sensitive topics&quot; in different locations across the country, to avoid repression, created competing political and cultural analyses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clubs in Service of Independence</td>
<td>KSN</td>
<td>Domestic (Poland)</td>
<td>Under Solidarity's umbrella, nationalist group that added general assistance to the movement, such as providing protesters and spreading information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee Accord for National Independence</td>
<td>PSN</td>
<td>Domestic (Poland)</td>
<td>Under Solidarity's umbrella, nationalist group that added general assistance to the movement, such as providing protesters and spreading information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young Poland Movement</td>
<td>RMP</td>
<td>Domestic (Poland)</td>
<td>Under Solidarity's umbrella, nationalist group that added general assistance to the movement, such as providing protesters and spreading information aimed at the Polish youth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers' Defense Committee</td>
<td>KOR</td>
<td>Domestic (Poland)</td>
<td>Precursor to Solidarity, first major opposition civil-society group, sought reinstatements of fired employees, release of prisoners, coordinated the delivery of aid, advertised situation to West for funding, and led/organized protests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Sign</td>
<td>ZNK</td>
<td>Domestic (Poland)</td>
<td>Core Catholic Organization, published journals, primarily focusing on philosophical discussions, contributed members to newly formed NGOs, as they were already a developed and cohesive group, and eventually became part of Solidarity movement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish Independence Accord</td>
<td>PPN</td>
<td>Domestic (Poland)</td>
<td>Under Solidarity's umbrella, acted to change foreign policy and improve freedom of speech, closely linked with Catholic NGOs, and used publications to spread beliefs, also shared members with other groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confederation for Independent Poland</td>
<td>KPN</td>
<td>Domestic (Poland)</td>
<td>Under Solidarity's umbrella, nationalist group, right-wing radicals, organized and coordinated demonstrations, wanted credit to pull pressure away from KOR being repressed. Also acted as intellectual leaders for many of the events.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universal Weekly</td>
<td>TGP</td>
<td>Domestic (Poland)</td>
<td>One of the oldest opposition groups, also mainstream Catholic, voiced opinions through periodical, one of the core organizations of the movement, provided protesters, resources, and leadership to the movement, came under Solidarity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Club of Catholic Intelligentsia</td>
<td>KIK</td>
<td>Domestic (Poland)</td>
<td>One of the oldest opposition groups, also mainstream Catholic, sponsored community lectures, language classes, excursions. Acted to socialize opposition writers and artists. Eventually came under Solidarity's umbrella.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Link</td>
<td>WEZ</td>
<td>Domestic (Poland)</td>
<td>One of the oldest opposition groups, also mainstream Catholic, voiced opinions through periodical, one of the core organizations of the movement, provided protesters, resources, and leadership to the movement, came under Solidarity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Catholic Union</td>
<td>ZNA</td>
<td>Domestic (Poland)</td>
<td>Under Solidarity's umbrella, mainstream Catholic, but also nationalist, one of the core Catholic organizations of the movement, provided protesters, resources, and leadership to the movement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Association of Students</td>
<td>NZS</td>
<td>Domestic (Poland)</td>
<td>Under Solidarity's umbrella, student group that added general assistance to the movement, such as providing protesters and spreading information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement of Polish Socialists' Accord</td>
<td>RPS</td>
<td>Domestic (Poland)</td>
<td>Under Solidarity's umbrella, leftist group that added general assistance to the movement, such as providing resources and protesters, and spreading information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Nickname</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Contributions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic Church</td>
<td>Holy See</td>
<td>International (Vatican)</td>
<td>Provided an international voice for the movement, as the Pope sent out political messages in favor of the opposition, and the Vatican permitted parish vans and buses to be used for transportation to protests and then to be used in the blockade of Warsaw. Pope also called for greater assistance to the movement, especially food, medical, and financial donations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charitable Commission of the Episcopate</td>
