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A Narrative of Uncertain Intent: Communication Ethics Literacy and FBI Counterterrorism Practices

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A NARRATIVE OF UNCERTAIN INTENT:
COMMUNICATION ETHICS AND FBI COUNTERTERRORISM PRACTICES

A Dissertation

Submitted to McAnulty College of Liberal Arts

Duquesne University

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

By

Hannah Karolak

May 2018

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Hannah Karolak

2018

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COMMUNICATION ETHICS AND FBI COUNTERTERRORISM PRACTICES

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Approved March 23, 2018

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ABSTRACT

A NARRATIVE OF UNCERTAIN INTENT: COMMUNICATION ETHICS AND FBI COUNTERTERRORISM PRACTICES

By

Hannah Karolak

May 2018

Dissertation supervised by Ronald C. Arnett

This project works in the horizon of one driving question: What value does communication ethics bring to counterterrorism practices in this current moment? Following insights of communication ethics scholars that have come before, this work understands communication ethics as practices that yield social literacy about what matters to an other. This work adds to communication ethics scholarship the following finding: When applied to current and future events, communication ethics literacy affords one a lens for opening and sustaining spaces for creative communicative response. Through five chapters—which work in tandem to perform an application of communication ethics literacy to the current and ongoing practices of FBI counterterrorism—this project finds that what one ends up with is not solution-based answers, but reflective communicative practices that sustain counter responses to

terrorism. These reflective practices, performed with attentiveness to communication ethics literacy, validate the importance of communications ethics for thinking about and responding to terrorism. Communication ethics literacy affords professionals a lens for exploring the questions that shape counterterrorism. And while this application does not provide answers for the demands that terrorism places on professionals in this historical moment, it provides meaningful assistance for navigating threats in a manner that does justice to the diverse nation it seeks to protect. In this moment where solution-based answers are not an attainable reality, and the demands of terrorism are ongoing, reflective communicative practices offer a space for learning and adapting to challenges in real-time.

DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my brother, Ian Cherico, who continuously pushed me to work harder. Ian, who did not get to see me defend this work, was the first person to introduce me to philosophy and a love of learning. May his spirit forever speak through my work. Thank you, Ian, for all that you were, are, and continue to be.

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Chapter 1: National Security through the Ages: Shaping Counterterrorism

This project works in the horizon of one driving question: What value does communication ethics bring to counterterrorism practices in this current moment? This driving question shapes additional considerations regarding communication ethics and counterterrorism. For instance, how does communication ethics assist in navigating counterterrorism practices; and, how can professionals engage counterterrorism in reflection of communication ethics? Counterterrorism practices and procedures assist the security community in navigating the increasing demands that terrorism presents to our country. These methods for preventing and responding to attacks work within a framework committed to a singular goal—to keep the nation safe. This project explores counterterrorism from the vantage point of communication ethics asking: can the literacy of communication ethics provide assistance? This work attends to two basic and grounding assumptions regarding communication ethics and counterterrorism: (1) the literacy of communication ethics serves as an interpretive lens, allowing us to discover new hermeneutic openings for research and development; and (2) terrorism is foreground violence fueled by competing background goods—terrorism is an ongoing phenomenon with multiple sources. This project argues that communication ethics as interpretive lens offers a *pragmatic first step*¹ to navigating counterterrorism responses in the 21st century. The work recognizes the terror attacks of September 11, 2001 as a turning point in the organization of national security policy and counterterrorism in the United States. As a significant story that transformed the narrative of counterterrorism, 9/11 continues to shape our communicative response to counterterrorism. Due to the range and scope of

¹ Ronald C. Arnett, “The Fulcrum Point of Dialogue: Monologue, Worldview, and Acknowledgement,” *The American Journal of Semiotics* 28, no. ½ (2012): 105–127.

counterterrorism research and practices, this project will identify one area of this large study that will serve as a catalyst for future research. Particularly, this work will explore the role of the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) in combatting terrorism. In order to (1) situate the FBI in the area of national security and counter terrorism within the U.S., and (2) to provide a context for the current organization of national security offices following 9/11, the beginning of this project will provide a historical context of American national security. This work understands communication ethics as historically situated, therefore, by offering an account of national security prior to the 9/11 attacks. This beginning chapter provides a backdrop against which counterterrorism practices can be explored.

Introduction

Communication ethics involves practices that yield social literacy about what matters to an other.² When applied to social artifacts, the literacy of communication ethics provides a lens for collecting, interpreting, and making sense out of data. In this moment, the U.S. faces a unique threat as terrorism continues to present security professionals with demanding challenges to national security. The challenges resulting from terrorism are both complex and dynamic. As professionals develop means to respond to threats, new challenges arise. Thus, efforts are ongoing in the *fight* against terrorism. In response to this challenge, this project begins with the assumption that communication ethics can assist researchers in navigating the post-9/11 terrains of counterterrorism practices by broadening the scope of counterterrorism research and

² François Cooren, *Action and Agency in Dialogue: Passion, Incarnation, and Ventriloquism*. (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publish Co., 2010).

opening new avenues for creative response. Creative response, which, this work argues, is made possible by active and continued reflective communicative practices, prevents terrorism from achieving its aim of crippling persons to inaction through violence and fear. These reflective communicative practices are shaped by attentiveness to communication ethics. Communication ethics, in this project, articulates the goods that persons are willing to die for in order to secure; questions concerning the importance of these goods in our current historical moment, as well as the communicative practices used to protect these goods, demand our attention.

This project begins not from a critical stance, but with an openness to learning from and about the complexities of counterterrorism in this moment. As I engage communication ethics scholarship alongside documented FBI counterterrorism practices and procedures, this work will continually ask the following questions: (1) What are the emerging limitations to practices and research? (2) What touch points between these two areas of research exist? (3) Are there additional hermeneutic openings for engagement? These questions shape this project as both exploratory and practical in this attempt to bridge theory and practice in a way that offers pragmatic steps for future insights. Reflecting upon these questions, this project frames creative response with attentiveness to the following definition of creativity: “The faculty of being creative; ability or power to create.”³ This definition highlights ability as a key aspect of creativity. As such, creative response rests on a *capacity* to create rather than on the creation of specific goods. The hope, then, of this project is to speak to the ability of communications ethics

³ This definition comes from the Oxford English Dictionary. Merriam Webster defines creativity in a similar manner: The ability to create.

literacy to open and maintain the capacity to create communicative openings when confronted with complex and ongoing challenges. Regarding counterterrorism, this hope for creativity rests on the capacity to open spaces for response in the face of violence seeking to overrun these spaces with fear and uncertainty.

Over the course of five chapters, this work will bring a communication ethics lens to FBI counterterrorism practices. Chapter one, “National Security through the Ages: Shaping Counterterrorism,” provides insights on the history of U.S. national security in order to shift our focus of attention away from national security as an objective end goal toward national security as the ever-evolving challenges and demands that shape our security demands and responses. Of primary concern for this project, this chapter shows that national security responds to the needs of a given moment. As leaders interpret emerging threats, the narratives, goods, and practices that define national security shift. Additionally, this opening chapter begins to shape the story of 9/11 as one with a rich and diverse history. Chapter two, “Communication and Competing Backgrounds: The Interruption of 9/11,” presents the 9/11 terror attacks as both a turning point in American national security practices and a significant story that continues to shape our narratives of national security. This chapter acknowledges that stories guide one’s engagement with the historical moment and offer appropriate grounds for responding to current existential demands. Of particular importance for this project, chapter two engages September 11 as story for guiding our engagement with counterterrorism in this particular moment. Chapter three, “Communication Ethics: The Importance of Being Literate,” addresses one significant question: Why communication ethics? While the literacy of communication ethics is used in a preliminary fashion throughout the first two chapters, chapter three

vet's the significance of communication ethics literacy for this project. Chapter three argues that communication ethics assists counterterrorism professionals by providing an interpretive lens through which security professionals can better identify the commitments, motivators, and aims of terrorists. Regarding this project as a whole, chapter three reviews communication ethics literature and presents the dialogic approach to communication ethics, which frames this project's interpretive lens. Chapter four, "Communicative Context: Counterterrorism in this Historical Moment," presents counterterrorism in our historical moment by framing the current communicative context of counterterrorism. To identify the practical and significant contributions that communication ethics makes to counterterrorism and the FBI, this chapter identifies the emerging questions and demands regarding counterterrorism. For the purposes of this project, this chapter recognizes that with knowledge of the communicative context, we can address the challenges of terrorism with tools and practices that are grounded in current context, capabilities, and limitations. This chapter also begins to frame the application portion of this project by establishing specific areas in FBI counterterrorism practices that can benefit from a communication ethics lens. The purpose of this chapter is to offer the FBI as a key artifact in the battle against terrorism in this moment. As a key artifact, this chapter becomes an exemplar of how the literacy of communication ethics can sustain creative opportunities for new avenues of practice. The fifth and final chapter of this work offers pragmatic first steps in the future of counter-terrorism research and development in the case of the FBI's defense against domestic terrorism. Using the communicative context of counterterrorism situated within our current historical moment as a guide, this chapter offers connections between communication ethics metaphors and

counterterrorism. This chapter recognizes the importance of narrative for continued intelligence work while acknowledging that navigating narrative in this era is a difficult task. Chapter five, “Communication Ethics Literacy as Lens: Responsiveness, Imagination, and Creativity,” finds that what we end up with are not answers, but communicative practices for sustaining our counter response to terrorism. These practices, built with attentiveness to communication ethics literacy, offer genuine hope in the face of violence and fear perpetrated by terrorists. Engaging the demands that shape our moment requires a commitment to strive for imagination that fuels creativity. These recommended practices validate the importance of communications ethics for thinking about and responding to the phenomenon that is terrorism.

The overall objectives of this project are as follows: This project situates terrorism and counterterrorism within the broader context of U.S. national security interests and challenges; This project presents terrorism as a conflict characterized by a communication ethics gestalt of foreground violence fueled by competing background sentiments; This work analyzes the Bureau’s practices for countering domestic terrorism efforts within the United States with the purpose of showing how communication ethics assists in finding new insights into this area; Through the lens of communication ethics, this project offers pragmatic next steps for groups charged with responding to and countering terrorism. As a whole, this work finds pragmatic significance in bridging the theory of communication ethics literacy with practical processes and procedures for addressing terrorism. This feat is made with attentiveness to the complexities of our current historical moment as hypertextual (in which the goods of multiple historical eras

are copresent) and in response to complexities of counterterrorism as diverse and unending. The first of these objectives guides this proposal.

Communication ethics scholars Arnett, Fritz, and Bell remind us that ethics are performed, defended, and practiced in response to that which has come before; this project also understands communication ethics as historically and contextually attentive.⁴ For this reason, this chapter will situate current practices of U.S. national security against a broad historical backdrop. This project is attentive to communication ethics metaphors articulated in the work of Ronald C. Arnett, Pat Arneson and Leeanne Bell in their article, “Communication Ethics: The Dialogic Turn,” and Arnett, Janie Harden Fritz and Bell in their text *Communication Ethics Literacy*.⁵ These works provides a literacy of communication ethics through particular metaphors discussed at length in later chapters. However, in this chapter, the metaphors of narrative and communicative goods are particularly important.

Communication ethics metaphors offer one a “fuzzy clarity” of interpretation that resists attempts to control research with exact definitions. As such, metaphors act as a

⁴ Ronald C. Arnett, Janie Harden Fritz, Leeanne M. Bell, *Communication Ethics Literacy: Dialogue and Difference* (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2009).

⁵ Ronald C. Arnett, Pat Arneson, and Leeanne M. Bell, “Communication Ethics: The Dialogic Turn,” *Review of Communication* 6, no. 1/2 (2006): 62–92. Arnett, Arneson, and Bell articulate each of the six approaches to the study of communication ethics, explaining that four of the approaches function as prescriptive approaches, or approaches that view the study of communication ethics as prescribing right and wrong action, one of the approaches function as descriptive, or approaches that seek to describe the ethics being protected and promoted. Finally, the sixth approach, the dialogic approach, is presented as a counter to both prescriptive and descriptive approaches. The dialogic approach is attentive to postmodernity as an era rich with diversity. The following four approaches function as prescriptive and were first presented by James Chesebro (1) The universal-humanitarian approach, (2) the democratic approach, (3) the codes, processes and procedure approach, and (4) the contextual approach. The fifth approach, the narrative approach, functions as descriptive and was identified with the work of Arnett. (See James Chesebro, “A Construct for Assessing Ethics in Communication,” *Central States Speech Journal* 20 (1969): 104-114; Ronald C. Arnett, “The Status of Communication Ethics Scholarship in Speech Communication Journals, 1915–1985,” *Central States Speech Journal*, 38 (1987): 44–61.) The final approach, the dialogic approach, is an alternative to prescriptive and descriptive approaches.

literacy for texturing our understanding of communicative events.⁶ These metaphors allow one to see differently; or, see beyond what is initially apparent. Communication ethics metaphors transform our efforts to explore events to find the *what is*, to explore events with the hope of finding *what could be*. The following paragraphs offer introductory remarks on the metaphors of narrative and communicative goods. As noted above, these metaphors will be discussed at length in subsequent chapters.

Narratives frame our communicative response to the demands that call us in a given moment. As noted by Arnett, narrative houses the persons, stories, and events that provide meaning to the communicative practices we embody and perform.⁷ Additionally, narratives shape and uncover the things that matter most; the communicative goods we protect and promote. Communicative goods, as understood by Arnett, Fritz, and Bell depict what matters to particular persons, places, and organizations. Communicative goods are that which persons protect and promote at all costs. In this project, communication ethics is characterized by the protection and promotion of particular communicative goods situated in particular narratives.⁸ These communicative goods have two components. First, communicative goods reflect the substantive good protected and promoted. Second, communicative goods are protected and promoted in real time by communicative practices. The communicative practices component of goods characterizes communication ethics as pragmatic and responsive; communicative practices are embodied and performed in a given moment in response to a given situation.

⁶ Arnett, Fritz, and Bell, *Communication Ethics Literacy*, xx.

⁷ Ronald C. Arnett, "The Fulcrum Point of Dialogue: Monologue, Worldview, and Acknowledgement" *The American Journal of Semiotics* 28, no. ½ (2012): 105–127.

⁸ Arnett, Fritz, and Bell, *Communication Ethics Literacy*, 3.

Communicative goods provide clarity of communicative practices of a given person or organization. Thus, acknowledging the goods in action during a communicative event provides a backdrop for understanding. To that end, within the following historical overview of U.S. national security, the communicative goods protected during each time period will be identified. This historical overview presents national security as characterized by leadership who define the goods of a country at a given time; evolving as a result of the changing landscape of politics; and, shaped by the needs a given public at a specific time. Announcing these goods of multiple time periods reveals how national security reflects and responds to the needs of a given communicative environment. Therefore, the communicative goods that shape national security practices will be acknowledged at the end of each subsection.

National Security in the United States: Overview & Trends

This section identifies major coordinates of the history of U.S. national security. Following the insights of seminal works in the area of U.S. foreign policy and national security studies, this section presents the historical backdrop of national security through the key events that shaped this policy over time. This section begins by discussing security in early American history leading to the 1941 attacks on Pearl Harbor. Next, this section overviews national security during World War II and covers U.S. security following the 1947 National Security Act. Finally, this section overviews security challenges resulting from the Cold War. The objective of this section is to present a contextualized view of the national security challenges that emerge from the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

While a formal policy of national security in the U.S. did not begin until the 1947 National Security Act, the decades leading up to and following the American Revolution set a precedent for how Americans dealt with foreign relations and challenges. During this period, a policy of isolationism⁹ developed. Following the Pearl Harbor attacks and subsequent entry of the U.S. into World War II, national security was formalized in the U.S. The attacks at Pearl Harbor proved that a policy of isolationism was no longer practical in a world with advanced technology. In response to the failure of isolationism, a policy of containment was established. These turning points in the policy of national security will be discussed in the following sections. Within this section, these policies will be textured by significant historical events that shaped the trends and changes of security policy over time.

Security: Early American History-World War I

In the following paragraphs, national security in early America will be presented using the work of William O. Walker, professor of history and international relations at Florida International University. Walker's research explores early U.S. national security working to identify the threads of security challenges leading to the Cold War. Within this section, additional scholarly voices will texture Walker's story as needed.

In the years leading to and following the American Revolution, security was characterized by two components: First, with the goal of establishing America as an independent power, leaders of the Colonies bridged the relationship between security and economics; Second, following the war for independence, leaders witnessed challenges

⁹ Isolationism is a policy of excluding one's country from international affairs. This policy attempts to protect one's country from foreign entanglements and conflict. For a discussion of isolationism, see Eric A. Nordlinger, *Isolationism Reconfigured* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995).

and responses to the civil liberties guaranteed by the Bill of Rights and recognized a close connection between the security of the nation and the social atmosphere of its citizens. During the American Revolution (1765–1783), leaders “hoped to provide security through a political economy of expansion and commerce,”¹⁰ and while this sentiment of economic security was challenged during the early years of America, it was maintained through the mid 19th century. By the mid to late 1800’s, the industrial revolution and modernization of industry secured the relationship between security and economic stability in the U.S. and abroad.¹¹ While economic security secured the future of America, the importance of unity between and among states was also necessary to secure the country as a whole. Challenges to the founding documents of the U.S. from individual states and citizen groups arose as early the Civil War, and these challenges carried over to the 20th century with civil rights activism. While many events during this period in American history contributed to the particular challenges the nation faced, this project focuses on The French and Indian War (1756–1763), the American Civil War, and the social environment before and after World War I as significant events that shaped a policy of national security during this time period prior to 1941. Therefore, in the following paragraphs, a brief discussion of these events will elucidate the on-going tension in discussions of liberty versus security, the mergence of private security as a national force, and the strengthening of isolationism as a security tactic.

The French and Indian War, also known as the Seven Years War, established a sentiment of revolution among colonists. Prior to the Revolutionary war, colonists,

¹⁰ William O Walker, *National Security and Core Values in American History* (New York: Cambridge University Press. 2009), 43.

¹¹ As is witnessed through work of Thomas Paine, who in 1776 published *Common Sense*, and Adam Smith, who in the same year published *The Wealth of Nations*.

having linked security to economic stability, worked to enter and exert control over lands occupied by Native Americans. Attempts to expand into these lands led to the French and Indian War as military forces under the direction of George Washington attempted to disperse the French out of the Ohio Valley. Following Great Britain's victory in this war, the imperial leash of British control over the colonies tightened. An increase in colonial taxes was imposed specifically in response to this conflict, and the Royal Proclamation was signed.

The Royal Proclamation formally ended the French and Indian War and gave French land in the colonies to Great Britain. It prevented colonists from claiming land west of the Appalachia and limited colonists from expanding into Indian lands. Yet, colonists and Great Britain paid little respect to the Proclamation, and dispossession, or the forcing out of their homelands, of Native Americans by Great Britain and the colonists followed. This dispossession continued until 1763 when two important treaties were signed—Treaty of Paris and Treaty of Fort Stanwix.¹² These Treaties redefined the boundaries of Great Britain land and Native American land and attempted, finally, to calm relations between these two groups and their allies by stressing the importance of respect for the Proclamation. Following the Treaties, colonists identified Native Americans as a threat to their security, which was tied directly to economic interest through land expansion. This sentiment carried on into the Revolutionary War until the Battle of Fallen Timbers in 1794.

¹² The Treaty of Fort Stanwix was signed by Great Britain and representatives of the Cherokee Indians to verify that land south and east of a line running from Fort Stanwix to the Allegheny River was ceded by American Indians and open to European expansion.

When, as mentioned above, Great Britain attempted to strengthen their imperial rule of the colonies and rebuild funds spent during the French and Indian War by imposing and increasing taxes, the colonies began a formal rejection of Great Britain's intentions. Colonists, having "linked. . . political economy of trade and development with their security," rejected the taxes and the increased control imposed by Great Britain.¹³ Worrying about the aftermath of the French and Indian War, Benjamin Franklin expressed in a 1755 letter to the Governor of Pennsylvania that "those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty or Safety."¹⁴ With the imperial leash tightened, the colonies further recognized their need for independence on a social, political, and economic front.

Prior to the American Revolutionary War, colonists recognized that freedom from Great Britain's rule would secure the colonies as an independent political entity and economy. Following the Revolutionary War, a remaining British presence in the colonies threatened the security of new America. It was not until the Jay Treaty of 1795 that this threat lessened.¹⁵ Close to this same time, the Articles of Confederation placed power within and among the 13 sovereign states. Yet, class conflicts led to public outcry against the articles in the form of protests and rebellions (Shay's Rebellion and Whiskey Rebellion, for example).¹⁶

Once independence was won, leaders of the country recognized the importance of unity among states and the need for both public and private systems of security. As

¹³ Walker, *National Security and Core Values in American History*, 16.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 19.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 24.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 26. Shay's Rebellions occurred in 1786 and 1787 when groups of farmers publically protested the enforcement of local and national taxes. The Whiskey Rebellion occurred in 1791 as protestors resisted the "Whiskey Tax" imposed by the national government.

leaders worked to quell threats to unity through law—for example, John Adams in 1798 approved strengthening the navy and supported Alien and Sedition Acts, which silenced oppression¹⁷—the need for private forms of security was recognized as dissent to these laws resulted in private contempt of law on a local scale. Additionally, as a newly formed nation, the U.S. recognized the need to suppress international conflicts, which threatened free trade and the economic stability of the country.

Following the War of 1812, The Missouri Compromise of 1820 delineated a line in American soil limiting the spread of slavery from South to North. As slaves began to be transferred illegally into free territories via the Underground Railroad, slave owners began hiring private investigators to find and return escaped persons.¹⁸ Regarding security, disputes between and among persons and state leaders began to demand attention of the country as a whole. While the Revolution had secured America as its own entity, disputes among states threatened the security of the new nation. On September 14, 1865, Hon. Charles Sumner addressed the Republican State Convention in Massachusetts, calling attention to the debate concerning civil liberties and security. He stated, “Be just, and the republic will be strong.” Yet, as the revolution began, groups within the young country expressed competing virtues. Groups within the country, often elementarily depicted as southern states and northern states, disputed freedom as a human and civil right. These disagreements came to a head during the American Civil War (1861–1865).

¹⁷ Ibid., 29.

¹⁸ Milton Lipson, "Private Security: A Retrospective," *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (1988): 16.

The need for private security expanded during the Industrial Revolution as the birth of railroads and big business required protection for good transfers. Responding to this need was the birth of private security firms, notably was Allan Pinkerton's agency.¹⁹ In 1849, Pinkerton was named Chicago's first detective, and, by 1850, he began a private practice of investigation. Due to the need for private security at the time, Pinkerton's agency was a success, and by 1853, the agency housed a staff of five investigators including one woman. On retainer with the agency were a number of railroad companies including the Illinois Central Railroad and the Pennsylvania Railroad. During the Civil War, Allen Pinkerton served the Union through President Abraham Lincoln.²⁰

Following the Civil War, the need for private security in American industry remained as expansion into the West continued and as questions concerning civil liberties and economic/employee rights continued to foster public debate. The development of private security organizations would come to shape the organization of security at a national level. Questions concerning the founding values of American freedom—life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness—created tensions among civilians. When the republic unified at the conclusion of Civil War, a cohesive “capitalist political economy” resulted in early 20th century prosperity.²¹ Within the country, opposition to social order continued with the question of minority rights and the establishment of groups such as the Ku Klux Klan. Externally, the U.S. worked to secure economic prosperity and security through international efforts aimed at democratizing other nations.

¹⁹ Ibid. Pinkerton was a Scottish-born man who immigrated to a small town outside of Chicago at the age of 23. By happenchance, Pinkerton, while wondering a wooden area near his home, came across a plant producing counterfeit currency. Upon alerting the local sheriff, Pinkerton was rewarded and named a deputy sheriff of Kane County. This marked the beginning of Pinkerton's career providing private security

²⁰ Ibid., 18.

²¹ Walker, *National Security and Core Values in American History*, 46.

Social issues throughout the U.S. resulted in a variety of local and national concerns over crime. At the local level, violence increased due to famed gangsters such as Al Capone and John Dillinger. Additionally, corruption in local politics and big business continued (as was explored in the work of Upton Sinclair and his seminal text, *The Jungle*). At the national level, arguments against capitalism came in the form of anarchism. In 1901, U.S. President William McKinley was shot and killed by Leon Czolgosz. Angry about capitalism and government policy following the loss of his factory job, the FBI labeled Czolgosz as the first U.S. terrorist.²² In response to increasing violence at the local, domestic, and national level, formal organizations charged with preventing crime were established.

In 1896, the National Bureau of Criminal Identification was founded with the purpose of gathering and releasing local crime information to police agencies across the country. By 1912, local, federal, and national police forces existed in 48 states.²³ In 1908, Attorney General Charles J. Bonaparte, recruited 9 Secret Service investigators to join 25 of his own investigators. Bonaparte's group was charged with conducting investigations for the Department of Justice. In 1935, the group was formally named the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI).

Beginning near the turn of the century, clandestine intelligence efforts increased.²⁴ Efforts to protect the state from external threats were contained to the military at this time. Apart from The Pinkerton Agency, the State Department's Cipher Bureau (also

²² "A Brief History: The National Calls 1908–1923," *Federal Bureau of Investigation*, from <https://www.fbi.gov/history/brief-history> (accessed October 1, 2016).

²³ Lipson, "Private Security: A Retrospective," 21.

²⁴ Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman, *Strategic Intelligence in American National Security* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 7.

known as the “American Black Chamber”) served as a national agency from 1917–1929, and was charged with “collecting, deciphering, and analyzing signals intelligence.”²⁵ Following WWI, Republican presidential candidate for the 1920 election, Warren G. Harding, preached a return to prewar isolationism in regards to foreign affairs. Harding’s commitment to isolationism gained him a significant advantage in the election, which he won.²⁶ However, as the country moved toward the Second World War, this sentiment of isolationism was publicly challenged.

As foreshadowed in the above paragraphs, this project recognizes World War II as a turning point in U.S. national security. As shown above, early U.S. national security responded to the economic interests of the Colonies, and the need to be a unified country among states following the Revolutionary War. During this time in American history, the communicative goods protected and promoted by leaders of the country was access to a free market without imperial taxes or limitations and commitments to the values established by the founding documents of the country—the Bill of Rights and the Constitution—which attempted to provide unity among states. Yet, as shown in the following section, as past threats were resolved and new threats emerged, the communicative goods that shaped national security in this early American period transformed.

Security: World War II and the 1947 National Security Act

²⁵ Ibid., 7. The Cipher Bureau, charged with intercepting and analyzing foreign communications and threats, was disbanded by Secretary of State Henry Stimson who felt that U.S. collection of other countries’ messages was immoral.

²⁶ Douglas T. Stuart, *Creating the National Security State: A History of Law that Transformed America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 5.

