The Dialectic of Naturgeist in Hegel's Anthropology: Soul, World, and Bodiliness

Jiho Oh

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THE DIALECTIC OF *NATURGEIST* IN HEGEL’S *ANTHROPOLOGY*:

SOUL, WORLD, AND BODILINESS

A Dissertation

Submitted to the McAnulty College & Graduate School of the Liberal Arts

Duquesne University

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By

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August 2020
THE DIALECTIC OF NATURGEIST IN HEGEL’S ANTHROPOLOGY:
SOUL, WORLD, AND BODILINESS

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ABSTRACT

THE DIALECTIC OF NATURGEIST IN HEGEL’S ANTHROPOLOGY:
SOUL, WORLD, AND BODILINESS

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August 2020

Dissertation Supervised by Dr. Jennifer Bates

The primary concern of the “Anthropology” section in Hegel’s Encyclopedia of 1830 is the relationship between soul and body: how the soul gains an immediate, bodily existence through embodiment, why and how this immediate mode of the soul’s bodily existence is precarious, and how the soul becomes second nature by overcoming the immediate, bodily existence through habit, more precisely. Importantly, the “Anthropology” is the place in Hegel’s Encyclopedia system where the Philosophy of Nature ends, and the Philosophy of Spirit begins. The thematization of the soul-body relationship in the “Anthropology” is thus essentially framed by a broader, systematic problem concerning the relationship between nature and spirit. What Hegel ultimately theorizes by thematizing the soul-body relationship, in other words, is how spirit emerges out of nature as spirit: how spirit appears in its submergence in and subordination to nature, develops itself up to the point where its negativity burst out, and sublates its
naturalness. The goal of this dissertation is to offer a comprehensive analysis of the “Anthropology” section in Hegel’s *Encyclopedia* of 1830, spelling out its twofold concern, that is, the emergence of spirit out of nature through the soul-body relationship. It claims that the “Anthropology” does not simply thematize the soul-body relationship but conceptualizes a threefold complex consisting of soul, world, and body. It further reconstructs Hegel’s treatment of this ontological, existential complex in the *Anthropology* in terms of the dialectic of *Naturgeist* and considers how human existence and life are understood under this dialectic.
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**CONCLUSION**

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

HEGEL


\[ENZ\] = \textit{Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse} (1830).


KANT

Ak = Gesammelte Schriften. Edited by die Königliche Preußische (later Deutschen) Akademie der Wissenschaften, 29 vols. Berlin, 1902-83; 2nd edn De Guyter, for vols.1-9). Citations from Kant’s texts refer to volume and page number in the Akademie edition, except for references to the Critique of Pure Reason (cited by A/B pagination in the original editions), and to the Critique of the Power of Judgement (cited by passage numbers).


AP = Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht (1798), Ak 7. Anthropology from a pragmatic standpoint, Ca Anthropology, History and Education

CO = Ca Correspondandce

IaG = Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht (1784), Ak 8. Idea toward a universal history with a cosmopolitan aim, Ca Anthropology, History and Education.

GM = Grundlegung zur Ketzanphysik der Sitten (1785), Ak 4. Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals, Ca Practical Philosophy

KpV = Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (1788), Ak 5. Critique of practical reason, Ca Practical Philosophy

KrV = Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781,1787). (Cited by A/B pagination). Ca Critique of Pure Reason

KU = Kritik der Urteilskraft (1790), Ak 5. Ca Critique of the Power of Judgment

R = Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft (1793-94), Ak 6. Religion within the boundaries of mere reason, Ca Religion and Rational Theology

RM = Von den verschiedenen Racen der Menschen (1775), Ak 2. The Different races of human beings, Ca Anthropology History and Education

TP = Ca Theoretical Philosophy. 1755-1770

WE = Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung? (1784), Ak 8. An Answer to Question: What is Enlightenment?, Ca Practical Philosophy
INTRODUCTION

Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit remains one of the least studied area in Hegel’s philosophy, in stark contrast to his other major works such as the Logic, the Phenomenology of Spirit, and the Philosophy of Right, which have received much attention for the last two centuries.1 In recent Hegel scholarship, however, there has been increasing interest in the first division of the philosophy of subjective spirit, the Anthropology. Specifically, those readers who attempt to portray Hegel’s philosophical position in terms of naturalism have paid special attention to his account of the soul-body relationship and the notion of habit in the Anthropology.2 While this contemporary, naturalist reading of Hegel is significant in making

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Hegel’s philosophy relevant to the contemporary context, it tends to ignore Hegel’s project of a philosophical system in the *Encyclopedia* as well as the historical context of the eighteenth-century German classic philosophy. Instead of narrowly focusing on some themes in the *Anthropology*, this dissertation aims at offering a comprehensive and detailed analysis of the *Anthropology* in Hegel’s *Encyclopedia* of 1830 while bringing into sight how it is systematically connected with the three divisions of the *Encyclopedia*: the Logic, the *Philosophy of Nature*, and the *Philosophy of Spirit* on the one hand, and how it is embedded in the historical context of the eighteenth-century German classic philosophy, on the other. Throughout such an extensive study, this dissertation focuses on spelling out Hegel’s notion that spirit emerges out of nature through the development of itself as *Naturgeist* in the *Anthropology*.

Hegel’s philosophy can perhaps be characterized as a philosophical anthropology, one in which all of the diverse dimensions of human life are comprehensively considered in terms of the dialectical development and manifestation of *Geist*. The idea that philosophy is an essentially anthropological discipline is more explicitly brought up by Kant. According to Kant, all three questions dealt with in his three *Critiques*—what I can know; what I ought to do; what I may hope—converge into one and the same question: what the human being is.³ Although Hegel does not explicitly characterize his philosophy in terms of anthropology, we observe that the *Philosophy of Spirit* in his *Encyclopedia* considers human existence and life in a comprehensive manner: it thematizes an individual human being’s natural existence and psychological

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constitution (*Subjective Spirit*), an intersubjective life form realized at various levels of institution including family, civil society, and the state (*Objective Spirit*) and a cultural form of life in art, religion, and philosophy (*Absolute Spirit*). The *Encyclopedia* system grounds this extensive and comprehensive consideration of human existence and life in the *Philosophy of Spirit* on the *Logic*. The *Logic* establishes that the Concept and reality are united with each other, and this unity constitutes the dialectical life of the logical Idea. The dialectical life of the Idea consists in unfolding itself as such a unity of the Concept and reality in and through the philosophical system in the *Encyclopedia*. In this system, the Idea thus externalizes itself into the realm of externality, i.e., nature, and internalizes this external existence of itself to return to itself as the ideality of nature, i.e., spirit. Further, this dialectical life of the Idea is at the same time the self-development of spirit. Spirit, in other words, first appears in the form of the Idea, then alienates itself into nature, and finally reflects into itself as spirit. Thus, one can perhaps view Hegel’s mature system of the *Encyclopedia* as embodying his complete and systematic anthropology, which bases the consideration of humanity on the dialectical, ontological monism of spirit—which is established in the *Logic* and developed through the *Philosophy of Nature* and the *Philosophy Spirit*.

Yet, it appears that Hegel’s main concern about humanity lies in the ethical and political life, which he discusses through the philosophy of objective spirit. Noticeable in this regard is the relationship between the first two divisions of the *Philosophy of Spirit*: the philosophy of subjective spirit and the philosophy of objective spirit. The philosophy of subjective spirit considers spirit in its interiority and ideality, thereby thematizing the internal, threefold constitution of an individual human spirit: the soul, consciousness, and spirit-as-such. By treating these three aspects of an individual human spirit, the philosophy of subjective spirit eventually
establishes that the essence of spirit is freedom and thereby provides a basis for the philosophy of objective spirit, which considers the ethical and political life in terms of the realization of the essence of spirit, i.e., freedom, in the realm of objectivity. Thus, one can draw out one of the fundamental insights of Hegel with respect to humanity: the essence of human life is freedom, and freedom is something objective that is realized through intersubjective and institutionalized forms of life.

Hegel’s concern about the intersubjective dimension of human life is further associated with his critical stance against the subjectivist tendency in modern philosophy. For Hegel, modern philosophy—starting from Descartes and culminating in Kant’s and Fichte’s transcendental philosophy—tends to privilege the perspective of the subject who cognizes the object and comprehends the objectivity of the world from the first-person based, one-sidedly subjectivist standpoint. On the one hand, Hegel positively assesses the subjectivist trend in modern philosophy as an expression of the stage of world-history where humanity has achieved in modern times. Subjectivism in modern philosophy, in other words, goes hand in hand with modern, political liberalism, which endorses the idea that every person—not just one person (Oriental monarchy), nor a limited number of people (Greek democracy)—is equally free. But he holds, on the other hand, that subjectivism in modern philosophy is to be crossed over, just as the individualist tendency in modern political life is to be reconciled with the ethical life [Sittlichkeit].

Thus, Hegel’s emphasis on the intersubjective dimension of human life is associated with his project of establishing a philosophical system capable of transcending modern subjectivism in an essential manner. If this is the case, however, the status and significance of the first section of the philosophy of subjective spirit titled “Anthropology” becomes puzzling. As mentioned above, the
philosophy of subjective spirit deals with spirit in its interiority without yet bringing up its objectivity in the external world. It gives a foundation to the philosophy of objective spirit by establishing that the essence of spirit is freedom. However, it does not itself present a treatment of freedom. Accordingly, one can best say that the philosophy of subjective spirit is a preparation for the subsequent treatment of freedom in the philosophy of objective spirit. It then seems hard to take the *Anthropology* in the philosophy of subjective spirit as Hegel’s philosophical anthropology in a positive and constructive sense. More significantly, the notion that the essence of spirit is freedom is established in the *Psychology* and not in the *Anthropology*. The *Anthropology* rather thematizes the natural, bodily existence of the human being and considers spirit in terms of its submergence in and subordination to nature. It considers, in other words, the least spiritual form of spirit: *Naturgeist*, which is far away from its essence, i.e., freedom.

Therefore, one can rightly pose the question as to why Hegel gives the title “anthropology” to the section in which he considers the relationship between the soul and the body in terms of spirit’s submersion in and subordination to nature, and which thus seems unrelated to humanity considered in terms of spirit’s freedom and its realization in the realm of objective spirit. Can we take the “Anthropology” section in Hegel’s *Encyclopedia* as his philosophical anthropology? If so, what does its main thesis, spirit’s emergence out of nature, mean for humanity?

Now, it appears that one of the important reasons for the relative ignorance of Hegel’s *Anthropology* rests on the prevalent criticism of Hegel’s philosophy of history for its commitment to the Eurocentric, teleological presentation of human history. For instance, the contemporary American anthropologist, Marvin Harris, suggests that anthropology began to form as an independent discipline in the eighteenth-century Europe with the Enlightenment vision of universal history of mankind. The view of humanity as essentially historical in the
sense of teleologically ever progressing, Harris suggests, is prominent in Kant’s pragmatic anthropology and is also an important part of Hegel’s philosophy of spirit. However, for him, “most of Hegel’s philosophy is a worthless ruin.” 

Despite in a more subtle nuance, Odo Marquard also suggests that Hegel does not differ much from Kant in that he subjugated the new rising discipline anthropology to the philosophy of history. It should be noted, however, that Hegel’s philosophy of world history does not play any systematic or methodological role for his Anthropology. More significantly, the Anthropology has no conceptual or theoretical bases for thematizing human history because it is where the Philosophy of Nature ends, and the Philosophy of Spirit begins. The preconception that Hegel’s Anthropology is based on a teleological understanding of human history is therefore to be called into question. Further, the fact that the Anthropology considers Naturgeist at the junction of the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Spirit suggests that its primary concern is the relationship between nature and spirit rather than the historicity of spirit.

Hegel’s understanding of human life and existence in the Anthropology, therefore, is to be elucidated in light of the dialectic of Naturgeist that it displays. As I hopefully show throughout this dissertation, the dialectic of Naturgeist in Hegel’s Anthropology does not institute a teleology of history, nor does the latter underlie the former. The human being that it considers is not the one who is involved in the teleological movement of the world history but the one who exists, first of all, in and through the body. This prominently spiritual being in nature is also an

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essentially worldly being whose life and existence is inseparably connected with the world, and who stands in a relationship with the world through its bodiliness. The dialectic of Naturgeist thus describes the complicated relationship between human life and existence, the world, and bodiliness. Further, these three terms constituted of the dialectic of Naturgeist together form a dynamic complex such that the difference in the form of bodiliness entails the difference in the way in which one relates herself to the world and further, the difference in the form of the world she lives in. By considering the relationship between the three terms in their inseparable connections at various levels, the Anthropology ultimately shows how Naturgeist develops itself to Geist, or how spirit emerges out of nature as spirit. As the result of the dialectic of Naturgeist, we thus come to have a properly spiritual form of human existence and a properly spiritual form of the world: the intersubjective subject of recognition and the world of actuality that is alive by the activity of the former.

The primary goal of this dissertation is to shed full light on the dialectic of Naturgeist in Hegel’s Anthropology and the relationship between human, world, and bodiliness that it describes. It also aims at spelling out the properly dialectical aspect of Naturgeist. As I show, if the Anthropology has an important significance for Hegel’s notion of Geist, this is because the emergence of spirit out of nature cannot mean an absolute denaturalization. On the contrary, spirit is for Hegel essentially subject to self-naturalization since it can reveal itself only in and through its other, i.e., nature. Spirit is for Hegel fundamentally dialectical in this sense, and Naturgeist, considered in all of its dialectical aspects, is the proper form of spirit. Considering all the rich and complicated ideas presented in Hegel’s Anthropology, then, it seems that contemporary naturalist readings of Hegel are somehow limited in their understandings of this German philosopher from two hundred years ago. In the Conclusion of this dissertation,
therefore, I reflect on the motivations, insights, and limits of recent naturalist readers of Hegel. Further, another important issue of Hegel’s *Anthropology* is whether or not the “Natural Soul” section where Hegel deals with human existence and life in terms of spirit’s submersion in and subordination to nature supports the naturalist, reductionist view that cultural, social, and political elements are decided by natural, biological ones. Obviously, this view is dangerous due to its discriminatory effects concerning ageism, racism, and sexism. In the second part of the Conclusion, therefore, I examine Hegel’s dialectic of *Naturgeist* from a critical point of view, addressing the extent to which his *Anthropology* has racist and sexist implications, the ways in which we can defend Hegel against this criticism, and more importantly the ways in which we can draw critical powers of Hegel’s philosophy from his dialectic of *Naturgeist*.

**Chapter Outline**

Chapter 1 investigates the formation of post-Kantian German Idealism in the last decades of the eighteenth century. It deals with the works of Jacobi, Schulze, and Fichte and sets Hegel’s “1803/4 Philosophy of Spirit” in the context of the post-Kantian discussions of consciousness and self-consciousness. With this study, I show that since his early years in Jena, Hegel rejects the Post-Kantian, first-person conception of consciousness and instead considers consciousness in terms of the relationship between nature and spirit.

Chapters 2 and 3 examine the status of the *Anthropology* within the *Encyclopedia* system. Chapter 2 deals with how it is structurally connected with the three divisions of the *Encyclopedia*: the *Logic*, the *Philosophy of Nature*, and the *Philosophy of Spirit*. Chapter 3 examines the relationship between the three sections of the philosophy of subjective spirit: the
Anthropology, the Phenomenology of Spirit, and the Psychology. Throughout these studies, I show that Hegel’s notion of Geist cannot be equated with what we today call “mind” due to the dialectical relationship between nature and spirit that underlies the philosophy of subjective spirit. In contrast with our narrow concept of the mind, subjective spirit more broadly denotes an individual human spirit. And the philosophy of subjective spirit portrays it as a living being: not just an organism that has a bodily existence, but a living being whose interior is filled with concrete contents including spiritual ones that concern our moral, ethical, artistic, and religious lives. This notion of subjective spirit further requires viewing the three divisions of the philosophy of subjective spirit as internally connected with each other rather than as presenting a linear development of spirit toward ever higher stages. As I show, the Anthropology can be viewed as part of the Phenomenology of Spirit, dealing with consciousness in its negative, deranged aspect. It also presupposes the Psychology in the sense that the formation of the soul as a container of all things in potentiality, including universal representations of particular things, involves the process of recollection [Erinnerung].

Chapter 4 sets Hegel’s Anthropology in the historical context of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. It is largely assumed that the tradition of philosophical anthropology began to form at the end of the eighteenth century with the Enlightenment vision of human history as ever progressing, and that Kant was the founder of this new tradition. Historians of philosophical anthropology also suggest that Hegel’s Anthropology, like Kant’s pragmatic anthropology, takes on the Enlightenment, optimistic and teleological view of history. Chapter 4 shows, however, that Hegel’s Anthropology is not grounded in a teleology of history; the teleology of history in his philosophy of world history does not play any methodological, theoretical, or systematic role in his Anthropology. To show this, Chapter 4 compares Kant’s and Hegel’s understandings of
nature under the assumption that the two philosophers’ different conceptions of anthropology bear on their different understandings of nature. Briefly stated, Kant’s argument in his pragmatic anthropology is that moral perfection is a noumenon that a human being, as a single individual, cannot achieve due to their empirical and egoistic proclivities; however, it is the direction toward which the human species as a whole is destined to be heading. This teleology of history in Kant’s pragmatic anthropology is grounded in his teleology of nature in the third Critique, which establishes that nature constitutes a well-ordered chain of means and ends in which the human being, conceived as a cultural being, is the ultimate end of nature, namely the last end within the system of nature for the sake of which all other natural beings are supposed to exist, and in which the same human being, considered as a moral being endowed with the faculty of freedom, is the final end of nature, that is, the supra-natural end that grounds the teleological system of nature outside it. In contrast to Kant, Hegel does not view nature as a teleological whole. Rather, nature is for him an inorganic whole in which natural beings exist separately from and independent of each other in space. For Hegel, the fundamental determination of nature is therefore externality, conceived as side-by-sideness and asunderness of things in space. Thus, Hegel’s philosophy of nature arranges the natural beings and our understandings of natural beings according to the degree of externality, proceeding from the most external to the most internal form of nature, that is, from the physical to the chemical and finally to the organic nature. In this system of nature in which we come closer to the teleological form of the Concept, an organism occupies the highest place. Hegel further suggests that sensation is the end point of nature and the starting point of spirit in the sense that a sentient being is the first being in his system of nature that displays subjectivity, specifically through its self-reflective operation such as immediate self-awareness or self-feeling. This methodology of the philosophy of nature,
grounded in his teleological conception of the Concept or the logical Idea, enables Hegel to consider the human existence and life in the *Anthropology* in terms of a bodily existence of a sentient being.

On the basis of those studies in Chapters 1 through 4, Chapter 5 carries out a detailed analysis of the *Anthropology*. Hegel’s *Anthropology* comprises three parts: the natural soul, the feeling soul, and the actual soul. With respect to the “Natural Soul” section, I first show that its first stage, “Natural Qualities,” challenges Schelling’s philosophy of nature with the idea of the gradual emergence of *Geist* out of nature. Further, I pay special attention to the section stage, “Natural Alterations,” attempting at articulating Hegel’s dialectical notion of *Naturgeist*. All of the three forms of the soul’s alteration, i.e., the stages of life, the sex-relationship, and the transition from sleep to waking, seem important in figuring out Hegel’s notion of *Naturgeist* because they are all concerned with the differences that are at once natural and spiritual, thereby displaying natural-spiritual complexes. While attempting to clarify the natural and the spiritual dimension that each form of the soul’s alteration displays, I suggest, first, that the stages of life present four different modalities of an individual’s relationship with the world rather than describe how a person experiences the world differently depending on how old he or she is. They also frame the development of *Geist* in the *Anthropology*; specifically, the first three modalities (full acceptance, idealistic resistance or alienation, and actualization or active participation, which correspond to childhood, youth, and adulthood, respectively) represent the ways in which the natural soul, feeling soul, and actual soul relates itself to the world. I also show that at this first stage of the “Natural Alterations,” both the soul and the world has some natural remainder. The soul is considered as living in a cultural world; however, it is ultimately subordinated to natural birth and death. Likewise, the cultural world that is considered at this stage is not yet an
ethical world, which for Hegel requires the sublation of death. Reflecting on the significance of the stages of life, I also investigate how Hegel’s notion of Gattung in the Anthropology can be considered in terms of an environmental world to which one is to react practically, in contrast to Kant’s genealogical and teleological understanding of a natural species. With respect to the second way of the soul’s alteration, i.e., the sex-relationship, I focus on Hegel’s idea that it finds its ethical and spiritual meaning in the family, and that the family is the reappearance of Naturgeist at the level of objective spirit. To spell out this, I examine Hegel’s presentation of Antigone in the Jena Phenomenology of Spirit and the discussion of the family in the “Ethical Life” section in the philosophy of objective spirit. With this study, I show that Naturgeist can be considered the properly dialectical form of Geist, which is to naturalize itself to become spirit for itself, and I argue that there cannot be an absolute denaturalization of spirit in Hegel’s Encyclopedia system. In relation to this study, I further consider two different meanings of Hegel’s notion of habit as a second nature to underline that the soul in the Anthropology is still caged in its monadic world. Lastly, I consider how Hegel blurs the distinction between dreaming and waking by examining his discussion of the transition from sleep to waking, which is the third way of the soul’s alteration. As I further consider in relation to the “Feeling Soul” section, the ultimate significance of Hegel’s discussion of sleep and waking bears on the contrast between the feeling soul and consciousness, which are, in fact, two different forms of consciousness: one without the mediation of objective consciousness, and the other that stands in an objective relationship with the world of actuality. By suggesting that one can be said to be dreaming even when she is physically awake if her psyche is isolated from the world, Hegel sets the stage for his discussion on the feeling soul. Reflecting on this idea of Hegel, I suggest that the
Anthropology can be considered as a doctrine of a dreaming soul, which can become a waking soul, i.e., consciousness when its mode of bodily existence is transformed through habit.

The last part of the “Natural Soul” section is on sensation, and Hegel here considers sensation in terms of the embodiment of one’s inner feelings. With respect to this last stage of the natural soul, I focus on Hegel’s idea of the relationship between the soul and the body. As I suggest, sensation is in Hegel’s Anthropology considered in terms of the soul’s immediate, bodily mode of existence rather than an epistemic relation with a sensory object. Further, the bodily existence of the soul that Hegel considers is an expressive existence in the sense that the soul comes to exist by exteriorizing its interior. As such, bodiliness is not just a physical, organic body but a symbolic materiality in which the spiritual contents are immediately embodied. The bodily existence of the soul, however, is completely immediate such that it lacks a connection with the world. It is therefore precarious because lacking an objective relationship with the world, it necessarily leads the soul to fall into one-sided subjectivism.

Under this condition of the sentient soul that immediately exists as the body without the connection with the world, Hegel proceeds to the “Feeling Soul” section and discusses the essentially subjectivist character of the feeling soul under the rubric of derangement or madness [Verrücktheit]. By exploring the history of psychiatry in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in relation to Hegel’s discussion of animal magnetism and derangement, I spell out Hegel’s dialectical notion of consciousness as the unity of consciousness and unconsciousness, reason as the unity of reason and unreason. Following this, I suggest that the deranged subject—who is tormented by an awareness of the contradiction between her inner world and the reality of the outer world, and the feeling of unhappiness that arises from this awareness—is for Hegel a self-conscious subject par excellence, which reveals the speculative form of consciousness in its
negative form, i.e., the contradiction between consciousness and unconsciousness. As such, the feeling soul constitutes the negative stage in the development of Naturgeist in the Anthropology. Considering the significance of derangement, I further suggest that there is a Hegelian, dialectical paradox in the Anthropology: the most deranged is the most self-consciousness. By implication, if there is any distinct character of humanity in Hegel’s Anthropology, it would be the power of derangement; humans differ from any other natural beings in that they can get deranged—in that they can resist the world, enter into a negative relation with the world, and feel alienated from the world.

In the last stage of the feeling soul, “Habit,” then, Hegel brings up habit as the way in which one’s bodiliness is transformed into a second nature. I suggest that habit is for Hegel a process of an overall transformation of bodiliness such that it can serve spiritual purposes in the ethical world. With this transformation, one’s relationship with the objective world of actuality can be established. We thereby come to the stage of the Phenomenology of Spirit, which concerns the realm of intersubjectivity.

This is how in Hegel’s Anthropology, Naturgeist first appears in the from of submergence in and subordination to nature, develops itself up to the point where its negativity bursts out with the soul’s derangement, and sublates itself into and as spirit through habit.

In the Conclusion, I consider the limits of naturalist readings of Hegel. I argue that they fail to see the dialectical dimension of Hegel’s Naturgeist with their tendency to dismiss a priori, metaphysical thinking in general as well as their narrow, pragmatist-scientific conception of nature and the relationship between natural science and philosophy. They suggest that Hegel’s Anthropology presents the idea of embodied cognition; or, they focus on the normative dimension of Hegel’s theory of habit. However, they fail to portray, most importantly, the
ontological and existential significance of Hegel’s *Anthropology* that concerns the dynamic and dialectical triad of soul, world, and body.

In the Conclusion, I also consider the problem of the “Natural Soul” section where Hegel discusses the difference of human races, the stages of life, and the sex-relationship. These discussions in the “Natural Soul” section raise the question as to whether Hegel thereby supports naturalist reductionism, which claims that our identities and lives are determined by biological factors including race, age, and gender. I argue that this cannot be the case because naturalist reductionism should mean, for Hegel, the complete subordination of Geist to nature. I concede that his statements about the stages of life, race, and sex-relationship, when we disregard the dialectical context of the *Anthropology*, have some discriminatory implications and effects. I suggest, however, that his dialectical notion of Naturgeist can give us some important conceptual tools that have strong, critical powers.
CHAPTER 1. The Formation of Post-Kantian German Idealism in Jena and the Problem of Consciousness

The first part of Hegel’s *Philosophy of Spirit* in the *Encyclopedia* of 1830 is the philosophy of subjective spirit, and Hegel here thematizes the finite human spirit from a threefold perspective: undifferentiated substantiality of the soul (*Anthropology*), conscious opposition between subject and object (*Phenomenology of Spirit*), and spirit-as-such which achieves an infinite form of self-knowledge (*Psychology*). With this threefold consideration of subjective spirit, Hegel challenges both rational and empirical psychology. While rational psychology conceives of the finite human spirit as a metaphysical substance of which properties such as simplicity, unity, and immortality are assumed to be predicable, empirical psychology considers it as a mere collection or an aggregate of dissected parts. But both psychologies, for Hegel, commits the error of making the finite human spirit into a thing or a thing-like entity and doing away with its concrete and dynamic nature.¹ Hegel’s suggestion is that the true nature of the finite human mind can only be grasped from the standpoint of spirit—as that which exhibits the *subjective, internal, and ideal* dimension of *Geist*.

One of important elements underlying Hegel’s notion of spirit is his objection to what he calls the standpoint of consciousness, that is, the perspective of understanding [*Verstand*] that holds on to the oppositional relationship between subject and object. Overcoming this antithetical, non-speculative view of consciousness constitutes the key project of Hegel’s early

¹ Cf. *ENZ*, §378, §386.
Phenomenology of Spirit of 1807. In the philosophy of subjective spirit of the 1830
Encyclopedia, however, we observe that the issue of the finite conception of consciousness also
frames the Anthropology in a significant manner. For our study of Hegel’s Anthropology, it is
therefore indispensable to elucidate how the issue of consciousness frames this opening part of
the philosophy of subjective spirit and further his notion of spirit.

Hegel’s concern with overcoming the standpoint of consciousness bears on his challenge
of Kant’s transcendental idealism. To explicate how the issue of consciousness frames the
Anthropology, we would therefore have to examine Hegel’s critical engagement with Kant as it
is presented in the Anthropology. Yet, a close reading of the Anthropology reveals that Hegel’s
notion of consciousness is as much over-determined as his notion of spirit. To my view, the

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2 For instance, we see the words consciousness, and its related notion understanding, frequently occurring
throughout the Anthropology; cf. ENZ, §397 Z, §408.

3 We can draw out multiple meanings of Hegel’s notion of consciousness from his Phenomenology of Spirit of 1807.
Importantly, Hegel conceives of consciousness as structured by the opposition between subject and object but
strongly rejects the idea of an epistemological opposition between cognizing subject and cognized object—or
between empty forms of cognitive powers and external objects which are supposed to be given to them for contents.
This antithetical, epistemic relationship between subject and object, for Hegel, stands only when one theoretically
abstracts all complex relationship of consciousness with the world. In this context, the term consciousness, first, has
a critical meaning, representing the finite, antithetical perspective that confines our views of the human mind to
some epistemic operations. Of importance with respect to this critical meaning of consciousness is his project of the
Phenomenology of Spirit, which dissolves the view of the rigid opposition between subject and object step by step
by describing the oppositional relationship between subject and object at various levels and reveling the conflict or
contradiction internal to that relationship from within it. Throughout this journey of consciousness full of errors and
despairs, the Phenomenology of Spirit eventually leads us to the speculative perspective of absolute identity.
Consciousness thus has a second, methodological meaning: it configures the subject of dialectical experiences that
dissolves its intrinsic, oppositional constitution from within itself to attain the truth of the absolute identity of being
and thought. This methodological meaning of consciousness is implied in the central thesis of the Phenomenology of
Spirit that the truth of consciousness is self-consciousness. By revealing the self-conscious truth of consciousness at
various levels, however, Hegel extensively deals with the cognitional-epistemic, practical-intersubjective,
communal-historical, and moral-religious existence of the human being. In this sense, the dialectical experiences of
consciousness ultimately pertain to the manifestation of Geist. Herein lies the third, anthropological meaning of
consciousness.

Hegel’s mature system of the Encyclopedia, especially its third part, the Philosophy of Spirit, can be considered as
representing Hegel’s philosophical anthropology. As I discuss later in detail, however, the Encyclopedia system does
not adopt the methodological idea of the early Phenomenology of Spirit, i.e., the dialectical experiences of
consciousness. Proceeded by the Logic, it assumes that the absolute identity of being and thought is already
established, and that the full, speculative meaning of the identity of being and thought is displayed by the absolute
subjectivity of the logical Idea. The absolute subjectivity of the Idea consists in its self-alienation into its other and
difficulty in understanding Hegel’s mention about consciousness in the *Anthropology* chiefly comes from the fact that it retains, in condensed and elaborated forms, plentiful important elements from the early post-Kantian discussions about consciousness, which Hegel had digested before he came to be able to present his original thoughts through the *Phenomenology of Spirit* of 1807.4

In this dialectic of the Idea’s self-externalization and internalization within the *Encyclopedia* system, the *Anthropology* is the stage where spirit begins to emerge as spirit out of its immersion in nature. And the *Anthropology* thematizes this central issue of the *Encyclopedia* system in terms of the rise of consciousness out of the soul’s unconscious, undifferentiated substantial totality. In the *Encyclopedia* system, consciousness—conceived as arising from the *Anthropology* as the subject matter of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* within the philosophy of subjective spirit—thus configures a human subject whose existence is liberated from an immediate attachment to nature. As I discuss in detail in Chapter 5, however, the soul thematized in the *Anthropology* is a form of consciousness. Specifically, the second stage of the *Anthropology*, the feeling soul, represents a one-sidedly subjective or subjectivist form of consciousness in which it lives a pathological psychical life, lacking the connection with the objective world. But in the *Anthropology*, the negativity of spirit is exhibited in this negative, pathological form of consciousness. Despite the great difference from the Jena *Phenomenology of Spirit*, the *Anthropology* in the *Encyclopedia* thus holds the leitmotif of the early *Phenomenology of Spirit* that consciousness is the locus of the negativity of Geist. But the *Anthropology* in the mature system of the *Encyclopedia* presents the connection between consciousness and spirit, again, in terms of the dialectical relationship between nature and spirit, and this issue underlies Hegel’s philosophical anthropology within the *Philosophy of Spirit* in the *Encyclopedia*.

4 In the years of the last quarter of the eighteenth century, the so-called Kantian critical philosophy was widely conceived as a philosophical project to complete rather than as a work of the author, Kant. We thus observe that during the years of 1770s through 1800s in Jena, there was a vigorous intellectual movement around the Kantian critical philosophy, one in which the leaders proclaimed to be genuine successor of Kantian philosophy while developing and transforming their master’s ideas in various significant ways. Regarding this post-Kantian intellectual movement in Jena, Dieter Henrich points out that during this period Kant did not leave Königsberg and was alienated from that movement of the early German Idealism. He thus poses an interesting retrospective question as to what would have happened in the formation of the early German Idealism, if Kant was in Jena. For studies of the early formation of German Idealism in Jena, see: Dieter Henrich, *Between Kant and Hegel Lectures on German Idealism*, ed. David S. Pacini (Cambridge, Massachusets, and London: Harvard University Press, 2008); Frederick C. Beiser, *German Idealism. The Struggle against Subjectivism, 1781-1801* (Cambridge, Massachusets, and London: Harvard University Press, 2008). For studies more focused on Hegel in Jena, see: H.S.Harris, *Hegel’s Development. Night Thoughts (Jena 1801-1806)* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983); Gilbert Gérard, *Critique et dialectique. L’itinéraire de Hegel à Jéna (1801-1805)* (Bruxelles: Faculté universitaires Saint-Louis, 1982). The original texts important for the early formation of the German Idealism in Jena are edited and translated into English: George di Giovanni and H.S.Harris, *Between Kant and Hegel: Texts in the Development of Post-Kantian Idealism* (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2000). For a study of post-Kantian idealism in a larger historical context of the German philosophy from the fourteenth through nineteenth centuries, see: Lewis White Beck, *Early German Philosophy: Kant and his Predecessors* (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press; Cambridge, 1969).
It therefore appears that the early post-Kantian reactions to *Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason* is still important in understanding Hegel’s *Anthropology*. As a preliminary study for our reading of Hegel’s *Anthropology*, this chapter therefore aims to examine the late eighteenth-century German context in which consciousness was thematized, problematized, and theorized, in the aftermath of Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*. Needless to say, the intellectual movement of this period of time is so rich that no approach centered on a particular topic or on certain figures can cover the entire reality. Being aware of this and for that reason, I will focus on those figures who explicitly addressed the issue of consciousness specifically in the context of the post-Kantian project of accomplishing the Critical philosophy as a philosophical system, including Reinhold, Schulze, and Fichte. For the part on Hegel, the focus will be given to several works of Hegel in Jena with a serious attention given to *Differenzschrift* and the *Philosophy of Spirit of 1803/4*.

1. Crisis

Regarding the acceptance of Kant’s critical philosophy by his contemporaries, Manfred Kuehn offers a very helpful historical description of the German intellectual situation around the mid-eighteenth century. Kuehn states that the German intellectual situation after the death of Wolff in 1754 can be characterized as a crisis, “the cognitive crisis of the Enlightenment.”¹⁵ It was an era of crisis because all the old authorities of the Scholastic philosophy began to collapse,

and yet no new authority was yet established. Claiming that the German intellectual anarchy around the mid-eighteenth century should be considered in the wider context of the European Enlightenment, Kuehn underlines the significance of the German acceptance of the British empiricism. While the rise of Hume’s skepticism and the subsequent development of the Scottish school of the common sense contributed to the dramatic decline of the classic conception of philosophy as a foundational discipline grounding all other derivative knowledge, the German thinkers responded to this new trend of philosophy promptly, seriously, and passionately. Of importance is that they reacted to British empiricism with a serious concern for securing the status of philosophy as systematic knowledge, which was the case neither of England nor of France. Briefly, the ideal of a synthesis of British empiricism and the tradition of German rationalism characterizes the time around when Kant’s first Critique was brought into the world. How to establish philosophy as a scientific system and defend it against Humean skepticism, by reviving the argumentative power of reason and not by appealing to the common sense, in other words, was the core problem that framed this era, according to Kuehn.

Considering that the Enlightenment was a multifarious movement which, together with social and political changes, involved an explosive intellectual development in various domains, the rise of the popular philosophy should also be mentioned. Popular philosophers are said to be

6 Kuhn points out that the writings of the Scottish school were promptly translated into German and received immediate reviews. With respect to the translation of the English “common sense” into the German “der menschliche gesunder Verstand” by the German readers of the time, see in particular: Manfred Kuehn, Scottish Common Sense in German: 1768-1800, (McGill Queen’s University Press, 1987), 53-68.

7 A similar characterization is offered by Ernst Cassirer. In the preface to his book, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, Cassirer states that although the Enlightenment begun by breaking down the old metaphysical idea of philosophy, the loss of the “spirit of systems” did not entail giving up the “systematic spirit.” Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, trans. Fritz C.A. Koelln and James P. Pettegrove (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951; the German original published in 1932), vii. Cassirer also suggests that there was a modification in their conception of the system: from an axiomatic and deductive form to a fundamental form of all natural and spiritual beings that can be articulated by philosophy’s free movement and immanent activity.
“skeptics who moderated their skepticism with eclecticism and common sense.”

They enjoyed relatively more intellectual freedom, either in terms of their loose or non-institutional connection or in terms of their predilection for non-academic style of writing. Worth noting is that Kant held a complex relationship with the popular philosophy. Kant’s Critiques alone offer the picture of Kant only as an academic philosopher, as if the Critical philosophy had nothing to do with the popular philosophy, or as if Kant’s Critical philosophy as a whole stood in an entire isolation of the latter. But the fact that Kant kept teaching the anthropology course for thirty years of his career and acknowledged the significance of the rise of empirical psychology reveals a more complicated relation between his Critical philosophy and the popular philosophy.

Noticeable with respect to this complicated relation Kant’s Critical philosophy and the popular philosophy is

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8 Lewis White Beck, Early German Philosophy: Kant and his Predecessors (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press; Cambridge, 1969), 321. Beck offers a concise but thorough description of the characters of popular philosophers. He states that during the third quarter of the eighteenth-century Berlin was the center of the German Enlightenment, having two important intellectual groups: those who belonged to academy of philosophy founded and sponsored by Frederick the Great and the popular philosophers. Popular philosophers were German speaking protestants enjoying a new intellectual freedom and achieved a high level of literary criticism. The German popular philosophers were not so much actively engaged in the political critique as the French philosophers such as Diderot, Rousseau, and Voltaire were. Instead, their interests were focused on the private sentiment and virtue, religion, education, and art: cf. Lewis White Beck, Early German Philosophy: Kant and his Predecessors, 319-324. John H. Zammitto sheds light on the rise of popular philosophy as the rise of a new intellectual social class, i.e., the educated [der Gebildete] who can be identified as “the bourgeois reading public,” distinct from the scholars [der Gelehrnte] who held their posts at universities; cf. John H. Zammitto, Kant, Herder, the Birth of Anthropology (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2002), 15-23. With regard to the co-existence of those two different modes of philosophical writing and life, Beck suggests that the German philosophy since the establishment of universities in the fourteenth century is characterized by two distinct tendencies: the dominance of university-based academic philosophy which has a scholar form, on the one hand, and a constant recurrence of various non-institutional, non-Scholastic modes of philosophical thinking on the other—pantheism, humanisms, vitalism, mysticisms, and pietisms. The rise of pietism in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, and counter-enlightenment, Sturm and Drang, and Romanticism in the late eighteenth century, according to Beck, were part of the non-institutional philosophical movement: cf. Lewis White Beck, Early German Philosophy: Kant and his Predecessors, 6-8.

9 According to Zammito, the traditional claim that Kant’s critical turn was a turn away from the Wolffian Scholastic metaphysics, and it happened during the years of 1762-63 fails to explain Kant’s silence of a decade between 1762-73. Instead, Zammito suggests that the so-called critical turn of Kant can be better explained when we take into account of Kant’s turn away from the popular philosophy and the subsequent change in his self-conception from a popular philosopher to an academic philosopher, which happened during that decade. For Zammito’s overall perspective of the pre-critical Kant, see in particular: John H. Zammitto, Kant, Herder, the Birth of Anthropology (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2002), 5-8.
Odo Marquard’s remark that Kant laid a foundation-stone of the tradition of philosophical anthropology but acknowledged only an auxiliary status of this new discipline. According to Marquard, the genuine contribution of Kant’s Critical philosophy to his time consists in the philosophical “turn toward the life-world” that it effectuated.\textsuperscript{10} Without necessarily alluding to Husserl’s phenomenological notion of the life-world,\textsuperscript{11} Marquard emphasizes that Kant’s \textit{Critique of Pure Reason} brought up the human life-world as a problematic domain, one that evades both the metaphysics of the old Scholastic philosophy and the modern mathematical natural science. A new philosophical discipline was needed to deal with this rising new problematic domain. Kant can therefore rightly be called the founder of the tradition of philosophical anthropology, Marquard suggests, because he opened up the problematic, anthropological domain through the twofold turn toward the life-world away from the metaphysics and from the mathematical natural sciences with his transcendental doctrine of human reason. It is therefore worth noting that offering his courses on anthropology over three decades, Kant stated that all three questions of his \textit{Critiques}—what can I know?; what ought I to


\textsuperscript{11} Husserl’s view of Kant with respect to the issue of the life world is twofold: cf., Edmund Husserl, \textit{The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy}, trans. David Carr (Northwestern University Press, 1970; the German original published in 1936), 103-104. Husserl appreciates that Kant was insightful in criticizing rationalism for not being able to penetrate “the subjective structure of our world-consciousness prior to and within scientific knowledge.” But Kant did not advance his insight so far as to grasp that which grounds the \textit{a priori} subjective conditions of our conscious relationship with the world, i.e., the “surrounding life-world.” Husserl therefore corrects Kant by stating that understanding has two functions in relation to nature; “understanding interpreting itself, in explicit self-reflection, as normative laws” and “understanding ruling in concealment, i.e., ruling as constitutive of the always already further developing meaning-configuration ‘intuitively given surrounding world’.” For Husserl, conceiving these two different functions of understanding was part of Kant’s discovery, but Kant failed to show that and how the latter grounds the first. In a similar vein, Robert R. Williams points out that although Kant contributed to the philosophical turn towards the mundane life-world, he did not develop an ontology of the life-world: “Kant never goes beyond transcendental justification of the categories of Newtonian science, and so never reached, much less developed, an ontology of the life-world;” Robert R. Williams, \textit{Recognition: Fichte and Hegel on the Other} (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 8.
do?; what may I hope—converge to the anthropological question as to what the human being is.

In this context, we can also say that what underlies Kant’s Critical philosophy is his anthropological concerns. As Marquard points out, however, Kant himself took anthropology to be merely instrumental for pure considerations of morality.12 The new discipline of the world-

12 Marquard claims that the development of philosophical anthropology in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is to be understood in terms of a mutual exclusion of the philosophy of history and the Romantic Naturphilosophie. He suggests that Kant inaugurated the new discipline of philosophical anthropology with the Critical turn toward the life-world but only acknowledged an auxiliary status to his pragmatic anthropology by basing it on the philosophy of history. While Kant’s pragmatic anthropology remained subordinated to the philosophy of history, the Romantic philosophers found his philosophy of history unsatisfactory on account of the presumption of infinite progress of human history and the idea of conjecture and faith as the ultimate ground for the link between morality and history. For Marquard, the turn toward the life-world effectuated by Kant’s Critical philosophy and the theoretical deficiency of his philosophy of history were important contributing factors to the rise of the Romantic Naturphilosophie. He thus suggests that it was Kant who founded the new tradition of philosophical anthropology; however, it was through the breakaway from his philosophy of history and the development of the Romantic Naturphilosophie that philosophical anthropology gained its disciplinary independence, escaping from its subordinated status in relation to the philosophy of history. This was, for Marquard, how the remarkable development of philosophical anthropology in the nineteenth century was made possible. In suggesting this, Marquard briefly mentions that in Hegel’s philosophy, the treatment of humanity ultimately belongs to the philosophy of history while his Anthropology in the Encyclopedia involves some critical engagement with Romanticism. Seen this way, Hegel does not differ much from Kant, for Marquard, in that both philosophers base their anthropological discussions on the philosophy of history.

Marquard’s remark on Hegel is very short, and he does not really offer a detailed and systematic account of the relationship between Hegel’s Anthropology in the Encyclopedia, his critical engagement with Romantic Naturphilosophie, and his philosophy of world history. While this remains an issue yet to be thoroughly studied, I suggest in this dissertation that the dialectic of Naturregeist in Hegel’s Anthropology plays a pivotal role in his philosophical anthropology embodied through his philosophy of spirit in the Encyclopedia, and that the dialectic of Naturregeist, which I attempt to articulate as the fundamental form of Hegel’s Geist that can become Geist only in and through its other, is not grounded in his philosophy of world history.

Marquard’s remark on Hegel, however, provides us with some crucial insight about the historical context of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in which we can set Hegel’s Anthropology. With respect to his emphasis on the role of the Romantic Naturphilosophie in the formation and development of philosophical anthropology, we can thus point out that the development of the Romantic Naturphilosophie instituted an important change in the view of nature, from the Newtonian, mathematical-mechanistic one in the seventeenth century to the vitalist-organist one in the eighteenth century; for a detailed account, see Peter Hans Reill, “The Legacy of the ‘Scientific Revolution’: Science and the Enlightenment,” in The Cambridge History of Science Volume 4. Eighteenth Century Science, ed. Roy Porter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 23-43; Peter Hans Reill, Vitalizing Nature in Enlightenment (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2005). This paradigm change in the view of nature entailed the development of various fields of inquiry of Enlightenment science including physiology, medicine, biology, psychology, and so forth. This further entailed, I suggest, the rise of the view of the human being as a physical-psychical being whose health, disease, and death, at both physical and psychical levels, are assumed to be treated scientifically. Shedding light on how this new angle on the human being was formed and developed in some inter-disciplinary manner—inter-disciplinary not in the sense that there were interactions among existing separate disciplines on a certain set research subject, but in the sense that the life phenomena at physical and psychical levels were formed as objects of anthropological inquiries through various approaches and methodologies, and this entailed the formation of various scientific disciplines—is therefore vital for a study of the formation of philosophical anthropology in the eighteenth century. This point gives an important clue for setting Hegel’s
knowledge [Weltkenntnis], which concerns the empirical knowledge of the different people and cultures of the world and thus went hand in hand with the flourishing development of the popular philosophy, drew significant attentions of Kant but was not recognized of a scientific value on its own right by the same author.

The popular philosophy enriched the German Enlightenment, but it was also conceived by some thinkers as a counterpart, so to speak, of a true philosophy. Evidently this picture covers only part of the entire German intellectual movement of the late eighteenth-century. But it is an important thread, at least, of the formation of early German Idealism in the aftermath of Kant’s Critical philosophy. We thus observe that the self-conception of his era as a crisis, or as a mere antithesis of different points of view without a synthesis, and the claim for systematic philosophy as a solution to this crisis were determining factors in Reinhold’s enthusiastic reception of Kant.

2. Kant in the Crisis: Reinhold’s Fact of Consciousness

Scholars agree that Reinhold played a pivotal role not only in popularizing Kant’s Critical philosophy but also for the development of post-Kantian German Idealism. But his contribution to the development of German Idealism has not been paid attention as much as it deserves until recently. Reinhold attends to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason with an intense discussion of derangement in the Anthropology in the context of the formation of psychiatry at the end of the eighteenth century as I discuss in Chapter 5. It also leads us to reconsider Foucault’s thesis that there was no science of man before the nineteenth century. I briefly discuss this issue in Chapter 5, note 96.

13 Reinhold published twelve essays on Kant’s first Critique in the Teutscher Merkur in 1786 and 1787. In 1787, “six years after the publication of the Critique of Pure Reason, one year before the publication of the Critique of Practical Reason, and three years prior to the appearance of the Critique of Judgement,” he became the chair of Jena
awareness of what Kuehn describes as crisis. While holding that his era is framed by the decline of Leibniz-Wolffian metaphysics and the rise of popular philosophy, Reinhold claims that the existence of God is the foundation of human morality and, as such, should be the prominent subject matter of philosophy. Both the absence of a metaphysics capable of giving a universally valid answer to the question of God and the prevalent indifference of the Enlightenment reason to metaphysical investigation are therefore problematic to Reinhold. For the existence of God is a question that reason can “neither avoid nor leave unanswered.”

Reinhold’s enthusiasm with Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason thus comes from his concern about morality and religion and his belief that Kant’s first Critique offers a conclusive answer to the question of God. The result of the entire investigation of the first Critique, according to

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15 Reinhold, Letters, 10.
Reinhold, is that “the impossibility of all apodictic proofs for or against the existence of God follows from the nature of speculative reason, and the necessity of moral faith in the existence of God follows from the nature of practical reason.” The answer offered by the Critique, in other words, is that the existence of God can neither be proved nor unproved but should be postulated for the sake of practical reason. Both the one-sided claims, one for only finite human reason and the other for supernatural faith, are thus suspended by Kant’s argument that there cannot be any apodictic proof of the existence of God and therefore it is necessary to postulate it for the benefit of practical reason. This reading does not seem to deviate too much from the author’s intention, considering Kant’s own inauguration of moral theology.

However, Reinhold begins to develop the idea that Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason lacks a principle grounding its whole work. The principle established by the Critique is that “the only tenable metaphysics is the science of the objects of possible experiences,” and Kant was able to achieve this principle by his treatment of human cognition per se. While all metaphysical impasses have their roots in ascribing the predicates belonging to a representation of a thing to the thing itself, Kant’s doctrine of a priori conditions for the objects of possible experience made it possible to separate that which belongs to a representation of a thing from that which belongs to the thing itself. The greatness of the Critique, therefore, consists in its offering a ground for

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16 Ibid., 38. For Kant’s conception of rational faith for morality in the first Critique, see: KrV, A631-43/B659-71, A804-19/B832-31, B856-59. Reinhold thus draws out “the moral foundation of cognition” as the main theme or result of the Critique of Pure Reason (Third Letter). The conception of the supremacy of the practical interest of reason is a theme that connects Kant, Reinhold, and Fichte. For the development of this theme in Kant-Reinhold-Fichte, see in particular: Daniel Breazeale, “Reason’s Changing Needs: From Kant to Reinhold,” in Karl Leonhard Reinhold and the Enlightenment, ed. George di Giovanni (Dordrecht, Heidelberg, London, New York: Springer, 2010), 89-112.


18 Reinhold, The Foundation of Philosophical Knowledge, 66.
resolving all metaphysical conundrums; positively, Kant gives a foundation for the metaphysics of sensible nature through his treatment of cognition *per se*. However, Reinhold contends that the doctrines of cognition *per se* in the *Critique* which grounds the metaphysics of sensible nature remains itself ungrounded. The *Critique* treats human cognition in terms of three different cognitive powers, i.e., sensibility, understanding, and reason, but it does not offer any account of their common ground. The common ground for Reinhold cannot be anything other than the faculty of representation, since “space and time, the twelve categories, and the three ideas of reason” are nothing but “properties of representation *per se*.” The *Critique* deals only with the properties of representations and fails to give an account of that to which those properties belong. It establishes the metaphysics of “*objects proper*” but does not inaugurate a science of “*mere representation*.”19 The *Critique* for Reinhold, in other words, is not completed but remains a project to be completed. It should be more than a mere propaedeutic work to the metaphysics; it should itself be established as a science.

As it can be seen clearly from above, a foundationalist conception of philosophy guides Reinhold’s reading of Kant. Since Reinhold assumes that representation is the common ground of all the cognitive powers, the crucial issue of his Elementary philosophy is to set forth the ultimate ground from which the concept of representation can be drawn out. Reinhold eventually claims that the (actual) fact [*Tatsache*] of consciousness is the only ground from which the concept of representation can be drawn out:

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It is not through any inference of reason that we know that in consciousness representation is distinguished through the subject from both object and subject and is related to both, but through simple reflection upon the actual fact of consciousness, that is, by ordering together [Vergleichung] what is present in it.\(^{20}\)

The fact of consciousness is a fact in the sense that it is given by “simple reflection” on “what is present in consciousness.” It is a fact of which any conscious being can make an immediate experience by virtue of consciousness’s self-reflective nature. As such, it is an immediate inner experience of oneself, obviously comparable to the Cartesian Cogito. Reinhold further assumes that the fact of consciousness makes the fundamental proposition [Grundsatz] that offers a concept of representation immediately known: that in consciousness representation is distinguished from and related to both subject and object. This being said, the fact of consciousness is for Reinhold the last recourse to refer to when one wants to articulate the fundamental principle of a science of the faculty of representation per se; it also makes it possible for us to avoid falling into an infinite regression which Reinhold seems to assume to be unavoidable when one tries to find the fundamental principle of a science by means of rational inference.\(^{21}\)

\(^{20}\) Reinhold, The Foundation, 70.

\(^{21}\) The significance of Reinhold’s idea that the fact of consciousness is known by simple reflection and not by inference, I think, can be considered in terms of the infinite regress problem, one in which one can get involved in pursuit of the first principle of a philosophical system. With regard to the problem of the first principle, Kant claims that human reason is forced by its nature to proceed to the unconditioned causality of the conditioned, comes to transcendentental ideas such as the soul, the world, and God, but then unavoidably falls into contradiction, i.e., antinomies. Thus, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason does not offer any positive account of the first principle. By bringing the issue of the first principle to the forefront, however, Reinhold emphasizes that the first principle “is not, and cannot be, demonstrated in the science it grounds, or through it.” Reinhold, The Foundation of Philosophical Knowledge, 66. It is not something that can be demonstrated by rational inference, but something whose “meaning can be elucidated in the science only through its application,” and which “cannot be further developed or grounded without circularity;” ibid., 66-67. Reinhold’s theorization of the fact of consciousness as the ultimate source of the first principle can therefore be viewed as a strategy for avoiding the problem of the infinite regress by appealing to a
Reinhold’s notion of the fact of consciousness as the ultimate reference for the fundamental principle that ties together sensibility, understanding, and reason, however, seems to intensify the problem rather than resolve it. As we have seen above, what drove Reinhold to a serious examination of Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* and the subsequent development of his Elementary philosophy was the idea that philosophy is to be pursued as a scientific discourse. The scientific status of a philosophy is then assumed to be secured by its systematicity grounded on a fundamental principle, and this is the way in which Reinhold believed one could defend, so to speak, a true philosophy in the face of different forms of empiricism and skepticism. Yet, Reinhold makes an appeal to the authority of a given fact by taking the fact of consciousness as the ultimate reference for articulating the fundamental principle. We can therefore rightly pose a question as to whether Reinhold is not, in fact, employing the empiricist methods of observation of and abstraction from experience—in particular, an immediate self-conscious experience of oneself called the fact of consciousness. The implication of this question goes far beyond a methodological issue. By calling the immediate self-conscious experience of oneself a fact, Reinhold conceives consciousness as an immediate given to oneself. But how this conception of consciousness as an immediate given can be justified within the framework of Kant’s *Critique* remains questionable. Is Reinhold’s fact of consciousness an object of possible experience—namely, an appearance that is subject to the *a priori* conditions of sensibility and understanding, i.e., space and time and categories of understanding—or a thing in itself? Further, the proposition of consciousness leaves the notion of representation much more ambiguous than Reinhold himself believes. The proposition defines representation in terms of the two activities, relating

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psychological fact, an immediate inner experience of oneself.
and distinguishing; however, whether those activities are *a priori* or *a posteriori*—logically or temporally—to that which are related and distinguished needs to be better articulated.

3. Being of Consciousness: From Reinhold’s Fact to Fichte’s Act via Schulze’s Skepticism

With the conception of the fact of consciousness, Reinhold leaves his doctrine of the faculty of representation vulnerable to skeptic challenges. Specifically, Schulze brought up sharp criticism of the critical philosophy of Kant and Reinhold, and this played an important role in Fichte’s elaboration of an alternative notion of consciousness as an Act [*Tathandlung*] to Reinhold’s one as a fact [*Tatsache*]. Schulze concedes that as a skeptic, he never intends to deny the matter of fact itself, the fact “that we possess the representations of a sensibility, an understanding and a reason.”

Rather, the problem he finds in Reinhold’s notion of the fact of consciousness is that Reinhold’s “conscious-fact” philosophy the same belief in “indubitable certainty” of “the facts of consciousness:”

G.W.F. Hegel, *On the Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy, Exposition of its Different Modifications and Comparison of the Latest Form with the Ancient one*, in *Between Kant and Hegel. Text in the Development of Post-Kantian Idealism*, 318. Although Schulze brought up some critical, skeptic questions about the Critical philosophy of Kant and Reinhold, he does not go beyond the standpoint of consciousness, which assumes that “the existence of what is given within the compass of our consciousness has undeniable certainty” (ibid. 318). Hegel’s criticism of Schulze is acute. The fact-conscious philosophy of Schulze, for Hegel, makes two inconsistent claims: that “the existence and character of things is self-explanatory,” and that it is “not self-explanatory” (ibid. 319). It is a skepticism holding fast to the idea that “nothing of what experience teaches, can be an object of skeptical doubt” (ibid. 320). Ultimately, the source of such a defective position of Schulze lies in his clinging to “an extremely subjective point of view” (ibid. 315). Hegel thus concludes Schulze’s skepticism is incomplete and not philosophical indeed, in contrast to the ancient skepticism that puts into doubt all sensible, empirical experiences. With regard to Hegel’s understanding of the ancient skepticism and its significance for Hegel’s later reintroduction of the issue of
consciousness is that it undermines the main ideas of Kant’s *Critique* on which it is supposed to be based. Reinhold establishes that “there must be the faculty of representation” with an emphasis on its belonging to an undeniable fact, but he does not offer any proof of “the objective actuality of the faculty of representation.” Schulze therefore claims that Reinhold’s assumption of the faculty of representation *per se* as that to which three cognitive powers belong is in fact based on a causal inference: since there are representations (sensibility, understanding, and reason), there must be the faculty of representations. In this causal inference, cognitive powers are regarded as effects of which the cause is supposed to exist independently of them, and the mind, called the faculty of representation *per se*, is assumed to be their effective cause. Yet, Reinhold ignores the fact that the mind is an object that is a “suprasensible object,” which is “neither intuitable nor given to any experience.” Thus, Schulze contends that the defect of Reinhold’s argument consists in applying the categories of understanding, causality and actuality, to the suprasensible object called mind or the faculty of representation *per se*. For Schulze, Reinhold is committing the same error as one that Kant finds has been committed by the classic metaphysicians.

Schulze further claims that the same problem occurs in Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*. He points out that Kant believes a satisfactory account of the possibility of synthetic judgements can be given by showing that they are necessary as far as they originate in the mind, and by

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the standpoint of consciousness in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, see in particular: H.S.Harris, “Skepticism, Dogmatism and Speculation,” in *Between Kant and Hegel. Text in the Development of Post-Kantian Idealism*, 252-271.


24 Ibid. 107-109.

25 Ibid. 110.
establishing that they are forms of our experiential cognition.26 But Kant thereby treats the existence of synthetic judgements in the mind as “undeniable conscious fact[s],” and points to the mind as the ultimate ground of their being *a priori* when the necessity of those conscious facts is called into question.27 Schulze therefore suggests that Kant’s “Transcendental Deduction” regards the mind as the effective cause of cognitive powers, just as Reinhold’s Elementary philosophy considers the faculty of representation as the effective cause of representation. Schulze’s primary concern is not to decide the epistemological or the ontological status of mind. As a skeptic, he is content with the skeptic conclusion that one can only affirm that it is “undecided whether or not such faculties of this sort have actual being outside our representations of them,”28 and that both Kant and Reinhold fail to dispel Hume’s doubt on account of their presupposition of the existence of mind as the efficient cause of representations and as the ultimate ground for the latter’s necessity. To what extent Schulze’s criticism does justice to Kant would be a matter of a further independent research. Regardless of how relevant his criticism is to the authors’ own view he criticizes, the point remains important that his skeptic reconstruction of Kant’s and Reinhold’s argument made the being of consciousness a problem.

Along with Schulze’s reading of Kant and Reinhold, we can therefore pose a question about the ontological status of consciousness. How can one speak of the mode of being of consciousness within the framework of the Kantian transcendentalism? Indeed, Kant himself dismisses any metaphysical approach to consciousness. He claims that it is a paralogism of pure reason, committed on the behalf of rational psychology, to take the soul as a substance that

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26 Cf. ibid. 112.
27 Ibid. 112.
28 Ibid. 109.
allegedly has simplicity, unity, and identity, for its properties. For Kant, this metaphysical notion of the soul is nothing but a transcendent ideal that pure reason is forced to bring forth by its internal demand for “the absolute identity of a thinking subject.” Pure reason thus deduces the substantiality of the self from the activity of thinking, just as Descartes establishes the existence of I from the self-conscious act of thinking. But such a deduction is illicit, Kant argues, because “although I exists in all thought, not the slightest intuition is connected with this representation.” Kant therefore concludes that the I, as transcendental apperception, has only a logical meaning that it is a representation accompanying all representations. “Even our inner experience, which Descartes considers as undoubted,” Kant contends, “is possible only on the supposition of outer experience,” and the I alone, as a pure concept, cannot be the object of knowledge. With such an anti-metaphysical approach, however, Kant seems to leave it more or less ambiguous what consciousness can be—what it is if it is neither an object of possible experience, nor an appearance, nor an object of knowledge. In this regard, Schulze’s criticism of Kant and Reinhold has a point in calling attention to the fact that if consciousness is to be regarded as something in which all epistemic processes take place, this something, within the framework of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, cannot be an appearance which is subject to the conditions of space and time. Indeed, the Critique disallows ascribing the category of actuality to consciousness by establishing that the soul is something that can be thought but is not an object of our possible experience. But it still leaves a room for treating consciousness as a transcendent

29 KrV, A336/B393
30 KrV, A350.
32 Cf. KrV, B275.
object, a thing-in-itself, because of the same idea that consciousness is not an object of our possible experience. This is a trap of Kantian transcendentalism which Reinhold ends up falling into when he tries to think of the fact of consciousness as the ground of all the three different doctrines of cognitive powers in the *Critique*.

In 1794, two years after the publication of Schulze’s book *Aenesidemus*, Fichte wrote a long review of it. As an enthusiastic proponent of Kant’s Critical philosophy who claimed for remaining true to the spirit, not the letter, of Kant’s thought, Fichte takes on a defense of Kant against Schulze’s challenge. In his review, Fichte thus points out that it was neither Kant nor Reinhold but Schulze who thought of “the faculty of representation” only as “‘a thing’ that exists as thing-in-itself, independent of his representing it, and indeed as a thing that represents.” Kant’s Critical philosophy, in other words, is not necessarily responsible for the misconception of consciousness as a thing-in-itself. And what is important to Fichte is the fact that it is a misconception to regard consciousness as a thing-in-itself. Given the dualism in Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* between appearance and thing-in-itself, then, one might attempt to define consciousness as an appearance. This cannot be a satisfactory account of consciousness, however, because, as Fichte sees through the problem, consciousness differs in kind from any external object given to consciousness as an object of possible experience. In criticizing Schulze,

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34 J.G.Fichte, *Aenesidemus, or Concerning the Foundation of the Philosophy of the Elements issued by Prof. Reinhold in Jena, together with a Defense of Skepticism against the Pretensions of the Critique of Reason*, in *Between Kant and Hegel. Text in the Development of Post-Kantian Idealism*, trans. George di Giovanni and H.S.Harris (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2000), 137-157. In the following, citations from this text will be used with the abbreviation “Aenesidemus Review.”

35 His “Aenesidemus Review” is known to be important not only in the development of German Idealism but also in the development of Fichte’s own transcendental philosophy, specifically of his notion of the Act of consciousness [*Tathandlung*]. For a systematic and detailed account of Fichte’s *Aenesidemus* Review, see: Daniel Breazeale, “Fichte’s ‘Aenesidemus’ Review and the Transformation of German Idealism,” *The Review of Metaphysics*, vol. 34, no. 3 (1981): 545-568.

therefore, Fichte does not entirely dismiss his problematization of the mode of being of consciousness. The relevant strategy for defending Kant against the skeptic questioning would consist in showing how one can then speak of the mode of being of consciousness within the framework of the Kantian philosophy, not doing away with the opponent’s questioning. When Fichte charges Schulze for his “extravagant awareness” to call into question “the objective existence of such a thing as the faculty of representation,” what Fichte finds extravagant is therefore not the question of the existence of consciousness, but more precisely the allegedly objective mode of existence, which one usually ascribes to external objects of consciousness and which Schulze seems to be projecting to consciousness. Yet, it seems then indispensable to move the so-called Kantian Critical philosophy forward to such an extent as to go beyond the doctrine of the first Critique, since consciousness can be neither a thing-in-itself nor an appearance. This is where Fichte’s replacement of Reinhold’s fact of consciousness [Tatsache] with his new notion of consciousness as an Act [Tathandlung] comes into play.

Fichte establishes that the truth of consciousness is that “the faculty of representation exists for the faculty of representation and through the faculty of representation.”37 In other words, consciousness is an activity of positing itself through itself. Ego is an act that produces its being by its activity of positing itself. Such is the act of consciousness [Tathandlung]. This being assumed, Reinhold’s failure, responsible for Schulze’s wholesale criticism of the Kantian philosophy, consists in his incapacity to think of the faculty of representation per se as an

37 Ibid. 143.
activity of producing representations, nor of representation as a mode of operation of
consciousness or as a means of producing representations.  

Fichte also argues that his new notion of consciousness as the Act [Tathandlung] clears
up the ambiguity of Reinhold’s proposition of consciousness. Reinhold’s proposition of
consciousness sets up a mediating-mediated relationship among the three components of
consciousness (object, subject, and representation) by ascribing two activities (relating and
distinguishing) to consciousness, but it leaves it ambiguous which mediates which and which is
mediated by which. In this regard, Reinhold declares the priority of representation over subject
and object, a logical priority necessitated by the fact that subject and object are present in
consciousness only by mediation of representation. But Schulze counters Reinhold by claiming
that subject and object must be prior to representation because it would otherwise be impossible
for representation to be related to subject and object. With regard to those two positions, Fichte
acknowledges the relevance of both, and yet only partially. As Reinhold claims, representation
has priority over subject and object, but the priority stands only with empirical consciousness in
which subject and object are only relatively considered via representation, i.e., only “qua
representing and qua represented.” Schulze’s idea is also right, Fichte argues, and yet only with
the absolute Ego and not with empirical consciousness. There must be, in other words, the bearer
of the relationship in order for there to be any representation, but this bearer can never be an
empirical consciousness but only a pure Ego which is capable of producing that relationship
from within itself.

38 Cf. ibid. 142.
39 Ibid.
The debate about Reinhold’s proposition of consciousness among Reinhold, Schulze, and Fichte is fundamentally concerned with the relationship between the act of relating and the terms that are related by that act—which occurs prior. It is caused by the problem of Reinhold’s proposition, which establishes that consciousness is relational but does not offer any further account of the nature of that relationship. Fichte’s solution to this problem, as we have seen above, consists in separating two dimensions of consciousness, in confining the relational aspect to empirical consciousness and elaborating a non-empirical notion of consciousness for the source of that relationship. In separating the two dimensions of consciousness, Fichte acknowledges that the relational aspect of consciousness emphasized by Reinhold is the nature of empirical consciousness. Implicit in this acknowledgement is the idea that it is the nature of empirical consciousness to lead us to the puzzle of the relationship between the bearer of the act of relating on the one hand, and terms that are related by revealing only its relational aspect on the other. Fichte thus brings forth a fundamental insight about the puzzle of the self-reflectivity of consciousness, namely the fact that consciousness is at the same time subject of and object to itself. The insight states that the puzzle becomes a puzzle when consciousness is considered in terms of the immediate self-conscious experience of oneself conceptualizable as the fact of consciousness or as the Cartesian Cogito, or as such an immediate, psychological given. Therefore, when Fichte claims that consciousness is not a fact but an act, consciousness as an act is not to be confused with in immediate self-conscious reflection of oneself.

The psychological reflection for Fichte has to do with Reinhold’s fact of consciousness, a fact that is given through empirical self-observation. Fichte therefore sides with Schulze with respect to the idea that there must be something responsible for the act of relating, and that the bearer of the conscious act must be prior to representation. But Fichte is careful, at the same
time, not to make the bearer into a thing, something that has a mode of existence of an external thing, or into a transcendent object, i.e., a thing-in-itself. Fichte therefore suggests that the bearer of the conscious act of relating is not subject to the conditions of sensible intuition, space and time; rather, it should be an intellectual intuition which produces its own being by thinking. In short, the radical change in the conception of consciousness made by Fichte can be viewed as a result of radicalizing Schulze’s provocative question concerning the being of consciousness. With his skeptical reading of Reinhold and Kant, Schulze brings up the issue that consciousness should ontologically differ from any other external object. He showed that as soon as the peculiar mode of the being of consciousness is called into question, it comes into sight that Kant’s doctrine of a priori conditions of an object of possible experience leaves it undecided whether consciousness belongs to appearance or to thing-in-itself. In this context, while Schulze charges Reinhold’s conception of the faculty of representation for making the mind into a transcendent object, Fichte pushes this point so far as to affirm that “the absolute subject, the Ego, is not given in an empirical intuition, but is posited through an intellectual one.”

The conception of intellectual intuition obviously contradicts the main assumption of Kant’s first Critique—that human intuition is sensible. But this is, for Fichte, a consequence one must accept when one wants to achieve a philosophical system on the base of the Kantian Critical philosophy. Fichte thus maintains that his new notion of consciousness as the Act better grounds the Critical philosophy than Reinhold’s fact of consciousness does.

\[40\] Ibid.
4. Beyond Fichte’s Transcendental Consciousness

4.1. Tathandlung in Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre of 1794

In the Wissenschaftslehre of 1794, Fichte claims that “the primordial, absolutely unconditioned first principle of all human knowledge” is to be expressed as “Act-fact [Tathandlung].” He defines Tathandlung as that which does not appear among our empirical

41 In 1794 Fichte published the first version of his Wissenschaftslehre (the full title is Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre, translated as Foundation of the Entire Science of Knowledge). By the neologism Wissenschaftslehre Fichte intends to radically revise Kantian Critical philosophy. But he was never satisfied with his presentation of the new Critical philosophy and so continuously revised it right up until his death. Fifteen versions of the Wissenschaftslehre are handed down to us. The English translators of Hegel’s Differenzschrift, H.S. Harris and Walter Cerf, state that Hegel’s exposition of Fichte’s system in this text is mainly based on the Foundation of the Entire Science of Knowledge of 1794: cf. Hegel, The Difference Between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of Philosophy, trans. H.S. Harris and Walter Cerf (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977), 119, footnote 1. They also point out that “intellectual intuition” Hegel mentions in the Differenzschrift is thematized by Fichte for the first time in the “Second Introduction to the Science of Knowledge” of 1797. On the basis of the remark by Harris and Cerf, I refer to those two works of Fichte—the Foundation of the Entire Science of Knowledge of 1794, and the “Second Introduction to the Science of Knowledge” of 1797—to examine Hegel’s understanding of Fichte in the Differenzschrift. English translations of both texts of Fichte are contained in: J.G. Fichte, Science of Knowledge with the First and Second Introductions, ed. and trans. Peter Heath and John Lachs (Cambridge, New York, Port Chester, Melbourne, Sydney: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

Another important resource of Fichte Hegel refers to in the Differenzschrift is the Foundation of Natural Right of 1796. In this text, Fichte develops the notion of recognition as the fundamental condition for interactions between free agents. Fichte’s suggestion is that in order to secure the sphere of free action, the Ego makes a demand on every other free agent that they should limit their action, and this necessarily involves the Ego’s recognition of all other free agents as rational beings who make the same demand on him. This is an application of the first principle of a theoretical science established in the 1794 Wissenschaftslehre—that the Ego posits itself as limited by the non-Ego—to the relation of right [Recht]. To ground his notion of recognition, Fichte further theorizes the body as the external, material world in which the mutually recognitional relationship can take place. In the Differenzschrift, however, Hegel challenges Fichte’s notion of the embodiment of the Ego as the necessary condition for an individual agent’s being a subject of right, for its treatment of the body as a merely dead matter (cf. W 2, 80-81/ Diff, 142-3). Hegel calls into question Fichte’s claim that a community of rational beings must depend on the system of coercive laws because recognition does not necessarily involve a moral respect of others’ rights. Hegel thus sees Fichte’s system as entailing a multiplication of prohibitive and punitive laws, which he finds are made superfluous by customs in a beautiful community (cf. W 2, 84-5/ Diff, 146-7). Further, the multiplication of coercive laws in Fichte’s system is for Hegel a logical consequence of the view of a rational agent’s body as a dead matter, and of the recognitional relationship between rational agents as a causal relationship. This is more fundamentally associated with Fichte’s antithetical conception of the relationship between the Ego and the non-Ego, intelligence and nature. In my view, this early critical engagement of Hegel with Fichte’s notion of embodiment and recognition is later systematically developed into his theory of habit as a second nature, which I discuss in Chapter 5.

42 The German Tathandlung is translated as “fact/act” or “Act.” It appears that one can understand the full meaning of this term only by going through the entire Wissenschaftslehre, which Fichte revised over a decade. The term
consciousness but underlies all consciousness and makes it possible. To present [darstellen] how Tathandlung can operate as the first principle of all knowledge, Fichte suggests two methodical procedures: reflection and abstraction. Reflection can proceed from any proposition that is granted by everyone without dispute, i.e., a fact of empirical consciousness accompanying the feeling of necessity. Reflection is a free thinking about what such a fact of empirical consciousness is in its purity. Abstraction is then concerned with detaching from the same fact of consciousness all empirical features one after another until there remains nothing empirical.

To present Tathandlung, Fichte first singles out the proposition of identity A=A. He reflects on the fact that the proposition A=A does not posit “that A is” or “that there is an A.” The only thing that is posited by the proposition is the “if-so connection (=X):” “if that A is, then there is an A.” It then turns out that the X is only posited in and by the Ego because the ‘I’ is the one who judges in that proposition. Yet, the X is connected to both ‘A’s, subject and predicate, and the two ‘A’s are, in their turn, united in the X. This means, for Fichte, that insofar as A is posited at all, A is posited in and by the Ego.

From this, it follows that what is posited in the proposition of identity is “Ego is.” Whereas the proposition A=A does not establish the being of the terms of the proposition, its self-evidence establishes that the “Ego is.” But this Ego, of which the being is thus posited by the proposition of identity, is an empirical consciousness, the one who makes the judgement A=A. “Ego is,” is therefore itself “a fact of consciousness [Tatsache]” of which the being is assured

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Tathandlung also seems to involve a complex, problematic relationship between empirical and transcendental consciousness. Considering the difficulty of finding an English word which conveys its full meaning and sounds natural at the same time, I here use the German word Tathandlung.

43 Fichte, Science of Knowledge, 93.
44 Fichte, Science of Knowledge, 96.
by a fact of empirical consciousness, by the feeling of necessity accompanying the proposition of identity.

Now, if we abstract all the empirical features from the reflections above, two pure factors of the proposition of identity can be drawn. First, the two ‘A’s, i.e., both subject and predicate, of the proposition of identity are posited in and by the Ego. Second, the Ego is. From these two factors, then, a new proposition of identity is finally drawn out: “Ego is Ego.” Fichte highlights that in this new proposition “Ego is Ego,” the Ego is posited unconditionally and absolutely [schlechthin]. If in the proposition “A=A,” A is posited by the if-so connection and hence by the mediation of the Ego, the Ego in proposition “Ego=Ego” is posited by and through the Ego itself. If the Ego in “the Ego is” is a fact of consciousness [Tatsache], in other words, the Ego in the “Ego=Ego” “posits itself simply [schlechthin] because it exists; it posits itself by merely existing and exists by merely being posited.” This is the conclusion that Fichte draws out from his abstracting reflection on the proposition of identity “A=A.” Consequently, what Tathandlung is, is now fully unfolded and can be expressed in the formula: “Ego posits fundamentally and absolutely [schlechthin] its own being.”

Fichte’s notion of Tathandlung can be considered in light of the problem of a thing-in-itself in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. As it is well known, Jacobi pointed out that problem in Kant’s Critique with his famous statement that without the presupposition of a thing-in-itself one cannot partake in Kant’s philosophy, and yet one cannot stay with it holding the same proposition. The ambiguity in Kant’s idea of a thing-in-itself was thus regarded by the early Kant

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45 Fichte, Science of Knowledge, 98.
46 Fichte, Science of Knowledge, 99.
readers as one of the biggest problems of Kant’s Critical philosophy. Indeed, one of the most important claims presented in Kant’s first *Critique* is that a thing-in-itself, although it can be thought, cannot be an object of knowledge. Yet, Kant states, on the other hand, that “the non-sensible cause of the representations,” i.e., “merely intelligible cause of appearances in general” can be called “the transcendental object.” With an emphasis on his thesis of the Transcendental Aesthetic that sensible intuition is only receptive and hence should be affected by something else, the statement then most likely authorizes the idea that sensible intuition is to be affected by something merely intelligible, by a thing-in-itself. This being said, Kant seems to be inconsistent in claiming, on the one hand, that a thing-in-itself cannot be known and has no constitutive value regarding our knowledge of objects, and on the other hand, that it *is* the non-sensible cause of our representation.

Proclaiming himself to remain true to the spirit of Kant without sticking only to the letter of the critical philosophy of Kant, Fichte justifies his reading of Kant by distinguishing between two ways of establishing a system of transcendental philosophy. There are, according to Fichte, two different ways of grounding our experiences: dogmatism and idealism, depending on if they ground experiences upon a thing-in-itself or the self-conscious activity of the Ego. Those who criticize Kant for his doctrine of a thing-in-itself as an efficient cause of representation such as Jacobi and Schulze are dogmatists. But Fichte maintains that “certainly our knowledge all proceeds from an affection; but not affection by an object.” For him, this notion leads us to an idealistic reading of Kant, enabling us to remain true to the spirit of Kant. To support his idealist

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47 Kant, *KrV*, B522.
reading of Kant, Fichte focuses on Kant’s idea of transcendental apperception which he finds is primarily characterized as a pure act of a self, an act conditioning all consciousness. Fichte’s claim is that Kant’s transcendental apperception contains the idea of his Wissenschaftslehre, which aims to explain how intellectual intuition, i.e., the absolute self-activity of the pure Ego, grounds all empirical consciousness. But he also recognizes the difference between Kant’s transcendental philosophy and his Wissenschaftslehre. Whereas “being conditioned [Bedingtheit]” for Kant does not necessarily imply “being determined [Bestimmtheit],” it does in his Wissenschaftslehre. Kant’s Transcendental Deduction, in other words, only establishes that self-consciousness conditions empirical consciousness without showing how the former grounds the latter and how one can derive the latter from the former. It does not prove the categories to be conditioned by self-consciousness but simply says that they are. For this reason, Fichte holds that in Kant’s Deduction there is no deduction of categories from the activity of the pure self-consciousness. This being said, Kant’s Deduction does not offer a truly transcendental account of

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51 Fichte, “Second Introduction,” Science of Knowledge, 50. Before Fichte, Maimon addresses the problem of Kant’s deduction of categories in terms of determinability. Although concepts of understanding are a priori conditions of our experience of an object, from this it does not necessarily follow that those concepts actually determine our experience of an object. This being assumed, it turns out that Kant does not properly address how categories actually apply to the manifold of sensory intuition. With respect to Maimon’s conception of the principle of determinability and its direct influence on Fichte’s idea of reciprocal determination [Wechselbestimmung] in the Wissenschaftslehre, see: Daniel Breazeale, “‘Real Synthetic Thinking’ and the Principle of Determinability,” in Thinking Through the Wissenschaftslehre. Themes from Fichte’s Early Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 43-69.

52 Cf. “I am aware that he [Kant] by no means proved the categories he set up to be conditions of self-consciousness, but merely said that they were so:” Fichte, “Second Introduction,” Science of Knowledge, 51. Indeed, this sentence is ambiguous because it seems to imply that categories are to be proved as that which conditions self-consciousness. The German original amplifies the ambiguity: “Ich weiss, dass er die von ihm aufgestellten Kategorien keinesweges als Bedingungen des Selbstbewusstseins erwiesen” (Italic is mine). To my understanding, neither Kant’s Deduction nor Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre conclude that categories condition self-consciousness. Thus, I read “Bedingungen des Selbstbewusstseyns” as “being conditioned by self-consciousness” or “results of self-consciousness’s conditioning.”
the possibility of synthetic \textit{a priori} judgements. Consequently, Fichte believes that by developing the Kantian notion of transcendental apperception into the key notion of his \textit{Wissenschatslehre}, i.e., intellectual intuition, he can develop a system of true transcendental philosophy that fits the spirit of Kantian Critical philosophy, one that can offer a deduction of categories without the presupposition of a thing-in-itself.

For Fichte, \textit{Tathandlung}, intellectual intuition, and pure Ego are the names for a truly transcendental consciousness that replaces Kant’s transcendental apperception. The truly transcendental is to be defined as a self-affecting, self-positing, active principle. Only as such, can there be a transcendental consciousness that underlies all consciousness without itself appearing among empirical consciousness, which Kant expressed through his doctrine of transcendental apperception but failed to develop as a first principle grounding his Critical philosophy.

Fichte’s presentation of the way in which \textit{Tathandlung} operates as such a transcendental principle, however, leaves the relationship between empirical and transcendental consciousness enigmatic. As we have seen above, Fichte starts with a law of identity A=A and proceeds to the thesis that a pure Ego posits itself in an absolute and unconditioned manner. Fichte’s claim is that he can thereby show how a pure Ego underlies the fact of empirical consciousness, i.e., the law of identity. But Fichte seems to be deriving a pure Ego from the fact of empirical consciousness.\textsuperscript{53} To be more precise, he seems to be assuming that his derivation of the principle

\textsuperscript{53} Perhaps we can address the enigmatic relationship between empirical and transcendental consciousness in Fichte’s \textit{Wissenschatslehre} in terms of the methodic meaning of a presentation \textit{[Darstellung]}. Fichte states that his thought process, methodologically guided by reflection and abstraction, is a presentation \textit{[Darstellung]} of how the pure Ego operates as the first principle of all empirical consciousness. It is then questionable how a transcendental principle, assumed not to appear among empirical consciousness, can be a matter of presentation if the term presentation has a meaning of conveying images or illustrating representations and hence presupposes a certain symbolic relationship between presentation and what is presented. Indeed, the problem is begging the question because presentation
of Ego=Ego is itself a presentation of Tathandlung. He shows what the Tathandlung is by himself reflecting on a series of propositions. Along with the method of abstracting reflection, Tathandlung is thus turned into his philosophical reflection, a thought-process of an individual philosopher called Fichte. But this does not seem to fit well with his definition of Tathandlung as the pure Ego that posits its own being in an unconditioned and absolute manner, since this positing by pure Ego is by definition not to take place in an empirical consciousness. In continuation of our previous discussion about Reinhold’s definition of consciousness as a psychological fact, therefore, we can pose a question as to whether Fichte’s Tathandlung is not, in fact, leaving room for being confused with a psychological act, a psychological self-consciousness of an individual mind. This is one of the main points of Hegel’s criticism of Fichte, which I will deal with below in more detail by examining the second and third principles of Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre together with Hegel’s critical reconstruction of Fichte’s argumentation given in his Differenzschrift.

 cannot have a methodical meaning without presupposing a certain relationship between empirical and pure consciousness, which Fichte should therefore define prior to setting out the presentation. This is also a question we can pose in the context of Kant’s definition of presentation [Darstellung] as a method for mathematics and not for a philosophical proof. Kant states that “Philosophical knowledge is knowledge which reason gains from concepts; mathematical knowledge is knowledge which reason gains from the construction [Darstellung] of concepts. By constructing a concept I mean exhibiting a priori the intuition corresponding to it” (KrV, B 741). An example of this type of construction is presenting an image of a triangle to the mind which corresponds to the concept of a triangle. When presenting an image of a triangle to the mind, reason does not borrow anything from experience. Kant therefore affirms that in the mathematical construction, one presents the object entirely a priori. Thus, both philosophy and mathematics are a priori knowledge. However, they differ in the direction in which each of them proceeds: “philosophical knowledge considers the particular only in the universal, mathematical knowledge the universal in the particular, and indeed in the individual” (KrV, B742).
4.2. Hegel’s Criticism of Fichte in the Differenzschrift

In 1801, shortly after his arrival at Jena, Hegel published the *Differenzschrift*. Hegel’s goal in this work is to clarify the difference between Fichte’s and Schelling’s systems, which he finds their contemporary readers fail to notice. As a champion of Schelling’s identity philosophy Hegel eventually endorses his younger friend’s system as truly speculative. But the *Differenzschrift* contains Hegel’s detailed critical analyses of Fichte’s doctrine of *Tathandlung* and thus gives some important clues for elucidating Hegel’s own position about the systematic significance of consciousness.

In the *Differenzschrift*, Hegel first calls attention to the historical meaning of Fichte’s and Schelling’s philosophies. As with Reinhold, Hegel considers the need of philosophy as essential in defining the present philosophical task. But Hegel’s consideration of the need of philosophy is not limited to philosophical situations, i.e. those which, for instance, Reinhold framed in terms of the decline of old philosophy, the rise of popular philosophy, and the lack of a new system. For Hegel, the need of philosophy has its source, more widely and deeply, in the culture of his era: the modern European culture which he finds is penetrated by various forms of dichotomy, such as the division between life and philosophy, between individuals and community, between man and God, etc.\(^{54}\) Such historical conditions with which philosophical endeavors are inherently connected, give rise to the need for a philosophical system capable of

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\(^{54}\) For Hegel’s conception of dualism as characteristic of modern culture, see in particular: Michael N. Forster, *Hegel’s Idea of a Phenomenology of Spirit* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), 17-60. In Hegel’s early theological writings, Forster articulates the eight modern dualisms which he finds at play behind the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. The first four are concerned with separation of man from reality: divisions between man/nature and God, man and nature, individuals and their community, and the self/its thought and reality. The last four deal with the division of man within himself: divisions between fact and human volition, duty and inclination/desire, virtue and happiness, and mind and body.
bringing all dualistic conceptions to a synthesis. Whether there remains any oppositional idea is therefore for Hegel an essential appraisal standard of any philosophical system. Hegel coins the evaluative terms speculation and reflection, matching them with the Kantian terms, reason and understanding, respectively. An infinite mode of thinking capable of grasping the absolute identity of subject and object is called speculative; a finite mode of thinking that remains the standpoint of opposition is called reflective.

With regard to Fichte’s doctrine of Tathandlung, Hegel first appraises that the notion of a pure Ego expresses the idea of the identity of subject and object. In this respect, Fichte’s philosophy, for Hegel, has a speculative aspect. This is so, however, only when it comes to the idea of a pure Ego. After a short remark about the speculative aspect of Fichte’s philosophy, Hegel contends that the speculative aspect is lost in Fichte’s system and is downgraded to reflection. To illustrate how this occurs, Hegel reformulates the problem of Fichte’s system as follows.\(^5\) Since Fichte wants empirical consciousness to be completely determined, and not just conditioned, by pure consciousness, his task is to demonstrate a complete annulation of the opposition between empirical and pure consciousness. However, Fichte considers the relationship of the two different types of consciousness in terms of a mutual determination. As a result, the opposition between the two does not completely disappear, and empirical consciousness is not completely determined by pure consciousness.

To understand Hegel’s critical reconstruction of Fichte’s problem, we need to examine how Fichte proceeds from the first principle Ego=Ego to the second and third principles. As we have seen above, the principle Ego=Ego is derived from the proposition of identity A=A.

\(^5\) Cf. W2, 52/ Diff, 119.
Following the derivation of the first principle Ego=Ego, Fichte takes up the proposition of opposition: “–A is not equal to A.” Fichte holds that in this proposition the subject –A is conditioned by A as to matter, in the sense that the content of –A means that it is not some specific thing, i.e., A. But the subject –A is not conditioned as to form because the form of –A only means that it is an opposite of something else. From this Fichte concludes that the second principle of all knowledge, i.e., the principle of opposition, is conditioned as to content.

It is not hard to see that Fichte’s principle of opposition is concerned with the law of contradiction, which affirms that something cannot both be A and –A. Noticeable, however, is the fact that in contrast to the first principle “A=A,” Fichte does not proceed to articulate the second principle in terms of Ego. Instead, he simply states that the principle of opposition is the second principle of all knowledge, and that the second principle is conditioned as to content. But this is not a coincidence. Fichte further adds that the second principle cannot be defined or verbally expressed at the present stage. Proper understanding of the proposition of opposition from the perspective of the Wissenschaftslehre can only be obtained after elucidating how the same principle is conditioned as to form, and this moves us into the need for the third principle, which states that the proposition of opposition is conditioned as to form.

Although Fichte characterizes the second principle as being conditioned as to content, it thus seems that the focus of the second principle is rather on the formal aspect of opposition in general. By the unconditionality of the proposition of opposition as to form, Fichte means that –A is posited just as absolutely as A. Positing of –A therefore has very little to do with a logical negation of the terms that cannot be predicated of A. Rather, it is a counter-positing performed

by and in one and the same consciousness that posits A. The fact that the two acts, positing and counter-positing, belong to one and the same consciousness, according to Fichte, can be expressed by the formula “the Ego=the non-Ego.” This formula then sets down the last task of the philosopher of the *Wissenschafstlehre*. The task is to reconcile the two principles, one of identity and the other of opposition, by showing how the two acts belong to one and the same consciousness.

From his considerations of the second and third principles, Fichte thus establishes that positing and counter-positing are not nullification of each other insofar as Ego and non-Ego *mutually limit* themselves. Since the conception of mutual limit comes from the idea of the unity of opposites by *divisibility*,\(^57\) which, in its turn, comes from pure abstraction even from the ideas of Ego and non-Ego, the third principle establishes that Ego and non-Ego are conditioned as to form.

Now, Hegel’s criticism is that this idea of the Ego’s positing itself as being limited by the non-Ego cannot be an adequate answer to the problem brought up by Fichte: i.e., demonstrating a complete annihilation of the opposition between empirical and transcendental consciousness. If empirical and transcendental consciousness appear in opposition, their identity for Hegel should be shown in a higher synthesis from which both originate. Fichte’s conception of the pure act of Ego expresses such a higher synthesis, but it disappears as soon as Fichte

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\(^{57}\) Hegel holds that Fichte’s idea of mutual determination cannot offer a satisfactory solution to the problem brought up by Fichte himself: how to show empirical consciousness is determined and not just conditioned by transcendental consciousness. To my understanding, this is an underlying issue of Hegel’s Logic of Essence in which he shows how determinations of reflection (essentialities) including identity, difference, and contradiction are developed to the determination of essence, i.e., ground [*Grund*] by positing and determining reflections. For an interpretation of Hegel’s Logic of Essence in terms of a practice of Fichte’s *Taethandlung*, see: Michael Quante, “The Logic of Essence as Internal Reflection,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Hegel*, ed. Dean Moyer (Online Publication: DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199355228.013.12, 2017).
draws out the principle of Ego=Ego from his reflection on the proposition of identity, and the principle of the Ego’s positing itself as being limited by the non-Ego from another reflection of his on the proposition of opposition. Specifically, Hegel points out that the distinction between empirical and transcendental consciousness is a “concept” which “originates because he [the philosopher] abstracts in his thinking from all the extraneous things that are not Ego and holds on only to the connection of subject and object.”\textsuperscript{58} This being said, the task of the philosopher of the \textit{Wissenschaftslehre} consists in “suspending pure consciousness as concept.”\textsuperscript{59} The philosopher promises to complete this task by constructing empirical consciousness from “an active emanation or self-production of the principle.”\textsuperscript{60} At this point, Fichte’s reflections on the three principles may well be said to be “three absolute acts of the Ego.”\textsuperscript{61} But they are all ideal factors and hence not real.\textsuperscript{62} Consequently, empirical consciousness is not completely determined by transcendental consciousness and their opposition remains in Fichte’s system.

In the \textit{Differenzschrift}, Hegel estimates that Schelling’s identity philosophy is completely speculative both in its principle and system. While the speculation is supposed to present a proper way for resolving the dichotomy of the two opposed poles—subject and object, nature and intelligence, necessity and freedom—and thus for establishing a system incorporating the two, the truly speculative solution is given by Schelling’s identity philosophy and not by Fichte’s \textit{Wissenschafstlehre}. This is because Schelling’s system conceives not only the subject pole, but also the object pole as an expression of the absolute identity. In Schelling’s system,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{58} W 2, 52-3/ Diff, 120.
  \item \textsuperscript{59} W 2, 53-4/ Diff, 120.
  \item \textsuperscript{60} W 2, 53/ Diff, 120.
  \item \textsuperscript{61} W 2, 57/ Diff, 123.
  \item \textsuperscript{62} Cf. W 2, 57-8/ Diff, 123-124.
\end{itemize}
“both subject and object are posited as Subject-Object” and “the Absolute presents itself in both together as the highest synthesis that nullifies both in so far as they are opposed.”63 Both poles are thus equally credited for their being real for itself and hence for their status as “an object of a science.”64 Since both poles are equally conceived as something real in and through the absolute identity, the opposition of the two in Schelling’s system is real. Accordingly, Schelling’s system enables one to conceive both of its parts, nature and intelligence, as distinct ways in which the absolute identity is realized: nature as a self-determining, constitutively teleological totality, and consciousness as equally conditioned by nature. Nature and Intelligence, in other words, have only quantitative difference, such that neither of the two sciences has superiority over the other. The philosopher of the identity philosophy can then only show the “inner identity” of the two poles of the system.65 He is thus assumed to achieve an absolute equilibrium of its two parts by achieving the point of absolute indifference between the two.

Hegel claims that Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre reduces the absolute identity to the subject pole by setting up a causal relationship between the pure and empirical Ego. It thus turns out that in Fichte’s system, “the only consciousness that exists is pure consciousness,” whereas “it is flatly denied that empirical consciousness is.”66 The object pole, in other words, is here conceived of as an ideal moment for the subject pole; hence, Fichte’s system is based off of an ideal opposition between subject and object. This is, so to speak, a nullification of the ontological objective validity of the world of non-Ego. Such is the consequence of Fichte’s

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63 W 2, 94/ Diff, 155.
64 W 2, 100/ Diff, 160.
65 Ibid.
66 W 2, 54/ Diff, 121.
subjectively one-sided identity of subject and object. Therefore, Hegel concludes that the “absolute identity of the Ego,” capable of grounding the whole system of philosophy—incorporating both poles of subject and object, Ego and non-Ego, consciousness and nature—cannot be such a “pure identity” opposed to the non-Ego, but must be “both identity and duplication at once.”67 This is the point that evades Fichte’s thought, demonstrating Fichte’s falling into the finite mode of thinking, reflection.

