

Duquesne University

Duquesne Scholarship Collection

Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Winter 12-17-2021

Philosophical Anthropology and Biblical Interpretation in John Paul II's Theology of the Body

Shawn Conoboy

Follow this and additional works at: <https://dsc.duq.edu/etd>



Part of the [Other Anthropology Commons](#), [Other Philosophy Commons](#), and the [Practical Theology Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Conoboy, S. (2021). Philosophical Anthropology and Biblical Interpretation in John Paul II's Theology of the Body (Doctoral dissertation, Duquesne University). Retrieved from <https://dsc.duq.edu/etd/2033>

This Immediate Access is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Duquesne Scholarship Collection.

PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION
IN JOHN PAUL II'S THEOLOGY OF THE BODY

A Dissertation

Submitted to McAnulty College and Graduate School

Duquesne University

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

By

Fr. Shawn Conoboy

December 2021

Copyright by
Fr. Shawn Conoboy

2021

PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION
IN JOHN PAUL II'S THEOLOGY OF THE BODY

By

Fr. Shawn Conoboy

Approved November 11, 2021

Dr. William M. Wright IV
Professor of Catholic Studies and
Theology
(Committee Chair)

Dr. Jeffrey McCurry
Director, Simon Silverman
Phenomenology Center
Affiliated Faculty, Department of
Philosophy
(Committee Member)

Dr. Bogdan G. Bucur
Associate Professor of Patristics
St. Vladimir's Orthodox Theological
Seminary
(Committee Member)

Dr. Kristine L. Blair
Dean, McAnulty College and Graduate
School

Dr. Marinus Iwuchukwu
Associate Professor of Theology
(Chair, Department of Theology)

ABSTRACT

PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION IN JOHN PAUL II'S THEOLOGY OF THE BODY

By

Fr. Shawn Conoboy

December 2021

Dissertation supervised by Dr. William M. Wright IV

In the *Theology of the Body*, through a series of Wednesday Catecheses, John Paul II presents a magisterial understanding of the sacrament of marriage and of marriage and family ethics. At the same time, John Paul II presents a theological anthropology, which forms a basis for the magisterial teaching. His theological anthropology is developed through an exegesis of selected biblical texts, especially Genesis 1-3 and Ephesians 5, and through an application of a philosophical anthropology articulated by Karol Wojtyła. This dissertation draws the connection between the philosophical anthropology of Wojtyła, especially as it is articulated in his major works, *Love and Responsibility* and *Person and Act*, and the theological anthropology presented in the *Man and Woman He Created Them*.

Ultimately, the roles of poet, professor, and pastor influenced the philosophical and theological writings of Wojtyła. His key insight is that the integration of the person in human acts is the foundation of a philosophical anthropology and ethics. Understanding the human

person as created in the image of God and called to a communion of persons is at the foundation of John Paul II's theological anthropology.

This dissertation underscores that John Paul II fully incorporated philosophical anthropology and employed it in a philosophical exegesis of Scripture. This dissertation underscores that John Paul II incorporated an interpretation of Scripture developing a theological anthropology that goes beyond the limits of human reason in understanding the human person.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Abstract.....	iv
Chapter 1.....	1
Chapter 2.....	33
Chapter 3.....	56
Chapter 4.....	99
Chapter 5.....	136
Chapter 6.....	161
Chapter 7.....	187
Chapter 8.....	221
Bibliography.....	258
Appendix.....	262

Chapter 1

Wojtyła's Turn to Anthropology

On 5 September 1979 John Paul II¹ began a series of Wednesday Audience addresses. He introduces them saying, “During the following Wednesday reflections at the general audiences, we will try, as Christ’s interlocutors today, to dwell at greater length on St. Matthew’s words (Mt 19:3-8).”² On 28 November 1984, John Paul II acknowledges the end of the series when he says, “The whole of the catecheses that I began more than four years ago and that I conclude today can be grasped under the title, ‘Human Love in the Divine Plan.’”³ In the same concluding Audience, John Paul II notes the use of the phrase, “the theology of the body.”⁴ He first used the term on 12 September 1979.⁵ Because of the use of the term “theology of the body,” early and often in the series, the entire collection of addresses came to be known as the *Theology of the Body*.

The *Theology of the Body* is a continuation and a culmination of the work that Karol Wojtyła completed before his papal election. In many of his works, Wojtyła focused on the human person. His methodology often used human experience as a starting point. From that starting point, as his academic work continued, he developed an anthropology. In his major and minor works, Wojtyła especially articulates his philosophical anthropology. As an anthropology, the *Theology of the Body* continues his pre-papal focus on the human person.

¹ St. John Paul II was canonized on 27 April 2014.

² TOB 1:5. John Paul II, *Man and Woman He Created Them*, tr. Michael Waldstein (Boston: Pauline Books & Media, 2006).

N.B. Given the unique genre and history of development of this work, I am following the convention used by Waldstein. When citing from the General Audience, I use “TOB,” followed by the Audience number, followed by the paragraph number, for example, in this case, TOB 1:5.

³ TOB 133:1. There were periodic breaks taken over the five years (e.g. some months in 1981 corresponding to time spent in recovery from the assassination attempt on 13 May 1981, and most of 1983 corresponding to the Holy Year).

⁴ cf. TOB 133:1.

⁵ TOB 2:5. The quotation reads, “Of course, all this has its own significance for theology as well, and above all for the theology of the body.”

For this project, I begin with a survey of some of Wojtyła's work, especially his minor essays, illustrating the influences that came from his life as a poet, a philosopher, and a pastor. Then, I examine in detail both *Person and Act* and *Love and Responsibility*, detailing his philosophical anthropology. With this groundwork laid, then, I offer a detailed analysis of the content of the *Theology of the Body*, showing the role of Scripture in developing this theological anthropology. I, then, detail the characteristics of an "adequate anthropology,"⁶ according to John Paul II, that the fruit of Wojtyła's philosophical anthropology and the insight gained from biblical revelation.

Through biblical interpretation, the theological anthropology of *Theology of the Body* goes beyond the philosophical anthropology of Karol Wojtyła.

I. Formative Influences on Wojtyła as a Philosopher and Theologian

As Wojtyła's life unfolded, he was actively engaged in the arts, academic life, and pastoral work. Karol Wojtyła's formal education and professional work exposed him to the arts and to a variety of other influences, specifically the works of St. John of the Cross, the philosophies of Thomism and phenomenology, and the teachings of Vatican II. A historical review of his life and work shows a progression in thought and a definite turn to anthropology. The same review shows a consistency in his focus on and articulation of his understanding of the human person.

These various influences are the foundation of the theological anthropology of the *Theology of the Body*.

⁶ TOB 13:2.

A. Wojtyła's Literary Work

Born in 1920 in Wadowice, Poland, Karol Wojtyła began his undergraduate studies at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow in 1938.⁷ His field of study was Polish philology and literature, and his extra-curricular activities included the theater and poetry.⁸ Wojtyła wrote and published a number of plays as well as poetry. These were written both before and after his priestly ordination. Even though his vocation to the priesthood led him to stop his university studies in literature, he did not stop producing literary work, which indicates the foundational place the artistic has in the mind of Wojtyła.

1. Wojtyła's Plays

Continuing his connection to the theater begun in Wadowice as a child, Wojtyła became deeply connected to the theater during his early years in university.⁹ He was a principal agent in the Rhapsodic Theater in Krakow. This was a theater group formed to promote Polish culture. It was an underground group, because such activity was prohibited by the occupying Nazi regime. The senior member of the group was Mieczysław Kotlarczyk. Kotlarczyk described the Rhapsodic Theater as “a protest against the extermination of the Polish nation’s culture on its own soil, a form of underground resistance movement against the Nazi occupation.”¹⁰ Even before the war, Kotlarczyk had been experimenting with some elements of theater that characterize the Rhapsodic style. Performed in private apartments, these plays involved no stage curtain or traditional stage, no scenery, costumes or makeup, and limited actor movement.

⁷ George Weigel, *Witness to Hope* (New York: Harper Perennial, 2005), 16.

⁸ *ibid.*, 40.

⁹ Karol Wojtyła, *The Collected Plays and Writings on Theater*, tr. Boleslaw Taborski (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1987), 2-3.

¹⁰ *ibid.*, 6.

Instead, the emphasis was on the spoken word.¹¹ Commenting on the rhapsodic style, Wojtyła wrote:

The rhapsodic company has accustomed us a theater of the word. What does this mean? Is not every theater a theater of the word? Does not the word constitute an essential, primary element of any theater? Undoubtedly it does. Nonetheless the position of the word in a theater is not always the same. As in life, the word can appear as an integral part of action, movement, and gesture, inseparable from all human practical activity; or it can appear as “song”—separate, independent, intended only to contain and express thought, to embrace and transmit a vision of the mind. In the latter aspect, or position, the word becomes “rhapsodic,” and a theater based on such a concept of the word becomes a rhapsodic theater.¹²

In this way, rhapsody is equivalent to song, except, without music. It is the words themselves that lift the spirit. To speak to the inner experience of the observer, rhapsody first captures an inner experience and then, through the words, communicates that experience to the other. All of this was done with minimal physical action.

With his decision to enter seminary, Wojtyła could no longer be an actor in the Rhapsodic Theater. While there is a great resonance between his plays and the work of the Rhapsodic Theater, Wojtyła’s plays cannot be strictly identified with the plays performed there. In his Introduction to *The Collected Plays and Writings on Theater*, Boleslaw Taborski writes of Wojtyła’s plays:

The world of external events is not so much expressed by the dramatist directly as absorbed into the ‘inner space,’ the psychological space, of the protagonist, where it exists timelessly, in projections into the past or future (that is, in the memory of the hero or in his prophecies), supported by the author’s knowledge of history, or even theology.¹³

Wojtyła’s plays are a communication of inner experience. One characteristic of this inner theater is that the dialogue in Wojtyła’s plays is often a series of monologues, individuals reflecting on a particular experience or on a statement by another character. Wojtyła’s focus is on the drama of

¹¹ *ibid.*, 16.

¹² *ibid.*, 372.

¹³ *ibid.*, 16.

the inner experience of the character. His plays are written to be performed with a bare minimum of set and physical movement, perhaps even less than the Rhapsodic style that influenced him.

Before ordination, Wojtyła wrote several plays of a socio-political nature: *David*;¹⁴ *Job*,¹⁵ and *Jeremiah*.¹⁶ *Job* is a reflection on suffering. Wojtyła locates this play with an extended description on the title page:

The Action Took Place in the Old Testament/Before Christ's Coming/The Action Takes Place in Our Days/In Job's Time/For Poland and the World/The Action Takes Place in the Time of Expectation,/Of Imploring Judgment,/In the Time of Longing/For Christ's Testament,/Worked Out/In Poland's and the World's Suffering.¹⁷

While the Old Testament biblical figure and his companions are the protagonists of the play, Wojtyła explicitly introduces Christ's suffering as giving meaning to the socio-political angst of those who are suffering in a world at war.

Job limits the play's characters to biblical figures while *Jeremiah* incorporates figures from both the Bible and Poland's history. Taborski writes: "One should keep in mind, however, that Jeremiah is not, strictly speaking, a historical play. It is not concerned with external events and facts, though it alludes to them, but with ideas and attitudes, with a vision of Polish history."¹⁸ The primary vision of *Jeremiah* is the fall and rebirth of a nation. Wojtyła points to the historical experience of the Kingdom of Judah in the book of the prophet Jeremiah and of the country of Poland in the time of Peter Skarga.¹⁹ The *Parliamentary Sermons* of Skarga were published in 1597.²⁰ Skarga preached against threats to the post-Reformation Church and to the

¹⁴ *ibid.*, 3. This play, written in 1939 when Wojtyła was 19 years old, is now lost. He described it as partly biblical and partly rooted in Polish history.

¹⁵ *ibid.*, 25-74. This play was written in 1940.

¹⁶ *ibid.*, 93-145. This play was written in 1940. The subtitle is "A National Drama in Three Acts."

¹⁷ *ibid.*, 25.

¹⁸ *ibid.*, 76.

¹⁹ *ibid.*, 79. Fr. Peter Skarga (1536-1612) was appointed court preacher in 1588 by King Sigismund III in Krakow.

²⁰ *ibid.*, 84.

continuance of the nation and its monarchy, which eventually fell.²¹ Wojtyła presents large sections of the *Parliamentary Sermons in Jeremiah*, showing that, in the words of Taborski, “Father Peter not only is a prophet of doom but also shows the way of rebirth.”²² Set during Holy Week, the play ends with the promise of rebirth and resurrection. Wojtyła is concerned for the Poland of his time. His message in *Jeremiah* is that whatever threats there may be to the people of Poland, there is a promise of rebirth.

After ordination, Wojtyła continued to write plays, although they were now centered on more philosophical and theological themes. They are *Our God’s Brother*,²³ *The Jeweler’s Shop*,²⁴ and *Radiation of Fatherhood*.²⁵ By 1950, the socio-political situation in Poland had changed from Nazi occupation and ideology to that of the Communists. While there is a marked awareness of the prevailing political ideology in the play, *Our God’s Brother* is a depiction of the vocation story of Adam Chmielowski.²⁶ Weigel writes: “The play’s main ‘action’ takes place in the conscience of Adam Chmielowski.... The mainspring of the play’s dramatic tension is vocational.”²⁷ Even while serving others and while leading his religious community, Brother Albert is in a process of self-discovery. That self-discovery includes questions of social ethics. Weigel writes: “In the play, through the struggles of Brother Albert, Wojtyła is working out for himself the problem of revolutionary violence.”²⁸ The play concludes with Brother Albert

²¹ cf. *ibid.*, 78.

²² *ibid.*, 87.

²³ *ibid.*, 159-266. This play was written in 1950.

²⁴ *ibid.*, 277-322. This play was written in 1960. The subtitle is “A Meditation on the Sacrament of Matrimony, Passing on Occasion into a Drama.”

²⁵ *ibid.*, 333-364. This play was written in 1964. The subtitle is “A Mystery.” This play was not published until after his papal election. Wojtyła published a condensed version of it in 1964 as *Reflections on Fatherhood* (365-368).

²⁶ *ibid.*, 147-148. Adam Chmielowski (1845-1916), who took the religious name Brother Albert in 1887 in Krakow, served the poor.

²⁷ Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, 113.

²⁸ *ibid.*

saying, “I know for certain, though, that I have chosen a greater freedom.”²⁹ Weigel says, “At the deepest level, the dramatic action in *Our God’s Brother* is a struggle over the meaning of freedom, and by extension the meaning of human existence.”³⁰ In this drama, Chmielowski experiences a struggle over those ideologies with which to identify himself. He finds his answer when he lets himself be “molded by love,” in the words of the play.³¹ While he is discovering his vocation, he is also discovering who he is as a person and what it means to be a human person. At the heart of the drama is a question of anthropology.

Perhaps Wojtyła’s most well-known play is *The Jeweler’s Shop*. The story concerns three couples: Andrew and Teresa, who had become a widow when Andrew died; Stefan and Anna, who had become deeply isolated from each other despite continued cohabitation; and, Christopher, the son of Andrew and Teresa, and Monica, the daughter of Stefan and Anna, who are engaged to be married. Their various and intertwined circumstances provide opportunities to reflect on the meaning of married love. Through the figure of the Jeweler, each person makes a discovery about that meaning. Wojtyła, through the words of Adam, a chance interlocutor, unites the various discoveries in this way:

every person has at his disposal an existence and a love. The problem is how to build a sensible structure from it. But this structure must never be inward-looking. It must be open in such a way that, on one hand, it embraces other people, while, on the other, it always reflects the absolute Existence and Love; it must always, in some way, reflect them. That is the ultimate sense of your lives.³²

Even with this assertion, *The Jeweler’s Shop* does not expound upon this meaning. In fact, the play ends with Stefan confessing that he does not know what it means to reflect Existence and

²⁹ Wojtyła, *The Collected Plays and Writings on Theater*, 266.

³⁰ Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, 114.

³¹ Wojtyła, *The Collected Plays and Writings on Theater*, 221.

³² *ibid.*, 321.

Love.³³ In this way, Taborski says that Wojtyła “imposes no theological solutions. Though the play invites us to look for them, it asks us to approach love not just on the level of self-seeking animal passions but with the whole person.”³⁴ *The Jeweler’s Shop* is an invitation to discover the meaning of existence and love.

Radiation of Fatherhood deepens this reflection on human existence. The protagonist is the biblical first man, Adam. The play opens with this line: “For many years I have lived like a man exiled from my deeper personality yet condemned to probe it. ... The thought constantly returns to me that I ought to find myself in every man—searching not from without but from within.”³⁵ His main discovery is that he can only overcome isolation by giving of himself, by love. Wojtyła writes: “People inhabit an earth that has two poles. They have no permanent place here. They are all on their way, which leads them from the pole of loneliness to the pole of love.”³⁶ The choice before Adam is between continued isolation or fatherhood. By accepting love in the acceptance of fatherhood, he becomes more like God. Kenneth Schmitz writes, “He realizes that the radiation of the Father’s love consists in giving birth, even as from all eternity the Father is Father through begetting His Son.”³⁷ Even with this insight, the play ends with Adam between the two poles of isolation or creative interaction. In this way, Wojtyła is underlining that each human person is still facing this same choice, because Adam is each of us, the “common denominator” of humanity.³⁸

Wojtyła’s plays explore questions of fundamental human experience.

³³ *ibid.*, 322.

³⁴ *ibid.*, 275.

³⁵ *ibid.*, 335.

³⁶ *ibid.*, 360.

³⁷ Kenneth Schmitz, *At the Center of the Human Drama: The Philosophical Anthropology of Karol Wojtyła/Pope John Paul II* (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1993), 26.

³⁸ Wojtyła, *The Collected Plays and Writings on Theater*, 338.

2. Wojtyła's Poetry

In addition to his published plays, beginning in 1939 and continuing until just days before his papal election in 1978, Wojtyła published a number of poems.³⁹ Without giving a comprehensive list of them, his poems include the following: *Song of the Hidden God*, a cycle of poems about human and non-human creation, God as Creator and Father, our Father;⁴⁰ *Mother*, a series of poems about the Blessed Virgin Mary centered around the Incarnation as well as her relationship with the disciple John;⁴¹ *Thought—Strange Space*, a series of poems reflecting the struggle to find adequate words to capture reality, a struggle like Jacob's wrestling with God;⁴² *The Quarry*, a cycle of poems about the meaning of work and the dignity of workers;⁴³ *Easter Vigil*, a series of poems meditating on how Christ's Paschal Mystery is experienced in history, specifically Polish history, set in the darkness of the night waiting for the Resurrection;⁴⁴ and *Stanislas*, a cycle of poems about St. Stanislaus and the meaning of his martyrdom for the church and the nation of Poland.⁴⁵ The style of his poetry is not unlike his plays. Taborski writes:

The character of his poetry, in fact, is closely linked to that of his plays. Wojtyła's poems are usually long and divided into parts, their structures resembling that of a play. They often contain monologues, even dialogues, dramatic in their intensity. They deal with the drama of human existence.... In his plays, as in his poems, he is concerned not so much with external events as with exploring man's soul; it is there that the 'action' often unfolds.⁴⁶

In his poems, as in his plays, Wojtyła is concerned with inner experience. Similarities between his poetry and his plays can be seen in the content of each, as well. A most obvious connection

³⁹ These have been collected and translated in English in, Karol Wojtyła, *The Place Within: The Poetry of Pope John Paul II*, tr. Jerzy Peterkiewicz (Vatican City State: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1982).

⁴⁰ Wojtyła, *The Place Within*, 3-26. The original was written in 1944.

⁴¹ *ibid.*, 41-49. The original was written in 1950.

⁴² *ibid.*, 53-60. The original was written in 1952.

⁴³ *ibid.*, 63-71. The original was written in 1956.

⁴⁴ *ibid.*, 121-140. The original was written in 1966. This theme was continued in *Thinking My Country* (143-149), written in 1974.

⁴⁵ *ibid.*, 179-184. The original was written in 1978.

⁴⁶ Wojtyła, *The Collected Plays and Writings on Theater*, 15.

is the concern with the individual under an oppressive regime. Such is the case in the plays, *Job* and *Jeremiah*, and the poems, *Easter Vigil* and *Stanislas*.

Characteristic of Wojtyła's artistic writings is that almost all of them were published under a pseudonym.⁴⁷ Although there may be socio-political reasons for using a pseudonym under regimes that repress culture, Weigel suggests that using a pseudonym allowed Wojtyła "to make a distinction between his literary work and his writings on religion, faith, morals, and Church affairs, which were always published under his own name, and he thought he had a right to have his work considered on its own merits, rather than as clerical curiosities."⁴⁸ The role of an artist is distinct from the role of a philosopher or pastor, even when they reside in the same person, which deeply connects them.

