An Exploration of Communication Ethics Scholarship and Economic Spheres

Andrew Tinker

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AN EXPLORATION OF COMMUNICATION ETHICS SCHOLARSHIP AND ECONOMIC SPHERES

A Dissertation
Submitted to McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts

Duquesne University

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

By
Andrew Jarvis Tinker

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AN EXPLORATION OF COMMUNICATION ETHICS SCHOLARSHIP AND ECONOMIC SPHERES

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ABSTRACT

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Dissertation supervised by Professor Ronald C. Arnett

This project examines communication ethics scholarship to understand how economics is understood within the field and to establish coordinates for scholars to discuss economic spheres as phenomena that affect communication ethics. Scholars draw from the tradition of virtue ethics to mark communication ethics inquiry as that which explores the practices that protect and promote the “good.” Philosophers of communication and communication ethicists have developed paradigmatic metaphors for the field that allow us to understand the formation of ethical guidelines within communities both familial, corporate, and national, that promote and protect various goods. These metaphors include “hierarchy” and “sameness” from Charles Taylor, who notes that these “social imaginaries” determine the way people are treated within a hierarchy is based upon their role within it. Public identity also determines how others are treated and how communication transpires, which Alasdair Macintyre notes is a tradition dating back to
Aristotle. The metaphor of private and public spheres, and their boundaries, also form how communicative agents interact. Hannah Arendt’s analysis examines how the conflation of these two spheres in the time of the Industrial Revolution and following, transformed in part by Karl Marx’s writings, created a “social” sphere in which ethical boundaries are continuously contested. This differs greatly from ancient economics, though the ancient period in the West still informs an identification of economics as part of the private sphere and government as part of the public sphere.

Drawing from these metaphors, economic spheres affect communication ethics in our present historical moment. Capitalism creates a hierarchy grounded in an ontic presumption of sameness. Its institutions, such as corporations, reify hierarchical order while the freedom to enter into contracts, which Taylor identifies as a primary turn toward “civility” after the 16th-17th century time of “Reform,” requires a presumption of sameness among its members. That is, people are considered to have the same opportunity to participate, or at least are treated as if they do, and, therefore, share equal responsibility for maintaining the system. Socialism reifies sameness and distributes goods based upon that notion. Both systems inform public identities, such as “consumer” and “producer,” and both rely on particular accounts of public and private spheres—debates surrounding neoliberal capitalism, for example, focus on the primary discussion of what role the government should have in market activity. As such, communication ethics scholars are in a unique position to explore economic spheres and how they affect communication as each revolves around a particular good.
DEDICATION

I dedicate this dissertation to my family and friends for their unending support of my work and life. In the words of Emily Saliers, “The prize is always worth the rocky ride.”
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

A cloud of witnesses has brought me to this point in my career. These include my dissertation director Professor Ronald C. Arnett, Professor Pat Arneson, Professor Janie Harden Fritz, and the rest of the faculty at Duquesne University. I also offer my deepest thanks to Mrs. Rita McCaffrey for her commitment to administrative excellence. I also wish to thank my many fellow students and their feedback and support. Outside of Duquesne University, this cloud has included Professor Jolyon Mitchell at the University of Edinburgh and Professor Paul Nimmo at the University of Aberdeen, who encouraged me to continue onto Ph.D. work at the conclusion of my master’s work. The late Professor Marcella Althaus-Reid, of the University of Edinburgh, was of great personal support to me as a student there and introduced me to the work of Canadian journalist Naomi Klein, whose analysis of branding culture and neoliberal economics is largely responsible for my interest in economics and communication ethics. The Rev. Dr. Teresa Eisenlohr has continued to support my academic work and offer encouragement after supervising my M.A. dissertation at Pittsburgh Theological Seminary in 2004. Dr. Cary Wecht, Associate Professor at Youngstown State University, oversaw my undergraduate Senior Capstone Research project at Westminster College (PA) and was the first person to say to me that graduate school was “for you.” She got me to present my project as part of an undergraduate poster session at the 1999 Eastern Communication Association conference in Charleston, WV—my first scholarly presentation.
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Chapter One – Economics Spheres and the Turn to Communication Ethics

Introduction

Communication ethics scholarship examines a broad range of phenomena, understanding how multiple spheres of communication studies, rhetorical studies, and humanities scholarship affect the way that we communicate. In this dissertation, I explore communication ethics literature and its discussions of economics. Insights within the literature reveal economic inquiry to be a significant future area of exploration for contemporary communication ethics scholarship.

In this dissertation, I explore a plain, guiding question: what understandings of Western economics emerge from communication ethics scholarship and how might these contribute to our understanding of the ethics of human communication? As will be shown in the following chapters, economic spheres define public goods, and the ethical practices that promote and protect them, in a way that warrants particular attention from communication ethics scholars. Through this analysis, I argue that communication ethics offers a robust series of discussions of economic spheres and their effects on human ethical praxis.

This project is ordered through five general discussions, one per chapter, that reveal the exigence of economic reflection for communication ethics scholarship. This introductory chapter accounts for the method of inquiry of this project, followed by an examination of economic vocabulary from scholarship on ancient economics. A key argument of this dissertation is that economics has transferred from the private sphere of human activity to the public sphere. How this occurred and its social effects are of great interest to communication ethics scholars—understanding the process requires connections to ancient thought. After establishing initial concepts, I turn to Charles Taylor’s 2007 study *A Secular Age*. It reveals the central place that trade and economic activity assumed in the period after the Protestant Reformation, offering an
alternative for those looking for “fullness” in a disenchanted world. The success of Western capitalism, through the shared goods of production and growth, is central to modernity. Modernity initiates an account of economic ethics not as focused on the control of greed, but on harnessing the power of capitalism and, within that sphere, a “free market”—a realm of trade and economic activity without external restraints from the State. This realm provides a vision to build a liberated world grounded in the collective pursuit of self-interest. Taylor’s work is influential on communication ethics scholarship, examining the rise of the “self” and its protection as a primary good that, in part, defines how we communicate in the modern era (Arnett et. al. Communication Ethics Literacy 5-6): how we enter into discourse with one another, how we enter into it, how we assert the need for protection in the use of language, all of which reflects a shift in the understanding of “free speech” and “dialogue,” among other communicative practices. As such, his work offers an undeniable entry into the conversation of how economic spheres affect communication ethics. It also provides a central metaphor for communication ethics scholarship that will recur throughout this study: hierarchy and sameness.

Metaphors that continue throughout the project emerge from the communication ethics literature and the close readings of scholars throughout the Western canon. As do other communication ethics scholars, this project employs an interpretive method to encounter their work.

**Method**

The goal of the dissertation is not to make immediate pronouncements of laws to define communication ethics in economic spheres, but to reveal areas of inquiry for scholars. As Deirdre N. McCloskey reminds us, economics is rhetorical—the application of scientific principles to economic ideas comes from the contemporary re-envisioning of economics through
a lens of science, rather than human interaction. Looking for laws replicates the persistent and flawed idea that economic spheres are fixed beyond their own constructed nature—that is, they have internal logic and boundaries that define them, but they do not exist *a priori* as a fixed rule. Communication ethics scholarship is in a unique position to highlight this problem. Economics spheres do have particular qualities for communicators. Martin Buber, for example, envisioned economics as a part of distanced communication, marking a separation between parties that prevents the presence of a *Thou*. This does not mark economic communication as lesser or worse than another kind of communication, but as different, meaning that economic spheres of communication, as they re-envision human relations, render distance between individuals, embodying modern individualism and the protection of what Taylor calls the “buffered self” through consumerism. This turn accounts for contemporary communicative phenomena, such as reimagining relations between children and parents, for example, through the lens of production—the development of child-care as an industry rather than a practice and the shifting demographics of child-rearing, as Richard A. Easterlin discussed in a 1982 article for the *Journal of Communication*. The transformation of public professions and private institutions mark the need for reflection upon economic spheres for communication ethics scholarship.

Discussions within this project are grounded in an interpretive method of inquiry. Qualitative research in communication “seeks not to impose, but to engage the communication event and is responsive to learning and innovations called forth from us, not imposed upon the focal point of study” (Arnett “Interpretive” 30). Such a method stands in the tradition of the humanities, from which communication ethics comes. That is, communication ethics literature reveals coordinates and metaphors that can be recognized and interpreted from the literature, searching for what is revealed as well as what is hidden.
Understanding the influence of economics on social life, and subsequently, human communication, requires a method that challenges the bias of economic inquiry as social (or other) science. Gary S. Becker, for example, who was a Chicago School economist (a School of theorists emergent in the early 20th century from the University of Chicago, known for advocacy of the free market) and colleague of Milton Friedman, and a fellow Nobel Laureate, argues in *The Economics of Discrimination* that his primary accomplishment in the study is methodological. That is, his purpose was “to develop a theory of non-pecuniary motivation and to apply it quantitatively to discrimination in the market place. It is my belief that this application will stimulate the quantitative analysis of non-pecuniary motivation in other areas” (Becker 11).

In the book, Becker develops equations measuring human economic interactions, arguing that communities are unwise to discriminate on the basis of race in business practices, though he focuses equally on discrimination by African-American business owners and consumers who only shop at other minority businesses rather than white businesses that discriminate in the Jim Crow era. The science, in this case, gives Becker the paternalistic authority to argue that it is not in the best interest of owners not to shop at white-owned stores, reifying human actors into parts of an equation. In one figure, for example, he compares the net income of whites, \( W \), with the net incomes of “Negroes” \( N \), converting them into variables in an equation (35-38). Edward P. Lazear has extolled Becker as “the ultimate economic imperialist” for Becker’s contribution to understanding social behavior through the lens of the market (Lazear 80). Yet this activity negates the rhetorical, human nature of economic interaction. Later in this dissertation, I examine McCloskey’s analysis (herself a former colleague at the Chicago School) of economic rhetoric and the problems in analyzing the rhetorical discipline of economics as a social science.
Stanley Deetz critiques the re-imagination of institutions through the lens of corporatization, the family sphere and the community in particular, where social behavior is ordered around one’s work and one’s income, grounded in commitment to the institution that is the corporation, above all other commitments (Deetz 24). To put this phenomenon in contemporary marketing terms: it is corporation as first place.¹ The private sphere trumps the public sphere, particularly through the lens of a neoliberal system that advocates for and insists upon this process. Wendy Brown and David Harvey are two exemplars of scholars who critically analyze neoliberalism (Brown; Harvey) for this conflation. The goal of this project is to clarify considerations for communication ethics by examining the metaphors and presumptions, such as the private and public sphere, that ground them and connect them to economics. A running presumption throughout this project, then, is that insights leading to critical analysis have yet to be formed because communication ethics scholarship has not yet fully examined economics through its own lens. Practices of disclosure, truth-telling, and others that are inherent to ethics and communication connect to particular historical moments and narratives. This project points to the economic sphere as a narrative shaping contemporary public goods.

This project is grounded in a constructive hermeneutic typified in humanities research of communication ethics. In an emulation of Kenneth Burke, this project joins an academic conversation, interjecting with a new subject for others to consider and justifying its importance from previously discussed topics (Burke “Philosophy of Literary Form,” 111 fn27). In a discussion of qualitative inquiry, Ronald C. Arnett identifies “a public question” as the beginning of research in philosophical hermeneutics, research that reveals what is happening within a text.

¹ Starbucks has relied upon a “third place” business model, where it becomes a place to be after home and work, which are first and second place. Its attention to its nature as a place has been central to its success as a brand (Rajasekaran 46-48). Critics of neoliberalism, tying to Marxist critique, note the growing “first place” nature of the business in human life.
Drawing from Gadamer, he notes that “[p]hilosophical hermeneutics eschews the impulse to tell; if one has no question, then research is not underway, but something more akin to a subjective disclosure” (Arnett “Interpretive” 30). A public question leads “to public engagement of the text” (30). The constructive hermeneutic reveals what is in a text to make it “public.” These reveal “guiding metaphors” that shape action in the understanding of an academic story (30). Arnett provides a guide for the analysis of specific events. revealing metaphors to shape an academic story, guiding inquiry.

Arnett further notes, grounded in the analysis of Gadamer, that researchers should reveal bias that provides interest and sustains the inquiry (33). In this dissertation, I avoid identification with particular ideologies. It should be noted that many analyses discuss economics, particularly socialism and neoliberalization, from a critical perspective. It would be disingenuous to assert that my analysis is not sympathetic with or aligned with such a task. This project does not participate in the deconstruction of contemporary capitalism, though it does seek to account for contemporary *topoi* such as “survival of the fittest,” excellence for its own sake as virtue, and other tropes of business, as well as competition for its own sake and profit-over-all for their effects on human relations. Deetz carries a critical bias in his work, but it points to the relationship between “modern social conditions” and the asking of “communication questions” in a justification of his inquiry into the nature of corporations and their effects on democracy (Deetz 80). Deetz’s work is Foucauldian in that he is deeply concerned with the power of the corporate structure in organizational communication. Michel Foucault, along with Jacques Derrida, has been understood to provide a critical, rather than constructive, hermeneutic toward analysis; Deetz notes that examinations of the domination of the body must also examine a critique of the method that legitimates it (87), a project that leads to critical inquiry of institutions
and organizations. While this is not a critical project per se, it does aim, like much humanities research, to ask questions of economics and communication ethics “to work out a theoretical perspective that leads us to perceive differences that make a difference and organize our perceptions toward making useful social responses” (78-79). Throughout, my aim is to deepen an understanding of economics in a meaningful way through a constructive hermeneutic, making space for communication ethics scholars to examine these phenomena more closely.

If anything, my analysis seeks to account for how economic systems—capitalist, socialist, or otherwise—deconstruct themselves (Caputo 4), much to the chagrin of their advocates. It does not understand productivity in the market, business, or industry as inherently problematic, as constructive accounts of business and professional communication attest (Arnett et. al. Communication Ethics Literacy 176-78). Nor does it view critical or Marxist scholarship in any inherently adversarial way. It does, however, allow ethical reflection upon economic praxis beyond the presumed “laws” of market activity that must be maintained at all costs, or efficiency as all-powerful good. It is an examination of conversations about economics beyond a scientistic approach, one that acknowledges its rhetorical nature and its pliability to varied virtues (McCloskey Bourgeois Dignity 156-67).

**Economic Inquiry as Social**

A primary move toward understanding the shared ground of economics and communication ethics is accounting for the social nature of economics. An examination of historical accounts of Western economics supports a humanities-based, interpretive analysis of economics, one that both contributes uniquely to the field of communication ethics and draws from it. Historically, economics *qua* discipline was not separated from other spheres of academic inquiry until well into the 19th century, almost a century after Smith wrote *The Wealth of Nations*
In ancient analysis, such as Xenophon’s *Oikonomos*, economics was a subject of ethical inquiry (18-19). “Political economy,” which expanded the understanding of the sphere of economics to the realm of the State, appears about 1,800 years later in 18th century France (20-21, 161). Interpreting the economic through the lens of human communication is true to its historical, Western understanding as a social phenomenon.

As such, I examine key metaphors in this dissertation that respond to questions arising from an understanding of the human situatedness of economic communications (Arnett et. al. *Communication Ethics Literacy* 113). Money and economics, as a system in which money was exchanged, are generally understood to be inseparable from the social. With accounts of ancient economics that recognize this, Ian Morris argues that sociologists like Max Weber, Johannes Hasebroek, and Michael Polanyi are more in a position to analyze ancient economics than economists (Finley xviii). Social ethics are integral to understanding the economic sphere, as Joseph Stiglitz argues in an essay about Karl Paul Polanyi and his influential analysis of this reality (Polanyi vii-xviii).

Modernity presents the primary challenge to understanding economics as social. The legacy of reason and the Enlightenment led to the unprecedented envisioning of several spheres of academic inquiry into sciences. Of course, rhetoric and philosophy in conflict is a discussion as old as Western academic thought (Ijessling). Yet money, along with politics, was redefined in the 19th century through the lens of science apart from rhetoric or argumentation.

Some modern scholars separate economics and money and moral inquiry, doubtlessly influenced by the brutality of communist and socialist regimes and the call to revolution required by Marx to instill socialism as a moral imperative. David Frisby, for example, notes that Emile Durkheim was skeptical of the influence of money as a ground of moral influence. In a critique
of Georg Simmel’s account of *The Philosophy of Money*, Durkheim argues that only economic regulations affect behavior, not an exploration of money or other categories of economic symbology (G. Simmel xviii). For Simmel, however, understanding money can “construct a new storey [sic] beneath historical materialism such that the explanatory value of the incorporation of economic life into the causes of intellectual culture is preserved, while these economic forms themselves are recognized as the result of more profound valuations and currents of psychological or even metaphysical pre-conditions” (56). Here, Simmel exemplifies the decentralization of discussions of economics from the central place in Western life it was given by Karl Marx. Contra Marx, Simmel’s analysis of money attempted to reclaim understandings of human relations underneath the economic, rather than as resulting from the economic. That is, money as a symbol affects social interactions and relations, as do the systems and narratives that define and change its meaning.² This project, then, assumes that varied processes and understandings that account for interpretations of human communication.

In particular, economic transactions inform our account of the Other. Blindness to the Other dismantles public virtue. Neo-Aristotelian philosopher Alasdair Macintyre argues that economic relationships should not be grounded purely in profit; accounts of economics mark such relational goals as “vice.” Instead, we must understand others as a “particular,” rather than a generalized Other, in all relationships, including economic, particularly if economic relationships “are to contribute to overall flourishing, rather than, as they so often in fact do, undermine and corrupt communal ties” (Macintyre *Dependent* 117-19). Communication ethics, then, has the capability of informing economic praxis, enlightening our understanding not only of the traditions within professional and personal spheres that form communicative practices, but also

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² This understanding of money suggests a strong justification for a media ecological account of money as a component of the redefinition of communities (Innis).
in understanding a market-driven world of analytics and demographics that reifies the Other not just as an agent of economic production or consumption, but as a datum within a spreadsheet, the human person epistemically reduced to variables in an equation or algorithm.³

From this point, a brief survey of economic history, of key practices and terminology, illustrates the social nature of economics, informing Taylor’s examination the secularization of the modern era. His work gives a primary insight into communication ethics scholarship, one that warrants a foundational review of the social context of economics. Scholars argue that analysis of ancient economics is still growing and can suffer from insufficient data. Morris notes that M. I. Finley’s classic examination of ancient economics, *Ancient Economy*, for example, has received sustained criticism for missing important empirical information, and either relying too heavily on sociological interpretation of economic activity or not relying upon it enough (Finley xxvi-xxxi). Still, a brief treatment of economics establishes its social nature and gives context to Taylor’s analysis in *A Secular Age*, particularly the communication ethics metaphor of sameness and the economic metaphor of commensurability.

**Ancient Western Economics**

**Social Context**

Economic historians understand economics to be inherently social, drawing heavily from Finley, whose work emerged in an historical moment in academia when U.S. scholars turned to sociological and economic factors to understand history (Finley xxiv). Edward T. Cohen and Scott Meikle find that economics has been a concern of Western thought since archaic poetry, 

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³ In 1973, social scientist Daniel Bell discussed the role that computers play in economic forecasting. He called economics as determinative of policy “technocratic,” noting the political telos of computer tabulations. But he does acknowledge the constraints that computers “indicate” (Bell 24-6). See also Cathy O’Neil’s discussion of algorithms and their negative effects on educational and criminal sentencing outcomes through the reduction of human traits to variables.
grounded in a dichotomy of understanding between economics as maintenance of human life and economics as productivity. As resources were consolidated and trade began between ancient Greece and Sparta, society grew through economics—its expansion after the 5th century has been speculated to be a contributing cause of the Peloponnesian War. Economics came from the development of households and small market systems within a city-state that emerge from an earlier “gift economy” in Ancient Greece. This account emerged from archaic Greek society, an economy of exchange not focused on production for the sake of profit. Redfield identifies this in *The Iliad* (Cohen 186); production was focused on private consumption for the producers (6). Production for the household created wealth or poverty, though these were tied to laboring, rather than to accumulation. In public, social relations were always at the heart of trade, as M. Polanyi asserted (Finley xiii). Finley notes that wealth was, from the beginning, considered “necessary” and “good…an absolute requisite for the good life” (36), drawing from *The Odyssey*. But it did not define human existence. Weber notes that ancient man was understood as *homo politicus*, driven by citizenship in the State rather than *homo economicus*, which reflects the contemporary telos of acquisition of goods (Weber, *Economy and Society*, as qtd. in Finley xv). The social and political, then, came first.

Scholarship is clear that the ancient system of economics varies from contemporary markets. Economists refer to analysis of the emergence of economic markets at this time in terms of the “primitivist-modernist” debate (xxi). That is, primitivists believe that Greece had no market economy as in the present time and that all economic thinking was ethical in nature (Meikle 4); modernists wish to study the time with modern concepts. Finley offers a rebuke of the temptation for contemporary economists to understand economics in the ancient world

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4 Donald Kagan rebuts this presumption forcefully (Kagan 347-49).
anachronistically, as with political analysis of ancient concepts of “liberty” and “freedom,” which can also easily fall prey to mistranslation (Finley 26-28). For example, debt bondage, which was “uniformly harsh and unyielding” even after reforms of it from the time of Homer (40), challenged the viability of a society of “statuses,” to use Weberian language, in ancient times, and led to the idea of a “city-state” populated by equal men (xviii). But equality was for male property owners in the public sphere with a slave trade and a household, where slaves, women, and children were listed as the property of the male head. The private sphere was marked not by equality, but by hierarchy. So the meaning of “equality” does not escape its own context.

Modernists are tempted to find ideological threads along lines of class in the ancient world; Jean Andreau ties this debate to comparisons of ancient economies and industrial production (Andreau 6-7). Finley argues that ideologies do emerge regarding class in the ancient period, but that such ideologies cross reified lines of division (Finley 38). Varied professions and statuses existed in the polis, as was true of ancient Rome; money was used differently by different classes, yet neither meets what might be called an industrial or Enlightenment account of “capital” (Andreau 4). Meikle disputes the premise of primitivism, asserting that market activity clearly existed; he argues, rather, that the “scale and significance” should be the focus of “anti-modernists” (Meikle 5). By the time of ancient Rome, multiple regional economies, influenced in production by geoeconomic factors of climate and terrain, informed that Empire’s economic expanse (Finley 32). But it would not be until well into the 13th century when something akin to modern economics and global trade were sparked. In an analysis of money in the ancient Roman period, Andreau argues that money “reinforced not only social relations but an intuitive awareness of the cohesion of the community, symbolized by the political authority
that minted the money. Despite the greater social divisions, the effect of money was to maintain a community’s consciousness of its existence” (Andreau 2). Money in the Roman era was integral to understanding a community beyond contemporary discussions of power relations. Whether the development of markets is a progression, a mere change, or even a corruption of ancient economics, it is crucial to understand that in ancient times, economics begins at home. Land, as the ground of the economy, was “the fountainhead of all good, material and moral” for most residents of the ancient world (Finley 97). This is the primary mark of Western economics—homes tied to land, marking the private sphere. Finley identifies this as a longstanding interpretation; he notes that Francis Hutcheson, teacher of Smith, identified it as such in his own examination of economics, noting that “property, succession, contracts, the value of goods and of coin, the laws of war” were understood as part of the “Laws of Nature” (Finley 17). That is, the natural component of a human being engages in self-sustenance through economic practices, in distinction from culture. While “economics” would eventually extend to the maintenance of “public revenues,” and while “rudimentary agreements” known as *symbola* appeared to set ground rules for civic disputes that included trade, economics did not describe public trade or activity between neighbors in addition to home maintenance until well into the 18th century, with the identification of “political economy” in France (though with an emphasis on the politics) (20-21, 161). “Economics” was not isolated as a field of inquiry apart from the social life until the late 19th century (21).

**Terminology**

The language of economics itself reveals its ties to the private sphere. Economics emerges from the Greek *oikonomos*, which ties to the maintenance of the “household” (*oikos*)

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5 Considering Abraham and Job, connection to land is also an ancient theme of Judaism, one with contemporary relevance for sectarian conflict in the Middle East.
Production in ancient society was grounded in sustenance and orderliness of the home, rather than in accumulation of wealth. Market systems emerged in Ancient Greece, establishing Western practices of trade and envisioning economics beyond the home. Its pull was powerful in the ancient world, though; Socrates, for example, is concerned with the temperance of eros in the city, regarding social practices, which points to greed as a vice (Rosen 75). Cohen argues that Aristotle’s account of economics discusses a shift in understanding from an economy grounded in household relations to the development of what can be identified as a “market” system. Importantly, reliance on trade, the value of goods, and mass production grew within society (Cohen 6), affecting social relations. Trade that overcame geographic boundaries led to the minimization of local difference in favor of economic gain (Cohen 7). That is, exchange with others marked the rise of retail trade and changes in production. This was a separate form of economics from maintenance of the home and land, whose management and acquisition “was never…a matter of systematic, calculated policy, of what Weber called economic rationality” (Finley 117). Still, the private sphere is the realm of economics.

Plato’s Republic accounts for the rise of “money,” defining it as a “token for exchange,” allowing various producers to acquire that which they are unskilled to produce (Republic 371a-371e). Rosen notes that Plato aligns this development with a shift in attitudes toward temperance within a city (Rosen 74). Money derives from the Greek chrêmata, which can also be translated as “needful things,” or material resources (Walker Genuine Teachers, 311). Meikle notes that Aristotle makes a foundational contribution to its understanding by dividing value into two sorts: use and exchange (Meikle 8). Use value is the value or utility of the good itself; exchange value is its value to another who does not possess it (8). This difference facilitates the growth of the

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(Cohen 6)

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6 Finley notes that there is no word in Greek or Latin for realtor, “land-seller,” “house-seller,” “property-seller,” or broker (118).
market of exchange, and the systems and phenomena that order its operations. Money emerged through the need to transmit exchange value beyond borders, as Aristotle identified; money was marked with a stamp that certified its value for portability (Aristotle *Politics* I, §9, lines 22-32). The households of the time focused more on consumption than production (Finley 138-139).

Wealth accumulation, in this sense, however, is not the same as procuring needs for the home; Aristotle designates retail trade as the system to accumulate wealth (Aristotle *Politics* I, §9, 1257b1); this difference reiterates that the account of economics as wealth production is more historically recent.

Ethics regarding money are of great concern in ancient writings. Aristotle laments households who trade “increase their hoard of coin without limit” (§9, 1257b). This is understood as greed, or *pleonexia*. This establishes a primary ethical difference for ancient writers: economics as production *contra* economics as accumulation and acquisition. While these cannot be totally separated, especially in our present historical moment, the telos of these praxes marks a primary division between them, between economics as grounded in maintenance of the household and economics as growth/progress of the political sphere. As will be discussed in the final chapter of this dissertation, economic motive becomes a primary cause for concern in Ancient Greek writers, particularly in the Sophists.

From the rise of trade came banking. Cohen, drawing heavily from the analysis of M. Polanyi and others, notes that local communities would mint their own money, necessitating a way of exchanging local coin to be traded between them. This would happen in a “prominent place” in the market called the *trapeza*, which was a table where money was exchanged (Cohen 7), though there would be no set exchange rate (149), which could be quite profitable for early bankers to exploit (150). Those exchanging money, called “money changers” (*trapezitai*), would
offer loans and accept deposits. These are the first bankers, instituting the first banks (7). Cohen dates the contemporary phrase “bank” to the later mediaeval Genoese word “banc(h)a,” which also made reference to the name for the money changer’s work surface (9). As Cohen notes, all could deposit in banks, whether home owners or slaves; this would transform “both society and the economy” (7), marking an influential ancient understanding of how money could overcome hierarchical difference. This form of the bank would persist in Rome through the argentarius who held deposits and lent funds to third parties based upon them (Andreau 2).

Again, scholarly consensus prohibits equating these early banking practices to contemporary economic praxis as anachronistic (Cohen 9). Finley notes, for example, that wages and interest rates in lending were stable in those days, and investment was also quite different (Finley 23). Also, while insurance was offered in relation to maritime trade, there are no tables or statistics to support a comparison to contemporary actuarial practices (23). Josiah Ober further notes, drawing from Finley, that the wealth of society was used to encourage participation in democracy, including payment to the poor for attendance at Assembly meetings (Ober 24). Rich and poor existed with a large degree of reciprocation, to grow society through political participation. Despite having tax exemptions for estates, the rich still paid for most of the costs of the state (Finley 96); this process was facilitated through leitourgia, in which the rich offered money to build temples and pay for festivals and the like, a process that links etymologically to “liturgy,” as a form of service to the state (151). In this model, in an observation “too often neglected” from the analysis of David Hume (22), commerce did not grow society, but a commitment to social interaction and a good greater than economic gain did.

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7 L’argent is the French word for “money,” related to “silver” and the exchange of coin (l’argenterie in French; Ag on the periodic table).
8 Humean analysis also identifies the further trend to locate economics as a “vulgar subject” (Hume 255).
Making money from money by taking currency from others and holding it with the promise of retrieval starts in this period and continues in ancient Rome. This, as the focus of banking, is a point shared both by Demosthenes and contemporary bankers (Cohen 9). From banking emerged a sophisticated understanding of markets and money exchange in Ancient Greece, though scholars disagree on the specifics of these points. \(^9\)

This facilitates a key moment in Western economic history; economics producing money to sustain oneself without participating in production. The Greek word *ploutos* translates to the ability of one to live off of income, while *penia* relates to one who must “toil” to sustain livelihood (Finley 41). The beggar was known as *ptochos*; Finley argues that in the work of Aristophanes, these two concepts are separated (41). That is, one who works for pay should not be confused in status with a beggar. In Rome, class distinctions clearly existed between elites (senators, knights, aristocracy) and professionals (Andreau 140), facilitated by this process. Further, such explorations are complicated by the elimination of banking practices in the ancient era by the second half of the third century C.E. (Andreau vii), which would be re-envisioned through the Western mediaeval era.

Ancient Economics and Contemporary Communication Ethics

Metaphors common to communication ethics scholarship, such as “hierarchy” and “sameness,” emerge from these discussions of the ancient economy, metaphors developed by Charles Taylor, a philosopher and Roman Catholic. The private sphere is marked by the former and the public marked by the latter to the extent that equality in Ancient Greece was marked by

\(^9\) Finley argues that no central paper currency can be claimed in Athens, though this has commonly led to an understanding of economic transaction as unsophisticated. Cohen argues in his analysis that money changing activity led to the production of money, which Aristotle mentions in his *Politics* (Cohen 11). Cohen further develops varied accounts of “commodity money,” “bank money,” and “representative money,” and the development of what is known as an industry of credit, and of the contemporary bank account, which was expected to be held by any person “purporting to be of substance” (17) to critique Finley’s account of ancient banking practices (11-18).
citizenship. The class division of Ancient Rome was marked by *noblesse oblige*, by social commitments held between rich and poor. To be sure, the Roman Empire was marked by substantial class division, but the public sphere was a realm where those divisions diminished in terms of public participation, at least until the time of Caesar Augustus (Chrissanthos 344-345). Freedom was marked by freedom of speech, not wealth. The Enlightenment era and the turn to free speech within democracy are primary marks of sameness, of the ethical imperative for all to have equal access to a system of expression, though this is not understood in the same way by all scholars. The Western class division lamented by Marx centuries later reflected discussions of exchange value not between things, but between people. The embrace of sameness as resistance to the brutality of industrial production that would mark the 19th century sparked the Utopian movement and contemporary socialism, as well as the conflation of the public and private realms into a social sphere. Human sameness, facilitated by the transference of exchange value into anthropological matters, marks contemporary communicative phenomena and ethical presuppositions in this context. Speech can potentially have the same “value” in public from rich or poor.

Philosophically, Taylor provides an account of this process in his scholarship. *A Secular Age* offers an account of this transfer that has informed communication ethics scholarship. He discusses the “social imaginary,” which involves “the ways in which they [people] imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations which are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images which underlie these expectations” (Taylor *Secular Age* 171). Those holding these imaginaries are not theorizing about society in general, on the terms of social science, but they do understand others in their world and relate to them through an account of who they are as an “Other.”
Taylor’s examination argues that prior to an era of Reform, one which, sparked by the Protestant Reformation, leads to an embrace of “civility” as social praxis (243), and the turn to liberalization, the world was enchanted. One’s life was connected to a greater spiritual realm. This enchantment was marked by an understanding of “hierarchy” that protected difference in public roles. The age of Reform conversely results in disenchantment, in a focus on the powers of the world, on others. This disconnection resulted in a “buffered self,” a person who must be protected from spirits of the world and its powers through confidence in our own capabilities of moral ordering (27). The time of Reform and the transformation of ecclesial leadership created practices that drove an anthropological understanding of sameness among some Protestant Christians, which would later expand into the Enlightenment and modern liberalism, and a turn to the self, whose cultivation is the primary good that must be protected and promoted in the West. I now highlight Taylor’s contribution, which envisions how ethics emerges, and how trade and economics come to be situated within it in the West, marking the change from the ancient period.

A Secular Age

Taylor offers an account of community in cultures grounded through a lens of social imaginaries and moral order, which provide the structure that form human interactions in the West. These imaginaries and order guide the interpretation of information into knowledge and undergird the presumptions of what is ethical. In the case of the West, understanding and patterns of behavior establish ontic grounding, or components that structure moral order beyond a mere set of norms, in concepts of enchantment and disenchantment.
Enchantment – Social Imaginaries and Moral Order

For Taylor, enchantment and subsequent disenchantment emerge from social imaginaries in a medieval, Roman Catholic West. Inherent to this understanding is a view of community as the foundational ground that gives trajectory to decisions of faith and context to visions of belief. Imaginaries operate within a “moral order,” which is the order in which human life is envisioned to work; this order can be understood as “an ‘ontic’ component” which make ethical norms “realizable” (164). Both form the understanding of social interactions from which community emerge; this is the context that defines understanding of a “self,” as well as matters of theology and orthopraxis, including the purpose of life. Put simply, these are two primary foundations for human interaction.

Taylor traces the primary changes in these understandings through the prism of “enchantment” and “disenchantment,” which are two distinct social imaginaries. The enchanted era runs from “pre-Axial” religion through to the time of “Reform,” after the 16th century, and describes an understanding of relationship between the physical and supernatural world, or to use the language of Rudolf Otto, the noumenal and the phenomenal (Otto). The pre-Axial refers to natural religion, which involved the development of ritual practices serving as interaction with the Gods prior to the rise of formal religious structures defining historical development (Taylor Secular Age 151). Taylor’s description of this period is drawn from Karl Jaspers, who marks the historical rise of major religions and their texts—Confucianism, Buddhism, and Christianity, for example—as the point when humanity developed consciousness of itself, with the ability to

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10 For further discussion of the communal formation of the Self in the Christian tradition, see Macintyre, After Virtue; Hauerwas, A Community of Character.
11 Though “Reform” as used by Taylor broadly refers to the time of the Reformation, it also refers to the theological privileging of matters of the State in general (certainly marked by John Calvin’s reforms in Geneva, for example). See Milbank 76.
reflect upon its relationship in the world, to contemplate and think for the sake of thinking (Jaspers 2). Enchantment framed religious ritual, such as a sacrifice, not as a “negotiation” or *quid pro quo* with God, but in terms of “a sense of awe at these higher powers, and often a sense of wrongness in going against them, captured by a term like ‘hubris’…as well as feelings of devotion and gratitude for favours [sic] conferred” (Taylor *Secular Age* 439).