4.3. The Problem of the Subjectivist Model of Consciousness

Hegel’s primary concern in the Differenzschrift is to spell out the difference between Fichte and Schelling in favor of Schelling’s identity philosophy, but Hegel gradually gives up his alliance with Schelling. As it is well documented, the Phenomenology of Spirit of 1807 formalizes Hegel’s break with his younger, wizardly friend by identifying the latter’s philosophy as formalism that captures only a “night in which all cows are black.”68 The Phenomenology of Spirit therefore suggests that the absolute is found, not in the absolute indifference of Schelling, but in the life of spirit tarrying with the negative, which necessarily makes itself into its own other and becomes for itself in its being otherness to itself. Indeed, the Phenomenology of Spirit does not fully develop a systematic concept of spirit; nor does it systematically consider the relationship between nature and spirit. Despite this, the conception of spirit as the self-relating negativity exhibits Hegel’s ultimate position about the proper way of achieving a philosophical system. As his mature system of the Encyclopedia substantializes, a philosophical system grasps

67 W2, 55/ Diff, 122.
68 GW9, 17-8/ PhS §16.
the absolute as the logical Idea’s externalization into nature and the sublation of nature by spirit. Thus, the truly speculative identity is for Hegel to be grasped in terms of the sublation of nature by and into spirit insofar as spirit is inherently self-relating negativity.

Along with Hegel’s declaration of his departure from Schelling, one might be tempted to take the *Phenomenology of Spirit* as resuscitating some elements of Fichte’s conception of consciousness as an act [*Tathandlung*]. Both Fichte’s pure Ego and Hegel’s spirit are characterized as self-conscious and active. Further, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* sets up a connection between natural consciousness and the perspective of a philosopher (‘for-us’) as the methodological ground of how natural consciousness achieves absolute knowing by going through all its experiences. Apparently, this is comparable to the relationship between empirical and transcendental consciousness in Fichte’s *Wissenschaftslehre*.

However, these factors which Fichte and Hegel seem to have in common appear to have no substantial meaning, if not for the self-relating, active element assigned to the principle of a philosophical system. Obviously, both Fichte and Hegel can be said to inaugurate *self-consciousness* as the truth of *consciousness*. But they have different ideas of each of those key terms. If self-conscious activity is for Hegel an essential term that articulates the speculative identity, this is so, strictly speaking, insofar as that activity belongs to spirit and not to consciousness. For the same reason, when Hegel establishes in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* that the truth of consciousness is self-consciousness, both consciousness and self-consciousness belong to natural consciousness which has to make experience, such that they are not concerned with such a pure Ego as that of Fichte which ultimately involves an intellectual intuition. More importantly, Hegel leaves no room for reducing self-consciousness as the truth of consciousness
or the self-relating, active nature of spirit, to a self-awareness of an individual mind. Hegel’s
departure from Schelling and the subsequent development of his doctrines of consciousness and
spirit, therefore, cannot be understood as a reinstatement of Fichte’s doctrine of the pure Ego, if
not the global theme of the superiority of spirit over nature.

Therefore, Hegel’s notion of spirit differs both from Fichte’s pure Ego and Schelling’s
nature-intelligence identity. Perhaps it is correct to say that Hegel finds a third way of
establishing a philosophical system. To my understanding, this is the place where we can discuss
the significance of the early fragmentary manuscript of Hegel, “the Philosophy of Spirit of
1803/4.” In this manuscript, Hegel establishes the thesis that consciousness is the concept of
spirit, assuming that nature and spirit differ from each other depending on whether the absolute
union of being and becoming is only implicit (nature) or actual (spirit). As I will show in the next
section, Hegel thus theorizes consciousness as a living organism, and yet as a particular sort of
an organism in which spirit becomes spirit for itself. Thus, this early Jena manuscript affirms the
superiority of spirit over nature and not the equilibrium of the two, and hence alludes Hegel’s
departure from Schelling. But it also shows how Hegel develops his notion of consciousness on a
different base from that of Fichte’s Ego, specifically by conceiving it as a living organism.

Importantly, Hegel’s criticism of the Fichtean conception of consciousness is part of his
broader critical assessment of the modern concept of the subject. In his Lectures on the History
of Philosophy, Hegel appreciates that Descartes’ philosophy is the “true starting point of modern
philosophy.” Specifically, Descartes opened up a completely new era in the history of

69 W 20, 123.
philosophy by transplanting philosophy to a new sphere, i.e., “the sphere of subjectivity.” For Hegel, both Kant and Fichte move within that sphere opened up by Descartes, one in which subjectivity is considered at the level of an individual mind and not of spirit’s self-relation. Hegel holds that such a modern concept of subjectivity clings to a rigid opposition between an individual mind and the external world; it thus also represents antithetical principles that frame modern forms of life. While the speculative identity is ultimately concerned with overcoming all the antithetical structures framing modernity, Hegel sees that Fichte remains in the framework of the Cartesian Cogito by taking the I, conceived as self-certainty and such a self-relation, as the absolute starting point for building up a philosophical system. Just as he did in the Differenzschrift, so too does Hegel appreciate in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy the speculative aspect of Fichte’s notion of the ego. What Fichte developed was “the absolute form,” which affirms the idealist truth that “all the matter in the universe must be represented as produced from the ego.” However, Fichte ultimately turned this absolute ego into “the artificial consciousness,” “the consciousness of consciousness,” by making the ordinary consciousness of the one who is philosophizing into his own object.

Along the lines of those critical remarks of Hegel, we can therefore pose a question as to whether the activity of Fichte’s pure Ego is, in fact, reducible to the activity of the Cartesian Cogito. Is it not the case that consciousness, which is assumed to be irreducible to such a psychological fact as that of Reinhold, is now instead understood by Fichte as a psychological

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70 W 20, 130.
71 Cf. W 20, 391-391.
72 W 20, 388.
73 W 20, 393.
act of an individual philosopher’s mind? At this point, Hegel’s criticism of Fichte’s *Tathandlung* for being only ideal in his system becomes more comprehensible. In Fichte’s *Wissenschaftslehre*, Hegel finds that both the distinction between and identity of empirical and transcendental consciousness take place in the consciousness of a philosopher. *Tathandlung* thus becomes an act that the philosopher of the *Wissenschaftslehre* carries out, which amounts to saying that transcendental consciousness becomes empirical consciousness. Is this not a trap that one cannot but help falling into without ever knowing how to get out of it when adopting the first-person perspective?

If Fichte’s pure Ego thus involves some methodological considerations regarding how consciousness can operate as an active principle, Hegel’s rejection of the Cartesian-Fichtean model of the ego for its inherently subjectivist orientation can more fully be explained by his distinction between external and internal reflection. The distinction between the two sorts of reflection is made in the Preface to the *Phenomenology of Spirit* where Hegel speaks of the customary way of writing a preface to one’s own work. It is generally assumed that in a preface the author explains the goal he sets for himself and how his approach is related to others’ approaches to the same subject matter. But Hegel suggests that each work of philosophy should be considered as part of the whole history of philosophy, i.e., the whole truth that has the form of an organic unity. Just as the truth reveals itself over time through such a teleological movement of the history of philosophy, so does the thing itself [*die Sache selbst*]74 require “development

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74 The German *Sache* literally means the subject matter of a talk or an action. But Hegel imposes a particular meaning upon it: reality that is produced by reason, one that has in itself rationality. *Sache* thus prefigures the spiritual reality, namely the substantiality of spirit which in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel considers in terms of the ethical life of the ancient Greek. Jean Hyppolite highlights that *Sache* is objectivity, and yet the most contentful objectivity, calling it “spiritual objectivity:” cf., Jean Hyppolite, *Genesis and Structure of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. Samuel Cherniak and John Heckman (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974; the French original published in 1946), 300. In the *Logic*, *Sache* also implies the unity of being and thought. It is “the concept
[Ausführen]” because “the actual whole is not the result, but the result together with its becoming.”

Since the result is a result of a becoming, if one deals only with the result left behind its coming to be, this amounts to setting aside an essential part of the thing itself. Philosophical reflection is then only external to the thing itself. In order for a philosophical reflection to be internal to the thing itself, therefore, it is necessary to “reside in the thing itself and forget oneself in it.” At the center of this statement is the idea that the actual reality, called the thing itself, has in itself rationality; truly philosophical reflections consist in making the truth of such a rational reality emerge from within itself. Internal reflection therefore assumes a necessary, inherent connection between philosophical reflection and the thing itself, such that the rationality of the thing itself, in order for it to be truly actual, requires a philosophical reflection, and a philosophical reflection can be internally involved in the thing itself because of the rationality of the thing itself. A dynamic, living relationship between philosophy and reality thus defines an internal reflection, in comparison to an external reflection that grasps only the dead result left behind the movement of actuality.

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75 GW 9, 10-11; PhS, § 3.
76 Ibid.
4.4. Rationale for the non-Cartesian-Fichtean Model of Self-consciousness

The Cartesian-Fichtean model of the ego for Hegel can be said to be associated with an external reflection since it presupposes an antithetical relationship between a philosophizing subject and his objects. But the distinction between external and internal reflection also gives a clue for understanding how Hegel’s notion of spirit can offer an alternative conception of a self-relating activity to Fichte’s pure Ego. What kind of self-relation and activity, if not of an individual’s self-consciousness, can be thought in pursuit of a philosophical system? At this point, it appears that Kant’s theory of the power of reflecting judgement offers an insight into the context in which what Hegel calls internal reflection carries an important meaning specifically with regard to the issue of overcoming the dualism between nature and human by a non-subjectivist model of self-relation.

To begin with, it should first be noted that the issue of a philosophical system, conceived by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, is not only concerned with the local problem of the Transcendental Deduction, but more broadly and more fundamentally with Kant’s dualism of nature and morality. Throughout the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant presents a dualistic system comprised by the mechanism of natural causality and the metaphysics of moral freedom, without giving an account of a common ground of the two. In his Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant attempts to show how the two sorts of teleological experience, i.e., aesthetic experience of beauty and reflective comprehension of an organism, can bridge nature and morality. At this point, it is worth nothing that the theory of the power of reflecting judgement in Kant’s third Critique affirms an opposite direction to the first Critique: from object to subject, instead of from subject to object. The first Critique sets forth the goal of
carrying out a Copernican revolution in philosophy by switching the direction of the working assumption: from the assumption that our knowledge must confirm to its object, to the notion that the object must confirm to our knowledge.\textsuperscript{77} It thus theorizes pure reason as that which has a full capacity for self-investigation. The validity of the objects of natural sciences is assumed to be guaranteed by pure reason’s investigations into its own powers and limits; the errors of the old metaphysics can also be revealed by the same power of pure reason. To that extent, the first \textit{Critique} can largely be said to reiterate the Cartesian approach proceeding from a thinking self to the world of objects. Yet, the third \textit{Critique} pays attention to the fact that certain products of nature are not subject to mechanistic laws of nature, i.e., living organisms. In relation to living organisms, human understanding possesses no concepts under which to subsume those non-mechanistic products of nature and hence cannot be determining. For those products, reflecting judgement is in play, putting forward from within itself universal principles that may correspond to those phenomena exceeding the categories of understanding. It thus brings up a teleological idea of a natural end [\textit{Naturzweck}] affirming “internal purposiveness in organized beings,” namely the idea that “an organized product of nature is that in which everything is an end and reciprocally a means as well.”\textsuperscript{78} In this way, reflecting judgement proceeds from nature to understanding.

\textsuperscript{77} Cf. Kant, \textit{KrV}, B xvi.

\textsuperscript{78} \textit{KU}, §66. With regard to the teleological notion of the end of nature [\textit{Naturzweck}], Kant states that it is a subjective maxim for our understanding and not a constitutive principle determining how the object is constituted: cf., \textit{KU}, §76. As with transcendental Ideas, only the regulative value is thus acknowledged for the notion of the end of nature. Underlying this notion is the idea that we cannot say that \textit{there is} a teleological constitution of nature, but some teleological presumptions are heuristically necessary in pursuit of grounding a natural science. But this idea seems to involve an important ambiguity, since it involves skepticism about the teleology of nature on the one hand, and yet suggests that the teleology can have objective validity on the other. Regarding this, Hegel claims that Kant’s restriction of the operation of the power of judgment to a regulative use makes the Kantian reflection into an external reflection: cf. \textit{The Science of Logic}, p. 350. It is an external reflection because it “applies itself to the immediate as to something given.” If it is proved that neither reflection nor object is immediate, such that “reflection rises in its process of determination” and the universals put forward by reflection are “the essence of the immediate
Kant’s consideration of the power of reflecting judgement likely approves an alternative conception of a self-relation to the Cartesian-Fichtean model of self-consciousness that assumes a first-person perspective for a methodical ground and a third-person perspective on the subject matters under investigations. Although Kant himself does not develop an alternative conception of a self-relation from his considerations of the power of reflecting judgement, perhaps we can speculate that as a power of reflecting judgement, human understanding is reflecting, not simply in the sense that it turns back to itself from certain natural phenomena, but more fundamentally in the sense that it is a self-understanding through self-discovery in nature. This being said, nature is a mirror or an objective counterpart by mediation of which human understanding comes to recognize the universals within itself. Reflecting judgement is therefore internal both to nature and understanding itself; internal to nature because it starts from nature, and internal to understanding because understanding discovers itself in nature.

Assuming this, Hegel’s endorsement of and departure from Schelling can be better understood. Indeed, Kant’s doctrine of reflecting judgment, if his restriction of it to a regulative use can be set aside, justifies viewing nature as that in which rational principles are somehow exhibited. From the perspective of reflecting judgement, therefore, there is some truth in Schelling’s idea that one can assign an equal status to nature as intelligence, such that both are equally considered as different modes of expression of the absolute—just as Spinoza conceives extension and thought as different attributes of one and the same substance. However, if we are correct in assuming that the operation of reflecting judgement makes it necessary to conceive of

from which the reflection began,” then, there is no reason for claiming that the reflection is only concerned with the subjective conditions of our faculties. Such is, for Hegel, “absolute reflection.” In Chapter 4, I discuss Kant’s teleology of nature and Hegel’s non-teleological conception of nature in detail.
nature as a mirror or the counterpart of human understanding by the mediation of which understanding comes to recognize itself and thus becomes conscious of itself, it seems insufficient to simply say that nature is an expression of the absolute. Rather, we would have to say, more precisely, that nature is an expression of the absolute, and yet only insofar as nature is that in and through which mind comes to recognize itself by reflecting into itself from nature. The movement of reflection, in other words, is completed by the reflecting subject and not simply by reflected nature. That reflecting subject, however, cannot be a self-consciousness of an individual mind, insofar as an individual mind, theoretically and practically, stands in an oppositional relationship to object. This is the point where Hegel’s notion of spirit, defined as a self-relating negativity, becomes significant.

5. Hegel’s Definition of Consciousness as the Concept of Spirit

Our final question is about the status of consciousness in Hegel’s system. As we have seen above, Hegel denies first-person perspective notions of consciousness for its being inherently dualistic. But this does not imply that Hegel dismisses the problem of consciousness

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79 This does not imply that Hegel denies the reality of the psychological experiences that one describes with the first-person singular pronoun “I.” Importantly, Hegel maintains that consciousness is structured by the opposition of the abstract I and an object external to it. As we notice in the Phenomenology of Spirit of the 1830 Encyclopedia, however, Hegel understand the essentially oppositional constitution of consciousness in terms of a practical relationship between a desiring, appetitive subject and an object that it desires rather than as an epistemic opposition between a cognizing subject and a cognized object. In Chapter 3, I will argue that Hegel critically appropriates the Kantian notion of abstract I, as he calls it, by conceptualizing the conscious opposition as a confrontation between a desiring subject and a desired object. What is important to Hegel is that consciousness, namely a practical subject who relates herself to the world through desire has an intersubjective subjectivity. To put it differently, consciousness is a practical relationship that is mediated by the world of objectivity rather than an immediate encounter and consumption of an object of desire. If it lacks the mediation by the world of intersubjective objectivity, it remains a one-sidedly subjective consciousness that is trapped inside itself. As I will show in Chapter
itself. Rather, the problem of consciousness is at the center of his philosophy of spirit. The connection of consciousness and spirit is so essential for Hegel’s system that we would have to say that there is no consciousness without spirit, and no spirit without consciousness. Now, Hegel’s doctrine of consciousness should then involve an account of the identity of subject and object, since Hegel claims to conduct a speculative philosophy with his denial of any dualistic conceptions. The identity of subject and object has little to do with correspondence between a cognizing mind and a cognized object, but more so with two antithetical poles whose features can be characterized in terms of subjectivity and objectivity—specifically, nature and spirit. Further, Hegel contends that a genuinely speculative identity consists in the identity of identity and difference, not in the only one-sided identity opposed to difference. This being said, a speculative doctrine of consciousness should then involve an account of the speculative identity of identity and difference. What can such a speculative notion of consciousness be?

5.1. Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit of 1803/4

Regarding Hegel’s speculative notion of consciousness, it should first be noted that in the aftermath of Fichte and Schelling, a crucial matter of the project of a philosophical system consists in reconciling the two distinct spheres: nature and morality, necessity and freedom, or nature and intelligence—broadly speaking, non-human nature and non-natural humanity. If consciousness for Hegel has a systematic significance, therefore, the systematic significance can

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5 through an examination of the “Feeling Soul” section in the Anthropology, this solipsistic consciousness, which believes what it senses and feels to be true and objective, is for Hegel fundamentally pathological. Therefore, the “Feeling Soul” section can largely be read, I suggest, as Hegel’s criticism of the subjectivist tendency to privilege one’s immediate, personal experiences predicated of the first-person singular pronoun “I.”
be found in his considerations of consciousness as a being that is both natural and spiritual. In his *Philosophy of Spirit of 1803/4*, known as his first attempt to develop his own system, we notice that it starts with consciousness, following the discussion of an animal organism at the end of the philosophy of nature. We also notice that consciousness is considered a being that makes itself into a conscious being, or a spiritual being that becomes spiritual by spiritualizing itself. Though only implicitly, this early manuscript of Hegel thus seems to anticipate the notion of the soul presented in the *Anthropology* of his mature system of the *Encyclopedia* that it is an embodied mind: a natural existent that spiritualizes itself in and through that natural existent, more precisely. In other words, what is implicit in the *Philosophy of Spirit of 1803/4* is the idea that consciousness is a being that spiritualizes itself and as such, has the status of a link between Nature and Spirit in the philosophical system. And this is, as far as I see, what makes his early conception of consciousness break from the post-Kantian, first-person oriented philosophy of consciousness I have treated in this chapter. I will also reflect on Hegel’s lines of thought presented in this early Jena manuscript about the relationship between nature and spirit while having his philosophy of subjective spirit in the 1830 *Encyclopedia* in view. Among the three parts of the *System of Speculative Philosophy 1803/4*, the manuscript of the first part, the *Logic*, does not survive; the *Philosophy of Spirit* is translated into English by Harris and Knox, but there is no English translation of the *Philosophy of Nature*. In the present work, I will provide my translation when citing passages from the *Philosophy of Nature*; the existing English translation of Harris and Knox will be used for citations from the *Philosophy of Spirit*, followed by the abbreviation *PS 1803/4*.

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80 The *System of Ethical Life*, written in 1802/3, is also taken as one of the earliest of Hegel’s “systematic” manuscript. In the Introduction to his English translation, Harris suggests that this manuscript of 1802/3 represents the third part of the four-part system comprised of *Logic, Philosophy of Nature, Ethical Nature*, and *Religion*, which Hegel had been working on since 1801: cf. G.W.F. Hegel, *System of Ethical Life (1802/3) and First Philosophy of Spirit (Part III of the System of Speculative Philosophy 1803/4)*, ed. and trans. H.S. Harris and T.M. Knox (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1979), 5-8. The *System of Ethical Life* deserves a serious amount of research with regard to Hegel’s early conception of a philosophical system as well as his insight into practical and political dimensions of human life and their systematic meanings. Now, it is in the *System of Speculative Philosophy 1803/4* (*Jenaer Systementwürfe I: Das System der spekulativen Philosophie 1803/4*) that Hegel puts forward for the first time the idea of the three-part system, comprised of *Logic, Philosophy of Nature*, and *Philosophy of Spirit*. The *Philosophy of Spirit of 1803/4* thus has a significant value in tracing the development of Hegel’s fundamental idea that a philosophical system must be a system of *Geist*. But the manuscript is only fragmentary and contains many elements of Schelling’s identity philosophy, as we can see, for instance, from his theorization of sensation in terms of the three levels [Potenz]. It is therefore hard to say that in this manuscript Hegel works on his systematic concept of spirit entirely independent of Schelling. Without intending to neglect such a transitory character of this manuscript, however, I will attempt to draw out some fundamental ideas of Hegel as far as they help shedding light on the originality of Hegel’s notion of consciousness in relation to other post-Kantian German philosophers of consciousness I have treated in this chapter.
consciousness. For Hegel, consciousness is far from being a principle whether it be expressed as a proposition of a fact of consciousness [Tatsache] (Reinhold) or as an act of pure Ego [Tathandlung] (Fichte). It is neither a psychological fact nor a psychological act, but something living, a special kind of living being of which life and existence is to be considered in terms of spirit.

In the *Philosophy of Spirit of 1803/4*, Hegel establishes that “consciousness is the concept of spirit.”\(^1\) This is Hegel’s first clear formulation about the relationship between consciousness and spirit. This intrinsic relationship between the two was not mentioned in the *System of Ethical Life* of 1802/3 but becomes more and more important in his later works, specifically the *Phenomenology of Spirit* of 1807. In what follows, I examine the meaning of the thesis that consciousness is the concept of spirit. By paying attention to what relationship is set up by this thesis among nature, consciousness, and spirit, I attempt to articulate an answer to our previous question as to what Hegel’s speculative notion of consciousness can be.

Before delving into an analysis of the thesis that consciousness is the concept of spirit, Harris’s “Introduction” to his translation of the *Philosophy of Spirit of 1803/4* is worth mentioning because it gives a good account of the context and character of this fragmentary text. Hegel composed the *Philosophy of Spirit of 1803/4* for his course of 1803: “philosophiae universae delineation,” i.e., “outline of universal philosophy.” As Harris points out, Hegel understand “universal philosophy” within the framework of the identity philosophy as pursuing a systematic treatment of two realities of the Idea: body and spirit, or nature and *Sittlichkeit*. Hegel thus brings up a being-conscious [*Bewusst-sein*] as the point where the two realities of the Idea

\(^1\) GW 6, 266/ PS 1803/4, 206.
converge—“man as the embodiment of the theoretical reason” toward which the philosophy of nature is elevated and “the free spontaneity of practical reason” in which the philosophy of spirit finds its origin. Harris emphasizes that a theory of consciousness is the most important and most difficult part of the *Philosophy of Spirit of 1803/4*. But we can be assured, he states, of the fact that Hegel’s theory of consciousness developed in this text synthesizes the idealist position, claiming for a reality’s belonging to the mind, and the realist position, claiming for a mind-independent reality. Hegel thus nullifies the opposition of self and world by considering consciousness as “a neutral position,” in such a way that from this neutral position the opposition is comprehended. With regard to the thesis that consciousness is the concept of spirit, Harris points out that this idea was not present in the text of the *System of Ethical Life* of 1802/3, which Hegel distilled from his lectures on “natural law” in a form suitable for direct incorporation into the system of universal philosophy. He suggests that the thesis’s absence in the previous text is ultimately concerned with the difficulty Hegel believed he could easily solve when he began to write the *System of Ethical Life* as an outline of universal philosophy. According to him, Hegel holds the idea of a philosophy of nature that “life reaches its point of absolute contraction in the consciousness of the cognitive organism,” but the spatial notion of the point of absolute contraction, though considered as that which expands *from within itself*, does not make it known how spirit can be seen *from within itself*. In the *Philosophy of Spirit of 1803/4*, Hegel resolves this difficulty, Harris suggests, by describing the self-evolvement of spirit, as conscious-being, from within itself. For Harris, this is the point where the thesis that consciousness is the concept

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82 *PS 1803/4*, 190.
83 *PS 1803/4*, 194.
84 *PS 1803/4*, 190.
of spirit comes into play. Interestingly, Harris seems to assume that the ultimate meaning of this thesis is found in what Hegel calls a third consciousness, which denotes, according to him, an observer of the spirit’s self-evolvement who does not simply observe it from outside but also participates in bringing it to consciousness. For Harris, the Philosophy of Spirit of 1803/4 is therefore significant in its anticipation of the Phenomenology of Spirit of 1807.\textsuperscript{85}

In the years of 1803/4, Hegel largely remains in the framework of Schelling’s identity philosophy. But Harris’s analysis of the Philosophy of Spirit of 1803/4 above likely seems to authorize us to set Hegel’s notion of consciousness presented in the context of Fichte’s discussion of consciousness. This is specifically because his understanding of Hegel’s notion of a third consciousness seems to be comparable to Fichte’s conception of a transcendental consciousness. However, the Fichtean interpretation of Hegel’s notion of consciousness is hardly tenable given Hegel’s criticism of Fichte’s transcendental Ego, and his rejection of subjectivism. Another important aim of this section is therefore to elucidate how Hegel’s notion of consciousness developed in his early Jena manuscript differs from Fichte’s and how it declines the first-person perspective notion of consciousness in general.

5.2. Hegel’s Definition of Consciousness as the Concept of Spirit

To facilitate our analysis, I here consider Hegel’s thesis that consciousness is the concept of spirit, as involving a twofold distinction: a distinction between nature and spirit on the one hand, and a distinction between consciousness and spirit on the other. Insofar as consciousness is

\textsuperscript{85} PS 1803/4, 191.
the concept of *spirit*, how spirit differs from nature and how consciousness is spiritual are essential for defining what consciousness is. But consciousness, since it is the *concept* of spirit, cannot itself be identical with spirit, implying that there remain certain natural aspects to consciousness. Correspondingly, we see that throughout the introductory part of the Philosophy of Spirit (Fragment 15 and 16) Hegel works on ontological determinations of nature, spirit, and consciousness, which are in fact quite complex and often confusing. Regarding the distinction between nature and spirit, Hegel states that whereas in nature the union of being and becoming remains an inner aspect of nature, something hidden, “in the philosophy of spirit […] it is really their absolute union as absolute becoming.” The distinction between consciousness and spirit is then said to consist in the fact that “in the spirit it [the absolute union of being and becoming] exists for itself,” whereas consciousness remains the concept of spirit.

**External and Internal Organism**

To make comprehensible those complex ontological ideas that together constitute the definition of consciousness as the concept of spirit, it should be noted that Hegel finds a close connection between the life of an organism and spirit. An organism for Hegel is a theme that emerges at the culminating point of the development of Nature where Spirit is at play. This idea requires some detailed analysis of the last part of the *Philosophy of Nature* (Fragment 15), in which Hegel suggests considering an organism in terms of the twofold system comprised by what he calls an external and internal organism. An external organism is concerned with the

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86 GW 6, 268/ PS 1803/4, 206.
87 GW 6, 266/ PS 1803/4, 206.
structuring of an organic body; but it alone does not make the body *organic*, since structuring a body into different parts does not necessarily ensure an *organic* relationship between the whole and parts. On the other hand, an internal organism—which is in its turn a threefold system of senses, lymph, and nerve—makes parts be the whole and the whole immediately exist in parts. Without an internal organism, an external organism is nothing but an inorganic assembly of different bodily parts.

What draws our attention in Hegel’s theory of internal organism is the idea that the totality of an organic body cannot properly be thought of in terms of the static ontological category, i.e., being or substance. An organic body is in a constant movement of constituting itself as a whole; hence, its oneness cannot simply be thought of as a being-one, but fundamentally as becoming-one. Hegel thus states that the organic whole is “absolute one,” in which each part is itself an internal organism, i.e. “unseparated becoming.” For this reason, Hegel does not consider an external and internal organism only in terms of biological operations of an organic body. Those antithetical factors can rather be conceptualized as quasi-principles: a fluid one (internal organism) which communicates particular parts with each other such that they are connected to each other, thereby being itself present in all those parts; a static one (external organism) which is concerned with already particularized, structuralized bodily parts. As such, an internal organism represents the universal in particulars; an external organism, the particulars that can operate as particulars by virtue of the operation of the universal. An internal organism represents the principle of becoming; an external organism, the principle of being.

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88 Cf. *GW* 6, 246.
89 Ibid.
Based on this, Hegel establishes that the life of an organism consists in a dynamic, inseparable connection of the two organisms, i.e., in its being “the movement that makes itself out of the indifference of fluidity into a potency [sich potenziert] of the difference of its moments and preserves its differentiating movement in the fluidity.”\textsuperscript{90} Accordingly, life and death for Hegel can also be defined in terms of the relationship of an internal and external organism. An organism is alive when an internal organism does not fail to perform its proper operations, commuting particular bodily parts. A dynamic and inseparable relationship of an internal and external organism is thus essential to life. On the other hand, an organism gets ill when an internal organism does not function properly, when the factor of the absolute fluidity, in other words, is isolated from the other constructing factor and thus becomes for itself. From this, it follows that the life of an organism exhibits an infinite unity, a union of two antithetical factors. Life is a union in which the universal (absolute fluidity) is present to and in all particulars (bodily parts). As such, it is a union of being and becoming. In this context, the life of an organism for Hegel prefigures spirit which is essentially being-itself in being-an-other.

\textit{Nature and Spirit: Organism in General and Conscious organism}

That the organic life \textit{prefigures} spirit does not mean that it \textit{is} spirit. While bringing up becoming as a prominent ontological category for thinking about the totality of an organism, Hegel on the other hand concludes that being and becoming are not united in nature. This is because, according to Hegel, an internal organism is only a “passive medium”\textsuperscript{91} that is in a

\textsuperscript{90} GW 6, 247.
\textsuperscript{91} GW 6, 248.
constant movement of becoming—becoming its other, particular bodily parts, more precisely—without being able to constitute its own being. It is, in other words, a universal that is to constantly dissolve itself into particulars so as to remain the universal. As such, it is an absolute fluidity, a negativity which cannot constitute its self-identity. The fact that an internal organism is such a passive, only negative medium, fundamentally pertains to another fact of an organism, i.e., that it gets ill and dies. As we have seen above, Hegel holds that disease and death occur when an internal organism cannot perform its proper functions, when it loses its negative connection to the external organism. This means that in nature there is no way for a universal factor to become for itself, since its becoming for itself means death, an end to the life of an organism. As far as its becoming for itself means an annulation of its existence together with the death of the entire organism, an internal organism for Hegel cannot be said to be genuinely internal to an external organism. As far as it should constantly annihilate itself without ever being able to constitute its own being in its becoming its other, an internal organism fundamentally remains external to an external organism. Therefore, if the organic life prefigures spirit, the biological death explains why it cannot itself be spirit.

While an internal and external organism are concerned with a bodily constitution of an individual organism, Hegel next examines sensation in terms of a genus-process. Since Fragment 15, as the last stage in the development of Nature, has for its subject matter the life and totality of an organism, sensation is here not a matter of a perceptive cognition of an external object. It is rather concerned with an animal’s self-feeling, which involves an immediate feeling of the species it belongs to and an immediate recognition of another individual belonging to the same species and having an opposite sex. Sensation, thus understood, triggers an entire genus-process by motivating individual animals to go engage in sexual intercourse. Hegel states that “its [an
individual’s] particularity immediately becomes absolute universality, that what an individual acts [tun] for itself, immediately becomes an act for the whole species.” ⁹² Indeed, it can hardly be the case that the universality of the species comes to the consciousness of individual animals involved in a sex-relation [Geschlechtsverhältnis], as if they were consciously aware of their belonging to the same species. But when we pay attention to their act, it turns out that an animal’s feeling of itself and another, as it occurs in a sex-relation, involves a complex recognitional relationship taking place at an unconscious, non-rational level. ⁹³ It is a quasi-recognitional relationship in the Hegelian sense inasmuch as a species is a universal that is produced by individuals’ mutual acts. Although begetting a newborn necessarily involves an individual’s coming to be, we do not necessarily have to assume that an individual’s qua individual animal’s coming to be is all about sex-relation. Further, the genus-process is for Hegel a process in which an individual’s act is an act for the whole species, one in which a universal comes to be by particulars’ mutual acts. However, Hegel points out, on the other hand, that in a genus-process a species comes to be at the sacrifice of individuals in the sense that the death of an individuals is necessary for the subsistence of a species. A species is thus for Hegel a being that is maintained throughout constant appearance and disappearance of individuals, which is opposite to the case of an internal organism. If an internal organism exhibits an only negative universality that is to constantly dissolve itself into particulars, a species is a universal that can exist only by virtue of individuals’ constant appearance and disappearance. But they make no difference in that being and becoming, universality and particularity, identity and difference, are

⁹² GW 6, 264.

not united in them. Consequently, “in nature the unity of being and becoming is only something hidden [das Verborgene].”

At this point, we can clarify how Hegel’s definition of consciousness as the concept of spirit gives an account of the ontological difference between an organism in general and a conscious/spiritual organism. Considering the lines of thought of Hegel regarding an internal organism and a genus-process, the being of conscious/spiritual organism consists in its being an *active* medium having two requirements. First, it should be a medium in which a universal maintains its subsistence through the relationship it makes with individuals without itself being constantly dissipated into particulars. Second, it should be a medium in which individuals are not merely perishing moments for the existence of the universal, but rather the beings that produce their existence through the relationship in which it stands with the universal. In the case of a conscious/spiritual organism, in other words, there cannot be a universal that can stand without individuals, nor can there be an individual that can stand without a universal.

Now, it is worth noting that Hegel highlights that an internal organism is the medium of an internal and external organism and not merely one of the two juxtaposed in opposition to the other. This idea illustrates Hegel’s fundamental, speculative thesis that identity is not a finite term opposed to another finite term, i.e. difference, but the identity of identity and difference. With regard to the way in which the relationship between the universal and an individual — which defines consciousness as the concept of spirit—exhibits a speculative identity, perhaps we can refer to the idea in the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit that spirit is essentially a self-relating negativity; more fundamentally, to the thesis given in the mature system of the

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94 *GW* 6, 268/ *PS* 1803/4, 205.
Encyclopedia that spirit is an internalization of itself from its outer existence in nature, nature which is in its turn an externalization of the logical Idea. In the Philosophy of Spirit of 1803/4, however, Hegel does not seem to have attained such a clear articulation. As we will see below, he instead develops the theory of the middle [das Mitte] as an explanation of how consciousness can be such an active medium.

Despite this, it can be noted that this early manuscript displays Hegel’s original idea that spirit differs from nature in virtue of its potential for positively constituting its self-identity in its self-negation. Of importance here is that the difference of spirit from nature is not merely conceptual, but rather something that occurs as differentiation through the conscious/spiritual organism. This would be the fundamental reason why conscious/spiritual organism is called a medium. Thus, Hegel states that “the being of consciousness is at first […] that it is the ideality of nature; in other words, it is at first in [a] negative relation with nature, and in this negative relation it exists as related to nature itself within the nature; the mode of its existence is not a particularity [or] a singularity of nature, but a universal [moment] of nature, an element of it.”95 If spirit can be understood as a universal in which individuals partake in their existence, this is so insofar as the being of consciousness consists in the ideality of nature.

Referring to the master-slave dialectic in the Phenomenology of Spirit, the thesis that the being of consciousness consists in the ideality of nature can be understood as meaning that consciousness, considered only as a natural being, is only a negative universality that is to constantly consume natural objects for its subsistence. As such, consciousness as an organism is attached to natural conditions. We know that the Phenomenology of Spirit thus draws out from

95 GW 6, 276/ PS 1803/4, 214-5.
that basic requirement for the life of self-consciousness the fundamental paradox of self-consciousness: that it cannot entirely annihilate the objects of its natural desire. For this would then mean that there is no way of satisfying its desire. The *Phenomenology of Spirit* presents recognition as the genuine way in which self-consciousness can satisfy its desire, which is also the way in which self-consciousness proves itself to be independent from those natural conditions. It thus frames the mode of existence of a human being, designated by self-consciousness, in terms of a twofold issue: attachment to, and detachment from, nature. Since detachment cannot occur without attachment, perhaps we could say that a human being can be spiritual because it is tied to nature but knows to untie itself from it. Returning to the thesis of the *Philosophy of Spirit of 1803/4* that the being of consciousness consists in the ideality of nature, we can articulate a similar idea that consciousness as an organism is the very place in which nature is idealized, and thus spirit eventually emerges.

5.3. A third: Consciousness and Spirit

In the *Philosophy of Spirit of 1803/4* Hegel conceptualizes the middle [*das Mitte*] as the mode of existence of consciousness, which is an explanation of how consciousness is not to be considered among other living organisms but rather as a conscious organism. The middle has three forms: speech, tool, and family goods. Those three forms of the mode of existence of consciousness then have for their counterparts three activities of consciousness: memory, labor, and family. It is here not hard to see that Hegel is considering the existence of a human being in terms of a threefold activity: psychological, physical-economic, and inter-subjective activities through which speech, tool, and family goods are produced as their material counterparts. But
Hegel underlines that the middle itself is neither consciousness nor its object, but “the work of both,” “the third to which they are related, in which they are one, but [as] that in which they likewise distinguish themselves.”96 If we consider, for instance, speech as one side of the antithesis of which the other is memory, this is for Hegel only “for the standpoint of consciousness which only looks at the antithesis of consciousness.”97 That consciousness exists as the middle, therefore, means that consciousness is an active being that “posits itself as conscious” by “posing both sides [of the middle] and their particular moments as ideal.”98 In other words, consciousness is not an agent who carries out those three activities (memory, labor, family) against their material counterparts (speech, tool, and family goods). But it is an agent who in the middle, “separates himself from his true antithesis: in speech, from others to whom he speaks; in the tool, from that against which he is active with the tool; through the family goods, from the members of his family.”99 In short, the middle is not “that against which he is active […], but […] the means [das Mittel], whereby, through which, he is active against something else.”100

The theory of the middle illustrates Hegel’s struggle for a description of the mode of existence of consciousness without a reflective, dualistic assumption of an active subject and passive object, and of an inner subjectivity and an outer objectivity. The speculative character of this theory is found in the idea that consciousness exists as a medium in which the opposition between conscious acts and its products take place through the activities of consciousness. In this

96 GW 6, 275/ PS 1803/4, 214.
97 GW 6, 277-8/ PS 1803/4, 216.
98 GW 6, 278/ PS 1803/4, 216-7.
99 GW 6, 287/ PS 1803/4, 216.
100 Ibid.
sense, consciousness is not merely an agent who materializes his memory in the form of a speech, uses a tool for producing goods, and manages home life, but an agent who speaks to and with other speakers, labors for the consumers of his products, and raises a family with other family members. This is for Hegel the true meaning of the active nature of consciousness, of the fact that consciousness posits itself as conscious. And this is the way in which consciousness, unlike other animal organisms, constitutes itself as an active medium.

Yet, the account of consciousness as a third, given in the only fragmentary manuscript of Hegel’s early Jena years, does not seem truly speculative unless it is supplemented by another account of how those intersubjective activities are concerned with the speculative identity. Without a well-established notion of spirit, it does not offer a satisfactory account of how those activities can be the ways in which the universal exists through individuals and how individuals exist through the universal.

While the theory of the middle thus seems to remain somewhat obscure, the idea of “a third (consciousness)” which formally resembles the theory of the middle gives an important clue for elucidating the relationship between consciousness and spirit. In the beginning of this section, we established an interpretative thesis that Hegel’s definition of consciousness as the concept of spirit involves two ideas: consciousness is the concept of spirit, and it is the concept of spirit. If the ontological account of the difference between an organism in general and a conscious/spiritual organism clarifies the meaning of consciousness’s being the concept of spirit, now it is to be clarified what it means that consciousness is the concept of spirit, that it is spiritual but not identical with spirit. At this point, I make a loose distinction between a formal and a real definition for the purpose of argumentation, depending on whether the definition
specifies an essence or a true reality in which the essence finds its existence. With regard to the spirituality of consciousness, we can thus refer to the formal definition which concerns the essence of consciousness: consciousness is “the union of the simple and infinity.”\textsuperscript{101} By this Hegel means that consciousness is something simple that unites within itself the opposed terms. To that extent, consciousness is essentially the absolute unity of the antithesis and thus pertains to spirit. However, Hegel establishes on the other hand that this essence is not present for consciousness itself but only “for a third.”\textsuperscript{102} This implies that “consciousness appears only on one side,” only as “active” and “negative”\textsuperscript{103} which is thus opposed to the other side, i.e. something passive that is negated by it. As such, it is an empirical consciousness that “posits only itself as consciousness, that of which it is conscious.”\textsuperscript{104} In other words, although empirical consciousness must be absolute in itself because its essence consists in the absolute unity of the antithesis, it is not absolute as it stands. Correspondingly, the absolute identity of the antithesis remains only a concept and is not yet real. However, it must become such an absolute consciousness for which the absolute unity of the antithesis is not merely a concept but is real, because the absolute identity is its essence. Therefore, Hegel concludes that an empirical consciousness has absolute unity for its goal. Empirical consciousness must become absolute consciousness by sublating all that appears as an other to itself. “This is,” according to Hegel, “the goal, the absolute reality of consciousness, to which we have to elevate its concept.”\textsuperscript{105} Briefly, empirical consciousness is in a movement of becoming absolute consciousness.

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\textsuperscript{101} GW 6, 266/ PS 1803/4, 206.
\textsuperscript{102} GW 6, 273/ PS 1803/4, 212.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{104} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{105} GW 6, 274/ PS 1803/4, 213.
Then, what is a third—a third consciousness to which the absolute unity of the antithesis, which is not immediately present to empirical consciousness, is assumed to be present? Indeed, the concept of consciousness as a third anticipates the perspective of “for us” in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*\(^{106}\)—the speculative perspective of a philosopher who dialectically organizes the experiences of natural consciousness to show how absolute knowing is achieved through those experiences of consciousness. We can therefore say that a third consciousness in the *Philosophy of Spirit of 1803/4* is analogous to the absolute knowing of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, inasmuch as both indicate an absolute unity that can come to be only by empirical or natural consciousness’s movement of itself becoming the absolute unity; this is so because it is, as concept, inherent to empirical or natural consciousness but is not immediately present to it. However, the text of 1803/4 seems to contain more than the methodic ground for the science of experience of consciousness. This can be clarified by our distinction between the formal and real definition as discussed previously. Indeed, it is clear that consciousness as a third does not indicate a concept of the absolute identity which gives a formal definition of consciousness. It rather pertains to the absolute identity that is real, which Hegel vaguely means by “an absolute reality of consciousness.” A third is therefore a real definition of consciousness. Now, if a third

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\(^{106}\) As mentioned in the beginning of this section, Harris claims that the notion of a third (consciousness) in the *Philosophy of Spirit of 1803/4* prefigures the method of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. This leads him to conclude that Hegel here upholds that the genuinely speculative philosophy can be achieved by the perspective of the philosophy of spirit and not by Schelling’s Identity philosophy: cf., H.S. Harris, *Hegel’s First Philosophy of Spirit*, 191. Harris’ claim is suggestive in figuring out the context of Hegel’s early Jena years in which he begins to develop his own theory of consciousness. But it also seems that Harris bases his interpretation of Hegel’s discussion of a third consciousness developed in the text of 1803/4 mainly on the later, far more elaborated notion of the perspective of “for us” in the *Phenomenology of Spirit of 1807*. To my understanding, Harris’s interpretation runs a risk of obscuring the natural aspects which seem to be important in Hegel’s early conception of consciousness. Specifically, the natural aspects of consciousness seem to have important meanings regarding the issue of how consciousness can link Nature and Spirit in Hegel’s system. Although the *Philosophy of Spirit of 1803/4* is only fragmentary and sketchy, we can therefore also notice a certain continuity between this early manuscript and the philosophy of subjective spirit in Hegel’s mature system of the *Encyclopedia*. For these reasons, I here focus more on those natural aspects which I find are important in Hegel’s definition of consciousness given in his early text of 1803/4.
is thus concerned with the absolute unity that is real, this idea seems to fundamentally bear on
the distinction between nature and spirit which we previously discussed. Again, it is Hegel’s
main thesis that in spirit “the union of being and becoming” is “really their absolute union as
absolute becoming” whereas in nature the same union is only something hidden. Since this thesis
states that spirit is an absolute union (of being and becoming) that is real, we can assume a
certain connection between consciousness as a third and spirit that is distinct from nature. If a
third in the text of 1803/4 contains more than the for us or absolute knowing in the
Phenomenology of Spirit, it should therefore be clarified by demonstrating how consciousness as
a third is concerned with the distinction of spirit from nature.

We have seen above that nature for Hegel is characterized as becoming without being. In
this sphere of permanent repetition of appearance and disappearance of individuals, we can
therefore say that the absolute union of being and becoming, one in which the union is both for
the universal and individuals, is its other and not itself. To that extent, it can also be said that
nature is an alterity of spirit; it is the other of the spirit, such that in nature the spirit is the other
of itself without being itself. Therefore, spirit can come to be when its being-otherness in
nature is negated. But the negation must then take place in nature because nature is the very
other of the spirit. We can then pose a question as to specifically in what part of nature the
negation takes place. Is there any particular natural being in which spirit comes to be?

What is in the sphere of spirit, is its own absolute activity; and our knowledge that it
raises itself out of nature […], must be known as knowledge of the spirit itself. Or [it

107 In the Encyclopedia of 1830, Hegel states that “the spirit has nature as its presupposition, of which the truth and
therefore the absolute first is the spirit” (ENZ, § 381).
must be known as] spirit’s coming to be, i.e., its merely negative relation with nature. This negative relation with nature is the negative side of spirit in general, […]]; or in other words, how it becomes the totality of consciousness of the singular. For consciousness itself, as active, as negating, as sublating, the being of its other-being, is consciousness as [the] one side of it, as subjective consciousness or consciousness as absolute singularity.\textsuperscript{108}

According to the passage above, the particular nature in which the negation for spirit’s coming to be occurs is the subjective consciousness, i.e., an individual mind. Individual mind is, in other words, the nature in which spirit comes to be, i.e., a living organism in which a certain negation of nature takes place.

With regard to the issue of the concept of consciousness as a third, as the absolute unity that is real, the passage above stands out due to its exposition of some important epistemological, so to speak, dimensions of spirit. While in this early manuscript Hegel seems to consider spirit chiefly as “the spirit of a people [der Geist eines Volks],”\textsuperscript{109} the passage above defines spirit, above all, in terms of knowledge. Importantly, it states that spirit’s emergence from nature is our knowledge but is to be understood as knowledge of spirit itself. Further, this is so insofar as spirit’s emergence from nature occurs in a particular nature, i.e., an individual mind called subjective consciousness. Thus, we have here three bearers of knowledge: a philosopher, spirit, and mind. At this point, perhaps we can first say that the ultimate bearer of the absolute activity occurring in the sphere of spirit is not necessarily an individual person, i.e. a philosopher who is

\textsuperscript{108} GW 6, 275/ PS 1803/4, 213.

\textsuperscript{109} GW 6, 274/ PS 1803/4, 213.
currently describing spirit’s emergence from nature. Referring to the Preface of the Phenomenology of Spirit, if “everything turns on grasping and expressing the True, not only as Substance, but equally as Subject,”110 “the true shape in which truth exists can only be the scientific system of such truth.”111 Scientific system is of course a written work which materializes an individual philosopher’s reflection. But insofar as a philosopher’s reflection is transformed into such a written, materialized, systematized form of knowledge, this knowledge that thus gains a new body is irreducible to the knowledge that is present in the philosopher’s consciousness. In this context, spirit can be said to be an impersonal form of knowledge that is embodied in the form of a scientific system. This would be the meaning of a somewhat ambiguous expression indicating a philosopher, i.e., the third person pronoun, us. Yet, this requires, according to our analysis above, an account of spirit’s emergence from nature in and through an individual mind called subjective consciousness, i.e., a cognitive living organism. In fact, the subjective consciousness in the passage above likely seems to foreshadow the subjective spirit in the Encyclopedia. In this mature system, Hegel establishes the necessity for spirit’s having a subjective dimension and theorizes the subjective spirit as that in which spirit comes to be for the first time as the embodied soul, which sublates such an immergence in nature, and achieves its concept, i.e., freedom.

The philosophy of subjective spirit in the Encyclopedia thus represents Hegel’s theory of an individual mind. But the Philosophy of Spirit of 1803/4 only throws out the idea that spirit emerges from nature in and through subjective consciousness, without developing a well-

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110 GW 9, 18/ PhS, §17.

111 GW 9, 11-2/ PhS, §5.
elaborated theory explaining how this is the case. Therefore, we cannot here precisely decide the significance of the notion of subjective consciousness for our question about the meaning of consciousness as a third. Despite this, the text of 1803/4 provides us with Hegel’s insight that spirit, insofar as it can be considered as highest form of knowledge, has for its essential moment the finite form of knowledge called either consciousness or subjective spirit.

If we have a point in saying that consciousness as a third can be better understood by an assumption of an impersonal form of knowledge, called spirit and materialized as a system, then, by turning it into an individual persons’ consciousness or knowledge we can also show how Hegel’s model of consciousness differs from Fichte’s. To put it briefly, Hegel’s consciousness as a third, together with “us” in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, can hardly be reduced to Fichte’s transcendental consciousness which is assumed to carry out *Tathandlung* for the purpose of establishing a transcendental system by constructing empirical consciousness for transcendental consciousness. In this context, the *Philosophy of Spirit of 1803/4* seems to be sufficiently informative with regards to the alternative position about consciousness Hegel will eventually take. In the philosophy of subjective spirit of the *Encyclopedia*, Hegel will develop his theory of mind, and yet without any assumption of the Cartesian-Fichtean conception of self-consciousness. His theory of mind rather aims at laying down the fundamental category of our practical, communal life described in the philosophy of objective spirit, i.e., freedom, by theorizing how the cognitive living organism negates its attachment to bodiliness [Leiblichkeit].
Conclusion: Hegel’s Consciousness as the Link between Nature and Spirit

Hegel’s definition of consciousness as the concept of spirit in the Philosophy of Spirit of 1803/4 has far-reaching implications, specifically considering the post-Kantian discussions of consciousness. As Hegel announces the Phenomenology of Spirit as “psychology”\(^\text{112}\) and presents what we can call a philosophical psychology in the philosophy of subjective spirit in the Encyclopedia, a treatment of an individual mind for Hegel has a critical meaning for a philosophical system. However, Hegel strongly rejects any subjectivist approach which grasps the mind primarily as an epistemic subject standing against the objects on the basis of the first-person perspective Cogito subject. Indeed, Hegel has no theory of consciousness as an empty form of the thinking I, of which the primary role is supposed to consist in an epistemic operation of receiving information of outer objects. Regarding this, the Phenomenology of Spirit of 1807 well illustrates that consciousness for Hegel rather refers to a practical existence of a human being. By establishing that the truth of consciousness is self-consciousness, Hegel here considers self-consciousness as a subject of desire who stands in a practical relationship with material things by the mediation of a recognitional relationship with another self-consciousness. Attachment to and detachment from naturality are thus brought up as essential factors defining self-consciousness. But Hegel’s description of the master-slave dialectic and the ever leveling-up experiences of self-consciousness up to absolute knowing leave it ambiguous as to how spirit

\(^{112}\) Shortly after the publication the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel made an announcement of his first major work in the Bamberg Zeitung, where he worked as an editor. In this announcement, Hegel introduces the Phenomenology of Spirit as “the first part” of his “system of science” and added that “it should take the place of a psychological explanation, or an abstract account about the grounding of knowledge:” cf., G.W.F. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1988), 549.
comes out of nature. These issues are directly addressed in the *Anthropology* in the mature system of the *Encyclopedia*. Treating the soul as indifferented substantiality from which consciousness comes to arise, the *Anthropology* offers an account of the rise of consciousness, which is at the same time an account of the rise of spirit out of nature. How the human mind is the link between nature and spirit is thus explained by the *Anthropology* which considers bodiliness [*Leiblichkeit*] as the external/material form of the existence of consciousness, as a place where a certain negativity takes place such that spirit comes out of nature. To that extent, perhaps we can say that the *Anthropology* gives a preliminary explanation to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Or, we can say that in order to be able to phenomenologically speak of the manifestation of spirit, we should first speak of the bodily existence of consciousness.

From this consideration, it becomes clearer what the new element is which Hegel introduces to the concept of consciousness in his *Philosophy of Spirit of 1803/4*: consciousness, above all things, is a natural being, a living organism. More strictly, consciousness deserves a systematic interest only when it is considered as a natural-conscious being, or as an embodied mind. This is one of the guiding threads of our reading of the *Anthropology* of the *Encyclopedia* of 1830. Again, the *Anthropology* gives a detailed account of the negation of natuality for the spirit’s coming to be in terms of bodiliness [*Leiblichkeit*], embodiment [*Verleiblichung*], and habit, of the soul, while the *Philosophy of Spirit of 1803/4* establishes that consciousness is the place where that negation takes place.

From the Hegelian speculative perspective, then, consciousness is not something purely inside since it exists in relation to something material. But the material existence of consciousness, even when it is considered in terms of a body, is not something pre-given,
because consciousness comes to exist as a subject through an active relation with the material from. In short, the speculative concept of consciousness would then pin down consciousness as external. It is outside of oneself and comes to be inside of oneself only by being constituted as an inside from the outside.
CHAPTER 2. Subjective Spirit: Mind, Geist, and the Actuality of Reason

It is widely assumed that the philosophy of subjective spirit in Hegel’s *Encyclopedia* presents his philosophical psychology or the theory of mind. However, Hegel’s notion of subjective spirit is not in full accord with what we call mind today.\(^1\) More importantly, we unlikely have any established definitions of the terms “mind” and “psychology” against which to

\(^1\) Regarding the discrepancy between Hegel’s notion of subjective spirit and what we call mind, Winfield offers a helpful overview of contemporary understandings of Hegel’s philosophical psychology within the Anglophone academia: cf., Richard Dien Winfield, *Hegel and Mind. Rethinking Philosophical Psychology* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 1-8. Winfield points out that today’s understanding of Hegel’s philosophy of mind has been framed by linguistic holism under the influence of Wilfred Sellars and Robert Brandom. Briefly stated, linguistic holism assumes that three forms of awareness, that is, awareness of an object, oneself, and other subjects, are interconnected to each other by the medium of language. An awareness of an object involves the subject’s self-awareness, and this makes it possible for the subject to express her cognition of the object through a proposition. The subject’s awareness of an object also involves intersubjective relations with other subjects because one has to learn a language to have the ability to use propositions. Thus, linguistic holism regards the mind primarily as discursive consciousness. Winfield highlights, however, that Hegel does not reduce the mind to discursive consciousness. He points out that in the philosophy of subjective spirit, Hegel treats the mind as inherently connected to a physical world of life and incorporates an organism as a constitutive element of the mind. He further suggests that even the forms of consciousness (sense-certain, perception, and understanding) may be considered in terms of prelinguistic, pre-reflective operations of the mind, which he finds is accessible to certain animals and immature children too.

Winfield’s suggestion is insightful in showing that Hegel’s subjective spirit is not reducible to discursive consciousness because it more broadly denotes the finite human spirit having an organic body. However, it seems untenable to proceed from this to claim that the forms of consciousness are prelinguistic and pre-reflective. As I discuss in detail in Chapter 5, the sentient body of a human being is in the *Anthropology* treated as involving a spiritual dimension in the sense that the embodiment of one’s inner feelings is preceded by the process of inwardizing recollection [Erinnerung]. The sentient body of the soul is therefore an expressive, symbolically spiritualized body rather than a living organism. Further, the key issue of the *Anthropology* is not just the bodily existence of the human being but its transformation into a body that serves the realization of spiritual purposes. Therefore, there is no good reason, I think, for holding that Hegel privileges the non-discursive, pre-reflective dimension of the human spirit insofar as the *Anthropology* presupposes the *Psychology* in such a dialectical way that the *Anthropology* presupposes the *Psychology* and the truth of the *Anthropology* is revealed in the *Psychology*. By implication, although the *Anthropology* does not portray the embodied soul in terms of linguistic activities, there is no good reason for assuming that it is non-discursive. With respect to the connection between the three parts of Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit, I suggest in Chapter 3 that they together treat one and the same subject, i.e., the finite human spirit, from different aspects. As far as I see, Winfield’s emphasis on the organic, pre-linguistic, and pre-reflective dimension of Hegel’s conception of the human mind goes hand in hand with the tendency in the recent Anglophone Hegel scholarship to treat Hegel as a naturalist philosopher. In the Conclusion, I discuss the limits of recent, naturalist readings of Hegel.
measure Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit. As with most other philosophical concepts, the meanings of the words “mind” and “psychology” involve historical formations. A student trained in the analytic camp, for instance, would have some epistemological preconceptions that the mind is a discursive, conscious, and reflective entity capable of perceiving oneself and other objects and of justifying this perception. Thus, one can hardly understand what an author’s theory of the mind without an examination of a set of implicit assumptions under which he works on his theory, and his background knowledge of the psychological discussions made in the past and in the present as well.

This chapter aims at spelling out the sense in which Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit represents his philosophical psychology but exceeds the general scheme of today’s theory of mind. For the reasons stated above, however, I start this chapter only with a very loose, almost empty definition of philosophical psychology as a discipline that studies the human mind, in attempting to shed light on the underlying assumptions of Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit. In pursuing this study, it seems necessary to consider the relation of the philosophy of subjective spirit with the system of the Encyclopedia. Failing to see where it stands within the system and how it is related to other parts of the system would easily lead us to somewhat violent misrepresentation of Hegel’s thoughts.

In the first section of this chapter, I consider the reason why subjective spirit cannot be equated with the human mind. My strategy is to articulate the ambiguity between spirit [Geist] and subjective spirit as the essential constitution of subjective spirit. I thereby argue that subjective spirit does not simply signify a human mind because it is, within the system of the Encyclopedia, the place where spirit emerges as spirit out of nature. Another crucial aspect of
Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit is its essential connection with the first part of the Encyclopedia system, i.e., the Logic. As I discuss below, Hegel defines subjective spirit as “knowing [Erkennen]” and considers it as concrete spirit’s self-determination in comparison to the knowing that was in the Logic presented only as “a determinacy of the logical Idea.” Hegel thus thematizes knowing twice in the system of the Encyclopedia: in the dialectic of the logical Idea, and in the philosophy of subjective spirit. In the second section of this chapter, I therefore examine the systematic connection of these two thematizations of knowing in the Encyclopedia. What I show by this examination is the essentially finite feature of subjective spirit, that is, its embeddedness in the body. It thereby reveals the concrete sense in which spirit is submerged in nature before it emerges as spirit. In the third section, I investigate the Objective Logic (the Doctrine of Being and the Doctrine of Essence) in Hegel’s Science of Logic, focusing on his ideas of the objectivity of thought-determinations, and actuality [Wirklichkeit] as the subjectivity of the absolute. I pursue this study of the Science of Logic to set the stage for my subsequent discussion of the transition from the Phenomenology of Spirit to the Psychology in Chapter 3, paying attention to the fact that Hegel relates this transition in the philosophy of subjective spirit to the transition in the Logic from the Objective Logic to the Subjective Logic. While treating Hegel’s notion of objective thinking and actuality, I also take a close look at the dialectic of form and matter presented in “The Absolute Ground” section of the Doctrine of Essence and Hegel’s lectures on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, aimed at elucidating the relationship between the finite human spirit and the absolute.

\[ENZ, \S\ 223.\]
1. Why is Subjective Spirit not a Mind?
Ambiguity between Subjective Spirit and Geist

*Geist* is the central concept in Hegel’s philosophy, but it can hardly be translated into any other language due to its thickness. It is often translated into the English “mind,” but the inadequacy of this translation easily comes to light when one considers, among others, the fact that the *Philosophy of Spirit* in the *Encyclopedia* comprises not only the philosophy of subjective spirit but also the philosophy of objective spirit and that of absolute spirit. Even when we confine ourselves to the philosophy of subjective spirit, subjective spirit cannot be equated with what we call mind. The prime reason for this is that within the system of the *Encyclopedia* the philosophy of subjective spirit is the place where *Geist* emerges for the first time as *Geist*. This signifies that there is an essential connection between subjective spirit and *Geist*. The extent to which subjective spirit coincides with and differs from “mind,” can therefore be settled down when this connection is spelled out. In this section, I attempt to clarify the sense in which subjective spirit is connected to *Geist* by analyzing Hegel’s ambiguous usages of those two terms, which I find prominent in the “Introduction” to the *Philosophy of Spirit* (ENZ, §§ 377-386).

The knowledge of spirit is the most concrete, and thus the highest and most difficult one. *Know yourself.* The meaning of this absolute command […] is not only self-knowledge in respect of the particular capacities, character, propensities, and foibles of the individual, but rather knowledge of that which is true of human as it is the true in and for itself,—of the essence itself as spirit.³

³ *ENZ*, § 377.
In this first passage of the “Introduction” to the *Philosophy of Spirit* (§ 377), Hegel speaks of the difficulty of the knowledge of spirit. The knowledge of spirit is the most difficult because it is the most concrete. With respect to the concrete feature of the knowledge of spirit, the Zusatz to this passage adds that the knowledge of spirit is concerned with “the most concrete, developed form that the Idea achieves in its actualization.” The Zusatz further states that “even finite or subjective spirit, not only absolute spirit, must be grasped as an actualization of the Idea.” The knowledge of spirit is thus concrete not simply because it considers this or that particular thing but because it comprehends spirit as an actualization of the Idea. Yet, it is ambiguous what Hegel means by this knowledge of spirit that bears on the actualization of the Idea. Since § 377 is the first passage of the “Introduction” to the *Philosophy of Spirit*, the knowledge of spirit in question seems to refer to the *Philosophy of Spirit*. Then, we can perhaps say that the knowledge of spirit, which is embodied through the *Philosophy of Spirit*, is that through which the Idea is actualized. But the second statement in the Zusatz then becomes puzzling. Since Hegel here seems to be identifying “finite spirit” with “subjective spirit,” it is questionable why Hegel does not mention “objective spirit,” which is equally finite. The emphasis on subjective spirit in the Zusatz thus leads to suspect that Hegel has in mind, not exclusively the *Philosophy of Spirit*, but also its first division, the philosophy of subjective spirit.

This suspicion leads us to reconsider the “knowledge of spirit” mentioned in § 377. If this refers to the *Philosophy of Spirit*, why does Hegel contrast it with the *Menschenerkentniss*, namely the psychologist-anthropological discourses of the time that only concern “particular capacities, character, propensities, and foibles of the individual”? Indeed, the *Philosophy of*
Spirit can be viewed, I suggest, as Hegel’s philosophical anthropology in the broad sense that it is all about humanity. It is an anthropology that deals with humanity in terms of the three dimensions of spirit: subjective spirit that is concerned with an individual person’s psychological constitution; objective spirit, with communal life forms such as the family, civil society, and the state; absolute spirit, with cultural activities such as art, religion, and philosophy. Hegel’s mention about the Menschenerkenntniss can then be understood as involving a claim for a holistic approach that considers all the dimensions of the human life and a speculative approach that conceptualizes them in accordance with the determinations of the Concept. We can also presume Hegel’s criticism of a one-sided, subjectivist portrait of humanity of which the focus is on an individual man and a particular psychological constitution of her personality, and the criticism of an empiricist inquiry that is incapable of synthesizing their observations of diverse manifestations of humanity in terms of their necessary connections. Without ignoring these comprehensive, anthropological concerns of Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit, I call attention to the fact that those topics of the Menschenerkenntniss as “particular capacities, character, propensities, and foibles of the individual” are the themes of the first division of Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit, the Anthropology—specifically, its first sub-division, the “Natural Soul.” Given this, it is also plausible to presume that by the knowledge of spirit in § 377 Hegel is expressing a local concern about the Anthropology rather than a global concern about the Philosophy of Spirit.

Now, the question I pose in this chapter is as follows. In the “Introduction” to the Philosophy of Spirit, does Hegel address the Philosophy of Spirit or the philosophy of subjective spirit or both? Does he have in mind Geist or subjective spirit or both? Concerning these questions, which I formulated out of a reading of § 377 and the Zusatz to § 377, one may well
call into question the credibility of Zusätze. These additional texts are not from Hegel’s original manuscript but from notes taken by students at his lectures. One cannot expect that they convey Hegel’s verbal presentations without any distortion. However, even if we discredit the texts from Zusätze, the questions I raised above seem to remain relevant. For the ambiguity between Geist and subjective spirit is also found in other passages of the Introduction text. In trying to answer the questions above, I will below analyze in detail Hegel’s ambiguous usages of those terms in the Introduction text and the organization of this text.

To begin, the ambiguity between Geist and subjective spirit is more explicit in §378. In §378, Hegel challenges rational and empirical psychology and appreciates Aristotle’s De anima and other essays on the soul for being the sole work of speculative interest. Hegel points out that rational psychology considers soul in terms of an abstract, ambiguous category, i.e., “a thing,” something of which such abstract concepts as simplicity and immortality are assumed to be predicated. It is thus “abstract metaphysics of understanding,” which only applies some fixed, abstract categories of understanding to the equally abstract notion, i.e., a soulful thing. Empirical psychology, on the other hand, differs from rational psychology in that it has as its object concrete spirit and bases its investigations of this subject matter on experience and observation. But it does not differ much from “the conventional metaphysics of understanding [Verstandesmetaphysics]” insofar as it sticks to rigid conceptual elements such as forces or

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4 For an informative summary of the editorial and interpretative debates about the Zusätze texts, see in particular: Robert R. Williams, “Translator’s Introduction,” in G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit 1827-8 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 1-6. In the present work, I will use the Zusätze texts insofar as I find they largely hang together with Hegel’s manuscripts or with the general ideas of Hegel’s philosophy.

5 Cf. ENZ, § 34.

6 ENZ, § 378.

7 Ibid.
faculties of the mind. Consequently, empirical psychology does conceive of concrete spirit, and yet only as an aggregate of diverse mental forces, without being able to grasp the original unity of its subject matter. Aristotle’s treatments of soul have advantages over those two types of philosophical psychology because they point to a way of considering concrete spirit in terms of the absolute restlessness of spirit, that is, of the pure activity of negating all fixed determinations of understanding by dealing with the soul as inwardly bounded to the body.\(^8\) Hence, the essential aim of “a philosophy of spirit”\(^9\) consists in nothing but introducing the Concept into the knowledge of concrete spirit such that the meaning of Aristotle’s treatments of the soul can thereby be revealed in terms of spirit’s absolute negativity.

Thus, we notice that what Hegel addresses in the second passage of the “Introduction” to the *Philosophy of Spirit* (§378) is the issues of the philosophy of subjective spirit and not the *Philosophy of Spirit*—the defectiveness of rational and empirical psychology, the need of speculative approach to spirit, and a preferred model of the latter. His speculative approach to “concrete spirit” consists in treating it without arbitrarily dismembering its original unity by some presupposed, fixed, abstract categories, such that its concreteness is not lost on the course of theorization. For Hegel, this is possible by introducing the Concept, that is, by considering concrete spirit in terms of the self-development of the Concept whereby all its determinations are shown to be related to each other in a necessary manner. Now, it then becomes clearer that by “concrete spirit” Hegel means “mind,” so to speak, treated by empirical psychologists or what he

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\(^8\) Cf. *ENZ*, § 378 Z. Hegel’s presentation of Aristotle’s conception of the soul in terms of the absolute negativity of spirit raises the question about its relevance to Aristotle. I discuss this issue later in this chapter when I examine Hegel’s lectures on Aristotle’s metaphysics.

\(^9\) Ibid.
thinks Aristotle means by the “soul.” Consequently, by “the philosophy of spirit” Hegel means philosophical psychology or his philosophy of subjective spirit.

The issue of the ambiguity between Geist and subjective spirit leads us to call into question the overall structure of the “Introduction” to the Philosophy of Spirit (§§ 377-386). I already pointed out the ambiguity in the first two passages (§§377-378). In the next passage (§379), Hegel speaks of the self-feeling [das Selbstgefühl] as a phenomenon that testifies to the deficiency of empirical psychology; animal magnetism as an example that evidences the “substantial unity of the soul.” These examples, for Hegel, serve to support the Aristotelian approach, one that sees the soul as the principle of life and does not take on a dualistic assumption about the relationship between soul and body. But the relationship between soul and body is within Hegel’s system the issue of the Anthropology. It is also in the Anthropology that Hegel thematizes the self-feeling and animal magnetism. Shortly, this third passage of the “Introduction” (§379), too, concerns the philosophy of subjective spirit. In the next passage (§380), Hegel again brings up the concrete feature of spirit. The concrete feature of spirit, Hegel states, makes it necessary that a lower stage (the Anthropology) anticipates a higher one (the Phenomenology of Spirit), and the higher one is present in the lower one. The “concrete spirit” mentioned in §380 is therefore more narrowly concerned with the philosophy of subjective spirit rather than with the Philosophy of Spirit. While the first four passages of the “Introduction” (§§377-380) thus mainly address the issue of philosophical psychology or the philosophy of subjective spirit, the remaining six passages (§§381-386) consider the “Concept of Spirit” (§§381-384) and the “Division of the Philosophy of Spirit” (§§385-386). In the “Concept of Spirit” Hegel lists essential conceptual elements defining spirit [Geist]: ideality (the relationship between nature and spirit), freedom (the formal essence of spirit), and manifestation (the
absolute mode in which spirit presents itself). In the “Division” he finally outlines the three divisions of the *Philosophy of Spirit*: the Subjective Spirit, the Objective Spirit, and the Absolute Spirit. Those later six passages are therefore more properly concerned with *Geist* and not with subjective spirit.

Consequently, the questions I posed above concerning the ambiguity of the “knowledge of spirit”—whether it indicates the *Philosophy of Spirit* or the philosophy of subjective spirit—can now be reformulated as follows. Why did Hegel not move the first four passages (§§377-380) to the “First Division of the Subjective Spirit” (§§387-482)? How can we make sense of this textual issue that Hegel left, consciously or unconsciously, those passages concerning subjective spirit at the head of the “Introduction” to the *Philosophy of Spirit*? In trying to answer these questions about the somewhat confusing structure of the “Introduction” to the *Philosophy of Spirit*, I pay attention to the fact that in the first four passages of this text Hegel seems to be placing emphasis on the *Anthropology* among the three divisions of the philosophy of subjective spirit. As I describe above, his appraisal of Aristotle’s treatments of the soul and the cases of self-feeling and animal magnetism all pertain to the *Anthropology*. Further, his mention about a lower stage’s (the *Anthropology*) anticipation of a higher stage (the *Phenomenology of Spirit*) and the latter’s being present in the former spotlights the *Anthropology* rather than the *Phenomenology of Spirit* because what Hegel here emphasizes is that particular stages of the soul as awakening and derangement belong to certain forms of consciousness and understanding, not the other way around.

Now, if I have a point in suggesting that Hegel puts emphasis on the *Anthropology* in the “Introduction” to the *Philosophy of Spirit*, one can perhaps presume a special meaning of the
*Anthropology* for the *Philosophy of Spirit*. First of all, one can assume that the unity of soul and body is for Hegel one of the critical standards for measuring whether a psychological account is speculative or not since he repeatedly underlines the necessity for a consideration of the soul as intrinsically connected to the body. Correspondingly, the *Anthropology*, since Hegel here deals with the relationship between soul and body, makes his philosophical psychology contained in the philosophy of subjective spirit speculative, distinct from empirical and metaphysical psychology of the time. But this explanation is not satisfactory because it discloses nothing about the relationship between the philosophy of subjective spirit and the *Philosophy of Spirit*, one that I have articulated as an ambiguity between subjective spirit and *Geist*. One can therefore pose a question as to why Hegel attaches great importance to the unity of soul and body. Where does this issue, among so many other psychological subject matters, find a rationale for being treated as such an important problem in an introduction to the *Philosophy of Spirit*?

It is important to note that the *Anthropology* is not only the first division of the philosophy of subjective spirit, but also the first stage of the *Philosophy of Spirit*. It is the watershed where *Geist* emerges for the first time as *Geist* out of nature. This being said, the *Anthropology* has an introductory role, not only concerning the philosophy of subjective spirit, but more significantly concerning the *Philosophy of Spirit*. The account of the relationship between soul and body in the *Anthropology* is at the same time an account of the sense in which *Geist* emerges out of nature. The *Anthropology* thus introduces *Geist*. If there is any ambiguity between subjective spirit and *Geist*, this ambiguity is essentially constitutive of subjective spirit.
2. Psychological Subject: The Emergence of Spirit out of Death of an Individual

In the previous section, I claimed that Hegel’s notion of subjective spirit cannot simply be identified with the mind because it also denotes \textit{Geist} that emerges out of nature. Now, another important feature of Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit is its connection with the \textit{Logic}. Subjective spirit develops itself by going through three stages: (1) the soul or nature-spirit \textit{[Naturgeist]} (the \textit{Anthropology}); (2) consciousness or spirit in relationship \textit{[Verhältnis]} or particularization (the \textit{Phenomenology of Spirit}); (3) \textit{spirit determining itself in itself}, as a subject for itself (the \textit{Psychology})\textsuperscript{10}. Yet these three stages constitute the “progress of development \textit{[Fortgang der Entwicklung]}.”\textsuperscript{11} In other words, the movement of subjective spirit through the three states occurs in the way that the Concept develops itself from within itself. The soul or \textit{Naturgeist} is what spirit is in itself; in the spirit-as-such, this becomes for spirit itself. Hegel highlights that this method of the self-development of the Concept makes his philosophy of subjective spirit distinct from “the psychological, or the habitual ways of consideration” of spirit, that is, the psychological trend of the time that only recounts unsystematically \textit{[erzählungsweise]} how the mind is constituted and what its activities are.\textsuperscript{12}

Since the notion of the Concept’s self-development is the key idea of Hegel’s speculative logic, one can hardly understand the speculative feature of his philosophy of subjective spirit without an understanding of its relationship with the logic. Throughout this section and next

\textsuperscript{10} \textit{ENZ, § 387.}
\textsuperscript{11} \textit{ENZ, § 387 Z.}
\textsuperscript{12} \textit{ENZ, § 387 Z.}
section, I examine some arguments of Hegel put forward in his logic that I find give important clues for spelling out the relationship between the logic and the philosophy of subjective spirit. I thereby attempt to articulate some key insights of Hegel underpinning his philosophy of subjective spirit. In this section, I analyze his discussions about the logical Idea’s differentiation into knowing [Erkennen] and the external world (ENZ, §§ 223-235). In next section, I will examine Hegel’s idea of the objective thinking. My focus on these two issues in Hegel’s logic—knowing as differentiation of the logical Idea and the unity of rationality and reality—draw on the following definition of subjective spirit given by Hegel.\(^\text{13}\)

Spirit, developing itself in its ideality, is spirit as knowing [Erkennen]. The knowing, however, is conceived here not merely as a determinacy of the logical Idea (§ 223), but in the way in which concrete spirit determines itself to knowing.\(^\text{14}\)

In this passage, Hegel defines subjective spirit in terms of knowing. It is a knowing to which spirit determines itself and not the knowing as a determinacy of the logical Idea. As I will show below, the “knowing” here has two meanings: the subject matter of the Psychology, i.e., the spirit-as-such, which has cognitive and volitional aspects, on the one hand, and its genesis or its rise as the theme of the Psychology in the system of the Encyclopedia, i.e., spirit’s self-determination, on the other. These two meanings of knowing are eventually involved in what I

\(^{13}\) Throughout this dissertation, I use the term “logic” without capitalizing or italicizing when I broadly refer to Hegel’s speculative logic. But I use the italicized title “the Logic” when I refer to the first part of the 1830 Encyclopedia system, as I use the italicized titles “the Philosophy of Nature” and “the Philosophy of Spirit” when discussing these two other parts of the Encyclopedia system. To avoid confusion, I use the title “the Science of Logic” when I deal with Hegel’s greater logic published between 1812 and 1816.

\(^{14}\) ENZ, § 387.
have articulated as the ambiguity between subjective spirit and *Geist* in the previous section, but in a different way than the *Anthropology* weaves two issues together, the relationship between soul and body on the one side, and the emergence of spirit from nature on the other. Briefly stated, the passage above sums up the movement of subjective spirit from the *Anthropology* to the *Psychology*. It states that spirit “develops itself in its ideality” and thereby comes forth as “knowing.” In other words, by idealizing nature and thus de-naturalizing its naturalness (the *Anthropology*), spirit comes forth as knowing, namely as the finite human spirit with two aspects: intelligence and will (the *Psychology*). But these cognitive and volitional aspects of the finite human spirit are not just arbitrarily chosen by an observer or speculator from outside as themes of psychological investigations. They rather belong to necessary results from the movement of spirit that “determines itself” to such psychological themes. This determination of spirit’s own is concerned with the movement of subjective spirit and, more narrowly, I suggest, with the transition from the *Phenomenology of Spirit* to the *Psychology*.

Now, both of those two issues in the definition of subjective spirit—thematization of the finite human spirit in the *Psychology* and spirit’s self-determination to this in the transition from the *Phenomenology of Spirit* to the *Psychology*—involve a vital connection with the first part of the *Encyclopedia* system, i.e., the *Logic*. As Hegel mentions in the citation above, knowing as the finite human spirit is already considered in the *Logic*, specifically as the determinacy of the logical Idea. But the *Logic* and the philosophy of subjective spirit differ in that the former deals with knowing only as the determinacy of the logical Idea whereas the latter concerns the concrete spirit that determines itself to knowing. If so, why does the same subject matter, knowing, appear twice at different places in Hegel’s system? Is there any necessity that knowing, which we can call a psychological subject having intelligence and will, is to be thematized in the
Logic but re-thematized in the philosophy of subjective spirit? This is what I examine in this section. On the other hand, spirit’s self-determination to knowing, which I find present in the transition the Phenomenology of Spirit to the Psychology, somehow reinstitutes the transition from the Objective Logic to the Subjective Logic. This will be discussed in the next section and in Chapter 3 more thoroughly.

2.1. Immediacy of the Idea in Life

With respect to the finite human spirit as a theme of the Psychology, it is to be noted that the same subject matter is already thematized in the last part of the Logic on the Idea (ENZ, §§ 223-235). Hegel here defines the logical Idea as “the absolute unity of the Concept and object” \(^{15}\) and hence, as that which involves the unity of all dualistically related terms—“the unity of the ideal and the real, of the finite and infinite, of the soul and the body, as the possibility that has its actuality in itself, as that the nature of which can only be comprehended [begreiffen] as existing, etc.” \(^{16}\) Briefly, the logical Idea is the logical unity that underlies all dualistic relations. Following this, Hegel considers the differentiation of the logical Idea into “knowing [Erkennen]” and an external world or life. As with the Psychology in the philosophy of subjective spirit, Hegel here in the Logic considers knowing as having theoretical and practical activities, i.e., intelligence and will. It thus indicates a psychological subject that relates to the world through its cognitive and volitional operations. It is here to be noted that Hegel’s logic has no psychological ground but is instead grounded in the idea of the unity of thought and being. Accordingly, the pure forms of

\(^{15}\) ENZ, § 213.

\(^{16}\) ENZ, § 214.
thought considered in it do not pertain to psychological operations of an individual mind that already takes up separation from the world. Instead, such a psychological subject arises as a result of all logical considerations about being, essence, and the Concept, specifically as a differentiation of the logical Idea.

If so, why does the psychological subject come forth as an outcome of the Logic? Is there any necessity for it to be thematized in the Logic? Further, why does Hegel not directly proceed to the Psychology at the end of the Logic? Is there any reason for making a lengthy detour through the Philosophy of Nature, the Anthropology, and the Phenomenology of Spirit to address in earnest what he already took up in the last stage of the Logic?

These questions have to do with the dialectic nature proper to the logical Idea. In considering the logical Idea as unity underlying all dualistic relations, Hegel does not make it into an absolute substance underlying all finite attributes or such an “abstract, calmly enduring identity.”\textsuperscript{17} Instead, it is dialectic in the sense that it essentially involves a “process”—the process in which the Concept […] determines itself to be objectivity, […] and in which this externality that has the Concept as its substance leads itself back into subjectivity.”\textsuperscript{18} As it is clear in this passage, it is important to note that the dialectic nature of the Idea is fundamentally concerned with the self-developing feature of the Concept. Hegel underlines that the Concept constitutes a different kind of movement from being and essence; it is self-development [\textit{Entwicklung}] whereas being is characterized by transition [\textit{Übergehen}] and essence is in the shining [\textit{Schein}].\textsuperscript{19} What makes the Concept stand out is the fact that in it “what are

\textsuperscript{17} ENZ, § 215A.
\textsuperscript{18} ENZ, §215
\textsuperscript{19} Cf. ENZ, § 161.
differentiated are at the same time immediately identical with each other and with the whole.”

In other words, the Concept is a totality that is determined in such a way that all the elements constitutive of its movement are identical with it and, conversely, it is somehow implicitly present in all those moments of its movement. As Hegel makes it clear, the development of the Concept is therefore a teleological movement, one in which the end that is to be achieved through the movement is implicitly present in the beginning and in the whole process of the movement as well, which is analogous to the growth of a seed which “contains the entire plant in itself already.” In accordance with this teleological feature of the self-development of the Concept, the Doctrine of the Concept comprises three sub-divisions: (1) the subjective or formal Concept (the Concept as such, judgment, and syllogism); (2) the Concept determined to be objectivity (mechanism, chemism, teleology); (3) the Idea as the unity of the Concept and objectivity (life, knowing, the absolute Idea).

Thus, the Doctrine of the Concept somehow anticipates the progression of the *Encyclopedia* system from the Idea to Nature, and to Spirit, by considering the mechanic, chemic, and teleological constitution of natural beings in terms of the objectivity or objectification of the Concept and by considering knowing and the absolute Idea in terms of the restored unity of the Concept. Hence, one can roughly say that the movement of the Concept within the Doctrine of the Concept establishes that and how the system is to be structured as the self-development of the Concept, before one moves forward to Nature and Spirit. Further, it should be noted that it does not assume a somewhat categorical distinction between Nature and

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20 *ENZ*, § 161
21 *ENZ*, § 161 Z.
22 *ENZ*, § 162.
Spirit. Regarding this, it is important to note that the last stage of the movement of the Concept within the Doctrine of the Concept, i.e., the dialectic process of the Idea anticipates the transition from Nature to Spirit—from the organic nature in the Philosophy of Nature to the spirit-as-such in the Psychology of the philosophy of subjective spirit while the Anthropology and the Phenomenology of Spirit are missing. It thereby establishes that the transition from Nature to Spirit is to be shown as part of the teleological self-development of the Concept. The Doctrine of the Concept thus gives some basic methodological foundations for the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Spirit so that both nature and spirit can be grasped in terms of the self-development of the Concept. To that extent, the dialectic of the Idea is not mere anticipation or an overview of the process from organic nature to knowing which will come on later in the system. While the latter is more concerned with the self-development of the Concept in reality, the dialectic of the Idea in the Logic is more concerned with the necessity of the Concept’s self-development in reality. It is therefore important to note that the dialectical process of the Idea reifies the teleological self-development of the Concept whereby the Concept makes itself into objectivity and turns back into itself as subjectivity. More precisely, the dialectic of the Idea comprises (1) life, (2) knowing, and (3) the absolute Idea, where life is the “immediate Idea,” knowing is its “difference,” and the absolute Idea is the “restoration of the unity.” It thereby establishes that the Concept is determined in such a way that it is essentially life and is differentiated into knowing and the external world to come back to itself as their unity. Conversely, perhaps one may say that the process from organic nature to knowing in the

23 ENZ, § 215 A.
*Realphilosophie* is the exemplary case of the self-development of the Concept, one that paradigmatically exhibits the teleological, self-developing constitution of the Concept.

To begin with, the dialectic of the Idea starts with life, with the fact that the Idea is immediate in life, more precisely. In his discussion about life, Hegel weaves together, as far as I see, three different strands in the theory of life: (1) Aristotle’s notion of the soul as a sort of principle of life that makes living beings distinct from inanimate bodies; (2) Kantian teleology of an organism; (3) the biological discussions of the day about irritability and sensibility—and further, about reproduction of an individual body and the natural history. While considering life in terms of the relation between soul and body in line with Aristotle, Hegel suggests that the soul expresses the determinations of the Concept. It can be considered, in other words, the “immediate, self-relating *universality*” of the externality of the body and the “*particularization*” of the body as well, that is, the “*individuality* as infinite negativity.”

Hence, life for Hegel can be identified with the Idea, insofar as the soul, i.e., that which makes a living being alive, exhibits the determinations of the Concept. But there is an important qualification in this identification between the Idea and life: life is not just the Idea but the *immediate* Idea. By this qualification, Hegel brings up the issue of a body. If life is the *immediate* Idea, this is because the soul exists in a body, such that “the Concept is realized as the soul in a *body.*”

One can therefore assume that those determinations of the Concept are also concerned with vital functions making a living organism alive. Alternatively, one would have to say, more strictly, that what makes a living body alive is not the determinations of the Concept themselves, but certain bodily

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24 *ENZ*, § 216.

25 Ibid..
operations that can be explained in terms of the conceptual relations between universality, particularity, and individuality. Hegel understands those bodily operations in the Kantian terms of teleology. They are, for Hegel, nothing but the teleological process in which “all members are reciprocally momentary means as much as momentary purposes,” which he calls the “dialectic of the bodiliness [Leiblichkeit].”26 But Hegel understands this teleological process in terms of some vital functions such as sensibility and irritability. For Hegel, these biological functions are concerned with reproduction, namely the process of self-organization by which an organic body constantly reproduces itself as an individual living organism.

Considering all these elements, I interpret Hegel’s term Lebendiges as “an individual living organism which constitutes itself as such in a constant movement of self-organization.” When he states that “life is essentially an individual living organism [Lebendiges],”27 therefore, his point is that life is to be considered in light of the self-organizing process of a living body—which he believes Aristotle already grasped, Kant successfully formulated with his notion of inner purposiveness, and the biological studies of the time comprehended. To that extent, “life is the immediate Idea,”28 implying that an individual living organism is the reality that embodies the Concept, namely the concrete universality that is an individuality.

However, the individual living organism is essentially finite due to its subordination to mortality, which, in Hegel’s terms, relates to the determination that “the soul and the body are separable, on account of the immediacy of the Idea.”29 Further, a living body’s self-organization

26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
is not always entirely successful as it gets ill when some parts of it become inorganic. Life is therefore “constant battle against inorganic powers.” Accordingly, insofar as it is considered in terms of an individual organism’s bodily processes of self-organization, life is not just life. Instead, it is intrinsically self-contradictory, involving in it its opposite, namely disease and death. This is what the immediacy of the Idea signifies.

Indeed, Hegel’s discussions about life and death, which I have articulated as an inner contradiction of life, does not seem hard to understand from a common-sense standpoint. Hegel emphasizes that life is not something mysterious or incomprehensible. He thus seems to be certain that fundamental vital phenomena that make living beings alive are biologically understandable and philosophically explicable. The extent to which his biological understanding of the vital phenomena such as irritability and sensibility and his philosophical conceptualization of those biological phenomena meet today’s scientific and philosophical standard, is a matter of further examination. Whatever the case may be, Hegel’s thesis that life is the immediate Idea, does not entail any bold claim for a supernatural entity’s instantiation in natural beings. Instead, it concerns the teleological structure of an organism’s self-organization, which Hegel finds squares with the logical structure of the Concept. Further, there is no absurdity in Hegel’s idea that life is intrinsically self-contradictory insofar as the phenomena that seem only negative to life, i.e., disease and death, are part of life. For these phenomena belong only to living beings and not to any other kinds of being.

30 ENZ, § 219 Z.

While Hegel’s discussion about the immediacy of the Idea in life does not cause significant difficulty, his theorization of the sublation of the immediacy of the Idea is complicated. It is also in this problematic of the sublation of the immediacy of the Idea that knowing [das Wissen] becomes an important theme in Hegel’s Logic. To spell out the sense in which knowing becomes a key issue in the dialectic of the Idea, we can therefore pose a question as to why the immediacy of the Idea should be sublated. Indeed, if it only concerns vital phenomena such as an organism’s self-organization, disease, and death, it does not necessarily have to be sublated. The problem that an organism’s life and death causes to the dialectic of the Idea is therefore to be more clearly articulated.

To recapitulate, the immediacy of the Idea is for Hegel eventually concerned with the fact that the Concept has its reality in an embodied-ensouled being, i.e., an organism. Specifically, Hegel understands the life of an organism in terms of a biological process of self-organization, and the latter as embodying the logical structure of the Concept. Again, an organism is alive by a constant process of self-organization, which Hegel considers as a battle against inorganic tendencies of the body. Hence, the life of an organism consists in a dynamic association of self-organizing activities and inorganic tendencies. Now, the death of an individual organism then consists in a complete, irreversible dissociation of those two antithetical elements. Yet, this dissociation is a dissolution of the individuality of a living body. For a living body’s self-organization has to do with maintaining itself as an individual body, one in which organic elements (universality) and inorganic elements (particularity) continuously communicate with each other to have an individual living body reproduce itself constantly. Consequently, the inner
contradiction of life does not simply denote the plain truth that disease and death are essential parts of life. Since life as an individual living body \([\text{das Lebendige}]\) for Hegel signifies a realization of the Idea, the death of an individual organism denotes the impossibility of the Idea’s realization. This is so because death is a dissolution of the individuality of an organism, and this is the dissolution of the Concept that is defined as a concrete universality that is an individuality.

The problem is here not about whether or not plural organisms exist such that the Concept finds its reality whenever a living being lives. For the relationship between the Concept and a living organism is not instantiation of the universal in particular things or participation of the particulars in the universal. Instead, the problem consists in the fact that a living being does not have the power of enduring or mastering the negativity of death, implying that in an organism, life contradicts death. This is a problem since the Concept is ultimately a teleological whole which constitutes itself as self-identical in differentiating itself into externality. In short, if an organism is the immediate reality of the Concept, this is so only insofar as it is alive. But when one considers the fact that a living being dies and life essentially involves death in itself, it turns out that this contradictory connection of life and death does not fit with the teleological unity of the Concept. In short, life cannot be a reality adequate for the Idea when it is considered in the biological terms of an individual organism’s self-organization. To save the Idea from the inner contradiction of life, it is therefore necessary to sublate the immediacy of the Idea, and this means that one should seek another reality that is adequate for the Idea.

In the dialectic of the Idea, the sublation of the immediacy of the Idea is eventually achieved by the transition from life to knowing. Before examining this transition, I would here like to briefly reconstruct Hegel’s conception of the genus-process to set the stage for the discussion about the meaning of death that I will make in the last part of this section. The genus-
process is the first solution to the problem of the immediacy of the Idea. Sexual intercourse and begetting newborns for Hegel constitute another dimension of life than an individual organism’s self-organization: the life of a species that comes to be by virtue of interactions among plural individuals. When considered in relation to the genus-process, the death of an individual organism is therefore given another meaning than a mere dissolution of individuality, as Hegel states that it “perishes in this [universality] as the power.”

In relation to the genus-process, the death of an organism has a positive meaning because a species preserves itself by the individuals’ birth and death. It is, in other words, a constitutive factor of the life of a species; in this sense, it is a perishing in the universality. Further, life is also to be redefined. When considered at the level of the species, life is no longer an immediate universality that the Idea has in an individual organism’s self-organization. Instead, it is a mediated universality that is mediated by the birth and death of the individuals: a universality that preserves the individuality as its moment. In this sense, the immediacy of the Idea is sublated in the genus-process. Hegel therefore states that in the genus-process the Idea “comes to itself, to its truth, entering into existence as the free genus for itself.”

Further, this sublation of the immediacy of the Idea results in spirit’s emerging, as Hegel states: “the death of the merely immediate, individual being [das Lebendige] is the spirit emerging.”

I here do not enter biological investigations into Hegel’s thoughts about the species. What I find complicated and pivotal as well in his discussion about the immediacy of the Idea in life and its sublation in the genus-process, is the thesis that spirit emerges out of that sublation. If the

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31 ENZ, § 221.
32 ENZ, § 222.
33 Ibid.
“genus for itself” is the existence in which the Idea comes to itself, to its truth, as Hegel puts it, why does the Idea not come to an end with the genus-process but proceed to spirit? What is the spirit that thereby emerges? What does the “emergence” mean?

These questions relate, again, to the teleological, self-developing feature of the Concept. Hegel characterizes the dialectic process of the Idea as “the absolute unity of the Concept and objectivity” and defines this unity as the “exhibition [Darstellung] of the Concept.”

By this Hegel means that the Concept, whose determinations constitute the ideal content of the Idea, exhibits itself in the form of external existence [Dasein] and takes this shape, which it enclosed in its ideality, up into its power. It is therefore to be noted that the Concept as such, i.e., the concrete universality that is an individuality, is itself not identical with the Idea. The Idea is present only in the exhibition of the Concept. It is, in other words, a logical movement in which it is at first present in the Concept, then goes for a reality conforming to this ideal content, and finally takes up this reality up into itself. Or, it is the movement in which the Concept makes itself into its object and turns back into itself by positing this objectivity of its own as such for itself.

This scheme of the exhibition of the Concept explains why the genus for itself is not the complete truth of the Idea. Indeed, that the genus for itself and not an individual living being is the reality adequate for the Idea, is only half the dialectic process of the Idea. For it only means that a mediated universality that it exhibits is the true form of the reality in which the Idea has objectivity but does not ensure that the objectivity of the Idea is posited for and by the Idea.

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34 ENZ, § 213.
35 Cf. ENZ, § 213.
other words, the genus for itself is the reality that illustrates the true form of the objectivity of the Idea, but not the reality in which the Idea posits itself for itself. For the same reason, the sublation of the immediacy of the Idea by the genus-process is only a middle stage and not an endpoint in the exhibition of the Concept.