National security prior to WWII was tied directly to the interests of given leaders who interpreted security needs alongside a set pathway for the growth of a new country. Until the attacks on Pearl Harbor, leaders maintained this sentiment of tying national security directly to American interests. However, the communicative goods of security connected to the interests of a young country would soon change with advances in warfare introduced during World War II. As will be discussed in the following subsection, while the system of national security in the U.S. formalized as a result of WWII, many of the challenges facing the country during these early years continued into the post-World War II era. Yet, the ways in which these challenges were addressed changed significantly following the attacks on Pearl Harbor and the 1947 National Security Act. Security scholars recognize the 1941 attacks on Pearl Harbor as a significant turning point in American foreign policy and national security. While the trend of economic security and isolation from threats abroad had carried the country into the 1900s, the attacks on Pearl Harbor quickly altered the feelings of citizens and leaders within the U.S., causing them to recognize the reality of external security threats. Following World War II, trends in national security were tied to a modern system of containment, which is a strategy of securing a nation's interests and ideals by containing the threat and expansion of competing governments.²⁷ The work of Douglas T. Stuart, chair of international studies at Dickinson University and director of civilian-military education cooperation funded by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, guides this subsection. Stuart's work examines the move to modern national security.

²⁷ See John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).

The concept of national security in the U.S. that we know today—one maintained by multiple government organizations and driven by strategic intelligence with both defensive and offensive aims—did not exist prior to U.S. involvement in WWII. Following involvement in World War II, the ideal of isolationism with respect to securing the country crumbled. The December 7, 1941 attacks on Pearl Harbor were a significant turning point for leaders and citizens in the U.S., in terms of security. The attacks uncovered the limits of isolationism and proved to Americans that they could not be secure from technological advances leading to changes in perceived time and space. Protection of the country had to extend beyond a sole focus on military capabilities and had to last beyond wartime. National security transformed from a strategy implemented at critical moments of fear, to one requiring maintenance during times of peace.

The current system of national security bureaucracy was foreshadowed in the Roosevelt era following WWII and was formalized following the attacks on Pearl Harbor.²⁸ In his text, *Creating the National Security State: A History of Law that Transformed America*, Douglas T. Stuart,²⁹ chair of international studies at Dickinson University, traces the roots of modern national security ideology among Americans to WWII.³⁰ Stuart recognizes the 1941 attacks on Pearl Harbor as a “turning point in

²⁸ While this section does not focus particularly on Third World conflicts including the Korean War, Vietnam War, and Arab-Israeli conflicts, I do not wish to minimize these events for the history of American policy. This work echoes the sentiment of Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman who write, “When the Third World has been considered important. . .it was mainly in the context of the larger Soviet American conflict.” The Soviet-American conflict is discussed in the following section. See Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman, “Afterword to the Second Edition,” in *Strategic Intelligence in American National Security* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 188.

²⁹ Douglas T. Stuart is the chair of international studies at Dickinson University. He is the author/editor of 11 books and multiple scholarly articles. Additionally, he is director of a civilian-military education cooperation funded by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation.

³⁰ The roots of the move from isolationism to our current system to national security can be seen just prior to the attacks on Pearl Harbor. Following WWI, Republican presidential candidate for the 1920 election, Warren G. Harding, preached a return to prewar isolationism in regards to foreign affairs. Harding’s commitment to isolationism won him a significant advantage in the presidential election and he won. Noting

American history,” at which point the concept of national security replaced the concept of national interests as the guiding component of foreign policy. The effects of this change were instrumental for the development and organization of national security efforts.³¹

In addition to the events leading to U.S. involvement in WWII, Stuart recognizes the work of Edward Pendleton Herring (1903–2004), former Harvard University professor of government, whose writings in the early 20th century introduced policymakers to a concept of national security by challenging their current system of defense.³² Herring served as president of the Social Science Research Council (1948–1968),³³ during which time he was influential in moving political science from a purely theoretical study to a “behavioral science” drawing on many disciplines, including sociology.³⁴ Prior to the attacks at Pearl Harbor, Herring published *The Impact of War* in which he worked to develop a *systemic* concept of national security.³⁵ In his text, Herring argued that technological developments in air warfare and the increase in totalitarian regimes presented America with a unique and timely threat. While Herring recognized a trend in the American public to be fearful of militarization, he argued that security needed to be upheld by a powerful military who were integrated into and among society.

the success of Harding’s campaign, Stuart argues that 1932 presidential candidate, Franklin D. Roosevelt, recognized the American public’s commitment to isolationism and expressed a commitment to this policy while campaigning for the presidency. However, economic changes and the beginning of Nazi power in Germany during the prewar years of Roosevelt’s presidency allowed to explore other avenues of foreign policy. Particularly, in his later years as president, Roosevelt expressed a commitment to being prepared for war over isolation.

³¹ Stuart, *Creating the National Security State*, 2.

³² *Ibid.*, 5. Herring’s writings include *Group Representation before Congress* (1929) and *The Politics of Democracy: American Parties in Action* (1940).

³³ The Social Science Research Council is a nonprofit, leading research organization in the U.S. aimed at fostering scientific inquiry in the social sciences through rigorous research.

³⁴ Christopher Lehmann-Haupt, “Pendleton Herring, 100, pioneer in political science,” *New York Times* August 21, 2014.

³⁵ See Edward Pendleton Herring, *The Impact of War; Our American Democracy Under Arms* (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1941).

Even once current threats were dispersed, Herring argued that a system of national security would need to be maintained continuously. Herring's work fought against a stark distinction between peace time and war time, arguing that the line between them was no longer clear and that preparations for war needed to be made even during times of peace.³⁶ The attacks on Pearl Harbor confirmed Herring's claims and stand as a turning point in American public sentiment toward security. Specifically, the Pearl Harbor attacks proved to leaders of America that (1) the lack of armed forces unification in defense disallowed the army and navy to "prepare for, and respond to, a military attack;" (2) that a central intelligence agency was needed; and (3) that a central system of "civilian-military coordination" for national security was needed.³⁷ These arguments were "reinforced" during the rest of WWII.³⁸

While WWII saw the creation of the first central intelligence organization, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the organization was disbanded in October 1945 by Harry Truman.³⁹ Upon the death of President Roosevelt on April 12, 1945, Harry S. Truman assumed the role of president. As a stark supporter of military unification, Truman proposed unifications of the War Department (the Army) and the Navy Department. A message to Congress on December 19, 1945, details his resistance.⁴⁰ Speaking to military unification, Truman writes: "A grave responsibility will rest upon

³⁶ Douglas T. Stuart, "Ministry of Fear: The 1947 National Security Act in Historical and Institutional Context," *International Studies Perspectives* 4 (2003): 294.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 295.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ Jeffrey T. Richelson, *The US Intelligence Community* (5th ed.) (Philadelphia: Westview Press, 2008), 15–16.

⁴⁰ Anna Kasten Nelson, "President Truman and the Evolution of the National Security Council," *The Journal of American History* 72, no. 2 (1985): 360–378, 362.

Congress if it continues to delay this most important and urgent measure.”⁴¹ Debate ensued following the delivery of Truman’s letter to congress. While Army leaders supported Truman’s plan for unification, James Forrestal, the then U.S. Secretary of Navy, began searching for counter arguments. In his search for an alternative plan for national security changes following WWII, Forrestal invited his friend, Ferdinand Eberstadt, a U.S. lawyer and political advisor recognized for his contributions to the creations of the National Security Council and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), to research the effects of unification on American national security.

Following the war, the questions and arguments concerning military unification, the development of the CIA, and the coordination of military and civilian national security came to the forefront of politics. These debates were addressed formally with the 1947 National Security Act. The National Security Act created the infrastructure of American national security that stands today.

The outcomes of the National Security Act are as follows:

- First, the act created the National Military Establishment (renamed the Department of Defense in 1949) led by a Secretary of Defense. The Department of Defense is a coordinated effort of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Joint Chiefs of Staffs (also established with the National Security Act), and the Office of the Inspector General.

⁴¹ Harry S. Truman, “December 19, 1945 Special Message to the Congress Recommending the Establishment of a Department of National Defense,” Harry S. Truman Presidential Library & Museum, from <https://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=508&st=&st1=> Of importance for this chapter, Truman also noted “the necessity of making timely preparations for the Nation’s long-range security now-while we are still mindful of what it has cost us in this war to have been unprepared.”

- Second, the Act established the National Security Council. The Council was created with the purpose of advising the President on domestic, foreign, and military policies regarding national security.
- Third, the Act established the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The CIA, under the direction of the National Security Council, was established with the purpose of “coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security,”⁴² to advise and make recommendations to the NSC on such matters, and to obtain intelligence.
- Fourth, the Act established the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff established under the provision for the National Military Establishments and under the direction of the President and Secretary of Defense, was created with the purpose of preparing plans for military direction and for unifying these commands in the interests of the safety of the American public.

The National Security Act of 1947 set the precedent for the coordinated efforts of national security in the U.S. for the years to come.

As witnessed through the previous paragraphs, the communicative goods of national security in the U.S. dramatically shifted following World War II. After the attacks on Pearl Harbor, American leaders and citizens recognized that the particular interests of the country could no longer direct national security. Rather, national security had to be proactive in an effort to secure the nation from external threats; gone were the days where national security was simply response to emerging threats. Proactive security required an ability to research, analyze, and forecast attacks. Following the 1947 National

⁴² *National Security Act*, 1947.

Security Act, the communicative goods of the U.S. transformed into strategic and counter intelligence, domestic and international security agencies, and preventative practices of security.

The 1947 Act introduced an understanding of national security that saw little difference in peace times versus war times. National security in itself became a leading interest of the nation. After the war, it was apparent that the “United States would have to protect its national interests throughout the world without the support of a stronger ally.”⁴³ As the reach of communism at the hands of the Soviet Union stretched, new security challenges emerged during the Cold War, to which this work now turns.

Security: The Cold War and Post-Cold War

Following the 1947 Security Act, America faced security challenges presented by the rise of communism. The Cold War created a unique challenge to U.S. national security. For arguably the first time in American history, threats to national security were not simply driven by military forces; threats to national security at times were also formal challenges of “ideological, social, and economic” stature.⁴⁴ The following paragraphs tell the story of U.S. national security responding to the Cold War using the work of Bruce D. Berkowitz, Foreign Policy Research Institute fellow, former International Affairs fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and lecturer at multiple foreign policy programs in the United States, and Allan E. Goodman, president and chief executive officer of the Institute of International Education and former dean of the School of Foreign Service at

⁴³ Berkowitz and Goodman, *Strategic Analysis for American National Security*, 3.

⁴⁴ Barry Buzan, “Rethinking Security after the Cold War,” *Cooperation and Conflict* 32, no. 5 (1997): 5–28, 6.

Georgetown University. This section textures the work of Berkowitz and Goodman with the work of John Lewis Gaddis, professor of naval history at Yale University.

During the Cold War, a continuation of Roosevelt's efforts of containing international security threats through a policy of firm and patient displays of strength was carried on by Truman.⁴⁵ The Truman Doctrine, which went into effect in 1947, promised economic and military supports to countries under threat by the Soviet Union.⁴⁶ The Cold War policy of containment highlighted the relationship between U.S. national security and the environment of international relations as a whole. The policy recognized the importance of *spheres of influence* and friendly relations with other political regimes. In his seminal text on the policy of containment during WWII, Gaddis explains that containment worked to defend national security with the following goals:

- (1) restoration of the balance of power through the encouragement of self-confidence in nations threatened by Soviet expansionism; (2) reduction, by exploiting tension between Moscow and the international communist movements, of the Soviet Union's ability to project influence beyond its border; and (3) modification, over time, of the Soviet concept of international relations, with a view to bringing about a negotiated settlement of outstanding differences.⁴⁷

During the Cold War, the notion of securing the nation through military force was challenged as weapons of mass destruction and the sheer size of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and their forces made a successful vision of war appear as an

⁴⁵ John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 22.

⁴⁶ The policy of containment was coined and defined by George Frost Kennan in his 1947 article "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." Kennan worked for the State Department and his scholarship informed and influenced the Truman Doctrine. See Gaddis, "George F. Kennan and the Strategy of Containment."

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 36–36.

unachievable goal.⁴⁸ During the decades of Cold War, a move toward securing the nation through policy and the support of democratic values superseded military efforts, as was made apparent during the Cuban Missile Crisis (October 14–October 28, 1962) and through the negative aftermaths of the Vietnam War (1955–1975). Criticism surrounding American failures in the Vietnam War particularly urged leaders to think broadly about the role of militarization and the role of natural security.

The Cuban Missile Crisis and Vietnam War showed that militarization alone was insufficient for protecting the U.S. and its citizens. National security challenges were complex matters involving communicative actors, events, and motives beyond the scope of the current pressing issue. Thus, a military solution aimed toward securing the nation with military capabilities required additional diplomatic support.

At the conclusion of the Cold War, marked in this project by the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the U.S. began to face intricate and multifaceted challenges of national security. Stuart characterizes the moment as a “cluster of complex and interacting threats including transnational terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the spill-over effects of failed and failing systems,”⁴⁹ What the Cold War brought to light was the understanding of multiple grounds upon which security threats stand. These grounds, including, and yet not limited to, those of military, economic, and social challenges, since the Cold War, become areas of importance in all efforts of securing the nation.

The unique challenges to national security that the Cold War presented also determined the importance of ongoing strategic intelligence. During this time in

⁴⁸ Ibid., 47.

⁴⁹ Stuart, *Creating the National Security State*, 284.

American history, national security protected and promoted the influence of American values in areas outside of its borders. The good of introducing and spreading democracy as a strategic tool in the fight against communism directed the decisions of leaders. During the Cold War, the focus of security practices was directed at the challenges caused by the Soviet Union. At the conclusion of the War, and following the subsequent dismantling of the Soviet Union, scholars began to question how the U.S. would adapt.⁵⁰ The national system for security was broad and diverse and post-Cold War challenges were not easy to identify.⁵¹

This section presented national security in this period as dynamic and ever-evolving. Specifically, national security, as the U.S. approaches it today, evolved from multiple turning points in American history, including the attacks on Pearl Harbor and the *1947 National Security Act*; these turning points called attention to gaps in security and shifted the communicative goods of security. The following section introduces the 9/11 terrorist attacks as the most recent turning point in U.S. national security.

The Disruption of 9/11: Conclusions and Implications for this Project

The above historical account of U.S. national security provides a context for thinking about the particular challenges to national security as they would emerge following the attacks of 9/11. From the information provided above, we see a textured view of national security policy in the U.S. as responding to the challenges of given times and places; national security reflects and responds to a given communicative environment, and the

⁵⁰ Berkowitz and Goodman, *Strategic Analysis for American National Security*, 182–183.

⁵¹ The establishment of the Department of Homeland Security proves this point well. The Department consolidated approximately 170,000 persons from 22 agencies charged with national security initiatives.

organizations charged with defending national security adapt to these challenges as they arise. This sentiment drives the remainder of this project.

The particular challenges of a post-Cold War world were exposed on September 11, 2001, when Islamic extremists strategically coordinated four terrorist attacks on the United States. Since these attacks, there have been over 60,000 other terrorist attacks worldwide (68,888 according to the University of Maryland's Global Terrorism Database (GTD) 2001-2014). Due to the severity of the attacks on 9/11 and the subsequent increased visibility and vulnerability presented by terrorism, the catastrophe marks a significant turning point in the history of U.S. national security. Yet, these attacks do not stand apart from the broader historical, social, and political context presented above. As this project argues, terrorism is grounded in and sustained by multiple background sentiments. As such, terrorism present a dynamic challenge to security professionals charged with counterterrorism.

In his seminal text on terrorism, Bruce Hoffman, director for the Center of Security Studies at Georgetown University, writes, "The most feared terrorists are arguably those who are the most successful in translating thought into action."⁵² This work extends and explores Hoffman's sentiment with particular attention paid to the importance of communication ethics. Attentiveness to communication ethics frames communicative action as situated within a historical context, amongst a diversity of communicative goods, and in response to the demands of a given communicative event. Terrorists do not think and act apart from the moment in which they stand. This work adds that terrorism and counterterrorism are not only driven by a motive of translating thought into action,

⁵² Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 178.

but rather, risking one's life to defend particular communicative goods. This chapter, therefore, serves as the hermeneutic entry into the remainder of this project.

This chapter provided insights on the history of U.S. national security, which allows us to shift our focus of attention away from national security as an end goal to national security as an on-going concern involving ever-evolving challenges and demands that shape our time. Of primary concern for this project is how national security responds to the demands of a given moment. As leaders interpret emerging threats, the narrative, goods, and practices that define national security shift. Understanding the stories that shape national security provides greater clarity into the practices used to defend a nation. When we shift our definition of national security from an objective goal to an overarching metaphor that shapes a given moment's security practices, we open the term for broader intel and application. Understanding national security as embedded in a given moment and responsive to the stories that shape our time affords us a more solid ground to begin this project's investigation.

The next chapter begins where this introductory chapter leaves us—the story of September 11, 2001. This project recognizes 9/11 as a significant turning point in American national security. The attacks presented an existential crisis to national security professionals by displaying the reality that current security practices were inept to meet the demands of a world riddled with terrorism.

The attacks on 9/11 demanded of security professionals new means for responding to the emerging challenges of our time with advanced practices and insight. The following chapter frames post 9/11 terrorism and counterterrorism practices as communicative

gestalts driven by grounded background commitments. Communication ethics yields insight and new directions for exploring these current challenges.

Chapter 2: Communication and Competing Backgrounds: The Interruption of 9/11

In this project, communication ethics attends to the emerging questions that shape a given historical moment. Stories guide one's engagement with the historical moment and offer appropriate grounds for responding to current existential demands. Engagement with the stories that shape our moment allots the communicator with what Aristotle termed *phrônesis*, or the practical wisdom for meeting the demands of a particular moment.⁵³ This chapter engages the events of September 11, 2001 as story for guiding our engagement with counterterrorism in this particular moment. September 11, 2001 marks the most recent turning point in U.S. national security. 9/11 exposed the power and reach of Islamic terror groups, most notably, al-Qaeda, and made visible the security limitations of the U.S. intelligence community. In response to the attacks, U.S. leaders called for a reevaluation of national security practices, arguing that Cold War security practices were no longer sufficient to meet the demands of terrorism in the 21st century. Within the FBI, organizational change was vast. Over a decade after the 9/11 attacks, security experts reflected upon the success and failures of new security practices. This contemporary reflection showed that gaps exist in the effort to fight and prevent terrorism. While reports recognize notable successes of the FBI, there remain areas for improvement. These areas continue to frame the context of counterterrorism.

For the purposes of this project as a whole, this chapter achieves two primary goals. First, by articulating the story of 9/11, this chapter showcases the FBI as a primary counterterrorism resource. Second, this chapter frames responses to 9/11 to identify gaps in counterterrorism prior to 9/11.

⁵³ Ronald C. Arnett, "Paulo Freire's Revolutionary Pedagogy: From a Story-Centered to a Narrative Centered Communication Ethic," *Qualitative Inquiry*, no. 8 (2002): 494–495.

Introduction

Over 15 years after the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, these events continue to shape our nation's security practices and response to threats. 9/11 proved that Cold War methods were inadequate against terrorism and that a major restructuring of the security apparatus of the U.S. was necessary. In response to the attacks, security leaders urged the intelligence community to work together in making counterterrorism a national security priority, resulting in structural changes within security organizations. This chapter tells the story of 9/11 beginning with a selective history and sequence of the day's events. This chapter continues by overviewing the recommended changes for the intelligence community and concludes by discussing the success of the current state of the FBI. The 9/11 terror attacks continue to shape our engagement with counterterrorism and offer a ground for responding to current and future threats. The attacks are also a significant influence on the FBI counterterrorism narrative. Exploring this story provides us with a practical entryway for thinking about communication ethics applications.

Through three sections, the following pages engage two major official reflections on 9/11. Section one, "September 11, 2001: The 9/11 Commissioner Report," tells the story of 9/11 using *The 9/11 Commissioner's Report*. The U.S. government recognizes this report as an official "full and complete account of the circumstances surrounding the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks."⁵⁴ The purpose of this section is twofold. First, this section presents an account of the day's events as told by official representatives of the U.S. government. Second, this selective history textures the story of 9/11 to show the diverse backgrounds and competing communicative goods made visible on September

⁵⁴ "National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States" <http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/about/index.htm>

11, 2001. While it is important to note that there exists multiple versions and interpretations of 9/11 as story, this project, in focusing on FBI counterterrorism, limits exploration of this story to the U.S. government's official account of the event. Section two, "September 11, 2001: National Security Report," overviews the immediate response to the attacks by the U.S. government, and outlines the recommendations for improving security practices to effectively respond to terrorism made by the 9/11 Commission. The purpose of this section is to outline the security gaps identified by U.S. leaders in response to 9/11. These gaps shape over a decade of counterterrorism practices in the U.S. and remain a valid source of referral for implementing changes to security processes and procedures. Section three, "FBI and Counter-Terrorism: Adapting to New Threats," turns to the Congressionally mandated response to the Commission Report entitled "The FBI: Protecting the Homeland in the 21st Century." This recently released report responds to the recommendations for terrorism prevention presented by the 9/11 Commission. The report outlines the FBI's successes and opportunities for growth with respect to counterterrorism. This chapter ends by identifying places of value where communication ethics research and practice can make a contribution to further understanding the needs of security professionals and vetting the practices of these professionals.

The story recounted below presents a backdrop to the attacks that forever changed the way in which the U.S. thinks about and coordinates counterterrorism. The attacks on September 11, 2001 exposed the reality of Islamic terror and displayed the limitations of the U.S. defense community. Following the attacks, two significant and demanding questions arose: Why must we change our security practices? And, how can we adapt our intelligence community to better address the threat of terrorism? Nearly two decades

following the 9/11 attacks, these questions continue to demand research as security gaps still exist in U.S. efforts to fight terrorism. The story of 9/11, as a significant turning point in U.S. national security, continues to shape the narrative of national security writ large. Communication ethics in this project takes seriously the stories that shape one's communicative practices. For current and ongoing security demands, 9/11 acts as a pivotal story that guides communicative response. The richness of 9/11 shows us that counterterrorism practices must attend to the complex and dynamic background influences that fuel foreground violence when there is any attempt to make sense of future directions.

September 11, 2001: A Selective History

Immediately following 9/11, families of 9/11 victims, the American public, and leaders in the U.S. and abroad called for an official inquiry into the attacks and a recounting of the event. In November 2002, the U.S. Congress and President at the time, George W. Bush, responded to the call for this official response and announced the establishment of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, a bipartisan and independent group of ten commissioners charged with preparing a complete account of the 9/11 terror attacks. This Commission worked with two objectives: First, the Commission provided clarity to the story of al-Qaeda and the background of the 9/11 attacks. Second, the Commission provided direction for counterterrorism by articulating security practices to prevent future attacks.⁵⁵

⁵⁵ Commissioners included the following individuals: Thomas Kean, Lee H. Hamilton, Richard Ben-Veniste, Fred F. Fielding, Jamie S. Gorelick, Slade Gorton, Bob Kerrey, John F. Lehman, Timothy J. Roemer. And James R. Thompson. Please see "Commissioner Biographies," *National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*, from <http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/about/bios.htm>

On July 22, 2004, the Commission released “The 9/11 *Commission Report*.” The Commission closed on August 21, 2004.⁵⁶ The purpose of the Report was to provide a full account of the terror attacks to best of the committee’s ability and to acknowledge valuable lessons regarding preparation for and prevention against future attacks. The authorized edition of the report includes thirteen chapters.⁵⁷ These chapters fit within three theme areas:

- Chapters one through eight discuss the background of the events including a history of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda and an overview of the 9/11 hijackers.
- Chapters nine and ten tell the story of the day’s event and immediate aftermath.
- Chapters eleven through thirteen present recommendations for advancements in U.S. national security.

This section is divided into two main subsections, which, taken together, summarizes chapter one through chapter ten. Subsection one, *The Story of 9/11: The Emergence of a New Terrorism*, overviews the history of bin Laden and al-Qaeda. It also provides an overview of U.S. security responses to bin Laden. Subsection two, *September 11, 2001: Overview of Events*, recounts the events of 9/11 beginning with the strategic planning of the attacks and ending with event of the day. As a whole, this section contextualizes the story of 9/11 in an effort to show the complexity, depth, and richness of this story.

The Story of 9/11: The Emergence of a New Terrorism

⁵⁶ <https://www.9-11commission.gov>

⁵⁷ The 13 chapters are as follows: (1) “We Have Some Planes”; (2) “The Foundation of the New Terrorism”; (3) “Counterterrorism Evolves”; (4) “Responses to Al Qaeda’s Initial Assaults”; (5) “Al Qaeda Aims at the American Homeland”; (6) “From Threat to Threat”; (7) “The Attack Looms”; (8) “The System was Blinking Red”; (9) “Heroism and Horror”; (10) “Wartime”; (11) “Foresight—and Hindsight”; (12) “What To Do? A Global Strategy”; (13) “How To Do It? A Different Way of Organizing the Government.”

The story of 9/11 begins with the conclusion of the Cold War and the birth of the modern Middle East. The modern Middle East resulted from the fall of the Ottoman Empire at the conclusion of World War I and independence from Western powers following World War II. During the 1960s and 1970s, Middle East states experienced a period of vast social and economic prosperity.⁵⁸ This growth resulted in “unmodernized oil states attempt[ing] to shortcut decades of development.”⁵⁹ Quickly, education reforms and vast infrastructure projects began. Yet, by the late 1980s, decreasing oil revenues negatively impacted the economy as corruption and the downfall of public programs increased. By the 1990s, high birthrates and a declining economy resulted in an increased population of young, unemployed men among Middle Eastern states.

Authors of *The 9/11 Commission Report* attribute these social ills to the development of what they call *new terrorism* in the Middle East. Distrust in the government and anger at corrupt leaders resulted in violence planned and executed by non-state actors typically associated with extremist organizations. Unlike traditional terrorism led by small groups with clear political goals, this new wave of terrorists organized widespread violence based on religious grounds. Authors of the *Commission Report* write that the significance of new terrorism for national security was seen in 1998 when Osama bin Laden, publicly recognized leader of al-Qaeda during the September 11, 2001 attacks, issued a public fatwa (religious order) in an Afghan newspaper. While the roots of this extremist terror began in the 1980s and 1990s, This fatwa, given by bin Laden was one of the first significant public statements of terror released from Islamic

⁵⁸ Tarik M. Yousef, “Development, Growth and Policy Reform in the Middle East and North Africa since 1950,” *The Journal of Economic Perspective* 18, no. 3 (2004): 91.

⁵⁹ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report* (Washington, DC: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004), 53.

terror leaders. To place this fatwa into context, the Commission provides a brief history of bin Laden and the birth and development of al-Qaeda. The following paragraphs summarize this selective history.

The story of al-Qaeda begins in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, conflict with the Soviet Union between 1979 and 1989 provided Islamic extremists with a common goal and meeting place. This common center—a shared enemy—under the leadership of bin Laden would eventually birth al-Qaeda. During this decade of conflict in the late 1970s through the late 1980s, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in an effort to maintain Communist control of the country. Afghan nationals resisted the intervention and young Muslims from around the world came to Afghanistan to aid their companions in the fight against Soviet Russia. bin Laden stood out among volunteers; his family’s fortune allowed him to be a major financier of the anti-Soviet fight. For bin Laden, the success of Afghanistan depended upon a larger, worldwide organization. In April 1988, the Afghan jihad was successfully expelling Soviet forces. Leaders of the jihad including bin Laden debated what to do next. bin Laden and others agreed that the organization should not break up and established a foundation, al-Qaeda, as a headquarters for a global jihad.⁶⁰ By August 1988, al-Qaeda followers recognized bin Laden as their leader.