In developing accounts of economics as historically new after the period of Reform, it is important to separate exchanges in ritual from economic transactions. Taylor does not explicitly draw out this point, but rituals contextualize the difference between a response to God from humanity, or what may have been understood as a covenant, and a contract (which would emerge in prominence for social relations in the following centuries). Ethical concerns of the nature of covenant in human relationship exist at the inception of Axial religion and are resisted as *quid pro quos*, which are inauthentic expressions of a life of faith; consider, for example, Romans 6:1-2: “What then are we to say? Should we continue in sin in order that grace may abound? By no means! How can we who died to sin go on living in it” (*NRSV*)? Here, the Apostle Paul rejects the suggestion that more grace can be accumulated if one sins more; that is, he is rejecting a calculative faith. Pre-Axial religion precedes a contractual understanding of behavior; worship is an act of response to a Creator who is in control of the world. Consciousness of one’s behavior begins the process of developing particular ethical stances within Axial religions, and from here comes the examination of ethics and the nature of relation to the noumenal world.

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12 Covenant is understood as an assertion of the relationship between God and God’s own people throughout the Bible. See, for example, Genesis 3:15, where Adam is promised redemption for his sin, though accompanied with great suffering, or Genesis 17:1-14, where God covenants to provide Israel with land, and the people respond to the covenant through circumcising males.
Consciousness developed, in the case of Western Christianity, through a Roman Catholic Church that existed in an enchanted social imaginary, with a particular moral order that sustained it as an institution and informed its hierarchical structure. This included an understanding that human beings are connected to a higher world of spiritual forces and accounted for the connection of objects to this world as well, serving as the basis for God’s incarnate presence in history (Taylor Secular Age 278), as well as for transubstantiation within the ritual of Eucharist (73). This enchanted understanding of ritual was also expressed in pagan ritual; the “magic” of Christianity developed as a theological response to the battle with “dark magic” (73-74). Christianity, then, was rooted in an enchanted account of existence facilitated by the “social imagination” that bridged between responses to God’s presence in the world and a system of ritual.

Moral order in this time reflected this enchantment. For Taylor, the Church was grounded in an ontic structure of “hierarchical complementarity”;\(^\text{13}\) that is, different groups within society functioned in conjunction with one another out of reciprocal relationship, though with some groups having “greater dignity and value than the others” (164). For the church, this included the ordering of social and ecclesial roles as a hierarchy recognizing difference between persons and their public roles. The clergy, the lords, and the peasants all had varied parts to play in the maintenance of society, for example (45). Participation in this system provide a sense of “fullness,” that one’s activities and station in life connect to a great depth of purpose, which reinforce the importance of these roles. Taylor argues that this order was reinforced in popular cultural forms, such as the medieval festival (which may date back to Mesopotamian times [46]), in which participants, who came from all class designations, performed the reversals of roles in a

\(^{13}\) This concept has been controversially adapted as “hierarchical complementarianism” in theological scholarship on gender and marriage ethics. See, for example, Allen 473-474.
framed setting, re-enacting lascivious, or almost violent acts. In this, hierarchy is briefly mocked, though the strength of community is affirmed (47). But he argues that their purpose was not subversive; rather, they reinforced the hierarchical norms of society.\textsuperscript{14} The social imaginary between persons and forces was not perfect sameness, but balance and equilibrium.

This understanding of relation held hierarchy as a good, and as Taylor argues, honored diversity. Church leadership and ascetics, for example, lived in a manner of contemplation and did not suffer in the manner of laity, while laity performed work, but were not expected to hold the piety of leaders. Taylor describes this as living at different “speeds” (66). Ethical implications for relations between others that emerge from this account include, importantly for an examination of economic ethics, a commitment to charity, which marked the early church (737).

The question turns, subsequently, to how such a world in the West was transformed to one that challenged ritual and enchantment. This transformation, from covenants to contracts, from enchantment to disenchantment, sets the stage for the public prominence of economic activity.

Disenchantment - From Equilibrium to Sameness in the Reformation

Taylor describes disenchantment, which is the move away from understanding the world as full of magical forces to rejecting their imminent presence. Taylor argues that this social imaginary eschewed the complementarity of the Church and challenged the ecclesial split “between lay life and the renunciative vocations” that emerged during the Protestant Reformation (61). That is, the diverse public roles of the Catholic Church were minimized under

\textsuperscript{14} This interpretation of popular cultural forms would, of course, follow for analysis of spectacles in Western culture of the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century though in very different contexts. Such interpretations form understandings of how representation in ritual and cultural production informs cultural praxis, an on-going conversation in much contemporary humanities scholarship.
a set of ethical beliefs within Protestantism that drove believers to “sameness.” For Taylor, the “reforms” not only attempted to add to existing theology but delegitimized several presumptions of Roman Catholicism and set the march to secularity into motion.

The turn to Reform led to a moral imaginary and order grounded in an understanding of sameness between persons, rather than equilibrium between unequals. Reformers’ attacks on the Roman hierarchy, from Martin Luther, John Calvin, and others, would alter the Church by calling for increased piety among all believers, transforming social relations or equity (Haas 19) as marked by decreased vocation and station within the life of the church. Laypeople, monks, and leaders were called to sameness of orthopraxy and ethical norms. Public roles were heavily reduced within the church, facilitating this sameness. This transitioned an understanding of human consciousness from emerging in historical, ordered community to an increasingly individualized direction; this would occur through the individualization of the doctrine of revelation, that is, how the Holy Spirit reveals the Word through limited sacraments, or through encounters with Scripture when God chooses to reveal the Word, but not through transubstantiation or the mediation of the Magisterium.

Taylor’s primary metaphors to describe this transition in the imaginary of community are equilibrium and sameness. The time of “Reform,” marks a transformation of social imaginaries into the concept of “sameness.” Though Taylor notes that this process may have begun as early as the Lateran Council of 1215, through moving believers closer to the religious practices of ecclesial leaders (Taylor Secular Age 64), another key development of this period of Reform, which is a change in Scriptural hermeneutics, was preceded by William of Ockham, John Huss, Wendelin Steinbach, and John Major (Jeanrond 31).
charging for plenary indulgences, and the resulting corruption were primary catalysts sparking this Reformation. Indulgences, in particular, offered a model of soteriological extortion that gave Luther a clearly authoritative charge with which to challenge the Church’s theological doctrines of death and salvation (75). Luther’s call to salvation through faith alone (sola fide) countered the assertion of the Church’s role in whether a believer went to heaven, purgatory, or hell, challenging its mediating role in offering salvation.

It is significant to note the foregrounding of economic ethics as a primary component of this process. Not only does Luther challenge the authority of the Church to mediate for sins (Luther A Sermon 393 fn 2), but, in his famous 95 theses, he challenges the authenticity of those who buy indulgences, particularly as an excuse not to practice mercy to others (Luther Ninety-Five Theses 10, 13). Calvin compared indulgences to the payment of silver pieces to Judas Iscariot, accusing church officials of “voraciousness” in their corruption and “sacred plundering” of funds for the poor, as well as vulgar displays of wealth (Calvin Institutes IV.18.14; IV.5.16-18). For Taylor, recasting all as sinners reifies the sameness of believers, moving all to devout piety, not just those with “renunciative vocations” (Taylor Secular Age 75). Luther’s statements also challenge class assumptions and the idea of equality grounded in the possession of money. That is, the hierarchy of the Church as a structure facilitated exploitation of the “equilibrium” between believers and church leadership. To highlight this point, Luther asserts that moral duty and faith cannot be replaced by economic transaction prone to corruption.

Reform, then, points to equality through orthopraxis, grounded in the theological basis of anthropological “sameness.” Calvin extended this disenchantment through further challenges to Catholic dogma, including the role of sacraments and the intercession of saints (79). This led

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16 Papal doctrine on indulgences date at least to 1343, with Pope Clement VI’s Bull Unigenitus (Eire 154).
Calvin to a theological focus on atonement for evil and the active renunciation of vice (77-82). His writings made clear that it is the responsibility of all to live in holiness in everyday life (230) – though it should be noted that this sameness did not extend to salvation – some are saved, others are not, and through grace, not works, as Luther and Calvin both argued. Salvation is beyond negotiation, which is the tactic of the plenary indulgence. Sameness as sinners, then, is an assertion of human value (or lack thereof) as a prerequisite for judgment of all before God.

Of particular concern for Calvin was the ethos of church leadership; laity must retain holiness as ethos for the authority to lead.17 The corruption of the Church collapsed its ethos, leading Calvin to depict church leadership as “ambitious, greedy, envious persons,” (emphasis mine) with “unclean li[ves]” (Calvin Institutes IV, 3, 8). Calvin turned to the “simplicity” of faith as a response to this Church bureaucracy (Institutes IV, 3, 5), where those called to educate in the tongues of the people instructed others in faith, rather than separate classes of priests. The call to holiness for all church members was a move to restore ethos to leadership; sameness as sinners, then, serves as a mark of consistency that restores immanent authority as the enchanted nature of God’s presence marking the Church’s authority was challenged.

This transition from equilibrium to sameness would affect theological understandings of social practices; from money lending and popular culture, to the practice of war and sexual ethics. Taylor argues that varied expectations of behavior existed acceptably within the Church in age of hierarchy, when the layperson was not considered as holy as the Pope. Taylor, for example, discusses that brothels were even supported by the church at one point in the Middle Ages (Taylor Secular Age 107), to emphasize that there was no expectation of sameness in social praxis between those holding varied roles. But under Calvinism, all are accountable to God for

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17 Rudolf Otto identified the alignment of “holy” with fidelity in ethical behavior as a Kantian construction, identifying the “numinous” as an unreifiable connection with our mind and our behavior (Otto 7).
their salvation (and simultaneously unable to affect their election to heaven or condemnation to hell on judgment day). Social practices, then, should reflect the human ability to produce, to provide moral order, to bring about God’s kingdom on Earth.

The sameness of responsibility, as well as the hierarchy of salvation, resulted in what can accurately be called an “unequal sameness.” This is to say that the ability to receive favor is “unequal,” but accountability to pray, worship, follow God’s law, is the same. “Unequal sameness” results in a Reformed re-imagination and simplification of Church structures, providing new accounts of moral order and disrupting ontic structure within community. It overcomes extensive bureaucracy with the church while maintaining authoritative structures and identities. Reforms spread throughout Europe, which Taylor laments as a violent and transformative period for the behavior of Christians. As social imaginary shifted to disenchantment, however, responsibility for the moral order of society was imminently envisioned through individuals who studied the Bible and extolled sameness in behavior to presume ontic equity and responsibility within interactions, defining ethical praxis. Taylor writes that this particularly changed how everyday people approached guilt and their own social ethics. “[Everyday people] are precisely not left as they are, but badgered, bullied, pushed, preached at, drilled and organized to abandon their lax and disordered folkways and conform to one or another feature of civil behavior” (102). For Taylor, this moves people not only away from Roman Catholicism and emerging Protestant alternatives, but from religion all together.

Taylor laments this transition as the source of tremendous conflict that drove Europeans to secularity, including the foregrounding of economic production as a component of what sought to replace the “fullness” of Roman Catholic spirituality. He notes that religious conflict

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18 This contradiction has long been a source of critique. Taylor laments Calvin’s doctrine of double predestination as “horrible” (652).
toward nonbelievers (or the unorthodox) later influenced figures such as Hume and Edward Gibbon to sidestep religion all together (287). Taylor foregrounds the turn to three spheres as a result of this shift toward secularity: the economic sphere, the public sphere, and the sovereign people, as resources for what is possible in human life and for moral order. The goal of these changes was a system of “civility,” which would be the alternative to the religious conflict that partnered with Reforms throughout Europe (99). Both required “taming, of an originally wild, raw nature” (101); Taylor recognizes this trend as “Neo-Stoicism,” grounded in the philosophy of Justin Lipsius and others (107, 119). This Protestant vision extended beyond the boundaries of religious community, resulting in what he calls a “Great Disembedding” (146-158). The ground of the sacred, Taylor argues, changes at this point. What was intended during a time of Reform to unite Christianity led to a “corruption”: “…what we got was not a network of agape, but rather a disciplined society in which categorial relations have primacy, and therefore norms,” in an attempt to remake the world in the vision of the New Testament (158). With this came a new moral order for social interaction, grounded in “sameness.” This becomes the ground for imminent systems—such as economics—to offer alternative forms of ontic structure.

Protestantism and the New Moral Order for Social Interaction

Civic life was reimagined through the era of Reform with a new moral order. From the Reformation, the social and religious came to have an “overlapping agenda” (107), part of which was marked by the influence of Seneca and Stoicism over Calvin, as well as renewed attention to Augustine’s two cities (119; 122), and the influence of humanism stemming from the

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19 Taylor, however, is no pacifist, echoing modern defenses of violence and rejections of pacifism much later in the chronologically-organized text. He frames violence as important “to defend the innocent against attack” (Secular Age 673). Taylor argues that suppressing violence in Christianity only leads to more violence (674), particularly after the lessons of World War II. He also notes that violence in Christianity was a product of spiritual fullness (612, 646-649; 671-674), offering little to no discussion of pacifist Christian traditions and their persecution. See Horsch.
Among multiple new understandings were accounts of civic life. Calvin, importantly, would call for the elect to rule over the State, since the State presumably could not teach virtue. All of society would benefit from the re-ordering of lives through the understanding of holding all to the same ethical standards in the church, to alter praxis through discipline and education, leading to productive peoples—this trend develops through the Lutheran “Christian Pietism” as well. This productivity, demanded through the sameness of members of the Church, would mark Calvinist culture, a notion later developed famously by Weber.

For Taylor, economic productivity emerges as a method to deepen human experience. It will eventually redefine the self as consumer and provide an alternative to the human alienation that results from lack of fullness. Economics reimagines ontic structures that contextualize social imaginaries and moral order to interpret a new anthropology of unequal sameness through the lens of exchange value and the monetization both of human practices and goods, and of persons themselves. That is, everyone has a place/value in the hierarchy of the market, while all are equally responsible for following the ethics of market praxis. Two phenomena for the moral order of society would intertwine at this point to create a sphere of production announcing an alternative to the Church and the State and shaping the envisioning of both: these are the social contract and expansion and liberalization of economic ethics, especially in regards to lending, or usury.

*Social Contract*

Society was reformed in sameness through social contracts. People enter into agreements with each other and abide by them, building a “civil” society in which people submit to authority through their own agreement. Jean-Jacques Rousseau would argue that society becomes an “a

20 As a lawyer, Calvin was extensively trained in classical literature (Partee). Ironically, the new Reformed understanding of Scripture would challenge humanism (Jeanrond 32).
unified social entity consisting of a number of individuals, and their acceptance of that entity’s authority over them,” (Rousseau xv). Taylor goes on to discuss the development of masses and the identity of a society emerging from this period; society is now seen as a unity of people (xvi). Rousseau, building from the work of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke among others, envisioned his social contract in the context of his hometown of Geneva, Switzerland, which had been run by an oligarchy of families (xvi), not long in the shadow of Calvinist administrative reforms during the Reformation that provided material support for some of Rousseau’s ancestors (Olson). The good of the society became the protection of the society (Rousseau xvii), leading to the need for a democracy and a turn to militarism. That is, society operates as a whole with agreements between persons with a commitment to its greater health. Military culture protected this Here, sameness is reified in government – all are responsible for maintaining the health of society.

Usury

A second shift in economic praxis is liberality toward usury, which traditionally had been sinful for Christians. R. H. Tawney notes the significance of Calvin’s reimagining of usury, providing theological ground for the activities of Dutch, English, and Scottish industrialists to follow, particularly those that would develop Scottish industry and the subsequent quality of life for Scots. The resulting economic growth would influence Smith to speculate about the wealth of nations (Kingdon; Tawney); Paul Oslington offers a helpful description of scholarship surrounding the influence of Calvinism on Smith, linking the idea of “general providence” to Smith’s “invisible hand” (Oslington 434-435).

Taylor’s “sameness” accounts for Calvin’s new understanding of social order, grounded in his readings of Scripture. The move to obedience for all due to the same predicament of sinful identity was, initially, a call to responsibility for those who are no different than each other to
help; that is, a monk and a layperson have the same call to study Scripture and conform their practices to its new interpretations. For Calvin, this was in line with Biblical command. This obedience produced strong networks of charity and giving in Calvin’s Geneva. Calvin’s social reforms were put into civic practice there as Catholicism was driven out. These reforms required the re-envisioning of policy for the redistribution of funds from the Catholic Church to civic leaders in line with the new forms of governance (Olson 155-157). This vision was tied to new ecclesial structures and practices of Scriptural interpretation, driven by increased literacy rates and the translation of the Bible into vernacular (non-Latin) language. As all believers were led to read Scripture, all held responsibility before God and others for their ethical practices.

Calvin’s work envisioned production as a sign of providence, a system in which usury held an historically unprecedented place. Usury was a sin as a practice, reflecting ethical discussions dating back at least to Aristotle, which argue that money in and of itself is not productive (Haas 119). Aristotle separated usury from other forms of acquisition as an “unnatural” method of exchange, since it is money emerging from money (Aristotle Politics, 1258a1). The New Testament reiterated this; Luke 6:35, for example, states: “But love your enemies, do good, and lend, expecting nothing in return” (NRSV). Your reward will be great and you will be Children of the Most High.” Tawney discusses the economic system of the Middle Ages where farmers and other laborers would occasionally need to borrow money to sustain their properties and labor; borrowing was part of a “hierarchy of values” which protected those suffering from exploitation (Tawney 153-155). Usury as exploitation was considered to violate this process. Usury itself had been connected not just to lending, but lending at unreasonably high rates, and had been a sin for pastors in Geneva (Olson 168) as well as England (Tawney 21)

Communication ethics scholars should note that Tawney is equally concerned with individualism, driven by the market sphere (Tawney 164).
163-164). This accounts for the history of anti-Judaic attachment of sin to money lending; the practice was akin to forcing Jewish people to oversee sewage systems for money or to become sex workers. Money was “dirty,” 22 tied to the private activities of self-sustenance that marked the nature of humans qua animals. Lending and the puritan development of the practice by “economic individualism of the later Puritan movement,” (219) were historically unprecedented.

Calvin parsed his interpretation of this Scripture regarding the poor, noting that duty toward them should not prohibit usury on the whole (Haas). Equity and charity are required, and the exploitation of the poor are forbidden by Scripture; Calvin argues that theft, as well, is a broadly understood category of neglect of duty to others, either through deceit or sloth (Calvin Institutes II.8.45). But varied practices of economic lending are not necessarily theft; those issued in accord with Matt. 7:12 (the Golden Rule) are permitted (Haas). Loans that would permit usury would be lending to a wealthy person to buy a piece of land or charging of interest to compensate for loss when taking a long amount of time to pay money back (118). In this paradigm, rates of interest should be determined by the “Word of God,” and the interests of charity (119), and not the standards of the economic sphere and the law of equity. That is, the Holy Spirit, rather than the forces of the market, oversee the transaction. Still, liberality toward the practice is established.

Calvin challenged the idea that making money from money is unproductive, an ideal disconnected from the productivity of money in the actual economic sphere. The other idea that he challenged was that the Hebrew Bible, or Christian Old Testament, forbade the practice

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22 Established at least as early as the Lateran Council of 1215, Jewish money lenders were castigated for usury toward crusaders and others. Methods such as being forced to wear distinctive dress to avoid deceitful intermarriage with Catholics were used as discipline. It is surprising that anti-Semitism is not considered more substantially by Taylor as a force for secularization, as a substantial challenge to the authoritative ethos of the Church. Though Taylor clearly identifies anti-Semitism as wholly improper to Christian belief in the text (Secular Age 709), he fails to grapple with its legacy as the Church developed the phenomenon from a history dating back centuries, even prior to Christendom (see The Deeds of Pope Innocent III 138-139; Nirenberg 18-47).
explicitly; again, except toward the poor, such restrictions were anachronistic, applying to ancient Judaism but not to the 16th century Geneva (120). Olson notes that Renaissance-era Italy had revisited ethics in this area as well, with trade routes established throughout Europe and Asia, and debates about the topic in Geneva would well-survive Calvin (Olson 169).

Taylor develops how the shift to sameness transformed social praxis in terms of economics in this era. In democracy, sameness is reified through citizenship and voting (though masking inequality of non-citizens, slaves, indentured servants, laborers and others). Taylor notes that this led to a “sociability” in which society ran on a process of “mutual exchange rather than hierarchical order” (Taylor Secular Age 217). It was in response to the time of Reform, in which elites came to run society and reimagine public identity tied to income. Those who are poor or mendicant (or “the poor” or “mendicants” – reified nouns) undergo “re-evaluation. …are less seen as occasions of charity, and more as social problems which need to be dealt with. They are dealt with by being organized, taken in hand, disciplined, sometimes semi-incarcerated” (86). Sameness negates the identity of the Other in economic terms. This leads to an economic anthropology. That which adds value to an item—labor hours, for example—adds value to a person. The ability to measure equality of value between two different objects—commensurability—becomes commensurability of value between two people. Value becomes the metaphor describing sameness between two persons. Despite clear evidence of Calvin’s treatment of the poor as worthy of help through the church office of deacon (Olson 165), the view of “sameness” transformed public identity and, significantly, changes social order through the “sanctification of ordinary life,” with economics and anti-elitism as its center. The turn from enchanted hierarchy led to a search for fullness in the immanent world, the phenomenal, grounded in the sameness of persons. Taylor argues that this increases the significance of
everyday life and trade: “the notion becomes more and more accredited that commerce and economic activity is the path to peace and orderly existence” beyond “the aristocratic search for military glory” (Taylor Secular Age 179-180).

Into the Modern Period

Critics of this persistent anthropological view emerged soon after this period. The need for certainty in economics evolves since, as Georg Simmel argues, money “has important consequences for the stability of society” (G. Simmel xxix); his work examines exchange value in a manner that ties it to concepts of sameness undergirding communication ethics and the importance of economic systems to this process. He notes the value that a system provides to what is natural (59) and makes a Humean inference as to the understanding of economics: “The value of objects, thoughts and events can never be inferred from their mere natural existence and content, and their ranking according to value diverges widely from their natural ordering” (59). That is, value is socially and culturally created, not naturally. Exchange value is created within a context of communication. Value for an object is known through correspondence to another object (61). This correspondence legitimates it, but does not provide veracity, to use Habermasian language. Value is existential, but not essential. It is a “judgment,” but “never a ‘quality’” (63). His exploration speaks to the overlap of hierarchy and sameness presumed to exist within agents in an economic systems; post-Reform Westerns would have no problem considering artificiality in hierarchy, a critical hierarchy of suspicion. Yet sameness is presumed to be essential within a democracy; Simmel’s analysis of economics suggests that value is a judgment constructed within a society, on the standards of a society. It is not a given any more than the superiority or inferiority of those within a hierarchy. The presumption of sameness that
facilitates participation in democracy, in social contract, as well as in economic contracts, is also constructed.

The ontic structure of sameness persists for Taylor, marking the individualism of modernity that comes to be tied to economics. This era, emerging from the Enlightenment onward, was one in which the Western social imaginary was both grounded in democracy and sameness in distinction from the pre-Modern era. This transition led to a vision of society that was entirely ontological, not grounded in correspondence to hierarchical forms, as with Platonic thought (165). This vision is a society grounded in “mutual respect and mutual service,” but out of seeing sameness in others (165). This involved “collective security,” or making “lives and property safe under law”; security and prosperity now mark organized society (166). This leads Enlightenment Era thinkers such as John Locke to connect these values to being industrious and rational (167). Mutual exchange and behavior is defined as “economic,” or “ordered, peaceful, productive” (167). Taylor argues that this move from hierarchy seems liberating, but in fact leads to further violence, to correct imbalance in our sameness: “The individual seems primary, because we read the displacement of older forms of complementarity as the erosion of community as such. We seem to be left with a standing problem of how to induce or force the individual into some kind of social order, make him conform and obey the rules” (169). The changes in moral order point to an economic structure, one which may account for the modern, industrial, and present foregrounding of economic structures as liberating over the State, in which some semblance of hierarchy still exists.

It is here in this consideration, to the epistemological and the ontological, that the economic foregrounds with moral ontic structure, both grounded in the reason and logic of math and contracts, and interactions and encounters with Others that protects and promotes the self
above other goods. Ethics are a product of the system, grounded in a good of liberating an individual, which will be developed later in this dissertation. It is here that communication ethics inquiry challenges. The ethical call to others, that to which we listen, marks an ontological risk beyond a commitment to the protection of sameness. This requires communication ethics to encounter the economic as a product of this time period and an agent of the perpetuation of individualism.

**The Turn to Communication Ethics and Economics**

Economics systems reify sameness in social praxis through commensurability. Aristotelian metaphysics calls for things to share some property in order to share value (Meikle 12-13). Exchange value accommodates commensurability in a way that use value cannot, since not all things fall into the same categories or properties (16-17). This commensurability allows varied goods to be traded and market activity to flourish, reified through the value of money. The shift between use and exchange accounts for the ethical split between what is produced within the home to sustain it and what is exchanged to accumulate money. Yet Meikle also argues that exchange does not succeed in accounting for shared properties, despite the clear wish of modern and neo-classical economists that this be the case. Money reifies the value of an object, but it does not really account for it. “Need,” or *chreia*, which is the utilitarian reading of Aristotle’s theory, that value is based on how much something is needed, is problematic to describe varied categories that money cannot measure (16-27, 29-30, 34). Commensurability becomes a problem in exchange value. This mirrors challenges to sameness within communication ethics accounts of anthropology and social praxis. That is, the idea that sameness is an adequate anthropological metaphor upon which to base a social imaginary, is flawed.
Economic systems, and the good of liberty and sameness that they facilitate in distinction from wars over hierarchy that marked 16th and 17th centuries (for Taylor), reify commensurability, allowing persons to be quantified in terms of exchange value. This has at least one obvious consequence of a renewed transatlantic slave trade, which also emerges in the post-Reform era of the West. Though slavery was nothing new as an institution, nor was it new in medieval life (Taylor *Secular Age* 101-102)—it came to treat persons within a system not as flesh and blood, but as variables in a formula, as agents of production, as lines on a balance sheet.23 Even after the illegality of slavery, companies argue for the limitation of freedom and rights within contracts so long as persons enter into such limitations freely—drawing from the original conception of contracts in the writings of Hobbes, who defines contracts as a “mutual transferring of right” (Hobbes 112). Contemporary concerns over non-disclosure agreements in corporate life and the parsing of their legality in whistleblower complaints (*Whistleblower* 1-2), as well as forced participation in private arbitration to settle disputes and its effects on due process and labor concerns (Berman and McCabe) illustrate this dilemma—that the freedom to negotiate relies on the sameness of responsibility of those entering into agreements, regardless of their value within society or place within a business hierarchy. Imbalances of power are reified within the hierarchies of markets, marking the transfer of ancient economic hierarchy into the public sphere and marking the conflation of hierarchy and sameness that merges in the private and public merging of spheres.

Here, then, Taylor’s analysis of the transfer from hierarchy to sameness in the modern era is embodied by the transfer of business into the public sphere. The irony of economics as tied to

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23 Taylor has little to say on the slave trade as a factor of secularization—as a phenomenon leading to the embrace of Marxist atheism in the Harlem Renaissance, for example. Kenneth M. Stampp argues that Christian and Muslims alike enslaved “infidels,” evidence of 17th century violence. (see Cameron; Stampp 16-17).
the home, to the hierarchical structure of one’s private life, marks a primary confusion of private and public that Arendt’s analysis identifies. The rise of the economic in public life, such as the corporation, and the fragments of ethical praxis that remain protecting economics as private—the concealment of payments to political parties, for example, or the privacy allotted to our tax returns—are components contemporary social life in the West. This initial of hierarchy and sameness, emerging from Taylor’s work, illustrates one connection between communication ethics inquiry and economics. As metaphors for communication ethics emerge in 20th century literature, this merging of spheres gives the social context for our understanding—the economic as social.

Throughout this dissertation, other metaphors for inquiry emerge that illuminate the understanding of economics and how economic spheres operate. Furthering this conversation requires an understanding of communication ethics scholarship, which is examined in the second chapter. Decades of communication ethics examination has revealed key spheres of inquiry for scholarship: democratic communication ethics, universal-humanitarian communication ethics, contextual communication ethics, narrative communication ethics, codes, procedures, and standards in communication ethics, and dialogic communication ethics. Each of these emerges from a basic task of communication ethics grounded in Aristotelian virtue ethics: “reflection upon the good or goods that self and others seek to protect and promote” (Arnett et. al. Communication Ethics Literacy 8). Each of these points to a particular historical moment to which ethical commitments are tied (10). The goal is not the generation of a universal set of principles, a Kantian attempt to reveal morality through reason, but an encounter with the face of the Other, attention to how others define goods and communicate through their own protection and promotion of that good. These spheres of inquiry examine methods for decision making,
rather than decisions themselves. While multiple metaphors exist as starting points for exploration of an ethical system or other set of practices, two emerge as central to understanding the historical moment of the 21st century. These are the importance of identity and the importance of public and private spaces to the process. Examining these, in addition to metaphors of hierarchy and sameness, is central to understanding communication ethics and becomes another central focus of this dissertation.

Understanding identity is the third area of focus for this project. Public identity in the Western tradition contributes to the ethical guidelines with which we communicate. A public label—teacher, student, entrepreneur, soldier, farmer, citizen, child of God, law enforcer, prisoner—reifies understandings of others that inform how we communicate with them. Some identities stem from professional communities and others from political and social spheres. They are defined by a shared good that its members protect and promote through particular practices. A key insight of this dissertation project is how economic spheres operate in the same way, to reify identity anew. Further, the privileging of economic identities—particularly consumer and producer—mark the modern era and delineate differences in how we interact with others, and the presumptions we make about them through a lens that privileges economic goods over social or political goods. So a commitment to upholding the free market or a socialist system of economics reifies those who struggle financially not as a “child of God” in need, or a “citizen” or neighbor that has fallen on hard times, but as a consumer or producer that has merely neglected their own duties to participate in markets (Middleton). Political spheres reify identity in a similar manner—status of citizenship has determined treatment and participation in cultural practices dating back to ancient Greece (Finley 95-122) and is still a contentious issue today in the treatment of war prisoners and those without the status of citizen in a country (Butler 62-66).
Communication ethics, as it pertains to identity, is in a unique position to remind scholars of the contingent, dynamic nature of public identity as it shifts between spheres. Identities that emerge from economic spheres hold increasing weight in how humans communicate.

With this understanding, the importance of examining economics through a communication ethics lens emerges, leading to a fourth area of exploration: the treatment of economics in communication ethics literature. Capitalism, socialism, and the marketplace each emerge at points in communication ethics literature, establishing the exigence for understanding how economic spheres affect human communication. This section foregrounds the analysis of neoliberal economics envisioned in particular by the Chicago School, arguing that growing academic concern for neoliberalism and its political and social influence within Western government, particularly the United States (Harvey 22-26), gives exigence to the contributions of communication ethics scholarship. In particular, the salient identification of “self-interest” as the primary virtue that must be promoted and protected in its practices, even if it means redefinition or elimination of longstanding institutions, make it of particular interest. Economist Milton Friedman and his co-author and wife Rose Friedman interpret Adam Smith and his account of capitalism thusly: “economic order can emerge as the unintended consequence of the actions of many people, each seeking his own interest” (Friedman and Friedman 13-14). Milton Friedman views neoliberalism as a means to reclaim “liberty” from the paternalistic State, where the government is a “master” or “God,” rather than a “means” to organize society for free people (Friedman Capitalism 1-2). The practice of market deregulation, as an embodiment of the virtue of self-interest that makes people free, impacts social life and foregrounds economic activity as the primary lens through which human behavior is understood above that of commitment to country or other institution. The shared good of the market, as it translates across institutions in a
process called “neoliberalization,” marks a shift in the shared goods that are protected and promoted with society, in professional communities such as education and the practice of law.

Communication scholars have previously examined connections between economic regulation and social praxis. For example, Jessica Kuperavage examines the efforts of missionary sisters to stop the opium crisis in 19th century China through economic regulation (Kuperavage 374-75). Economists in recent years have also addressed socio-cultural debates such as those over blue laws (Stehr 86). Regulation of markets of vice as social control have been understood to be a spectacular failure in the U.S., after the events of the Prohibition Era of 1920-1933, though conversations about wars on drugs, pornography, and gambling obviously persist. In light of contemporary discussions of neoliberalism, ethical advocates emerge both for the free market and for a reclamation of connection to human products in the face of it. The Marxist account of alienation from produced goods within capitalism has caused some communication scholars to reclaim practices of leisure in response to the brutal efficiency and perfection of the modern era, driven by efficiency and progress. Such discussions are also mindful of 20th century history and the problems that emerge when applying Marxist identities of “proletariat” or “bourgeoisie,” or producer and consumer, to human beings over all other identities. These discussions further reveal the exigency of exploring economic labels and goods as they define communicative practices.

In the final section of this dissertation project, I explore the work of Hannah Arendt, along with Arnett’s analysis of it, as Arendt looks back to the ancient period to understand how the split between the private and public sphere defined ethical praxis historically in the West. Further, Arendt diagnoses how these spheres merged in the industrial period. As constructed spaces, the public and the private must be protected and promoted for their individual goods that
are in flux. Here, I further develop insights from the primary literature of Isocrates, Plato, & Aristotle, three scholars whose work serve as important resources for communication ethics scholarship. In ancient Greece, the hierarchical structure of the family contributed to the production of wealth and of goods that sustained a life. This form of sustenance tied to the natural realm, marking the private nature of those practices that sustain humans *qua* animals—sexual reproduction and human digestion being two other examples. Like those, public displays of wealth were considered “vulgar”: Thorsten Veblen would lament the modern acceptability of this in his classic work *Theory of the Leisure Class*. In *The Human Condition*, which is, in part, Arendt’s response to Marxist thought, she laments the shattering of the divide between private and public. In modernity, this is marked by the process of gaining publicity for economic discussions, in the Habermasian sense (*Habermas Structural Transformation* 201). That is, economics becomes a regular topic in the public sphere and claims space from the private, as Habermas argued in the 1960s. This process is lamented by Arnett, who argues for what is lost in this process of conflation, which is, in part, clarity over the designation of ethical practices and the turn to the publicity of individualistic values and practices, as well as confusion regarding the differences between work and labor, action and contemplation.