<td>KCEP</td>
<td>Domestic (Poland)</td>
<td>Used networks of parishes spread out in all areas to efficiently disperse aid and resources, used to circumvent aid having to go through government, mostly provided medical equipment and clothing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church World Services</td>
<td>CWS</td>
<td>International (America)</td>
<td>Sent blankets, quilts, clothing, soap, and water cleansing pills, among a variety of other resources to the Polish opposition movement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lutheran World Relief</td>
<td>LWR</td>
<td>International (America)</td>
<td>Sent blankets, quilts, clothing, soap, and water cleansing pills, among a variety of other resources to the Polish opposition movement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations</td>
<td>AFL-CIO</td>
<td>International (America)</td>
<td>Provided funds to Solidarity for office/publishing supplies and also sent funds to groups that they felt were underfunded by Solidarity. Also worked to promote human rights in Poland and sent a large amount of technology that opposition could use, such as voice and cassette recorders, extra tapes, transistor, two-way, and short wave radios, mobile and base station antennas, and other types of communication equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zeszyty Literackie</td>
<td>ZL</td>
<td>International (France)</td>
<td>Small opposition literary journal that was published both for Polish immigrant and to be smuggled back into Poland, containing information about past and upcoming protests and actions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Trade Union Institute</td>
<td>FTUI</td>
<td>International (Europe)</td>
<td>Financial middleman. Funds were given to FTUI to forward to the proper Polish groups to help affected workers and keep certain organizations and offices operating.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>International (America)</td>
<td>Provided financial and material aid to political prisoners and their families throughout the movement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith-Richardson Foundation</td>
<td>SRF</td>
<td>International (America)</td>
<td>Private group that provided grants that were used to send parcels to jailed opposition members that were hidden in care packages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Endowment for Democracy</td>
<td>NED</td>
<td>International (America)</td>
<td>Funded underground/opposition publishers, PLDF, PHWC, cultural programs banned/limited by the government, and provided funding for the production/distribution of video resources across Poland, including independent theater shows, lectures from the Flying University, special political events, banned films, and opposition/instructional documentaries. Also acted as intermediary for majority of funds provided by the US government that went to the opposition movement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANEKS Publishing</td>
<td>ANEKS</td>
<td>International (England)</td>
<td>Supported by NED funds, translated and published works for Western audiences and also published underground literature that was smuggled into Poland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aurora Foundation</td>
<td>Aurora</td>
<td>International (America)</td>
<td>Responsible for administering the funds to the different organizations in the opposition movement provided by the NED, primarily to the Polish Legal Defense Fund.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncensored Polish News Bulletin</td>
<td>PNB</td>
<td>International (England)</td>
<td>Supported by NED funds, translated and published works for Western audiences and also published underground literature that was smuggled into Poland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom House</td>
<td>FH</td>
<td>International (America)</td>
<td>Responsible for administering the funds to the different organizations in the opposition movement provided by NED and Marshall Fund.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARE International</td>
<td>CARE</td>
<td>International (America)</td>
<td>Provided 120,000 tons of aid worth $60 million to Polish opposition through public and private donations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic Relief Services</td>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>International (America)</td>
<td>Between 1981 and 1985 CRS was responsible for 266,000 tons of aid worth $188 million, including food, medical, and other general resources, which were sent directly to aid the Polish opposition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish American Congress Charitable Foundation, Inc.</td>