B. St. John of the Cross

In 1939, at the beginning of World War II, the Jagiellonian University was forced to operate underground. Continuing his literary studies, Wojtyła took part in clandestine education.⁴⁹ During this time, a sense of a vocation to the priesthood arose in Karol Wojtyła. In 1942, he was accepted into the underground seminary in Krakow.⁵⁰ Describing this change in direction, he wrote: "As I came to appreciate the power of the word in my literary and linguistic studies, I inevitably drew closer to the mystery of the Word [Jesus Christ]."⁵¹ This new fascination led him to his studies of philosophy and theology, as he began his formation for the priesthood.

⁴⁷ His two most common ones were Andrzej Jawień and Stanisław Andrzej Gruda, cf. Wojtyła, *The Collected Plays and Writings on Theater*.

⁴⁸ Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, 112.

⁴⁹ *ibid.*, 44.

⁵⁰ *ibid.*, 69.

⁵¹ John Paul II, *Gift and Mystery: On the Fiftieth Anniversary of My Priestly Ordination* (New York: Doubleday, 1996), 7.

Wojtyła was first introduced to St. John of the Cross by his spiritual mentor, the layman Jan Tyranowski, during the time of Wojtyła's clandestine studies.⁵² Wojtyła, even, had begun a work on St. John of the Cross during the time of his studies at Jagiellonian University.⁵³ In the Apostolic Letter, *Maestro en la Fe*, John Paul II wrote: "I myself have especially felt attracted to the experience and teachings of the Saint of Fontiveros. From the first years of my priestly formation I found in him a sure guide on the pathways of faith. This aspect of his doctrine seemed to me of vital importance for every Christian, particularly in a time like ours, exploring new paths, but also exposed to risks and temptations in the area of faith."⁵⁴ Despite this attraction to St. John of the Cross and Carmelite spirituality, Wojtyła continued with his formation in the diocesan underground seminary, and he was ordained a priest on 1 November 1946.⁵⁵

Almost immediately after ordination, Wojtyła began doctoral studies in Rome at the Angelicum. In 1948, he completed his doctoral dissertation: *Faith According to St. John of the Cross*,⁵⁶ which was directed by the Dominican Reginald Garrigou-Lagrance. At the outset, Wojtyła recognizes that the articulation of doctrine in the spiritual theology of St. John of the Cross is different than what is found in scholastic theology. He says that St. John of the Cross "treats of only one aspect of faith: its unifying power, which he elaborates with precision and utmost competence. There are other elements of particular importance in the theology of faith,

⁵² Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, 61.

⁵³ John Paul II wrote in *Gift and Mystery*, 17: "At that time I also began to write a work on Saint John of the Cross, which I then continued under the direction of Father Ignacy Różycki, a lecturer at the University of Cracow, when the University was reopened. I later completed this work at the *Angelicum*, under the direction of Father Garrigou Lagrange."

⁵⁴ John Paul II, *Maestro en La Fe* (Vatican City State: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1990), 2. The translation is mine.

⁵⁵ Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, 79.

⁵⁶ John Paul II (Karol Wojtyła), *Faith According to St. John of the Cross*, tr. Jordan Aumann (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf & Stock, 2009). The original title is *Doctrina de fide apud S. Joannem a Cruce*.

but he leaves them aside.”⁵⁷ Instead of expounding on faith in a scholastic manner, Wojtyła’s project is to discover what the Mystical Doctor contributes to an understanding of faith. His focus is that for St. John of the Cross faith is a means of union with God.

Wojtyła first offers an analysis of the references to faith in the writings of St. John of the Cross, specifically *The Ascent of Mount Carmel*, *The Dark Night*, *The Spiritual Canticle*, and *The Living Flame*. The analysis of these texts is followed by a synthesis of his findings, and a presentation of his conclusions. Wojtyła’s study thus examines the nature of union with God through faith. He writes, St. John of the Cross “always states that in the transformation the soul becomes divine or that the soul becomes God by participation. This clearly presents the ontological aspect of the question.”⁵⁸ But St. John of the Cross also gives much attention to how union with God through faith is experienced, Wojtyła says, “Faith is therefore a proper means of union wherein divinity is communicated to the soul; but at the same time it is a dark night because the communication of the soul with God is effected through faith, which is obscure.”⁵⁹

What is happening to the soul (union with God) is different than what is happening intellectually (an obscuring of human experience). Wojtyła articulates:

The intellect is restricted to the lower level of knowledge and activity that lie within the scope of its natural power. Consequently, the virtue of faith provides a knowledge of divine things to which the intellect attains by a borrowed light; its own light does not reach that far, and hence the natural power of the intellect falls short of such knowledge. Nevertheless, it is a curious fact that in the very act of knowing, faith is still a darkness. This is explained psychologically by the fact that the intellect attains the object of knowledge but at the same time is prevented from knowing it. At first glance, therefore, faith seems to be an obstacle to the intellect’s natural craving for knowledge and, indeed, as regards its higher act of knowledge.

The virtue of faith is thus presented as uniting and fusing with the human cognitive faculty. We could call it the psychological aspect of faith. But to discover what lies beneath this first impression, it is necessary to study some particulars in greater detail.

⁵⁷ *ibid.*, 26.

⁵⁸ *ibid.*, 89.

⁵⁹ *ibid.*, 102.

And the first thing to consider is the subject—the intellect—which is described in the text as overwhelmed and oppressed by “excessive light”.⁶⁰

Later Wojtyła states, “Thus, through faith the human intellect is united with the ‘substance’ of revealed truths ontologically, but not psychologically, because the excessive light of faith in no way changes the nature and mode of operation of the intellect.”⁶¹ Faith is a means of union with God and involves a purification of the intellect.

Throughout his dissertation, Wojtyła also considers St. John of the Cross’ teachings on the role of other virtues, specifically charity, as means of union with God. He says: “Faith considered in itself, even vivified by charity but not operating through charity, cannot be called the means of transformation. ... The answer is that St. John of the Cross never speaks about faith alone or unformed faith, but always about faith vivified by charity.”⁶² Wojtyła continues, “Indeed, if faith is to attain its plenitude and total possible perfection, it must open itself to the other virtues because it needs them. To be perfect, faith must be a living faith, vivified by charity and the gifts of the Holy Spirit.”⁶³ The role of charity in faith is to create union with God. Wojtyła summarizes, “faith is a means of union only in relation to charity.”⁶⁴ Wojtyła recognizes that St. John of the Cross is referencing a qualified version of faith—faith vivified by charity—even if he uses the word, faith, without any qualification. Although Wojtyła somewhat artificially analyzes faith in and of itself, he again concludes that, for St. John of the Cross, “faith is the proper and proportionate means for uniting the intellect with God.”⁶⁵

⁶⁰ *ibid.*, 73-74.

⁶¹ *ibid.*, 208.

⁶² *ibid.*, 254-255.

⁶³ *ibid.*, 267.

⁶⁴ *ibid.*, 137.

⁶⁵ *ibid.*, 269.

In the final pages of his dissertation, Wojtyła compares the work of St. John of the Cross to that of St. Thomas Aquinas, with regard to their treatment of faith. The two areas considered are faith as a means of union with God and faith as a virtue of purgation of the intellect.⁶⁶

In both cases, Wojtyła lists a number of quotations from the saints. With regard to faith as a means of union, Wojtyła says: “We can say that the foregoing passages contain the nucleus of the doctrine of St. John of the Cross on faith as a means of union, so far as through the virtue of faith the intellect adheres to the reality of revealed truths.”⁶⁷ Similarly, he says, when treating the purgative role of faith:

However, when it is a question of the purification of the intellect which St. John of the Cross attributes to faith working through charity, St. Thomas, with greater theological precision, assigns this purifying action to the gift of understanding. In conclusion, we can say that the entire doctrine of St. John of the Cross on the purgative power of the virtue of faith, of the preparation of the intellect for the vision of God, and of the realization of God’s incomprehensibility is synthesized in this passage from the *Summa theologiae*.⁶⁸

In comparing these two Doctors of the Church, Wojtyła shows the deep agreement of the two. They agree, but their treatments are not equal. St. Thomas is able to provide answers that are more theologically precise than St. John of the Cross. St. John of the Cross expounds on, in greater detail than is found in syntheses and summaries, the experience of the virtue of faith as a dark night of the intellect. Wojtyła says: “The description is often couched in Scholastic terminology, but the experience that is described will often give a different nuance or a new meaning to the technical terminology.”⁶⁹ For Wojtyła, St. John of the Cross articulates human experience in greater detail.

⁶⁶ *ibid.*

⁶⁷ *ibid.*, 270.

⁶⁸ *ibid.*, 272. Wojtyła is referencing *Summa theologiae*, II-II, q. 8, a. 7.

⁶⁹ *ibid.*, 25.

C. Scheler

After completing his doctoral studies in Rome, Wojtyła returned to Poland to engage in pastoral work, which he did until 1951 when he was asked to become a professor.⁷⁰ This request required him to write a habilitation thesis, a second dissertation. His habilitation thesis is entitled *Evaluation of the Possibility of Constructing a Christian Ethics on the Assumptions of Max Scheler's System of Philosophy*.⁷¹ In this dissertation, Wojtyła presents both the ethical system of Max Scheler, rooted in the phenomenological method, and some essential elements of being a follower of Christ, based primarily on Scripture.

Wojtyła initially saw the possibility of using the phenomenological method to build a Christian ethics. In the course of evaluating that possibility, his conclusion was in the negative, which he states in this way: “The ethical system constructed by Max Scheler fundamentally does not conform to the scientific formulation of Christian ethics.”⁷² Even if there is an impossibility of constructing a Christian ethics based on the phenomenological method, a system like Scheler's can still have a value for a Christian ethics. Wojtyła expresses that value in this way: “Although the ethical system created by Scheler is not fundamentally suited to interpreting Christian ethics, it can be helpful in a scientific work on Christian ethics.”⁷³

With those two conclusions, Wojtyła states that Max Scheler's system of philosophy would go beyond its limits if it were used as a basis for a Christian ethics. Yet the phenomenological method is nevertheless an assistance to a Christian ethicist.

⁷⁰ Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, 124-125.

⁷¹ Karol Wojtyła, *Valutazione Sulla Possibilità di Costruire L'Etica Cristiana Sulla Basi del Sistema di Max Scheler*, tr. Sandro Bucciarelli, in *Metaphysica della Persona*, ed. Giovanni Reale and Tadeusz Styczeń (Vatican City State: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2003). This work is not available in English. I am using the translation of the title according to Michael Waldstein used in his Introduction to the *Theology of the Body*, cf. Waldstein, *Man and Woman He Created Them*, 69.

⁷² Wojtyła, *Valutazione Sulla Possibilità di Costruire L'Etica Cristiana Sulla Basi del Sistema di Max Scheler*, 439. The translation is mine.

⁷³ *ibid.*, 446. The translation is mine.

Wojtyła continues his reflection on the utility of the phenomenological method in his minor works, which I will look at in this chapter.

D. Vatican II

In 1958, Wojtyła became auxiliary bishop of the Archdiocese of Krakow. In 1962, he was named the administrator of the archdiocese.⁷⁴ At the beginning of 1964, he became the Archbishop of Krakow, and a cardinal in 1967.⁷⁵ His early years as a bishop coincided closely with the Second Vatican Council, at which he became an active participant in its sessions.⁷⁶

1. Sources of Renewal

At the conclusion of Vatican II, Wojtyła once again returned to Poland from Rome, this time bringing with him the teachings of the Council. His pastoral reflections culminated in one of his major works: *Sources of Renewal*.⁷⁷ These reflections were written in order to help implement Vatican II in the life of his diocese. As such, there is a great breadth to the work. In fact, he includes citations from all sixteen documents of Vatican II. Throughout the work, Wojtyła takes long citations from the conciliar texts and links them to each other and to the themes of his commentary. The result is less of a commentary of each conciliar text individually, and more of a synthetic linking of the appropriate sections of each conciliar text according to a given theme. The result is also a revelation of an internal unity of the conciliar texts more than an artificial connection of disparate passages.

⁷⁴ Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, 145.

⁷⁵ *ibid.*, 181.

⁷⁶ Paul McPartlan, *John Paul II and Vatican II*, in *The Vision of John Paul II: Assessing His Thought and Influence*. ed. Gerard Mannion (Collegeville, Minnesota: Liturgical Press, 2008), 45-61.

⁷⁷ Karol Wojtyła, *Sources of Renewal: The Implementation of the Second Vatican Council*, tr. P.S. Falla (San Francisco: Harper & Row Publishers, 1980).

There are three main parts to *Sources of Renewal*: “The Basic Significance of Conciliar Initiation,”⁷⁸ “The Formation of Consciousness,”⁷⁹ and “The Formation of Attitudes.”⁸⁰ The first part is concerned with questions of faith, with *Dei Verbum*⁸¹ and *Gaudium et Spes*⁸² as the primary touchstones. He begins the work by saying that “The implementation of Vatican II, or the process of Conciliar renewal, must be based on the principle of the enrichment of faith.”⁸³ Wojtyła then considers passages from the documents of Vatican II that speak to an individual’s faith. He concludes this first part with the consideration of the Church as an article of faith:

The way towards the enrichment of faith rediscovered by Vatican II passes through the mind and consciousness of the Church. Paul VI formulated it similarly in the first encyclical of his pontificate, published in the same year as *Lumen gentium*, the Council’s Dogmatic Constitution on the Church. This Constitution is in a sense the key to the whole of the Council’s thought. In it we find once more the complex variety of ways towards the enrichment of faith, leading from Vatican II into the future. This variety inspires nearly all of the Council’s documents, albeit in different degrees. The dogmatic Constitution is best complemented by the pastoral Constitution on the Church in the modern world, known by the title *Gaudium et spes*.

For this reason it was important to begin by clarifying the relationship between faith and dialogue, as it is closely linked with the consciousness of the Church. The Church is itself a truth of faith and is a subject of an article in the Creed: ‘I believe in one holy, catholic and apostolic Church.’ If the Council’s approach had been ‘purely doctrinal’, its teaching concerning the truth of faith as regards the Church might have taken a different form; but on this very point it had to be pastoral first and foremost. It was impossible to treat the Church merely as an ‘object’: it had to be a ‘subject’ also.⁸⁴

This passage names *Lumen Gentium* as the key for interpreting Vatican II. It also reveals the centrality of *Gaudium et Spes*, as the best complement of *Lumen Gentium*. Paul McPartlan notes that, for Wojtyła, “*Gaudium et Spes*, on the church's relationship to and activity in the modern

⁷⁸ Wojtyła, *Sources of Renewal*, 13-41.

⁷⁹ *ibid.*, 42-200.

⁸⁰ *ibid.*, 201-422.

⁸¹ Vatican II, *Dei Verbum*, http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_const_19651118_dei-verbum_en.html.

⁸² Vatican II, *Gaudium et Spes*, http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_cons_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html.

⁸³ Wojtyła, *Sources of Renewal*, 15.

⁸⁴ *ibid.*, 35.

world, complements and completes *Lumen Gentium*.”⁸⁵ If *Lumen Gentium* is inward focused, then *Gaudium et Spes* describes the work of redemption of Jesus Christ, accomplished in the world. The Church’s self-understanding in faith leads her to pastoral work. McPartlan writes: “In short, for John Paul, the church was essentially outward looking, and *Lumen Gentium* described the inner reality of *such* a church.”⁸⁶

The next major section of *Sources of Renewal*, “The Formation of Consciousness,” alternates between *Gaudium et Spes* and *Lumen Gentium* as the primary conciliar texts on which Wojtyła comments. He asserts that the Council raises the consciousness of the individual as being created by God, as sharing in Trinitarian life, as receiving salvation and redemption, as being a member of the Church, the People of God. Wojtyła connects these elements of the consciousness of faith in this way:

The vocation of the individual to communion with God is closely linked with his vocation to human dignity, and is furthermore, in the most authentic manner, given him by reason of his own inner nature. This intimately personal vocation of man, which is the main theme of the Gospel, must, however, be realized in communion with other men, and therefore it is also a vocation to communal life.⁸⁷

With the communal as central, Wojtyła continues: “The Council devotes much attention to making the faithful conscious of *communio* as the link binding together the community of the People of God. Thus it appears that the internal development and renewal of the Church in the spirit of Vatican II depends to a very great extent on the authentic deepening of faith in the Church as a community whose essential bond is that of *communio*.”⁸⁸ An individual human person is to be aware of oneself as part of the communion of persons of the Church.

⁸⁵ McPartlan, *John Paul II and Vatican II*, 53.

⁸⁶ *ibid.*, 53. Emphasis in original.

⁸⁷ Wojtyła, *Sources of Renewal*, 117.

⁸⁸ *ibid.*, 144.

The third major section of *Sources of Renewal*, “The Formation of Attitudes,” describes the various responsibilities of the Christian, both within and outside of the inner life of the Church. The major points of reference are *Gaudium et Spes* and *Lumen Gentium*. However, Wojtyła does provide a more sustained look at other conciliar documents as they pertain to particular responsibilities. For example, he has a number of citations from *Sacrosanctum Concilium* when he discusses participation in the Liturgy,⁸⁹ and citations from *Nostra Aetate* and *Unitatis Redintegratio* when he discusses ecumenical activity.⁹⁰

Wojtyła’s purpose in writing *Sources of Renewal* was to help the faithful of Krakow to implement Vatican II. However, he did not provide detailed and systematic presentations of each of the documents. Wojtyła asserts, “Therefore, we have tried in this present study not so much to consider ‘how’, but rather ‘what’ it is we have to implement, which is the more important question.”⁹¹ The mechanisms of implementation are secondary to the formation of the faithful’s consciousness and attitudes.

2. Wojtyła’s Incorporation of Vatican II

The Council called for a response of faith from Wojtyła.⁹² He accepted the teachings of the Council into his pastoral and academic life. Wojtyła’s relationship to Vatican II was not just in terms of episcopal responsibilities. His writings consistently included references, even explicit references, to the texts of Vatican II.⁹³ Two things can be said about Vatican II as an

⁸⁹ *ibid.*, 231

⁹⁰ *ibid.*, 310.

⁹¹ *ibid.*, 420.

⁹² *ibid.*, 10.

⁹³ John Paul II’s first papal encyclical, *Redemptor Hominis*, also had Vatican II as a framework, in a way that resonates with *Sources of Renewal*. John Paul II, *Redemptor Hominis* (Vatican City State: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1979). As a programmatic document of his pontificate, *Redemptor Hominis* has a different purpose than *Sources of Renewal*. Nevertheless, many (but not all) of the documents of Vatican II are explicitly cited throughout the encyclical, indicating that the Council is a definite point of reference.

influence on the thought of Wojtyła. First, his experience at the Council does not account for the development of this thought. The turn to the human person, including ethics, anthropology, and marriage and sexuality, had begun before the beginning of the Council. The turn to the human person was largely independent of the Council. Second, the Council did generate in Wojtyła an increased attention to anthropological questions, providing him with specific concepts and vocabulary, especially the concept of *communio personarum*.

The text that had the deepest connection to the pastoral and academic work of Wojtyła is *Gaudium et Spes*. The first three chapters of it are concerning the dignity of the human person, the interconnectedness of human beings, and the faithful's responsibility in the various forms of human activity in the world.⁹⁴ These three themes connect with the major sections of *Sources of Renewal*, and with the development of thought in Wojtyła's academic writings.

II. Wojtyła's Essays on Ethics and Anthropology

In 1954, Wojtyła became a university professor at the Catholic University of Lublin, teaching ethics.⁹⁵ Even up until his papal election, he remained a professor, though in a reduced capacity.⁹⁶ During this time Wojtyła published both major and minor works. His minor works complement his major works.

The major works, *The Acting Person* and *Love and Responsibility*, will be reviewed in following chapters. Here I offer a review of his minor works. This survey of a selection of Wojtyła's essays reveals a progression from questions of methodology in ethics to anthropological questions and, finally, to questions of marriage and sexuality.

⁹⁴ Vatican II, *Gaudium et Spes*, 1-45.

⁹⁵ Schmitz, *At the Center of the Human Drama*, 62.

⁹⁶ Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, 214.

A. The Lublin Lectures

From 1954-1958, Wojtyła produced a lecture series each year, which are now collectively known as the Lublin Lectures.⁹⁷ During those first years in Lublin, Wojtyła was developing his philosophical methodology.