In 1991, bin Laden, at the request of Hassan al Turabi, a Sudanese political leader, moved al-Qaeda headquarters to Sudan. Over the course seven years, bin Laden laid the groundwork for a global extremist organization. By August 1998, al-Qaeda included a military, financial component, political committee, media affairs and propaganda group,

⁶⁰ Ibid., 53–55. This organization included a financial network of 28 financiers from Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf named the “Golden Chain.” bin Laden and the anti-Soviet forces in Afghanistan relied heavily upon this Golden Chain who supported ““holy warriors.””

intelligence group, and an Advisory Council made up of bin Laden's closest confidants.⁶¹ Mosques and schools around the world served as recruitment centers for al-Qaeda. In Egypt, Ayman al Zawahiri led a group of Egyptian jihads. Shortly after the victory in Afghanistan, Zawahiri's group joined forces with al-Qaeda. The relationship between bin Laden and al Zawahiri would last many years with Zawahiri replacing bin Laden as leader of al-Qaeda following bin Laden's capture by U.S. forces.⁶² By the early to mid-1990's, bin Laden had established himself as a well-known leader among Islamic extremists. As leader, he focused his attention on attacking the United States. The Commission notes that with the support of al-Qaeda members and extremist leaders around the world, bin Laden began approving attacks on the U.S.

Throughout the 1990s, Islamic extremists planned and executed a number of small terror attacks against the U.S. and its supporters.⁶³ In 1996, bin Laden returned to Afghanistan where the Taliban had exerted control over much of the country excluding some key centers such as Kabul.⁶⁴ The Taliban offered a safe haven to all persons who wanted to travel to Afghanistan and train in their camps. Thus, the alliance between the Taliban and bin Laden gave al-Qaeda a home plate to train fighters and connect with other extremist groups. In 1998, bin Laden issued the public fatwa discussed in previous

⁶¹ Ibid., 56.

⁶² bin Laden was killed in May 2011 by a special team of U.S. Navy Seals who ambushed his home in Pakistan under direction from then President, Barack Obama.

⁶³ For example, in December 1992, Yemeni associates of bin Laden detonated bombs at two hotels in Aden where U.S. troops were known to stop en route to Somalia. The bombs killed two civilians but no Americans. In November 1995, four Saudi persons inspired by bin Laden exploded a car bomb outside of a U.S.-Saudi National Guard training facility in Riyadh. The bomb killed five Americans and two Indians. Ibid., 59–60.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 65.

paragraphs. This fatwa was a “public launch of a renewed and stronger al-Qaeda.”⁶⁵ By the summer of 1998, the strength of al-Qaeda was displayed on an international scale.

The Commission writes that al-Qaeda’s first organized strategic attack occurred in August 1998 when trucks carrying bombs drove into the U.S. Embassies in East Africa (the Nairobi Embassy, Kenya and Dar es Salaam Embassy, Tanzania). The attack in Nairobi killed 12 Americans and 201 other persons of varying nationalities. The attack in Dar es Salaam killed 11 additional people. Following the African embassy attacks, U.S. president at the time, Bill Clinton, organized a response to al-Qaeda. As noted in the *Commission Report*, the 1998 embassy bombing shaped U.S. policy toward al-Qaeda until the 9/11 attacks. Experts expressed a need to “reevaluate the threat posed by bin Laden,”⁶⁶ and even though intelligence linked bin Laden to the attacks, a divide amongst U.S. leadership existed. This divide separated those who recognized bin Laden as a “novel threat” and recommended action, and those who believed bin Laden not to be dangerous enough for a U.S. response. This divide is witnessed within security agencies leading up to the 9/11 attacks.

Authors of the *Commission Report* note that “although the 1995 National Intelligence Estimate had warned on a new type of terrorism, many officials continued to think of terrorists as agents of states Hence, government efforts to cope with terrorism were essentially the work of individual agencies.”⁶⁷ At the federal level, the Justice Department was responsible for counterterrorism, with the FBI being the dominant agency. Abroad, the CIA and State Department were responsible for

⁶⁵ Ibid., 66.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 119.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 108.

counterterrorism intelligence. While these agencies were leaders in U.S. counterterrorism, the White House did make efforts to combat new terrorism, and often, resources were not allocated or viable for these agencies to successfully grasp the scope and range of terrorists' capabilities. For instance, in 1995, Clinton issued the Presidential Decision Directive 39 stating that the "United States should 'deter, defeat, and respond vigorously to all terrorist attacks.'"⁶⁸ Clinton also allotted increased funds to the FBI designated for counterterrorism, and supported budget requests within the CIA for counterterrorism objectives. Abroad, Clinton encouraged cooperation among nations in support of counterterrorism and denying homes to terrorist organizations.⁶⁹ These directives, however, resulted only in small counterterrorism policy changes within the FBI and CIA.

In 1996, the CIA, then interested in terrorism finance, developed the bin Laden Unit, a headquartered based unit focused solely on research aimed at bin Laden. In May 1996, the unit received an intelligence "breakthrough" when Jamal Ahmed al Fadhli, a former senior employee of bin Laden, went to a U.S. embassy in Africa and provided the CIA with information on al-Qaeda directives and objectives.⁷⁰ With the assistance of Fadhli, by 1997, the bin Laden unit recognized al-Qaeda as a leading terrorist organization and bin Laden as the leader. By 1998, the CIA and agencies within the Justice Department were developing plans to capture and trial bin Laden for attacks in the 1990s.⁷¹ Yet, only one plan for capture was fully prepared. In 1998, the CIA Counterterrorist Center sought approval for a bin Laden capture plan—a plan well

⁶⁸ Ibid., 101.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 101.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 111.

⁷¹ Ibid., 111.

detailed and rehearsed. However, senior management within the CIA worried about the risk of the plan and decided that these risks outweighed the benefits. *No other plan to capture bin Laden was successfully or fully developed before 9/11.*⁷²

For the FBI, Clinton appointed Louis Freech as Director; Freech recognized terrorism as a significant threat to homeland security.⁷³ In 1999, the agency underwent a large reorganization process, which included the development of the Counterterrorism Division.⁷⁴ This development marked the first time that counterterrorism activities were handled within a stand-alone division. In 2000, the Chief of the Counterterrorism Division, Dale Watson, launched MAXCAP 05, a program to “enhance the FBI’s counterterrorism capacity” across all FBI offices.⁷⁵ In theory, the FBI established plans to make counter-terrorism a significant priority. In reality, field offices did not dedicate significant resources to counterterrorism. These offices, instead, maintained focus on local priorities and criminal justice, both apart from intelligence and terrorism research. *As a result, the FBI did not complete any assessments regarding the “overall threat” of terrorism to the U.S. prior to 9/11.*⁷⁶ At the time of the September 11, 2001 attacks, up-to-date intelligence regarding the capabilities of al-Qaeda was not available.

As the U.S. was determining an appropriate response to bin Laden and al-Qaeda, terrorists were strategically developing plans for the 9/11 attacks. As shown in the above paragraphs, significant gaps in counterterrorism knowledge and practice were present leading up to the attacks. First, security professionals in the U.S. developed no successful

⁷² Ibid., 114.

⁷³ Ibid., 76.

⁷⁴ Amy Zegart, *Spying Blind: The CIA, The FBI, and the Origins of 9/11* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 132.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 133.

⁷⁶ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report*, 77.

plans to address the threat of bin Laden before 9/11. Second, the FBI completed no formal assessments regarding the capabilities, plans, and reach of terror groups prior to 9/11. As discussed, by the late 1990s, al-Qaeda was a worldwide organization spearheaded by bin Laden. The organization “relied heavily on the ideas and work of enterprising and strong-willed field commanders who enjoyed considerable autonomy.”⁷⁷ Field officers strategically planned and executed the 9/11 terror attacks. Authors of the *Commission Report* discuss Khalid Sheikh Mohammed as the “mastermind” of the attacks.⁷⁸ The following section discusses the planning and execution of the 9/11 attacks.

The Story of 9/11: Planning 9/11

The 9/11 terror attacks began with a proposal by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed to bin Laden in the mid 1990s. As a major player in the story of 9/11, the authors of the *Commission Report* spent time presenting the story of Mohammed’s life and plans for attacks against the U.S. Mohammed serves as the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks and his life story is one of diversity. Below is an overview of this story.

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (b. 1964) joined the Muslim Brotherhood⁷⁹ at the age of sixteen. Upon graduating from secondary school in 1983, Mohammed left his hometown of Kuwait and enrolled in Chowan College in North Carolina. Soon after, Mohammed transferred to North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University where he graduated with a Mechanical Engineering degree in December 1986. After graduation, Mohammed returned to the Middle East to join anti-Soviet fighters in

⁷⁷ Ibid., 145.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ The Muslim Brotherhood is a Sunni Islamic organization whose goal is to establish the Quran as the primary reference for family and political life. See Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, *The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamist Movement* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015).

Afghanistan. In 1987, Mohammed visited Pakistan. While in Pakistan, Mohammed's brother introduced him to Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, Head of the Afghanistan Islamic Union Party (also referred to as the Islamic Dawah Organization of Afghanistan).⁸⁰ Sayyah became Mohammed's mentor, and between 1988 and 1992, Mohammed ran a nongovernmental organization under Sayyah's sponsorship. Around this time, Mohammed learned of Ramzi Yousef, the organizer of the 1993 World Trade Center bombings. Mohammed came to the attention of U.S. intelligence agencies after wiring \$660.00 to supporters of Yousef. Yousef's 1993 attack inspired Mohammed to plan his own attack against the U.S.⁸¹ Authors of the *Commission Report* write that Mohammed's disdain of the U.S. stemmed from his disagreement with U.S. policy favoring Israel over the Palestinian Liberation Organization. By 1994, Mohammed and Yousef accompanied one another to the Philippines and began planning the "Manila air plot."⁸² The Manila air plot was a terror plan intended to bomb a dozen U.S. airplanes in flight at the same time. The plan was stopped by U.S. intelligence and Philippine authorities, but Yousef was not captured until years later.

In 1996, Mohammed travelled to Afghanistan to meet bin Laden. During this meeting, Mohammed proposed his plan for the 9/11 attacks. His original proposal included an airplane attack on key cities in the United States and a simultaneous airplane attack in East Asia. By 1999, bin Laden gave Mohammed the "green light" for his World Trade Center plot and selected four individuals to serve as the suicide pilots— Khalid al

⁸⁰ The Islamic Dawah Organization of Afghanistan was founded with the goal of unifying Islamic forces in Afghanistan.

⁸¹ Ibid., 145–147.

⁸² Ibid., 147. The Manila Air Plot, planned by Yousef and Mohammed to take place in January 1995, included plans to assassinate Pope John Paul II and destroy 11 aircrafts travelling between Asia and the U.S.

Mihdhar, Nawaf al Hazmi, Khallad and Abu Bara al Yemeni. In the fall of 1999, the four chosen pilots attended a training course with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. The training session focused on physical fitness, English language skills, firearms and target practice among other skills. In the spring of 2000, bin Laden ordered the cancelling of the East Asia portion of the 9/11 attacks. Thus, the attention of Mohammed and the chosen pilots lay solely on the U.S.⁸³

In the beginning months of 2000, bin Laden added the so called “Hamburg group” to the list of persons responsible for carrying out the 9/11 attacks. The Hamburg group⁸⁴ included four aspiring Islamic extremists from Germany who were fluent in English and familiar with the West. Each of the Hamburg group members—Mohamed Atta, Ramzi Binalshibh, Marwan al Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah—served as key plays in the attacks. Upon formal inclusion in the attacks, the four men returned to Germany to begin training. As noted in the *Commission Report*, the 9/11 terrorists spent between \$400,000 and \$500,000 on planning, training, and conducting the attacks.⁸⁵ By May 2000, the 9/11 jihadists were arriving in the United States.

Within the U.S., major political changes took attention away from counterterrorism preparations. Authors of the *Commission Report* note that the “millennium scare” of 2000 consumed much of the FBI’s attention, and that the presidential election of 2000 played a significant role in the preparedness of the intelligence community. These events, coupled with disagreements within the FBI

⁸³ Ibid., 159.

⁸⁴ For additional information on the Hamburg group, see Kim Crogin and Sara A. Daly, *The Dynamic Terrorist Threat: An Assessment of Group Motivations and Capabilities in a Changing World* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2004).

⁸⁵ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report*, 169.

concerning the capabilities of bin Laden and Islamic terrorism, kept the attention of security professionals away from terrorism.

In November 2000, the U.S. presidential election resulted in a race so close that the Supreme Court was charged with deciding the outcome. Due to the circumstances of the vote, the transition period between Bill Clinton and George W. Bush was shortened by nearly half. The quick transition in personnel and the cut in time for training resulted in a steep learning curve regarding security threats, bin Laden, and al-Qaeda. During the 36-day transition, the newly named security advisor, Condoleezza Rice, and her deputy, Stephen Hadley, focused attention on the disputes with “China, missile defense, and the collapse of the Middle East peace process.”⁸⁶ While attention amongst some security leaders was directed at al-Qaeda, the debate regarding the actual threat that al-Qaeda and bin Laden posed to the U.S. was ongoing.

At the FBI, Watson and Director Freeh continued to argue for additional funding and attention for counterterrorism. In the spring of 2001, Freeh announced his retirement. Just prior to 9/11, Freeh’s successor, Robert Mueller took office.⁸⁷ Additionally, after winning the Presidential election, Bush named John Ashcroft as U.S. Attorney General. Upon his entrance to this new role, Ashcroft expressed the need for reform within the FBI. These transfers of power between key security personnel created gaps in knowledge and policy as funding and direction of counterterrorism was revised.

In the days and hours leading up to the attacks on the morning of September 11, 2001, all signals regarding a terror attack on U.S. soil were “blinking red.”⁸⁸ Yet,

⁸⁶ Ibid., 199.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 210.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 254.

significant transitions of power and leadership within the U.S. drew attention away from the terrorist threat thus creating gaps in security knowledge. As the attacks began and continued throughout the morning hours of 9/11, the vulnerability of U.S. intelligence and preparation was exposed. The following section overviews the day's events on September 11, 2001.

September 11, 2001: Overview of Events

This section describes the events on September 11, 2001, overviewing the story of the attack and initial response to the attack as listed in *The 9/11 Commission Report*. It also summarizes the story reported by the Commission. On September 11, 2001, 19 terrorists from a variety of social backgrounds and countries of origins hijacked four planes with the purpose of carrying out well-planned suicide attacks at four strategically selected sites across the U.S. Two of the planes hit the Twin Towers in Lower Manhattan, one crashed into the Pentagon, and one crashed in a field in Pennsylvania. Close to 3000 persons perished due to the attacks. These attacks serve as a significant turning point in U.S. national security that continue to shape U.S. counterterrorism policy nearly two decades later.

The hijackings took place on the morning of September 11, 2001. The first of four planes, American Flight 11, was scheduled to fly from Logan Airport in Boston, Massachusetts to Los Angeles, California on the morning of September 11. The aircraft was boarded by five hijackers, Mohamed Atta, Abdulaziz al-Omari, Wail al-Shehri, Waleed al-Shehri, and Satam al-Suqami. Both Atta and Omari had arrived at Logan International around 6:00am by a flight travelling from Portland, Oregon to Boston. American 11 took off from Logan International at 7:59 a.m.

At a second terminal in Logan International, Marwan al-Shehhi, Fayez Banihammad, Mohand al-Shehri, Hamza al-Ghamdi, and Ahmen al-Ghamdi boarded United Airlines Flight 175 to Los Angeles International Airport. United Flight 175 took off from Logan International shortly before 8:00 a.m. Concurrently, Hani Janjour, Khalid al-Mihdhar, Majed Moqed, Nawaf al-Hazmi, and Salem al-Hazmi boarded American Airlines Flight 77 at Dulles International Airport in Washington, D.C. The flight, headed for Los Angeles International airport departed D.C. at 8:20 a.m. Finally, in Newark, NJ, Ziad Jarrah, Ahmedal-Haznawi, Ahmen al-Nami, and Saeed al-Ghamdi, boarded United Airlines Flight 93 to San Francisco International Airport. The plane departed Newark at 8:42 a.m.

Of the 19 hijackers, 10 were selected for extra screening during the pre-flight security checkpoints. Each of the 10 received extra baggage screening before being allowed entrance to the flight terminals. American Flight 11 from Logan International Airport in Boston to Los Angeles International Airport was hijacked approximately at 8:14 a.m. Communication between flight attendants Betty Ong and Madeline “Amy” Sweeny and the American Airlines Southeastern Reservations Office in Cary, North Carolina allowed Boston’s Air Traffic Control Center to be alerted of the hijacking.⁸⁹ At 8:46 a.m., the flight crashed into the North Tower of World Trade Center in New York City killing all persons on board and an unknown number of persons working in the tower.

United Flight 175 was hijacked sometime between 8:42 a.m. and 8:46 a.m. Communication between passengers onboard the flight and their family members alerted

⁸⁹ Ibid., 4–6.

authorities to the hijacking. Additionally, the rerouting of the plane away from Los Angeles and toward New York City cautioned New York Air Traffic Controllers of a possible problem aboard the plane. At 9:03 a.m., United Flight 175 struck the South Tower of the World Trade Center killing all on board and an unknown number of persons working in the Tower.⁹⁰

American Flight 77 was hijacked sometime between 8:51 a.m. and 8:54 a.m. At 8:56 a.m., the plane's transponder was turned off thus alerting Indianapolis Air Traffic Control of an issue. At 9:00 a.m., American Airlines Executive Vice President, Gerard Arpey, ordered all American Airline Flights in the Northeast to be grounded until further notice. Upon learning of the hijacking of United Flight 175, Arpey grounded all American Airlines flights nationwide. At 9:37 a.m., American Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. killing all on board and an unknown number of personnel in the building.⁹¹

The pilots of United Flight 93 were alerted to the previous hijacking at 9:24 a.m. At approximately 9:28 a.m., the flight was hijacked. Communication between passengers and their family members alerted passengers to the previous three hijackings. Aware that they were in a hijacking, the passengers attempted to fight the terrorists. The passengers succeeded in preventing the terrorists from reaching their destination of Washington, D.C. The plane crashed into a field in Somerset County, Pennsylvania, killing all passengers on board.

Upon knowledge of the hijackings and the subsequent crashing of aircrafts into the North and South Towers of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, U.S. leadership

⁹⁰ Ibid., 8–9.

⁹¹ Ibid., 9–10.

began implementing crisis management practices. The 9/11 Commission noted that the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) were “unprepared” to manage the circumstances of the 9/11 hijackings.⁹² Therefore, the President, Vice-President, and Secret Service of the United States worked without clear Intel on the situation.

At 8:30 p.m. on the evening of 9/11, President Bush addressed the nation from the White House declaring, “We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.”⁹³ Within the White House, leaders worked to coordinate immediate and long-term emergency response efforts. By the following day, September 12, 2001, Bush led meetings regarding the declaration of war against terrorists. As noted in the *Commission Report*, while intelligence sharing between security organizations was not a priority, as soon as a week following the attacks, what would become the U.S. Patriot Act began to take shape.⁹⁴

Over the weekend of September 15 and 16, 2001, President Bush coordinated meetings amongst his war council at Camp David with the purpose of “assign[ing] tasks for the first wave of war against terrorism.”⁹⁵ These tasks evolved into the National Security Presidential Directive 9 (or, “Defeating the Terrorist Threat to the United States”). The directive expanded war against Al-Qaeda to war against all terrorists and restated the president’s remarks not to distinguish between terrorist and those who harbor them.⁹⁶ In a set of meetings on September 21 and October 2, Bush approved military

⁹² Ibid., 45.

⁹³ Ibid., 326.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 328. The Patriot Act, signed into law on October 26, 2001, provided security organizations within the U.S. with additional liberties and tools for intercepting and preventing terrorist attacks.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 333.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 333.

action against Afghanistan. This plan, “Enduring Freedom,” included four phases of military action:

1. In the days and weeks following 9/11, the U.S. and its allies moved forces into the countries surrounding Afghanistan.
2. Beginning on October 7, air strikes and special operation attacks hit for key al-Qaeda and Taliban locations.
3. By December, all key Afghan cities fell to the coalition.
4. After liberation, armed forces focused on security and stabilization of the country.⁹⁷

In addition to the action taken against Afghanistan, military plans for actions against Iraq began to take shape.

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States ends their story of the 9/11 attacks with the overview of plans for Afghanistan. At the time of the reports completion, this publicly accepted text offers as full and complete recounting of the events leading to 9/11, the terror attacks, and the immediate aftermath.

This selective history of 9/11 textures the story of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks showing the multiple persons, voices, and actions taken to develop, execute and respond to this communicative event. Of particular importance, the history reveals the driving forces of the 9/11 jihadists, including their commitments and beliefs. On September 11, 2001, nineteen men from nineteen different backgrounds, funded by multiple sources, carried out the most deadly terror attacks ever witnessed on American soil. These men died for their cause, and their motives, commitments, and actions

⁹⁷ Ibid., 338.

continue to persuade persons toward violence today. Understanding the varying and multiple background, influences, and identifies of these men shapes the context of the 9/11 attacks as expending far beyond the day of the event. This event, and the communicative events leading up to it, exposed U.S. national security as incapable of meeting the demands of emerging threats.

The *9/11 Commission Report* ends with a discussion of the security failures identified before and during 9/11. Responding to these failures, the Commission provided recommendations for counterterrorism practices in hindsight of 9/11. The following section outlines the recommendations for improving security practices as a contributing portion of the story of 9/11.

September 11, 2001: National Security Report

Distance and time provide greater clarity to the security practices in place prior to 9/11. At the conclusion of the Cold War, America “stood out as an object for admiration, envy, and blame.”⁹⁸ As shown in the selective history discussed above, intelligence leaders found it difficult to secure funds or approval for counterterrorism practices as the threat of al-Qaeda often seemed distant and minor compared to local challenges including drug and mafia related crimes, amongst other domestic criminal activities. As the Commission notes, while Afghanistan seemed very far away to the U.S., the U.S. seemed within reach for members of al-Qaeda.⁹⁹ If the American public and American leaders recognized al-Qaeda as an approaching threat, the outcome of 9/11 may have been different. However, as noted within the 9/11 report, hindsight is often 20/20. The focus of attention now, proclaimed the Commission, must remain on the valuable security lessons

⁹⁸ Ibid., 340.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 340.

9/11 taught us. With distance, time, and clarity, the Commission identified the following four failures regarding pre-9/11 national security and terrorism: imagination, policy, capabilities, and management.¹⁰⁰ The following paragraphs will introduce these four failures—imagination, policy, capabilities, and management. These failures will continue to serve as a significant source of reflection throughout the remainder of this project. As this work continues to discuss the relationship between communication ethics and counterterrorism practices, it will periodically refer to these failures in greater detail as a cornerstone of security opportunities and limitations.

Imagination—The Commission notes that leaders and the public alike did not understand the threat of al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden prior to the 9/11 attacks. Despite intelligence reports noting bin Laden’s desire to attack the U.S., “there were no complete portraits of [bin Laden’s] strategy or of the extent of his organization’s involvement in the past terrorist attacks.”¹⁰¹ While both former U.S. president Clinton and former president Bush were briefed on bin Laden, the Commission argues that the threat was not “compelling.”¹⁰² Yet, the Commission also argues that suicide attacks and the hijackings of planes were both terrorism realities prior to 9/11. Since the attacks at Pearl Harbor, the intelligence community has raised awareness regarding security preparations for surprise attacks. While efforts to thwart surprise attacks have been discussed by multiple leading researchers, each of these methods include practices to “institutionalize imagination”; or, to see the capabilities of terror organizations as unlimited.¹⁰³ The Commission recommended that the following practices could institutionalize imagination in a way that

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 339.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 342.

¹⁰² Ibid., 343.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 346.

could prevent future surprise attacks. These practices include (1) brainstorming about how attacks may be carried out; (2) identifying telltale indications that a surprise attack is being planned; (3) collect intelligence on the indicators when possible; and (4) integrate defense mechanisms to stop or alert to the most deadly attacks.¹⁰⁴ These practices, the Commission argues, were never developed or implemented into security practices prior to 9/11.¹⁰⁵

Policy—The Commission argues that the 1998 Embassy bombings offered an opportunity for the entire intelligence community to exam the threat of bin Laden and al-Qaeda. This examination could have made visible the reach and power of al-Qaeda. However, security organizations “did not meet this the threat.”¹⁰⁶ Policymakers placed responsibility with the CIA, who, the Commissioner argues, worked hard to prevent an attack. However, the CIA alone was limited in their efforts. Before 9/11, the president took no action against al-Qaeda. Therefore, no formal policy for addressing Islamic terrorism existed. As a result, transfers between leadership created gaps concerning the policies and procedures for terrorism research and counterterrorism practiced.

Capabilities—Prior to 9/11, leaders attempted to combat al-Qaeda with the same capabilities used during the Cold War. “These capabilities were insufficient, but little was done to expand or reform them.”¹⁰⁷ In addition, the Commission writes that at no point prior to 9/11 was the entire Defense Department entirely engaged on the terrorism threat. In the domestic arena, the FBI failed to link intelligence and agent knowledge to national

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 346.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 348.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 349.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 351.

threats.¹⁰⁸ Finally, the lack of communication and sharing of intelligence between agencies resulted in security gaps and intelligence overlaps. There was no developed procedure for sharing intelligence across organizational lines. Thus, resources were limited by an inability to foster strong intelligence relationships between security organizations.

Management—As discussed above, communication between agencies was nearly limited. Thus, the intelligence community failed to work as a team. Clarity of objectives and roles was not managed between and among intelligence offices effectively. In effect, there were missed opportunities concerning the communication and management of terrorism research.¹⁰⁹ What was missing prior to 9/11, the Commission argued, was an overarching manager who communicated the roles and security needs to various organizations. Without a developed plan for communicating roles, policies, and procedures, each agency, office, and personnel worked independently toward a variety of different objectives and goals. When personnel attempted to alert others of terrorism threats, they were met with resistance; this resistance prevented the allocation of resources necessary to develop formal plans capable of addressing the threat of al-Qaeda.

Reflecting on the failures outlined above, the Commission developed a list of security practices for the U.S. intelligence community to implement. Specifically, the Commission outlined considerable security changes for the FBI, which included a detailed plan for implementing budget increases put into effect following 9/11. The enemy, Commissioners argued, was twofold: First, there is al-Qaeda, the network of terrorists; Second, is Islamic extremism, a “radical ideological movement” inspiring

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 352.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 357—358.

terrorists around the globe.¹¹⁰ A successful counterterrorism strategy will be broad, including policy and military objectives that address each of the aforementioned enemies alongside future terror networks that could possibly stem from a variety of ideologies and places.