<td>PACCF</td>
<td>International (America)</td>
<td>&quot;Administers relief, rehabilitation, disaster assistance, welfare, medical equipment and supplies, and training on behalf of the Polish people. Since 1981, when Solidarity was formed, the PACCF has provided medical assistance in the form of equipment, supplies, medicines and medical books, food and agricultural supplies (such as seeds).&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Free Europe</td>
<td>RFE</td>
<td>International (Europe)</td>
<td>Closely followed and reported the situation in Poland internationally, including interviews with opposition leaders. Spread awareness of major events, people, and places of the struggle, including responses from the regime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Hope</td>
<td>Hope</td>
<td>International (America)</td>
<td>Sent 100,000 tons of medical equipment worth $23 million to Polish opposition, mainly consisting of medical aid and equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pomost</td>
<td>Pomost</td>
<td>International (America)</td>
<td>Collected funds, published a Polish-American periodical, organized protests/demonstrations, lobbied congress, led Polish-American coalition in support of Solidarity movement, tried to attract attention of important international officials.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish American Congress</td>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>International (America)</td>
<td>Collected over 5 million dollars and 122 million dollars worth of relief goods between 1981-1988 that was sent to the Polish opposition, organized protests/demonstrations. August 1980 had 100,000 demonstrators in Chicago. Lobbied Congress.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish Legal Defense Fund</td>
<td>PLDF</td>
<td>Both (Poland and America)</td>
<td>Provided legal advice and support to pro-democracy protesters and strikers on trial. All services provided Pro Bono, as funding came from grants and donations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish Helsinki Watch Committee</td>
<td>PHWC</td>
<td>International (Finland)</td>
<td>Research/Published scholarly reports on situation in Poland, especially concerning human rights and murders by police and military forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLCUL</td>
<td>POLCUL</td>
<td>International (Australia)</td>
<td>Provided awards of about $500 every year to Polish artists, writers, journalists, lawyers, actors, intellectuals, and scientists. Designed to advance Polish culture internationally.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Appendix 2: Organizations involved in the non-violent movement in Serbia, 1999-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Type (International or Domestic)</th>
<th>Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Otpor!</td>
<td>Otpor!</td>
<td>Domestic (Serbia)</td>
<td>Independent civil-society institution, but acted as umbrella organization for all who wanted to get involved. Organized/led most major events/campaigns, such as the Birthday part, rallies, and the &quot;He's Finished&quot; Campaign.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Opposition of Serbia</td>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>Domestic (Serbia)</td>
<td>Coalition of 18 opposition political parties, unified with Otpor!. Planned and organized rallies, campaigns, and election monitoring.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Society Institute</td>
<td>OSI</td>
<td>Domestic (Serbia)</td>
<td>Started working with students at the University of Belgrade in 1998, teaching them about non-violent methods, global democracy, and human-rights campaigns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Society Institute</td>
<td>OSI</td>
<td>International (America)</td>
<td>Sent funding and materials to start and operate OSI Belgrade, continued throughout movement, provided access to greater resources on non-violent action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drevni Telegraf</td>
<td>Drevni</td>
<td>Domestic (Serbia)</td>
<td>Former Milosevic ally, began to print anti-Milosevic newsletters accusing Milosevic of establishing a &quot;criminal autocracy&quot; and printed materials for Otpor!, such as &quot;Live the Resistance,&quot; the groups first manifesto.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boom 93</td>
<td>Boom 93</td>
<td>Domestic (Serbia)</td>
<td>Illegal radio station broadcasting in Pozarevac, Serbia, developed into local Otpor! Cell, and used airways to spread protest information, and news for everyone, especially about the pro-regime strong arm actions of Marko Milosevic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Star Belgrade Fans</td>