In the first Lublin Lecture, he articulates that Scheler defined himself in contradistinction to Kant. Kant based his ethics on duty, while Scheler based his ethics on value. Because of Scheler's dependence on Kant, Wojtyła felt obliged to engage Kant. This examination of Kant led Wojtyła to a dual negative and positive evaluation similar to his previous evaluation of Scheler. According to Jarosław Kupczak, Wojtyła's negative conclusion of the two philosophers is that "Kant and Scheler were both mistaken...in excluding duty or value from the ethical life of the human person."⁹⁸ Wojtyła also says that Kant and Scheler's theories both have positive import for ethics. Kupczak summarizes Wojtyła's position saying, "Both duty and value perform important roles in the ethical life, and what is really needed is a new, synthetic description of the relation between them."⁹⁹ As the Lecture continues, Wojtyła begins synthesizing the ethics of Kant and Scheler into his own treatment of ethics. Kupczak writes, "While his *Habilitationschrift* was concerned mostly with a sharp criticism of Scheler's moral theory, *Lublin Lectures* also reveals the positive elements of Kant's and Scheler's respective systems, which Wojtyła used as the building blocks of his own theory of the acting person."¹⁰⁰ In the Lublin Lectures, Wojtyła was refining his own methodology.

⁹⁷ *ibid.*, 25-47. The last lecture in the series was incorporated into Wojtyła's book, *Love and Responsibility*. The other lectures remained unpublished for many years and are still unavailable in English.

⁹⁸ Jarosław Kupczak, *Destined for Liberty: The Human Person in the Philosophy of Karol Wojtyła/John Paul II* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 36.

⁹⁹ *ibid.*

¹⁰⁰ *ibid.*, 41.

B. Essays on Ethics

In his essays on ethics, Wojtyła continued his methodological reflection. In *Gift and Mystery*, the autobiographical reflection that John Paul II wrote on the fiftieth anniversary of his priestly ordination, he remarks about the influences in his education. He writes: “My previous Aristotelian-Thomistic formation was enriched by the phenomenological method, and this made it possible for me to undertake a number of creative studies. ... In this way I took part in the contemporary movement of philosophical personalism.”¹⁰¹ With his literary interests and Carmelite influence, the role of experience resonated with Wojtyła as he came to appreciate the phenomenological method. With the absence of clear ontological foundations in Phenomenological thought, he continued to employ the insights of Thomism. Wojtyła was searching for a coherence between Thomism and Phenomenology.

1. Essays on Methodology

Representative of Wojtyła’s answers to methodological questions, these two essays serve: “The Problem of the Separation of Experience from the Act in Ethics” (published in 1955)¹⁰² and “On the Metaphysical and Phenomenological Basis of the Moral Norm” (published in 1959).¹⁰³ In “The Problem of the Separation of Experience from the Act in Ethics,” Wojtyła offers an evaluation of Kant and Scheler. He describes Kant’s separation of experience from the ethical act in these terms: “1) Kant removed the very essence of ethical life from the realm of personal experience and transferred it to the noumenal, trans-empirical sphere, and 2) he crystalized the whole ethical experience of the personal subject into a single psychological element: the feeling

¹⁰¹ John Paul II, *Gift and Mystery*, 93-94.

¹⁰² Karol Wojtyła, *Person and Community: Selected Essays*, tr. Theresa Sandok (New York: Peter Lang, 1993), 23-44.

¹⁰³ *ibid.*, 73-94.

of respect for the law.”¹⁰⁴ If Kant over-reduces ethical experience to the sense of duty, Wojtyła says that Scheler, in avoiding that mistake, achieves a better description of ethical experience. Wojtyła writes, “I must admit that the picture of ethical life that Scheler has painted using only his phenomenological method is very suggestive and in many points agrees beautifully with what we know from inner experience.”¹⁰⁵ But Scheler, too, ultimately separates experience from the ethical act. Wojtyła comments that Scheler failed to recognize that “the only value that can be called ethical value is a value that has the acting person as its efficient cause.”¹⁰⁶ Both Kant and Scheler fail to describe Wojtyła’s assessment of ethical experiences. Wojtyła says that one key element of that experience is this, “Ethical experience is by its very nature something dynamic; its whole psychological structure involves motion: a passage from potency to act.”¹⁰⁷

The essay, “On the Metaphysical and Phenomenological Basis of the Moral Norm,” compares Aquinas and Scheler. After an exposition of both systems, Wojtyła compares the two. On the question of exemplars in the moral life, Wojtyła writes that for Aquinas, “God as subsistent existence is the supreme model for all beings as goods.”¹⁰⁸ Wojtyła agrees that God is the model for the human person. This assertion is problematic in a system based on Scheler because, Wojtyła says that, for Scheler “resembling and becoming like Christ...occurs in a purely human manner—in a psychological and merely intentional manner.”¹⁰⁹ Despite the emphasis that Scheler places on the moral model of Christ, Christ’s example is only of a psychological order, not an ontological order.¹¹⁰ Continuing his evaluation, Wojtyła comments on the question of the basis of moral norms, Wojtyła asserts: “the essence of the moral life is not just the ‘lived

¹⁰⁴ *ibid.*, 31.

¹⁰⁵ *ibid.*, 37.

¹⁰⁶ *ibid.*, 38-39.

¹⁰⁷ *ibid.*, 41.

¹⁰⁸ *ibid.*, 88.

¹⁰⁹ *ibid.*, 89.

¹¹⁰ *ibid.*, 89.

experience' of value (or even of the good), but precisely the 'lived experience' of the truth of the good that is an object of action and that is realized in this action."¹¹¹ He continues, "Only by placing the good under the light of truth is there a place for the norm—including the ethical norm—in a philosophical system as a whole. By itself, the concept of value would exclude such a place in advance."¹¹² Scheler's system precludes the existential status of moral goods.

2. Wojtyła's Philosophical Methodology

In terms of his methodology, although Wojtyła was attracted to Scheler and Kant, there was something missing in their approach to ethics: the role of metaphysics and the role of experience. Schmitz writes: "Wojtyła turns to metaphysics, not out of piety toward a venerable tradition, but in order to retrieve the reality of act and in order to give to act the primary role within the entirety of the ethical life as it is lived and experienced."¹¹³ Wojtyła criticizes both Kant's and Scheler's ethical systems because they fail to adequately describe ethical experience. For Wojtyła, experience is foundational to philosophical and theological reflection.

Wojtyła held in tension the two influences of Thomism and Phenomenology. Commenting on Wojtyła's Thomistic influence, Weigel writes: "The Thomism he had learned in Kraków and at the Angelicum...had given him an intellectual foundation. But, it was precisely that, a foundation. And, foundations were meant to be built upon."¹¹⁴

With Thomism as a foundation only, Wojtyła experienced a tension between ontology and a description of experience. Wojtyła expressed the tension this way:

But certain questions always remain: Are these two types of understanding the human being—the cosmological and the personalistic—ultimately mutually exclusive? Where, if

¹¹¹ *ibid.*, 91

¹¹² *ibid.*, 92.

¹¹³ Schmitz, *At the Center of the Human Drama*, 44-45.

¹¹⁴ Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, 87.

at all, do reduction and the disclosure of the irreducible in the human being converge? How is the philosophy of the subject to disclose the *objectivity* of the human being in the personal *subjectivity* of this being? These seem to be *the questions that today determine the perspective* for thinking about the human being, the perspective for contemporary anthropology and ethics. They are essential and burning questions. Anthropology and ethics must be pursued today within this challenging but promising perspective.¹¹⁵

The ontological view of the human person treats the human person as an objective object. By so doing, it does not give appropriate space to the subjective reality of the human person.

When considering philosophical questions, anthropological questions specifically, there is a tension between Thomism and Phenomenology. Andrew Woznicki offers insight into Wojtyła's resolution of the tension between Thomism and Phenomenology saying: "Reflecting on Wojtyła's anthropology, we can describe it as an existential personalism, which is metaphysically explained and phenomenologically described. By consciously using these two philosophical disciplines, Wojtyła sheds a new light on man."¹¹⁶ By working intimately within their tension, Wojtyła confronts the limitations of both Phenomenology and Thomism. In this way, he is neither, strictly speaking, a Thomist or a Phenomenologist. He uses both together to understand and to articulate experience.

C. Essays on Anthropology

As Wojtyła's intellectual work developed, he broadened his reflections beyond questions of methodology and ethical evaluations to reflections about the human person in general. His essays from this time tend towards question of interpersonal relations.

¹¹⁵ Karol Wojtyła, "Subjectivity and the Irreducible in the Human Being," in *Person and Community*, 216.

N.B. The emphasis in this quotation, and in every subsequent quotation from the works of Wojtyła and the writings of John Paul II, is in the original. The use of italics is a distinctive feature of Wojtyła's writing, which was carried over into the works of John Paul II.

¹¹⁶ Andrew Woznicki, *A Christian Humanism: Karol Wojtyła's Existential Personalism* (New Britain, Connecticut: Mariel Publications, 1980), 59.

Representative of his understanding of the human person are the essays: “Participation or Alienation?” (published in 1975)¹¹⁷ and “The Person: Subject and Community” (published in 1976).¹¹⁸ The essay, “Participation or Alienation?,” considers the relationship between an individual person and another person, an “I-thou” relation. In this relationship Wojtyła asserts that “Another person is a neighbor to me not just because we share a like humanity, but chiefly because the other is another *I*.”¹¹⁹ Wojtyła describes participation in this way, “that each of us must continually set ourselves the task of actually participating in the humanity of others, of experiencing the other as an *I*, as a person.”¹²⁰ Alienation, which as a concept has Marxist origins, is meant to separate an individual from everyone and everything else. As such, Wojtyła says, alienation “weakens the ability to experience another human being as another *I*” to the extent that it makes difficult or even negates participation.¹²¹ The essay ends with the question that the title proposes: Faced with the choice, will we choose participation or alienation?

The essay, “The Person: Subject and Community,” continues the reflection on the relationship of an individual and other people. The essay begins with a description of experiencing oneself as a subject. He says, “Being a subject (*a suppositum*) and experiencing oneself as a subject occur on two entirely different dimensions. Only in the latter do we come in contact with the actual reality of the human self.”¹²² He continues, “After all, the reality of the person is ... ‘trans-phenomenal.’ In other words, we must deeply and comprehensively explore the ‘phenomenon’ of the human being in order fully to understand and objectify the human being.”¹²³ With that methodological assertion and understanding of the individual, he takes up

¹¹⁷ Wojtyła, *Person and Community*, 197-207.

¹¹⁸ *ibid.*, 219-261.

¹¹⁹ *ibid.*, 201.

¹²⁰ *ibid.*, 203.

¹²¹ *ibid.*, 206.

¹²² *ibid.*, 227.

¹²³ *ibid.*, 228.

the question of community. Community may be understood as a number of individuals in a common space. Wojtyła defines it differently, “By community I understand not this multiplicity of subjects itself, but always the specific *unity* of this multiplicity.”¹²⁴ There are some basic ethical implications of interpersonal relations in a community. Wojtyła asserts, “In interpersonal I-thou relationships, the partners should not only unveil themselves before one another in the truth of their personal reality, but they should also accept and affirm one another in that truth. Such acceptance and affirmation is an expression of the moral (ethical) meaning of interpersonal community.”¹²⁵ Participation is what creates the possibility of community.

D. Essays on Marriage and Family

In part due to his pastoral work, in part due to his reflections on community, in part due to his consideration of specific ethical questions, Wojtyła was led to questions of marriage and sexuality.¹²⁶ As a final stage of development in his academic writings, questions of marriage, family, and sexuality become more prominent.

These two essays serve as representatives of his marriage and family reflections: “The Family as a Community of Persons” (published in 1974)¹²⁷ and “Parenthood as a Community of Persons” (published in 1975).¹²⁸ The whole essay “The Family as a Community of Persons” is written with explicit reference to various sections of *Gaudium et Spes*. The point of departure in this essay is the theological anthropology of Vatican II, especially as found in *Gaudium et Spes* 24. The focal text for Wojtyła is this passage:

¹²⁴ *ibid.*, 238

¹²⁵ *ibid.*, 245.

¹²⁶ Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, 139.

¹²⁷ Wojtyła, *Person and Community*, 315-327.

¹²⁸ *ibid.*, 329-342.

Indeed, the Lord Jesus, when He prayed to the Father, “that all may be one...as we are one” (John 17:21-22) opened up vistas closed to human reason, for He implied a certain likeness between the union of the divine Persons, and the unity of God's sons in truth and charity. This likeness reveals that man, who is the only creature on earth which God willed for itself, cannot fully find himself except through a sincere gift of himself.¹²⁹

In coming to understand the key anthropological insight in this conciliar passage, Wojtyła does not focus on its implications for an understanding of an individual person. Instead, Wojtyła focuses on its meaning for interpersonal relationships, for a communion of persons.

In this essay, he immediately applies this understanding to a marriage relationship:

The *gift of self* is essential for the special *communio personarum* that takes the form of marital and familial community, and this gift would be difficult to comprehend without *first comprehending the very being and goodness of each person*. ... Here, however, I am concerned with illuminating the *logos* of marriage and the family in a way that will provide a firm foundation for their *ethos*.¹³⁰

Family is not just a factual reality, but an ethical one as well. From the standpoint of methodology, in light of the teaching in Vatican II, Wojtyła says: “Clearly, then, a *theological analysis of the family* must proceed from the communal reality, *from the category of communio*, and not merely from the category of society.”¹³¹ Especially because a communion of persons is in the image of the communion of Divine Persons in the Trinity, an analysis of the family cannot be done simply in human terms. This applies also to procreation. Wojtyła writes:

This applies first of all to conjugal intercourse. We grasp the objective reality and the objective criterion of this relationship when we perceive that it involves the realization of a true *communio personarum*, a union of persons, and not just of bodies—not just sexual intercourse but a real union of persons, one in which the spouses mutually become a gift for each other, mutually give themselves to and accept one another.¹³²

¹²⁹ Vatican II, *Gaudium et Spes*, 24.

¹³⁰ Wojtyła, *Person and Community*, 325.

¹³¹ *ibid.*, 319.

¹³² *ibid.*, 325.

Wojtyła sees the insights gained from *Gaudium et Spes* as integral to understanding the family, to understanding “the divine plan” for the family.¹³³

Continuing the reflection on marriage, again with various references to *Gaudium et Spes*, the essay “Parenthood as a Community of Persons” takes up the question of parenthood—motherhood and fatherhood. In a family, fathers and mothers are first husbands and wives. Insofar as they follow the ethical obligations of establishing a communion of person, the marriage relationship first confirms the personhood of each individually. Wojtyła calls this a bestowal of humanity, when he writes, “The spouses’ mutual bestowal of humanity, which determines the authentically personal character and plane of their marital community, leads, by means of the conjugal act of sexual intercourse, to parenthood. Parenthood is expressed in the conception of a child and in the subsequent birth of the child into the world.”¹³⁴ The responsibilities of marriage are connected to the responsibilities of parenthood. With regard to the birth of a child, Wojtyła says: “This external fruit and expression of parenthood, however, is intimately connected with an internal effect. *Parenthood* is an *internal fact* in the husband and wife as father and mother.” Wojtyła acknowledges both a biological and a moral component to parenthood.

Wojtyła then comments on the parents’ responsibility for the education of their children. And, while this does include things like schooling and intellectual formation, Wojtyła identifies its theological meaning in more fundamental terms, saying: “The whole task that the parents discover in their child from the very beginning and throughout the years of the child's development is reducible simply to the exigency of *making a gift of mature humanity to this little*

¹³³ *ibid.*, 315.

¹³⁴ *ibid.*, 329.

person, this gradually developing human being.”¹³⁵ The responsibility of the education of children involves both an internal and external component. With the internal as primary, Wojtyła understands the role of parenthood as a bestowal of humanity.

The parents’ bestowal of humanity on their child is the primary task of parenthood. Paraphrasing *Gaudium et Spes*, Wojtyła calls this responsibility by the term, personalization: “By *personalization* the Council understands ‘the proper maturation of the personality’ and ‘truly personal relationships.’ This brings us back to the concepts of community and *communio*.”¹³⁶ Personalization helps the child to accept their humanity and to make a gift of self. Wojtyła elaborates on this point:

The whole family community develops as a *communio personarum* as though in stages, and this development in each of its stages includes the development of each person who comes into the community. This development, in turn, is simply an increasingly more complete and mature actualization of the human being, who, as Vatican II tells us, in keeping with the whole Christian tradition, ‘is the only creature on earth that God willed for itself,’ and who ‘cannot fully find himself or herself except through a disinterested gift of himself of herself’ (*Gaudium et Spes* 24).¹³⁷

The final section of this essay describes the responsibility of the family to society. Wojtyła describes the role of the family in the modern world in terms of personalization. The family helps all individuals in their personal maturation and in establishing truly personal relationships. He underscores, “And it is precisely in this wholistic sense that the family, both as a factual reality and as a rich and varied ethical imperative, is indispensable and irreplaceable.”¹³⁸ The role of the family is fundamental to society and is primary to any other societal structure, especially because of the responsibility of the family to personalize society.

¹³⁵ *ibid.*, 334.

¹³⁶ *ibid.*, 341. cf. *Gaudium et Spes*, 26.

¹³⁷ *ibid.*, 333-334.

¹³⁸ *ibid.*, 342.

The responsibility of the *communio* of the parents can be understood in terms of a bestowal of humanity—upon themselves, their children, and society as a whole. By exercising this responsibility, the members of a family create a *communio personarum* described as “a mode of being and acting in mutual relation to one another (not just ‘in common’ with one another) such that through this being and acting they mutually confirm and affirm one another as persons.”¹³⁹

III. Preparation for the *Theology of the Body*

In 1972, Wojtyła began a project with a student to integrate his ethics and his philosophical anthropology. The unfinished work is entitled: *Man in the Field of Responsibility*.¹⁴⁰ Up to this point, Wojtyła’s ethics and his anthropology were basically separated, in part due to the sequential focusing of anthropology after ethics. Wojtyła says, “in my study of the person I did not subject morality itself to analysis. That is precisely what I now intend to do in this study: This will be a study of morality as such. ... *morality* as a reality subjectivized in the person.”¹⁴¹ By beginning this project, Wojtyła recognized the possibility of synthesizing his philosophical anthropology and his ethics. His turn to anthropology led him to return to ethics in order to deepen both.

The unfinished *Man in the Field of Responsibility* shows Wojtyła’s own understanding of the possibility of incorporating his various works into a unified vision. While Wojtyła did not

¹³⁹ *ibid.*, 321.

¹⁴⁰ Karol Wojtyła, *Man in the Field of Responsibility*. tr. Kenneth Kemp and Zuzanna Maślanka Kieroń (South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine’s Press, 2011). The manuscript is from 1972, it was not published until 1991. This is Wojtyła’s last book on philosophy. There are three major sections to this manuscript. The first section takes up the question of experience and the moral assessment of that experience as good or bad. The second section is primarily methodological and also considers the response of the person to ethical norms. The third section deepens the focus on the question of moral norms and how to justify them as norms. The work ends by posing the issue of how to unite the multiplicity of norms.

¹⁴¹ Wojtyła, *Man in the Field of Responsibility*, 5.

complete his philosophical project, the *Theology of the Body* can be seen as an incorporation of this philosophy and his theology, as following through on the trajectory set forth by his minor works and his major philosophical works.

Chapter 2

Wojtyła's Focus on Anthropology

Wojtyła's works are interconnected and internally consistent. Kupczak writes: "An impressive characteristic of Wojtyła as a philosopher is his intellectual consistency. One cannot find any sign of a significant change in his thought during half of the century of his intellectual career."¹⁴² Wojtyła only made occasional cross references within his writings to his other works. Because of Wojtyła's intellectual consistency, commentators note the connections. They make explicit the points of contact, which serves to deepen the understanding of each work. Moreover, commentators illustrate the connection between the works of Wojtyła and the *Theology of the Body*.

After a general introduction to the *Theology of the Body*, this chapter will review some of these commentaries.

I. Introduction to the *Theology of the Body*

Some initial comments help to establish the unique status and significance of the *Theology of the Body*.

A. Genre of the Catecheses

The papal practice of the Wednesday Audience is a modern custom. Since John Paul II, the Wednesday Audiences have often developed a theme over the course of weeks and months. No other series of Audiences, even in John Paul II's own pontificate, resemble the length and depth of the *Theology of the Body*. As a unique manifestation of a relatively new practice, the

¹⁴² Kupczak, *Destined for Liberty*, 46-47.

Theology of the Body raises the question of the role of the Wednesday Audience in the Magisterium.