Broadly, the requested changes reflect the following all-encompassing recommendations: (1) The intelligence community must be unified under a director and share information between and among agencies; (2) The community must balance its commitment to criminal justice and national security, (3) The U.S. should commit itself long-term to the stabilization of Afghanistan and the rooting out of terror cells; (4) The U.S. should work with other nations to support youth in Muslim states and combatting Islamic terrorism; and (5) The U.S. should be vigilant in tracking terror funding. These broad recommendations were successfully implemented by changing the practices within the various agencies of the U.S.

Due to the focus of this particular project resting with the FBI as an entrance into the intelligence community at large, the following paragraphs outline the FBI practices for adoption listed within the *Commission Report*. Authors of the *Commission Report* recommend the following practices to be adopted by the intelligence community as a whole and the FBI in specific:

- The FBI will create and maintain through specialized training a national security group dedicated to the prevention of terrorism. This workforce will consist of analyst, agents, linguists, and surveillance specialists trained in intelligence and national security.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 360.

- The FBI will train all new hires on intelligence gathering, analysis, and dissemination. Following the broad training on intelligence and national security, agents and analysts will specialize in one subject area.
- The FBI will certify all leaders in intelligence training.
- The FBI will create a management position to be filled within every field office. This manager's goal will be to ensure that national security priorities are carried out amongst their local offices.
- The FBI budget will align with four primary objectives: intelligence, counterterrorism, criminal, and criminal justice.
- The FBI will regularly report their progress on the aforementioned recommendations to Congress.
- Congress will make sure funding is available to the FBI when needed.

In response to the changes listed above, the U.S. government funded research for the 2014 report, "The FBI: Protecting the Homeland in the 21st Century."¹¹¹ This report addressed the following questions: Has the FBI successfully met the above recommendations? Have these recommendations improved the effectiveness of the FBI in countering terrorism within the county? Are additional recommendations necessary? The final section of this chapter summarizes this report and ends this selective history of 9/11.

FBI and Counter-Terrorism: Adapting to New Threats

This section turns to the second official report on 9/11, "The FBI: Protecting the Homeland in the 21st Century." In January 2014, the FBI 9/11 Review Commission was

¹¹¹ Bruce Hoffman, Edwin Meese III, and Timothy J. Roemer, "The FBI: Protecting the Homeland in the 21st Century," *Federal Bureau of Investigation* (2015).

established in response to a congressional mandate to complete an external review of the FBI's implementation of the *9/11 Commission Report's* recommendations. Specifically, the Review Commission was tasked with the following aims: (1) Assess the progress and challenges of implementing the recommendations; (2) Analyze the FBI's response to terrorism and domestic radicalization since 9/11; (3) Assess any information not known to the 9/11 Commission regarding the terror attacks on 9/11; and (4) provide any necessary additional recommendations to the FBI. This report serves as the official response to the *9/11 Commission Report* recommendation for the FBI.

The Review Commission, funded by Congress in 2013, 2014, and 2015 was composed of Edwin Meese, former U.S. Attorney General, Tim Roemer, former Congressman and Ambassador, and Bruce Hoffman, counterterrorism expert and professor at Georgetown University. These members appointed former CIA Deputy Director, John Gannon, as the Review Commission Executive Director. Together, these four leaders completed an analysis of FBI progress concerning counterterrorism between 2001 and 2014. Additionally, the FBI Review Commission offered an evaluation of the lessons learned from more recent terrorist attacks, an assessment of the FBI's preparedness for terrorism in the next decade, and an evaluation of the FBI's current and future needs for intelligence community partners.

For their research report, the FBI Review Commission evaluated over 60 extensive briefs from FBI headquarters, interviewed over 30 intelligence community agents and leaders, and visited 8 FBI field offices. The report recognizes that today, the FBI is facing a complicated threat, which "demands an accelerated commitment to

reform.”¹¹² The following paragraphs provide an overview of the FBI Review Commission’s findings.

Reviewers note that three trends define current challenges facing the FBI. First, the collapse of the Cold War world order (discussed in chapter one) resulted in the increase of non-state terror actors. To further this challenge, lone wolf attacks following the decrease of centralized terror networks have increased in the past few years.¹¹³ Second, a significant increase in research and development resulted in the fast-paced, changing landscape of technology; innovations in science and technology offer terrorists new avenues for recruitment and the carrying out of violence. Particularly, the use of social media by terror groups has been largely noted in recent scholarship.¹¹⁴ Third, an increase in domestic terror attacks has refocused resources to the state and local level. Community police forces currently have a legitimate need for FBI intelligence resources.¹¹⁵ The report notes that the FBI is successful in responding to the 9/11 Commissioner Report. However, these changes were not rapid enough and, in the years since the 9/11 attacks, terror threats have evolved. While the recommended changes may have been sufficient to meet the demand of Islamic terrorism as it stood in 2001, current terrorism challenges require additional swift and ongoing changes.

Currently, the FBI assesses threats through three primary levels: the FBI headquarters in Virginia, field offices located throughout the country, and *legat attachés* (LEGATS), temporary overseas offices developed to address unique threats. The 9/11

¹¹² Ibid., 6.

¹¹³ Ibid., 18.

¹¹⁴ For an overview of terror networks’ use of social media, see Jessica Stern and John M. Berger, *ISIS: The State of Terror* (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2015).

¹¹⁵ Hoffman, Meese III, and Roemer, “The FBI: Protecting the Homeland in the 21st Century,” 19.

Review Commission offered the following list of high-level recommendations to address each challenge within each FBI location.

- The FBI must develop a multi-year strategic vision that identifies ongoing and emerging threats. This plan should include a budget request to be approved by Congress yearly. This budget request will overview the FBI's plan for resource allocation.¹¹⁶
- The FBI must streamline and accelerate the recruitment and implementation of an intelligence workforce.¹¹⁷ “Innovative thinking and efforts to identify new threats” should be rewarded, and a clear career path for intelligence workers must be defined.
- The FBI must define more clearly the value of the LEGAT program, the FBI's international program. Intelligence support for LEGATs should be increased with some LEGATs having a dedicated intelligence analyst present overseas.
- Threat identification processes at field offices should be flexible enough to incorporate new and emerging threats as they arise.

The above selective history of 9/11 commences with the 2014 FBI Review Commission's recommendations. These official reports of 9/11 depict the story of September 11, 2001 as complex, of diverse origin, and of ongoing significance. Thus, 9/11 as a significant turning point in counterterrorism research, development, and practices continues to shape our response to the demand of this historical moment.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 70.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 71.

Conclusion

Communication ethics seeks clarity on the goods protected and promoted by self and other. On the eve of 9/11, intelligence systems were “blinking red.” Islamic extremists had systemically planned an attack that was executed with minimal interruption. As noted in the *Commission Report*, al-Qaeda was more globalized than America, who remained committed to Cold War security practices. These practices failed to prevent an attack on U.S. soil because they failed to take into consideration the depth and reach of Islamic extremism. The intelligence community failed to recognize what al-Qaeda protected and promoted.

The 9/11 Commission notes, “Now is the time for that reflection and reevaluation. The United States should consider *what to do*—the shape and objectives of a strategy. Americans should also consider *how to do it*—organizing their government in a different way.”¹¹⁸ As the Review Commission looked back on the effectiveness of FBI organizational change, the group found that while many of the measures implemented in the decade following 9/11 have proved successful, the agency still has significant room for growth. This project argues that this growth can be grounded in communication ethics; *why should we do this*.

Communication ethics in this project takes seriously the stories that shape our communicative responses in given moments. For current and ongoing security demands, 9/11 continues to act as a pivotal and influence story that guides our communicative response. Yet, as shown, this story is not only dynamic, it is diverse. The 9/11 terror attacks were the culmination of various backgrounds, influences, and demands that

¹¹⁸ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report*, 361.

coordinated together on that fateful day. The richness of 9/11 shows us counterterrorism practices must attend to this dynamic background in order to attempt to make sense of future directions. Threats and challenges do not exist in a vacuum. Equipping security professional with an interpretive lens for exploring these backgrounds is a practical asset that communication ethics literacy can provide.

To understand the value of communication ethics for counterterrorism, the following chapter will review communication ethics literature and present the dialogic approach to communication ethics which frames this project's interpretive lens. Up to this point, we have explored the changing landscape of national security and the turning point posed by the events on September 11, 2001. With this information, the following chapter frames the theoretical insights that will be used to apply communication ethics in the subsequent final chapters.

Chapter 3: Communication Ethics: The Importance of Being Literate

In this work, communication ethics is the protection and promotion of goods. The question of terrorism reflects the struggle of communication ethics among a diverse and mobile society. It concerns varied, distinct, and competing goods protected and promoted by multiple groups—uncovering these goods is the challenge of counterterrorism experts. This chapter examines the literature of communication ethics from the thesis of the protection and promotion of differing goods and connects the reader to the hermeneutic center of this project—taking communication ethics literacy to the past, present, and future practices of counterterrorism. This project’s approach to communication ethics begins with the recognition that there is conflict regarding what *matters* to different persons, and communication ethics is an appropriate tool to navigate this conflict. Becoming literate in communication ethics will assist security professionals in interpreting intelligence in a way that offers pragmatic assistance in the research and development of counterterrorism.

Introduction

Communication ethics takes seriously the goods, beliefs, values, and motives that drive groups’ communicative practices. In their 2009 seminal text on communication ethics, Ronald C. Arnett, Janie Harden Fritz, and Leanne Bell articulate the approach to communication ethics that guides this project. They write, “communication ethics rests at the intersection of philosophy of communication and applied communication adding a meaningful bridge between the communicative why and the communication how”¹¹⁹—communication ethics navigates amongst conflict by restructuring one’s approach to

¹¹⁹ Arnett, Fritz, and Bell, *Communication Ethics Literacy: Dialogue and Difference* (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2009), 26.

communicative events. The literacy of communication ethics presented by these authors allows for the identification of the goods guiding everyday action. In this project, I argue that when moved into an interpretive lens for data collection, analysis, and application, this literacy equips researchers with practical tools necessary for continued counterterrorism practices.

Three sections guide this chapter. Section one, “Approaches to Communication Ethics,” reviews the defining approaches in communication ethics research that shape communication scholarship and provide background for this project’s approach—the dialogic approach. This section situates the dialogic approach to communication amongst multiple theoretical insights regarding communication ethics. Regarding this project, the purpose of this section is to remind readers that multiple viewpoints and approaches to communication ethics exist in scholarship and practice. Section two, “Communication Ethics as Literacy and Interpretive Lens,” summarizes the literacy of communication ethics and presents communication ethics as a real-time interpretive lens capable to assisting persons in data discovery and analysis. This section details how communication ethics literacy offers a practical interpretive distance between researcher and communicative events that afford clarity and direction in future action and decision-making. Section three, “Communication Ethics Lens: Application,” offers readers three ways in which this interpretive lens can be used pragmatically to understand the counterterrorism practices of the FBI. These identified practices will guide this project’s application in the final two chapters of this work.

Communication ethics literacy invites persons to identify, acknowledge, and learn about the goods that shape their own and others’ actions. Being literate in communication

ethics moves one's focus of attention beyond the self and allows opportunities for response and creative insight into current and ongoing emergent contentions.

Communication ethics provides us with the tools to interpretive the diverse and competing goods that exist in our society. These tools offer practical assistance in addressing the recommendations for improving FBI counterterrorism made in response to 9/11 and recent evolutions in terrorism threats.

Approaches to Communication Ethics

This section provides a topical overview of the key approaches to communication ethics. Communication ethics acts as a fulcrum or meeting point between philosophy of communication and applied communication situating communicative practices as a reflection of what *matters* to particular persons/organizations.¹²⁰ Since the founding of the Communication Ethics Division of the National Communication Association in 1984, communication ethics research has grown, coming to encompass multiple topics beyond theoretical development to include applied conversations. Among this scholarship are six approaches to communication ethics. The following paragraphs overview the approaches to communication ethics recognized in our discipline's scholarship.

In his seminal 1987 review essay of communication ethics scholarship,¹²¹ Arnett extends the work of James Chesebro and identifies five approaches to the study of communication ethics—democratic, procedural/code ethics, universal-humanitarian, contextual, narrative. Arnett surveys 128 articles on communication ethics published

¹²⁰ François Cooren, *Action and Agency in Dialogue: Passion, Incarnation, and Ventriloquism*. (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publish Co., 2010).

¹²¹ Ronald C. Arnett began the topical overview of communication ethics scholarship used in this project in his seminal 1987 review essay. See Ronald C. Arnett, "The Status of Communication Ethics Scholarship in Speech Communication Journals from 1915 to 1985," *Central States Speech Journal* 38, no. 1(1987): 44–61.

between 1915 and 1985, finding that communication ethics scholarship naturally aligns with one of the five approaches listed above. In response to this article and the defined approaches to communication ethics, Arnett, Arneson, and Bell introduce the dialogic approach to communication ethics in their 2006 article, “Communication Ethics: The Dialogic Turn.”¹²²

Each of these six approaches to communication ethics protect and promote a particular set of communicative goods. As discussed in chapter one, communicative goods show what matters to particular persons and organizations.¹²³ Communicative goods are that which one protects and promotes at all costs. These goods are supported by communicative practices embodied and performed in a given moment as response to a particular demand. The paragraphs below offer a brief summary of each approach.

Democratic ethics—The democratic approach to communication ethics surrounds questions of the public process of decision-making, especially amongst diverse publics. This approach recognizes the value of difference and dissent, while remaining committed to debate and rational choice. Arnett recognizes the work of Karl Wallace who identified four habits of democratic communication. These habits—habit of search, habit of justice, habit of public and private motivation, habit of respect for dissent—protect the freedom to find, present, and debate research. This approach promotes the process of creating and maintaining spaces that give voice to minority publics.

Codes, procedures, and standards ethics—The codes, procedures, and standards approach to communication ethics emphasizes a given organization’s public standard for ethical decision-making. This approach recognizes that elected officials design and make

¹²² Arnett, Arneson, and Bell, “Communication Ethics: The Dialogic Turn.”

¹²³ Arnett, Fritz, and Bell, *Communication Ethics Literacy*.

public a code for handling complex situations. These codes become a standard bearer for decision-making involving the protection of an organization's values. This approach protects and promotes an organization's publicly stated mission and commitments.

Universal humanitarian ethics—The universal humanitarian approach to communication ethics emphasizes public, a priori principles for ethical decision-making. The a priori principles find value in the work of Immanuel Kant who articulated the categorical imperative approach to ethics. This approach recognizes the value of universal principles that bind persons to prescribed ethics in any and all contexts. Arnett notes that this approach protects the value of wisdom that allow persons to navigate culturally accepted morals.

Contextual ethics—The contextual approach to communication ethics emphasizes the value of private discernment within particular contexts. This approach recognizes the private self's ability to deliberate and decide upon an appropriate response to a given need. This approach protects individual and cultural ethics that do not have a universal appeal. Contextual ethics recognize that persons are rooted within particular locations that shape and guide given values for decision-making. This approach protects the uniqueness of context and promotes a given individual's wisdom for acting ethically.

Narrative ethics—Narrative ethics emphasize the local stories that shape our lives, providing meaning to our decision-making. Arnett frames the narrative approach as an alternative to the previous four approaches. He recognizes the scholarship of Alasdair MacIntyre and Walter Fisher as founders of this approach. The narrative approach is grounded in the agreement of a community on values that should guide ethical decision-

making. Rather than a rigid set of expectations, the narrative approach protects and promotes a given community's agreed-upon vision of action.

These five approaches provide a conceptual framework for addressing communication ethics questions, and they provide grounding for the dialogic approach discussed by two seminal studies on communication ethics and postmodernity: Arnett, Arneson, and Bell and Arnett, Fritz, and Bell. These studies are more fully summarized in future paragraphs. Extending the work of Arnett in his 1987 seminal essay, Arnett, Arneson, and Bell survey 73 communication ethics articles published between 1986 and 2004. Their review shapes the emergence of the dialogic approach to communication ethics. These authors frame the dialogic approach as an alternative to the previous five by establishing an approach to communication ethics that introduces to this study a pragmatic examination of communicative practices.¹²⁴ Unlike the approaches that precede it, the dialogic approach recognizes that each approach is valuable depending upon the needs of a given situation. With a communication ethics literacy, we are able to sense the particularities of a given situation and respond appropriately.

The dialogic approach to communication ethics recognizes the reality of a postmodern moment characterized by diversity and disagreement concerning what matters. Arnett, Arneson, and Bell explain, "The 'dialogic turn' [in communication ethics scholarship] embraces [postmodernity's] multiplicity of 'goods,' seeking to meet, learn from, and negotiate with difference."¹²⁵ This approach also acknowledges that we live in an era rich with diversity, where persons protect and promote a variety of substantial

¹²⁴ Arnett, Arneson, and Bell, "Communication Ethics: The Dialogic Turn."

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 62.

goods. The paragraph below offers a summary of the dialogic approach presented by Arnett, Arneson, and Bell.

Dialogic ethics—The dialogic approach recognizes that human communication meets ethics when a given person enacts the protection and promotion of a chosen communicative good or set of goods. This protective action “shapes a given communication ethic.”¹²⁶ The dialogic understanding of communicative goods transforms ethics from a study focused on the question *what is ethical*, to one focused on exploring the tensions of everyday life lived amongst difference. This approach to communication ethics protects and promotes an ethics *literacy* for better learning, analyzing, and making sense of diverse and competing communicative goods. Additionally, this approach recognizes that in each communicative event, a dialogue between and among various goods is played out through human communication. Through attentiveness to these goods of self and other, communicative actors navigate their commitments alongside the needs of a given situation.

The approaches to communication ethics summarized in this section begin to shape a communication ethics literacy. While the above approaches offer helpful tactics for responding to particular challenges, no single approach to communication ethics in this moment can adequately address all communicative events; no approach is all encompassing. Amongst a diverse and mobile society where persons protect and promote a variety of goods, being literate in communication ethics is important, and application of this literacy in action is invaluable.

¹²⁶ Ibid., 66.

It is important to note that literacy in this project refers to a continued attentiveness to the metaphors that offer actors an interpretive distance for exploring, analyzing, and responding to communicative events. A communication ethics literacy is never complete; thus, one can never be literate across all time and space. Rather, being literate in communication ethics is akin to learning a new language. When learning a new language, success is based on the ability to speak and act with a new dialect in a variety of contexts and amongst multiple people; success depends on a continued learning and application of one's newly acquired literacy. This project, therefore, acknowledges that being literate in communication ethics is an ongoing task. The following section summarizes dialogic ethics literacy outlines by Arnett, Fritz, and Bell and frames this literacy as an interpretive toolset for continuous data collection and analysis.

Communication Ethics as Literacy and Interpretive Lens

This section outlines the dialogic approach to communication ethics and presents this literacy as an interpretive lens. While the dialogic approach to communication ethics responds to postmodernity, this project's approach to ethics recognizes hypertextuality as a significant and guiding reality of our current moment. Therefore, regarding this project as a whole, this section grounds communication ethics literacy as attentive to hypertextuality, defined here as the coexistence of commitments to multiple eras. As such, this section will articulate the dialogic approach as attentive to postmodernity followed by a discussion of applying this approach as interpretive lens with acknowledgment of the hypertextual reality of this moment. This section is divided into two subsections. Subsection one, *Dialogic Communication Ethics as Literacy*, summarizes the dialogic literacy of communication ethics presented by Arnett, Arneson,

and Bell and extended by Arnett, Fritz, and Bell. Subsection two, *Communication-ethics-literacy-as-interpretive-lens*, identifies practices for moving this literacy into action.

Dialogic Communication Ethics as Literacy

Responding to changing landscape of communication ethic scholarship, Arnett, Arneson, and Bell present the “dialogic turn” in ethics in their 2006 article “Communication Ethics: The Dialogic Turn.”¹²⁷ This introductory work on dialogic ethics transforms the study of communication ethics from the application of a singular communication *ethic* to a “postmodern reality of a multiplicity of communication ethics.”¹²⁸ This recognition of multiple communication ethics transcends the five approaches (democratic, universal-humanitarian, contextual, codes, procedures, and standards, narrative) acknowledged by Arnett in his article, “The Status of Communication Ethics Scholarship.” The dialogic turn recognizes that communicative actors are each situated upon a given ground. As such, within every communicative event exists multiple communicative goods.

This approach to communication ethics acknowledges the work of postmodern writers, notably Jean-Francois Lyotard. Lyotard’s work rejects the modern assumption that there exists a universal understanding of ethics via Truth. Rather, we live amongst multiple petite narratives where truth is dependent upon the ground of the communicative actor.¹²⁹ Communication ethics amongst postmodern petite narratives recognizes the existence of multiple communicative goods in each communicative event. Due to the

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Ibid., 62.

¹²⁹ See Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984). For a discussion of petite narratives and communication ethics, see Ronald C. Arnett, “The Fulcrum Dialogue: Monologue, Worldview, and Acknowledgment.”

presence of multiple communicative goods, dialogic communication ethics invites attentiveness to difference. This attentiveness encompasses learning from others and the creative possibilities that emerge when one meets these differences in communication.

Dialogic ethics also presupposes competition between persons in communication. This competition manifests through each persons' commitments to multiple, competing communicative goods. The dialogic approach protects and promotes the necessity of knowing the goods that shape one's own commitments while being open to learning about an other's commitment to goods. This learning is made possible by communication ethics literacy, which consists of communication ethics metaphors.

Communication ethics metaphors provide a "fuzzy clarity" on communicative events.¹³⁰ Metaphors provide us with a scope through which we can explore communicative events with an interpretive distance resistant to overshadowing the event with one's own biases or predetermined findings. Metaphors acts as the literacy of this approach to communication ethics, providing researchers with a language for exploring events with decreased limitations. Communication ethics metaphors are abundant. However, the metaphors of historical moment, narrative, communicative goods, and attentiveness to multiplicity drive this project.

The literacy of communication ethics is presented in the 2009 book, *Communication Ethics Literacy: Dialogue and Difference*, by Arnett, Fritz, and Bell. This text frames the dialogic approach as tied to the enactment of communicative goods—those values requiring protection at all costs.¹³¹ The literacy of communication

¹³⁰ Arnett, Fritz, and Bell, *Communication Ethics Literacy*.

¹³¹ Ronald C. Arnett, "Communication Ethics: The Wonder of Metanarratives in a Postmodern Age," in *The Handbook of Global Communication and Media Ethics*, ed. Robert S. Fortner and P. Mark Fackler, vol. 1 (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011): 26.

ethics encompasses narrative ground, communicative goods, and learning amongst difference. While these terms have been used in a preliminary fashion throughout this project thus far, the following paragraphs offer an extended summary of these key terms.

Historical moment—Historical moments are defined by the emerging questions that shape a given period of time. “How once responds to these questions their identity.”¹³² Alasdair MacIntyre discusses the importance of historical moments in his text *A Short History of Ethics*.¹³³ Throughout his text, MacIntyre shows that meaning and ethics are not universal but rather always tied to a given time and locale. Attentiveness to historical moments reminds us that we cannot examine communicative events apart from the communicative context in which they exist. One’s embeddedness in a given historical moment is a significant factor in shaping communicative action. Historical moments are responsive to the past, present, and future demands that call on communicative actors to respond.

Narrative—Narratives are the stories, persons, and goods that provide meaning to our communicative practices. Narratives are situated by publicly *agreed upon stories* that tell us why goods are important, giving meaning to the practices that protect and promote a set of communicative goods.¹³⁴ Narratives act as human ground offering a meaningful “center” or dwelling place that guides human action. Narratives also shape the way we view the world, and act as embedded monologue to one’s belief, worldviews, and identity. Narratives situate persons within given communities with particular histories or monologues. Recognition of this monologue is the first step in understanding an other as

¹³² Arnett, Fritz, and Bell, *Communication Ethics Literacy*,

¹³³ See Alasdair MacIntyre, *A Short History of Ethics* (IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998).

¹³⁴ Arnett, Fritz, and Bell, *Communication Ethics Literacy*,

“embedded communicative agent” who thinks, acts, and communicates based upon a particular view of the world.

Narratives provide a frame for making meaning in our lives. They also shape our worldview. When one understands that narratives shape our own view of the world, it becomes clear that we explore the actions of others from a specific standpoint. Clarity on the stories that shape our narrative as well as the background motivators that shape the narratives of others, allows one to witness the multiple communicative goods present in each communicative event.

Communicative goods—The dialogic approach to communication ethics is characterized by the protection and promotion of communicative goods.¹³⁵ Communicative goods are those values protected and promoted by given persons at all costs. These goods shape the decision-making of groups as they act as a rhetorical guide for communication practices. Communicative goods have two components. The first component is the substantive good to be protected and promoted. The second component is the communicative practices enacted to protect and promote the substantial good.¹³⁶ The communicative practices characterize communication ethics as pragmatic and responsive; communicative practices are embodied and performed in a given moment in response to a given situation.

Understanding which goods groups protect and promote and how these groups protect and promote provides insight into the motivations and commitments that define what matters to given persons. Identity is shaped by how persons or groups respond to the needs before them, this response is often guided by one’s commitment to a particular set

¹³⁵ Arnett, Fritz, and Bell, *Communication Ethics Literacy*, p. 3.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 3.

of communicative goods.¹³⁷ As a key term in the literacy of dialogic communication ethics, this articulation of communicative goods allows researchers to move the focus of attention beyond personal interpretations of given actions toward the understanding of motivated decision-making. The recognition of communicative goods provides us with a textured entrance into the values, commitments, and practices of given groups.

Multiplicity and Difference—The dialogic approach to communication ethics recognizes difference between and among persons as ever-present. Attentive to postmodernity as an era defined by multiple petite narratives, the dialogic approach understands that “a single communication ethic . . . no longer exists.”¹³⁸ Rather, differences and disagreements center upon what one defines as requiring protection and promotion. The meeting of multiple and, at times, competing goods between persons requires that communicators negotiate difference.

The dialogic approach to communication ethics is ever attentive to the richness and multiplicity of difference in a postmodern moment and moves away from prescribing or describing what is ethical, explicating the importance of learning how different persons or groups define what is important and what requires protection and promotion. Communication ethics as literacy is a practical and important tool for navigating conflict in a moment rich with diversity.

Communication ethics literacy invites persons to identify, acknowledge, and learn about the goods that shape their own and others’ actions. Being attentive to the communicative goods, narrative ground, and difference between communicators opens new avenues for analysis. The following subsection presents the core of this project—

¹³⁷ Arnett *The Fulcrum Point of Dialogue: Monologue, Worldview, and Acknowledgement*,” 105.

¹³⁸ Arnett, Arneson, Bell, “Communication Ethics: The Dialogic Turn.”

how a communication ethics literacy can be used pragmatically as an interpret lens for data collection and analysis.