2.3. Transition from Life to Knowing

Now, Hegel reconceptualizes the sublation of the immediacy of the Idea by the genus-process in terms of differentiation of the Idea, and this sets out the transition from life to knowing in the dialectic of the Idea. Specifically, Hegel reconsiders the relationship between an organism’s self-organization and the genus-process in terms of the relationship between the subjective Idea and the objective Idea whose identity is to be posited by and for the Idea itself.\textsuperscript{36} First, Hegel already defined an organism’s self-organization as something subjective. What is reproduced by the process of self-organization is the members of a body. Hegel understands this as a living being’s “making its bodiliness its object,” or “its inorganic nature” having “relative externality.”\textsuperscript{37} But all activities of the members of a body belong to “one activity of the subject” that serves to reproduce the subject, i.e., an individual living body.\textsuperscript{38} For this reason, self-organization is \textit{self}-reproduction; in this sense, Idea has subjectivity in an organism’s self-organization. However, self-organization is “the process of the individual living body \textit{within} itself.”\textsuperscript{39} The externality of the members of a body is therefore only relative and does not have an

\textsuperscript{36} \textit{ENZ}, § 224.
\textsuperscript{37} \textit{ENZ}, § 218.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid.
objectivity that itself displays the determinations of the Concept. For this reason, Idea is only one-sidedly subjective in an individual’s self-organization. Secondly, the genus for itself is that in which the Idea “has the universality for the element of its existence;” it is “the objectivity” of the Idea, that in which Idea makes itself into its object.”\(^{40}\) But in this existence, the Idea has no subjectivity since its objectivity in the genus for itself depends on the individuals that constantly come to be and perish. In the genus-process the Idea is therefore only one-sidedly objective without being able to turn back to itself. But both an individual organism’s self-organization and the genus for itself are identical to each other “in itself or as life.”\(^{41}\) More precisely, they belong to differentiation of what is identical in itself, i.e., life as the Concept.

In this way, Hegel reconceptualizes the life of an individual living being \([\text{das Lebendige}]\) and the life of a species as a differentiation of the Idea into its subjectivity and objectivity, both of which are equally one-sided. Following this, Hegel proceeds to the next stage of the dialectic of the Idea, i.e., knowing. He states that the differentiation at stake is “a pure differentiation within the Idea itself,” such that “the Idea is for itself both itself and its other.”\(^{42}\) It is therefore “the certainty of being in itself the identity of this objective world with it.”\(^{43}\) This means that “reason comes to the world with the absolute faith in its capacity to posit the identity and elevate its certainty to truth.” This is “the process of knowing \([\text{das Erkennen}]\).”\(^{44}\) The differentiation of the Idea into its subjectivity and objectivity is here once again reconceptualized as the pure differentiation of the Idea within itself, implying that it is both itself and its other. It is then

\(^{40}\) ENZ, § 223.

\(^{41}\) ENZ, § 224.

\(^{42}\) Ibid.

\(^{43}\) Ibid.

\(^{44}\) ENZ, § 225.
identified as the process of knowing, namely the relation between the finite human spirit and the external world in which reason comes forth as the certainty of its identity with the world and demonstrates this to be true.

The transition from the genus-process to knowing is thus made by a series of reformulations of the notions that concern the differentiation of the Idea: (1) an individual organism’s self-organization and the genus-process, as the differentiation of the Idea into one-sided subjectivity and one-sided objectivity; (2) this differentiation of the Idea, as a differentiation of the Idea within itself; (3) this unifying differentiation in which the Idea is both itself and its other, as the differentiation between the finite human spirit and the external world whose identity is presupposed by reasons’ certainty and is posited as such for and by reason. As I have attempted to show above, the first reformulation is concerned with the one-sidedness that the Idea has both in an individual living body’s self-organization and the genus-process. The second reformulation hinges on the fact that both the subjectivity and objectivity are of the Idea. But it further adds an important point to the discussions of the differentiation of the Idea that it is the self-differentiation of the Idea. The aspect of self-identity of the Idea is therefore to be taken as the key conceptual standard defining the next object in the dialectic of the Idea. The third reformulation then suggests that the finite human spirit is the reality that meets that standard, specifically when it is considered as reason that demonstrates the certainty of its unity with the world to be true. Therefore, the emergence of a psychological subject, i.e., knowing, in Hegel’s logic is a necessary consequence of the logical structure and the dialectic nature of the Idea. The dialectic exhibition [Darstellung] of the Concept hinges on the conformity between the Concept and reality—the logical structure of the Concept at each stage and the conceptual constitution of the reality corresponding to it. In this exhibition, the finite human spirit is the reality in which the
Idea can exhibit itself as self-identical self-differentiation. Therefore, the sublation of the immediacy of the Idea occurs in the process of knowing.

2.4. The Emergence of Spirit out of the Death of the Individual Living Being

As mentioned above, Hegel states that “the death of the merely immediate, individual living being [Lebendigkeit] is the emergence of spirit [das Hervorgehen des Geistes].”\(^{45}\) Since this statement condenses all the dialectic process of the Idea I have reconstructed so far, I here turn back to the thesis of the emergence of spirit out of the death of an individual living being. Now it becomes more evident that the spirit that emerges out of the death of an individual living being is subjective spirit—knowing [das Erkennen] that is thematized in the Psychology of the philosophy of subjective spirit more precisely. My concern here is therefore to clarify the significance of the death of an individual living being for the knowing.

I have earlier suggested that the genus-process brings up a modification in the meaning of death: from an immediate dissolution of the individuality of a living organism to a mediating factor constitutive of the life of a species. On this basis, I understand “the death of the merely immediate, individual living being” in the statement above as involving that modification, while identifying the Lebendigkeit in the statement with das Lebendige which I have previously interpreted as an individual living body that is alive by self-organization. Hence, the statement that spirit emerges out of the death of an immediate individual living being cannot be understood as if spirit emerges when living beings all die, or as if spirit is something supernatural that can

\(^{45}\) ENZ, § 222.
subsist even when there are no living beings. Instead, it condenses the dialectic process of the Idea that goes from an individual organism’s self-organization to the genus process, and to knowing. I have attempted to show that the transition from life to knowing in the dialectic of the Idea involves a series of reformulations concerning the logical structure of the Idea and the conceptual constitution of the realities such as an individual organism, the genus for itself, and the finite human spirit. If my previous analysis of this dialectic has a point, the thesis of spirit’s emergence out of the death of an individual living being can be understood as reaffirming the dialectic of the Idea. It means that through the dialectic of the Idea it has been shown that the finite human spirit that interacts with the external world through its cognitive and volitional operations, i.e., knowing, is the reality adequate to the Idea, the reality in which the Idea is identical to itself in its self-differentiation.

But the meaning of spirit’s emergence out of death is to be more aptly clarified in both terms of connection and disconnection between spirit and death, as the German “hervorgehen” ambiguously means both the origin from which something comes forth and the state in which it has become somehow independent from that origin. Hegel’s thesis of spirit’s emergence out of the death of an individual living being therefore involves, as far as I see, the conceptual difference between the biological life of an organism and the cognitive and volitional life of a spiritual being. Specifically, the dialectic of the Idea implies that when we are concerned with the biological life of a living body, the self-contradictory constitution of life is the conceptual limit we can reach. But we move from this realm of natural life to the realm of spiritual life when we put the inner contradiction of life in the context of the life of a species and consider the resolution of that contradiction in the genus-process in relation to the logical structure of the Idea. For it thereby turns out that the finite human spirit that relates to the world through
cognition and volition is the reality in which the Idea exhibits itself as self-differentiation. By implication, the finite human spirit differs in kind from non-human organisms in that it is, again, the reality in which the Idea, which has its objectivity in the speciating life of organisms, posits this objectivity for itself.

But spirit’s emergence out of the death of an individual living being does not mean that spirit completely leaves behind the realm of death. Instead, the finite human spirit that comes on following the genus-process in the dialectic of the Idea, holds an essential connection with its living body. Noteworthy in this regard is Hegel’s following characterization of the finitude of a human spirit: it is the “finitude in this sphere [the sphere of life]” in which “the presupposing is not yet a positing” and hence “for the subjective Idea the objective one is an immediate world that is present as un-reflectively pre-given [vorgefundene] or the Idea as life in the appearance of individual existence.”

Hegel here formulates the cognitive relationship between the finite human spirit and the world by employing the terms the subjective Idea and the objective Idea, those terms he used for reconceptualizing an individual organism’s self-organization and the genus-process as a differentiation of the Idea. This formulation finds its rationale in the fact that the finite human spirit is still in the “sphere of life in which the presupposing is not yet a positing.” By implication, the spirit that is emerging is something alive, and hence, something embodied.

Therefore, the thesis of the emergence of spirit introduces the theme of the finite human spirit as something between nature and spirit: something spiritual that is distinct in kind from an animal organism but has at the same time a living body. From this, we can quickly grasp Hegel’s

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46 ENZ § 224.
strategy in his philosophy of subjective spirit. If the finite human spirit is the reality in which the Idea posits itself for itself, this positing of the Idea can only be exhibited by the process of the finite human spirit in which it somehow sublates its embodied conditions (the *Anthropology*), develops itself into reason (the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the *Psychology*), and thereby exhibits itself as a spiritual being that is distinct from a mere animal organism. While holding this framework of the philosophy of subjective spirit for its detailed analysis I will carry out in Chapter 3, I would here like to look deeper into the issue of the death of an individual living being. If the spirit that is emerging is an embodied living being, this implies that the death of an individual remains a problem. I have suggested that the physical death of a living body denotes the dissolution of the Concept and the impossibility of the Idea’s realization; the genus-process presents a way out of this difficulty by bringing forth a positive understanding of the meaning of death. However, it should now be mentioned that the modification in the meaning of death does not make any change in the fact that embodied living beings die. Or, the death of an individual may positively be comprehended by a philosopher who is considering its meaning in relation to the genus-process. But it does not ensure that it has the same positive meaning for the individuals who are subject to death. By this, I do not intend an existentialist interpretation, but only point out that the logical problem caused by the mortality of living beings, namely its preclusion of the concrete universality that is an individuality, remains a problem insofar as the finite human spirit is dealt with as an embodied living being.

In this respect, it is to be noted that the thesis of the emergence of spirit reintroduces the issue of individuality. Returning to Hegel’s characterization of the finitude of a human spirit, Hegel speaks of how the objective Idea (the genus for itself) appears *to the subjective Idea* (an organism) and how *the subjective Idea* conceives of the objective Idea. We here discern a switch
of the focus from the universality of the genus for itself to the individuality of an organism. By this formulation Hegel imbues new meanings to the terms the subjective Idea and the objective Idea: the former now indicates the finite human spirit, and the latter, the external world. On this basis, the finitude of the human spirit is said to consist in the fact that it encounters the objects in the world only as having “individual existence.” At this stage of the emergence of spirit, in other words, the finite human spirit is an individual being with a living body that recognizes its objects in the world of life only as individual entities. This incipient cognitive relationship between the finite human spirit and its objects is just a confrontation of individual beings. We do not see how the finite human spirit as such an individual embodied being can be, at the same time, the concrete universality. Hence, this should be exhibited by an analysis of the finite human spirit that is embodied, and this analysis should involve an explanation of the sublation of death since this is the problem of individuality. Now all these issues concerning the finitude of a human spirit set the stage for the Anthropology in the philosophy of subjective spirit. If the spirit that emerges by the death of an individual living being in the dialectic of the Idea, ultimately refers to knowing, i.e., a psychological subject thematized in the Psychology in the philosophy of subjective spirit, this is so only under the condition that all the issues concerning its bodily existence are clarified in the Anthropology. Further, if spirit emerges out of the death of an individual living being, this is not a metaphor. As I will discuss in Chapter 5, it is concerned with a real process of habituation, one through which the soul as a first nature dies and is reborn as a second nature.

Now, the considerations above give a clue for figuring out the reason why Hegel makes a

47 ENZ, § 224.
lengthy detour through the *Philosophy of Nature*, the *Anthropology*, and the *Phenomenology of Spirit* to address in earnest what he already dealt with in the *Logic*: knowing. If this psychological subject appears at first as a natural being that is embodied, it can only be thematized when its position in the order of natural beings is defined. The *Logic* can therefore deal with knowing only as the determinacy of the logical Idea. It can only establish that knowing is the reality in which the Idea can turn back to itself in its self-differentiation and that this knowing is at first something alive. But it cannot further deal with how the Idea posits itself in this embodied spirit. For this requires an explanation of how an organism occupies the culminating point in the system of nature, how the finite human spirit comes forth as an embodied living being, and how this embodied spirit develops itself to reason that is liberated from embodiment in a certain manner. In short, subjective spirit has the logical Idea for “its first presupposition,” and nature for “its proximate presupposition.”

### 3. Objective Thinking and Actuality in Hegel’s *Logic*

In the previous section, I have attempted to show how Hegel’s treatment of knowing in the dialectic of the Idea relates to the philosophy of subjective spirit. I have thereby suggested that knowing, namely the finite human spirit that relates itself to the world through cognitive and volitional activities, is the reality adequate for the Idea; however, it can be thematized in the *Encyclopedia* system only after the issues concerning the natural aspects of the human spirit such as its bodily existence and mortality have been settled down. But I have left untouched another

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48 Cf. *ENZ*, § 381 Z.
crucial thesis of the dialectic of the Idea that knowing is the reality adequate for the Idea when it is reason. Now, in the philosophy of subjective spirit, the relationship between reason and knowing has to do with the transition from the *Phenomenology of Spirit* to the *Psychology*, as the *Psychology* begins its discussion of knowing based on the *Phenomenological* exhibition of reason as the truth of self-consciousness. But this transition in the philosophy of subjective spirit is also associated, I suggest, with the transition from the Objective logic to the Subjective logic.

Regarding the relation between the two transitions—one in the philosophy of subjective spirit and the other in the logic—I draw attention to the following formulation concerning reason and knowing given in the last passage of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*: “the certainty that its determinations are objective, are determinations of the essence of things, just as much as they are its own thoughts. Hence, it is reason, which is […] not only the absolute substance, but the truth as knowing.”¹⁴⁹ As I deal with in this section, one of the main claims of Hegel in the Objective logic (the Doctrine of Being and the Doctrine of Essence) is that thought determinations are to be treated as essentialities of a thing. To be more precise, thought is for Hegel something substantial that is itself content and produces its content by the negative, active movement of pure reflection rather than a pure, empty form, which is supposed to give conceptual orders to sensual data received from outside world. In this sense of thought-determinations as essentialities of a thing that produce themselves as such, Hegel calls the subject matter of the logic “objective thinking.” What Hegel suggests in the above citation from the last passage of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is that the notion of objective thinking in the logic constitutes the *Phenomenological* certainty of reason. We can therefore assume that the transition from the *Phenomenology of Spirit* to the

¹⁴⁹ ENZ, § 439.
Psychology whereby reason is further treated as knowing somehow reinstitutes the transition in
the logic from the Objective logic to the Subjective logic whereby it is established that the truth
of objective thinking consists in the unity of existence and essence and the true form of this unity
consists in the absolute reflection internal to that unity, namely actuality.

As a preliminary study for close analysis of Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit which
I undertake in Chapter 3, this section examines Hegel’s notion of objective thinking and
considers its implications for the philosophy of subjective spirit. Prior to carry out this study, it is
to be noted that Hegel’s logic does not consider the thought and thinking in terms of
phenomenological reality or psychological operation. What it considers is the logical
interconnections among thought determinations, which Hegel finds underlie all our mental
activities. The movement of pure reflection that constitutes the negative activity of pure thinking
is concerned with the dialectical exhibition of those logical relations among thought
determinations. To put it simply, what is active, what moves, and what thinks, in Hegel’s logic,
is the thought itself that determines itself and thus produces its own determinations and not the I
who thinks about them as a psychological subject. Conversely, the activity of knowing
thematized in the Psychology is not the pure reflection exhibited in the logic but the activity of
the human spirit whereby what is intuited is recollected and thus transformed into universal
representations.

If one wants to draw out some psychological implications of Hegel’s notion of objective
thinking for his philosophy of subjective spirit, one would therefore have to spell out how the
thought or thinking in the logic, which is not psychological, relates to reason and knowing as
psychological reality and activity. Bearing this issue in mind, I examine in this section Hegel’s
notion of objective thinking. First, I pay special attention to the dialectic of form and matter presented in the sub-section on the Absolute Ground in the Doctrine of Essence and Hegel’s notion that the content of thought is a determinate substrate [Grundlage] of form and matter.\textsuperscript{50} By putting this idea in the context of his reading of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, I explore, second, the sense in which the subjective spirit in Hegel’s *Encyclopedia* system can be considered to be the substrate of the absolute spirit. This section also offers a brief reconstruction of Hegel’s dialectic with the categories concerning actuality: possibility, contingency, and necessity. By working on this dialectic, I finally attempt to shed light on Hegel’s notion of actuality as the manifestation of the absolute.

### 3.1. Hegel’s Notion of Objective Thinking

As with Kant’s transcendental logic, Hegel’s speculative logic deals with pure forms of thought having no empirical origin. But Hegel argues that categories or pure forms of thought are not the forms of “subjective” thought external to things, but “the nature or essence of things,” i.e., “that which is truly permanent and substantial in the manifold and accidentality of appearance and fleeting externalization.”\textsuperscript{51} In the “Preliminary Conception” of the *Encyclopedia*

\textsuperscript{50} As I will later consider Hegel’s notion of Grundlage in reference to his lectures on Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, Hegel seems to maintain the meaning of the Greek τὸ ὑποκείμενον as substrate or substratum. For this reason, I use the word “substrate” for the translation of his term Grundlage instead of the standard translation “foundation.” However, I am not suggesting “substrate” as an alternative translation of “foundation.” This standard translation should be maintained because Grundlage is in Hegel’s logic considered in the dialectical terms of the movement of self-grounding, that is, producing itself as Grund. My choice of the word “substrate” is to facilitate the investigation of the relationship between Hegel and Aristotle. I therefore confine my use of the word “substrate” for the translation of the term Grundlage only to the present chapter.

\textsuperscript{51} GW 21, 14/ SL, 16. Hegel’s criticism of Kant’s subjectivist notion of category is found in §§40-60 of the *Encyclopedia* logic. To recapitulate, Hegel challenges Kant for turning the objectivity of thought into subjective objectivity (*ENZ*, § 26). Kant deals with categories only as forms of thought, whose contents are to be given through sensation. This Kantian approach is based on the view of the opposition between subjectivity and objectivity, but both subjectivity and objectivity are the “element internal to experience” (*ENZ*, § 26). Consequently, the objectivity
logic, Hegel makes this point clearer by claiming that thoughts are to be considered as “objective thoughts.”52 Further, the logic treating objective thoughts may well be called “metaphysics” insofar as metaphysics means the “science of things captured in thought that have counted as expressing the essentialities of things.”53 However, Hegel’s notion of objective thinking is not to

of categories is unavoidably turned into something subjective. This problem is clearly seen, I suggest, from Kant’s argument about the objective validity of categories. His claim is that categories have objective validity in the sense that they have universality and necessity, and that they have universality and necessity because they are a priori. As Hegel indicates, the objective validity of categories in this Kantian sense hinges upon the internal feature of categories—the fact that they are a priori concepts. Correspondingly, the objectivity of categories considered in Kant’s transcendental logic has to do with how categories serve to our mind’s having a representation of a united object and not just a mere manifold of sensation. This objectivity cannot strictly be said to be “objective” since it applies to an object as a representation in our mind and not to an object outside our mind. For this reason, Hegel estimates that the old metaphysics establishes superiority over Kant’s Critical philosophy because it considers thought determinations as belonging to things in themselves. Thus, Hegel argues that Kant’s claim of the emptiness of categories is unjustified (ENZ, § 43 Z). This claim of Kant can be justified when one assumes that contents of categories are sensory, or spatial-temporal. However, Hegel argues that this is not necessary; categories are determinate in any way and can rightly be said to have contents in themselves. This contentful feature of categories further requires that the notion of knowing [das Erkennen] be corrected. For Hegel, knowing needs not to be confined to the cognition of a sensible object. Since categories or thought-determinations have contents in themselves and these contents eventually pertain to essentialities of a thing, one can rather speak of “knowing [wissen] an object in terms of its determinate content” that “contains multiple connections within itself and grounds connections with many other objects” (ENZ, § 46 A). Pure forms of thought can therefore be examined, for Hegel, in their determinate contents which are somehow objective in themselves, without taking into consideration the conditions of sensibility, nor presupposing the opposition between a cognizing subject and a cognized object.

52 ENZ, § 24.

53 Ibid. Vittorio Hösle portrays Hegel’s position in the Encyclopedia system in terms of objective idealism, which he sets in the context of the Platonic tradition in which concepts or ideas are considered as general essences of particular things rather than subjective representations produced by the human mind. For Hösle’s comprehensive analysis of Hegel’s project of a philosophical system, see Vittorio Hösle, Hegels System. Der Idealismus der Subjektivität und das Problem der Intersubjektivität (Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft Darmstadt, 1998).

Following Hösle, we can draw out two criteria for evaluating how successful Hegel’s system is in defending the position of objective idealism, or the idea that reason is in the world, without violating the Kantian critical spirit. First, Hegel’s logic should ground [begründen] itself without assuming any presupposition. Second, the logic should ground the Realphilosophie in a consistent manner. Hösle suggests, first, that Hegel’s logic successfully establishes the objectivity of thought-determinations through a dialectic exhibition of the thought’s self-grounding movement. For him, this Hegelian demonstration of the absolute subjectivity of thought whereby thought grounds itself in its objectivity remains unassailable. In relation to the Realphilosophie within the Encyclopedia system, however, Hösle points out that the absolute subjectivity of thought established in the logic seems to apply only up to the philosophy of subjective spirit. It is thus questionable, according to Hösle, why Hegel does not give a good account of how the philosophy of objective spirit and the philosophy of absolute spirit are grounded on the logic whereas he is earnest in showing how the Philosophy of Nature and the philosophy of subjective spirit are within the dialectical movement of the Concept’s self-development. Hösle therefore suggests that in the Encyclopedia system, the logic does not consistently ground the Realphilosophie, and that the principle of absolute subjectivity (the logic and the philosophy of subjective spirit) remains unreconciled with the principle of intersubjective subjectivity (the philosophy of objective spirit and the philosophy of absolute spirit).

But Hösle’s intention is not to disclose Hegel’s failure in establishing a consistent philosophical system. He seems to
be regarded as a return to pre-Kantian old metaphysics. Hegel challenges the old metaphysics for being blind to “the opposition of consciousness in and against itself.” It lacks, in other words, the critical elements of Kantian philosophy in which pure reason makes itself into its object for the self-investigation of its own limits and legitimate boundaries. With the lack of the critical spirit, the old metaphysics takes thought-determinations to be valid per se and makes them into predicates of the truth without ever calling into question the validity of those thought-determinations. What is predominant in the old metaphysics is such pre-Critical, naïve beliefs in the objectivity and the truth of thought-determinations.

Thus, Hegel’s notion that his speculative logic takes objective thinking as its subject matter involves a twofold criticism of pre-Kantian dogmatic metaphysics and Kantian subjective idealism. Conversely, it can also be considered in terms of a twofold critical appropriation of the

be more concerned with the tension between the view of absolute subjectivity (the logical Idea and subjective spirit) and the view of intersubjectivity (objective spirit and absolute spirit). And this is related to his idea that objective idealism can provide us with a way to respond to what he takes to be a crucial philosophical crisis today, that is, skepticism in both epistemological and ethical senses: cf. Vittorio Hölsle, “What Can We Learn from Hegel’s Objective-Idealist Theory of the Concept that Goes Beyond the Theories of Sellars, McDowell, and Brandom?,” in The Dimensions of Hegel’s Dialectic, ed. Limnatis, Nectarios G. (London, New York: Continuum, 2010), 216-236. Further, developing the objective-idealist position defensible against skepticism, for him, hinges upon elaborating a satisfactory model of intersubjectivity. Seen this way, the unsystematic connection between the logic and the Realphilosophie in Hegel’s Encyclopedia system implies that Hegel left the relationship between subjectivity and intersubjectivity somewhat obscure. Hölsle further suggests that the tension between the two found in Hegel’s system is more fundamentally concerned with the tension between modern philosophy of subjectivity and contemporary philosophy of intersubjectivity. Hegel’s absolute idealism, Hölsle suggests, thus left us with the question as to “whether one could think of a more contemporary form of absolute idealism that concerns objective reason, which would have to be interpreted primarily, not as subjectivity, but as intersubjectivity.” “What Can We Learn from Hegel’s Objective-Idealist Theory of the Concept that Goes Beyond the Theories of Sellars, McDowell, and Brandom?,” 10.

I here refer to Hölsle because I find his works compelling in making sense of Hegel’s notion of “objective thinking” as a “metaphysical” subject matter, which might seem obsolete to some contemporary readers. Since my interest is in Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit and its relation to the logic, I here do not enter the discussion about intersubjectivity Hölsle introduces. But I find another formulation of his concerning the unsystematicity of Hegel’s Encyclopedia suggestive in thinking about Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit. That is, why is it that spirit that is supposed to be de-naturalized through the philosophy of subjective spirit is to be re-naturalized as second nature in the realm of objective spirit? In Chapter 5, I attempt to answer this question by showing that for Hegel, there cannot be an absolute de-naturalization of spirit because spirit can reveal itself only through its other, i.e., nature.

54 ENZ, § 26.
classic metaphysical notion of the objectivity of thought-determination and of the Kant-Fichte\-an notion of self-conscious activity as the self-grounding principle of a transcendental system of knowledge. Seen this way, then, the Objective Logic can be viewed as synthesizing two standpoints, namely the objectivity of thought and the subjectivity of thinking. This synthesis culminates in the exposition of the absolute in terms of actuality, which is at the same time the logical exposition of the thesis that the absolute is not only substance but is also subject. The Objective Logic thus establishes that the Concept is such a unity of being and reflection. From the perspective of the Concept, Hegel states that his logic first considers the Concept as being (the Doctrine of Being, where the Concept is only immediate, in-itself, and objective), and then, the Concept as the Concept (the Doctrine of Concept, where the Concept is mediated, for itself, and subjective). Hence, the Doctrine of Essence can be viewed as the place of mediation where the Concept as being is turned into the Concept as the Concept. My suggestion is that this mediation can be considered in terms of the synthesis I articulated above.

With respect to the twofold critical appropriation of two different traditions constituting Hegel’s idea of objective thinking, it is worth noting that Hegel’s logic starts with “being” and being is regarded as a thought-determination. As such, being is being as thought in the sense that “being” as a word or a thought-determination expresses itself the unity of being and thought. From its beginning, Hegel’s logic thus twists the classic notion of being by introducing the Kantian idea of category as a form of understanding. As Longueness puts it, “metaphysics after Kant is a science of being as being thought” rather than “a science of being qua being or a science of the universal determinations of things as they are in themselves.”

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if the objective thinking is relevant to the classic notion of thought as the essence or essentiality of a thing, essence is also to be shown in some elements involved in thought. Regarding this, the notion of pure reflection elaborated in the first section of the Doctrine of Essence, “The Pure Reflection Within,” can be viewed, I suggest, as offering a model of pure thinking that produces essence as essence. Thus, the unity of being and thought, which was immediately expressed in the simple word “being,” is posited as such by the active movement of pure reflection. If thought is essence or essentiality of a thing as the pre-Kantian metaphysicians rightly conceived, such an objective feature of thought is to be shown within the movement of reflection whereby essence determines itself as such an essential determination of a thing. The notion of essence as pure reflection, namely thought’s self-determining movement by virtue of its self-relating negativity can therefore be considered, I suggest, in terms of the Hegelian alternative to the Kant-Fichtean conception of the transcendental self-consciousness as the self-grounding principle of a system of knowledge. Of importance is that Hegel’s pure reflection significantly differs from Kant-Fichtean transcendental self-consciousness because it belongs to essence itself and not to the I who thinks about essence.

    Another element I find important with respect to the way in which Hegel’s notion of objective thinking relates to the two different traditions, is the idea that the objective thinking is a matter that has a form and, as such a matter, is content. In the second Introduction to the Science of Logic, Hegel writes: “the objective thinking is thus the content of pure science,” which is a “veritable matter,” namely “a matter for which the form is nothing external, because this matter

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is rather pure thought and hence the absolute form itself.”56 Obviously, objective thinking—that is, the content which is a matter that has a form—does not pertain to empirical datum:

Scattered in fixed determinations and thus not held together in organic unity, they [logical forms] are dead forms and the spirit which is their vital concrete unity does not reside in them. But, thus conceived, they lack solid content—a matter that would in itself be unreflected-content [Gehalt]. The content which is missed in the logical forms is nothing else than a fixed substrate [Grundlage] and a concretion of these abstract determinations, and such a substantial being is usually sought for them outside them. But logical reason is itself the substantial or the real which, within itself, holds together all the abstract determinations and constitutes their solid, absolutely concrete, unity.57

While arguing that the objective thinking is the subject matter of the logic, in this passage Hegel criticizes the Kantian conception of transcendental logic for its “total disregard of metaphysical significance.”58 For Hegel, this non-metaphysical logic is right in leaving out solid contents—that is, “content of the kind which ordinary consciousness would accept as reality”—from their consideration of pure forms of thinking.59 However, they are wrong in holding that thinking is a “mere form of cognition” abstracted from all content since the thinking constitutes “the content of its own.”60 For Hegel, the content of a logical form has nothing to do with empirical datum, which the phenomenological consciousness takes to belong to an object external to it. Instead, it

56 GW 21, 34/ SL, 29.
58 GW 21, 32/ SL, 27.
59 Ibid.
60 GW 21, 28/ SL, 24.
is a “fixed substrate” in which the abstract forms of thinking are concretized. Objective thinking as content is therefore a “substantial being.” Consequently, objective thinking as content is not to be found outside of the logical form. Instead, we find it within the logical reason, which brings together all the logical forms as well as all the phenomenological, conscious solid contents.

3.2. The Move from Pure Reflection to Ground:
From the Relation without Relata to the Real Relationship

In what sense can we consider thought to be a matter that has a form? Holding that Hegel’s notion of objective thinking involves a twofold critical relationship with the two traditions, and that the Objective Logic can be viewed as a synthesis of the two standpoints, I examine the move within the Doctrine of Essence from pure reflection to the last reflection-determination, i.e., ground. I pay special attention to the dialectic of form and matter presented in the “Ground” section, which establishes that the content is the “unity of form and matter” as a “determinate substrate [Grundlage] of both.”

In the Doctrine of Essence, Hegel elaborates on the notion of pure reflection to present the dialectical movement of pure thinking whereby essence determines itself by positing what it presupposes. Pure reflection thus denotes the pure activity of essence’s self-determination, which is made possible by virtue of the self-relating negativity inherent to essence. In the self-determining activity of essence, a series of determinations including identity, difference, and contradiction appear and disappear one by one until the last determination, ground, appears. The last reflection-determination, ground, fundamentally differs from the other determinations that

\[GW11, 301/ SL: 396.\]
precede it. Whereas these reflection determinations preceding ground appear and disappear in the
movement of pure reflection, this movement of pure thought now disappears into the
determination ground. As the German “zu grunde gehen” ambiguously means, essence thus
determines itself and grounds itself by letting itself as a self-determining movement disappear in
the determination ground. Indeed, the move from pure reflection to ground establishes the
fundamental methodological facet of Hegel’s logic. For the meaning of “becoming” applicable to
all of the dialectical movements in the logic consists in the “reflection of that which passes over
into its ground.”\textsuperscript{62} But this methodological aspect is only half of the significance of the move
from pure reflection to ground. The “Ground” section, I suggest, constitutes a watershed within
the Doctrine of Essence, setting out a new discussion about real mediation—which is further
developed into the dialectic between an inner essence and an outer appearance.

With respect to this new element introduced in the “Ground” section, i.e., real mediation,
we need a more detailed explanation of how the last reflection-determination, ground, differs
from pure reflection. As the expression “reflection within” \textit{[Reflexion in him selbst (in dem
Wesen)]} implies, essence’s self-determining movement, i.e., pure reflection, is a purely internal
movement, which has no outside, nor a distinction between inside and outside. Essence is thus a
determining movement itself and nothing other than that movement. Describing essence’s self-
determination, therefore, involves a fundamental difficulty:

Essence \textit{has} a form and form-determinations. Only as ground does it have a fixed
immediacy or is \textit{substrate}. Essence as such is one with its reflection, inseparable from its

\textsuperscript{62} Cf. \textit{GW} 12, 12/ \textit{SL}, 509.
movement. It is not essence, therefore, through which this movement runs its reflective course; nor is essence that from which the movement begins, as from a starting point. It is this circumstance that above all makes the exposition of reflection especially difficult, for strictly speaking one cannot say that essence returns into itself, that essence shines in itself, for essence is neither before its movement nor in the movement: this movement has no substrate on which it runs its course.\textsuperscript{63}

Indeed, the difficulty Hegel mentions in the passage above with respect to a description of pure reflection seems to be inherent to any attempt to verbalize a movement or change. Verbalizing a movement or change involves a tension between being and becoming—the tension between the ever-changing nature of becoming and the fixed nature of a linguistic expression, more precisely. Now, pure reflection is a movement; it is the becoming of essence. In contrast with this, ground has a fixed immediacy or substrate. Ground thus differs in kind from the other reflection-determinations that come before it. For it is a determination that has a self-subsistence separable from the movement of pure reflection—separable in the sense that it is not swallowed up by the movement of the becoming of essence but instead emerges as something positive from within the negative activity of pure reflection. It is no longer an essentiality in which essence only shines, and which is dissolved as a moment of pure reflection. It is the “sublated reflection” of which the immediacy is the “being as restored by essence.”\textsuperscript{64}

The difference between pure reflection and ground relates to the distinction between relation \textit{[Beziehung]} and relationship \textit{[Verhältnis]}. While the relation has no relata, the

\textsuperscript{63} GW 11, 295/SL, 390.

\textsuperscript{64} GW 11, 291/SL, 387.
relationship is a connection among existents. Thus, whereas pure reflection is a relating [beziehen] within, namely “a pure relation without relata [die reine Beziehung ohne das Bezogene],” ground is the “real mediation of essence with itself.”

Ground is a real mediation, in the sense that “it contains reflection as sublated reflection” such that “what is posited receives the determination of immediacy.” Consequently, ground pertains to “an immediate which is self-identical outside its relation or its shining.” It is something substantial which contains within itself the sublated reflection and has an externality separable from pure reflection. As such, it can serve as a relatum of a relationship. Thus, the “Ground” section can be read in terms of the genesis of a relatum for a real relationship. At the stage of ground, thought comes to have the form of a term of which the meaning is objectively associated with the existent it refers to.

We can go further to say that objective thinking is here concerned with the objective form of thought in which it is expressed as a term of a real relationship rather than an internal, indeterminate movement of thought.

The “Ground” section thus introduces the notion that a thought-determination, which gains its determination by the movement of pure reflection that determines itself by letting itself disappear into ground, serves as a relatum of a real relationship among existents. The dialectic of form and matter presented in its first sub-section, “The Absolute Ground,” then, establishes that the thought-determination, conceived as a relatum of the real relationship, is a determinate substrate. Importantly, Hegel here brings up the distinction between form and matter, stating that the reflection-determinations that appeared previously in the movement of pure reflection—

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65 GW 11, 292/ SL, 387.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid, my emphasis.
identity, difference, and contradiction—turn out to be *form*-determinations of essence. More precisely, it turns out that “the completed whole of reflection” pertains to a “form.”\(^{68}\) Conversely, form is the activity of “determining,” “relating itself to itself as sublated positedness, and thereby relating itself to its identity as an other.”\(^{69}\) Yet, the *completed whole* of reflection, since it is not just a pure reflection but the reflection sublated into ground, involves two heterogeneous elements: the activity of determining or self-relating negativity (pure reflection) on the one hand, and positedness or a fixed identity that is posited through that self-determining activity (ground), on the other. Thus, the difference between pure reflection and ground is now developed into the distinction between form and matter. While form is concerned with the self-determining activity of essence, matter is “the formless indeterminate” to which pure reflection relates itself [verhalten sich], or “the simple substrate undifferentiated identity,” which is “the other of form,” and “the proper substrate [Grundlage] of form.”\(^{70}\) This matter—which is the other of form and as such, the substrate of form—is not something that we can perceive, Hegel underlines, because what we perceive is a composite of matter and form and not the matter itself, which is formless and indeterminate.

It seems that Hegel’s conception of matter as a formless, indeterminate substrate is closely associated with Aristotle’s notion that matter is an indeterminate substrate [τὸ ὑποκείμενον].\(^{71}\) Hegel also develops the idea that matter is passive whereas form is active, which echoes with Aristotle’s idea that matter is potentiality for a form, and form is the principle of


\(^{70}\) *GW* 11, 297/ *SL*, 392.

actuality. As I discuss below, Aristotle develops his notions of matter and form and the scheme of potentiality and actuality to explain the principle of change and the constitution of a sensible substantial being. But Hegel’s Doctrine of Essence is not so much concerned with the metaphysical principles of a sensible substance’s being, motion, and action as with the self-determining movement of thought, which is not sensible. It is therefore important to note that when Hegel defines matter as an indeterminate substrate, he is considering it in terms of his scheme of pure reflection: matter has the reflection determination of identity, and it is the positedness or a posited being of a form. This being said, the distinction between form and matter is the self-division of essence into its moments, which were not separated in the movement of pure reflection: form as the movement of pure reflection, and matter as a positive that is determined by pure reflection.

Now, through the dialectic form and matter, Hegel re-establishes the unity of form and matter: “matter is as such determined or necessarily has a form, and form is simply [schlechthin] material, subsistent form.”72 Thus, the dialectic of form and matter restores the identity of essence. But this restored identity of essence differs from the identity as a reflection-determination that appeared and disappeared in the movement of pure reflection because it now has an externality or materiality, as “informed matter or “form that possesses subsistence.”73 It is therefore to be noted that the dialectic of form and matter displays a fundamentally different aspect from the movement of pure reflection. In contrast to this internal movement of essence without an outer, in the dialectic of matter and form, “in withdrawing into itself,” essence “has

72 *GW* 11, 300/ *SL*, 395.
73 *GW* 11, 300/ *SL*, 396.
repelled itself from itself and has determined itself.”⁷⁴ Thus, the restored identity of essence, namely the identity of form and matter is a substrate [Grundlage], and this substrate, Hegel emphasizes, is their “determinate substrate.”⁷⁵ This determinate substrate is defined as “content.”⁷⁶

Through the dialectic of matter and form, therefore, it is established that essence is something substantial. Instead of being swept away in the indeterminate movement of pure reflection, essence serves as the underlying substrate of its self-determining movement and contains the same negative movement as sublated. For Hegel, this is the sense in which thought or thought determination, as an essentiality of a thing, is the content. As the content, thought is a determinate substrate; determinate, in the sense that it comes to have a determinate determination as a result of essence’s self-determining movement and can therefore be exhibited in the dialectical self-determining movement of pure reflection. In this sense, thought determination is for Hegel a substantial being, but this substantial being that determines itself is different from Aristotle’s substantial being of which the substrate is an indeterminate matter susceptible to this and that form.

3.3. Hegel’s Lectures on Aristotle’s Metaphysics

The dialectic of form and matter in the Doctrine of Essence re-establishes the unity of being and thought. While the Doctrine of Being begins with the simple term “being” that

⁷⁴ GW 11, 300/SL, 396.
⁷⁵ GW 11, 301/SL, 396.
⁷⁶ GW 11, 301/ SL, 396.
immediately expresses that fundamental identity as a thought determination, the dialectic of form and matter restores the same identity as the dialectic, negative unity of pure reflection and ground. It thus established that thought is a determinate, substantial being that posits itself as what it is through a self-relating, self-determining movement, one that contains within itself a determination expressing what it is as a sublated reflection. Seen this way, the “Ground” section is the first place in Hegel’s logic where it is established that thought is a substance that has a subjectivity, the essential, ontological idea of Hegel’s logic that is further developed through the notions of actuality [Wirklichkeit], the Concept, and the logical Idea. It is therefore important to note that Hegel’s objective thinking contains subjectivity. Thought or thought determination for Hegel is the essence of a thing; however, it is an essence that determines itself as an essence and not a universal determination that can be abstracted from particular instances, nor a universal being in which particular things are supposed to participate. This notion of objectivity thinking as intrinsically involving subjectivity underpins Hegel’s absolute idealism exhibited through his Encyclopedia system. Now, it appears that one can shed more light on Hegel’s notion in the “Ground” section of thought as a determinate matter by investigating his lectures on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. This will also give a good clue for figuring out the connection between the logic and the philosophy of subjective spirit in Hegel’s Encyclopedia system.

To begin, Hegel’s high praise of Aristotle is well known. In the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, he states that Aristotle was “one of the most highly endowed, most learned, most comprehensive, and most profound geniuses ever to appear.” Specifically, Aristotle is superior to Plato in his theory of Idea. While “the rational must be determined as what is active,” the

77 VGP, 59/ LHP, 225.
Platonic Idea remains an inert universal lacking the “activity of actualization.” In contrast to this, the Aristotelian Idea is based on “the principle of life [Lebendigkeit] or the principle of subjectivity.” In Hegel’s view, the principle of subjectivity characteristic of Aristotle’s Idea is found in his theory of substance, and the notion of potentiality and actuality plays a key role in his theory of substance. Specifically, Hegel highlights that in Aristotle’s theory of substance, potentiality is “what is objective, what is in itself” rather than an “indeterminate possibility,” and actuality is “what is active or that which actualizes.” To be more precise, Aristotle’s actuality is “the moment of negativity, yet not as change and also not as nothing, but as what differentiates, what determines.” Thus, Hegel understands Aristotle’s notion of actuality in terms of the self-determining movement of pure reflection and the self-relating negativity underlying that movement whereby essence rejoins itself in differentiating itself. In this narrow sense of the self-relating negativity whereby essence determines itself, the Aristotelian actuality for Hegel exhibits the principle of life or subjectivity.

Now, Hegel suggests that one can understand Aristotle’s theory of substance in the Metaphysics in terms of “the relationship of form to matter, of potentiality to actuality, to energy or entelechy.” Depending on the ways in which potentiality, actuality, and entelechy are related to each other, then, there are three different “ways or modes of substances:” (1) sensible substance, (2) the human nous, and (3) God.

78 VGP, 68/ LHP, 234.
79 VGP, 68/ LHP, 234.
80 VGP, 69/ LHP, 236.
81 VGP, 70/ LHP, 236.
82 VGP, 70/ LHP, 236.
First, Hegel characterizes Aristotle’s notion of a sensible substance as a “finite substance” that “has a matter.” As we can see from this characterization, Hegel focuses on the issue of matter in his presentation of Aristotle’s notion of sensible substance. As Hegel points out, Aristotle holds that when there is a change, there must be something that underlies it and calls this matter. More precisely, matter for Aristotle is an indeterminate substrate, one that remains when all the forms and determinations are taken off. Now, Hegel comments that when a sensible substance undergoes a change, form remains external to matter; e.g., the form of a bronze status is separable from and indifferent to the bronze as an indeterminate matter. By using this example of the bronze, Hegel thus suggests that in the case of a sensible substance, either a natural or artful product, the matter is indifferent to the form or shape that it happens to receive. Since the actuality of the form remains external to the matter that undergoes the change caused by that actuality, a sensible substance for Hegel does not exhibit the principle of subjectivity, which consists in the self-relating, self-differentiating, self-determining, negative activity.

83 Cf. Aristotle, Physics 190 b10. Aristotle argues that there are three principles of change: form, matter, and privation of form. Accordingly, change can be explained in terms of a transition between contraries (form and privation of form) that occurs in the same matter: e.g., a non-musical person becomes a musical person. Those three principles are also the principles and causes of sensible substances: cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 1069 b34-5.

84 In Book 7 Chapter 3, Aristotle considers the four candidates of substantial being: essence, universal, genus, and substratum or substrate [τὸ ἑποκείνενον] and discusses the sense in which substrate can be considered as a substance. Substrate is defined as “that of which the others are predicated, while it is not itself predicated of anything else” (Metaphysics 1028b36-1029a1). Matter can be considered a substrate since it is what is left when one takes away all of the determinations including length, depth, and breadth from a body (cf. Metaphysics 1029a7-26). Matter is “that which in itself is neither a particular thing nor a certain quantity nor assigned to any other of the categories by which being is determined” (Metaphysics 1029a21-22). Thus, substrate is considered a candidate of substance since its definition somehow overlaps the definition of substance as “that which is not present in a subject nor is predicated of a subject” (Categories 1b3-4). Thus, it seems as though we can make a syllogism that matter is a substance because matter is a substrate and substrate is a substance. Aristotle suggests, however, that this cannot be the case. Matter may be considered a substance, together with form and composite of form and matter, but in a different sense than the latter is called a substance. Form and composite of form and matter meet the standard criteria for substance, that is, “separability and individuality [τὸ χωριστὸν καὶ τὸ τόδε τι],” but matter as an indeterminate substrate does not (cf. Metaphysics 1029a26-34). If matter can be called a substance, therefore, this is only in an analogous and loose sense.
Second, the human *nous* differs from sensible substance because it has an activity [*die Tätigkeit*] which contains “what ought to be.” For Aristotle, the human soul can act as the moving cause for the production of an artifact; e.g., a housebuilder produces a house by putting the design or plan in his soul into the materials such as bricks and woods. The form of a house present in the house-builder’s soul also operates as a final cause in the production of a house because it is the ultimate end of the housebuilder’s building a house. In this sense, the actuality of the human *nous* is a teleological realization of an end as Hegel points out. Hegel therefore emphasizes that in the case of the human *nous*, actuality [*ενέργεια*] occurs as complete actuality [*ἐντελέχεια*]. Regarding the difference between *ενέργεια* and *ἐντελέχεια*, we need to pay attention to Aristotle’s distinction between motion [*κίνησις*] and action [*πρᾶξις*]. For Aristotle, motion is incomplete because it is directed towards an end, thereby having a limit. But action is a completion of an end at every moment, that is, being-at-an-end at every moment of the action. Building a house is therefore not a motion but an action because every moment of the building is a realization of an end, i.e., a house. In this sense, action combines the moving cause and final cause (e.g., a builder and a design of a house in his soul) and further, *ενέργεια* and *ἐντελέχεια* (e.g., the presence of the form of a house in every moment of building as a final cause). For Hegel, this is the distinct characteristic of the activity [*Tätigkeit*] of the human *nous*, which contains what is ought to be.

Third, Aristotle’s God, namely the “absolute substance” is “what is unmoved, immovable, and eternal,” which is at the same time “pure activity [*Tätigkeit*], actus purus.”

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85 *VGP*: 71/LHP: 237.
87 *VGP*, 71/LHP, 237.
More precisely, Aristotle’s God is a substance that “in its potentiality also has actuality;” hence, “its essence (potentia) is activity [Tätigkeit] itself” and its “potentiality is not distinct from form.” For Hegel, this divine substance without matter is “what itself produces its content, what itself posits its own inner determination.” Thus, Aristotle’s God is for Hegel the absolute substance in which δύναμις, ενέργεια, and ἐντελέχεια are all united. Now, it is to be noted that the Aristotelian God is a thinking [νόησις]: a thinking of thinking [νόησις νοήσεως], more precisely. Aristotle holds that God is the highest and most excellent kind of being; hence, it must be a self-thinking because it is absurd, Aristotle argues, for the most excellent being to have for its object something else that is less excellent than itself. Since the self-thinking is its prominent feature, Aristotle also holds that God is an eternal self-thinking and is thus in eternal actuality. Hegel suggests that with this notion of God Aristotle’s Metaphysics establishes the unity of thought and thinking, and that this unity of the thought’s substantiality and subjectivity implies that “the objective element and thinking, the energy and what is moved [by it], are one and the same.”

Hegel’s articulation of the three ways or modes of substance, however, does not square with Aristotle’s distinction among the three kinds of substance in the Metaphysics Book 12: perishable sensible substantial beings (including natural and artful products), imperishable sensible substantial beings (heavenly bodies), and a non-sensible eternal substantial being (God). According to this classification, what Hegel calls the “human nous or understanding”

88 VGP, 72/ LHP, 237.
89 VGP, 72/ LHP, 237.
90 Aristotle, Metaphysics 1074b 25-35.
91 VGP, 72/ LHP, 238.
92 Regarding Aristotle’s notion of potentiality and actuality in the Metaphysics, we can first refer to Book 7 where he
pertains to a perishable sensible substance. It is therefore to be noted that the human *nous* for Aristotle is not a theme for the first philosophy, i.e., metaphysics. Instead, it is the subject matter of psychology within the *De anima*, which can largely be considered as part of physics in the sense of a study of beings in change. Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* certainly considers *nous*; however, what this first philosophy thematizes is the divine *noesis* and not the human *nous*. And the human *nous* is in his *De anima* considered the rational part of the soul rather than a substance.

By taking the human *nous* as a substance, Hegel thus seems to be suggesting that Aristotle’s notion of the human, poietic activity is to be integrated into his theory of substance in the *Metaphysics*. The motivation behind this Hegelian reading of Aristotle would be to make Aristotle’s theory of substance more systematic in the light of his own philosophical system that considers the three realities: nature, finite human spirit, and infinite absolute spirit. But if Aristotle’s notion of the human *nous* is for Hegel to be treated as a distinct substance that does not fall into the group of perishable sensible substantial beings, the ultimate reason of this, I think, bears on the essential significance of finite human spirit for infinite absolute spirit in

sets out the discussion of the coming-to-be or change of sensible substances. He considers the coming-to-be in such a broad sense that it covers a change in any categories. Since the other categories are derivative of the first four categories—substance, quality, quantity, and place—there are four kinds of the coming-to-be: the substantial (being generated and perishing), qualitative (alteration), quantitative (growth and diminution), and locomotive one. Further, there are three principles of the coming-to-be or change: form, privation of form, and matter. Things come to be by nature or spontaneously; whichever way they come to be, however, the source of their coming-to-be is the moving cause, i.e., form. In the case of a natural product, the form that is present in the parents, for example, begets their offspring having the same form as itself (cf. *Metaphysics* 1032a 15-26). A product of art has its moving cause in the form that is present in the soul of the artist; e.g., the art of medicine or building is the form of health or a house (cf. *Metaphysics* 1032b1-15). The moving cause of the heavenly bodies is God, which is an unmoved mover. In Book 12, Aristotle further argues that since all substantial beings share the same principles, potentiality and actuality apply to all substantial beings but only analogously, namely in different ways (cf. *Metaphysics* 1071 a3-11). In the case of imperishable sensible substances, i.e., the heavenly bodies, their matter only permits locomotion; their form is always in actuality since they are in a circular, eternal motion. Perishable sensible substances undergo all of the four kinds of coming-to-be. This is because they have different matters than those of the heavenly bodies; further, different sensible substances (e.g., wine, flesh, and human) have different matters. Of importance is that perishable sensible substances, unlike the heavenly bodies, do not always undergo the coming-to-be; hence, their form is not always in actuality. Now, God is a non-sensible substance that has no matter. Therefore, it has no potentiality. God is in eternal actuality without being in potentiality.
Hegel’s system. The crux of the matter here is his controversial interpretation of Aristotle’s divine actuality in terms of an activity [Tätigkeit]. Indeed, Hegel has been criticized for turning the Aristotelian, unmoving God into something moving by translating the divine “ενέργεια” into the German “Tätigkeit.” With this translation, Aristotle’s divine substance is understood as having potentiality, and this point is also explicit in Hegel’s statement that the divine substance unities potentiality, actuality, and complete actuality. As we have seen above, however, Aristotle considers God pure actuality that has no potentiality. Since it has no potentiality, the divine substance is always in the act of thinking. The divine thinking of thinking, therefore, fundamentally differs from the human nous, which does not always think because its potentiality is not always actualized.

Thus, Hegel’s reading of Aristotle’s Metaphysics turns the relationship between the human nous and the divine substance into a crucial problem. To make Hegel’s point clearer, we can pose a question as to what would happen to the relationship between the human nous and the divine substance if one assumes, as Hegel does, that the eternal thinking of thinking has

93 Pierre Aubenque points out that by this translation, Hegel makes the pure divine act into a motion [κίνησις]: cf., Pierre Aubenque, “Hegel et Aristote,” in Hegel et la pensée grecque, ed. Jacques d’Hondt (Presses Universitaires de France, 1974), 103-4. He suggests that this misinterpretation of Hegel is based on the erroneous identification of the pure act of the divine substance with the circular motion of the heavenly bodies. Whereas the divine substance for Aristotle is transcendent to all celestial and sublunar motions, Hegel’s translation of the divine ενέργεια into the German Tätigkeit thus seems to take part in the Neo-Platonist tradition in which the Aristotelian God was (mis-)conceived as immanent to the created world. Regarding the controversy over Hegel’s translation of Aristotle’s divine ενέργεια into Tätigkeit, Alfredo Ferrarin suggests that Hegel correctly understood and translated Aristotle’s Metaphysics, but his reading and translation was guided by the uncritical, Erasmus edition of Aristotle’s works, which was circulated among the Neo-Platonists as well: Alfredo Ferrarin, Hegel and Aristotle (Cambridge: The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 2004), 120-128. Ferrarin further suggests that Hegel’s Neo-Platonist reading of Aristotle can be viewed as a solution to the fundamental difficulty in the Aristotelian notion of God. When God is considered as pure actuality opposed to potentiality, this might entail, Ferrarin suggests, the unwanted consequence that it is an inert being isolated from the world. With the controversial, but correct translation, Hegel thus comes to the conclusion, Ferrarin underlines, that “the Aristotelian God is not just the most excellent, best, and most free being; the first substance becomes visible in the universe as heaven and thinking reason in which it appears and moves:” Alfredo Ferrarin, Hegel and Aristotle, 124.
potentiality. Now, this question leads us to Hegel’s comments on Aristotle’s distinction between the passive *nous* and active *nous*. We notice that Hegel puts emphasis on the active aspect of the passive *nous*: he states that the passive *nous* is “none other than the in-itself, the absolute Idea as considered in itself” but “it is first posited as active [Tätiges];” the passive *nous*, “as distinct from activity,” “is nevertheless, as absolute, itself activity too” because “*nous* is active too and not merely ‘suffering’;” therefore, “*nous* is everything in itself, but it is actuality [Wirklichkeit] only through activity [Tätigkeit].”^{94} Hegel’s point is that the passive *nous* cannot entirely be passive insofar as it is *nous*. In his terms, Aristotle’s passive *nous* is the absolute that is everything in itself but is to actualize itself as such through its activity. This being said, the passive *nous* and active *nous* are not independent from one another. Instead, the passive *nous* is the absolute in potentiality and the active *nous* is the same absolute in actuality. As far as I see, the passive *nous* and active *nous* in the last passage of Hegel’s lectures on Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* roughly refer to the human *nous* and God respectively. They are thus related to the finite human spirit and infinite absolute spirit in Hegel’s system. This further relates to Hegel’s thesis that it is necessary for the absolute to actualizes itself in and through the finite beings because it cannot otherwise be a truly infinite being. That is, the absolute for Hegel is not transcendent but immanent to the world of the finite beings; its activity of self-actualization consists in manifesting itself as such a self-actualizing absolute in and through the finite beings. And this is possible because the finite being itself is the absolute in potentiality.

In relation to Hegel’s philosophy, I suggest that the passive “*nous*” mentioned in his lectures on Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* can be understood in the following two terms. First, we can

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^{94} *VGP*: 73/*LHP*: 238-9.
consider it in terms of the “objective thinking” conceived in Hegel’s logic as “determinate substrate,” of which the actuality is to be established by the dialectical movement of absolute reflection at the end of the Objective Logic. Further, if Hegel’s conception of thought as a determinate substrate has little to do with Aristotle’s hylomorphic notion of an indeterminate matter as the underlying substrate of the change of a sensible substantial being, this is ultimately because thought is for Hegel the passive nous, which is everything in potentiality or something that contains everything in potentiality.95 The idea in Hegel’s logic that thought is a determinate substrate and is thus the content, therefore, also implies that it is a substantial being that contains everything in potentiality. This point leads us to the second meaning of the passive nous, namely the soul in the Anthropology of the philosophy of subjective spirit.

Based on these two meanings of the passive nous in Hegel’s philosophy, I suggest, first, that the dialectical thinking in Hegel’s logic is the divine thinking that thinks itself, one that, however, has its actuality in the activity of the human spirit. By this, I mean that the logic is a sequential exhibition of the thinking of thinking by means of the human language. Second, the human spirit, which contains everything in potentiality, is the substrate that underlies all the dialectical thinking; more importantly, it is the substrate of the absolute spirit. This being said, the principle of subjectivity Hegel seeks to find in Aristotle’s Metaphysics would not merely be concerned with Aristotle’s notion of God as thinking of thinking but with the relationship between the human nous and God. If the Aristotelian God, for Hegel, has potentiality, one may

95 Hegel’s formulation that the passive nous is everything in itself, relates to Aristotle’s argument in the De Anima that the intellective soul (nous) can “think all things” or is the place of all intelligible things (cf. De anima 429 a13-28). Hegel applies this formulation to his definition of the soul in the Anthropology: “the soul is […] the passive nous of Aristotle, which is all potentially” (ENZ, § 389). I discuss this definition of Hegel in Chapter 4.
say that the human _nous_ is the God in potentiality; more precisely, the finite human spirit is the absolute spirit in potentiality in Hegel’s _Encyclopedia_ system.

### 3.4. Actuality: Manifestation of the Absolute

Through an examination of the dialectic of form and matter in Hegel’s logic and his reading of Aristotle’s _Metaphysics_, I have examined above Hegel’s notion of objective thinking as a determinate substrate and its implication for his philosophy of subjective spirit in the _Encyclopedia_. In what follows, I examine the last section of the Doctrine of Essence on the “Actuality” to spell out Hegel’s idea that the absolute is a substance that has subjectivity. Briefly stated, the Doctrine of Essence works on the truth of being, i.e., essence, by examining step by step how essence shines [Scheinen], appears [erscheinen], and manifests [offenbaren]. As we have seen above, in the “Ground” section Hegel establishes that essence is not just a pure reflection within it whereby determinations only appear and disappear, but a determinate substrate that involves a sublated reflection. Since it thus turns out that thought or thought determination has materiality or externality, one can move forward to the realm of existence, namely appearance. In the second sub-division of the Doctrine of Essence on “Appearance,” Hegel establishes the absolute immanence of the essential world to the phenomenal world.

In the last section of the Doctrine of Essence on the “Actuality,” Hegel further establishes that the unity of essence and existence consists in the manifestation of the absolute. That is, the absolute is the unity of essence and existence. Importantly, this unity is far from being a static relationship between the absolute substance and its attributes, which is considered in Spinoza’s philosophy. For Hegel, the unity of essence and existence can be the absolute only in and by the
dynamic movement of absolute reflection whereby the absolute externalizes itself and returns into itself in that externalization. It is therefore to be noted that the categories possibility, contingency, and necessity, which Hegel considers in the section on the “Actuality,” are not the Kantian modal categories, which are supposed to “only express the relation of the object to our faculty of knowledge.” For Hegel, “the mode is the externality of the absolute” or “the absolute’s own manifestation.” Thus, Spinoza’s consideration of the mode and modality of the absolute for Hegel is more truthful than Kant’s treatment of modal categories. The modality of the absolute, its externality in the realm of the being, however, must not be presupposed but posited as such by the movement of absolute reflection. This is what Hegel shows in the “Actuality” section with the categories of possibility, contingency, necessity, and actuality.

In the first place, actuality is considered in its immediacy. As such, it is viewed as containing within itself its possibility, as it is said that “what is actual is possible.” Actuality can thus be defined as the unity with possibility. But at this first stage of absolute reflection, it is a unity with formal possibility. Thus, actuality in the sense of formal possibility allows us to say that “everything that is not self-contradictory is possible.” Not everything that has formal possibility, however, is actuality. Formal possibility makes it possible that the possibility of A involves the possibility of non-A. Considering this logical feature of formal possibility, it turns out that the actuality relating to formal possibility is contingency, which pertains to the realm of being and existence considered as a realm of limitless manifold. In this realm of determinate

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96 *KrV*, B266.
97 *GW* 11, 380/ *SL*, 477.
98 *GW* 11, 382/ *SL*, 478.
beings \(Dasein\), necessity only has a factual meaning that something \(is\). Something is said to be necessary, in other words, because it exists; its existence is itself its necessity.

While possibility, actuality, and necessity are all formal in the case of formal actuality, Hegel draws from his consideration of this first form of actuality the conclusion that necessity must be an actuality that has contents. Thus, he further considers, secondly, real actuality, which involves the manifold content. Real actuality is concerned with the existing world. Yet, this world is not just a realm of the appearance of a sensible manifold but the one whose being-in-itself involves within itself reflection-into-itself. That is, “what is actual can act” such that it announces its actuality “by what it produces.”\(^{100}\) It is what manifests itself in an other. In relation to real actuality, therefore, possibility no longer covers anything that is not self-contradictory but rather means a “being-in-itself full of contents,” namely “the determinations, circumstances, conditions of a thing \([Sache]\).”\(^{101}\) This real possibility is itself the “manifoldness of existence,” which is itself an actuality. This real possibility, however, is not the possibility of its own actuality but the possibility of another actuality: in Hegel’s terms, it is “the in-itself of an other actual.”\(^{102}\) This character of real possibility makes it possible for the things in the existing world to have a conditioning-conditioned relation to each other, in such a way that the possibility of A as a real actuality serves as the condition for the actuality of B, and the possibility of B as a real actuality conditions the actuality of C, and so forth. When all conditions are present such that the thing \([Sache]\) is actual, however, in this actual thing, possibility as real actuality does not transit to another actuality but rejoins itself as real actuality. When the thing \([Sache]\) is considered,

\(^{100}\) *GW* 11, 385-6/ SL, 482.

\(^{101}\) *GW* 11, 386/ SL, 482.

\(^{102}\) *GW* 11, 386/ SL, 482.
therefore, real possibility has a real necessity, which is expressed through the proposition that what is really possible cannot be otherwise. This real necessity, however, is a relative necessity since it starts with something contingent and has this real actuality for its presupposition.

The consideration of real actuality leads us, third, to the idea of an actuality that cannot be otherwise because its “in-itself is not possibility but necessity itself,” i.e., absolute necessity. The unity of actuality and possibility is thereby restored, and actuality is posited to be absolute. Now, nothing would be more misleading than taking these notions of absolute necessity and absolute actuality as implying the deterministic claim that the actuality is absolutely pre-determined such a way that there is nothing contingent in it. Indeed, through his consideration of real actuality, Hegel showed that a manifold of existing circumstances, which is real possibility of the thing [Sache], is itself actuality. Consequently, if the manifold is considered to be contingent, this is because the actuality that is a manifold of existing circumstances is converted into a possibility of something else. Likewise, possibility is converted into actuality when it is present in the actual thing. Thus, it turns out that real necessity consists in the “simple conversion of one of these moments [possibility and actuality] into the other.” It also turns out that contingency is not immediate but is posited as contingency. In Hegel’s terms, real actuality is not just implicitly contingency, but the contingency becomes in it.

Therefore, Hegel’s notion of absolute necessity has nothing to do with removing contingency. Rather, it is a free conversion between possibility and actuality with real actuality or contingency. Further, it is a formal movement whereby contingency is posited as contingency.

\[103 \text{ GW 11: 389/ SL, 486.}\]
\[104 \text{ GW 11: 390/ SL, 486.}\]
\[105 \text{ Cf. GW 11: 390/ SL, 486.}\]
and further, as an in-itself of something else which is, in fact, itself—namely, as absolute necessity. It is a movement of reflection whereby the distinction between form and content disappears, and this is how the absolute manifests. Absolute necessity is therefore the unity of being and reflection, which is free in its self-relating negativity. Hegel writes: “this contingency is rather absolute necessity; it is the essence of those free, inherently necessary actualities. […] Their essence will break forth in them and will reveal what it is and what they are. The simplicity of their being, their resting just on themselves, is absolute negativity; it is the freedom of their shining-less mediacy.”106

Now, actuality as absolute necessity is an actuality as thought. This is how it differs from immediate being and existence as well as real actuality or immediate contingency. More significantly, it is a thought that involves thinking, in the sense that the free conversion between the formal determinations of real actuality, i.e., possibility and actuality, is the movement of reflection by virtue of its self-relating negativity. In this sense, actuality is a thought that has subjectivity. This does not imply, however, that actuality as absolute necessity is separable from contingency. Again, it is the reflection within the contingency or a reflected contingency. Actuality as absolute necessity is therefore not a passive reality which is assumed to be intelligible or rational; instead, it is an active reality that embraces absolute reflection whereby it discovers itself in what is reflected, thereby making itself identical with the latter while relating itself to the existing manifold. Further, it is to be noted that the absolute reflection which Hegel exhibits through his considerations of the categories of possibility, contingency, and necessity does not add any new contents to the real actuality, i.e., contingency. It only makes it turn out

that the real actuality is an absolute necessity. It is in this sense that the absolute is self-manifestation. The unity of essence and existence is only manifested as such by absolute reflection, which, again, does not add any new contents to contingency.

**Conclusion: Concreteness of Subjective Spirit**

Throughout this chapter, I have attempted to shed light on some crucial features of Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit. First, in trying to clarify why “subjective spirit” is not translatable into the English “mind,” I concluded that this is because the global problem of Hegel’s system, i.e., the relationship between nature and spirit, frames the philosophy of subjective spirit. This point has far-reaching implications for our study of Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit. Since the philosophy of subjective spirit is to show how spirit emerges out of nature and this systematic problem frames it, it thematizes the finite human spirit in terms of the bodily existence of the human being and its spiritualization. This point guides my analysis of the *Anthropology* in Chapter 5.

By examining the transition from life to knowing in the dialectic of the logical Idea, I came to the same conclusion concerning the significance of the issue of bodiliness for Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit. Indeed, the dialectical transition of the Idea from life to knowing anticipates the last stage of the *Philosophy of Nature*, i.e., the “animal organism” but deals with this teleological existence in the logical terms of the dialectical process of the Idea. By analyzing this dialectic, I concluded that the finite human spirit thematized in the *Psychology*, i.e., knowing [das Wissen], is the reality adequate to the Idea, one in which the Idea posits its objectivity for
itself and thus turns back into itself. But Hegel also assumes that knowing is in the realm of finitude, i.e., that of life and death. By reflecting on the issue of death of an individual, I therefore concluded that the death of an individual remains an issue that is to be settled down in the first part of the philosophy of subjective spirit, i.e., the Anthropology. This being said, one cannot understand Hegel’s thematization of the bodily existence of the human spirit in the Anthropology as merely implying that the human spirit has biological life through its organic living body. What Hegel thematizes in the Anthropology is rather the sublation of the soul’s immediate bodily existence through habit. In this sense, habit for Hegel is that through which the soul comes to obtain a new body that can live a spiritual life, thereby sublating its physical death.

While the first two sections of this chapter thus shed light on some significance of the issue of bodiliness for Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit, rationality of the finite human spirit is another important axis of Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit. I drew out this point from Hegel’s definition of subjective spirit and through an interpretation of what Hegel formulates as spirit’s determination of itself to knowing as concerning the transition within the philosophy of subjective spirit from the Phenomenology of Spirit to the Psychology. Further, I focused on the fact that Hegel formulates this transition within the philosophy of subjective spirit in terms of the transition in the Logic from the Objective Logic to the Subjective Logic. To set the stage for my analysis of the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Psychology in Chapter 3, I therefore examined Hegel’s idea of “objective thinking” and some important arguments in the Objective Logic. By examining the move from pure reflection to ground in the Doctrine of Essence, the dialectic of form and matter, and Hegel’s lectures on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, I focused on the sense in which thought for Hegel is a substantial being, which is however distinct from a sensible substantial being. I thereby suggested that the finite human spirit is the substrate
of the divine, dialectical thinking in the logic as well as the absolute spirit in the *Encyclopedia*.
Following this, I briefly reconstructed Hegel’s discussion of actuality with the related categories including possibility, contingency, and necessity. I attempted to show that actuality as absolute necessity for Hegel is the manifestation of the absolute, and that the manifestation of the absolute consists in dissolving the difference between form and content such that the contents of real actuality obtain an absolute form and not any new contents.

Based on the studies I undertook in this chapter, I make the following remarks with respect to the transition within the philosophy of subjective spirit from the *Phenomenology of Spirit* to the *Psychology*. I note, first, that the *Psychology* exhibits the movement of spirit-as-such as a series of transformation. In other words, the *Psychology* only concerns to show how the contents of the finite human spirit come to take off the form of immediate givenness and obtain a new, rational form by inwardizing recollection [*Erinnerung*]. But what constitutes the contents of the finite human spirit and how they are formed are the subject matter of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Seen this way, the transition from the *Phenomenology of Spirit* to the *Psychology* can be considered in terms of actuality, i.e., manifestation of the absolute, which is a formal movement of absolute reflection whereby contingency is posited as absolute necessity. These points, together with the conclusions I made above about the *Anthropology*, will guide my analyses of Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit in Chapter 3.

As a final remark, I would like to discuss the *concrete* nature of subjective spirit. In analyzing the “Introduction” to the *Philosophy of Spirit*, I stated that by “concrete spirit,” Hegel means the mind that is considered by empirical psychology or the soul that is treated by Aristotle. This interpretation I could offer within the context of the “Introduction” text, however,
does not really reveal Hegel’s idea about the concrete nature of the finite human spirit. Now, I draw attention to the Anmerkung of §25 in the Encyclopedia Logic, where Hegel makes a retrospective remark about his 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit. A short analysis of this remark will make it clearer what Hegel means by “concrete spirit” and what I have mentioned with respect to the spiritual contents of the mind.

In the Anmerkung of §25 in the Encyclopedia Logic, Hegel gives a justification for the explosive expansion of his 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit to the “Spirit” and “Religion” chapters. He states that it was necessary to move forward to “the concrete shapes of consciousness, such as morality, ethical life, art, and religion” because “the standpoint of philosophical knowing is inwardly the richest in basic content [Gehalt] and the most concrete one.”107 We may well doubt if Hegel was aware of this or was able to articulate the reason for the unexpected expansion of the Phenomenology of Spirit around the year of 1807. Regardless of whatever the case may be, the remark above gives an important clue for comprehending Hegel’s idea about the concrete nature of the finite human spirit. We notice that in the remark above, Hegel identifies the themes he dealt with in the “Spirit” and “Religion” chapters in the early Phenomenology of Spirit with “concrete shapes of consciousness.” Hegel thus explains how the experience of consciousness in the first half of the Phenomenology of Spirit from sense certainty to reason is linked to the appearances of spirit in the “Spirit” and “Religion” chapters. The link

107 “My Phenomenology of Spirit, which when it came out […], had been designated the first part of the system of science, began with the first, simplest appearance of spirit, namely immediate consciousness, and developed its dialectic up to the standpoint of the philosophical science, the necessity of which is shown by this progression. For the sake of this end, however, it was not possible to remain content with the formal aspect of mere consciousness, for the standpoint of philosophical knowing [Wissen] is in itself most basic [gehaltvollst] and concrete. Hence, emerging as [the development’s] result, that standpoint also presupposed the concrete shapes of consciousness such as morality, the ethical life, the arts, religion. Consequently, the development of the basic content [Gehalt] of the objects of the distinctive parts of the philosophical science likewise falls within the development of consciousness, which at first seems to be restricted to a merely formal aspect” (ENZ, § 25 A).
consists, in retrospect, in the fact that the moral, ethical, artistic, and religious appearances of spirit are in fact the concrete shapes of consciousness. By implication, consciousness is concrete, not in the sense that it has this and that content, but in the sense that it is filled with spiritual contents that concern morality, the ethical life, arts, and religion. In short, consciousness is concrete insofar as it is spiritual.

In my view, Hegel’s above remark is more than a justification of his early Phenomenology of Spirit. The idea that consciousness is concrete insofar as it is spiritual, as far as I see, plays a key role in the transition within the philosophy of subjective spirit of the 1830 Encyclopedia from the Phenomenology of Spirit to the Psychology. As I deal with in Chapter 3, the Phenomenology of Spirit in the Encyclopedia comprises the three chapters: Consciousness, Self-consciousness, and Reason. Following it, the Psychology starts its discussion of spirit-as-such. With respect to the connection between these two parts of the philosophy of subjective spirit, we can perhaps say that both reason (the Phenomenology of Spirit) and spirit-as-such (the Psychology) are concrete and spiritual in the sense that they are filled with the contents concerning morality, the ethical life, arts, and religion.

Thus, Hegel’s subjective spirit refers to the concrete psyche of the human being who lives moral-practical, ethical-communal, and cultural-historical lives. In this sense, it differs, again, from the conception of the mind as a recipient of sense data and information about the external world. Further, Hegel’s notion of subjective spirit requires that the human psyche or the mind be considered in the relationship with the world that it inhabits because the spiritual contents concerning morality, the ethical life, arts, and religion necessarily suppose one’s embeddedness in the world. This being said, the relationship of the mind with the world is not
something that can be thought of after the inner constitution of mind has first been explained by some epistemological investigations. On the contrary, according to Hegel’s notion of consciousness as spiritual and concrete, an epistemological investigation can have a significance only under the ontological assumption of the mind’s being embeddedness in the world. That is, there is no mind without the world, and this is the underlying assumption of Hegel’s philosophical psychology presented through his philosophy of subjective spirit.
CHAPTER 3. Hegel’s Philosophical Psychology in the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit

The philosophy of spirit is both the whole (the Encyclopedia) and a part (the third division of the Encyclopedia, the Philosophy of Spirit) of Hegel’s system. Likewise, Hegel’s philosophical psychology is present in the whole body of his philosophy of subjective spirit and in its part, the Psychology. The philosophy of subjective spirit, in other words, forms one whole discourse that considers finite human spirit in its three aspects, i.e., soul, consciousness, and spirit-as-such. But it is in its third division, the Psychology, that Hegel displays his own speculative theory of the human mind. Any serious undertaking of Hegel’s philosophical psychology will therefore have to clarify how the Psychology is related to the first two divisions of the philosophy of subjective spirit, i.e., the Anthropology and the Phenomenology of Spirit. This undertaking must also elucidate how the three divisions thematize altogether one and the same subject matter: subjective spirit.

The goal of this chapter is to grasp the overall structure of Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit. Instead of assuming that spirit linearly develops to higher stages from Anthropology to the Phenomenology of Spirit and finally to the Psychology, this chapter shows how these three divisions of the philosophy of subjective spirit are internally connected to each other, treating one and the same object, i.e., the finite human spirit, from different aspects. Further, it puts the connections among those three division in the context of the Logic, given Hegel’s notion that the connection with the Logic makes his philosophical psychology in the philosophy of subjective spirit speculative.
This chapter starts with a discussion on the status and role of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* in the *Encyclopedia* system, showing how it differs from the early *Phenomenology of Spirit* of 1807. It also offers a detailed analysis of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* in the *Encyclopedia*, aimed at clarifying its role for and connection with the *Psychology*. Following this, it examines the *Psychology* and makes a brief discussion of the *Anthropology*. As I show, the *Anthropology* can be seen as part of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* in the sense that it considers the subject matter of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, i.e., consciousness, in its negative, natural aspect, i.e., bodiliness and derangement. Further, the *Psychology* deals with the rational, which the *Phenomenology of Spirit* establishes as the truth of consciousness, in terms of a process whereby it is given a rational form. But this process of recollection [*Erinnerung*] entails the formation of a mindful repository, that is, the soul containing all things in potentiality including spiritual contents.
1. The Phenomenology of Spirit in the 1830 Encyclopedia

1.1. The Problem of the Phenomenology of Spirit in the Encyclopedia System

In his Nurnberg years (1808-1816), Hegel shortened his 1807 *Phenomenology of Spirit* to use it for his courses. The shortened *Phenomenology of Spirit* comprised of only the first three main chapters of the original version (Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, and Reason) and was titled by Hegel “a doctrine of consciousness.” He also included the short version of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* in the *Encyclopedia* system. Despite the differences in the contents and organizations of the texts, all three versions of the *Encyclopedia* in 1817, 1827, and 1830 include the shortened *Phenomenology of Spirit* as part of the philosophy of subjective spirit and conceive it as a doctrine of consciousness. This doctrine of consciousness in the *Encyclopedia* system is given different meanings, different significances, and different status from the early gigantic *Phenomenology of Spirit* of 1807. This leads us to pose a question about the status and role of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* for Hegel’s mature system in the 1830 *Encyclopedia*.

One of the characteristics of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* of the *Encyclopedia* is its conciseness. Preceded by the *Logic*, the *Philosophy of Spirit* in the *Encyclopedia* system assumes that all conceptual, ontological, and methodological foundations are already well established. Accordingly, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* in the philosophy of subjective spirit does not exhibit the experiences of consciousness that were pivotal in the 1807 *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Most of

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the detailed dialectical descriptions of the experiences of consciousness given in the early *Phenomenology of Spirit* are removed. The first sub-division of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* in the *Encyclopedia*, “The Consciousness-as-such” (sensory consciousness, perception, and understanding), is curtailed to six paragraphs (§§ 418-423). In this short account, there is no dialectical experiences of consciousness about “here,” “now,” and “I;” nor any dialectical analyses of the relationship between oneness of a perceived thing and multiplicity of its properties; nor the play of forces. The second sub-division, “The Self-consciousness,” defines self-consciousness as desire (§§ 424-429), presents recognition as the achievement of freedom, and conceptualizes the result of recognition in terms of the achievement of universal self-consciousness (§§ 436-437). It thus maintains the master-slave dialectic given in the early *Phenomenology of Spirit*, but its overall account is not so much a dialectical exhibition as a summary. It further dispenses with the historical experiences of the thinking I that the early *Phenomenology of Spirit* described under the three forms of stoicism, skepticism, and unhappy consciousness. The third sub-division, “Reason,” has only two short paragraphs (§§ 438-439). All the lengthy descriptions of the three aspects of reason—observation, action, and production—are left out. Instead, it briefly defines reason as the certainty that the determinations of self-consciousness are “the determinations of the essence of things,” adding that it is however not only “the absolute substance” but the “truth as knowing.” With this conclusion, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* gives places to the *Psychology* which deals with “spirit-as-such.” Note that in the last paragraph of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel defines reason in logical terms of the objectivity of thought-determinations, which I discussed in Chapter 2. I turn back to this issue later on when I deal with the transition from the *Phenomenology of Spirit* to the *Psychology*. 
Since the *Phenomenology of Spirit* of the *Encyclopedia* dispenses with the dialectical experiences of consciousness, this doctrine of consciousness within Hegel’s *Encyclopedia* system must have a different significance than the 1807 *Phenomenology of Spirit*. What draws our attention in this regard is Hegel’s characterization of Kantian philosophy under the rubric of a phenomenology of spirit. In the *Anmerkung* on § 415, Hegel states that Kant was able to consider spirit only as consciousness; consequently, Kantian philosophy knows only a phenomenology of spirit but is ignorant of a philosophy of spirit. As this statement illustrates, Hegel’s conception of a phenomenology of spirit is closely associated with his critical position against the Kantian standpoint of consciousness holding on to the opposition of subject and object and the dualistic framework of Kant’s philosophy concerning the relationship between understanding and reason, phenomena and noumena, nature and freedom, etc. Yet, his statement in the *Anmerkung* on § 415 makes the status of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* in the *Encyclopedia* somewhat perplexing. While the early *Phenomenology of Spirit* aims at overcoming the antithetical standpoint of consciousness and introducing the speculative standpoint for the *Logic*, the *Encyclopedia* system starts with the *Logic*. The *Encyclopedia* system thus assumes the speculative standpoint of the unity of being and thought from the start; hence, it does not need to show how the standpoint of consciousness is overcome and how the speculative perspective is achieved. Consequently, we cannot assume that the *Phenomenology of Spirit* in the *Encyclopedia* performs a critical role in relation to the standpoint of consciousness as the early *Phenomenology of Spirit* did. Instead, it should represent Hegel’s theory of consciousness from the speculative standpoint underlying the *Encyclopedia* system. This being said, consciousness as an object that is treated in a philosophical system is to be distinguished from consciousness as a standpoint that is to be overcome.
However, a close examination of the philosophy of subjective spirit reveals some awkwardness in its incorporation of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. While the *Anthropology* and the *Psychology* are primarily concerned with the internal constitution of the human spirit, the themes discussed in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* including desire, recognition, and universal self-consciousness seem to have little to do with psychological aspects of the human spirit.\(^2\) The strange position of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* in the philosophy of subjective spirit is also illustrated by the editor of Hegel’s posthumous works, Karl Michelet’s decision to take it off from the philosophy of subjective spirit. The problem of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* in the *Encyclopedia* system becomes more complicated when we consider the titles that Hegel used for announcing his courses on the philosophy of spirit. Hegel gave his courses on the philosophy of spirit five times in Berlin: in the summer semesters of 1820, 1822, and 1825, and in the winter semesters 1827/8 and 1829/30.\(^3\) In the years of 1820, 1822, and 1825, the course was announced under the title “*Anthropology and Psychology*;” in 1825, with the addition “*i.e., Philosophy of Spirit.*” In winter semesters of 1827/28 and 1829/30, Hegel changed the title of his course to “*Psychology and Anthropology or Philosophy of Spirit.*” It thus seems that Hegel considered the

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\(^2\) Otto Pöggler points out that the philosophy of subjective spirit has two different layers of the text: the *Anthropology* and the *Psychology* on the one hand, and the *Phenomenology of Spirit* on the other: Otto Pöggler, “Psychologie und Logic der Idee,” in *Hegels enzyklopädisches System der Philosophie. Von der „Wissenschaft der Logic“ zur Philosophie des absoluten Geistes*, ed. Hans-Cristian Lucas, Burkhard Tuschling, and Ulrich Vogel (Stuttgart: Frommann Holzboog, 2004), 28. Pöggler claims that the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is not dispensable in the philosophy of subjective spirit, but its role and significance are different from those of the 1807 *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Paying attention to the *Realphilosophie* of 1805/06 in which the triad of intuition, representation, and concept (the triad of theoretical spirit in the 1830 *Encyclopedia*) is presented as corresponding to the triad of art, religion, and philosophy (the triad of absolute spirit in the 1830 *Encyclopedia*) and the differences among the three versions of the *Encyclopedia*, he suggests that the philosophy of subjective spirit should perhaps contain an account of the differentiation of objective spirit and absolute spirit: cf., Otto Pöggler, “Psychologie und Logic der Idee,” 28-29. The meaning of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* in the 1830 *Encyclopedia* is accordingly to be considered in terms of guidance to the absolute spirit, and hence, in terms of the historicity of subjective spirit—not in terms of the grounding of practical philosophy (the philosophy of objective spirit).

Anthropology and the Psychology to represent his philosophy of (subjective) spirit in an interchangeable way while taking the Phenomenology of Spirit as somewhat peripheral. We also notice that the Phenomenology of Spirit only contains a brief and limited account of consciousness in contrast to the comprehensive and detailed accounts of the soul and spirit-as-such in the Anthropology and the Psychology. It thus seems that in the philosophy of subjective spirit, the Phenomenology of Spirit does not play a substantial role as much as the Anthropology and the Psychology do.

1.2. Absolute Negativity: Consciousness and Spirit’s Scission

As discussed above, the Phenomenology of Spirit in the Encyclopedia arises suspicion as to the structural consistency of the philosophy of subjective spirit. However, it does not seem that the Phenomenology of Spirit is dispensable in the philosophy of subjective spirit insofar as consciousness is considered as a necessary, negative moment in the development of spirit, that is, the scission of spirit. Indeed, Hegel introduces this idea of consciousness as the negativity of spirit in the Preface to his early Phenomenology of Spirit, and it seems that he reinstitutes that idea in the philosophy of subjective spirit of the Encyclopedia for its structural consistency. As I discuss below, however, the philosophy of subjective spirit thematizes the negativity of consciousness in a different way than the early Phenomenology of Spirit, that is, in terms of the derangement [Verrückheit] of the feeling soul.

To begin, Hegel’s criticism of the Kantian standpoint of consciousness involves his ambivalent attitude toward the philosophy of reflection—the philosophy of Kant and his successors, which Hegel finds confined to the antithetical view of the conscious opposition
between subject and object. As I discussed in Chapter 1, Hegel criticizes them for their inability to comprehend the unity of subject and object. But he also highly values the philosophy of reflection. In the Preface to the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit, he characterizes “understanding” as holding “the tremendous power of the negative.”\(^4\) Understanding is here conceived as the faculty that represents the general ways in which reflection—philosophers perform their philosophical thoughts. For Hegel, its principal activity consists in turning familiar ideas into unfamiliar ones, thereby making what is taken granted into an object of critical investigation. Such a critical activity of understanding is based on its “analytic power” in the sense of “breaking an idea up into its original elements.”\(^5\) Understanding is therefore an activity of dissolution. As such, it has “the tremendous power of the negative,” which is “the most astonishing and mightiest of powers, or rather the absolute power.”\(^6\)

Hegel’s appreciation of the power of understanding goes hand in hand with his objection to Romanticism. He challenges the Romantic conception of the absolute for its shunning from the negative power of spirit. The true knowledge of the absolute for Hegel hinges upon the power to look the negative in face and tarry with it. The true knowledge of the absolute, in other words, consists in the conceptual labor that can be carried out by virtue of the power of absolute negativity. Therein lies the essential significance of the philosophy of reflection. But the dissolving power of understanding is not sufficient for obtaining the complete knowledge of the absolute insofar as it remains only dissolving. In contrast with it, spirit is a reflective power to recognize itself in the elements dissolved by it. It is, in other words, that which becomes for itself

\(^4\) GW 9, 27-8/PhS, § 32  
\(^5\) Ibid.  
\(^6\) Ibid.
by going through what is performed by understanding. This being said, the opposition of subject and object assumed by the philosophy of reflection constitutes a phase in the development of spirit: it is spirit’s own scission.7 If the power of understanding to dissolve is an absolute power of negativity, therefore, this is in the sense that consciousness constitutes a negative phase in the development of spirit such that the negativity essentially belongs to spirit.

By assigning the absolute power of negativity to understanding, Hegel thus incorporates the activity of this faculty, which is representative of the philosophy of reflection, into the movement of spirit. The thesis of the absolute negativity of understanding found in the Preface to the early Phenomenology of Spirit, I think, reflects Hegel’s self-conception concerning the position he occupies in the history of philosophy. The philosophy of reflection, in other words, is the historical pre-condition under which his philosophy of spirit comes out. The early Phenomenology of Spirit thus exhibits Hegel’s attempts to go beyond the philosophy of reflection and critically incorporate it into his philosophy of spirit.

The idea that understanding or consciousness represents spirit’s scission seems to play an important role for the philosophy of subjective spirit in the Encyclopedia as well. Hegel writes: the soul is the truth, i.e., the identity of the subjective and the objective “in an immediate unconscious totality;” consciousness is the differentiation of this totality into the I and the object external to it, whose self-conscious constitution results in the same truth as a determination of knowing; spirit-as-such is the “verification [Bewährung]” of this knowing by virtue of its self-knowing activity.8 That is, the soul, consciousness, and spirit-as-such are three different forms of

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8 Cf. ENZ, 440 Z.
one and the same object, i.e., a totality in which the subjective and the objective are identical. And the philosophy of subjective spirit considers this one and the same object in terms of undifferentiated totality (the *Anthropology*), its differentiation into subject and object and their reunification (the *Phenomenology of Spirit*), and verification of this unity (the *Psychology*). In these three stages that subjective spirit passes through in its self-development, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is where it is divided into two poles of subject and object. Thus, it seems that in the philosophy of subjective spirit, Hegel keeps the idea in his early *Phenomenology of Spirit* that ordinary consciousness, which stands in an essentially oppositional relation to the world, is spirit’s own scission.

This schematic account of the status of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* of the *Encyclopedia*, however, does not reveal the full significance of consciousness for the development of subjective spirit. If consciousness marks an essentially negative stage in the development of spirit, this does not merely bear on the oppositional constitution of our ordinary consciousness. As mentioned above, Hegel associates the oppositional constitution of ordinary consciousness with the negative, analytic power of the understanding to dissolve an idea or representation into its elements. And understanding is considered to have the absolute power of negativity in the sense that the antithetical standpoint of the philosophy of reflection is overcome by the dialectical experiences of consciousness. Yet, the *Encyclopedia* system, presented two decades later than the early *Phenomenology of Spirit*, does not exhibits such a critical concern with the philosophy of reflection. While keeping the idea of consciousness as related to spirit’s scission into two poles, the philosophy of subjective spirit in the *Encyclopedia* thematizes the negativity of spirit in other terms than the overcoming of the standpoint of the philosophy of reflection: derangement [*Verrücktheit*] of the feeling soul. We thus notice that the *Anthropology*
addresses the problem of the one-sided subjectivism of consciousness by identifying the feeling soul whose representation of the world is based on the particularity of her sensation with the “understanding in derangement.” That is, the *Anthropology* treats understanding or consciousness in its deranged form; consciousness as the subject matter of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* arises from the sublation of this deranged consciousness. Spirit is in the *Anthropology* involved in the diseased state in its development; it comes to exhibit itself in the form of spiritual life when it achieves the stage of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. This is how the negativity of spirit is thematized in the philosophy of subjective spirit of the *Encyclopedia*.

**1.3. The Phenomenology of Spirit and the Doctrine of Essence**

Consciousness constitutes the stage of the reflection or relationship [*Verhältnis*] of spirit, or of spirit as *appearance*. I is the infinite relation [*Beziehung*] of spirit to itself, but as subjective relation, as certainty of itself; the immediate identity of the natural soul has been raised to this pure ideal self-identity; the content of the natural soul is object for this for-itself [*fürsichseidend*] reflection. Pure abstract freedom for itself releases from itself its determinacy, the natural life of the soul, as free as an *independent object*. It is of this object, as *external to it*, that I initially knows, and is thus consciousness. I, as this absolute negativity, is implicitly identity in otherness; I is itself and extends over the object as an object *implicitly [an sich]* sublated, I is *one* side of the relationship and the *whole* relationship – the *light*, that reveals itself and an other, too.  

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9 *ENZ*, § 380.

10 *ENZ*, § 413.
This first passage (§ 413) in the introductory part of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* condenses all the elements with which Hegel defines consciousness in this final version of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, and the other introductory passages (§§ 414-417) offer further detailed explanations of this passage. In § 413, Hegel characterizes consciousness as pertaining to the Doctrine of Essence in the *Logic* and as successive of the discussion on the soul in the *Anthropology*. He thereby attempts to fix the place occupied by the *Phenomenology of Spirit* within his system of the *Encyclopedia*. The meaning of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* of the *Encyclopedia* is therefore to be elucidated by examining those two systematic connections to the Doctrine of Essence on the one hand, and to the *Anthropology* on the other. In this section, I only focus on the connection with the Doctrine of Essence, and I will consider the connection with the *Anthropology* in the section devoted to the *Anthropology* below.

As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Doctrine of Essence presents the absolute negativity, namely the self-relating negativity as the logical form of pure reflection. To briefly recapitulate, in this second division of the *Science of Logic*, Hegel elaborates the dialectic of the reflection-determinations, which fully exhibits the operation of absolute negativity. It is thereby established that identity is a whole relationship of identity and difference and not a term whose counterpart is difference, and that the identity of identity and difference can properly be understood only as a self-relating negativity [*die sich auf sich beziehende Negativität*]. At the stage of reflection and shine, this equally applies to difference. Just as self-identity of something (A=A) contains in itself self-difference (A≠A), so does the difference of something from something else (A≠non-A) contains the identity of the two. As with identity, difference is therefore the difference of identity...
and difference. Considered this way, both identity and difference have their logical meanings only in relation to their counterparts. In Hegel’s terms, they relate to themselves only by negatively relating themselves to their own others. The absolute negativity thus consists in self-rejoining in self-differentiating.

Of importance here is that the absolute negativity is equally distributed to each of the terms, such that both terms equally take part in the self-relating negativity. It is therefore not something external to the terms but is itself a whole relation of the two which occurs in each of the two terms antithetical to each other and hence requires mutually dynamic and equally negative activities from both parts. Applied to consciousness, the absolute negativity then requires that consciousness be conceived as self-consciousness. Consciousness, in other words, exists only as a self-consciousness standing in a negative relation with another self-consciousness—a negative relation in which both parts are within themselves self-differentiating, self-negating, and self-rejoining.

The thesis of the absolute negativity thus brings forth a thematic switch in the discussion of consciousness from an opposition between subject and object into the confrontation between two self-consciousness—from the epistemic constitution of consciousness to the recognitional mode of existence of self-consciousness. The transition from Consciousness-as-such to Self-consciousness thus illustrates how Hegel critically appropriates the philosophy of reflection. Hegel characterizes Kantian philosophy as “conceiving spirit as perception.” That is, if consciousness is conceived in terms of a firm opposition between subject and object, this is

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12 ENZ, § 420 A.
because consciousness is chiefly understood in its sensory, perceptive operations. For Hegel, consciousness is, in its truth, not such an epistemic subject that is assumed to be ready to receive sensory information from outside, but a practical subject which is driven by desire and thus lives an intersubjective world of recognition. Further, sense perception for Hegel has a spiritual dimension as I show in Chapter 5 by an analysis of his notion in the *Anthropology* of the embodiment of the soul’s inner feelings.

### 1.4. Desiring Self-Consciousness: Hegel’s Appropriation of the Philosophy of Reflection

But the passage above (§ 413) suggests some intrinsic relationship between the antithetical notion of consciousness of the philosophy of reflection and Hegel’s notion of spirit. What draws our attention is the identification of the I with “the infinite relation of spirit to itself.” An isomorphism is thereby affirmed between the I and spirit on account of their common self-referential structure. But this affirmation is somewhat surprising because the I for Hegel points to an “abstract, formal ideality.”13 The meaning of “ideality” is fundamentally to be understood in the context of spirit’s emergence from nature. But it would here be sufficient to note that the I, thus understood as an abstract, formal ideality, designates a subjectivity that constitutes itself as a totality only internally. More precisely, it is an empty I which has no concrete contents in it and hence, seeks its contents in external objects. In this context, Hegel states that the I deems its objects an independent subsistence outside of itself and the I makes an only external and superficial relation to its objects. To this empty consciousness, its object is thus analogous to

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13 *ENZ*, § 414.
“darkness outside light.” What is surprising is therefore the point that the I, which is said to be “infinite relation of spirit to itself,” is indeed relevant to sensory, perceptive consciousness that Hegel critically assigns to the philosophy of reflection. To speak strictly, the notion of the abstract, formal I as such, critically characterized as a mere internal subjectivity that is empty, cannot therefore provide a foundation to Hegel’s own doctrine of consciousness.