One author who has assessed the role of the Wednesday Audience in the grand scheme of magisterial teachings is Charles Curran. Overall, he has concluded that the Catecheses are of a low magisterial status. Noting that the Audience is often a greeting to the people in attendance and often not written directly by the pope, Curran asserts that “talks to general audiences have little or no authoritative character.”¹⁴³ Nevertheless, Curran also notes that the *Theology of the Body* has a privileged place “to know and study John Paul II’s approach to human sexuality and marriage.”¹⁴⁴ And he says that they are certainly in the genre of teaching.¹⁴⁵

Michael Waldstein, however, makes the case that greater import could be granted to an Audience. Waldstein says that Wednesday Catecheses should be considered as having a “primacy of place in the ordinary magisterium of the Bishop of Rome as pastor of the Universal Church.”¹⁴⁶ In the case of the *Theology of the Body*, in the course of the series, John Paul II refers to the audiences as a study, or as reflections, meditations (which take the posture of receptivity), and analyses (which take the posture of spontaneity).¹⁴⁷ Waldstein also notes that, close to the beginning of the series, in 1979, John Paul II issued an Apostolic Exhortation, *Catechesi Tradendae*, on the role of catechesis in the Church. Given the indicators of the method and content in the Apostolic Exhortation, Waldstein identifies the *Theology of the Body* as “John Paul II’s catechesis *par excellence*.”¹⁴⁸ As catecheses, audiences are more than a greeting that might also be useful to understand the mind of the pope. At least in the case of the

¹⁴³ Charles Curran, *The Moral Theology of John Paul II* (New York: T&T Clark, 2006), 4.

¹⁴⁴ Curran, *The Moral Theology of John Paul II*, 5.

¹⁴⁵ *ibid.*, 167.

¹⁴⁶ Waldstein, *Man and Woman He Created Them*, 14.

¹⁴⁷ *cf. ibid.*, 17.

¹⁴⁸ *ibid.*, 15.

Theology of the Body, Waldstein further notes that the Wednesday Catecheses should be considered as having significant authority. Waldstein says: “One must measure the authority of TOB in accord with these findings about office, genre, and content: the authority of a text is high if the Pope speaks (1) as pastor of the Universal Church, (2) in a form of teaching central to his office of bishop, and (3) on a topic central to the faith. All three of these indicators are high in TOB.”¹⁴⁹

Given that the presentation lasted over five years, given that the scope of the whole work could be lost on the pilgrims each week, it was a deliberate choice to present the *Theology of the Body* in the genre of catechesis. Even without an explicit statement by John Paul II concerning its authority, it is clear that the *Theology of the Body* is significant and is meant to be considered as such.

B. The Pre-Papal Text of the *Theology of the Body*

At the conclusion of the series of the Audience addresses, the catecheses could then be compiled into a book format. In his *Introduction* to his translation of the Audiences, Waldstein articulates the history of development of the book format of the catecheses, noting this development in a number of language editions.¹⁵⁰ The history of development reveals the tension between John Paul II speaking of the catecheses as a coherent whole, which invites the publication of catecheses in a book format, on the one hand, and the lack of clear headings, chapter divisions, and the like (except for sporadic indications by John Paul II), on the other hand. This tension yielded non-uniform presentations of the *Theology of the Body*, with each editor structuring the material differently, supplying their own book title, chapter divisions, and

¹⁴⁹ *ibid.*, 16.

¹⁵⁰ *ibid.*, 1-128.

headings. Waldstein identifies the variety of structures as revealing insights into the theological content of the collected series.¹⁵¹ The symphony of editions results in an inconsistent presentation of the catecheses.

Yet one edition of the catecheses bears special mention: the Polish edition. Waldstein describes how the Polish edition of the *Theology of the Body* has a number of headings and subheadings not found elsewhere (and does not include a few of the Wednesday Audience addresses).¹⁵² In his research, Waldstein discovered that the Polish edition of the *Theology of the Body* is essentially a pre-papal text written by Wojtyła, published with a few adaptations that would reflect the nature of the Wednesday Audience. Furthermore, the Polish manuscript, as Waldstein explains, was used to create the Addresses themselves. Each week, John Paul II would pen a paragraph or two for an introduction and a conclusion to the Address, and then indicate which paragraphs of the Polish manuscript should be included. The newly penned paragraphs (if not in Italian) and the designated portions of the Polish manuscript would then be translated into Italian for the Address. In this way, the manuscript headings/subheadings (and the structure to the text that they provided) of the pre-papal text were jettisoned.

Despite the fact that an unpublished pre-papal text written by Wojtyła was used to create the major content of the text of the series of Wednesday Audience Addresses, the normative text for the *Theology of the Body* is the Italian-language Audience addresses—not the Polish manuscript.¹⁵³ Because of their pedagogical value, in his edition of the *Theology of the Body*, Waldstein translated and included the headings that are found in the pre-papal Polish text.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵¹ cf. *ibid.*, 114, where Waldstein says that the varying “readings of the structure are theologically true and pedagogically helpful.”

¹⁵² *ibid.*, 7-11.

¹⁵³ *ibid.*, 7.

¹⁵⁴ In the Appendix, I have included all of the headings, showing the full overview of the structure of the text.

The addition of these headings helps to navigate the sea of varying structures of the collected Audiences.¹⁵⁵

Given the existence of the pre-papal text and given that John Paul II recast it in the form of catechesis, a comparison between the *Theology of the Body* and the works of Wojtyła is both justified and necessary.

II. Contextualizations of the *Theology of the Body*

A number of authors have articulated the connection and continuity between the works of Wojtyła and the *Theology of the Body*.

A. The *Theology of the Body* and Wojtyła's Philosophical Work

This selection of commentaries articulates the points of contact between the Catecheses and the philosophical work of Wojtyła. This review of their thought serves to deepen the understanding of the *Theology of the Body*.

In *Gift and Communion*, Jarosław Kupczak examines two key notions in the anthropology of John Paul II, and their roots in the works of Wojtyła: gift and *communio*.¹⁵⁶ The *Theology of the Body* highlights the gift of self. Kupczak notes the focus on the gift in the work of Wojtyła in the decade prior to his papal election, which reveals a philosophical deepening of the concept of gift. This deepening takes the two paths of gift and communion. Kupczak says: “It seems that there are two currents in evidence in these reflections: the first concerns the structure of human self-determination, and the second consists in Wojtyła’s theory of

¹⁵⁵ In addition to the inclusion of the manuscript headings, other benefits of Waldstein’s translation should be noted, cf. *Man and Woman He Created Them*, 5-14. Waldstein included the paragraph numbers used by John Paul II in the manuscripts. As a single translator there is consistency in translating, where with multiple translators, different words in English can be used for the one same word in Italian. And he retrieved John Paul II’s use of italics.

¹⁵⁶ Jarosław Kupczak, *Gift and Communion* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2014).

participation in the humanity of other persons.”¹⁵⁷ Wojtyła’s analysis of the gift looks at the inner life of the human person on one hand and on interpersonal relations on the other hand.

Kupczak notes, “The human dynamic of self-possession and self-governance is essential for the possibility of a self-gift.”¹⁵⁸ Kupczak also notes the connection of participation and *communio personarum*.¹⁵⁹ These analyses find their way into the *Theology of the Body*. Kupczak says:

The theology of the body presents a very realistic picture of human love. John Paul II emphasizes that only the person who has reached some necessary level of maturity and internal integrity, described as self-possession and self-governance, is able to become a self-gift for another. This fundamental dimension of ethical self-governance becomes especially important in relation to one’s own sexuality. A harmonious integration of sensuality, emotions, reason, and will turns out to be a necessary condition for undertaking the effort to affirm the other person, that is, to treat the other person not as an object, but as a subject.¹⁶⁰

In this way, Kupczak especially connects the concept of integration, so central in Wojtyła’s philosophical anthropology, with the anthropological content of the Catecheses.

Another key theme from the *Theology of the Body* that speaks directly to gift and communion is the language of the body. At the basis of understanding the language of the body is attention to the body itself, on which Wojtyła already had focused. Kupczak articulates that for Wojtyła the body—and consequently sexuality—should be understood in terms of the person.¹⁶¹ Wojtyła facilitates this understanding through a description of the dynamisms of the human person. Kupczak presents Wojtyła’s analysis of sensual experience¹⁶² and emotive experience¹⁶³ in a relationship of love between a man and a woman, which culminates in the assertion: “Human love must not take place ‘on the surface’ of the subject, in his senses and

¹⁵⁷ *ibid.*, 105.

¹⁵⁸ *ibid.*, 106.

¹⁵⁹ *cf. ibid.*, 107.

¹⁶⁰ *ibid.*, 132.

¹⁶¹ *cf. ibid.*, 180.

¹⁶² *cf. ibid.*, 180.

¹⁶³ *cf. ibid.*, 181.

emotions, but should engage the whole person, the mind and will of the one who loves.”¹⁶⁴

Prefaced by a review of Wojtyła’s analysis of the body and sexuality, Kupczak turns to John Paul II’s Catecheses on the Song of Songs, saying: “Using philosophical language from *Love and Responsibility*, it can be said that the catecheses speak of how the sensuality and emotionality of the human body reveal the beauty and mystery of the other sex and also how mature love transcends the physical ‘language of the body’ and moves toward the affirmation of and responsibility for the other person.”¹⁶⁵ In this way, Kupczak emphasizes the dynamisms of the human person at the foundation of the language of the body, which must be spoken in truth to build a communion of persons.

Kupczak notes that the terms, gift and communion, have both philosophical and theological developments.¹⁶⁶ With that background, he weaves together seamlessly the philosophical language of Wojtyła with the *Theology of the Body*. This especially illustrates the continuity of thought between the various works. Nevertheless, Kupczak does not erase the distinctions between the works, the distinction between philosophy and theology.¹⁶⁷ He notes that they influence each other. One prime example is with regard to the notion of the communion of persons: Kupczak makes a significant historical note saying, “Prior to the Second Vatican Council, the concept of *communio personarum* is simply not present in Karol Wojtyła’s philosophical and theological reflections.”¹⁶⁸ Commenting on the relationship between philosophy and theology as it plays out in the *Theology of the Body*, Kupczak writes: “In the papal ‘hermeneutics of gift,’ the Word of God is accepted in faith, and then undergoes ‘philosophical exegesis,’ and its ‘biblical images are translated to philosophical notions,’ so that

¹⁶⁴ *ibid.*, 182.

¹⁶⁵ *ibid.*, 193.

¹⁶⁶ *cf. ibid.*, 93.

¹⁶⁷ *cf. ibid.*, 208.

¹⁶⁸ *ibid.*, 98.

the Word can shine with all the radiance of its truth.”¹⁶⁹ In *Gift and Communion*, Kupczak deepens the philosophical exegesis as it stands in the *Theology of the Body*, with the philosophical anthropology as expressed in Wojtyła’s work. The main limitation with Kupczak’s work is that it could be more detailed.

In *John Paul II on the Vulnerable*, Jeffrey Tranzillo connects the *Theology of the Body* with the philosophical anthropology of Wojtyła.¹⁷⁰ Tranzillo states: “*Person and Act* and the catechesis on the body are somewhat similar in their basic structure. Each work concerns itself initially with analyzing the experience and implications of fully mature human acting, so as to arrive at an understanding of the personal attributes and essential constitution of the human subject.”¹⁷¹ The human person is not only considered as an individual, but in relation to other human persons. Noting the background of *Gaudium et Spes* 24, Tranzillo says: “The concept of alienation, as the antithesis of participation in the humanity of others, shows philosophically why we cannot fulfill ourselves humanly and personally apart from sincere self-giving. Pope John Paul II develops that idea *theologically* in terms of the detrimental effects of original and personal sin on the image of God in us.”¹⁷² Despite their different methodologies, the two works affirm the same conclusion. Tranzillo says, “both *Person and Act* and the catechesis on the body proceed toward and reach the conclusion that the greatest possible expression, and hence fulfillment, of oneself takes place in actions constitutive of the communion of persons.”¹⁷³

In Tranzillo’s analysis, of these works, the central concern is human action in interpersonal relations. Given the starting point of the human person, individually and as a

¹⁶⁹ *ibid.*, 40.

¹⁷⁰ Jeffrey Tranzillo, *John Paul II on the Vulnerable* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2013).

¹⁷¹ *ibid.*, 131.

¹⁷² *ibid.*, 131-132. Emphasis in original.

¹⁷³ *ibid.*, 132

communion of persons, in the image of God in the *Theology of the Body*, Tranzillo says that the catechesis “brings out much more clearly than does his philosophical treatment of our ontologically personal identity that even the most rudimentary activity of a human being cannot simply be equated with that of a nonpersonal being, however similar the activity of both might sometimes appear to be.”¹⁷⁴ For Tranzillo, the theological anthropology of John Paul II, with its development of the revelation of the human person being in the image of God, is key for extending the *Theology of the Body* to who he calls vulnerable bodies. Tranzillo says: “While John Paul’s philosophical/theological anthropology generally centers around ethical and moral concerns, it is nevertheless also true that in the context of the whole, he has laid the foundation for a genuine anthropology of the vulnerable.”¹⁷⁵

Tranzillo seems to have a strong insight into the continuity of thought between Wojtyła’s philosophical anthropology and John Paul II’s theological anthropology. His facility with interweaving the key concepts and language of the two helps to reveal that continuity of thought. But, in the end, Tranzillo does not develop the philosophical foundations of the *Theology of the Body*, taking a different route to articulate how the vulnerable can make a sincere gift of self.

In *Crossing the Threshold of Love*, Mary Shivanandan develops a theology of marriage.¹⁷⁶ Ultimately, she incorporates a number of magisterial documents, from Vatican II and various popes, along with a number of texts from John Paul II’s papacy to address questions of marriage, sexuality, contraception, and natural family planning. She also examines some of the works of Wojtyła, identifying the connection between the philosophical anthropology and the *Theology of the Body*. Shivanandan says: “It is not possible to understand fully Pope John Paul

¹⁷⁴ *ibid.*, 316.

¹⁷⁵ *ibid.*, xvi.

¹⁷⁶ Mary Shivanandan, *Crossing the Threshold of Love* (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005).

II's catechesis on Genesis without grasping the main principles of his philosophical anthropology. The very words he uses in his commentary on the Genesis text reflect the philosophical categories of *The Acting Person*.”¹⁷⁷

Shivanandan notes some specific points of contact, saying, “Self-determination, which flows from free will, is given in the Garden of Eden with the command not to eat of the tree of knowledge.”¹⁷⁸ She notes, “Man is defined also through a specifically *human action*—tilling the earth, which no other creature is able to do.”¹⁷⁹ Continuing, she says: “Man becomes *aware* of the complexity of the structure of the body-soul composite and of his superiority over the animals. (The phenomenological analysis of conscience, emotional attitudes and instinctual responses enables Wojtyła to penetrate this complexity in its full richness and to place it within the context of experience.)”¹⁸⁰ Shivanandan especially highlights original solitude, which she defines as subjectivity. She says: “The fundamental aspects of man’s transcendence, his relationship with God and his self-determination, were both put to the test in the Garden of Eden. ...Here, a ...meaning of solitude emerges, that of alienation, a state that pre-occupied John Paul II from his earliest writings.”¹⁸¹ Original solitude, as alienation, is not overcome without original unity. Shivanandan says: “For original solitude lay open to original unity, but the loneliness or alienation resulting from man’s first sin attacked both the unity and integrity of the soul-body composite and the communion of persons.”¹⁸² Integration and transcendence are important concepts in Wojtyła’s philosophical anthropology but are not explicitly present in the *Theology of the Body*, which Shivanandan draws out as essential for original solitude and

¹⁷⁷ *ibid.*, 66.

¹⁷⁸ *ibid.*, 67.

¹⁷⁹ *ibid.*, 67. Emphasis in original.

¹⁸⁰ *ibid.*, 67. Emphasis in original.

¹⁸¹ *ibid.*, 101.

¹⁸² *ibid.*, 67.

original unity. She also points to Wojtyła’s analysis of intersubjectivity by participation as “a clear philosophic statement that original unity and the communion of person pass by way of original solitude.”¹⁸³

In general, beyond these assertions, Shivanandan does not develop the connections between Wojtyła’s philosophical work and the *Theology of the Body*.¹⁸⁴ Shivanandan presents the organic connection between Wojtyła’s works and John Paul II’s papal writings, especially in the area of marriage and family. Like Kupczak, she identifies Vatican II as a watershed in Wojtyła’s thought.¹⁸⁵

In “*In the Beginning...* ”: *A Theology of the Body*, Eduardo Echeverria treats the question of homosexuality and Catholic sexual ethics.¹⁸⁶ While not as his exclusive source, Echeverria includes significantly the *Theology of the Body* as providing normative value to his theme.¹⁸⁷

In his analysis, Echeverria draws a clear line of continuity between Wojtyła’s philosophical anthropology and the *Theology of the Body*, both with regard to content and method. He identifies the content and method of the philosophical work and the Catecheses as concerning the experience of human action.

His presentation of the Catecheses begins with an evaluation of the foundational methodological role of phenomenology in John Paul II’s thought—as a method, not as a system.¹⁸⁸ Echeverria sees the impact of phenomenology in Wojtyła’s analysis of “lived experience, the relationship between action and the person, and the personal nature of man’s human body, of his bodily existence, as the dimension in and through which man reveals

¹⁸³ *ibid.*, 68.

¹⁸⁴ One exception is her treatment of incommunicability and communion of persons (cf. Shivanandan, *Crossing the Threshold of Love*, 141-157). I do not offer an analysis of her discussion of incommunicability.

¹⁸⁵ cf. Shivanandan, *Crossing the Threshold of Love*, 70.

¹⁸⁶ Eduardo Echeverria, “*In the Beginning...* ”: *A Theology of the Body* (Eugene, Oregon: Pickwick Publications, 2011).

¹⁸⁷ *ibid.*, 239.

¹⁸⁸ *ibid.*, 167.

himself.”¹⁸⁹ Echeverria also comments on the content of the Catecheses. The experience of the human person as described phenomenologically is foundationally linked with the original human experiences, which John Paul II develops in the *Theology of the Body*: original solitude, original unity, and original nakedness.¹⁹⁰ And, then, Echeverria makes explicit the connection between the phenomenological statements and the original human experiences. Solitude, in the language of Wojtyła’s philosophy, makes one aware of one’s own subjectivity, the power of self-determination, and that the body expresses the person in an authentic human action.¹⁹¹ Unity, as reciprocal enrichment, is built on the subjectivity of the other.¹⁹² Nakedness reveals that a human person is a gift for another, which is possible because of personal integration. With the introduction of concupiscence inner division marks the experience of the human person. Echeverria writes: “Indeed, the man of concupiscence is no longer integrated within himself; his body does not express his reality as a person, something which is fundamental to the meaning of the acting person *qua person*.”¹⁹³

The above commentaries illustrate the connection of the *Theology of the Body* with the works of Wojtyła, illustrating the philosophical anthropology that underlies the Catecheses.

B. The *Theology of the Body* and Wojtyła’s Literary Work

The deep consistency of Wojtyła’s thought can be seen in the connection between his literary works and his academic work.

¹⁸⁹ *ibid.*, 175.

¹⁹⁰ *cf. ibid.*, 191.

¹⁹¹ *cf. ibid.*, 192.

¹⁹² *cf. ibid.*, 193. For this point Echeverria cites the essay, “Participation or Alienation?,” in Wojtyła, *Person and Community*, 197-207.

¹⁹³ *ibid.*, 228. *cf. Echeverria*, “*In the Beginning...*”, 197.

1. Wojtyła's Literary Work and his Philosophical Anthropology

Joseph Rice offers an analysis of some literary works of Wojtyła.¹⁹⁴ His essay shows the continuity of thought between Wojtyła's literary work and his philosophical anthropology. Rice notes that the notion of participation is found in both Wojtyła's literary and philosophical works. In both cases, participation is predicated upon what Wojtyła calls the proper weight of the human person. Rice notes that Wojtyła speaks of proper weight and participation in his philosophical essays and major philosophical works.¹⁹⁵ But Rice does not analyze any philosophical work in this essay. Instead, Rice notes the insight that can be gained by examining Wojtyła's literary writings. Rice says, "let us turn to the...artistic contexts in which Wojtyła employs the notion of the *concrete weight of personal being that comes with being a man*. The key to our analysis will be to maintain our focus on the notion of *humanity*, with its *weight*, for participation is always rooted in the *humanity* of those who participate."¹⁹⁶ Understanding a communion of persons is rooted in understanding an individual human person.

In *The Jeweler's Shop*, at times, the jeweler weighs the rings of the characters in the drama. If a married person presents their ring separately from their living spouse, then the jeweler finds that the ring has no weight. The image is that, in this case, the one presenting the ring has lost the proper weight of the human person. Since the communion of persons has been disrupted, since the participation of the spouses in each other has been disrupted, their proper weight has likewise been forfeited. Rice notes: "It is through the *mutual* commitment of this weight, the weight of the *humanity* of each, that a *communio personarum* is formed, such that the

¹⁹⁴ Joseph Rice, "On the 'Proper Weight of a Man': Reexamining the Poetic Foundations of Wojtyła's Theory of Participation," in George McLean, ed. *Karol Wojtyła's Philosophical Legacy* (Washington, D.C.: The Council for Research on Values and Philosophy, 2008), 297-324.