Communication-ethics-literacy-as-interpretive-lens

The following paragraphs address the primary aim of this project—articulating the dialogic literacy of communication ethics as an interpretive lens for data collection and analysis. When used as a tool for data analysis, the literacy of communication ethics provides us with an intellectual distance for exploring and navigating difference. This distance allots creative insight into conflicts that are stalled or overwhelming. As an interpretive lens, communication ethics literacy recognizes human action and decision-making as situated within a given narrative and reflective of the commitments protected and promoted by a unique and specific view of the world.¹³⁹ My presentation of communication ethics as an interpretive lens is made in reflection of the work of Hans Georg Gadamer who discussed interpretation as philosophical hermeneutics and the work of Arnett who bridged Gadamer’s sentiments with this approach to communication ethics.¹⁴⁰ Additionally, communication-ethics-literacy-as-interpretive-lens acknowledges the hypertextual nature of our current moment defined by Umberto Eco and integrated into communication ethic scholarship by Arnett.¹⁴¹

For the importance of communication ethics literacy, Gadamer’s work shapes an approach to philosophical hermeneutics that embeds interpreters within a given historical moment. Philosophical hermeneutics works with the assumption that *texts*, understood

¹³⁹ See Ronald C. Arnett, LeeAnne Bell McManus, and Amanda G. McKendree, *Conflict Between Persons: The Origins of Leadership* (Dubuque, IA: Kendall Hunt Publishing Company, 2014).

¹⁴⁰ See Ronald C. Arnett, “Interpretive Inquiry as Qualitative Communication Research,” *Qualitative Research Reports in Communication* 8, no. 1 (2007): 29—35.

¹⁴¹ See Ronald C. Arnett, “Communicative Ethics: The Phenomenological Sense of Semioethics,” *Language and Dialogue* 7, no. 1 (2017): 81.

here as communicative events, bring life and new meaning to given contexts. This approach to interpretation is attentive to this acknowledging that findings are not final answers, but findings for a given time and place. Arnett discusses the influence of Gadamer on communication ethics as resting on the understanding of meaning as situated within a horizon of authenticity. Meaning is made in the communicative events that shape a life.¹⁴² To interpret communicative events, it is necessary to understand the communicative context in which a person is situated. Meaning does not take shape in a vacuum. Rather, attentiveness to the persons, goods, and motives that shape a given artifact and event are of utmost importance. An interpreter always walks a thin line between making sense of a given artifact and imposing undue significance onto an event. Successful interpretation walks along a horizon of authenticity. Dialogic communication ethics works along this horizon. The following paragraphs briefly overview Gadamer's work to display the significant of this sentiment for this project.

Gadamer's *Wahrheit und Methode* (Truth and Method), published in 1960, is guided by the following question: how can hermeneutics do justice to understanding once it is freed from the scientific understanding of ontology? For Gadamer, understanding is not a grasping of objects themselves, but a grasping of objects through their history.¹⁴³ Gadamer suggested that hermeneutics, the study of interpretation, had historically been understood as a scientific inquiry or approach to understanding a text. In *Truth and*

¹⁴² In his 1969 text, *Hermeneutics*, Richard Palmer explains Gadamer's significance for hermeneutics. Palmer explains that Schleiermacher brought hermeneutics out of biblical interpretations, and Wilhelm Dilthey introduced hermeneutics to the human sciences. Gadamer, responding to both and directly to Dilthey argues that there is no method of hermeneutics. Rather hermeneutics is an event that occurs in the space between a reader and a text. With his work, Gadamer established philosophical hermeneutics, moving away from a prescriptive hermeneutic method and away from authorial intent and toward meaning discovery and making. See Richard E. Palmer, *Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1969).

¹⁴³ Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (New York, NY: Bloomsbury, 1975).

Method, he asks, whether there is a *method* to understanding. Responding to the work of Martin Heidegger, Gadamer acknowledges the importance of acknowledging one's biases as one approaches a given text.

Gadamer finds that understanding with and through biases is not an objective task and that these biases do not disappear. Rather, the process of identifying biases allows one to locate the origin of these foreprojections in a way that increases understanding of one's own point of reflection.¹⁴⁴ The task of the reader, he writes, is to examine their own literacy as they work to understand the intent of the original author.¹⁴⁵ An interpreter, thus, does justice to a communicative event by questioning rather than finding; interpretation begins with an openness to learn.

Openness to learning with, from, and alongside a communicative event begins with an acknowledgement of one's own biases and commitment to discovering the communicative context surrounding an event. One gains interpretive authority as one engages events with insights grounded in reflection and recognition of the communicative context. This authority of understanding never seeks to control or own a communicative event. Rather, it secures a ground off of which genuine understanding or interpretation can push. When we approach an event with an openness to learn, we shift our focus of attention away from finding answers toward opening opportunities for new and creative insight. Where answers limit, successful interpretation pushes boundaries.

The importance of Gadamer's work for this project's presentation of communication ethics as an interpretive lens rests on this idea of the fusion of horizons. An interpreter is always already interpreting based upon the ground upon which they

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 269.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 192—193.

stand. Without recognizing the biases of this context, interpretations can be made in vain, without adequate care for the communicative person, event, or artifact. Dialogic communication ethics recognizes this horizon as the communicative context or historical moment that shapes the questions that guide lives. This context shapes the background sentiments that come to play in foreground communicative action. The following paragraphs shape this interpretive lens in reflection of Gadamer's work.

Bringing the study of communication ethics to current and ongoing communicative events illuminates the nature of conflicts in a moment both rich with diversity and riddled with disagreements. Arnett argues that postmodernity, characterized by hypertextuality¹⁴⁶—the existence of multiple historical moments and their corresponding communicative goods in any one moment—necessitates the study of communication ethics in conflict because it “unmasks” the multiple biased grounds present in a given conflict.¹⁴⁷ When conflict is viewed through communication ethics attentive to hypertextuality, the focus of attention moves past the conventional understandings of a conflict, exploring the multiple perspectives energizing and responding to this conflict.

The literacy of communication ethics, when brought to conflicts of this nature, provides a framework for interpretation.¹⁴⁸ As discussed in the previous chapter, the evolution of terrorism results in difficult and demanding counterterrorism issues.

Attentiveness to the literacy of communication ethics amongst conflict acknowledges the

¹⁴⁶ Although introduced here, hypertextuality is discussed at length in chapter five of this work.

¹⁴⁷ Ronald C. Arnett, “Rhetoric and Ethics,” in *Concise Encyclopedia of Communication*, ed. Wolfgang Donsbach (Wiley-Blackwell, 2015): 533.

¹⁴⁸ Hannah Karolak and Susan Mancino, “The 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum: Conflict Attentive to Communication Ethics,” in *Communication and Conflict Transformation Through Local, Regional, and Global Engagement*, ed. Peter M. Kellett and Thomas G. Matyók (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2017), 196.

communicative gestalt interplay between background sentiments comprised of the narratives, communicative goods, and communicative practices of communicative actors and foreground competition between and among communicative goods.¹⁴⁹ While foreground struggles may be transparent; research, investigating, and learning is required to uncover the competing background communication ethics motivating the foreground disagreements. This background data analysis is aided in creative and beneficial ways when the literacy of communication ethics is applied.

The recognition of conflict as a gestalt allows us to move dialogic communication ethics literacy into an interpretive lens. Communication ethics attentive to a gestalt understanding of conflict recognizes that in order to understand conflict, we must move our focus of attention beyond the immediate state of conflict in the foreground in an attempt to identify and learn about the driving commitments in the background. These background commitments, shaped by particular narratives and the protection of a set of communicative goods, are uncovered when researchers take seriously the communicative commitments of their subjects. For counterterrorism experts, this means data analysts must acknowledge the commitments of terrorists as valid for communicative action—a task not easily accepted. As an interpretive lens, the literacy of dialogic communication ethics is *performed* as persons are attentive and open to learning from competing communicative goods. The enactment of this literacy is outlined below:

- *Attentiveness to narrative ground*: The agreed upon stories that make up the narratives guide one's communicative action. These stories are often complex and

¹⁴⁹ Arnett, McManus, and McKendree, *Conflict Between Persons: The Origins of Leadership*, 2014. The authors detail the relationship between communication ethics and conflict using the metaphor of “communicative gestalt.” As a communicative gestalt, conflict is presented as a foreground issue driven by competing background communicative goods.

span great distances in time and across places. One's narrative commitments exist in the background, and, when left uncovered, foreground communicative action may be deemed irrational or unexpected. Uncovering the narrative grounds upon which decision-making finds its meaning aids researchers in better understanding and predicting current and future communicative action. This uncovering begins with background research addressing the communities, family, public and private affiliations to which a person attends. Further, it is important to remember that in this postmodern moment characterized by hypertextuality, people have multiple narrative grounds. Being attentive to this multitude of grounds is necessary.

Attending to multiple narrative grounds opens new research possibilities. For instance, research may uncover that a given person is highly committed to a given religious affiliation. However, if research is only focused only on this narrative, researchers may fail to uncover the importance of other commitments in predicting communicative action. Navigating the multiple grounds and commitments of research subjects textures insights in a way that opens new avenues for discovery.

- *Attentiveness to communicative goods:* Arnett, Fritz, and Bell argue that narrative ground serves as a “voice or articulateness to a good or set of goods.”¹⁵⁰ By attending to one's narrative commitments, one can uncover the goods protected and promoted through communicative practices. Yet, it is important to recognize that researchers work from their own narrative grounds. Thus, biases and assumptions regarding others' goods may be overlooked. Analysis cannot end

¹⁵⁰ Arnett, Fritz, and Bell, *Communication Ethics Literacy*, 38.

with the identification of the goods guiding one's action. Rather, researchers must continuously explore and learn about these goods beyond their own interpretations. While two persons may protect and promote the same good, the commutative practices they embody to do so will differ.

- *Attentiveness to multiplicity and difference*: Hypertextuality, the co-presence of goods emerging from historical moments, reminds us that goods transform over time.¹⁵¹ One's interpretation and commitment to a given communicative good is negotiated and renegotiated over time. Thus, researchers must remain committed to uncovering the background sentiments that guide action as this background will transform in time. Being attentive to these changing goods requires ongoing alertness to the dynamics of a given situation and ongoing openness to learning.

Attentiveness to the metaphors of narrative, goods, and multiplicity shape an interpretive lens that afford professionals a guide for engaging research. This literacy as interpretive lens reminds researchers to reflect continuously on the complex and changing aspects of communicative events so as to avoid missing gaps in research.

Communication Ethics Lens: Application

Communication ethics in this project finds value in exploring significant, ongoing issues with recognition that this area of study provides a practical framework for exploring and engaging difference. The theoretical heart of this approach to communication ethics moves the focus of attention beyond "reductive and abstract engagement to experience of the subject matter before us."¹⁵² The final section offers

¹⁵¹ Umberto Eco, "Books, Texts, and Hypertexts," *The Power of Words: Literature and Society in Late Modernity* 135, no. 23 (2005): 25; as interpreted by Arnett, "Rhetoric and Ethics."

¹⁵² Ronald C. Arnett, "Philosophy of Communication: Qualitative Research, Questions in Action," *Qualitative Research Reports in Communication* 17, no. 1(2016): 1.

three practices for applying this interpretive lens to counterterrorism efforts of the FBI. Applying the literacy of communication ethics is not a new task. This application works in reflection of communication ethics applications that have come before it. These scholarly applications provide direction and legitimacy to this project as a whole. I outline a selection of these applications briefly below.

- Ronald C. Arnett, Janie Harden Fritz, and Leeanne Bell use communication ethics literacy to understand Victor Hugo's *Les Misérables*. Arnett, Fritz, and Bell explore the novel through the viewpoint of competing ethical goods. They find that "*Les Misérables* is an ongoing interplay of goods that shaped and transformed lives in a particular historical moment."¹⁵³ Applying the metaphor of goods in a moment of conflicting ethical goods shows that the protection and promotion of goods shapes one's ethical life.
- Ronald C. Arnett interprets the work of Hannah Arendt with communication ethics in *Communication Ethics in Dark Times: Hannah Arendt's Rhetoric of Warning and Hope*.¹⁵⁴ Using Arendt's historical moment of modernity as a starting point, Arnett finds that Arendt's scholarship poses a communication ethics response that resists modernity's attempts to overrun reality with imposed obligations and solutions.

¹⁵³ Arnett, Fritz, and Bell, *Communication Ethics Literacy*, 23

¹⁵⁴ Ronald C. Arnett, *Communication Ethics in Dark Times: Hannah Arendt's Rhetoric of Warning and Hope* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2013).

- Arnett, McManus, and McKendree use communication ethics literacy to explore *The Odyssey*.¹⁵⁵ These authors apply communication ethics metaphors to reflect on the multiple conflicts presented in Homer's classical work.

Like these works that have come before, this project attempts to apply communication ethics literacy to communicative events. Where this work differs is in the prospects of applying this literacy in real-time as to open new avenues for research and foreshadow events to come.

Real-time application of communication ethics begins with recognition of one's own and Other's narrative ground, communicative goods, and openness to learning. This attentiveness expands avenues for exploring current research and future possibilities. As a key artifact in counterterrorism, the FBI provides an exemplar of how the literacy of communication ethics can be applied to offer creative openings for new avenues of practice. The following paragraph outlines this application.

Metaphors provide a level of clarity into a given situation that shapes a possibility for opening new avenues for counterterrorism research and development. Attentiveness to the metaphors that guide this project—narrative, communicative goods, and multiplicity—begins with situating the communicative context of events within their historical moment. Application of communication-ethics-literacy-as-interpretive-lens for this project, therefore, begins by framing the current communicative context of counterterrorism. With knowledge of the communicative context, one can address the challenges of terrorism with tools and practices that are grounded in current context, capabilities, and limitations. From there, researchers can locate with better clarity specific

¹⁵⁵ Ronald C. Arnett, LeeAnne Bell McManus, and Amanda G. McKendree, *Conflict Between Persons: The Origins of Leadership* (Dubuque, IA: Kendall Hunt Publishing Company, 2014).

areas in FBI counterterrorism practices that can benefit from a communication ethics lens. Using the communicative context of counterterrorism situated within our current historical moment as a guide, this communication ethics lens offers connections between communication ethics metaphors and counterterrorism. Attentiveness to narrative as the ground which hosts the stories, persons, and goods that shape meaning and decision-making in everyday life thus becomes a pragmatic tool for counterterrorism research and development. Finally, with clarity on embedded communicative actors and the narrative grounds shaping motives, good, and practices, this communication ethics lens can offer a set of practical practices that both acknowledges the limits of our hypertextual moment and embeds creative insights into the intelligence process.

This project understands terrorism as a communicative gestalt fueled by diverse background sentiments. While application of communication ethics literacy happens in current time, researchers must remain attentive to the background knowledge and experience that have fostered new insights in counterterrorism. Therefore, this project's application begins by examining the current failures, challenges, and opportunities of FBI counterterrorism. The application continues by addressing the recommended practices for continued improvement and growth of the organization. The application ends by identifying current and suspected future challenges the organization will face and detecting research tools for better data collection and analysis.

This work's applications of communication ethics literacy spans the final two chapters of this project. The final two chapters of this work will address this communication ethics literacy as lens application. This interpretive lens acknowledges the existence of multiple and competing goods in each communicative event and takes

seriously the multiplicity of background commitments that drive human action. In summary, this lens allows us to recognize the value of communication ethics as tied to being literate. This approach to communication ethics is not tied to a theory; rather, the interpretive lens offers a pragmatic examination of communicative practices. The dialogic approach to communication ethics establishes this literature, and performing this literacy provides us with an interpretive lens for data collection and analysis. The following chapter will explore this lens in reflection of the current issues facing the FBI.

Chapter 4: Communicative Context: Counterterrorism in this Historical Moment

In order to apply communication ethics literacy, we must first situate the communicative context of counterterrorism. This chapter frames the communicative context of counterterrorism in this historical moment. This chapter also begins to frame the application portion of this project by establishing specific areas in FBI counterterrorism practices that can benefit from a communication ethics lens. The purpose of this chapter is to offer the FBI as a key artifact in the battle against terrorism in this moment. As discussed thus far, communication ethics literacy assists researchers by providing an interpretive lens through which they can better identify the commitments, motivators, and aims of communicative actor—all of which are shaped by a given historical moment. With communication ethics literacy, we can enrich findings for future improvements and explore current issues with an intellectual distance capable of uncovering new findings. Recognizing the FBI as a key artifact in counterterrorism, this chapter becomes an exemplar of how the literacy of communication ethics can sustain creative opportunities for new avenues of practice. With this communicative context, the final application chapter will interpret these findings using communication ethics metaphors.

Introduction

This work argues that communication ethics literacy as an interpretive lens offers pragmatic insights for security professionals charged with detecting and responding to terror attacks. Communication ethics provides us with the tools to interpret the diverse and competing goods that exist in our society; these tools are the communication ethics metaphors that, when applied to current and ongoing events, offer an interpretive distance

for research and development. These tools offer practical assistance in addressing the recommendations for improving FBI counterterrorism made in response and reflection on 9/11. When applied to past events, communication ethics offers researchers a tool for widening past research on security policy and finding new areas for inquiry.

Communication ethics literacy acknowledges one's embeddedness in a given historical moment as a significant factor in shaping communicative action. Historical moments are responsive to the past, present, and future demands that call on communicative actors to respond. Our current historical moment situates the communicative context of counterterrorism as one void of simplicity. Additionally, our current historical moment is one characterized by the existence of multiple and competing communicative goods. "Each communicator protects and promoted a given good through communicative action."¹⁵⁶ This communicative action is shaped in response to the particular historical moment, which, in this approach to communication ethics, is understood as the major questions that shape our given time. To identify the practical and significant contributions that communication ethics makes to counterterrorism and the FBI, we must first understand the emerging questions and demands that shape our historical moment and the communicative context of counterterrorism.

This chapter elucidates the communicative context of counterterrorism in this historical moment. To do so, it presents past, present, and future counterterrorism FBI challenges. Three sections guide this first application chapter. Section one, "Communicative Context: Understanding Past Challenges," articulates the identified

¹⁵⁶ Ronald C. Arnett, LeeAnne M. Bell, Janie Harden Fritz, "Dialogic Learning as First Principle in Communication Ethics," *Atlantic Journal of Communication* 18, (2010): 111.

failures of the FBI security practices and overviews the Bureau's organizational response, identifying the major questions that continue to shape counterterrorism. Section two, "Communicative Context: Exploring Current Challenges," identifies and reviews current demanding challenges facing the FBI, identifying the questions that shape contemporary counterterrorism challenges. Section three, "Communicative Context: Exploring Future Challenges," overviews the proposed future security challenges the FBI will face, identifying the questions that will shape counterterrorism efforts in the near future. Within each section, the major questions, challenges, or demands regarding counterterrorism are identified. These questions, challenges, and demands emerge from, and help researchers to identify, the current historical moments.

Apart from the *Commission Report*, this chapter leverages for-public releases by the FBI, unclassified FBI documents, and speeches by FBI leaders, often times using direct quotations from these sources. This primary literature provides an intimate look into the FBI as an organization growing, adapting, and responding to the needs a given moment. In addition, other scholarly sources are used to texture and provide clarity to FBI statements.

As an interpretive lens, communication ethics literacy finds value in providing an interpretive distance that allots better clarity on communicative events of the past, present, and future. When the pragmatic value of applying communication ethics to counterterrorism challenges is acknowledged, tools for incorporating this interpretive lens into future analytics can be developed. In order to apply communication ethics literacy, we must first establish the major questions that shape our current moment and demand a

counterterrorism response. The following section provides an expanded overview of past FBI challenges and failures.

Communicative Context: Understanding Past Challenges

This section expands on the FBI failures prior to 9/11 and explores the systemic changes implemented by the FBI in the wake of these findings in order to initiate application of communication ethics literacy. Interpreting past conclusions using communication ethics metaphors offers a new way to explore findings. These interpretations cast light on data, opening new avenues for engagement. Communication ethics allows us to think differently, think beyond what has already been found. With this insight, security professionals can continue to enrich data.

The failures identified by the *Commission Report* offer a starting point for addressing past, current, and future FBI challenges. The *Commission Report* identified failures of imagination, policy, capabilities, and management regarding counterterrorism, the FBI, and the September 11 attacks. The following paragraphs offer an extended read of these failures in order to frame the FBI responses to these failures.

Responding to Old Failures and New Directives

Today's FBI is the result of structural changes implemented in response to the 9/11 attacks and in the wake of evolving terrorism threats to the U.S. After 9/11 and the *Commission Report*, U.S. leadership implemented structural changes to reorganize U.S. national security agencies. For the FBI, this meant large scale, centralized changes. The directives, goals, organization of offices, and training initiatives were overhauled in response to the failures identified by the *Commission Report*. These sweeping changes

“challenged both the design and identity of the FBI in fundamental ways.”¹⁵⁷ Arguably, the most significant change regarding the FBI after 9/11 was the shift in mission from solving domestic crimes after they occurred to the prevention of future terror attacks before they occurred.¹⁵⁸ Operationally, this change foreshadowed a need for counterintelligence personnel and resources. Changes in the objective of the FBI required changes in the organizational structure. The top-down implementation of change invites questions regarding how the Bureau adapted to this overhaul while also adapting to new identified goals. For the Bureau, failures noted in the *Commission Report’s* offered a starting point for designing these changes.

As noted previously in this project, the *Commission Report* identified the following failures regarding the FBI: imagination, policy, capabilities, and management.¹⁵⁹ The organizational response to these failures shape the Bureau as it is today. Exploring these failures in light of the structural changes within the FBI opens ways for thinking about the value of applying communication ethics literacy. The following paragraphs review these identified failures offering additional insights and greater clarity concerning past FBI failures.

Imagination—Regarding imagination, the Commission recommended the following practices: (1) brainstorm about how attacks may be carried out; (2) identify telltale indications that a surprise attack is being planned; (3) collect intelligence on the

¹⁵⁷ Ranjay Gulati, Jan Rivkin, and Ryan Raffaelli, “Does ‘What We Do’ Make Us ‘Who We Are’? Organizational Design and Identity Change at the Federal Bureau of Investigation” (Working Paper 16-084, Harvard Business School, 2016): 3.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, *Before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Science, the Departments of State, Justice and Commerce, and Related Agencies*, (September 4, 2006) (statement of Robert S. Mueller III, FBI Director). <https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/testimony/the-fbi-transformation-since-2001>

¹⁵⁹ *The 9/11 Commission Report* (Washington, DC: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004): 339.

indicators when possible; and (4) integrate defense mechanisms to stop or alert to the most deadly attacks.¹⁶⁰ Significantly, the Commission noted that, looking back upon the events of 9/11, telltale signs that an imminent terror attack using planes as weapons were visible but overlooked by security professionals. The question remained as to how and why these signs were overlooked. Per the Commission’s findings, security professionals failed to recognize the magnitude of opportunity terrorists had in terms of resources. Additionally, security professionals limited their research to more current, pressing issues and failed to understand the reality of a large-scale attack; security professionals could not *imagine* the possibility of another Pearl Harbor like surprise attack on U.S. soil. The focus on current issues at the sacrifice of future planning allowed these professionals to overlook the signs that a plan of this nature was underway. Responding to the failure of imagination, the Commission offered a list of specific practices that resulted in what they term the failure to institutionalize imagination.

Per the commission, “institutionalizing imagination” begins with addressing the following past failures:

1. Security professionals failed to explore opportunities from the enemy’s perspective. This type of *red team analysis*—a strategy of playing devil’s advocate and exploring the opposition’s strategies for decision making—could have increased awareness regarding the capabilities of large-scale suicide attacks.¹⁶¹
2. Security professionals failed to develop telltale signs regarding terror attacks.

While this list of telltale signs is difficult to develop if awareness concerning

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 346.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., 347

capabilities is nonexistent, this tactic finds value in taking the perspective of the enemy. With greater care concerning the objectives, goals, and practices of the enemy, security professionals could identify tactics that are out of line with the normal practices of these groups. Such identification could trigger a warning and thus instigate further analysis.¹⁶²

3. Leadership failed to communicate expectations regarding the above mention telltale signs. Without this set of expectations, the “potential significance” of such signs were overlooked.¹⁶³ Personnel were unable to connect the dots between and among signs of an impending attack.
4. Security professionals failed to institute broad security practices for future threats. There existed security practices for current and credible threats, but practices regarding unplanned for, future threats were not institutionalized.

These identified failures speak to the need to institutionalize imagination. As a whole, they also encompass the failures of policy, capabilities, and management discussed below.

Policy—Regarding policy, the Commission recommended that research regarding possible threats be coordinated among all security organizations and be carried out thoroughly. Each security organization within the U.S. has limits to what they can achieve in terms of intelligence gathering and preparation for attacks. The ability to move quickly on threats in a coordinated fashion was limited prior to 9/11. Specifically, arguing for the spending of resources against a threat that was not yet validated proved difficult.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

Prior to 9/11, the FBI's focus centered on domestic crimes. This area of law enforcement worked apart from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), who were primarily charged with counterterrorism intelligence. Directives were identified and coordinated within each local field office, and broad-based directives delivered from headquarters were limited. Without a formal policy concerning communication, goals, and collaboration, opportunities for research closed. Thinking beyond the local level of threats, resources, and security needs created silos of security personnel who either could not see value in collaboration, or who were not offered areas where collaboration could effectively take place between office and organizations.

Capabilities—Regarding capabilities, the Commission noted that the FBI failed to link intelligence and agent knowledge to national threats,¹⁶⁴ and the lack of communication and sharing of intelligence between agencies resulted in security gaps and intelligence overlaps. Per the commission, boundaries between security organizations limited the free sharing of intelligence. Without the sharing of intelligence, professionals who argued for an increased focus on terrorism found it difficult to plead their case as other professionals were not aware of these threats. Additionally, communication amongst FBI offices was limited. Therefore, a coordinated effort at identifying security threats and implementing training efforts did not exist. Organizational boundaries and limited access to intelligence sharing created gaps in acknowledging terrorism as a direct threat to the U.S.

Prior to 9/11, there were limited spaces for intelligence experts within the FBI. Those who worked in intelligence were placed at FBI headquarters. Field offices did not

¹⁶⁴Ibid, 352

have intelligence analysts and instead were housed by special agents. Without intelligence training, special agents were unable to link data to national threats, missing key opportunities to discover implications of an impending terror threat.

Management—The Commission found that managerial coordination and communication regarding the goal of counterterrorism failed. The *Commission Report* contextualizes this failure thusly:

However the specific problems are labeled, we believe they are symptoms of the government's broader inability to adapt how it manages problems to the new challenge of the twenty-first century. The agencies are like a set of specialists in the hospital, each ordering tests, looking for symptoms and prescribing medications. What is missing is the attending physician who makes sure they work as a team.¹⁶⁵

There was no central command to communicate the roles and security needs to various organizations. For the FBI specifically, field offices fell victim to varying goals and objectives. Resource allocation to counterterrorism intelligence was limited. Across the board of security organizations, goals differed as well.

Taken together, these failures highlight the inability to explore the possibilities of new threats and work in a coordinated manner to address threats. Responses to these failures urged security professionals to reimagine both *why* and *how* persons terrorize. Additionally, they urged professionals to challenge their assumptions regarding background influences on terrorism and work across organizational lines to address emerging threats. Upon identifying threats, the Commission urged organizations to

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 353.

coordinate resources to address future violence. “Insight for the future is thus not easy to apply in practice. It is hardest to mount a major effort while a problem still seems minor.”¹⁶⁶ Success in mobilizing policy rests on finding opportunities to engage common goals amongst multiple organizations.