<td>RSB</td>
<td>Domestic (Serbia)</td>
<td>Gave Belgrade protesters devices to monitor police radio transmissions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANEM Media Network</td>
<td>ANEM</td>
<td>Domestic (Serbia)</td>
<td>Organized pro-democracy rock tour in 25 Serbian cities, using music to tell the audience it was their responsibility to act for democracy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Republic Institute</td>
<td>IRI</td>
<td>International (America)</td>
<td>US NGO provided funds for movement, established contacts for Otpor!, and helped set up the movement with additional funding from different countries and NGOs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albert Einstein Institute</td>
<td>(None)</td>
<td>International (America)</td>
<td>Provided, through Helvey and Sharp, the philosophical and political foundation for the movements by speaking appearances and communicating with the leaders of the movement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cable News Network</td>
<td>CNN</td>
<td>International (America)</td>
<td>Closely covered the movement and the regime's response from approximately 1998 to Milosevic's overthrow, provided movement with greater domestic and international attention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
<td>HRW</td>
<td>International (America)</td>
<td>Reported on the multiple human-rights violations by the regime against the organizations, leaders, and non-participants, helped report internationally and attract attention to the violations of human rights in the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center for Free Elections and Democracy</td>
<td>CESID</td>
<td>Domestic (Serbia)</td>
<td>Operated training program for thousands of election monitors to eliminate/detect fraud at polls.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OK98</td>
<td>OK98</td>
<td>International (Slovakia)</td>
<td>Leader of non-partisan Exit 2000 and Vreme Je campaigns, to get everybody out to vote. Helped to get people to understand the importance of their vote, actually provided transportation and other means so that people could go vote.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rock Volieb</td>
<td>(None)</td>
<td>Domestic (Serbia)</td>
<td>Leader of non-partisan Exit 2000 and Vreme Je campaigns, to get everybody out to vote. Helped to get people to understand the importance of their vote, actually provided transportation and other means so that people could go vote.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Marshall Fund</td>
<td>(None)</td>
<td>International (America)</td>
<td>Provided a large amount of funds to the movement, especially for the Exit 2000 campaign.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of the US</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Endowment for</td>
<td>NED</td>
<td>International (America)</td>
<td>One of three American NGO's responsible for donating &quot;several million dollars&quot; that went to Otpor!.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amnesty International</td>
<td>AI</td>
<td>International (America)</td>
<td>Helped Serbian conscientious objectors flee conscription from JNA and provided legal services to refugees attempting to escape Serbia, such as Bojan Aleksov.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institute for War and</td>
<td>IWPR</td>
<td>International (America) and Domestic (Serbia)</td>
<td>Reported during and after about the results of the protest events, specifically the number of arrests that occurred after each event led by Otpor!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Reporting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom House</td>
<td>FH</td>
<td>International (America)</td>
<td>Provided funding, printed materials, and monitored all protests and events and reported back to American</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States Institute</td>
<td>USIP</td>
<td>International (America)</td>
<td>Monitored institutional structures of both the opposition and the regime, and kept the opposition informed regarding institutional considerations if/when they would take power from Milosevic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of Peace</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exit 2000</td>
<td>Exit 2000</td>
<td>Domestic (Serbia)</td>
<td>Collective of civil society groups, focused on those disconnected from politics, made/spread leaflets, posters, T-shirts, hats across the country, trying to persuade more people to the movement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Law</td>
<td>HLF</td>
<td>Domestic (Serbia)</td>