¹⁹⁵ cf. *ibid.*, 303.

¹⁹⁶ *ibid.*, 305. Emphasis in original.

two no longer ‘weigh’ separately, but only together.”¹⁹⁷ In terms of Genesis, they have become one flesh. In philosophical terms, Rice says: “What is in play here is a notion that Wojtyła terms the mutual bestowal of the humanity of the spouses.”¹⁹⁸ The participation of the husband and wife also bestows humanity on their child. Rice says, “In essence, their bestowal of the concrete ‘weight’ of their *humanity* is directed not only toward each other, but also, in some way, toward the *new person* that may come *to be* as a result of a divine action that depends upon the conditions that they freely decide to bring about.”¹⁹⁹

Another dimension of participation can be seen in *The Radiation of Fatherhood*. The proper weight of the human person is only experienced in participation in God. Rice says, “To become a *father*, spiritually, one must first be willing to become a *child*, that is, one must first experience one’s own dependence in relation to the Source.”²⁰⁰ The experience of participation in God is not passive or simply ontological, but relational. It is a participation that is experienced by a communion of persons, not only individually. Rice says that participation is also seen in “that instance in which a man and a woman begin to weigh together in relation to the Creator, the Absolute Person, in the most excellent and paradigmatic example of every *communio personarum*.”²⁰¹

Rice’s analysis reveals philosophical themes in Wojtyła’s literary work. Furthermore, Rice shows that the literary work complements Wojtyła’s philosophical writings. Rice comments, “Formed in a poetic perspective steeped in the traditions of Polish Romanticism, educated by the theatrical experiments of...[the Rhapsodic Theater], and inspired...by the mysticism of John of the Cross, Wojtyła’s...poetic vision would...found his philosophical vision

¹⁹⁷ *ibid.*, 311. Emphasis in original.

¹⁹⁸ *ibid.*, 310.

¹⁹⁹ *ibid.*, 312. Emphasis in original.

²⁰⁰ *ibid.*, 312. Emphasis in original.

²⁰¹ *ibid.*, 315.

of the inner life as a life fixed on the good and the true.”²⁰² The literary work shaped the methodology and content of, and is consistent with, the philosophical work of Wojtyła.

2. The Role of Literary Expression in Wojtyła

The consistent publication, especially of poetry, indicates that artistic expression remained an integral, almost necessary, mode of expression for Wojtyła. Weigel notes: “Against the temptation to see life as a relatively flat terrain..., Wojtyła almost relentlessly lays bare the dramatic tension to be found in every life.”²⁰³ Wojtyła gives voice to the dramatic tension of every life by exercising both artistic and technical language.

Other connections between Wojtyła literary work and his other writings can be noted. For example, Wojtyła’s plays *The Jeweler’s Shop*, *Radiation of Fatherhood*, and the poem *Mother* resonate with his writings on marriage, sexuality, and parenthood. His play *Our God’s Brother* and his poem *The Quarry* take up questions of ethics as part of their dramatic reflection. *Our God’s Brother* and *Song of the Hidden God* begin to probe questions of anthropology in general. Perhaps a deeper connection can be seen in *Thought—Strange Space*. The poem opens with these lines: “Sometimes it happens in conversation: we stand/facing truth and lack the words,/have no gesture, no sign;/and yet – we feel – no word, no gesture/or sign would convey the whole image/that we must enter alone and face, like Jacob.”²⁰⁴ Wojtyła is not the only author to acknowledge the inadequacy of words to convey thought and experience. His response is somewhat unique. Wojtyła treats many of the same themes in both philosophical and artistic modes of expression. In this way he claims that questions of ethics, marriage, and anthropology cannot be fully treated in philosophical language. His literary writings thus complemented his

²⁰² *ibid.*, 299.

²⁰³ Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, 117.

²⁰⁴ Wojtyła, *The Place Within*, 53.

philosophical and theological writings, for both modes of expression often treated the same themes.

Weigel notes: “Wojtyła believed that language, either technical or literary, was always inadequate to the reality it tried to grasp and convey. Thus Wojtyła’s literary activity was not a hobby.”²⁰⁵ The two written expressions, the literary and the philosophical, are not just two different ways of saying the same thing. Wojtyła’s literary expression presents his philosophical notions in ways that go beyond what he says in even his major philosophical works. The detailed analysis of human action in *Person and Act*, for instance, only opens up to the question of participation and intersubjectivity. As Rice illustrated, in Wojtyła’s literary work, ethics and anthropology are synthesized in such a way that participation is clearly linked with the *communio personarum* of the husband and wife.²⁰⁶ Moreover, the literary work incorporates the human person’s relationship with God, individually and as a communion of persons, which is outside the scope of philosophical work. It is clear in Wojtyła’s literary work that the proper weight of the human person is found in relation to God. Rice does not consider the writings of John Paul II in his essay. But there are points of contact between the husband and wife participating in God and the man and the woman living a communion of persons in the image of God as seen in Genesis. The proper weight of the human person as a requisite for participation resonates with the concern for a sincere gift of self in an adequate (proper) anthropology.

The points of contact, through Wojtyła’s literary work, also justify the reading of the *Theology of the Body* in relation to Wojtyła’s philosophical work, which can elucidate the anthropological and ethical implications of John Paul II’s theological anthropology. In my final chapter, I return to the question of the role of literary expression in the *Theology of the Body*.

²⁰⁵ Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, 112.

²⁰⁶ cf. Rice, “On the ‘Proper Weight of a Man’”, 298.

III. St. John of the Cross and the *Theology of the Body*

The *Theology of the Body* is not a presentation of philosophical anthropology, but rather, a presentation of theological anthropology rooted in biblical interpretation and a theology of marriage. Some commentators have offered evaluations of the *Theology of the Body* in light of theological considerations.

1. Negative Evaluations of the *Theology of the Body*

One author who has negatively received the moral theology of the Catecheses is Charles Curran. His evaluation of the Audiences is not entirely negative, though. Curran names some points of merit. He finds positive the spousal meaning of the body as a foundation for a spirituality of marriage.²⁰⁷ Also positively assessed is the presentation of the unity of the body and soul—and a positive understanding of the body, in general.²⁰⁸ He also says that this positive view of the whole person highlights the need to develop self-possession.²⁰⁹

But then, Curran assesses negatively the *Theology of the Body* in other ways. He finds the spousal meaning of the body to be inadequate to speak to other bodies, for example, those who are unmarried or who have same-sex attraction.²¹⁰ And, even if there is basically a positive understanding of the human person, Curran sees in the *Theology of the Body* an inadequate account of the role of pleasure, especially its role in a marriage relationship. He says: “The impression given by *The Theology of the Body* is that passion and sexual pleasure are totally suspect and in need of control. The pope does not seem to acknowledge a fundamental goodness

²⁰⁷ cf. Curran, *The Moral Theology of John Paul II*, 168.

²⁰⁸ cf. *ibid.*, 169.

²⁰⁹ cf. *ibid.*, 170.

²¹⁰ cf. *ibid.*, 168.

about sexuality.”²¹¹ He disagrees with John Paul II’s rejection of the use of contraception within marriage, saying that, in the *Theology of the Body*, “The pope’s analysis demands too much meaning and symbolism from each and every single act.”²¹² Curran’s general assessment is that the *Theology of the Body* is inadequate.²¹³

Luke Timothy Johnson issues very similar criticisms of the Catecheses. In *The Revelatory Body*, Johnson develops a theological anthropology.²¹⁴ And, in the course of developing his own theology of the body, he incorporates a few comments about the *Theology of the Body*, which serve to offer a contradistinction to his own work. Concerning the Audiences themselves in a statement that goes beyond similar observations, Johnson states: “They are, in fact, exceptionally difficult to read and almost mind-numbingly repetitious.”²¹⁵ As a project that intends to speak to various bodies—bodies that experience play, pain, passion, and aging, for example—*The Revelatory Body* agrees with Curran’s assessment that the Catecheses do not apply to all persons.²¹⁶ Like Curran, Johnson asserts that the Catecheses’ treatment of the role of pleasure in marriage is inadequate. He says: “John Paul II’s *Theology of the Body* effectively eliminated *eros* from theological consideration—even within marriage.”²¹⁷ The focus on self-control in the *Theology of the Body* (and on other magisterial teachings), Johnson says, characterizes sexual pleasure as an obstacle to love.²¹⁸ As well, Johnson offers his own disagreement with the magisterial teaching against contraception, e.g. *Theology of the Body* and

²¹¹ *ibid.*, 170.

²¹² *ibid.*, 176.

²¹³ *cf. ibid.*, 170.

²¹⁴ Luke Timothy Johnson, *The Revelatory Body* (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2015). Kindle Edition.

²¹⁵ *ibid.*, 601.

²¹⁶ Throughout the text, Johnson asserts the need to apply a theology of the body to all persons. Most of the time the criticism of the Catecheses would be implicit. At least one instance with a more explicit criticism can be found in Johnson, *The Revelatory Body*, 698.

²¹⁷ Johnson, *The Revelatory Body*, 3325.

²¹⁸ *ibid.*, 746.

Humanae Vitae.²¹⁹ Overall, Johnson sees the *Theology of the Body* as inadequate, not just in content but also in method. Naming this inadequacy, Johnson says, “his effort in this book falls far short of adequate theological thinking on the subject of the human body as the arena of God’s self-disclosure.”²²⁰ That is, the doctrinal errors are based on methodological errors. Johnson says: “Solemn pronouncements are made on the basis of scriptural exegesis rather than living experience.”²²¹ A theology of the body needs an adequate treatment of experience.

2. The Sanjuanist Triangle

In his introduction to the *Theology of the Body*, Waldstein analyzes some background for the development of the Catecheses. Waldstein examines Wojtyła’s philosophical work and the thinkers who significantly influenced it (e.g. Kant, Scheler). He shows how these influences culminated in the formation of the *Theology of the Body*.²²² Capturing John Paul II’s motivation, Waldstein notes: “The response to such a violent scientific-technological attack on the body must be a defense of the body in its natural intrinsic meaning. The spousal mystery is the primary place at which this defense must take place, because the highest meaning of the body is found there.”²²³ Rather than showing intertextual connections between Wojtyła’s philosophical work and the Catecheses, Waldstein develops these broader connections.

Waldstein shows the continuity of thought that led to the *Theology of the Body* (and beyond) that can be seen already in Wojtyła’s first doctoral thesis on St. John of the Cross.²²⁴

Waldstein comments: “Had Wojtyła chosen the topic of love rather than faith for his dissertation,

²¹⁹ cf. *ibid.*, 773. On this point, Johnson is objecting to the prohibition of mechanical contraception only. He does not support the use of chemical/hormonal contraceptives noting that they can affect negatively women’s health.

²²⁰ *ibid.*, 601.

²²¹ *ibid.*, 651.

²²² Waldstein, *Man and Woman He Created Them*, 94.

²²³ *ibid.*, 95.

²²⁴ cf. *ibid.*, 23, 34, 87.

the evidence of the strong impact of St. John of the Cross in his understanding of spousal love would be more direct and clear.”²²⁵ Since the focus of the dissertation is the union of the human person with God, it does not treat thematically the question of the interpersonal human communion. Nevertheless, the theological background for the Catecheses can be found in Wojtyła’s analysis of St. John of the Cross, in what Waldstein calls the “Sanjuanist triangle.”²²⁶ The specific points of the triangle, the specific points of contact between St. John of the Cross and the Catecheses, according to Waldstein are these:

(1) Love implies a cycle of mutual giving, supremely the gift of self. (2) The paradigmatic instance of such self-gift in human experience is the spousal relation between man and woman. (3) The Trinity is the archetype of such love and gift from which the love between God and human persons as we as love between human beings derives as an imitation and participation.²²⁷

The connection of these points with the *Theology of the Body* is seen over the course of the Catecheses themselves. Waldstein does make some specific comments. Concerning the first two points, Waldstein offers a textual comparison between St. John of the Cross, Wojtyła’s *Love and Responsibility*, and the *Theology of the Body*, highlighting the deep coherence concerning the self-gift of spousal love as it is addressed in the various texts.²²⁸ Concerning human love as the imitation of the Trinity, the third triangular point, Waldstein identifies the influence of *Gaudium et Spes* 24. Waldstein identifies the point of contact between Wojtyła’s book on Vatican II, *Sources of Renewal*, and the Catecheses, and their deep foundation in St. John of the Cross, as hinging on *Gaudium et Spes* 24.²²⁹ Furthermore concerning that passage from Vatican II, Waldstein links the statement that God has willed the human person for one’s own sake with

²²⁵ *ibid.*, 26.

²²⁶ *ibid.*, 23.

²²⁷ *ibid.*, 29.

²²⁸ *cf. ibid.*, 32.

²²⁹ *cf. ibid.*, 34, 89, 94.

the personalistic norm, which demands that we respond to a person in an adequate way, and that the sincere gift of self is an act of love, thus explicating the connection with Wojtyła.²³⁰

While offering an exposition of both the philosophical and theological background of the *Theology of the Body*, Waldstein's specific textual analysis is especially powerful concerning the theological connection between the works of Wojtyła and the Catecheses. As a summary statement on the purpose of the *Theology of the Body*, and the influence of St. John of the Cross, Waldstein writes: "Faith must penetrate and transform human experience. It must be received and enriched in the lived experience of personal subjectivity."²³¹ This theological understanding of experience, especially concerning the central importance of experience in human love, is a line that runs through the works of Wojtyła into the *Theology of the Body*.

As a foundational work, *Faith According to St. John of the Cross*, contains many elements that continue into the anthropology of John Paul II. One primary element is the turn to the human person, the subject, and to human experience—a turn that is completed in his explicit treatments of anthropology. In his dissertation, there is a recognition of different levels of the human person, which he will treat thematically in his later work. There is an acknowledgement of the limits of human intellect or human reason to know divine things. Moreover, there is an acknowledgement of the centrality of love in the ethical life of the human person. Wojtyła describes St. John of the Cross' notion of experience as an aide to theological reflection in this way: "Now we refer to his own experience, whether drawn from his contact with other souls in spiritual direction or from his own interior life. And here, it seems, we touch a constitutive element of his works. They are not simply speculative treatises on mystical theology; they are a

²³⁰ cf. *ibid.*, 23.

²³¹ *ibid.*, 87. cf. Waldstein, *Man and Woman He Created Them*, 82.

witness to mystical experience.”²³² Wojtyła understands experience as a touchstone of philosophical and theological reflection. It serves as a fundamental aide to theology.

St. John of the Cross articulates the type of experience that John Paul II understands as necessary in order to develop an adequate anthropology.

III. Summary

From his earliest published artistic works, Wojtyła was concerned with speaking to human experience. That concern took different forms as his life progressed, influenced by a number of sources, including the work of St. John of the Cross, St. Thomas Aquinas, Scheler, and his pastoral work.²³³ Wojtyła consistently returned to the world of inner experience. He did this in his art, his ethics, his theological writing, and his pastoral writing. As he deepened his focus on inner experience, the themes of anthropology and sexuality take center stage.²³⁴

As Wojtyła continued to speak to human experience, he repeatedly encountered the limits of the various modes of expression. He approached the limits of ontology, needing the input of inner experience. He encountered the limits of technical philosophical and theological language, needing the complement of rhapsody. He recognized that the world of inner experience needs all of these modes of expression working together. For Wojtyła, personal experience is an essential point of reference for philosophical and theological reflection. But that experience is not absolute. Any description of phenomena requires some sort of transcendence, e.g. moral norms or ontology.

²³² Wojtyła, *Faith According to St. John of the Cross*, 21.

²³³ Other writers have explored the connection of Wojtyła to other thinkers. One example is: Nigel Zimmerman, *Facing the Other: John Paul II, Levinas, and the Body* (Eugene, Oregon: Cascade Books, 2015), which articulates Wojtyła’s dialogue with Judaism and Phenomenology through Wojtyła’s interaction with Emmanuel Levinas. This example, and similar evaluations that show the connection between Wojtyła and other thinkers, while illustrative, goes beyond the scope of this work.

²³⁴ e.g. *Love and Responsibility* and *Person and Act*, which will be the focus of the subsequent chapters.

But, ultimately, Wojtyła approached the limits of human knowledge itself, needing “vistas closed to human reason,” opened by Divine revelation.²³⁵ So he turns to Scripture when he takes up the question of theological anthropology and in describing the *communio personarum* in the *Theology of the Body*.

The next chapters will look at Wojtyła’s major works, *Person and Act* and *Love and Responsibility*, in order to illustrate the limits that Wojtyła took human reason in his development of anthropology.

²³⁵ Vatican II, *Gaudium et Spes*, 24.

Chapter 3

Karol Wojtyła's Philosophical Anthropology: *Person and Act*

The next two chapters offer a detailed analysis of Wojtyła's major philosophical works.

This chapter examines *Person and Act*.

There has been some debate about the proper way in English to refer to the work, *Osoba i Czyn*. The work has been translated and published in English as *The Acting Person*.²³⁶ The editor of the volume, Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, had been working with Wojtyła on the publication of *Osoba i Czyn*, and was working with him on the English translation before his papal election. While the collaboration was begun, it was not completed by October 1978, at which point the pope did not get involved in the translation of *Osoba i Czyn*.²³⁷ Without an English translation that had received final review and approval by the author, doubt is cast upon the translation, specifically about the appropriateness of the title, which is not a literal translation of the Polish title. The debate engaged is ultimately about how to understand Wojtyła, either as a Thomist or as a Phenomenologist, with "acting person" reflective of a phenomenological position, and "person and act" seemingly consonant with scholastic metaphysics. Without entering into the debate of the philosophical merit of the English translation of the entire work, I refer to the work as *Person and Act* because it reflects the Wojtyłaan style in titling his other works, e.g. *Love and Responsibility*.

Person and Act is a sustained philosophical analysis of the human person. It articulates a language with which to speak about human experience and action, which is used by Wojtyła throughout his philosophical and theological work. Wojtyła's philosophical anthropology is

²³⁶ Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, tr. Andrzej Potocki (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979). I will denote all subsequent citations from the work as "PA."

²³⁷ A comment about the history of the incomplete dialogue between the translator and Wojtyła is found in the translator's "Editorial Introduction," PA, xxiii.

rooted in the human person's experience of oneself. His philosophical anthropology is based on an understanding of the human person as a unity of body and soul. Wojtyła describes how the human person can grow in the experience of inner unity through integration.

The *Theology of the Body* employs the language and concepts of integration.

I. Human Action

The primary focus of *Person and Act* is a description and analysis of inner experience. Wojtyła limits his analysis to the human person's inner experience, in its complexity. He identifies the focus of his analyses saying, "This experience, which man has of himself, is the richest and apparently the most complex of all experiences accessible to him."²³⁸

A. Inner Experience

Wojtyła begins *Person and Act* by making the distinction between two fundamental inner experiences of the human person: the passive experience of something happening to a person, within a person, and the active experience of action, articulated in terms of the dynamisms within a person. The passive experience is captured by the phrase: "It happens to me," or more for Wojtyła's purposes, "It happens in me." The active experience is captured by the phrase: "I act." Wojtyła writes, "The two objective structures, 'man-acts' and 'something-happens-in-man,' determine the two fundamental lines of the dynamism proper to man."²³⁹ "It happens" is characterized by passivity, by the human person being aware that it is not an experience of action.²⁴⁰ "I act," however, Wojtyła describes as "that form of the human dynamism in which

²³⁸ PA, 3.

²³⁹ PA, 61.

²⁴⁰ cf. PA, 67.

man himself is the agent, that is to say, he is the conscious cause of his own causation.”²⁴¹ In this case, the person is aware that they are responsible for the action. Wojtyła refers to both “I act” and “it happens” with the term dynamism. He states clearly that the human dynamism is that “which issues from within and may have the form either of acting or of happening.”²⁴² While an initial understanding of the distinction between the active and the passive human dynamisms is presented in these chapters, Wojtyła will continually refer to them and deepen the understanding throughout *Person and Act*.

Another insight mentioned in the preliminary chapters of *Person and Act* is a recognition of the levels of the person. Within a single human person are experiences on different levels. Both the passive and the active dynamisms are each experienced on level of the psyche and the level of the soma, Wojtyła names them “the psychoemotive and the somato-vegetative” levels of the person.²⁴³ Wojtyła further articulates the dynamics of these levels as they become thematic in later chapters of *Person and Act*. As Wojtyła continues to articulate the experience of the active and the passive human dynamisms, the recognition of the levels of the human person gives insight into the complexity of the experiences that he addresses.