Arendt’s work gives particular relevance to the continual process of privatizing public institutions and professions, which critical scholars call “neoliberalization” (Harvey). This process receives repeated analysis throughout this dissertation. Neoliberalism and neoliberalization, emerged in its ideological and intellectual infancy after WWII, in a time when theorizing about resistance to totalitarianism had particular exigence. F.A. Hayek, representative of the Austrian School of Economics, and his classic work, *The Road to Serfdom*, argue that socialism and Marxist Utopianism are the cause of the conditions that gave rise to early 20th
century totalitarianism in Europe (Nazi Germany, for example). Hayek offers free market reforms as the only defense against totalitarianism and the only moral system to protect “personal liberty” (Hayek 10-16, 20-21). Neoliberalism as a movement came from an influential consortium of scholars called the Mont Pelerin society, which met in 1947. These scholars included Hayek, Ludwig von Mises, and Milton Friedman. In Germany, economists explored “ordoliberalism” after this consortium, to help Germany recover in this period. In the U.S., neoliberalism theory emerged soon after this meeting, though it would take over 3 decades to be integrated fully into U.S. economic policy. Based at the University of Chicago, Frank Knight established the “Chicago School of Economics,” who, according to A.M.C. Waterman, “had spearheaded a newly emerging American neoclassicism,’ by defending the assumption of a rational, utility-maximizing individual, necessary to safeguard the scientific status of economics” (Emmett xviii). Milton Friedman was a member of The Chicago School who taught and advocated its ideas throughout his career—Friedman would win the Nobel Prize for Economics in 1976. Journalists and scholars debate the extent of Chicago School influence, though Friedman’s influence on Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher is not in dispute. This influence in the 1970s and 1980s was elemental in the transformation of the neoliberalism system of economics from an academic idea, which it largely had been prior to the 1970s, into a social reality (Harvey 22-26).

Of particular significance for communication ethics scholarship is that the Chicago School conceived of social problems through the lens of neoliberalism, often finding that problems are grounded in not in a problem with public virtue, for example, but in government interference in markets. Friedman and his colleagues advocated for free market reforms not only of nationally held economic companies, to remove the State from economics, but of institutions
such as education. For them, homelessness in U.S. cities, for example, was solely caused by State interventions (public) into real estate markets (private). This process reflects not so much the conflation of public and private, but the advocacy of supremacy of private over public, the reduction of the State. This phenomenon shifts the public good of the pursuit of self-interest, which is liberty for Friedman, to the center of public life, creating exigence for communication ethics scholarship to consider it.

Analysis in each of these chapters requires an accounting of the communication ethics field of scholarship, which has developed from individual approaches to communication to more unified emphases. The next chapter will focus specifically on this progression in scholarship and highlight communication ethics as a field to clarify its potential contributions to understanding human communication in economic spheres.
Chapter Two: A Survey of Communication Ethics Research

Communication ethics scholarship reflects the nuance and complexity of human communication. In an initial review of the scholarship, multiple coordinates emerge to ground the ethical inquiry of human communication. Scholars discuss the meanings of communication and ethics in an age of global trade and conflicts, of simulations of reality and mass media consumption, and of interpersonal and intercultural divides. This chapter explores the question of what themes and practices emerges as central to communication ethics inquiry that can inform reflection upon economic spheres within the field. This initial review reveals that decades of scholarship reveals key theoretical discussions of human identity, narrative commitments, and the public and private spheres that inform communication ethics inquiry and provide grounding coordinates for understanding how economic contexts inform the ethics of how humans communicate. Further, reflection upon communication ethics points to economic spheres as significant areas of theoretical reflection for scholarship.

Multiple theoretical and philosophical coordinates exist throughout the field, from explorations of social justice in communication (Holba “Leisure as Catalyst”) and multiple discussions of human identity as ground for ethical practices (Arnett and Arneson Philosophy of Communication Ethics xi-xii), to larger cultural trends and the influences of other fields of research on accounts of communication. The field engages philosophers and ethicists from the ancient to the postmodern, reflections of sociologists and psychologists, narrative and ideological traditions, historical influences, and concepts of language, embodiment, rationality, empiricism, and phenomenology.

Communication ethics also examines central practices of communication, including speaking and listening, and ethical reflection upon them. As the primary components of human
communication, reflection upon them reveals dispositions to protect the humanity of the other in the modern, “self-centered” context of communication, or even inhumane circumstances (Arnett Levinas’s 195). Some of these ethical dispositions include openness to the other and the call to responsibility for them, as well as “communicative humility” (Holba “Leisure as Catalyst,” 50). These dispositions are also informed by traditions that didactically shape practices.

Culturally contingent ethical practices that necessarily encompass communication are also present in communication ethics research; as Arnett and Arneson assert in their edited volume examining the intersection of philosophy of communication and communication ethics, philosophies of communication reveal varied ethical practices that exist within public spheres. The interpretation and understanding of these is contingent upon awareness of “otherness, alterity, and concern for the neighbor” (Arnett and Arneson ix-x). As such communication ethics should always be understood in a plural multiplicity (ethics), rather than in universals (ethic). Each emerges from particular theories, traditions, and dispositions.

This review privileges virtue ethics as central to understanding other accounts of communication ethics. Defined through an Aristotelian lens, identifying virtue within ethical systems overcomes ethical practice as commitment to rules, or to duties, or to particular people or traditions. Cracks that emerge in ethical systems (Caputo) point to reformation and to revolution within them; these are only deepened when one closed ethical system of particular rules or outcomes is privileged. Virtue ethics upholds motives, intentions, actions, and consequences in ethical practices and supports improvisation within these rules, eschewing dogmatic commitments that privilege systems over humans. Virtues also reveal the key good that shapes ethical understanding within systems and account for contradictions and subsequent changes within them. Commitment to virtue facilitates ethical practices as discussions tied to in
situ realities of community, accounting for unity among diverse communicative subjects, and denying ethics as a mere call to duty or a calculation. Identifying virtues within systems reveals ethical commitments that account for promotion and protections of goods and foreground what is determined to be ethical or unethical within a system.

**Defining Communication Ethics**

Scholars typically identify communication ethics in the plural, acknowledging multiple accounts of the field. In a series of interviews published as the edited book *Exploring Communication Ethics*, scholars reflect on the definition of communication ethics. They explore it as a subset of “ethics,” revealing key overlapping concerns between general ethical inquiry and communication ethics inquiry.

Communication ethics inquiry is inseparable from ethical inquiry. Pat Arneson notes that ethics “provides the methods one can use to arrive” at decisions, which is distinct from understanding what is ‘right’ and ‘wrong’; these relate to personal morality (Arneson *Exploring* xviii). Christopher Lyle Johnstone connects ethics to the Greek account connected to one’s character (1). It also ties to a “dwelling place,” where one is home, reflecting one’s values and the customs by which one is known, (1), and to “obligation” (4). It involves the capacity for *phronesis* or practical judgment from Aristotle (5). Aristotle’s phronesis marks ethical action beyond mere correspondence to ethical technique, grounding it in virtue. This Greek account reflects tradition, duty, and judgment as central to ethics.

While ethical inquiry in the West encompasses virtue, religious understanding, emphasis on motive or principle within particular ethical systems, or teleological accounts of what gives maximum benefit or the most beneficial outcome, Aristotelian thought leads to a privileging of virtue reflected in communication ethics inquiry. Virtue ethics, as reclaimed by Alasdair
Macintyre, offers accounts of ethics beyond legalistic utilitarian calculation or the privileging of motive or principle over outcome (or vice-versa) (Macintyre *After Virtue*). Within a situated narrative or ideology, a virtue guides ethical behavior and the formation of ethical systems. It is through the ethical fulcrum of this virtue that moral judgment and practices are weighed and deemed acceptable. Virtues as commonly held goods are protected and promoted through particular practices. This marks the search for virtue within a system as a primary task for understanding ethical practices within it, including practices of communication. Further, the contemporary era of virtue contention identified by Macintyre points to the identification of contending virtues as central to accounting for communication ethics praxis within systems of morality and ethics.

Communication ethics, in particular, is a subset of ethics exploring communicative theory and practices, as well as rhetorical construction through communicative engagement. Kenneth E. Andersen notes that all communication has an ethical component (Arneson *Exploring* 132). Richard L. Johannesen sees communication ethics as an “interdisciplinary field of study” (38) and Sharon L. Bracci describes it as “an inquiry into the range of other-regarding communication patterns that engage difference… in ways that contribute to our willingness to live peaceably among one another”; it is tied to a dialogical account of self (22-23). For Clifford G. Christians, it is tied to social values (90). For Arnett, it concerns the “good” that we take into the spheres of our life, both personal and professional (57). It spurs us to conceive of guidelines with which to deliberate, “fostering conditions for living well together (75). Michael J. Hyde also ties communication ethics to “rhetorical competence,” as well as acknowledgment of an Other (105-106). His understanding gives ethical weight to the significance of eloquence and excellence in rhetorical and communicative practices, in addition to acknowledgment. In each of these
nuanced accounts, concern for living with Others emerges as a primary concern for communication ethics by definition.

Communication ethics is envisioned as a pluralistic field tied to larger conversations of ethics, as well as language. For communication ethics theorists, the term should be understood in the plural, acknowledging multiple conceptions of communication ethics positions, as Christopher Lyle Johnstone, Sharon Bracci, Ronald C. Arnett, and Josina M. Makau argue (10, 22, 57, 73; see also Arnett and Arneson Philosophy ix). For Johannesen, the singular “communication ethic” indicates some sort of Platonic ideal to be determined (38), though Makau notes the usefulness of the singular is discussing a particular “ethic” understood to be one among many rather than an ideal (73). Andersen seeks such an ethic tied to the process of communication itself (134). Bracci and Christians make a succinct case for the connection of communication to ethics, grounded in the use of language. They argue that the “instrumental power of language motivates the search for theoretical support and practical criteria to evaluate the use of language for achieving desired human ends; to respond to calls for community and more intimate relationships; to reflect on the word’s power to construct human identity” (Bracci and Christians 1). Language and its use receives theoretical consideration in semioethics and the consideration of language in communicology (Petrilli, Catt). Ethical inquiry gains exigence from awareness of the inherent power of language and how it shapes community, particularly in pluralist contexts.

In this survey of the field, emphasis emerges on social interaction, grounded in multiple accounts of what can be ethical. Communication ethics, then, is plural and ties both to action and to language. Multiple avenues of research grounded in this understanding emerge throughout the 20th century, dating back almost to the inception of speech and communication scholarship.
Categories of Communication Ethics Inquiry

From previous literature reviews of communication ethics scholarship comes an influential list of theoretical approaches to communication ethics that encompass much of the field. In a review of the primary literature from 1915-1985, Arnett examined the field, working with a 1967 study of James Chesebro. Chesebro identified four categories describing the nature of communication ethics inquiry. These are democratic ethics, procedural, standard, and code ethics, universal-humanitarian ethics, and contextual ethics (Arnett “The Status of,” 57). Arnett makes the case for a fifth category, which is narrative ethics. This list would later be updated with an account of “dialogic ethics,” coming from the “dialogic turn” in the analysis of Arnett, Fritz, and Bell. These six metaphors mark the varied ways that scholars explore these fields. All are grounded in understanding the practices that promote and protect the goods of a community, though in particular ways. Further, each reflects what “is central to the dialogic process of negotiating contending social goods in a postmodern society, an era of narrative and virtue contention” (Arneson xxi).

The following review of these six areas of inquiry follows a traditional account of ordering for these fields. Each, however, offer points of intersection with another. For example, democratic ethics of public and private space inform the authoritative weight of contextual accounts of communication ethics. Each area of inquiry ties to definitions as listed in Arnett, Fritz, and Bell’s Communication Ethics Literacy: Dialogue and Difference.

Democratic Communication Ethics

This field of ethics concerns how speech is protected as a practice within democracies. It is “a public communication ethics process for discussion of ideas, customs, and rights, protecting and promoting the good of collaborative decision making” (Arnett et. al. Communication Ethics
Primary concerns for those examining democratic communication ethics include communicative engagement and free speech (Arneson *Communicative*). These accounts are often grounded in human rights as foundational to democracy and can be understood both in the analysis of human communication and mediated communication.

Scholars approach communicative engagement in the public sphere in multiple ways, including reflection upon pre-democratic societies. Foucault examined communicative engagement historically in an analysis of speech in ancient traditions (Foucault *Fearless Speech*). His discussion of *parrhesia* elaborates upon the ability to speak truth to power. Interruptions of speech that provoke or challenges are also understood through a biblical lens in explorations of prophetic speech. Abraham Heschel referred to prophets as “iconoclast[s]” who challenge the “holy, revered, and awesome” and expose the pretention of certainty and sanctity within institutions in society as an “ambassador” of God (Heschel 11-26). Contemporary democracy extols liberty as a virtue that drives communicative engagement and free speech, allowing for the interruption of the other, the uncomfortable confrontation, and the mistaken crackpot alike, all standing in the tradition that communicative engagement tames political, social, and traditional power.

Democracy and the right to free speech are grounded in accounts of universal rights and religious tolerance emerging in the 17th century West. Taylor’s sameness in the period of Reform serves as the ontic structure for an account of human rights. Hobbes identifies equality of “the faculties of the mind” among humans, which can ironically lead others to states of war to disrupt this equality (Hobbes 105-109). Western democracy is often understood through the analysis of the United States from Alexis de Tocqueville, who noticed the “equality of conditions” in U.S. culture (de Tocqueville 12-16), an equality that drives ethical accounts of free speech. These and
other conditions have been reified in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and remain a central virtue in accounts of communicative engagement (United Nations).

Central to communicative engagement is the ability to participate in the creation of new understanding of *Verstehen*, to borrow from Wilhelm Dilthey. The subject in Western thought understands through her own lens. Engagement overcomes this subjectivity and its ensuing dynamics of power, of one interpretation hegemonizing others in communicative exchanges. Arneson has highlighted the key metaphor of engagement as *poiesis* (Arneson *Communicative*) interpreted through Martin Heidegger’s account of the emergence of Being (Heidegger *Introduction*). That is, as elements converge, new structures grow with an “emerging sway” that challenge what is comfortable or “canny,” to borrow from *Antigone*, structures that disrupt and cause anxiety in their uncanniness as they assert themselves within nature, upsetting established order, as culture upon nature. This marks the human being as *to deinotaton*, from the Greek, or that which introduces Being; Heidegger calls this introduction “violence” (158-161). *Poiesis*, in this way, marks humanity through language. The ability to participate in the process further marks one’s humanity and mitigates against the war and domination that marked the pre-Democratic era in the West. Arneson considers *poiesis* in light of Calvin Schrag’s account of *theoria-praxis* as philosophical ground for ethical theory. Drawing from Aristotle, Schrag examines the abductive reciprocation between *theoria* and *praxis*, both of which are tied to community (Schrag). Arneson contributes *poiesis* as that which interrupts and shapes this reciprocation. It is the cultural expression, grounded in democratic rights to free speech, that improvises, challenges, and shapes social praxis in new ways, creating new structures and understandings; social justice is the focus of her initial analysis.
Free speech ethics are understood through this merging of the human capacity to construct through language and the inhumanity of denying the right to do so. They are discussed, significantly, in the public sphere, marking a key theme through which all contemporary communication ethics is understood—public space and private space. For example, those concerned with media ethics, who wish to examine the effects of media on truth, as well as propaganda (Johannesen 113-14; Ellul *Propaganda*; Lippmann), explore speech in the public sphere. Jacques Ellul notes that propaganda drives action to protect the “efficiency” of an organization (Ellul *Propaganda* 196) rather than to promote ideology. That is, the coherence of an ideology is not a concern for propagandists so much as obedience. Free speech ethics focus on rules in the public sphere to protect ideas. Protecting the equality of all, emerging from Hobbes, is protection against violence. As such, communication ethics research shows particular interest in communication law as it defines such speech in the public sphere. *First Amendment Studies*, one journal published by the National Communication Association, contains multiple engagements with court decisions establishing guidelines for the “free-flow” of information in the public sphere, which is central to democracy (Johannesen 191). Arneson and David R. Dewberry offer a helpful overview of scholarship in the field, including articles on ethics (Arneson and Dewberry). Critical media literacy scholars also contribute to an understanding of communication ethics in a democratic age examining privatization and its effect on public discourse in democracy, especially the suppression of “violent” ideas that diminish the ability of governments to act as they wish (McChesney). Here, then, free expression and its suppression are concerns of democratic communication ethics.

Private spheres typically restrict the authority to reify and to enforce ethical communication to the owners or leaders of spaces. Family spheres, for example, point to parental
control. Privately held forms of communication, even when participating in the public sphere, are limited by owners, who define and enforce spaces of communication, both in physical structures (the restriction of speech or conversation at a place of work) and in policies (policies surrounding fraternization, email communication, communication with publics on behalf of the private entity). The effect of privately held media companies on engagement and free speech are a particular concern for media scholars examining the transfer of engagement from the human to the mediated electronic sphere. Media ecologists examine material artifacts \textit{qua} media and the effects that such forms of communication have on understanding in the public sphere (McLuhan; Postman; Carr). A key insight across this tradition is that forms do not merely mediate language, but they participate in the rhetorical exchange. Ethical considerations of computers and social media now also extend from these conversations, challenging the boundaries of engagement within seemingly public cyberspaces whose private nature as owned entities and public nature as a utility are in dispute.

Democratic communication ethics concerns itself, then, with conditions of communication within democracy. It privileges the virtue of “being human” in the name of shared, equal rights and negotiates the meaning of speech in public spaces accordingly. Some theorists note the need to protect tolerance of others’ ideas and the promotion of “extreme” or unwanted speech as the sign of true freedom. Discussions of speech within public space have led to accounts of universal or ideal forms of speech that address the multiple differences and the violence that occasionally emerges from heated engagement. The effects of this violence have been tied to the Cartesian reclamation of certainty in knowledge and the subsequent division of knowledge into rational categories, causing rhetorical argument to fuse with the certainty of
science or demonstrative proof. This leads to further attempts to account for a universal ethic overlapping such violence.

Universal-Humanitarian Communication Ethics

This form of communication ethics “assumes one guiding communicative ethical principle of reason from the Enlightenment, protecting and promoting the ability of the human to discern the good through a rational process” (Arnett et. al. Communication Ethics Literacy 44). Connected to human rights, this form stands in the liberal, 20th century tradition of scholarship to identify universal principles informing ethics for all humans. The universal points to certainty for ethicists of varied kinds, drawn from the Cartesian search to remove doubt from knowledge; that is, it serves as a foundation for all communication, manifesting in universal ethics that would be re-examined in the postmodern age.

18th and 19th century philosophers offered an account of ethics where systemization and calculation make certainty of judgment possible, suggesting universal authority. This calculation emerged as one trend from the advancement of civility as an alternative to the violence of the 17th century; this ethical approach mirrors the enlightenment turn to objective understanding of certain principles, which are irrevocable. Systems emerging from this era to account for ethics that can be broadly applied included utilitarianism. Utilitarianism offers both a “felicific calculus” from Jeremy Bentham, and a consideration of pleasure and pain as standards for ethical judgment (Warnock 6; Bentham 41-51). The system presupposes utility as an ultimate good that creates commensurability between competing factors to weigh, balance, and calculate the most ethical decision. Post-dating the presumption of equality in Hobbes, this process of ethics

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24 These acts are measured to increase happiness. Philosopher Abraham Tucker, as early as the 18th century, considered happiness in terms of a “bank of the universe” in which we deposited good works to increase them (Macintyre, “Egoism and Altruism,” 464).
brings the language of calculation and math into ethical judgment. Utilitarianism points to the creation of systems in which to understand ethical judgment definitively. Certainty in humanities-based inquiry is also reflected in the work of Dilthey, who envisioned a “science” of interpretation (Jeanrond 51-57) and G.E. Moore, who understood ethics as a science (Moore 4-5). Here, ethical practices are weighed in a turn to the teleological, to weigh the maximum benefit for humanity.

Calculation also emerges in aesthetic reflection on art and expression, highlighting the need for taste and standards in communication and production that appeal to the “highest” good of humanity, pointing to ethics in aesthetic communication. Superlative communication becomes a preliminary form of “best practices” that reflects modernity in language and epideictic rhetoric. Hugh Blair embodies this in his exploration of standards of rhetoric grounded in a European model of “good” and “bad” for its “proper application”; for example, rhetorical introductions must have “modesty” and be “calm” (Blair 86-91). Matthew Arnold was interested in the nature of poetry and its “eternal objects,” held “among all nations, and at all times” (Saintsbury 3). Nietzschean reflections on aesthetics would extend these conversations, marking the achievement of excellence through the encounter with suffering as the highest form of art, one which replaces false “heights” of excellence into art within German scholarship on antiquity (Nietzsche). This embrace of both high and low marks the romantic era, a time of aesthetic expression linked to the emergence of Western culture from the industrial age. These categories presume European based standards that are then universalized, categories that would be revisited 20th century conversations surrounding colonization.

In the 20th century universalism becomes a focus for forensic rhetoric. Grounded in the democratic assumption that “all men are created equal,” as well as the 14th amendment right to
due process, 20th century forensic ethics examines judgment through a lens of universal rejections of bigotry and inequality under the law for citizens of the United States. The Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s in the United States demanded equal treatment and universal access under the laws. Such efforts lead to the development of ethical accounts that incorporate the universal from theorists such as John Rawls. The Rawlsian “original position” for moral judgment and his “veil of ignorance” are concepts to account for ethical judgment guaranteeing equal consideration beyond biases; each presumes and equality of identity within the law and an objective approach of legal judgment. Systemic mistreatment in court systems in the West led some people labeled with essentialized identities of race to be treated one way, and some another, hence this reflection. Though the Rawlsian position has been heavily critiqued by rhetoricians and ethicists alike for examining the problem of reducing legal inequality and justice to a system of equations to be solved through objective logic (Perelman 131-135; Nozick 183-231), his work reflects the universal-humanitarian vision of social ethics grounded in universal rights, pointing to (and requiring an account of) sameness among persons affected. Jürgen Habermas argues that this approach, shared by several other 20th century ethical theorists, dates directly back to Immanuel Kant (Habermas Moral Consciousness 43).

Habermas extends this epistemological framing of argument on universal ground in his “ideal speech situation,” which comes from reflection upon discourse ethics. Originally offered as a “sketch” or a “proposal” (88), it concerns formal argumentation anchored in the lifeworld (103) and governed by the rules of time and space (92), that acknowledge universal rules. When all are equally heard in a conversation, with protected freedom, discourse can then be ethical.

Yet in the public sphere of the West, standards are contested by their public nature with openness of multiple interpretive perspectives, communicating diversity of argumentative
presumption and ethical ground. Hermeneutic insights point to the dynamic role of rhetor, text, and interpreter. Universal tolerance and the rise of civility, grounded in a Kantian confidence to categorize and label, presume that humans can devise systems to overcome ethical hurdles “distorted” by bias through shared standards. This has resulted in a presumption that universal good or a system in which the universal emerges can be constructed. Yet interpretation always factors into moral judgment, as Gadamer understood: there is always context and history that determine judgment or understanding (Gadamer Truth and Method). Communication ethics and rhetorical scholarship of the mid-20th century further tie interpretation to context (Hikins and Zagacki 204-06), grounded in temporality. Christians and John C. Merrill have discussed the challenge of accounting for a globalized universal in the postmodern age that presents multiple intersectionalities to international audiences (Christians and Merrill 1-8). They present a “pluralist” understanding of communication ethics, which is not to be confused with a relativist understanding. In a 2009 edited volume, they account for the “the complexity of the intellectual landscape,” where many speak authentically from their own ethical ground (8). Bracci and Christians argue that attempts at universal accounts for ethics “are intellectually suspect,” and “doomed to founder on unyielding, incommensurable values” (Bracci and Christians 3). John D. Caputo examines this philosophical territory in his examination of Derridean ethics. The universal has been challenged, then, on philosophical grounds.

Further, Western democracy has been challenged for universalizing its accounts of rights and justice, both in philosophical analyses, where Macintyre called rights “moral fiction” (Macintyre After Virtue 84), and in post-colonial examinations of Western paternalism toward non-Western peoples (Nussbaum 51). As Anwar Abdel Malek writes:

One sees how much, from the eighteenth to the twentieth century, the hegemonism of
possessing minorities, unveiled by Marx and Engels, and the anthropocentrism
dismantled by Freud are accompanied by europocentrism in the area of human and social
sciences, and more particularly in those in direct relationship with non-European peoples.
(Malek, as qtd. in Said 97)

That is, what is European is mistaken for what is universal. Ethical inquiry grounded in universal
rules risks converting communication into what Ellul called la technique, a submission to one
understanding, procedure, or method emergent from the industrial world (Ellul The
Technological Society 3-4). Such an account necessarily dehumanizes those who understand
ethical inquiry and judgment through diverse lenses. Foucault expresses this difference as a
distinction between “jurisdiction” and “veridiction” (Foucault The Birth of Biopolitics 34-6); that
is, justice based on what is fair or right or good, and justice based on what is true. In veridiction,
standards are applied universally, rather than with jurisdiction, which is based upon rhetorical
nuance and appeal – on narrative. This process, which evaluates, judges, and communicates
attributes shaping social identity in the public sphere, such as “criminal,” “innocent,” “citizen,”
“felon,” and the like, reifies such labels and connects them to those exterior to a system. This
applies both in contexts of social justice and in the interpersonal exchange (Arnett Dialogic),
where commitment to a universal system causes one to miss the “needs” of the particular
moment (181).

Such universalist tendencies persist in the digital age as tech developers aim to overcome
the “hurdle” of subjective thought through analytics and data. Cathy O’Neil has argued that the
quest to overcome subjectivity is problematic, reinforcing the oppression of bureaucracy and the
“error” of bias in the system. O’Neil notes that education and incarceration inequality are
exacerbated by analytics, which is an ethical issue (O’Neil 224-26). Here, communication of
identity comes through a person reified into a statistic, a mathematical form translating across contexts—a reduction of the ungraspable, individual Other into a form of graspable data. Emmanuel Levinas argues that systems are supreme in the turn to universality (Levinas 72); as reflected in the ideal speech situation, a universal system of discourse focuses on the functionality of the system, not the humanity of those who communicate. Universality “dispenses with communication” (72). For Makau and Arnett, universality dispenses with the multiple accounts of what informs communication (Makau and Arnett).

Scholars drawing from the Enlightenment have sought to overcome these critiques through a reframing of the universal. Seyla Benhabib has reconsidered the individual, tied to the subjective and to the historical moment (Arnett Dialogic 205). Her communicative ethics are grounded in “respect” and “reciprocity” for and with the Other; these are both formal considerations within communicative ethics and a telos of such reasoning (Benhabib, Situating the Self). Christians has also analyzed “protonorms” or norms underlying the experience of being human across all experiences; these would include a duty to preserve life that includes respect for human dignity, truth-telling, and discussions of the ethics of violence (Christians and Nordenstreng 21-24). Christians’s scholarship draws from the global examination of ethics across cultural contexts. A globalized world both challenges universal ethics and guides humanity to consider how principles and praxis translate into multiple contexts.

So the universal, emerging from the Enlightenment, has conceived of ethics as the reification of a priori principles in the past, highlighting them above or beyond localized narrative or myth, and beyond historical moments. The turn to repair the problematic nature of the universal ethic, in its modernist account, points to a postmodern response from communication ethics inquiry. This shift reflects the move from the universal to particular,
pointing to individual ground as the basis for communication ethics, leading to theoretical accounts exploring the nature of contextual ethics. Contexts challenge accounts of universal ethics both in terms of judgment and in the reification of ethical principles.

Contextual Communication Ethics

A contextual approach “recognizes communication ethics variations across differing cultures, persons, and settings when applying communication ethics principles, protecting and promoting the good of the particular” (Arnett et. al. Communication Ethics Literacy 45). This field acknowledges intercultural and pluralistic accounts of communication ethics in the increasingly globalized world, both in human diplomacy and in McLuhan’s mediated “global village.” This field can be understood through the lens of understanding an Other, or through the establishment of one’s own context. Arnett’s examination of the ethical theory of Dietrich Bonhoeffer accounts for the relationships between narrative, praxis, rhetoric, dialectic, and the factors that allow for contexts to exist beyond soft relativism without drifting into hard determinism. Understanding others requires a commitment to one’s narrative ground that opens one to listen (Arnett Dialogic).

20th century communication scholarship identifies the exigence in dealing with communication in context. Edward T. Hall established intercultural communication as a diplomat attempting to communicate successfully with colleagues from other countries. His close examinations of temporality (Hall The Silent Language) and proxemics in communication (Hall The Hidden Dimension) establish time and space as culturally contextual factors for one to understand to communicate successfully in a globalized world. Dire consequences result from lack of attention to context, or to the desire to eliminate context. Arnett, Fritz, & Bell also discuss the contexts of organizational communication and communication ethics. Unique
mission statements of organizations point to particular goods that define particular practices as ethical or unethical (Arnett et. al. *Communication Ethics Literacy* 52). For example, a group established to protect public reputations for companies may handle ethics surrounding disclosure differently than an investigative newspaper, whose mission is to expose corruption. From a virtue ethics standpoint, the commonly held good of an organization creates particular contexts. Attention to particularity is inseparable from the formation of ethical principles in on-going dialectical exchange with ethical systems (Arnett, *Dialogic*). In diplomacy and in organizational theory, external goods define ethics of communication within contexts.

Arnett’s examination of the work of Dietrich Bonhoeffer accounts for ethical contexts within a postmodern moment that focus on the “pentultimate,” rather than the “ultimate.” In this account, congruence between word and deed that marks fidelity within narratives ties to pentultimate concern, or a commitment truth within context. Arnett identifies the ultimate concern as that of modern universalism—the application of principles in any given situation regardless of historical context. Response to moments, however, requires a commitment to ethical praxis “unavailable in a priori answers” (93). Contextual ethics require interpretation and judgment beyond technical application in a “world come of age,” which is Bonhoeffer’s term for the postmodern West (93). The “good,” which is the focus for decision making, is not reified into “pure” or “perfect,” but acknowledges a response to the Other, a response required by a faith that calls to engagement with the Other in the world. Decision-making exists in a horizon, in phenomenological, contextual encounters within historical moments, grounded in narratives, rather than in atemporal, technical application of principles.

Narrative, here, must serve as ground lest decision making fall into an account of protectionist personal preference; this is the problematic turn of psychologistic ethics in the
West. This process is found in two strands, both tied to each other: one is libertarian, grounded in individual liberty as the highest ethical good, while the other phenomenological tied to psychological as a radically relativistic ground for dialogue and communication emerging from models for therapeutic communication.

Libertarianism has centered ethics, particularly communication ethics, around the virtue of liberty as a replacement for, or acknowledgment of, the reduction of authority in universal accounts of ethics grounded in religious and nationalist traditions. John Stuart Mill conceived liberty as a virtue suppressed by systems such as the Benthamite utilitarianism that preceded him. Mill’s work questions the need for a system to define what is right and wrong, to make ethical judgments, or to define an ethical telos for his praxis (Mill). He advocates for the liberation of the individual in the face of institutional, paternalistic power, to decide for himself or herself what ethical choices are proper. This individualistic emphasis, the subjective transfer of ethical judgment from a tradition or system to an individual subject, necessitates an open, unregulated account of communication between persons to cultivate the self. Mill privileges the self as originative; this protects, in part, from what he called the “tyranny of the majority” (27-28). Ironically, though, subjective self-cultivation requires a universal condition of unregulated communication ethics, an establishment of universal conditions, which must be protected, to guard the right to contextual ethical praxis. Arnett ties this to the therapeutic model of communication that upholds “primary confidence in the self” (Arnett Dialogic 213).

Mill’s analysis shapes Friedrich Nietzsche and the libertarian turn of the 20th century, tying self-dependence to progress and “bourgeois dignity” (McCloskey Bourgeois Dignity 25). Nietzsche challenged the authority of Western religion, particularly Christianity, to inform moral judgment and formation, arguing that the individual emerges into a good life through the
rejection of mediocrity and the embrace of suffering (Nietzsche). His famous “death of God” leads the individual to pursue excellence as the “pre-Axial” warrior, to use Taylor’s language (Taylor Secular Age 373). Taylor argues that this is an attempt to replace the “fullness” of life that marked the enchanted era of Western civilization (245). Nietzsche critiques the modern order that maintains religion as a source of moral goodness as a check on the dark side of humanity in a Kantian understanding. Rather, the self must emerge beyond the mediocrity of these systems. As such, there must be a context for the self to emerge beyond old narratives.

Mill and Nietzsche point to an individualistic ethic in which one liberates oneself in the face of varied contexts, rejecting tradition as the core of contextual ethics. This move to liberate connects to a second, psychologically-centered account of contextual communication ethics. Unlike liberty, or excellence, psychologically-centered communication ethics envisions the Self as an essential entity to be promoted and protected, rather than liberty.

Contextual ethicists often account for the Self in terms of a psychological essence (Bracci and Christians 2). Psychology privileges the depths of the mind in understanding reality, presuming that individuals determine reality and the ethics that define that reality better than any other source. Figures such as Carl R. Rogers have guided the West to accounts of ethics that privilege the individual experience in multiple contexts, extending a “self” centered approach from therapy into education, arguing that an approach grounded in the center of the individual counteracts “authoritarian culture,” offering an account of education relevant to a “democratic society” (Rogers 384-88). Education, for Rogers, filters through the “self” as a matter of

25 Patrick Frierson identifies three steps to understanding Kant’s account of religion: (1) questioning knowledge accommodates faith, (2) faith contains practical proofs for God’s existence, and (3) grace overcomes natural human evil. (Frierson 200-15).

26 This is also plainly present in the writings of Mill, who turned to the “Self” as the beginning of finding solutions to problems, rather than ethical constructs, the State, or even the sphere of trade (B. Simmel 10-13, 27, 31, 52-53).
pedagogical theory; that is, learning *does* filter this way, rather than it *should* filter this way (389). Advocating for a self-centered approach to responsibility and critical thought (387), Rogers merges the communicative practices of the counselor’s office, and its accounts of the Self and its cultivation and protection, with public, and, by definition, less protected spaces. He posits that the best form of education happens when the self is threatened as little as possible (391), when “the purposes of the students [are] foremost” (393). This creates communicative contexts that embody the “buffered self,” to use Taylor’s language, a move that Robert Bellah would lament in the emergence of a “therapeutic” culture (Arnett *Dialogic* 205-212). In this, the self privileges protection over engagement with foreign contexts.

Psychological contextual ethics protect the individualistic focus on personal emotions and experiences, a context that, ironically, requires the domination of other individuals to protect. This becomes what Macintyre would famously depict in his later analysis as “emotivism,” the collapse of an account of ethical reasoning to “this is what I feel to be true” (Macintyre *After Virtue* 27-42) reified into popular consciousness through Abraham Maslow and his “hierarchy of needs,” which places “self-actualization” as the prime virtue or good to be protected within society. The virtue that is protected and promoted in this understanding of ethics becomes “authenticity” of self; what a person “can” be, that person “must” be (Maslow 382). This movement also accounts for contemporary trends in popular culture understood as “expressive individualism,” which Taylor argues is having a profound impact on the West (Taylor *Secular Age* 491-510; Arnett *Dialogic* 212). This involves individuals expressing themselves in their “authentic self,” “as they truly are,” “without apology.”