Worth noting in this regard is Hegel’s logical-ontological reformulation of the notion of the I given in the Zusatz to § 413. Hegel here first defines I as an “abstract universal particularity,” i.e., “the individually determined universal that relates itself only to itself in its determinacy, in its difference.” Hegel thus defines the self-referentiality of the I in terms of the logical determinations of universality, particularity, and individuality. Of more importance is his addition that this is not only essential determination of the I, but also constitutes the “being” of the I, such that the “I and my being are inseparably connected to each other.” In other words, the I has for its being no other ground than self-certainty; the I is by being certain of itself. Hegel thereby modifies the notion of the I into immediate self-certainty, and yet with the qualification that immediate self-certainty is the mode of the being of consciousness.

Indeed, immediate self-certainty does not seem to indicate something entirely different from the abstract, formal I. They would instead pertain to the same psychological phenomenon, i.e., self-feeling accompanying any cognition of an object. By reframing the I as immediate self-certainty and characterizing self-certainty as the mode of the being of consciousness, however, Hegel builds a consistent trajectory in the Phenomenology of Spirit, such that all the three forms of consciousness (consciousness-as-such, self-consciousness, and reason) are considered as

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14 ENZ, § 414 Z.
distinct forms of the self-differentiating identity. Immediate self-certainty is therefore said to be nothing but a mere internal, formal self-difference, which finds “an actual difference, i.e., determinate content” in an external object. This abstract, formal I should then “posit this being [self-certainty] as an other opposed to and identical to itself,” in accordance with the logical necessity for “the difference in itself” to “be posited, developed to an actual difference.” While immediate self-certainty is at play at the level of a sensible, perceptive consciousness (Consciousness-as-such), this should be developed into a second type of self-certainty that involves real self-differentiation and relates to “the difference existing in the object” (Self-consciousness). The thesis that consciousness is in truth self-consciousness, therefore, implies that consciousness is a really existing subject that confronts an equally real, self-conscious object and reflects into itself in and through a real relation with that self-conscious object. When self-consciousness finally posits its being for itself through such a recognitional relation, it is then analogous to “the light which reveals both itself and darkness.” When this is achieved, self-consciousness is turned into reason, that is, “the absolute certainty of its being.” Thus, the Phenomenology of Spirit describes how immediate self-certainty (Consciousness-as-such) becomes an absolute self-certainty (Reason) by mediation of a relation between real, existing self-consciousnesses (Self-consciousness).

We can then spell out why the I is the infinite relation of spirit to itself, “but as subjective relation, as certainty of itself.” The formal, abstract I is the infinite relation of spirit, and yet only

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15 ENZ, § 413 Z.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 ENZ, § 413.
implicitly. It is implicitly spirit’s self-relation insofar as it has self-conscious constitution. But it is only subjective, insofar as it is the abstract, formal I that is at work at the level of sensual, perceptive consciousness. Hegel therefore does not do away with sensual-perceptive consciousness and the standpoint of consciousness. Sensual-perceptive consciousness is rather the starting point of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. But this is so under the condition that the abstract, formal I, which goes hand in hand with sensory, perceptive consciousness, is understood not just as an empty, epistemic subject, but as immediate self-certainty, that is, as a being whose epistemic, recognitional, and rational activities embody the logical space of identity and difference at different levels. The transition from Consciousness-as-such to Self-consciousness thus shows, on the one hand, how Hegel preserves, transforms, and appropriates the conception of the one-sided subjectivity framing the philosophy of reflection. It reveals, on the other hand, the phenomenological significance of the Doctrine of Essence.

In this context, Hegel’s theorization of desire as the first stage of self-consciousness can be viewed in light of a transformation of the theme of the abstract I of (sensory) consciousness. In transitioning from Consciousness-as-such to Self-consciousness, Hegel first suggests that the problem of self-consciousness consists in resolving the contradiction between consciousness and self-consciousness. Although self-consciousness is presented as the truth of consciousness, it is assumed, at the same time, that it is not entirely disengaged from consciousness. Rather, self-consciousness at first appears as consciousness. It is in this context that Hegel holds that desiring self-consciousness is the same empty I as consciousness.\(^{20}\) If consciousness, i.e., sensory, perceptive consciousness, is characterized by the opposition between the abstract I and the

manifold of an external world, desiring self-consciousness is likewise directed to an external object. Just as consciousness seeks its contents in an external object, so does self-consciousness seek to satisfy its desire through an external object. But they differ in that self-consciousness is an activity of nullifying its object, whereas consciousness does not have such a power. Due to a lack of activity, consciousness can hardly be said to be a subject in a proper sense. Lacking desire, it rather has the form of an object. In contrast with this, self-consciousness is a subject, one that exercises its power upon a self-less object.

It is to be noted, however, that desiring is not an activity that is one-sidedly performed by self-consciousness upon an object. Hegel emphasizes that desire involves a twofold direction: self-consciousness’s becoming objective and the object’s becoming subjective. In desiring, in other words, self-consciousness knows itself as identical with its object, since it sees in the object the possibility of satisfying its desire. When an object is desired by self-consciousness, the object does not merely undergo an alien power because it is the object that arouses desire to self-consciousness. To put it another way, self-consciousness sees itself in an object conformable to its desire, and an object capable of satisfying its desire exercises a power to arouse desire upon self-consciousness.²¹

²¹ With regard to the power of the object of desire, Hegel states that the object is sublated by virtue of “its own nature, its own concept, since its individuality does not correspond to the universality of its concept” (ENZ, § 413 Z). The object of desire perishes, in other words, “by the power of its own concept which is only internal to it, and, just for that reason, appears to come to it only from outside” (ENZ, § 413 Z). By the power of the object of desire, Hegel thus means the conceptual necessity of its being consumed by self-consciousness. Hence, the subjectivity that the object is assumed to have in the process of desire pertains to the subjectivity of the Concept. Although Hegel mentions the object’s “arousing” desire in the same text, it is therefore untenable, to speak strictly, to construe the power of the object as the power of arousing desire.

However, if I am right in interpreting desiring self-consciousness as sensory consciousness—not cognitively or epistemically, but appetitively and practically sensory—we can perhaps support the idea of the power of the object to arouse desire by referring to Aristotle’s theory of sense perception as potentiality as well as Hegel’s appraisal of it. We may think about the connection between the two theories—Hegel’s theory of desire and Aristotle’s theory of sense perception—on the two assumptions: (1) Hegel’s desiring consciousness is a type of sensory consciousness, as
By defining self-consciousness in terms of desire, Hegel thus modifies the conception of (sensory) consciousness. As with consciousness, desiring self-consciousness stands in an oppositional, negative relation to sensory objects and is directed toward those external objects. In its activity of consuming, however, it is a subject in its relation to the object. Desiring self-consciousness is therefore not just sensory consciousness but a sensory subject, in the sense that it is appetitively and practically sensory, not cognitively or epistemically sensory.

This sensory subject, however, involves some intrinsic problem. Hegel suggests that satisfaction is only transitory: desire always reproduces itself and hence, self-consciousness will never completely satisfy its desire. This implies that self-consciousness is supposed to find itself in an object, but it is only self-seeking [selbstsüchtig] without ever achieving self-identity. This theory of desire is far from being didactic. In the context of self-consciousness—in which it is

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I am here articulating: (2) Hegel’s understanding of sense perception is indebted to Aristotle. The second assumption requires an extensive study that goes far beyond the scope of this footnote. But it will partially be dealt with in subsequent chapters when I pursue a study of Hegel’s theory of the soul in the *Anthropology*.

Aristotle distinguishes between two distinct meanings of potentiality by using the analogy of learning (*Physics*, 255a30-b13). Briefly stated, a learner has a potentiality of learning; this raw, undeveloped potentiality is actualized when the learner possesses the knowledge. But the possessor of knowledge can possess knowledge without exercising it. The actuality of the raw, undeveloped potentiality of learning is therefore itself a potentiality: the potentiality of putting the knowledge in practice. This is a developed, second potentiality, which is a dispositional state (*hexis*). Aristotle suggests that non-living bodies which are set in motion by being acted upon not by itself but by something else contain within themselves the source of motion, i.e., the potentiality of suffering motion. But this potentiality of suffering motion is not a raw potentiality but is analogous to the dispositional state of a possessor of knowledge, since a body (e.g., air) has a particular, natural tendency that decides the direction of its motion (e.g., upward and not downward motion). Assuming that sense perception is a type of motion, i.e., alteration, Aristotle applies the analogy of a possessor of knowledge to the case of sense perception (*De anima*, 417b16-27). He thus denies the view that sense perception is merely passive and has its source or cause only in an external object. Although sense perception cannot occur without an external object, neither can it occur if the sensor has no potentiality of suffering alteration.

In the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Hegel highly rates Aristotle’s notion of sense perception: see, *W* 19, 205-212. Paying attention to the Greek *hexis* [*ἔζις*] and the analogy of learning knowledge, Hegel reformulates that “sense perception [*Empfindung*] is in general a potentiality (we should say a receptivity) but this potentiality is also activity; it is therefore not to be conceived as mere passivity.” Hegel concedes that sense perception is essentially passive. But it is an erroneous view of subjective idealism that sense perception is only passive. Sense perception involves “activity in passivity.”

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22 Cf. *ENZ*, § 428.
assumed that sensory consciousness is a subject when it is desiring self-consciousness—the cliché that desire only reproduces itself and cannot be satisfied implies that self-consciousness cannot, in fact, be a subject as it is supposed to be. It is in this context that the subjectivity of the object becomes an important issue. The object of desire is nonresistant to the power of self-consciousness, but it is not impotent. It arouses desire to self-consciousness. Consequently, desire, and hence the subjectivity of self-consciousness depends on its object.

Now it becomes clearer why Hegel formulates that the key problem of self-consciousness consists in resolving the contradiction between consciousness and self-consciousness. What desire involves is the co-existence of antithetical elements: consciousness and self-consciousness. They are antithetical because the independent power of an external object (conscious element) frustrates self-consciousness’ satisfaction and thereby impedes its achievement of self-identity. Since the notion of consciousness is modified, the problem is accordingly reset. The problem is now how to sublate consciousness involved in self-consciousness—more precisely, how “to sublate the objectivity that is given and to posit it as identical to itself [self-consciousness]” or “to liberate itself from sensoriness.” Hegel here assumes that this sublation is implicit in consciousness, insofar as its form, I=I, expresses the necessity for self-consciousness to constitute itself as self-identical. It should therefore be noted that desire of self-consciousness is not reducible to physical urge. It is eventually the desire “to posit what it is implicitly,” which makes possible the entire movement of self-consciousness toward reason.

23 ENZ, § 425.
24 ENZ, § 425.
To sum up, Hegel’s theorization of consciousness and desiring self-consciousness in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* can be considered in terms of Hegel’s appropriation of the notion of an abstract, empty I shared by the reflection-philosophers. First, Hegel starts his discussion on consciousness by defining it as an empty, abstract I. But he develops this notion of the philosophy of reflection into the immediate self-certainty having the logical form of self-differentiating self-identity. As I have suggested, this immediate self-certainty is not an empty, epistemic subject opposed to an object. Instead, it denotes a being whose all epistemic, recognitional, and rational activities embody the logical space of identity and difference.

Secondly, Hegel’s desiring self-consciousness can be seen as a type of sensory consciousness. But this sensory consciousness is not cognitively or epistemically sensory, but appetitively and practically sensory. The most characteristic of this sensory consciousness is found in the idea that the object has a certain power on its side. For Hegel, even the lowest from of consciousness, namely sense-perception is not a one-sided relation in which the object is entirely passive to the subject’s activity. Nor is it a representation of an object as Kant theorizes in his *Critique of Pure Reason*. It is a real object that arouses desire to consciousness. This understanding of sensory consciousness as desire eventually leads Hegel to proceed to recognition in pursuit of a preferable type of the object in the relation with which self-consciousness can genuinely be self-consciousness, satisfying its desire.
2. Transition from the *Phenomenology of Spirit* to the *Psychology*

In trying to show how Hegel appropriates the notion of an empty, abstract I shared by the philosophers of reflection, I have examined in the previous section some psychological implications of his conception of desiring self-consciousness. As I discussed, desiring self-consciousness can be understood as a kind of sensory consciousness. However, it is to be noted that sensory consciousness is not the main concern of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Within the framework of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, the section on desiring self-consciousness constitutes an intermediate stage between consciousness and self-consciousness, setting up the key problem of self-consciousness. That self-consciousness desires, in other words, is the problem of self-consciousness. Briefly stated, this problem consists in the fact that self-consciousness cannot satisfy its desire, cannot be identical with itself in its appetitive relation to a sensory object, since its desire and existence depends on the object of its desire. Therefore, to exist as true self-consciousness, it requires another kind of relation to an object, one that makes it possible for it to be identical with itself in its relation to that other. This is the recognitional relationship with other self-consciousnesses; in this relationship, self-consciousness exists as a free subject. With respect to the structure of the philosophy of subjective spirit, we can now pose the question of how Hegel’s notion of recognition in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* relates to the *Psychology*. While Hegel’s thought about recognition incorporates his social and political theories concerning the realm of objective spirit, what I examine in what follows is its significance for the philosophy of subjective spirit.
2.1. Recognition and Universal Self-consciousness

According to our interpretation of desire above, desiring self-consciousness cannot be a genuinely free subject due to the independence of its objects. But this does not imply that Hegel views a subject to be a coercive power to subjugate an object to itself. The fundamental problem for desiring self-consciousness consists in the logic that it should not completely annihilate its object because the existence of the object is a prerequisite for the satisfaction of its desire. More importantly, self-consciousness is not a solipsist ego separable from the external world but an objective I which knows itself only in and through its object. In order for it to be identical with itself, therefore, self-consciousness needs an object. It should penetrate its object, not in the sense of annihilating the subjectivity of the object, but in the sense of becoming “the light which reveals both itself and its object.”25 For Hegel, self-consciousness can exist as such a genuinely free subject through a process of recognition.

While desiring self-consciousness operates only as an individual, recognition is a relation between two particular self-consciousnesses. In the process of recognition, both parts are supposed to prove themselves to be free, specifically from sensory conditions, by exercising an equally subjective power upon its other. As we have seen earlier, recognition is thus a realization of the reflection within itself of essence, whereby the identity of identity and difference is established through the self-relating negativity, in the realm of existence. In the realm of existence where the human beings as desiring subjects are subordinated to natural conditions, however, recognition results in an asymmetric relation between master and slave, thereby

25 ENZ, § 413.
forming “a community [Gemeinsamkeit] of need and its satisfaction.” In this economic bond tying the members together through the mediation of recognition, the relation of needs and their satisfaction, Hegel underlines, preserves the objects of desire as the medium of the relation between master and slave rather than destroys them. More significantly, the slave’s service does not merely signify his being subjugated to the mater because the slave is the one who “works off his individual will and self-will in the service of the master.” It is, in other words, in and through the slave’s labor that self-consciousness is freed from individuality by yielding its egoistic particular will to universal will—to use Rousseau’s distinction as Hegel does.

But Hegel underlines that recognition, specifically the slave’s servile self-alienation is only the beginning of freedom. It is here to be noted that for Hegel, freedom has very little to do with an individual person’s right to exercise her particular will, nor the moral freedom in the Kantian sense. Instead, it is ultimately concerned with the unity between particular will and universal will that is realized at the level of the ethical life. In this context, the slave’s self-alienation and yielding her egoistic individual will is the beginning of freedom; however, it is nothing more than the beginning since that negative activity alone cannot be called freedom in a positive sense. Freedom is therefore obtained when a completely reciprocal recognition is achieved in such a way that both parts are recognized by each other and recognize each other as an equally free subject. Hegel calls such a completely reciprocal recognition universal self-consciousness. This theory of recognition and universal self-consciousness in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* contains some important elements of Hegel’s political thoughts about

26 ENZ, § 434.
27 ENZ, § 435.
the *Sittlichkeit*. But in the *Encyclopedia* system, the *Sittlichkeit* belongs to the realm of objective spirit, and the *Phenomenology of Spirit* in the philosophy of subjective spirit does not present a systematic account of recognition and intersubjectivity as a political and social-ontological notion. Instead, it puts emphasis on the “speculative, or rational” aspect of universal self-consciousness, i.e., “the unity of the Concept, of the subjective and the objective.”

Since Hegel does not give any political or historical account of universal self-consciousness but instead places emphasis on the “speculative, rational” aspect of it, it is questionable whether Hegel here has in mind any historical reality that would instantiate the completely reciprocal recognition. By stating that universal self-consciousness is the “knowing itself as recognized by the free other,” Hegel seems to be suggesting that in order for there to be a completely reciprocal recognition, it is necessary for each individual to *know the fact* that she recognizes the other and is recognized by the other. However, this requirement, in my view, is too strong, insofar as we can assume that in order for us to recognize others and be recognized by others, we do not necessarily have to be aware of the fact that we are recognizing and being recognized. More significantly, if the knowledge here at issue indicates each individual’s personal awareness, this condition does not seem to fit well with the *universal* feature of

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28 In the *Phenomenology of Spirit* in the 1830 *Encyclopedia*, Hegel seems to be presupposing his theory of the *Sittlichkeit* presented in the *Philosophy of Right* (1827). In the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel presents civil society as an economic association based on the right to property. Hegel’s theory of civil society reflects his acute, swift awareness of the changes in the economic systems of the time, specifically with respect to the rise of capitalist system. But Hegel holds that such an economic association, which solely aims at protecting individuals’ properties, cannot be the true *Sittlichkeit*. Offering a model of the modern *Sittlichkeit* is the main concern of his theory of the state in the *Philosophy of Right*. For a thorough analysis of Hegel’s theory of the modern *Sittlichkeit* and his non-nationalist and anti-fascist position presented, see in particular: Shlomo Avineri, *Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State* (Cambridge University Press, 1972).

29 ENZ, § 436 Z.

30 ENZ, § 436.
universal self-consciousness that involves the slave’s yielding her particular will to the universal will.

In the framework of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, it is therefore important to articulate the meaning of universal self-consciousness distinct from a political or a social-ontological notion of intersubjectivity. In this regard, it should be noted that universality of universal self-consciousness consists in “reciprocity” itself; hence, universal self-consciousness does not simply involve mutual recognition between self-consciousnesses but more fundamentally the knowledge of the mutual recognition. Seen this way, the “speculative, or rational” aspect of universal self-consciousness is essentially concerned with the concept of recognition, or the knowledge of what recognition ought to be. It is not so much concerned with being aware of whether I or a certain self-consciousness is recognized as with conceptualizing the formal essence of recognition as such. This conceptual element characteristic of Hegel’s treatment of recognition in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* would not be affected by whether it was present in the past, or is present now, or remains an ideal yet to come in the future.

The conceptual dimension of universal self-consciousness, then, creates an important context in the philosophy of subjective spirit, as it brings into effect the transition from the *Phenomenology of Spirit* to the *Psychology*. The knowledge of recognition involved in universal self-consciousness cannot merely be an external analysis of the reciprocal structure of recognition. It is internal to the movement of the *Phenomenological* consciousness and hence, of subjective spirit. Once subjective spirit has undergone the recognitional mutuality and made it for itself what recognition is, a modification in the meaning of knowledge is needed in such a way that it can embrace the objectivity produced by the process of recognition. In this context,
Hegel’s following formulation of the truth of universal self-consciousness, i.e., reason, draws our attention. Reason is “the certainty that its determinations are objective, are determinations of the essence of things, just as much as they are its own thoughts. Hence, it is reason, which is […] not only the absolute substance, but the truth as knowing.”31 Reason is therefore far from being a subjective faculty of mind, but the certainty that one’s thoughts are themselves objective in reality. When this is proved, subjective spirit passes to the Psychology. Conversely, one can deal with “spirit-as-such” only when the objectivity of reason is proved.

Hegel’s formulation of reason above echoes with the thesis in the Preface to the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit that the absolute is to be grasped not only as substance but equally as subject, and with the thesis of the Objective Logic that thought determinations are objective. Further, Hegel also defines reason as “the simple identity of the subjectivity of the Concept with its objectivity and universality.”32 Accordingly, we can rightly suppose that the movement of the last stage of the Objective Logic brings up the transition from the Phenomenology of Spirit to the Psychology within the philosophy of subjective spirit. The Psychology can deal with spirit-as-such after it has been established that reason is itself reality, just as the Subjective Logic can deal with the Concept after the objectivity of thought-determination has been proved. In this close connection with the speculative logic, the Psychology treats spirit-as-such in terms of the logical subjectivity of the Concept, i.e., spirit’s self-development. But more importantly it also reinstitutes the logical movement of actuality exhibited in the last stage of the Objective Logic. As I claim later by reconstructing Hegel’s theory of representation in the Psychology, Hegel’s

31 ENZ, § 439.
32 ENZ, § 438.
conception of mind can therefore be defined in terms of actuality. In this section, I focus on the remaining question concerning the role played by the *Phenomenology of Spirit* for the *Psychology*: what does the rational mean for Hegel’s philosophical psychology in his philosophy of subjective spirit?

### 2.2. The Rational: From the Phenomenology of Spirit to the Psychology

Again, the abstract, formal I is for Hegel an empty I of sensory, perceptive consciousness that contains within it no concrete contents. Yet, can we not say that sensory consciousness has sensory contents or raw sense data no matter where they come from or how they are constructed? We can therefore assume that sensory contents in the raw for Hegel have no value of true contents or do not deserve the name of concrete contents. Noteworthy in this regard is Hegel’s overview of the movement of self-consciousness as that in which self-consciousness “liberates itself from its sensuousness” and “gives contents and objectivity to the abstract knowledge of itself.”\(^{33}\) In reference to the suggestions I made in the previous section with respect to desiring self-consciousness, I therefore here suggest the following points. As discussed earlier, in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* Hegel modifies the problematic of sensory consciousness from its cognitive, epistemic operation to appetitive, practical existence by defining self-consciousness as desire; this is also the way in which he transforms the notion of an empty, abstract I established by the reflection-philosophy. Despite this, how the abstract I comes to have contents, in my view, remains a problem, insofar as the appetitive and practical constitution of desiring self-consciousness does not explain anything about the kind of the content that makes self-

\(^{33}\) *ENZ*, § 425.
consciousness concrete. With this respect, we can probably portray recognition as a process in which self-consciousness “gives contents” to itself by “liberating itself from sensuousness” as Hegel states. Insofar as recognition can thus be viewed as a process whereby consciousness fills its mind with concrete contents, then, the theory of recognition in the Phenomenology of Spirit has a psychological significance within the framework of the philosophy of subjective spirit.

In making this claim, I bear in mind another claim I made in Chapter 2 concerning Hegel’s unique conception of concrete nature of the human spirit. I there suggested that the human spirit is for Hegel a store of concrete contents, not in the sense that it has within it this and that content, but in the particular sense that it stores the spiritual contents—the moral, the ethical, the artistic, and the religious. If I have a point in claiming that recognition is a process by which consciousness fills its mind with concrete contents, this claim is therefore to be qualified as follows. It is a process by which self-consciousness fills its mind with those spiritual contents. This is, as far as I see, what reason in the Phenomenology of Spirit means.

This being said, the issue of recognition in the Phenomenology of Spirit boils down to what I discussed about the actuality of reason in Chapter 2. In this regard, I pay attention to Hegel’s reformulation of reason in the Psychology as the knowledge that “has no other content than itself” in “its division into pure infinite form, boundless knowledge, and into the object identical with this knowledge.”34 To this, he adds that spirit has “the certainty that in the world it will find its own self and the world must be friendly to it.”35 These formulations resonate with what I dealt with in Chapter 2 with respect to Hegel’s notion of reason. In treating the dialectical

34 ENZ, § 440 Z.
35 ENZ, § 440 Z.
transition of the Idea from life to knowing in the logic, I stated that the finite human spirit, insofar as it is reason, is the reality adequate for the Idea, and that reason as the reality of the Idea has a dual structure, namely the certainty of its unity with the world and the demonstration of this. I also suggested that this dual structure, which corresponds to the dual structure of the Idea, namely a positing of a presupposing, finds its fundamental logical form in the actuality—specifically, manifestation as a logical movement in which the discrepancy between content and form is removed by a free conversion between contingency and necessity.

Now, the formulations above in the Psychology establishes that reason has the certainty of its unity with the world and has itself for its content in the differentiation of this content, which is itself, into an infinite form and the object identical to it. In my view, the certainty here at stake can be understood as referring to the rational as the content of self-consciousness, which I have above construed as a product of recognition. It therefore has nothing to do with an individual person’s unexamined conviction, but only denotes that a production of recognition embodies the unity of self-consciousness and the world in a certain way. Further, that reason has itself for its content in its differentiation into an infinite form and the object, implies that it is something that reveals itself as the identity of form and content in their differentiation. It has no other content than itself, namely the rational that is produced as the content of self-consciousness by recognition; further, it reveals this rational content in its rational form, such that it can thereby reveal itself as the unity of content and form. In short, if the Phenomenology of Spirit presents the rational as a product of recognition for the concrete content of the mind, the Psychology exhibits the sense in which this rational content has a rational form. The Psychology, as successor of the Phenomenology of Spirit, thus reveals the movement of actuality at the level of subjective spirit.
3. Hegel’s Speculative Psychology:
Representation and Memory of the Theoretical Spirit

In the previous section, I examined the meaning of Hegel’s theory of recognition in the context of the philosophy of subjective spirit. I have argued that recognition has a psychological signification insofar as it is considered a process whereby the concrete contents of the human mind are produced. I have also claimed that the Psychology can be considered as a case of actuality, exhibiting the movement of manifestation by which the discrepancy between content and form in the rationality of the human mind is removed. The goal of this section is to show how the Psychology, specifically its first part on the theoretical spirit, exhibits the actuality at the level of subjective spirit.

3.1. Theoretical Spirit: Subjectivity of the Concept in the Psychology

While the transition from the Phenomenology of Spirit to the Psychology can be understood in terms of the actuality of reason as I have argued in the previous section, it is now to be mentioned that the Psychology treats its subject matter, knowing, in terms of the absolute subjectivity of the Concept. As I discussed in Chapter 2, the thesis of actuality put forward in the last stage of the Objective Logic is at the same time a demonstration of the subjectivity of the Concept. On this basis, the Subjective Logic establishes that the Concept is concrete universality that determines itself through self-development [Entwicklung]. As such, the Concept is the subjectivity that produces itself by thinking itself and conceptualizing [begreifen] itself. How then is the logical subjectivity of the Concept at play in the Psychology?
Let us first give an outline of the *Psychology*. Hegel divides the *Psychology* into three parts: theoretical, practical, and free spirit. Theoretical spirit pertains to intelligence which is in its turn considered in the three forms of intuition, representation, and thinking; practical spirit considers the will in the three forms of practical feeling, urges and willfulness, and happiness. With respect to these first two dimensions of spirit-as-such, Hegel puts emphasis on their common feature, i.e., productivity. Theoretical spirit produces from within itself an ideal world comprised of words; practical spirit produces enjoyment by the will’s self-determination. Although they differ in the direction of their productive activities—inward production of theoretical spirit and outward production of practical spirit—they are same in that they produce realities. Theoretical spirit is therefore as much as active, productive, creative as practical spirit. An important difference of the two consists in the fact that theoretical spirit has no resistance in its production of its inner world, whereas practical spirit externally confronts other human wills in its outward realization. For this reason, Hegel states that theoretical spirit is less restricted and less finite than practical spirit. But the distinction between theoretical and practical spirit is only relative rather than absolute since since they are mutually incorporated. They are rather identical in that both productions are one-sided incomplete unities of the subjective and the objective: ideal unity in the case of theoretical spirit, and real unity in the case of practical spirit. Free spirit is then the synthesis of those equally one-sided unities of the subjective and the objective. It is the will that is at the same time intelligence, i.e., spirit that knows itself as free will and wills itself as the object of itself. Since it thus turns out that the concept of spirit is freedom, it can give a foundation to the philosophy of objective spirit, which considers the realizations of the freedom of spirit in the realm of objectivity.
Hegel seems to have a good reason for blurring the distinction between intelligence and will. In accordance with his overarching claim for a speculative consideration of spirit as intrinsically active, intelligence should be considered involving activity and hence its own will. Will should likewise be thought of as incorporating intelligence because not the contingent, but the rational operation of the will deserves a speculative analysis. Hegel’s claim of the inseparability of intelligence and will carries some interesting implications. Intelligence’s involvement of will makes intelligence more than just a passive activity of synthesizing received information; it is a creative activity of producing itself as a reality, that is, as a system of names and signs. By virtue of will’s incorporation of intelligence, rational agent is neither “understanding-less hearts” nor “heart-less understanding” but a bearer of a rational will— as it is exemplified by historic figures whose passions express the rationality of the world-history.

The progression [Fortschreiten] of spirit is development [Entwicklung], insofar as its existence, knowledge [Wissen], has within itself the in-and-for-itself determinateness, i.e., the rational, or its basic content [Gehalt] and end, and hence the activity of translating is pure, only the formal transition to manifestation [Offenbarung] and returning into itself in that manifestation. Insofar as knowledge is encumbered with its initial determinacy, is at first only abstract and formal, the goal of spirit is to produce the objective fulfillment and thereby the freedom of its knowledge at the same time.

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36 ENZ, § 445 A.
37 ENZ, § 442.
With respect to our question about the connection between the Psychology and the Subjective Logic, the passage above suggests that theoretical spirit displays the “development [Entwicklung],” i.e., the logical subjectivity of the Concept. Theoretical spirit has its own basic content and this for its end. The basic content here denotes, as far as I see, the rational as the contents of the mind that I have previously articulated as a production of recognition. According to the passage above, theoretical spirit exhibits a teleological movement of development by which its contents, which is initially only abstract and formal, is transformed into something objective and concrete. If psychological spirit has activity, subjectivity, and freedom, and for that

38 For an analysis of the relationship between the Psychology and the Subjective Logic, see in particular: Klaus Düsing, “Endliche und absolute Subjecktvität. Untersuchungen zu Hegels philosophischer Psychologie und zu ihere spekulativen Grundlagung,” in Hegel’s Theory des subjektiven Geistes in der “Enzyklopädie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse,” ed. Rothar Eley (Stuttgart: Frommann-holzboog, 1990), 33-58. Düsing suggests that the three divisions of the philosophy of subjective spirit (the Anthropology, the Phenomenology of Spirit, and the Psychology) correspond to the three parts of the Logic (the Doctrine of Being, the Doctrine of Essence, and the Doctrine of the Concept). Accordingly, the absolute subjectivity of the logical Idea underlies the Psychology in an important manner, which thematizes the finite subjectivity of the human spirit. That is, while the absolute subjectivity of the Idea consists in self-thinking and over-grasping [übergreifen] of objectivity, this dialectical unity of the subjective and the objective is in the Psychology presented through the self-development [Entwicklung] of subjective spirit. And the self-development of subjective spirit is found in the “increasing subjectification” of theoretical spirit. He thus states that in Hegel’s Psychology, “intuition, representation, and thinking are not explained as fundamentally heterogeneous faculties or powers, but as serial moments of the development, which consists in the increasing subjectification of the contents that are represented through those faculties or powers:” Klaus Düsing, “Endliche und absolute Subjecktvität. Untersuchungen zu Hegels philosophischer Psychologie und zu ihere spekulativen Grundlagung,” (Ibid).

As I notice in Düsing’s analysis, the development of subjective spirit in the Psychology can be seen in its two aspects: the inwardizing recollection of theoretical spirit, and the unity of theoretical and practical spirit. Indeed, what the Psychology eventually establishes is the unity of theoretical and practical spirit. It thus comes to the conclusion that the essence of spirit is freedom, thereby laying the foundation for the philosophy of objective spirit. In this chapter, however, I do not deal with the unity of theoretical and practical spirit and instead focus only on recollection. This is first because of the impression that in the Psychology Hegel gives priority to theoretical spirit and the account of the unity of theoretical and practical spirit is relatively short and not detailed. More importantly, this issue seems to have to do with the questionable status of the Phenomenology of Spirit in the philosophy of subjective spirit, namely the fact that it thematizes practical/objective spirit that is directed toward outer world, whereas the philosophy of subjective spirit primarily concerns theoretical/subjective spirit, which is still ideal in the sense of remaining internal to itself. As I attempted to make sense of the significance of the Phenomenology of Spirit for the Psychology, I leave the thesis in the Psychology of the unity of theoretical and practical spirit for a future study.
reason can be called spirit, this is the case insofar as the transformation of the basic content of
and by theoretical spirit is a manifestation, i.e., the dissolution of the disparity between form and
content.

The above formulation of the subjectivity of theoretical spirit is based on an important
assumption that knowledge [Wissen] is the existence of spirit and has the rational for its
immediate determination. Assumed here is the connection of theoretical spirit with reason. As
we have seen above, the Phenomenology of Spirit ends with reason, i.e., the certainty of the unity
of the subjective and the objective—the certainty in which “reason finds its own self in the world
and the world must be friendly to it.” 39 This certainty is the rational, the knowledge, the
existence of spirit. But theoretical spirit finds this rationality at first as a pre-given [vorfinden]. 40
To theoretical spirit, the rational is a given basic content [Gehalt]; as such, it constitutes the
immediate, unproved determination of theoretical spirit. Therefore, theoretical spirit is to
appropriate its pre-given content, the rational, since the pre-givenness contradicts the subjective
nature of spirit. More significantly, theoretical spirit is nothing but such an appropriation of its
own content, the rational. Hegel therefore constructs theoretical spirit as a movement, that is, one
process of knowing [erkennen] whose moments are the three activities of intelligence: intuition,
representation, and thinking.

Briefly stated, intelligence at first finds its content as pre-given, which is not produced
by it (intuition); it liberates itself from this illusion of the pre-givenness of its content by

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39 ENZ, § 440 Z.
40 ENZ, § 446.
inwardizing it (representation); finally, the rational becomes completely subjective to intelligence (thinking).

At this point, the terminological distinction between knowledge [Wissen] and knowing [Erkennen] and the related one between intelligence and theoretical spirit reveals more clearly what kind of subjectivity is here at play. While knowledge [Wissen] indicates the rational as it is immediately given from the Phenomenology of Spirit, knowing [Erkennen] narrowly defines the movement through which this given content is appropriated by intelligence itself. It is therefore neither a perceptive or cognitive activity, nor among other activities in addition to intuition, representation, and thinking. It is the comprehensive activity in which intelligence posits its immediate determination for itself by going through its moments. As the bearer of this comprehensive movement, intelligence is then more narrowly defined as theoretical spirit. In this narrow sense, theoretical spirit, not the intelligence, exhibits the logical subjectivity of self-development. Such a teleological movement of theoretical spirit is, according to Hegel, the element that makes his treatment of what is usually called faculties of mind, i.e., intuition, representation, and thinking, distinct from other psychologies of the time.

To sum up, it is theoretical spirit that is assumed in the Psychology to realize the logical subjectivity of self-development. What the content of mind is, is already shown by the Phenomenology of Spirit: the identity of the subjective and the objective—more precisely, the rational as a concrete content of the mind, which is a product of recognition. Following this, the Psychology is concerned with granting an adequate form to this content. While pre-giveneness is not an adequate form to spirit which is intrinsically active and self-reflective, theoretical spirit actively transforms its content. This is, as far as I see, the way in which theoretical spirit
reinstitutes the logical movement of actuality exhibited in the last stage of the Doctrine of Essence. Again, the logical movement of actuality concerns the proof of the subjectivity of the absolute as substance by the absolute’s gaining the form adequate to its concept: manifestation. If theoretical spirit is a “manifestation,” as Hegel states, the meaning of this is be shown by an analysis of how the rational content of the mind is transformed into something rational through the movement of theoretical spirit.

3.2. Representation: Transformation of the Given Rational Content by Theoretical Spirit

Now, we can pin down how the Psychology, as successive of the Phenomenology of Spirit, exhibits Hegel’s speculative, philosophical psychology. Following the Phenomenology of Spirit, the Psychology presupposes that the content of mind is the rational, comprising the moral, the ethical, the right, the religious, etc. It is therefore not surprising that Hegel defines intuition, the first form of intelligence, as “consciousness fulfilled by the certainty of reason whose object has the determination of the rational.” At the stage of the Psychology, what is intuited is not raw sense data, but the rational. But theoretical spirit, at first, finds rational contents as pre-given which is not produced by itself. Even when we speak of the immediate feeling of the religious, for instance, there is semblance that intuition passively receives what is intuited. Theoretical spirit remains only half-rational unless this semblance is removed. The task of theoretical spirit therefore consists in showing how rational contents of mind come to have rational forms. For this reason, the proper activity of theoretical spirit consists in nothing but bringing about formal

41 ENZ, § 442.
42 ENZ, § 449 Z.
changes in those rational contents, such that they are connected to each other in a certain rational manner. Intuition, representation, and thinking are those modes of transformation of the given rational contents by theoretical spirit.

The removal of the semblance of the externality of intuited rational contents first requires that intuition be thought of as an activity. Hegel therefore considers intuition as an activity of producing an image of an object, one through which what is intuited is transformed into an object present outside of mind in the temporal and spatial order. While images are such transient mental existents produced by intuition, Hegel secondly considers recollection [Erinnerung] as the process in which images are freed from their temporal, spatial particularity. By being recalled, images are appropriated by intelligence, made into intelligence’s own possession, and thereby unconsciously preserved in intelligence. While intelligence is thus made into “unconscious nocturnal pit” by recollection, imagination then creates connections among those contents stored in intelligence. In Hegel’s terms, imagination makes intelligence emerge from its being-within-it [Insichsein] into determinacy, such that the nocturnal darkness enveloping the wealth of images is dispelled by the luminous clarity of presence. More precisely, imagination makes images come into existence (reproductive imagination), makes them into universal representations by relating them to each other (associative imagination), and posits those universal representations identical with particular images by giving them pictorial existences (symbolizing, and sign-making phantasy).

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43 ENZ, § 453 A.
44 ENZ, § 455 Z.
Of importance here is the distinction between associative imagination and symbolizing, sign-making phantasy. According to Hegel, the so-called association of ideas is not a law, but the act of imagination by which only pictorial associations are created among the images. While those pictorial associations are made by categories of understanding such as likeness and unlikeness, ground and consequence, etc., the symbolic, sign-making fantasy is an act of intelligence qua reason, i.e., of making itself into a being, into the thing [Sache]. Insofar as we are concerned with rational connections among rational contents in mind, we can therefore assume that it is the third form of imagination whereby mental contents—those whose contents are rational, and which are unconsciously preserved in mind by recollection—gain rational forms adequate to their rationality. It is here not hard to see that by rationality of imagination qua reason Hegel first means an activity of self-producing as the thing. But this self-externalization into symbol and sign is at the same time a free activity because imagination here simultaneously produces connections between a rational content and its externalized form (sign and symbol). It is a free activity, more precisely, because it creates from within itself the relation of meaning between a content and its expression without relying on sensual elements of symbol or sign.

The arbitrary connection between meaning and sign here plays the role of a proof of the freedom of intelligence. Hegel thus makes a sharp distinction between symbol and sign. Symbolizing is less free than sign-making because the symbolic connection between a content (e.g., the strength of Jupiter) and the selected material image (e.g., eagle) is still dependent on some sensual elements (e.g., the strength of eagle) of the latter. Symbols which do not rely on

\[46\] ENZ, § 455 A.
\[47\] ENZ, § 457.
sensual elements of images (e.g., a cockade, a flag, a tomb-stone) are signs. In sign-making, imagination arbitrarily imposes meanings to signs. This is even more so in the case of linguistic signs, which reveals the reason why linguistic signs must be learned. By sign-making, intelligence becomes “the pyramid into which an alien soul is transferred and preserved.”

Consequently, we can conclude that the rational form adequate to a rational content for Hegel is eventually a linguistic expression; the rational connection among rational contents is a connection of meaning. The thing [Sache] which is the counterpart of imagination turns out to be “name.” The pyramid into which the intelligence is transferred turns out to be a mental world comprised of meanings, freed from all sensual, natural restraints. A rational intelligent being can then be said to be a subject capable of using language. It is also a subject capable of thinking because it is in words, according to Hegel, that we think.

Hegel thus adds a psychological account of how one appropriates a language system. This is the issue of memory, which is considered in the three forms: name-retaining, reproducing the meaning of a certain given word (e.g., “lion”) without relying on any sensory elements, and leaning to speak and write a language. Indeed, if mind can be conceived as a world in which names are arranged according to their meaning-connections, an account of how such a language system is appropriated by mind is necessary. For it cannot otherwise be affirmed that it is the inner word of “mind.” Hegel does not assume that the meanings of words and their connections originate from an individual speaker’s or writer’s personal intention. What he assumes is rather the objectivity of the meaning-connections. This explains why Hegel puts great emphasis on

48 ENZ, § 458 A.
49 ENZ, § 461.
50 ENZ, § 462 A.
mechanical memory. Mechanical aspect of learning language consists in this: “certain signs, tones, etc., are grasped in their merely external association and then reproduced in this association, without attention being thereby explicitly directed to their meaning and inward association.”\textsuperscript{51} Shortly, we learn a language by rote. And learning language by rote is the sublation of the disparity between name and meaning in the sense that the net of meanings which confers objective values and orders to the world of words is implanted to the mind.

But this is also that which makes the mind of the one who mechanically memorizes words have subjectivity. When one memorizes, for instance, a senseless sequence of words or recites a text without understanding its meaning, this evidences the power of the I over names, that is, the power of holding together words and keeping them in stable order even without understanding their meanings. Since it is thereby established that theoretical spirit is a subject capable of language, Hegel can finally deal with thinking at the last stage in the development of intelligence by analyzing it into understanding, judgement, and inference.

While the \textit{Phenomenology of Spirit} brings forth the rational, concrete contents of mind as the subject matter of the \textit{Psychology}, the \textit{Psychology}—specifically, the second sub-division of theoretical spirit, “Representation”—establishes that those rational contents have rational forms in the linguistic meaning-connections. Together with the \textit{Phenomenology of Spirit}, the \textit{Psychology} thus suggests that the mind is a totality of rational contents in which these contents are transformed into representations and into linguistic signs. By this transformation, they are freed from the particular and momentary forms of time and space and stored in intelligence. This is how they are materially produced by intelligence.

\textsuperscript{51} \textit{ENZ}, §195 Z.
3.3. *The Actuality of Mind and the Mechanism of Spirit*

Now we can return to the thesis concerning the transition from the *Phenomenology of Spirit* to the *Psychology*: consciousness achieves the truth, i.e., the identity of the subjective and the objective as a determination of knowledge, while spirit-as-such is a verification [*Bewährung*] of this knowledge. Again, reason, the last stage of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, is the certainty that “its [self-consciousness’s] determinations are objective, are determinations of essence of things”\(^ {52} \)—or, the certainty of the rationality of the world. But this certainty is not only “the absolute substance” but “the truth as knowledge.”\(^ {53} \) By this statement, Hegel makes it clear that the identity of the rational and the real here is an issue of knowledge. The *Phenomenological* identity of the rational and the real is indeed relevant to the logical objectivity of thought-determinations. But the same truth, which is phenomenologically expressed as the identity of the rational and the real and logically formulated as the objectivity of thought-determinations, is here in the *Psychology* considered as having a peculiar form: a psychological knowledge, i.e., the content of mind.

From this connection with the Objective Logic, we can then more aptly spell out the specific meaning of Hegel’s theory of representation. As we have seen earlier, the Objective Logic establishes that thought-determinations can eventually be said to have objectivity when it is shown how the absolute has actuality—how the absolute as substance proves itself to have subjectivity and reveals itself as the absolute by the absolute reflection which dissolves the disparity between its content and form. Likewise, the theory of representation in the *Psychology*

\(^ {52} \) *ENZ*, § 439.

\(^ {53} \) *ENZ*, § 439.
leads us to narrowly define Hegel’s conception of mind as actuality, that is, as an activity by which the disparity between content and form of mind is dissolved. From this perspective, recollection and sign-making are not just among other psychological operations. They are rather concerned with the verification of the truth, i.e., of the rationality of reality. Inversely, the verification here at issue has nothing to do with argumentative demonstrations, but with transformations of rational, mental contents by the activity of theoretical spirit. In this sense, the mind is for Hegel something actual, something that manifests itself as rational.

If our interpretation of Hegel’s theory of representation in terms of mind’s actuality has a point, then, we encounter an ironic conclusion with regard to the freedom of spirit (mind). Spirit’s freedom eventually consists in its ability to produce itself as something material, that is, as linguistic signs. According to Hegel’s doctrine of mechanic memory, however, it is by mechanic repetitions that spirit comes to be free. In Hegel’s terms, “the highest recollection of representation is the highest alienation of intelligence.”54 How can we make sense of this seemingly self-contradictory idea that spirit’s freedom consists in its mechanism? I will turn back to this issue when I deal with the notion of habit in the Anthropology.

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54 ENZ, § 463.
4. The *Anthropology as a Negative Part of the Phenomenology of Spirit*

As mentioned above, in the first passage of the introductory part of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (§ 413), Hegel articulates the meaning of this second division of his philosophy of subjective spirit in its two systematic connections to the Doctrine of Essence and to the *Anthropology*. With respect to the relationship between the *Anthropology* and the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, we can refer to § 413 where Hegel states that the object of consciousness is “the content of the natural soul” or “the release of the natural life of the soul.” As discussed earlier, this notion of consciousness as the release of the soul can broadly understood in terms of the differentiation of the soul’s undifferentiated totality into subject and object. But the concrete meaning of this differentiation requires a comprehensive analysis of the *Anthropology*. As I undertake an analysis of the *Anthropology* in Chapter 5, I here only examine Hegel’s conception of the soul as a deranged form of consciousness to show how the *Anthropology* and the *Phenomenology of Spirit* are intrinsically connected to each other:

“The concrete nature of spirit brings with it the peculiar difficulty for consideration [of spirit] that the particular stages and determinations of the development of its concept do not also remain behind as particular existences in contrast to its deeper formations. […] The determinations and stages of spirit, […] are essentially only moments, states, determinations in the higher stages of the development. As a consequence of this, a higher determination of spirit displays itself as present, even empirically, in a lower and more abstract one; e.g., all the higher that is spiritual [is present] in sensation as a content or determinacy. […] But all the same, when lower stages are under consideration, it becomes necessary, in order to draw attention to them in their empirical existence, to refer to higher
stages in which they are present only as forms, and, in this way, to anticipate a content which exhibits itself only later in the development (e.g., consciousness, in dealing with natural waking; understanding, in dealing with derangement).”

In the passage above, Hegel suggests that in the philosophy of spirit, the concrete nature of spirit makes it necessary to construe a lower stage as anticipating a higher one. For example, the spiritual (the moral, the ethical, the artistic, the religious) is present in sensation as the content or determinacy; consciousness and understanding (the Phenomenology of Spirit) are present in the waking and derangement of the soul (the Anthropology) as the content. The first example suggests that the spiritual content may have a sensory form; the soul can sense and feel the spiritual content. According to the second example, the waking and derangement of the soul may be considered in terms of a natural form in which consciousness is present. These two examples relate to the embodiment of the soul’s inner feelings and derangement of the feeling soul treated in the Anthropology, respectively. Thus, one can say that the Anthropology deals with consciousness but considers this subject matter of the Phenomenology of Spirit in terms of bodiliness and derangement. The Anthropology, in other words, thematizes consciousness in its negative, natural aspect and shows how this is overcome. As such, it can be understood as part of Hegel’s theory of consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit.

Given the connection between the Anthropology and the Phenomenology of Spirit, then, it is untenable to maintain that the movement of subjective spirit constitutes a linear progression towards ever higher stage. Just as the Anthropology can be considered as part of the

55 ENZ, § 380.
Phenomenology of Spirit, so is the Phenomenology of Spirit not just a lower stage to the Psychology that is discarded by the latter. The Psychology has no meaning without the Phenomenology of Spirit because the Phenomenology of Spirit offers the view of the rational constitution of the mind, which the Psychology considers in terms of form. If Hegel’s speculative approach to the mind consists in dealing with it in its totality without arbitrarily dismembering it, therefore, one would also have to apply this speculative approach to our reading Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit.

5. The Manifestation of Spirit: The Anthropology and the Phenomenology of Spirit

The considerations above about the concrete nature of spirit make us free from the pervasive understanding of the Hegelian dialectic in the philosophy of subjective spirit according to which a lower stage is only a moment for a higher one. Although this does not deviate much Hegel’s own formulation of his dialectic as well as of the structure of his philosophy of subjective spirit, we also pay attention to the fact that Hegel blurs a firm distinction between the Anthropology and the Phenomenology of Spirit by highlighting the concrete nature of spirit. I claimed earlier that the Phenomenology of Spirit specifies the kind of content that deserves an analysis of a speculative psychology and examined how the Psychology treats this particular content offered by the Phenomenology of Spirit. Now in this section I clarify how the Anthropology and the Phenomenology of Spirit address together the issue of the content of mind, while bearing in mind the twofold division of the speculative logic into the Objective Logic and the Subjective Logic.
In the passages titled “the Concept of Spirit” (§§381-384) in the “Introduction” to the *Philosophy of Spirit*, Hegel defines spirit in terms of ideality, freedom, and manifestation. Ideality means sublation of the externality that the logical Idea has in nature. It is the essence of spirit because all activities of spirit consist in making what is external into something internal to itself. For Hegel, this ideality fundamentally belongs to spirit’s freedom because it is spirit’s activity of assimilating all externalities to itself. This being assumed, it is said that manifestation is the determinacy of spirit. Again, Hegel underlines that manifestation is not a disclosure of something else or an addition of an external form to a certain content. While these conceptions presuppose the mutually external relation between form (that which manifests) and content (that which is manifested), manifestation for Hegel consists in a dynamic, internal identity of the two. It is, in other words, a form that is itself content, or a form that expresses the content in its entirety. In this sense, manifestation is for Hegel all the time self-manifestation. That spirit’s determinacy is manifestation, therefore, means that spirit’s free act of idealizing of all externalities is a formal activity that makes all its contents properly expressed in their entirety.

The *manifesting* [das Offenbaren], which, as the manifesting of the *abstract* Idea or immediate transition, is the *becoming* of nature, is, as the manifesting of spirit, which is free, the *positing* of nature as *its* world; a positing, which is, as reflection at the same time, a *presupposing* of the world as self-subsistent nature. The manifesting in the concept is the creating of the concept as its being in which the concept gives itself the *affirmation* and *truth* of its freedom.\(^\text{56}\)

\(^{56}\) *ENZ*, § 384.
In the passage above, Hegel specifies three forms of spirit’s self-manifestation: (1) the becoming of nature; (2) presupposing nature as an external world to itself and positing it as its own world; (3) grasping itself as that which posits its own being and produces its other, i.e., nature and finite spirit. We can accordingly point to the three places in the system of the *Encyclopedia* where spirit manifests itself: (1) transition from the logical Idea to the philosophy of nature, (2) the *Anthropology* and the *Phenomenology of Spirit* in the philosophy of subjective spirit, and (3) the philosophy of absolute spirit. This specification of the three places of spirit’s self-manifestation, however, raises the question about the meanings of other parts which are not listed in the passage above. Does Hegel mean, for instance, that the logic, the *Psychology* in the philosophy of subjective spirit, and the philosophy of objective spirit have nothing to do with spirit’s self-manifestation? This is untenable, given the ubiquitous, omnipresent nature of spirit in Hegel’s system. It would therefore be more relevant to construe that Hegel picked up those three stages to characterize the whole movement of spirit within the *Encyclopedia* system rather than took them to be three different places where spirit manifests itself differently at each time. Spirit manifests itself, in other words, through the whole movement in which it externalizes itself into nature, turns back into itself by inwardizing its own externality in nature, and posits this inwardness for itself. It manifests itself in and through the system of the *Encyclopedia*.

According to the passage above, the meanings of the first two divisions of the philosophy of subjective spirit—the *Anthropology* and the *Phenomenology of Spirit*—should be considered in the framework of spirit’s self-manifestation. To speak somewhat

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57 Cf. *ENZ*, § 384 Z.
schematically, it is not the Psychology but the Anthropology and the Phenomenology of Spirit that have a true significance for the whole movement of spirit in the encyclopedic system. By implication, one cannot properly understand those two first divisions of the philosophy of subjective spirit without putting them in the context of the emergence of spirit from nature or its sublation of nature. The psychological meanings of the Anthropology and the Phenomenology of Spirit, in other words, are to be examined in terms of spirit’s natural constraints and liberation from them. This is the spot where Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit exceeds the framework of an ordinary psychology.

In this context, it is noticeable that in the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel formulates recognition in terms of the sublation of bodiliness. As we have seen earlier, recognition is a relation between two different particular self-consciousnesses. They confront each other to prove themselves to be a free subject. But Hegel suggests that what each self-consciousness is supposed to sublate is not the other self-consciousness. Instead, each self-consciousness is to sublate his own immediacy, i.e. his “bodiliness.” Bodiliness here means that “in which, as in its sign and instrument, self-consciousness has its own self-feeling, as well as its being for others and its relation that mediates between itself and them.” The subjects who are engaged in the struggle for recognition are therefore natural, bodily subjects. Further, this fact that they are natural, bodily subjects are the key problem of recognition. Specifically, self-consciousness is to sublate his own bodiliness to prove himself to be a free subject.

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58 ENZ, § 431.
59 Ibid.
60 In relation to my interests in the systematic connection of the Anthropology and the Phenomenology of Spirit, I here focus on the issue of bodiliness. In the encyclopedic Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel emphasizes that the struggle for recognition is not a duel, which I understand in relation to medieval feudalism. More importantly, Hegel suggests that the life-or-death struggle might have occurred in the state of nature and might have contributed to the
The formulation of recognition in terms the sublation of bodiliness suggests that the theory of the soul exhibited in the *Anthropology* underpins the issue of self-consciousness’ liberation in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Returning to the formulation given in § 431, bodiliness is that in which, “as in its sign and instrument,” self-consciousness has its self-feeling. This formulation condenses the theory of the sentient soul and the habit presented in the *Anthropology*. It is therefore important to note that the bodiliness of self-consciousness is not just a physical organism, but a soulful body that immediately embodies inner sensations and is instrumentalized as the soul’s own body through the process of habituation. The self-consciousness engaged in the process of recognition is a subject who has such a soulful body. The natural element that contradicts self-consciousness’ freedom and is therefore to be sublated, is the same soulful body.

The theory of the soul in the *Anthropology* thus qualifies the kind of the natural element that is to be sublated for the sake of self-consciousness’ proof of its freedom. This qualification

beginning of a state, but it is not present in the civil society or a political state (*ENZ*, § 432 Z). What we have in the civil society, in other words, is not the real struggle for recognition, but its result, i.e., recognition. Given that the civil society and the state are the political institutions that Hegel deals with in his *Philosophy of Right*, the political context of Hegel’s theory of recognition is also to be considered in order to understand the problem of self-consciousness in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. We can therefore construe that the result of recognition, specifically the asymmetric relationship between slave and master, is concerned with the rise of capitalism or of an economic association of needs and care for their satisfaction, which Hegel calls a civil society. But Hegel views the economic association instituted only on the basis of each person’s right to possession to be a mere external bond. Instead, a true *Sittlichkeit* can be achieved at the level of the state, that is, by a political community that creates an internal bond among its members. Considering this framework of Hegel’s theory of modern *Sittlichkeit* in his *Philosophy of Right*, perhaps we can put the problem of self-consciousness’ liberation from its bodiliness in the context of the sublation of the civil society by the state. In this case, we would have to show, first, how the modern state can create a political bond that internally ties its members to each other; second, how this political achievement of the completely reciprocal recognition can be understood in terms of the emergence of spirit from nature, that is, spirit’s denaturalization. This requires an expansive study of Hegel’s political philosophy. Instead of pursuing a study of Hegel’s political philosophy, which goes far beyond the scope of this dissertation, I discuss in Chapter 5 whether there can be an absolute denaturalization of spirit in Hegel’s system, focusing on Hegel’s idea of the family as spirit’s re-naturalization.

61 Cf. *ENZ*, § 401.

is important because the sublation at stake, inasmuch as it is more broadly concerned with spirit’s sublation of nature, can hardly take place in or by a raw nature. Sublation of bodiliness therefore does not simply mean that bodiliness is to be negated. Bodiliness is that which makes the sublation at stake possible. It is in this sense that it is defined as that in which self-consciousness has “its being for others and its relation that mediates between itself and them.” To put it another way, bodiliness is the mode of the being of self-consciousness that makes it possible for it to engage in the process of recognition; further, it is the medium through which the recognition takes place.

If spirit manifests itself in the first two divisions of the philosophy of subjective spirit, the Anthropology and the Phenomenology of Spirit, this is therefore so in the sense that they thematize together denaturalization of spirit. Only on this basis of the denaturalization of spirit, the Psychology can begin its speculative discussion about spirit as such. It is thus the main theme of the preliminary discussions that are offered by the Anthropology and the Phenomenology of Spirit for the Psychology.

Conclusion: Hegel’s Dialectical Rationalism

Reason is the fundamental notion of Hegel’s philosophical psychology. As I have attempted to show by analyzing the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Psychology, the human mind for Hegel has rational contents, and the rational contents of mind have rational forms. Hegel’s rationalism, however, has far-reaching significances that are not reducible to some traditional understandings of reason. As concluding remarks, I shed light on how Hegel’s
conception of reason exceeds the traditional framework in which reason is largely considered in
terms of a certain power of the human mind. Further, I make a few suggestions about the
systematic connections among the three divisions of his philosophy of subjective spirit.

As I attempted to show throughout this chapter, Hegel’s notion of reason involves the
idea of the unity of reason and reality. To put it simply, the underpinning of the Psychology is the
idea that the world is rational, which the Phenomenology of Spirit presents with the theory of
recognition. In this context, the rationality of the world is concerned with recognitional
institutions of an intersubjective social order. However, Hegel’s notion of the unity of reason and
reality cannot simply be understood in terms of intersubjectivity. Far more importantly, it is
concerned with verification in the specific sense that the unity of reason and reality, which
defines reason, is to be verified as such in and through that reality. To explain this, I attempted to
reconstruct Hegel’s theory of the theoretical spirit in the Psychology in terms of actuality,
namely the manifestation of spirit by which the discrepancy between content and form is
removed. Now, we can then state that the human mind is rational insofar as its contents somehow
square with the rationality of the world and the rationality of those mindful contents are verified
by an active psychological process of endowing them with rational forms, i.e., linguistic
expressions.

The consideration above about Hegel’s notion of reason leads us to reconsider the
meaning of the process of representation. I have attempted to reconstruct the movement of the
theoretical spirit in terms of the psychological verification of the unity of rationality and reality.
My claim was that the process of representation by which the rational content is transformed into
a linguistic expression is the verification at issue, and that the mind for Hegel can be defined as
actuality in this particular context. If this claim has a point, then, we come to make an unanticipated conclusion concerning Hegel’s rationalism: the rationality of the human mind is eventually concerned with the irrational realm of imagination and the operation of representation that occurs in it.

This gives an important clue for thinking about the connection between the *Psychology* and the *Anthropology*. According to Hegel’s analogy, what happens in the process of representation is the transformation of “the unconscious nocturnal pit” into “the pyramid into which an alien soul is transferred and preserved.” As far as I see, the nocturnal pit, which is the unconscious store of the contents of mind, does not differ from the soul, that is, the undifferentiated substantial totality of concrete contents dealt with in the *Anthropology*. Again, Hegel puts emphasis on the concrete nature of spirit, stating that the lower stage anticipates the higher one and the higher one presents in the lower one. Hegel does not apply this idea to the *Psychology*. But we can make Hegel’s claim of the concrete nature of spirit more complete by construing that the soul in the *Anthropology* anticipates the nocturnal pit in the *Psychology*. By an analysis in this regard, we can therefore show how the *Psychological* spirit is rooted in the *Anthropological* soul. Further, we can also address the questions as to how reason comes forth from un-reason and how spirit emerges as spirit in the human mind. This is a topic I deal with in later chapters.

With regard to Hegel’s non-traditional rationalism in his philosophy of subjective spirit, his notion of desiring self-consciousness should also be mentioned. I have considered Hegel’s notion of desiring self-consciousness specifically in terms of his transformation of the notion of

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63 *ENZ* § 453 A, § 458 A.
the abstract I that he critically assigns to the Kantian philosophy. By this conceptual transformation, Hegel switches the framework of the discussion on consciousness: from the epistemic, self-enclosed, abstract I, to the practical, appetitive, object-relational subject. This switch of the direction in the discussion about consciousness echoes with Heidegger’s existentialist notion of the \textit{Dasein}. Heidegger claims that the primordial mode of being of the \textit{Dasein} is the being-in-the-world, and that the relationship between \textit{Dasein} and the world differs from the relationship between subject and object. For Heidegger, the \textit{Dasein} therefore is already embedded in the world and encounters the objects in the world with its practical concerns.

Knowledge and cognition are only secondary to the \textit{Dasein}’s existence and its practical relation with the world. In a similar vein, what derives Hegel’s self-consciousness is its practical interest: satisfying a desire. His refutation of the notion of the abstract I thus entails the claim for the practical nature of the human being. But the practical constitution of desiring self-consciousness has little to do with the calculative reason by which one compares a variety of possible means for realizing a particular end and chooses the most likely effective one. More fundamentally, it is concerned with the directionality of self-consciousness in relation to the objects in the outer world. Self-consciousness, in other words, is directed toward its objects. But this directionality toward the world is not something that it may or may not choose according to calculative reasoning; one is rather already endowed with that directionality on account of her appetitive power, i.e., desire. In short, self-consciousness is fundamentally open to the world because of its appetitive constitution.

Hegel develops the issue of desire into that of recognition. The ways in which the two German philosophers deal with the practical nature of the human being significantly differ from each other. But the openness of self-consciousness to the world, which I find compatible with
Heidegger’s idea of the Dasein’s being-in-the-world, gives a clue for thinking about how the *Anthropology* grounds the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Of importance is that consciousness does not come to be from nothing. It is something that is formed, and the formation of consciousness cannot occur without certain relations with the world. With regard to the formation of consciousness, the relation with the world is to be considered in its most wide sense: including all life experiences that we are always making as far as we are alive. These experiences include, for instance, experiences of sensual objects that are repetitive but are different at every time, daily interactions with the natural environment that we may not be aware of, intercommunication with other people that we have at various levels depending on the age and the stage of life, etc. Considering this, mind does not exist without the world, in the sense that the current constitution of the mind of each person is the result of a life-long process comprised of those experiences. Further, the life-long formation of our mind is not always conscious of. In many respects, it is rather pre-conscious, pre-reflective, unplanned, and uncontrollable. This is one of the main concerns of Hegel’s discussion of the natural soul in the *Anthropology*, which I discuss in Chapter 5. Further, consciousness as such a worldly existent is at the same time a bodily existent. In this respect, the *Anthropology* carries an important meaning for Hegel’s philosophical psychology in the philosophy of subjective spirit.
CHAPTER 4. Kant and Hegel:  
Different Understandings of Nature and Different Ideas of an Anthropology

The term anthropology stems from the Latin word “anthropologia,” which combines the Greek words, ἄνθρωπος and λόγος. As such, anthropology means a study of man or humanity. However, this plain meaning of the term anthropology does not seem to fit well with the Anthropology in Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit. As Michael Wolff points out, Hegel never uses the term “man [der Menschen]” in his Anthropology; instead, the adjective “human [menschlich]” appears only once in § 411.¹ Further, in the Philosophy of Right, Hegel states that it is only from the perspective of needs peculiar to the civil society that we have before us for the first time the concrete correlate of what we call “man.”² This being assumed, one would have to say that the part in Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit where Hegel exhibits his study of man is the Phenomenology of Spirit rather than the Anthropology. For the Phenomenology of Spirit thematizes the intersubjective life of self-consciousness by which “the community of need and of care for its satisfaction”³ is established. If this is the case, how can we make sense of the title “anthropology” Hegel puts on his treatment of the soul in the philosophy of subjective spirit?

This chapter undertakes a historical study concerning the notion of philosophical anthropology to fill the gap between the general meaning of anthropology as a study of man and Hegel’s employment of the term for his theory of the soul in the philosophy of subjective spirit.

¹ Michael Wolff, Das Körper-Seele-Problem. Kommentar zu Hegel, Enzyklopädie (1830), § 389 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1992), 29.
² PR, § 190 A.
³ ENZ, § 434.
Noteworthy in this regard is the consensus among the scholars that the remarkable development of anthropology in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has its origin in the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. The contemporary American anthropologist, Marvin Harris, suggests that anthropology was not able to achieve its disciplinary identity before the sociocultural sphere of the human life was identified as a legitimate field of inquiry. According to Harris, various, new theoretical attempts in the eighteenth-century were pivotal in such an identification of the sociocultural sphere as a legitimate field of inquiry and hence, in the formation of anthropology as an independent discipline.\(^4\) Odo Marquard suggests that the remarkable development of philosophical anthropology in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is indebted to a double theoretical turn accomplished in the eighteenth-century: a turn toward the life-world away from

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\(^4\) For the history of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment with respect to the formation of anthropology, see: Marvin Harris, *The Rise of Anthropological Theory: A History of Theories of Culture* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1968), 8-52. To list some important theoretical factors of the Enlightenment that contributed to the rise of anthropology as he portrays, (1) Locke’s theory of the human mind as a *tabula rasa* gave foundation to this new discipline by fostering the notion of *enculturation*. Also, ethnographic, synchronic studies of behavior patterns observed among different group of people provided empirical data concerning different customs. (2) Vico saw cultural events as governed by universal laws and suggested that the human being is the author of *history*. Vico’s view entailed the philosophical conundrum concerning the relationship between universal, quasi-deterministic laws of history and the human free will. Despite this, it made a great contribution to the paradigm shift in the discussion about the orderliness of human history: from divine providence to this-worldly causes of socio-cultural phenomena. The works of Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Rousseau can be viewed in this respect. (3) La Mettrie put forward the *materialist idea* of “man-machine” to portray human behavioral capacities as continuous with those of non-human organisms. This line of thought contributed to the development of physiology and physiological anthropology. D’Holbach’s radical materialism is also important, in that it rejected all traditional religious ideas. (4) There were a series of attempts at the *universal history of mankind*: the representative of such an attempt is Vico’s idea that each nation evolves through the three ages of the gods, heros, and men, and Turgot’s history of mankind through the stages of hunting, pastoralism, and farming, which was further developed by Ferguson. (5) This was followed by a set of *evolutionary models of culture*. This includes: Millar’s account of evolution of the family (including sex relations and marriage forms) and the development of class differences and political systems, Robertson’s evolutionary typology going from savagery to barbarism to civilization, and Condorcet’s ethnocentric ten-stage scheme concerning intellectual development of human rationality going from tribal society to the invention of alphabet, and up to the modernity from Descartes to the French Republic.
the traditional Scholastic metaphysics by Kant’s transcendental philosophy and a turn toward nature away from mathematical natural science by the Romantic philosophy of nature.\textsuperscript{5}

Interestingly, both Harris and Marquard portray the rise of anthropology in both terms of association and dissociation with the Enlightenment philosophy of history. Harris’ thesis is that anthropology began as the science of history with the vision of universal history of mankind, but the development of cultural anthropology developed since the nineteenth century was no longer within this framework. Marquard suggests that Kant’s pivotal contribution to the rise of anthropology is found in his notion of knowledge of the world \([Weltkenntnis]\). Kant distinguishes this popular knowledge concerning the ways of life of other humans from the scholastic, theoretical knowledge dealing with pure concepts. The notion of knowledge of the world, thus defined, contributed to a recognition of a new domain of inquiry, which evades both the scholastic metaphysics and mathematical natural philosophy, i.e., the life-world. Were there not such a turn toward the human life-world which is not properly grasped either metaphysically or mathematically, the development of philosophical anthropology throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries would not have been possible. To that extent, Kant may well be called, Marquard underlines, the founder of philosophical anthropology. However, Marquard also emphasizes that anthropology did not enjoy an independent status in Kant’s philosophy. In Kant’s philosophy, anthropology remained subjugated to the philosophy of history; its role consisted in preserving the domain of the philosophy of history by offering supplementary accounts of geographical, physiological, psychological, and aesthetical phenomena of humanity. Conversely, Kant’s philosophy of history needed, Marquard suggests, the assistance of

anthropology, since it lacked any principle for explaining historical reality and thus could only appeal to conjecture and faith. For Marquard, Kant’s philosophy of history, specifically the unjustifiable belief in the progress of humanity throughout history was challenged by the Romantic philosophy of nature which brought up an alternative, physiological view of the human beings.\(^6\) This is what he calls the turn toward nature. For Marquard, such a turn toward nature contributed to the liberation of anthropology from its disciplinary subjugation to a history of philosophy, which gave the foundation for its remarkable development in the nineteenth century.

Now, Hegel’s anthropology receives a poor evaluation from both Marquard and Harris. Marquard suggests that the first sub-section of Hegel’s \textit{Anthropology} on the natural soul may be viewed in terms of Hegel’s acceptance of the conception of Romantic natural philosophy—or better, the naturalist approach of the Romantic natural philosophy to humanity, as far as I understand—but Hegel’s fundamental intention is rather to criticize it. Of importance is that Hegel’s \textit{Anthropology} thematizes “the in-itself, i.e., the \(δύναμις\), of the human being” whereas “the theory of human actuality” for Hegel belongs to the philosophy of history.\(^7\) This implies, for Marquard, that “Hegel’s attempt to adapt anthropology to the philosophy of history implies the demotion of anthropology.”\(^8\) This demotion of anthropology in Hegel’s philosophy, for him, is

\(^6\) For Marquard, Kant’s pragmatic anthropology plays a supplementary role for his philosophy of history. But anthropology became an independent discipline, he argues, when the central belief of the Enlightenment philosophy of history, which underlies Kant’s understanding of history as well, was called into question. In his view, the crisis of the Enlightenment philosophy of history went together with the formation of the Romantic philosophy of nature. In his terms, “the infinite progress of history becomes charming as an infinite absence of its goal” and “this crisis established the Romantic philosophy of nature:” cf. Odo Marquard, “Zur Geschichte des philosophischen Begriffs ‘Anthropologie’ seit dem Ende des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts,” 214 (my emphasis). With respect to the Romantic philosophy of nature in this respect, he refers to Schelling’s \textit{Idea concerning the Philosophy of Nature} (1797), \textit{On the World-Soul} (1798), \textit{First Plan of a System of the Philosophy of Nature} (1799), and the works of Baader, Eschenmayer, Steffens, Wagner, Windischmann, Ritter, Görres, Treviranus, Oken, Schbert, Novalis, and so forth: cf. ibid. footnote 49.


\(^8\) Ibid. 217.
comparable to what happened to Kant’s pragmatic anthropology—the disciplinary subordination of anthropology to the philosophy of history. In a similar way to Kant, the human actuality is in Hegel’s philosophy conceived as the business of the philosophy of history. But this entailed degradation of anthropology according to Marquard. On the other hand, Harris argues that although Hegel was regarded among Marxists as a hallowed steppingstone of dialectic materialism, Hegel shares with cultural idealists the belief in the progress of rationality in history. For him, Hegel is worse than any other Enlightenment figures due to the nonsensical or meaningless metaphysics of spirit, as he puts it, which even the greatest of the nineteenth-century cultural materialist, Marx, failed to throw off. In short, “most of Hegel’s philosophy is a worthless ruin.”

The criticism of, and aversion to Hegel’s philosophy of this kind is nothing new. Indeed, Hegel claims that philosophical understanding of world history consists in grasping the progress of consciousness of freedom—from the acknowledgment of only one person’s freedom (Orient’s monarchy) to the modern political principle that all humans are free (Germany), via the limited democratic approval of some people’s freedom (the Greek antiquity). To that extent, it is hard to deny that Hegel’s philosophy of world history takes on the Enlightenment conception of the universal history—the Eurocentric, racist view of human history as well as the idea of the progress of humanity in history. It is also true that the first sub-section of Hegel’s *Anthropology* on the natural soul includes some discussion about geographical distribution of different human races that is framed by his Eurocentric conception of history. However, it is questionable whether Hegel’s *Anthropology* finds its theoretical foundation in his philosophy of history. Does Hegel’s *Anthropology* take on the Enlightenment conception of universal history as its

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methodological, or ideological bases? Or, can we say that the *Anthropology* endorses the Enlightenment conception of the progress of humanity by giving some psychological, epistemological foundation to the philosophy of world history? These are the questions I pursue in this chapter.

As it will turn out throughout this chapter, a close examination of Hegel’s philosophy of nature and the *Anthropology* make the pervasive assumption concerning the theoretical connection between his *Anthropology* and philosophy of history doubtful. To show this, I pay attention to the relationship between nature and culture as it underlies Kant’s idea of pragmatic anthropology on the one hand, and the relationship between nature and spirit as it frames Hegel’s *Anthropology*. I thereby show that Hegel’s *Anthropology*, unlike Kant’s pragmatic anthropology and what has largely been assumed, does not take on a teleological understanding of history as its theoretical basis. But my intention is not just to compare two different conceptions of anthropology. Of importance in understanding the development of philosophical anthropology in the eighteenth century, I think, is the emergence of what we call today biology. An important consequence of this is the rise of the view of the human being as an organic living being, which I see underlies Hegel’s *Anthropology* in an important manner. Therefore, what I would like to address in this chapter by a comparison of Hegel’s anthropology with Kant’s one is the question of how different understanding of nature and different ways of dealing with an organism result in different understanding of humans.
1. Kant’s Idea of a Pragmatic Anthropology

Nobert Hinske claims that Kant’s idea of pragmatic anthropology traces back to the year of 1762-64, a decade before his first lectures on anthropology in 1772-73.\textsuperscript{10} Hinske refers to the *Nachricht von der Einrichtung seiner Vorlesungen in dem Winterhalbenjahre von 1765-1766* where Kant mentions some changes he made to the Wolffian metaphysics. Kant “put empirical psychology at the beginning of metaphysics” and he means by empirical psychology “a metaphysical, empirical science of man [die metaphysische Erfahrungswissenschaft von Menschen].”\textsuperscript{11} Thus, the *Nachricht* shows, according to Hinske, that Kant’s idea of anthropology has its origin in the Wolffian notion of empirical psychology. Wolff inaugurated the notion of empirical psychology as a study of the faculties of the human mind based on observation and experiment and called it “empirical doctrine of the soul,” namely “anthropology.”\textsuperscript{12} This Wolffian notion of empirical psychology explains the background against which Kant’s


\textsuperscript{11} Nobert Hinske, “Kants Idee der Anthropologie,” 412. Baumgarten’s compendium *Metaphysics* comprises four parts: (1) ontology, (2) cosmology, (3) psychology, (4) natural theology, following Wolff’s division of theoretical philosophy into general metaphysics (ontology) and special metaphysics (cosmology, empirical and rational psychology, and theology). What Kant states in the *Nachricht* is that he will use Baumgarten’s compendium as the textbook for his lectures in the winter semester of 1765-66 but disrespect the order of the textbook; he will start his lectures with empirical psychology contained in (3) psychology before proceeding to (1) ontology, (2) cosmology, (3) rational psychology, (4) theology. Kant states: “I hope I shall be able in the near future to present a complete account of what may serve as the foundation of my lectures in the aforementioned science [metaphysics]. Until that time, however, I can easily, by applying gentle pressure, induce A.G.Baumgarten, the author of the textbook on which this course will be based—and that book has been chosen chiefly for the richness of its contents and the precision of its method—to follow the same path. Accordingly, after a brief introduction, I shall begin with empirical psychology, which is really the metaphysical science of man based on experience” (*Ak* 2, 308-9/ *TP*, 294-5). Note, as Hinske underlines, that Kant defines empirical psychology as “empirical science of man” of the Wolffian metaphysics and appreciates the “richness in the contents” of the empirical psychology in Baumgarten’s compendium.

pragmatic anthropology treats various faculties of the mind by appreciating the method of observation.\textsuperscript{13}

But Hinske’s point is not just to disclose the historical origin of Kant’s conception of anthropology. As a reply to Marquard’s thesis that the development of philosophical anthropology in the nineteenth century was made possible when anthropology escaped its subordination to the philosophy of history characteristic of Kant’s pragmatic anthropology, Hinske highlights that no philosophical anthropology has so far succeeded in getting rid of its disciplinary unstableness. For him, we do not have yet a consistent, systematic philosophical anthropology; he thereby implies that our era is characterized by the crisis in our self-understanding. As far as I see, Hinske’s point is that given that all philosophical anthropology is unstable, Kant’s pragmatic anthropology is as relevant today as it was in the eighteenth century as a case of philosophical anthropology, despite its unstableness and the fluctuation in Kant’s idea of pragmatic anthropology.

As a response to Marquard, Hinske argues that Kant’s anthropology is subordinated to his metaphysics of morals and not primarily to the philosophy of history. Regarding this, we can refer back to the Nachricht where Kant mentions of “putting empirical psychology at the beginning of metaphysics.” Indeed, Kant’s intention of making this change was straightforward; what he intended was to have students to become familiar with concrete materials of experience before entering metaphysical studies. But Hinske points out that this change entailed a significant theoretical consequence. While empirical psychology in the Wolffian philosophy remained a part

\textsuperscript{13} It is noticeable that Kant’s anthropology adopts a different model of an observation than the Wolffian one. While the Wolffian empirical psychology assumes “self-observation,” Kant’s pragmatic anthropology takes the “observation of others;” cf., Nobert Hinske, “Wolffs empirische Psychologie und Kants pragmatische Anthropologie: Zur Diskussion über die Anfänge der Anthropologie im 18. Jahrhundert,” 103-4.
of metaphysics, Kant somehow separated that anthropological study from metaphysics by making it into a preliminary empirical study for the latter. As Brandt suggests, this can be seen as Kant’s criticism of the previous metaphysics for neglecting empirical aspects of the human mind and life. However, in Kant’s philosophy, anthropology cannot be recognized as an independent branch of knowledge since, for Kant, no empirical studies can bring forth the principles for their investigations. Hinske therefore emphasizes that determining the nature of the human being is in Kant’s philosophy the task of the metaphysics of morals and not that of anthropology. Correspondingly, Kant’s pragmatic anthropology is subordinated to the metaphysics of morals in the sense that it is to be provided with fundamental principles for its empirical investigations from the *a priori* pure consideration of human nature.

Thus, for Hinske, Kant’s anthropology is subordinated to the metaphysics of morals as an observational study of man is subordinated to an *a priori* determination of the human essence. To that extent, the subordinate character or the unstable status of Kant’s anthropology, he argues, is

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14 For a similar approach to Hinske, see in particular: Reinhard Brandt, “Die Leitidee der Kantischen Anthropologie und die Bestimmung des Menschen,” in *Erfahrung und Urteilskraft*, ed. Rainer Enskat (Würzburg: Königshausen u. Neumann, 2000), 27-40. As with Hinske, Brandt suggests that the formation of Kant’s idea of pragmatic anthropology can be considered in terms of the association with Wolffian notion of empirical psychology and the pragmatic turn away from it. In his view, Kant’s claim in the 1772-3 lectures on anthropology that empirical psychology or anthropology as such does not belong to metaphysics, and that the study of the human being has so far been neglected, involves Kant’s criticism of previous metaphysics for having disregarded empirical resources of the human life in their considerations of the human being: cf., ibid., 30. This view of Brandt makes it relevant, I think, to put Kant’s turn away from Wolffian empirical psychology in the context of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment movement, given Kant’s suggestion that anthropology makes use of empirical knowledge of the world obtained through traveling, reading travel books, and having social intercourse with others (cf. *Ak* 7, 121/ *AP*, 232). Thus, Kant’s idea of pragmatic anthropology incorporates both traditional and modern elements concerning a study of the human being. As I will discuss below, one of the important instances of this is the combination of the traditional, cosmological viewpoint and the modern, natural history which underpins his conception of the physical geography. In Brandt’s argument, we also find such a combination of the traditional and modern elements underlying Kant’s idea of pragmatic anthropology. Brandt sees that Kant’s notion of the *Bestimmung des Menschen* (destination or vocation of the human being) admits Rousseau’s idea of "perfectibilité de l’homme" but is framed by the stoic-Christian finalism which sees nature or the universe as a teleologically organized whole, one whose final end is the human being and in which evil is understood as the means for the good. For Brandt’s analysis of this connection, see in particular: ibid. 30, 32-40.
no problem. As far as I see, this is his strategy for saving Kant’s anthropology from the criticism for its association with the Enlightenment belief in the progress of humanity throughout history—the criticism that Marquard’s problematization of the subordination of Kant’s anthropology to the philosophy of history may raise. However, although Kant’s anthropology is subordinated to the metaphysics of morals and not to the philosophy of history as Hinske suggests, this does not imply that Kant’s anthropology has no relationship with his philosophy of history. Rather, Kant’s pragmatic anthropology is connected with his philosophy of history in an important way and this remains yet to be thoroughly examined.

In the following, I spell out Kant’s idea of pragmatic anthropology. I examine (1) Kant’s definition of pragmatic anthropology in the 1798 *Anthropology* and the way in which this work thematizes the issue of morality, (2) his early notion of knowledge of the world [Weltkenntniss] and the way in which this notion possibly allows both a naturalist and a moralist approach to the human being. By working on these topics, I develop the point that the relationship between nature and moral is the key problem in Kant’s pragmatic anthropology. I then examine (3) Kant’s argument about a teleology of nature in order to articulate the relationship between nature and moral since I find this essential for his anthropology. Through this analysis, I show how Kant’s reconciliation of nature and moral by a teleology of nature introduces a teleology of history, one that sees the modern civil society and the achievement of moral perfection by the human species as the end of nature.

1.1. The Question and Answer of Kant’s Pragmatic Anthropology

Kant gave his lectures on anthropology for twenty-three years from 1772/3 throughout 1796 and turned those lectures into a book, the *Anthropology from the Pragmatic Point of View*, in 1798. In the introduction to the 1798 *Anthropology*, Kant highlights that his pragmatic anthropology differs from physiological anthropology. Whereas physiological anthropology examines “what nature makes of the human being,” pragmatic anthropology addresses the question as to “what he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself.”\(^{16}\) Pragmatic anthropology, in other words, assumes the view of the human being as an agent of a free will and does not pursue a study of mutual interactions between the soul and the body as the physiologist Ernst Platner does.\(^{17}\) The distinct feature of pragmatic anthropology thus consists in the view of morality, which Kant is supposed to bring into the center of his lectures. Accordingly, if one wants to elucidate Kant’s idea of pragmatic anthropology, one would have to examine how his empirical studies of the human being as a free agent in the *Anthropology* relate to his *a priori* account of morality in the *Critique of Practical Reason* and the *Metaphysics of Morals*.

However, in the most of the *Anthropology* Kant does not really thematize the human being as a free agent. Nor does he consider the human mind and life from the perspective of morality. As a brief outline, the *Anthropology* comprises two parts: (1) the Didactic, which treats

\(^{16}\) *Ak* 7, 119/ *AP*, 231.

\(^{17}\) See the last page of Kant’s letter to Marcus Herz in 1773 (*Ak* 10, 145-146/*CO*, 140-141) where he mentions Herz’s review of Ernst Platner’s *Anthropologie für Ärzte und Weltweise* (Leipzig, 1772) in the *Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek*, XX (1773), no.1: 25-51. In this letter, Kant states that he “intends to make [anthropology] into a proper academic discipline” and emphasizes that his plan is unique. Specifically, he plans with his anthropology to “disclose the sources of all the [practical] sciences, the science of morality, of skill, of human intercourse, of the way to educate and govern human being, and thus of everything that pertains to the practical.” This anthropology differs from Platner’s one, which is an “eternally futile inquiry as to the manner in which bodily organs are connected with thought.”
the cognitive faculties of the mind including inner sense and imagination, the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, and the faculty of desire), and (2) the Characteristic, which examines the inner constitution of the human mind in terms of a character considered at the levels of person, people, race, and sex. In the Didactic, Kant does not relate his accounts of cognitive, aesthetic, appetitive faculties of the mind to the issue of free action or moral freedom. The only place where Kant brings up the issue of morality is the three and a half pages long section in the Characteristics, titled “On Character as the Way of Thinking.” While defining character as a moral property of the will to act according to principles, Kant here suggests that it is not naturally given but is acquired and created out of oneself over time. In other words, it does not depend on “what nature makes of the human being” but pertains to “what the human being makes of himself.” From this, one may presume that the formation of moral character should be the vital issue of Kant’s anthropology which makes it pragmatic. However, Kant does not offer any consistent account of the formation of moral character, nor does he thematize this seriously. Moreover, except for the three and a half pages section, the Characteristic is mostly devoted, as Louden points out, to the issues of non-moral or physical characters, or “what nature makes of the human being.” Thus, Kant’s anthropology does not seem to be answering the pragmatic question as to what the human being as a free agent can and should make of himself as it is supposed to do.

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18 Ak 7, 292-95/ AP, 389-93.
19 Ak 7, 292/ AP, 390.
20 In the Anthropology, Kant suggests that formation of moral character is like “a kind of rebirth” rather than gradual acquirement over time (Ak 7, 294/ AP, 392). But Louden points out that this account in the Anthropology does not match with the idea in the Menschenkunde manuscript that education and instruction are the means to the acquisition of a character: cf., Robert R. Louden, Kant’s Impure Ethics. From Rational Being to Human Beings (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 76.
22 Brandt suggests that Kant does not seem to have had a consistent idea conducive to a clear articulation of what pragmatic anthropology concerns: cf., Reinhard Brandt, “Die Leitidee der Kantischen Anthropologie und die Bestimmung des Menschen,” 29. According to Brandt, the titles of the two parts of the 1798 Anthropology—didactic
1.2. Knowledge of the World

Given that the 1798 *Anthropology* is a distillation of the twenty-three years of lectures, we can also refer to some early works of Kant which help clarify Kant’s idea of pragmatic anthropology. What I find the most important in this regard is the notion of the knowledge of the world (*Weltkenntnis*), which is found in his 1775 essay, *On the Different Races of Human Beings* [*Von den Verschiedenen Racen der Menschen*]. Knowledge of the world consists in making “acquired science and skill useful not only for school but instead for life,” such that “the accomplished apprentice is introduced to the scene of his vocation [*auf den Schauplatz seiner Bestimmung*], namely the world.”23 In other words, it has the goal of preparing senior students for their future lives in the world after graduation. As such, there are two parts of the knowledge of the world: physical geography and anthropology, which treat nature and the human being, respectively. These two are both *cosmological* not with respect to particular features of their objects but with respect to “their relation as a whole in which those objects stand and in which each one takes its place.”24

The notion of the knowledge of the world exhibits some crucial factors concerning Kant’s idea of pragmatic anthropology. First of all, we notice the sense of usefulness which characterizes knowledge of the world. As we have seen above, knowledge of the world, or Kant’s lectures on anthropology and geography, is not so much concerned with theoretical and characteristic—are not made by Kant; further, they are not informative with respect to the contents of the *Anthropology*. Nor do the subtitles give any clue for making sense of the “pragmatic view” which is supposed to integrate them into one anthropology. For they are not concerned with the human being as a free acting being or the issue of “ought to,” but with “non-normative [*normfrei*] observations of the human beings in terms of their factual motive that is hidden to us” (cf. ibid. 27).

23 *Ak* 2, 443/ *AP*, 97.
24 Ibid.
instruction or technical training as with having students be ready for making use of what they
have learned in the school. Knowledge of the world is thus useful. But the usefulness of
knowledge of the world is not only concerned with practical utility or means-ends calculations
based on prudence. What is implicit in Kant’s mention about “the scene of one’s vocation” is
perhaps his view of the world as a place where the human species is heading to moral perfection,
as I will later discuss in more detail. Consequently, the usefulness of anthropology and physical
geography consists in having students to get a sense of the world or to form a world-perspective,
rather than delivering this and that knowledge about this and that thing in the world. This point
relates, second, to the cosmological feature of the knowledge of the world. If both anthropology
and geography are cosmological, this is because they lead one to situate oneself within a whole
world and consider oneself and one’s objects in relation to that whole world, namely from a
cosmological perspective.

Kant’s notion of the knowledge of the world somehow blurs the borderline between
nature and human by assuming that anthropology and geography are both cosmological.
Regarding this, we notice that Kant’s anthropology does not exclude the issue of nature from its
considerations of the human being. Instead, it portrays the human mind from its natural aspects
with a treatment of natural predispositions, temperaments, sexualities, races, etc. Nor does
geography assume a clear-cut distinction between nature and human. It treats the distribution of
various human races on the earth as an important topic. Thus, those two parts of knowledge of
the world, i.e., physical geography and anthropology, somehow overlap each other around the

25 Kant’s discussion about prudence [Klugheit], see: Ak 4: 416-419/ GM: 68-71. Prudence is for Kant a hypothetical
imperative concerning deliberation of the means for achieving happiness. It is narrowly defined as “skill in the
choice of means to one’s own greatest well-being” It thus differs from categorical imperative which only concerns
the “form of action and the principle from which it follows” and not “the matter of action.”
issue of the human existence considered from its natural aspects. Kant’s notion of knowledge of
the world, therefore, does not take on the Critical, transcendental dualism between the
phenomenal realm of mechanistic natural laws and noumenal realm of moral freedom. Instead, it
rests on the idea that human existence can be examined as part of nature. More importantly,
nature, which is here considered incorporating the human existence, is not concerned with the
Critical notion of nature as a totality of appearances. Instead, the notion of nature which is at
stake in the case of anthropology and geography is a *cosmological* one which is embedded in the
traditional, cosmological paradigm of the great chain of being on the one hand and is associated
with the rising, new paradigm of the natural history on the other.

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26 With respect to the cosmological paradigm of the chain of being, I am indebted to Arthur O Lovejoy’s *The Great Chain of Being* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London: Harvard University Press, 1936, reprinted in 2001). The history of cosmological thoughts which Lovejoy presents in his monumental work *The Great Chain of Being* is very helpful but very dense as well. So, I would here like to recapitulate only some points in his work by focusing on the association of the understanding of the universe with the contemplation on the meaning of the human existence in the world.

Lovejoy suggests that the conception of the universe as the chain of being, which was largely accepted from the Greek antiquity down to the close of the eighteenth century, is based on the three principles: (1) plenitude, the notion that the universe is full of all kinds of beings, which he draws out from Plato’s idea in the *Timaeus* that the universe is an exhaustive replica of the world of Ideas; (2) continuity, the idea that things in the universe can be classified according to common features shared by adjacent kinds of things and distinct features that one kind has and the other does not, as Aristotle articulates continuity as that which has one and the same limit of two things wherein they overlap; (3) graduation, the notion of an infinite number of links ranging in hierarchical order from the lowest kind of existents up to the highest possible one, which was made into a coherent general schema of existents by Neoplatonism.

In line with this, Lovejoy suggests that the switch in the cosmological perspective from the Ptolemaic system to Copernican heliocentrism was not a turn toward a non-geocentric view in the literal sense. Within the Neoplatonic-medieval worldview, the change in the cosmological perspective was associated with the glorification of the earth, namely the idea that this planet is the only place where rational creatures dwell in. Thus, he pays attention to the paradoxical aspect in the history of the concept of the chain of being that the genuinely geocentric view was not present in the Ptolemaic system but in the era when the infinity of the universe was conceived, and the place the earth occupies in the universe was considered in relation to the infinite space. In his view, this paradoxical element is also present in Kant’s cosmological claim from the 1750s that the infinity of universe does not assure that all planets are inhabited by living creatures, just as the abundance of nature does not contradict the existence of sandy desert. This claim of Kant connects the awareness of the infinity of the universe with the sense of superiority of the earth over other planets having no leaving creatures. Lovejoy thus underlines that “it was not in the thirteenth century but in the nineteenth that *homo sapiens* bustled about most self-importantly and self-complacently in his infinitesimal corner of the cosmic stage.” *Ibid.* 143.

But this does not imply, for Lovejoy, that the medieval, geocentric view and Kant’s cosmology were necessarily anthropocentric. Lovejoy features the eighteenth-century thought in terms of the rise of the Christian-anthropocentric theology and philosophical objections to it. The glorification of the earth was transformed into the
In this way, Kant’s early notion of the knowledge of the world allows, I claim, a naturalist approach to human existence without assuming the view of pure practical reason—naturalist, not in the sense of natural science, but in the sense of a cosmological consideration which sees the human being as a part of the whole universe and a part of nature as well. However, does not this claim contradict Kant’s fundamental position that human existence is to be considered in terms of moral freedom? Alternatively, does Kant develop any theory that can reconcile the cosmological investigation of the human existence as a natural being with another, moral consideration of the same subject matter as a being of freedom?

These questions lead us to Kant’s re-formulation of his notion of the knowledge of the world as cosmopolitan in the introduction to the 1798 Anthropology. Kant here states that anthropology is called knowledge of the world insofar as it considers the human being “according to his species as an earthly being endowed with reason.” But this knowledge of the world, which also contains “an extensive knowledge of things in the world, for example, animals, plants, and minerals from various lands and climates,” is pragmatic “only when it glorification of humans with the Christian conception that all other creatures exist for the human being’s sake. But this teleology was challenged by the view of the human being as the middle link in the chain of being, namely the point of transition from the merely sentient to the intellectual forms of being. One example of this challenge, Lovejoy suggests, is Kant’s notion in the Universal Natural History and the Theory of the Heavens (1755) that the human being occupies the middle rung of the Scale of Being. Kant’s argument is that if the inhabitants of the earth, humans, envy the most sublime class of rational creatures inhabiting Jupiter or Saturn, they may console themselves by turning their gaze upon Venus and Mercury of which the inhabitants have less degree of perfection than human beings. Lovejoy notices in this old-fashioned speculation of the early Kant his preoccupation with human morality. For Kant here argues that the greater the distance the planet is from the sun, the lighter and finer the matter of its inhabitants’ bodies, and that the moral imperfection of the human being hinges upon the human mind’s dependency upon a coarse and inert matter: cf. ibid. 193-4.