Ultimately, the importance of the dynamisms experienced by a human person is found in the possible changes for the individual. Wojtyła writes, “man changes one way or another with all his actions and with all that happens in him: both these forms of the dynamism proper to him make *something* of him and at the same time they, so to speak, make *somebody* of him.”²⁴⁴ The change into something/somebody Wojtyła captures with the word “becoming.”²⁴⁵ One clear demonstration of the process of becoming is seen in the physical development of a human

²⁴¹ PA, 66.

²⁴² PA, 86.

²⁴³ PA, 88.

²⁴⁴ PA, 97.

²⁴⁵ PA, 96.

person. For example, there is a becoming of a human person in the progress from birth to adolescence to adulthood. To this somatic development, Wojtyła also adds the psychic development of the human person. And, he notes that this process of becoming is characterized by passivity. Wojtyła writes: “both kinds of becoming—one connected with the vegetative potentiality and dynamism of the organism, and the other with the psychoemotive potentiality and its corresponding dynamism—depend on a certain passiveness in man.”²⁴⁶ In other words, some experiences of “it happens” are part of the psycho-somatic development (i.e. becoming) of the person. But, the becoming of a person can also be experienced via “I act.” With regard to action, Wojtyła employs the term efficacy. He says, “the moment of efficacy is to be understood as the having of the experience of ‘being the actor.’ ... When acting I have the experience of myself as the agent responsible for this particular form of the dynamization of myself as the subject.”²⁴⁷ Through action the person experiences the becoming of a human person. For example, Wojtyła indicates that action leads the human person to become morally good or morally bad. He writes, “Moral conduct partakes of the reality of human actions as expressing a specific type and line of becoming of the man-subject.”²⁴⁸ Morally good actions lead a person to become a morally good person. Rather than understood as a static reality, the human person is a dynamic one.

In his analysis of complex inner human experiences, Wojtyła acknowledges that both passive and active experiences on both the psychic and somatic levels of the person contribute to the experience of becoming of the human person. These insights of the initial chapters of *Person and Act* is further expounded in the subsequent chapters of the work.

²⁴⁶ PA, 98.

²⁴⁷ PA, 66.

²⁴⁸ PA, 99.

B. Self-Determination and Self-Possession

After establishing the basic distinction between the experiences of passivity and action, Wojtyła further analyzes human action. He introduces the categories of “self-determination” and “self-possession.”

Recognizing the possibility to think of action in terms of bodily movement, Wojtyła writes: “It seems necessary to stress at this stage in our discussion that we are here primarily, if not exclusively, concerned with action as the *inner and intransitive consequence of a person’s efficacy*.”²⁴⁹ In other words, Wojtyła stresses that action, in the sense used in *Person and Act*, is first of all an inner experience. Again, this helps the reader recognize that Wojtyła uses the term “action” in the technical sense of inner action, instead of “action” as synonymous with physical movement. It is with this specific approach to “action” that Wojtyła articulates his analysis of human experience.

A primary characteristic of action is self-determination. Wojtyła writes, “every authentically human ‘I will’ is an act of self-determination.”²⁵⁰ In describing self-determination, Wojtyła aligns it with free will.²⁵¹ As an execution of self-determination, action can also be understood in contradistinction to the experience of happenings in the human person on the level of somatic dynamisms. On this level, “it happens” has the characteristic of necessity. And, Wojtyła writes, “Necessity as the opposite of freedom...is thus attributed to the dynamism at the level of nature alone.”²⁵² For example, the digestion of food happens by necessity when it is consumed, but the choice to eat or not is an act of self-determination. If necessity is the opposite of freedom, then self-determination has the characteristic of response. Wojtyła writes: “Every

²⁴⁹ PA, 150.

²⁵⁰ PA, 106.

²⁵¹ cf. PA, 115.

²⁵² PA, 117.

instance of ‘I will’ constitutes such an individual and unique response, which is specially apparent in every instance of choosing.”²⁵³ Connecting to the above example, the experience of hunger may seem to direct our action, but, as a response to hunger, the choice to eat or not is an act of self-determination.

In light of the dynamisms that take place on the level of nature, Wojtyła indicates that self-determination takes place on the level of the person. He writes, “it is self-determination that at the level of the person binds together and integrates the different manifestations of the human dynamism.”²⁵⁴ In this way, the level of the person stands above the level of nature, above the level of the psycho-somatic dynamisms. As characteristic of persons, self-determination, Wojtyła says, “constitutes, defines, and brings into view this level as such. Because of it, in experience—primarily in self-experience—man is given as the person.”²⁵⁵ Self-determination reveals the level of the person.

While Wojtyła introduces self-determination as part of the level of the person, at the same time, he identifies self-possession as the foundation of self-determination. Wojtyła asserts, “For only the things that are man’s actual possessions can be determined by him.”²⁵⁶ And Wojtyła says, “Because ‘I will’ is an act of self-determination at a particular moment it presupposes structural self-possession.”²⁵⁷ But, the relation between self-possession and self-determination is not one-sided: self-determination has an effect on self-possession. Wojtyła writes that self-possession is realized “in an act of self-determination, which is constituted by every real human ‘I will.’”²⁵⁸ In this way, self-determination can create greater self-possession.

²⁵³ PA, 134.

²⁵⁴ PA, 107.

²⁵⁵ PA, 107.

²⁵⁶ PA, 106.

²⁵⁷ PA, 106.

²⁵⁸ PA, 107.

Wojtyła writes: “the will, every genuine ‘I will,’ reveals, confirms, and realizes the self-possession that is appropriate solely to the person.”²⁵⁹ Even as the foundation of self-determination, the experience of self-possession is increased through acts of self-determination.

In other words, self-determination is key to the experience of human becoming. Wojtyła says that the person “experiences the awareness that *he is the one who determined himself* and that *his decisions make him become somebody*.”²⁶⁰ The execution of self-determination, as action, is experienced as becoming.

C. The Spiritual Element in the Human Person

A key concept in the relationship between the level of nature and the level of the person is transcendence. Describing transcendence, Wojtyła writes: “Etymologically ‘transcendence’ means to go over and beyond a threshold or boundary.”²⁶¹ A human person can experience transcendence in more than one way. Wojtyła identifies “horizontal” boundaries, writing, “Transgressing the subject’s limits in the direction of an object—and this is intentionality in the ‘external’ perception or volition of external objects—may be defined as ‘horizontal transcendence.’”²⁶² This is how the term transcendence may be used in metaphysics or epistemology.²⁶³ Since it refers to an external object, it is not the focus of Wojtyła’s analysis at this point.

Wojtyła calls the transcendence that refers to the interiority of the person “vertical transcendence,” which he then simply refers to as “transcendence.” Wojtyła writes, “The transcendence we are now considering is the fruit of self-determination; the person transcends

²⁵⁹ PA, 106,

²⁶⁰ PA, 113.

²⁶¹ PA, 119.

²⁶² PA, 119.

²⁶³ cf. PA, 179.

his structural boundaries through...*acting*.”²⁶⁴ The structural boundaries are the levels of the human person: the level of nature and the level of the person. It is this experience that Wojtyła is concerned with, as he writes: “Thus conceived, transcendence as an essential of the person can be best characterized by comparing the dynamism of the person with the dynamism of nature.”²⁶⁵ Once again, the dynamisms of activity and passivity come to the fore. Wojtyła writes, “In the dynamism at the level of nature there is no self-determination to serve as the basis from which acting itself as well as its direction and purpose are derived. The dynamism at the level of nature lacks that special dependence on the ego which is the characteristic mark of the specific dynamism of the person.”²⁶⁶ The passive experience of happening characterizes the level of nature. The experiences which happen on the level of nature are precisely moments of passivity. They are not experiences of action. The purpose of contrasting the level of nature and the level of the person is to illustrate that acting—not happening—is the cause of the transcendence of the structural boundaries of the person. Moreover, actions are proper to the level of the person. Wojtyła writes, “The fact of self-determination and all that self-determination relies upon in the structure itself of the person...provides the key to the reality of the person we are attempting to reach.”²⁶⁷

Transcendence is what bridges the level of nature and the level of the person, through acting, through self-determination. The boundary between passivity and activity is crossed by transcendence. On one hand, Wojtyła writes, “the person’s transcendence in the action also shows a certain complexity; the one who possesses himself is simultaneously the one who,

²⁶⁴ PA, 119.

²⁶⁵ PA, 119.

²⁶⁶ PA, 117.

²⁶⁷ PA, 116.

according to the same principle of self-determination, is possessed by himself.”²⁶⁸ On the other hand, this complexity reveals the unity of the human person. It is the one and the same person who possess oneself and is possessed by oneself. By reaching the level of the person, transcendence is aligned with the act of possession, rather than the “is possessed” of the person. The transcendence to the level of the person from the level of nature shows a complexity of the person. But the experience at the level of the person, especially of self-possession and of self-determination, shows that there is a single subject experiencing these complex experiences.

Wojtyła acknowledges that the unity of the human person is a metaphysical principle. He writes, “It belongs to metaphysics, in which throughout the ages thinkers have been unraveling the nature of man as a being consisting of soul and body, of spirit and flesh.”²⁶⁹ In Wojtyła’s terms, the body corresponds to the level of nature, and the spirit corresponds to the level of the person.²⁷⁰ With this bipartite understanding of the human person, the soul is the principle of unity. Wojtyła writes, “It is to metaphysical analysis that we owe the knowledge of the human soul as the principle underlying the unity of the being and the life of a concrete person.”²⁷¹ Wojtyła asserts that there is no direct experience of the soul.²⁷² The ability to understand the soul as the principle of unity does not come from phenomenology.

Nevertheless, Wojtyła asserts that his phenomenological analysis points to “an immaterial factor which is inherently irreducible to matter.”²⁷³ In other words, the experience of personal unity reveals the spiritual element in the human person. Wojtyła further articulates the contribution of the phenomenological method in describing the spiritual nature of the person,

²⁶⁸ PA, 183.

²⁶⁹ PA, 186.

²⁷⁰ cf. PA, 185.

²⁷¹ PA, 186.

²⁷² PA, 186.

²⁷³ PA, 181.

writing, “it seems however that we have gone much farther than traditional philosophy in its conception of man, inasmuch as in our analyses we have accumulated sufficient evidence of the spirituality of man.”²⁷⁴ Again, the key experience that reveals the spiritual element of the person is transcendence. Wojtyła writes, “Thus we come to the conclusion that the evidence of the spiritual nature of man stems in the first place from the experience of the person’s transcendence in the action, which we have been trying to describe and analyze.”²⁷⁵ He further writes, “Indeed, self-determination manifests itself as the force holding together the human dynamism and integrating it at the level of the person.”²⁷⁶ Transcendence not only reveals the complexity of the person, the different levels of the person, the dynamisms of the body and the psyche. Wojtyła says that transcendence also reveals this complex structure as “a specific organic unity and not as an unintegrated manifold.”²⁷⁷ The experience of transcendence reveals the experience of personal unity.

The phenomenological analysis does not just point to the metaphysical principle of unity, the soul. Phenomenological analysis also deepens the understanding of personal unity. The unity of the person is not just a metaphysical principle. Wojtyła asserts that the unity of the person is something that is created. Action reveals the unity of the person, but it also “helps to compose the unity of the person.”²⁷⁸ In action, the person has the experience of becoming somebody. In becoming, the person has the experience of transcending the level of nature into the level of the person. And, insofar as the experience of “it happens” is transcended by the experience of “I act,” the person increases their self-possession. Wojtyła writes, “The fact that in the performance of the action man also fulfills himself shows that the action serves the unity of

²⁷⁴ PA, 182.

²⁷⁵ PA, 181.

²⁷⁶ PA, 116.

²⁷⁷ PA, 183.

²⁷⁸ PA, 183.

the person, that it not only reflects but actually establishes this unity.”²⁷⁹ The unity of the person is something that is created through action. The human person as an author of action, as opposed to a subject of happenings, is the key to becoming.

Every person has experiences in the form of acting and happening, activity and passivity. Wojtyła recognizes that these dynamisms reflect the need for self-fulfillment, for the creation of self-unity. In other words, even though the human person is a unity, a person stands in need of fulfilling oneself. Wojtyła writes, “To fulfill oneself means to actualize, and in a way to bring to the proper fullness, that structure in man which is characteristic for him because of his personality and also because of his being somebody and not merely something.”²⁸⁰

In this way, the role of action—including efficacy and transcendence—as the means of realizing the fulfillment of the person, is revealed as the central concern of *Person and Act*.

II. Integration and Disintegration

Wojtyła introduces and defines integration in this way: “the term ‘integration’ is used to denote the realization and the manifestation of a whole and a unity emerging on the basis of some complexity rather than the assembling into a whole of what was previously disconnected.”²⁸¹ Integration is not assembling component parts. Integration is the increase in unity of elements that are already connected within the human person. Integration complements what has been already said of transcendence. Wojtyła writes, “‘Complementary’ is to be understood here ... in the sense that without integration transcendence remains, as it were, suspended in a kind of structural void.”²⁸² That is to say, through transcendence the human

²⁷⁹ PA, 184.

²⁸⁰ PA, 151.

²⁸¹ PA, 191.

²⁸² PA, 190.

person crosses the threshold from passivity to activity. Transcendence, then, leaves passivity behind conceptually. But, as Wojtyła writes, it is not possible “to have *active* possession of oneself without a *passive* response in the dynamic structure of the person.”²⁸³ In action, the human person experiences that it both possesses itself and is possessed by itself. The unity of the person necessitates the conceptual inclusion of passivity. The human dynamisms, all that happens in the human person, are to be understood as part of the personal dynamism. Every experience, passive or active, is part of an individual’s personal experience.

Transcendence reveals the person as “above” the level of nature, whereas integration reveals the dynamisms as part of the level of the person. Integration includes the happenings that are part of the complex inner experiences in a way that transcendence does not. In action, the dynamisms of each level of the person are present, included, integrated in the action. Because of this Wojtyła can write: “When I act, I am wholly engaged in my acting.”²⁸⁴ In action, or efficacy, the person experiences oneself as being wholly present in the action, through integration. In this way, the unity of the person—the psychosomatic spiritual unity of the person—is more completely understood. Integration accounts for the experience of the human person as being wholly present in the action. Integration describes the manifestation and the realization of the unity of the person in becoming.

Wojtyła’s analysis of integration, immediately leads him to the concept of disintegration, in order to further articulate his explanation of integration. Wojtyła writes, “‘Disintegration’ in its fundamental sense signifies what in the structure of...self-possession of the person appears as a defect or failing.”²⁸⁵ In other words, Wojtyła asserts, “disintegration...signifies a more or less

²⁸³ PA, 190.

²⁸⁴ PA, 192.

²⁸⁵ PA, 193.

deep-seated inability to govern, or to possess, oneself.”²⁸⁶ It is an experience of personal disunity. If integration includes happenings, then disintegration is when “what happens” remain happenings and are not self-possessed, not raised to the level of the person. When there is a new experience of a new happening, there is a new occasion to experience the integration (or disintegration) of all of the levels of the person. Consequently, the term disintegration either reflects a structural reality (the non-integrated levels of the human person before efficacy) or is the result of a failure to act, failure to raise a happening to the level of action (integration of the person in the action).

A. Integration of the Soma

Having established the concepts of integration and disintegration, Wojtyła then presents an analysis of those concepts in terms of the psycho-somatic spiritual dynamisms of the person. Wojtyła considers integration in terms of both the somatic and psychic levels of the person separately and together.

1. Somatic Dynamism

Focusing on the somatic level of the person, separately, Wojtyła indicates what he means by the soma. In addition to all that can be seen and colloquially referred to as the body, Wojtyła includes the inner functioning of the body. He writes, “While the complexity is outwardly reflected by the diversity and the mutual coordination of bodily members, its inward reflection is in the diversity and the mutual coordination of the bodily organs.”²⁸⁷ So to include both the inner and outer realities of the human body, Wojtyła uses the term soma in his presentation. He

²⁸⁶ PA, 194.

²⁸⁷ PA, 201.

writes, “The term ‘somatic’ refers to the body in the outer as well as the inner aspects of the system...with its appropriate members...and the joint functioning of all the bodily organs.”²⁸⁸

The somatic dynamism includes things like the development of the human body, the lengthening of hair, breathing, the beating of the heart, digestion. Wojtyła says, “the dynamism of the human body as such does not depend on the self-determination of the person.”²⁸⁹

The integration of the soma needs to consider the independent somatic dynamisms. They are beyond self-determination (and consciousness). But, the independent reality does not undermine the unity of the human person or the possibility of integration. Wojtyła says: “the body seems to have a somewhat separate ‘subjectivity’ of its own—without, however, affecting in any way the ontic unity of man.”²⁹⁰ The integration of the soma, then, means uniting the somatic dynamism with the personal dynamism. Wojtyła defines it this way: “The integrity of the man-person consists therefore in the normal, indeed, in the possibly perfect matching of ‘somatic subjectivity’ with the efficacious and transcendent subjectivity of the person.”²⁹¹ The somatic dynamisms (e.g. bodily growth) remain processes outside of self-determination. Yet, the integration of the soma includes working with these dynamisms. In Wojtyła’s words: “We may say that at the moment of self-determination man puts into operation the reactive dynamism of the body and in this way makes use of it, or, putting it differently, that at the moment of self-determination he consciously uses it by taking part in its operation.”²⁹² For example, the preparing and eating of a meal as an act of self-determination takes into account the autonomous need of the body to eat and to eat healthily.

²⁸⁸ PA, 201.

²⁸⁹ PA, 210.

²⁹⁰ PA, 212.

²⁹¹ PA, 212.

²⁹² PA, 212.

The general example that Wojtyła uses to illustrate the integration of the soma is movement. The body's ability to move in reaction to a stimulus (e.g. the patellar reflex of the leg kicking out after being hit below the knee) is part of the somatic dynamism. That ability becomes integrated in the action of kicking a ball, as a willful choice. In this way, movement becomes an act of personal efficacy. In this way, the somatic dynamism has been integrated into the action that is taking place on the level of the person.

Wojtyła immediately notes that the integration of the soma in movement is so commonplace that it is usually imperceptible. Wojtyła says: "The presence of skill makes the whole motor dynamism, the whole of human mobility so spontaneous and fluent that in most cases we never notice the causative effect of the will in the synthesis of actions and motions."²⁹³ When performing some particular action, however, the person can be aware of the integration of the soma in a clear way. After naming mountain climbing, performing a surgical operation, and performing liturgical functions, Wojtyła says, "In such special circumstances nearly all our attention concentrates on making the necessary motions, and then we have a more or less clear experience of conscious efficacy."²⁹⁴ These and similar special circumstances help illustrate the integration of the soma in action.

Wojtyła further notes that the integration of the soma in action often opens up to contexts that are broader than the immediate. A person can intend a meaning to an action beyond an immediate context. In the integration of the soma, he says, "a given motion being dictated by the will may itself constitute the action or it may form part of an action that consists of a broader whole (for instance, the action of going to school includes many motions, in particular those of

²⁹³ PA, 214.

²⁹⁴ PA, 214.

walking).”²⁹⁵ Particular actions or series of actions may reveal both the personal dynamism and a larger purpose.

This insight leads Wojtyła to comment on two specific somatic dynamisms that he uses to illustrate the integration of the soma: self-preservation and the sexual drive. He refers to these dynamisms as instincts—which have meaning beyond an immediate context. In referring to instincts, Wojtyła is not including somatic, “instinctual,” reactions to particular stimuli. Instinct, he says, “does not refer to any particular reaction as a purposeful activation of the somatic subject,” but to “a trait of nature itself.”²⁹⁶ For an individual, instincts indicate something beyond the immediate. They reveal the movement of the somatic dynamism beyond a particular context.

In describing self-preservation, Wojtyła says: “The elementary sensation of hunger and thirst—as well as their satisfaction—springs from the instinct of self-preservation; in addition, the enormous progress in medical science and art may be related to this instinct.”²⁹⁷ More than just a reaction to specific stimuli (e.g. threats), self-preservation is concerned with maintaining one’s existence long-term. Wojtyła says: “All the somatic dynamisms preserving the vegetation of the individual are subservient to this compulsion.”²⁹⁸ In other words, self-preservation is the affirmation that one’s existence is good. Wojtyła says, “This feeling meets the intellectual affirmation of existence, the awareness that ‘it is good to exist and to live’ while it would be ‘bad to lose one’s existence and one’s life.’”²⁹⁹ Self-preservation, even in particular acts, reflect an instinct that has meaning beyond the particular acts. The integration of the instinct of self-preservation means working with this dynamism, at which point, Wojtyła says, “the instinct of

²⁹⁵ PA, 213.

²⁹⁶ PA, 216.

²⁹⁷ PA, 217.

²⁹⁸ PA, 217.