This turn to “self” emerges from a challenge to bourgeois “civility,” the middle-class commitment to communities grounded in conventional ethical praxis, as hollow and mediocre;
such virtues reinforce what Nietzsche called the herd mentality. The battle over context, of the redefinition of public excellences and the publicization of the private-as-identity, characterizes the muddled context and confusion of leadership between what is political and social (Arendt 24-25). That is, the realization of the self requires both self-disclosure to become one’s own authentic self, requiring a protected context in which one can self-disclose, and the rejection of all other constructed contexts as hegemonic to that context.

Overcoming this danger has led to the inquiry of narrative as a category for understanding communicative praxis. The presence of stories, whether mythical or historical, challenge the centrality of the self as the architect of one’s own ethical context, problematizing the protection of the authenticity of a “self.” Communication ethics theory turns to narrative as ground for approaches between context that protect one’s identity while calling for the development of communicative praxis such as listening and discerning. Jeffrey Walker argues that narratives were the first form of persuasive rhetoric in the West, demonstrating practices to be imitated for communities interpreting those texts and establishing identities of individuals within the ancient polis (Walker Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity 3-16). Histories, interpreting events that unfold from communities sharing identity and ethical practices, shape the meaning and direction of the community itself. Reflection upon this phenomenon, to understand communication practices, is understood as narrative communication ethics.

Narrative Communication Ethics

This approach “assumes that a communication ethic begins with persons’ lives guided by stories about the way the world is or should be, protecting and promoting the good residing within given narratives” (Arnett et. al. Communication Ethics Literacy 45). These analyses examine how communication ethics are defined and shaped by the stories that provide meaning
and context to theory and praxis. Narratives identify, express, and extol which virtues should be protected and promoted within a context of interpreters, acknowledging what Calvin Schrag called “communicative texture,” which is the complexity that marks exchanges within historical moments (Arnett *Dialogic* 162; Schrag).

Narratives not only serve a didactic purpose in guiding ethical praxis; they mark human identity beyond the contextual definition of the “self.” Macintyre argues that in ancient narratives, ethical instruction regards how one should “be” in the context of story. Religious ethics are grounded in ethical exemplars of narrative that establish architectonic understandings of the world. The protection and promotion of the virtues of within a narrative is the ethical fulcrum balancing a community and those outside of it with divergent narratives creating varied boundaries. Augustine and his discussion of the ethics of Christian consumption of pagan poetry (Augustine), grounded in the New Testament (Colossians 2:8; Romans 12:2), speaks to the tension between community narratives. Others’ stories are interpreted in an early account of what Walter Fisher would call the “narrative paradigm,” where coherence and fidelity are standards by which one can judge a story its ethical significance or implications (Fisher “The Narrative Paradigm”).

Communication ethics examined through narrative acknowledges the interpretation of “Self” constructed through the lens of community. Narrative persuades persons how to perform identity, though the nature and extent of this performance may be in much dispute. Discussions of the correct interpretation of a narrative can be contentious and appear unresolved. Divergence comes in the discussion of the ethics of ritual communication (variance in sacramental ethics in Christianity, for example, or flag-handling rituals in a nation-state), the historicity of a narrative, the hermeneutical distance between subject and text identified in the modern era and its effect on
the understanding of ethical prescriptions from a narrative, and the temporal relevance of a
narrative. Discussions over, and the performance of, ethical guidelines within a context of
community define identity. Aristotle ties public role to identity (Macintyre *After Virtue*),
reaffirming for Macintyre that stories account for identity and shape the self. Burke’s rhetorical
analysis also offers dramatistic understandings of rhetoric, that is, the interpretation of
knowledge through the lens of the story (Burke *A Grammar of Motives*), also revealing the role
that narrative plays in interpretation and knowledge.

Fisher noted that narrative as a category often goes unacknowledged in modern ethical
interpretation, but it powerfully shapes human identity. Even science, a tradition of inquiry
firmly grounded in reason, incorporates narrative; Fisher reminds researchers that narrative
informs social science in explorations of the Self, for example (Fisher “The Narrative Paradigm”
347). Communication ethics researchers regularly adopt narrative argumentation, tying literature
to research projects (Arnett et. al. *Communication Ethics Literacy*; Arnett and Holba; Arnett
Levinas’s). The privileging of the contextual self is, in many respects, an attempt to defend
against narrative-shaped identity. For example, a man with a chaotic family background who
discriminates which members of his family are allowed to contact him, in order to protect his
sense of “self,” is not so much in charge of his own identity formation as he is buffering himself
from the interpreted narratives of events that have defined him to that point. The protection of his
“self” acknowledges the role that narrative plays in shaping him and his ethical decisions direct
the creation of new stories of encounters that will continue to shape him, rather than essentialize
his identity apart from such a context. This protection, then, acknowledges the role of narratives
in identity formation.
Narrative accounts of communication ethics acknowledge the unique, co-creative nature of story and the contexts of ethics that must follow without collapsing all narrative into autobiography, reflecting the contextual privileging of the self. That is, an ethical subject is part of a web of stories that create a narrative into which one is located, a story that is on-going, with plot twists and new characters. Narrative protects the context for interpretation in a code or rule. Stories of ethical violation merge to build a particular narrative about the best way to promote or protect the good of a group or profession through their own code—balance theory suggests that stories provide equilibrium when a code is tested (Fisher “The Narrative Paradigm” 349). Narrative resists the centering of one person over another, focusing ethical inquiry onto virtue.

Various virtues emerge from narratives in a postmodern, pluralistic context of petite narratives; Macintyre describes this as the contemporary phenomenon of “virtue contention” (Macintyre After Virtue). “Virtue contention” results from the postmodern collapse of metanarrative (Lyotard). In the postmodern era, only totalitarianism requires total fidelity to one narrative, and subsequent ethical conformity and dehumanization follows. Petite narratives, those which guide behavior but eschew either the reality of a universal ground for all or the desire of a universal ground for all, replace the metanarrative, which has had frightening historical ramifications in early 20th century Russia and Germany (34). Virtue contention, and the viability of multiple possibilities driving varied community contexts, is marked by distrust in institutions that define our narratives. Petite narratives result from smaller community, built through face-to-face encounters with others. This regulates the power of a narrative, which Jean-François Lyotard describes as substantial, defining “what has the right to be said and done in the culture in question” (23), playing a legitimizing function for knowledge within a society (27-28).
way, they give ground to the ethics of communication within a culture. Reducing their scope, therefore, limits the dominating potential of a narrative to interpret other stories.

Examining intimate interactions, the postmodern collapse of metanarrative drives a turn to the Other, in communication, as a source of knowledge, responding to the alienation of humanity in the modern period, noted by Hegel, Feuerbach, Marx, and others (Silva). Whether through capitalist production that produces alienating practices, or through the atomization of community as a grouping of individuals in the utilitarian perspective27 (Bentham), interactions between two individuals takes on renewed focus and purpose in ethical reflection. This includes reflection upon the nature of how one communicative agent appears to one another, is understood by another, and is shaped by another, as being emerges between them in dialogic encounter.

Contexts of organizations reify standards in cultural practices to maintain, promote, and protect the institutions challenged by the assertion of the subject, the “self.” Institutions and professions must be protected through ethical practices establishing discrete boundaries between those inside and outside of them. As with the contextual self, these boundaries define institutions and professions, though with space for Others. Grounded in petite narratives, dialectical interplay between ethical goods, human events, and the historical moment, reveal particular practices and principles to guide organizations. Ethics, in these contexts, are reified in codes, procedures, and standards defining the particularity of these groups. Such codes, procedures, and standards become foci for ethical theorists.

27 Macintyre notes that this account is an adaptation of Thomas Hobbes’ historically unprecedented account of individualism. (Macintyre, “Egoism and Altruism,” 462-463).
Codes, Procedures, and Standards in Communication Ethics

This account of communication ethics “defines communication ethics guidelines by which appropriate ethical conduct is evaluated, protecting and promoting the good of corporately agreed-upon practices and regulations” (Arnett et. al. *Communication Ethics Literacy* 44). Ethical standards establish in-group and out-group boundaries for community through adherence or non-adherence to those standards, creating identity for both institutions and professions through a shared teleological good. Establishing principles as ethical ground suggests a Kantian reduction of the good into *a priori* principles, pointing to a primary concern of sourcing: do codes express ethics from another source or are they themselves the source? Yet codes, procedures, and standards are always tied to narrative or organizational context.

Not understood as the *source* of ethics, but the expression of them, narrative-based systems of ethics and law date as far back as the Code of Hammurabi, the Ten Commandments, and the Leviticus holiness code. In these, community was promoted and protected, members of society were specifically directed toward practices (either Babylonian or Hebrew), and the maintenance and health of the community was the primary good. Such codes were tied to theological inquiry or direct revelation from gods. In contemporary lists of practices and standards, however, codes for ethics are reified through organizational leadership, yet they still contribute to the salience of identity for a group. That is, groups are known by their ethical praxis.

It is tempting for ethicists to dismiss such codes as insignificant for reflection when they appear, on their face, disconnected from praxis and from dialectical reflection with Others and with historical moments. It is also tempting to allow petite narratives to expand into universalist accounts. Communication studies and semiotics has resisted the modern turn to codification for
this reason. In 1948, Claude E. Shannon and Warren Weaver reified communication in a model of exchange that minimizes feedback, oversimplifying the nuance of communicative exchange and ignoring both power dynamics and the contribution of ritual communication (McQuail 219). Ferdinand De Saussure offers an account of 20th century semiotics governed by mathematics, reinforcing a correspondence theory of truth to gain certainty and dictate reality (ontology) and ethics (axiology). Susan Petrilli argues that both C.S. Peirce, who offers interpretation as an account of semiotic understanding, and Mikhail Bakhtin strongly refute De Saussure’s account (Petrilli 2.4). The postmodern turn to the petite narrative accounts for the correction of this problem in the development of ethical guidelines, eschewing universalization through codification.

Codes, standards, and procedures determine orthopraxy for communities grounded in a shared good of a particular group. These principles, in terms of the discussion of communication ethics thus far, are contextual. This is significant for professional communities. For example, The American Association of Advertising, the American Advertising Federation, and the Better Business Bureau Code of Advertising establish guidelines for practitioners of advertising, as does the Public Relations Society of America for Public Relations professionals (Johannesen 186-90). Generally, these ethical practices are grounded in truth-telling and integrity to build trust. In a democratic society where people choose their professions, community establishment of standards contributes to the civility that grounds Western culture (Fritz 8-10). To the extent that identity exists, it is determined by boundaries established in contexts of community, as Macintyre argues in his discussion of the transition from the Homeric Age to Athens in Ancient Greece (Macintyre A Short History 5-13), rather than an exploration of the interior self. Codes, procedures, and standards establish guidelines and parameters for judgments, creating just
decision-making and choice-making in social contexts that protect and promote ethical behaviors. Importantly, this understanding is spread amongst the group, but it is not universal.

Narratives, then, shape and determine ground beyond universal principles, acknowledging pluralism in the 21st century world. This historical reality requires resources for interpreting and judging ethics in this context. Communication ethics turns to the dialogic to account for such a moment. Dialogue is the process that facilitates encounter with the Other, accounting for interaction that challenges and shapes ethical praxis.

**Dialogic Communication Ethics**

This approach “acknowledges communication ethics as attentive to the emergent, not owned by either party in the conversation, and responsive to multiple goods that give rise to and emerge in ongoing conversations, protecting and promoting the good of learning” (Arnett et. al. *Communication Ethics Literacy* 45). The relations of two parties in dialogue hold multiple goods in play, in situations that mark ethical commitment to an Other, establishing ethics as “first philosophy” (Arnett *Levinas’s* 4). That is, the call from the Other and to an ethical commitment to that Other is the ground of dialogue. This stands in contrast to an epistemological evaluation of proper method or a focus on the saliency of the identity of “self” or “Other.”

Dialogue involves the face-to-face encounter, from which emerges understanding. It does not assume that the Other can be understood in transparence; dialogue protects the “unmasking” of the Other (67), or the privacy of the Other’s interiority—the protection of what is backstage, to use Goffman’s language (Goffman *Presentation of Self*)—the unmasking of which is often a move of domination. What happens in-between two parties is a focus of understanding. Responsibility for the other marks this encounter, in an ethical concern found in existentialist philosophy, even when those accounts are grounded in an ontological subject-orientation toward
the other. Yet the dialogue creates a bond between persons in a “unity of contraries” (Arnett Communication and Community 111-26; Dialogic 206). The public “in-between” of dialogue builds understanding, and thereby community.

One enters into dialogue from one’s own narrative ground. The postmodern moment indicates a lack of commonly held public virtues; what is held in “common” is in question (Dialogic 111) and, often, in dispute. Narrative, as the locus of identity and guidance for ethical judgment and praxis, supplies the ground allowing one to engage Others with humility. The social practices shared by those with divergent narratives allow for exchange. Public narratives also provide the resources to exchange within dialogue while eschewing private unmasking. That is, dialogue does not require over-disclosure in a confusion of candidness and honesty driven by expressivist, mediated popular culture. Narrative ground allows persons to interpret Others in humility, negating the reification of the other required to judge within the boundaries of a closed ethical system. It is the basis for dialogue in-between persons.

For Martin Buber, this “in-between” is the locus for dialogue—between an I and a Thou (Buber I and Thou). It marks interaction with boundaries that are set and then dissolved, present yet elusive; it is a temporal, spatial event that cannot be replicated, what Bakhtin calls “utterance” (Bakhtin 60-102). Its nature as outside of the self, or another self, marks the turn from the originative “I,” driven by a call that is exterior to self. This call, which Arnett, in his examination of Levinas, discusses as the “immemorial ethical echo” that “I am my brother’s keeper,” (Arnett Levinas’s) disrupts ethical systems (Caputo), challenging the intellectual...

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28 For example, Jean-Paul Sartre is deeply concerned with the responsibility of the for-itself (Sartre 553-56).
constructs of epistemology and ontology. It is also understood as a “call to conscience” (Hyde) that challenges ethical norms. The space between two people, then, provides a locus for examining the ethics that protect such a space and make it salient (without reification).

Some accounts of dialogue examine ontology through the lens of phenomenology, examining our relation to others in our distance from them. Science as “human” produces Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology, which attempts to account for the traditional split between the objective and the transcendental, grounded in a “pre-given” ontic life-world structure that grounds objectivity (Husserl 68-70). Understanding objects as they appear to us, in careful analysis, marks the phenomenon, with an awareness of separation between form, content, appearance, and interpretation. Heidegger develops this phenomenon in terms of human “being” and the meaning of existence. His account of Dasein, or being-toward, points to the communal nature of existence, that all exist in relation to another, with an ethic of care as an ontic component of Dasein, the reality of being-toward (Heidegger Being and Time 237-41). Thrownness reveals the necessary orientation toward other in dialogue, the orientation of Self that cannot reach a protectionist essence in separation from history or from others. From this, human relations, in their complexity, emerge from contexts and situations, leading to particular understandings of how we should communicate. Heidegger’s account has proved highly influential for feminist authors in understanding the processes of care (Noddings), as well as in studies of the ethics of euthanasia (Hyde), communicative engagement (Arneson Communicative), and listening (Lipari).

Communication ethicists have questioned whether this places ontology as first philosophy in shaping accounts of communication. Being, as an ontological concept, reveals concerns in dialogue, but is in danger of repeating the modern turn to the self as center of
communication ethics—that is, accounting for ethics in terms of the experience of the subject-towards-another at expense of the object or vice-versa, and not in the “in-between.” Buber and Levinas’s analysis, as noted by Arnett, points to the in-between of two persons. Dialogue is understood as consciousness that is “shared” (Catt 97) in human communication, not individualistic. This becomes a primary concern for communication ethics.

The transformation of dialogue in the globalized, digital world informs accounts of “in-between” and practices of interaction. The plurality of voices often drives conflict and reactionary fear, leading to incivility. Dialogic civility is a concern for Arnett and Arneson, particularly in the digital age of multiple narratives engaged not through the face of the other, but through the distanced, buffered phone/computer/TV screen. The expansion of the in-between through distance, from petite narratives in community to buffered cyber-communities without an account of the face of the Other, increasingly encourages incivility. Video gamers seeking revenge, for example, have engaged in “swatting,” which involves calling a SWAT team to someone’s home under false pretense—which led to a death in Wichita, Kansas, in December 2017 (BBC). The rise of the “alt-right,” which has marked a resurgence in public displays of hate speech in the United States, congregated originally in gaming chat rooms (Salazar). Penance through public shaming, deemed as cruel in the medieval era of the stocks, re-emerges through social media via Twitter and other formats, where a person can be globally stalked (Ronson). Dialogic civility is challenged in an era where community standards for responsibility and accountability are as undefined as the spontaneous “communities” and interactions between the

29 Other philosophers have depicted this dialogue to human/culture, human/society, and human/technology (Catt).
30 In his journalistic account, Jon Ronson tells the story of Justine Sacco. Just before boarding a 2013 flight from New York City to Cape Town, Sacco tweeted a joke to her 170 Twitter followers about not having to worry she will contract AIDS while in South Africa because she is white. By the time she deplaned, she was the #1 trending topic on Twitter worldwide and had lost her job. She was then followed through the airport with people filming her on their phones. Her mental health would be severely affected by this event.
avatars of cyberspace. Mediation distorts and masks the narrative ground of persons, altering dialogue. Communication ethics in the dialogic age, then, focuses on the “in-between” in an era where the space between two persons, two organizations, two nations, has been redefined.

Human communication ethicists, through these lenses, explore and account for communicative praxis. Encapsulating rhetoric, dialogue, and dialectic, these six theoretical accounts: democratic communication ethics, universalist-humanitarian communication ethics, contextual communication ethics, Codes, procedures, and standards, narrative communication ethics, and dialogic communication ethics, serve as ground for communication ethics literature. Multiple ethical concerns emerge from these conversations, both theoretical and practical.

This survey reveals no specific focus on economics within the literature as a whole. What do emerge, however, are coordinates of human identity, tradition and narrative ground, which Taylor has examined in his analysis of the time of Reform, and accounts of the public and private sphere, each of which inform these 6 categories and give insight into reflection upon the economic sphere. The following chapters focus on coordinates shaped by varied goods: human identity and the ethical practices that emerge from its understanding, the place of economics, and public and private spaces as contexts determining the ethics of communications. In moving toward an understanding of economic systems and the communication ethics that emerge from the goods that they protect and promote, these two coordinates change dependent upon a discerned good. This change has profound ethical consequences for subsequent communicative practices.
Chapter Three: Human Identity and Communication Ethics – Practices and Goods

The preceding chapter offered a review of communication ethics scholarship with 6 primary areas of inquiry. Each centers around the conception of communication ethics as the protection and promotion of a shared good. From these emerge practices that can be deemed ethical to the extent that they contribute to the protection and promotion of that shared good. As such, the primary difference between one communication ethic and another focuses on the differences in goods forming the practices of an ethic. It is not a given that only one good exists or that the coherence of an ethical system is presumed; poststructuralist understandings of ethics problematize the construction of a set formula through which all actions can be coherently judged as “ethical” or “unethical,” regardless of the level of discomfort that this reality may offer to ethicists.

Coordinates emerge from these areas of inquiring that are considered across a spectrum of literature, coordinates that reflect the primary differences between ethics and that inform communication ethics across pluralistic accounts of them. Communication ethics inquiry across fields is particularly concerned with the theorization of the origin and construction of human identity. Differences in the understanding of human identity in the literature account for differences in ethical praxis stemming from an ultimate “good.”

This chapter examines Charles Taylor’s account of the “self” and how it is understood in ethical reflection. This leads to understand Arnett’s distinction between derivative “I” and the originative “I.” In the modern era, this is reflected in the difference between a story-based “I” and a production-based “I.” This distinction gives us insight into the coordinates of economics and identity as they apply to the 6 identified fields of communication ethics inquiry.
Human Identity Formation

Identity formation is a fundamental area of reflection for communication ethicists considering the modern privileging of the protection of the “self” as ultimate ethical good. Taylor reminds communication ethics scholars that the self and community are inseparable entities. He offers a paradigmatic account of human identity and its definition. Connecting it in the modern era to accounts of “human agent, a person, or a self” (Taylor Sources 3) and their definitions and formations. Formation of identity is inseparable from an understanding of what is good. Taylor argues that boundaries of our interactions with others, and our understanding of how to form a community made up of individuals, is driven by this process. As such, community and self are inseparable, despite the modern trend toward autonomy and the redefinition of community as an aggregate of individuals seen in writers such as Mill and Bentham. Identity has always been tied to “moral ontology,” or the commitments that define us; our identity changes as these commitments change or otherwise end. So if a person moved from an urban center to a rural area several miles away, for example, that person would have new commitments and understandings of social patterns that would alter one’s identity over time—adjusting to business schedules centered around farmers or perhaps traffic patterns that reorient one’s connection to a space. This does not mean that one’s identity changes wholly in new circumstances, but part of it is affected. Identity is dynamic; Taylor notes that multiple dynamic spheres define one’s identity, including community, nationality, or a role in a family, among identification (29). Its existence and construction, then, is tied to outside forces and to the relation of a self to an Other.

Self as Essential and Self as Constructed

Taylor also discusses the “self” that is constructed. He notes that “self” connotes “beings of the requisite depth and complexity to have an identity … (or to be struggling to find
one)” (32). He differentiates this from psychological and sociological accounts of self, which are closer to essential identity. Essential identity is the notion that a self exists prior to its ontological reification into Being. Existential identity understands a self that exists but is defined as an essence by its encounters, its interactions with others, its situatedness within a community, and for some, such as Fisher and Hauerwas, its situatedness within a story that defines a community. Taylor defines this relation, drawing from Dasein in Heidegger, as “being able to find one’s standpoint in this space, being able to occupy, to be a perspective in it” (112; emphasis is his).

The formation of self involves interaction with others in a way that refines a self either through intentionality of relation within a community or unintentional factors such as history or geography. This is not the same as defining it in negation from another thing.

Arnett identifies this as the difference between a derivative and an originative “I.” In his discussion of Arendt’s philosophy of the effect of human life on individuals, he argues that Arendt envisioned a derivative “I,” drawing from her early study of Augustine (Arnett Communication Ethics). In this understanding, “existence meets us, with or without our approval or liking, with the resultant interaction of existence and communicative responsiveness forming a derivative self” (7). That is, our self is built through interaction with existence. We are constructed externally. Eschewing anachronistic labels, identity emerges within the world, within reality, not independent of it. From this emerges the question of what sorts of realities we encounter, marking a key difference from Augustine. In the Christian tradition, the original existence of self for humanity is grounded in our createdness as a child of God, when one renounces the self in the Augustinian understanding. This derivate identity makes love of neighbor possible. It is not driven by acquisition “but by the emergent reality of love rightly
situated” (9). Nor is this self sufficient to stand alone outside of community. Self and community are intertwined.

This stands in contrast to an originative “I.” Marked by modernity, this “I” conceives of a self that is either essential or constructed through a lens of preferential, individualistic judgments of interactions and exchanges with Others. It is an account of identity that either denies community as a resource for construction of a “self” or only engages with community and Other through the buffer of autonomous judgment, preference, and protection.

For Arnett, this process counters what he terms the “trinity of modernity”: “‘efficiency,’ ‘progress,’ and ‘individual autonomy’” (15). The construction of the derivative “I” is not efficient. Judgment stands outside of the self in Others, in community, or other external factors. An originative “I,” however, short-circuits the process of construction through an individualistic account of self that does not have the time or resources to consider others. Further, existential phenomenology challenges the ability of an originative “I” to understand the face of another accurately, as Levinas notes; one’s interpretation is never efficiently certain or correct (Sebbah 50), embodying only a “fuzzy clarity” (Arnett Levinas’s 119). Efficiency leads one to increased certainty of judgment, of one’s ability to “size another up” in the name of evaluation and judgment, of location of an Other within one’s own originative world.

The originative “I” also presumes progression. The development of a “self” beyond a mere phenomenon of existence, as an intentional goal that redefines communicative praxis. One does not exist in relation to others, but progresses either with or beyond them. Bellah et. al. discuss this phenomenon in relation to career and family. The authors argue that individualistic identity formation as progress translates into a “quest for ‘something better,’” typical of U.S. culture (Bellah et. al. 17, 105). The canon of U.S. fiction presumes that one must leave a
community on one’s own to solve problems, to find something new. Progress drives moral courage to step out of one’s own barriers of community, to sever ties. They also discuss the effect this has had on marriages where persons are liberated to share their feelings within a relationship even if this sharing means the dissolution of the relationship (101). If the “self” must continue to progress to be found, then the originative “I” emerges from this good to redefine communicative praxis.

Presumably both as a response to colonial domination and a result of a “psychologist” trend within Western culture, autonomy toward institutions and Others marks the “I” as originative. This involves the freedom for a person to define his or her “self.” Protecting the ability to construct an identity from an individualistic method of judgment and interpretation is a choice grounded in the protection of a good, but not a truthful account of what it means for one to shape one’s own identity. The process of identity formation in children, for example, never presumes autonomy. Only as adults do we assert the right to construct ourselves through exploration, play, performance, aesthetics, and/or consumption. Psychologism often marks a process of attempting to come to terms with identity formation outside of one’s control, which is presumed to be traumatic in some circumstances. This process is particularly important when mental illness becomes salient. This process is particularly problematic when one cannot accept that an “I” is formed by exterior forces, creating a cognitive dissonance that marks selves as increasingly traumatized regardless of actual physical circumstance. So encountering any narrative that challenges or shapes, that either presents as uncertain or reveals the uncertainty of another perspective, can be traumatizing, a step toward relinquishing autonomy in a context where autonomy of identity formation is the centrally held good. Even in circumstances of
colonial or interpersonal domination, such processes of identity formation are not escapable. Yet to protect modern goods, the originative “I” presumes otherwise.

Communication ethics within contexts that challenge modernity or otherwise deviate from its “trinity” are often marked by identity grounded in a derivative “I.” At least two accounts of human identity explicate the derivative “I.” One is story-formed community, the other is ideologically produced. Both envision the “I” through a role that defines it beyond the self *qua* self.

Story-based “I” and production based “I”

An account of story-formed community identifies the “self” within a role that determines a course of action defining it. Macintyre notes that classical accounts of identity were inseparable from participation within the *polis*. A person was part of an interconnected web in which each takes responsibility for the performance of one’s role. Stories give salience such roles, informing identity and defining public virtues that shape community. In religious communities, myths serve this purpose, as do histories of a community.

Modernity turns to the individual to overcome the formation of the “I” from an ideology focused on production. Buber explores this in his examination of the development of socialism in the 19th century. Socialism reduces the “self” to a participant in production for the State or for the sake of production itself. This is not so much a transfer from a story-based community to one where the story is imminent, where values and virtues are driven by the processes of material production. Buber then differentiates kinds of socialism (*Buber Paths to Utopia*). Such an understanding also informs Roberto Esposito’s account of community as a “lack,” a group of people united and defined by a shared missing something (Esposito). Community, then, involves not what the individual is, but accounting for what the individual is not. These accounts mark
either transcendent (story) or imminent (ideological) community formation. Each gives a
derivative account of the formation of “self.” Each also marks a challenge to the originative
identity of the modern “I.” Ethical praxis that forms identity is informed through each of these.

Practices within communication ethics inquiry are envisioned as they promote or protect
a shared good. Whether the formation of “self” is this good, or merely a part of an overall
system, choice-making, truth-telling, and disclosure are practices defined by this good and tied to
the formation of identity. In this section, I turn to the communication ethics literature to account
further for these practices. From this, their contribution to identity formation is further explained.

Choice-Making

Choice-making appears commonly in communication ethics literature and is a concern
for several prominent figures in the field (Arnett “The Status of” 56, 69; Jensen 155; Arneson
Exploring xiv, 3, 8, 12-3, 38, 56, 107; Arnett et. al. Communication Ethics Literacy 45-6),
informed by Aristotle, as Andersen notes (Arneson Exploring 133-38; Andersen 13). Burke also
connects ethics explicitly to our choices (Burke Philosophy of Literary Form 29-36). A key
presumption is that the freedom to make a choice defines an act as ethical. This assertion, of
course, is the source of contentious debate in a post-WWII context, where choice and
responsibility for action, made under duress, were litigated at the Nuremberg trials. Choice ties
to free will and, subsequently, responsibility as a ground for ethics. The ability to make a choice,
here, serves as primary ground for ethical judgment.

Communicative choice-making is explored across ethical fields of inquiry and emerges as
the primary concern for modern identity formation. Democratic communication ethics and the
protection of unregulated, free speech, as Mill asserted, is the condition that eschews paternalism
and marks free will. Choosing to discriminate between messages and ideas grounds his project of
self-cultivation. The liberty to choose for oneself challenges universal ethical goods beyond self-interest—even human rights as the universal ethical good of the contemporary West. Choice-making provides agency in the determination and navigation of contexts, the adoption or rejection of narratives, and the alignment with groups and responsibility to/for their principles. Choice-making privileges a buffered, originative “I” in processes of dialogue, though also marking the existential move to encounter Others as Other with courage and risk.

Such a disposition, for a derivative “I,” marks openness to an Other that avoids reification, and subsequent domination or control, of them. Discussions persist from ancient civilization about the necessity of free will in ethical interactions, a free will that choice-making requires in order to assign ethical judgment and responsibility to the process. Yet reframed through a contemporary lens of awareness of the magnitude of the world, choice-making overcomes the distanciation from Others that marks anxiety, calling one to choose to engage with others. Interpreted through existential philosophy, it is existential anxiety that cripples the ability to make choices, an anxiety that Kierkegaard understood as “the mood in which human beings awaken to the peculiarly exposed vantage point they ‘enjoy’ by virtue of their specifically reflective form of awareness, loosening an initially immediate tie with the world” (Hannay xxiii-xxiv). While one should not conflate contemporary psychologistic accounts of anxiety disorders with Kierkegaard, or Heidegger’s later adaptation of Dasein and being-toward-death (xxiv), the ability to make a choice in how one communicates—the choice to open to another, to respond to the call that transmits through our buffered boundaries, to respond to the interruptive call to conscience—marks both an originative and a derivative “I.”
Telling the Truth

Telling the truth allows for integrity and fidelity of identity. Telling the truth as an ethical communicative practice dates to the time of Socrates, who challenged whether Sophists could account for what they thought they “knew” to be true (Plato Gorgias); the exposure of their hypocrisy would famously factor into Socrates’s trial and death. Truth, whether as correspondence and fidelity to an ideal, or as a coherent part of understanding, gives integrity to self-definition. The presumption that one self-cultivates presumes that personal judgment is guided by a phronetic capacity to understand, evaluate, and judge what is true. Conversations of contemporary concerns over fake news, which may not solely be contemporary—see Kierkegaard’s critique of the press (Kierkegaard)—question truth to its very core as a rational, logical phenomenon existent separate from narrative. Truth as a consumer matter in identity construction is an aesthetic choice. Such a perspective, however, emerges from, rather than contradicts, the postmodern turn to embrace truths as an originative “I,” as one that shapes truth through one’s own capacity for cultivation. The good of liberty and the right to grow and be educated, to protect the process of learning, allow truth to be diverse and contradictory in public spheres.

Truth as a process of construction or revelation, whether guided through narrative or tradition-based pedagogy, or through the principles of an organization, whether guided in particular contexts or as responses to Others, undergirds multiple other goods that define ethical systems. Truth-telling makes organizations possible tied to the maintenance of community and within a sphere, whether political, social, or economic (Johannesen 33). Philosophy of language challenges truth as correspondence, as the alignment of idea or thing and reality, and the ability
of a person to determine something to be true through one’s own senses (Plato *Phaedo*), pointing instead to truth as coherence in a rational context.

Modernity has greatly influenced accounts of what it means to tell the truth. After the age of Reform (to use Taylor’s language), rationality and science delivered “truth.” Descartes led a revolution in understanding truth as the elimination of doubt and the formation of principles tied to certainty. Scientific truth seemed more certain, capable of delivering progress, after centuries of religious conflict in Western Europe, though the turn to science would ironically mirror the rise of the transatlantic slave trade. Science as a replacement for faith is challenged after the deaths of World War I and the scientific “progress” of the Manhattan project (Niebuhr 2-3). Further, semiotics, or the understanding of signs, concerns itself with the dynamic relationship between a sign and what it signifies, demonstrating the capacities for insincerity and irony, as well as flat-out deceit, as that which we understand “rationally” is questioned. It further problematizes modern Cartesian dualism, an ultimate split between mind and body. The uncertainty of interpretation in an era of virtue contention challenges truthfulness as a primary social virtue and centers the liberty of the self to construct as the best weapon against bad narratives.

The present historical moment reflects anxiety over the certainty with which we hold truth and, consequently, challenges us to consider the practice of how truth is told. Is truthfulness a tent-pole for democracy or is the right to explore multiple truths the important good regardless of the potential of falsehood directing community life? Should truth be universal or are the conditions for exploring truth universal? Debates over metanarrative and petite narratives,

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31 I draw an account of truthfulness in ethics, as opposed to truth, from Hauerwas, who identified truthfulness, which is grounded in the cohesion of community in a reciprocal exchange between truthfulness, which builds community, and community, which is “the necessary condition for truthfulness” (Hauerwas et. al. 10).
grounded in the “self” or the “in-between” with Other, or as a primary concern within professional codes all mark the importance of truth-telling in communication ethics; Johannesen identifies codes with multiple references to truthfulness as a primary metaphor. Here, in all of these contexts, truth-telling supports liberated identity construction and, in the modern paradigm, is often subverted to liberated identity construction.

**Disclosure**

Disclosure is a third primary concern of communicative praxis related to the formation of identity. Tied to truth-telling and trust, disclosure and concealment are communicative practices tied to community. In a context of democratic ethics, over-disclosure is ethical, driven by the need for an originative self to have access to as much information as possible to make judgments; Johannesen calls disclosure a “core principle” to foster “informed decision making” in a democracy (Johannesen 192). Power is increasingly marked by the ability to conceal, to non-disclose or force others to non-disclose. In business, concealment refers to the ability to protect the privacy of a client or associate (192). As a practice, it is central to multiple professions including journalism, law enforcement, and other corporate affairs, as well as the institution of the family, though these are situated within multiple variables (Jensen 48-60; 167-174). Each receives pressure to increase disclosure to produce more material with which a self can make judgments.