Although Kant’s early cosmological thought does not necessarily involve an anthropocentric view as Lovejoy suggests, Kant seems to be developing an anthropocentric view in his third Critique. As I will later discuss, Kant’s discussion of teleology of nature in the third Critique leads to the idea that the human being, considered as cultural and moral being, is the end of nature. By implication, civilization and moral perfection constitute the ultimate meaning of the existence of the world, the fundamental reason why this world exists.

27 Ak 7, 119/ AP, 231.
contains knowledge of the human being as a citizen of the world.”28 In other words, anthropology pursues cosmological knowledge of the human species in relation to its habitation, i.e., the earth that comprises the mineral, plant, and animal kingdoms. But this cosmological knowledge serves to pragmatic anthropology only when it promotes a cosmopolitan perspective. At this point, perhaps one may roughly say that the project of Kant’s pragmatic anthropology consists in completing our cosmological understanding of the earth as the human habitation into the cosmopolitan realization of the same world as a kingdom of ends,29 as a place where all

28 Ak 7, 120/ AP, 231-32.

29 In the second section of the Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant produces three different formulations of the categorical imperative: (1) “act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law” (Ak 4, 421/ GM, 73); (2) “so act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means” (Ak 4, 429/ GM, 80); (3) “act in accordance with maxims that can at the same time have as their object themselves as universal laws of nature” (Ak 4, 437/ GM, 86). These three formulations constitute three stages of the argument of the second section of the Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals concerning the universal principle of moral action, which is to be performed by the obligation to duty and respect for the moral law as it is discussed in the first section. The first formulation establishes that the universal command for moral action consists in self-legislative autonomy of reason. After having established this, Kant poses the question as to whether the categorical imperative can work as a universal law to all rational beings. In relation to this question, the second formulation specifies the ground on which the categorical imperative can serve as the standard for estimating whether an action is moral. Kant’s argument is that the evaluative role of the categorical imperative is affirmed insofar as “the human being and in general every rational being exist as an end in itself, not merely as a means to be used by this and that will at its discretion” (Ak 4, 428/ GM, 79). Thus, the respect for humanity, either in myself or in others, is the ground for the respect for the moral law either in performing or in estimating an action. With the third formulation, Kant returns to the issue of the good will, with which sets up his discussion about morality in the Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals. Since it turns out that the categorical imperative has universal validity for all human beings’ moral action, the good will can be said to be absolutely good when it follows the categorical imperative. The third formulation confirms this by “an analogy” of “the will as a universal law for possible actions” with “the universal connections of the existence of things in accordance with universal laws” (Ak 4, 437/ GM, 86).

In the Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals, the idea of a kingdom of ends occurs after the second formulation. Kant stipulates that the kingdom of ends is “a systematic union of various rational beings through common laws:” “a whole of all ends in systematic connection,” which “we shall be able to think of” “if we abstract from the personal differences of rational beings as well as from all the content of their private ends” (Ak 4, 433/ GM, 83). As this formulation suggests, the kingdom of ends is a thought experiment performed by an abstraction of all personal differences and all private ends. Kant’s thought experiment has an important significance for his cosmopolitanism since it establishes that all human beings, regardless of their personal differences including sex, race, and educational and cultural background, have the same dignity. But the role it plays for the whole argument of the second section is controversial. Whereas the categorical imperative in all its three formulations mainly concerns an individual agent’s action, the idea of the kingdom of ends introduces the issue of a commonwealth constituted by a plurality of rational agents. Therefore, we may well assume a close connection in Kant’s philosophy between the individual’s moral life based on his self-legislating autonomous pure reason and his communal life among diverse rational agents. But the Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals does not provide any well-elaborated theory concerning how those two dimensions of a rational agent’s life are connected to each other. Regarding the way in which one proceeds from the categorical imperative to the kingdom of ends, we only find Kant’s loose comment:
human beings as rational agents are equally treated as an end in itself regardless of their sexual, racial, cultural, or religious particularities.

1.3. Kant’s Teleology of Nature: Culture as the Link between Nature and Morality

I have suggested that Kant’s conception of pragmatic anthropology hinges upon grasping the human world both as part of nature and the kingdom of ends. But what does this “both” that the kingdom of ends is “a very fruitful concept dependent upon it [the concept of every rational being as the self-legislative autonomous moral subject of the categorical imperative]” (Ak 4, 433/ GM, 83).

Therefore, Kant’s idea of the kingdom of ends cannot properly be understood without examination of how his moral theory is systematically connected with his ethical, political, religious, and historical thinking; for a concise introduction to this problem in Kant’s philosophy and a systematic interpretation of the argumentative role of the idea of the kingdom of ends in the second section of the *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*, see: Barbara Herman, “A Cosmopolitan Kingdom of Ends,” in *Reclaiming the History of Ethics. Essays for John Rawls*, eds. Reath, Andrews. Herman, Barbara. Korsgaard, and Christine M. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 187-213. Since this goes far beyond the scope of the present work, I would here like to refer to Cavallar’s comprehensive analysis of Kant’s cosmopolitanism. Cavallar’s main point is that there are different types of cosmopolitanism in Kant’s philosophy. Whereas Kant’s cosmopolitanism has been studied, he points out, with the focus on legal or political cosmopolitanism put forward in *Toward Perpetual Peace* concerning international organizations and laws, he argues that there are also cognitive, economic or commercial, moral, religious, and cultural cosmopolitanisms in Kant: cf. Georg Cavallar, *Kant’s Embedded Cosmopolitanism. History, Philosophy, and Education for World-Citizens* (Berlin/Boston: Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2015), 23-43. From his viewpoint, the kingdom of ends in the *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals* presents a moral cosmopolitanism which concerns the ethical commonwealth, whereas the *Idea for an Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim*, together with the *Toward Perpetual Peace*, presents a legal or political cosmopolitanism. But Kant’s moral cosmopolitanism is deeply associated with his religious cosmopolitanism in the *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, which conceives of the ethical commonwealth as the kingdom of God on earth, one in which a people of God is supposed to be governed by an invisible church. Cavallar suggests that Kant’s ethico-theological cosmopolitanism is similar to the conception of religious commonwealth of the pre-Kantian theologians and Christian philosophers; however, it is distinct from traditional religious cosmopolitanism in that it takes the ethical commonwealth as a matter of practical philosophy and not of metaphysical knowledge. Additionally, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* exemplifies a cognitive cosmopolitanism whereby one puts oneself into a cosmopolitan perspective by his knowledge of the world; the *Critique of Pure Reason* also exhibits cognitive cosmopolitanism with the idea that philosophy is concerned with the “world-concept” and not the “scholastic concept” (*KrV*, A838/ B866).

Cavallar’s approach to Kant’s cosmopolitanism, I think, has a great advantage in considering the relation between Kant’s moral theology and the Critical philosophy with reference to his philosophy of politics and history. When I use the term “kingdom of ends” in this chapter, I focus on the moral dimension of Kant’s cosmopolitanism, namely the idea of an ethical commonwealth in which all members are equally respected as ends in themselves. Thus, I largely equate it with the transcendental ideal of moral perfection and put it into the context of Kant’s philosophy of history. How does the ideal of moral perfection guide Kant’s thinking about human history in a teleological manner? In this chapter, I pursue this question by examining Kant’s notion that moral perfection is a transcendental ideal, namely a noumenon that is not realizable in space and time.
mean? Indeed, Kant’s thesis that the cosmological knowledge of the world is pragmatic only when it is cosmopolitan at the same time, shows that the relationship between nature and moral is the underlying theme of his anthropology. But the thesis itself does not explain anything about how the two views concerning nature and moral relate to each other. Further, Kant does not seem to have succeeded in developing his idea of the connection between cosmological and cosmopolitan views into concrete analyses and accounts in his anthropology lectures. Regarding this, Foucault observes that the idea of the 1775 essay that nature and human are considered two domains of the cosmological knowledge of the world is no longer present in the 1798 Anthropology:

[…] physical geography and anthropology are no longer set alongside one another as the two symmetrical halves of the knowledge of the world. The task of directing us toward a Weltkenntnis is now the sole responsibility of an anthropology which encounters nature in no other form than that of an already habitable Earth [Erde]. As a result, the notion of a cosmological perspective that would organize geography and anthropology in advance and by right, serving as a single reference for both the knowledge of nature and the knowledge of man would have to be put to one side to make room for a cosmopolitical perspective with a programmatic value, in which the world is envisaged more as a republic [cité] to be built than a cosmos given in advance.30

As Foucault suggests, one of the important changes in Kant’s idea of pragmatic anthropology is the replacement of the cosmological view with the cosmopolitan view. But this replacement is not discarding of the cosmological view. By this, I do not mean that Kant maintained the idea

30 Michael Foucault, Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology, trans. Nigro, Robert & Briggs, Kate (Los Angeles: Semiotext, 2008), 32-3.
that both geography and anthropology constitute together the knowledge of the world.

Obviously, Kant gradually gives less significance to geography while giving more concern to anthropology. But what Foucault calls “cosmopolitical perspective with a programmatic value” does not consist in conceiving the human world as a world of pure morality or a political world based on pure morality which has no connection with nature. The relative devaluation of geography, in other words, does not necessarily entail a disregard of nature in anthropology. Instead, the cosmopolitan view, which is supposed to define anthropology as pragmatic, takes on the view of a certain continuity between nature and morality. To support this point, I reconstruct Kant’s discussion about the teleology of nature put forward in the *Critique of the Power of Judgement*.

In the “Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment,” Kant discusses teleological judgments concerning (1) organisms, (2) all natural beings, and (3) nature as a whole. First, there are some natural objects whose possibility is not comprehensible in terms of mechanistic principles, ones that instead require teleological principles. Organisms are such objects that call for our teleological judgment since their life activities such as growth and generation as well as their bodily constitution are not comprehensible if not through the teleological notion of a natural end [*Naturzweck*], namely the notion of “cause and effect of itself.”31 Specifically, an organism organizes itself in the sense that it maintains its life through a constant process of reproducing its bodily organs. The distinct character of an organism, in other words, consists in the fact that its “parts are possible only through their relation to the whole” and “its parts are combined into a whole by being reciprocally the cause and effect of their form.”32 Thus, an organism has itself as

31 *Ak 5, 370/ KU, §64.*

32 *Ak 5, 373/ KU, §65.*
the means and end for itself. In this sense, it has internal purposiveness. Second, natural products may serve as a means for something else. For instance, soils carried with by rivers, Kant suggests, may be advantageous for the growth of plants; to that extent, they can be said to serve as the means for the growth of plants. In general, we can say, Kant suggests, that a natural product has external purposiveness when its existence turns out to be advantageous for the existence of another natural product. Kant highlights that the notion of external purposiveness is merely hypothetical. Despite this, the fact that “the grass is necessary to the livestock, just as the latter is necessary to the human being as the means for his existence” makes us think, third, of a chain of natural products for the sake of the existence of an organism and thereby leads us to the view of nature in general as a system of ends. It is therefore important to note that an organism is a natural end, not only in the sense that it is the end of itself (internal purposiveness), but also in the sense that it can be thought of as an end for the sake of which other natural products exist (external purposiveness). Again, the notion of external purposiveness is only hypothetical, but it can be used for our pursuit of the study of nature insofar as it is based on the maxim for our reason that “everything in the world is good for something, that nothing in it is in vain.” Thus, one can hypothetically assume, Kant suggests, that the existence of plants is the means for the existence of herbivorous animals and the latter is the means for the existence of carnivores whose end is the existence of the human being.

Worth noting with respect to Kant’s discussion in the “Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment” is such an expansion in his conception of the teleology of nature from that

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33 Ak 5, 367/ KU, §63.
34 Ak 5, 378/ KU, §67.
35 Ak 5, 379/ KU, §67.
36 Ak 5, 426-427/ KU, §82.
concerning an organism to that concerning nature as a whole. But this expansion is not something arbitrary. Kant argues that the teleological concept of an organism as a natural end “necessarily leads to the idea of the whole of nature as a system in accordance with the rules of ends.”\(^{37}\) That is, our experience of an organism as a natural product that requires teleological causality necessarily leads us to the notion that nature constitutes a systematic whole, one in which all natural beings, including both animate and inanimate beings, are connected to each other in an orderly manner. The expansion in Kant’s argument from the teleology of an organism to the teleology of nature as a whole, I think, is concerned with the issue of establishing a consistent philosophical theory of nature, one that can give an account of both animate and inanimate beings based on one single principle. But it is also concerned, more significantly, with the idea that our experience of a living being often leads us to pose the teleological question as to why nature exists. Thus, Kant’s point is that such a question about the *raison d’être* of this world leads us to think about nature as a chain of means and ends and to seek for an unconditioned end that grounds that chain.

Yet, the unconditioned end grounding the chain of natural beings cannot be found inside nature since it would then itself be something conditioned. If it were found inside nature, our reason would unavoidably get entangled in an infinite regress since what conditions that something is to be found in something else, and what conditions this something else, in another something else, *ad infinitum*. Therefore, the end that grounds nature as a whole must to be found outside nature. Kant calls this unconditioned end that is found outside nature a final end [*Endzweck*] and distinguishes it from an ultimate end [*letzer Zweck*], i.e., the last end in the chain.

\(^{37}\) *Ak* 5, 378-79/ *KU*, §67.
of ends, which is therefore inside nature.\textsuperscript{38} Seen this way, nature is for Kant not just a chain of ends. According to Kant, the fact that nature constitutes a chain of ends leads to the idea that there must be something that grounds it without belonging to the order of natural beings. Therefore, nature as a whole is not just a chain of ends but a teleological whole in which that chain of all natural beings on earth is grounded by a super-natural end.

Kant’s notion of nature in general as a teleological whole hinges on the special status that he believes the human being takes in relation to that teleological whole of nature. First, Kant suggests that the human being is not just an organism but the ultimate end of nature insofar as it can set up an end for itself and seek to accomplish that end. Further, the human being, when considered as noumenon, namely as a moral being endowed with the supersensible faculty of freedom, is the final end of nature.\textsuperscript{39} The human being as a moral being, in other words, the “highest end” of which “it cannot be further asked why it exists.”\textsuperscript{40} By expanding his discussions about teleological judgments from those concerning an organism to natural beings in general and to nature as a whole, Kant thus assigns a twofold status to the human being: the human being is the last end in the chain of natural beings and is the final end that grounds that chain. That is, the human being is a natural being and a being beyond nature as well; it is a phenomenon that exists and appears in space and time and a noumenon that concerns \textit{a priori} moral laws. By implication, the human being is a natural being who can make use of all other natural beings for her sake, or a natural being for the sake of whom all other natural beings supposedly exist. It is also a super-natural being that grounds the chain of all other natural beings. Kant’s idea would be

\textsuperscript{38} Cf. \textit{KU}, §§ 82-84.

\textsuperscript{39} \textit{Ak} 5, 435/ \textit{KU}, § 84.

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid.
that the human being, insofar as it is considered a moral being, is the fundamental ground of the existence of this world. One may roughly say that the fundamental meaning of the existence of this world for Kant consists in the human being’s pursuit of a moral life.

But Kant’s discussion in the third Critique of the human being’s twofold status in relation to nature as a whole makes us pose the question as to how the same subject matter, the human being, can be considered a natural being and a being beyond nature at the same time. This question is fundamentally concerned with the issue of the relationship between nature and morality, which is in the first Critique considered in the dualistic terms of the antinomy between mechanical necessity and moral freedom. Therefore, the notion in the third Critique that the human being is the ultimate end and the final end of nature as well, does not simply imply that the fundamental meaning of the existence of the world consists in the human being’s pursuit of morality. Far more significantly, it suggests, I argue, that nature and morality constitute a continuum in a certain way.

To spell out the way in which nature and morality constitute a continuum, I examine Kant’s argument in § 83 that culture is the ultimate end of nature. Kant suggests that the only way to know what the ultimate end of nature is, is to look into the ways in which the human being sets up its end and strives to achieve it. For, in doing these activities, we eventually relate ourselves to ourselves and not to an object outside us. Now there are two ends, Kant suggests, which the human being strives to achieve: happiness and culture. But Kant maintains that happiness is eventually unrealizable. While pointing out that our pursuit of happiness is often unrealizable.

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41 Kant’s idea that happiness is unrealizable is also found in the *Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals* (Ak 4, 417-419/ GM, 71-2). Kant argues that the concept of happiness is “an indeterminate concept” in the sense that nobody can say “determinately and consistently with himself what he really wishes and wills.” The will to riches, Kant states, may involve negative feelings such as anxiety and envy and unvirtuous behaviors such as intrigue. The one who has a will to a great deal of knowledge and insight may neglect his health. A long life one enjoys may be a long
frustrated by some natural conditions, Kant further highlights the relative vulnerability of human beings in nature. We, humans, are more vulnerable than any other animals, Kant states, to hunger, the danger of flood, cold, attacks by other animals. For him, nature does not seem to have favored the human beings over other animals. More significantly, nature has implanted in the human beings the propensity for conflict as their natural predisposition to such an extent that they create wars and destroy their species. Kant therefore argues that even if an intellectual being designed nature in such a way that the human happiness is its ultimate end, this end cannot be attained due to the human nature which is antagonistic and dissentious. Therefore, the ultimate end of nature cannot be happiness but culture, which is achieved by the human being’s aptitude and skill. In cultural life, we set an end for ourselves and make use of objects to realize that end. We actively relate ourselves to our end and the objects for that end. The realization of an end here depends on ourselves and not the beneficence of nature. If the human being can be regarded as the ultimate end of nature, namely the last end within the chain of ends for the sake of which other earthly beings such as minerals, plants, and animals may be supposed to exist, this is for Kant insofar as the human being is considered a cultural being capable of making use of other natural beings for her own sake. That culture is the ultimate end of nature, implies that the human being is a distinct kind of a natural being, namely the master of nature.

Yet, Kant further elaborates the notion of culture as a stepping-stone to the final end of nature: culture is a process whereby nature “prepares the human being for what he must himself do in order to be a final end.”42 This being said, culture is not only about making use of natural

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42 Ak 5, 431/ KU, §84.
objects for human sake. More fundamentally, it is concerned with the “production of the aptitude of a rational being for any ends in general” to such an extent that this rational being becomes apt for the highest end, i.e., the moral agent having the faculty of freedom which is the final end of nature.\(^43\) This is carried out by the “culture of training (discipline),” namely by an education of beautiful arts and sciences which brings about “the liberation of the will from the despotism of desires.”\(^44\) Insofar as, in other words, one is educated by the culture of training, this person is not merely an ultimate end of nature. Instead of being a mere master of nature capable of making use of other natural beings, she is in preparation for becoming a moral being whose will does not fail to follow a priori moral laws. If the human being, as a cultural or encultured being, is distinct from all other kinds of natural beings, this is in the sense that it is a natural being who can transcend its naturalness. Culture in the Kantian sense is therefore an intermediary stepping-stone from nature to morality rather than the opposite of nature.

\[1.4.\textbf{Unsociable Sociability: The Teleology of History concerning Modern Civil Society}\]

Kant’s notion of culture in the third \textit{Critique}, I suggest, involves a historical-political view of modern civil society. My focus is on his argument that civil society is the greatest development of the natural predisposition of the human species and, as such, is the end of nature:

But with the progress of this culture [culture of a higher class] (the height of which, when the tendency to what is dispensable begins to destroy what is indispensable, is called luxury) calamities grow equally great on both sides, on the one side because of violence

\(^{43}\) \textit{Ibid.}

\(^{44}\) \textit{Ak 5, 432/ KU}, §84.
imposed from without, on the other because of dissatisfaction from within; yet this splendid misery is bound up with the development of the natural predisposition in the human race, and the end of nature itself, even if it is not our end, is hereby attained. The formal condition under which alone nature can attain this its final aim is that constitution in the relations of human beings with one another in which the abuse of reciprocally conflicting freedom is opposed by lawful power in a whole, which is called civil society; for only in this can the greatest development of the natural predispositions occur.  

When a high culture excessively develops to such an extent as to become luxurious, this may cause a violent class struggle to the society and a feeling of emptiness to the members of the community. But Kant here seems to be not so much concerned with giving a general account of the progress and decline of a culture as with portraying some negative aspect of modern civil society. For we notice in his argument that the “splendid misery” is somehow equated with the opposition between individual freedom and national, lawful coercion, which is characteristic of “civil society.” Kant’s argument is that this opposition, which is paradigmatic of the political constitution of modern civil society, is in fact the greatest development of the natural predisposition of the human species. The underlying of this argument is the notion of unsociable sociability put forward in the “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose.” Kant holds that although human beings cannot live alone by satisfying all their needs for themselves and, for this reason, form a society, they have by nature a propensity for conflict and antagonism, namely a selfish, individualist resistance to socialization. Characteristic of the human species is unsociable sociability in this sense, and this is part of Kant’s account of human

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45 Ak 5, 432/ KU, §83.
46 Ak 8, 21-21/ IaG, 111.
nature with respect to the human being considered as a natural being. Now the passage above from the third Critique suggests that unsociable sociability as human nature is for Kant something that develops in time, implying that it may or may develop and may or may not well develop. Kant further claims that it develops itself to the highest degree with the rise of modern civil society. Thus, we can say that civil society is the highest development of human nature; the political conflict between individual freedom and national coercion is the expression of the full development of human nature.

But Kant’s notion that civil society is the full development of unsociable sociability, is not just a psychological or sociological account of how the political constitution of civil society goes hand in hand with the natural propensity of an individual. Kant suggests that the greatest development of the human nature, i.e., civil society, is the attainment of “the end of nature itself” although this is not an end we humans set up by ourselves. We are here concerned with the fourth aspect of Kant’s notion of the teleology of nature. While the third Critique discusses teleological judgments of nature in its three dimensions—i.e., internal purposiveness of an organism, means-ends connections among all natural beings in virtue of external purposiveness, and nature as a teleological system of which the ultimate and final end are the human being—Kant puts forward a somewhat different version of a teleology of nature in the “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose.” He states, “nature does nothing in vain and is not wasteful in the use of means to its ends.”\(^{47}\) By implication, antagonism and conflicts among the human beings observed throughout history are not just moral vices without which this world would be better off. Instead, they should be, for Kant, a means that nature uses for attaining its end. Also, the end for the sake of which nature employs antagonism consists in “bringing about

\(^{47}\text{Ak 8, 19/ IaG, 110.}\)
the development of all its [the human being’s] predispositions” because “all natural predispositions of a creature are determined sometime to develop themselves completely and purposively.”

Kant’s discussion of unsociable sociability in the “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose” sheds light on the sense in which the teleology of nature in the third Critique involves a teleology of history. I have above put emphasis on Kant’s argument in the third Critique that modern civil society is the attainment of the end of nature. Of importance is that what is supposed to be attained with the rise of civil society is the ultimate end of nature, that is, an end inside nature. Correspondingly, the human being living in modern civil society is within the framework of the teleology of nature put forward in Kant’s third Critique treated as a natural being, a phenomenon that exists and appears in space and time. However, the fact that the human being is a natural being does not make it necessary, of course, that culture is the ultimate end of nature. The argument in the third Critique that culture is the ultimate end of nature thus seems to be missing links between the two notions: the human being as a natural being and culture as the ultimate end of nature. The link between the two, as far as I see, is provided by the notion of unsociable sociability in the “Idea for a Universal History with the Cosmopolitan Purpose.” The notion of unsociable sociability in the “Idea for a Universal History” portrays the human being as a natural being endowed with natural, egoistic propensities. It gives the ground for how the rise of modern civil society, which is a historical phenomenon, can be considered the end of nature by providing the view of human nature as antagonistic, and of the political conflict characteristic of modern civil society between the right to individual freedom and the coercive

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48 Ak 8, 20/ IaG, 111.
49 Ak 8, 18/ IaG, 109.
legal system of a state as the full development of the antagonistic human nature. Seen in this way, modern civil society is not just a historical accident which happened to emerge in eighteenth-century Europe. Instead, it is a teleological phenomenon in which nature accomplishes its end, i.e., the complete development of human nature.

1.5. The Human Bestimmung: The Teleology of History Towards Moral Perfection

Now, the way in which Kant’s teleology of nature leads to a teleological understanding of history is to be made clearer in relation to his view of the human being as the final end of nature: an end of nature that finds itself outside nature and grounds nature as a whole—nature considered a teleological whole in which all natural beings are connected to each other as means and ends of each other. That is, the human being is in Kant’s teleology of nature not merely the master of nature who relates itself to other natural beings on the basis of utility, but a being beyond nature who grounds nature as such a chain of means and ends, namely the ultimate raison d’être of this world. To be more precise, the final end of nature, which grounds nature as a whole, is the human being “considered as noumenon,” namely the “only natural being in which we can cognize […] a supersensible faculty (freedom).”

To begin with, I draw attention to the fact that morality is the primary category in Kant’s understanding of humanity; however, the deontological notion of morality concerning the relationship between our will and a priori moral laws is only part of his moral theory. Indeed, Kant puts emphasis on the immoral, egoistic tendency of a human being in many places of his works. As we have seen above, the distinct character of the human being for him consists in

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50 Ak 5, 435/ KU, §84.
unsociable sociability. He also maintains that evil consists in the “fundamental propensity that belongs to our nature,” namely the human being’s innate propensity to subordinate the moral law to egoistic maxims.\textsuperscript{51} Thus, it is important to note that Kant’s philosophy of history, developed in the “Idea of a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View,” concerns the human being as a natural being, i.e., an empirical, egoistic agent who does not always obey, by nature, the command of the moral law as his metaphysics of morals suggests. In a similar vein, Kant’s pragmatic anthropology portrays morality in its empirical aspects. Kant characterizes his anthropology as pragmatic in the sense that it pursues the question as to “what the human being as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself.”\textsuperscript{52} The pragmatic anthropology thus deals with the human being as a being with the faculty of freedom, which is the faculty of morality. But the anthropology is for Kant an empirical discipline that considers diverse phenomena of the human life and psychology varying depending on geographical, cultural, racial, and sexual differences. As such, it thematizes morality in terms of the formation of moral character and not in terms of a duty to obey \textit{a priori} moral laws. Noteworthy in this regard is Kant’s claim that moral perfection or the “complete conformity of the will with the moral law” is a “perfection of which no rational being of the sensible world is capable of at any moment of his existence;” there can only be an “endless progress toward that complete conformity” and this “practical progress” is the “real object of our will.”\textsuperscript{53} Moral perfection, in other words, is for Kant a transcendental ideal, a noumenon that the human being as a moral

\textsuperscript{51} \textit{Ak} 6, 32/ \textit{R}, 54.

\textsuperscript{52} \textit{Ak} 7, 119/ \textit{AP}, 231.

\textsuperscript{53} \textit{Ak} 5, 122/ \textit{KpV}, 238.
existent seeks to achieve but is not realizable in space and time. This is, as far as I see, what underlines Kant’s philosophy of history and pragmatic anthropology.

In Kant’s philosophy of history and pragmatic anthropology, therefore, morality is not a matter of *a priori*, a-temporal operations of pure practical reason. Instead, it is temporalized with the view of the human being as a phenomenon, that is, as one who exists and appears in space and time with natural, egoistic inclinations. But the sense in which morality is temporalized in Kant’s philosophy of history and pragmatic anthropology is to be more aptly spelled out by showing how the notion of the human being as the final end of nature, i.e., as a noumenon concerning moral perfection, is at play in those disciplines in which the human being is primarily considered to be a phenomenal, natural being.

In this regard, I pay special attention to the point that the question of Kant’s pragmatic anthropology, as to what the human being as a free agent should make of herself, concerns the human species’ self-determination in history. This point requires an examination of Kant’s claim concerning the *Bestimmung* (determination or destiny or vocation) of the human being. Kant claims that the *Bestimmung* of a non-human animal is achieved by every single individual belonging to the species, but the *Bestimmung* of the human being is accomplished only by the human species: “the human species can work its way up to its determination only through progress in a series of innumerably many generations.”54 In the case of non-human animals, in other words, every single individual develops all its predispositions and capacities. But the animal endowed with “the capacity of reason can make out of himself a rational animal” by “brining about the perfection of the human being through progressive culture.”55 This claim of

54 *Ak 7*, 324/ *AP*, 419.
Kant can be viewed as a twist of the traditional, Aristotelian definition of the human being as a rational animal. The twist consists in transforming the definition of the human being by genus and differentia into a determination or destiny that the human species is supposed to achieve in an infinite period, through an infinite series of generations.

Kant’s discussion of the human Bestimmung in the “Anthropology from the Pragmatic Point of View” is worth noting in that it counts the capacity of reason as one of the natural predispositions of the human being and views this natural predisposition, like the other non-rational, egoistic ones, as that which develops in time—that which may or may not develop and may or may not fully develop. But Kant also conceives of the capacity of reason as essentially distinct from the other natural predispositions of the human being. It is distinct in that its full development is carried out by the human species and not by any single individual. Further, the full development of the capacity of reason by the human species is something that the human species is supposed to be approaching in an infinite series of generations. The significant consequence of Kant’s discussion of the human Bestimmung therefore consists in the fact that human reason is historicized with the view of its full development as involving a temporality concerning the species and not an individual. More significantly, the temporality for the full development of human reason hinges on the futurity as noumenal temporality, that is, the temporality of the perfection of human rationality toward which the human species is supposed to be approaching in an infinite series of generations but can never be realized in our world. The futurity that is viewed as concerned with the infinite progress toward the full development of the capacity of reason or moral perfection, I argue, constitutes the distinct historical temporality underlying Kant’s philosophy of history and pragmatic anthropology.
The above consideration about Kant’s discussion of the human *Bestimmung* sheds light on the sense in which Kant’s teleology of nature involves a teleology of history. As we have seen above, Kant’s teleology of nature assumes that nature does nothing in vein, such that all natural beings are destined to fully develop their natural predispositions. In the case of the human being, the capacity of reason is particular in that its full development is a destiny that the human species is supposed to be ever approaching. This is a teleological conception of human history since it takes on the view of a direction or destination of human history. But, again, the direction or destination of history assumed in Kant’s philosophy is concerned with the future conceived as a noumenal time.

Now, Kant’s teleological, optimistic view concerning the progress of humanity in history is not comprehensible without taking into consideration the notion of rational theology that the *Bestimmung* debate of the German Enlightenment revolved around. As a brief introduction, the debate on the *Bestimmung* of the human being is inaugurated by Spalding and developed by Abbt and Mendelsshon. The debate was on the human soul’s task in this life and its destination in the afterlife. Spalding defended theological rationalism by arguing that the *Bestimmung* of the human being consists in leading a rational, virtuous life, which is higher than the life of sensual pleasures, and that injustice of this world—that is, the experience of virtue not rewarded and vice profitable—is the proof of the immortality of the soul. While Mendelsshon supported

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56 Zammito suggests that the *Bestimmung* debate was one of the most important events in the history of the German Enlightenment. For the summary of this debate, I refer to his reconstruction in John H. Zammito, *Kant, Herder; the Birth of Anthropology* (Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press, 2002), 165-171.

57 Printy examines the influence of Splading’s *Bestimmung des Menschen* (1748-1794) on the transformation of German Protestantism in the second half of the eighteenth century; Michael Printy, “The Determination of Man: Johann Joachim Spalding and the Protestant Enlightenment,” *Journal of the History of Ideas*, vol. 74, no.2 (2013): 189-212. It offers a helpful analysis concerning the historical context in which Splading’s *Bestimmung des Menschen* exerted a great philosophical influence on the formation of German popular philosophy, the development of the debate on philosophical anthropology, and even Kantianism.
Spalding’s optimistic view that affirms the divine providence in this world, Abbt dismissed the idea of divine providence in human history. Herder sided with Abbt’s skepticism and further suggested that one should specify as to whether the Bestimmung refers to the destiny of an individual being or of the whole species. He claimed that one does not need to introduce the question about the human species in order to think about how one should lead one’s life. Thus, Kant significantly differs from Spalding in that he historicizes the Bestimmung of the human being. But he sides with Spading’s rational theology and Mendelsshon’s optimism rather than with Abbt’s and Herder’s skepticism because he maintains that the human Bestimmung consists in the rational, moral life and conceives this Bestimmung as that which the human species is destined to approach in an infinite period of time in history.

The teleological aspect of Kant’s view of human history is thus inseparable from his endorsement of rational theology and his own notion of moral theology. Regarding this point, I refer to Brand’s suggestion that Kant’s Bestimmung takes on the conception of nature that combines “the finalism of Christianity and the finalism of Stoicism.” First, stoic finalism views cosmic nature as a rationally organized system by the Zeus-reason. In this system, the human being is supposed to be distinct from other beings by the ability to reason; this rational being is also supposed to be capable of appropriating the cosmic, Zeus-reason by fully developing the moral, virtuous state of the soul. Second, Christianity suggests that everything in the world is good since God created the world from nothing; evil is a means for the good, which demonstrates divine providence. Brandt claims that “Kantian morality is chimerical and sets to nothing” “without the deistic, namely the Christian-Stoic foundation” since this warrants that the world inhabited by a moral, free agent is not the hell where her moral action is nothing but a vain

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effort of Sisyphus rolling a boulder up a hill only for it to roll down.\textsuperscript{59} Brand’s claim well illustrates the religious-philosophical background against which Kant understands humanity and history. In supporting his claim, I argue that what grounds Kant’s teleology of history, which I see as embedded in his teleology of nature, is the view of moral theology—the view that the ethical commonwealth is the kingdom of God on earth, one in which a people of God is supposed to be governed by an invisible church, as it is described in the \textit{Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason}.

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As I have attempted to show, Kant’s teleology of nature in the third \textit{Critique} involves a teleology of history, one that views modern civil society as the ultimate end of nature, and moral perfection as the final end of nature. Kant’s teleology of history, thus considered as part of his teleology of nature, reveals Kant’s concern about the historical actuality of modern civil society on the one hand, and about the perfection of humanity, i.e., morality, in the future on the other. Seen this way, the notion of culture as the ultimate end of nature can be understood, I suggest, as Kant’s philosophical justification of the historical actuality he was living in, and the notion of moral perfection as the final end of nature as his philosophical suggestion with respect to where to go—where we, the human race, should be heading.

As far as I see, these two concerns, one about the actuality of modern civil society and the other about the future of humanity, are in Kant’s teleology of nature closely related to each other. As I have suggested, Kant develops the notion of culture as a stepping stone between nature and morality. This being said, the teleology of nature of the third \textit{Critique} allows the view

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid.
that nature and morality constitute a continuum of which the joint is the human being. This implies that the human being is not just a master of nature but a being that transcends its naturalness. By implication, the human being living in modern civil society is not merely a natural being that lives a political life and undergoes a conflict with the latter due to its egoistic propensities, but a being heading toward moral perfection. This further implies that modern civil society is the historical precondition for achieving the perfection of humanity in the future.

Thus, we eventually come to face the controversial, uncomfortable issue concerning Kant’s commitment to racism. If Kant’s notion of modern civil society as the ultimate end of nature can be understood as Kant’s philosophical justification of the historical actuality he was living in as I have suggested, it is also to be noted that this justification of Kant may well be associated with the Eurocentric, racist view that takes the European culture of the eighteenth century to be the end: the ultimate end of nature, to be more precise, that is allegedly necessary for the human species to progress toward the perfection of humanity.60

60 Whereas Kant’s racist commitment is one of the most controversial issues in today’s Kant scholarship, what Kant’s position is cannot be decided only on the bases on the study I have undertaken in this chapter. I would therefore like to refer to Cavallar’s remark that Kant kept refining his theory of race; “the Kant of the early 1780s is very different from the Kant of the late 1790s” such that the horrible racism of the early Kant gradually disappears with the refinement of his theory of universal cosmopolitanism; cf., Georg Cavallar, “Cosmopolitanism in Kant’s Philosophy,” Ethics and Global Politics, vol. 5, no. 2 (2012): 97-8.

But the chronological evolvement of Kant’s thinking about race, as Cavallar suggests, would not exempt Kant from the criticism and suspect of his racist commitments. For a helpful overview of the recent debates on Kant’s commitment to racism, see in particular: Jon M. Mikkelsen, Jon.M, Kant and the Concept of Race. Late Eighteenth Century Writings (New York: State University of New York Press, 2013), 3-18.

To list just a few of the recent studies concerning Kant’s racism, Eze highlights that Kant’s pragmatic anthropology and physical geography constitute together Kant’s theory of man, pursuing the knowledge of inner-moral, and outer-physical nature of man, respectively; cf. Immanuel Chukwudi Eze, “The Color of Reason: The Idea of ‘Race’ in Kant’s Anthropology,” in Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader, ed. Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publisher, 1997), 103-140. By paying attention to the connection of the two, Eze sheds light on Kant’s view that the white (Europeans) is the race with the full capability for moralization, civilization, and history whereas the yellow (Asian), black (Africans) and red (American Indians) lack the capability the white has. According to his critical remark, Kant’s preoccupation in his anthropology can be summarized as “an exercise in the sympathetic study of European humanity, taken as humanity in itself, and a demonstration of how this ‘ideal’ or ‘true’ humanity and its history is naturally and qualitatively (spiritually, morally, rationally, etc.) and quantitatively (bodily, physically, climatically, etc.) superior to all others:” ibid. 117.
In his extensive work on the history of psychology, Fernando Vidal discusses the change of the meanings of the “scientia de anima” and “psychologia” that happened around the end of the sixteenth century. Throughout the sixteenth century, the scientia de anima, Vidal states, remained a general science of living beings, which investigates the soul in its three aspects—vegetative, sensitive, intellective—following the Aristotelian framework of De anima. During this time, psychologia could refer to any domain of the scientia de anima; it was not conceptually differentiated from the latter. But the term psychologia began to receive a more specific sense than the general sense of scientia de anima around the end of the sixteenth century. It began to narrowly refer to a study of the rational human soul which is united with the body. Following this, the meaning of psychologia was somehow settled down around the mid-seventeenth century: a doctrine of the human soul which is separable from but united with the body. Vidal explains that this shift in the meaning of psychologia that happened in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was a shift from the Aristotelian hylomorphic notion of the soul-form.
to the anthropological notion of the soul-mind \textit{mens}. For Vidal, psychology thus emerged as an anthropological discipline and the connection between psychology and anthropology became far stronger in the eighteenth century.  

Vidal’s historical research illuminates the eighteenth-century context in which anthropological and psychological studies were not separated from each other as distinct disciplines. It was the time, as Vidal portrays, when the terms anthropology and psychology were used somehow interchangeably around the notion of the human soul as separable from but united with the body. This point is illuminating concerning Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit. First of all, by situating Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit within the anthropological-psychological discussion about the human soul as separable from and united with the body, we can perhaps roughly say that the \textit{Anthropology} deals with the human soul as united with the body, and the \textit{Psychology}, with the intelligence as it is separable from the body. These two considerations of the human soul are then mediated by the \textit{Phenomenology of Spirit}, by an examination of conscious, practical life-forms of the human being such as desiring and consuming sensory objects and living an intersubjective life in a community. Second, the anthropological preoccupation characteristic of the eighteenth-century psychology explains the context in which Wolff identified empirical psychology with anthropology and Kant called Wolff’s empirical psychology an empirical study of man of the metaphysics. In a similar vein, the way in which the Wolffian notion of empirical psychology is somehow developed and transformed by Kant into pragmatic anthropology offers an important historical insight.

\footnote{Vidal challenges Foucault’s thesis that “man” did not appear as an object of knowledge until the nineteenth century. On the contrary, “psychology of the eighteenth century cannot be considered independently of the ideal of ‘science of man’:” cf. ibid. 99. He argues that “man” was the essential preoccupation of the eighteenth century and one of the most important ambitions of this time was to produce a general science of man, comprehending man from all the aspects of his life—individual, social, and historical—and incorporating all sorts of knowledge concerning man—from anatomy, biology, to cultural history. I discuss Vidal’s challenge of Foucault in Chapter 5, note 96.}
concerning why Hegel’s subjective spirit cannot be identified with what we call mind today. As Kant’s anthropology is a psychology whose eventual concern is humanity, Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit does not concern the mind in a narrow sense but an individual human existence who has the embodied soul, conscious relations with the world, and intelligence and will.

However, Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit introduces a new scheme which was not present in the tradition of the scientia de anima and psychology: the relationship between nature and spirit. Again, the embracive issue that frames the relationship between the soul and the body in Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit, is the spirit’s immergence in and emergence out of nature.

We can now therefore ask the meaning and significance of the introduction of the nature-spirit relationship for a theory of the human soul. In this section, I reflect on the way and sense in which the issue of nature frames Hegel’s Anthropology. I first examine Hegel’s appraisal and criticism of Kant’s teleology of nature to make it clearer how Hegel’s anthropology takes on a different worldview and a different method from Kant’s pragmatic anthropology. Following this, I consider some basic elements of Hegel’s idea of the philosophy of nature. This examination will offer a basis for further investigation of Hegel’s notion of the soul. It will also make it apparent that Hegel’s understanding of nature is radically different from Kant’s teleological notion of nature. Based on this, I analyze § 389 of the 1830 Encyclopedia to outline Hegel’s notion of the soul, and the main issues and problems of his Anthropology.
2.1. Kant’s Inner Purposiveness and Hegel’s Teleology of the Concept

In the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Kant suggests that the antinomy of the power of reflective judgment can be solved by his notion of teleology of nature. The power of reflective judgment gets involved in the conflict between two *a priori* principles concerning the cause of natural products. While the thesis states that all natural products are possible by mechanical laws, the antithesis states that it is necessary to introduce the notion of a final cause for some natural products that are not possible by mechanical laws. Kant holds that it is necessary and unavoidable for the power of reflective judgment to introduce teleological causality for the objects of which the possibility is inexplicable by mechanical causality, i.e., a living organism. This is because our reason does not possess any universal principles for explaining its possibility while our understanding needs to be provided with universal laws under which to subsume particular phenomena. When reason cannot provide it with such universal principles, the power of reflective judgment intervenes to provide a hypothetical universal law to assist our understanding’s investigation of nature. For Kant, teleological causality is such a heuristic law posited by the power of reflective judgement. Thus, the necessity of teleological causality rests on the condition of our cognitive faculties and not that of the objects that are investigated. It is a maxim that assists our cognitive faculties in pursuit of a study of nature rather than a metaphysical principle that affirms the existence of a final cause in nature. Consequently, one may well say that the possibility of organisms is made *comprehensible to us* only when we posit teleological causality. But one cannot say, Kant maintains, that organisms *exist* in accordance with teleological causality. Thus, teleological causality for Kant only has *subjective* validity. This being assumed, mechanical and teleological causality are compatible as two different

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63 *Ak 5, 387-8/ KU, § 70*
maxims for our understanding that apply to different objects, and the antinomy of the power of reflective judgement is resolved in this way.

For Hegel, Kant’s notion of “intuitive understanding, of inner purposiveness” is the speculative element of Kant’s philosophy,64 which opens up “the concept of life, the idea.”65 Hegel criticizes, however, that Kant’s inner purposiveness does not offer a satisfactory resolution of the antinomy of the power of reflective judgment. Indeed, Kant’s strategy for the resolution of the antinomy between mechanism and teleology hinges on the dualistic scheme of his transcendental philosophy that concerns the distinction between appearances and things in themselves, and between constitutive and regulative use of reason. Within this dualistic framework, Kant’s delimits the relative legitimacy of our cognitive faculties in the use of mechanical and teleological principles. His resolution, however, does not really address the reconciliation between mechanism and teleology with respect to the objective conditions of natural products. Thus, Hegel’s criticism targets his claim that teleological principles are to be regarded as subjective maxims for our cognitive faculties and not as objective principles concerning how things are in themselves. By challenging Kant, therefore, Hegel claims that inner purposiveness is to be regarded as objective. This is one of the crucial claims made in the Doctrine of the Concept of the Science of Logic. Briefly stated, Hegel’s claim is that purposiveness is immanent to natural beings insofar as the Concept has objectivity in the realm of nature encompassing mechanical, chemical, and teleological objects. As I discuss in what follows, what Hegel eventually develops with his argument for the immanence of purposiveness

64 ENZ, § 55 A.
65 GW 12, 157/ SL, 654.
in nature is the idea that the Concept or the Idea has life. This is, for Hegel, what Kant failed to see due to his subjectivist understanding of inner purposiveness.

One might be tempted to articulate Hegel’s teleology of nature by referring to his claim that purposiveness is immanent to nature and compare this with Kant’s teleology of nature, which considers purposiveness a heuristic assumption assisting our study of nature. To be precise, however, Hegel’s teleology is the teleology of the Concept and not that of nature because what has inner purposiveness or life, for Hegel, is the Concept. Again, Hegel’s claim in the Doctrine of the Concept is that the Concept is immanent to all kinds of natural beings—mechanical, chemical, and teleological—and that it exists in them as a purpose. By this, he does not mean that the Concept is the purpose for the sake of which all natural beings exist. What he instead suggests is that the Concept has itself for its purpose in nature. That is, the Concept is that which actualizes itself by passing through the stages of nature comprising mechanical, chemical, and teleological ones.

In what follows, I examine the relationship between the Concept and nature in Hegel’s *Encyclopedia* system. One of the key working assumptions of this chapter is that the different conceptions of anthropology held by Kant and Hegel go hand in hand with their different views of nature. Since I have examined Kant’s teleology of nature in detail, I spell out in this section what I have defined as Hegel’s teleology of the Concept and consider how nature is understood within the framework of Hegelian teleology of the Concept.
The Dialectic of Syllogism in the Doctrine of the Concept

The most distinct character of the Concept is that it is a self-determining, concrete totality. The Concept is an active totality that differentiates itself and posits itself as something simple and self-identical in the determinacy obtained through its self-differentiation. As such, it is the determinate determinacy that has simplicity and self-identity by virtue of its self-relating negativity. Therefore, the concreteness of the Concept has nothing to do with an immediate, external given. The Concept is concrete because its content involves the self-determining movement. In this sense, it is dialectically concrete. And the dialectical self-determination of the Concept has three moments: universality, particularity, and singularity. Thus, the Concept is a universal that particularizes itself into its species and makes itself into a singular by negating the first self-negation made in its self-particularization.

Hegel thus emphasizes that the Concept constitutes the realm of “subjectivity or of freedom” in the sense that it is a posited self-identity in its determinations. Of importance is that the subjectivity of the Concept embraces objectivity rather than opposes it. In other words, the Concept that essentially has a dialectical subjectivity somehow exists in the realm of objectivity. This truth of the Concept is at first only implicit but is made explicit by the dialectical exhibition of the Concept itself. What Hegel offers in the first sub-section of the Doctrine of the Concept on “Subjectivity” is such a dialectical movement of the Concept whereby its objectivity is established. Now, the dialectic of the Concept in the “Subjectivity” section comprises three stages: the Concept, judgement, and syllogism. At this point, it is worth noting that the dialectical movement of the Concept in these three stages differs from those of

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66 GW 11, 409/ SL, 505.
Being and Essence. In the case of the Doctrine of Being and the Doctrine of Essence, the dialectical movement has the form of passing over [Übergehen] into an other (Being) or that of reflection into itself as an other (Essence). Whereas the dialectical movements in being and essence thus essentially involve a relation to an other, the Concept is the movement of self-development [Entwicklung]. This being said, the three stages of its self-development, i.e., the Concept, judgment, and syllogism, constitute different forms of the concrete totality of the Concept, or different ways in which its three moments, i.e., universality, particularity, and singularity, relate to each other. Briefly stated, the Concept is first presented as a concrete, determinate totality involving universality, particularity, and singularity (the Concept); this totality is divided into the subject and predicate in a proposition (judgment) and is restored as a concrete totality by the syllogistic mediation (syllogism). Thus, the Concept, judgment, and syllogism constitute all together one dialectic movement of the Concept’s self-development.

To spell out Hegel’s idea that the Concept exists as a self-purpose in nature, I here reconstruct the third stage of the Concept’s self-development in the “Subjectivity” section, i.e., syllogism, because this is where it is established that the Concept has objectivity in the realm of nature. Hegel sets out the dialectic of syllogism with the formalist notion of syllogism that it is a connection of three successive judgements in which the conclusion is drawn out from the link between the extremes made by the mediation of the middle term. Syllogistic inference is largely assumed to have universal validity due to the necessary connection between the three terms. For instance, we conclude that the singular (e.g., Socrates) belongs to the universal (e.g., being mortal) from the fact that it inheres to the particular (e.g., man) that inheres to the same universal. We take this inference to be valid on the ground of the relationship of inherence between the three terms. But Hegel challenges this formalist view of syllogism by arguing that
the syllogistic connection between the terms is contingent. The syllogistic connection is not internal but only external to the terms that are connected because the “therefore” in the conclusion belongs to the external reflection of the one who makes the inference. More significantly, while there are multiple particulars that may link the singular and the universal, which particular is taken as the middle term is contingent. One can infer, for instance, that Socrates is mortal because he is a man and a man is mortal. But one can make the same conclusion from another premise that he is a biped. Socrates is put into different contexts of his existence depending on whether he is considered a man or a biped. For “man” and “biped” have different sets of determinations that circumscribe their meanings. But this difference, which eventually concerns the content of the subject matter, is ignored in the formalist notion of syllogism. For the same reason, even contradictory conclusions may be drawn with respect to one and the same subject matter, Hegel claims, depending on which particular is taken as the middle term. For instance, “from sociability as the middle term, the community of goods among citizens can be inferred; however, from individuality as the middle term, there follows the dissolution of the state.” Consequently, the alleged validity and necessity of syllogistic inference is called into question when the content of the terms is considered.

All the deficit of syllogism rests on its formalist feature, namely the fact that the mediation by the middle term is only formal and all the three terms are treated in their abstract aspects alone. Thus, the syllogistic connection between the universal, particular, and singular does not exhibit the Concept in its concrete totality since it is, again, merely external and contingent. It is therefore to be noted that the Concept has subjectivity only in this negative sense.

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67 GW 12, 94/ SL, 592.
68 GW 12, 97/ SL, 594.
of being a formal, external, and contingent totality of determinations before it is established that it has objectivity in nature, and that the truth of its objectivity in nature consists in the Idea, which is life. To make clearer what the dialectic of syllogism carries out, I therefore make a distinction between two different meanings of the subjectivity of the Concept. As mentioned earlier, the Concept has subjectivity in the sense that it is a self-determining totality and its dialectic movement consists in its self-development. I define this as the absolute subjectivity of the Concept in contrast with what I specify as its one-sided subjectivity, that is, the subjectivity that the Concept has before it achieves the stage of objectivity. This one-sided subjectivity of the Concept is removed by Hegel’s dialectical treatments of various forms of syllogism. Since this dialectic of syllogism is part of the Concept’s self-development, it can be viewed, I suggest, in terms of the dissolution of the one-sided subjectivity of the Concept by its absolute subjectivity.

To begin with, the dialectic of syllogism comprises three stages: (1) the syllogism of determinate being [Dasein], (2) the syllogism of reflection, and (3) the syllogism of necessity. In the syllogism of determinate being, Hegel shows how the figure S-P-U is necessarily turned into the second figure P-S-U, and into the third S-U-P. What he shows by these successive transformations of the syllogism is the fact that the mediation by the middle term (P) in the first figure is an immediate mediation which depends on some contingent element of the singular (S). While the singular thus takes the position of the middle term in the second figure, the second figure reveals the fact that the mediation is in fact a mediation by an abstract universality (U) that connects the extremes only as abstract determinations. The third figure S-U-P thus makes explicit the truth of the formal syllogism, namely the fact that it is based on a merely formal mediation. What is revealed is that the connection between the universal, particular, and singular in a syllogism is not determinate but is contingent with respect to the content.
However, this exposition of the one-sided subjectivity of the formal syllogism is at the same time a demonstration of its dialectical truth: the mediator of the syllogism is “essentially a universal” in which the moments of the Concept only shine and disappear into their ground. In the course of the dialectical transformations of the syllogism of determinate being, each of the three moments of the Concept appears to the position of the middle term and disappears. Consequently, the formal difference between universality, particularity, and singularity is removed. This dialectical truth of the syllogism of determinate being is expressed by the fourth figure U-U-U. Importantly, the dialectic of the syllogism of determinate being thus brings about the mediation of the middle term. Whereas the middle term appears as the immediate particular in the first figure, it is turned into a singular in the second figure, and into a universal in the third. This mediation of the middle term entails removal of the immediate givenness of the two premises of the first figure: S-P is mediated in the second figure and P-U is mediated in the third figure.

Second, the syllogism of reflection differs from the syllogism of determinate being in that its middle term is a reflected totality of determinations that encompasses the extremes within itself and not an abstract universality which connects the extremes only in an abstract, external manner. There are three forms of the syllogism of reflection: the syllogisms of allness, induction, and analogy. (1) In the syllogism of allness, the middle term has the quantifier “all;” it has the concrete meaning that it encompasses all singular things belonging to the class of the middle term. But this syllogism presupposes the conclusion (e.g., Socrates is mortal) in its premise (all men are mortal). It thus turns out that the validity of the syllogism of all depends on inductive inferences with respect to the completeness of the “all” of the middle term. (2) The syllogism of

69 GW 12, 104/ SL, 602.
induction can be considered a variation of the figure U-S-P: U-(s1, s2, s3,...)-P. But the middle term of this syllogism is no longer the abstract singular that neither subsumes, nor is predicated of the particular. For the “all singulars” in an inductive inference assumes their immediate unity with the universal to which they belong. That is, the “all singulars” immediately expresses the genus: “lion, elephant, etc., constitutes the genus of quadruped”. However, Hegel points out that inductive inference cannot achieve the completeness of the “all” of the middle term insofar as there remains the possibility of counter-cases. The conclusion of an inductive inference is therefore only problematic. The syllogism of induction remains a subjective syllogism subordinated to an external reflection; hence, the external universality, i.e., the genus, remains internal. (3) The dialectical truth of the syllogism of induction—that is, the fact that the middle terms is “a singular taken in its universal nature”—is expressed in all the more superficial form of an inference: the syllogism of analogy. For instance, the syllogism of analogy that “the moon has inhabitants since the earth has inhabitants and the moon is an earth” rests on the ambiguity of the middle term “earth.” In this syllogism, the middle term is posited as singularity (the earth that has inhabitants) but “immediately also as the true universality of the singular” (an earth which has inhabitants by its nature). In the syllogism of analogy, we therefore have four terms: two singulars (the earth and the moon), the particular (“being inhabited” as the particular determination of the earth), and the universal (“being inhabited” as the universal nature of the earth or the heavenly bodies in general). It thereby makes it explicit.

70 GW 12, 114/ SL, 612.
71 GW 12, 115/ SL, 614.
72 GW 12, 117/ SL, 615.
that like the conclusion (the moon is inhabited), the premise (the earth is inhabited) is S-P. Consequently, it makes it explicit the fact that the middle term, i.e., the universal nature of the heavenly bodies in general, is only immediately assumed. In short, the syllogism of analogy expresses the “demand that it be mediated,” namely the demand for “the sublation of the moment of singularity” so that the middle term is “the objective universal, the genus purified of immediacy.”

In this way, the dialectic of the syllogism of reflection moves forward to an increasingly superficial form of an inference. By proceeding from the syllogism of allness, to induction, and to analogy, one gets farther and farther away from the syllogistic self-evidence that is assumed to consist in the formal relationship of subsumption or inherence between the terms. If the dialectic of the syllogism of determinate being entails the dissolution of the fixed, formal differences between universality, particularity, and singularity, the dialectic of the syllogism of reflection further dissolves the formal validity of syllogism.

It is therefore important to note that the third stage of the dialectic of syllogism, i.e., the syllogism of necessity, concerns the necessity of the content rather than formal necessity. More precisely, it is the syllogism “full of contents,” which has necessity in the sense that “its middle terms is not any adventitious immediate content but is the reflection of the determinateness of the extremes into itself.” Thus, the first form of the syllogism of necessity, i.e., categorical syllogism, for Hegel, does not concern the formal relationship of inherence between the terms. The middle term of a categorical syllogism is the “essential nature of the singular.” It is not just

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73 *GW* 12, 117/ *SL*, 616.
74 *GW* 12, 118/ *SL*, 617.
75 *GW* 12, 120/ *SL*, 618.
one or the other quality that is contingently chosen among many possible particulars and links
the subject and predicate in a merely formal, external manner, which is the case of the syllogism
of determinate being. Instead, the middle term of a categorical syllogism is “the identity, full of
content, of its extremes, and these are contained in it in their self-subsistence.”76 In the
categorical syllogism, the substantial content thus runs through the three terms as one and the
same essence, such that universality, particularity, and singularity are only formal moments. The
necessity of the categorical syllogism rests on the identity of the content, which runs through the
three terms. Consequently, the categorical syllogism, Hegel highlights, is “no longer subjective”
and “in that connection of identity, objectivity begins.”77 The one-sided subjectivity of the
syllogism of determinate being is thereby removed. But this removal is not yet complete since
the formal difference between the three moments of the Concept remains un-reflected and the
identity of form is not yet posited.

(2) The hypothetical syllogism is the second form of the syllogism of necessity. It
concerns the identity of form, which is not posited in the categorical syllogism. The hypothetical
syllogism starts with the necessary connection between A and B (if A is, so is B), proceeds to the
being of A (A is), and concludes with the being of B (B is). What mediates the being of A and
the being of B in this syllogism is the identical content underlying them as their foundation. This
content first appears as a “dismembered and dispersed appearance” and gains “actuality” in the
conclusion.78 This is a translation of the “totality of determinations” of appearance into
“actuality,” or the transformation of universality into singularity. Thus, one may well say that

76 GW 12, 120/ SL, 619.
77 GW 12, 120/ SL, 619
78 GW 12, 122/ SL, 620.
since the being of A and the being of B share the identical content, which side is taken as universality and which one, as singularity, does not matter. But Hegel further argues that the being of A is not an immediate being but the being according to the Concept, i.e., the “singularity as self-relating negative unity.”\textsuperscript{79} That is, the being of A as the middle term of a hypothetical syllogism mediates its being as contingency in the premise with its being as actuality in the conclusion. Therefore, the mediating term (the being of A) and the mediated (the being of B) have the same, absolute content due to the self-relating, negative activity, or the form activity of the middle term. In this sense, the unity of the two is a unity of form. To that extent, the hypothetical syllogism, Hegel argues, concerns not only necessity but the necessary. The middle term of the hypothetical syllogism, in other words, is not just objectivity or objective universality but the “self-identical existent content.”\textsuperscript{80}

(3) This truth of hypothetical syllogism is made explicit in the disjunctive syllogism. In the first premise of a disjunctive syllogism (A is either B or C or D), the universal A is particularized into its species. In the second premise (A is neither C nor D), the same subject A appears as the singularity that excludes the others. This singularity of A is positively posited in the conclusion (A is B) in a determinate manner. The disjunctive syllogism is therefore the mediation of the universality of A with the singularity of A by virtue of A’s self-particularization into its species and the determination of itself as a singular. It presents, in other words, the self-mediation of the Concept whereby the mediator and the mediated are united. Its middle term is

\textsuperscript{79} GW 12, 122/ SL, 621.

\textsuperscript{80} GW 12, 123/ SL, 622.
“the totality of the Concept itself” that “contains the two extremes in their complete
determinateness.”

I have suggested that the dialectic of the syllogism of determinate being dissolves the
fixed, formal difference between universality, particularity, and singularity; the dialectic of the
syllogism of reflection dissolves the formal notion of syllogistic validity. Now, the dialectic of
the syllogism of necessity is the dissolution of the formal syllogism as such. In Hegel’s terms,
the disjunctive syllogism is “no longer a syllogism at all” since the distinction between the
mediator and the mediated is collapsed. Thus, the whole series of dialectical transformations of
the syllogism brings about the self-dissolution of the formal syllogism as such. Along with this
self-dissolution of the syllogism, it is established that the Concept is the self-mediating content,
or such a concrete totality that contains its determinations in a determinate manner by virtue of
its self-relating negativity. To that extent, the self-dissolution of the formal syllogism is at the
same time the sublation of what I specified as the one-sided subjectivity of the Concept in
contrast with its absolute subjectivity. In Hegel’s terms, what is sublated by the dialectic of
syllogism is “the formalism of the syllogistic inference, and consequently the subjectivity of the
syllogism or the Concept in general.”

The sublation of the one-sided subjectivity of the Concept entails the notion that the
Concept is objectivity. In Hegel’s terms, what is established through the dialectic of syllogism in
the “Subjectivity” section is that “it is not just that the syllogism is rational but that everything

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81 GW 12, 124/ SL, 623.
82 GW 12, 124/ SL, 623.
83 GW 12, 125/ SL, 623.
"rational is a syllogism","84 further, “everything is a syllogism.”85 That is, the Concept is something rational that exists in reality. But the sense in which the Concept is objectivity, I think, requires a subtle interpretation. It is noticeable that the dialectic of syllogism as a whole reinstitutes the stages of the Objective Logic on a larger scale. The syllogism of determinate being is concerned with the qualitative determination of being (the Doctrine of Being); the syllogism of reflection realizes the reflection of essence, and the syllogism of necessity reinstitutes the notion of appearance and actuality (the Doctrine of Essence). Accordingly, Hegel’s notion that the Concept is objectivity cannot simply be regarded as an affirmation of the existence of the order of rational or ideal in the order of the material or real. Since the Concept in the last stage of its subjectivity, i.e., syllogism, re-passes through the stages of the Objective Logic, its objectivity resulting from the dialectic of syllogism contains within it the sublated unity of being and reflection. It is the objectivity that posits itself as contingency and reflects into itself as necessity in actuality. As such, it is the objectivity that contains within it the absolute subjectivity of the Concept.

The Objectivity of the Concept in Nature

Therefore, it is important to note that the objectivity of the Concept in the realm of nature encompassing mechanical, chemical, and teleological objects is concerned with a dialectically active reality of the Concept and not a static, inactive, given reality of the phenomenal world itself. In other words, nature is in Hegel’s system the objectivity of the Concept, namely the

84 GW 12, 90/SL, 588
85 ENZ, §181 A.
objectivity in which the Concept exists as the self-developing absolute subjectivity purified from the one-sided, formal subjectivity. By implication, the absolute subjectivity of the Concept no longer remains internal to the Concept but has externality in nature. Accordingly, the Concept is re-defined: it is that which, “as the identity in its being-for-itself [die fürsichseiend Identität], is differentiated from the objectivity in a being-in-itself [die ansichseiende Objektivität], and thereby has externality, but in this external totality is the self-determining identity of that totality. So the Concept is now the Idea”\(^8\) The Concept, in other words, is a self-actualizing totality, that is, a concrete totality that makes all the determinations implicit in it into an external objectivity, thereby mediating itself with itself in that external objectivity to become the explicit identity of the totality of its own. This truth of the Concept is the Idea, which is at first life (organic nature), develops itself into cognition and will (subjective spirit), and finally achieves the absolute knowledge of itself (absolute spirit).\(^7\) Thus, the Concept or the Idea is an essentially teleological totality, one that actualizes itself by externalizing itself and turning back into itself in that externality. Again, what is teleological and what has life, for Hegel, is the Concept or the Idea.

Since the Concept or the Idea is a teleological totality, a living organism has special meaning for Hegel’s system. An organism is alive through the activity of self-organization; it thus embodies the teleological constitution of the Concept. Hegel thus writes: “life, or organic nature, is the stage of nature where the Concept comes on the scene” although only “as a blind Concept that does not comprehend itself.”\(^8\) Although the Concept exists in all three realms of

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\(^8\) \textit{GW} 12, 172/ \textit{SL}, 669.

\(^7\) Cf. \textit{GW} 12, 177-8/ \textit{SL}, 674-5.

\(^8\) \textit{GW} 12, 20/ \textit{SL}, 515.
natural beings, Hegel therefore highlights that teleology concerns “a higher nature” than mechanism and chemism.\textsuperscript{89}

It is in this context that Hegel makes a high evaluation of Kant’s notion of inner purposiveness that it opens up “the concept of life, the Idea.”\textsuperscript{90} As I have suggested, Hegel’s favorable evaluation of Kant’s inner purposiveness is concerned with the fact that the Concept or the Idea, like a living organism, has a teleological constitution. Instead of recapitulating Hegel’s criticism of Kant’s subjectivist limitation of the teleological principle to a regulative use of reason, I would here like to spell out the relationship between the Concept and an organism in Hegel’s system. I have suggested that both the Concept and an organism are teleological and for that reason, an organism has special significance for Hegel’s system. But if we can say that the Concept or the Idea has life, this is in the analogical sense that both the Concept and an organism share the same, teleological constitution. Therefore, we need to recall that the life of the Concept consists in its dialectical self-development throughout the philosophical system—the entire trajectory of the Encyclopedia system in which the Idea externalizes itself into nature, internalizes itself into spirit, and develops itself until the equilibrium of subjective spirit and objective spirit is attained. But the two meanings of life are not just analogically connected. The dialectical life of the Concept in the philosophical system involves the sublation of the biological sense of life, as I have discussed, in Chapter 2, Hegel’s notion that the death of an individual organism is the spirit emerging. Therefore, the Kantian sense of inner purposiveness of an organism is for Hegel quintessential to the extent that it anticipates the teleological notion of the Concept; but it is that which is to be sublated by the dialectical life of the Concept in the system.

\textsuperscript{89} GW 12, 156/ SL, 653.
\textsuperscript{90} GW 12, 157/ SL, 654.
To put it another way, in the view of Hegel’s teleology of the Concept, Kant’s notion of inner purposiveness is appreciated insofar as it can be understood analogically in relation to the Concept; however, the biological sense of life is to be sublated in and by the dialectical life of the Concept.

As a final analysis, I make a brief remark on Hegel’s position about the notion of external purposiveness. As we have seen above, Kant claims that our experience of an organism as a teleological object necessarily leads us to the notion of nature as a whole. Considered in this way, nature for Kant constitutes a teleological whole in which all natural products are linked to each other by relative means-ends relations, i.e., external purposiveness, and which has a suprasensible end for its ground. By clarifying Hegel’s position about external purposiveness, then, we will be able to clarify whether he admits of the Kantian notion of nature as a teleological whole, one that considers humanity, considered in its cultural and moral terms, to be the end of nature.

Hegel points out that external purposiveness takes on the “viewpoint of utility” and the purpose is here only “finite.” But he does not believe that we, humans, can master nature as the viewpoint of utility assumes. Indeed, there is “an endless variety of ways of using and mastering nature” as we develop various ways of countering the negative and destructive powers that nature exercises on us including unfavorable natural conditions such as extreme weather conditions and the threat of wild animals. However, our reason “cannot overcome nature herself in this way,” “nor can he turn her to his own purpose.” For whereas we enter into a practical relationship with natural objects through our faculty of desire, our desire for an external, material

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91 ENZ, § 205, § 205 A.
92 ENZ, § 245 Z.
object cannot be satisfied due to its dependence on the latter. Further, Hegel challenges the concept of external purposiveness for its resulting in the “trivial reflection where God’s wisdom is admired in that He has provided cork trees for bottle-stoppers, or herbs for curing disordered stomachs, and cinnabar for cosmetics.” Hegel here rejects the conception of divine providence that underpins the idea of the chain of natural beings by the means-ends relationship. Thus, Hegel dismisses the notion of external purposiveness by dismissing the two main theses underlying it: the viewpoint of utility and the conception of divine providence. Consequently, nature for Hegel does not constitute a teleological whole in which natural beings are linked to each other as means and ends of each other, and the human being is the ultimate and final end of that whole. In Hegel’s *Philosophy of Nature*, nature is rather inorganic, as I argue in what follows.

2.2. Hegel’s Notion of Nature as an Inorganic Whole

In § 251 of the *Philosophy of Nature*, Hegel states that “nature is in itself a living whole.” Hegel here seems to be suggesting that nature somehow constitutes an organic whole. One can therefore pose a question as to whether he considers nature a teleological whole in a similar way

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93 By arguing that desire for external objects cannot be satisfied, Hegel does not mean that we cannot settle our stomach by eating. His point is that eating or satisfying one’s physical desire in general is not the ways in which we exist as self-consciousness. Maybe we can say that what I sacrifice by eating is not the food I eat, but myself who is hungry: “the negation of myself which I suffer within me in hunger, is at the same time present as an other than myself, as something to be consumed; my act is to annul this contradiction by making this other identical with myself, or by restoring my self-unity through sacrificing the thing” (*ENZ* § 245 Z.) By implication, perhaps one can say that the various ways in which we make use of natural products and the technological development facilitating it are the ways in which we negate ourselves wanting in something rather than the ways of mastering nature. From the Hegelian perspective, our negation of ourselves lacking in something will be endless insofar as our lives depend on material things including natural, artificial, and technological products. Seen in this way, mastering nature will fundamentally be impossible insofar as we remain wanting in something.

94 *ENZ*, § 245 Z.
to Kant. However, what Hegel means by a living whole in the statement above has very little to do with the notion of nature as a teleological whole in which natural beings are supposed to be linked to each other by external purposiveness. Instead, nature is a living whole, for Hegel, in the sense that it involves the “movement of its stages” whereby “the Idea posits itself as that which it is in itself.”95 As I have discussed earlier, what has life, for Hegel, is the Concept or the Idea—or, the philosophical system understood as the latter’s teleological self-development. It is therefore important to note that nature is in itself a living whole. It is, in other words, in itself the Idea; conversely, the Idea is only in itself and not yet for itself in nature. The Idea becomes for itself by going through the stages of nature.

Thus, in Hegel’s system, the Idea-Nature-Spirit constitutes an organic whole, but nature does not. Nature is only part of that triad constituting the philosophical system within the Encyclopedia. And yet, it is part of the system only as the alterity or otherness of the Idea. In Hegel’s terms, nature is “the Idea in the form of otherness [Anderssein].”96 This being said, nature is not the Idea. Accordingly, there is an essential difference between the Idea and spirit on the one hand, and nature on the other. Whereas the Idea and spirit have interiority, nature is characterized by externality. This difference can first be understood in terms of the dialectical, teleological movement of the Idea: the movement in which the Idea externalizes itself into nature and turns back from nature into itself as spirit. In this dialectical movement, the Idea remains internal to itself until it is considered in its external existence in nature; spirit has a reflected interiority because it is the Idea’s turning back from nature into itself as spirit. However, it is to be noted that the externality of nature does not only concern the externalization of the Idea into

95 ENZ, § 251.
96 ENZ, § 247.
nature, or the dialectical transition from the Idea in the logic to the Philosophy of Nature. Indeed, this transition in Hegel’s system is made on the basis of the assumption that the objectivity of the Concept in the realm of nature is already established, and that this is what the Idea means. But another crucial assumption is that externality is the essential feature of nature as such.

Importantly, nature for Hegel does not constitute a self-identical realm. Instead, it is a realm of “mediation-less indifference,” which is characterized by “side-by-sideness [Nebeneinander]” and “asunderness [Außeinander],” hence, it is essentially concerned with “space.” 97 Natural beings, in other words, appear to exist separately from and independently of each other in space; it is an indifferent coexistence of all natural beings in space. In this sense of the side-by-sideness and asunderness in space, externality is the essential determination of nature. In Hegel’s system, therefore, nature—understood as the realm of the objectivity of the Concept encompassing mechanical, chemical, and teleological objects—is fundamentally inorganic. As such, it is the alterity and otherness of the Idea. In Hegel’s terms, “the Idea is the negative of itself, or is external to itself,” so that “nature is not merely external in relation to the Idea” but the “externality constitutes the determination in which nature stands as nature.” 98 If the transition from the Idea to the Philosophy of Nature can be considered in terms of the externalization of the Idea into nature, therefore, this can be the case insofar as externality is the fundamental feature of nature itself.

Now, this inorganic, external feature of nature also circumscribes the method of Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature. As natural beings are dispersed in space and nature is a realm of diversity without an reflective self-identity, so are the determinations of the Concept in nature isolated

97 ENZ, § 254.
98 ENZ, § 247.
from each other without revealing the Concept in its true form, i.e., as the organic whole that constitutes itself as something self-identical in self-differentiation. In Hegel’s terms, “the determinations of the Concept have the semblance of an indifferent subsistence and particularization in regard to each other.”99 The Philosophy of Nature can therefore present nature only as “a system of stages, one arising necessarily from the other and being the proximate truth of the stage from which it results.”100 Since nature is the alterity of spirit as mentioned earlier, strictly speaking, there is no truth in nature. Despite this, the Philosophy of Nature can arrange the distinct domains of nature in accordance with how proximate they are to the truth, to the organic form of the Concept. Thus, the Philosophy of Nature starts from the least organic and the most external form of natural existence and proceeds to more organic and less external forms. By proceeding from the mechanic, to the chemical, and to the organic nature, Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature thus moves forward to increasingly complex forms of natural beings. The externality of nature is thereby gradually overcome; the Concept gets closer to its true, organic form.

Seen this way, the degree of asunderness and side-by-sideness in relation to the Concept is the critical standard for Hegel’s classification of natural beings in his Philosophy of Nature. Accordingly, the Philosophy of Nature arranges our understandings of natural beings according to the degree to which those objects in nature fit to the organic form of the Concept. As far as I see, this idea plays a crucial role for Hegel’s non-dualist approach to the animal-human soul in the Anthropology. I below discuss in more detail the way in which Hegel applies his notion of

99 ENZ, § 248.
100 ENZ, § 249.
asunderness to the bodily constitution of inanimate beings, plants, and animals to establish that
the sensitive soul, unlike the vegetative soul, has a subjectivity.

2.3. An Analysis of § 389: What is the Soul?

The soul is not only immaterial for itself, but the universal immateriality of nature, its
simple ideal life. Soul is the substance, the absolute foundation [Grundlage] of all the
particularizing and the individualizing of spirit, so that spirit has in it all the stuffs of its
determination and the soul remains the pervading identical ideality. But in this
determination which is still abstract, soul is only the sleep of spirit;—the the passive nous
of Aristotle, which is all potentially.¹⁰¹

In this first passage of the Anthropology, Hegel characterizes the soul in terms of the
following three notions. Soul is (1) the universal immateriality of nature, or the simple ideal life
of nature; (2) substance as the absolute foundation that contain all stuffs for spirit’s
particularization and individualization; (3) spirit in sleep, which Aristotle considered in terms of
the passive nous. Based on Hegel’s idea of nature as an inorganic whole I have examined above,
I here analyze those three notions defining the soul to grasp the main concerns and issues of
Hegel’s Anthropology. This will offer some guideline for the subsequent analysis of the
Anthropology which I undertake in Chapter 5.

¹⁰¹ ENZ, § 389.
(1) Universal Immateriality of Nature. In the first line of the Anmerkung to §389, Hegel suggests that “the immateriality of the soul” is of interest only when “matter is represented as something true, and spirit is represented as a thing.” Later in the Anmerkung, Hegel discusses the problematization of the communion of the soul and the body by Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza and Leibniz. We can therefore interpret the citation above as a challenge to the dualistic framework of modern philosophy that underlies the soul-body problem. In Hegel’s view, modern philosophers struggle to give an account of the communion of the soul and the body under the assumption that both finite substances are independent of each other. While the soul-body communion thus becomes an “incomprehensible mystery,” modern philosophers, Hegel suggests, appeal to the notion of God as the real foundation of the soul-body relationship, thereby making them into mere “ideal determinations in respect of each other” that “have no truth.” For Hegel, the “identity of the soul and the body” conceived by modern philosophers is either “too abstract” or “only like the copula of a judgment,” which hinders one from proceeding to the system of “absolute syllogism.”

Hegel’s dissatisfaction with the soul-body dualism and the notion of the immateriality of the soul is concerned with the way in which the soul is considered in terms of a non-dialectic, fixed notion of substance by modern philosophers. Although the soul and the body are considered by modern philosophers to have radically different attributes, i.e., immateriality and materiality, both are alike conceived as thing-like—as, for instance, Descartes considers the soul and the body as a thinking thing [res cogitans] and an extended thing [res extensa] respectively. For Hegel, what turns the soul-body communion into a crucial philosophical question is such a representational, non-Conceptual mode of thinking in which one sticks to an image-like, fixed element of thought, and which is therefore inadequate for grasping the proper negativity, activity,
and subjectivity of spirit. This point explains why Hegel mentions the representation of matter as true. Within the dualistic framework of modern philosophy, matter is considered as something solid that has spatial extension for its essential attribute. But this notion of matter as a solid, extended thing also frames one’s representation of the soul to some degree, such that the soul is considered as a thing, one that is separable from, independent of, and parallel to another thing, i.e., the body. Worth noting in this regard is Hegel’s objection to the view of matter as an extended, solid thing. In the same paragraph of the Anmerkung to §389, he points out that modern physics experiments with “imponderable matters”—matters such as heat and light, which have a sensory existence but do not display material properties such as weight and the capacity of resistance. He also observes that his contemporaries work on the notion of “vital matter,” which is assumed to be even without sensory existence. Those physical and vitalist notions serve to counter the conception of matter as a solid, extended thing, which underpins the soul-body problem and is also associated with the representation of the soul as a thing-like substance.

One can therefore say that the immateriality of the soul is for Hegel a false conception, which is made into a crucial problem due to the non-dialectic, non-speculative standpoint that predominates modern philosophers’ thoughts about the soul-body problem. Indeed, the existence of an embodied-ensouled being, I suggest, is for Hegel a sort of a matter of fact, which does not need to be considered a metaphysical conundrum. As we have seen earlier, one of the important claims Hegel makes through the dialectic of the Idea in the Logic is that the Idea is immediately present in a living being. That is, a living being that actively constitutes itself as an organic totality exhibits what the Idea, namely the Concept that has life in a dialectical sense is like. By implication, there exists a living organism that is alive by virtue of teleological, self-organizing
activities inherent to it, and not a soul-body complex. As such, the soul cannot be an immaterial substance opposed to another, material substance. Instead, it is always embedded in the body—as the principle of life or the self-organizing functionality of a living body.

The fact that Hegel dismisses modern philosophers’ notion of the immateriality of the soul as a false conception and instead focuses on the existence and life of an organism, however, does not imply that he would support a reductivist, materialist view of the soul. Nor does it mean that he reduces the problem of the soul-body relationship to the biological issue of an organism. What Hegel suggests in the *Anmerkung* to §389 is that the “identity of the soul and the body” is to be reconsidered from a speculative standpoint that brings about the system of the absolute syllogism. The speculative understanding of the soul consists in seeing the fact that “the immaterial is not related to the material as a particular to a particular, but as the genuine universal which overarches particularity is related to the particular; the material in its particularization has no truth, no independence in face of the immaterial.”102 That is, the soul is something in and through which the genuine universality, which is immaterial, comes to be by subjugating the particularity of the material. The soul, in other words, is something in and through which the dialectical movement of spirit occurs, the movement whereby spirit emerges as spirit by sublating its naturalness. It is therefore important to note that Hegel’s notion of the soul is grounded in his broader discussion of the relationship between nature and spirit:

Spirit has *come into being* as the truth of nature. In the Idea without qualification this result has the meaning of the truth and of what is prior, rather than posterior, as compared with what precedes it. But, besides this, becoming of transition has, in the Concept, the more

102 *ENZ*, § 389 Z.
determinate meaning of free judgment. Spirit that has come into being means, therefore, that nature in its own self sublates itself as what is untrue, and spirit thus presupposes itself as this universality that is no longer self-externalized in bodily individuality, but simple in its concretion and totality. In this universality it is not yet spirit, but soul.\textsuperscript{103}

In the Doctrine of the Concept of the Logic, Hegel establishes that the Idea is the unity of the Concept and objectivity. As I dealt with in Chapter 2, the Doctrine of the Concept thereby anticipates the progression of the Encyclopedia system from the Idea to Nature, and to Spirit. The truth, which can only be manifested through the dialectical movement of the Idea or spirit in the system, is therefore already grasped with the attainment of the Idea in the Logic. To that extent, it precedes all the subject matters dealt with in the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Spirit. However, the truth is for Hegel not something that is immediately present or that can be grasped at once. The truth has the syllogistic form of the Concept, namely the concrete universality that constitutes itself as an individuality by differentiating itself into particulars and reflecting into itself in the particulars. As such, it can only gradually reveal itself through the entire movement of spirit in the system, as the entirety of that movement. This being said, the truth is essentially involved in the movement of becoming. It proceeds, in other words, from untruth and completes itself as true by sublating its untruth. This movement of the truth’s becoming involves spirit’s sublation of its externality in nature insofar as nature, prominently characterized by externality, is the improper existence of spirit.

For Hegel, the soul is conceivable in the dialectical movement of the truth because it is that in which spirit begins to sublate its externality and thereby reveals itself as spirit. This is, in

\textsuperscript{103} ENZ, § 388.
turn, because an embodied being, insofar as it is ensouled, is no longer a dead matter to which
the universality of the Concept is merely external but a living matter that has a universality that
is a concrete and simple totality. To put it another way, the soul, conceived as the principle of
organic life, expresses the interiority of a living organism that makes it into a simple totality.
Hegel’s point in the passage above, however, is that this interiority of a living organism, i.e., the
soul, is not yet spirit. This is because the soul is immediately connected to the body and does not
yet reveal spirit in its properly dialectical form, i.e., the absolute negativity through which it
confronts what is negative to it, the material, and reflects into itself in negating the latter. This
point requires us to be careful about the subtle nuance in Hegel’s objection to the notion of the
immateriality of the soul by modern philosophers. It is evident that Hegel rejects the soul-body
dualism. This does not imply, however, that he does away with the oppositional relationship
between the soul and the body. On the contrary, Hegel holds that the soul is “for itself
immaterial.”104 This can be understood, first, as implying that the soul, conceived as the principle
of life that is concerned with the interiority of organic life, is not reducible to the order of the
material. But Hegel holds, more importantly, the view of the body as something negative to the
soul, namely something that is to be negated by and subordinated to the soul. It is therefore to be
noted that within the framework of Hegel’s dialectical notion of the truth, the soul-body
opposition does not merely display the defect of the representational thinking of modern
philosophers. If modern philosophers consider the soul-body communion in terms of a “copular
of a judgment,” namely in a non-dialectical connection of the two finite substances by the divine,
infinite substance as their real ground, this dualism of modern philosophy denotes, more
fundamentally, the free judgement of the Concept, namely the original division [Urteil] of spirit

104 ENZ, § 389.
into the material and immaterial, or the natural and spiritual: the self-division of spirit in and through which it restores its original unity.

In short, the soul constitutes the starting point of spirit insofar as it is conceived as the principle of organic life that makes a living body into a totality that has simplicity, but it is nothing but a starting point. Again, spirit’s emergence necessarily involves the sublation of its externality in nature, which occurs through the movement of the soul whereby it gradually overcome its immediate subordination to the body. In this sense, the soul is for Hegel not just “for itself immaterial” but the “universal immateriality of nature.”\textsuperscript{105} The soul, in other words, is not just the principle of organic life but an existent in which spirit reveals itself as the truth of and the power over nature, thereby actualizing itself as the genuine universality. It is therefore important to note that the soul that Hegel thematizes in the \textit{Anthropology} has very little to do with the biological functionality or teleological constitution of a living body. Instead, the soul in the \textit{Anthropology} designates a human existence that is under the direct influence of natural factors, immediately embodies her inner feelings or emotions, and inscribes social norms into her body through habituation. By going through this pathway in the \textit{Anthropology} from the natural, to the feeling, and finally to the actual soul, the soul gradually displays itself as a power over its body, which is the pre-condition for a human being to exist as a spiritual being—one who leads a self-conscious, intersubjective life as described in the \textit{Phenomenology of Spirit} and who lives in the realm of objective spirit as the bearer of the freedom of spirit, in the sense established in the \textit{Psychology}. Eventually, the soul is for Hegel defined as nature-spirit [\textit{Naturgeist}],\textsuperscript{106} both in the

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105 Ibid.
106 \textit{ENZ}, § 387.
\end{flushright}
sense of itself being directly subordinated to natural factors and gradually subordinating them to its power.

Returning to §389, Hegel also suggests that the soul, conceived as the “universal immateriality of nature,” constitutes the “simple ideal life of nature.” This determination of the soul as the simple life of nature, I think, gives an important clue for grasping in detail the sense in which spirit’s sublation of its externality in nature takes places in and through the soul. To spell out this, I refer to the Zusatz to § 381 where Hegel speaks of the different degrees of externality found in inanimate beings, plants and animals, respectively. As we have seen earlier, by externality of nature, Hegel means asunderness and side-by-sideness of natural beings in space. In the Zusatz to § 381, Hegel applies the notion of asunderness to the constitution of a single material body and categorizes different kinds of natural bodies depending on different degrees of asunderness.

To begin, animate bodies have lesser externality and greater interiority than inanimate bodies. Inanimate bodies can easily break up into parts but cannot recover their original bodies once these break up. They have a greater degree of asunderness than animate bodies because these can preserve themselves as organic wholes even when they get wounded or diseased by virtue of their abilities to heal the wounds and diseases for themselves. In a similar vein, animate bodies have interiority, which inanimate bodies lack, insofar as they are alive by the constant process of self-organization. Hegel suggests that this process essential to animate bodies is comprehensible as involving “a center that overflows into the periphery, a concentration of differences.”

This being said, animate bodies also have subjectivity in the sense that they

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107 ENZ, § 381 Z.
actively reproduce themselves as self-identical unities in self-differentiations. In this sense of having interiority and subjectivity, animate bodies, Hegel suggests, are “less real, more ideal, and of a higher necessity” than inanimate bodies.\textsuperscript{108} Whereas inanimate bodies are characterized by pure externality of nature in the sense of asunderness, animate bodies are ideal in the sense that their parts do not remain asunder but actively organize themselves to form a single body.

But Hegel further emphasizes the difference between plants and animals. An animal body constitutes a sentient body due to the system of nerve and brain. It is therefore not just a self-organizing whole.

[…] the whole is so penetrated by its unity that nothing in it appears as self-subsistent, […] in the animal body the complete untruth of asunderness is exposed. Through this being-together-with-itself in the determinacy, through this immediate reflectedness into itself in and out of its externality, the animal is subjectivity that is for itself and has sensation; sensation is just this omnipresence of the unity of the animal in all its members, which immediately communicate every impression to the single whole which in the animal, is beginning to become for itself.\textsuperscript{109}

As I will discuss in Chapter 5, Hegel holds that sensation is accompanied by self-feeling. This being assumed, an animal body has subjectivity not only in the sense that it is a self-organizing whole but also in the sense that it has an unconscious, immediate self-awareness in its sensory activities. An animal body is therefore not just a simple totality. Insofar as it senses and has a self in sensations, it constitutes the “being-together-with-itself,” namely a unity that is reflected into

\textsuperscript{108} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid.
itself, as Hegel puts it in the passage above. To that extent, an animal body has interiority and subjectivity to a greater degree than a plant body does. It is more ideal, less real, and more necessary than the latter. In this context, it is also to be noted that Hegel considers sensation in terms of a practical activity that involves a negative and active relationship of a sentient subject to the surrounding world. The fact that animals have sensations, in other words, means for Hegel that they can exercise a negative power on the objects in the world by eating them up. This negative, active feature of an animal’s sensitive life makes an animal body essentially distinct from a plant body. Whereas the growth of a plant body, Hegel suggests, passively depends on external elements including sunlight, water, and temperature, an animal body can actively annihilate external objects due to its sensitive power.\footnote{Ibid.} Thus, animals have interiority and subjectivity to a greater degree than plants do, not only in the sense that they have an immediate self-awareness in their sensory activities but also in the sense that they can assimilate external objects to them. By implication, animals are freer from externality of nature than plants are. In this sense, Hegel states that overcoming externality of nature is “incomplete in plants and complete in animals.”\footnote{Ibid.}

By referring to Hegel’s discussion of the difference among inanimate, plant, and animal bodies, we can understand his notion of the soul as the “simple ideal life of nature” as implying that an animal body is the most ideal among all natural beings due to its ability to sense. We can also say that an animal actively overcomes externality of nature through its sentient body insofar as its body has ideality in the sense of having a self for itself, i.e., an immediate self-awareness, in sensations and assimilating external objects to themselves by eating them up. I therefore pay
attention to the fact that the sentient soul is where in Hegel’s system Nature ends and Spirit begins. Hegel writes: “this transition from necessity to freedom is not a simple transition but a gradual transition [Stufengang] of many moments, whose exposition constitutes the philosophy of nature. *At the highest stage of this sublation of asunderness, in sensation*, spirit, which is in itself in its being captive in nature, reaches the beginning of being-for-itself and thus of freedom.”\(^{112}\) I have earlier suggested that the soul is for Hegel defined as the “universal immateriality of nature” or the “nature-spirit” in the sense that it is that in which spirit reveals itself as a genuine universality by sublating its externality in nature. In relation to this point, the consideration above concerning Hegel’s other definition of the soul as the “simple ideal life of nature” shows that spirit’s sublation of its externality in nature takes place in and through a sentient body.

It is to be noted, however, that the *Anthropology* certainly thematizes the sentient soul but does not deal with sensations in terms of a sentient subject’s active, negative relationship with an external object. As I have suggested in Chapter 3, the ability to sense conceived as a power of desire that enables one to enter into a practical relationship with the objects in the world requires the oppositional relation between subject and object. It can therefore be treated in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, which thematizes the oppositional constitution of consciousness. But in the *Anthropology*, we do not have yet the distinction of consciousness between subject and object. At the level of the *Anthropology*, in other words, we have a sentient soul as the subject matter, and we know that it constitutes a turning point between Nature and Spirit. But we do not know anything about the distinction between an internal self and an external object that consciousness is supposed to have as a subject of desire. In this sense, the soul in Hegel’s

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\(^{112}\) Ibid (my emphasis).
*Anthropology* is characterized as a pre-conscious, undifferentiated totality, which has no distinction between inner and outer worlds. What the *Anthropology* shows is how the conscious distinction between an inner subject and an outer object arises from the undifferentiated soulful totality.

If so, how can we treat our faculty of sensation without presupposing the distinction between subject and object? Do we not enter into a relationship with an object primarily through our sensations? Regarding these questions that may arise from our ordinary understandings of sensation, it is to be noted that the key theme of the *Anthropology* is the relationship between the soul and the body. Hegel’s primary concern in this first part of the *Philosophy of Spirit* where spirit is still immersed in nature is to show how the soul and the body constitute an immediate unity and how the soul immediately exists as and through its bodiliness. What the *Anthropology* concerns in this context is the sentient body through which the soul expresses its inner feelings and has self-feeling and not the soul’s interactions with sensory objects. As I deal with in Chapter 5, however, the immediate bodily existence of the soul, namely the soul’s immediate exteriorization of its self through its expressive bodiliness ultimately leads to the soul’s pathological, one-sidedly subjective relationship with the world. Only when this pathological existence of the soul is overcome, one can enter into the world of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* in which consciousness as a subject of desire makes a practical relationship with sensory objects. The conditions under which the soul stands in a non-subjectivist, objective, and actual relationship with the world, in other words, are first to be elucidated before one moves forward to a discussion on the life of consciousness, which is based on the distinction intrinsic to consciousness between an inner subject and an outer object. The problem of the sentient body in Hegel’s *Anthropology* thus boils down to the issue of how the existence of a human, spiritual
being emerges from the transformation of bodiliness from its first, sentient mode into a second, encultured one.

(2) **Substance as absolute foundation** [*Grundlage*]. Hegel’s definition of the soul as a substance can first be understood in terms of the universality of the natural soul. As I deal with in Chapter 5, the natural soul, which comes to the first stage of the *Anthropology*, is an undifferentiated substantial totality that has neither individuality nor subjectivity, in contrast to its subsequent form, the feeling soul that has a subjectivity in its self-feeling. This implies that in its first appearance in the *Anthropology*, the natural soul immediately participates in the universal course of nature. What the *Anthropology* first portrays is thus the mode of existence in which the human being’s life is immediately subordinated to environmental factors.

But Hegel’s definition of the soul-substance as the *absolute foundation of spirit* further implies that the soul is a substrate containing all determinations of consciousness and spirit-as-such that will be developed in the philosophy of subjective spirit, and even all the determinations of objective spirit, which will be posited and recollected by absolute spirit. Thus, the soul is a substrate that underlies and undergoes all further developments of spirit in the *Philosophy of Spirit*. It is that which embraces everything about *Geist*. Now, one can set Hegel’s definition of the soul as the absolute foundation of spirit in the context of his notion of the determinate substrate developed through the dialectic of form and matter in the “Ground” section in the Doctrine of Essence. As I attempted to show in Chapter 2, what Hegel develops through that dialectic is the notion that thought is a matter of which the form involves the self-relating negativity. As such, thought is a determinate substrate; in this sense, it is the content. My claim was that this Hegelian notion of matter is indebted to Aristotle’s thought about the relationship
between form and matter but is fundamentally different from the latter’s hylomorphic notion of
matter as an indeterminate substrate receptive of any form. Indeed, one cannot directly apply
Hegel’s logical notion of matter as a determinate substrate to the notion of the soul as a
determinate substrate because the former concerns pure thought and its self-determining
movement whereas the latter concerns a natural existent with a psyche. But the idea in the logic
that thought is a self-determining matter allows us to consider the soul as such a matter that
determines itself, given that both are defined as a determinate substrate. Although the connection
is loose, this likely further allows us to consider the soul’s bodiliness as a particular kind of
matter or a natural being in which spirit’s movement of self-development takes place. As I show
in Chapter 5, it is a realm where some spiritual elements can directly be embodied or
materialized and this immediate mode of the materialization of the spiritual can also be
transformed.

(3) *Sleep of spirit: the passive νοῦς of Aristotle*. Traditionally, it has been largely assumed that
chapters 4 and 5 of Aristotle’s *De Anima*, Book III, deal with the passive and active nous,
respectively. Since Hegel defines the soul as spirit in sleep and identifies this with Aristotle’s
passive nous, I below examine Aristotle’s notion of the nous as “all things in potentiality”
presented in the *De anima*, Book III, chapter 4 and Hegel’s interpretation of it in his Lectures on
the History of Philosophy.