<td>Provided legal advice to thousands of protests, especially Otpor! Activists after their offices were raided by the military/police.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Based on Collin (2009), Lazic (1999), Ramet (2005), and Schock (2004).*
### Appendix 3: Major Non-violent Action Campaigns and Events in Poland, 1980-1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location(s)</th>
<th>Method of Non-violent Action</th>
<th>Leader(s)/Organizer(s)</th>
<th>Third-Party Participation</th>
<th>Number of Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strikes: after meat prices are raised, then spread to wages and right to strike.</td>
<td>July 1980 - August 1980</td>
<td>Initially Northern Poland, then Gdansk, Lublin, Warsaw, and then nationwide</td>
<td>Protest and Persuasion, noncooperation</td>
<td>Initially no clear leadership, August 16, 1980 Inter-factory Strike Committee formed. Leads strikes.</td>
<td>Minimal at beginning, increased gradually as strikes continued.</td>
<td>Protests range between 1,000 and 200,000 Participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1-hour warning strike for pay raises</strong></td>
<td>October 3, 1980</td>
<td>Nationwide</td>
<td>Protest and Persuasion, noncooperation</td>
<td>Solidarity</td>
<td>Moderate, but still active.</td>
<td>300,000 nationwide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Free Saturday Strike</strong></td>
<td>January 24, 1981</td>
<td>Nationwide</td>
<td>Protest and Persuasion, noncooperation</td>
<td>Solidarity</td>
<td>Moderate participation, provided resources to spread action</td>
<td>Approximately 7,000,000 workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>General Anti-Government Strikes</strong></td>
<td>January 28, 1981 - February 6, 1981</td>
<td>Nationwide</td>
<td>Protest and Persuasion, noncooperation</td>
<td>Solidarity</td>
<td>Moderate participation, provided resources to protesters</td>
<td>Estimated between 1,000 and 250,000 participants per protest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Protests and City Blockade</strong></td>
<td>August 3, 1981 - August 6, 1981</td>
<td>Warsaw</td>
<td>Nonviolent intervention: Disruptive</td>
<td>Solidarity</td>
<td>Heavy participation, provided resources and support</td>
<td>Approximately between 3,000 and 100,000 participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Underground rallies and protests</strong></td>
<td>May 1, 1982 - May 3, 1982</td>
<td>Primarily Warsaw and Gdansk, but also in some other cities</td>
<td>Protest and persuasion</td>
<td>Solidarity (underground)</td>
<td>Increased involvement, especially from Catholic Civil Society Institutions</td>
<td>Estimated between 3,000 and 60,000 per event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Anti-Government demonstrations on Gdansk Agreement anniversary</strong></td>
<td>August 31, 1982</td>
<td>Nationwide</td>
<td>Protest and persuasion</td>
<td>Solidarity (underground)</td>
<td>Moderate involvement, support for Solidarity while underground</td>
<td>30,000 per city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lenin Shipyard Strikes (including hunger strikes)</strong></td>
<td>October, 1982</td>
<td>Gdansk</td>
<td>Nonviolent intervention: Disruptive</td>
<td>Solidarity (underground)</td>
<td>Minimal participation.</td>
<td>Ranges between 1,000 and 30,000 strikers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Elections Protests</strong></td>
<td>June 20, 1984</td>
<td>Warsaw</td>
<td>Protest and persuasion</td>
<td>Solidarity (underground)</td>
<td>Heavy involvement, provided transportation, resources, and information</td>
<td>Varied reports put estimates between 100 and 1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sejm Election Boycotts</strong></td>
<td>October 18, 1985</td>
<td>Warsaw</td>
<td>Nonviolent intervention: Disruptive</td>
<td>Solidarity (underground)</td>
<td>Heavy participation, primarily by human rights orgs and the Catholic Church</td>
<td>Approximately 5,000 participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>First wave of nationwide strikes</strong></td>
<td>April, 1988 - May, 1988</td>
<td>Started in Gdansk Shipyard, spread nationwide</td>
<td>Protest and persuasion</td>
<td>Solidarity</td>
<td>Heavy participation, primarily by human rights orgs and the Catholic Church</td>
<td>Between 3,000 and 16,000 participants per strike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Tactics</td>
<td>Leader/Solidarity</td>
<td>Participants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second wave of nationwide strikes</td>
<td>August, 1988</td>
<td>Started in Warsaw, rapidly spread nationwide</td>
<td>Protest and Persuasion, Noncooperation, and Nonviolent intervention: Disruptive</td>
<td>Solidarity and the Catholic Church</td>
<td>Heavy participation by civil society groups</td>