Contemporary communicative praxis in business, understood as economic spheres shaping professional practices, creates exigence in debates over disclosure. The monetization of social media requires the tracking of those who fit into demographics. Those who track us monitoring our consumptive patterns, revealing much about our identities and predicting future behavior. Those who measure, then, reveal trends hidden to those who act. This is an emerging
discussion in higher education administration, among other fields, where analytic companies measure statistics of usage that “disclose” patterns for future action—a turn to social scientific approaches to leadership over rhetorical discussion (Hartellus and Mitchell). Such disclosure either textures and deepens the identity of a personal or organization within a role or flattens and distorts it.

Disclosure marks differences between what is frontstage and what is backstage (Goffmann The Presentation of Self). Human identity is marked by the right to control this difference in disclosure. The frontstage can, depending upon the situation, cause irrevocable stigma, as Goffman offers in his etymology of the concept (Stigma 1-6), or it can reveal a depth of understanding to someone who receives a new revelation about themselves. In business, the communication of a long-ago criminal record to an organization offers a chance to reflect upon this ethical issue. Non-disclosure of such a record to co-workers can cast doubt in the absence of information and non-transparency can communicate deceit. The examination of concealment ethics in public and private life is, again, complicated within the conflated social space, where accounts of responsibility for disclosure, the meaning of privacy itself, and the importance of protecting the “backstage” are primary discussions (Koohikamali et. al. 31). Further, autonomy, which has been a concern for business ethics (Maciejewski 247), might involve the protection of organizations in the face of a lying CEO, or dehumanization when exposed lies unmask an Other. Here, the protection of a public identity becomes ethical, grounded in the good of autonomous identity construction, of the right to be an originative “I.” The protection shapes, more than anything, the public identity of the “I,” the agency of the “I” to control image and behavioral interactions. That is, to buffer our encounters with others.
Levinas offers a provocative critique of rhetoric and disclosure. For him, the psychology, demagoguery, and pedagogy of rhetoric inhibits disclosure (Totality 70). That is, rhetors may be candid and disclose, but their Otherness is not seen, only their presented Self in exchanges between two subjects. Rhetoric reifies the Other into categorical language. Looking beyond a category to an Other requires a face-to-face encounter in which the Other is disclosed (71). That is, the Other is experienced in vulnerability, “withdrawn” from “categories” (71). This experience facilitates justice and truth and puts ethics beyond epistemology or rhetoric (72). Disclosure, for Levinas, is a prerequisite to the beginnings of community and society, as well as knowledge. But it is not an avenue to scientific, data-driven reification.

These practices—choice-making, truth telling, and disclosure, are three that reveal how a publicly held good is protected and promoted in human communication and how this process is tied to accounts of human identity and the formation of a self. Each also connects to economic spheres uniquely, demonstrating how particular practices of communication can be conceived through an economic lens. Each of the 6 categories of communication ethics inquiry explored in Chapter One are informed by human identity, most of them centrally so. Accounts of identity formation mark central controversies within the ethical literature.

**Categories of Communication Ethics Inquiry**

Identity and coordinates of economics intersect in particular ways in the modern era. Each of the categories of ethical inquiry found in communication ethics reveals this.

Democratic Communication Ethics

Typical accounts of communication ethics affirm one’s right to express thoughts freely and to encounter, challenge, or reject other forms of thought as a condition of the liberty to
cultivate the self, which is its primarily held good. Again, Mill affirms self-cultivation as the ground for liberty, which he affirms as the best way to achieve a developed account of self.

Yet his contribution stands in contrast to Hobbes, with both offering differing accounts of liberty. Mill challenges an account of liberty from Hobbes, who defines it as “the absence of opposition…external impediments of motion” (Hobbes 170). Hobbes chooses a particularly physical metaphor – the freedom to move. For Hobbes, however, liberty is understood as a corporate value, not an individualistic one. It facilitates the responsibility to choose even when pre-existing choices require reaction to the actions of another out of fear and necessity. That is, one who acts from fear and necessity still has liberty and bears responsibility for her actions. Hobbes notes that liberty in ancient Greece and ancient Rome referred to the commonwealth, not to individuals per se. Liberty was from foreign intruders, not from one’s responsibility within the State or in some other individualist account (173-174). Liberty was held through any system of government protecting its citizens from outside attack be it democratic or monarchical (175). That is, there is freedom to move with a State apparatus that protects this freedom. There are particular acts of communication in which an individual may express personal liberty, for Hobbes, such as the right not to self-incriminate (reified over 100 years later in the 5th amendment to the U.S. Constitution), but liberty is tied to an obligation to the State.

Mill, in his classic On Liberty, reclaims this process, arguing forcefully for the need to be liberated from paternalistic structures of government, which limit self-cultivation philosophically, and inhibit social growth practically (Mill 155-161). This liberty allows the individual the power make choices that shape our own identity. The self has the resources to construct new liberating structures of human interaction through response to Others, though with judgment remaining centralized within the individual. For Mill, even a personal descent into
mediocrity from a lack of education or discernment in judging communications does not justify the restriction of speech in the democratic public sphere.

These two accounts reflect differing accounts of the ethical construction of human identity and its role in the democratic public sphere. Hobbes’s work argues for the importance of the state as an ordering force in social interaction, particularly in the 17th century age of English Civil War, as well as for the importance of citizenship in this process (Höffé 5-8). That is, commitment to others and responsibility are joined to the pursuit of liberty. Citizenship is integral to the democratic sphere of communication. It defines identity through the lens of attachment to the state: citizen as identity. Mill’s account of self-cultivation pairs with duty, but moves in a post-Utilitarian direction of self as atomized foundation of community and the State. That is, personal judgment is the locus of the growth of self that should be protected, even if it can devolve into a “tyranny of the majority.” Mill’s work offers what Brantly Womack argues was historically new in 19th century political philosophy—a critique of the effectiveness of the State. Truth and innovation for Mill came from minority views that must be amplified, hence one primary justification to protect individual liberty. While Mill conceived of the State as legitimate, he would not recognize what later would be called “socialist” States and did not affirm the effectiveness of welfare (Womack 3-4). Individuals are not inevitably tied to class, as Karl Marx would later argue. Further, the State is to serve individual development, with individual liberty as the basis for liberty for all (5).

The risk identified by Womack, that absolute liberty of the individual marks a “‘freedom of the void,’ in which any actual choice is a restricting commitment” (5), develops in the 20th century West in the emergence of a libertarian commitment to self-cultivation as primary virtue. This was not the primary goal of liberalism. The social contract, which Hobbes, noted as an
alternative to war, was to protect against radical individualism: “…as long as every man holds this right of doing anything he likes, so long are all men in the condition of war” (Hobbes 110). The transference of rights marked in contracts facilitates an elevation beyond the state of nature that marks times of war. In it, liberty is inextricable from personal responsibility tied to a greater good that defines how one communicates. Yet the later modern era marks a different understanding of liberty, of an absence of any paternalism that determines commitment beyond the preservation of democratic conditions of equal access to information, marking an ironic reduction to a state of nature based in evolutionary accounts of public life and markets.

Mill’s account emerges forcefully in the economic liberalism of the 20th century. Dating to Mill’s contemporary Herbert Spencer, the government’s role becomes to protect order and defend natural rights. Spencer’s famous maxim “survival of the fittest” marks the introduction of social Darwinism into the Western lexicon and emergent millionaires, such as John D. Rockefeller, connect the pursuit of personal gain to God’s plan (Ebenstein 14-18). Here, the protection of the individual over the State emerges in its primary form as a virtue, marking a turn to self interpreted through the metaphor of market.

As the liberty of the self becomes central above community as a primarily protected good, a new social order with varied ethics accommodates this virtue. The exchange of ideas takes on economic metaphor: market. The marketplace of ideas connotates a space driven by a self-cultivated human identity. U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes reified this process into accounts of democratic communication ethics with his dissent in Abrams v. United States 250 U.S. 616 (1919), though the concept dates to John Milton (Moro and Aikat). The case involved the restriction of the distribution of pamphlets calling for a strike and for resistance to the United States during World War I. The court upheld that the pamphlets in question violated
the Espionage Act, having been written by Russian “anarchists” to destroy the capitalist United States. Protection of the State within a democracy, here, guides the ethics of communication in this situation. Holmes’s dissent argued, however, that a robust “free trade in ideas” reflected the wishes of the framers of the U.S. Constitution: “that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out” (Abrams 630). This symbolic convergence marks the role of the self in communication ethics as embedded in a process of market-based cultivation of thought. That is, the preservation of the market becomes the primary good to protect and promote.

There exists in democratic communication ethics guidelines and laws protecting against libel and slander, indicating a commitment to truth that shapes human identity. Generally, laws of what is true or right will be thought to guide self-cultivation; the competition of ideas will challenge falsity and the acceptance of fraudulent ideas or worldviews will be hindered by radical access to a plethora of truthful options that reveal themselves and dominate what is false.

The desirability of free speech in light of its centrally held good of the liberty to self-cultivate restriction of speech points to discussions of human identity through universal-humanitarian ethics. The modern turn does not merely mean an embrace of democracy, but a spread of these values to all the world. Rights become the central good to protect and promote worldwide.

Universal-Humanitarian Communication Ethics

The modern era marks a turn to universal principles for the formation of a self. The universal account of ethics makes a system in which calculation becomes possible by reducing or reifying ethical variables into manageable forms. Ironically, the Kantian identification of a priori
principles as ethical guide, as principles to which one must adhere when universally true, facilitate calculation, which reshapes what is universal from the deontological to the teleological. In terms of ethics, what is “humanitarian” is conceived outside of particular contexts. Not only can duty or principle be identified, but outcome as well. Reliance on calculation in the Utilitarian mode exists from the 19th century into today, in varied models in the present, largely through the proxy of “cost-benefit analysis” in business, which has a long history establishing the calculation of whether investment outweighs outcomes (Livermore and Revesz xi-xiv). A teleological emphasis on literal cost confuses further ethical judgment in the symbolic convergence of the democratic sphere and the marketplace.

Principles and calculated outcomes reify effects for humans to construct their own identities and their own standards for construction, promoting an originative “I.” The postmodern collapse of these standards marks the turn to the consumerist model of identity construction, challenging what is universal. This is marked, for example, by the transformation of the ethics of cultural production of artifacts that are “good” or “bad” in a universal sense (whether Arnoldian or Benthamite), to the transformation of artifacts that are “authentic,” which marks the universal value. This becomes the basis of “expressive individualism” (Bellah, et. al.), which can be understood as an originative “I” determining one’s own authentic identity and its communication to others. Further, as a universally held good, the process of this virtue defines ethical communication to preclude paternalistic interference in the construction process, centering autonomy as a universal good that produces an authentic identity, echoing Maslow and his hierarchy of needs.

This condition of autonomy is often conflated with empowerment. This has taken powerful form in the West through the context of human rights. The assertion of “rights” is
understood as a powerful statement that gives ethical ground to communicate or otherwise act in a particular fashion: “I have the right not to listen to you.” “I have the right to be heard.” These echo individualistic accounts of communication ethics through the adoption of rhetorhetorical framing of standards for how all should be treated.

Yet rights are not necessarily individualistic or solely enabling of an originative “I.” Discussions of the decolonization of non-Western countries, for example, are grounded in the presumption that humans have agency to define themselves independently of the lens of the West. In this perspective, autonomy for a nation is typically collective rather than individualistic. It is the nation that is liberated to make their own decisions for the formation of their traditions and communal practices. Civil rights struggles of the 20th century in the United States also reflect the fight for political, social, and cultural autonomy, though never divorced from the needs of communities. The tactics of nonviolence used by Martin Luther King, inspired by the decolonizing tactics of Gandhi, require communal commitment to resist hatred and inequality; pacifist literature makes clear the deprivileging of the individual within community to sustain non-violence as a virtue with associated practices (see Hauerwas Christian Existence). The right for a person to self-determination in the face of such discrimination is not an embrace of individualism, but resistance to the domination of others; King, for example, drew from the prophets of the Hebrew Bible who prophesied political autonomy for people, rather than individual persons, in the Hebrew diaspora after the Second Temple (Miller). It is resistance to a system that distorts human identity, marked by domination of the Other.

Artifacts of the civil rights era, such as “Lift Every Voice and Sing,” place human rights in the context of history, of situated context, to shape identity, marking a universal beyond individualism. Imani Perry notes that communities of Black artists and writers, embodying what
Alexis de Tocqueville called “associational life,” as a distinctly American practice of “forming and joining of associations for nearly every venture,” created together as resistance to the Jim Crow laws of the South (Perry 5-6). These are responses to external events acknowledging that rights protect the community in shaping a self; this is particularly important in the face of regular violent crimes face by Black Americans in the 20th century. Rights enable the resistance of domination in social praxis, not merely individualist praxis.

Liberal scholarship conceived of the universal in communication as an opportunity for objective accounts of rhetorical subjects, particularly in political discourse. Habermas conceives of an ideal speech situation. His ideal has been challenged as only existing in theory, never reality. The protection of speech to create the conditions for the cultivation of identity violate the universal principle that speech in the public sphere should be non-dominating because protection involves some form of domination over intrusion. This has been reified in the contemporary moment through invitational rhetoric (Foss and Griffin). Conceived as the creation of an invitational space for expression, it ironically requires the domination of a space to protect the identity formation process within it, to filter and judge what communication is dominating or not through domination. To state plainly, only domination protects one from being dominated. Such ethical conditions of communication emerge from an originative “I.” It enables the autonomous construction of a self that should be recognized universally, excluding community and traditional commitments that shape practices and reinforce identity with a community role if such practices are unwanted.

Macintyre has challenged the rejection of tradition in the contemporary account of universal rules of identity formation that protect the self. Though particular traditions come under scrutiny and structures of ethics deconstruct in the postmodern era of virtue contention,
ideas formed and shaped through tradition persist: definitions of “evil,” “pride,” “forgiveness,” and others. As he argues, it is not possible to have rationality separate from tradition (Macintyre *Whose Justice?* 350). Groups communicate ritualistically, with narratives as an interpretive key, to protect and promote their own ethical principles and practices. A virtue approach, grounded in virtue as necessarily public, establishes that the self is not originative, drawing from traditions as it is constructed. It lives in situ within multiple narratives and traditions that influence its formation.

The persistence of support for an originative construction of self continues in cyberspace. Digital avatars function in capacities of ontological interaction, virtual space, and the transmission of data through space. Lance Strate accounts for the ontological nature of cyberspace, including descriptions of “paraspace” and “nonspace” (Strate). In this cyberspace, defined by Gourgey and Smith as an interpretive system, something like an ideal is thought to exist, where communities construct identity without governmental limitation (Gourgey and Smith). The economic development of cybercurrency also points to the ideal of banking without governmental limitation. As such, universal principles of access, liberty, and deregulation have been reified in accounts of its ethics. This phenomenon is affirmed by scholars noting the affirming nature of cyberspace to construct and envision new identity (du Preez and Lombard). The phenomenon of “catfishing,” or the construction of false, deceitful identity, also emerges, reflecting the danger of accepting identity construction in cyberspace without restriction, as a universal good.

As these discussions continue, Benhabib reiterates identity construction within space as a universal good with respect for the Other, with “egalitarian reciprocity” in interaction that supersedes the individualistic (Benhabib *Situating*). Benhabib’s scholarship points to the
temporal and spatial context of human interaction. It is in contexts that human identity forms most powerfully. Human identity in its contextual nature, then, is another particular concern for communication ethics inquiry.

Contextual Communication Ethics

The postmodern era of virtue contention, in a globalized world, a “world come of age,” to use Bonhoeffer’s language (Arnett Dialogic), reveals the plurality of forms of identity formation within context. Public roles differ across contexts, problematizing a universal account of identity formation within communication ethics scholarship.

Contextual communication offers narrative interpretation of situations, of realities and potentialities, as the ground for identity formation. Narratives exist prior to a human by definition. Parents have a story, for example, that shape the conception, birth, and rearing of a child prior to its own self-awareness and ability to reflect upon its own identity. This story, such as a story of love, tragedy, or even hate, shape a child’s identity: a product of “love,” a “gift from god,” an unexpected burden, a mistake, or worse. Such smaller, or petite narratives—in this case, the narrative that exists within a family and is shared publicly among its members—cast an infant human in the role of a drama without the agency to shape it, for better or worse. This merely discusses the context of family as it shapes human identity. Varied spaces create contexts that determine ethical praxis and shape the individual in a diverse way. That is, multiple roles come with multiple ethical commitments to perform that role, establishing ethical praxis, including communicative ethical praxis. Narratives shape these understandings and provide firm ethical justification, standards for judgment that emerge from narrative ground rather than universal principles, and the resources to make judgments among narratives—what Fisher called “narrative rationality” (Fisher “The Narrative Paradigm”).

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Modernity, marked by an originative “I” as paradigmatic, responds to unwanted narratives and unwanted public labels through autonomy in the face of context, to buffer and protect the “I,” through a turn to distribution as a primary practice to drive society. Emergent from capitalist production, material gain permits the accumulation of power to choose artifacts, relationships, and other elements that comprise the factors shaping contexts in varied forms of what Bourdieu referred to as “capital” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). These include social, cultural, and economic capital. Each of these permit individual risk and activity in a public sphere that protect autonomy of responsibility and empower individualistic maneuvering within public contexts. Contemporary accounts of personal responsibility are marked by the liberal choice determining which acts and circumstances for which one will accept accountability; these are often reified through economic contracts impacting social spheres such as the prenuptial agreement, such as the plight of those without homes and the precariat, for example, who “choose” to enter into deeply imbalanced contracts that diminish social justice as a story-based endeavor. Consumerism extends beyond the sphere of the markets, then, into the realms of social contexts. Civic contracts reify responsibility prior to the making of a choice, permitting an ironically strong bond to commitments and their support in the presumption of autonomy in the creation of a context, in the presumption that our choices are made in consumerist freedom. Distributive justice presumes agency in the creation of contexts, due to accumulation, in the face of historically-grounded social justice, where contexts and roles are predetermined. That is, more money facilitates the consumerist construction of an originative “I,” permitting one to choose one’s community, friends, or environment overcoming other social barriers through the privilege and social capital of wealth.
The presumption of this model is that it is preferred to the deterministic nature of social history. Some narratives must be challenged, must be resisted, must be allowed to be shaped by a self that abductively re-envision a narrative; some contexts do call for defense of a self on one’s own terms. Contemporary debates over the ethical use of derogatory epitaphs, for example, and the challenges to one’s first amendment rights in light of contexts that resist such restriction, do not include an affirmation of one’s status as a derivative “I” to permit abuse or mistreatment. Yet narratives are always abductive—social justice presumes the ability to interact with and change a narrative, though through models that are communal, rather than individualistic. Autonomy, again, presumes a communal liberation, rather than purely individualistic. Contexts in postmodernity are not necessarily atomistic reductions of community and praxis to individualistic preference.

The derivative “I” acknowledges the decentralization of the self in the postmodern, global era, acknowledging and working through multiple contextual accounts of communication ethics. The derivative “I” affirms the rhetorical vernacular, which is a mark of communal identity (whether through accents or vocabulary usage) formed in particular geographic (or other) contexts. Expectations of ethical or communicative purity found in ideals or universals that silence the vernacular limit engagement and inhibit others. Expectations of pure conditions to shape an originative “I” lead to the domination from which an originative “I” seeks liberation. Colonial labels such as “uncivilized” or “primitive” hegemonize identity construction by subverting vernacular markers, such as the “wrong” accent. These expectations also appear as catalysts for contemporary anti-immigrant sentiment in Brexit and the construction of President Donald Trump’s wall on the border of Mexico beyond the motive of “safety.” Attention to contexts determining ethics permit exposure to multiple Others and lead to the kind of self-
cultivation that liberal, democratic communication ethics espouses, eschewing a protectionist model of identity formation.

The dichotomy between emotivism, which is the supremacy of personal preference in ethical inquiry and contextuality, and acknowledgment of particular ethical praxis tied to contexts of time and space, call for a ground from which to maintain an identity that is open to the Other. This is narrative ground. Narrative provides the resources to interpret identity and to give meaning to the conclusions and implications of its formation within contexts.

Narrative Communication Ethics

Narratives emerge from community and shape identity, a process challenged by liberalism. The liberal argument is that an originative “I” risks being “brainwashed” through submission to a derivative process of identity construction. Such fears were heightened in the 20th century through extensions of post-WWII and Cold War-era fears of communism and the reification of identity to an agent of production within the State—the domination of the individual by a brutal narrative. The ethical inquiry of Reinhold Niebuhr and H. Richard Niebuhr both marked a turn, even in religious community, to suspicion toward the communitarian, particularly communities that require commitments to non-violence as an extension of their publicly held narrative. In Stanley Hauerwas’s evaluation of the Jonestown Massacre involving Jim Jones and the People’s Temple in Guyana in 1978, he notes the tendency of liberal society to use examples of cults to negate the concept of sacrificing oneself for a cause, to argue for the foolishness of taking one’s beliefs seriously. Hauerwas argues that the formation of identity within community is inseparable from truthfulness—he argues that the conformity of Jonestown was not a problem of the subversion of individual identity, but of conformity to a lie and to
violence (Hauerwas *Against the Nations*). Truthful understanding of one’s identity cannot be separated from community.

This has led narrative to be feared, to be confused with ideology. Ellul defends ideology, in a post-World War II, post-colonial context. His discussion of ideology separates it from propaganda, with which an individualist understanding of identity typically pairs ideology. Ellul argues that ideology is a universal phenomenon that emerges from all communities; “no social group can exist” without beliefs that come to be termed “ideology” (Ellul *Propaganda* 193). He argues that ideology is a “degraded and vulgarized” belief, but that ideologies do drive humanity to action (193-194). He further argues that propaganda drives action for its own sake, regardless of ideology. Ideology of a group, instead, gives the resources to resist bad narratives, to resist propaganda, which aims for a member of a political party, nation, or other group “to insure the efficiency of that organization” (196). While images of mindless conformity lead to the liberal rejection of narratives, it is narrative that provides the ground to reject the reshaping of identity without an “I.” Narrative is the source of an “I” providing resources to reject the mobilization of masses to mindless conformity and action (197). Community identity is inseparable from narrative, whether in “higher” forms such as religion, or “lower” forms such as ideology.

Narrative acknowledges that multiple characters and multiple events situate identity, shaping an “I.” Commitment to narrative allows the development of wisdom in the tradition, the on-going sets of communicative practices establishing a narrative, to flourish. For Fisher, this involves Aristotle’s *phronesis* (Fisher “The Narrative Paradigm” 350). Wisdom emerges from a commitment to identity formation that participates in narrative, evaluating identity through a narrative lens. It decenters the “I,” offering humility and depth of identity.
The concern for Macintyre and Taylor is not whether narrative shapes the self—for them, it inescapably does—but whether we acknowledge this. Whether a narrative is religious, grounded in one’s role in family, within a public role of the State, or even increasingly in the workplace, all of these labels, their performances as roles, and their convergence, contribute to create a self as an ontological reality. Authenticity, which marks the shift in moral judgment in existential philosophy beyond the hierarchical standards of Blair or Nietzsche, aligns praxis with one’s role rather than an essential quality within an individual that exists apart from a tradition. Narratives produce and reproduce systems of ethical behavior, ones that improvise and change over time, or are reaffirmed and reinforced. Whether these are imperatives to obey, such as the Golden Rule, principles to affirm, such as the categorical imperative, or immutable “laws,” as reified into ideologies, the boundaries of narratives and the communities that embody them shape identity. Narratives create genitive identification—the description of a person through qualities reified through identification with a narrative.

As communication ethics inquiry considers the formal reification of these standards, they give shape to an “I” with the sorts of boundaries that mark identity formation. Consumerism in the 21st century marketplace reifies identity through branding. Brands risk replacing the narratives of communities with the narratives of corporations. Critical treatments of branding such as No Logo: No Space, No Choice, No Jobs by Naomi Klein question whether brands express who we are as people (originative “I”) or construct them (derivative “I”); it is interesting to note in this case that identity formed through consumption is typically questioned as the “I” is not originative (Klein No Logo).
Professional communities have identified standards of excellence that require particular communicative practices to determine and judge one’s identity within the community. These codes, procedures, and standards highlight a necessarily derivative “I.”

Codes, Procedures, and Standards in Communication Ethics

Professional communities shape the identity of selves as practitioners. The agency of the “I” to adhere to these principles forms responsibility for one’s actions and allows one to author one’s own self. While narratives pre-exist, establishing hermeneutical ground to pre-understand a “self” before such a thing is reified, particular codes, procedures, and standards are negotiable and offer agency in a reciprocal relation of identity formation. They emerge from reflection upon praxis in an abductive relation within communities setting such codes and standards.

Poststructuralism challenges the viability of such codes existing without reinforcement, without persistent reimagining. When reified through law, for example, restrictions of the self require restriction of body and mind; Foucault has argued that such restrictions and their public expressions exist as discipline and form the prison (Foucault Discipline) and mental health industries (Foucault Madness). Yet the shared good of a community, protected through these practices, are inseparable from the narratives that reveal their fidelity and coherence to the narrative: admonitions against lying for public relations executives, regulations against disclosure for lawyers, each of these emerge from phronetic experience. Adherence to these shape further the identity of those who identify publicly with a role and presume the existence of communities with on-going negotiation of ethical praxis. That is, in communities of practice, these are changeable, reciprocal. This prevents such codes from being weaponized. Bonhoeffer’s emphasis on the “pentultimate,” rather than “ultimate,” speaks to this difference between publicly protected goods, and perfectly reified ideals. Offered in petite communities of
profession, adherence to ethical standards powerfully mark identity, especially in a modern world where conformity to standards is often argued to be hegemonic. Petite narratives reified through codes of practice make a location for economics in their original place as only one sphere in ancient life, albeit in a public forum.

Identities formed in community, through the performance of narrative involving adherence to codes, procedures, and standards, mark a derivative “I,” enabling interaction with those exterior to community. The challenging process of negotiating communication beyond one’s own context, beyond one’s own rules, with an Other, further shapes identity through dialogue. It is in this process that an originative “I” is ultimately revealed not so much as a truth, but as a disposition to dominate, manage, or otherwise control how an Other interacts in communication.

Dialogic Communication Ethics

In face-to-face encounter, an originative “I” is buffered, again borrowing from Charles Taylor, filtering and judging information to protect the autonomy of identity formation while a derivative “I” responds to the Other, through a call to ethics, not epistemology or ontology, as first philosophy. One’s own narrative ground allows responsiveness to an Other as an ethical imperative. A derivative “I,” grounded in the practices of a community, listens to an Other without domination, a sign of the formation of an Other as an extension of an originative “I.”

As Bonhoeffer argued, dialogue involves encountering another “darkly,” without precision of knowledge, without incomplete psychologizing that reifies the Other (Arnett Dialogic 15). This phenomenological encounter permits exchange that emerges as “I-Thou” in Buber’s account of the relation, of an “I” that cannot be reified. Buber argues that “No man is pure person and no man pure individuality. None is wholly real, and none wholly unreal. Every
man lives in the twofold I’ (Buber *I and Thou* 65). Identification of the total individuality of another or of their sole personhood without it, both reflect inaccurate renderings of an Other. The movement between two people here reflects not a defensive clash of beings, but two entities in further process of becoming. This metaphysical distinction marks the dialogic encounter, requiring that one who encounters and exchanges with another does so in openness, in risk, in courage, in the relinquishment of control over another, with narrative providing resources for resistance in the potentially hegemonic shaping of identity.

The originative “I” eschews care as an activity involving risk, involving openness to the truth of another. Care risks violation of the essential identity of an “I” through the exchange of new ideas with an Other, in new communicative forms, in the adoption or interpretation of vernaculars or other genitive markers of narrative. Technology increases the propensity of buffering in dialogue—the exchange through a computer screen, on a faceless chat room message board, the necessity of increased amounts of interpretive labor through increased media and symbols. The derivative “I” already affirms that identity itself necessarily emerges from these processes. The formation of identity through technological “dialogue” does not escape the need for a derivative disposition and encourages a protectionist, buffered privileging of the originative through its form.

Tied to this perspective is openness. Openness to the Other in dialogue is often envisioned as two or more people, but this also extends to two or more cultures, two organizations, two traditions, or societies. Formation of self, whether radically open or buffered, still involves reflection upon openness. Tradition and its boundaries involve conversations of openness. Consideration of the nature of spaces establish ethical ground for how openness occurs within that space, whether public, private, social, or cyber. Openness eschews the calculative
ethics of utility, the reductive deontological commitment to a duty or principle, or the relativity of what “works.”

What emerges from this discussion of human identity and communication ethics is that identity formation is a foundational consideration for accounts of ethical communication as a coordinate through which one can compare or evaluate a communicative ethic. Emergent from this conversation are motifs of consumerism and buffering, of agency and power, of commitments to collective identity and individualistic identity. Each of these informs communication ethics. One, then, should consider the nature of identity in economic exchange and its impact on subsequent practices, such as choice-making, truth-telling, and disclosure. The formation and sustenance of an identity in an economic sphere drives ethical approaches as powerfully as in a democratic sphere.

The centrality of identity in communication ethics, as well as the presumption of sameness, both figure heavily in understanding economic spheres and their effects on public virtue and the practices that promote and protect them. The next chapter offers a specific focus on economics in the communication ethics literature and on accounts of economic spheres.
Chapter Four: Communication Ethics and Economic Spheres – An Exploration

This chapter examines intersections between economics and communication ethics scholarship, exploring how communication ethics theorists have treated the issue. Contemporary writers have drawn from thinkers such as Smith and Marx, yet explicit explorations of economics by these scholars have not been foregrounded in research projects. In this chapter, I discuss philosophers and theorists who set the academic stage for these. McCloskey’s analysis receives attention, both for her reflections on capitalism and ethics and for her examination of the rhetorical nature of economics. Emerging from the influential Chicago School of Economics, McCloskey both critiques how economists ignore the rhetorical nature of capitalism and reinforces the argument that its supremacy as a system has been repeatedly proven to bring a higher quality of life, with State involvement in production leading to disaster. Communication ethics scholars understand capitalism and socialism as constructed spheres with multiple possibilities in their construction, a multiplicity that has been lost in contemporary economic discussion of ethics. Communication ethics scholarship reminds us of the importance of their plurality and that multiple spheres must define public goods, so as to resist the economic determinism of communism and the subversion of the public sphere (in terms of the State) in neoliberalism.

Broad understandings of economics as metaphor can be found in existing communication ethics scholarship. For example, Levinas argues that the idea of “equality” between persons is a result of economic rhetoric (Levinas 72), though he laments this analogy as a metonymic reduction of differences between persons. Economic systems uncontroversially produce identity for those engaging in market practices. Identities (“employee” or “manager,” for example) connect to public roles. Economists in the West who resisted Communism in the 20th century
were uniquely concerned with the equivocation and elimination of public roles within one system—person as employee or manager, but not citizen or parent (Deetz 15). Neoliberalism, which, in part, involves the privatization of public institutions, was conceived as a response to socialism and communism but, as this chapter will show, risks the same problems in identity, converting noneconomic spheres into economic ones.

Economic spheres lead to the conflation of private and public spheres (which will receive more theoretical explication in chapter five). Education as a public good is a strong contemporary example of this tension. Paulo Freire famously identified the rhetorical impact of economics on education in his account of “banking” and its dehumanization of the student (Freire 71-86). Education, as he considered, should raise conscientização, a deeply influential idea that has formed critical pedagogies. Yet education for economic gain is now an increasingly popular idea, one that is transforming K-12 and higher education alike. Stemming from Milton Friedman, this vision of private education is grounded in “greater benefits in efficiency and technical progress by promoting choice and competition” (Levin and Belfield 185). Stemming from a 1955 article entitled “The Role of Government in Education,” Friedman advocated for school vouchers so students could attend private institutions with public funds. He argued that the conversion of the National Education Association into a trade union in 1965 prompted his influential advocacy for school vouchers (Friedman “Prologue,” viii). The effects of economic

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32 It should be noted that an edited volume of essays discussing Friedman’s advocacy of vouchers, published in 2006 by The Cato Institute, scarcely mentions racism as a motive for vouchers beyond one section of one essay, which argues that government regulation of education causes poor educational outcomes for students of color more than any other factor. Nor does its treatment of homeschooling throughout the book mention cultural division, merely the ability to choose a school. This despite scholarly discussion of resistance to school desegregation after Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka 347 U.S. 483 (1954) and privatization as a response to the decision in the U.S. South. Feagin and Barnett (2004) argue for proven benefits of forced school desegregation even in the face of its resistance through slow implementation and eventual weakening of its implementation in the 1970s.
goods such as growth or efficiency on the transformation of public institutions, such as education, make economics of interest to communication scholars.

Discussions of economic metaphors emerge in contemporary communication ethics scholarship. In his discussion of the work of Arendt and Bonhoeffer, Arnett considers the conflation of private and public into the social, which is commonly attached to the marketplace. The marketplace is an historically public arena where those who produce privately exchange items or money with each other—where people trade. The public is robust with diversity. The conflation of public and private leads to a “social” realm that breeds conformity (Arnett Dialogic 146). It emerges in a world that allows the marketplace to provide meaning when the Other, a person in their private world, is commodified, reified in terms of value. Bonhoeffer’s work points to an understanding of marketplace not that eschews conformity and routinely contributes to the “unmasking” of the other, but as one sphere of multiple spheres in a “rich texture of life” (144-147). This lack of cynicism is one typical approach to understanding economic spheres and their role in public life.

Literature reveals that communication ethics scholars typically discuss economics through the lens of two particular systems: socialism and capitalism. Multiple analyses of these systems reveal them to be constructed systems rather than eternal formulae. The conflation of multiple accounts of each system most likely stems from the envisioning of the systems as products of scientific inquiry and observation, rather than as products of rhetoric. That is, the goal becomes the establishment of formulae and principles that serve as bases for the demonstration of their scientific truths, rather than as the premises of their rhetorical arguments. McCloskey has explored this at length, noting that economics is a deeply rhetorical discipline, chained to the limitations of language that challenge its objectivity, particularly in addressing
socioeconomic concerns (McCloskey Knowledge and Persuasion 51-52; Rhetoric of Economics). Discussion of human science and affairs, the intersection of anthropology, psychology, philosophy, and ethics, reminds us that economic principles work within systems, much in the way that particular parts work within particular brands of car, but that such systems are constructed and their constructed nature requires rhetorical perspectives. One system might provide luxury and conspicuous consumption, while the other provides utility or perhaps a failure to distribute goods, but both are systems grounded in rhetoric and can be implemented, augmented, or negated dependent upon socio-political contexts.

Economic systems are inextricably tied to social goods and the particulars of communities, not only informing the ethics of communicative practices within those systems but challenging their universality for all contexts. Not only is this important to remember in light of economists who view their work as science, but also for advocates for systems who attempt to reify and universalize their values. Advocates for capitalism in communication ethics scholarship tie the system to improvements of quality of life and the protection of freedom as a primary virtue. Communication ethicists have examined the effects of capitalism as an ideology rather than as a system defining one sort of practice – trade – in a virtuous life. Though capitalism is often described as a singular concept, definitions of the concept vary, revealing commitments to virtue that vary. Its various definitions immediately reveal problems in trying to demonstrate its superiority as a singular system.