In chapter 4 of his *De anima*, Book III,113 Aristotle sets out his discussion of the
intellective soul by the analogy and disanalogy with the sensitive soul. As with sensing, thinking

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113 When citing Aristotle’s *De anima*, I use the revised Oxford transition edited by Jonathan Barnes in the Complete
is “potentially identical in character with its object without being the object.” Aristotle, De anima, 429a15-16. Regarding the citation above, I choose Polansky’s translation “mind” for “νοῦς” instead of “thought” used in the Oxford translation because νοῦς in the citation denotes the soul that thinks, i.e., the intellective soul whose operations differ from those of the nutritive and sensitive souls. For the detailed explanation of this translation, see: Ronald Polansky, Aristotle’s De Anima, 440.

Aristotle, De anima, 440.

Aristotle, De anima, 440.

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Aristotle, De anima, 440.
Regarding the way in which mind as all things in potentiality comes to actually think, it is important to note that all things stored in mind are not possibilities in a broad sense of whatever is not impossible. 118 For Aristotle, mind’s potentiality of thinking is a real power or capacity which is developed over time. Mind develops the potentiality of thinking by forming intelligible things by experience and learning. In this sense, mind is all things in potentiality. To put it another way, mind is “what it is by virtue of becoming.” 119 Further, Aristotle argues that mind as actual thinking is “what it is by making of all things.” 120 By this, he suggests that actual thinking involves a difference between “matter” and “cause which is productive in the sense that it makes all.” 121 This idea in chapter 5 of De anima, Book 3 caused a number of discussions on and controversies over the passive and active nous. Given the complexity of this issue, however, I here only attempt to grasp some general ideas of Aristotle which I find are helpful to elucidate Hegel’s definition of the soul as the passive nous in the Anthropology. First, insofar as mind can be conceived as the place of intelligible things, one may consider it a substrate where actual thinking arises in the way that matter is considered a substrate of changes. This notion of matter as a substrate of changes, however, is applicable to mind only analogously. Since Aristotle consider “mind’s becoming intelligible things,” the distinction between mind and intelligible

118 As for the distinction between possibility and potentiality, see in particular: Ronald Polansky, Aristotle’s De anima, 439. To recapitulate, the notion of possibility involves the idea that whatever is not impossible is possible. As such, possible things may or may not be potentially the cause of something; they are not necessarily potential powers to be actualized. Polansky gives an example: “bricks on the way to becoming a house are potentially a house, whereas clay would only be potentially a house when already formed into bricks.” When applied to the mind, a human newborn is born with the power or potentiality of sense perception. But she is born with the possibility of thinking and not the potentiality for thinking. This is because in order for mind to think, intelligible things must enter the mind from sense experiences. Intelligible things, in other words, are formed in mind over time by experiences and learning. This is the way in which mind is developed from its initial mere possibility of thinking all, into a potentiality of thinking all.

119 Aristotle, De anima, 430a14.

120 Aristotle, De anima, 430a14.

121 Aristotle, De anima, 430a10-14.
things is somehow blurred. Consequently, we do not have to assume that mind is a substrate where intelligible things are thought. Instead, perhaps one can say that intelligible things are matters in the sense that they are objects of thinking in potentiality. Second, intelligible things in mind operate as unmoved movers of thinking just as sensible objects are unmoved movers of sensing; they are the cause of thinking. Thus, the distinction between matter and cause does not necessarily imply that there are two different parts of the mind or two distinct minds. Instead, it is concerned with two different ways in which intelligible things are at work in thinking: as matters of thinking which are to be actualized by thinking on the one hand, and as the moving cause of thinking on the other. Then, thinking is an actualization of intelligible things in potentiality. This activity of thinking is eventually a self-thinking, thinking itself, since its object is the thinking itself in potentiality.

With respect to Aristotle’s notion of mind as potentially all and actually nothing, Hegel puts great emphasis on the idea that mind is intelligible things as it becomes the latter: as he puts it, “νὀς is νοητος or that which becomes thought [das Gedachtwerdende].”122 This further implies that “that which thinks [das Denkende] and that which becomes thought [das Gedachtwerdende] are one and the same.”123 The activity of thinking would then consist in making that unity of its subject and object actual; it is “the form of forms” “just as the hand is the tool of tools.”124 For Hegel, this is the correct way to comprehend the unity of subject and object, which the modern philosophy seeks for.

122 VGP: 88 (my translation.)
123 VGP: 89.
124 VGP: 89.
Now, Aristotle’s discussion about the intellective soul and Hegel’s reading it in his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* make Hegel’s definition of the soul as the passive *nous* in the *Anthropology* both comprehensible and questionable. First, if we put emphasis on Aristotle’s notion of mind as *potentially all*, we may interpret Hegel’s soul in the *Anthropology* as something that contains all further determinations of spirit in potentiality. However, it is then questionable why Hegel refers to the Book 3 of *De anima* where the intellective soul is discussed. Indeed, Aristotle deals with the intellective soul as separable from matter, in the sense that it is unmixed with any other things in order to be able to think all, that its operations do not depend on bodily conditions, and that its objects, intelligible things, are not enmattered. As Hegel rightly emphasizes, the separability from matter in this sense is the element that makes it possible for mind to be identical with intelligible things. The activity of the intellective soul, which is a self-thinking and which Hegel conceives as a form of forms, is therefore concerned with the pure thinking exhibited in the *Science of Logic*. However, the main concern of the *Anthropology* is not the human-divine thinking but the animal-human sensation. Therefore, one can call into question how the notion of passivity characteristic of Aristotle’s *nous* as intelligible things can be used for characterizing the soul of Hegel’s *Anthropology*.

But what Aristotle says about thinking, is for itself absolutely speculative and does not stand next to another, for instance, to sensation; [...] *for sensation is a mere δύναμις [potentiality] for thinking. νοῦς is all in itself, is totality, or what is truthful without qualification with respect to its being-in-itself and to thought [Gedanke]; then, it is being that is truly in and for itself, or thinking—this activity, which is being-for-itself and being-
in-and-for-itself, is a thinking of thinking, [...] which constitutes the nature of absolute spirit for itself.\textsuperscript{125}

Hegel suggests that the intellective and sensitive soul are not separate from each other the way that a thing stands next to another thing. Instead, the thinking soul should somehow include the sensing soul such a way that the latter is the potentiality for the former. This implies, as far as I see, that the formation of intelligible things as objects of thinking involves the process of sensation. We have seen above that mind develops itself into the potentiality for thinking all by forming the intelligible things in the soul. While holding that the formation of intelligible things in mind is carried out by learning and experience, Aristotle explains in chapter 2 of \textit{De anima}, Book 3 how it occurs within the soul in terms of \textit{fantasia}. Briefly stated, sensation is here not considered a momentary cognitive event with respect to what is immediately present. The sensation of red color, for instance, disappears when one takes away a red rose from the sight. But it leaves in mind a sort of image of red color, i.e., \textit{fantasma}, which can be present in mind without the presence of a red rose and which we can bring to mind as we wish. It is distinct both from sensation and thinking but somehow overlaps with both. For it is involved in the process of sense perception on the one hand; it can be part of thinking on the other, insofar as it leads, as a faculty of illusory images, to opinions [\textit{endoxa}].

Considering the way in which in Aristotle’s \textit{De anima}, \textit{fantasia} connects sensation and thinking while remaining distinct from both, the part on representation and imagination in the \textit{Psychology} of Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit, I suggest, can be read as a Hegelian version of a theory of \textit{fantasia}. Indeed, Hegel seems to concern more to a positive link between

\textsuperscript{125} \textit{VGP}: 91 (my emphasis).
representation and thinking, as he suggests that memory [Gedächtnis] is a thought [Gedachte]. The positive link can further be considered to be a genesis of pure thinking, insofar as the internalization [Erinnerung] which takes place in imagination or the faculty of representation can be understood as a process whereby mind becomes thoughts or intelligible things. It is, in other words, a process whereby it is established that "νοῦς is νοητός or what becomes thought [das Gedachtwerdende],” namely that “that which thinks [das Denkende] and that which becomes thought [das Gedachtwerdende] are one and the same.” 

From this perspective, the part on imagination and representation in the Psychology may be viewed as offering the genesis of the pure, infinite thinking in the Science of Logic.

But Hegel’s point in the passage above from the Lectures on the History of Philosophy is that sensation—neither fantasia nor representation or inwardization of images—is the potentiality of thinking. Again, “soul is the passive νοῦς of Aristotle, which is all potentially.”

Therefore, I suppose an essential connection between the Anthropology and the Psychology as I have mentioned in Chapter 3. Soul and spirit-as-such denote different aspects of the same subject matter, i.e., subjective spirit, rather than different entities. If the inwardizing recollection of images takes place in spirit-as-such, the soul is the same spirit-as-such which is considered in its undifferentiated substantiality. With reference to the notion that the soul is substance and universal materiality of nature, I further suggest that the soul is the substance of spirit-as-such: that which underlies the movement of theoretical spirit in the Psychology. Further, it is also to be noted that while the soul is for Hegel the passive nous which is all potentially, he also holds that Aristotle’s notion of a thinking of thinking, namely the divine νοησίς or νοεῖν exhibits “the

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126 VGP, 88-9.
127 ENZ, § 389.
nature of the absolute spirit.”¹²⁸ If the soul is the passive *nous*, it is therefore something substantial which includes all, with respect not only to spirit-as-such but more fundamentally to the absolute spirit.

According to the above considerations, perhaps one can say that the difference between the *Anthropology* and the *Psychology* consists in the different ways in which sensation is thematized. In the *Psychology*, sensation is considered separately from the body, whereby its intelligent aspect concerning representation and inwardization is thematized. In the *Anthropology*, sensation is considered in terms of immediate embodiment of inner feelings, which may be pathological due to the immediacy of the embodiment.

**Conclusion. Hegel’s *Anthropology Without a Teleology of History***

As a final remark, I here briefly discuss how the difference in the view of nature results in the different idea of an anthropology by comparing Kant and Hegel. As I have attempted to show, nature plays a vital role in Kant’s pragmatic anthropology. But what grounds his anthropology is not the notion of his transcendental idealism that nature is a totality of appearances, which are also the objects of natural sciences, but the teleology of nature that considers nature a whole that is teleologically organized. We thus notice that Kant’s anthropology is grounded in the view that nature is not just a mechanistic space in which natural beings are supposed to stand in causal relations to each other. More fundamentally, nature is a

¹²⁸ *VGP*, 91.
teleological world in which the teleologically self-organizing objects, i.e., organisms exist; they are the ends for the sake of which inanimate beings are supposed to exist; and human beings populate as the master of all other natural beings while heading towards another world of moral perfection. This teleological world of nature thus has for its end the existence of the moral and cultured beings, i.e., humans. It is also a historical world in which numerous generations of the human species have lived and will continue to live; and the human species fully developed its antagonistic nature with the advent of modern civil society and is heading for the cosmopolitan future. In Kant’s teleology of nature, nature is thus moralized, humanized, and historicized. This is the world of nature that Kant’s pragmatic anthropology assumes. And the humanity that Kant’s pragmatic anthropology seeks in this teleologically humanized world of nature consists in moral perfection, which is always in the noumenal, future tense.

Unlike Kant, Hegel does not consider nature in terms of a teleological whole or totality of all natural beings. What for Hegel defines nature is for externality in the sense of asunderness and side-by-sideness. That is, nature is a realm of indifferent coexistence of natural beings in which they exist asunder and side-by-side without forming a teleological whole. What is organic in Hegel’s system is the Concept or the Idea, and nature is itself inorganic. Nature constitutes part of the organic whole of the Concept and a moment of the dialectical life of the Idea. As it is primarily defined as externality, however, nature is the negative moment in which the Idea does not exist in its true form and is therefore to restore itself as interiority and subjectivity by sublating its untrue existence in the form of externality. As I discussed, the organic character of the Concept and the inorganic character of nature also have important methodological implications. Although nature does not reveal the Concept in its concrete totality, we can arrange our understandings of natural beings according to the degree of externality, namely the extent to
which they are far from or close to the interiority and subjectivity of spirit. Thus, Hegel’s *Philosophy of Nature* describes how the Idea becomes for itself by going through the stages of nature—mechanical, chemical, and teleological ones. This being said, Hegel’s *Philosophy of Nature* does not go for a spiritualization of nature in the Kantian, teleological sense. In his system of absolute idealism, nature is neither moralized, nor humanized, nor historicized. This does not imply that nature for Hegel has nothing to do with spirit. Evidently, nature is in his system of absolute idealism conceived as part of the life of spirit. It is part of the life of spirit, however, as the alterity or otherness of spirit. The relationship of nature with spirit, therefore, is entirely dialectical: nature is the other of spirit because it is the other of spirit.

What underlies Hegel’s treatment of the soul-body relationship in the *Anthropology* is the dialectical relationship between nature and spirit. Its primary concern is to show how spirit first appears in the form of Naturgeist and how it gradually emerges as spirit out of this immediate submersion in nature. Consequently, the various forms of human life treated in his *Anthropology* in relation to the systematic issue of spirit’s emergence out of nature do not take on the teleological, Enlightenment view of human history. The sweeping criticism that Hegel’s *Anthropology* is grounded in the teleology of history is therefore to be thoroughly reexamined.
CHAPTER 5. The Dialectic of Naturgeist in Hegel’s Anthropology: Soul, World, and Bodiliness

In the previous chapters, I have discussed Hegel’s rejection of subjectivist notions of consciousness based on the first-person perspective (Chapter 1); how his philosophy of subjective spirit in the Encyclopedia relates to the Science of Logic (Chapter 2); how the philosophy of subjective spirit deals with the finite human spirit in its threefold constitution concerning the soul, consciousness, and spirit-as-such (Chapter 3); how Hegel’s Anthropology is related to his philosophy of nature and how it does not adopt the Enlightenment view of universal history (Chapter 4). Based on these previous studies, in this chapter I offer a thorough analysis of Hegel’s Anthropology.

Hegel’s Anthropology comprises three parts: “The Natural Soul” (§§ 388-412), “The Feeling Soul (§§ 403-10), and “The Actual Soul” (§§ 411-12). “The Natural Soul” section begins with the consideration of the soul’s immediate connection with natural qualities including meteorological, geographic, and dispositional determinations. While this first stage of the natural soul portrays human life as it is under the direct influence of nature, the second stage deals with the differences that are at once natural and spiritual, which Hegel calls natural alternations. In this second stage of the natural soul, Hegel thematizes the stages of life that a person goes through during her lifetime, the sex relationship in which a subject finds her self in another subject of the opposite sex, and the alternation between sleep and waking that one undergoes every day. The differences that an individual soul runs through in these three ways of alteration are all at once natural and spiritual: a person goes through different stages of life depending on
her age, but they involve different ways in which the person relates to the cultural world; two individuals of the opposite sex form a relationship based on sexual desires and emotional affections, but they thereby produce an ethical union, i.e., the family; and the alternation of sleep and waking is a change in physical state but is ultimately concerned with the soul’s differentiation into being and being-for-itself, substantiality and subjectivity. Through the first two stages of the natural soul, i.e., natural qualities and natural alterations, spirit thus appears, first, in its immediate submersion in nature and, second, in the form of a complex of natural and spiritual elements. With this development of Naturgeist in the first two stages of the natural soul, the Anthropology comes to thematize its subject matter: the relationship between the soul and the body. This is what Hegel deals with in the third stage of the natural soul, i.e., sensation.

We thus notice that Hegel’s treatment of the soul-body relationship in the Anthropology is preceded by the development of Naturgeist, which leads us step by step to the point where we come to have an object that has both individuality and subjectivity, i.e., the sentient soul. It is therefore important to note that Hegel’s treatment of the soul-body relationship at the last stage of the natural soul, i.e., sensation, is embedded in the pivotal problem of the Encyclopedia system, that is, the emergence of spirit out of nature. As Hegel holds that sensation is the end point of Nature and the starting point of Spirit, the sentient soul is that in which spirit sublates its naturalness, thereby revealing itself as spirit. Framed by this systematic issue of the Encyclopedia, Hegel’s Anthropology thematizes sensation in terms of the immediate bodily existence of the soul rather than an epistemic encounter with an external object. The sentient soul is thus considered an immediate existence as the body, namely as that which comes to exist by immediately exteriorizing its interior through its bodiliness.
This expressive, bodily existence of the sentient soul, however, is completely immediate such that it has no connection with the external world. This condition of the stage of sensation where it is supposed that the natural soul is not yet mediated by objective consciousness and its objective relationship with the world is not yet established causes the soul to fall into one-sided subjectivism. Falling out of joint with the world of actuality, the soul thus insists on her beliefs and ideas even when they are contradicted by the objective reality outside of herself. This one-sided subjectivism of the sentient soul is what Hegel thematizes in the “Feeling Soul” section and considers under the rubric of derangement [Verrücktheit] or madness. Derangement, however, is not just insanity. For Hegel, derangement proper occurs when one is tormented by an awareness of the unresolved and irresolvable contradiction between her inner world and the outer world of actuality. The distinct character of a deranged subject is therefore not the maniacal reactions but the feeling of unhappiness, which is in fact an expression of a high form of consciousness, i.e., self-consciousness.

The ultimate significance of derangement bears on Hegel’s speculative notion of consciousness as the unity of consciousness and unconsciousness, reason as the unity of reason and unreason. Derangement presents the conflictual coexistence of those two elements in one conscious subject and thus reveals the speculative constitution of consciousness, although only negatively. This stage of the feeling soul where the inner contradiction of consciousness bursts out thus constitutes the negative stage in the development of Naturgeist in the Anthropology. Derangement, in other words, represents the negative of spirit’s own, which spirit is to overcome for itself to reveal itself as spirit. In relation to the self-development of Geist in the Encyclopedia system, we further notice that whereas Geist or the Idea went through the life, disease, and death of an organism at the end of the Philosophy of Nature, in the Anthropology it starts from the
death (the stages of life) and proceeds to the disease (derangement) and life (the actual soul) of an individual soul. Whereas the system of nature culminates in the death of an organism, the *Anthropology* thus describes the journey of *Geist* whereby it gets out of the death of nature and comes to gain its proper form, that is, life, with the attainment of the actual soul, or consciousness in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. In this journey of *Geist* toward life in the *Anthropology*, then, derangement also represents the diseased stage of *Geist* that it is to overcome to acquire life.\(^1\)

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\(^1\) By suggesting that the self-development of *Geist* in the *Anthropology* throughout the three stages of the natural soul, feeling soul, and actual soul can be considered in terms of the process whereby *Geist* gets out of death and goes through disease before it attains life, I draw on Hegel’s conception of disease as the state in which a certain part breaks loose from the organic, fluid totality of the whole. For Hegel, this notion of disease is applicable to the psyche as well as to the body, such that derangement or madness bears on the unconscious, soulful elements’ breaking free from the unity of consciousness. But derangement differs from physical disease in that it displays the negativity proper to *Geist*. Derangement is for Hegel the conflictual coexistence of consciousness and unconsciousness in one and the same psyche. As such, it reveals the speculative form of consciousness as the unity of consciousness and unconsciousness in its negative form. As I later examine in detail, therefore, the speculative meaning of derangement, for Hegel, rests on the fact that the most deranged is the most conscious. And this is the sense in which derangement represents the negativity of *Geist*. It is therefore important to note that what Hegel considers in the “Feeling Soul” section is not just this and that phenomenon or experience of mental disease, but the philosophical, speculative meaning of derangement in general. This being assumed, one can say that derangement represents the diseased stage in the self-development of *Geist*, more precisely, in the sense that it is that through which the negativity of *Geist* is fully exhibited.

In this dissertation, I also suggest that the self-development of *Geist* in the *Anthropology* can be viewed as a process whereby *Geist* goes through childhood and youth before it achieves the stage of adulthood, drawing on Hegel’s discussion of the stages of life. This cannot mean, however, that *Geist* is born and grows like a person. Indeed, *Geist* is not a person. As I discussed in Chapter 2, it is that which displays its dialectical life in the *Encyclopedia* system through the movement of the Idea’s externalization into nature and internalization as spirit. It is therefore to be noted that the self-development of *Geist* in the *Anthropology* bears on the dialectical process whereby one moves from the natural soul to the feeling soul, and to the actual soul—dialectical, in the logical sense of the self-development of the Concept as a concrete universal, one through which it starts as undifferentiated unity and differentiates [Ur-teilen] before it reveals itself as reunited identity. Again, this process of *Geist* is not the development of a person. We cannot say, for example, that the natural soul is a child, the feeling soul is a youth, and the actual soul is an adult because we are directly affected by natural circumstances, become insane, and habituate ourselves regardless of our ages. What Hegel thematizes with those three forms of the soul, in other words, has little to do with how old a person is. My claim is that the natural soul, feeling soul, and actual soul can be portrayed as representing the stages of life of *Geist* and not those of a person. In making this claim, I also argue that the stages of life hinge upon the ways in which the soul and the world relate to each other; to that extent, they involve some general meanings applicable to the *Anthropology* as a whole. Briefly stated, the natural soul immediately participates in the universal course of nature, or it lives in a half-natural and half-spiritual world. Whereas there is no conflict between the soul and the world in this first stage of the *Anthropology*, the feeling soul stands in a conflictual relationship with the world. This second stage of the *Anthropology* thus introduces the conflict between the soul and the world. The third stage, then, shows how the soul comes to establish an objective relationship with the world by habit. Thus, the three forms of the soul represent three different modalities of our relationship with the world, and we proceed from immediate unity between the soul and the world to their separation, and their reunification step by step as we move.
What is to be overcome, however, has nothing to do with mental illness as a psychical symptom that a person undergoes; nor is the Anthropology concerned with suggesting a psychiatric remedy for mental illness. The problem of the feeling soul ultimately bears on the ontological condition of the sentient soul of immediately existing as the body without the mediation of objective consciousness and having not yet established its relationship with the world of actuality. What is to be overcome is this mode of existence. In the last stage of the feeling soul, “Habit,” Hegel thus re-thematizes the bodily existence of the soul, suggesting that it is the fundamental problem of the Anthropology. Habit, then, effectuates an overall transformation of bodiliness such that it can serves spiritual purposes in the realm of ethical life. With this transformation of bodiliness into a second nature, we thus arrive at the stage of the Phenomenology of Spirit, the realm of the intersubjective life of objective consciousness. This is how spirit emerges out of nature in the Anthropology.

Now, the main theme of Hegel’s Anthropology is the relationship between the soul and the body, and it treats this in relation to the key problem of the Encyclopedia concerning the emergence of spirit out of nature. This short summary, however, can never reveal the richness of the Anthropology. As I have outlined, the Anthropology is full of rich ideas with multiple layers of meaning, which together in their interconnections illuminate Naturgeist, its development and sublation. The aim of this chapter is to reconstruct Hegel’s idea of the soul-body relationship and show how spirit emerges out of nature without sacrificing the richness of the text. As I hopefully show, the dialectic of Naturgeist in Hegel’s Anthropology portrays the complicated relationships from the natural soul to the feeling soul, and to the actual soul. In the Anthropology, in other words, Geist—Naturgeist, more precisely—develops itself by going through those three different forms of the soul-world complex. This is the sense in which we can say that in the Anthropology, Geist goes through the stages of childhood and youth before it achieves the stage of adulthood.
between human, world, and bodiliness in their inseparable and dynamic connections. It thereby suggests that the prominently spiritual being in nature, i.e., the human being, exists, first of all, as the body, and that she is an essentially worldly being whose life and existence is inseparably connected with the world, and who interacts with the world through her bodiliness. How, then, does the human being as such a bodily-worldly existent come to live in the objective, spiritual world of actuality as an intersubjective subject? This is the key question I address in this chapter. This question further leads us to the properly dialectical meaning of Naturgeist. Indeed, the emergence of spirit out of nature or the spiritualization of nature performed by the dialectic of Naturgeist in the Anthropology cannot result in an absolute de-naturalization of spirit because spirit can reveal itself only through its other, i.e., nature. As I show, spirit is for Hegel essentially subject to self-naturalization, and Naturgeist embraces this essentially dialectical aspect of spirit. Herein lies the significance of the Anthropology for Hegel’s notion of Geist.

1. Naturgeist and the Natural Soul: Soul, World, Bodiliness

The first stage of Hegel’s Anthropology, “the Natural Soul,” comprises three sub-stages: (1) Natural qualities (§§ 392-395); (2) Natural alterations (§§ 396-398); (3) Sensation (§ 399-402). In the Anthropology the soul thus appears at first in its immediate connection with natural qualities or determinations including meteorological factors, geographical/racial differences, and natural predispositions. These sidereal, earthy, and personal elements that determine the soul in an immediate way present the stages in which spirit that is submerged in nature, i.e., Naturgeist, develops itself through universality, particularity, and individuality. At the end of this first stage,
we thus have the form of the natural soul that has individuality. Following this, the second stage, “Natural alterations,” thematizes the individuality of the soul, specifically in terms of the differences constituting an individual soul that are at once natural and spiritual. These differences are considered in terms of the three ways of the soul’s alteration: the stages of life (§ 396), the sex relationship (§ 397), and the transition from sleep to waking (§ 398). Thus, the natural soul is conceived as an individual who passes through different stages of life, finds herself in another subject of the opposite sex, and alternates between sleep and waking. Through the last way of the alteration, then, the soul is differentiated into being and being-for-itself, i.e., substantiality and subjectivity. This is the place where an object that has subjectivity appears for the first time in the Philosophy of Spirit. This incipient subjectivity has the form of a bodily subjectivity of a sentient soul because in the Anthropology spirit still has the form of the Naturgeist. This is what Hegel considers in the last stage of the natural soul, “Sensation.” Since this last stage of the natural soul discusses the soul-body relationship in earnest, in what follows I only consider the first two stages of the natural soul. The third stage, “Sensation,” will be discussed in the second section of this chapter.

The first two stages of the “Natural Soul” section, the “Natural Qualities” and the “Natural Alterations,” have received relatively less attention than other sections of the Anthropology where Hegel discusses embodiment, derangement, and habit. They contain, however, a set of pivotal ideas concerning Hegel’s dialectical notion of Naturgeist. While the “Natural Qualities” thematizes the human life forms in which one’s life is immediately affected by natural factors, the “Natural Alterations” concerns those forms in which one’s life has some spiritual elements, but these are ultimately subordinated to nature. The first two stages of the “Natural Soul” section thus exhibits how Geist appears, first, in its immediate submersion in
nature and, second, in its subordination to nature. Accordingly, we can hardly understand Hegel’s conception of *Naturgeist* and his idea of the relationship between nature and spirit without close examination of those first two stages of the “Natural Soul” section. Nor can we properly understand his discussions of embodiment, derangement, and habit if we dismiss those stages of the natural soul because Hegel’s *Anthropology* deals with the soul-body relationship within the framework of the dialectical relationship between nature and spirit.

Indeed, the unpopularity of the “Natural Soul” section is not surprising given its racist, ageist, sexist implications. Hegel’s presentation of different human races, together with his philosophy of world history that frames it, raises criticism for its commitment to racism. His discussion of the stages of life gives rise to the suspicion that he endorses the idea that one’s ways of life are decided by age, which is hard to accept due to its discriminatory effects concerning children, adolescents, and old people. And his consideration of the sex-relationship involves sexist and patriarchal ideas, suggesting that the family is based on gender roles, monogamist marriage, and the blood relationship. Given the severity and enormity of racist and sexist problems today in particular, then, the “Natural Soul” section seems to have no relevance today no matter what interesting philosophical ideas it presents. We therefore need to examine whether or not the “Natural Soul” section, where Hegel discusses spirit’s subordination to nature, supports naturalist reductionism, claiming that our identities and lives are determined by biological factors including race, age, and gender. In what follows, I show that the “Natural Soul” section does not involve the claim to naturalist, biological reductionism because it eventually means, for Hegel, that *Geist* is so fundamentally subordinated to nature that discussing its emergence out of nature is nonsensical. It is therefore important to investigate Hegel’s dialectical notion of *Naturgeist* without sacrificing all its subtlety. Leaving the context of
Hegel’s dialectic aside, however, it should also be noted that his statements about different human races and the presentation of the sex-relationship may have some racist and sexist implications and effects. I critically address this problem of the “Natural Soul” section in the Conclusion of this dissertation. Prior to this, I focus in this chapter on giving a detailed analysis of the “Natural Soul” section.

In what follows, I examine, first, the “Natural Qualities” and show how Hegel starts off his discussion of the soul-body relationship by challenging Schelling’s notion of the world-soul. With respect to the “Natural Alterations,” I show that the first alteration, the stages of life, presents the notion of the threefold complex consisting of soul, world, and body as the subject matter of the *Anthropology*, and that in this respect, Hegel’s treatment of the soul-body relationship in the *Anthropology* departs from Aristotle’s hylomorphism. Further, I consider the form of the world that we have at the stage of the natural soul. By doing this, I suggest that in this pre-recognitional, pre-intersubjective, cultural world, the individuality of the natural soul is ultimately subordinated to nature, i.e., death, and that it does not have yet the subjectivity proper to a spiritual being living in the ethical world, namely the intersubjective subjectivity realized by self-conscious subjects. But one cannot downplay the significance of the stages of life because one’s relationship with the world of actuality is the key element that underlies Hegel’s thought about human life in the *Anthropology*. This point will turn out to be important more explicitly as we proceed to the “Feeling Soul” section. The second mode of the soul’s alteration, the sex-relationship, also provides crucial ideas concerning Hegel’s notion of *Naturgeist*. To spell out this dialectical notion of Hegel in relation to his thesis that the sex relationship finds its ethical, spiritual meaning in the family, I examine his presentation of Antigone in the Jena *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the discussion of the family found in the “Ethical Life” section in
the philosophy of objective spirit of the Encyclopedia. I show that there cannot be an absolute denaturalization of spirit because spirit is essentially involved in the movement of spiritualizing its other, i.e., nature, to reveal itself as spirit, and that this is the properly dialectical, speculative meaning of Naturgeist. Lastly, the transition from sleeping to waking exhibits how Hegel blurs the distinction between dreaming and awaking, thereby setting the stage for his discussion of derangement in the “Feeling Soul” section.

1.1. Natural Qualities: The Gradual Emergence of Spirit out of Nature

Hegel sets out his discussion of the soul in the Anthropology by defining the soul as “universal substance, which has its actual truth only as individuality, subjectivity.”\(^2\) Thus, the natural soul does not appear in its true form from the outset. It appears at first in its immediate association with universal determinations of nature. Starting with this form of the soul in which it participates in the universal course of nature, having neither individuality nor subjectivity, the first stage of the natural soul, “Natural Determinations,” further thematizes the particular/geographical and individual/dispositional determinations to which the soul is bound. It thus shows step by step how the natural soul comes to appear in its individuality.

To be more precise, the Anthropology treats the soul as “an individual soul, but immediately only as a soul which just is [nur als seierse Seele], which has natural determinations in it.”\(^3\) It thus thematizes the human life forms that are immediately associated with natural factors including meteorological, geographical elements, and innate predispositions.

\(^2\) ENZ, § 391.

\(^3\) Ibid.
First, the natural soul takes part in universal planetary life in the sense that it is directly affected by meteorological factors such as climate, seasonal change, and periods of the day. On account of the immediate association with those environmental elements, it happens that one’s mood, decisions, and ways of behaving vary depending on them. Second, the natural soul is bound to race and the geographical features of the place where its race inhabits. Hegel conceptualizes the geographical distribution of human races on earth as the particularization of universal planetary life into different races. Third, the natural soul has natural predispositions such as talent, temperament and character. One may be born with a unique talent; one may be sanguine or phlegmatic or choleric or melancholic; one may be predisposed to cling to mere details or concerns or to greater aims. These natural predispositions are the elements that turn the natural soul into an individual soul. In short, the natural soul is under the direct influence of the movement of the universe, embodies the geographical features of the local habitation, and has peculiar natural predispositions. In this first stage of its development, the natural soul stands for the natural existence of the human being—natural, in the sense that one is immediately and inseparably associated with those natural determinations in all her aspects of universality, particularity and individuality.

Notable in this first stage of the natural soul where the soul gradually gains individuality is Hegel’s rejection of the idea of “a world-soul as a sort of subject.”4 What Hegel thereby challenges is Schelling’s Platonic conception of the soul as an animating principle of nature. Briefly stated, Schelling understands the notion of the world-soul in Plato’s Timaeus through the lens of Kant’s notion of the inner purposiveness of an organism presented in § 65 of the Critique of the Power of Judgement. Schelling writes: “we must moreover remind ourselves that Plato

4 Ibid.
looked at the entire world as a ζωον, i.e., as an organized being, thus as a being whose parts are possible only in relation to the whole, and thus according to their form as well as connection reciprocally produce one another.”⁵ For Schelling, what Plato brings forth through the Timaeus is the idea that the entire world of nature constitutes an organic whole which has itself for both its means and ends.⁶ Schelling’s great concern to the view of nature as a self-organizing whole comes from his dynamic notion of the absolute. He holds that the absolute, conceived as the undivided, original unity of subject and object, completes itself as such by making itself divided into the two poles and constitutes itself as their unity. For Schelling, this self-development of the absolute takes place in nature. Thus conceived, nature is the realm in which the absolute reveals itself, which we can reconstruct in the form of a philosophical system that considers natural phenomena as the expressions of the self-organizing power of nature.


⁶ In the Timaeus, Plato suggests that the supreme, divine intelligence, personified as Demiurge, created the well-ordered universe (kosmos) from an unordered aggregation of basic material elements, i.e., fire, earth, air and water (chaos), by setting in its center a “soul, which he extended through the whole body, with which he then covered the body outside;” Timaeus 34b, in Plato. Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis, Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997). Thus defined, the world-soul denotes a kind of principle of the cosmological organization of the universe, which is immanent and ubiquitous to it. That is, the universe has a rational order such that all motions in it are accountable in terms of mathematical relations, and this immanence of the supra-sensible world of the forms in the sensible world is made possible by the mediation of the world-soul. In the mythical language, Plato also gives an account of the creation of the world-soul by a Demiurge. This divine intelligence, first, made a mixture between divisible and indivisible being, a mixture between divisible and indivisible sameness, and the same mixture with difference and, second, mixed these three mixtures before he re-divided them, third, into two intersecting circles, an outer circle of the sameness and an inner circle of the difference, such that it keeps itself undividedly same and uniform outside while having divided inner circles that move at different speeds. What is to be noted is that the world-soul is constituted by the ontological elements shared by all things in the world including both indivisible and divisible things and not just pure supra-sensible forms. It also has the figure of a line, or more precisely a set of circles, which is assumed to ground the relations between the bodies with magnitude. One can therefore say that the world-soul is called a “soul” in the sense that it denotes a pure intelligence (nous) or rationality that exists or is realized in the sensible world. However, the intelligence or rationality that is embodied in the universe is for Plato conceived primarily in the Pythagorean mathematical model. That the universe has a world-soul, therefore, means that it has a rational, namely mathematical order. It does not necessarily mean, however, that the universe has life in the way that an organism has life. Although Plato hints at this, it is in an analogical sense rather than in a systematic, theoretical sense as Schelling conceives.
Hegel’s rejection of Schelling’s notion of the world soul rests on the idea that the absolute reveals itself as spirit rather than in nature. As I discussed in Chapter 4, the truth or the absolute, for Hegel, consists in the organic totality of the Concept and reveals itself through the dialectical life of the Idea. The prominent feature of nature, however, consists in externality, namely non-organic relations such as the asunderness and side-by-sideness of natural elements and beings in space. Thus, nature does not exhibit the Concept in its properly dialectical form. Whereas Schelling takes nature and spirit to be ontologically continuous and considers the self-conscious form of human spiritual life to be a part of the self-organizing life of nature, therefore, spirit is for Hegel not reducible to the realm of nature.

This does not imply, however, that Hegel endorses a dualism of nature and spirit. With respect to the constitution of his mature system of the Encyclopedia, he states that while the Idea is “immediate simple being-in-itself [Insichsein],” nature is “its being-outside-of-itself [Außersichsein]” and spirit is “its being-with-itself [Beisichselbestein].” More precisely, spirit is the Idea’s being-with-itself as “ideality, that is, the sublation of the otherness of the Idea, the Idea’s returning, and its having returned, into itself from its other.” Hegel’s Encyclopedia system thus presents the dialectical monism of the Idea or spirit. In his monistic system, both nature and spirit are parts of the dialectical self-development of the Idea, exhibiting different determinations of the Idea, i.e., externality and reflective interiority. These determinations certainly mark the essential difference between nature and spirit but do not render them incommensurable. For the reflective interiority of spirit consists in sublating its externality in nature. Spirit, in other words, reveals itself as spirit in and through nature, but this is not in the

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7 ENZ, § 381 Z.
8 Ibid.
sense that it is a part of nature but in the dialectical sense of idealizing this other of itself. Importantly, spirit’s sublation of its naturalness is not achieved at once. As I deal with later, embodiment of the soul is an idealization of nature by spirit. But this immediate idealization of nature through an immediate exteriorization of the soul’s interior lacks an objective link with the actual world, thereby leading the soul to the deranged, feeling form of life. The idealization of nature by spirit that occurs through the bodily exteriorization of the soul’s spiritual interior is therefore to be negated. This occurs through habit, which concerns the overall transformation of the soul’s bodiliness. When the soul thus obtains a habituated body that serves spiritual purposes in the actual world, nature is spiritualized such that it is sublated in and as a second nature. What Hegel’s *Anthropology* describes is such a gradual emergence of spirit out of nature. As I discuss later in relation to the sex relationship, however, the emergence of spirit cannot mean a complete denaturalization of spirit because it reveals itself only through its other, i.e., nature.

Now, the point that spirit gradually reveals itself in increasingly spiritual forms by passing through various forms of a nature-spirit relationship explains why Hegel starts from universal, planetary determinations and proceeds to particular, geographic determinations, and to individual, dispositional ones. With this Conceptual order, the soul starts from its most natural and most abstract mode of existence and proceeds to more concrete and less natural modes of existence. Seen this way, the idea of spirit’s gradual emergence out of nature is at work from the beginning of the *Anthropology*. 
1.2. The Stages of Life of the Natural Soul and the Stages of Life of Geist

The discussions of the soul’s immediate connection with natural determinations leads to the point where the soul has individuality in natural predispositions. Following this, Hegel proceeds to examine how one individual soul relates to its differences. At the level of the natural soul, the differences of an individual soul are both natural and spiritual, and they appear in the form of alteration, that is, the change of state that the soul undergoes:

In the soul determined as an individual, the differences take the form of alterations in it, in the single subject persisting in the alterations, and of moments in its development. As they are at once [in einem] physical and spiritual differences, a concrete definition or description of them would require us to anticipate an acquaintance with the cultivated spirit.  

Hegel discusses three different ways of the alteration of the soul: the stages of life (§ 396), the sex relationship (§ 397), and the transition from sleep to waking (§ 398). But in the passage above Hegel seems to be starting out his discussion of the first way of the alteration, i.e., the stages of life. In what follows, I consider the sense in which the stages of life involve the differences that are both natural and spiritual, and the way in which they frame Hegel’s Anthropology.

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9 ENZ, §396.
Briefly stated, the natural soul passes through the stages of life including childhood, youth, adulthood, and old age. The stages of life are distinguished from one another depending on the way in which an individual relates herself to the actuality of the world she inhabits. Childhood is characterized by the soul’s innocent harmony with the world whereas youth is a period of opposition between the soul and the world or the soul’s ideal resistance to the existing order of the world. Adulthood is a period when one recognizes the world as completed and leads a practical life in that world. Finally, old age is a stepping back from the actuality of the world and liberation from limited interests with respect to the external world. If one can identify the stages of life as the differences that constitute an individual soul as Hegel does, this is because the soul can be said to remain a selfsame subject which goes through those stages and to which these belong. Further, those differences of the soul are both physical and spiritual because childhood, youth, adulthood, and old age involve one’s bodily growth and aging on the one hand, and the changes in her view of the world and way of relating herself to it on the other.

At first glance, Hegel’s thematization of the stages of life in terms of alterations of the soul seems quite odd. The formulation of the soul as a “single subject persisting in the alterations” in §396 is reminiscent of Aristotle’s notion of the substratum as what underlies all the changes it undergoes. Thus, it reminds us of Aristotle’s treatment of the soul in the De anima, in which the diverse functions of an ensouled-embodied being including growth, perception, and

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10 As I discuss later, Hegel’s notion of bodiliness [Leiblichkeit] denotes the dynamic, ontological, expressive communion of the soul and the body rather than a physical, organic body (embodiment), or the dialectical relationship between one’s existence and the world in which one becomes part of the world by inwardizing it and outwardizes the world by taking part in the actuality of the world (habit). Since this technical meaning of Hegel’s term Leiblichkeit is not yet established, I here use the general term body instead of Hegel’s terminology bodiliness [Leiblichkeit].

11 ENZ § 396 A.
thinking are explained in terms of the changes undergone by that form-matter composite between potentiality and actuality. We notice, however, that Hegel’s notion of the soul as a subject that has individuality in its persisting through the stages of life has very little to do with Aristotle’s hylomorphic account of the soul. As we have seen in Chapter 2, Hegel highly appreciates Aristotle’s accounts of the soul-body relationship, estimating that they reveal Aristotle’s speculative insight about the inseparable unity of soul and body. And Hegel himself develops his non-dualistic, dynamic account of the soul-body relationship in the *Anthropology*, specifically by thematizing embodiment at the last stage of the “Natural Soul” section, and habit at the last stage of the “Feeling Soul” section. What Hegel’s *Anthropology* considers, however, is not just the soul-body relationship but the threefold complex consisting of soul, world, and body. As I discuss later in detail, embodiment, for Hegel, represents the way in which the soul immediately exists as the body; however, the soul that comes to exist by immediately exteriorizing its interior is necessarily subject to one-sided subjectivism due to the lack of an objective relationship with the world. Habit, then, is a process whereby the soul establishes an objective relationship with the world by transforming the mode of its bodily existence. Thus, the crucial assumption of Hegel’s *Anthropology* is that the human being is a worldly existence, one whose psychic life necessarily depends on her ways of interacting with the world, and that the mode of her worldly existence is mediated by the mode of her bodily existence.

If the soul can be called a substance in the sense of the self-identical unity that underlies and undergoes changes, we thus observe that throughout his discussion of the stages of life, Hegel transforms this Aristotelian notion of sensible substance to conceptualize a particular type of sensible being: the sensible being that has a temporal individuality determined by birth and

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12 As I discussed in Chapter 3 by examining Hegel’s lectures on Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, Aristotle does not consider
death and undergoes changes in its physical states as it grows and gets old. This individual, sensible being that Hegel thematizes with his discussion of the stages of life, however, is not just a living organism because it goes through different ways of interacting with the cultural world as well as changes in its physical states. Therefore, Hegel’s treatment of the soul-body relationship in the *Anthropology* is anthropological because what it thematizes is the human soul in particular and not the enmattered-ensouled being in general.

With respect to the point that Hegel’s *Anthropology* considers the human being as a worldly being, it is important to note that the world here at stake is a cultural world and not the natural environment. When discussing the stages of life, Hegel thus uses the term the *genus* (*Gattung*) for indicating the cultural world in which the soul is born, grows, and dies. As Hegel puts it, childhood consists the soul’s innocent unity with her genus; youth, in her opposition to her genus; adulthood, in an actual unity with her genus and the achievement of the “standpoint of the objective spirituality.” As I dealt with in Chapter 2, in the last stage of the *Philosophy of Nature* Hegel considers the genus-process to represent the relationship between individuality and universality that is inadequate for a spiritual existence. The genus-process is a natural course in which a natural species is sustained by individuals’ constant coming to be, begetting, and perishing. Hegel’s point was that in this course of nature, individuals are subordinate to death, which implies that their individuality is nothing but a vanishing moment of and for the universality of their species. The natural soul that undergoes the stages of life and maintains itself as a single subject persisting in them, however, differs from an individual member of a

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13 *ENZ*, § 396 Z.
natural species because it can truly “actualize the genus within itself.”\(^\text{14}\) Hence, the genus to which the natural soul relates herself is not the natural species but a cultural world that she inhabits as a cultural being. It is not a static universality in which all the same individuals perpetually appear and disappear. Instead, it is a dynamic and living universality that involves various relations with individuals: full acceptance, idealistic resistance, actual preservation, and reflective distancing, performed on behalf of individuals in relation to it.

Now, we can pose a question as to why Hegel considers the relationship between an individual human being and the cultural world in terms of the four modalities: acceptance, resistance, actualization, and reflection, and why he considers these as related to age. Since we can explain the difference between nature and culture in many different ways, we need to expound the sense in which the cultural world differs from nature on account of those four modalities. We also need to examine whether or not these modalities are necessarily associated with age, and whether or not this is Hegel’s claim. All these issues are ultimately concerned with the sense in which the stages of life present the differences that are at once natural and spiritual. Since Hegel’s discussion is somewhat unfocused, discerning between the natural and spiritual dimension of the stages of life and elucidating the relationship between the two dimensions remain our interpretative tasks.

To begin, Hegel’s discussion of the stages of life is to be understood as concerning different modalities of one’s relationship with the world rather than a person’s life course. As mentioned above, the “Natural Alterations” differs from the “Natural Qualities” in that it concerns spirit’s subordination to nature whereas the latter thematizes spirit’s submersion in

\(^{14}\) Ibid.
nature. Thus, we can now point out that the soul’s immediate participation in the universal course of nature—e.g., the immediate determination of one’s mood by the weather, one’s life by race, and one’s personality by innate dispositions—cannot be called relationship, if a relationship is between two distinct relata, because the soul is in these cases so immediately merged with the natural, determining factors that it is not distinct from them. In the “Natural Alterations,” however, the soul no longer remains immediately associated with natural determinations. Instead of being merely passively affected by nature, the soul enters a relationship with the cultural world through its individuality. Of importance here is that the cultural world also undergoes changes in accordance with the ways in which individuals react to it. This is because it is the genus that is actualized by individuals’ activities. It is therefore to be noted that the relationship between humans and the world is deterministic bilaterally, in such a way that we grow up as adults responsible for the actuality of the world by being encultured in this world, and the world undergoes changes in accordance with our reactions—for instance, violent upheavals by our revolutionary actions, gradual reformations by our moderate approaches, and decays along with our falling into mannerism, indifference, and moral decadence. Since it is deterministic bilaterally, it is essentially dynamic and flexible. Of course, natural beings too bring about changes to their environmental world; some animal interactions, for instance, can cause changes in their ecosystem by bringing about changes in the food chain of their habitat. I am here not in a good position to enter into an in-depth discussion of the difference between nature and culture. It is here sufficient to note that the changes in the cultural world by human activities are far more contingent, irregular, and unpredictable than those in the natural world due to the exercise of human free will.
Thus, we can say that just as an individual is born, grows, and dies, so does a cultural world come into being, become prosperous, decay, and collapse. In this sense of undergoing changes through a dynamic relationship with individuals, the cultural world has a historical temporality. This historical temporality that I draw from Hegel’s discussion of the stages of life, however, is the one that is grounded in natural temporality. It is therefore to be noted that birth, growth, and death are natural categories peculiar to an organism. When we say that a cultural world comes into being, becomes prosperous, decays, and collapses, we are thus applying the model of an organism’s life to the cultural world. On what ground, then, can we determine the four modalities of one’s relationship with the world, which Hegel presents through his discussion of the stages of life, as constituting a historical temporality of the world? Is it not a natural temporality that is metaphorically applied to historical changes? It is, indeed. And the fact that the four modalities constitute a historical temporality by analogy with nature is associated with the status of the Anthropology within the Encyclopedia system. Since the Anthropology is the place where the Philosophy of Nature ends and the Philosophy of Spirit begins, and the “Natural Soul” section considers human life and existence in terms of spirit’s submersion in or subordination to nature, we here do not have any conceptual or theoretical bases for thematizing human history. Thus, the stages of life have a spiritual dimension in that they display the historical nature of the human, cultural world; however, this spiritual dimension of the stages of life is subordinated to nature insofar as the historical temporality they display is grounded in natural temporality.

The stages of life, however, also involve some distinctly human, historical aspect that is not grounded in nature. Regarding this, I pay special attention to the two modalities of one’s relationship with the world: resistance (youth) and actualization (adulthood). It is here to be
noted that the four stages of life and the four modalities of one’s relationship with the world Hegel discusses in the “Natural Alteration” have no conceptual, *a priori* ground. Neither one’s life course nor historical temporality, in other words, need be considered in the way that Hegel presents. Hegel’s formulation of the stages of life rather finds its ground, I suggest, in his experiences of and concerns with the reforms of Germany in the aftermath of the French Revolution, and the two modalities, resistance and actualization, reflect them. These two modalities, then, represent the non-natural, spiritual dimension of the stages of life, first, in the general sense that revolution and reformation are distinctly human-historical changes and, second, in the particular sense that they exhibit the negativity of *Geist* in its historical manifestation that Hegel contemplated and conceptualized in relation to his experiences of the historical changes of his time. We can here refer to the Preface to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, published one year after Napoleon’s defeat of the Prussian army at Jena in 1806: “it is not difficult to see that ours is a birth-time, and a period of transition to a new era. Spirit has broken with the world it has hitherto inhabited and has been conceived, is in the Concept that lets it sink into the past, and in the labor of its own transformation. Spirit is indeed never at rest but always engaged in moving forward. But just as the first breath drawn by a child after its long, quiet nourishment breaks the gradualness of merely quantitative growth—[and makes] a qualitative leap—and the child is now born, so likewise the spirit in its formation [*der bildende Geist*] matures slowly and quietly into its new shape, dissolving bit by bit the structure of its previous world, whose tottering state is only hinted at by symptoms here and there. […] But this new world has no more a complete actuality than a new-born child has.”

In the *Anthropology* of the 1830 *Encyclopedia*, then, we notice that the two modalities frame the Feeling Soul” section in a

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15 *GW* 9, 14-5*/PhS*, §§ 11-2.
significant manner; historical changes may cause individuals to feel alienated from the world and unhappy to such an extent as to become insane (derangement), or they may make them feel at home and enjoy settling down in the world (habit). As I discuss later, derangement constitutes a necessary stage in the development of Geist in the Anthropology. And the necessity of derangement is dialectical, first, in the sense that it represents the stage of differentiation [Urteilen] in the development of Naturgeist and, second, in the sense that radical alienation dissolving and fluidizing all the things that were previously held is the prerequisite for the emergence of Geist—I consider the critical implications of Hegel’s notion of derangement in the Conclusion. Anticipating the “Feeling Soul” section, then, we can say that Hegel’s Anthropology considers humanity as essentially historical; further, the historicity of human existence in Hegel’s Anthropology is ultimately concerned with the particular ways of interacting with the world, those in which one feels alienated or feels at home with historical changes, rather than the analogous understanding of the cultural world as growing and decaying in a similar way to an organism.

Seen this way, Hegel’s presentation of the stages of life does not involve any claim to ageism. Indeed, Hegel does not claim that our experience of the world is necessarily connected with how old we are; instead, he thematizes the stages of life to conceptualize different forms and modalities of our relationship with the world. Further, it can never be Hegel’s position that our relationship with the world is necessarily decided by age because this means, for him, that spirit is subordinated to nature in such a way that it can never emerge from that subordination. Therefore, I draw attention to the fact that the “Natural Alterations” thematizes the forms of human life in which we can discern, grasp, and conceptualize spiritual elements constitutive of human existence and life that are entangled in natural elements. Since spirit’s subordination to
nature is in Hegel’s *Anthropology* considered as something that is to be overcome for the emergence of truly spiritual reality, no discussion in the “Natural Alterations” support the position of naturalist reductionism, which claims that our identity, existence, and life are decided by natural, biological categories including race, age, and gender.

We can further show that Hegel’s presentation of the stages of life, in fact, supports the idea that we can accept, resist, actualize, reflect on the world regardless of age, by showing how they frame the development of *Geist* in the *Anthropology*. Again, Hegel’s discussion of the stages of life centers around different modalities of our relationship with the world: acceptance, resistance, actualization, and reflection, and the two modalities, resistance and actualization, play an important role in his discussions of derangement and habit in the “Feeling Soul” section. Thus, the three stages of the *Anthropology*, i.e., the natural soul, feeling soul, and actual soul represent the three different modalities: while the natural soul represents the form of human life that involves no conflict with the world, the feeling soul is characterized by a serious conflict with it. The actual soul that is achieved by habit, then, represents the one who establishes an objective relationship with the world, thereby actualizing the world she lives in by her activities. Seen this way, what passes through the stages of life in Hegel’s *Anthropology* is *Geist* which passes through the three forms of the soul. To be more precise, *Geist* passes through childhood (the natural soul), youth (the feeling soul), and adulthood (the actual soul).

*Geist* passes through the stages of life, however, not temporally but dialectically, in the sense that the three forms of the soul are concerned with philosophizing different modalities of one’s relationship with the world in terms of spirit’s emergence out of nature. Insofar as the *Anthropology* thus concerns the stages of life of *Geist* in this sense of conceptualizing different modalities of one’s relationship with the world, each of the three forms of the soul can represent
any person who is involved in the modality it represents regardless of how old this person is. Any person, in other words, can be the natural soul, or feeling soul, or actual soul depending on the way in which she relates herself to the world. Any person can accept, resist, and actualize the world regardless of age. It is also possible that a person actively participates in the world she lives in at some point of her life but comes to feel alienated at another. All these have nothing to do with how old we are.

*The Natural Soul: Individuality without Intersubjective Subjectivity*

I have considered Hegel’s discussion of the stages of life in terms of modalities of one’s relationship with the world. In what follows, I examine the kind of individuality that the natural soul has at this first stage of the “Natural Alterations.” The individuality that the natural soul is supposed to have by persisting through all the stages of life, I argue, is a temporal individuality, of which the starting and ending points are determined by its physical birth and death. To that extent, it has a natural aspect. But the temporality that individuates the natural soul is not just a natural temporality because it also involves distinct stages representing the different ways in which the natural soul relates herself to the cultural world she inhabits. In this sense, the stages of life, again, are the differences that are at once natural and spiritual. The stages of life that thus involve the spiritual dimension of human life, however, constitute the *differences of* the soul. They are different moments of an individual, natural soul, which belong in the latter. This implies that the spiritual dimension of human life, which we recognize in the stages of life, is still subordinated to the natural elements, that is, the physical birth and death that makes the natural soul into an individual soul. It is therefore to be noted that the entire course of life embracing childhood, youth, adulthood, and old age may well be considered in terms of
individuation of a soul but cannot itself be identified with the individuality of a person living in the intersubjective world. It is a natural course of life of which distinct moments involve some spiritual aspect whereas the life of an intersubjective subject consists in a negative relationship with other subjects through the mediation of a negative relationship with nature. Briefly stated, the natural soul is an individuality that does not have the subjectivity characteristic of a self-conscious, intersubjective subject.

Now we can more aptly determine the status of the natural soul in Hegel’s *Anthropology*. It represents the mode in which the spirituality of the human life is still subordinated to nature. As mentioned earlier, the natural soul can be said to be leading a spiritual life insofar as the stages of life she goes through involve her relationship with the cultural world she inhabits. But this is not yet a fully spiritual life in the proper sense because the natural soul is here considered as an individual without an intersubjective subjectivity. The natural soul, in other words, is one who lives the spiritual world in a natural mode. In the “Feeling Soul,” Hegel proceeds to consider self-feeling in terms of the subjectivity that the soul has in its sentient activities. As I discuss later in detail, however, this subjectivity of the sentient soul is eventually pathological. The feeling soul gets deranged in its contradictory relationship with the spiritual world in which she lives.\(^\text{16}\) The main concern of Hegel’s *Anthropology* is to show how the soul comes to overcome its pathological subjectivity before it reaches the stage of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

\(^\text{16}\) I discuss the debate on the necessity of derangement in Hegel’s *Anthropology* in note 93.
1.3. Hegel's Non-Evolutionary Notion of the Genus [Gattung] as the Environmental World of the Soul

Throughout the above consideration of Hegel’s idea of the stages of life, I have suggested that the natural soul represents the mode in which one’s spiritual life is subordinated to nature. Following this, I examine in what follows Hegel’s conceptualization of the genus as the correlator of the natural soul involved in the stages of life. I have suggested that the genus to which the natural soul relates herself is the cultural world inhabited by human beings, which involve diverse modes of reaction on behalf of the latter. In the Anthropology, Hegel thus imposes a new, spiritual meaning on the term genus, which he used in the Philosophy of Nature for indicating a natural species. But Hegel’s retention of the word genus as the term indicating the cultural world that the natural soul inhabits by going through the stages of life implies, I claim, that this world for the natural soul is not a fully spiritual world. There is a natural remainder in the universality to which the natural soul relates herself, just as her individuality is determined by natural elements such as birth and death. My claim is that the cultural world is at the stage of the Anthropology considered as a pre-Phenomenological, environmental world to which the soul is subordinated. For Hegel, the cultural world is spiritual, as far as I see, when it appears in the form of objective spirit, which incorporates the communal, social, cultural, political and historical dimensions of human life. This is also the world, I argue, to which the self-consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit relates herself. As with Kant’s pragmatic anthropology, Hegel’s Anthropology takes on a semantic transformation of the notion of a natural species [Gattung] for indicating the human world. But this human world considered in Hegel’s Anthropology is still a natural world which affects the life of individuals and not the spiritual world in the proper sense, i.e., an intersubjective world that is constituted by human
actions and also involves a historical temporality, nor the Kantian teleological world for moral perfection.

**Buffon and Kant: The Genealogical View of a Natural Species**

To spell out the sense in which the genus of the natural soul has a natural remainder, I would like to briefly discuss the historical background of the eighteenth century in which a new conception of natural species served to give rise to a historical, diachronic, and genealogical view of nature. To begin with, in 1753, the French natural historian, Georges-Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon, suggested defining a species as the constant succession of similar individuals capable of producing fertile offspring, known as Buffon’s rule. What triggered Buffon’s new definition of species was his methodological dissatisfaction with the Swedish natural historian, Carolus Linnaeus’ taxonomy. Buffon strongly criticized Linnaeus for classifying natural beings on the basis of artificial and arbitrary concepts. He instead paid attention to the empirically observable process of breeding and was thus able to establish a consistent notion of species, which does not rely on abstract and arbitrary conceptual distinctions. As many scholars acknowledge, Buffon’s rule made a significant contribution to the rise of a new, historical view

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17 In the twelve editions of his *System naturae sive regna tria naturae* that were published from 1735 until 1778, for instance, Linnaeus classified *Homo sapience* into *Homo americanus*, *Homo Europaeus*, *Homo Asiaticus*, and *Homo Africanus*, and later added *Homo monstrosus* and *Homo ferus*. Linnaeus correlated the difference in the color of skin found among those four geographical varieties of the human species with the medieval theory of the four humors, suggesting that Americans are choleric, Europeans sanguine, Asians melancholic, and Africans phlegmatic. Linnaeus’ classification of the four varieties of the human species is unsatisfactory due to the questionable connection between the color of skin and the theory of temperament. But his addition of two more varieties, i.e., malformed individuals (*Homo monstrosus*) and feral children encountered in European forests (*Homo ferus*), makes his classification of the human species even more suspicious due to the lack of consistent conceptual criteria for the classification.
of a natural species, which entailed the subsequent development of the modern, Darwinian theory of evolution in the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{18}

Thus, Buffon opened a diachronic view of natural species. Conceived under his rule, species is not just a synchronic collection of the individuals sharing similar morphological characteristics, but a temporal existent that constitutes a lineage through the constant process of reproduction. This temporalization of natural species, which was latent in his theory of species, was solidified by Kant’s theory of race.\textsuperscript{19} Kant accepted Buffon’s rule as a correct understanding of species and made a distinction between what he calls the history of nature [\textit{Naturgeschichte}] and the description of nature [\textit{Naturbeschreibung}] depending on whether the natural division is grounded on “the common law of propagation” or the abstract, Scholastic notion of “classes” which “divides animals according to resemblances [\textit{Ähnlichkeit}].”\textsuperscript{20} The idea was that the study of natural species in light of Buffon’s rule of fertile progeny can truly be called the “history” of nature whereas Linnaeus’ taxonomical system pursues a mere descriptive classification of nature.\textsuperscript{21} Kant’s acceptance of Buffon’s rule was concerned with his

\textsuperscript{18} For instance, Doron suggests that Buffon played a leading role for the change in the style of reasoning in natural history: from a logical and classificatory style to a genealogical one. What Buffon’s theory of species brought about was the view of “genealogical continuity” among varieties of a species, which focuses on lineages and descent; cf. Claude-Olivier Doron, “Race and Genealogy. Buffon and the Formation of the Concept of ‘Race’,” \textit{Humana. Mente Journal of Philosophical Studies}. vol.22 (2012), 87-93.


\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Ak} 2, 429; “Of the different races of human beings” (1777), 84. Kant’s notion of \textit{Naturgeschichte} as a genetic history of nature is first articulated in his 1755 work, “\textit{Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels},” which concerns the genetic account of the solar system.

\textsuperscript{21} Kant’s endorsement of Buffon’s approach, according to Doron, illustrates the historical association of the rise of a genealogical perspective of nature and the change in the view of reproduction. In his words, “natural reproduction constitutes the basis of this new system, and not in its Linnaean meaning (i.e., that the anatomical parts necessary to reproduction must be fixed and static); reproduction is here understood as a \textit{dynamic function} (with historical depth), \textit{as a process which creates lineages, establishes the constancy of characters and sorts differences as more or less constant}.” Claude-Olivier Doron, “Race and Genealogy. Buffon and the Formation of the Concept of ‘Race’,” 92. In a similar vein, Sloan suggests that the Darwinian evolutionary view of nature has its origin in the Enlightenment thinkers’ historicization of biology, which gave “some \textit{privileged epistemological status} to viewing organisms in terms of their history, rather than in terms of their atemporal relations:” Phillip R. Sloan, “Buffon, German Biology,
monogenetic position, claiming that all human beings belong to one and the same human species. Buffon’s rule offered scientific support for the monogenetic claim by providing the essential principle of the biological unity of mankind. However, Kant was also seriously concerned with giving an account of the racial differences of one and the same human species. While the notion of race remained ambiguous in Buffon’s theory of species, Kant elaborated on a precise definition of race. In his second essay on race, “Determination of the concept of a human race” (1785), Kant suggested defining race as the “class difference of the animals of one and the same line of descent [Stamm] insofar as this difference is unfailingly hereditary,”22 arguing that the only character of the human species that is unfailingly hereditary is skin color. To explain the permanent inheritance of the single racial character, i.e., skin color, Kant further supposed the existence of “the germs [Keime] and predispositions [Anlagen] lying in the species itself,” namely the original stock containing a set of pre-structured characteristics of a species on the one hand, and its development depending on the environment on the other.23 What Kant solidified

and the Historical Interpretation of Biological Species,” The British Journal for the History of Science, vol.12, no. 2 (1979), 110. By “historicism of nature,” Sloan means “a genetic explanation” of nature, drawing upon Meinecke’s idea of historicism as concerning “specifying forces and principles acting in time, in opposition to universally acting general laws:” Phillip R. Sloan, “Buffon, German Biology, and the Historical Interpretation of Biological Species,” note 2. He thereby claims that historicism appeared in the realm of the Enlightenment natural history and not only in the studies of human history.

22 Ak 8, 100/ DC, 154. For Kant’s terminological distinction between class (Klasse), species (Gattung), kinds (Arten), stem (Stamme), and race (Rassen), see: Andrea Gambarotto, Vital Forces, Teleology and Organization: Philosophy of Nature and the Rise of Biology in Germany (Cham: Springer, 2018), 66. Gambarotto argues that Kant’s conception of race is mostly derivative of Buffon. According to him, Kant endorses Buffon’s rule as the correct definition of species and shares with the latter the idea that “the natural division actually concern stems (Stämme), which divide animals according to relationships (Verwandtschaften) and generation (Erzeugen),” and not “any abstract division relying on classes (Klasse), which divides animals according to resemblance (Anlichkeiten):” Andrea Gambarotto, Vital Forces, Teleology and Organization: Philosophy of Nature and the Rise of Biology in Germany, 67.

23 Ak 8, 97/ DC, 151. For instance, Africans’ skin is black because they “live in regions in which the air is so phlogistized through thick forests and swamp-covered region” and their skin therefore needs to “remove much phlogiston from the blood” (Ak 8, 103/ DC, 156); Americans’ skin is red because they live in the “aerial acid” environment which “would give the iron particles in the blood the red rust color” (Ak 8, 104/ DC, 157). Inheritance of skin color thus testifies to the human species’ prominent adaptability to the environment, the ability that makes it populate everywhere on earth. But it testifies, more fundamentally, to the purposiveness of nature. In his third and final essay on race, “On the use of teleological principles in philosophy” (1788), Kant claims that the differences of human races cannot be the work of chance; they are “purposively supplied in the original phylum” “in order to
was the genealogic view of species with his definition of race in terms of transmission of
certain characteristics over generations. By considering the color of skin as the definitive
character of the human race and suggesting that the existence of different races and their
inheritance are predetermined, however, Kant theorizes, philosophizes, and perpetuates racism.

What Kant established, therefore, was not only the neutral, biological idea that a species
is a temporal existent that is maintained through a constant process of successive reproduction.
As we have seen above, Kant held that the development of a species involving its differentiation
into racial varieties is pre-determined. That is, there is nothing accidental in the existence of a
species and its differentiation into racial varieties because this is teleologically pre-determined.

In Kant’s theory of race, the temporality of species therefore has very little to do with the notion

ground and subsequently develop the fitness to fewer but more essential ends” (*Ak* 8, 166/ *UT*, 202). That is to say, differentiation of the human species into the four racial varieties is predestined in its original stock. In the same paragraph cited above, Kant further claims that neither do existing races become extinguished, nor is any new race formed. For him, race is preformed and irreversible.

24 In this context, it is to be noted that Kant also embraces epigenesis as a correct account of the generation of an organism, but Kant’s epigenesis involves some preformationist components. Although Kant does not explicitly mention Buffon’s *molecule intérieure*, he acknowledges that Blumenbach offers a plausible account of generation with his notion of formative drive [*Bildungstrieb*], one that neither postulates a supernatural, divine cause, nor appeals to a mere mechanistic notion of matter and motion. Kant writes: “even if one did not recognize the great advantage that the defender of epigenesis has over the other side in the matter of experimental grounds for the proof of his theory, reason would still already be favorably disposed to this explanation because it considers nature, at least as far as propagation is concerned, as itself producing rather than merely developing those things that can initially be represented as possible only in accordance with the causality of ends, and thus, with the least possible appeal to the supernatural, leaves everything that follows from the first beginning to nature. No one has done more for the proof of this theory of epigenesis as well as the establishment of the proper principles of its application, partly by limiting an excessively presumptuous use of it, than Privy Counselor Blumenbach. He begins all physical explanation of these formations with organized matter. For he rightly declares it to be contrary to reason that raw matter would originally have formed itself in accordance with mechanical laws, that life should have arisen from the nature of this lifeless, and that matter should have been able to assemble itself into the form of a self-preserving purposiveness by itself” (*Ak* 5, 424/ *KU*, 292). What is to be noted is that the generation of an organism, for Kant, cannot merely be concerned with the formation of an organic matter insofar as reproduction is also considered a process of inheriting hereditary characters. But his argument about the development of germs and predispositions resulting in racial varieties involves a preformation line of thought that it is pre-determined by nature. Alix Cohen portrays Kant’s theory of race in terms of epigenesis limited by preformationist component and explains the connection of epigenetic and preformationist components as follows: “without preformationist component that allows for natural predispositions to be developed and then transmitted, permanent racial lineages cannot be secured; yet without an epigenetic component that allows some seeds rather than others to be actualized depending on the environment, racial differences cannot be accounted for;” Alix Cohen, *Kant and the Human Sciences. Biology, Anthropology and History* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 25.
of time as objectively measurable, nor with his transcendental view that time as a form of sensibility serving our subjective cognition. It is instead a teleological temporality, which is allegedly governed by the purposiveness of nature. In Chapter 4, I discussed the ways in which Kant’s pragmatic anthropology is grounded in his teleology of nature and his teleology of nature introduces a teleological understanding of human history. What we see in his theory of race is the same line of thoughts whereby a natural species comes to take on a teleological, racist historicity on the basis of the purposiveness of nature. The fundamental problem of Kant’s theory of race, then, consists in the fact that he erroneously makes a constitutive use of a teleology of nature by defining race as predetermined existence and heredity of the color of skin, in contradiction with his claim in the third Critique that a teleology must be limited to a regulative use of reason. Seen this way, Kant is not just a racist who enjoyed a pejorative gossip about non-European races but a racist theorist who gave an epistemological status and theoretical justification to racist understandings of humanity.

**Hegel’s Anti-evolutionary Conception of Species**

Hegel’s discussion of species has often been dealt with in terms of its compatibility with the modern, Darwinian evolutionary theory. J.N. Findlay argues that “had the Darwinian and later data been available, he would certainly have acknowledged the historical trend in Nature that he admits in the realm of Spirit; if any philosopher is a philosopher of evolution, that philosopher is Hegel.” Errol E. Harris suggests that Hegel’s dialectic conceived as a process in which “the superseded moment is preserved, transformed at a higher level of integrity enabled

Hegel to develop a consistent theory both of nature and of mind, which requires, while it properly explains, an evolutionary process in nature.” As these authors observe, Hegel’s notion of the dialectical development provides some conceptual inspiration for the theory of evolution. Their arguments for Hegel’s pro-evolutionism, however, are hardly tenable. Hegel predates Darwin’s evolutionary theory. He was familiar with Lamarck’s pre-Darwinian theory of evolution but strongly rejects Lamarck’s evolutionary theory as a non-Conceptual comprehension of nature. Hegel writes: “one must reject such nebulous and basically sensuous conceptions as for example the so-called emergence of plants and animals out of water, and of the more highly developed animal organizations out of the lower, etc.” Indeed, Hegel’s explicit objection to Lamarck’s evolutionary theory would not be a big problem if one is concerned with demonstrating the conceptual suitability of Hegel’s dialectic for the contemporary conception of evolution, disregarding Hegel’s position to this or that evolutionary theory. But the problem in both Findlay’s and Harris’ arguments, as far as I see, consists in their failure to recognize the essential difference between nature and spirit in Hegel’s philosophy. Hegel holds that the dialectical life of the Concept cannot be exhibited in nature. Consequently, Hegel’s notion of the dialectical development, even if it can be considered as illuminating the conceptual scheme of the Darwinian notion of evolution as those pro-evolutionist readers assume, is within Hegel’s philosophy not applicable to a natural species.


27 As Houlgate points out, the Conceptual comprehension is for Hegel concerned with comprehending “the logical rather than temporal relations between phenomena in nature:” Stephan Houlgate, An Introduction to Hegel. Freedom, Truth and History (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 173.

28 ENZ, § 249 A.
In opposition to pro-evolutionary readings of Hegel, I argue that Hegel’s conception of species is framed by his anti-evolutionary understanding of nature—his rejection of temporalization or historicization of natural species, more broadly speaking.

In its in-itself-existing universality, the genus *particularizes itself*, first of all, in varieties [*Arten*] in general. At the basis of the *various forms* and *orders* of animals lies the universal *type of the animal* determined by the Concept. Nature exhibits this type partly in the various *stages of its development* from the simplest organization to the most perfect, in which nature is the instrument of spirit, and partly in the various *circumstances* and *conditions* of the *elemental nature*. Developed into individuality, the class of the animal distinguishes itself from others in and through itself and is for itself through the negation of others. In this hostile relation to others, in which they are reduced to inorganic nature, *violent death* constitutes the natural fate of individuals.\(^{29}\)

In § 368, Hegel considers the particularization of the genus [*Gattung*] into varieties [*Arten*]. What Hegel here considers is a rational, conceptual classification of natural beings, which he sees is carried out by the French zoologist and paleontologist, Geoges-Fédéric Cuvier’s comparative anatomy. In the *Anmerkung* to § 368, Hegel suggests that Cuvier’s distinctions between monocotyledon and dicotyledon and between vertebrate and invertebrate illustrate a scientific comprehension of empirical observations in accordance with the Concept. Hegel’s point in the passage above is that morphological features of animals exhibit the determinations of the Concept, such that one can systematically arrange them by the extent of their organization. The “development” here at stake, therefore, has very little to do with a temporal, evolutionary

\(^{29}\) *ENZ*, § 368.
development which underlines Kant’s genealogical consideration of a species’ differentiation into its varieties over time; instead, it concerns the logical determinations of the Concept, which one can associate with certain morphological features of natural beings. Animals’ morphological features are also associated with different circumstances and conditions of the environmental world. When one systematically considers the division of nature in view of those morphological features which display both the Concept-determinations and the particular environmental factors, it turns out, for Hegel, that the highest one in the system of nature is the class of animals that have individuality, which bears selfness in and through the negative relation to an other, and is subject to death in that practical relation to an other.

A completely systematic classification of nature, however, is not possible because nature exhibits the infinite variety of animal features, all of which cannot be, and not need to be considered in conformity to the Concept-determinations. In Hegel’s terms, “the forms of nature cannot be brought into an absolute system” and this is because the animal life is “bound to the infinitely numerous particularizations of inorganic and vegetable nature,” which it is “not able to overcome.” The particular circumstances and conditions of the environmental world to which the animal life is subordinated are therefore the fundamental elements that hinder us from conceiving the animal world as a complete, rational system of organization. They mark the contingency of nature and further, the externality of the Idea. Correspondingly, the infinite variety of nature, for Hegel, marks “the immediacy of the Idea of life,” that is, “the Concept as such failing to exist in life, submitting its existence therefore to the manifold conditions and

30 ENZ, § 368 Z.
circumstances of the external nature, and being able to appear in the most stunted forms:” “the fruitfulness of the earth” which “allows to break forth everywhere, and in all kinds of ways.”

As was clearly shown above, the focus in Hegel’s discussion of the genus in terms of the classification of natural beings is based on the natural character of the environmental circumstances and conditions to which the animal beings are connected—natural, in the sense of representing the externality of the Idea. Accordingly, animal life in general can be called a natural life, for Hegel, in the sense that it is essentially connected to environmental factors. To be more precise, animal life is characterized by its “sympathetic participation in the universal course of nature,” which makes it plausible to assume a “connection between the life of the animal, and the moon, as well as terrestrial and sidereal life.” This immediate participation of the animal life in the environmental world is demonstrated, Hegel suggests, by animals’ premonitions including birds’ prediction of earthquakes, spiders and frogs’ presentiment of the coming weather, and man’s awareness of a future climatic change. It is here not hard to see that the natural soul in the Anthropology lives an animal life insofar as, for example, the weather, climate, and season affect its mood.

However, neither every kind of animal nor every kind of animal life is subordinated to the environmental world to the same degree. For Hegel, not all animals share the same environmental world because “each animal has as its own only a restricted range of inorganic nature, which is its own domain, and which it must seek out by instinct from its complex

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31 ENZ, § 368 A.
32 ENZ, § 361 A.
33 Cf. Ibid.
Each animal, in other words, has a specific, particular range of other plants and animals that serve to its preservation of life and has an instinctual cognition of what other plants and animals it is to eat to maintain its life. In Hegel’s terms, the animal can be stimulated “only by means of its inorganic nature” because the animal “does not recognize the other in general” but “its own other.” The sight of a deer, Hegel suggests, cannot give rise to a lion’s desire for it if there is not such an instinctual, immanent determinations of the lion’s inorganic nature. Thus, the kind of animal life that plays a key role in Hegel’s thought about animals’ connection with the environmental world, as far as I see, is the nutritive life or eating. This point bears a further, important implication with respect to the ways in which animals interact with their environmental world. Hegel considers Cuvier’s attention to teeth and claws to offer a valuable insight into animals’ instinctual connection with the environmental world because those “weapons” are “that through which an animal posits and preserves itself as a being-for-itself over against another animal, that is, differentiates itself from itself.” This being said, animals with such weapons are not passive to their environmental world because they can exercise a negative power on its inorganic nature to the extent that it brings violent death to other animals. This class of animals that can bring death to others and risk its life in bringing death to others, I suggest, is one that is in § 368 said to occupy the highest position in the system of nature: the class of animals that have individuality and subjectivity in and through a negative relation to others. They are highest natural beings because they are the least subordinated to their environmental world and can even go for a negative relation to the latter.

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34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 ENZ, § 368 A.
The considerations above about Hegel’s discussion of the environmental world show that his notion of the genus \([\textit{Gattung}]\) means more than a natural species. Hegel certainly holds the idea of the genus as a natural species. He embraces Buffon’s rule in his discussion of the genus-process by taking the sex-relationship and propagation as key factors of that process, which he considers as a way in which an individual relates to its universal. It is to be noted, however, that Hegel’s notion of the genus as a natural species does not take up Kant’s and Buffon’s genealogical ideas. Regarding this point, I pay attention to the fact that in considering the genus-process, Hegel does not address questions about the generation of an organism or about the origin of diverse varieties of one and the same natural species. He dismisses the debates between epigenesis and preformation as unworthy of philosophical discussion and criticizes the debates between monogenesis and polygenesis as being motivated by the desire to show one’s race’s superiority over others.\(^{37}\) For him, the sole fact that the human being is rational is sufficient for ensuring the equality of right for all human beings.\(^{38}\) In a similar vein, he takes the racial difference of humankind to be a matter of geography, which connects the diversity of human races with different geographical features of the Old world (divided into Africa, Asia, and Europe) and the New world (America).\(^{39}\)

\(^{37}\) ENZ, § 393 Z.

\(^{38}\) Ibid.

\(^{39}\) One of my claims is that Hegel’s \textit{Anthropology} is not grounded in the teleological view of history presented in his philosophy of world history, nor does it systematically introduce the racist, Eurocentric view of history. This is because the \textit{Anthropology} considers the racial differences as merely natural, non-spiritual determinations of human beings. Despite this, it is hard to deny that Hegel’s “spiritual” standpoint has some racist implications. In the \textit{Zusatz} to § 393, Hegel states that “in a spiritual respect,” “negroes are to be regarded as the nation of a child” dominated by uncultured naïveté; with Asian races, “spirit begins to awake, separate itself from nature” but “does not grasp itself as yet in its absolute freedom;” with the Caucasian race, spirit “first attains to the absolute unity with itself.” This “spiritual” consideration of the racial differences is based on his view that universal human history can be considered in terms of the achievement of the modern, political freedom. In the Conclusion, I critically consider the potential, racist implications of Hegel’s \textit{Anthropology}. For studies of Hegel’s racism, see in particular: Susan Buck-Morss, \textit{Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History} (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009); Robert Bernasconi, “Hegel at the Court of Ashanti,” in \textit{Hegel After Derrida}, ed. Stuart Barnett, (Routledge, 1998), 41-63; Darrel Mollandorf, “Racism and Rationality in Hegel’s Philosophy of Subjective Spirit,” \textit{History of Political Thought},
In contrast with Kant’s and Buffon’s genealogical notion of a natural species, Hegel holds a broader conception of the genus, I suggest, as signifying the universal of an individual that appears in three forms: (1) the natural species it belongs to; (2) the environmental world to which it is immediately connected, but with which it can enter into a negative relation; (3) the organic constitution of its living, healthy body.\footnote{40} My claim is that what has a special significance for Hegel’s \textit{Anthropology} is the second meaning of the genus, i.e., the environmental world. As

\textit{Gattung as the Environmental World}

For an analysis of Hegel’s dialectical notion of life and death, see in particular: Jay Lampert, “Speed, Impact, and Fluidity at the Barrier between Life and Death,” \textit{Angelaki}, 10:3 (2005): 145-56. Paying attention to several places in Hegel’s \textit{Philosophy of Nature} where he mentions life and death, Lampert shows that they are not subject to a dualistic, rigid distinction. From the case of death by impact and Hegel’s idea that impact of bodies constitutes displacement of one space-time configuration by another configuration, first, Lampert draws out the point that life is transition between motion and impact whereas death is the loss of this transition. This being said, life consists in space-time flexibility whereas death is its dissolution. Hegel’s idea of an animal organism, second, for Lampert, involves three forms of life and death: in the bone, excretion, and the sex. Through an analysis of these three forms of life and death concerning an animal’s self-movement, Lampert shows that life consists in superfluidity, surplus, and overflow whereas death is over-fluidity, over-surplus, and the flow of overflow. Specifically, he makes an interesting remark on excretion. He suggests that excretion of the bile is for Hegel a high animal’s ability to “make use of useless things to take death itself and reshape it.” Jay Lampert, “Speed, Impact, and Fluidity at the Barrier between Life and Death,” 149. As such, a high animal can immediately embody its feeling of anger with the excretion of the bile. This discussion complements Hegel’s idea of embodiment in the \textit{Anthropology} from the perspective of the \textit{Philosophy of Nature}. The last case Lampert discusses is Hegel’s idea of health and disease. As he shows, health and disease are for Hegel concerned with the proportional relationship between organic and inorganic elements, that is, fluidity and rigidity.
mentioned above, Hegel considers the environmental world, first, as the universal, terrestrial and sidereal course of nature in which the animal life immediately and sympathetically participates and, second, as the particular, inorganic nature with which an animal enters into a negative relation. In relation to this notion of the environmental world in the *Philosophy of Nature*, we notice that the natural soul is in the *Anthropology* treated, first of all, as participating in the universal course of life, being immediately subordinated to meteorological, geographic/racial, and dispositional determinations. The natural soul, I suggest, is also exposed to the violent death that characterizes the mutual relationship between animals in the environmental world. Although Hegel does not make this point explicit in the *Anthropology*, his conception of the violent death in the *Philosophy of Nature* of the 1830 *Encyclopedia*reminds us of his idea in the 1807 *Phenomenology of Spirit* of the life-death-struggle as the requisite for the rise of self-consciousness. Hegel’s idea in this early work is that self-consciousness first appears as a subject of desire, that is, a natural, sentient being, and it should get itself liberated from this natural existence by risking its life and thereby proving that it is completely detached from the attachment to life. In relation to this, the notion of the environmental world as involving the violent death in the *Philosophy of Nature* in the 1830 *Encyclopedia* makes it plausible to assume that the world in which self-consciousness enters into the life-death-struggle is a natural world in which animals are forced to risk their lives for survival. Seen this way, one can say that the early *Phenomenology of Spirit* thematizes the sublation of this natural world into a spiritual world of intersubjectivity. The *Anthropology* of the 1830 *Encyclopedia*, as far as I see, retains this theme of the transition from nature to spirit but addresses it through a systematic examination of a sentient being’s bodiliness and its sublation by habit.
However, the environmental world inhabited by the natural soul cannot be the same as the environmental world of animals discussed in the Philosophy of Nature. As mentioned earlier, the natural soul that has individuality in its persisting through the stages of life is no longer subordinated to the universal course of nature; it lives in a cultural world by reacting in different ways depending on the stage of life it is passing through. The natural aspect of this cultural world is therefore to be explained in other terms than the violent death characteristic of the animal environmental world. The cultural world in which the soul is still subordinated to death, as far as I see, can best be understood in terms of the co-growth of the soul and the world. Regarding this point, I pay attention to Hegel’s notion that the external world “has its thread in him in such a way that what he actually is for himself, consists in threads, so that he too would die away internally together with the disappearance of these externalities.”⁴¹ In other words, the soul is essentially opened to the external world and lets the latter flow through into it; it thus comes to reflect within it the rational constitution of the actual world. By implication, the soul grows in the world and together with the world. She grows in the world since it is to be educated and enculturated so as to lead her life in actuality as an adult; she grows together with the world in the sense that the actuality of the world is not something fixed but is something changeable by the activities of the individual souls. We may say that the world grows, for Hegel, as much as the individuals grow. Conversely, the external world that flows through into the soul and becomes part of it is essential for the soul to have actuality. This close connection between individuals and the world also applies to death, such that the collapse of the existing world results in the internal death of an individual. It happens, Hegel suggests, when one’s beloved friends die or when one suffers from homesickness. The internal death of an individual upon her losing the connection

⁴¹ ENZ, § 406 A.
with the world is also observed, according to Hegel, in the stoic Roman senator, Cato’s killing himself with the downfall of the Roman republic. As Hegel gives many examples of such a connection between individuals and the world, the idea of the co-constitution, co-growth, and co-death of individuals and the world, I argue, serves as an implicit, underlying assumption of Hegel’s *Anthropology*.

As I discuss later, Hegel’s concern about this anthropological world that co-exists and co-grows with individuals is that the soul gets involved in derangement if it loses such a close connection with the world. The soul’s immediate existence as bodiliness marks the spiritual illness, that is, the diseased state in which spirit is involved in its development throughout the *Anthropology*. Accordingly, spirit comes to reveal itself in the form of life when the soul’s immediate bodiliness is transformed into second nature by habit. Seen this way, if the natural aspect of the cultural world inhabited by the natural soul consists in the fact that the soul’s individuality is determined by natural birth and death; the natural aspect which is to be sublated is eventually concerned with the soul’s bodiliness. Then, we can perhaps say that for Hegel, habit is a process whereby one’s natural, first body dies and gains a spiritual, second life.

1.4. The Sex-relationship and the Family: Duplication of Naturgeist

The second way of the alteration of the natural soul is the sex-relationship. According to Hegel’s short account in §397, the sex-relationship is the “moment of real opposition of the individual to itself” whereby “it seeks and finds itself in another individual.” It involves the “natural difference” between woman and man: the difference between the one who remains a harmonious self-unity without having the moment of opposition and does not advance to
“universal purposes” because her life is based on the “sentiment [Empfindung] of ethical life [Sittlichkeit],” and the other who proceeds to the “opposition of universal, objective interests to the existence at hand, the existence of his own and that of the external world, and “actualizes those universal, objective interests in this existence” by “producing their unity.” Finally, the “spiritual and ethical significance” of the sex-relationship is found in the “family.”

While the stages of life are concerned with the life of an individual soul, the sex-relationship is a relationship between two individuals. We thus notice that the sex-relationship, considered in terms of seeking and finding oneself in an other, prefigures the intersubjective relationship of recognition—that in which “self-consciousness exists for another self-consciousness,” as stated in the Phenomenology of Spirit. What underlies Hegel’s recognitional presentation of the sex-relationship is the concept of love that he developed in his Frankfurt years. In the 1798 manuscript “The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate,” Hegel elaborated on the idea that in love the self finds itself in the other as the other finds itself in that subject. While in this manuscript Hegel articulates the significance and structure of the experience of love in order to present the religion of love as an alternative to Kantian morality, in his fragment on “Love,” written eight months before “The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate,” we find a more explicit reference to the mundane experience of love. Specifically, the logic of love is found in Juliet’s statement in Romeo and Juliet that “the more I give to thee, the more I have.” For the young Hegel at Frankfurt, love was thus a category that expressed a union of subject and object, which one can broadly understand in terms of the dialectical union in difference, although Hegel had

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42 GW 9, 108-9/ PhS, § 177.

not yet developed the idea and method of the dialectic. Thus, the sex-relationship as the second way of the alteration of the natural soul in the *Anthropology* retains the recognitional, dialectical meaning of love, as opposed to denoting a sexual relation, which we understand according to its natural aspects such as sexual desire or reproduction.

Despite this spiritual connotation, however, the sex-relationship in the *Anthropology* is natural; it still marks the naturalness of *Naturgeist* and not its sublation as and into *Geist*. To spell out the signification of the sex-relationship for the development of *Naturgeist* in the *Anthropology*, we therefore need to clarify the spiritual and natural aspect of it and the relationship between these two aspects. Regarding this, we observe that Hegel describes the natural difference between the two sexes involved in the sex-relationship in terms of the difference in the ways in which each side relates to her/his ethical life [*Sittlichkeit*]. The difference between the two sexes thus involves a certain spiritual dimension, of which the full spiritual significance is, Hegel suggests, found in the family. This short account of the sex-relationship in the *Anthropology*, as far as I see, retains the contrast between man and woman in the “Spirit” chapter of the 1807 *Phenomenology of Spirit*. In what follows, I examine, first, how the Jena *Phenomenology of Spirit* describes the first appearance of *Geist*, the Greek ethical life, in terms of the opposition between woman and man through an interpretation of Sophocles’ *Antigone*; second, how the “Ethical Life” section in the philosophy of objective spirit deals with the sex relationship and the family in terms of spirit’s re-naturalization of itself as *Naturgeist*; and third, what these mean for the *Naturgeist* in the *Anthropology*.

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44 For the detail, see Frederick Beiser, *Hegel* (New York and London: Routledge, 2005), 112-123.
Antigone and the Family: the Limited Sublation of Nature in and through Nature in the Phenomenology of Spirit

In the Jena Phenomenology of Spirit, Geist appears for the first time in the ethical life [Sittlichkeit] of the ancient Greeks. For Hegel, the characteristic of the Greek ethical life is the un-reflected, immediate unity of private and communal life. For instance, Antigone did not experience any inner conflict in risking her life to bury her brother, Polynices’ body, following the unwritten, customary law; the Greek heroes accepted their fate without any resistance or hesitation. Yet, this Greek ethical life also involves the opposition between the two laws concerning one’s communal life: the unwritten, customary law, and the written, public law. This opposition is revealed by the confrontation between Antigone and Creon, the new ruler of Thebes, that is, Antigone’s burial of her brother’s body in defiance of Creon’s command that Polynices’ body be left to rot on the battlefield as punishment for his treason.

The confrontation between Antigone and Creon thus reveals, for Hegel, the opposition within the Greek ethical life itself. This internal opposition of the Greek ethical life embraces the mutually related, binary oppositions: between the divine and the human law, the family and the city, night and light, unconsciousness and consciousness, passivity and activity, substantiality and subjectivity/actuality, and so forth. But all these oppositions are eventually represented by one and the same opposition, that between woman and man. Thus, Antigone and Creon represent womanhood [Weiblichkeit] and manhood [Männlichkeit], which represent, in turn, the different principles for the two different forms of community, i.e., the family and the city, respectively. Whereas womanhood bears the passivity of following the given, divine law, manhood is the activity of enforcing the human law. Whereas woman is immersed in the substantiality of the ethical life, sticking to the life of the family, man is engaged in the subjectivity and actuality of the ethical life that is realized in the city. Thus, the difference between the two sexes, for Hegel,
is a natural difference, of which the “naturalness acquires at the same time the significance of their ethical [sittlich] determination.”

In his early work the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel considers the first appearance of *Geist* in terms of a community [*Gemeinwesen*] that ties up plural individual agents. At least in its first appearance as the ethical life of the ancient Greek, spirit thus has the connotation of the spirit of the people [*Volkgeist*]. It is therefore to be noted that the *Phenomenology of Spirit* thematizes the appearance or emergence of *Geist* in a very different way than the mature system of the *Encyclopedia*, in which the *Philosophy of Spirit* is preceded by the *Logic* and the *Philosophy of Nature*; and the family, together with civil society and the state, is considered in light of the modern *Sittlichkeit*. Despite this, we notice that the *Phenomenology of Spirit* also presents, although not systematically, the idea of the overcoming of nature in and through nature for the development of *Geist*. This is found in Hegel’s account of the sex-relationship within the family.

To begin, the family is for Hegel basically a “natural ethical community” grounded in natural factors: the blood relationship, sexual desire, and emotional affections. It is thus distinct from the city because the family members’ service and work are made for the sake of meeting their private needs and not the universal purposes realized by the city. Now, Hegel analyzes the family according to three relationships: husband and wife, parents and children, and sisters and brothers. The relationship between husband and wife involves “mutual recognition;” however,

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45 GW 9, 248/ PhS, § 459.
46 Cf. GW 9, 242/ PhS, § 447.
47 GW 9, 242-3/ PhS, §§ 450-51.
48 See GW 9, 246-7/ PhS, § 456. This passage in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is the source of all citations made in this paragraph with respect to Hegel’s accounts of the relationships between husband and wife and between parents and children.
this mutual recognition is a “natural and not an ethical one.” The recognition between husband and wife is natural because it is based on sexual desires, feelings, and affections; it is not ethical because the union of those two parties seeking and finding themselves in their other has no “actual existence” in itself. Instead, the union of husband and wife has its actual existence in its other, i.e., the child, which is their “objective reality.” Thus, the relationship between husband and wife “disappears [in their other],” in such a way that “this alteration of successive generations has its enduring basis in the people [Volk].” In the relationship between husband and wife, which is “mixed with a natural relation and with feeling [Empfindung],” “the return-to-itself to the relationship does not take place within the relationship itself.” By the same token, the second relationship constitutive of the family, the relationship between parents and children, is characterized by mutual otherness. Both sides have emotional affections towards each other, specifically reverence. But the parents’ reverence of their children is grounded in their witnessing that their children become an “alien reality,” an “independent existence which they are unable to take back again;” the child’s reverence towards their parents comes from the fact that “[the child] has her becoming or being-in-itself in an other who disappears, and attains her being-for-itself and self-consciousness of her own only by the separation from the origin.”

The third relationship constitutive of the family, between sister and brother, is different from those first two relationships, which are confined to a “transition and disparity of the sides.”\footnote{See \textit{GW} 9, 247-8/ \textit{PhS}, § 457.} Sister and brother are tied to one another through the blood relationship. However, they are “free individuals with regard to each other” because they have “not given to, or received from, one another [their] being-for-itself;” further, they “do not desire one another.”\footnote{Ibid.} In this
relationship between two free individuals free from desire, “the feminine, in the form of the sister, has the highest intuition of the ethical essence.” What Hegel here has in mind is the story of Antigone and her burial of her brother Polynices’ body. For Hegel, burying a dead family member’s body has a special meaning for the family as an ethical community. Through burial, the family keeps its dead member tied up to itself beyond natural death and thereby expands its blood relationship beyond the limit of nature. Through burial, in other words, the dead members are turned into universal beings who are preserved as family members even after their deaths. The buried dead members, then, are no longer natural beings confined to natural conditions and limits because they are dead; however, they are preserved as part of the natural ethical community grounded in the blood relationship. One would therefore have to say, more precisely, that the blood relationship, as the ground of the family, is completed by the elements that contradict its naturalness: the deaths of individuals, that is, the perishing of its living members, and the transformation of them into non-natural, universal beings. The family, then, is a natural community that keeps itself as such by overcoming nature in and through its own naturalness. It is also an ethical community in which individual members are not separate from one another but instead tied up to each other by the mediation of the dead members who are turned into universal beings. It is in this sense that the family can rightly be called a natural ethical community.