²⁹⁹ PA, 217.

self-preservation becomes a consciously adopted attitude, a primary concern of man and a fundamental value.”³⁰⁰

In describing the sexual instinct, Wojtyła says, “the desire for sharing with another human being, the desire that springs both from close similarity and from the differences due to the separation of the sexes is based on the instinct of sex.”³⁰¹ Furthermore, the desire for bodily union is related to reproduction. Wojtyła says: “The sexual drive...is simultaneously the instinct of reproduction, to which man owes the preservation of his species in nature. This natural desire is the basis of marriage and through marital life becomes the foundation of the family.”³⁰² In this way, Wojtyła identifies a broader context to the immediate instinct for sexual union: that is, sharing with another human being and reproduction. With regard to the integration of the sexual instinct, Wojtyła makes mention of his work in *Love and Responsibility* and the moral context of the integration of the sexual instinct. He says: “The point of view of ethics on the need for controlling the sexual drive was discussed more fully by the author in another book, the theme of which is human love and the ensuing responsibilities.”³⁰³ Given the detailed analysis of the sexual instinct in *Love and Responsibility*, Wojtyła, here in *Person and Act*, is able to describe the integration of sex as having a proper end (e.g. marriage and family). Thus, the integration of the instinct of sex means working with this dynamism, controlling it. Wojtyła says, “Essentially this control consists in the adaptation of the body’s instinctual dynamism of sex to its proper end.”³⁰⁴

³⁰⁰ PA, 218.

³⁰¹ PA, 218.

³⁰² PA, 218.

³⁰³ PA, 219.

³⁰⁴ PA, 218.

At this point, some final insights can be identified with regard to Wojtyła's description of the integration of the soma in action, the transition of the somatic dynamism from "it happens" to "I act."

Wojtyła describes disintegration in terms of the soma as any defects in integration, "in the matching of 'somatic subjectivity' with the efficacious and transcendent subjectivity of the person."³⁰⁵ Wojtyła stresses that defects in integration are not the same as defects that are strictly somatic, for example losing an arm, having a lung removed. He writes, "purely somatic obstacles as such have but a physical and in nowise a moral significance. ...On the contrary, very often a human being with a high degree of somatic disintegration may represent a personality of great value."³⁰⁶

The somatic dynamism in general, and specific reflexes or instincts in particular, can be integrated into the personal dynamism with an immediate or non-immediate context or meaning. Instincts, as particular manifestations of the autonomous somatic dynamism, are not absolute. The example that Wojtyła uses to illustrate this point with regard to self-preservation is self-harm or suicide. He says: "In his mind, man, as we well know, may reject the value of his own existence and substitute negation in the place of affirmation, which shows that the instinct of self-preservation has no absolute control over the person...[even if the choice is to] only cease to exist in a way that seems to them unbearable."³⁰⁷ And, the instinctual dynamism of sex manifests itself, Wojtyła says, "in strictly defined reactions of the body that to some extent automatically or spontaneously *happen* in man. In spite of all their specificity and automatism,

³⁰⁵ PA, 212.

³⁰⁶ PA, 215.

³⁰⁷ PA, 218.

however, these reactions remain sufficiently conscious to be controllable by man.”³⁰⁸ Instincts do not determine the personal dynamism.

The analysis of the integration of the soma is incomplete without including the psyche. Wojtyła says, the interpretation of instinct “in somatic terms alone can never be complete. In fact, instinct as a definite dynamic trait affects also the human psyche, and it is in the psyche that it finds its proper expression.”³⁰⁹ Again, he says of the somatic dynamism: “We have seen, however, that this one particular element does not provide the full solution to the question of the integration of instincts, a question requiring a broader look at the psycho-emotive element.”³¹⁰ In other words, the analysis of the integration of nature with the level of the person necessarily includes both the somatic and the psychic elements of the level of nature.

2. The Body as Psycho-Somatic Dynamism

As already seen in Wojtyła’s description of transcendence, his understanding of the human person corresponds to a hylomorphic understanding of the human person as a unity of body and soul. Wojtyła has an ample understanding of the body as soma—containing both external and internal workings of the body. But, his conception of the body is not even limited to the description of the soma stated above. His phenomenological description of the bodily dynamism includes the dynamism of the soma and the dynamism of the psyche. Describing one’s experience of oneself, Wojtyła says: The human person “has the experience of his corporality just as he has of his sensuality and emotionality.”³¹¹ It is as if the level of nature has two levels: the level of the soma and the level of the psyche. Wojtyła states that the “two

³⁰⁸ PA, 218.

³⁰⁹ PA, 216.

³¹⁰ PA, 219.

³¹¹ PA, 51.

structural levels of the dynamic man-subject...are the psychoemotive and the somato-vegetative.”³¹² With the description of the somatic dynamism above, Wojtyła still needs to give a similarly detailed description of the psychic dynamism. Nevertheless, Wojtyła offers an initial definition of the psychic dynamism: “Thus ‘psyche’ and ‘psychical’ apply to the whole range of manifestations of the integral human life that are not in themselves bodily or material, but at the same time show some dependence on the body, some somatic conditioning...[for example] eyesight, feelings, emotions [which] are not in themselves corporeal.”³¹³

Wojtyła analyzes the somatic and psychic dynamism separately, yet, since they are both part of the level of nature, they remain connected to each other. These two dynamisms “mutually condition” each other.³¹⁴ Wojtyła asserts that the somatic influences the psychic, it “conditions the various psychical functions.”³¹⁵ One example that Wojtyła gives is “the experience of physical pain...[where] the nature of the experience is basically psychical and not vegetative, though its objective roots are on the somato-vegetative level.”³¹⁶ And, he asserts that the psychic influences the somatic when he says: “It is also well known and corroborated by numerous treatises on ethics that emotions may in some respects enhance our actions, but in others they have a restraining or even crippling effect on” acting.³¹⁷ An example of the psychic conditioning the somatic is the heart racing or the person sweating, when that person is afraid. Again, Wojtyła says that the psychic conditions the somatic “in the direction of expression.”³¹⁸

The psychic dynamics can have bodily manifestations.

³¹² PA, 88.

³¹³ PA, 201.

³¹⁴ PA, 202.

³¹⁵ PA, 89.

³¹⁶ PA, 90.

³¹⁷ PA, 52.

³¹⁸ PA, 202.

In terms of complex inner experiences, the dynamisms of the soma and the psyche are both experiences of “it happens,” but each in their own way. Wojtyła assigns the term “reactive” to the soma (as described above) and the term “emotive” to the psyche, when he speaks of “the psychosomatic dynamism of man, to whom we attribute *reactivity* as well as *emotivity*, the former corresponding more to the soma and the latter to the psyche.”³¹⁹ “Reactivity” describes the cause-and-effect relationship between a stimulus and the physical/bodily effect. A certain stimulus yields a particular bodily effect, e.g. the patellar reflex of the leg kicking out after being hit below the knee. Whereas “emotivity” accounts for the variety of effects of a particular psychic stimulus. The same person may experience the same stimulus differently at different times. For example, when a telephone rings, a person may welcome an opportunity to talk to someone, or that person may be irritated with an interruption. Commonly, it is said that, in each new case of psychic stimulus, a person *reacts* differently. Wojtyła uses “emotivity” to capture the fact that clearly, given the variance in experiences, a person does not “react” to a stimulus, in a cause-and-effect way on the psychic level. But emotivity is related to reactivity insofar as the psychological experience “happens” in the human person. The mutual conditioning of the soma and the psyche interplay to create the full experience of passivity of the person on the level of nature.

Thus, Wojtyła asserts that the integration of the person requires raising the dynamisms of both the soma and the psyche to the level of the person. In the cases described above concerning the integration of the soma, Wojtyła acknowledges the importance of including the psychic dynamism. Concerning self-preservation Wojtyła writes: “Even a brief analysis of the instinct of self-preservation shows how difficult it would be to reduce it in man to its somatic aspects alone,

³¹⁹ PA, 200.

how powerfully it is reflected in the psyche, and how great is the share of consciousness in the shaping of the processes that it generates.”³²⁰ Concerning the sexual drive, he writes:

The same applies, perhaps even in a greater degree, to the sexual drive. The drive of sex, which relies on the momentous division of mankind into male and female individuals, stems from the somatic ground and also penetrates deeply into the psyche and its emotivity, thereby affecting even man’s spiritual life. ... Though possible, the control of the sexual drive may, and often does raise many difficult problems...; this does not consist in somatic reactions alone but also in a special psychical urge of the emotive type.³²¹

From this description it is clear that Wojtyła understands that, in the case of at least some of the passive experiences of the human person, there are the presence of both somatic and psychic dynamisms. And, given their mutual conditioning, it is possible to speak of a psycho-somatic dynamism in the person. He says: “At this higher level of the person-action unity the dynamism belonging to man’s psyche and soma seem to disappear. They fuse together. This does not mean, however, that they cease to be in some way distinct. On the contrary, they continue to exist in their own right and essentially co-create the dynamic reality of the person’s action.”³²² Again, while the somatic and the psychic dynamisms are experienced separately, it is possible to speak of them together as the psycho-somatic dynamism.

In hylomorphic terms, the somatic and the psychic levels, together, comprise the “body” of the person. As the body, they are together integrated into the action of the person. Wojtyła says: “The crucial fact in the total experience of man is that it is in action that the whole psychosomatic complexity develops into the specific person-action unity.”³²³ Before Wojtyła further analyzes the integration of the psycho-somatic dynamism, he details more fully the integration of the psyche.

³²⁰ PA, 219.

³²¹ PA, 219-220.

³²² PA, 198.

³²³ PA, 197.

B. Integration of the Psyche

Wojtyła presents in the sixth chapter of *Person and Act* his analysis of the integration of the psyche and its relation to the soma and the spirit.

1. Psychic Dynamism

Wojtyła's initial description of the psychic dynamism was noted above, in which he says: "Thus 'psyche' and 'psychical' apply to the whole range of manifestations of the integral human life that are not in themselves bodily or material, but at the same time show some dependence on the body, some somatic conditioning...[for example] eyesight, feelings, emotions [which] are not in themselves corporeal."³²⁴ Wojtyła makes the distinction between the soma and the psyche, while accounting for their unity, saying, "The psyche and the soma are distinctive with respect to each other even though they form a mutually conditioned unity in man."³²⁵ But he further articulates the distinction between the soma and the psyche, saying, "The functions of the psyche are 'internal' and 'immaterial' and while internally they are conditioned by the soma..., they can in no way be reduced to what is somatic," though they can be expressed by the body.³²⁶ As distinct from the body, emotions, which Wojtyła notes that the word etymologically comes from Latin "ex" and "movere" ("to move out of" the body), exceed "the capacity of the body...both in quality and essence."³²⁷ The connection between the psyche and the soma and the expression of the psyche by the soma are revealed, for instance, when a person says that they feel well or ill. Wojtyła says: "Physically and psychically we always feel more or less 'well' or more or less

³²⁴ PA, 201.

³²⁵ PA, 220.

³²⁶ PA, 223.

³²⁷ PA, 224.

‘bad’; man always has present in him some kind of feeling or self-feeling, which forms a sort of psychic fabric or undercurrent of his existence of acting.”³²⁸

Even though the psyche is internal and immaterial, it is not equivalent to the spiritual element of the person. It is not equivalent to the soul. Wojtyła says: “In every day use we contrast the notion of ‘soul’ with that of ‘body.’... Even though the Greek term ‘psyche’ means the soul, the two terms are not synonymous.... ‘psyche’ and the adjective ‘psychical’ apply to those elements of the concrete human being that in the experience of man we discern as in a way cohesive or integrated with the body but that in themselves differ from it.”³²⁹ In short, Wojtyła is describing the person as a psycho-somatic spiritual unity, borrowing from metaphysics while supplying details gained from phenomenology. The psyche is neither the soma, nor the soul. The psyche is deeply connected to both the soma and the soul, even uniting the two. Wojtyła says: “The psychical strand in emotivity may be seen as running between corporality and spirituality, but far from dividing them it interweaves with the one and the other, bringing them together.”³³⁰

Before addressing the integration of the psyche, Wojtyła articulates more fully some manifestations of the psychic dynamism. Wojtyła asserts that these manifestations are “connected with the whole wealth of the differentiated domain of human emotions, feelings, and sensations as well as with the related behaviors and attitudes.”³³¹ Wojtyła then describes two specific types of these manifestations: first, excitement (which is a psychic dynamism more aligned with the soma) and second, stirring emotions or, simply, emotions (which are more aligned with the soul).

³²⁸ PA, 229.

³²⁹ PA, 221.

³³⁰ PA, 227.

³³¹ PA, 224.

Wojtyła describes excitement this way: “Excitement is always manifested in a definite reaction of the body, indeed in a whole complex chain of reactions of the organism (blood circulation, breathing, a quickened heartbeat, etc.), which are very distinctly felt.”³³² The experience of excitement is that it is a reaction to a stimulus. Wojtyła does not intend to equate the reaction of excitement to the somatic reactivity described above. He says, “It is a specific sensation of the body contained in the feeling of excitement itself; we feel and have the experience of the emotive and the reactive moment as one dynamic fact, and this circumstance allows us in a way to call the fact a ‘reaction.’”³³³ Wojtyła also points out that the source of excitement, the stimulus, can be either a physical or a spiritual stimulus. He says, “The source of excitement, the stimulus that provokes it, does not necessarily affect the senses. The stimulation may come from the experience of a value that is entirely inaccessible to sense or from wholehearted acceptance of ideals.”³³⁴ In either case, psychic excitement is expressed somatically. Excitement also has a close connection to instinct. Wojtyła asserts that instinct “has its own psychosomatic center, which apparently inheres in a particular excitability, it may be the sexual excitability or any of the different forms of excitability associated with self-preservation. ...both reactivity and excitability remain at the disposal of the powerful forces of nature that steer them in the direction of the most elemental and fundamental value that is existence itself.”³³⁵ This alignment of excitability with instinct helps to reveal another important characteristic of excitement, which is that it is an experience of “it happens.”³³⁶ The experience of excitement is intense. Wojtyła says, “Excitability...tends to refer to an awakening of

³³² PA, 236.

³³³ PA, 236.

³³⁴ PA, 237.

³³⁵ PA, 238.

³³⁶ cf. PA, 236.

emotions...[that] is often rather sudden” and can be characterized as explosive.³³⁷ As such, we can regard excitement as the most intense somatically-expressed psychic experience of “it happens.”

Wojtyła names the psychic experience aligned with the soul as “stirring emotions.” Wojtyła describes this psychic experience as a deep emotional stirring, more moving than excitement, and “bringing to the surface man’s psychic dimension otherwise remaining unnoticed.”³³⁸ While somatic reaction still accompanies stirring emotions, there is less of a mutual conditioning. Wojtyła says, “in the experience of several types of deep emotions bodily feelings may appear to give priority to spiritual feelings...[including] an aesthetic emotion generated by the perception of something beautiful, a cognitive emotion that arises from the discovery of a truth,...remorse at a committed wrong... mental peace and equally deep joy.”³³⁹ In fact, deep emotion can be stirred from the center of the person and dominate other more superficial feelings. Wojtyła says, “this emotive core may be said to be radiating internally...[which] spreads it to the whole of man’s psychical sphere.”³⁴⁰ The depth of stirring emotions indicate the spiritual element of the human person. Wojtyła says, “These distinctions presuppose an innerness of the man-person, something like an immaterial space, where on the ground of the role of feelings we may differentiate between the ‘central’ and the ‘peripheral.’”³⁴¹ Like excitement, emotions happen, though engendered by spiritual realities, and more independent of somatic expression. Wojtyła notes: “When we try to characterize emotions and call them by different names, we in fact distinguish between *the different ways emotions are stirred*. For instance, different emotional stirrings mark the feelings of sorrow and of joy, of

³³⁷ PA, 237.

³³⁸ PA, 239.

³³⁹ PA, 239.

³⁴⁰ PA, 240.

³⁴¹ PA, 242.

anger and of tenderness, of love and of hatred.”³⁴² Wojtyła notes that there is an infinite spectrum of emotions, which “like colors, can be mixed, they overlap and interpenetrate, they also enhance or complete and destroy each other.”³⁴³ And, this infinite spectrum of emotions is caused by the innumerable ways that emotions are stirred.

Wojtyła asserts that deep and central emotions “constitute a separate and powerful realm within man.”³⁴⁴ Emotions are integral to identifying this level of the person. Emotions are useful in identifying the psychic dynamism, without being the only manifestation of the psychic dynamism. The psychic dynamism as a phenomenological experience of “it happens” provides an opportunity for integration.

2. Integration of the Psychic Dynamism

As with the somatic dynamism, the psychic dynamism can be integrated into the action of the human person. Wojtyła comments on the way that the psychic dynamism is experienced as happening in the human person when he says:

It is remarkable that emotions and passions are not experienced by the human being when too strong; they are then only “undergone” by him or, strictly speaking, allowed to grow in him and prevail upon him in some primitive and, as it were, impersonal fashion; for “personal” signifies only that experience in which also the experienced subjectiveness of the ego is to be discerned.³⁴⁵

The fact that emotivity can take control Wojtyła describes as *spontaneous* efficacy. He writes, “there is a clearly marked tension between the spontaneous efficacy of the human psyche and the efficacy of the person.”³⁴⁶ Yet, even when undergoing the experience of emotivity radiating through the human person, there remains the possibility of integration. Wojtyła says, “While

³⁴² PA, 240.

³⁴³ PA, 241.

³⁴⁴ PA, 241.

³⁴⁵ PA, 55.

³⁴⁶ PA, 244.

emotions themselves occur or happen in man, he is aware of them, and owing to this awareness he can in a way control them. The control of emotions by consciousness has a tremendous significance for the inner integration of man.”³⁴⁷ Control is exercised by “self-determination and efficacy.”³⁴⁸ In this way, Wojtyła is describing that the determination of human action can be made either by emotivity or by self-determination. And, because of this overwhelming power of emotions, the integration of the psyche is a “special task” for the human person.³⁴⁹

The origin of this special task is the spontaneous emotivity to a value. Wojtyła asserts that the “emotional dynamism introduces a spontaneous turn toward certain values. The turn may have an attractive or a repulsive character.”³⁵⁰ The spontaneous efficacy is a turn towards or away from a certain value. The turn towards (or away from) a value is determined strictly by the psyche, even as it radiates to direct the human person. Wojtyła’s insight that the person is conscious of this happening is what creates the space for the human person to choose, to determine, the personal dynamism. The integration of the psyche is accomplished in that conscious choice to accept or to reject the determination of the spontaneous efficacy.

Wojtyła asserts that the reason to accept or to reject the direction of spontaneous efficacy is found in intellectual cognition, when he says: “The appropriate integration in this field thus presupposes some reliance on the intellect and that relation to the objects of acting which is based on the truth about the good presented in these objects.”³⁵¹ In other words, what is good for the personal dynamism, perceived by the intellect, is not automatically equivalent to what the psyche spontaneously determines to be good by the psyche. What is good or bad for the person is not necessarily the same as what is attractive or repulsive for the psyche. Wojtyła further

³⁴⁷ PA, 53.

³⁴⁸ PA, 220.

³⁴⁹ PA, 243.

³⁵⁰ PA, 251.

³⁵¹ PA, 250.

illustrates the point: “Indeed, self-determination...often require[s] that action be taken in the name of *bare truth* about good, in the name of values that are not felt. It may even require that action be taken against one’s actual feelings.”³⁵² The integration of the psyche is only possible if the person is able to make the choice to change a psychological happening into a human action. The ability to make that transition likewise means that action might reject the direction of spontaneous efficacy.

The fact that the psychic dynamism can be rejected reveals something unique about the maturation of the psychic dynamism. Comparing the psychic dynamism to the somatic dynamism Wojtyła says:

The human organism determines almost entirely its own development, and only the conditions of the development are established by man. The situation is the opposite in the psychoemotive sphere, which itself establishes the conditions and, as it were, supplies the material for its own development; consequently, the formation of this sphere mainly depends on the human person.³⁵³

In terms of somatic maturation, according to its own dynamism, the human person develops from infancy to adulthood. But Wojtyła is asserting that the psyche does not mature on its own in the same way. For example, a person does not cease to be afraid of the dark, according to the activation of the psychic dynamism, which will persist in turning away from that experience until presented with a reason to not fear. The maturation of the psychic dynamism occurs through integration, which either affirms that the value which stimulates spontaneous efficacy corresponds to a value that is consonant with personal efficacy or rejects that the value which stimulates spontaneous efficacy corresponds to a value that is consonant with personal efficacy. Part of the special task of integrating the psyche, on one hand, is that the psychic dynamism does not develop and mature on its own. On the other hand, the integration of the psyche helps the

³⁵² PA, 233.