Capitalism

Despite rapidly growing trends that consider the free market as a system that deserves protection and promotion above all other socio-political goods, capitalism was intended to facilitate human choices, not to define them. Emergent from a long history of trade in Europe,
Smith elaborated upon capitalist production in *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (Smith), a reflection prompted by positive urban development in cities like Edinburgh, Scotland. Weber’s *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* examines the rise of the system in relation to the virtues that propelled the productivity of those operating within the system. Weber defines capitalism as the pursuit of profit through “peaceful” means, conceived through an account of “balance” (Weber 17-18). That is, the agent in the system weighs the balance of each transaction in light of profit. Mutually beneficial exchanges mark trade, which, following from Smith, make society better. Economic success becomes a sign of God’s favor, a product of virtuous living. In this rhetorical tradition, economic success remains exterior to virtue, as might other social practices. This understanding establishes a hierarchy of morals and ethics over economic trade, subverting its importance to the commitment of virtue that incorporates capitalism into its practices. The benefit was that participating in this system allowed those from multiple backgrounds to benefit through the universal practice of trade. One’s beliefs or narratives easily adapt and, therefore, participation in the system does not inhibit one’s freedom.

How capitalism facilitates personal freedom and affects other institutions is a central point of debate over ethical practices within the system. Understood singularly—that is, not as a plural concept with multiple accounts of how it can be pursued but, rather, as a demonstrable good—the system forcefully affects ethical practices. How this occurs is in dispute for ethicists. As discussed in the first chapter of this dissertation, Taylor’s analysis notes that trade and the pursuit of production and wealth would become one substitute for the “fullness” of an enchanted life in Western culture. That is, trade would expand from the private sphere and the drive to accumulate in capitalism would enter the public sphere as one practice among many that
contribute to a virtuous life. Ethically, the teleological focus on profit comes to supersede the virtues inherent to it, controlling it from above (the virtues of those within the system). That is, the end comes both to justify and to establish the means. Whether the inadequacy comes from an idolatrous commitment to consumption, or the alienation from one’s own cultural products, as Marx argued, the freedom to live with one’s own virtue commitments transforms that freedom into the prerequisite virtue that comes before that which is chosen. As such, advocates for capitalism, particularly for capitalism as an organizing system superior to the State or other institutions, often privilege freedom as the primary and best of virtues.

Participation in freedom, marked by a social contract and by the private arrangement of trade agreements and their honoring, becomes a universal ethic, typical of an understanding of the system as a scientific theory rather than a created system. The protection of the universality of this freedom comes to have particular ethical ramifications. Forgiveness, for example, as a practice, is challenged. In the late 1990’s, efforts to liberate decolonized nations from the debts incurred by their colonizers addressed required free market reforms that several sub-Saharan African countries were required to make to receive funds from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. These funds were often delivered to dictators and right-wing leaders who used the money to enslave their own people (Collins 421; see also Nasong’o 2004). The movement, entitled Jubilee 2000, led to some debt forgiveness from South Africa towards its neighbors (Collins 421). But the growth of capitalism as a primary system that supersedes localized narratives and goods, emergent from what Arnett calls “local soil” (Arnett Sentiment 31), competes against the freedom within such contexts that the system is supposed to protect.

33 Erich Fromm argues that these may be the same at root—see Fromm 37-48.
That is, the protection of contracts supersedes the protection of persons. Other communicative practices, such as symbolic production, like making a wedding cake for a gay couple, or serving an African-American person at a front counter in a restaurant, when argued at all, draw from the same dilemma—a tension between the universality of the principles of the free market and the freedom of those to adapt them for their own purposes, whatever they may be. Ironically, this parallels a primary critique of socialism held in the 20th century— that all life should be understood through the lens of the means of production.

McCloskey and the Virtues of Capitalism

Despite social criticism, advocates for a capitalist system counter by arguing for the physical health of persons under the system, as well as an ability to resist domination through the acquisition of goods that sustain communities. McCloskey argues this forcefully, that capitalism has facilitated human interaction, education, and dialogue, raising the quality of life for others. The results of the system include “the emerging global village, the rise in literacy, the progress of science, the new rule of law, the fall of tyrannies, the growth of majority government, the opening of closed lives, the liberation of women and children, the spread of free institutions, [and] the enrichment of world culture” (McCloskey Bourgeois Virtues 26). McCloskey gives a book-length retort to those who blame capitalism for grand ills, arguing that “Capitalists ended slavery and emancipated women and founded universities and rebuilt churches, none of these for material profit and none by damaging the rest or the world. Bourgeois virtues led us from terrified hunter bands and violent agricultural villages to peaceful suburbs and lively cities” (30). Such arguments are often grounded in traditions of philanthropy.

Each section of this claim from McCloskey can be rebutted to some degree, rebuttals that illustrate how the practices of capitalism as a system can be geared negatively toward the virtue
of freedom of self-fulfillment. McCloskey rebuts the claim that capitalism was central to specific social ills such as slavery, arguing that it had little to no good effects for anyone (McCloskey *Bourgeois Dignity* 223, 245). This echoes arguments that slave labor was unskilled and thereby less preferable than paid labor. She further argues that the system is the best to allow all communities to raise up their levels of standard, and quickly, so long as they are free to participate in trade, echoing her former colleague Milton Friedman, who argued that participation in markets was the primary tool of resistance for Jewish populations against centuries of anti-Semitism (Friedman “Capitalism and the Jews”). It is perhaps this reimagining of capitalism as a system that inherently perpetuated slavery to one that liberates us from it that allows McCloskey to posit that the redistribution of wealth through taxation, along with Robert Nozick, is a moral equivalent of slavery (McCloskey *Bourgeois Virtues* 43). She argues that taxation means that you think others exist for you. This argument presumes that capitalism deters, rather than reinforces slavery and also negates the necessity of all to participate in the market to protect its functionality. That is, capitalism may be grounded in self-interest, but it necessitates that all do their part so others can be free within it.

Hierarchy of production in the family, which would mark *oikonomos*, including the ownership of slaves, is completely ignored. The presumption of sameness in democracy is transferred to the private sphere when the two are conflated; that is, equality is private or on tic, but not ontological. The drive for profit facilitates the reification of private hierarchy in public life. For example, Eric Williams notes that the volume of necessary labor to exploit resources in the pre-Civil War Americas and Caribbean required unpaid slaves (Williams). Calvin Schermerhorn argues that during the Civil War, slaves, as a commodity, were profitable and needed for the trade of cotton and other goods internationally (Schermerhorn 12-21). Though
literature on the transatlantic slave trade is voluminous, communication ethics calls particular attention to the transfer of private to public as a prerequisite for its growth.

Each part of McCloskey’s claims is further explored critically by scholars and ethicists, from the desirability of Western expansion of trade establishing a global “village,” to the effects that economic exploitation have had on women, to profit motives blinding political policy makers to the realities of climate change. McCloskey’s argument for higher education, for example, presumes a limited sphere for education protected from profit. Yet the sprawl and “freedom” of capitalism has spread the reformation of institutions through a profit motive that has challenged their nature. Scandals of for-profit colleges and their dubious admission practices—which William Beaver argues are nothing new historically—34—are driven by free market goods of accumulation and growth (Beaver 274-275). Traditions of professional practice are focused on virtues beyond the market. From the practice of medicine (now labeled the “health care industry”) to the practice of law, which was protected by a ban on lawyer advertising in the United States by the American Bar Association from 1908 until Bates v. Arizona State Bar 433 U.S. 350 (1977), virtues restricted market practices. It is the good of the market to participate in democratic speech that led to the increasing deregulation, or lifting of restrictions on market praxis in the name of freedom and, in the case of Bates v. Arizona State Bar, the virtue of the “greatest benefit to consumers…lower costs” (O’Steen 245) drove the change. Lower costs mean accessibility to markets, with poor people affording legal representation in a deregulated marketplace, though quality is secondary—O’Steen, who was a litigant in this case, notes after mentioning lower costs as a primary point of defense for overturning the ban, “Quality of service research is addressed, as well” (245)—that is, it is an

34 Beaver notes that for-profit universities also emerged as a problem after the passage of the G.I. Bill in 1944.
afterthought. Access comes first and, presumably, quality will follow. Though the rebuttal here bears more thorough attention, it is enough to show that the rhetorical certainty with which advocates for the free market assert its goods above other organizing systems or ethical principles are very much in dispute as rhetorical assertions; they are not demonstrable facts in the Aristotelian distinction (Aristotle *Rhetoric*).

Nonetheless, McCloskey forcefully reiterates that the free market is not driven by nefarious virtues. Virtues handed down historically from Aristotle and Christianity, such as “prudence,” as well as temperance and justice (McCloskey *Bourgeois Virtues* 32), virtues that temper, she argues, are protected and promoted by capitalism. For McCloskey, what allows us to sustain ourselves, even from the consumption of natural resources, is the ability to keep “our wits about us,” to innovate solutions (34-35). She argues that corporations have little power and natural resources are not that valuable for us to be interested in wasting them (35). Echoing her colleagues from the Chicago School of Economics, the danger is “the powers of the modern state” (35). Personal freedom allows one to produce on one’s own terms in defiance of the State, to accumulate the goods needed for natural sustenance. Allowed this ability, one does not need be subservient to “macroparasites” that use the State to line their pockets (37-38). Historical evidence, for McCloskey, shows that the world has only, on the whole, improved for all through capitalism and that virtues persist. Her view is built on capitalism as a system of voluntary exchanges, not forced (47). Ultimately, McCloskey argues that virtues are reinforced by capitalism, not challenged by them.

The cynicism toward the State marked by this argument presumes that States have no virtues, or that they inhibit the protection of freedom, which is the primary virtue. The paternalism of the State inhibits liberty, echoing Mill. Yet the State protects access of citizens to
markets, as we see in the Bates case, over and above the uniquely conceived goods of professional communities. That is, the State is re-envisioned as a powerful tool to protect the goods of the market and facilitate distributive justice, which is one of its only functions under a neoliberal market (Friedman and Friedman 29). McCloskey’s comprehensive historical analysis of multiple world economies leads her to conclude that the State, rather than protector of a collective good, is depicted as the proven enemy of it (McCloskey Bourgeois Virtues 48). Such sentiment is only conceivable if all justice is reduced to distributive and all human freedom is limited to the sphere of the market. Evidence to the contrary abounds. The service of the State to protect markets, which becomes its primary role in neoliberalism, allows corporate interests to negotiate from places of power with governments to a degree that decidedly does not make us freer, as Pulitzer-Prize winner Steve Coll argues in his analysis of the world’s largest corporation, Exxon Mobil. The wealth that allows minority groups to persist in the face of oppression also allows corporations to negotiate from places of power with countries like Indonesia, Equatorial Guinea, or Chad (Coll). McCloskey argues that collective action in government, supposedly, encourages a corrupt leader like Putin (McCloskey Bourgeois Virtues 49), but ignores deregulated laissez-faire trade within the “global village” as a source of corruption, ignoring more recent insights into his ties to crony capitalists in Russia (Trautman 817-821).

While McCloskey argues that her ideas would not have been understood prior to August 1914 (McCloskey Bourgeois Virtues 50), though her own analysis here was published prior to the economic collapse of 2008 and the election of 2016. It could be that McCloskey is merely guilty of a narrow academic focus for the causes of liberation, as a sociologist might view a particular issue solely through the lens of sociological research. Yet the freedom to live as one
chooses, presumably, allows one to choose one’s own virtue systems. Virtues that fall out of support for the market are off the table. This exposes the limitations of a view of public good confined solely to a quality of life that is restricted by the State. Ironically, the reification of citizens and producers and consumers within socialist systems becomes even more salient in McCloskey’s view of capitalism.

Capitalisms and Communication Ethics

Yet McCloskey’s analysis of economics as rhetorical demonstrates how scholars of communication ethics can theorize beyond a singular account of capitalism or socialism. Though I disagree with the surface of McCloskey’s argumentation, she forcefully argues for the understanding of language as constructive of economic theory and for the ethical nature of economics, as well as an understanding of economics through game theory, that systems come with their own governing rules (McCloskey “Adam Smith,” 503-505). Understanding definitions of capitalism as tied to a particular shared good account for their effects on particular communicative practices, such as the liberty to advertise or the development of public identities and roles, such as “slave” or “master.” McCloskey defines capitalism “merely” as “private property and free labor without central planning, regulated by the rule of law and by an ethical consensus” (McCloskey Bourgeois Virtues 14). McCloskey aims to separate this definition from that of Marx, who defined it as “greed” in chapter 1 of Das Kapital (2). But the desire to fulfill one’s wants without coercion, as opposed to needs, marks the freedom of capitalism for Friedman (Friedman Capitalism and Freedom 15). Its voluntary nature is vital to its primary virtue, the facilitation of freedom (see also Friedman Market or Plan? 5; Friedman “Using the Market” 569). These understandings of capitalism both differ from John Maynard Keynes, who free market conservatives such as William F. Buckley conceived of as propagating “evil” ideas
(Keynes xxvi). Keynesian theory advocated for governmental intervention into markets as part of effective capitalism. This difference alone reminds communication ethicists that the rhetorical nature of economic systems persists and that the primary good of such a system is constructed, not revealed or demonstrated, allowing for varied practices.

Also important is the designation of identity within systems of economic production, defining ethics. Capitalist accounts of “self” identify persons first through the lens of a system of production, above other constructs, as consumers. The reification of all as bourgeoisie or proletariat, as producers or workers, feared in the dehumanization of socialism, slowly overtakes contemporary life through capitalism and the reification of Other as consumer before citizen, before person. Herman E. Daly and John B. Cobb, Jr., identify *homo economicus*—human being as consumer. The turn to global markets in the 20th century has marked a change in the nature of human identity, relating to the subsumption of institutions under the guise of new human identities. *Homo economicus* desires to consume and determines exchange value and price through this process (Daly and Cobb 85). McCloskey offers a plain example of this identity construction process in a discussion of *bourgeois*, married physical therapists: “He and she can at any moment *become a little company* in private practice” (McCloskey *Bourgeois Dignity* 3; emphasis mine). That is, a physical therapist becomes an independent contractor offering therapy services. McCloskey presumes that this move requires an account of “dignity” for the liberty of participants to create their own place in the system (11). She offers a positive account of liberal economics, highlighting one’s role in the system as a source of dignity—though, as Macintyre notes, tying to Aristotle, communities produce identity. The role defining identity within capitalism threatens to become our sole role as capitalism, as ideology, replaces other institutional goods, competing from a place of power with local, national, and international
governments. As Meikle argues, the reification of human value within systems is a prerequisite for commensurability, undergirding economic activity (Meikle 12-13). Rather than a system that upholds the economic practices that sustain a society, capitalism is an ideology with an alternative account of justice and, consequently, communication ethics practices.

This is significant given the effect of capitalism on contemporary knowledge and shared goods, in which 21st century capitalism is continually reified as a singular account of neoliberalism. The means of production redefines language and persuades through its own lens of what is good. Jean-François Lyotard argues that capitalism-as-revealed affects epistemology as does science; it marks the turn to the universal-rational (Lyotard 77), emerging from the Enlightenment, the period in which trade emerged as a system of primary good. The universal system is ruled by formulae and the efficiency of the reconciliation of such formulae within the mechanics of the system. So if market deregulation is a firm principle that is the only way to facilitate justice, as Friedman repeatedly argued throughout his career, then the faster a system is deregulated from government interference, the faster a system will be functional, regardless of the effect on humans within the system. Knowledge and goods, such as communication, become increasingly focused on efficiency and self-interest as the primary goods of a capitalist system.

This power allows capitalism to question the premise of reality itself, redefining institutions and artifacts through its own lens until they are only real through a lens of “nostalgia” (Lyotard 74) for the organic original; mass production, for example, replicates artifacts that point to, but are not, the real artifact. Their ubiquity both points to an original, organic origin and suggests higher exchange value for it. Production, however, defines reality through its own terms, rendering authenticity as a component of exchange value, rather than as a good. Umberto Eco develops this theme in his analysis of hyperreality (Eco). Jean Baudrillard
also examines this in the production of symbols, allowing one to drown in symbols until reality ceases to exist—it is “already calculated, audited, and realized in advance” (“The Millenium” 157). A key difference lies in the virtue protected. Ellul discusses “economic technique,” the reinforcement of bureaucratic repetition and totality through the use of machines in production (Technological Society 114). His analysis of the brutality of industrialization led to an anthropological search for meaning, one which reified humans as producers in response (114). Yet humans disrupt the perfection of economic technique, leading to a technique of labor that minimizes human poiesis (115) and alienates humanity from its means of production. Such an account stands in contrast to the concept of “innovation” foregrounded in McCloskey’s analysis of capitalism. That is, innovation may be driven by entrepreneurs, but non-entrepreneurs are increasingly driven by a system, forcing those who wish to experience liberty to re-envision themselves and all of their practices through the lens of entrepreneurialism. Habermas notes the interruption of the human in these contexts; that is, the violation of the system, the exposure of the human, is disruptive and demands the reinforcement of authority (Habermas 24-5). Drawing from Marx, the contribution of a person is re-envisioned in the system as capital, not human labor (25). Most ironically, then, liberty becomes hegemonic.

If authenticity or originality deserve to be protected, then goods preceding mass production are extolled. If utility is the primary good in order to fulfill our desires, then originality is often secondary. Either way, the system perpetuates the goods of modernity when defined one way, and contains the resources to resist efficiency, or to incorporate other justices than distributive, other virtues than the satiation of greed and appetite, dependent upon our definitions. The stakes for these redefinitions are high. This power may account for the worship of the entrepreneur; for the election of Donald J. Trump, as president of the United States, or the
lionization of Steve Jobs as deity, head of a “cult,” in language used by Anja Pogačnik and Aleš Čmič (2014) in their Durkheimian analysis of Apple. That is, the process of production becomes its own good, competing with religion in an increasingly secularized Western context.

Capitalism as Neoliberalism

Because definitions of capitalism vary, each understood through the lens of a protected virtue, communication ethicists interpret them as they relate to morality, or do not relate. They should not continue to understand economic systems without specific commitments to ethics and morality. This is particularly true of neoliberalism, or Friedmanite capitalism. These thinkers quite influentially applied mathematical and economic theory to social behavior and ethical outcomes, affecting political policies in a manner that inspires great debate in the present historical moment. Multiple schools of economics, exploring varied theories, exist. These include the Austrian School, from which Chicago emerges, a “classical” and “neoclassical” school grounded in humanist understanding, or a focus on the individual (Wolff and Resnick 10, 54), and the Keynesian, which focuses on structures (10), as well as the “post-Keynesian” school, which understands the desire for capital from investors as the engine of economics (127), among others.

This examination has led to the redefinition of the “Self” through economic structures, an interaction with great consequence for human communication and human praxis. Daly and Cobb argue, for example, that such an understanding of economics and human interaction negates an understanding of “gift” within a cultural exchange, reducing human economic exchange to pure utility; they note that with *Homo economicus*, there is “neither benevolence nor malevolence in any of these instances, only indifference” (Daly and Cobb 86). Economic systems and motivations, then, redefine how humans interact.
Friedman would also author multiple articles to account for neoliberal reforms to address several social issues, such as anti-Semitism, (Friedman “Capitalism and the Jews”), homelessness in U.S. cities (Friedman and Stigler), and the legalization of drugs in the U.S. (Friedman “Drug War”). Coincidentally, for Friedman, all of these reforms are improved through the primary concern of his entire economic career: the deregulation of economic markets throughout the world. For example, Jewish people survived pogroms and the Holocaust and centuries of anti-Judaism through self-sustenance by participation in the free market. Government regulation of real estate building prevents developers from providing affordable housing solutions for the poor, and so on.

Neoliberalism does not operate in the private sphere of life as in the ancient world; it asserts its public virtue of liberty to pursue one’s self-interest to affect social life. While markets are understood as existing in “equilibrium,” rather than perfection, that is, they are dynamic (Niehans 81-98), such understandings of the market occur through the reification of producers, production, work, labor, and other categories. The individual becomes a cog in a system. The drive of the industrial age that preceded neoliberalism was famously visualized by Charlie Chaplin in the 1922 film Modern Times; a worker literally grinding through the gears of an assembly line. Though money itself came into being as a means of increasing efficiency in exchange (Niehans 2), the sphere in which this modern virtue reigns, the economic, slowly

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35 Self-interest as an organizing behavior is presumed as a psychological and biological truth in neoliberalism. Macintyre argues that this understanding, which first emerges in the Western philosophical tradition from Hobbes’s account of individualism—an historically unprecedented one—is rhetorically framed as proven by those following Hobbes’s analysis (Bentham, Lord Shaftesbury, Mandeville, Mill, Sedgwick, etc.), influenced further by Freud’s pleasure principle. Hobbes argued that altruism, acting for others, was concealed self-interest, driving his account of its centrality. Macintyre argues that self-interest as a unified, reified motive is inherently problematic. It only truly applies to specific situations rather than general human behavior and cannot be categorized in any universal way. Motives always have a “particular character” (Macintyre “Egoism and Altruism,” 465-466).
overtakes others and redefines how humans communicate with each other, how humans define each other as “Self,” “Other,” “neighbor, “citizen,” “child,” “parent,” etc.

Though McCloskey’s emphasis on virtue suggests some overriding principles that guide production in the system, along with her public repudiation of economic positivism (McCloskey Rhetoric of Economics xi), her argument for capitalism’s greatness still closely mirrors neoliberal theorists. A primary mark of self-interest in the market is using the institutions that serve it (corporations, banks) to challenge the authority of the State in an effort to diminish it. For example, Christians discusses Enron and its economic practices that drove that company to bankruptcy. In the system, a deregulated practice called “mark to market” was adopted, where company leaders communicated and collected future earnings before they were earned (McLean). Further, leaders failed to disclose their actions to rank and file employees. Christians interprets this as amoral, rather than immoral (Arneson Exploring 97). Neoliberals may argue that this action was immoral and illegal, and a violation of neoliberalism as it resulted in the coercion of employees to buy stock in Enron despite the deceitful communication of success, but the deregulation that led to this accounting practice was facilitated by the same system that drove the corporation to grow into multiple markets. The idea that capitalism has no morality presumes that we bring the morality to our involvement within it, along with subsequent ethical practices within the system. This is thought to reflect the ontic openness of capitalist structure that facilitates global participation of multiple nations, language, and communities. Yet the system itself is rhetorical, not scientific, not beyond moral judgments that determine ethical guidelines for praxis. Communication ethics recognizes that the good protected by the system leads to practices such as boundary testing as ethical.
Further, Enron reflects the change of human identity within a neoliberal system theorized in the 1940s, advocated publicly throughout the 1960s, and implemented worldwide in the 1970s and 1980s. It recast the identities of those who drove fraud not as corrupt persons, but as players of a game, neoliberalism, in which they dictate and interpret the rules to test their boundaries. The resulting bankruptcy and loss of retirement savings for the employees of Enron were a result of indifference, not intentional action. The externality of negative effects, the ignorance of the ethical “third,” or the neighbor (Arnett *Communication Ethics* 6), marks a particular form of ethical praxis in neoliberalism. Contracts are between two parties, often negotiating at the expense of a third in contemporary business life, what might be called fellow stakeholders.

Not only identities, but ethics within organizations and nations have been increasingly reified through the narrow neoliberal lens in unprecedented ways. Neoliberal sprawl leads to the notion of a “Common Market,” such as the European Union (139), leading to disputes over boundaries. Commitment to the market has led at least one journalist to question whether all national borders should be eliminated, in favor of market rule (Tabbarok). Reimagining the whole world under one system of production replicates that which capitalists feared most about Marxism: the reification of identity, communities, and practices around means of production, and has led in part to anti-immigrant sentiment and conspiracies about a “New World Order,” though grounded in ancient anti-Jewish *topoi*. The virtue of self-interest, which is the virtue of neoliberalism, and the explicit rejection of sacrifice or commitment for the State as virtue (Friedman *Capitalism and Freedom* 1-2), mark the new neoliberal capitalism.

For communication ethicists navigating conversations of capitalisms, neoliberalism warrants attention for its socio-political effects, but in particular because it is one kind of capitalism masquerading as the only kind of capitalism, with one kind of good that its policies
protect and promote: liberty envisioned as the dismantling of social programs from the State. As Wendy Brown argues, this has had deleterious effects on democracy (Brown 27-29). Though its principles presumably support equal access to markets and goods for all, as McCloskey and others argue, it also monetizes and exploits variance in quality, building exchange value through restriction to access (175-176). Yet its advocates depict it as the settled, proven form of capitalism that makes us free, demonstrated clearly by Ronald Reagan in his 1989 Farewell Speech in which he asserted that governmental deregulation improved society in a manner that is “predictable as the laws of physics.”

Robert C. Rowland and John M. Jones argue that Reagan was attempting in his speech to redefine the American Dream through this vision (Rowland and Jones 637). Yet it is only one kind of capitalism allows communication ethicists to theorize ethics within capitalist systems and structures that vary. McCloskey’s analysis of economics as science demonstrates that framing capitalism rhetorically as a “fact” or a “formula” negates its true nature as a constructed system for which people advocate. It is not a fixed idea and socialism is not necessarily the only alternative.

Systems of economics are products of and responses to historical moments. Historically, neoliberalism is understood as a reaction to the events of World War II and the Statist rule of Stalin, Franco, Mussolini, and Hitler, among others (Harvey). Though neoliberal reforms began to take more forceful hold during the 1970s and 1980s, it was a particular response to socialism and the Cold War. Socialism itself also emerged in the shadow of history—the French Revolution (Meisner 187). Communication ethics were also redefined under it based on the central good that socialism protected and promoted—the collective good of the State. Buber’s analysis of socialism is helpful to understand the stakes for communication ethics.

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36 I explore this more fully in my own published article on Buber and Utopias. See Tinker. See also Reagan.
Socialisms and Marxism

Pluralizing Socialism

Buber reminds communication ethics scholars that socialism should be understood plurally. He identifies three forms of socialism emerging from the 19th century exploration of utopias by Robert Owen and others. The first is a consumer co-operative, grounded in the actions of the people consuming and meeting their own needs, beyond a binding narrative (Buber Paths to Utopia 75). The second is a producer co-operative, which Buber identifies with Marxism. Here, the workers rule society in a fully realized national structure (as opposed to a petite-cooperative) (85-87). The third form, a co-operative that unites consumer and producer, unites society. For Buber, this connects to the original understanding of socialism, which was coined in France by Pierre Leroux in 1848. This rendering was drawn from Christianity and emphasized mutual relationships (134). This overcomes the failure of Owen, that directed co-operative responsibility to managers, and the violence of Marxist revolution.

Contemporary nomenclature problematizes this plural understanding as socialism is typically conflated with Marxism in a post-Cold War context. “Marxist” orientation in scholarship, tending toward critical reflection and deconstructive methods, has gained prevalence in communication studies—communication scholars can contribute to the journal Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies, for example. Yet this stands in contrast to 20th century hunts for communists in the academy; academic inquiry in the United States has long stood in the shadow of the McCarthy Red scare and the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) (Kille 4). The 20th century was a time in which the United States university became an exemplar of capitalism (Heller), of contribution to particular goods of consumption of
production, of the reorientation of educational outcomes and matrices to determine policies. In this context, Marxism can frighten us. But it is not the only kind of socialism.

The sprawl of Marxism as an ideology is forcefully felt in communication ethics scholarship. Famously, it is a classically atheist ideology, in distinction from the religious origins of Western higher education. Macintyre, for example, saw Marxism as a rival to a Christian worldview, along with logical positivism (McMylor 4-6; Macintyre *Marxism*), though he understood Marxism as an important corrective to power and injustice alongside the Christian gospels, if from a secular view (McMylor 7). Yet Ellul marks communism as ideology, with both a doctrine and a myth (Ellul *Propaganda* 117). Its nature not just as a system, but as an ideology, points to the problem of universalization. That is, Marxism, like neoliberalism, is not envisioned as a “petite narrative.” The “brand” of socialism *qua* Marxism as it transformed from an economic system into an ideology had disastrous historical consequences in East Germany, the former U.S.S.R., and other regimes. For its reification of identity and its disastrous effects on communication in the Eastern Bloc, Marxism stands as a provocative point of inquiry for communication ethics scholarship.

Communication Ethics and Marxism

Marxist critiques of production, and the ensuing alienation it produces, have led to more contemporary reflection upon leisure. Arendt’s call to contemplation in the age of production marks a turn to reclaim production from the drive of industry, particularly the production of cultural artifacts as manifestations of human communication. The split between *vita activa* and *vita contemplativa* identified by Arendt are reunified through leisure. Holba analyzes this approach in her call to reclaim leisure as a central component of the “good life” from its common confusion with “entertainment” (*Holba Transformative Leisure* 14) and popular culture. Popular
culture is commonly viewed pejoratively through the lens of mass entertainment and news (Japp et. al. 5-6), confusing leisure with the elimination of work (Mumford 279). Popular culture has also been tied to presumptions about social class; Lewis Mumford analyzes popular sport through such a terministic screen of class distinction, for example (303-309). Leisure as restorative, as Holba notes, has also been tied to class; productivity is aligned with the production of capital (Holba *Philosophical Leisure* 69). As Veblen lamented, many in the late 19th century bourgeoisie engaged in leisure to show off to their friends, as a sign of status (Holba *Transformative Leisure* 24-25). Marx’s work suggests to theorists of human communication that self-identity must also consider the material (Cronen 35; Holba *Transformative Leisure*); its separation from the self is dualistic. One’s capacity for leisure allows for self-exploration beyond self-definition and self-centeredness envisioned through the Aristotelian lens of craft and mastery, of submission to a process that adds value and depth to production.

Further, examination of Marxism allows for exploration of “communitarian ethics,” offering attention to community as a good, as with Christians, for example (Arneson *Exploring* 91). Benhabib identifies this trend in writers such as Macintyre, Sandel, Taylor, and Walzer as a critique of contemporary capitalism (Benhabib “Communicative,” 332). While not advocating for violent revolution, consideration of Marxist thought allows for resistance to a sole communicative good of individual liberty, reified through practices that facilitate the pursual of our wants.

A philosophical metaphor emerging from leisure is *telos.* Leisure and community facilitate the unexpected, the stranger in a collection of practices that explore unreified virtue. The practice of leisure contains benchmarks (the creation of an artifact, the completion of a

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37 See Tinker for an in-depth treatment of this in economic literature.
performance, e.g.) without final determinations (crafts continue beyond the development of expertise). Insights are revealed without totalizing definition or solution as production is tied to public virtues, such as excellences of craft or the values of performance. This process both fulfills capitalism as a system that recognizes the public good of production and the problem of Marxist alienation within it. Neoliberalism seeks one telos: liberty to pursue self-interest, which requires the transformation of other international markets and currency exchanges to facilitate the process. Activist writers have argued how this process of globalizing neoliberalism has transpired in the 20th century, with varying degrees of chaos from political chaos to the instillation of dictators (Klein *Shock Doctrine*; Harvey). This difference in telos is evidence of how economic systems reflect and reinforce public goods, establishing exigence for communication ethics inquiry.

**Economic Intersections with Communication Ethics Theory**

Democratic Communication Ethics

Economic literature and the nature of economic systems reveals increasing competition between the goods protected and promoted by economic systems and those of democracy. The central good of neoliberalism as personal liberty and freedom (from government) is evident in contemporary literature, particularly in economists from the Chicago School. Identifying the central good of democracy is not as self-evident. That good could be access to participation in public life, or the good of a “public” to define its own values and ethics. Jeffrey Stout, in ongoing conversation with Macintyre, Hauerwas, John Milbank, and others, notes that participation as a good, separated from a particular virtue beyond that participation, is a common

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38 Klein’s analysis puts forth the contentious idea that members of the Chicago School of Economics directly worked with murderous Chilean dictator Auguste Pinochet to instill free market reforms as an experiment, even at the cost of human rights. Neoliberal advocates have challenged her work.
understanding of democracy from liberal philosophers (Stout 2). Democracy, stemming from modernity, is also commonly defined as “free public reason,” absent from traditional or religious influences (2). As McCloskey argues in terms of capitalism, Stout argues that democracy “inculcates certain habits of reasoning, certain attitude toward deference and authority in political discussion, and love for certain goods and virtues, as well as a disposition to respond to certain types of actions, events, or persons with admiration, pity, or horror” (3). It is a tradition, grounded in “enduring attitudes, concerns, dispositions, and patterns of conduct than it is a matter of agreement on a conception of justice” (3)—here, Stout separates his work from Rawls.

He echoes John Dewey, that democracy is community itself, an experience rather than a mode of government; Fisher argues that this is Buber’s own understanding of community, though Buber’s vision draws from socialist ideas (Fisher Glimpses 54). Here, then the democratic and the economic are similar enough to demonstrate comparability for their competing ethical goods.

The vision of economic systems reifying ethical arguments (for example, the position that state intrusion into markets must always be resisted, or the idea that state forms of production must always be protected), and attitudes toward the authority of the market as higher or better than the State (made evident by the attempt to privatize institutions), with certain goods and dispositions, shows that economic systems are not a smaller part of a larger democratic structure anymore, but can potentially rival democracy as an ordering system for the world. Personal liberty, as a good, reflects the on-going trajectory, since the Enlightenment, toward individualism, a trend identified by de Tocqueville in Democracy in America (Arnett, et. al. “The Rhetorical Turn” 118). It describes “a reflective and peaceable sentiment that disposes each citizen to isolate himself from the mass of those like him and to withdraw to one side with his family and his friends, so that after having thus created a little society for his own use, he
willingly abandons society at large to itself” (118). Privatization and the concern for business overtakes other concerns, redefining communication often in contrast to democratic institutions. This tension reveals the importance of economic systems as loci for reflection among those concerned with democracy.

Authority is transformed by economic systems, thereby also transforming democracy. People are the authority in democracy, in a tradition dating to the ancient view of the “commons” rule (Stout 4). Representative government presents rule by the people—the government are meant to serve them. Neoliberal capitalism as a system is meant to replace this, but not as something that makes democracy flourish by allowing people’s material needs to be met, to facilitate public work or the achievement of excellence, but as a system that democracy serves.