Of importance, however, is not such a general meaning of burial. In Hegel’s presentation, burial is an ethical action that Antigone was able to do because she was standing in the sex-relationship that is free from sexual desire. Since she is in that particular sex-relation with her brother free from natural desires and individual interests, she conducts herself as a universal

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51 Ibid.
52 See GW 9, 244-5/ PhS, § 452.
being rather than as an individual member who sticks to another with some particular feelings or affections. Further, her burial is an action, one that animates her family. Thus, Antigone is not just one of the members of her family; she is the guardian, namely the one who turns her family into an ethical union beyond the natural limit by her action, binding her family members to each other by effectuating the mediation by the dead. Thus, the sex-relationship between sister and brother, Antigone and Polynices, is contrasted with another sex-relationship in the family: that between husband and wife. As mentioned above, this sex-relationship involving sexual desire does not produce an ethical union because its product, its objective reality, is an other that remains outside of it, i.e., the child.

Now, one can rightly call into question the legitimacy of the special meaning and status that Hegel gives to the relationship between sister and brother. If burial offers the key element that makes the family an ethical union, should the member who performs the burial actually matter? If Hegel’s message is that the full meaning of that ethical action bears on the fact that the actor acts as a universal being free from natural desire and individual interests, why can we not expect that that ethical action takes place in the same-sex relationship between brother and brother, and sister and sister? Further, if the ethical action occurs in the other-sex relationship between sister and brother as Hegel suggests, can we not think of the opposite case to Antigone’s burial as also an ethical action, namely the brother’s burial of his sister’s body? All of these questions boil down to the key supposition underlying Hegel’s presentation of Antigone: the difference between the sexes is a natural difference, and as such, is the natural element that underlies the first appearance of Geist in the form of the Greek ethical life.

Thus, we must remember that Antigone stands in another sex-relationship that is outside of the family: the binary opposition between woman and man, represented by her confrontation
with Creon. Of importance is that Antigone, who displays “the highest intuition of the ethical essence” through her ethical action, is “the feminine” appearing “in the form of the sister.”

That is, Antigone, as the guardian of the family who makes her family into an ethical union, is the woman who resists the ruler’s command, to be precise. And this woman, for Hegel, is an “internal enemy” of the city, because the city can sustain itself only by keeping itself from being dissolved into multiple families. Hegel’s point here has nothing to do with an extreme anti-family socialist position. What he analyzes through the story of Antigone is, again, the internal opposition of the Greek ethical life between the two principles of the two different forms of ethical community: the family and the city. This internal opposition is “the conflict of the ethical order and self-consciousness with unconscious nature and the contingency stemming from nature.” It is also the conflict between two powers: the power of the “manifest spirit [der offenbare Geist]” of the upper world, and that of the household deities, the Penates, governing the underworld. In the case of the Greek ethical life, however, the former has the source of its union in the latter, that is, in the “mute unconscious substance of all, in the waters of forgetfulness.” The internal opposition of the Greek ethical life is therefore not resolved within it, which leads to its collapse. This is how Hegel describes the development of Geist at its beginning stage in terms of the historical transition from the Greek antiquity to the Roman world in the Phenomenology of Spirit.

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53 Ibid.
54 GW 9, 258-9/PhS, § 475.
55 GW 9, 256/PhS, § 452.
56 GW 9, 257-8/PhS, §§ 474-5.
57 Ibid.
From the above considerations of Hegel’s presentation of the Greek ethical life in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, we can then draw out the following points with respect to the relationship between nature and spirit. In the Greek ethical life, there is a moment when nature is overcome in and through itself: Antigone’s burial of her brother’s body, which serves the establishment of the family as an ethical union beyond the natural limit, death. This sublation of nature, however, is limited because it stands in an oppositional relationship with another, more truthful, ethical union, i.e., the city. Further, this limited sublation of nature strengthens the principle of the family, thereby intensifying the internal conflict of the Greek ethical life so as to lead this spiritual union to its dissolution. In the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, therefore, the family, its guardian Antigone, and therefore womanhood, remain representative of nature, which leads to the dissolution of the first appearance of *Geist* in stark opposition to it.

**The Family in the Philosophy of Objective Spirit: the Sublation of Naturgeist in and through Naturgeist**

Hegel’s presentation of Antigone in the Jena *Phenomenology of Spirit* has generated criticisms for being sexist.58 The idea that the difference of the sexes is a natural difference likely supports gender essentialism, suggesting that femininity and masculinity are fixed, innate qualities. The idea that womanhood concerns the life of the family and manhood is about the life of the city tends to promote a patriarchal understanding of gender roles. This sexist connotation of Hegel’s Antigone, however, turns out to be far more perplexing than it seems when we consider the significance of nature in relation to the manifestation of spirit, which underlies his

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discussion of the difference of the sexes. If my previous discussion is correct, womanhood eventually represents nature, and it does so as the power of opposition. Of importance is that womanhood does not just oppose manhood but represents the opposition itself. It represents, in other words, the element of difference that stubbornly resists incorporation into the system of identity. Thus, it eventually concerns the opposition between nature and spirit that is internal to spirit: the moment of difference or self-differentiation in and through which alone spirit can manifest itself. This ontological framework of his discussion of the sexual difference, I think, has some important critical powers in relation to sexism. I will discuss this in the Conclusion. Of more importance with respect to our study of Hegel’s *Anthropology* is that in his mature system of the *Encyclopedia*, nature is the locus of the negativity of spirit as a realm of difference which does not exhibit the Conceptual, organic totality. Seen this way, what womanhood presented in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is fundamentally concerned with is the dialectic negativity of nature that plays a key role in the *Encyclopedia* system.

Hegel’s discussion of the sex relationship is thus essentially situated in the dialectical relationship between nature and spirit. And this is even more the case in his mature system of the *Encyclopedia*. At this point, we need to clarify how the two texts, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the *Encyclopedia*, consider the sex relationship differently. As we have seen above, the discussion of the sex relationship in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* boils down to the notion of the family as a natural ethical union. To recapitulate, the sex relationship constitutes a union of love, specifically through the relationship between husband and wife, where each side seeks and finds his or her self in the other side. The sex relationship thus has a recognitional structure, but it only

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59 It should also be noted that limiting the resistance to incorporation of the system of identity to a particular gender entails sexism.
realizes a natural mode of recognition, which is based on sexual desires and emotional affections. As such, the sex relationship does not create a rational bond among the members, failing to produce a spiritual, ethical community that realizes universal purposes of the people. The family is also involved in another sex relation: the opposition between man and woman. Considered in terms of the womanly guardianship, the family is a union of kinship, which is preserved beyond the natural limit, death, through the mediation by the dead. In this framework where the principle of the family opposes the principle of the city, however, the oppositional difference of the sexes eventually leads to the decline of the Greek ethical life. In the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, the family thus represents the natural remainder in the appearance of Geist that remains not sublated by and as Geist. That is, the family is a spiritual union; however, as a bond of love or as a bond of kinship, it is also a natural union of which the ethical, spiritual dimension is subordinated to nature.

At first glance, the brief discussion of the sex relationship in § 397 of the 1830 *Encyclopedia* seems to reiterate the idea presented in the early *Phenomenology of Spirit* that the sex relationship is about the family as a natural ethical union. To recapitulate, the sex relationship, now conceived as the second way of the alteration of the natural soul, constitutes (1) a bond of love, (2) involves a natural difference that also represents the different ways in which one relates herself or himself to their ethical life, and (3) finds its ethical, spiritual significance in the family. We notice, however, that the family is here considered in terms of spirituality, rather than naturalness, of the sex relationship. It is, in other words, not a natural ethical union that fails to reconcile with another ethical union that concerns the public life of the city, but a spiritual ethical union in which the half-natural and half-spiritual relationship, i.e., the sex relationship conceived either as a bond of love or in terms of the difference of the sexes, has
its ultimate spiritual meaning. In line with this, we also notice that in the *Encyclopedia* system, the family is not the subject matter of the *Anthropology* but is treated in the third part of the philosophy of objective spirit, “Ethical Life.” Thus, we can say, to be precise, that what really concerns the sex relationship as a way of the alteration of the natural soul is its first two conceptual factors, i.e., a bond of love and the difference of the sexes. We are here reminded that the alteration of the natural soul is concerned with the differences that are at once physical and spiritual. The “Ethical Life” chapter in the philosophy of spirit, then, presents the family as that in which the naturalness of the sex relationship is ultimately resolved. In the mature system of the *Encyclopedia*, the family no longer represents a natural remainder of spirit, which can even lead to the latter’s dissolution, but presents the sublation of Naturgeist. As I examine in what follows, however, this sublation of Naturgeist in the family assumes re-naturalization of spirit as Naturgeist in the form of the family. Thus, the significance of the sex relationship in the *Anthropology* centers around the dialectic of Naturgeist in the *Encyclopedia* system.

To begin, the sex-relationship reappears in the last stage of the philosophy of objective spirit, i.e., ethical life [Sittlichkeit]. In the mature system of the *Encyclopedia*, ethical life is the “completion of objective spirit” in which the one-sidedness of both subjective, and objective spirit is sublated. With this completion of objective spirit, we come to the reconciliation between the objective, normative world and one’s inward individuality. Thus, an ethical [sittlich] subject relates herself to the ethical substance she is living in with an ethical sentiment [sittliche Gesinnung], specifically trust. As such a sentimental unity of an ethical subject and

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60 ENZ, § 513.
61 Ibid.
62 See ENZ, § 515.
her ethical substance, ethical life has the form of custom [Sitte],” and in custom, the “subjective freedom” or the “self-conscious freedom” “became nature.”63 To be precise, custom is a nature that has become nature and not a nature that is given: a second nature, which in the Philosophy of Right is considered to be “posited in the place of the first, merely natural will” and to be the “spirit that is living and presents as a world, of which [spirit] the substance exists now for the first time as spirit.”64 This being said, at the stage of ethical life, Geist appears as “immediate or natural spirit [Naturgeist],” and this Naturgeist that reappears at the stage of ethical life is the “family.”65 And the family is, first of all, the elevation of the sex relationship to something spiritual:

The ethical spirit, when in its immediacy, contains the natural moment that the individual has its substantial existence in its natural universality, the genus,—the sex relationship, but elevated to a spiritual determination;—the unity of love and the sentiment of trust;—spirit, as family, is sensitive [empfindend] spirit.66

In the family, in other words, the sex-relationship is, first, a natural, animal process, that is, the sex relationship as a moment of the genus-process considered at the end of the Philosophy of Nature.67 But it means more than sexual copulation [Begattung], second, because in the

63 ENZ, § 513.
64 PR, § 151.
65 ENZ, § 517.
66 ENZ, § 518.
67 One might here point out that Hegel’s understanding of sexual desires as merely natural is somehow limited, considering the fact that they also involve complicated operations of unconsciousness as Freud showed. This issue would require an extensive study of Hegel’s understanding of the sex-relationship in relation to his theory of sensation, imagination, and desire. As this goes beyond the scope of my dissertation, I reserve it for my future studies.
family, it constitutes a bond of love and involves the ethical sentiment [Besinnung]. This elevation of the meaning of the sex relationship in the family, however, elevates the Naturgeist reappearing at the level of objective spirit only to “sensitive spirit.” A rationally ethical bond, which is to replace the bond based on love and sentiment, then, is produced by marriage:

The difference of the natural sexes also appears at the same time as a difference of intellectual and ethical determination. These personalities combine, in accordance with their exclusive individuality, to form one person; subjective intimacy determines them to substantial unity, makes this union into an ethical relationship—marriage. The substantial intimacy makes marriage into an undivided bond of persons—monogamous marriage; the physical union is a consequence of the ethically formed bond.68

The ethical meaning of the difference of the sexes here consists in the fact that the two sexes conduct themselves as persons, namely as those who have the abstract right to property and enter into the contract relationship with other persons.69 This notion of person as an economic and legal subject being assumed, what the two persons of different sexes produce through marriage is one person: one entity for household economy. This ethical entity produced by monogamist marriage, then, is itself a living unity that operates for the purpose of earning a living. This is the third, economical dimension of the family considered in the Encyclopedia system, and it is through the family in this third sense that the difference of the sexes as a natural difference reveals its full, ethical and spiritual meaning. With this being revealed, then, a physical union between the two sexes based on desire does not have any essential meaning for the family. When

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68 ENZ, § 519.
69 For the details see ENZ, §§ 488-492; PR, §§ 41-71.
the family is considered in its spiritual ethical bond, the physical union is not the cause, but only a consequence of marriage; it is not necessary, but only accidental; not essential, but merely peripheral. To be more precise, if the physical bond has any sense in the family, this is so only through marriage; marriage is the end of the physical bond and not vice versa. In a similar vein, if the sex relationship can constitute a union of love in the family, this second sense of the family is made possible by marriage; Hegel writes, marriage is the converting of the “union of natural sexes,” the union that “is only internal or in-itself and for that reason is only external in its existence,” into “self-conscious love.” When the family is considered as a bond for house economy produced by monogamist marriage, therefore, the Naturgeist that reappears in the philosophy of objective spirit in the form of the family, is no longer subordinated to nature. Its naturalness is now exhausted.

It thus appears that the family occupies a pivotal status in Hegel’s system. As discussed several times throughout this dissertation, Hegel’s Encyclopedia system centers on the dialectical relationship between nature and spirit. The fundamental characteristic of Hegel’s Geist, again, consists in the determination that it can only reveal itself in and through its other: it is a being in otherness, which can reflect into itself only in this being in otherness. The dialectical becoming of Geist thus occurs through nature because nature is its principal, prominent other. Geist reveals itself by alienating itself into nature and reflecting into itself in and from nature. This being assumed, Naturgeist has an essentially dialectical meaning: it is the form of Geist in which Geist is in its other and therefore, through which it is to return to itself. According to Hegel’s

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70 PR, § 161.
exposition of ethical life in the philosophy of objective spirit, Naturgeist in this dialectical sense is the family.

*Naturgeist in the Anthropology without the World as a Second Nature*

Returning to the sex relationship in the *Anthropology*, we first need to clarify how the two forms of Naturgeist, one in the *Anthropology* and the other in the philosophy of objective spirit, differ from one another. We notice that in the *Anthropology*, Naturgeist appears in its immediacy. It appears in the form of the natural soul, of which existence and life are associated with natural elements in an inseparable, unconscious, and irreflective manner. The *Anthropology*, then, shows how this Naturgeist gets out of its immediate submergence in nature by thematizing the soul-body relationship—by considering how the soul immediately exists as bodiliness, and how this immediate and natural bodiliness is transformed into a spiritual bodiliness through habit. The *Anthropology* thus concerns the immediate presence of Naturgeist and its spiritualization with the sublation of its naturalness. In relation to this, then, Naturgeist in the philosophy of objective spirit is a re-naturalization of spirit—spirit that appeared as immediate Naturgeist, sublated its naturalness, and thus spiritualized itself in the *Anthropology*. What underlines this re-naturalization of spirit in the form of the family, again, is the dialectical feature of spirit that necessarily involves self-externalization, self-alienation into its other, and self-naturalization to regain and reveal itself in its being otherness. While in the *Anthropology* Naturgeist appears in its immediacy, then, this immediacy is resolved by spirit’s re-self-naturalization as Naturgeist. What the family concerns is such a dialectical movement of spirit that lets itself reappear in its immediate submergence in nature to resolve this immediacy itself.
While Naturgeist is a central figure of spirit that is involved in its dialectical movement, its double appearance has a further implication concerning the relationship between a subject and the world she lives in. Regarding this, we notice that the two different forms of Naturgeist come together around the notion of habit. As I deal with later, the Anthropology presents habit as a process of the overall transformation of one’s bodiliness. Since the Anthropology is part of the movement of subjective spirit, habit is here concerned with the way in which a subject’s will is exercised—the mode of a subject’s existence in which she can exercise a universal or public will, more precisely. In contrast to this, the philosophy of objective spirit presents habit as a second nature and considers this in terms of custom. We thus notice that in ethical life, where spirit finds itself in the realm of objectivity, habit is concerned with a certain form of the world: the world consisted of customary norms and rules. This world is called a nature in the sense that those norms and rules are given to individuals rather than established by the latter’s self-conscious activities; it is a second nature, namely a nature that has become nature, because those customs can exist only when they are practiced by individuals, and they are thus subject to changes in accordance with the social, cultural, historical changes of the community. Thus, the immediate presence of Naturgeist and its sublation in the Anthropology are essentially concerned with an individual subject’s natural mode of existence and its transformation into a spiritual one. In contrast to this, the re-naturalization of spirit as Naturgeist in the philosophy of objective spirit bears on the world that exists as a second nature and changes through the activities of the individuals. The philosophy of objective spirit, then, is to show how this Naturgeist as a second nature, namely the world of customs that an individual appropriates as her own though habit, and to which she is bounded through sentiment, is elevated to a truly self-conscious, spiritual union. In short, the double appearance of Naturgeist ultimately concerns the spiritualization of an
individual who lives in the ethical world on the one hand, and the spiritualization of this ethical world on the other. And the spiritual mode of an individual’s existence is so closely intertwined with the spiritual mode of the world that the sublation of nature cannot be performed one-sidedly but is necessarily duplicated.

Returning to the sex-relationship in the *Anthropology*, it is now important to note that at this stage of the natural soul, we do not have yet the notion of the world as a second nature. The natural soul is still far away from habituation; the ethical world of customary norms and rules appears at the stage of ethical life in the philosophy of objective spirit. The only world we have at the stage of the natural soul is the cultural world in which the soul goes through the stages of life: the genus of an individual, which I suggested refers to an environmental world of the human beings. This cultural genus is different from the animal genus that is considered at the end of the *Philosophy of Nature*. To recapitulate, the genus-process is a process whereby animal organisms preserve their species by entering into the sex-relation and giving birth to newborns. In this natural course, however, individual members are nothing but the perishing moments in and for the universal; in this sense, they remain external to the latter. In contrast to this, the stages of life offer a different model of the relationship between individuals and their universal. With the semantic modification in the term genus into an environmental, cultural world, the stages of life illustrate a spiritual, genus-process in which individuals are born, grow, and die in their close connection with that cultural world. Conversely, this cultural world co-exists and co-grows with the individuals and hence, the latter is no longer external to their genus. Yet, this *Anthropological* world, as mentioned above, is not yet the universal, rational world that contains a set of ethical norms, rules, and values which binds individuals through the latter; nor is it yet a world that exists through the individuals’ ethical activities. Lacking the dialectical interplay
between individuals and ethical life through habit, then, the *Anthropological* world finds the ground of its existence only in the individuals’ pre-self-conscious, feeling lives. As I deal with later, this is the form of the world that Hegel considers in the “Feeling Soul” section, namely a monad that is immediately individualized in and as the feeling soul, lacking the mediation of objective consciousness.

### 1.5. From Sleep to Waking: The Soul’s Differentiation into Substantiality and Subjectivity

The third way of the natural soul’s alteration are the two states that the individual soul alternates between every day and every night, i.e., sleep and waking. The discussion of sleep and waking plays a key role in the transition in the *Anthropology* from the natural soul to the feeling soul. Whereas the natural soul is in its first mode of alternation, i.e., the stages of life, treated as having individuality without subjectivity, the alteration between sleep and waking exhibits the way in which an individual soul has subjectivity at the level of sensation, which is next treated in terms of the feeling life of a sentient soul. In Hegel’s terms, the alternation between sleep and waking marks the differentiation of the soul’s individuality into a mere being and a being-for-itself, namely into substantiality and subjectivity:

Differentiating of the individuality as *being-for-itself* [*für-sich seinder*] from the individuality as merely *being* [*nur seiender*] is immediate *judgment* [*Urteil*], and this judgement is the *awakening* of the soul, which, as the determinacy of nature and *state* in the soul’s self-enclosed natural-life, confronts another state, *sleep*.—Waking is differentiated from sleep not only *for us* or externally; it is itself the *judgment* of the individual soul, […]. All the self-conscious and rational activity of the spirit’s differentiation, a differentiation that is for itself, falls into the waking state [of the soul].—
Sleep is an invigoration of this activity, not as a merely negative rest from it, but as a return from the world of determinacies, from dispersion and solidification in singularities into the universal essence of subjectivity, which is the substance of those determinacies and the absolute power over them.  

As Hegel suggests in the Zusatz to this passage, when we awake from sleep, we gradually come to perceive ourselves and the external world distinctly as we open our eyes and sense the object in the surroundings. The soul in the state of waking is therefore not just a substance filled with contents and determinations but something subjective that can perceive itself and the objects in the surrounding world. It is, in other words, not just what is but what is for itself. In this sense, the transition from sleep to waking is the differentiation [Ur-teilen] of the soul into itself as a mere being and itself as a being-for-itself.

It is to be noted, however, that the two distinct moments of the soul that Hegel observes in the alteration between sleep and waking, i.e., being and being-for-itself, do not exclude each other. To illustrate the inclusive relationship between those two moments, Hegel draws on the distinction between organic and animal life made by the French anatomist and pathologist, Bichat. In Bichat’s distinction, organic life is concerned with the reproductive system concerning digestion, blood-circulation, perspiration, and breathing; animal life comprises the system of sensibility and irritability, which makes an organism responsive to stimuli from the external world. As Hegel underlines, Bichat characterizes organic life in terms of a complete cutting off from the external world and animal life, in terms of its being directed toward the external world. Further, organic life does not cease to function unless the

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71 ENZ § 398.
organism dies, whereas the animal life may not function when the organism is asleep.\footnote{ENZ § 398 Z. For Bichat’s distinction between organic and animal life, see his \textit{Recherches physiologiques sur la vie et la mort} (Paris, 1800 ; 4th ed. 1822; reprinted in 1973 by Éditions Gérard: Verviers, Belgium), 7-8.}

Hegel’s point in referring to Bichat would be that the soul in sleep remains the foundation of all conscious and spiritual activities even when there are no conscious or spiritual activities. That is, the soul is a substance that embraces all fundamental thought-determinations; these determinations are necessarily interconnected to each other by virtue of the absolute negativity of thought, as dealt with in the \textit{Logic}.\footnote{Regarding this point, Inwood’s commentary on this statement in the \textit{Zusatz} to § 398 is insightful: “Hegel does not mean that we think all the time […]. He means rather that any human mental activity, whether in sleep or in waking, involves thought. In sensing a mountain, for example, thought or categories enable me to see it as a unitary object, as mountain, and to assign the perception to myself, to be aware that I can see the mountain. The doctrine stems from Kant, but it is also present in Plato’s \textit{Theaetetus}, where Socrates argues that perception of a unitary object by a unitary self involves such concept as being, identity, and difference:” \textit{Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind}, trans. W.Wallace and A.V.Miller with Revisions and Commentary by M. J. Inwood (New Work: Oxford University Press, 2007), 350.}

In Hegel’s terms, “man always thinks, even in sleep; in all forms of spirit, in feeling, in intuition, as well as representation, thinking remains the foundation” which is “unaffected by the alteration of sleep and waking.”\footnote{ENZ § 398 Z.}

Passing to the state of sleep is therefore returning to this fundamental state of thought where its absolute power is at work, away from the world of ordinary consciousness in which the fundamental power of thought is solidified in singular representations. Since the absolute negativity of thought is for Hegel at the basis of all conscious and spiritual activities, returning to the state of sleep is “invigoration” of the spiritual activity in the waking state.

But the soul embraces not only thought-determinations dealt with in the \textit{Logic}, but also the spiritual contents in a comprehensive sense: the ethical, the moral, the artistic, and the religious, which characterizes the notion of spirit in the \textit{Phenomenology of Spirit} as I discussed in Chapter 2 in reference to the \textit{Anmerkung} on § 25 of the \textit{Encyclopedia Logic}, and
the universals recollected from particular intuitions, treated in the *Psychology*. The different kinds of the contents dealt with in the *Logic*, the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, and the *Psychology*, cannot be separated from each other in actual operations of our mind. As I discussed in Chapter 3, the case should rather be that one’s mind is filled with the spiritual contents that are formed by the processes of enculturation and recollection; the logical interconnections among thought-determinations are always at work when the spiritual contents are actualized in our mind. In this sense, the soul is a substance that is all in potentiality as Hegel defines, that is, a substance containing all the logical, phenomenological, and psychological contents in potentiality.

However, the fact that the soul is a substance containing all the logical, phenomenological, and psychological contents, does not make it necessary that its cognitive operations are all the time objective and true. As I discussed in Chapter 4, Hegel considers the soul as a substance in the sense of being all in potentiality. By implication, the soul may well fail to actualize the substantial contents in an objective manner. It may have a deranged subjectivity. This is, I think, what makes the soul’s division into sleep and waking into a crucial problem in Hegel’s *Anthropology*. Hegel mentions two different ways in which the substantial totality of the soul underlies our mental activities: in sleep and dreaming on the one hand, and in waking on the other. In dreaming, we often produce false representations, but Hegel highlights that this is not because the soul loses some fundamental thought-determinations. While the soul remains the substantial totality containing all thought-determinations, it may take a merely subjective attitude toward its representations without the presence of external objects corresponding to them. This is what happens in dreaming and the way in which false representations are produced. As I discuss in what follows, the distinct
feature of the feeling soul consists in its production of deranged representations of herself and the world. This being said, the differentiation the soul into itself as being and into itself as being-for-itself, which Hegel conceptualizes through his discussion of the soul’s alternation between sleep and waking, does not entail the achievement of the soul’s true being-for-itself. At the last stage of the natural soul, one comes to have for the first time an individual soul that has subjectivity. But this incipient form of the soul’s subjectivity, which is at work in our sentient activities, is involved in the one-sided subjectivism of the sentient soul. Thus, the second sub-division of the Anthropology on “the Feeling Soul” thematizes the conditions under which the soul gets involved in the deranged state and how it comes to overcome the one-sided subjectivity.

In Hegel’s discussion of the natural soul, sleep and waking therefore mean more than the physical states in which sense organs are active or inactive. Instead, the distinction between these two states of the soul is for Hegel concerned with the existential conditions under which one produces a one-sidedly subjective, deranged representation of herself and the world or an objective, true one. Even if one is physically awake, in other words, she may well be said to be dreaming if she gets involved in her subjective representations that do not match the actual constitution of the things outside her. She may well also be said to be sleeping in the sense of being shut off from the world, insofar as she is stuck in her inner, subjective world, turning away from the actual constitution of the objective world. What one comes to have at the last stage of the natural soul is therefore a soul in the dreaming state.75 One can

75 Jeffery Reid offers an insightful analysis of Hegel’s modification in the title of the section concerning the soul’s feeling life (§§ 403-408) from “The Dreaming Soul [die träumende Seele]” in the 1827 edition of the Encyclopedia to “The Feeling Soul [die fühlende Seele]” in the 1830 edition: Jeffrey Reid, “How the Dreaming Soul Became the Feeling Soul, between the 1827 and 1830 Editions of Hegel’s Philosophy of Subjective Spirit: Empirical Psychology and the Late Enlightenment,” in Essays on Hegel’s Subjective Spirit, ed. David S. Stern (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2013), 37-54. As Reid points out, the contents of the texts and Hegel’s main points remain largely
therefore say that Hegel’s *Anthropology* is a doctrine of the dreaming soul, showing how this deranged subject becomes a waking soul, i.e., an actual soul, which indicates consciousness, and eventually, self-consciousness in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Consequently, the soul in the state of waking refers to the “concrete I or understanding [Verstand].” This being assumed, the *Anthropology* deals with the way in which the soul in the state of dreaming awakens to become consciousness.

unchanged in those two editions of the *Encyclopedia*. Yet, the fact that the feeling soul in the third edition was considered as a dreaming soul in the second edition, Reid suggests, reveals one of the significant concerns underlying Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit: Hegel’s rejection of Schleiermacher’s conception of religion as being based on the religious fervor [*Schwärmerei*].

Reid shows that the dreaming/feeling soul section has its original source in Hegel’s 1794 manuscript on psychology, titled by Hoffmeister as “*Materien zu einer Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes*.” In this early manuscript, Hegel considers the mind in terms of the production of representations—specifically, under the heading “the sign of Kant’s transcendental esthetic, through his interpreters Johannes Schultze and Karl Reinhold”—and address the issue of how the mind comes to produce irrational representations unconsciously. Hegel’s suggestion was that this happens when consciousness is weakened to such an extent that it is overpowered by the soul’s arbitrary representations. While drawing a special attention to the section in Hegel’s 1794 manuscript entitled, “Use on Certain Conditions Where Phantasie Takes Part: Dreams, Somnambulism, Madness, Premonitions, and Visions,” Reid highlights that this section begins with a subsection entitled “Sleep” and ends with a final section on religious fervor [*Schwärmerei*]. Relying on Hoffmeister’s supposition that the content of Hegel’s 1794 manuscript is derived from the Tübingen professor J.F.Flatt, Reid argues that “much of the inspiration for Philosophy of Subjective Spirit §§ 403 to 408, on the dreaming/feeling soul, actually comes from J.F.Flatt.”

But he emphasizes that the one who inspires Hegel with respect to the dreaming/feeling soul is not the Flatt Hegel critically recognizes as a dogmatic theologian at Tübingen but the earlier Flatt as a proponent of Leibniz/Wolffian late Enlightenment reason against the claim of the phantasy, whose position includes an objection to the religious fervor [*Schwärmerei*]. Seen this way, the underlying concern of Hegel’s discussion of the dreaming/feeling soul, for Reid, consists in his struggle against the *Gefühlsreligion* of Schleiermacher.

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76 *ENZ*, § 398 A.
2. The Sentient Soul and Symbolic Bodiliness

As I discussed in Chapter 4, Hegel considers sensation as the highest point in the system of nature and hence, the middle point between Nature and Spirit. The concrete sense in which spirit emerges as spirit out of its submersion in nature is therefore to be elucidated through an examination of how Hegel considers sensation. As I discuss later by examining “The Feeling Soul” section, the life form based on sensation is for Hegel fundamentally subject to derangement [Verrücktheit] and the rise of the spiritual form of life requires the overcoming of this spiritual illness through habit. Yet, the fact that the sentient soul is subject to spiritual illness implies that sensation is not just a natural or physical process but instead involves a certain spiritual aspect. Sensation is certainly a bodily process, which cannot occur without the operation of sense organs and sensory nerves. But if it were a mere mechanic process involving no spiritual aspect at all, it would not be possible for it to be involved in any spiritual phenomena, either pathological or healthy ones. In what follows, I spell out the sense in which the sentient soul is in Hegel’s Anthropology considered to be spiritual, paying special attention to his notion of the sentient body. As I show, the sentient body is for Hegel a sphere for the embodiment of the soul’s inner feelings, and it is made into an instrument for this externalization of the soul’s interior by virtue of the inwardizing recollection treated in the Psychology. But I argue that this symbolic, spiritual aspect of the sentient body is eventually subordinated to the natural aspect of embodiment.
2.1. Sensation: Internal Process of the Soul Mediated by Bodiliness

In the being-for-itself of the waking soul, being is contained as an ideal moment; the waking soul thus finds the content-determinacies of its sleeping nature—which are in itself in the sleeping nature as in their substance—within itself and indeed, for itself. This particular, as a determinacy, is distinct from the self-identity of being-for-itself and at the same time simply contained in its simplicity: sensation.\(^7\)

As I discussed in Chapter 4, Hegel holds that sensation marks the end point of the system of Nature and the starting point of Spirit. If sensation constitutes the starting point of Spirit, this is because it involves a form of subjectivity, i.e., self-feeling. Now, the passage above where Hegel defines sensation in terms of the simple unity of being and being-for-itself is worth noting because it illustrates how the incipient form of subjectivity that the sentient soul displays differs from the subjectivity of the self-consciousness in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. In the passage above, Hegel repeats the point that he made in §398: the soul is a being in the sense of containing all content-determinations, and a being-for-itself in the sense of having a self-reflective aspect, i.e., self-feeling. Hegel’s point is that these two aspects constituting the sentient soul are immediately and inseparably associated with each other. Sensation and self-feeling, in other words, are not distinct from each other; instead, one and the same operation of the sentient soul is called sensation when its aspect of passivity is

\(^7\) ENZ, § 399.
emphasized, and self-feeling, when the emphasis is given to the aspect of selfness [Selbstischkeit].

Hegel’s emphasis on the immediate, inseparable, and indistinguishable association between a particular sensation and self-feeling is closely related to the fact that the soul is in the *Anthropology* treated as an undifferentiated substance filled with content-determinations. As I discussed previously, the *Anthropology* considers how the oppositional relationship between subject and object arises from the undifferentiated substantiality of the soul without presupposing this conscious opposition belonging to the realm of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. It is therefore important to note that the sentient soul is in Hegel’s *Anthropology* treated as an inner without an outer, having no distinction between a sentient subject and a sensed object: sensation is considered as an internal process within the sentient soul rather than as an interaction between the soul and an external object. Importantly, the fact that the sentient soul, unlike consciousness in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, does not have a relationship with an object entails that it also lacks an intersubjective relationship with another subject. Since the sentient soul is assumed to have no distinction between subject and subject, the self-feeling involved in a particular sensation does not involve a relation to an other either. The subjectivity that the sentient soul has in its self-feeling, in other words, is not mediated by an other to itself, whereas self-consciousness is in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* considered to have intersubjective subjectivity, which necessarily requires a relation to and mediation by an

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78 Cf. ENZ, § 402 A: “In ordinary linguistic usage, sensation [Empfindung] and feeling [Fühlen] are not sharply distinguished. Still we do not speak of the sensation [Empfindung] of right, self-sensation [Selbstempfindung], etc. but of the feeling [Gefühl] of right, self-feeling [Selbstgefühl]. Sensation is connected with sensitivity [Empfindsamkeit]; it seems plausible therefore that sensation emphasizes more the aspect of passivity, of finding [des Findens], i.e. the immediacy of the determinacy in feeling [Fühlen], whereas feeling [Gefühl] looks more to the selfishness [Selbstischkeit] involved in it.”
other. In this sense, sensation and self-feeling, the being and being-for-itself of the sentient soul, are immediately associated with each other.

The fact that the sentient soul has no distinction between subject and object such that its self-feeling is immediately attached to a particular sensation further implies that the self-feeling involved in our sensory activities is far from being a conscious awareness. As self-consciousness in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* displays, a conscious awareness of oneself for Hegel involves a reflection into oneself in and through a relation to an other to oneself. The self-feeling is therefore a special phenomenon which certainly displays the aspect of subjectivity, reflectivity, and selfness but displays this without any relation to an other. We can then rightly pose the question of what the self-feeling is, if it is not a self-conscious awareness of oneself. I argue that the self-feeling considered in Hegel’s *Anthropology* is an unconscious, bodily subjectivity of the soul. As Hegel underlines, being-for-itself, which is a fundamental determination of consciousness or spirit, is determined in sensation as “natural bodiliness [*die natürliche Leiblichkeit*].”\(^79\) The soul therefore differs from self-consciousness in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* in that it has a bodily subjectivity, that is, the subjectivity mediated by natural bodiliness. In what follows, I discuss in more detail what this bodily subjectivity of the sentient soul is like.

2.2. *The Bodily Subjectivity of the Sentient Soul*

Since Hegel assumes that natural bodiliness is essential for the subjectivity of the sentient soul, I first examine his notion of the sentient body. In § 401, Hegel suggests that

\(^79\) ENZ, § 401.
natural bodiliness can be analyzed into two spheres: (1) the “bodiliness (e.g., of the eye or of any particular physical part whatever)” which “becomes sensation by being made internal, recollected in the soul’s being-for-itself;” (2) “the sphere of the determinacies originating in spirit and belonging to it, which, in order to be sensed, in order to be as if found, become embodied.”80 These two spheres are concerned with two different kinds of sensation, which have two different directions: the first sphere for outer sensation, and the second sphere for inner sensation. As Hegel discusses in the Anmerkung to § 401, the first sphere of the natural bodiliness for outer sensation is comprised of the five senses: the senses of physical ideality (sight and hearing), diffusive reality (smell and taste), and solid reality (touch). Besides this system of outer sense organs, there must be a system of particular organs that embody the inner contents of the soul. This system of inner sense organs, Hegel states, possibly includes all organs as well as viscera and deserves a separate scientific investigation by psychic physiology.

Now, it appears that Hegel holds a non-conventional conception of outer and inner sensation. Outer sensation considered in his Anthropology has very little to do with an immediate, passive process of receiving sensory data from the external world because it involves, as Hegel suggests in the passage above, the recollective inwardization of what is intuited, which is dealt with in the Psychology. Outer sensation thus presupposes the process whereby what is sensed or intuited is given a symbolic or even spiritual meaning by being turned into a universal representation. Likewise, inner sensation is far from being a conscious awareness of one’s inner state because it is what is to be embodied rather than what is to be brought to consciousness. The soul’s inner feelings involve the determinations concerning

80 ENZ, § 401.
spiritual life, but Hegel’s point is that these spiritual determinations, insofar as we are concerned with inner sensation, must be embodied because they cannot otherwise be sensed.

Noticeable regarding this non-conventional notion of inner and outer sensation by Hegel is his comparison between the *Anthropology* and the *Psychology* in terms of the issue of bodiliness. He somehow blurs the distinction between these two parts of the philosophy of subjective spirit by suggesting that both parts thematizes the same subject matter, i.e., outer and inner sensation, in different respects. The *Anthropology*, he states, does not consider outer sensation in terms of pleasure and displeasure because the feelings of pleasure and displeasure, which arouse urges and desires, belong to practical spirit. It only examines “the unconscious relatedness of outer sensation to the spiritual interior,” namely “mood.”

Further, the *Anthropology* deals with inner sensation insofar as it is embodied, whereas the disembodied, purely internal aspect of inner sensation is the subject matter of the *Psychology*. The *Anthropology* thus deals with sensation in terms of the arousal of a mood by outer sensation and the embodiment of the soul’s inner sensation, of which both are unconscious and immediate. This illustrates how Hegel introduces a non-dualistic view of

81 *ENZ*, § 401 Z.
82 *ENZ*, § 401 Z.
83 For a study of Hegel’s notion of mood, see: John Russon, “Emotional Subject: Mood and Articulation in Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind,” *International Philosophical Quarterly*, vol.49, n. 1, issue 193 (2009): 41-52. By analyzing Hegel’s notion of mood in the *Anthropology*, Russon suggests that mood is a species of sensibility [Empfindung]. He shows that Hegel considers sensation not merely as a cognitive process but as a way in which we live in the world with bodiliness. For Russon, Hegel thus sides with Heidegger in holding that mood precedes ego-based consciousness. Further, he focuses on Hegel’s idea presented in the *Zusatz* to § 401 that the highest form of the expression of the soul’s inner sensation is gesture, and that gesture is completed in language. With a close analysis of this idea of Hegel, Russon argues that emotion is not merely subjective; instead, “emotion is the subjective non-differentiation of subject and object which seeks an adequate externalization,” which “accomplishes itself in its expression of itself as an intersubjective reality;” cf. John Russon, “Emotional Subject: Mood and Articulation in Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind,” 52. This is, for Russon, how emotion and spirit are necessarily linked in Hegel’s philosophy. Russon also provides a comprehensive analysis of Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* in terms of the relationship between the self and the body: John Russon, *The Self and Its Body in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit* (Toronto, Buffalo, London: Toronto University Press, 1997). In his view, the science of experience in Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* can be reconstructed in terms of the “science of the embodiment of consciousness;” cf.
the unity of the soul and the body. The *Anthropology* treats both inner and outer sensation as bodily-emotional processes internal to the sentient subject and not as a cognitive, objective-relational process.

As sensation is in the *Anthropology* considered in terms of a physical-emotional process internal to the sentient subject, the sentient body is an instrument for this externalization of the soul’s interior. As mentioned earlier, Hegel holds that the sentient body comprises the system of outer sense organs and that of inner sense organs; the former serves to the sense of outer materials, embracing from the most real and solid to the most ideal and fluid ones and the latter serves to the expression of one’s inner feelings. Yet, we would have to say that the system of outer sense organs is incorporated to the system of inner sense organs because all organs, including viscera, according to Hegel, serve the embodiment of the soul’s inner sensations. This being said, the sentient body is an expressive body that embodies the soul’s inner feelings.

Of importance is that the physical-emotional process in which an outer sensation arouses a mood in the soul or serves to the expression of her inner feelings is made possible by the symbolic meaning associated with that outer sensation in an immediate, unconscious, and unreflective manner. Hegel suggests that the sensation of the color of black, for instance, arouses a gloomy mood in the soul, and that this arousal of a mood by an outer sensation is

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John Russon, *The Self and Its Body in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit*, 3. Specifically, he articulates the three forms of the body: *phusis*, *hexis*, and *logos*—namely, the natural body engaged in the process of life and desire, the encultured body engaged in the process of master-slave dialectic and the social, cultural institutions, and the scientific body, which is absolute knowing. While Russon’s analysis is illuminating in elucidating the role of the body in Hegel’s thought, he does not seem to be doing full justice to the fact that the body is for Hegel eventually the locus of the *negativity* of spirit. In what follows, I focus more on showing that the emotional body is that which is to be sublated by spirit and that spirit emerges as spirit through this negation of what is the negative to itself, i.e., the immediate, emotional bodiliness.
possible due to the association of the soul’s inner determination with an outer sensation, which is in turn made possible by a meaning stored in the soul. The soul, in other words, contains the meaning of black including death, fear, and ominousness; this meaning is actualized upon seeing the color of black, which arouses a gloomy mood in the soul. Further, the meaning of black immediately intervenes the soul’s sensation of the color of black—“immediately, namely without conscious understanding needing to intervene,” and “by this [inner] meaning, the outer sensation becomes symbolic.” Further, the symbolic meaning stored in the soul also makes it possible for the soul to express her inner feelings by using an outer sensation. For instance, one wears in black, Hegel states, to express the grief when attending a funeral.

84 ENZ, § 401 Z.

85 ENZ § 401 Z. Hegel’s example of the color of black can provoke criticism for its potential, racist implication, although giving the context of his discussion of embodiment, his example does not necessarily involve a racist claim. Given the severity and enormity of the problem of racism today, however, it should be noted that associating the color of black with negative meanings carries the risk of racist commitment, and that the color of black may well be associated with positive symbolic meanings such as comforting and beautiful.

86 In the Zusatz to § 401, Hegel make a distinction between two different kinds of inner sensation; emotions such as anger, revenge, envy, shame, and so forth, which he considers to be individual, and the feelings of universals such as right, the ethical, the religious, the beautiful, and truth. Hegel discusses physiological expressions of emotions, such as an abdominal illness as the embodiment of grief and the embodiment of courage and anger in the heart and breast. He also discusses laughing and weeping as the reactions to comedy and tragedy respectively, suggesting that those bodily externalizations of the inner feelings such as gaiety and destruction are eliminations or expulsions of the latter. However, he does not offer an explanation of the embodiment of the feelings of the universals. This point makes us refer back to Hegel’s mention in the Zusatz to § 401 that the Anthropology deals with inner sensation insofar as it is embodied whereas the disembodied, purely internal aspect of inner sensation is the subject matter of the Psychology. As far as I see, Hegel’s idea is that a person’s emotion can be embodied and this physical expression of one’s emotion can be thematized in the Anthropology, but the feeling of what he calls universals, that is, spiritual determinations concerning morality, the ethical life, art, religion, and philosophy are not necessarily embodied. Further, the feeling of these spiritual determinations, insofar as they can be immediately felt, may be treated in the Psychology, which thematizes the disembodied, internal aspect of the soul in relation to the universalization of what is intuited. As we notice in his Psychology, however, this last part of Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit does not address the immediate feeling of universals or those spiritual determinations. In short, Hegel considers the embodiment of a person’s individual emotion to be an important issue of the Anthropology; however, he does not deal with the immediate feeling of universals or spiritual determinations although he suggests that these are the subject matters of the Psychology. The fact that Hegel’s Psychology does not really thematize the feelings of universals seems to bear on his objection to Romantic subjectivism, specifically Schleiermacher’s conception of intuition and feeling as the fundamental faculty of religion. Throughout his philosophical career, Hegel consistently held that the absolute cannot truly be grasped by immediate feelings but only by thought, the speculative thought involving the power of absolute negativity. This is, I think, what is implicit in Hegel’s distinction of inner sensation
Therefore, both the arousal of a mood by outer sensation and the embodiment of inner sensation treated in the *Anthropology* presuppose, I claim, the process of the inwardizing recollection considered in the *Psychology*. This is what is implied by Hegel’s assertion that the bodiliness of outer sensation involves inwardizing recollection. As I discussed in Chapter 3, the process of recollection entails the production of symbols and signs whereby what is intuited is liberated from its particularity and is given the form of a universal representation. I also showed that Hegel views symbols and signs as having rational meanings in the sense that they are somehow determined by custom. Prior to this spiritual process, there cannot be the physical expression of one’s emotions, nor the arousal of a mood by a sensation.

The above considerations of Hegel’s conception of inner and outer sensation illustrate that the natural bodiliness of the sentient soul is not a mere physical body. It is not just an apparatus consisting of sensory organs and sensory nerves that process outside information but a material sphere that can perform a symbolic function, one that immediately stimulates a symbolic meaning stored in the soul to rise and immediately externalizes it. The sentient soul has an expressive, symbolic body in this sense; this is also the spiritual aspect of the sentient body.

This being said, we can now spell out the sense in which the sentient soul has subjectivity in and through its natural bodiliness. As Hegel suggests in the *Anmerkung* on § 402 that “the waking soul finds the content-determinacies of its sleeping nature within itself,”

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To the extent that immediate feelings thus do not play any constitutive role for Hegel’s philosophy, they do not necessarily have to be thematized in the *Psychology*. Regarding Hegel’s rejection of Schleiermacher’s conception of religion and its implication for his *Anthropology*, see in particular: Jeffrey Reid, “How the Dreaming Soul Became the Feeling Soul, between the 1827 and 1830 Editions of Hegel’s *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*: Empirical Psychology and the Late Enlightenment,” in *Essays on Hegel’s Subjective Spirit*, ed. David S. Stern (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2013), 37-54.
the subjectivity of the sentient soul consists in self-reflectivity, namely in the activity of
recognizing itself in and through what constitutes itself. Generally speaking, subjectivity in
this sense of a self-recognitional reflectivity, for Hegel, requires a differentiation of the
subject from herself as an object of her self-recognition and a recognitional reunification of
this objectified self, which became an other to herself, with herself. But at the level of
sensation, this self-reflective process, as mentioned above, does not occur in a conscious way
due to the lack of a conscious, oppositional relation between subject and object. Regarding
this point, my previous claim that the sentient soul is in Hegel’s *Anthropology* treated as an
inner without an outer is now to be more aptly understood as follows. The fact that the soul is
treated as an internal process within the soul without a conscious relation to the external world
does not imply that it is a pure interior without an exterior, nor that it involves no relation to
an other at all. When a mood is aroused by an outer sensation and the soul’s inner feelings are
embodied, the sentient body operates as the exterior of the soul, one that immediately
stimulates or expresses the interior of the soul. Accordingly, in those physical-emotional
processes the soul does not remain a pure interior or a purely undifferentiated substance
because it takes on a new, external form of existence, a bodily expression. They thus involve
the soul’s self-differentiation into itself as an interior and into itself as an other to itself, i.e.,
the sentient body that externalizes itself.

Therefore, the sentient soul essentially has a relation to an other to itself, i.e., the
sentient body. Further, the body that embodies the soul is not just any sentient body but the
body *of the soul* because it becomes “a sign” of the soul, “a sign visible to others.” More
precisely, the bodiliness of the sentient body as mine consists in this: “that its materiality is

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87 *ENZ*, § 401 Z.
unable to be for itself, can offer no resistance to me, is subordinate to me, is pervaded through and through by my soul for which it is an ideality."\textsuperscript{88} This being said, the sentient soul has subjectivity in the sense of having its body as its own and not in the sense of having a conscious self-awareness of herself and others.

It is to be noted, therefore, that the sentient soul has the subjectivity in this sense only in an immediate way. The soul does not make its body into its sign in an active, negative, and conscious way. The arousal of a mood and the embodiment of its inner feelings occur in an unconscious and immediate way. As I argued that these physical-emotional processes are made possible by inwardizing recollection conceived as a process whereby the sentient body is turned into a sphere for symbolic meanings, we can perhaps say that recollection is the process whereby we appropriate our bodies as that which expresses our interiors, gives an external existence to our souls, and thereby shows who we are at this moment. In this sense, it is also a process that turns our natural body into a spiritual bodiliness. Once this process has been made, however, the embodiment of the soul’s interior occurs unconsciously or naturally without the intervention of consciousness.\textsuperscript{89} The sentient soul does not appropriate its body as

\textsuperscript{88} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{89} Regarding this, the feeling of anger can be a good example because it makes it possible for us to think of various cases in which the feeling, the body, and consciousness operate in their interactions, including a voluntary or conscious control of the rise of the feeling and its embodiment. When I have a feeling of anger, this feeling is not necessarily embodied. It may just arise inside me and remain an internal feeling. It is also possible for me to be mindful of the rise of anger in me, watch it with my internal eyes, and let it go. In this case, my feeling of anger remains internal to my soul without gaining an external, bodily existence. When I am mindful of its rise, my soul is also differentiated into itself as the feeling of anger and another self of mine which is my internal eyes watching its rise. This differentiation of my soul into two selves, however, does not involve an externalization of my soul’s interior. But the same feeling may also be immediately and unconsciously embodied through my heartbeat or facial expression. In this case, whether or not I am conscious of the rise of the feeling of anger in me and its embodiment is not an issue. What is here at stake is the fact that the embodiment occurs regardless of my will or thinking. Certainly, I can control this bodily process and even the rise of the feeling of anger before it arises in me through some practices with my mind. But I cannot control it at every time it arises in me and even if this is possible for someone, it is not what Hegel considers in the Anthropology. What is at stake in the “Sensation” section is the case in which my feeling of anger is embodied through my heart beating or facial expression regardless of my will and thinking and prior to my consciousness of its happening. In this case, embodiment is immediate and unconscious. Further, my heartbeat and facial expression are not the feeling
its own but instead is just given the latter; to be more precise, the sentient soul immediately exists as the body. Although the sentient body is subordinated to the soul as its sign which offers no resistance to it, we would have to say, therefore, that the soul is likewise subordinated to its exteriorization through the embodiment of its inner feelings. In short, the natural bodiliness of the sentient soul is a special, spiritual kind of body whose materiality is capable of symbolizing the spiritual interior of the soul; however, the embodiment in this sense of externalizing the soul’s interior is still a natural process that occurs to the soul in an immediate and unconscious way.

3. Derangement of the Feeling Soul and the Negativity of Naturgeist

In the previous section, I discussed how Hegel’s *Anthropology* treats the sentient soul in terms of the embodiment of the soul’s inner feelings without pursuing a dualistic approach to the soul-body relationship, nor presupposing the conscious, oppositional relationship between a sensed object and a sensing subject. As I discussed, Hegel thus considers embodiment in terms of the soul’s immediate, bodily existence through the symbolic, of anger itself but its externalization. The part of my soul’s interior thereby gains an external existence, i.e., the motion of my heart and the change in my facial muscle. My soul is thereby differentiated into itself as the feeling of anger and into the motion of the heart and facial muscle. As mentioned earlier, in relation to embodiment, Hegel holds that all organs, including viscera, can serve to embodiment of the soul’s inner feelings. As far as I see, this notion of all bodily organs as the means of embodiment of inner feelings supposes that embodiment incorporates all kinds of unconscious bodily gestures that reflect one’s psychic states: e.g., eye movements when I tell a lie and have the feeling of anxiety, shaking of my legs when I feel bored or nervous, and so forth. In this sense of the sentient body for inner feelings as incorporating all organs, my heart and facial muscle are part of my sentient body. My soul is thus differentiated into itself as its internal feeling and the sentient body that embodies it. I would here like to say that this sentient body embodying my feelings is an other to myself not simply in the sense that it is an externalized form of my interior or that I recognize the feeling of anger as my feeling and its embodiment as an expression of this feeling and hence, as secondary to the feeling itself, but more fundamentally in the sense that this embodiment occurs regardless of my will and consciousness.
expressive bodiliness. Embodiment in this sense of the immediate bodily existence of the soul, however, constitutes a key problem of the *Anthropology*. First of all, embodiment occurs to the soul regardless of her will. This implies that the soul has no power over her substantial being and its externalization. Seen this way, embodiment is a natural process to which the soul is subordinated. More importantly, the soul’s bodily existence through embodiment is completely immediate such that it has no connection with the world. In order for the soul to come to exist by exteriorizing its interior, in other words, the soul needs not to actively interact with the world. And the soul’s immediate bodily existence without a relationship with the world is for Hegel problematic because it forms the ontological condition under which the soul falls into one-sided subjectivism. Lacking the relationship with the world, the soul thus remains a self-enclosed, one-sided subjectivity, which dictates “what I sense I am” and “what I am I sense.” Hegel calls this soul that believes what it senses and feels to be true even in contradiction to the actual constitution of the external world “subjective consciousness” in comparison to “objective consciousness.” Subjective consciousness in this sense is what Hegel thematizes in “The Feeling Soul” section.

The “Feeling Soul” section comprises three parts: (1) The Feeling Soul in Its Immediacy (§§ 405-406); (2) Self-Feeling (§§ 407-408); (3) Habit (§§ 409-410). In the first stage of the feeling soul, “The Feeling Soul in Its Immediacy,” Hegel thematizes what he calls the magical relationship and animal magnetism. At first glance, Hegel’s thematization of these pseudo-scientific themes seems philosophically insignificant. Hegel’s thematization of various irrational phenomena related to those topics, however, essentially bears on his

90 *ENZ* § 402 Z.

91 Ibid.
speculative notion of consciousness as the unity of consciousness and unconsciousness, reason as the unity of reason and unreason. What Hegel conceptualizes through a reflection on those irrational phenomena, then, is the contradictory coexistence of the two elements in one and the same conscious subject. This is the structure of the feeling soul, or the feeling form of consciousness, which Hegel considers in the second stage of the feeling soul, “Self-Feeling,” under the rubric of derangement. In Hegel’s terms, the “Self-Feeling” concerns the form of the soul in which it “finds itself in the contradiction between its totality systematized in its consciousness, and the particular determinacy that is not fluid in that totality, not integrated and subordinated [to that totality],” and this is “derangement [Verrückheit].” As I show, the feeling soul is therefore a form of consciousness, which reveals the speculative constitution of consciousness (i.e., the unity of consciousness and unconsciousness) in its negative form (i.e., the contradiction between the two). As such, derangement is the stage in the Anthropology where the negativity of Naturgeist bursts out.

Of importance here is that derangement is fundamentally grounded in the ontological condition of the sentient soul, namely the fact that the soul immediately exists as the body without an objective relationship with the world. What Hegel further shows in the first two stages of the feeling soul is that under that ontological condition of the sentient soul, the soul is caged in the monadic world that is only perceived from her individual perspective, and that the soul thus lives a dreaming life even while being awake. Since this problem of the feeling soul is ultimately grounded in the condition of the sentient soul of immediately existing through bodiliness and having not yet established an objective relationship with the world, in the third stage, “Habit,” Hegel re-thematizes the bodily existence of the soul. In this last stage of the

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92 ENZ § 408.
feeling soul, Hegel thus shows how the soul comes to establish an objective relationship with the world of actuality by transforming its bodiliness. In what follows, I investigate the first two stages of the feeling soul, aimed at spelling out Hegel’s speculative notion of consciousness and its role in the *Anthropology*. The last stage, “Habit,” will be discussed in the next section of this chapter.

3.1. *The Feeling Soul in its Immediacy: Being Awake while Dreaming or Dreaming while Being Awake*

Embodiment presents the immediate unity of the soul’s being and being-for-itself with respect to bodiliness. In the first stage of the “Feeling Soul” section, titled “The Feeling Soul in its Immediacy,” Hegel thematizes the same, immediate unity of the soul’s being and self anew by switching the focus to the soul’s psychical life. He thus examines a wide range of psychic phenomena that present the immediate unity of the soul’s being and self. These phenomena fall into two categories: (1) the magical relationship [*das magische Verhältnis*] (§405); (2) animal magnetism (§406). The magical relationship is the immediate subordination of a selfless and passive subject to the power of another subject, which Hegel calls the genius or the guardian spirit. This magical relationship is observed in the life of a fetus in the womb and the influence of circumstantial factors on one’s destiny. Whereas the fetus who is under the direct influence of her mother’s physical and psychological states and an individual whose life is directly affected by circumstantial factors are, in fact, selfless objects rather than conscious subjects, animal magnetism is the fixation of the magical relationship as a form or state of *sober consciousness*. This is observed in clairvoyance and mesmerism or hypnosis. Interestingly, Hegel starts off his discussions of those two forms of
the feeling soul in its immediacy with an examination of a kind of dreaming: (1) natural
dreaming (premonition and postmonition),\(^93\) which is relevant to the magical relationship; (2)
somnambulism, which is related to animal magnetism.

It seems that those phenomena Hegel considers in terms of the immediate unity of the
feeling soul’s being and self are philosophically insignificant or hard to accept from the
viewpoint of modern science and rationality. Obviously, the idea that a mother’s physical and
psychological states affect the formation of her fetus’ personality, and that external
circumstances determine the direction of one’s life runs counter to the essential feature of the
modern conception of human subjectivity: autonomy in the sense of self-determination and
self-reliance, in particular. Further, premonition, postmonition, mesmerism, and clairvoyance
are all pseudo-scientific in the eyes of today.\(^94\) The fact that Hegel discusses those irrational

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\(^93\) I translate “Ahnen” and “Durchträumen” into premonition and postmonition respectively, suggesting that they
denote the forms of paranormal dreaming in which one has a vision of what will happen in the future or a vision of
what has happened in the past without knowing it happened. I discuss the reason for this translation below in note
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\(^94\) Indeed, dreaming, somnambulism, clairvoyance, and mesmerism are all concerned with the development of early
German psychiatry at the turn of the nineteenth century. In 1808, Johann Christian Reil, who was a professor of
medicine at the University of Halle and recognized as a leader of German medicine, coined the term Psychiatrie. In
his 1803 work *Rhapsodien über die Anwendung der psychischen Kurmethode auf Geisteszerrüttungen*, Reil
discussed somnambulism, suggesting that madness [*Wahnsinn*] is analogous to the state in which one’s mind dreams
without her body being asleep.

Animal magnetism, or mesmerism, stood at the center of the controversy between the somatist and the psychist
school; for the detail, see Daniel Berthold-Bond, *Hegel’s Theory of Madness* (Albany: State University of New
York, 1995), 29-35. Clairvoyance was conceived as the highest stage of animal magnetism which is adduced by a
Mesmerist for the treatment of a mental patient.

With respect to Hegel’s interest in and knowledge of those psychiatric themes of the time, it is noteworthy that he
had some personal experiences with mental illness and its treatment; he saw his friend at Tübingen, Hölderlin, going
mad, and his sister Christianne got treatment for hysteria over a decade (1822-32) from Schelling’s brother Karl,
who was himself a practicing Romantic physician and published articles on animal magnetism. Karl’s treatments for
Christianne likely included “magnetic or mesmeric therapy;” Glenn Alexander Magee, *Hegel and the Hermetic
back to his years in Jena where he worked together with Schelling. In his letter to Hegel dated to March 22 of 1807,
Schelling stated that mesmerism was “continuing to progress and prove indeed correct” and recommended Hegel
reading his brother Karl’s article on animal magnetism; see Glenn Alexander Magee, *Hegel and the Hermetic
Tradition*, 216-7.

Hegel regularly discussed mental derangement [*Verrücktheit*] in his lectures from 1816 to 1830, but he only left
short and condensed lecture notes on this topic: § 408 and *Anmerkung* to § 408 in the 1830 *Encyclopedia*. In 1845,
and pseudo-scientific experiences at length, however, does not imply that he acknowledges their scientific value or status. More importantly, Hegel maintains his critical stance against Romanticism, which places great value on unconsciousness and imagination as the source of true knowledge.\textsuperscript{95} It is therefore to be noted that Hegel’s discussion of the magical

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his student Boumann edited a thirty-page long text on the basis of Hegel’s lecture manuscripts and the notes that he and other students took from Hegel’s lectures. It is in this Zusatz text where we find Hegel’s discussion of dreaming, somnambulism, clairvoyance, animal magnetism, and mesmerism. Examining this editorial history, Daniel Bond-Berthold points out that Hegel’s discussion of the psychiatric themes of the time has not received sufficient attention from Hegel scholars as well as his contemporaries. As he quotes, W.T. Stace, for instance, suggests that Hegel’s discussion of derangement “appears to be parenthetical, and to have no connection with the course of the dialectic:”


However, one can hardly dismiss Hegel’s lengthy discussion of dreaming, somnambulism, clairvoyance, animal magnetism, and mesmerism in the Zusatz to § 408 as merely parenthetical or insignificant, considering the formation of psychiatry at the turn of the nineteenth century, his interest in the change of the era and the breadth of his reading, as well as his personal experiences with mental illness and its treatment. By this I do not mean, again, that Hegel believes those pseudo-scientific phenomena and theories to be true. Regarding the suspicion that Hegel is a pseudo-scientist, nor do I mean that one can argue that he is not because the pseudo-scientific themes Hegel discusses in the “Feeling Soul” section are those that played an important role in the formation of psychiatry in his time. Indeed, the question as to whether or not the Hegel in the “Feeling Soul” section is a pseudo-scientist, as far as I see, is off the track. The best way to characterize of Hegel’s treatment of those themes in the Anthropology would be to say that Hegel thematizes them and make use of the psychiatric discussions of his time to theorize his notion of consciousness. As I discuss later, in other words, what Hegel theorizes in the “Feeling Soul” section is his dialectical notion of consciousness as uniting unconsciousness with itself rather than as opposed to the latter, and not those pseudo-scientific themes in themselves. Of importance in this regard is the fact that the “Feeling Soul” section constitutes a negative stage in the Anthropology. As I discuss in the next note, Hegel’s thematization of those themes implies his critical stance on Romanticism. Further, I think that the historical context of his time in which psychiatry began to form has an important significance for elucidating his theory of the soul-body relationship in the Anthropology. By this, I do not mean that one can show that Hegel’s theory of the soul-body relationship is right in all its aspects by drawing on the historical context. Nor do I mean that historical researches justify all ideas of Hegel. In my view, however, historical researches are necessary prerequisites for further critical researches as well as accurate understandings of Hegel.

With respect to the significance of Hegel’s discussion of derangement, Berthold-Bond thus challenges Stace, highlighting Hegel’s claim that derangement is a necessary and essential stage in the development of the soul: Daniel Berthold-Bond, Hegel’s Theory of Madness (Albany: State University of New York, 1995), 1-3. More importantly, he points out that in Hegel’s treatment of derangement, “insanity and rationality are not in fact conceived as the opposites, but in important respects as kindred phenomena, […] each illuminating their ‘other’ in significant ways;” Daniel Berthold-Bond, Hegel’s Theory of Madness, 3. This being said, Hegel’s notion of derangement and the discussion of the related, psychiatric themes have an essentially speculative, dialectical meaning, illustrating how reason involves its other, insanity, within itself, and how it becomes reason for itself by sublating this negative to itself. This is the direction I take in this chapter to interpret the “Feeling Soul” section in Hegel’s Anthropology.

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\textsuperscript{95} The late eighteenth-century is regarded as a turning point in the history of the concept of madness where psychiatry began to form as an independent medical discipline treating the health and disease of the psyche. While this Enlightenment movement occurred across the European countries including England, France, and Germany, German psychiatry at its inception is characterized by its association with the movement of Romanticism. Otto M. Marx gives a good picture of the mutual influence between Romantic philosophy and the rising, new discipline, psychiatry in the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-centuries: Otto M. Marx, “German Romantic Psychiatry. Part I: Earlier, Including More-Psychological Orientations,” in History of Psychiatry and Medical Psychology, ed. Edwin

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relationship and animal magnetism leads to an essentially internal criticism of those who find
the access to the truth in some irrational and unconscious experiences.

Further, Hegel’s treatment of the magical relationship and animal magnetism in his

*Encyclopedia* system is more importantly concerned with his speculative notion of reason.  

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R. Wallace IV and John Gach (New York: Springer, 2008), 313-334. First, he points out that the Romantic
enthusiasm with mesmerism was related to the social and political situation of the eighteenth-century Germany. Germany fell behind England and France in social and political reformation, maintaining the traditional, feudal and religious system. The Romantic yearn for an idealized past, search for unity and freedom, objection to the empiricist, cold reason, emphasis on subjective, intuitive experiences, and favor in metaphor and analogy, according to Marx, were part of a substitute revolution, compensating for its impotence to bring changes to the real world. Seen this way, what evoked Romanticists’ enthusiastic interest in mesmerism, Marx suggests, was not just Mesmer’s theory that a magnetic fluid penetrates the entire universe including the human mind, but more importantly, his view of utopian society, which went beyond the framework of the Enlightenment’s cold notion of reason. Thus, the Mesmerists’ interest in somnambulism and trance states “corresponded with the romantics’ concern with the dark side of life, the inner self, and the longing, dreams, and hidden forces that operates beyond the limits of the waking mind.” Otto M. Marx, “German Romantic Psychiatry. Part I: Earlier, Including More-Psychological Orientations,” 316. Second, Schelling’s philosophy of nature contributed to the reformation of medicine by bringing forward the organicist view of nature and humanity. His influence on the formation of early German psychiatry is first seen in the works by Johann Christoph Reil. By discussing mental illness in his 1803 work *Rhapsodien über die Anwendung der psychischen Kurmethode auf Gesteszerrüttungen*, Reil proposed a holistic approach to the human mind whereby one also considers the irrational depth of the psyche, namely an “empirical psychology for and by physicians, different from the psychology of the philosophers, who seemed satisfied to establish a system of mental functions in the normal state;” Otto M. Marx, “German Romantic Psychiatry. Part I: Earlier, Including More-Psychological Orientations,” 319. Further, Schelling developed the idea that madness [*Wahnsinn*] pre-exists as a basic part of human understanding, and understanding is nothing but regulated madness; this view of Schelling was accepted by Alexander Haindorf—the Jewish physician who wrote an award winning thesis “*Schrift über die Pathologie und Therapie der Gemüts- und Geisteskrankenheiten*” in 1810 and taught psychiatry at a university for the first time (at University of Heidelberg, 1811)—and was further developed by Johann Christian August Heinroth; for the details, see Otto M. Marx, “German Romantic Psychiatry. Part I: Earlier, Including More-Psychological Orientations,” 322-325.

With respect to Hegel’s place in the early nineteenth-century situation where psychiatry began to form under the influence of Romantic philosophy, Danial Berthold-Bond suggests that Hegel’s criticism of Romanticism for its empty formalism applies to Romantic medicine as well. He points out that Hegel criticizes Romantic medicine for its “construction of a priori” metaphysical systems which are then simply imposed on the diagnostic and classificatory tasks of medicine:” Danial Berthold-Bond, *Hegel’s Theory of Madness* (Albany: State University of New York Press,1995), 17-8. Yet Hegel dismisses empirical medicine too, Berthold-Bond highlights, which considers mental phenomena only as *a posteriori* facts. According to Berthold-Bond, Hegel’s position can ultimately be described as a middle way between Romantic and empirical medicine, where the main concern is a “conceptual, theoretical, philosophical” discernment of the underlying, inner meaning of disease;” Hegel’s speculative theory of mental illness thus essentially involves an “ontology of the psyche which rests upon the ‘notional thinking’,” which Freud also pursued in his own way a century later: Danial Berthold-Bond, *Hegel’s Theory of Madness*, 19.

96 In this chapter, I focus only on Hegel’s speculative notion of reason as the unity of reason and unreason and its significance for his treatment of the *Naturgeist* in the *Anthropology*. But it seems that one can find a crucial clue for elucidating Hegel’s notion of “anthropology”—in what sense he gives the title “anthropology” to the first part of his philosophy of subjective spirit in the *Encyclopedia* where he treats the soul-body relationship—by setting his thematization of those psychiatric themes of the time in the context of the rise of psychiatry in the early nineteenth-century. As I discussed in Chapter 4 in reference to Fernando Vidal’s work, anthropology and psychology were not
Dismissing those impenetrable phenomena as nonsensical without any examination, for Hegel, presupposes a specific notion of reason: the notion of a rigid opposition between

established as independent disciplines in Hegel’s time; the terms anthropology and psychology were often used in an interchangeable way around the notion of the human soul as separable from but united with the body: cf. Fernando Vidal, The Science of the Soul. The Early Modern Origins of Psychology, trans. Saskia Brown (Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press, 2011). Working on the history of Enlightenment psychology, therefore, for Vidal, amounts to investigating the formation of the idea of anthropology in the eighteenth century. By shedding light on the complicated history of Enlightenment psychology, Vidal thus challenges Foucault’s famous claim that man did not exist before the nineteenth century. Foucault’s claim, presented in his 1966 work, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, was that man was not taken as the object of a science before the overall redistribution of the episteme occurred in the nineteenth century: before the classic, general theory of representation was abandoned, and biology, economics, and philology were formed as new, specific disciplines treating human life, labor, and language. Foucault further remarks that in this modern event, “the necessity of interrogating man’s being as the foundation of all positivities was imposing itself in its place;” Michael Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), 345. Foucault’s idea is that the modern and contemporary human sciences revolve around the double notion of man as an a posteriori self-authorizer concerning her investigations as well as the a priori foundation of all knowledge: in his terms, man, first, as “that upon the bases of which all knowledge can be constituted as immediate and non-problematized evidence” and, second, as “that which justifies the calling into question of all knowledge of man” (ibid.). Whereas in this remark Foucault seems to be placing emphasis on the conception of man as an a posteriori self-authorizer in and for human sciences—and hence, the interconnection between power and knowledge, or the formation of modern disciplinary power—Vidal claims that “the ‘man’ of the ‘archaeology of the human sciences’ has nothing to do with its Enlightenment homonym, and that its meaning is decipherable only from within a Foucauldian framework;” Fernando Vidal, The Science of the Soul. The Early Modern Origins of Psychology, 100. He further suggests that in the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, there was “the idea of one science that would bring together and integrate all the disciplines concerning the human being,” namely the idea that “man as a composite totality of soul and body must be taken as an autonomous object of study,” and that this ideal of a science of man “played a key role in the advent of the human sciences;” Fernando Vidal, The Science of the Soul. The Early Modern Origins of Psychology, 101-109.

Vidal considers the formation of that Enlightenment ideal of one science of man in light of the history of psychology and thus does not thematize psychiatry. His suggestion gives an important insight, however, into the significance of psychiatry for the German conception of anthropology in the late eighteenth- and the early nineteenth-centuries. We can refer, for instance, to Reil’s student at the University of Halle, Christian Friedrich Nasse’s suggestion. In 1822, Nasse suggested determining the new discipline, psychiatry, as “psycho-somatology” or “psycho-physiology,” which should be “a branch of anthropology” treating “the entirety of human nature [das Ganze der Menschennatur];” his program of this new, sub-discipline of anthropology thus challenges the old division according to which “the soul belongs to philosophers and the body, to physicians” and the separation between “psychology and physiology.” Marion Schmaus, Psychosomatik: Literarische, philosophische, und medizinische Geschichten zur Entstehung eines Diskurses (1778-1936) (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2009), 169. It is therefore to be noted that psychiatry brought some important changes in the classic, philosophical framework of the soul-body relationship. In place of the old parallelism of the soul and the body, it introduced the idea of “an individually varying community of the soul and the body that is interactive, developmental-historical, and changeable depending on gender, external factors, etc.,” and the spatial topology of “the soul as inner and the body as outer.” Marion Schmaus, Psychosomatik: Literarische, philosophische, und medizinische Geschichten zur Entstehung eines Diskurses (1778-1936), 170.

Thus, to shed full light on the “anthropological” meaning of Hegel’s Anthropology, it seems that we need to explore the ambiguous semantic field of the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-centuries in which anthropology, psychology, and psychiatry were not differentiated. This comprehensive historical study will give a good picture of the conception or image of man at the turn of the nineteenth century, thereby offering a chance to reconsider Foucault’s thesis.
reason and unreason. He thus argues that the existence of animal magnetism or hypnosis does not need to be verified insofar as we observe it. Verification is called for in order to “deny what they have seen with their own eyes” as “mere deception and imposture” while being “fixed in their a priori understanding.”\(^9^7\) Hegel’s point here is not that we should accept all mysterious phenomena as true without verifying them. Needless to say, this claim is not only nonsensical but also extremely dangerous because a malignant person, for instance, can delude people and establish a pseudo-religion for the purpose of making money and gaining power by claiming that he met a divine being and this divine being gave him supernatural, healing powers. Instead, his point is about the theoretical attitude of the people who already decided to deny animal magnetism or hypnosis. That is, they require verifications not because they want to examine whether or not hypnosis really exists or what it is, but because they want to deny it. No matter what verifications they are provided, they will deny it because they already decided to deny it.

Instead of taking this antithetical standpoint of consciousness, Hegel thus embraces the irrational and paranormal experiences that attract a good deal of attention from his contemporaries and treats them as lived experiences, ones that are reported by people and deserve a speculative account with respect to the self-development of Geist in the Anthropology. This speculative account is first found in the way in which Hegel considers dreaming. As I suggest in what follows, natural dreaming is concerned with the state in which one is awake while dreaming; somnambulism, with the state in which one is dreaming while being awake. Both kinds of dreaming thus display an immediate connection between consciousness and unconsciousness; both the magical relationship and animal magnetism

\(^9^7\) ENZ, § 406 A.
challenge the idea of a rigid distinction between reason and unreason. Thus, Hegel’s intention in thematizing those experiences which seem to have no philosophical significances is not to give a scientific account or a phenomenological analysis concerning how or why it occurs. By seeing in them an immediate connection between consciousness and unconsciousness, he instead elaborates on the notion of the feeling form [Gefühlsform] of consciousness, one in which consciousness is tied to unconsciousness without being able to play the role of the mediator of that bond. This is, for Hegel, the disease of Geist, namely the diseased, negative stage that Geist, as Naturgeist, passes through in the Anthropology.

3.2. The Magical Relationship: Being Awake While Dreaming

Hegel starts his discussion of the magical relationship by considering what he calls natural dreaming. He already discussed dreaming in §398, framing the development of Geist in the Anthropology in terms of the soul’s awakening from sleep. His suggestion was that dreaming need not be identified with sleep insofar as it is thought of in terms of the production of unrealistic, subjective representations that do not match the actual constitution of the objective world. One produces these unrealistic and subjective representations even when awake. That is, one can be said to be dreaming even when she is awake. This form of consciousness in which it is subordinated to unconsciousness is the fundamental form of the feeling soul, which Hegel conceptualizes through a consideration of animal magnetism. Prior to developing this idea, Hegel considers the reverse form of that immediate bond between consciousness and unconsciousness: being awake while dreaming, which appears in natural dreaming.
The Zusatz to §405 suggests that the soul attains a “profound, powerful feeling of its whole individual nature, of the entire encompass of its past, present and future.” That is, the soul can have an immediate feeling or awareness of what has happened and what will happen; it can have an unconscious but objective knowledge of the world that matches reality even without the mediation of consciousness. Although Hegel calls this form of dreaming in which the soul attains a certain objective cognition of the past and the future “natural dreaming,” it thus refers to supernatural phenomena such as premonition and postmonition. But Hegel calls these “natural,” I think, to compare them with mesmerism, one in which a conscious subject’s withdrawal to her unconscious, substantial totality is artificially induced by another conscious subject, i.e., the magnetizer.

What is more important than those paranormal phenomena themselves is Hegel’s evolving conceptualization of the connection between dreaming and being awake—consciousness and unconsciousness, reason and unreason. The paranormal forms of dreaming lead us, as I suggested, to the idea of being awake while dreaming, that is, an objective cognition of the world that occurs in dreaming. Insofar as such unconscious knowledge of the world is given as people’s experiences and Hegel’s speculative perspective does not allow us to dismiss it only for the reason that it is incomprehensible from the antithetical standpoint of consciousness, one would have to concede that unconsciousness sometimes allows us, in a

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98 “Ahnen” and “Durchträumen.” I presume that Hegel read some materials reporting the paranormal experiences of having a vision of the past or the future in dreaming, but I could not find any materials that support this presumption. In spite of this, I translate “Ahnen” and “Durchträumen” into premonition and postmonition with reference to Hegel’s formulation that natural dreaming is concerned with the soul’s awareness of the entire encompassment of its ‘past, present, and future.” In translating “Ahnen” and “Durchträumen” into premonition and postmonition, I also paid attention to his idea that natural dreaming presents the soul’s unity with its objectivity: in natural dreaming, “which in recent times have received universal attention,” “the soul still lies in immediate, undifferentiated unity with its objectivity” (ENZ, §402 Z). By premonition [Ahnen], I therefore understand a dreaming in which one sees what will happen in the future. By postmonition [Durchträumen], I mean a dreaming in which one has a vision of what happened in the past without knowing it happened.
certain way, to access the objective world and produce a correct representation of it. Giving an account of how it occurs, however, is not Hegel’s concern. Those paranormal experiences suggest that unconsciousness is sometimes immediately bounded with consciousness rather than constitutes a purely irrational part of the mind inaccessible to consciousness. What Hegel sees in them and conceptualizes is such a relationship between consciousness and unconsciousness that challenges the idea of the rigid distinction between consciousness and unconsciousness. However, this unmediated, immediate fusion of dreaming and being awake is for Hegel essentially pathological. This is the critical position concerning the feeling form of consciousness, which he presents more clearly by considering somnambulism and animal magnetism, and further thematizes in terms of mental disorders in the second stage of the “Feeling Soul” section, titled “Self-Feeling.”

This critical position of Hegel is already found in his treatment of the magical relationship. The magical relationship represents the immediate unity of the soul’s being and self. Hegel mentions the case in which a mother’s psychological disturbance is said to negatively affect the formation of her fetus’ body and mind. In this case, the fetus is a selfless substantiality, which has its actual self in an other, i.e., her mother. Hegel calls such an actual self who exercises a power on the life and constitution of another being the genius or the guardian spirit. Further, it is a “magical power [die magische Gewalt]” that the guardian spirit exercises on its other: the power to dominate an other’s mind and body without any mediation by something else.99 The soul’s immediate subordination to its guardian spirit is also found in

99 In the Zusatz to § 405, Hegel suggests that the magical infection [die magische Infektion] also occurs, for instance, when a child is immediately affected by the adults she sees around; when an adult with superior spirit attracts another with weaker spirit—e.g., when “Kent felt himself drawn to Lear because the king seemed to him to have something in countenance which he would fain call master.” Even habit can be considered in terms of the magical infection; “making one’s bodiliness subservient, unresisting executant of her will” is the exercise of the soul’s “magical power” upon its “bodiliness.”
the case in which one’s destiny is said to be determined by external circumstances. In this case, circumstantial factors that are said to determine the direction of one’s life are the geniuses or guardian spirits, which exercise a magical power on that individual. Neither a fetus in the womb nor an individual who are greatly affected by circumstances, however, can be said to be a conscious subject. They are rather objects, the passive beings on which the magical power of an actual self is exercised.

As I discuss later, Hegel holds that the soul, or the human psyche in general, is ontologically connected with the world such that it is an individualized world of actuality. But when this individualization of the world in and as a soul occurs in a unilateral way, from the world to the soul, without the latter’s active participation, the life of the soul is like being awake while dreaming. That is, such an individual who just accepts a set of values and norms of the existing world can be said to be conscious in the limited sense that she can lead her life in accordance with those objective factors of the world. This conscious life, however, is not conscious in a self-conscious manner; it is said to be in the state of dreaming in the sense that it is subordinated to the magical power of the world.

3.3 Animal Magnetism: Dreaming While Being Awake

Animal magnetism is the fixation of the “feeling life [Gefühlsleben]” characteristic of the magical relationship as “a form, a state, of the self-conscious, enculturated, sober human being.”^100 As with the magical relationship, Hegel sets out his discussion of animal magnetism with a consideration of a kind of dreaming: somnambulism. When discussing

^100 ENZ, §405.
natural dreaming in the *Zusatz* to §405, Hegel briefly suggested that the soul’s unconscious, substantial totality is its “whole *individual* nature.” That is, the soul’s unconsciousness involves a whole of the factors that constitute its individuality; further, this whole individual nature of the soul also involves the factors concerning her relationships with the objective world, which bring about paranormal cognitions of the world when they are felt in dreaming. In the *Anmerkung* on §406, Hegel further develops the idea of the soul’s individuality as an individualization of the world of actuality in and as a soul. He states that “the concrete being of an individual” involves “the entirety of his fundamental interests, the essential and the particular empirical relationships in which he stands to other men and to the world at large.” This is also “the actuality of *that individual*;” an actuality “*immanent* to” her, which “was just called her *genius*.” In other words, unconsciousness contains the world of actuality in the individualized form as a soul; the unconscious, inner world of the soul is an individuation of the external world of actuality. Somnambulism occurs when this “sphere of the individually determined world, of particular interests and restricted relationships” enters into consciousness. It is such an immediate displacement of consciousness which is capable of relating to the world of actuality in a universal, objective manner by the soul’s unconscious, inner world—namely, by the world of actuality that is individualized in and as a soul, which the latter represents and feels only from her individual perspective.

Somnambulism thus represents the immediate bond of consciousness and unconsciousness in the reverse direction to natural dreaming. The unconscious but objective cognition in natural dreaming is consciousness’ seizing the place of unconsciousness; somnambulism is unconsciousness’ taking over the seat of consciousness. While natural dreaming is being awake while dreaming, somnambulism is dreaming while being awake.
Both thus challenge the rigid distinction between consciousness and unconsciousness. It is to be noted, however, that somnambulism is a form or a state of *sober consciousness*. By proceeding from natural dreaming to somnambulism, from the magical relationship to animal magnetism, Hegel thus elaborates on his critical conception of a particular form of consciousness in which it is immediately bound to unconsciousness without being able to play the role of the mediator of that bond, rather than just juxtaposing two different forms of the their immediate bond. It is “the feeling form [*die Gefühlsform*]” of consciousness, i.e., the feeling soul, which is, in fact, the “surrender of its (the soul’s) existence as the spirituality in being-with-itself [*die bei sich selbst seiende Geistigkeit*].”

The feeling soul is therefore contrasted with sober consciousness, namely “the man of sound sense and understanding.”

This subject who is consciously awake “relates to her inner world in a self-conscious way;” that is, “she knows herself in the form of the interconnection between herself and the determinations of that actuality as an external world distinct from herself, and she is similarly aware of this world as a network of rational [*verständlich*] connections.” Sober consciousness’ awareness of herself, in other words, involves an awareness of the rational interconnection between her inner world and the actuality of the world outside of her. For example, a person living in the aftermath of the French Revolution, as a sober consciousness, would be able to be aware of her reactionary mindset; she would also be able to know that her mind consisting of the factors from the pre-revolutionary world is no longer in accordance with the times; hence, she would be able to

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101 *ENZ*, § 406 A.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
recognize the revolutionized, new world as a rational one, thereby cultivating a new mindset that fits with this new, rational world.

That the feeling soul is the surrender of its existence as Geist, therefore, implies that consciousness, when having a feeling form, comes out of joint with the actuality of the world and gets stuck in her merely subjective representation of the world. It is therefore important to note that Hegel’s critical conceptualization of the feeling soul bears on his idea of consciousness as a worldly being, a being that is encultured in the world of actuality as part of it and makes this world actual by conscious and self-conscious activities. If consciousness’ awareness of the world is rational and objective whereas the feeling soul’s is subjectivist and even perverted, this is for Hegel an essentially ontological issue concerning one’s existence in the world rather than a merely epistemological issue with respect to a correct or incorrect representation of the world. Hegel thus states that the world has its “thread” in the soul in such a way that “what it actually is for itself, consists of these threads.”104 Due to this connection between the soul and the world, an individual dies internally, Hegel suggests, when her world is destroyed; for instance, the Stoic, Cato, killed himself after the collapse of the Roman Empire. Or, one becomes psychologically ill with the loss of her close connection with the world: for instance, one suffers from depression with the death of her beloved people, and homesickness when living in a foreign land. These cases, however, do not differ much from the magical relationship insofar as the suicide and the sufferers of psychological sicknesses remain passive in relation to their worlds of actuality. The issue at stake is therefore the fact that in such a feeling-life, consciousness remains a “monadic individual”

104 Ibid.
that reflects and perceives the world only from its individual perspective, a passive substance that has subjectivity in another man or the world.\textsuperscript{105}

Now, Hegel elaborates on the psychical structure of the feeling soul by examining animal magnetism. Animal magnetism is the withdrawal of consciousness and its submergence in the soul’s substantial totality. As with natural dreaming, this submergence in unconsciousness entails a variety of supernatural cognitions such as clairvoyant visions that go beyond the conditions of space and time. Unlike natural dreaming, however, these are experienced by those with sober consciousness when they are awake. Further, a person’s submergence in her unconsciousness can also be induced by another person intentionally. This occurs in mesmerism in which the magnetizer exercises the power on the magnetized to have the latter sink into her unconscious, inner world. Hegel calls mesmerism animal magnetism proper.

Animal magnetism proper, i.e., mesmerism or hypnosis, is similar to a fetus in the womb in that the magnetized stays passive in relation to the magnetizer; to that extent, both pertain to the magical relationship. However, there is a big difference between the two. Whereas the subjectivity of a mother is inseparably united with the substantiality of her fetus, the subjectivity of the magnetizer is separated from the substantiality of the magnetized. Whereas the mother has “the formal subjectivity of life,” the magnetizer has “the real subjectivity of the feeling soul.”\textsuperscript{106} To put it simply, mesmerism is a relationship between two independent, conscious subjects. It thus displays a rupture between consciousness and

\textsuperscript{105} ENZ, § 405.

\textsuperscript{106} ENZ, § 406 Z.
unconsciousness, between the one who actively induces the other to fall into the state of somnambulism and the other who is passively led to this state.

Of importance is that Hegel further conceptualizes this rupture between consciousness and unconsciousness observed in mesmerism in terms of the constitution of one person’s mind. What mesmerism introduces is the idea of a “rupture between my soulful being and my waking being.”107 That is, “everyone includes these two aspects in herself,” such that the rupture can occur “in even the healthiest people.”108 Thus, Hegel does not seem so much concerned with clairvoyant experiences and mesmerism themselves as with the general feature of the human psyche, which those phenomena lead one to consider. The phenomena of clairvoyance and mesmerism, in other words, leads us to the idea that the human mind is a coexistence of consciousness and unconsciousness, and that they coexist in such a way that unconsciousness can break loose from consciousness so far as to take over the seat in one’s mind. By implication, it is possible that a person with sober consciousness or even with the healthiest mind is caught by the power of unconsciousness and is drawn to some irrational ideas and behaviors.

Such a rupture between consciousness and unconsciousness in an individual person’s mind, however, is a disease [Krankheit] according to Hegel.109 For Hegel, disease is defined as the “fixation of an organ or system” in opposition to the organic totality of the body.110 One gets diseased, in other words, when a part of the body breaks loose from the organic system of

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107 ENZ, § 406 Z.
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid.
the body, loses fluidity in relation to the organic whole, and is fixated as such. This model of disease applies, Hegel suggests, to the psyche as well, such that the “soul-life” gets “disease” when “the merely soulful [Seelenhaft] side of the (psychic) organism” becomes “independent of spiritual consciousness.”\footnote{Ibid.} The psyche gets diseased, in other words, when unconsciousness breaks loose from the organic totality of consciousness; or, when consciousness loses its power to hold unconsciousness under its power, thereby surrendering the “objective relationship to the actual world.”\footnote{Ibid.} It is in this sense that “the feeling-life [Gefühlsleben], when it becomes a form, a state, of the self-conscious, educated, sober human being, is a disease.”\footnote{ENZ, § 406.}

3.4. Derangement: The Negativity of Naturgeist

Throughout his discussion of the magical relationship and animal magnetism in the first stage of the “Feeling Soul” section, Hegel elaborates on the notion of the feeling soul, that is, a feeling form of consciousness in which it is subordinated to unconsciousness without having the power to have the latter under control. As we may expect from this conceptualization, the feeling soul represents a conscious subject who is subject to mental illnesses. This mentally deranged consciousness is in the state of dreaming while being awake with her disconnection with the sober, objective consciousness. In Hegel’s terms, the feeling soul “can perceive visible things without the aid of the eyes and without the mediation of
light” whereas objective consciousness “is able to see only with the eyes.”¹¹⁴ For Hegel, derangement [Verrückheit] is therefore a matter of one-sided subjectivism. Further, this diseased state of consciousness eventually represents a spiritual disease, I suggest, in the sense that one loses her close and solid connection with the spiritual world she inhabits, falling off from this world-organism. Thus, it is important to note that derangement is for Hegel not simply concerned with this and that symptom and behavior that we categorize as mental illness. For him, “derangement is not an abstract loss of reason, but is […] only a contradiction within the reason that is still present.” The significance of this Hegelian idea of derangement is what I consider in what follows.

Starting his discussion of the second stage of the “Feeling Soul” section, titled “Self-Feeling” in §408, Hegel states that the self-feeling is concerned with the form of a soul in which it “finds itself in the contradiction between its totality systematized in its consciousness, and the particular determinacy that is not fluid in that totality, not integrated and subordinated [to that totality]” and defines this state of the soul as “derangement [Verrückheit].” In the Zusatz to § 408, he considers a wide range of the phenomena concerning derangement [Verrückheit], drawing the following three divisions.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁴ ENZ, § 406 A.

¹¹⁵ The English translator of Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit of 1827-8, Robert R. Williams, suggests that the best English translation of Hegel’s term Verrückheit would be “dementia” (LPS 149, note 260). According to Williams, the German “Verrückheit” contains as its root meaning “displacement,” and this illustrates Hegel’s fundamental idea that Verrückheit involves the division of a self into “two centers, the conscious and the unconscious” and occurs when “the unconscious is not subject to direct rational control.” The English “dementia” is suitable for conveying this meaning, Williams suggests, because it contains the “concept of mind (mens)” and implies at the same time “its disunion, derangement, and impairment.” Williams’ suggestion is relevant at large, but I use A. V. Miller’s translation “derangement” due to the specific medical idea of a decline in memory and language associated with “dementia.” “Insanity” or “madness” might be good alternatives, specifically when one sets Hegel’s consideration of Verrückheit in the context of the history of the concept of madness. But I do not use these terms, first, because my primary concern in this section is to consider the significance of the feeling soul for the development of Naturgeist in the Anthropology rather than the significance of Hegel’s understanding of madness or insanity within the history of the concept of madness. Second, insanity or madness in a narrow sense is Hegel’s
a) Imbecility [Blödsinn], absent-mindedness [Zerstreuheit], and rambling [Faselei]. (1) Imbecility is the “entirely indeterminate submergence in oneself.” It may be congenital but may also be the consequence of frenzy; it may be permanent or temporary. (2) Absent-mindedness is a “non-awareness of the immediate present;” a “submergence into a suspension of sober, objective consciousness, into an unaware non-presentation of spirit at things at which it should be present.” Absent-mindedness may be the beginning of madness but often occurs when one conducts profound meditations. (3) Rambling is the “inability to fix attention on anything determinate,” which is the opposite of absent-mindedness. Its cause is “the weakness of the power of rational [verständiges] consciousness to hold together the entirety of its representations.” Ramblers often suffer from delirium; hence, rambling is not merely non-awareness of what is immediately present but an “unconscious reversal of it.”

discussion one of the three classes of Verrücktheit, i.e., Tollheit or Wahnsinn, and does not represent Verrücktheit as a whole.

Dora B. Weiner also points out the difficulty in the translation of the German terms Geistesverwirrung and Geisteszerstürtung that were used for denoting insanity by the early German psychiatrists: Dora B. Weiner, “The Madman in the Light of Reason. Enlightenment Psychiatry. Part II: Alienists, Treatises, and the Psychologic Approach in the Era of Pinel,” in History of Psychiatry and Medical Psychology, eds. Edwin R. Wallace IV and John Gach (New York: Springer, 2008), 284. Geistesverwirrung was the German translation of Philippe Pinel’s French term aliénation mentale, which he used for describing a mental patient as the one who “feels foreign to the ‘normal’ world, a stranger (alienus) in the land of sanity,” and who can therefore be turned back to the world of sanity by a due moral treatment. While the German Geistesverwirrung well conveys “the image of a patient who has lost his way,” Verwirrung conveys, Weiner points out, “an image of tangled and snagged threads that an expert might disengage;” and Zerstürtung, “a strong physical commotion that shakes and deranges the mind.” Those two German terms thus imply a therapist’s “practical task” of “reconstructing the disturbed arrangements” and “making order,” which is “congenial to the Anglo-Saxon empirical approach” and is thus adequately translated as “derangement.” Weiner points out, however, that the real problem rests on the “unique plasticity of the German language” that connects “the tangible notions of Verwirrung and Zerstürtung” with “the spiritual and vague terms Geist and Seele.” This mixture of psyche and soma, Weiner suggests, is unique in German Idealism and especially German Romanticism but remains impenetrable to scientific analysis.
b) Folly proper [die eigentliche Narrheit]. While imbecility, absent-mindedness, and rambling are various modifications of the subject’s indeterminate submergence in herself, folly proper arises when a “determinate content” becomes a “fixed representation” of “the natural spirit that is closed within itself [Insichverschlossensein des natürlichen Geist].” Not every fool is crazy because folly proper means one’s holding fast to an “individual, merely subjective representation” and regarding it as “something objective.” Folly is still “consciousness” because it displays, unlike imbecility, the power and ability to hold on to something determinate; the fool is “crazy in relation to one point” but is at the same time a “good, coherent consciousness.” In most cases, it arises when “one shuts herself up in her subjectivity out of dissatisfaction with actuality.” It thus includes “weariness with life,” namely an “indeterminate, groundless disgust with actuality,” and “melancholy,” which is the mind’s unhappiness and inability to rise to the vitality of thought and action. In contrast with these indeterminate forms of folly which involve “killing off all vitality [Lebendigkeit],” folly proper has the “individualized content” of the fool—e.g., the fool’s idea that she is “God, or Christ, or a king,” or “a barleycorn, or a dog, or to have a carriage in their body”—and this displays “lively interests” and even “passions” of the fool. But the fool has no consciousness of the contradiction between her fixed ideas and the objectivity of the world; she is not tormented by her folly.

c) Mania or insanity [Tollheit/Wahnsinn]. Unlike folly proper, the insane “has a vivid feeling of the contradiction between her merely subjective representation and objectivity” but “insists on making her subjective representation an actuality or annihilating what is actual.” Insanity arises from some particular causes rather than mere illusions, including “a stroke of great misfortune,” “a derangement [Verrückung] of a person’s individual world,” and “the violent
The last case stands out in the French Revolution when many people went insane with their rejection of the present and insistence on the past. In contrast to folly proper, insanity entails an unhappy feeling, which is easily accompanied by a “hypochondriacal mood” and further, by a “suspicious, false, jealous, mischievous, and malicious disposition” and a “fury over her [the insane] hindrance by the surrounding actuality” from which she suffers a “limitation of her will.” Thus, the insane becomes frenzied, throwing off the “ethical laws rooted in the truly universal will.”