In response to these threats, the FBI implemented structural changes to their organization, leadership, and training. These changes attempted to address the failures of imagination, capabilities, policy, and management while staying prepared and ready to meet the demands of emerging threats. The following subsection provides an overview these structural changes.

Organizational Responses to Commission Identified Failures

The FBI responded to recommendations made within the *Commission Report* by aligning their organizational goals around the development of five branches—National Security, Criminal Investigations, Science and Technology, the Office of the Chief Information Officer, and Human Sources. Within the National Security branch were the Counterterrorism Division, Counter Intelligence Division, Directorate of Intelligence, and the Directorate of Weapons of Mass Destruction. These structural changes aligned with large-scale changes to national security as a whole. Additionally, this new structure decentered criminal investigation as a primary goal allowing space for intelligence and counterterrorism initiatives.

To grasp how vast the structural changes were within the FBI, it is necessary to reflect on how the FBI was organized prior to 9/11. Colleagues at the Harvard Business School, Ranjay Gulati, Jan Rivkin, and Ryan Raffaeili explore the changes in the FBI

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 350.

between 2001 and 2016. The authors write that between the founding of the Bureau in 1908 and the September 11, 2001 attacks, the FBI built its organization around the goal of law enforcement. FBI offices were situated locally amongst 56 major cities within the U.S., where most domestic crime occurred. FBI Headquarters provided “light-handed, advisory coordination,” and field office leadership led their local office according to the geographic demands where they were located. Coordination against large-scale crimes was led by the “office of origin,” or the field office that first began researching the case. In 2001, the FBI assigned nearly 76% of agents to criminal cases, 21% of agents to intelligence, and approximately 2% of agents to counterterrorism.¹⁶⁷ Gulati, Rivkin, and Raffaelli find that until 2001, the FBI’s primary objective amongst security organizations in the U.S. was to enforce domestic laws after a crime had occurred. This objective was drastically reformatted following the 9/11 attacks.

The Director of the FBI at the time of the attacks, Robert Mueller, describes the structural changes to FBI organization as divided into three phases, which are overviewed below.

- Phase one, triage, involved direct responses to the attacks. During this phase, national security objectives were separated from criminal law enforcement and direction was centralized at the FBI Headquarters. The “office of origin” directive was diminished. Additionally, FBI personnel developed relationships with local police forces to coordinate intelligence sharing and plan attack responses (during this time, FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces increased from 35 to 66).¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁷ Gulati, Rivkin, and Raffaelli, “Does ‘What We Do’ Make Us ‘Who We Are’? Organizational Design and Identity Change at the Federal Bureau of Investigation,” 11–12.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 16–19.

- Phase two, search, described the founding and development of intelligence. Cleared of the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Mueller focused on building a program for intelligence capable of ensuring national security. During this time, Mueller created the Director of Intelligence position to develop a pathway for FBI offices to analyze threats, identify gaps in research, and allocate resources to the greatest threat. To aid intelligence, analysts were placed at each FBI Field Office.¹⁶⁹
- Phase three, crystallization, described the implementation of intelligence as a key focus of FBI work. During this period, intelligence and national security practices were aligned with criminal investigation to create a unified approach to FBI goals.

Together, the implementation of these structural changes characterize the organization of the FBI as it stands today.

Currently, the FBI has field offices in 56 cities throughout the U.S., 355 satellite offices, a headquarters in Virginia including the FBI Academy, the FBI Engineering Research Facility, and the FBI Laboratory, a fingerprint identification complex in West Virginia, and the Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center (TEDAC) in Alabama.¹⁷⁰ The FBI also has 63 *Legal Attaché* (LEGAT) offices and 27 sub-offices in 75 countries around the world. LEGAT offices are temporary dispatches that respond to global threats. At the core of these offices is the FBI Headquarters, which provides centralized operations, policy, and administrative support. Whereas prior to the 9/11 attacks, the FBI was focused on domestic crime with little resources dedicated to terrorism, this

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 19–21.

¹⁷⁰ Federal Bureau of Investigation, “FY 2018 Authorization and Budget Request to Congress,” *U.S. Department of Justice*, May 2017. <https://www.justice.gov/file/968931/download>.

organization situates the FBI as a primary resource in preventing and responding to terrorism.

Additionally, FBI resource allocation is now divided among four units—Intelligence, Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence, Criminal Enterprises and Federal Crimes, and Criminal Justice Services. Resources are allocated to these units based upon the FBI’s core mission, workload, and necessary administrative support. Apart from these units, the FBI allocates resources to support current and emerging threats to the U.S. and its interests. These allocations are at the discretion of the Director, who identifies and prioritizes threats.

The reorganization of the FBI to address the failures identified by the Commission accomplished three objectives. First, the FBI created processes for establishing accountability regarding intelligence. No longer did the sole focus of the Bureau rest on law enforcement. Intelligence became a primary directive of the Bureau. Second, the FBI aligned national security objectives with the organizational goals of the Bureau. FBI Headquarters centralized the direction for these goals and communicated the primary goals and threats to each field office. Third, FBI leadership developed communication pathways between field offices and local law enforcement to understand the local threat and coordinate plans for future large-scale attacks. This sharing of resources opened a line of communication to align national goals with local concerns. Still, even with excellent analytics, coordinated communicative practices, and an endless supply of resources, the FBI cannot predict all violence and terror attacks. The current and ongoing threat of terrorism continues to evolve, transforming national security challenges and directions. As these threats evolve, past failures and areas for inquiry

resurface as significant questions needing continued reflection. The following paragraphs identify the questions that continue to shape counterterrorism responses in our current moment. These questions are as follows:

1. How can imagination be an ongoing and necessary component of terrorism prevention in order to preempt future capabilities, policy, and management failures?
2. How can the FBI adapt with future organizational responses and structural changes as new threats emerge and current threats evolve?

These questions characterize the past concerns that continue to shape the current communicative context of counterterrorism. This application as a whole will continue to reflect upon these questions.

This section overviewed the failures of the FBI prior to 9/11 and discussed the structural changes put into place by FBI leadership to address these failures. Exploring these past failures has allowed the questions that continue to shape the communicative context of counterterrorism in this moment to emerge. While time has allowed reflection and structural changes to take place, the FBI continues to respond to past challenges and the call to attend to the identified questions remains. In response, the identified two questions will shape the application of communication ethics literacy in the pages to come. Following suit, the next section explores current threats identified by FBI leadership as demanding of our attention and resources.

Communication Ethics Context: Exploring Current Challenges

Section one overviewed past security failures and their subsequent FBI responses in order to identify the emerging questions that continue to shape this moment's

communicative context of counterterrorism. This section explores current terrorism challenges identified by FBI leadership as today's most demanding issues. This section identifies the current and ongoing challenges that demand a response in this historical moment. The following list outlines the topics to be discussed in this section:

1. Alongside changes in technology, the use of social media by terror organizations to increase followers and promote violence is steadily increasing. These innovations in science and technology offer terrorist groups expanded opportunities for planning attacks and recruiting new followers.¹⁷¹
2. Alongside the increased use of social media by terror groups, the FBI noted an increase in lone wolf attacks. Specifically, the increase in lone wolf attacks has corresponded with the decrease of centralized terror networks.¹⁷²

These current challenges, which have come to shape FBI counterterrorism practices in the most recent years leading up to 2018, give rise to the current questions demanding FBI attention.

In his 2017 remarks for the Global Coalition Working to Defeat ISIS, U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson noted "A 'digital caliphate' should not flourish in place of a physical one" as "the internet is ISIS's best weapon for turning a recruit into a self-radicalized attacker."¹⁷³ As travel to ISIS locations such as Iraq and Syria have become increasingly difficult, ISIS messages via social media have called for followers to both create local networks and carry out attacks in their home states. Tillerson's remarks

¹⁷¹ Jessica Stern and John M. Berger, *ISIS: The State of Terror* (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2015).

¹⁷² Tillerson, Rex W., "Remarks at the Ministerial Plenary for the Global Coalition Working to Defeat ISIS," *U.S. Department of State*, 22 March 2017. <https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2017/03/269039.htm>

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*

reflect on the unique challenges facing counterterrorism professionals today. These challenges are rooted in the increasing use of the internet by terror groups. The paragraphs below overview the emergence of these threats.

Terrorism and the Use of Social Media

Communicating in spite of temporal and spatial barriers is crucial to the success of terror organizations.¹⁷⁴ Terrorists' use of technology and media evolves along with technological advancements. "Unless a terrorist group is ideologically opposed to technology itself, it will generally use every available tool to do its work."¹⁷⁵ The progression to the use of social media begins in the 1980s when terror organizations began using both video technology to film propaganda films and advanced printing techniques to produce color magazines for distribution. Distributions happened through mail and within mosques around the world. Groups engaged the films or print materials, discussing the implications of the materials together.¹⁷⁶ Moving forward, groups began producing sophisticated newsletters and magazines to distribute through email. Around the same time, groups produced digital videos to be distributed through downloaded files rather than DVD or VHS. By the 1990s, groups were engaging online chat rooms to communicate. Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, online message boards became the primary networking platform for terror organizations.¹⁷⁷ Online message board forums followed a clear hierarchical organization. The threat organizer owned the forum with the ability to add or delete users and content. Some threads were restricted to elite

¹⁷⁴ Jytte Klausen, "Tweeting the Jihad: Social Media Networks of Western Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 38, no. 1 (2015): 3.

¹⁷⁵ Stern and Berger, *ISIS: The State of Terror*, 127.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 128.

members of the organization who could “meet” via video conferencing to plan or coordinate attacks.¹⁷⁸ By 2009, terror supporters began using social media platforms.

Social media platforms (YouTube, Facebook, Twitter) created new opportunities for terror groups and new issues for counterterrorism professionals. With social media, terror groups could create new media without being at the control of media interpretation; with social media, terror groups could communicate with publics via a direct channel. While open source information (data depicting the use of social media by terror groups and their potential supporters) was “generated at a speed and volume unprecedented in the history of conflict,” questions concerning the validity, legality, and influence of this social media use emerged. Social media platforms offered jihadists a simple interface open to millions of users. Access to these platforms required limited internet access and few products; terrorists could access social media platforms from nearly any location on the globe, and because social media platforms are owned by private organizations, suspending or deleting accounts associated with terror groups happened at a slow rate, often as the result of much pressure.

Terrorists use social media for two purposes: (1) to attract new recruits and (2) inspire lone wolf attacks.¹⁷⁹ Prior to the emergence of social media use, terror recruiting often occurred in person. With social media, jihadists could recruit without leaving their physical location.¹⁸⁰ J.M. Berger, Brookings Institute fellow on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, and Jonathon Morgan, technologist and data scientist for Brookings

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., 129–130. In 2013, leaders around the world participated in a conference call in a private section of an al-Qaeda forum.

¹⁷⁹ J.M. Berger and Jonathon Morgan, “The ISIS Twitter Census: Defining and Describing the Population of ISIS Supporters on Twitter,” (analysis paper, Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, Washington, D.C., no. 20, March 2015), 2.

¹⁸⁰ Stern and Berger, *ISIS: The State of Terror*, 159.

Institute, conducted research on the volume and reach of ISIS use of Twitter. Berger and Morgan found that an estimated 46,000 pro-ISIS Twitter accounts were active in 2014. Of these accounts, 6,216 were detected using bot or spam technology to tweet pro-ISIS statements. This propaganda is used not only to recruit new followers, but to influence lone wolf attacks resulting in the increase of domestic terrorism.

Terrorism and Lone Wolf Attacks

Since 2010, the FBI has declared lone wolf attacks as a significant threat to the U.S. This realization is unique being that the *Commission Report*, written less than a decade prior, has no mention of lone wolves. Finding a concrete statistic on lone wolf attacks is difficult because the term itself is weighted. In the words of the Brookings Institute, “it is the rare lone wolf who is truly alone.”¹⁸¹ Lone wolves are described as “an individual or small group of individuals who uses traditional terror tactics . . . but who acts without membership in, or cooperation with, an official or unofficial terrorist organization.”¹⁸² While lone wolf violence is not a new phenomenon, lone wolf attacks in the United States and Europe have doubled in the past seven years.¹⁸³ Typically, these lone wolves find connection and validation through online interaction with terror groups. The increase in lone wolves directly correlates to the third current challenge facing the counterterrorism professionals in the US, an increase in domestic terrorism.

Traditionally, lone wolves were considered persons who commit violence without any connections to a network or terror group. However, today’s lone wolf differs.

¹⁸¹ Berger and Morgan, “The ISIS Twitter Census: Defining and Describing the Population of ISIS Supporters on Twitter.”

¹⁸² Gabriel Weimann, “Lone Wolves in Cyberspace,” *Journal of Terrorism Research* 3, no. 2 (2012). Accessed March 9, 2017, <http://doi.org/10.15664/jtr.405>.

¹⁸³ Daniel L. Byman, “Can Lone Wolves be Stopped?” *Brookings*, 15 March 2017. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/03/15/can-lone-wolves-be-stopped/>.

Modern lone wolves typically has some sort of contact with individuals associated with a terror network, the degree of this contact varies by person and attacks. What is common among lone wolves is the use of the internet. “Technology better enables a Lone Wolf credo.”¹⁸⁴ Connection to terror leaders, which formerly would only happen through direct contact, can now take place through social media platforms. This connection allows terror groups to disseminate their messages at a broader level and provide direction, support, influence and training to suspected lone wolves. The evolution of terror groups has made lone wolf terrorism the issue it is today.

While lone wolf terrorism is not new, the threat has evolved alongside new terror tactics. Gregory Ehrie, FBI Special Agent in Charge of Intelligence at the New York Field Office, explains:

ISIS represents a different style of terrorism. Al-Qaida and their affiliates are still there. The threat from these groups has been mitigated but it is still there. Those groups plan their attacks very carefully and they plan big attacks that attract attention. The intelligence community understands how they operate. ISIS is different. It is more like an autonomous collective where members are loosely affiliated and they are more interested in throwing all sorts of punches, no matter how small. It’s very difficult to mitigate that threat.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ International Center for Enterprise Preparedness (InterCEP), “FBI Report: Lone Wolf Terrorism and Militant Extremism,” *Global Resilience Network*, September 14, 2016. https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55b670ece4b004b66c56e8ca/t/57ec2560893fc07c3c287933/1475093856713/GregEhrie_LoneWolfTerrorism_09142016.pdf.

As intelligence improves, terror groups adapt to improve the strategies for planning and carrying out attacks. For security professionals, the increase in lone wolf terrorism presents unique challenges.

Lone wolves recruited through social media present a demanding threat to security professionals because these individuals can be recruited, communicate, and plan attacks without leaving their home.¹⁸⁶ Where traditional intelligence would target individuals with a history of radical ideological tendencies, or ask nonviolent groups to identify persons who may have radicalized, there are limited means for identifying lone wolves who solely use social media. Regarding lone wolf attacks, Ehrie explains that the time frame from when a recruit decides to carry out violent attacks to the time in which the attack takes place can be very short.¹⁸⁷ Additionally, there exists no concrete profile for lone wolves. Security professionals have identified persons of all races, religious affiliations, social-economic backgrounds, and cultures as lone wolf recruits.

Terrorists' increasingly sophisticated use of social media as a channel for propaganda and recruitment and the subsequent increase in lone wolf attacks presents a multilayered threat to the U.S. As social media allows terrorists to coordinate and plan violence without time and space limitations, the FBI has continued to call for increased intelligence sharing and collaboration between the U.S. and foreign governments and for resources to continue the engagement of "lawful investigative techniques . . . including both physical and electronic surveillance."¹⁸⁸ While the Bureau continues to pursue

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ *FBI Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2017, Statement Before the House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, D.C.* (February 15, 2016) (statement of James B. Comey, FBI Director). <https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/fbi-budget-request-for-fiscal-year-2017>.

methods for staying abreast of these current threats, the social media and lone wolf challenge is demanding. The following paragraphs explore the opportunities and limitations to addressing these challenges.

Emerging Questions: Communication Opportunities/Limitations

In his 2017 budget request to Congress, then FBI Director Comey stated, “Countering ISIS’s social media use is a demanding task requiring delicate research.” The reach and use of social media by terror organizations is more than simple propaganda; “tampering with social networks is a form of social engineering.”¹⁸⁹ Countering social media use by terrorists presents a complex problem. First, social media platforms are protected legally from liability as internet service providers. Second, social media offers an abundant open source resource for counterterrorism research wanting to access data information depicting the use of social media by terrorists and their supporters as well as data depicting the audience of such content.

As mentioned, social media platforms have experienced pressure by the public and security professionals to suspend accounts thought to be supportive of terrorism. While there is pressure to suspend and delete social media accounts associated with terrorism, this may not be the best solution. While simply finding and suspending social media accounts associated with terrorism propaganda can limit the distribution of pro-terror messages, questions regarding “how social radicalization works” and the “unintended consequences” of simply deleting accounts demand attention.¹⁹⁰ To address the widespread and multilayered threat of social media use by terror groups, the FBI has

¹⁸⁹ Berger and Morgan, “The ISIS Twitter Census,” 59.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

acknowledged the following capabilities and resources as necessary for countering current threats.

First, resources that allow for the collection and interpretation of data are needed. These resources are often publicly shamed in connection to the increase in government surveillance.¹⁹¹ Bureau leaders note:

We respect the right of people to engage in private communications, regardless of the medium or technology. . . . Our aim is not to expand the government’s surveillance authority, but rather to ensure that we can obtain electronic information and evidence pursuant to the legal authority that Congress has provided to keep America safe.¹⁹²

Yet, as the sheer volume of social media use increases, and technological advances in terms of encryption increases, FBI needs for collecting and interpreting data increase. Presenting these needs in a way that is favorable for the public will continue to be a challenge in the upcoming years.¹⁹³

Second, new directions for the training and development of FBI intelligence professionals and relationship building between the Bureau, local authorities, and additional national security agencies are needed. Michael Steinbach, executive assistant director of the FBI’s National Security Branch notes that responding to the challenge of

¹⁹¹ This comment is made in reference to social groups who protest against government surveillance as an invasion of privacy and overstepping of civil rights.

¹⁹² *Adapting to Defend the Homeland Against the Evolving International Terrorist Threat, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, D.C.* (December 6, 2017) (statement of Nikki Flores, Deputy Assistant Director of Counterterrorism Division). <https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/adapting-to-defend-the-homeland-against-the-evolving-international-terrorist-threat>.

¹⁹³ Michael Steinbach, “How Technology Has Transformed the Terrorist Threat Fifteen Years After 9/11,” *Stein Counterterrorism Lecture Series*, (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy), September 21, 2016. <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/other/SteinbachStatement20160921-ForDownload.pdf>.

increased use of social media as a recruitment strategy for lone wolf terrorism begins with providing security professionals with the right tools.¹⁹⁴ Many of these tools include data programs that can sift through online intelligence in place of human professionals. However, apart from these digital tools, there needs to be a cultural shift within the Bureau that demands rapid adaption to new threats. “Being adaptive also means looking at how these complex organizations communicate and move . . . We need to allow that information sharing itself is complete and work with partners to develop robust systems that take into account the type of information to be shared.”¹⁹⁵ At the core of this new training is innovation. Steinbach asks: how can we instill a culture of innovation among Bureau employees? Innovation will drive counterterrorism measures in the next decade.

As we continue to confront the current challenges explored in this section, the following questions will shape the FBI response:

1. How can the FBI work alongside with Social Media organizations to establish principles and goals for reducing terror groups’ use of the platforms?
2. How can the FBI challenge the narrative used as propaganda by terror groups online?

These questions currently demanding an FBI counterterrorism response address the realities of an evolved terrorism threat amongst a mobile society where distances in space and time are increasingly closed.

This section explored the current challenges that the FBI is facing in terms of counterterrorism. While responding to these challenges, it is also imperative that leaders

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

stay abreast of future threats. The final section of the chapter identifies and discusses these upcoming threats.

Communication Ethics Context: Exploring Future Challenges

The final section of the chapter explores future challenges for the Bureau. As the FBI's goals have changed from persecuting past crimes to preventing future violence, processes and procedures have focused on identifying and responding to future threats before attacks can occur. In the 2018 budget request to Congress, FBI leadership acknowledged domestic terrorism, violence committed by homegrown terrorists aimed at persons within the same country, as the primary future threat to security. The following paragraphs overview this threat, as well as the necessary FBI developments required to address it.

Domestic terrorism is broadly within the scope of counterterrorism measure of the FBI. Domestic terrorists, as defined within a 2017 special Congressional report, are “people who commit crimes within the homeland and draw inspiration from U.S.-based extremist ideologies and movements. . . . These include individuals who commit crimes in the name of ideologies supporting animal rights, environmental rights, anarchism, white supremacy, anti-government ideals, black separatism, and beliefs about abortion.”¹⁹⁶ Due to the nature of the violence—which can differ sharply from traditional terrorism—addressing domestic terrorism is a complicated issue. Since domestic terrorism includes a multiplicity of ideologies, motives, and tactics, the first question to be addressed is what is domestic terrorism? At a basic level, domestic terrorism is terrorism that occurs within the United States. In addition to acting within the homeland, domestic terrorists “lack

¹⁹⁶ Jerome P. Bjelopera, “Domestic Terrorism: An Overview,” *Congressional Research Service*. 21 August 2017. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R44921.pdf>.

foreign direction.”¹⁹⁷ While their actions may take influence from the type of violence committed by foreign terrorists, there is no direct communication between domestic terrorists and foreign terrorists. This distinction separates domestic terrorists from lone wolf terrorists.

One place where these two issues are connected, however, is the influence of traditional terror groups on domestic terrorists. Brian Michael Jenkins of the RAND Corporation explains that jihadists are often born, raised, and recruited in the U.S. Jenkins’s research finds that of the 178 terrorists who planned 86 terror attacks thwarted by U.S. security agencies, and successfully carried out 22 attacks between 9/11/2001 and December 2017, 86 were U.S. born.¹⁹⁸ Jenkins’ research, intended to assist professionals in developing protocols for vetting visitors to the U.S., assimilate immigrants and refugees, and identify possible terror recruits within the U.S., finds that as pressure on terror groups increased following 9/11, terror groups have increasingly focused on inspiring domestic terrorists to launch domestic attacks. “The most economically advanced, liberal democracies, including the United States, have also been the theaters of domestic terrorism campaigns—in many cases, led by the most privileged members of these societies.”¹⁹⁹ These findings are supported by research showing that alongside terror attacks planned and coordinated from outside the U.S. have been thwarted.

Yet, while there is separation between these two groups, policy against domestic terrorism has largely been grouped alongside lone wolf terrorism. This is likely to change

¹⁹⁷ Bjelopera, “Domestic Terrorism: An Overview,” 4.

¹⁹⁸ Brian Michael Jenkins, “The Origins of America’s Jihadists,” *RAND Corporation*, last updated December 5, 2017, 1. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE200/PE251/RAND_PE251.pdf.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.* 4–7.

in the upcoming years as the FBI has listed domestic terrorism as a primary threat to security. Since 9/11, efforts to prevent domestic terror attacks have increased. Laws in the U.S. have expanded to allow prosecution “on the basis of intention alone,”²⁰⁰ and new focused efforts have been coordinated to find solutions to home grown extremists. Yet, these efforts focus solely on prevention and work under the premise that potentially violent individuals can be identified by law enforcement. So far, the key response to domestic terrorism is the coordinated Combatting Violent Extremism task force (CVE).

The Combatting Violent Extremism task force (CVE) began as a presidential directive in 2011. The task force brought together security experts from the FBI, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). CVE was developed to address and implement the strategic goals outlined by then President Barack Obama, in his August 2011, “National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States.” This plan outlined the role of local police forces, the FBI, and national security agencies coordinated approach to preventing local terrorism.

The National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism proposed that local community stakeholders—police forces, business owners, citizens, and community leaders—were a beneficial asset to preventing extremism. The local stakeholders are imperative to the fight against local lone wolf attacks because they know their community and its members best. Speaking to the strategy, President Obama noted the following:

²⁰⁰ Jenkins, “The Origins of America’s Jihadists,” 8.

We rely on local, state, and Federal law enforcement to deter individuals from suing violence and to protect communities from harm Countering radicalization to violence is frequently best achieved by engaging and empowering individuals and groups at the local level to build resilience against violent extremism.²⁰¹

The U.S. modeled this approach to countering violent extremism on previous successful partnerships between local, federal, and national forces. Specifically, the task force was modeled based on three initiatives.

- Comprehensive Gang Model, an initiative to reduce and prevent gang activity through social intervention and education. This initiative led by local community forces with the support of the FBI succeeded in reducing gang related crimes in high-crime cities throughout the U.S.
- Building Communities of Trust Initiative, a coordinated effort between the Department of Justice and Homeland Security to improve relationships between local police forces and the communities they serve. The initiative successfully developed lines of communication between the police and their community members to address “information sharing, responding to community concerns, and distinguishing between innocent cultural behaviors and conduct that may legitimately reflect criminal activity or terrorism precursors.”²⁰²

²⁰¹ Barack Obama, *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States* (Department of Homeland Security, August 2011), 2. https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/empowering_local_partners.pdf.

²⁰² *Ibid.*, 4.

- Safe Schools/Healthy Students Initiative (SS/HS). Launched by the Departments of Education, Justice and Health and Human services, the SS/HS initiative successfully reduced violence and substance abuse in American schools.

CVE was founded on the premise that “Although we have learned a great deal about radicalization that leads to violence, we can never assume that the dynamics will remain same.”²⁰³ Thus, research and communication between individuals, local government, and national security agencies is imperative. This current strategy to counter domestic terrorism is based upon three goals: “(1) enhancing engagement with and support to local communities that may be targeted by violent extremists; (2) building government and law enforcement expertise for preventing violent extremism; and (3) countering violent extremists’ propaganda while promoting our ideals.”²⁰⁴

At the core of the CVE rests two primary objectives to be accomplished by the FBI: open communication with local and national security forces and engagement with the American public needs to increase awareness about domestic terrorism. President Obama explained:

Engagement is essential for supporting community-based efforts to prevent violent extremism because it allows government and communities to share information, concerns, and potential solutions. Our aims in engaging with communities to discuss violent extremism are to: (1) share sound, meaningful, and timely information about the threat of violent extremism with a wide range of community groups and organizations, particularly those involved in public safety

²⁰³ Ibid., 6.

²⁰⁴ Barack Obama, “Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States,” *Department of Homeland Security*, December 2011, 2. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/sip-final.pdf>.

issues; (2) respond to community concerns about government policies and actions; and (3) better understand how we can effectively support community-based solutions.²⁰⁵

For this engagement to be successful, the FBI must be cognizant of civil liberties while increasing awareness amongst the public of domestic terrorism. This engagement requires security professionals to take a “consultative approach” to community prevention methods.²⁰⁶

These methods for countering domestic terrorism will continue to take shape over the upcoming years. The following paragraph outlines the questions that will shape the FBI’s counterterrorism response in the months and years to come.

Emerging Questions—Future Demands

As the FBI continues to respond to current threats, including the increased use of social media and instances of lone wolf attacks, they will need to address the following challenges emerging as a result of new threats:

1. How can the FBI build relationships with local community members and police forces to better address domestic terrorism?
2. How can the FBI address domestic terrorism while showing that they do not wish to overrun civil liberties?