The goods of the market come first. An exemplary example of this is in on-going discussions of the safety of energy extraction and the legality of its restriction by State governments. Michael F. Smith and Denise P. Ferguson discuss rhetorical strategies made by the Marcellus Shale company to delegitimize federal oversight of natural gas drilling and EPA studies of water pollution stemming from it. Marcellus Shale argued that local governments should oversee the process, not federal authority. Yet they also argued that local governments should not have the right to restrict or stop drilling if they choose to do so (Smith and Ferguson 383). That is, businesses advocate for their own authority and attempt to influence local governance and regulation in the process. Authority over the sprawl of the public sphere into private business offers consequence for communicative practices, such as the use of non-disclosure agreements as prior restraint in reputation management or the concealment of crimes punished by the State (Prasad). Understanding this challenge to authority is made exigent by scientific, rather than rhetorical accounts of economic spheres.
Universal-Humanitarian Communication Ethics

Economic systems risk universalizing ethical practices when the systems themselves are universalized or expanded to exclude other authoritative systems that promote and protect varied goods. Stout explores the universalization of ethics as a legacy of the Enlightenment in a discussion of a universal rule against torture or terrorism (Stout 192-202). In terms of communication, this particular example discusses a practice that is rhetorical practice, one that, on the terms of human rights, inherently dehumanizes by eliminating communication and rational cognition in the application of pain or terror. Stout notes that disagreement with moralities or ethical norms that emerge from concepts of morality often lead to a distanced consideration of universal norms—this is “Moralität.” Hegel critiqued it as a method of ethical inquiry because it presumes that moral and ethical reflection can be unsituated from communities of practice (Stout 194). Stout then argues that principles against torture can have “universal reach,” drawing from Rawls and Richard Rorty, without having “universal validity” within one system of reasoning (195). He argues that torture violates the good of democracy, which is a tradition with its own morals that situate ethics—the protection of the good of others. Human beings, Stout argues, are “unique, irreplaceable individuals with the capacity to love, exchange reasons, repent of wrongdoing, and suffer” (200). So some things can be universalized. Yet this only persists universally within democratic systems.

Economic systems also risk this. The risk of universalization can be seen in McCloskey’s analysis of economic rhetoric. The conversion of economic discussions from those of rhetorical argument to those of scientific demonstration reify economic goods as scientific laws rather than rhetorical arguments. Capitalism (described generally) both resists this in communism—which was guided by laws that put the goods of the State first—and perpetuates this in its own
contemporary argumentation over discussions of privatization and taxation. The minimalization of the government into the private sector and the attribution most social ills to government regulation are described as law by neoliberals, as are other economic principles, as McCloskey herself argues. The Kantian project of drawing universal principles for morality from reason now extend to the universal principles from economics. Success for one kind of economic market becomes universally normative when economic systems are forgotten to be particularly constructed systems. Forms of rhetoric—shorter communication that moves ‘at the speed of the market,’ for example, or puffery, a legally protected form of exaggeration or (sometimes) lying within sales culture, risk expansion into the public realm, where everything would be better if it were not restricted by the government. This expansion presupposes the ontic universality of neoliberal and socialist principles because such principles are formed as universal, scientific truths rather than ongoing rhetorical conversations.

Economic systems, instead, should be understood as systems that create particular contexts, calling forth particular responses and ethical guidelines. Perhaps ironically, this is commonly understood as the benefits of the systems.

Contextual Communication Ethics

Capitalist systems understood as loci of liberty and freedom, especially from the State, are thought to protect the diverse contexts in which humans make money and engage in professional practices. The freedom to engage in one profession over another, or to consume one style of culture over another, are thought to mark the choice that makes the system so valuable. This, in turn, leads to pluralistic contexts for communication and for the promotion of varied styles. For example, consumer demand leads to multiple styles of dining on a suburban road,
each with its own context for what defines “good” for the consumer. Is it nutritious or does it embody epicurean goods? One chooses one’s own context.

Diversity of practice, however, is not necessarily a product of capitalism, nor is it defined as a good, per se. As Walter Benjamin argued, and as other Marxist critics have noted, mass reproduction highlights the authenticity and superiority of that which was originally reproduced—that is, a Big Mac or a pair of Levi’s—replicates the authentic original that precedes it. Mass production leads to art that conforms to a previous standard, particularly in the refinement of production techniques. Diversity, in this context, leads to an abundance of goods to consume—a phenomenon that McCloskey connects to the goods of capitalism. But abundance from mass production removes depth and context. Globalized mass production has led to the expectation of uniformity of products. That is, as capitalism expands as a demonstrable set of economic laws, diversity of their expression is challenged or minimized. Capitalism challenges local context of production and alters contextual artifacts in favor of recognizable, mass produced items alienated from their original context. For example, in his examination of the effects of Protestantism on rural Guatemalan life, Sheldon Annis notes the difference in milpas, a system of crop production, which produces for sustainable consumption, in comparison to production for the highest yield (Annis 59-61). Protestant mission, tied to capitalist production, drove change in these practices. Efficiency and the maximization of production are practices that tend toward universalization within a system—the satiation of customers drives practices.

Contexts succumb to universal practices when a system totalizes the vision of its own good, a risk for all economic systems. Business, driven by the humanistic psychology that leads to the manipulation of masses to consume, embodies Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. He reified this as a “science,” marking the turn to “oneself as the primary guide for a life” (Arnett and
Arneson 117). Capitalism is thought to facilitate this, though the protection of this ability for those participating in the system requires the restriction and control of others, the ignoring of an “ethical third” that exists outside of one’s own narrow temporal or spatial context.

Scientific rhetoric, for Maslow, replaced older less-useful narratives in defining a good life (105). Economics as a science conceal narratives beyond the success of the system. The interpretation of narrative as a resource for ethics applies to economic systems as well.

Narrative Communication Ethics

As narratives reify public identity that determine ethical interactions, economic systems must be understood in their effects on public identity. Communism redefines citizens as agents of production for the State. Cooperatives reify humans as members of a community. Capitalism reifies humans as participants in a system of trade that serves humanity. Neoliberal capitalism reifies humans as agents of production. As with other systems, the economic success of areas embracing free market capitalism serve as narratives, not scientific proofs, that drive its embrace for its advocates. Examples, as proofs, are rhetorical, as Aristotle reminds us (Aristotle Rhetoric 1393a21-1393b3). Such narratives require heroes (the entrepreneur), villains (bureaucrats, especially State bureaucrats), and incidents that reveal the virtues of those within the narratives. Communication ethics calls attention to the narrative nature of “scientific” defenses of economic systems. McCloskey’s analysis of capitalism provides one example. Her narrative of the success of capitalism globally speaks to the improvement of standards of living, whether access to water or education or health care. This is an exemplar of defenses of neoliberalism—Friedman spent his career extolling the positive effects of capitalism globally and on disenfranchised communities. Yet these arguments do not lead to the advocacy of anarchy. Rather, to the State as servant and protector of the market emerges. As Friedman argues, its role becomes the provision
of military and police, the enforcement of contracts, and the settling of contract disputes. This is rhetorical argument, not scientific analysis, and it emerges from narratives.

Deetz notes that narratives persist in organizations, producing memories through symbolic interpretation that direct ethics (Deetz 310). In capitalism, the control of shareholders leads to leadership grounded in management and the guidance of group activity to control and suppress conflict (322). The structure of meetings, to deliberate and decide on actions, show the narrative nature of leadership in business. Communication ethics reminds us that the “science” of leadership and management are actually guided by rhetorical engagement. That is, systems of practices within economics are not as scientific as we wish. They are driven by narratives of past failures and successes—by the credibility of leaders and the faith in deliberation over courses of actions, of the commemoration of those retired and the celebration of those prospering. Exemplars for behavior emerge through narrative.

Communities of professional practice that focus on the nature of their work, to produce public excellences, are challenged by the economic systems in which they operate to adapt to those systems. In this way, economic goods affect the codes, procedures, and standards used by professions.

Codes, Procedures, and Standards in Communication Ethics

Practices of communication and professional standards are affected by systems that transform them. In terms of production, the enforcement of goods relating to efficiency and the maximization of profit have challenged institutions and professions. As with the Bates case, the ability of lawyers to advertise has transformed the image of the practice of law. Marc Galanter argues that legal practice in the early 20th century was marked by secrecy, a cultural practice of communication designed to protect the good of clients. The free speech right to advertise for
lawyers changed this, with legal culture now advertising practices more openly since it was legal, but with it the creation of the “ambulance chaser,” and the profit driven attorney often tempted to act in his own interest and not his clients. He argues that evidence of the mockery of lawyers has persisted from ancient times (Galanter 3-5); clearly related to the sophists who advised clients for money on how to win arguments. Galanter argues that this contemporary transfer of ethics surrounding disclosure and secrecy has led to a rapid increase in legal journalism and the more contemporary phenomena of the Freedom of Information Act, as well as open meeting laws, cameras in the courtroom, and juror interviews (14). That is, the good of commerce transformed particular procedures and standards in this profession.

As sales drives capitalism, so sales practices aimed at producing profit also affect professions. Alexander Lyon and Julien C. Mirivel examine the impact that profitability and the goods of the market have had on the practice of medicine in the deceitful marketing of the anti-inflammatory drug Vioxx by Merck. They argue that the good of profitability obscured the communication of the drug’s risks to physicians, putting patient lives at risk (Lyon and Mirivel 54). They further argue that communication research on sales focuses on techniques while ignoring ethics as a domain of research (56). To protect their good, communication skills were constructed as a method of control through Merck creating “the appearance of dialogue” with a back and forth interaction with physicians that ignore more theoretical attributes of dialogue, such as “respect, compassion, and empathy,” (64) or the Levinasian “immemorial ethical echo” of “I am my brother’s keeper.” Merck sales representatives were pressured to speak with physicians about the drug in a manner that suggested the elimination of competition, to manage their nonverbal impressions closely, and to speak in a manner that mirrored physicians’ own movements and gestures (Lyon and Mirivel 64-66). Here, Lyon and Mirivel identify the non-
disclosure of dangers as unethical, driven by the market good of the liberty to pursue self-interest (profit).

Communication ethics in professions, then, are transformed by economic spheres. The transformation of dialogue is further shaped by communication ethics. Buber notes that economics has a unique quality as an element of dialogue, one that marks it as a distanced form of communication.

Dialogic Communication Ethics

Economics, as a field beyond particular systems, has been considered in dialogic communication ethics. In his account of I-It relations in communication, Buber identifies economic transactions as distanced, reflecting a separation from nature (Buber *Between Man and Man* 42-43). Buber’s analysis happens in a Marxist context true to Marx’s influence as a theorist in Buber’s time, though Buber’s work was deeply critical of Marx, in part for its historical determinism (Buber Agassi 231-232). The reunification of humanity from that which alienates is a thematic concern underlying I-It and I-Thou relations as theorized by Buber.39 Economics, in the I-It, begins an individual reconnection with others in communication. Structures and organizations growing from this require an I-Thou for community to flourish (Buber *Paths to Utopia* xv). Communities emerging from connection (Gemeinschaft) differ from (Gesellschaft) in that the former has a shared good while the latter grows from disconnection. The Thou connecting others in community informed Buber’s socialism, in contrast with Marxism and its bond of production and brotherhood in laboring; Buber called these “schematic fiction” (11). For Buber, economic spheres offer a start for dialogue, as all communication starts with distance. But

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39 Buber picked up this up from earlier discussions by Feuerbach, as did Sartre and Gabriel Marcel (Wartofsky 1).
more community, more spiritual connection, a structure that is bonded by more than economic self-interest, is required (72).  

For dialogue, this means that economics as one component of a sphere of human interaction—trade, in particular—is not bad or undesirable, but it is only the beginning or relations to another. Friedman considers the operation of neoliberal markets within capitalism from a distance, with as little “in-between” as possible, as a “miracle” (Friedman Capitalism and Freedom 133). That is, the selfishness of society facilitates orderly life—magically—with as little connection as possible. This becomes a benefit of the system, not a flaw. Rhetorically, the premise of this assertion borrows from the idea that capitalism is one part of life, as with the ancients, though Friedman’s comprehensive neoliberal agenda challenges this understanding as limited by envisioning neoliberalism in all institutions and realms of society and culture. The limited connection to the Other allows for those without personal knowledge of others to do business and to thrive without waiting for the painstaking work of connection and dialogue in public life. Communication ethics acknowledges a public/private divide that honors the need for distance in public relationships.

A sphere that connects humanity, promoting dialogue, requires overcoming this distance. In American neoliberalism, the global village of the free market posits all interactions as voluntary as a premise of their ethicality, drawing from Smith (Friedman and Friedman 13-14). The basis of such exchanges is the pursuit of one’s “own interest” (14). The ordering of the government as servant of the free market and its facilitation makes distanced communications not a beginning, but an end to themselves. Globalization, then, as envisioned through trade, only builds community when its participants choose a method of interaction beyond the It,
challenging the notion that trade brings all together. Presumably, markets facilitate the liberty to choose this for oneself. But in reality, the centrality of the free market structure comes to define the ethics of interaction and community first.

Western colonialism of the non-Western world stands in contrast to the ultimate good of the market—liberty. That is, the European system that envisions trade between civilizations as the start of connection and community often devolved into domination in the 18th and 19th centuries. Distance in communication facilitates personal interaction without the need for ethical agreement, but it also facilitates dehumanization in the process, the reduction and objectification of the Other. As discussed in the case of the Transatlantic Slave Trade, the Other was commodified—a process on-going in contemporary evaluations of organized labor and the age of data analytics (O’Neill). Contemporary markets and communication reflect a cosmopolitan orientation in the United States—Thai restaurants in Tennessee, British popular culture on U.S. public television, and so on. This often leads to an understanding of consumerism as bridge building. Yet journalists and scholars argue that free market reforms are often paired with the suppression of human rights by local governments and not always by the development of democracy (Klein <i>Shock Doctrine</i>; Coll). The liberty of the free market and the improvement of quality of life stand in contrast to the suppression of leaders that do not accept free market reforms wholeheartedly.

The “in-between” of two persons in dialogue, as theorized by Levinas, comes from a call in the face of the Other. Communication ethicists must consider economic systems to the extent that this face is obscured, either by mediation, or the individualism of business life as it hegemonizes the public sphere. It is not just the private that suffers from public oversight.
Economics holds a central place in human activity, as do the constructed systems of economic practices in human life. Communication ethics scholarship points to the increasing effects of these spheres, calling attention both to the constructed nature of these spheres and their limited capacities to sustain other human praxis as the primary organizing structure. The historical revision of economics in the face of WWII and Communism led to a neoliberal system that begins to replicate those same problems of identity and the confusion of public and private space. In a globalized world grounded in a globalized economy, the distance between persons both facilitates economic exchange and shows the insufficiency of the system as the primary ordering system of society. The freedom to choose, in liberty, one’s own organizing principles does not include economic spheres, despite the assertions of neoliberals. Understanding the importance of economic systems to communication ethics scholarship requires understanding the universalizing, totalizing nature of these systems as they are envisioned, especially in distinction from ancient economics.

The private, deprivileged nature of economic reflection, in comparison to political rhetoric, or the pursuit of excellence, is still reflected in communication ethics and may account for the current dearth of particular economic reflection in the field. Whether as an explicit rebuke of Marxism, or a rejection of the virtues that ground contemporary capitalism, primarily through the lens of “liberty” (McCloskey *Bourgeois Dignity* xi-xiv; 1-13), materialistic accounts of economic systems are typically not understood to be enough to account for contemporary life and, therefore, remain backgrounded. For example, in an analysis of the work of Amartya Sen, Thomas L. Jacobson describes Sen’s policies of national development as beginning in economics but “moving beyond” (Jacobson 793). That is, economics is understood as a starting point, but ethical reflection cannot stay in the material. Communication ethics affirms petite narratives in
the theorization and construction of ethical norms, leading scholars to see economics as a realm of human life that exists among others, in contrast to the totalizing nature of contemporary economic ideology. But it also informs how economics expands its influence into varied spheres. Benhabib notes competing institutional goods as a mark of modernity, including State, family and market (Benhabib “Communicative,” 352), that make claims on our shared values, such as an account of justice (364). The unique contribution of economic influence and the sprawl of neoliberalism call for more reflection. Economists who expand their spheres to replace or otherwise redefine other institutional or socio-political goods require our critical analysis for the effects of these ideologies on how we communicate. In this manner, re-envisioning economic systems as petite narratives, remove the stigma of their wholesale adoption while allowing meaningful exploration of their values and legacies.

The final chapter of this dissertation points to the metaphor of the private/public divide, creating spaces for petite and multiple narratives to emerge and inform ethical praxis. Arendt’s work considers what is at stake in the conflation of these two spheres into the “social.”
Chapter Five: Public/Private Spheres and Communication Ethics – Practices and Goods

This chapter examines the dynamics of public and private spaces and how these inform communication ethics scholarship and its relationship to economics. It elaborates upon the split between public and private spheres in the Western tradition, a conversation that Arendt traces and elaborates in her analysis of 20th contemporary life and modernity in *The Human Condition*. Fundamental to her analysis, and to understanding the relationship between communication ethics and economics, is the assertion that the economic marks the private sphere and its expansion into public life created the “social,” which became the mark of modernity.

The scholarship of Arendt offers at least two primary contributions to understanding economics and communication ethics in tandem. First, though she is not the only 20th century philosopher to consider the public sphere, Arendt establishes an historical timeline demonstrating the transition from firmly defined boundaries between public and private in the pre-Modern era of the West, to the blurring of these boundaries. This process accounts for the 20th century re-envisioning of communication ethics and explains the ethical climate of modernity as social. Public spaces allow for shared goods, shared virtues, and the development of practices that promote and protect them. They facilitate the development of humanity and its cultural identities. Private spaces facilitate the maintenance of the human being *qua* animal. What is animal tends to be hidden from public view. These two spheres and their relationship reveal varied ethical expectations and varied commitments to roles. These variances inform communication ethics as they are tied to economic spheres that promote and protect particular goods. Analysis from Arnett (*Communication Ethics*) clarifies the significant critique of modernity found throughout Arendt’s work and her multiple contributions to understandings of communication ethics.
Second, her historical timeline calls scholars to examine how traditional differences between private and public inform contemporary ethical phenomena. Margaret Canovan notes that Arendt dates the transformation of the public and private to the time of the Reformation (Canovan “Introduction”). Enlightenment authors such as John Locke, who argued that one’s labor to develop and cultivate property justifies its privatization (Locke 18-30), mark the modern quest for “freedom” on an individual basis, justifying contemporary attempts to replace the public with the private. This quest, Arendt will argue, stands in contrast to the role that a public sphere plays. It is the public that protects freedom and guards against tyranny, particularly in a groundless, globalized, neoliberal world without a shared metanarrative and a consumerist disposition toward tradition. This produces “existential homelessness” (Arnett Communication Ethics 149), which causes one to attach to a life of production and efficiency as the primary good to promote and protect within society. It is in the replacement of tradition with the free market that human identity transforms as a member of a community to an agent within the economic system, a Marxist phenomenon which, ironically, the turn to a neoliberalized sphere was meant to quash.

An account of spaces and spheres clarifies Arendt’s discussion and offers the groundwork for her argumentation. It also clarifies a metaphor that has thus far emerged in this dissertation: the contested nature of ontic structures as they determine social praxis. Understanding spaces as constructed reveals a core lesson of communication ethics grounded in virtue: ethics are contingent upon the goods that are promoted and protected within a space.

Spaces and Spheres

The concern within communication ethics literature over the construction and maintenance of private and public spheres as distinct is grounded in a Kantian understanding of
spaces as constructed, developed later through existential phenomenology. The exigence of attention to them as spaces derives from this constructed nature. They are always open to reshaping and redefining.

For communication ethics, the conflation of public and private spheres in the modern era should not be understood as “incorrect” so much as it should be understood as unprecedented, if not damaging. Public and private are differentiated spheres, intentionally constructed with particular governing practices and rules. Spheres are constructed with ethics focused around a commonly held good that is promoted and protected, with shared goods informing the construction of such a space. Conflating spheres into one blurs ethical norms between them, marking the confusion of ethical praxis currently being negotiated in the social sphere—the communication ethics of social media come immediately to mind. In the modern era, this hegemonic sprawl of the economic-private into the democratic-public, resulting in a “social” space, does not reflect a natural or evolutionary state of spaces but is the result of particular choices.

Immanuel Kant and Spaces

For Kant, space exists as an a priori condition for the appearance of phenomena to humans. It, along with time, makes ontological interaction possible. Because it is a priori, it is intuited by its nature. That is, it is (along with time) grounded in an understanding that is other than empirical and is the “condition of the possibility of appearances” (Kant Critique 158). That which humans conceive, external to themselves and empirical, appears within a space. Further, separate kinds of spaces can only be understood as “parts of one and the same unique space” (158). That is, spaces are never totally disconnected, but are reified through culturally constructed boundaries.
Immediately, the question arises whether space has any impact on those things within it. Kant argues that in and of themselves, they do not define relations between objects, but are merely the prerequisite for this (159). Kant does not argue that space is an irrelevant factor so much as he argues for the contingency of influences upon objects within space. That is, cultural contexts or language give meaning and salience to objects and their relations, but do not appear obviously. Nor should they be defined objectively based upon their relations within space alone—the interpretation of objects within a space are also constructed. Human beings, then, define the boundaries of spaces. They do not exist eternally in a reified form.

This is because humans can only speak of space “subjectivity” (159-160). Kant argues for an important implication of this: space cannot be understood as containing qualities that we can comprehend based upon our sensations. It is “not a form that is proper to anything in itself, but rather that objects are nothing other than mere representations of our sensibility, whose form is space…” (161-162). That is, our interpretation guides the intelligibility of objects and the space surrounding them. Space, then, presents as a representation tied to objects within it, but it is not observable or interpretable on its own terms beyond being the precondition for things.

This brief account informs an understanding of space within Arendt’s work as it establishes reified spaces themselves as human interpretations grounded in tradition. That is, Kant problematizes eternal categories of space as public or private, with qualities that are inherent to them, pointing to the maintenance of tradition as fundamental to public identity that gives communicators “ground” upon which to stand (Arnett Communication Ethics 247-248). Spaces with assigned traditional practices must be maintained to reinforce their culturally contingent boundaries.
Kant’s work clearly references geometry as a context for this understanding, but its application to ethical inquiry accounts for contentions over the boundaries of a space, even when reified through law. Arendt’s work accounts for the historical progression of public and private spaces within the West, one that changes not as a result of evolution or an inherent quality to a kind of space, but as a result of particular choices and practices. The pliability and change of “spaces” throughout Western history does not lead us to consider a “violation” of a natural law of what must be public and private, but to understand the transformation of our interpretations of space through our own subjective lens. Assigning or otherwise understanding ethics within a given space requires us to look not for eternal, unviolable principles that emerge, but to the traditionally constructed praxis that is promoted and protected in defense of a commonly held good. That spaces are intuited does not negate the ability to discuss them, but it means that they are understood through the phenomena within them. Their negotiation is rhetorical, grounded in appearance and sensibility. It is here that ethics within spaces make their nature salient. Spaces are tied to a context that is intentionally or unintentionally constructed through the adoption and adherence to ethical principles within a space.

Arendt revisits the distinct differences between public and private spaces in ancient Greece to account for their conflation in modern life, beginning with the ancient period. In ancient Greek writing, ethical discussions of communication permeate accounts of economics and money as the nature of space as public or private drives particular practices through the potential seduction of money to complicate public goods.

The following section briefly examines the divide between private and public and its relationship to the ethical in the primary literature of Isocrates, Plato, and Aristotle—thinkers whose work is foundational to rhetorical and communication ethics. Not only does this give firm
context to Arendt’s discussions, but it grounds the discussion of economics in communication ethics in on-going discussions of the Ancient era. Ancient rhetoricians Isocrates, Plato, and Aristotle were each concerned with the communication of wealth and the control of greed within the *polis*. These conversations account for the significance of the split between private and public in Arendt’s work.

**Economics in Ancient Greece and the Public/Private Divide**

Isocrates, Plato, and Aristotle each wished to curb greed in the ancient *polis* of Greece. Isocrates tied these discussions to leadership, while Plato differentiated between the satisfaction of appetite and the maintenance of the soul. Aristotle expanded the differences between the role of trade and economics in the private sphere and the necessity for diversity within the public realm of trade.

*Isocrates*

Isocrates discussed money and ethics in the public sphere it in relation to the authority of leaders. He argued that public leaders should be above pursuits of money; the stability of the state comes from character, not merely a large supply of capital or land (*Isocrates Nicocles or The Cyprians* 97). In his oration eulogizing Evagoras, father of Nicocles and ruler of Cyprus, Isocrates reminds Nicocles that deeds and principles are at the heart of greatness, and a commitment to glory even above life; spending money on celebratory displays and other extravagances only indicates wealth and does not gain one honor (*Evagoras* 5-7). He also considered the ethics of communicating wealth for political leaders, identifying unrest in the *polis* due to the communication of it. He argues that wealth does not lead to the poverty of others
(Antidosis 277-279), but its communication matters. As such, ostentation should be avoided (51, 59). Proper communication between people and leaders, not wealth, is the source of “highest prosperity and greatness” in a society (Nicoles or the Cyprians 83). Wealth is secondary to concerns of virtue and civic service. Further, reputation, or a “good name,” and character, are much more important than money (To Nicoles 59; Nicoles or the Cyprians 99).

In Antidosis, this conversation extends to rhetorical pedagogy and practice, with discussions of greed and the acquisition of wealth as a sign of inauthenticity in the rhetorical practices of Sophists (Poulakos 66; Schindler 401). Further, the misuse of money among Sophists and leaders creates class division and suspicion (Antidosis 277). His early discussions establish at least two primary coordinates for communication and economics: (1) The communication of wealth and consumption create social unrest. (2) Profit motives can corrupt, or communicate corruption of, practices of communication.

Plato

Plato discusses greed in public life, which, for him, must be tamed. Money is not intrinsically undesirable—it is more durable than perishable goods and has utility in acquiring them when needed, allowing one to overcome temporal constraints of production (Schindler 404). It is integral to the “hypothetical society” described in The Republic (Burke 94); its acquisition is a part of most societies (Schofield 256-257). But, as a passion, greed must be subordinated to reason in the maintenance of the polis. Plato considered greed as akin to lust and the desire for sexual reproduction (Plato Republic 559c); it is “insatiable” (442a) and marks a political tyranny (562a – 562c). The economic motive, then, is not as significant as the rational,

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41 Socrates also discussed the nature of wealth and political leadership in The Republic, offering early discussions of contract theory and what is honorable in political leadership in contrast to a profit-driven life (Republic 24-25, 346b-347d).
which is separate. The economic cannot interfere with the maintenance of the soul and the achievement of excellences (Plato *Apology* 30b).

For Plato, class division emerges from the inversion of excellences and wealth (Plato *Republic* 551d); the latter must always be understood to emerge from the former, lest it become *kerdos*, which is the lower pleasure of going beyond what is given (Schindler 400)—a generalized description of greed for things other than money. Poverty emerges when those of means rule over those who create through *ars* (Plato *Republic* 552a – 552d). Further, when wealth as an end overtakes virtue in the practice of rhetoric, it becomes inauthentic (to use an anachronism).

Plato’s work establishes that money is a part of life; greed is a powerful passion; it is unrelated to excellences in the public sphere; and its interests as ruling interests creates poverty. Further, profit as an end changes the nature of practices within society and can corrupt communication and pedagogy.

*Aristotle*

Aristotle develops money and its understanding both in the public and private sphere in a discussion that would influence the medieval era of trade, Catholic social thought, and Islamic economic thinking as well (Meikle 1). It will create the understanding of economics from which modernity would eventually pivot away.

As mentioned in the first chapter in this dissertation, Aristotle’s work ties economics specifically to social relations. Consideration of the relations between public and private for Aristotle acknowledge that the private—the home—precedes the *polis* (Aristotle *Economics* I, 1343a1). For him, the private, economic realm is hierarchical. The economic involves the ordering of members of the household, of men over women and slaves (1344a23—1345b4). This
hierarchy leads us to community, which is the primary context in which humans flourish (Finley 152) – publicly in the polis. Social order is crucial to understanding economic order.

*Pleonexia*, or greed, is of concern as a potential disruption to these relations. Aristotle defines it as “wrong-doing in regards to agreements, claiming a share of the object in dispute beyond one’s desserts” (Aristotle *On Virtues and Vices* 1251a30). He ties economic ethical malfeasance due to greed to the concept of shame—in *Rhetoric*, he argues that this can take the forms of “making profit in petty or disgraceful ways,” profiting from the poor or dead (“low greed”), giving less help to others than you should, asking for financial help from those worse off than you, begging under the guise of returning a favor, begging through praise, and ceaseless begging (Aristotle *Rhetoric*, 1383b20-32). The manipulation of hierarchy and its roles, then, is a shameful problem. Aristotle also laments other social lapses spurred on by greed, including the violation of social custom, disobedience to rulers, perjury, and the violation of agreements (Aristotle *On Virtues and Vices* 1251b3). Greed, then, must be controlled.

Aristotle further parses the difference between the acquisition of property/goods, and wealth. One is tied to our nature as sustaining animals, the other to our public selves. In *Politics*, he discusses the acquisition of wealth that facilitates the acquisition of property, which relates to the governance of a household. He describes this as a natural process, part of the natural practices of homo. This was tied to “security, necessity, and survival” (Arnett *Communication Ethics* 66). The maintenance of a home relates more to animal husbandry, or the use of the land (cutting wood for lumber, for example), which also ties the natural ordering of the home to manual labor (Aristotle *Politics* 1258a1). These activities, tied to the maintenance of the home, are private.
Exchange, or trade, through the public sphere, however, leads humans to think that money is the telos of economics, rather than the maintenance of a household through property (Aristotle *Politics* 1258a12-14). This public action goes beyond the natural, establishing what would later be called a public “persona” in the Roman Republic, which comes with responsibilities and rights – with “freedom, courage, and risk” (Arnett *Communication Ethics* 172, 66). Wealth acquisition is an art (Aristotle *Politics* 1256b39). This form of exchange for its own sake is “justly censured, for it is unnatural, and a mode by which men gain from one another” (Aristotle *Politics* 1258b1). The corruption of economic praxis was already evident in ancient life. Edward Cohen argues that ethical malfeasance in ancient trade involved counterfeiting between far-away lands with varied forms of currency and the evasion of ancient banking regulations through private, rather than public trade. Here, the qualitative difference in economic production of goods that maintain a home, in distinction from the acquisition of wealth through trade, mark a key difference between the private and the public sphere and the social relations that exist within them. The acquisition of wealth in public, beyond the sustenance of one’s home, facilitated the evasion of public regulation.

In the ordering of the home, Aristotle speaks highly of private property and its unique role. He argues that it exerts its own pleasure (Aristotle *Politics* 1263b1). He further argues that an encroachment of the State causes this pleasure to be lost (1263b1, line 7) and restricts the commonly held understanding of property so that women and children were not to be shared—in any sense—as property (1263b1, lines 10-14). That is, the structured boundaries between what is private and what is public, what is established to belong to one and not another, facilitates peaceful living (II, 5, 1263b124-26). Economics in public is based on the proportional, not the
equal, as Meikle notes (Meikle *Aristotle’s*). Diversity in economics allows varied roles to be fulfilled (*Aristotle Politics* 1289b2).

Education is the public practice that, for Aristotle, tames greed. It allows people to focus on higher things than money (1267a1). It is education that drives excellence, not wealth; economic gain is not tied to good leadership (1273a1). Echoing both Isocrates and Plato, greed leads to political disarray, which Aristotle spotted in Sparta (1271b1). Greed, then, should be tamed by education.

This brief account of Isocrates, Plato & Aristotle foregrounds economics within the conversations of public and private spaces and their nature within a society. It also reveals immediate conclusions that bear further exploration—for example, Isocrates’s emphasis on character over displays of wealth, Plato’s ordering of greed as a passion above the public good, rather than as that which should drive the free market, and Aristotle’s argument that education checks greed, standing in direct contrast to contemporary philosophies that education should be driven by the need to fill STEM jobs in the market (DeJarnette 77-78) and in the forms of educational administration and structure (Billet; Curren 136) in contemporary public life. Emphasis on these ethical concerns relies upon an understanding of division between what is public and what is private.

Arendt’s analysis of private and public spheres has informed communication ethics as a primary metaphor for considerations. Arendt argues for what Benhabib calls both an “agonistic” and “associational” split between private and public spaces (*Benhabib Models*). Her analysis is tied to the modern project of transcending the adoption of private, economic values into the public sphere in the industrial revolution. Arendt discusses these differences at length in *The Human Condition*. Canovan notes that the book emerged from a series of lectures in 1956.
addressing Marxist contributions to the brutality of the WWII-era in a way that her previous book, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, and its discussions of Naziism, did not (Canovan “Introduction” xi). It offers a thorough analysis of notions of labor and work in modernity, marked by the capitalist age of mass production. She notes that its results led to a space race, which she frames not as progress, but as an attempt to flee the system of life that was created through the Modern era; that is, modernity seeks not to cultivate the earth so much as escape the system it created—one of spaces of production.42

Key to understanding these differences is the sprawl of the economic sphere into the public realm. Arnett’s analysis of Arendt contextualizes these discussions for communication ethics. Central to Arendt’s project is the reclamation of the traditional public sphere and its ethical boundaries for the West. Scholars note the importance of these discussions for her.

**Hannah Arendt and the Private/Public Difference**

Following from ancient writers, Arendt identifies private and public as two discrete spheres constructed as what is owned (private) in distinction from what is not owned (public), with a lasting role in human cultural achievement that drives intentional action. The public, for Arendt, is “the world itself, in so far as it is common to all of us and distinguished from our privately owned place in it” (Arendt *Human Condition* 52). This private sphere is marked by the economic identification of ownership. Like the ancient Greek writers, Arendt extols the public sphere as a site of the performance of excellences and where achievement is not forgotten (55). In it, diversity of belief and achievement are present. It marks a space for individuality liberated from the need for conformity to the natural order that marks the sustenance of the self in the

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42 Escape from the spaces and practices of industrial production in the 19th century is a key reason for the development of planned suburbs and a British-Marxist account of the Romantic era within the humanities as one that birthed popular culture in response to it. See Mumford and Berlin.
private sphere. It is an area where people act rather than behave (22-23) – Arendt identifies behavior with the animal self, whereas action requires intent. Like Kenneth Burke, she is echoing an Aristotelian anthropology—intentional choice of language (Burke Grammar 59), or speech, and action are the primary concern of the bios politikos (Arendt Human Condition 25) or the political sphere. In distinction from the hierarchical private sphere, the public sphere allows free interaction for property-owning men. Intentional action in public leads to excellences that create “immortality.” That is, public achievement outlives those who achieve, offering a memorial to them that sustains over time; this is understood both in the Greek polis and the Roman res publica (55). Public action, then, has a unique benefit that deserves to be protected and promoted as a cultural good.

As such, public action is at the heart of Arendt’s overall political philosophy. Maurizio Passerin D’Entrènes argues that her primary project is to promote “civic engagement and collective deliberation,” in line with civic republicanism (D’Entrènes 2). Action, for Arendt, has been transformed in the modern era to divisions between “labor” and “work.” Yet this does not mean Arendt is advocating for escape from the private. Rather, alienation from nature, from the private, concealed tasks of life, becomes the central feature of modern life, one that allows the embrace of capital as public action that ancient writers lamented. Canovan notes this in Arendt’s discussion of the space race—a discussion of alienation that she extends from Marx (Canovan “Introduction”; Foster). It is the confusion of what is public and what is private that creates problems of oppression, tied to totalitarian control.