In short, derangement for Hegel has three forms: a) indeterminate submergence in oneself with the weakness of the power of consciousness; b) determinate submergence in oneself and adherence to her subjective representations without an awareness of the contradiction between her subjective representations and the outer, objective world; c) adherence to one’s subjective representations even with an awareness of the contradiction between herself and the world.

In discussing those forms of derangement, Hegel often refers to the French physician, Philippe Pinel, known as one of the founders of modern psychiatry. Let us briefly examine the historical background. Historians of Enlightenment science agree that psychiatry began to form as an independent medical discipline toward the end of the eighteenth century. Besides the historical background.

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116 Hegel’s speculative notion of derangement as concerning the form of consciousness of a rational person who is tortured by the feeling of unhappiness due to her conflictual relationship with the world hinges upon how to interpret this third category of derangement, i.e., mania. In what follows, I suggest that the Hegelian, speculative notion of derangement is grounded in his acceptance and correction of Pinel’s theory of mania.

increase in asylums and the development of medical studies in universities, Roy Porter counts as an important contributing factor to the formation of modern psychiatry the influence of Locke’s philosophy, specifically his idea that madness is the result of the mis-association of ideas and is therefore curable through a psychological approach. This Enlightenment situation entailed the rise of the new field of neurology, which assigns mental illness to the disturbance of the nerves and brain. In his *Synopsis Nosologiae Methodicae* of 1769, the Scottish physician, William Cullen, brought up for the first time the concept of *neuroses* as illnesses caused by the disturbance of the nervous system and included *vesaniae* ("disorders of judgement without any pyrexia or coma") to the sub-categories of neuroses. Pinel promptly introduced Cullen’s ideas of *neuroses* and *vesaniae* to France and developed his humanitarian and moral approach to insanity.

Influenced by Cullen’s neurology, in the *Nosographie philosophique ou méthode de l’analyse appliqué à la médecine* of 1798, Pinel classified mental illness into four main categories: melancholia, mania, dementia, and idiocy, while dividing mania into two kinds: mania with, and without delirium. In his *Traité médico-philosophique sur l’aliénation mentale; ou la manie* of 1801, he also put forward a sympathetic notion of a mental patient as the one who "feels foreign to the ‘normal’ world, a stranger (*alienus*) in the land of sanity" and who can therefore be turned back to the world of sanity by a due moral treatment. The importance of Pinel in the early history of psychiatry rests on his humanitarian and moral approach. While patients were often treated with chains, whips, straightjackets and some other violent methods in pre-Revolutionary asylums, Pinel suggested that insanity, since it is mental illness, can be treated through a mental and moral approach. Yet his humanitarian and moral approach does not seem to

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be a mere ideology. Its theoretical ground is found, I think, in his new category “mania without delirium [manie sans délire or folie raisonnable].” This category implies the idea of “partial insanity”: that one would become mad in one respect alone, and that one’s personality can be warped while her understanding remains sound. ¹¹⁹ By implication, every normal person can be insane in a certain respect while being rational in her thoughts and behaviors at large; hence, an abnormal person is the same, rational human being as a normal person.

Hegel’s appraisal of Pinel is found in his Lectures of the Philosophy of Spirit of 1827-8:

Many means are employed that are not capable of restraining the illness as such, but rather only restrain the mad frenzies: straightjackets and swing. However, the main aspect of the therapy is psychic healing. […] In modern times people have began to take spirit into consideration and to make people healthy [gesund] by spirit. This presupposes that the deranged are still human beings and are rational. […] This presupposition is the same as the idea that every illness still has health, and it becomes the focal point of the treatment. It presupposes that the demented person still knows what right and wrong are, and that he possesses complete soundness and accountability outside of the specific sphere of his folly itself. ¹²⁰

What Hegel here appreciates is the tendency of the emerging modern psychiatry to consider insanity as a psychical disease, of which both the cause and treatment are assumed to rest on the psyche and further, Pinel’s idea of mania without delirium, which suggests that a person with sound consciousness may be deranged in a certain respect. Pinel’s category of mania without

¹²⁰ VPG, 119-120/LPS, 149
delirium also suggests, conversely, that an insane person is still a rational subject capable of thinking and acting in accordance with rational rules. As Hegel puts it in the passage above, there is no (mental) illness that is absolutely separate from health; there is no absolute insanity that completely lacks reason.

Returning to Hegel’s classification of mental illness in the *Anthropology*, it appears that Hegel incorporates many cases and ideas found in Pinel’s works, but his classification is very different from Pinel’s. It is noticeable, among others, that Hegel does not consider the absence of reason to be the source of mental disorders whereas Pinel takes impairment of intellectual faculties as the cause of certain disorders: imbecility and mania with delirium. Hegel concedes that imbecility is a natural mental disease; it is characterized by the absence of rational faculty and is therefore incurable. But he categorizes imbecility more broadly, together with absent-mindedness and rambling, as one of the disorders that present the subject’s indeterminate submergence in her unconsciousness, which illustrates the weakness of the power of consciousness. Hegel’s point with this first group of derangement is therefore the fact that one’s submergence in her unconsciousness is associated with the powerlessness, rather than the

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121 In his 1794 work, *Nosographie philosophique ou méthode de l’analyse appliquée à la médecine*, Pinel classified mental illness as follows. (1) Melancholia is the gloomy state in which the patient is often fixated on one idea. It appears in the form of the exalted sense of self-importance as well as in the form of despair and depression. (2) Mania without delirium displays perverted ideas and shows the tendency to act violently; however, the patient maintains the ability to reason and think coherently, and her symptoms do not arise from impairment of her intellectual faculties. (3) Mania with delirium involves impairment of some cognitive faculties, accompanying fury, indulgence, and frenzy. (4) Dementia is the inability to think coherently; e.g., a rambler who keeps speaking in an incomprehensible manner and a patient who lost her memory and remains in the past. (5) Idiotism is the absence of intellectual faculties and affections.

When compared to this classification of Pinel, the first group in Hegel’s categorization of derangement (imbecility, absent-mindedness, and rambling) seems to incorporate a part of (4) dementia (the case of ramblers) and (5) idiotism. Hegel’s second group (foolishness and folly proper) includes Pinel’s notion of (1) melancholia and a part of (4) dementia (rejection of the present and insistence on the past); however, Hegel does not consider memory damage as the main cause of dementia but focuses on the contradictory relationship between subjectivity of one’s representation and objectivity of actuality. The third group (mania or insanity) seems to incorporate those two factors and further, some symptoms of (3) mania with delirium such as fury and frenzy; however, these symptoms for Hegel have little to do with impairment of intellectual faculties.
absence, of consciousness. An absent-minded person and a rambler can therefore be freed from their symptoms, Hegel suggests, when their mind regains the power of consciousness. More importantly, Hegel does not hold that maniacal reactions such as fury, indulgence, and frenzy prove the complete absence of consciousness or reason whereas Pinel takes those reactions as arising from impairment of intellectual faculties and hence, as providing the point of division between mania with, and without delirium. For Hegel, those reactions rather come from the maniac’s self-consciousness, the awareness of the contradiction between her subjective representation and the reality of the world, and the feeling of unhappiness, which arises from this self-consciousness concerning the unfilled gap between herself and the world.

Thus, it seems that Hegel generalizes Pinel’s notion of mania without delirium so far as to conceptualize all mental disorders in terms of a conflictual relationship between consciousness and unconsciousness. That is, there is no mental illness, for Hegel, in which consciousness or reason is absolutely removed. Consciousness is either weak, or conflicts with unconsciousness; it is too weak to keep the subject from wondering around her thoughts appearing out of the blue, or it is in discord with a particular, deranged representation that takes the subject’s mind off. Derangement in general is for Hegel such a conflictual coexistence of consciousness and unconsciousness. Or, it is a contradictory coexistence of objective consciousness and the subjective soul—“an internally consistent consciousness, which orders and maintains itself in accordance with its individual position and its connection with the likewise internally ordered external world” and “a particular determinacy” which is not subordinated to it.122

122 ENZ, § 408.
Yet, Hegel’s notion of derangement as a conflictual coexistence of consciousness and unconsciousness is more importantly concerned with the constitution of consciousness itself. It is here important to recall that the feeling soul is a form of consciousness: the deranged feeling soul is a deranged consciousness. That is to say, the contradiction between consciousness and unconsciousness is internal to consciousness. In Hegel’s term, “derangement is not an abstract loss of reason, but is [...] only a contradiction within the reason that is still present, just as physical disease is not an abstract, i.e., complete loss of health (that would be death), but a contradiction.”\(^{123}\) We here see Hegel’s speculative notion of reason as the unity of reason and unreason rather than the opposite to the latter. Further, this unity is dialectical in the sense that it has the contradiction between the two as its essential moment in such a way that it becomes consciousness for itself by resolving the contradiction that is internal and negative to itself. Seen this way, derangement is the negative moment of consciousness itself, in and through the negation or sublation of which consciousness constitutes itself as a self with a being-for-itself. By implication, one can largely say that our mind is healthy and sound when it is capable of incorporating the subjective beliefs arising from within itself to the consistent system of objective consciousness; it is deranged when it loses this capacity of consciousness, yielding itself to the power of unconsciousness.

Thus, derangement for Hegel displays the speculative feature of consciousness. As we have seen above, Hegel holds that properly maniacal reactions are the expressions of the subject’s awareness of the contradiction between herself and the world. This being said, a maniac has a higher cognition than a fool, the one who has no awareness of the discrepancy between her belief and the reality of the world and hence, no feeling of unhappiness. In contrast with a fool, a

\(^{123}\) ENZ, § 408 A.
maniac is self-conscious; she becomes insane, more precisely, because she is self-conscious. What we here see is the Hegelian, speculative paradox: the most deranged is the most conscious and the most rational. This paradox is not to be interpreted literally as implying that no one is rational unless she is insane. The notion of derangement as a “necessarily emerging from or stage in the development of the soul” is not to be understood, Hegel states, “as if we were asserting that every mind, every soul, must go through this stage of extreme disruption.” Instead, Hegel’s focus is on the “determination of the concept of derangement,” that is, the philosophical, inner meaning of derangement. Thus conceived, derangement for Hegel exhibits consciousness in its properly dialectical, spiritual form, namely in the form of self-relating negativity whereby it enters the dialectical movement of becoming itself in and through what is negative to itself. To the extent that derangement thus displays the negativity proper to Geist, one would have to say that consciousness is a spiritual being distinct from all other natural beings by virtue of its capacity of derangement. That is to say, the fact that one can become insane, namely that one can come out of joint of the world, insist on her subjectivity, and suffer from the feeling of unhappiness from this unfilled gap, would be the factor that makes the human being distinct from all other worldly beings.

Consequently, the feeling soul is the first spiritual being that appears in Hegel’s Encyclopedia system in the strict sense of Geist. As I discussed earlier, Hegel’s Anthropology concerns the spirit that is submersed in nature, i.e., Naturgeist, that finds itself in its otherness and is not with itself. This anthropological spirit is thus fundamentally self-alienated in its negative without having yet turned back to itself in that negative of its own. In relation to this overall framework of the Anthropology, derangement represents the phenomenon in which the

\[124\] ENZ § 408 Z.
natural, unmediated, unconscious element of the soul stands out for the first time as the negativity of this *Naturgeist*. In the previous stages of the *Anthropology*, Hegel considered the immediate association of the soul with natural elements in terms of the influences of meteorological, geographical/racial, and dispositional factors on the formation of the soul, and the bodily exteriorization of the soul’s interior. However, those natural elements were not explicitly considered as something negative to the soul. In contrast with them, the soulful element that coexists with objective consciousness in the deranged feeling soul constitutes its negative and is in conflict with it. More importantly, derangement reveals consciousness in its properly spiritual, negative form as I discussed above.

### 3.5. Bodiliness as Spirit’s Own Negative

According to the above considerations of Hegel’s notion of derangement, the development of *Naturgeist* in the *Anthropology* requires that the contradiction of the deranged soul be dissolved. That is, there must be a process whereby the soulful element which gets out of the control of objective consciousness is somehow reintegrated into the system of the latter. More precisely, it is to be shown how objective consciousness comes to have a power over the merely subjective, soulful element. For Hegel, this requires that the universality that is for itself get detached from the particularity of sensation:

Self-feeling, immersed in the particularity of feelings (of simple sensations, and also desires, urges, passions, and their gratifications), is not differentiated from them. But the self is implicitly a simple relation of ideality to itself, formal universality, and this is the truth of the particular; in this life of feeling the self is to be posited as this universality;
thus, it is the universality that differentiates itself from particularity, the *universality that is for itself.* [...] Particularity is [...] only the *particular being* or immediacy of the soul in contrast to its equally formal, abstract being-for-itself. This particular being of the soul is the moment of its *bodiliness*; here it breaks with this bodiliness, differentiates itself from it as its *simple being* and becomes the ideal, *subjective* substantiality of this bodiliness,[…].125

As I discussed in the previous section, a sentient being exhibits a form of subjectivity for the first time in Hegel’s system of nature, and Hegel considers this incipient form of subjectivity exhibited by a sentient being in terms of the self-feeling of the feeling soul, namely the soul’s self-conception that is immediately attached to a particular sensation or feeling. But the immediate self-feeling is one-sidedly subjective due to the lack of the mediation by objective consciousness. It is not a reflective self-awareness or the abstract I. For Hegel, this conscious form of subjectivity pertains to objective consciousness, i.e., the phenomenological self-consciousness that actively interacts with another self-consciousness in the intersubjective, actual world. And the self of objective consciousness is a universal that unites what it perceives, desires, represents, or thinks without being itself subordinated to the latter. As Hegel puts it in the passage above, it is a universality that is for itself, which is not immersed in the particularity of what it unites but keeps itself distinguished from the latter. In contrast with this, the self of the feeling soul is immersed in the particularity of what it senses and feels. It is such a non-reflective self that immediately takes the particular that it senses and feels to be true and objective. The feeling soul thus represents a deranged consciousness, a conscious subject who comes out of joint from the world of actuality and holds on to a deranged self-conception. Consequently, the

125 *ENZ,* § 409.
one-sided subjectivity of the feeling soul is essentially pathological. That is, the immediate self-feeling is disease: psychical disease in the sense of mental illness, and spiritual disease in the sense of the negativity of Naturgeist appearing in the contradictory constitution of the feeling soul.

What Hegel suggests in the passage above where he sets out his discussion of habit is that the self of the feeling soul is to be posited as the self of objective consciousness. As the universality that is for itself is the truth of particularity, the phenomenological objective consciousness is the truth of the anthropological feeling soul. The Anthropology is therefore to show how the self of objective consciousness emerges out of the self of the feeling soul: how the universality of self-consciousness comes to be by getting itself liberated from the immediate attachment to the particularity to which it relates itself and by gaining a power over that particularity.

As I discuss later in this chapter, Hegel considers the liberation of the feeling soul from its immediate attachment to the particularity of sensation in terms of habit by elaborating on the notion of habit as an overall transformation of bodiliness. Yet the transition from the second to the third stage of the “Feeling Soul” section, from the self-feeling to habit, likely seems problematic. Since Hegel deals with various mental disorders under the rubric of the self-feeling, one may raise the question, for instance, as to whether he means that those mental disorders can be treated by habit. If this is the case, one can easily refute it by giving a counterexample: e.g., a case of getting mad by some detrimental habits such as alcohol abuse. What Hegel conceptualizes in the second stage of the “Feeling Soul” section, however, is the speculative notion of consciousness according to which unconsciousness constitutes an essential, negative moment of consciousness. As I discussed above, Hegel thus views
maniacal reactions to be the expressions of the subject’s self-consciousness. What he eventually considers in terms of derangement is a form of unhappy consciousness who comes out of joint from the world of actuality and is tormented by this dislocation from the world. Hence, derangement for Hegel has an essentially existential sense. It concerns one’s existence in the world and therefore, has very little to do with this or that mental disorder which is assumed to be curable by this or that treatment. Accordingly, if habit is for Hegel the way in which consciousness becomes the mediator of itself and its own negative, unconsciousness, and thereby comes to have power over the latter, this is to be understood in terms of an existential relationship between consciousness and the world. The role of habit, in other words, consists in establishing a harmonious relationship between a conscious subject and the world in which the subject is not alienated from the world, keeps pace with the latter, and does not suffer from the feeling of unconsciousness. It is through habit in this existential sense that the negativity of Naturgeist is overcome.

What is to be noted with respect to this existential framework of the transition from the self-feeling to habit, is Hegel’s suggestion in the passage above that the particularity of the self-feeling, which is to be sublated for the emergence of objective consciousness, is fundamentally concerned with the particularity of bodiliness rather than this or that particular determinate content of sensation. In transitioning from the second to the third stage of the “Feeling Soul” section, from self-feeling to habit, Hegel thus turns back to the issue of bodiliness. This suggests that the negative element of Naturgeist, namely the natural element that constitutes the otherness of Geist in its alienation from the latter is no other than bodiliness. This further implies that bodiliness—the particularity of the soul’s bodily existence that is not subordinated to objective consciousness, more precisely—is the
fundamental problem of Hegel’s *Anthropology*. If the *Anthropology* is to show how spirit emerges as spirit out of its submersion in nature, in other words, this is to be shown through an account of how the particularity of bodiliness becomes subordinated to the universality of the phenomenological objective consciousness. In the *Anmerkung* on § 409, Hegel states more precisely:

The abstract being-for-itself of the soul in its bodiliness is not yet I, not the existence of the universal that is for the universal. It is bodiliness reduced to its pure *ideality*, which thus suits the soul as such. That is, just as space and time as abstract asunderness, as, therefore, empty space and empty time, are only subjective forms, pure intuitions; so the *pure being* mentioned above, which is being-for-itself when the particularity of bodiliness, i.e. the immediate bodiliness as such is sublated within itself, is the entirely pure, unconscious intuition, but the foundation of consciousness. It proceeds to consciousness when it has sublated within itself the bodiliness—of which it is the subjective substance, and which still constitutes a barrier for it—and is thus posited as a subject for itself.

We thus notice that the last transition within the “Feeling Soul” section from self-feeling to habit is made on the basis of an equation of bodiliness and unconsciousness. To make sense of the transition from the self-feeling to habit, the sense in which bodiliness represents unconsciousness in Hegel’s *Anthropology* is therefore to be clarified. As we have seen previously, in considering embodiment, Hegel developed the idea that bodiliness is the sign of the soul: bodiliness is that through which the soul expresses its interior, and thereby its interior obtains an external existence. Importantly, this inner and outer dynamic between the soul and the body exhibits their monistic relationship. Bodiliness, in other words, is an immediate exteriorization of the soul’s substantial totality and not a distinct substance
separated from the soul. In the strict sense, it thus denotes the dynamic, monistic relationship between the soul and the body as such rather than a physical body with flesh, blood, and bones. Further, the immediate exteriorization of the soulful, substantial totality is made possible by the fact that this substantial totality involves a network of inwardized, symbolic meanings. What unites the soul and the body through their inner and outer dynamic is therefore, to be precise, an expressive bodiliness. Accordingly, the soul’s bodily existence is likewise to be understood as an expressive existence. In the framework of embodiment, in other words, the mode of existence of the soul consists in its speaking through bodiliness; it comes to exist by making it visible through its bodiliness what it is, what it contains within itself. On account of this expressive dimension of the soul’s existence, bodiliness is at the same time the self of the soul—which is, however, distinct from a conscious self or a self-reflective I because it is an immediate, bodily exteriorization of the soul’s interior.

In short, bodiliness is not a physical, organic body, but the “pure ideality” of the soul, namely a “pure being” that serves as a sphere for the exteriorization of the soul’s interior, substantial totality. Further, it is at the same time the soul’s self, i.e., the soul’s “being-for-itself,” which is “abstract,” however, in the sense that the immediate, bodily exteriorization of the soul is not mediated by objective consciousness and the actuality of the world with which objective consciousness is connected. In this sense of exteriorization of the soul’s symbolic self without the mediation of consciousness, bodiliness represents unconsciousness: “the entirely pure, unconscious intuition” as Hegel puts it in the Anmerkung to § 409.126

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126 As mentioned earlier, embodiment of my feeling of anger by my cardiac impulse or facial expressions immediately occurs without intervention of my consciousness or will. Of course, it is possible for me to control my facial expressions or to deliberately grimace with intention to let others know about my feeling. But this is not always possible; I cannot control my facial expressions when I am mad completely, nor can I control my cardiac impulse. When I come to grimace unconsciously or my face becomes red regardless of my will, this
The equation of bodiliness and unconsciousness is tied up with what we have previously considered in terms of Hegel’s speculative notion of consciousness. In discussing consciousness in the form of feeling-life, i.e., derangement, Hegel develops the idea that unconsciousness is an essential, negative part of consciousness. Now, we have to add that unconsciousness, thus conceived as an essential part of consciousness, is not purely irrational. Instead, it is rational in a certain way insofar as it denotes the soul’s substantial totality containing all things, namely all symbolic meanings, representations, and thought-determinations, in potentiality, and insofar as this soulful, substantial totality constitutes a somehow consistent system in their interconnections rather than a hodgepodge of all possible, imaginary ideas. The distinction between consciousness and unconsciousness, therefore, for Hegel, hinges upon whether that totality of the mind is mediated by objective consciousness or not; whether it is actually connected to the world it lives in. If unconsciousness is irrational, this is so, for Hegel, in the sense that it lacks objectivity, which is rooted in the connection with the world. By the same token, consciousness is rational because it has objectivity in the actual connection with the world it lives in.

Thus, it is to be noted that the discussion of derangement brings an important development to the notion of bodiliness within the “Feeling Soul” section. As with embodiment, bodiliness still denotes the soul’s un-mediated existence. Yet, derangement reveals, as we have seen above, the dialectic, contradictory constitution of consciousness that involves unconsciousness as its essential, negative moment. In relation to this contradictory sentient body immediately expresses who I am now in my unconsciousness. It represents my unconsciousness because I am not aware of the rise of the feeling of anger and its embodiment. In a similar vein, shaking my legs while attending a boring discussion represents who I am in my unconsciousness when I am not aware of losing my attention to the discussion.
conjunction between consciousness and unconsciousness, bodiliness marks a precarious existence in which the subject is in the grip of the feeling of unconsciousness in discord with the world. At the stage between the self-feeling and habit, bodiliness thus represents the negativity of Geist in both senses of the contradictory constitution of consciousness and of the conscious subject’s discord with the world. It is in this sense that bodiliness is the “foundation of consciousness.” The contradiction internal to consciousness, because it is internal to it, is to be resolved in and by consciousness. With the resolution of this contradiction, consciousness can establish a spiritual, lively relationship to the world, which is achieved, for Hegel, by habit. We can here see why habit is in Hegel’s *Anthropology* considered in terms of an overall transformation of bodiliness. The overall transformation of bodiliness is no other than an overall modification in the mode of existence of a conscious subject. As I consider later, habit in its ultimate sense of overall transformation of bodiliness does not simply mean hardening one’s body, nor making it into a particular body specialized for a certain profession (e.g., a body of a pianist or a swimmer). More fundamentally, it means turning my body into something in which my wills and purposes are inscribed. Thus, habit brings another mode of existence in which the subject becomes part of the world of actuality, effectuating the subject’s spiritual connection with the world. It is thus that through which Geist emerges with the institution of a mediated relationship between the soul and the world. Further, we can now explain more clearly the sense in which bodiliness is the key problem of Hegel’s *Anthropology*, namely in what sense it represents the naturalness of Naturgeist. This naturalness in its proper sense bears on a conscious subject’s immediate existence in the world, in which Geist is not yet present as a mediator of the two.
4. Habit as Second Nature: Transformative Bodiliness

Through the above examination of Hegel’s discussions of animal magnetism and derangement, I have suggested that bodiliness is the element that marks the negative of Naturgeist in and through which sprit is to turn back into itself. It is the natural element that, when separated from objective consciousness, causes the soul to get deranged—deranged, not in the narrow sense of the soul becoming mad, but in the more general sense of it standing in a conflictual relationship with the actuality of the world. In relation to bodiliness as such a negative element of spirit, habit is a process whereby the soul overcomes its bodiliness. As I discuss below, the soul forms, transforms, and masters its bodiliness through habit, thereby positing itself as a subject for itself. While the feeling soul’s self-feeling is characterized by its immediate connection with the particularity of its bodiliness, habit is the soul’s detachment from that immediate connection. By virtue of this detachment, the soul becomes an actual soul and hence, consciousness. Habit is therefore the process whereby spirit emerges as spirit out of its submersion in nature. In what follows, I examine this notion of habit in Hegel’s Anthropology, focusing on how and in what sense the soul sublates its bodiliness through habit.


The feeling soul is immersed in a particular sensation and her self-feeling is likewise immediately attached to this sensation. As we have seen above, Hegel views such an immediate attachment to a particular sensation, and further, to bodiliness, as the source of
derangement. In contrast with this, the soul engaged in the process of habituation is characterized by its detachment from particular sensations. This point is illustrated by the first two forms of habit considered in the Anmerkung on § 410: (1) hardening against external sensations; (2) becoming indifferent to desires and urges. First, the soul can habituate herself to be unaffected by sensations (e.g., the sensations of frost, heat, weariness of the limbs, pleasant taste). By habituating herself this way, the soul develops a strength to become indifferent to particular sensations and to handle distress in general. Instead of being immersed in a particular sensation and directly identifying it with herself, the soul comes to distance herself from sensations. Second, the soul can also habituate herself to become disinterested in satisfying her desires and urges. Hegel suggests that this mode of habituation is, in fact, the liberation of the soul from her subordination to the body and re-subordination to the rational will. Thus, one can more generally characterize the habituated soul in terms of the detachment from the feeling-life form, that is, from the way of life based on the particularity of sensation, including appetitive life stimulated by desires and urges, which are in turn aroused by sensations. By virtue of this detachment, the soul becomes a universality-for-itself, one that is not subordinated to sensations, desires, or urges, but instead has these under its control.

The habituated soul can therefore be said to be the master of sensations and what is aroused by sensations, i.e., desires and urges, and Hegel explains habit in this sense of hardening of the soul in terms of a mechanistic process. In his terms, habit concerns “the mechanism of self-feeling, as memory is the mechanism of intelligence.”127 Thus, we can perhaps say that a habituated action occurs in a mechanistic way without the intervention of a

127 ENZ § 410 A.
conscious awareness. Just as a natural phenomenon takes place in a cause and effect relationship, so does a habituated action causally occur as a response to given circumstances.

Hegel’s accounts of habit in terms of hardening of the soul and mechanistic process, however, raise some important objections. First of all, the two cases of habit, i.e., hardening of the soul against sensations and becoming indifferent to desires and urges, seem to suggest that the habituated soul is nothing but the master of sensations and what is aroused by sensations, i.e., desires and urges. If Hegel’s theory of habit only involves such a didactic account, which disparages the roles and significances of sensation, desire, and urge, then, it is hard to accept not only because of its unjustifiable devaluation of sensation, but more fundamentally because of its lack of a plausible account of the complicated interplay between sensation and habit. Drawing on Aristotle’s notion of habit as cultivating a dispositional state of the soul by practices, we can therefore rightly point out that the dispositional state of the soul formed by habit is essentially changeable, flexible, and fluid. Since actions and practices are essential to habit, habituation is so situational that a virtuous, courageous soul, for instance, can become less courageous when she compromises on an unreasonable, social demand; she becomes a coward when her compromising practices are repeated. That is, the distinct character of habit consists in changeability, flexibility, and fluidity of the soul that can never be removed in the process of habitual hardening. To be more precise, the soul cannot harden itself without fluidizing itself if habit requires repeated practices which essentially involve trials and errors. The dynamic interplay between hardening and fluidizing characteristic of habit is further concerned with a sensible, animal being’s adaptability to the environment. If a didactic, moralist disparagement of sensation, desire, and urge is not acceptable, one of the fundamental reasons is that they perform indispensable functions for
the animal’s survival in nature. Importantly, the feelings of pleasure and displeasure accompanying sensations, which cause desires and urges and which are also caused by the latter, have a cognitive function that enables the animal to look for more favorable environmental conditions. Insofar as the environmental adaptation is a habituation, and this adaptive habituation hinges upon the cognitive function of sensation, it is untenable to say that habit only means a hardening of the soul against sensations. By the same token, it is too simplistic to say that habit is a mechanistic, natural process without intervention of consciousness or will.

A close examination of Hegel’s account of habit, however, reveals that it rather centers around the radical fluidity of habit that dissolves the body as a first, mechanistic nature to form a second nature, and that it is thus concerned with inscription of wills and purposes to a body rather than with merely mechanistic, involuntary responses to the given environment. Therefore, we need to pay attention to his notion of habit as an overall transformation of bodiliness from its immediate, natural form to a mediated, encultured one. It is, in other words, not just a cultivation of this and that virtue, nor is it a development of this and that adaptive function. Instead, it is concerned with the production of a new mode of the soul’s existence in which she is no longer immediately connected to nature but exists as second nature:

Habit, like memory, is a hard point in organization of spirit; habit is the mechanism of self-feeling, as memory is the mechanism of intelligence. The natural qualities and alterations of age, of sleeping and waking, are immediately natural; habit is the determinacy of feeling (as well as of intelligence, will, etc., insofar as they belong to self-feeling) made into something that is natural, mechanical. Habit has rightly been called second nature; nature,
because it is an immediate being of the soul, as second nature, because it is an immediacy posited by the soul, incorporating and moulding [Ein- und Durchbildung] the bodiliness that pertains to the determinations of feeling as such and to the determinacies of representation and of the will insofar as they are embodied.\textsuperscript{128}

By conceptualizing habit in terms of a second nature, Hegel does not do away with its mechanistic aspect. As he suggests in the passage above, habit is called nature in the sense that it is produced by repeated practices, and that a habitual action occurs without necessarily involving the intervention of consciousness. It is, however, a second nature that is produced by the soul. And habit in the sense of second nature is in the formation or in-formation [ein-bilden] of one’s bodiliness. Further, this in-formation is not a local or partial modification but an overall transformation [durch-bilden] of bodiliness—more precisely, the bodiliness that is considered as a sphere for the embodiment of the soul’s inner feelings. As bodiliness is considered in the Anthropology to be that through which the soul externalizes her interior and hence the immediate mode of the soul’s existence, habit as an overall transformation of bodiliness is thus eventually concerned with an overall transformation in the mode of the soul’s bodily existence.

The way in which habit produces an in-formation and overall transformation of bodiliness is illustrated by the third form of habit discussed in the Anmerkung on § 410: skillfulness or acquiring a skill [Geschicklichkeit]. It is here to be noted that skillfulness has a peculiar meaning in Hegel’s theory of habit. As Hegel puts it, skillfulness differs from the previous two forms of habit because in it “the abstract being of the soul is supposed not only

\textsuperscript{128} ENZ § 410 A.
to be held on to for itself, but to be imposed as a subjective purpose within bodiliness.”\textsuperscript{129} In other words, whereas the detachment from sensations, feelings, desires, and urges makes the soul into the abstract universality-for-itself which brings those particulars under its control, acquiring a skill makes the soul go further than becoming this abstract universality-for-itself. This is because when becoming skillful in a certain area by continuous practices, the soul inscribes a determinate purpose and will into her bodiliness. For instance, when one practices playing the piano, every moment of the practice may be considered an inscription of the player’s purpose and will into her body—to play a song well, for instance. Further, a piano player has a different bodiliness from a swimmer’s because a swimmer inscribes a different purpose from the piano-player’s one into her body. Thus, habit is more aptly defined as a process of transforming one’s bodiliness into the realm of “a particular potentiality or power [Möglichkeit] for a determinate purpose.”\textsuperscript{130} One can say that the body of a piano player has been developed so as to have a particular potentiality to play the piano and the body of a swimmer, a particular potentiality to swim.

Therefore, the practice of playing the piano or swimming differs from the motion of the hands of a watch, although both kinds of movement can be considered a mechanistic repetition. For habit is ultimately concerned with making one’s bodiliness into an “instrument” that serves the realization of her purposes without any resistance to her will. This habitual instrument of the soul differs from the bodiliness considered as an instrument for the embodiment of the soul’s inner feelings, which Hegel previously called “a sign of the soul.” Whereas the bodiliness is somehow given to the soul as the instrument for its

\textsuperscript{129} ENZ § 410 A.
\textsuperscript{130} ENZ § 410 A.
embodiment such that the soul is subordinated to the operation of this instrument, habit is to be more aptly defined as the “instrumentalization” of one’s bodiliness. By virtue of such an active appropriation of one’s body into her instrument, it becomes possible that “as soon as the representation (e.g., a sequence of musical notes) is in me, the physical body too, unresistingly and fluently, has expressed it correctly.”\textsuperscript{131}

Since the soul makes its bodiliness into the realm of a particular potentiality for a determinate purpose, the habituated soul is no longer an indeterminate substantial totality containing all possible things in potentiality. To be more precise, the habituated bodiliness serves to the selective actualization of some particular determinations contained in the soul. Nor is the habituated bodiliness a passive sphere for the immediate embodiment of the soul’s inner feelings because it involves the soul’s active instrumentalization. However, Hegel’s notion of habit is not simply concerned with acquiring a particular skill or forming a bodiliness suitable for a particular profession. As I argue in what follows, it is to be considered more fundamentally in terms of the formation of \textit{human} bodiliness, one that is developed as a particular potentiality for a \textit{spiritual} purpose—spiritual, in the sense that it is concerned with the ethical life [\textit{Sittlichkeit}] in the realm of objective spirit.

\textbf{4.2. Habit as the Genesis of Consciousness}

\textit{In itself} matter has no truth without the soul; the soul, as being-for-itself, cuts itself off from its immediate being, and places this being over against itself as bodiliness, which can

\textsuperscript{131} \textit{ENZ} § 410 A.
offer no resistance to soul’s in-formation [Einbilden] into it. The soul, which has set its being in opposition to itself, sublated it and determined it as its own, has lost the meaning of soul, of the immediacy of spirit. The actual soul in the habit of sensation and of its concrete self-feeling is in itself the ideality of its determinacies, an ideality that is for itself; in its externality it is recollected into itself, and is an infinite relationship to itself. This being-for-itself of free universality is the soul’s higher awakening to the I, to abstract universality insofar as it is for abstract universality, which is thus thinking and subject for itself, and in fact determinate subject of its judgement in which the I excludes from itself the natural totality of its determinations as an object, as a world external to it, and relates itself to that world so that in it is immediately reflected into itself: consciousness.¹³²

In this last passage of the Anthropology, Hegel recapitulates the meaning of the habitual instrumentalization of bodiliness in terms of the rise of the conscious distinction between inner and outer. Specifically, Hegel considers this rise of the conscious distinction as coming from the separation of the soul from its bodiliness. To spell out the sense in which the conscious distinction between inner and outer arises from habit, I first focus on how habit entails the separation of the soul from its bodiliness. According to our previous discussion of Hegel’s conception of skillfulness, the soul is differentiated from bodiliness in the way that a will and purpose are differentiated from the instrument that realizes them. Seen this way, the separation of the soul from its bodiliness is not to be understood in terms of an oppositional parallelism between the two because the soul is that which puts the body into practice. As Hegel puts it, the body has no resistance to the soul’s habitual practices; the soul has the power over her body in this sense. This does not necessarily mean that the soul has complete control of the body, nor does it mean that the soul controls the body consciously and willfully.

¹³² ENZ § 412
It instead implies that habituation has a mechanistic aspect that once the body has tuned into a second nature, namely a body in which the wills and purposes are inscribed, the habituated action occurs without necessarily involving the intervention of conscious awareness. Of importance in the passage above is the fact that the separation of the soul from its bodiliness is to be considered more fundamentally as the rise of a self that is neither immediately attached to the bodiliness nor subordinated to the latter. In Hegel’s terms, through habit, the soul cuts herself from her body, opposes herself to it, and stands as the universality-for-itself over against it. The sense in which the habituated soul has such a self that is detached from the body is illustrated by a sharp contrast with the feeling soul. Whereas bodiliness is the “abstract being-for-itself” and “pure ideality” of the feeling soul\textsuperscript{133} such that it immediately represents the self of the feeling soul, the habituated, actual soul is itself the “ideality of its determinacies” that is “for itself,” as Hegel puts it in the passage above. In other words, the actual soul no longer immediately exists as a bodiliness but is recollected into herself in and through this external existence of herself. It is no longer a natural subject who expresses herself through her body but the I that is the universality-for-itself, that is, a subject who can think. The actual, habituated soul, therefore, is no longer “a soul or the immediacy of spirit”—or, better, Naturegeist—because it has become a subject who achieves a self-reflective relationship to herself through the detachment from her bodiliness.

If habit entails the rise of consciousness, however, this is in the stricter sense that the separation of the soul from its bodiliness also involves the soul’s exclusion of the natural totality of her determinations as an object or a world external to herself. Hegel’s claim is that consciousness has its origin in the actual, habituated soul because the separation of the soul

\textsuperscript{133} ENZ § 409, A.
from its bodiliness simultaneously involves the differentiation between the internal soul and the outer world as the object of the soul. But this claim of Hegel involves some perplexing ideas. We can first consider the differentiation between inner and outer in terms of an awareness of one’s body as something external to oneself and the simultaneous awareness of oneself as something internal in relation to one’s body. There is no big problem, as far as I see, in arguing that such a twofold self-awareness is preceded by the process of habituation. Whereas the embodiment of inner feelings does not necessarily involve our conscious awareness as Hegel emphasizes, habit may well entail an awareness of oneself and one’s body insofar as it involves a number of practices with the body. Otherwise, one may also argue, I suggest, that one does not have an awareness of one’s body as something external to herself by birth; instead, this awareness is developed over time in the first years of life by repeated practices with sensations. Yet, it is hard to accept that habit effectuates an “exclusion” of the totality of the soul such that this totality becomes an external object, at least insofar as this is taken to be anything more than a metaphor. This is perplexing because it might sound as if an external object is in fact a projection of what is contained within the soul.

This problem requires a closer examination of how habit is concerned with the rise of the conscious distinction between one’s interior and the external world as an object. Further, one should show how this conscious distinction is not a merely subjective one that would make consciousness fall back into the stage of the feeling soul, but an objective one which ensures that it is in agreement with the actuality of the world. This is so because the actual, habituated soul is supposed to differ from the feeling soul in that it has overcome the problem inherent to the feeling soul: derangement. The actual, habituated soul, in other words, is no longer a subjective consciousness trapped in her own world but an objective consciousness
that takes part in the world-organism. It is here to be noted that taking part in the world-organism does not rule out the soul’s conflictual relationship with the world. More importantly, we need to say that the actual, habituated soul may well become a deranged, feeling soul. Ultimately, this issue is concerned with the essentially ambivalent aspect of Hegel’s theory of habit. As we have seen above, habit is for Hegel not just hardening of the soul but a hardening that comes to be in and through radical fluidization. Thus, Hegel further suggests that complete hardening and complete habituation lead to the death of Geist. Prior to examining this idea of Hegel, I consider in what follows in what ways habit ensure that consciousness lives the world as an adult responsible for the actuality of the world as I formulated in the first section of this chapter.

4.3. Habit and Spirit: The Mechanism of the Soul

Indeed, the fact that bodiliness is my instrument for exercising my will and actualizing my purpose does not make it necessary that I exist harmoniously with the actual world without making a delusive or distorted representation of the world. To use Hegel’s example, one may well remain a reactionary figure denying the actuality of the new order implemented by a revolution regardless of the profession in which she is skilled. In order that Hegel’s notion of habit works without the problem of the subjectivism inherent to the feeling soul, one should therefore presume that habit means more than acquiring this or that particular skill; the habitual instrumentalization of one’s bodiliness is not an inscription of any kind of subjective will and purpose whatsoever to one’s bodiliness.
To spell out the sense in which habit entails the objective distinction between one’s interior world and the external world, I refer to Hegel’s notion of second nature put forward in the *Philosophy of Right*. Hegel writes that the *Philosophy of Right* considers the system of right as a “realm of actualized freedom,” which is “the world of spirit brought forth out of itself as second nature.” In other words, it considers the legal, economic, political, and cultural institutions in terms of a system in which the freedom of a will is actualized, assuming that freedom is the fundamental determination of spirit. Hegel writes: “the basis of right is the *spiritual* and its precise position and starting point is the *will* which is *free*. For Hegel, this realm of the free will is a world brought up by spirit out of spirit itself as second nature. And the world of the free will as second nature bears on habituating oneself to the ethical [*das Sittlich*] or customs:

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134 For an insightful analysis of Hegel’s notion of second nature in the *Philosophy of Right* in terms of its connection with the *Encyclopedia* system, see in particular: Adriaan Peperzak, “‘Second Nature’: Place and Significance of the Objective Spirit in Hegel’s Encyclopedia,” *The Owl of Minerva*, 27/1 (1995): 51-66. Specifically, he suggests that the nation-state and world history can be viewed as two moments of Hegel’s philosophy of objective spirit which manifests “its natural, non-mediated, and ‘somatic’ side:” “Second Nature’: Place and Significance of the Objective Spirit in Hegel’s Encyclopedia,” 57. As he shows, the states are for Hegel big animals which appear and perish in world history. Hence, world history, namely the history of the second nature of the world can be considered in terms of a genus-process, which parallels the genus-process, so to speak, of first nature, presented at the end of the philosophy of nature. Accordingly, if spirit emerges out of the death of life, this can also be considered, Peperzak suggests, in terms of the destructive feature of the states and the people’s spirit [*Volkgeist*]. Perperzak points out that in Hegel’s system, spirit is to be naturalized or materialized into nature and a world of second nature, but both nature and history are not adequate for the genuine actuality of spirit. This is so because spirit is eventually infinite and eternal. The ultimate sublation of nature, therefore, occurs by “theoria” which Hegel says consists in “stripping off the limitedness of the peoples’ spirits and its own worldliness,” undertaken by “the thinking spirit of world history” (*ENZ* § 552). As Peperzak highlights, “contrary to all post-Hegelian attempts to present him as the philosopher *par excellence* of history, praxis, or politics,” “Hegel does not consider the dimensions of history or politics to be spiritual or ‘ideal’ enough for humanity to accomplish its full meaning;” “Second Nature’: Place and Significance of the Objective Spirit in Hegel’s Encyclopedia,” 63. In a similar vein, Simon Lumsden offers a discussion about the role of habit for world history: Simon Lumsden, “Second Nature and Historical Change in Hegel’s Philosophy of History,” *International Journal f Philosophical Studies*, vol.24, no.1 (2016): 74-94. Specifically, he draws attention to Hegel’s notion in the *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History* that over-refinement [*Überbildung*] and complete habituation are the sources of the fall of civilization since they make spirit lifeless and dead. Lumsden thus challenges Robert Brandom’s interpretation of the master-slave dialectic in terms of norm formation, by pointing out that this view contradicts the destructive feature of habit in relation to historical dimensions of human life.

135 *PhR* § 4.

136 *PhR* § 4
In the simple identity with the actuality of an individual, the ethical [das Sittlich] appears as the universal mode of action, i.e., as custom,—the habit of this [custom], as second nature, which is posited in the place of the first, mere natural will, and which is the penetrating soul, the meaning and actuality of the existence [Dasein] of the soul, namely the spirit living and present as a world, whose substance now stands as spirit for the first time.\textsuperscript{137}

If habit serves the soul’s transformation of herself into second nature, this is therefore also concerned with the notion that habit involves one’s taking up the existing ethical order. Of importance with respect to this notion of second nature as habitual acceptance of the existing ethical order is the distinction between the moral and the ethical standpoint. Hegel states that morality and right are not yet “customs, namely spirit.”\textsuperscript{138} The standpoint of morality is based on the moral subject’s value judgment concerning good and bad, but this inner judgment of the subject is for Hegel not free from the risk of an arbitrary, or only subjective judgment. From the ethical standpoint, however, “the will is a will of spirit and has a substantial content which is in conformity with itself.”\textsuperscript{139} That is, in the ethical life, my will is not just my subjective or private will but the will of spirit, namely an objective will that represents the ethical [sittlich] view of the community in which I am living. In this sense, my will contains the contents which come from a set of values and norms of my community. But my will does not coincide with the will of spirit by birth; it is encultured [gebildet] by education so as to

\textsuperscript{137} PhR § 151.
\textsuperscript{138} PhR § 151. Z
\textsuperscript{139} Ibid.
become the will of spirit. As Hegel puts it, “education is the art of making human beings ethical.”

Thus, habit is an educational process by which the existing system of normative values of the community to which one belongs is transplanted into one’s soul and body. Hence, habit also entails the formation of one’s will insofar as the direction of the will is decided by the value system that is to be acquired by education. As Hegel puts it, habituation is a replacement of the first, merely natural will with the spirit of the ethical life.

Habit, thus conceived as an educational acquisition of the existing ethical order, is a heteronomous process. Educational enculturation is brought about not by the will of the child who is educated but by the will of the community which educates the members. Habit is therefore a mechanism of the soul not simply in the sense that a habituated action is a conditioned reaction to some environmental factors. More precisely, it is a mechanistic process in the sense that it is the heteronomous implantation of a value system to one’s soul and body and that this is carried out by the way of learning by doing. This being said, bodiliness as the key issue of habituation represents the mechanistic mode of the educational enculturation of one’s soul and body, namely the fact that one learns by doing without necessarily thinking self-consciously. In this sense, habit is the process of a mechanistic development of oneself into an instrument for a spiritual purpose, namely the will of the ethical life, rather than of acquiring this or that skill.

Returning to the issue of the distinction between inner and outer, the notion of habit as educational enculturation put forward in the Philosophy of Right explains in what sense one

140 Ibid.
can say that habit entails the exclusion of the substantial totality of the soul into an external object, and how this is not just a subjective projection of one’s representation which is possibly deranged. As we have seen above, habit is an inscription of the general behaviors and judgments of the people with which an individual person lives together in a community. In this sense, it is an inscription of the ethical world into the individual’s soul and body. Indeed, the inscription would assure to a larger degree that her perception of the world is in agreement with the actuality of the cultural/social world. Once the world is thus inscribed into the individual, one can say that the external world she perceives is exclusion of the totality of the soul into something external to it without having to worry that this might be the projection of an individual’s subjective representation.

Hegel’s point about habit is that the heteronomous formation of one’s will is the foundation of our moral life. Of course, this does not mean that morality is all about accepting customs and following the existing rules of our community, which is hardly acceptable. Instead, Hegel’s point is that no one can be free without first settling down herself in the world or the ethical life of her community, and that her moral actions and behaviors are concerned with the interactions with customs and the existing rules of her community. Thus, the autonomy of moral self-consciousness would end up falling into empty formalism unless consciousness is provided with the contents of the ethical life. Since no one can be free without first settling down herself in the world, in this sense, we can say that the freedom of spirit consists in the mechanism of the soul. The heteronomous formation of one’s will as the necessary condition for the freedom of spirit, however, does not imply that one is assumed to uncritically accept any normative values, nor that one becomes a mechanical part of the state or an instrument that carries out the will of the state. As I discussed in this beginning of this
chapter, if the soul can “truly actualize the genus [Gattung],” this is in the sense that the world inhabited by the soul is not the natural universality in relation to which individuals just come to be and perish but the dialectical universality of which the spiritual life necessarily requires individuals’ activities. To put it another way, the actual world does not find its existence elsewhere than in consciousness; consciousness is not just an internal world separable from the world, but its interiority itself constitutes the external world. Seen this way, the heteronomous formation of one’s will through habit can be considered in terms of the dialectical limit between outer and inner that goes through in and out, building itself through inwardizing the world and outwardizing itself as the world.

To sum up, habit is for Hegel concerned with molding or in-forming our soul and body so that we can live the ethical life rather than acquiring this or that skill or this or that normative rule. It is a process of transforming a natural, sensitive, animal soul into a human, social existent. Thus, the habituated bodiliness is an artifact which is produced by the mechanistic practices of the soul and which is produced such a way that it can serve a human, spiritual purpose. For Hegel, this transformative production of one’s existence as second nature is the pre-condition of the existence of spirit. As he puts it, “habit embraces all kinds and stages of spirit’s activity.” Even the upright posture is a habit made by one’s will; seeing is also a habit which “immediately unites in a simple act the many determinations of sensation, consciousness, intuition, understanding, and so forth;” thinking also requires habit so that “I can exist for myself as thinking;” in spirit-as-such, habit is “recollection and memory.”

141 ENZ § 410 A.
Conclusion. Philosophy and Old Age

What is the soul in Hegel’s *Anthropology*? The soul is a substantial totality which is filled with contents. It is *undifferentiated* substance in the sense that it is an inner without an outer, having no distinction between interior and exterior. As such a non-conscious being, it constitutes a part of the universal course of nature, being subordinated to the influences of the meteorological, geographical/racial, and dispositional factors. Further, it is an interior that can immediately externalize itself through the embodiment of its feelings. Due to such an immediate relationship with its body as its other and the lack of the mediation by objective consciousness, however, it can always make unrealistic, subjectivist misrepresentations of the world. In this sense, it finds itself in the state of dreaming. It is not yet objective consciousness but is on the way of being awakened to this spiritual subject living in the intersubjective world. It is awakened to objective consciousness through an overall, habitual transformation of bodiliness and a heteronomous formation of her will as an ethical one. It is a bodily existence, which immediately externalizes itself through bodiliness but overcomes this natural existence by producing itself as second nature.

Throughout this chapter, I considered Hegel’s treatment of the soul in the *Anthropology* in terms of the development of *Naturgeist*, focusing on the question of how spirit emerges as spirit out of its immersion in nature. As I showed, this key problem of the *Anthropology* centers around bodiliness. Bodiliness is for Hegel the soul’s immediate, external existence insofar as it serves the embodiment of the soul’s inner feelings. But it is, as such, the negative of spirit, one that is sublated by the transformative process of habit which gives rise to the conscious
distinction between one’s internal world and the external world as its object. Bodiliness, conceived as such a locus of spirit’s negativity, is the foundation of spirit.

But the crucial notion that underlies Hegel’s treatment of the soul-body relationship in the _Anthropology_, I claim, is that one’s existence is inseparably connected to the actual world and is to be considered in terms of the ways in which she relates herself to that world she lives in. As a natural being, one is born, grows, gets ill, and dies. But she also undergoes spiritual illness and also actualizes spiritual life because she is born to the spiritual world that has the existing order and the ethical life. As I discussed, spiritual illness consists in the soul’s being disconnected from the actuality of the world and insistence on her subjectivist representations; the spiritual life, in its being the objective consciousness that takes in part of the actuality of the world. And the soul becomes objective consciousness through habit. As I suggested, habit is therefore to be understood in terms of the soul-world relationship: a dialectical process in which the soul inwardizes the world into her interior and outwardizes her interior as the actual world, rather than a unidirectional, passive imbuement of the existing order into one’s mind.

With respect to Hegel’s notion of habit as such a dialectical relationship between the soul and the world, I finally consider its implications for old age. As I discussed, Hegel’s discussion of the stages of life does not need to be understood as implying that one’s way of interacting with the world is decided by how old she is. Thus, what I would here like to consider is the last modality of one’s relationship with the world: reflection and contemplation on the world. I suggested that the soul in the _Anthropology_ represents a child who is being educated or a juvenile who resists accepting the existing world order; the habituated, actual soul represents an adult who takes part in the actuality of the intersubjective world. Seen this way, Hegel’s _Anthropology_ considers humanity in terms of an immature soul’s growing up into an adult consciousness,
which is to be understood more aptly as the transformation of one’s existence into second nature by habit. Habit is therefore what makes it possible for the human beings to lead spiritual life in an actual relationship with the world. It is also what makes spirit overcome the diseased state it is involved in as Naturgeist in the Philosophy of Spirit. However, habit seems to contradict the living nature of spirit. Whereas spirit is for Hegel essentially life in the sense that it is something active having the power of negativity, habit seems to make the soul proximate to a machine or a natural being rather than a spiritual being because it serves the heteronomous formation of one’s existence. With respect to this problem, I suggested, again, that it is concerned with the dialectical inwardization of the world into the soul and outwardization of the soul into the world.

In spite of this, we are left with the question as to what old age would then mean in relation to the dialectic of Geist—the fourth modality of our relationship with the world that I did not discuss when dealing with Hegel’s presentation of the stages of life, i.e., reflection. Regarding this, Hegel writes that recollection, namely the mechanism of spirit-as-such treated in the Psychology means in old age the “wisdom, the lifeless, complete coincidence of subjective activity with its world” and thus leads the soul to “death.” The complete mechanism of the soul, in other words, leads to the death of spirit because it no longer involves the activity and negativity of spirit. By implication, the habituated, actual soul, insofar as she leads a healthy, spiritual life, cannot be a complete adult who has left her childhood and youth behind but an incomplete adult who involves this immature, negative stage of life and confronts it to lead the healthy, spiritual life. In contrast with this, old age represents complete adulthood in which one has lost such a dialectical conflict between youth and adulthood. In old age, we thus do not live in the present, nor do we have a hope for the future, but live in the past; what we do in old age is

142 ENZ § 396 Z.
“living in recollection of the past and of the substantial.”143 Again, this does not involve the claim to ageism as I discussed earlier, but it rather leads us to the question as to what it means to be doing philosophy. As far as I see, Hegel’s above characterization of old age goes together with the idea put forward in the Preface to the *Philosophy of Right* that “the owl of Minerva spreads its wings at dusk.”144 What Hegel suggests by this is that philosophy comes after world history since it is a contemplation on the actuality of the world. Seen this way, the philosophical recollection of the past actuality of the world, which is the work of old age, represents the death of spirit: the work of spirit that has left with its death.

143 *ENZ* § 396 Z.

144 *PR*, “Preface.”
CONCLUSION

On the Recent Naturalist Readings of Hegel’s Anthropology

In this Conclusion, I consider the recent naturalist readings of Hegel and show why they do not fit with Hegel’s thought about the relationship between nature and spirit in the *Anthropology*. I also show that Hegel’s position cannot be determined as naturalism even when we refer to eighteenth-century context. On the basis of the studies pursued in this dissertation, I instead suggest that the crucial issue in studying Hegel’s *Anthropology* is to clarify the Hegelian, pre-*Phenomenological* sense of the life-world.

In recent Hegel scholarship, there has been a remarkable attempt at determining Hegel’s philosophical position in terms of naturalism and this has evoked interests in Hegel’s treatment of the soul-body relationship and the notion of habit in the *Anthropology*. Naturalist readings of Hegel have potential for making sense of Hegel’s thought in the contemporary context, but they have an essential problem concerning the definition of naturalism. The author of the article on “naturalism” in the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, David Papineau, observes that there is no agreed-upon definition of naturalism,¹ making the term uninformative. The recent debates on Hegel’s naturalism, as far as I see, are no exception. As I discuss below in more detail, some naturalist readers of Hegel do not clearly state what they mean by naturalism; others do, but use

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different criteria from one another, such that an author’s naturalism is often criticized by others for being anti-naturalist.

The rise of naturalism as an important philosophical position is associated with the formation and development of analytic philosophy in post-war American academia. The prominent analytic figure with regard to the rise of naturalism is Quine, who proposed a “naturalized epistemology” under the influence of logical positivism. Blurring the distinction between analytic meaning and synthetic knowledge, he takes on the empiricist view that knowledge of nature consists in sensory experience. In his terms, “all inculcation of meanings of a word must rest ultimately on sensory evidence.” Accordingly, for him, the best way to obtain knowledge about the world is through natural sciences, and natural sciences offer the standard of knowledge by which philosophers are to be constrained. This scientific naturalism of Quine involves the methodological claim that scientific methods and techniques are applicable and should be applied to any serious attempt at gaining significant information about the world. It further involves the ontological doctrine that all that exist are the things that are studied and known by natural sciences.

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3 Ibid. 75.

4 Jaegwon Kim points out that Quine’s rejection of normative epistemology in favor of the scientific psychology of cognition is hardly acceptable to most contemporary analytic philosophers although his “Naturalized Epistemology” is one of the main sources through which most analytic philosophers first encounter naturalism: Jaegwon Kim, “The American Origin of Philosophical Naturalism,” Journal of Philosophical Research, vol. 28 (2003): 83-98. Kim suggests that Quine’s naturalism has its origin in the earlier debates among American authors such as John Dewey, Sydney Hook, Ernst Nagel, George Boas, and John Herman Randall in a volume of essays published in 1944 under the title Naturalism and the Human Spirit. He underlines that naturalism was understood by those authors as well as by Quine primarily as a methodological doctrine but was more than a methodological doctrine. Another half of the history of naturalism around the mid-twentieth century in America, Kim suggests, is concerned with an elaboration of naturalist metaphysics. Stated briefly, Roy Wood Sellars and Ernst Nagel shared a metaphysical doctrine that “the spacetime world is the whole world; the entities, properties, events, and facts in spacetime are all the entities, properties, etc. of the world,” which excludes “a variety of entities that have been claimed to exist, such as deities (conceived as transcendent), Kantian noumena, the Hegelian Absolute, and abstract universals:” Jaegwon Kim, “The
The development of naturalism is situated within the broader framework of the tradition of American pragmatism, which began to form during the last decades of the nineteenth century by the philosophers such as Charles S. Peirce, William James, and John Dewey. There was no commonly shared conception of what pragmatism is even among those founders of pragmatism as well as their successors. But the early classic pragmatism is largely characterized by a concern with action and effects, and the belief that the truth of a conceptual idea consists in the effects brought up by its actualization. Further, they considered language and communication as essentially social practices. This idea is further developed by the neo-pragmatist Robert Brandom, whose main concern is the institution of linguistic conceptual norms by social-practical activities. Roughly speaking, naturalism and pragmatism have an affinity in their grounding belief that meaningful objects of any philosophical discussions are observable effects in space and time because there is no supernatural entity, and that the understanding of those effects does not requires a priori concept. This explains why Quine calls the classic pragmatist Dewey a naturalist who holds that, according to Quine, “knowledge, mind, and meaning are part of the same world that they have to do with, and that they are to be studied in the same empirical spirit that animates natural science; there is no place for a priori philosophy.”

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Given the historical context of the formation and development of naturalism and pragmatism in contemporary American philosophy, the appeal to Hegel on the part of naturalist philosophers is both understandable and surprising. First of all, the formation of classic pragmatism was deeply influenced by the philosophy of Kant and Hegel. Specifically, Dewey is known for being influenced by St. Louis Hegelians who conceived of Hegel’s philosophy as practical philosophy upholding political liberalism. The pragmatic concern with practical action and its social effects is in accord with Hegel’s dialectical notion of actuality according to which rationality is what is actualized in the world rather than a cognitive activity of an individual mind. Recent debates on Hegel’s naturalism thus show evidence of the liveliness of the tradition of American pragmatism in which the pragmatist themes concerning action, social practice, and normativity recur within the analytic tradition. It also evidences the liveliness of interaction between continental and analytic philosophy. While American pragmatism was formed under the strong influence of German philosophy, it is also noticeable that German thinkers such as Jürgen Habermas and Axel Honneth adopted and developed pragmatic themes.

The pragmatist background against which Hegel has been actively revisited illustrates the potential relevance of Hegel’s philosophy for today. However, the pragmatist-naturalist tradition has some important elements that do not fit with Hegel’s own context. As mentioned above, one of the most central characteristics of this contemporary American tradition is the rejection of a

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7 As for the detailed history of the adoption of Kant and Hegel by American intellectuals in the last decades of the nineteenth century, see in particular: Richard J. Bernstein, *The Pragmatic Turn* (Cambridge, Malden: Polity Press, 2010).

8 As with Bernstein, James A. Good underlines that the adoption of Hegel by nineteenth-century American intellectuals was closely associated with the political situation around the Civil War: James A. Good, “‘A ‘World-Historical Idea’: The St. Louis Hegelians and the Civil War,” *Journal of American Studies*, vol.34, no.3 (2000): 447-464. The need for social reform and the liberalist concern with antislavery brought Hegel’s philosophy and German Idealism together for these thinkers. Good argues that the perception of Hegel as an upholder of Prussian authoritarianism was formed during World War I. By contrast, during the time between the Civil War and World War I, Hegel was viewed as an upholder of advanced political liberalism.
priori, metaphysical thinking. But Hegel’s absolute idealism pursues a philosophical system dealing with two parts of reality, nature and spirit, on the basis of the logic, which is, for him, an essentially metaphysical discipline. This implies, as I discussed in Chapter 2, that Hegel’s thoughts about nature and spirit are grounded in his logical theses of the objectivity of thought determinations and the subjectivity of the Concept, which are concerned with a priori demonstrations of the identity of being and thought. Further, the claims of scientific naturalism—that all realities are exhausted by nature and that any account of realities must be constrained by natural sciences—contradict Hegel’s notion of spirit because spirit, for Hegel, is a higher reality than nature which is irreducible to the latter. Nor does Hegel credit natural sciences as the standard for valid knowledge.

In fact, what has evoked the naturalist readings of Hegel is an attempt within analytic philosophy to elaborate on an alternative version of naturalism to the scientific one. Scientific naturalism has been criticized for their conception of mind as part of nature with the narrow definition of nature as “a causally closed spatio-temporal structure governed by efficient causal laws,” and their “reductive attitude towards normativity, especially in the ethical and aesthetical domains.”9 As a response to these criticisms, there has been a movement to work on the other, “philosophically more liberal, naturalism,” which aims at offering a “new nonreductive form of naturalism and a more inclusive conception of nature than any provided by natural sciences.”10 John McDowell represents this new, liberal naturalism. Inspired by Aristotle, he developed the view that “reason, values, and meanings are conceived as sui generis but natural items on the

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10 Ibid. 1.
basis of the actual character and role of thinking, knowing, and evaluating in our lives.”

McDowell’s liberal naturalism has exerted a considerable influence on the naturalist readings of Hegel. Instead of going into the details of his naturalism, however, I here refer to Italo Testa’s discussion of Hegel’s Anthropology because it exemplifies, I think, McDowell’s influence on the naturalist readers of Hegel. Testa draws attention to Hegel’s non-dualistic treatment of the relationship of the soul and the body in the Anthropology. For him, these terms do not refer to things of a different kind but to “the same subject, namely the living individual,” and this identity of the soul and the body leads us to the notion of “Hegel’s naturalism:” the idea that “spirit is for Hegel nothing other than a determinate constellation of relations of Nature itself as the one single unity.” While he thus seems to be suggesting that spirit is an aspect of the one single unity, i.e., nature, he refines his position by stating that Hegel’s naturalism is not a “first-natural naturalism” which legitimatizes a physical description alone but a “broad or liberal naturalism” that embraces “the various levels of organization of living beings, including those phenomena of their social organization that we can consider as spiritual second nature.”

However, McDowell’s strategy of “re-enchanting nature” to consider the forms of human life as belonging to it sparked a controversy over whether this non-reductive, soft version of naturalism can be considered naturalism in the strict sense of the term. More importantly, the naturalist readings of Hegel inspired by McDowell’s liberal naturalism seems hard to avoid the

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11 Ibid. 10-11.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid. 25.
criticism that their strategy is the opposite of Hegel’s. For Hegel integrates nature and spirit by affirming the superiority of the latter over the former, not by extending disenchanted first nature to reenchanted second nature. Further, Alison Stone suggests a cluster-based approach to Hegel’s naturalism while defining naturalism by the belief in the compatibility of philosophy with empirical science and the disbelief in supernatural entities. Her suggestion is that Hegel’s position can best be described as broad naturalism, which is more naturalist than Schelling and less naturalist than Kant. But Gardner argues that Hegel is anti-naturalist by putting the contemporary, non-metaphysical trend in Hegel scholarship in perspective through an examination of the context of German Idealism.

Another important naturalist reader of Hegel is Terry Pinkard who understands Hegel’s notion of spirit—“Geistigkeit” which he translate as “mindedness”—as denoting “self-interpreting animals.” But Renault characterizes Pinkard, together with other neo-pragmatists such as Rorty and Brandom, as idealist readers of Hegel sharing anti-naturalist insights.

Thus, it seems that “broader, philosophically more liberal, naturalism” generally shares with scientific naturalism the tendency to consider all realities to be part of nature, no matter how broad or inclusive notion of nature they suggest. But this naturalist tenet turns out to run counter to Hegel’s position in the *Encyclopedia* when one considers his rejection of the Romantic *Naturphilosophie*. The formation of the *Naturphilosophie* is associated with the development of

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some particular domains of natural sciences including medicine, physiology, natural history, and biology in the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. We can perhaps characterize this new intellectual movement as eighteenth-century naturalism along the line of Zammito’s suggestion:

I term “naturalists” the protagonists in this study [philosophers and physiologists from Stahl to Schelling]. They operated in a conceptual field with two distinct poles of orientation. “natural philosophy” explained the physical world in terms of general principles. “Natural history,” by contrast, described all the plants, animals, and minerals encountered in the material environment. By the mid-eighteenth century, natural history came to a crossroads in its self-definition and articulation via-à-vis natural philosophy that coincides with some fundamental crises within natural philosophy itself concerning the possibility and importance of a “nonmathematical physique,” setting the stage for a shift in the “semantic field” of natural inquiry, a paradigm shift that has been conceptualized by historians of science as “vital materialism.” My thesis is that, over the eighteenth century, naturalists undertook to reformulate some domains of natural history (living things) into a distinct branch of natural philosophy (ultimately, the science of biology).  

In line with Zammitto, one can determine eighteenth-century naturalism by referring to those scientists and philosophers who were engaged in empirical studies of various phenomena of living organisms and philosophical speculations about general features or principles of life. This allows us to draw out two key important characters of eighteenth-century naturalism: (1) concerns with organisms (theme); (2) positive and hermeneutic interplay between empirical

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knowledge and speculation (method). Twenty-two. Eighteenth-century naturalism entails the rise of the Romantic Naturphilosophie, which presents the vitalist view of nature as a self-organizing, self-vitalizing totality. This new movement can also be considered as a challenge to the modern, mathematical-physical conception of natural science.²³

²² It is to be noted that the borderline between science and philosophy for eighteenth-century figures was not as sharp as it is today. Instead, the eighteenth century displays dynamic interactions between science and philosophy—between empirical knowledge based on scientific observation and experiment, and philosophical speculation. This positive, hermeneutic relationship between science and philosophy in the eighteenth century is well illustrated in Gambarotto’s recent study: Andrea Gambarotto, Vital Forces, Teleology and Organization. Philosophy of Nature and the Rise of Biology in Germany (Cham: Springer, 2018). As Gambarotto shows, Blumenbach’s notion of formative force [Bildungstrieb] was a postulated principle of self-organization in organic matter. Kielpemeyer developed Blumenbach’s scheme of five vital forces into a teleological principle that makes living organisms distinct from non-living bodies and applied this to the realm of the animal kingdom. Kant’s attempts at a definition of race can be seen as an example of a philosophical engagement with natural science. A more radical case of the engagement of this sort is found in Schelling who integrated Kielpemeyer’s framework of vital forces into his considerations of animal classification. Further, Manfred Frank shows that Schelling develops the conceptual structure of a living organism into an underlying principle of his philosophy. In his terms, an organism in its broad sense “served Schelling’s entire system as model.” Manfred Frank, “Schellings speculative Umdeutung des Kantschen Organisms-Konzept,” in Hegel’s Jenaer Naturphilosophie, ed. Klaus Vierweg (München: Fink,1988), 201-218. Olaf Breidbach shows that Hegel was exposed to the life sciences of the time during his early Jena years and elaborated on his notion of the Concept as an organic totality based on his understandings of the biological debates of the time: “Das Organische in Hegels Jenaer Naturphilosophie,” in Hegel’s Jenaer Naturphilosophie, ed. Klaus Vierweg (München: Fink,1988), 309-318.

To sum up, natural scientists (Buffon, Blumenbach, Kielpemeyer) were not reluctant to speculate about the general principles in pursuit of their studies of nature, which played a key role in the development of biology in the eighteenth century. Philosophers suggested some conceptual criterion for defining scientific terms such as race (Kant) or absorbed scientific discoveries concerning an organism into their philosophical system (Schelling and Hegel). Such dynamic interactions between natural science and philosophy can be characterized as hermeneutic, in the sense that the newly observed and experimented phenomena of living organisms stimulated speculative interpretations, and that the teleologically interpreted phenomena of an organism were integrated into philosophical systems as their underlying principles.

²³ Peter Hans Reill suggests that Enlightenment vitalism and Naturphilosophie is to be understood as a breach in the history of Enlightenment science and philosophy: cf., Peter Hans Reill, “The Legacy of the ‘Scientific Revolution’: Science and the Enlightenment,” in The Cambridge History of Science Volume 4. Eighteenth Century Science, ed. Roy Porter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 23-43. As he suggests, eighteenth-century science has been characterized as an era in which the scientific paradigm achieved by the scientific revolution in the previous century was accepted and made into normal science, and thereby the stepping-stone to another scientific revolution in the next century was laid down. While this view assumes continuity in the development of Enlightenment science over the centuries, Reill points out that the negative evaluation of Enlightenment reason, most famously by Horkheimer and Adorno, likewise sees the Enlightenment as a consistent and unificatory process. In both cases, their conception of the uniformity of the Enlightenment draws on “the triumph in and by the Enlightenment of a mathematically based science.” ibid. 24. However, Reill shows that the development of Enlightenment vitalism and Naturphilosophie challenges prevalent views of eighteenth-century science as a “tiresome trough to be negotiated between the peaks of the seventeenth century and those of the nineteenth century:” ibid. 23. Consequently, they overlook the Enlightenment vitalism and Naturphilosophie that emerged out of skepticism and criticism of mathematical-mechanical conceptions of nature. The organic-teleological notion of nature envisioned by
Eighteenth-century naturalism in the sense I just described seems to allow us to situate Hegel in that movement insofar as his notion of the Concept embraces the organic feature of a living being, i.e., self-organizing totality. However, it does not seem that we can call Hegel a naturalist on that basis. As I discussed throughout this dissertation, the organic dimension of the Concept for Hegel consists in the dialectical life of the Idea, which is exhibited through the self-development of spirit in his philosophical system. Within the dialectical life of the Idea, nature constitutes an inorganic whole rather than a self-vitalizing totality. Further, his discussion of the soul-body relationship in the *Anthropology* somehow involves the view of a human being as an organism to the extent that it focuses on the inseparable connection between the two, and hence, our immediate bodily existence. However, the biological feature of a living being, i.e., self-organization, is not essential to the soul-body complex treated in Hegel’s *Anthropology*. As I attempted to show, it is rather concerned with the sentient bodiliness through which the soul makes an ambivalent relation to spiritual life—ambivalent, in the sense that it immediately embodies the spiritual interior but, as such, constitutes the negative, diseased stage in the development of spirit in the *Anthropology*.

Therefore, it is important to note that Hegel’s *Anthropology* problematizes the immediate existence of the spiritual in the material; further, it suggests that this should be sublated through habit, which brings forth the mediation by objective consciousness or the intersubjective world. This leads us to the essentially dynamic character of Hegel’s notion of spirit. That is, spirit is what constitutes itself as spirit by emerging out of its immersion in nature. By implication, spirit

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Enlightenment vitalism and *Naturphilosophie* is therefore to be understood, Reill claims, as a breach in the history of Enlightenment science and philosophy.

does not remain part of nature, regardless of how nature is understood—either as a closed space of causality or a self-organizing whole. Therefore, Hegel’s thought about the relationship between nature and spirit in the *Anthropology* cannot be defined in terms of naturalism, either in the contemporary sense or in the eighteenth-century context.

Beyond the framework of naturalism, this dissertation finally leads us to a crucial question concerning Hegel’s dynamic notion of spirit, which is not addressed by naturalist readers: how can we determine the anthropological world treated in Hegel’s *Anthropology*? As I attempted to show, Hegel’s treatment of derangement and habit in the *Anthropology* centers around the idea that an individual exists in the world and the world exists in and through individuals. This relationship between individuals and the world is ontological rather than epistemological because it is concerned with the bodily existence of the human being and one’s relation to the world through the bodily existence. Further, this relationship is entirely dynamic and dialectical in the sense that the spiritual world emerges through a spiritualization of an individual’s mode of existence, and individuals become spiritual in the spiritual world. This dynamic and dialectical relationship, however, makes it hard to firmly determine what this anthropological world is like. We may say in a negative way that it is not a mathematical-physical world of causality, nor a world of organisms, nor a normative world of practical spirit. But the *Anthropology* does not give many clues for a positive characterization of the world in which the soul is living.

Determining the life-world in which the soul is living, however, is important specifically when we want to situate the *Anthropology* section in Hegel’s *Encyclopedia* within the tradition of philosophical anthropology of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. We are thus referred back to Odo Marquard’s thesis that philosophical anthropology began with the twofold turn to
the life-world from the old metaphysics and the mathematical-physical conception of nature, and it gained its disciplinary independence when it was liberated from Kantian teleology of history. Marquard also takes Hegel’s *Anthropology* to be based on a teleology of history in a similar way to Kant. As I attempted to show, however, Hegel’s *Anthropology* does not systematically institute a teleological view of human history; the anthropological world does not yet involve a historical temporality, which is introduced after the philosophy of objective spirit. We cannot therefore consider his *Anthropology* in alignment with Kant’s pragmatic anthropology. Thus, what the Hegelian, pre-*Phenomenological* life-world is, remains unsettled. It is a question that is to be further examined to offer a full account of Hegel’s thought about the relationship between nature and spirit in the *Anthropology*.

The Critical Powers of Hegel’s Dialectic of *Naturgeist*

When dealing with the stages of life, I suggested that Hegel’s *Anthropology* concerns the threefold complex of the soul, the world, and the body, claiming that in this respect, Hegel’s discussion of the soul-body relationship in the *Anthropology* departs from Aristotelian hylomorphism. My claim was that what turns Hegel’s treatment of the soul-body relationship in the *Anthropology* into an *anthropological* discussion rather than an epistemological or psychological one is the idea that the human being is a worldly being. Now, it is to be noted that Hegel’s conception of the world in the *Anthropology* does not rest on cosmological reflections on the position and significance of the earth as the human habitat within the universe, which
normally characterizes thought about the world in the European culture up until the seventeenth century. Rather, Hegel’s conception of the world reflects the complicated, European world-experience of the time. The most important part of this experience was the expansion of political liberalism and the underlying universal humanism throughout Europe in the aftermath of the French Revolution, which entailed radical changes in their social and political systems as well as outbreaks of inter-European wars. In relation to Germany of the time and Hegel’s conception and experience of the world, we can point out that throughout the nineteenth century, Germany was in the middle of omnidirectional modernization through the Stein-Hardenberg reforms, which were triggered by the defeat of Prussians by Napoleon I at Jena in 1806, abolished guild monopolies in 1812, and lasted until 1820. Uncomfortable, however, is the fact that the European experience of the formation of the new, modern world involved another world-experience of the colonialist exploration and invasion of the non-European world, together with the development of the commercial capitals. Thus, the awareness of the global world of the nineteenth-century Europe does not simply concern innocent curiosity and increasing knowledge of the world outside of Europe, but far more significantly the violent colonization of the non-European world, which runs against the ideal of the equality of all people. As it is well known, Hegel was well aware of the slave trades and the Haiti Revolution, although Germany did not establish or more precisely was not capable of doing so, overseas colonies up until 1884.

The world-experience of nineteenth-century Europe is thus essentially ambivalent. It involves modernization and rationalization of the domestic world on the one hand, and imperialist colonialism at the level of the global world on the other. While the social and political

reformations at the domestic level were based on the ideals of universal humanism and political liberalism affirming the equality of all people, the colonialist invasions of the lands outside Europe were anti-humanist practices upholding the anti-cosmopolitan, racist ideology. Hegel’s *Anthropology* reflects these ambivalent world-experiences of nineteenth-century Europe in a significant manner. In the “Feeling Soul” section, he uses the example of the ones who fail to accept the change of time: the Stoic, Cato, who committed suicide with the collapse of the Roman Empire, and the ones who resisted accepting the new regime and became insane during the French Revolution. His thematization of the soul’s derangement, feeling of unhappiness, and alienation from the world of actuality in the “Feeling Soul” section thus reflects his experiences of and concerns about the social and political upheavals of his time that greatly affected individuals’ mental lives. In line with this, his emphasis on the objective relationship with the world and the theory of habit, which is an important part of his philosophy of objective spirit, is closely associated with his experiences of and concerns with the reformation of Germany into a new, modernized state. Yet, his *Anthropology* also displays Eurocentric, racist ideology. For instance, in discussing the different human races in the “Natural Soul” section, he states that Africans are to be regarded as “a nation of children,” while Asians “rise above this childish naivety” characteristic of Africans, but “it is in the Caucasian race that spirit first attains to absolute unity with itself.”

Seen this way, the world that Hegel’s *Anthropology* inhabits cannot be a purely abstract concept that is theoretically neutral and politically innocent. It rather represents the global world that is organized by colonialism and structured by racism, as well as the domestic world that strives to achieve the ideal of political liberalism in the form of a modern state. Regarding the

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26 § 393 Z.
problem of Eurocentrism in Hegel’s *Anthropology*, however, I attempted to show that the *Anthropology* in Hegel’s *Encyclopedia*, unlike Kant’s pragmatic anthropology, is not based on a teleological understanding of human history. Although Hegel applies the framework of his philosophy of world history to his presentation of the differences in human races, the philosophy of world history does not play any systematic role for his treatment of the soul-body relationship in the *Anthropology*. If we confine ourselves to the *Anthropology*, we can rightly say that Eurocentrism is neither essential nor necessary, but only contingent to it.\(^{27}\)

Also, we saw that Hegel dismisses polygenesis for the reason that it is motivated by the malignant desire to establish the superiority of a particular human race over other races, arguing that men are all equal in their intellectual abilities and political rights. More significantly, I showed that Hegel’s *Anthropology* considers human existence and life in terms of the dialectical relationship between nature and spirit, namely the emergence of spirit out of nature. We therefore need to pay attention to the fact that his discussion of different human races occurs in the “Natural Soul” section, and that this section presents the stage where *Geist* is submerged in nature. Within the framework of the dialectical development of *Geist* in the *Anthropology*, this stage, where all of the spiritual dimensions of human existence and life are subordinated to nature, is the one from which *Geist* is to emerge, namely the one that is to be negated, overcome, and sublated. Seen this way, the “Natural Soul” section instead has critical implications, suggesting that the determination of human beings by natural and biological factors—conceived either as racist and sexist realities/practices or as such discriminatory perspectives/ideas—is to be overcome for the emergence of a truly spiritual, or rational form of the world.

\(^{27}\) Mollendorf makes this point clear: “his philosophy of spirit is not necessarily racist, only contingently so, that is that his racism does not follow from any of his fundamental claims about spirit.” Darrel Mollendorf, “Racism and Rationality in Hegel’s Philosophy of Subjective Spirit,” *History of Political Thought*, vol.XIII, no.2 (1992), 243.
When we take the “Natural Soul” section away from the dialectical framework of the development of *Geist* and look at Hegel’s statements, however, it is undeniable that many of them are indeed racist. No matter how successfully we can defend Hegel by drawing on his dialectical and speculative method, it is therefore not to be ignored that Hegel himself kept silent about the European colonialist practices of his time. Further, his philosophy of world history, which frames his presentation of different human races in the “Natural Soul” section, perpetuates Eurocentric ideology. On the one hand, Hegel seems less racist than Kant when he claims that Africans have the “capacity for education.”28 However, he also claims that Africans have no “inner impulse towards culture.”29 Thus, that Africans have the capacity for education ultimately means, for him, that they can at best follow the European model of modernization, namely “a state [founded] on Christian principles,” as we see in the case of “Haiti.”30 Although his philosophy of world history does not play any important methodological role in his *Anthropology*, and the “Natural Soul” section presents the stage that is to be overcome through the dialect of *Geist* in the *Anthropology*, we still must acknowledge that his statements about Africans are undoubtedly Eurocentric. The fundamental problem of such statements is the perpetuation of colonialist practices through the justification of missionary colonization of other lands. Thus, we should admit that Hegel’s *Anthropology*, although it does not institute a teleology of history systematically or methodologically, retains the theoretical tension in Kant’s philosophy between the ideal of cosmopolitan, universal humanism on the one hand, and the Eurocentric, colonialist and racist ideology on the other.

28 § 393 Z.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
Further, we need to point out that Hegel’s notion of the natural soul carries the risk of legitimizing the discriminatory, reductionist view that one’s identity is decided by natural factors such as age, race, and sex, by giving an epistemological and conceptual status to those biological categories. However, it must be admitted that these biological categories have no such determinate status. Thus, if we disregard all the dialectical meanings of Hegel’s presentation of the stages of life and take it literally, we can rightly object that one can resist, preserve, and philosophize the world regardless of age. Next, his statement that Africans are naïve and have no inner motivation for civilization is a racist stereotype. Further, the idea that the role of women is confined to taking care of the family justifies misogynic practices and the patriarchal structure of the society. In a similar vein, his model of the family as based on monogamist marriage, the blood relationship, and gender roles is sexist and patriarchal. Obviously, the family need not to be based on a heterosexual relationship between man and woman. A homosexual couple can form a family; an adult and an adoptee, too. We therefore have to say that not just monogamist marriage, but the marriage institution itself and the blood relationship are no prerequisite for the family.

Thus, the world presented in the “Natural Soul” section seems discriminatory at large, structured by colonialist-racist and patriarchal-sexist perspectives. The prominent way to defend Hegel, again, is to highlight the status of the “Natural Soul” section in relation to the dialectical development of Geist in the Anthropology. As discussed above, this strategy is relevant to Hegel’s context; however, it is a weak argument to assert that the “Natural Soul” section has no sexist and racist effects. It therefore seems that we are left with few positive options for studying this section that comes to the first place of Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit. If it constitutes a merely negative stage that is to be overcome, and if we understand this negativity as simply implying
that those phenomena that represent spirit’s subordination to nature are to be denied, we only
come to the abstract, unsubstantial conclusion, at best, that racism and sexism are bad and Hegel
does not necessarily oppose this. In this case, it does not really matter if we throw away the
“Natural Soul” section insofar as we have today a number of studies that address those problems
directly, profoundly, and critically.

Independent of the racist and sexist nature of the statements and ideas in the “Natural
Soul,” how we can defend or criticize Hegel, and what strategies and arguments we can use and
make, therefore, do not seem so essential to my inquiry here. The question that seems far more
important to me is whether or not Hegel’s conception of the dialectic of Naturgeist can offer us a
critical perspective that is relevant to our realities and problems today, and how effective and
powerful this critical perspective, if any, can be. Now, what is at stake in pursuing such a critical,
interpretative study is Hegel’s notion of the dialectical sublation. Since we cannot here discuss
all of its complicated meanings, I would instead like to confine myself to the dialectic of
Naturgeist in the Anthropology. As I have shown throughout this dissertation, the dialectic of
Naturgeist does not imply that spirit’s overcoming of its naturalness is an absolute
denaturalization. Instead, it consists in an essentially dynamic movement in which it naturalizes
and re-naturalizes itself to overcome its naturalness in and through this being-in-other of itself. It
ultimately reflects Hegel’s ontological insight that identity is dynamically constituted in and
through alterity, which is essential to any of his dialectical presentations. With respect to the
conception of the world in his Anthropology and the problematic tension between its
discriminatory and humanist dimension, we can first refer to Kant’s thesis that the perfection of
humanity is a transcendental ideal that cannot be realized in the empirical, phenomenal world. As
I have discussed, for Kant, the gap between the transcendental ideal of the perfection of
humanity and the empirical world of human history is concerned with the egoistic, antagonistic proclivities of human beings conceived as empirical beings. Whereas it thus bears on human nature for Kant, Hegel’s thesis of the necessity of spirit’s self-naturalization concerns the essentially dynamic feature of Geist: that it is in the movement of self-actualization, self-becoming, and self-completion. Since the movement is essential to it, the completion of the movement means the end of Geist. If we consider this dynamic feature of Hegel’s Geist in relation to human history, we can therefore say that Kantian transcendental ideal of the perfection of humanity, for Hegel, cannot be achieved because this ultimately means the end of history. To speak more radically, our history will see other anti-humanist phenomena that run against our ideals reappearing even when, hypothetically speaking, we are proud of the progress we have made in rationalizing and humanizing our societies. Our history will encounter other problems even if we succeed in establishing a non-racist and non-sexist world.

This line of interpreting Hegel’s dialectic of Naturgeist likely seems to give a pessimistic worldview, suggesting that we will never be able to make our world better. At this point, I would first like to point out that the interpretation above is one that I draw from Hegel’s dialectic as a person who lives in and experience today’s world and sees this contemporary world with far more critical eyes than Hegel’s, and that Hegel himself held, generally speaking, a rather optimistic view of the world, as many Enlightenment figures did. For an accurate evaluation of Hegel’s dialectic and a productive engagement with it, we need more historical works concerning Hegel’s ideas about the changes and reformations of his society that he observed and experienced, thereby keeping our distance from his philosophy. Since this goes far beyond the scope of this dissertation, I here only make a general suggestion. In the way that I read Hegel, the worldview we can draw from his dialectic of Naturgeist is realistic rather than pessimistic. And
the worldview concerning the failure in realizing the ideal world that both Kant and Hegel can offer to us is realistic not in the general sense that the human world has evil phenomena at all times, but in the particular sense that the tension between universal humanism and discriminatory ideologies structures our modernized, political world at both domestic and global levels. It is realistic insofar as the problematic tension characteristic of their philosophies appears in more radicalized, deepened, and complicated forms in our contemporary world. And the realistic view and diagnosis of the actual world, I believe, is the prerequisite for any critical work.

Now, I suggest that Hegel’s dialectic of Naturgeist has a critical power in the idea that the emergence of Geist out of nature requires the stage of an alienation from the world, namely derangement. Certainly, this does not literally mean that we all should become insane to achieve a truly spiritual world. As I discussed, Hegel’s treatment of derangement is part of his speculative notion of consciousness as the unity of consciousness and unconsciousness, which blurs a firm distinction between insanity and normality; it also involves an indirect criticism of Romanticism’s privilege of the power of irrational faculties, which I believe tends toward a conservative political ideology by appealing to the nostalgic longing for the past and by romantically idealizing nature. Most importantly, the necessity of derangement is speculative in the sense that it concerns the dialectical development of Geist in the Anthropology. To be more precise, by the necessity of derangement, Hegel means that a philosophical understanding of the significance of pathological mental phenomena, which people undergo in the time of radical upheavals, is required for theorizing the way in which one comes to establish an objective relationship with the world. Of course, one can object that treating insanity is not necessary for thinking about our relationships with the world, and one can definitely pick up other issues that she thinks important. In fact, insofar as we are concerned with philosophizing our relationships
with the world, one can never say that a certain issue is absolutely necessary, nor can anybody offer a theoretical proof of the necessity of a certain issue because thinking about the world is ultimately rooted in one’s experiences. Thus, if it is necessary to thematize derangement for thinking about our lives in the world, this necessity ultimately comes from Hegel’s experiences of and concerns with the world he lived in, as I suggested above.

Instead of recapitulating Hegel’s conception of derangement, I would here like to contemplate the possible or potential implication that we can draw from his idea of the necessity of the feeling soul’s derangement, namely the subject’s alienation from the world for the development of Geist in the Anthropology. The fundamentally critical power of the idea of the necessity of one’s alienation from the world consists in the fact that it gives us a chance to keep our distance from any values, ideas, views, perspectives, and ideologies that we have built up through all our life experiences since birth. If Hegel’s dialectical consideration of derangement suggests that the most deranged is the most self-conscious, as I discussed when interpreting the “Feeling Soul” section, then, we can further radicalize the critical power of Hegel’s notion of alienation by saying that we need to keep our distance even from our ideals about the world, specifically the modern ideals of universal humanism and political liberalism. These ideals are to be called into question at every time we pursue them because any claim to universality carries the risk of making the discriminatory effects it involves unseen. We know that Western philosophies have generally represented, in fact, a particular group of humans, i.e., white males, even when they make a claim about the universality of humanity. A prominent analysis of this problem is offered by Charles Mills, who showed that the radical doubt of the Cartesian Cogito is not applicable to the blacks who experience the world as a real, violent threat to their
existence.\textsuperscript{31} In Hegel’s context, the necessity of calling into question even our ideals about the world follows his logic that \textit{Geist} is essentially active, such that it comes to an end if it is not in a movement. By implication, any ideal turns into a dead, authoritarian dogma when it is just taken for granted.

The crucial issue in developing a critical perspective is therefore to ensure and exercise absolute intellectual freedom. Regarding this, the most critical element of Kant’s philosophy is found, I think, in his idea of the public use of reason put forward in the 1784 essay, “An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment.” In contrast to the private use of reason whereby one obeys civic and professional duties, the public use of reason concerns the scholar’s absolute freedom of speech. In the era of the Enlightenment, Kant thus “[hears] from all sides the cry: Do not argue! The officer says: Do not argue but drill! The tax officer: Do not argue but pay! The clergyman: Do not argue but believe.”\textsuperscript{32} But the Enlightenment cannot be achieved, Kant argues, if a citizen is not allowed to express her critical opinions about decrees, or if a clergyman is not allowed to communicate to the public his thought about what is erroneous in the creed of the church he serves. This intellectual freedom that allows one to freely argue with the established authority, for Kant, must be enjoyed by all people regardless of their profession. Thus, the scholar is for Kant not a profession but instead refers to the one who makes a public use of reason. Anyone performs as a scholar when she critically argues with the established authority; conversely, no one is a scholar if she is bound to the private use of reason. This idea of Kant gives a good reason why a critical perspective cannot come from establishing a school or a tradition, and why a critical scholar must be able to be free from all schools and traditions.


\textsuperscript{32} Ak 8: 37/ \textit{WE}, 18.
Assuming this, I think that the most critical perspective can be achieved by historicizing, relativizing, and localizing any claim to the universality of humanity, including Kant’s and Hegel’s. And Hegel’s dialectic strongly supports this approach.

The conceptually critical power of Hegel’s notion of alienation is also found in his theory of habit. Habit is a heteronomous, mechanistic process whereby we turn ourselves into a member of our community by learning basic rules that our community establishes and absorbing fundamental values that our community pursues. It is a process whereby every individual comes to embody in their own ways the world she lives in. Obviously, we do not learn the rules and absorb the values in a completely heteronomous way. Reflecting on and thinking about those rules and values that our community imposes on us is also an important part of the process of habituation. However, nor do we learn the rules and absorb the values in a completely conscious, autonomous way. If we understand this as a prescriptive statement, it leads us to a conservative view that we should thereby preserve the established orders. If we consider it as concerning a matter of fact, however, it leads us to a critical view that we should therefore call into question all the values we pursue. For an accurate evaluation of Hegel’s stance on this issue, I think we need an investigation of his idea of ethical feelings [Gesinnung] and their relationship with a modern state. It is here sufficient to point out that Hegel had a keen insight about the risk of modern political idealism, specifically concerning its tendency to uphold possessive, capitalist individualism. This also goes hand in hand, I think, with his criticism of the one-sided subjectivism of modern philosophy. Leaving this evaluative issue of Hegel’s theory of habit in relation to his critical position on the modern culture for further studies, I would like to refer to his thesis that a complete habituation leads Geist to death. As with his notion of alienation, therefore, habit is also a notion that has flexibility, fluidity, and dynamics for its essence. We
make ourselves into the members of our society who embody, sustain, and preserve it by habituating ourselves. If we completely habituate ourselves, however, this ultimately leads our world to collapse.

In a similar vein, Hegel’s idea that femininity represents, ontologically, the element of alterity that stubbornly resists incorporation into the system of identity, I believe, has a strong critical power. That idea is unlikely helpful in promoting women’s status in our societies. It does not help women, for instance, with competing with men for jobs, good salaries, social recognitions, and so forth, because what is important in this case is how a woman can escape from her status of alterity and settle down in the mainstream society as much as men can. I do not think that this issue is not important. It is a real problem that significantly affects the lived experience of women and the people of LGBTQ in general, insofar as our society is structured by sexism. When we are concerned with critical perspectives, however, I believe that we cannot develop them if we fail to liberate ourselves from all the ideologies that sustain, preserve, and perpetuate the orders of the mainstream society. In this regard, my view is that women and other minority peoples have more chances to develop critical perspectives because they have more chances to experience, recognize, and struggle with the real problems of the mainstream society. Of course, this is not necessarily the case, because there may well be a sexist woman and a man with a great feminist perspective. These counterexamples, however, do not necessarily negate the potential, critical power of the minority peoples who remain, in Hegel’s terms, the ontological status of alterity insofar as experiences of alienation can lead us to recognize problems, cause us to think, and look at the problems in a different prospective.

In the way that I read Hegel, he is a philosopher who was aware of the significance, difficulty, and laboriousness of a philosophical engagement with the actual world more than any
other philosopher, although his philosophical practices were not necessarily critical in the way that we today expect. Witnessing the upheavals of his time, feeling these as “a birth-time and a period of transition to a new era,” and conceiving this as spirit’s coming out of its egg, Hegel states in his *Phenomenology of Spirit* of 1807: “the easiest thing of all is to pass judgements on what has a solid substantial content; it is more difficult to grasp it, and most of all difficult is to unite them and produce the [dialectical] exposition [*Darstellung*] of it.”

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33 *GW* 9, 14-15/ *PhS* § 11.

34 *GW* 9, 10-11/ *PhS* § 3.
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