While not yet fully developed, awareness concerning domestic terrorism begins with increased engagement with the local communities who will be affected by this type of terrorism.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., 11.

The questions identified in this section as past, present, and future concerns shape the current communicative context of counterterrorism in this historical moment. These questions demand continued response by security professionals, and these questions situate the FBI as a significant organization in U.S. counterterrorism efforts. This section identified and discussed upcoming challenges noted by the FBI. The ongoing sensing and responding to upcoming threats will shape the future of the FBI and impact our understanding of national security and counterterrorism in the decade to come. With these questions in mind, the following paragraphs introduce a template for applying communication-ethics-literacy-as-interpretive-lens in action.

Engaging the Communicative Context and Application

The previous pages presented the questions that shape counterterrorism in this current moment. Understanding these emerging questions provides a basis for which one can investigate the communication ethics response. Part two of this application uses communication ethics metaphors to understand this communicative context in a manner that provides better clarity and direction for future action. Part two of this application will serve as the primary focus of application in the following chapter.

These emergent questions provide a list of current and future demands that the FBI must consider while shaping their response to terrorism. These questions shape federal counterterrorism response in this current historical moment:

- How can imagination be an ongoing and necessary component of terrorism prevention in order to preempt future capabilities, policy, and management failures?

- How can the FBI adapt with future organizational responses and structural changes as new threats emerge and current threats evolve?
- How can the FBI work alongside with Social Media organizations to establish principles and goals for reducing terror groups' use of the platforms?
- How can the FBI challenge the narrative used as propaganda by terror groups online?
- How can the FBI build relationships with local community members and police forces to better address domestic terrorism?
- How can the FBI address domestic terrorism while showing that they do not wish to overrun civil liberties?

At the base of these emerging questions are the following issues: (1) building creativity and imagination into counterterrorism training and practices; coordinating security responses amongst multiple organizations; (2) challenging negative narratives including those used as propaganda by terror groups and those used negatively against the FBI; and (3) building local relationships with community groups in an effort to present a strong and unified force against threats. These issues are primary communicative challenges shaping our current and future responses to terrorism. Responding to these issues will prove the FBI's effectiveness in adapting to ongoing, current, and future threats.

As shown, one's engagement with historical moments' questions shape their communicative practices and identity. As one confronts the issues that demand attention in our current moment, they recognize that these questions are formed in response to communicative events of the past, present, and future. Our communicative response, then, is made with attentiveness beyond the given moment. This understanding of

historical moment frames this project's application of communication ethics as responsibility beyond the given moment, recognizing that decision made in current time affect persons beyond a given special or temporal realm.

With knowledge of the communicative context of counterterrorism, this project can begin to shape a response that addresses the challenges of terrorism with tools and practices that are grounded in current context, capabilities, and limitations. Through the lens of communication ethics, this application aims to offer practical next steps for groups charged with responding to and countering terrorism. To apply communication ethics literacy as lens in a way that attempts to identify (1) the emerging limitations to practices and research; (2) existent touch points between these two areas of research; and (3) hermeneutic openings for engagement, the remainder of this application begins with connecting the communicative context of FBI counterterrorism with this work's approach to communication ethics to find the overt connections between theory and practice. Where these connections between theory and practice exist, this work aims to craft communicative practices that open and maintain spaces for creative responses to the complex and ongoing challenge of terrorism.

With the communicative context of counterterrorism and list of significant questions that shape FBI counterterrorism practices in this moment, the final chapter of this project, and part two of this application section, will apply communication ethics metaphors to seek clarity and direction regarding the past, present, and future challenges of the FBI and counterterrorism. Attention to terrorism in this historical moments requires that one makes sense of the threats we continue to face, while identifying the current and future challenges that demand our response. Applying communication ethics

metaphor to these identified challenges equips security professionals with tools for remaining vigilant, relevant, and prepared for the future.

Chapter 5: Communication Ethics Literacy as Lens: Responsiveness, Imagination, and Creativity

This chapter concludes the communication ethics application in this project. Until this point, this project has situated communication ethics as the protection and promotion of communicative goods, acknowledging that in this historical moment, multiple goods exist and compete for public recognition and space. Previous chapters have articulated the importance of recognizing a given historical moment by identifying the emerging questions that place an existential demand on the communicative agent. The literacy of communication ethics, presented in this project through the metaphors of narrative, communicative goods, historical moment, and attentiveness to multiplicity/difference, frame this chapter's application. The goal of this chapter is to demonstrate and discuss how communication ethics literacy functions as an interpretive lens, and why this lens affords communicators—and in this case, security professionals—a pragmatic capability to respond to our moment's demanding counterterrorism questions. Communication-ethics-literacy-as-interpretive-lens infuses communicative events with ethical height and weight.²⁰⁷ In moments where professionals are called to respond to ongoing, dynamic challenges, communication ethics literacy provides tools for navigation.

Introduction

We begin this chapter where the previous chapter left us, with knowledge of the communicative context of counterterrorism in this historical moment. Attentiveness to historical moment reminds us that communicative contexts are intertwined with past

²⁰⁷ Ronald C. Arnett discusses ethical height and weight in his work on Emmanuel Levinas. See Ronald C. Arnett, *Levinas's Rhetorical Demand: The Unending Obligation of Communication Ethics* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2017).

findings, current events, and future demands; communication is embedded with the muddiness of everyday life, which include the voices and experiences from the past, present, and future sentiments.²⁰⁸ With this knowledge, we can connect communication ethics metaphors. This project frames communication ethics metaphors beginning with narrative as the communicative ground that houses the persons and stories that give rise to communicative goods, which shape particular communicative practices. Narrative as a communication ethics metaphor has overt connections to the FBI as an organization charged with counterterrorism. Yet, navigating narrative in this era rich with diversity and conflict is a difficult task. The hope of this chapter, then, is to show how engaging narrative provides openings for creativity and imagination grounded on reflection.

Three sections shape this final application chapter. Section one, “Literacy and Hypertextuality: The Limits of Application,” discusses the limits and opportunities of communication ethics in a hypertextual moment. In reflection of research on the FBI and counterterrorism as it has evolved since 9/11, this section frames application of communication-ethics-literacy-as-interpretive-lens as resisting the assumption that one can provide definite answers to the complex and dynamic questions that shape our world. Section two, “Communication Ethics Literacy, Narrative, and Counterterrorism,” provides overt connections between communication ethics metaphors and the questions that shape and will continue to shape the communicative context of counterterrorism in this historical moment. The purpose of this section is to situate communication ethics literacy in a way that announces new insights and directions. This section leverages a diverse body of communication ethics scholarship to (1) establish a connection between

²⁰⁸ François Cooren, *Action and Agency in Dialogue: Passion, Incarnation, and Ventriloquism*. (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publish Co., 2010).

communication ethics and counterterrorism demands; and (2) situate a theoretically textured approach to applying these metaphors in action. Section three, “Engaging Communication Ethics Literacy in Action: Pragmatic Practices,” offers a list of communicative practices for security professionals engaging counterterrorism amongst hypertextuality. This section identifies a list of communicative practices that can be engaged pragmatically to open the scope of counterterrorism research and action. In conclusion, this chapter discusses the communicative practice of reflection as the defining communicative task in predicting and responding to future threats.

Communication ethics literacy affords professionals a lens for exploring the questions that shape counterterrorism. And while this application does not provide answers for the demands that terrorism places on us in this historical moment, it provides meaningful assistance for navigating these threats in a manner that does justice to the diverse nation it seeks to protect. Equipped with such tools for navigation, it is the hope of this project that creative ways for engaging security will emerge. Communication ethics and counterterrorism in this moment presents us with the critical ethical demand that characterizes this historical moment: our communicative response has no final resolution.²⁰⁹ Navigating security in this moment requires that we recognize the limits of reality—we may never achieve security in the objective sense; however, communication ethics in this moment is shaped by our response to the challenges that call us. One can, in the face of such reality, respond to security threats in a way that opens rather than limits future possibilities for action.

Literacy and Hypertextuality: The Limits of Application

²⁰⁹ Arnett, *Levinas’s Rhetorical Demand: The Unending Obligation of Communication Ethics*.

This section discusses the application of communication-ethics-literacy-as-interpretive-lens as responsive to the hypertextual nature of this current moment. Hypertextuality, understood in this project as the coexistence of commitments to multiple historical eras, does not signify a time period following postmodernity. Rather, hypertextuality recognizes that persons and organizations committed to a modern commitment of process and procedure stand alongside persons committed to a postmodern commitment to protect and promote difference. Hypertextuality is a characterization of a postmodern world rich with diversity where agreements are temporary, and conflict is complex. Acknowledging hypertextuality bounds this project's application of communication ethics literacy to limitations. These limitations are the result of the inability to offer final solutions to the demands that terrorism places upon the FBI and nation at large. Yet, understanding the application of communication ethics literacy in a moment defined by hypertextuality offers space for practical and important insights. The following paragraphs overviews the reality of applying communication ethics literacy amongst hypertextuality.

Communication ethics in this moment acknowledges the coexistence of goods. Attentiveness to the coexistence of goods recognizes that we live in a historical moment that is rich with diversity of communicative agents; rich with diversity of communicative goods; and, rich with diversity of communicative practices. This approach to communication ethics rejects a modern assumption that a universal method of ethics exists. More importantly, however, this approach to communication ethics is grounded in

the acknowledgment of hypertextuality²¹⁰—this is the understanding that ethics as the commitment to the goods of multiple eras exist side by side.

Hypertextuality, defined by Umberto Eco and situated in communication ethics scholarship by Arnett, is the recognition that varying approaches to communication ethics—the protection and promotion of goods—exist concurrently in this historical moment. Thus, persons committed to a modern prospect of processes and procedures live and work alongside persons committed to a postmodern protection and promotion of difference. Understanding this historical moment as hypertextual, one can acknowledge that not only are there multiple, competing goods being protected and promoted, there is also disagreement concerning how these goods should be protected through communicative practices.

For this project, this acknowledgment of hypertextuality and the understanding of communication ethics in this historical moment recognizes that there is no one publicly agreed-upon set of communicative practices to protect and promote national security; there is no one publicly agreed-upon way to navigate intelligence in a world riddled with terrorism; there is no one publicly accepted and agreed upon manner in which we can perform counterterrorism. Practices of counterterrorism are situated within particular organizations who respond to the demands of the moment in a way that is both unique to their defined communicative goods and interpretation of what matters. Embracing the hypertextual nature of this moment means that communication ethics must be both attentive to the why (the philosophical discernment of the good) and how (the performative enactment of communication ethics) of communicative action.

²¹⁰ Ronald C. Arnett, “Communicative Ethics: The Phenomenological Sense of Semioethics,” 81.

How we engage communication ethics in action matters. Our communicative practices are made meaningful not only in contemplating which goods to protect and promote, but in choosing a given communicative practice to accomplish this task. This task of reclaiming communicative practices as a significant and vital component to communication ethics literacy stands alongside Arnett in his work on hypertextuality. Arnett writes that accepting our current historical moment as hypertextual “offers a critical stance, challenging unreflective acceptance of process and procedure in a time of global communication expansion.”²¹¹ It is the communicative obligation of each and every person to engage their response to our moment’s demanding questions with reflection, research, and, at times, critique of self and Other.

Communication-ethics-literacy-as-interpretive-lens attentive to hypertextuality directs attention to the narrative structures that shape our own response and, concurrently, varying narrative structures that shape the communicative practices of our research subjects. For security professionals charged with the task of counterterrorism, this twofold approach to intelligence collection, interpretation, and application opens areas for new insights and directions—a task that was, is, and will continue to be the communicative task of counterterrorism.

The purpose of this project’s application, then, is not to provide answers to the questions that shape counterterrorism in this historical moment.²¹² Its approach to

²¹¹ Ibid.

²¹² Chapter four of this project identifies the current communicative context of this historical moment and counterterrorism as follows: How can imagination be an ongoing and necessary component of terrorism prevention in order to preempt future capabilities, policy, and management failures? How can the FBI adapt with future organizational responses and structural changes as new threats emerge and current threats evolve? How can the FBI work alongside with Social Media organizations to establish principles and goals for reducing terror groups’ use of the platforms? How can the FBI challenge the narrative used as propaganda by terror groups online? How can the FBI build relationships with local community members

communication ethics resists the assumption that we can provide definite answers to the complex and dynamic questions that shape our world. Rather, the hope of this application is to offer theoretically grounded, practical tools for which security professionals can engage issues of counterterrorism in a creative and insightful ways.

This response to this moment's communicative context of counterterrorism demands a recognition of monologue as a formative communicative ethics that underpins this project's presentation of narrative ground. Specifically, with the acknowledgment of hypertextuality, this section notes the following realities, which will provide a backdrop to this chapter as a whole:

1. When we recognize our historical moment as hypertextual, we recognize that multiple narratives compete for public recognition and authority. In each communicative space, there are limitations as to who/what speaks; what can be heard; and what will be heard. Competition between and among groups committed to competing communicative goods begins before the clashing of these goods take place. This competition works to secure successfully the viability of communicative space—be it physical spaces, technological spaces, or ideological spaces.
2. Sense-making in this moment rests upon the ability to identify and interpret multiple understandings of the good. The assumption that communicative actions follows a path for interpretation that makes sense is an assumption void of the complexities of this current moment. Communicative action need only make

and police forces to better address domestic terrorism? How can the FBI address domestic terrorism while showing that they do not wish to overrun civil liberties?

sense to those engaging in the communicative practice shaped by their narrative ground. Navigating this difference is the communicative task of this moment.²¹³ Utilizing communication ethics literacy as an interpretive lens for past, present, and future engagement with acknowledgment of hypertextuality avoids critique or the intention to replace systems with new structures for action. Communication ethics literacy and hypertextuality allows one to view demands as historically complex and void of simple solutions. At best, we can offer areas where we can add insight.

Offering practices that address the complexities of the moment without overrunning reality, then, becomes a practical and pragmatic goal for this type of application. With this insight, the following section begins to foreshadow this work's recommended practices by drawing overt connections between communication ethics literacy metaphors and the FBI as an organization charged with the demanding task of counterterrorism in a moment void of simplicity.

Communication Ethics Literacy, Narrative, and Counterterrorism

Equipped with an understanding of the current historical moment of counterterrorism, this section identifies pragmatic connections between communication ethics literacy and the FBI as an organization charged with counterterrorism. Communication ethics assists counterterrorism professionals by providing an interpretive lens through which security professionals can better identify the commitments, motivators, and aims of terrorists. Whereas previous chapters reviewed communication ethics literature and presented the dialogic approach to communication ethics that frames

²¹³ Ronald C. Arnett, "Communicative Meeting: From Pangloss to Tenacious Hope," in *A Century of Communication Studies: A Thematic History of the Discipline*, Eds. Pat J. Gehrke and William M. Keith (pp. 261–285) (New York, NY: Routledge, 2014).

this project's interpretive lens, this section integrates communication ethics literacy metaphors into this project's counterterrorism application. To that end, this section builds upon the research previously presented to undergird the importance of narrative as the ground that shapes us; our communicative ethic.

Communication ethics literacy is shaped by communicative metaphors that offer researchers a lens for exploring current and ongoing challenges in a way that opens boundaries for creative insight. In this project, communication ethics literacy is grounded in the metaphors of narrative, communicative goods, and multiplicity/difference. This project has framed our historical moment as it relates to counterterrorism by identifying the former, current, and future terror threats demanding a response from the FBI. This section explores these demands through the remaining communication ethics metaphors to offer creative ways to explore these demands. This section, specifically, frames connections between narrative—the stories, people, and practices which shape communicative response—and the FBI.

Within the following paragraphs is an overview of this project's communication ethics metaphors alongside connections to the FBI. To navigate these connections, the following paragraphs reference various communication ethics scholars. The aim of these paragraphs is to offer practical areas where communication ethics literacy meets FBI counterterrorism research gaps. Narrative guides this section. This project defines narrative as the communicative ground that houses the stories, persons, communicative goods, and communicative practices that shape communicative events and responses to the demands of our historical moment. Narrative houses the communicative goods we protect and promote; acknowledgment of our current moment as one void of narrative

agreement shapes communication ethics literacy commitment to multiplicity and difference. When we recognize our historical moment as hypertextual, we recognize that multiple narratives compete for public recognition and authority.

Regarding communication ethics literacy, communicative goods and practices derive meaning from particular narratives. Narrative ground houses one's identity and shapes one's communicative practices.²¹⁴ Citing the work of Charles Taylor, Arnett writes that narrative shapes the monologue of one's life. Without recognizing the narrative ground of another, one can never understand how and why another makes the decisions they do and performs communicative practices in a particular manner. Additionally, predictions regarding future actions are groundless.²¹⁵ Narratives are negotiated and renegotiated over time as they adapt to the needs a given moment. Arnett, Fritz, and Bell trace the roots of narrative in the discipline of communication to Walter Fisher and W. Barnett Pearce. Following the work of Pearce, Fisher bridged communication and narrative through rhetoric and argumentation.²¹⁶ Fisher discusses the importance of storytelling for human communication. Arnett, Fritz, and Bell bridge storytelling and communication ethics literacy noting that publicly agreed upon stories serve as narrative ground.²¹⁷ The stories that shape our identity—narrative ground—embed communicative goods and direct communicative practice. Like individuals, organizations work within a given narrative. Organizational goals and practices should align with their narrative ground upon.

²¹⁴ Arnett "The Fulcrum Point of Dialogue: Monologue, Worldview, and Acknowledgement."

²¹⁵ Ibid., 111.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ See Arnett, Fritz, and Bell, *Communication Ethics Literacy*, and Ronald C. Arnett, Pat Arneson, and Annette Holba, "Bridges Not Walls: The Communicative Enactment of Dialogic Storytelling," *Review of Communication* 8, no. 3 (2008): 217—234.

Narrative as persons, stories, and practices that shape individual communicative ground are gathered around what would be called the good. Arnett reminds us that we live in an era of narrative and virtue contention.²¹⁸ This contention produces a multiplicity of discourses that come to life in the public sphere as persons work to protect and promote a variety of contrasting goods. Regarding communication ethics literacy, the protection and promotion of communicative goods classifies communication ethics as pragmatic. In each communicative event, persons perform the protection and promotion of multiple goods. As noted in chapter three, two conceptions of goods exist. Substantial goods are the identifiable position(s) that a communicator works to protect and promote. Substantial goods are grounded in particular narratives and attentive to the needs of a given historical moment. Communicative practices are the actions that protect and promote the substantial goods.²¹⁹ This understanding of communicative goods allows communication ethics to be defined by the act of protecting and promoting goods through performative communicative practices. As performative, communication ethics is both practical and pragmatic; it responds to meet the demands that are everyday life.²²⁰ Acknowledging this moment as hypertextual requires that we understand competition between communicative goods. Narrative and virtue contention results in competition between and among goods for public space. No longer can one assume that a modern framework of defined communicative goods shaping communicative practice exists. Rather, there is a multiplicity of goods, perspectives, and practices within, among, and behind each communicative event.

²¹⁸ Arnett, *Communication Ethics in Dark Times: Hannah Arendt's Rhetoric of Warning and Hope*.

²¹⁹ Arnett, Fritz, and Bell, *Communication Ethics Literacy*, 4.

²²⁰ Karolak and Mancino, "The 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum."

Differences between and among persons and organizations drive disagreements and conflict. Our current historical moment is one of vast disagreement concerning what matters and what affords our attention and resources. Sense-making in this moment rests on the ability to identify and interpret multiple understandings of the good. Navigating this difference is the communicative task of this moment.²²¹ Focusing our attention to the demands that call us to respond in hopes of offering assistance without seeking final resolution requires an attentiveness to the dynamic and diverse ethics present in each communicative event.²²²

The application of communication ethics literacy to the questions that shape counterterrorism in this moment rests on the above presentation of narrative as the persons and stories which embed communicative goods and shape communicative practice amongst multiplicity and difference. The following paragraphs identify overt connections between these communication ethics metaphors and the FBI in order to offer practical associations between these two areas.

Communication Ethics Literacy and FBI as Counterterrorism Organization

This subsection draws connections between the FBI and communication ethics metaphors through the work of various communication ethics scholars. These connections allow the reader to witness practical associations between this theoretically rich literature and the FBI as a pragmatic organization charged with securing a diverse nation.

The FBI works within the larger framework of national security organizations within the U.S., but their narrative is specific to mission: “To protect the American

²²¹ Arnett, “Communicative Meeting: From Pangloss to Tenacious Hope.”

²²² Arnett, *Levinas’s Rhetorical Demand: The Unending Obligation of Communication Ethics*.

people and uphold the Constitution of the United States.”²²³ As discussed in chapter two, this mission is shaped by the stories in response to which the FBI responded and evolved. At the heart of this mission is the origins of the FBI as a criminal investigation organization, the transformation of the Bureau in response to the failures of 9/11, and the current organization of the FBI in relation to emerging threats. The FBI’s narrative, including the stories and person that shape this narrative over time, frame the communicative goods they work to protect and promote. Yet, this narrative exists within and among multiple narratives and, at times, must compete for dialogic space.

In addition to their own narrative, FBI analysts and agents find value in acknowledging and researching the narratives of prospective terrorists. Without context on the background of terror actions, analysts and agents can overlook future planning of terror groups. With narrative background, researchers can better predict how and why terrorist will make certain decisions. Research into the narratives of terror groups, therefore, becomes a practical tool in aiding security professionals in the pursuit of preventing future attacks. Coordinating efforts against future attacks requires information that is grounded in intelligence. In terms of narrative, understanding the difference between possible future threats versus impractical future threats is a distinction of importance for security professionals. While the FBI does not seek to be in dialogue with terror organizations, dialogue understood in this project as the meeting of different narratives with an openness to learning, the FBI does compete against terror narratives for physical, technological, and ideological space and authority. This competition is not tied to overrunning terror narratives by imposing a single worldview. Rather, the FBI

²²³ Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Mission and Priorities.” <https://www.fbi.gov/about/mission>.

works to interrupt terror narratives in a way that reminds persons to hear multiple stories, persons, and practices within a given space. At the center of this competition is an acknowledgement that other groups and individuals are grounded upon narratives that make sense from the standpoint of their own worldviews. Regarding terror groups, these narratives are a national security threat. Even still, it becomes the effort of the communicator to recognize these narratives as a valid source of communicative goods and practices.

Our current historical moment demands that we take narrative seriously. To assume that in this historical moment we can dismiss another's narratives as invalid is a fantasy assumption that disconnects our communicative action and tries to escape the reality in which we live. Arnett articulates fantasy and communication ethics by discussing Immanuel Kant's distinction between imagination and fantasy tied to narrative writing, "imagination is the faculty of making present that which is absent."²²⁴ Imagination is rooted in the "persons, stories, and ideas" that validate a particular narrative. In contrast to fantasy, imagination is confirmed through research tied to a given narrative. Fantasy, on the other hand, is not connected to a *real* ground. Unlike imagination, which begins with acknowledgement of narrative ground, fantasy is based only on optimism.²²⁵ Arnett and Pat Arneson explain that optimism is a naive engagement of current issues and demands that overlooks the challenges that shape our lives. Communicative practice based on optimism does not engage the realities of our current moment as hypertextual. In comparison, imagination as attentiveness to narrative ground fuels genuine hope for communicative responses. This hope acknowledges the

²²⁴ Arnett, *Communication Ethics in Dark Times: Hannah Arendt's Rhetoric of Warning and Hope* 115.

²²⁵ Ibid.

real-time demands, as difficult, demanding, and challenging as they may be, in an effort to respond in a way that offers solid implications for future engagement.²²⁶

For counterterrorism professionals, imagination tied to narrative is dependent on research that is attentive to the background motivators, resources, and capabilities of terror groups or individuals. For example, it would be fantastical to assume that terror resources are limited or unchanging. Security professionals charged with predicating future terror trends must stay on the forefront of intelligence, being ever attentive to change. Additionally, for federal counterterrorism practices, imagination offers avenues for creative insight. Regarding the recommendations made by the Commission for the FBI—brainstorm about how attacks may be carried out; identify telltale indications that a surprise attack is being planned; collect intelligence on the indicators when possible; and integrate defense mechanisms to stop or alert to the deadliest attacks²²⁷—beginning these tasks with attentiveness to narrative ground will fuel imagination. Expanding research beyond the foreground to discover the background persons, stories, events, and ideas that may shape future communicative action can open doorways for new areas of exploration.

Attentiveness to narrative ground as a gateway to increased awareness and intelligence opens pathways for identifying the communicative goods competing for viability in this moment. The FBI currently has an established and vetted set of communicative goods that claim significance in their day to day work. These goods emerge through the set of priorities that guide the action of security professionals. These communicative goods also shift as old threats decrease or evolve and new threats emerge.

²²⁶ Ronald C. Arnett and Pat Arneson, *Dialogic Civility in a Cynical Age: Community, Hope, and Interpersonal Relationships* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999).

²²⁷ *9/11 Commission Report*, 346.

Currently, the FBI works to protect and promote prevention of terror attacks against the U.S., prevent foreign intelligence and espionage, and detect cyber-attacks against the U.S. and public corruption.²²⁸ For counterterrorism, the FBI privileges the prevention of terror attacks on U.S. soil. Within this communicative good are smaller communicative goods that shape FBI professional's communicative practices. These communicative goods are, as identified in the previous chapter, as follows: counter social media recruiting and propaganda by terrorists, prevent lone wolf attacks, and combat homegrown violent extremism. The FBI navigates the protection and promotion of these goods amongst multiple goods competing for viability in public space. These goods compete not only against those who support terrorism as an indiscriminate tool of violence and communication, but with those who challenge the communitive practices of counterterrorism professionals. For instance, public outcry against intelligence as an oversight of privacy continues to shape conversations surrounding the FBI and counterterrorism.²²⁹

This project's approach to communication ethics assumes that even if agreement regarding the communicative goods exists, how to protect and promote this good can be a point of contention between and among persons. Solution-based practices impose a fantasy ideal that shifts attention away from the reality of multiple perspectives of the good toward imposed demands regarding what matters and what actions should be

²²⁸ Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Mission and Priorities."

²²⁹ For examples of this criticism see Andrew Rosenthal, "Invading Your Privacy," *New York Times* 26 March 2012, <https://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/26/invading-your-privacy-obama-style/>; Joshua Foust and Eric Posner, "Is the N.S.A. Surveillance Threat Real or Imagined?" *New York Times Room for Debate*, 9 June 2013, <https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/06/09/is-the-nsa-surveillance-threat-real-or-imagined>.

taken.²³⁰ This approach to communication ethics as universal commitment to a singular set of goods disregards the recognition that within each communicative event past stories, current persons, and future directions shape our demands. For the FBI, this project's approach to communicative goods requires that one work without assurance of a solution.