<td>1,000 - 10,000 participants per event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March through city centre (Great March)</td>
<td>February, 1989</td>
<td>Szczecin</td>
<td>Protest and Persuasion</td>
<td>Lech Walesa, Solidarity</td>
<td>non-active participants</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Appendix 4: Major Non-violent Action Campaigns and Events in Serbia, 1999-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location(s)</th>
<th>Method of Non-violent Action</th>
<th>Leader(s)/Organizer(s)</th>
<th>Third-Party Participation</th>
<th>Number of Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-government protests</td>
<td>June, 1999</td>
<td>Belgrade</td>
<td>Protest and persuasion</td>
<td>Otpor!</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Birthday Party” for Milosevic</td>
<td>August, 1999</td>
<td>Nis</td>
<td>Protest and persuasion</td>
<td>Otpor!</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbian economy protests</td>
<td>September, 1999</td>
<td>20 cities</td>
<td>Protest and persuasion</td>
<td>Fragmented Leadership</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>10,000 - 15,000 per city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital march to see wounded protesters</td>
<td>October, 1999</td>
<td>Belgrade</td>
<td>Protest and persuasion</td>
<td>Democratic Party, led by Zoran Djindic</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rock Concert Rally</td>
<td>November, 1999</td>
<td>Belgrade</td>
<td>Protest and persuasion</td>
<td>Otpor!</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox New Year rally</td>
<td>January 13, 2000</td>
<td>Belgrade</td>
<td>Protest and persuasion</td>
<td>Opposition politicians and Otpor!</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
<td>1,000 +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Milosevic Regime protests,</td>
<td>April, 2000</td>
<td>Belgrade</td>
<td>Protest and Persuasion, Nonviolent Intervention: Disruptive and Creative</td>
<td>Political Opponents and Otpor!</td>
<td></td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protests demonstrations</td>
<td>May, 2000</td>
<td>Nationwide</td>
<td>Protest and persuasion</td>
<td>Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) and Otpor!</td>
<td></td>
<td>Average of 20,000 per day over multiple days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest of University Closing</td>
<td>May 27, 2000</td>
<td>Belgrade</td>
<td>Protest and persuasion</td>
<td>DOS, Otpor!</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
<td>1,000 +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This is the face of Serbia Campaign</td>
<td>July 17, 2000</td>
<td>Belgrade</td>
<td>Protest and persuasion</td>
<td>Otpor!</td>
<td>Moderate: Non-active participants</td>
<td>1,000 +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“He's finished” campaign.</td>
<td>August, 2000</td>
<td>Belgrade</td>
<td>Noncooperation, Protest and persuasion</td>
<td>DOS, Otpor!</td>
<td></td>
<td>Unknown (not a typical protest rally, but underground action and movement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest for Milosevic's resignation in response to election outcome</td>
<td>Sept. 27, 2000</td>
<td>Belgrade and other cities</td>
<td>Noncooperation, Protest and persuasion</td>
<td>DOS, Otpor!</td>
<td></td>
<td>100,000 +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Movement Description</td>
<td>Participants</td>
<td>Scale</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>October 2, 2000</td>
<td>Kolubara Mines, then nationwide</td>
<td>Nonviolent Intervention: Disruptive and Creative; Protest and persuasion, and noncooperation</td>
<td>Coal Miners, DOS, and Otpor!</td>
<td>10,000 +</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 3, 2000</td>
<td>Nationwide</td>
<td>Nonviolent Intervention: Disruptive and Creative; Protest and persuasion, and noncooperation</td>
<td>Coal Miners, DOS, and Otpor!</td>
<td>1,000 + per city</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 4, 2000</td>
<td>Nationwide</td>
<td>Nonviolent Intervention: Disruptive and Creative; Protest and persuasion, and noncooperation</td>
<td>Workers, DOS, and Otpor!</td>
<td>1,000 + per city</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 5, 2000</td>
<td>Nationwide, but concentrated in Belgrade</td>
<td>Nonviolent Intervention: Disruptive and Creative; Protest and persuasion, and noncooperation</td>
<td>Workers, DOS, Police/Military Forces, and Otpor!</td>
<td>100,000 - 500,000 in Belgrade, thousands per other cities</td>
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</tbody>
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*Note: Based on Collin (2009), Lazic (1999), Ramet (2005), and Schock (2004).*
Appendix 5: Keck and Sikkink’s Boomerang Pattern