The conflation of these two spheres marks the modern era and confuses much of human life that follows the industrial period. This conflation is grounded in capitalism and reflects its very birth, with socialism following. Arendt ties this to the church attempting to acquire capital
rather than property (Parekh 33), marking the shift from property as wealth to capital as wealth, in an alienation of capital from the means of production and those who produce it. Capitalism, then, sets the stage for expansionism during the colonial Era and the turn to competition as political virtue (Canovan, *Hannah Arendt*, 29). The lack of protection of the public sphere from private interest through government controls violates freedom. Freedom becomes conceptualized through the private, rather than public (Arnett *Communication Ethics* 55). Capitalism did not cause totalitarianism for Arendt (Arendt “The Last Interview”); she would argue that private/public crossing of boundaries endangers both socialist and capitalist countries (see also Canovan *Cambridge* 32; Hansen, 35-36; Beiner 360). The fluid movement between property and capital marks a shift that defines modernity and redefines public action.

Arendt laments the shift from private and public divide into a realm called the social. She marks one key development as the ground from which this occurred—the confusion of wealth and property in the period following the Reformation. The accumulation of wealth and its maintenance beyond one’s life begins to rival the immortality that marked excellences in the public sphere (Arendt *Human Condition* 68). In this era, as others have noted (see Tawney), ethics surrounding the accumulation of capital change. As mentioned in the first chapter of this project, practices of usury develop from market-based activity and mark the trend of what Arendt calls “World-alienation” (*Arendt Human Condition* 254). The ability to transcend and look upon the world from a distance leads one to embrace wealth as a disembodied good over property, which had been inseparable from wealth previously (61). Property marked one’s citizenship in the polis and was even held by those who were otherwise identified as poor (61-63). The blending of leadership styles between public and private—the transference of private identities into the public realm—were not unprecedented. Plato clearly attempted such a project in his
hierarchical understanding of the *polis* (223). But this treatment of wealth was new. The individual itself was now a tool, a resource for the production of capital as a source of labor (70). Confusion of the two spheres now produced new accounts of human identity and of the function of society and the goods around which they are centered in the West.

The redefinition of labor (and work) have provocative consequences in the modern era. Perhaps most of all, the ability of those with accumulated capital to transcend labor of multiple kinds supposedly becomes an increase of freedom, marking further separation from one’s own animal nature—*The Hairy Ape*, a 1922 play by Eugene O’Neill, captures this reality in the dehumanization of those who labor. Consider Yank, the protagonist, a laboring grunt stoking the fire of an ocean liner who situates himself against the rich in the age of industrial production:

> I’m de ting in noise dat makes yuh hear it; I’m smoke and express trains and steamers and factory whistles; I’m de ting in gold dat makes it money! And I’m what makes iron into steel! Steel, dat stands for de whole ting! And I’m steel—steel—steel! I’m de muscles in steel, de punch behind it!...Slaves, hell! We run de whole woiks. All de rich guys dat tink dey’re somep’n, dey ain’t nothin’! Dey don’t belong. (O’Neill 16)

Subsequent labor divides create the class division that Marx would evaluate, leading him infamously to speculate that armed revolution would provide settled peace to bridge the divide. As capitalist production increases its sphere as a primary good in Western life, identities as laborers and producers overtake those marked by accomplishment or craft within the public sphere. The alienation from one’s ground, one’s mark in the private and public sphere, leads to an economic or sociological identity that is tied to the traditionally private (producer, laborer, child, parent) over a public one. Postmodernity would challenge the realms offered in humanity as the goods that challenge this homelessness, such as tradition and authority (4). Identity, then,
transforms in this era as the middle class increasingly seek to transcend labor, driven by the skill-
less nature, which Marx predicted would transform the meaning of labor and work (Arendt
*Human Condition* 90).

The social space, which conflates the previously agonistic private and public, adapts private economic goods into the public realm of virtues. This results in the continued foregrounding of the economic in public life in a transference of hierarchical private order into public life. Social Darwinism marks the development of modern capitalism with a turn away from regulation to the embrace of a more animalistic approach to interaction with others in the Industrial Age, marked by Oswald Spengler. Private needs become public conversation, echoing other public foregrounding of private ethical matters, such as the increasingly public discussions of sexuality in popular culture. The ability to consume, to meet one’s own needs, becomes a public good and a public *topoi*, rather than a prerequisite to build a life that allows one to then participate in the public sphere, participation that shapes conversation. As a result, the private overtakes what is public and the hierarchy that marked economic production in private life increasingly marks public life.

So what was considered a private process of business transformed into expansion for its own sake in the modern period, a process with “little sense of roots and no sagacity of restraint” (Arnett *Communication Ethics* 37). Three particular effects of this conflation emerge as areas of concern for communication ethics. These include the acceptance of progress and modernity as a substitute for the guiding force of tradition, the reshaping of dialogue and public judgment, a presumption of sameness among workers that facilitates totalitarian rule and loses Otherness.
Progress and Modernity

Following from Taylor’s analysis, personal freedom served as a liberal substitute for tradition, which in the Enlightenment era of tolerance, could lead to violence. Progress and hope in the future become the driving goods of modernity, driven by action (*vita activa*) rather than contemplation (*vita contemplativa*) (Arnett *Communication Ethics* 49). Progress becomes one of the sacred trinity of modernity (3) (also including efficiency and individual autonomy), a notion marked by the unquenchable thirst for accumulation—in the case of progress, accumulation of human achievement above and over nature. Personal freedom would be driven by one’s own will and ability to produce. Though social contracts and a deprivileging of State control were thought to create peace in the period following the 16th and 17th centuries in the West, Arendt argues that this move ironically creates space for totalitarianism. Freedom removed from the public sphere into the private sphere allows for demagoguery (53-55). Freedom, tied to individualism, focuses on the self on the expense of a free public sphere for others (55).

This contradiction is seen in industrial production and technology. The public life glorifies action for its own sake, productivity in particular tied to the rise of capitalism (37, 64). Yet technology argues for its own good in its ability to relieve humanity from excessive production by taking it away (64). Such a mindset echoes remnants of the Romantic era in which the swelling of aesthetics drowned out the brutality of life – escape as the only respite, rather than re-envisioning the system. The alternative to *vita activa* is no longer contemplation, but non-production.

A byproduct of the shift to production is an increasing distance between persons and locality in the search for new markets to exploit, increasingly severing connections of persons to traditions. Globalization scholars relate this to “time-space distanciation”; the relation between
space and time required for practices within a civilization to occur, specifically in relation to production. Anthony Giddens, like Harold Innis, notes the effects that writing—a technology to transport communication—had on the expansion of human culture (Giddens 90-108; Innis). Trade expands this, allowing countries to traverse greater distances, though often as a sign of power, which leads to conflicts, particularly over production. Arendt sees this as beginning in the 17th century with Hobbesian accounts of social contracts to overcome the violence of the period (Arnett Communication Ethics 37). This lack of connection, among other consequences, facilitated slavery and the exploitation of others who had been connect to local land by colonial forces—South Africa is one example (39). A new story had to unify persons in this market, one that was disconnected from the local. This, in part, drove anti-Semitism and racism, which were narratives that replaced traditional goods and gave identity “into a story of increasing meaningfulness, no matter how vile the means of welcome or conduct of the story” (43). Others simply were driven to embrace greed out of nihilism as one’s potential as a producer supplants one’s other role-based identity within community (159). Arendt would call this process an “abyss” (181, fn26).

Reclaiming the line between what is public and private restores this dichotomy and gives meaning and depth to existence. Friendship, facilitated by the encountering of others within community, is facilitated in public, allowing us to connect to others who do not share our private concerns, who must be put into our hierarchy of production as a relation. It is characterized by “Homeric impartiality”: “work at a public level, celebrate deeds that contribute to the polis, and recognize diversity of positions in the public domain as the defining understanding of a public driven by difference” (194, fn 27). Public acknowledgment and remembrance of accomplishment becomes the basis for traditions and narratives that give shape and form to community. It also
allows for forgiveness and the acceptance of others that are different, who have made mistakes, as all are presumed to be different (73, 166). Such friendship must be cultivated through “interspaces,” that create distance and make the relationships possible (121). Arnett’s discussion of Arendt’s work notes that Lessing argues for the virtue of friendship above truth or rationality; public distance allows us to connect to others outside the realm of self-interest with freedom, courage, and risk (121). Friendship is based in the impersonal (129) and it is central to public life, allowing us to work together with others (166). Those who violate our abilities to sustain ourselves in the private realm are harder to forgive, harder to interact with.

Dialogue and Public Judgment

Further, this existence of difference and relation to those who are different from us create “a common world of discourse” that makes dialogue possible (185, fn 5). For Arendt, emphasis on competition between private entities, rather than public friendship, collapsed the city-states of Greece (185). This sort of competition manifested with Social Darwinianism from Spencer and the “gospel of wealth” of Andrew Carnegie (258, fn 35). The conversations between others in dialogue creates “communicative substance” that attend to “the temporal demands of existential life” (242). Arnett describes this process as putting “mud” underneath the feet of those who are in dialogue—that problems are worked through in events and stories that create traditions and awareness of public identity, rather than a private, distanced, and misguided “reliance upon artificial hope and a routing sense of optimism” (242). The public offers “light” (249), building an “enlarged mentality” to use Kant’s language, which examines multiple points of view (59, fn 30).

These conversations lead to public judgments, which differ from private opinion. They challenge others’ prejudices, requiring courage and risk to encounter others; this stands in
contrast to war as a method of interaction (194). Public figures, further, hold more accountability when making judgments. They cannot merely focus on their own needs (177, fn 20). This public realm should contain multiple perspectives, allowing participation that saves the private realm from being dominated by a public realm only accessible by a few (87). This domination is resisted by a multiplicity of voices in public. Through this, judgments of what need to be tested to protect the life of the polis can happen, establishing both public taste, laying the foundations for judgment, and engaging in judgment with imagination and common sense (113). Proper judgment requires distance between judge and object, as opposed to the private realm of judgment that is guided by one good, one direction of acquisition or self-fulfillment. Reality, or to draw from Kant, the distinction “between imagination and fantasy” are made salient in public judgment (115, fn 26).

The public realm, through friendship and shared discourse, overcomes the Otherness that marks those retreating into their private spheres. It also allows for difference of motive, style, and practice not found in private, hierarchical ordering. The paternalism of the private, embodied in the hierarchical structure of leadership in corporate life, translates into the public realm, where owners expect hierarchical treatment in public spheres, with deference and privilege in access to public goods and the construction of conversations (the ability to set agendas, persuade political leaders, and gain special favor in public transactions are three examples). The protection of difference and diversity—covering a multitude of perspectives and roles, is facilitated by a robust public sphere that differs from the private.

Presuming Sameness of Action, Overcoming and Protecting Otherness

Echoing a Kantian, subjective construction of spaces, Arendt argues that reality itself is made salient by a public sphere with a plurality of identities that, ironically, reveals sameness of
consideration in contributions while protecting difference of identity (Arendt *Human Condition* 57). Private spheres in Ancient Greece were marked by a hedge or wall, which was the designation for private property; Arendt notes that distribution, possession and dwelling is the primary definition of *nemein* or law in Ancient Greece—this definition would transform to one of relationship between people in ancient Rome (63, fn 62). Privately-held wealth removed dependence upon others from one’s motive to enter the public sphere, thereby ensuring more liberated participation within it, or a transcendence of one’s self to join with others (64-65). This is a primary problem with poverty and its limitation of freedom. The freedom to act and speak, then, within a public space, are tied to the security of one’s economic status, giving exigence to address issues of poverty through the lens of justice.

Ironically, the Marxist attempt to overcome class differences through abolishing them led groups, mobs, masses, and elites alike, to seek a unified leader to provide direction and meaning to those without roles, accounting for the violence of Marxist revolution (Arnett *Communication Ethics* 41-42). Identity is understood through multiple lenses, but in terms of economic production, it is reified through class. Difference, and the ability to be different in the public realm, are the mark of freedom, not the individual pursuit of animalistic appetite. It drives friendship not grounded in necessity, allowing for the flourishing of ideas outside of a family context (191). Protecting class mobility is one thing, but abolishing differences in public role presumes that all share the same values, the same experiences. Such similarities require more firm boundaries, more firm hierarchies to reify relations, and intensify conflict between those are assigned difference arbitrarily, rather than through the role they play. Differences in society call us to listen to others—the Frenchman to the Algerian woman, the CEO to the day laborer, the middle-class citizen walking down a busy street to the person asking for a place to stay.
Presumptions of difference lead us to ignore the plights of others, presuming that one is violating one’s place in a shared hierarchy if one has a different experience to reconcile. Only a totalitarian can begin to put those in their place.

This is especially salient in differences in social injustice. Expectations of sameness, for example, led to suspicion of Jewish people in Eastern Europe that produced contemporary anti-Semitism beyond the long history of anti-Judaism. Who are these people who think they need their own language? Their own rituals? Condemnation of those experiencing homelessness is often grounded in the presumption of sameness, not difference, which negates the experiences that brought them to that point. Such presumptions of sameness also extend to critiques of affirmative action, the denial of legitimacy to same-sex marriages, and protection of the poor. A society based upon social contracts presumes sameness of responsibility, if not stature or rights, between two parties that enter into an agreement. This foundational idea of the 17th century, which was thought to replace state power as an organizing force in liberal society, requires an identity of sameness between agents and legitimates brutal compliance with shared systems that replace localized tradition.

The private/public split and the impact that a shared good has touch on each category of communication ethics inquiry. A consideration of each further focuses the contribution that Arendt’s account makes to conversations around communication ethics.

**Communication Ethics Inquiry and the Arendtian Private/Public Sphere**

Democratic Communication Ethics

The public sphere is the location for the free exchange of ideas and, as Arendt’s analysis shows, is protected as such in the Western tradition (see also Foucault *Fearless Speech*) for its multiple benefits to humanity. Within democracy, the State enforces the formal boundaries of
public speech and its ethics. While the study of free speech has several approaches in 20th century scholarship, many philosophers and legal scholars view self-fulfillment as its primary purpose (Arneson and Dewberry 204). This marks a decidedly modern understanding of democracy. Scholars also note contexts of free speech within education, the workplace, governmental spaces, and other contexts. The role of the press, assembly and petition, and religion are also foci for free speech research (208-215). In each of these, the connection between space and self is considered.

Importantly, speech within the public sphere, as guided largely by U.S. Supreme Court law, is largely unrestricted for content save for sedition; the form of speech is often restricted to protect the shared boundaries of the public sphere. In *Ward et. al. v. Rock Against Racism* 491 U.S. 871 (1989), guidelines for the restriction of communication were established – restrictions on public speech could be leveled if they “[1] are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, [2] …are narrowly tailored [3] to serve a significant governmental interest, and [4] …they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information” (*Ward* 783-784). Key to these types of restrictions is that they only apply to public space. Further, laws are narrowly tailored in the name of promoting and protecting the public good of free expression, even when content is unappealing (see *Snyder v. Phelps* 562 U.S. 443 (2011), for example).

Beyond this, what is private increasingly appears in the public sphere in the liberalization of discussions of sexuality and money alike. Supreme Court cases such as *Stanley v. Georgia* 394 U.S. 557 (1969) and *Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton* 413 U.S. 49 (1973) each reflect discussions of “obscene materials.” In the case of Paris, an obscenity law was upheld preventing the showing of pornography in a public theater, differentiating from the earlier Stanley case, which dealt with pornography in the home, helping to establish a legal right to privacy.
Regarding economics, however, the conflation of the private and public sphere has led to the identification of an ontological legal construction called the “corporate person.” This conflation of private and public identity has transformed democratic practices. Case law regarding this status dates to 1819 in *Dartmouth College vs. Woodward*, though Nicholas S. Paliewicz argues that several following cases established this construct, most notably *Santa Clara County vs. Southern Pacific Railroad* 118 U.S. 394 (1886), where the Supreme Court had presumed that the Railroad was a legal “person” with rights under the constitution (Paliewicz 195). Critics of corporate personhood have argued that the resources of a corporation allow it to expand and exploit its rights ironically much more than the people who were meant to be liberated by the laws that created those rights: freed slaves (Logan 977). Such decisions embolden economic institutions places of privilege within democratic discourse, sometimes with ethical consequences for communication.

Corporations with rights further establish their own right to arbitration courts and non-disclosure agreements. Arbitration courts began to settle small disagreements and have blossomed into a private sphere of courts with their own procedures (Noll 478). Differences between public and private courts can be described as the difference between “accuracy, fairness, and transparency” and “speed, finality, and the benefit of having disputes resolved by a subject-matter expert” (478). Non-disclosure agreements protect the privacy of government secrets and trade secrets with little imposition (though recent whistleblower statutes have been put in place to challenge this) (Prasad 2513). This has extended to the deliberate concealment of sexual abuse allegations by predators (2518) as well as dangerous chemicals used in fracking; John Craven argues that the good of the protection of “trade secrets” to protect and promote free trade (neoliberal capitalism) outweighs public safety as a shared good in disclosing the chemical
composition of fracking materials (Craven 404). Here, the protection of private interest outweighs the good of public health despite the status of person enjoyed by corporations. This conflation, then, confuses the boundaries of ethics to redraw them within spheres to redefine spheres in favor of the powerful, denying the historically participatory nature of the public sphere in favor of the amplification of economically powerful voices.

Both through participation in democracy and in corporate life, the private/public split informs communication ethics discussion. It also problematizes the Universal-Humanitarian approach to the extent that universal principles of communication are thought to transcend the public/private split.

Universal-Humanitarian Communication Ethics

Emerging from the Enlightenment Era is the project to establish universal rights within public and private spheres. Varied accounts of the public sphere result. Benhabib gives a helpful account of three understandings of the public sphere.

One involves two components of the public sphere – this is Arendt. The agonistic sphere is where varied voices battle for victory through rhetorical performance, as in ancient Greece, or in associational connection to others, where power emerges through “common action coordinated through speech and persuasion” (Benhabib Models 78). Each come from ancient Greece and modernity, respectively, for Benhabib. Benhabib disagrees, however, that the social and political are conflated because the move to publicity, in the Habermasian sense, is justice, not because of the economy. Benhabib, also in the shadow of Kant’s discussion over the subjective nature of space, refers to Arendt’s account of the public sphere as “phenomenological essentialism” (80). That is, Arendt defines the public space in particular ways that take on essential qualities. Particular action and speech content mark this sphere for Arendt.
seems to have developed a “procedural” rather than a substantive definition of the space (81). It should be noted here that Arendt’s Kantian influence in her moral theory (Benhabib Another 19) suggests that her account of space is not essentialist. Rather, Arendt argues for traditional categories in history. The social is a violation of tradition, but not essential qualities.

Liberal models also emerge for the public sphere for Benhabib, spaces where power, legitimacy, and public dialogue occur (drawing from Ackerman). The separation of the private and public, in the liberal model, leads to the silencing of some private groups (Benhabib Models 82). Indeed, women and people of color fought to transform the public space to a place where they could be included in public dialogue. Their difference was recognized beyond a disappearance of identity into the privately-ordered structures of hierarchy that capitalism thrust into the public. That is, private ownership of men over women, of masters over slaves, of colonists over the indigenous, relegates and restricts access to public spheres. This has led to attempts at universal accounts of justice with Rawls and inclusion in terms of Habermas’s ideal speech situation. Power, for them, is not a decided question as it is in the private sphere – decided primarily through ownership.

However, this justice for Rawls, and dialogue for Habermas, presume sameness within a system that deny the privileging of the voices of those of minority status. “Dialogic neutrality” suppresses ethical protections of goods beyond equality of access to a system as a primary good (84) (not to be confused with equilibrium within a sphere). Accounts of equality among parties in the public sphere, both corporate and public, powerful and weak, reinforce the concealment of information in the name of the liberal choice to participate or not in public conversations (83–84). Put in terms of communication ethics metaphor, sameness hides difference that hierarchy recognizes. Public dialogue is meant to renegotiate publicly held goods.
Habermas attempts to define the public as a discursive sphere, where multiple stakeholders engage in conversation beyond the land-owning members of the *polis* (85). It envisions a space that is democratic, where all can have their say (87). Benhabib contrasts this with the agonistic sphere of Arendt. For Habermas and others, “The public sphere comes into existence whenever and wherever all affected by general social and political norms of action engage in a practical discourse, evaluating their validity” (87). This all, however, presumes an understanding that society reasons, rather than consumes (88). It leads towards procedures as good, procedures of “egalitarian reciprocity” (89). Discourse becomes the ethical good to protect, as opposed to a particular moral virtue, or even participants themselves.

Further, Benhabib argues, what is private has been rendered quite ambiguous (90). The conflation of the economic and the public into the social redefines the private sphere not as a place of undisclosed information, or activities that go unpublicized, but the private sphere as unregulated by the government (91). Government involvement in private affairs such as child-rearing and the sustenance of the family makes what was private in an Arendtian understanding now public (94), marking a further conflation. Government interference in these practices was seen as a primary mark of communism, especially when interfering with private means of production.

This review from Benhabib shows that inclusion into public conversation, social justice, economic ethics, privacy concerns, and gatekeeping are just some particular ethical coordinates that emerge in the envisioning of the public and private spheres. The question becomes, as it does for communication ethics, what is the ultimate good that should be protected and promoted? Is it liberty? Inclusion in the system? Participation in markets? The guidance of *populi*? Though Benhabib is critical of Arendt in this essay, Arendt’s analysis is foundational to her critique of
Habermas—that is, the shift in societal goods from people who reason as a sign of their identity to people who consume is accounted for by the conflation of the public and private, regardless of whether such conflation is good or bad. The split of private/public protects context.

Contextual Communication Ethics

Public and private spaces become understood as the *a priori* contexts that establish varied ethical practices. What is social, what is cyberspace, are new accounts that pose challenges. Private and public are primary contexts to establish communication ethical praxis.

Space is particularly confused in the digital world, which reduces distance and obscures faces in cybernetic interaction. It appears radically public, creating insurmountable distance that liberates all to disclose their opinions, yet is protected as a private good. *Reno v. ACLU*, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), in which the Supreme Court argued that the 1996 federal Communications Decency Act was a violation of free speech online, evidences this. Cyberspace privileges binary logic as a structure that redefines humanity in still-emergent ways. If Heidegger is right, that technology reveals what is possible (*Heidegger Questions* 18-22), then we are in an age that challenges our sense of the real, of definitions of humanity, and disrupts our subsequent ethical presumptions. It has redefined space to where we can tweet both with celebrities thousands of miles away and text with those sitting across the table from us. The nature of cyberspace and the ethical ground from which we regulate (or deregulate it) facilitates the exposure of the private—the laying bare of secrets through hacking and data mining—and the reshaping of the public.

While the power of spaces and the labels “private” and “public,” or “cyber-” reveal contexts that define ethical communication practices, the multiple variables of human identity, political label, and models for discourse inform the contexts of ethics in varied spaces. The multiplicity of cybernarratives have confused narrative engagement, bringing to the adoption of
stories a false sense of consumer empowerment to select those we “choose,” those we wish to define us, while concealing the narratives that define us without our consent. Books facilitated this in the past, but computers spread narratives powerfully.

Narrative Communication Ethics

The contingent, dynamic nature of spaces are defined and claimed in part through reified narrative and ethical boundaries. Narratives reveal and define goods within communities emergent from particular public spaces. Sacred spaces, for example, emerge from narratives making them different from public and private spaces in that they, by definition, facilitate encounter with what is sacred, what is revealed at the edge of what is imminent or knowable through reason (Aquinas 1). Narratives contribute to what counts as public, private, or otherwise. For example, the communal place of worship cannot be considered private to those in a community, nor can the gathering of many in worship be seen as public in the democratic sense of a polis. Shared worship is a ritual activity that is guided by a narrative in which the particular character of ritual defines the community—shared narratives surrounding the meaning of communion, in part, separate Roman Catholic from Protestant, for example. Ethics of head-coverings in some Christian spaces, the separation of genders in Orthodox Jewish worship both come to mind as practices that mark the character of spaces. Narratives define goods in which communicative rules are established for a community and the boundaries of those ethical commitments held by community members marks the identity of the theoretical space in which they dwell.

Danger emerges when the narrative to protect the proper functioning of the space supersedes all other goods and hegemonizes identity and ethical praxis. Paul Tillich defined paganism as “the elevation of a special space to ultimate value and dignity” (Tillich 31). When
space is elevated as a primary good, in an agonistic context, it quickly evolves ontology from “beside-each-otherness” to “against-each-otherness” (33). Attachment to, and the protection of, a space as the locus of one’s narrative can develop into sectarianism—nationalism in the case of a political space—or the protection of the free market as a private space protected from State intervention—in the case of neoliberal economics. Conformity to the narrative of a space overcomes pentultimate concerns.

Private spheres, such as family, allow for the development of varied narratives that create the diverse tapestry of the public sphere. Humility results from the interpretation of public stories through multiple narratives that demand consideration and resist unitary understandings of the world—a primary mark of postmodernity. The conflation of one private narrative and the space in which it is conceived over all public narratives becomes the mark of the totalitarian, whether that narrative is fundamentalist religious, nationalistic, or grounded in one universal economic system. In this, the economic-as-private space that hegemonizes the state negates the multiplicity of spaces and their potential in dynamic interaction. Multiple spaces allow for the production of multiple codes, procedures and standards. When reified as petite narratives, these reflect the provincial identity of Others within boundaries that facilitate encounters with the Other (Arnett “Situating” 56).

Codes, Procedures, and Standards in Communication Ethics

Ethical boundaries within a space protect a shared good through codes, procedures, and standards. Professions that produce and promote public roles require particular ethical standards of communication and other human practices. These spheres of practice are understood not as agonistic, as part of debate over the procedures, so much as they are established guidelines. Narratives emerge from continued practice within spaces—the results, for example, of non-
disclosure by attorneys and the good of the non-disclosure agreement in law—informing other spheres of practice (outside of law, e.g.), but such results do not hegemonize other spaces. The separation of spheres, with modernity marked by a breakdown of these spheres in the name of progress, facilitates multiple ethical goods required in a world of diverse narratives, interests, and phenomenological experiences. Capitalism is thought to provide ontic structure for this process.

The conflation of the practices of private spheres into the public—applying the ethical boundaries of economic markets to the public sphere or to non-profit administration, for example—marks cultural hegemony. It rests on the false rhetorical presumption that economic principles such as the need for deregulation are proven, universal, demonstrable proofs rather than products of rhetorical arguments. When the social emerges to conflate the values of private, administrative tasks of maintenance with public risk and accomplishment, dialogue is hindered. That is, the otherness of multiple spheres with codes and practices is conflated into one reified identity. In Western economic terms, either as a producer for the State in communist regimes, or as a consumer in capitalist ones. Neither of these are inherently tied to democracy, but each promises freedom from oppression. The supremacy of one over all spheres of life negates the multiple practices that emerge from plural accounts of community and streamline goods, such as communication and the reification of certain signs. The otherness of multiple spheres of codes and procedures, tested in public practice, in dialogue, grounded in petite narratives, marks a humble, connected society in which communication with the Other requires attention beyond our own narrative ground.

Dialogic Communication Ethics

Dialogue requires the protection of multiple spheres from conflation. The private sphere, with protections of privacy, facilitates discussions of family, economic struggle, personal failures
and struggles, battles of illness, and other life events. The public sphere allows encounter with others from a distance, one where what is shared is not always intimate. While trade traditionally qualifies, it has historically been understood as the beginning of interaction (Buber *I and Thou*), not the end. Exclusive focus on trade as primary good over encounter with Other is the mark of colonial domination. Varied spheres permit the protection of one’s self and the sustenance of shared life as goods held in equilibrium rather than tension or oppression. The maneuver between public and private, described in Buber’s work as on-going and dynamic, allows narrative ground rather than economic goals to define the ethics of interaction, facilitating an in-between. The subsumption of all spaces into one account, by definition, removes this space of the in-between.

**Communication Ethics and Economic Spheres – Final Thoughts**

Particular lessons emerge from this reflection upon private and public spheres for scholars of communication ethics. Acknowledgment of Arendt’s account reveals exigence for reflection upon economic theory within them. Communicative practices and the debates over them have marked this conflation in contemporary life in other forms, such as on-going privacy violations or the supremacy of narcissism in the contemporary mediated age theorized by Marshall McLuhan in 1964 (McLuhan). The capability of disclosure problematizes the split between public and private figures (Meyrowitz), as do contemporary phenomena such as “personal branding” that allow the commodification of private experiences into public exchange value through mediation, embodying Bellah et. al.’s “expressive individualism.” In this, “social” media is a reservoir of private photos, bank records, histories of lawsuits, and other pieces of information. The traditional boundaries of freedom of press, tied to journalistic standards, which have long been a subject of scholarly inquiry (Arneson and Dewberry 211), redefine figures as
public and private to navigate the ethics of disclosure about them and avoid charges of privacy violation to continue the economically-driven sensationalization of headlines.

Arendt’s analysis, her understanding of the economic as tied to private expanding into the public realm, and the conversion of ethical practices in its wake, remind communication ethics theorists of important coordinates, not the least of which is that spaces are constructed. The negotiation of private and public boundaries and their barriers in a postmodern, neoliberal, electronically-based society do not result from a violation of eternal laws surrounding spaces. Spaces are in flux and redefined through the subjective cultural context of another. Critics of neoliberalization argue that the use of force to transform spaces from places of democratic exchange and support to place of commerce, marks history in much of what is called the global South after the colonial era (Brown 17-19). The organizing good within a space that determines practices that promote and protect them could change—from a public virtue such as courage, to a narrative embodiment of a particular story like sacrifice, to the rejection of sacrifice for the State, such as with neoliberalism. This potential for change in spaces is demonstrated in the historical record, from Ancient civilization to the present. The negotiation of these boundaries for ethical practice is on-going. Arendt’s analysis points not to a law, but a long-held tradition in which balances between hierarchy and sameness, private and public, nature and culture, were held in equilibrium. When a good is to be protected, it must be fought for and asserted.

Modernity and its goods of progress, efficiency, and individual autonomy emerge as suspect, as threats to this equilibrium. While hierarchies of varied kinds have been challenged through critical scholarship, the modern period simultaneously produced wealth and improved quality of life for billions of people while reifying hierarchical identity in the public sphere to enforce the transatlantic slave trade, the brutal suppression of immigrant labor throughout the
West, and the project of colonial expansion into non-Western countries. The telos of economic gain, the separation of wealth and property, of alienation of natural goods that grow in soil (such as trees) or exist in geological formations (such as fuels) from the contexts in which they are produced, drives pollution and exploitation. In the face of such malfeasance, philosophical considerations of the nature of spaces acquire new relevance for communication ethicists who acknowledge the pluralist nature of dialogue and narratives, of democratic goods and contextual practices.

Economic spheres create their own sense of goods to be protected that, driven by greed, can hegemonizes other spheres. Even when publicly owned, economic spaces have narratives and contexts shaped and determined by ownership, not dialogue. As corporations negotiate from places of power with governments, and U.S. companies successfully get local governments across the country to compete for their jobs through tax incentives and transfers of public wealth into their pockets through infrastructure projects—such as when economists for tech companies “partner with policymakers” (Athey and Luca 225)—the economic announces its unique force in the private and public spheres. It is a force recognized as early as Isocrates and Plato and transformed into a public good in the modern era.

Arendt’s analysis does not just highlight the effect that economics can have, but it argues that the economic sphere redefines basic categories such as work and labor, re-establishing the boundaries and ethics of the private and public sphere, as well as the identities of those within them. Capitalism and socialism as economic spheres deserve specific attention. The traditions of economics have always tied to social praxis—the separation of social justice from distributive
that marks the neoliberal era⁴³ is not a formula set in stone, or a discovery like the law of gravity. It is part of a constructed economic system reinforced through the reclamation and transformation of practices within spaces. It can and should be resisted.

**Future Direction for Communication Ethics Inquiry into Economics**

Throughout this dissertation, communication ethics metaphors have emerged highlighting how economic spheres affect social structure, public goods, and practices of communication. Taylor’s analysis points to the ontic structure of society envisioned through hierarchy and sameness. This hierarchy was based on public roles. The transfer of economics from the private realm to the public marked a shift, however—hierarchy in business and production based on the private ordering of the home, a key difference asserting hierarchy as complementary in distinction from hierarchy predicated upon on the commensurability of exchange value and human labor. In this way, economics transforms ontic structures of social interpretations of hierarchy and sameness.

Public identity has also transformed, with the individualistic “self” driven by consumerism and its satisfaction held as the highest good in neoliberal economics. The liberty to construct oneself presumes an originative “I” in distinction from a derivative “I,” constructed from encounters with the Other. The importance of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs both to psychology and to business becomes a point of relevance. Even in the constructed model of derivative “I,” the liberty of free markets advocates for the liberty to choose one’s identity as a matter of personal aesthetics, marking still an originative “I” that uses consumerism and the right to liberty as the buffer between the Other.

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⁴³ Hayek was particularly critical of the idea of the social. Brown discusses the crucially important way that his critique of the social differs from Arendt’s critique, yet both “share a conviction that the social question has overtaken modern political life and society has overtaken the individual” (Brown 46-50).
Advocates for capitalism and socialism, driven by the scientific rhetoric of the fields, assert the supremacy of economic spheres over the State. Economics as one private sphere of life are foregrounded as the primary of public good. The conflation into the social realm marked by this shift accounts for ethical quandaries experienced in social media as well—the confusion of ethical practices driven by the confusion of public goods. For example, controversies over the disclosure of tax information of the President of the U.S. rely on two separately held understandings of economics and communication ethics: the private role of production and financial growth as a remnant of ancient traditions and the public role of markets as the new ontic structure providing political order and distributive justice that requires the elimination of corruption. The insatiability of corruption within State bureaucracy is often a primary arguing point for the liberalization of markets (see, for example, Friedman and Friedman 118). Emerging from these are conversations involving practices of paternalism, the frontstage and backstage of our lives, the freedom of liberated individuals to choose to disclose or not disclose information, the privatization of space in business and its effects on speech and dialogue, and the ability to tell the truth. In the age of branding, truth becomes correspondence to a public persona. Conversations surrounding these practices are complicated by the conflation of private and public space. Social and cyberspace both are increasingly reified in markets as spaces of commerce.

The foregrounding of economics for communication ethics scholars clarifies how we consider particular practices, how we identify public and private goods, and how we approach the social structures that clarify ethics. Understanding these spheres allows us to reflect upon their significance in this present historical moment and how they contribute to contemporary communicative phenomena. Ancient wisdom sought public excellences outside of the home,
outside of the realm of economics, where public sameness and difference were based upon performance, upon commitment to craft and to mastery. The contemporary historical moment find excellences in the accomplishments of wealth, celebrating them through conspicuous consumption, through branding—that which is excellent often has the highest market value. The conflation of historical themes of ethics and economics in the present moment can drive further explorations in our field.
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