Additionally, for security professionals, acknowledging that current conflicts and threats are shaped by a diverse background of multiple and competing communicative goods helps to frame foreground threats as textured. Research into the various narratives of terror actors can provide insight into the goods they protect and promote. Recognizing terrorists as individuals acting to protect and promote a set of communicative goods defined by their given narrative opens the communicative *why* and *how* of communicative action. Arnett, Leeanne Bell McManus, and Amanda McKendree offer insight into communicative goods and conflict that provide additional support here. Conflict and violence in the present is the result of conflicting background goods. These authors explain that communicative actors promote and promote their representative communicative goods in each communicative event. This protection and promotion in the foreground makes communication ethics pragmatic. Acknowledging the background goods of others provides clarity into the *why* and *how* of their communicative practices. Research into the background motivators of communicative actors textures the analysis of foreground communicative events. This textured approach to conflict illuminates the foreground events in a way that offers new insights for analysts. Looking beyond present actions to identify the underlying goods allows us to see why actors are making the

²³⁰ Ronald C. Arnett, "The Communication Ethics of Bioethics," in *Encyclopedia of Global Bioethics*. Ed. Henk ten Have (Springer, 2015), 2.

decisions being made. This looking beyond offers professionals a critical approach for making sense of terror actions that read as inexcusable and incomprehensible.

Discernment of communicative goods with recognition that solution-based practices overlook the significance of multiplicity and difference in this moment opens the conversation for navigating conflicts in a way that is creative and insightful. For security professionals, understanding the background motivators of varying security organizations as well as the background motivations of terrorists can broaden the scope of action. As discussed, it is imperative that the FBI build and maintain relationships with local partners to prevent violent extremism. Finding the touch points between and among the multiple security organizations can assist the FBI in bridging and maintaining key relationships with organizations charged with similar tasks. This relationship building among multiple constituencies can account for a better dispersing of valuable resources. Each organization protects and promotes their interpretation of a given good. Thus, while aims may be singular, interpretations and practices are multiple. François Cooren expands on this meeting of difference between and among communicators in this given historical moment. Cooren notes that within every communicative event there are actions that can be observed and analyzed. However, behind these actions is an organizing structure that governs communicative practices.

Negotiation between persons, therefore, is not limited to the communicative event. Each actor in communication speaks and acts on behalf of their given organization. When these background organizations are acknowledged, we free communicative events from the present and open the possibility of future interactions between and among

organizations.²³¹ For resource allocation, those proposition resources can add weight to their claim by acknowledging the organizations, broadly, that give them the authority to make such claims. At the core of U.S. security is a coordinated effort that transcends each individual organization. Being attentive to communication ethics literacy in action requires that communicative agents practice due diligence in reflection and learning. This due diligence provides a backdrop of information that assists in navigating the diverse backdrop of communicative events. Recognition of this historical moment as hypertextual requires that one recognize the coexistence of competing narratives. This recognition resists an attempt to overrun reality with a commitment to process and procedure.

With these connections, the following subsection offers a set of communicative practices for practically engaging counterterrorism in a way that acknowledges the limits of our moment while opening avenues for creative insight. These practices offer security professionals a pragmatic first step for navigating terrorism and its demands amongst uncertainty.

Communication Ethics Literacy as Practice

Exploring counterterrorism and the FBI through the communication ethics metaphors of narrative, communicative goods, and multiplicity/difference allows us to draw overt connections between these two areas. These connections open space for exploration that is not limited to the conflict of the current moment; interpreting with these metaphors broadens the scope of research allowing professionals to see the textured, varied, and demanding reality of the threats we continue to face. These

²³¹ See François Cooren, *Action and Agency in Dialogue*.

connections show that (1) all persons and organizations work from narrative grounds. These narrative grounds are formed from past stories, persons, and practices recognized as valid sources of meaning amongst a group of individuals. (2) Communicative goods compete for public viability in each communicative event. Competition of these goods can stem from differences concerning what matters. Competition can also be fueled by disagreements regarding choice of communicative practice for defending such goods. Thus, two persons committed to the same good can disagree on the best approach to promoting the good. (3) Multiplicity and difference makes sense-making a temporary and difficult task. Looking beyond the current practices to see that each moment is full of various governing structures that shape communicative actors can create new spaces for insight.

Drawing overt, yet practical, connections between communication ethics literacy and the FBI's counterterrorism efforts identifies the following insights:

1. Attentiveness to narrative ground provides an interpretive gateway to increased awareness and intelligence. This gateway opens pathways for identifying the communicative goods competing for viability in this moment. With this knowledge, security professionals free communicative events from present demands to explore the future possibilities of threats and action.
2. Acknowledgement of communicative goods as competing for public recognition and public space allows professionals to understand the limitations of solution-based practices. Solution-based practices impose a fantasy ideal that shifts attention away from the reality of multiple perspectives of the good toward imposed demands regarding what matters and what actions should be taken.

- Attentiveness toward practical response in place of solution-based practices opens the conversation for navigating conflicts in a way that is creative and insightful.
3. Acknowledging the complex and diverse nature of relationships between persons and organizations affords security professional the ability to transcend organizational constraints in a way that does not dismiss the realities of the current moment and to work in a coordinated fashion for increased intelligence. This attentiveness to diversity provides a backdrop of information that assists in navigating the diverse backdrop of communicative events.

Attentiveness to communication ethics literacy in action shifts the focus of attention from limits and constraints to openings for future thought and action. The above insights provide a pathway for developing thoughtful and attentive communicative practices that assist navigation of counterterrorism in our historical moment.

This section provided overt connections between communication ethics literacy and the FBI as a counterterrorism organization in an effort to connect the theory and practice. The next section explores communicative insights to offer practical assistance for performing this theory in action in a way that opens creativity and hope for future directions.

Engaging Communication Ethics Literacy in Action: Interpreting Effective Practices

This section begins with the following acknowledgement made in reflection of the work of Arnett: hope and creativity live where assurance does not. They live in acknowledgment and response to the demands that shape a moment. This response, when made with attentiveness to the literacy of communication ethics offers avenues for discovery. Reflecting on this sentiment, this section asks, how do we attend to narrative,

goods, and multiplicity in a way that permits us to engage in the demands of our current moment? With insights from the connections between communication ethics literacy and FBI counterterrorism made in section one, this section identifies a set of communicative practices that respond to the questions shaping counterterrorism in this moment: How can imagination be an ongoing and necessary component of terrorism prevention in order to preempt future capabilities, policy, and management failures? How can the FBI adapt with future organizational responses and structural changes as new threats emerge and current threats evolve? How can the FBI work alongside with Social Media organizations to establish principles and goals for reducing terror groups' use of the platforms? How can the FBI challenge the narrative used as propaganda by terror groups online? How can the FBI build relationships with local community members and police forces to better address domestic terrorism? How can the FBI address domestic terrorism while showing that they do not wish to overrun civil liberties?

This project approaches these questions not with optimism for final solutions, but with hope for creative insight and direction. This assertion recognizes that, at times, we must endure the muddiness of life in search of areas that can provide genuine hope for navigation. Following the insights of Arendt, Arnett explain this task as it relates to communication ethics: “genuine light” counters “undue optimism” that promises an escape from the dangers of fear and uncertainty.²³² In this moment, those attentive to communication ethics literacy recognize that terrorism resists a final solution as national security evolves and changes over time.

²³² Arnett, *Communication Ethics in Dark Times: Hannah Arendt's Rhetoric of Warning and Hope*, 3.

Identifying Gaps for Reflective Practices

I begin this section by reviewing the FBI process for gathering, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence. The FBI, among other security organizations within the U.S., define intelligence as (1) a product of refined research that assists policymakers in decision-making; (2) a process by which information is gathered, refined, and disseminated; and (3) organizations charged with refining raw data into useful research for the security community at large.²³³ This project has shown that September 11 exposed specific gaps in security intelligence. Previous chapters presented 9/11 as a significant story shaping our narrative of national security noting that stories guide one's engagement with the historical moment and offer appropriate grounds for responding to current existential demands. The failures of 9/11 continue to shape our response the demands of our current moment. Thinking about these failures alongside the current process for intelligence will uncover practices for creatively navigating counterterrorism.

Intelligence gathering and dissemination works in a cycle consisting of six processes. First, intelligence officers analyze pressing threats identified by FBI leadership. The threats provide areas to focus intelligence gathering efforts and identify specific subjects for research. Second, an implementation plan for data collection, refinement, and dissemination is developed. Third, raw information is gathered through sources identified during the implementation period. These sources include information collected from human sources, or persons of interest, through interviews or covert operations, signals intelligence from electronic transmissions, photo intelligence gathered through satellites, measurement and signatures intelligence gathered through raw data

²³³ Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Leadership and Structure," <https://www.fbi.gov/about/leadership-and-structure/intelligence-branch>.

concerning weapon capability tests, and open source intelligence from public sources including media, academic sources, and public data. Fourth, raw data is converted into analysis. Fifth, data is converted into intelligence, and “information’s reliability, validity, and relevance is evaluated and weighed.”²³⁴ Intelligence personnel then draw conclusions regarding implications of the data. Finally, this intelligence is distributed in three formats: Intelligence Information Report (Iirs), FBI Intelligence Bulletins, and FBI Intelligence Assessments.

In each step of intelligence, FBI personnel are attentive to the line between data collection, analysis, and dissemination and civil liberties. To that end, the Bureau works within laws defined by the U.S. Constitution and follows guidelines directed by U.S. Attorney General. Additionally, all new intelligence personnel visit the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C. “to see for themselves what can happen when law enforcement becomes a tool of oppression.”²³⁵ This trip is planned in an effort to remind FBI personnel to be attentive to the dangers of oppressing publics in the attempt to secure intelligence. FBI policy is to share intelligence when possible with other security groups in order to protect against threats to the U.S. or law enforcement.

Viewing the intelligence distribution process through the lens of communication ethics literacy, one can identify areas for applying communicative practice. To begin, it must be acknowledged that the FBI works within a modern framework of documented processes and procedures, committed to one understanding of the good—protecting the U.S. from violence. Therefore, to assume that we could overhaul all of these processes would also be a fantasy. The best we can do is identify practices that create areas for

²³⁴ Ibid.

²³⁵ Ibid.

insight and creative action, thus opening the processes and procedures in a way that pushes the boundaries of informational constraints.

Taking the identified failures as a starting point, we can see that the greatest issues regarding intelligence gathering analysis and dissemination center upon the following constraints: instituting imagination, relationship building, and challenging and responding to dangerous narratives. This project argues that instituting imagination is central to the constraints outlined here. These constraints limit the possible for creative engagement of counterterrorism, and, when grounded in fantastical assumptions of solution-based practices, create further security gaps. Interpreting these constraints with insights from communication ethics affords professionals the ability to see limitations as a communicative practice worthy of implementation.

Integrating imagination within the intelligence process grounds this section's recommended communication. This project understands imagination "as the faculty of making present that which is absent."²³⁶ Imagination begins with attentiveness to others—as unacceptable and incomprehensible as they may be when viewed through our worldview. Echoing the sentiment of Hannah Arendt and her work on Immanuel Kant, Arnett writes that imagination works with two faculties for knowledge, sensing and knowing. Imagination offers an alternative to progress, or the effort to overrun reality with the hope of instituting processes and procedures that fix our demands. In place of a commitment to process and procedures that ignores the reality of difference and the demands of the particular moment, imagination offers the scope to explore demands without subjective demand that they conform to our own wishes. Building imagination

²³⁶ Arnett, *Communication Ethics in Dark Times: Hannah Arendt's Rhetoric of Warning and Hope*, 115.

into the intelligence process begins with reflective practices that change the way security professionals think about the goals of intelligence.

Currently, each step in the intelligence process is aimed at a particular goal: identifying research subjects, detailing raw data collection plans, gathering data, analyzing data, producing reports for audiences in charge of decision making. Within this process, the goal is defined at the beginning of the process when FBI leadership establishes the research subjects. From there, intelligence work is aimed at data collection and analysis for the goal of producing reports that provide clarity on the research subject. This process, when interpreted through the lens of communication ethics literacy, calls us to attend to reflection as a means of identifying and informing research gaps. Reflection practices offer professionals a ground for integrating imagination.

Integrating Reflective Practices

This project offers the following reflective practices as a means to improving intelligence in a hypertextual moment defined by the demands of terrorism. These practices remind professionals to revisit past practices with a lens for uncovering where and why gaps existed. With this knowledge, professionals can brace for events with insight and clarity. In this moment where solution-based practices are not an attainable reality and the demands of terrorism are ongoing, reflective practices offer a space for learning and adapting in real-time. The following communicative practices offer strategic initiative for engaging reflective practices so as to address the documented FBI counterterrorism failures listed throughout this project:

1. *Implement reflective practices*—Reflective practices work by looking back on communicative events with metaphors that afford professionals an intellectual

space for sense-making. This intellectual space offers professionals the ability to identify gaps, breakdowns in process and procedure, and critical moments where failures emerged. Reflections on 9/11 show that, in theory, the FBI had allotted resources for counterterrorism to local field offices. In practice, however, these resources were minimal. Additionally, as witnessed with the FBI's Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) initiative established in 2011, and discussed in previous chapters, while groundwork was laid for implementing practices to detect violent extremism, the processes were underdeveloped in practice. When we explore counterterrorism demands and actions through communication ethics literacy, we acknowledge the need for better attentiveness to integrated theory and practice.

Following the insights of Calvin O. Schrag, praxis addresses the interplay of theory, action, and context.²³⁷ This interplay recognizes the importance of each—theory, action, and context—without privileging one above the others. Communicative praxis reminds us that while we cannot rely simply on the presentation of data, we also cannot rely on theory left underdeveloped and not implemented. Continuous reflection requires that we ask: is the theory for implementation developed? Are the practices that bring this theory into action defined? Are these practices practical for this given moment and context? Reflecting upon these questions in all stages of implementation allow one to see gaps in intelligence as they emerge and gaps in practice as they unfold. The

²³⁷ Calvin O. Schrag, *Communicative Praxis and the Space for Subjectivity* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986). See also, Ronald C. Arnett, Pat Arneson, and Leeanne Bell, "Communication Ethics: The Dialogic Turn," 154.

complexity of this historical moment requires that professionals acknowledge that gaps and missed opportunities will occur. Reflective practice reminds us that amongst mistakes, professionals have an obligation to go back and interpret these failures in an effort to improve and resist repetition.

2. *Texture reflective practices.* Strategic relationships with local community organizations provide multiple resources for vetting counterterrorism practices. In addition to intellectual space afforded through one's own reflective practices, the coordination of groups and persons provides a textured approach to examine practices with the goal of identifying and closing gaps. The FBI depends on their ability to build strategic relationships with attentiveness to multiplicity and organizational constraints. These relationships allow for intelligence sharing that can provide early detection of individuals who may engage in violent extremism. Care in attentiveness to the interplay of multiple goods in public space can help to foster and maintain these strategic and necessary relationships. If we look to the joint CVE initiative of the Obama administration and FBI as an example, we can witness how inattentiveness to the multiplicity of goods can limit the growth of relationships and trust amongst local groups and the FBI. Attentiveness to the multiplicity and organizational restraints begins with recognition that all communicative events are shaped by multiple governing structures. This acknowledgment requires that security professionals ask: What goods drive this organization's commitments to security? What practices protect and promote these goods? How do these practices compete with the goods of the FBI?

Attentiveness to these questions can allow professionals seeking to build

quality relationships with insight on the best means of resource allocation.

Allocating resources to the strategic areas where local communities need them offers a pragmatic space for bridging gaps amongst local and federal counterterrorism efforts. Strong relationships build resources and afford professionals a strong capacity for reflective practices.

3. *Enhance reflective practices*—Interpreting narrative ground as monologue allots professionals the ability to augment reflective practices further. The FBI works to counter terror narratives online while also navigating criticisms against their intelligence processes. Similar to how the FBI depends on relationships with local groups to strengthen the ability to identify individuals who may commit violence, the FBI relies on tips from citizens to identify possible terror actors. As such, it is important for the Bureau to have measures in place to respond to counter dangerous narratives online and, when needed, understand public criticisms that may deter individuals from sharing pertinent information regarding terror threats. “The notion of common sense shifts from expected uniform universal access to a pragmatic existential humility that acknowledge[s] biased and tainted ground a particular narrative position.”²³⁸ In our current moment, narratives compete for “conceptual or discourse space.”²³⁹ Embeddedness in a given narrative shapes possibilities for communication as narratives encounter one another in dialogue.

We can no longer assume that persons work within a narrative framework that make sense to us; truth and common sense are no longer tied first to worldview. Rather, truth and common sense are situated in narrative which shapes

²³⁸ Arnett, “The Fulcrum Point of Dialogue: Monologue, Worldview, and Acknowledgement,” 113.

²³⁹ Ibid.

multiple worldview perspectives. We cannot counter the worldview of another without recognition of the fact that the persons, stories, communicative goods, and practices embedded in these narratives reinforce their worldview as a common sense truth. In a hypertextual moment, sense-making is grounded in a particular worldview shaped by a given narrative. Countering opposing worldviews from the standpoint of one's own narrative is not effective. The communicative practice for addressing dangerous narratives becomes one of showing fault in the ground of particular narratives rather than critiquing from one's own narrative. Additionally, asking oneself where the roots of criticism stem from and responding in a way that takes seriously the criticisms of the public upon which professionals depend. Monologue offers a source of understanding and countering other dangerous monologues.

Literacy as interpretive lens protects and promotes reflective communicative practices. Reflective practices shape practical and pragmatic measures for FBI counterterrorism professionals to work within the processes and procedures defined by the Bureau, while working to expand limitations and identify gaps and opportunities for intelligence professionals. Additionally, reflective practices create opportunities from which imagination and creativity can grow. This ground upon which imagination and creativity can stand is built on genuine hope attentive to the past concerns, current demands, and future threats that shape our moment.

This application of communication-ethics-literacy-as-interpretive-lens shows that navigating counterterrorism in a hypertextual moment is an unending task of reflection. Literacy as interpretive lens amongst hypertextuality shows that strategic communicative

practices open spaces for response rather than overrunning the realities of our moment or oversimplifying the demands of counterterrorism. Literacy as interpretive lens affords us practical means for engaging this moment's critical questions in a manner that does justice to the diverse nation it seeks to protect.

This work's applications place reflective practices as the practical and pragmatic communicative good of interpretation using communication ethics literacy. This project's presentation of communication ethics as interpretive lens transforms the application of communication ethics metaphors application from a tool applicable to understanding past events to a practical and important measure for navigating current and future demands. This transformation rests upon one's ability to infuse imagination rooted in reflective practices into the most difficult of demands and limitations. Communication-ethics-literacy-as-interpretive-lens equips security professionals with meaningful strategies for engaging the demands of our moment even when these moments seem to paralyze space for action. Reflective practices keep communicative life and communicative action alive in the face of danger and violence committed to paralyzing groups with fear. With this sentiment, this project concludes with commentary on the implications of connecting communication ethics with FBI counterterrorism.

Concluding Remarks: Communication Ethics as The Protection and Promotion of Precarious Life

This project began noting Bruce Hoffman's seminal work of terrorism, writing, terrorism is the nondiscriminatory use of violence to impose fear in hopes of changing political landscapes or promoting specific ideologies; terrorism is most successful when thought translates into action or, when plans for violence are successfully carried out. Following insights from the previous five chapters, this project extends this definition of successful terrorism to add that terrorism is most successful when it, through fear and violence, paralyzes a given community or group of persons making it difficult, if not impossible, to respond. Thus, the most successful terrorists are those who translate thought into an Other's *inaction*. In summary, terrorism exploits the freedoms it seeks to replace in hopes of making one incommunicable.²⁴⁰

Judith Butler, Maxine Elliot professor of comparative literature at the University of California, Berkeley, speaks of this motive of removing one's ability to respond in her work of the precarious nature of social life. Butler's work on performativity as a communicative act of resistance and reliance offers implications for continued research, development, and application of communication ethics literacy and counterterrorism.²⁴¹ This final section explores the implications of Butler's work on this project and the future of counterterrorism and communication ethics scholarship.

²⁴⁰ As noted in chapter one of this work, Bruce Hoffman defined successful terrorism as translating thought into action. This work recognizes the FBI definition of terrorism as violence aimed toward goals of political or ideological change. For a current FBI definition, see Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Terrorism," <https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/terrorism>.

²⁴¹ See Judith Butler, *Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative* (New York: Routledge, 1997).

Terrorism presents us with an unending call of communication ethics; respond. The ability to navigate life amongst the perils of violence depends on one's ability to prepare, reflect, and respond to the demands and questions that shape a given moment. This call to respond, specifically in the face of violence, is not a call one can avoid or control. In her work on the ethics of discourse, Butler explains: "No one controls the terms by which one is addressed To be addressed is to be, from the start, deprived of will, and to have deprivation exist as the basis of one's situation in discourse."²⁴² Butler's words echo the sentiment of this project: terrorism in all its forms (domestic, international, lone wolf), with its multiple motivations, theories, and actions, demand of us a response while aiming to close our ability to respond in any meaningful way. Thus, our responses are often made in darkness as it is impossible to know for certain if our efforts will deter or impact the capabilities of terrorist in any measurably successful manner.

Terrorism confronts us with violence that is "beyond our will" and imposes upon professionals the obligation to navigate such dreadful conditions. How and why we choose to respond to this reality is the defining communicative ethical choice of this time. The benefit of Butler's work for this project is found in her approach to the precarious nature of social life as the bonds that create and sustain one's ability to respond; the bonds that keep one afloat in the face of violence. Butler's work on precarity and performativity offer a constant reminder that our ability to communicate and act is, at its core, a life-granting and life-sustaining function of human capacity. Amongst oppression

²⁴² Butler references the work of Emmanuel Levinas who discusses ethics as first philosophy. See *Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence* (New York: Verso 2006), 139. For an overview of Levinas's ethics as first philosophy in relation to communication and rhetorical studies, see Arnett, *Levinas's Rhetorical Demand: The Unending Obligation of Communication Ethics*.

and violence, finding ways to sustain the ability to communicate is, at times, our greatest success. The paragraphs below offer remarks on the implications of Butler's sentiments for this project and the future of counterterrorism responses.

Butler situates precarity as a human condition of life lived with others.²⁴³ By nature, human life is precarious on the basis of social interdependence; simply put, we cannot determine who we share our world with, and, as a result of this indeterminism, our lives are precarious and full of uncertainty. Additionally, efforts to exploit this precarious nature of social life create or subdue additional precarious factors. For instance, precarity becomes tied to the body as employment, food security, housing security, and security against violence is threatened or alleviated based on persons, institutions, and structures that govern public life.²⁴⁴ Thus, sources and conditions of precarity are multiple and reducing the source or solution of precarity to singular efforts overlooks the significance of social interdependency. Terrorism exploits this uncertainty leveraging violence, propaganda, and fear to drive disconnects between persons, communities, and countries.

The precarious nature of social life lived amongst Others acknowledges the fate of terrorism in this moment: No one escapes the threat of such violence as we cannot objectify and achieve security across all areas of life. There is no easy way to foster sustainable solutions to precarious cohabitation.²⁴⁵ At times, our best hope of responding to this uncertainty is to limit the harm created by our responses and to endure challenges in a way that keeps imagination open. Where terrorism succeeds is in the exploitation of

²⁴³ Eliza Kania, "Exercising Freedom: Interview with Judith Butler," *Revolutions: Global Trends and Regional Issues* 1, no. 1(2013): 33.). See also Judith Butler, *Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence*.

²⁴⁴ Kania, "Exercising Freedom: Interview with Judith Butler," 34.

²⁴⁵ Butler, *Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence*, 21.

this precarious social interdependence with the use of violence, it is our response that ultimately determines this success. There are communicative events which can be overwhelming and in effect, cause the constraints of our reality to “paralyze” one to inaction.²⁴⁶ The question when confronted with the weight of such ethical burdens becomes: how does one carry the existence of such responsibility?²⁴⁷ Following the insights of Butler, I argue that we communicatively challenge this ethical *paralysis* through reflective practices create and sustain a ground for imagination that carries creative outlets for unending response.

Writing in reflection of the work of Emmanuel Levinas, who reminds us that we are called to ethical response through a demand that comes often against our will, Butler notes that the call to respond in such dire conditions holds us hostage and situates us in a realm of unending responsibility.²⁴⁸ The ground for ethics rests where assurance does not. “If I possess myself too firmly or too rigidly, I cannot be in an ethical relation.”²⁴⁹ At the core of Butler’s work on precarity is the sentiment that we cannot choose with whom we cohabit the world. The only choice one has is the choice to respond to the demands that shape our time as violent, challenging, and unending as they are. The ability to unparalyze oneself is to not only acknowledge the ethical demand placed upon us, but to acknowledge the call as unending. Every time we reflect on the gaps in our intelligence, every time we reflect on the failures and mistakes of our processes, and every time we

²⁴⁶ Judith Butler, “Precarious Life and the Obligations of Cohabitation,” *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 26, no. 2 (2012): 134-151.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 135. Butler states, “I want to suggest that these are ethical obligations which do not require our consent, and neither are they the result of contracts or agreements into which any of us have deliberately entered.” The question rests, where does the responsibility lie, and further, how do I burden the existence of such responsibility.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

reflect on the future state of unending security demands, we affirm the basis of ethics. Only in acknowledgment of darkness can we create the possibility for genuine hope of communicative action.

Whereas terrorism attempts to abuse or exploit precarity by staking a claim as to whose lives matter, our continued reflection and response can open pathways for imagination. Each time professionals commit themselves to the preservation of life and reflect on the demands of terrorism, we create pathways for imagination. And with this, we unparalyze ourselves from terror and keep alive the possibility for genuine hope. Through continued reflection, we do not simply endure violence and fear, we offer avenues for forecasting future predictions. It is in this forecasting that sincere contributions will be made. This forecasting offers a continuous reminder that our ethical demands are not simply to those in present eyesight. We cannot avoid the precarious nature of our lives, but we can reflect and respond to give life to genuine outlets and creative hope for future engagements.

When tasked with the burden of response in the face of fear and, at times, failure, reflective practices provide us with a ground off of which to push. We do ourselves a disservice by attempting to seek short-term answers that overlook the complexities of the moment place answers on a ground of optimism fueled only by fantasy. In our exposure to forces beyond our control and to the fear and violence perpetuated by terrorists in an attempt to rob us of ability to act, our persistence of reflective practices performs a continued message of “we are here” which, in turn, translates into a “we have not yet been disposed of.”²⁵⁰ This *thereness* asserts our ability to challenge terrorism on

²⁵⁰ Butler uses these words to describe the benefits of public assembly. The body enacts a message of *thereness*. See Jasbir Puar, “Precarity Talk: A Virtual Roundtable with Lauren Berlant, Judith Butler,

imaginative ground that keeps alive hope for future guidance and genuine social change. In the face of terrorism as a continued threat to safety, keeping alive the ability to respond through reflection is the primary good.

With response, made through an attentiveness to continued reflective practices, one moves past the hope for universal response toward the mud of everyday life, recognizing that the answers to our current communicative issues are not simple.²⁵¹ Yet, acknowledgement of narrative ground makes future direction possible. This future direction, built on creativity and imagination sustains real development for practically meeting the demands of terrorism in the years to come.

Bojana Cvejić, Isabell Lorey, Jasbir Puar, and Ana Vujanović.” *TDR/The Drama Review* 56, no. 4 (2012): 167.

²⁵¹ Arnett, *Communication Ethics in Dark Times: Hannah Arendt’s Rhetoric of Warning and Hope*, 115

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