³⁵³ PA, 98.

human person to change more easily a passive experience of happening to the active experience of human action and efficacy. Wojtyła writes: “the integrating process of developing and improving the psyche gradually produces the result that the will...learns how by spontaneous reference to emotion, by a spontaneous move of attraction or repulsion, to choose and to adopt the real good; it also learns how to reject the real bad.”³⁵⁴ As the psychic dynamism is integrated into human action, the tension between spontaneous efficacy and personal efficacy is relieved, and the two efficacies become united, fully integrated. Moreover, Wojtyła asserts that, in the development of the human person, relieving the tension between spontaneous and personal efficacy through integration is a “crucial moment of human personality and morality.”³⁵⁵

In a way that further highlights the importance of the integration of the psyche, Wojtyła describes disintegration in terms of the psychic dynamism. The person can be passive with regard to spontaneous efficacy to varying degrees, reducing or removing personal responsibility. Wojtyła describes this possibility: “The man who in his attitude to values would rely solely on the way his feelings develop is confined to the orbit of what only happens in him and becomes incapable of self-determination.”³⁵⁶ Wojtyła comments on the extreme case of the absence of responsibility:

Such are the situations when man loses his ability to act consciously and hence also to be responsible, the situations when in his acting there is no real acting but only a special sort of happening—something happening in and with him, something that he neither determines nor fulfills. Neither can he be fully responsible for what is taking place, though we may well ask what is his responsibility for the development of the situation in which he can no longer have responsibilities.³⁵⁷

If the will yields to the psyche, then emotivity determines the person. The disintegration of the psychic dynamism can result in the disintegration of the psycho-somatic spiritual unity of the

³⁵⁴ PA, 253.

³⁵⁵ PA, 244.

³⁵⁶ PA, 233.

³⁵⁷ PA, 247.

person. Wojtyła sees, in the case of the psychic dynamism because it is interwoven with the soma and the spirit, that yielding to spontaneous efficacy, remaining passive, is especially significant because it brings with it moral questions and the very development of the person, the essential moment when passivity becomes activity. Disintegration leaves the person in an experience of passivity.

Yet, integration can be difficult. The difficulty, however, is not meant to cause us to reject psychic experience. Wojtyła names the Stoic school and Kant as embracing a perspective that would see emotions as the cause of disintegration, as advancing a perspective that would reject emotions. In contradistinction to this perspective he states: “The fact that with the emergence of an emotion or passion man is prompted to seek some sort of integration and this becomes a special task for him, does not signify in any way that they are in themselves a cause of disintegration.”³⁵⁸ Wojtyła own evaluation of emotions is decidedly positive. Sensitivity, he says, “is itself a valuable endowment that greatly enriches human nature. The ability to sense, the spontaneous ability to feel, values is the basis for many human talents.”³⁵⁹ Despite his embracing emotivity as an essential part of the human person, Wojtyła is realistic about the tension posed by spontaneous efficacy in terms of personal efficacy. He is realistic about the special task that the integration of the psyche presents for the person.

At this point, some final insights can be identified with regard to Wojtyła’s description of the integration of the psyche in action, the transition of the psychic dynamism from “it happens” to “I act.” Wojtyła fully embraces the role of emotions in the action of the human person. He

³⁵⁸ PA, 243.

³⁵⁹ PA, 234.

says that emotions are not to be denied, even if “a certain detachment...from spontaneously experienced values” is demanded in order to achieve personal efficacy.³⁶⁰

Wojtyła underscores the vividness to personal efficacy that the integration of the psyche brings to human experience. He says that even with the presence of spontaneous efficacy “integration remains possible and then emotion adds special vividness to efficacy and with it to the whole” person.³⁶¹ The experience of emotivity can be vivid, intense. The intensity of emotivity leads some people to reject emotion as an integral part of the human dynamism, leads them to equate control of emotions with suppression of emotions. While Wojtyła recognizes that the human person may yield to the intensity of spontaneous efficacy remaining passive, if emotivity is integrated into the personal dynamism, then that emotion adds vividness to personal efficacy, creating an “affective attitude”³⁶² or an “emotional attitude”³⁶³ of the person. In this way, the integration of the psyche energizes the action of the human person, it concentrates human experience by “running between corporality and spirituality.”³⁶⁴ Integrated in the action, an intense psychic dynamism colors the whole personal dynamism.

Each new stirring of the psychic dynamism presents a new opportunity, possibility, and need for integration into human action. Each new stirring needs to be evaluated whether the direction of spontaneous efficacy corresponds to the direction of personal efficacy, and is either then rejected or accepted through integration, with the result that spontaneous efficacy is gradually formed to be more aligned with personal efficacy. Of this constant renewal of opportunity, of possibility, and of the need for integration, Wojtyła writes, “In this sphere the

³⁶⁰ PA, 250.

³⁶¹ PA, 246.

³⁶² PA, 240.

³⁶³ PA, 245.

³⁶⁴ PA, 227.

integration of the acting person is a task that lasts until the end of a man's life."³⁶⁵ The development of the psyche is a life-long task, given the infinite spectrum of the stimuli of emotions.

3. Integration of the Psycho-Somatic Dynamism

Even though Wojtyła addresses the somatic and the psychic dynamisms separately, he also asserts that they are experienced together, as the bodily dynamism, the psycho-somatic dynamism. It is an experience that is characterized by passivity.³⁶⁶ Integration is when the psycho-somatic dynamism is aligned—accepted or rejected—by the will, when, Wojtyła says, the two dynamisms “surrender to the direction and control of the will.”³⁶⁷ With integration, the psycho-somatic dynamism is brought to the level of the person. Wojtyła writes, “The integration of the person in the action indicates...[an] introduction of somatic reactivity and psychical emotivity into the unity of the action—into the unity with the transcendence of the person expressed by efficacious self-determination that is simultaneously a conscious response to values.”³⁶⁸

Disintegration occurs when the experience of the psychosomatic dynamism remains passive.³⁶⁹ Disintegration is possible because of the tension between the “psychosomatic subjectivity of man,” and the subjectivity of the human person.³⁷⁰ Wojtyła acknowledges that there are types of disintegration, defects in the capacity to act. There are instances of somatic disintegration and instances of psychic disintegration. The personal effect of the moment of

³⁶⁵ PA, 253.

³⁶⁶ cf. PA, 198.

³⁶⁷ PA, 220.

³⁶⁸ PA, 225.

³⁶⁹ cf. PA, 202.

³⁷⁰ PA, 231.

passivity may be superficial. In these cases, the person retains the capacity of self-possession, self-determination, and efficacy. Disintegration in its most extreme form is the loss of the capacity to act. Wojtyła says that the “essential trait of disintegration...consists in the ‘insubordinativeness’ or ‘unpossessibility’ of the subjective ego.”³⁷¹ Disintegration in this way is the inability to integrate the psycho-somatic dynamism on the level of the person, resulting in the inability to increase the unity of the body and the soul.

Ultimately, the experience of the integration of the psycho-somatic dynamism reveals the presence of the spiritual element of the person. Wojtyła’s analysis of integration leads him back to the complementary principle of transcendence, to the subjective ego of the level of the person. Wojtyła writes, “While the body itself is the source of the reactive dynamism...and indirectly also for the emotive dynamism..., the integration of these two dynamisms has to have a common origin with the person’s transcendence.”³⁷² The difficulty for Wojtyła in identifying the origin of integration as found on the level of the person is that the metaphysical relationship between the body and the soul is not experienced by the person. There is a philosophical tension between the complexity of the human person—the two basic levels: the psychosomatic level and the spiritual level—and the unity of the person, which is a psycho-somatic spiritual unity. This tension is not resolved in either the analysis of transcendence or in the analysis of integration, because these are analyses of experience. Wojtyła asserts that the human person does not have a direct experience of the soul. The soul as the principle of integration is a philosophical conclusion, but not an experienced reality. He says:

Experience of the transcendence of the person in the action...is in no way equivalent to a direct experience of the soul. Similarly, we have to assert that experience of integration...cannot be identified with the experience—the direct discovering and

³⁷¹ PA, 195.

³⁷² PA, 258.

experiencing—of the soul-body relation. Both the reality itself of the soul and that of the soul's relation to the body are in this sense transphenomenal and extraexperiential.³⁷³

In other words, the tension between the unity and the complexity of the human person cannot be resolved phenomenologically. He says that his analyses “indicate something like a boundary in man, which sets a limit to the scope of the dynamism...of the body.”³⁷⁴ This boundary delineates the difference between the body and the soul, between the level of nature and the level of the person. The absence of a direct experience of the soul leads Wojtyła to assert that the reality of the soul and its relation to the body “needs a more comprehensive metaphysical expression.”³⁷⁵

Despite Wojtyła's statement that metaphysics is necessary to fully address hylomorphism, he ends his analysis with strong statements about the insight gained from experience. That is to say, the called-for comprehensive expression has its basis in a comprehensive experience. Wojtyła says: “Nevertheless, the total and comprehensive experience of man shows the soul as real and as staying in relation to the body. They have been both discovered and are continuously being discovered in the philosophical reflection resulting from human experience.”³⁷⁶ Through his description of transcendence and integration, Wojtyła sees the revelation of “a capacity of a spiritual nature that seems to lie at the root of the person's transcendence, but also indirectly of the integration of the person in the action.”³⁷⁷ Insofar as it is true that experience reveals the distinction, the boundary, between the body and the soul, that is not the full extent of what experience reveals. In fact, Wojtyła says that “Integration—precisely because it is the complementary aspect of the transcendence of the person in the

³⁷³ PA, 257.

³⁷⁴ PA, 258.

³⁷⁵ PA, 258. Wojtyła does not supply a metaphysical expression to this question in *Person and Act*.

³⁷⁶ PA, 257.

³⁷⁷ PA, 258.

action—tells us that the soul-body relation cuts across all the boundaries we find in experience and that it goes deeper and is more fundamental than they are.”³⁷⁸ That is, though integration, the unity of the body and soul is revealed more than any difference between them. Wojtyła presents the deep unity of the body and the soul.

In sum, the human person is to be understood as a unity of diverse and distinct dynamisms. The human person is a psycho-somatic spiritual unity, and is able to grow in this unity through action. Increased structural unity, self-fulfillment, is achieved through passing from passivity with regard to psycho-somatic dynamisms to action. The unity of the human person may be a metaphysical fact. But experience reveals that personal unity can be diminished through disintegration, and it can grow through action.

III. Intersubjectivity

In *Person and Act*, Wojtyła focuses on the human action of an individual. He is concerned with developing a comprehensive understanding of the inner experience of an individual human person. Wojtyła concludes *Person and Act* with a discussion of intersubjectivity accomplished by participation. Recognizing that human persons are part of communities, recognizing that an anthropology is inadequate without some treatment of interpersonal relationship, Wojtyła begins such an analysis at the end of this text. He says, “We will now investigate...the fact that actions can be performed by human individuals together with others...to draw attention to the diverse communal or social relations.”³⁷⁹ This acting together is intersubjectivity.

³⁷⁸ PA, 258.

³⁷⁹ PA, 261.

A. Intersubjectivity in Society

In developing the theme of intersubjectivity, Wojtyła engages concepts and terms of socio-political theory and ideologies (e.g. Communism). But his interest is not to develop a socio-political theory regarding the nature of society. Instead, he says, “our intention is to keep to our initial approach and to confine ourselves to the acting person as the first aim and the pivot of our investigations.”³⁸⁰ Wojtyła evaluates various understandings of humans cooperating, of acting together, some of which are more consonant than others regarding the philosophical anthropology that is the focus of *Person and Act*. He asserts that the measure of a political theory is the personalistic value. A social theory is judged according to whether there is transcendence and integration in an individual’s action while that person is acting together with others. Wojtyła says: “If we call this value ‘personalistic’ it is because the person performing the action *also fulfills himself in it*.”³⁸¹ Individuals acting together while also achieving personal fulfillment is participation. Wojtyła says: “participation...allows man, when he acts together with other men, to realize...at once the *authentically personalistic value*—the performance of the action and the fulfillment of himself in the action.”³⁸² Furthermore, participation creates the possibility of increased personal fulfillment.³⁸³ In other words, a person achieves fulfillment through action and, a person can achieve fulfillment in acting with others through participation. Participation is thus a relation with others, a relation that ensures personal fulfillment together with others.

Two perspectives that fall short of the personalistic value are individualism and totalism. Wojtyła describes them this way: “Individualism sees in the individual the supreme and

³⁸⁰ PA, 262.

³⁸¹ PA, 265.

³⁸² PA, 270.

³⁸³ cf. PA, 275.

fundamental good, to which all interests of the community or the society have to be subordinated, while objective totalism relies on the opposite principle and unconditionally subordinates the individual to the community or the society.”³⁸⁴ The deficiency of individualism is that it limits participation because it conceives of others as threats to the individual, not as collaborators. Wojtyła says, “from the individualistic point of view an essentially constituent human property that allows the person to fulfill himself in acting ‘together with others’ simply does not exist.”³⁸⁵ Totalism is contradictory to participation because it conceives of the individual as a threat to the whole. Wojtyła offers his evaluation of totalism saying, “the objective of totalism...is to protect a specific common good from the individual.”³⁸⁶ In the end, both individualism and totalism share a vision of the human person as incapable of participation. They are both opposed to personalism.³⁸⁷

Wojtyła also describes two other perspectives that are contrary to the personalistic value and participation: conformism and noninvolvement. On one hand, it serves society and the individual to act together with each other, to conform one’s actions to the whole. But, on the other hand, there is a servile conformism which suppresses individuality. This servile conformism Wojtyła sees as a nonauthentic attitude towards intersubjectivity. He says, “Thus conformism consists primarily in an attitude of compliance or resignation, in a specific form of passivity that makes the man-person to be but the subject of *what happens* instead of being the *actor* or *agent* responsible for building his own attitudes and his own commitment in the community.”³⁸⁸ The experience of passivity is fundamentally contrary to participation. Noninvolvement rises from a dissatisfaction with the community. Instead of confronting the

³⁸⁴ PA, 273.

³⁸⁵ PA, 274.

³⁸⁶ PA, 275.

³⁸⁷ cf. PA, 275.

³⁸⁸ PA, 289.

cause of dissatisfaction, the person simply withdraws from the community. Noninvolvement is a renunciation of participation. Wojtyła sees conformism and noninvolvement as sharing the same perspective of the human person. He says, “either attitude causes man to abandon his striving for fulfillment in acting ‘together with others’; he is convinced of being deprived of his prerogatives to be ‘himself’ by the community and thus tries to save it in isolation.”³⁸⁹ In both the attitude of conformism and the attitude of noninvolvement the result is the removal of participation. Wojtyła notes the lack of participation saying, “Under certain conditions ‘acting’ ... may change to denoting something that only ‘happens’ to a particular man under the influence of other human beings.”³⁹⁰ The nonauthentic attitudes juxtapose uniformity and unity.³⁹¹ Uniformity does not engage the differences of individuals acting together. Unity cannot be achieved if an individual is isolated from the community. Unity is only achieved through participation.

In contradistinction to individualism, totalism, conformism, and noninvolvement, Wojtyła describes the characteristics of an authentic community, of a community constituted by participation. He starts with a clarification. By speaking of the actions of the community, he does not intend that the community be considered as a proper subject of acting. The action of the community is comprised of the actions of the individual members. Wojtyła says, “Being and acting ‘together with others’ does not constitute a new subject of acting but only introduces new relations among the persons who are the real and actual subject of acting.”³⁹² Identification as a member in a community may be determined by external criteria. But membership in a community is authentic only if there is intersubjectivity by participation.³⁹³ While a given community may have a shared goal (e.g. constructing a building), the prior goal of an authentic

³⁸⁹ PA, 291.

³⁹⁰ PA, 270.

³⁹¹ cf. PA, 290.

³⁹² PA, 277.

³⁹³ cf. PA, 279.

community is intersubjectivity by participation.³⁹⁴ No external goal can equivalent to the goal of intersubjectivity.

Furthermore, not only does participation benefit the individual due to self-fulfillment, participation also benefits the community.³⁹⁵ Two attitudes that mark individuals in an authentic community are solidarity and opposition. Solidarity is accepting and doing one's responsibility in a community. Wojtyła says, "In accepting the attitude of solidarity man does what he is supposed to do not only because of his membership in the group, but because he has the 'benefit of the whole' in view: he does it for the 'common good.'"³⁹⁶ The other authentic attitude that Wojtyła describes is opposition as a particular manifestation of solidarity. Wojtyła says, "The one who voices his opposition to the general or particular rules or regulations of the community does not thereby reject his membership; he does not withdraw his readiness to act and to work for the common good."³⁹⁷ Those who stand in opposition, Wojtyła continues, "seek for *that* participation and *that* attitude to the common good which allow them a better, a fuller, and a more effective share of the communal life."³⁹⁸ An authentic community welcomes opposition. Wojtyła describes such a welcoming: "the structure, and beyond it the system of communities of a given society must be such as to allow the opposition that emerges from the soil of solidarity not only to *express* itself within the framework of the given community but also to *operate* for its benefit."³⁹⁹ Solidarity and opposition, as a particular expression of solidarity, are significant expressions of intersubjectivity.

³⁹⁴ cf. PA, 281.

³⁹⁵ cf. PA, 283.

³⁹⁶ PA, 285.

³⁹⁷ PA, 286.

³⁹⁸ PA, 286.

³⁹⁹ PA, 287.

B. Shared Humanity

Given the fact that there is a spectrum of participation—including non-participation—of members of a community, Wojtyła articulates a more fundamental way to identify the individuals in interpersonal relationships: the neighbor. Wojtyła says that the notion of being a neighbor “is thus more fundamental than the notion of membership in a community. Membership of any community presupposes the fact that men are neighbors, but it neither constitutes nor may abolish this fact.”⁴⁰⁰ Prior to membership in any community, the term, neighbor, conveys the reality that each human person shares in the humanness of every other human person. What it means to be a neighbor then has implications for participation. Wojtyła says, “It is this ability to participate in the humanness of every human being that all types of participation in a community are rooted, and it is there that it receives its personal meaning.”⁴⁰¹ The fundamental notion of neighbor leads Wojtyła to say of participation: “We may say this participation serves the fulfillment of persons in *any community* in which they act and exist. The ability to share in the *humanness itself of every man is the very core of all participation and the condition of the personalistic value of all acting and existing ‘together with others.’*”⁴⁰² Participation is linked to self-fulfillment in action and in helping others achieve self-fulfillment. Participation is the basis of all intersubjectivity, and intersubjectivity is accomplished by participation. On the contrary, Wojtyła notes that, “Any community detached from this fundamental community must unavoidably lose its specifically human character.”⁴⁰³

In the final section of *Person and Act*, Wojtyła comments on a principle that comes from Christian revelation, the evangelical commandment of love. Wojtyła does not cite a chapter or

⁴⁰⁰ PA, 293.

⁴⁰¹ PA, 294.

⁴⁰² PA, 295.

⁴⁰³ PA, 293.

verse of any Biblical text. The commandment is “You shall love your neighbor as yourself” (Lev. 19:18, Matt. 22:39, Mk. 12:31, Lk. 10:27).⁴⁰⁴ But Wojtyła never cites the commandment as a whole. Rather, he only cites it in phrases (e.g. “You shall love.”). The exact reason why Wojtyła includes in this philosophical text an evangelical principle is not stated. He calls it “appropriate” to include it.⁴⁰⁵ Perhaps the appropriateness is related to the fact that the evangelical commandment of love is a most common phrase that is connected with the notion of another person as my “neighbor” which has significance for his treatment of intersubjectivity. As a command, a norm, it brings the conversation towards ethics, which Wojtyła notes is bound up with the evaluation of socio-political theory judged according to their personalistic value. But, in this section, Wojtyła does not turn to ethics. Moreover, Wojtyła never develops any theological theme, even if he does not deny the connection with theology and opens the conversation to possible theological development. In the end, Wojtyła treats the evangelical commandment of love as a Gospel formulation that happens to coincide with the philosophical themes that he has developed. Wojtyła says, “our aim is only to emphasize the confirmation it contains for our claim that the reference system centered on ‘thy neighbor’ has a crucial significance in any acting and existing ‘together with others.’”⁴⁰⁶

The commandment of love corresponds to participation, and a disregard of the other as “your neighbor” leads to alienation. Wojtyła says that alienation “stems from a disregard for, or a neglect of, that depth of participation which is indicated in the term ‘neighbor’ and by the neglect of the interrelations and intersubordinations of men in their humanness expressed by this term, which indicates the most fundamental principle of any real community.”⁴⁰⁷ Alienation

⁴⁰⁴ Unless otherwise noted, Biblical citations are from the *New American Bible Revised Edition* (NABRE).

⁴⁰⁵ PA, 295.

⁴⁰⁶ PA, 295.

⁴⁰⁷ PA, 297.

creates a division between the person and the community. Ultimately, Wojtyła says, alienation “leads to the disintegration of the community itself.”⁴⁰⁸ The commandment of love contains within it the principle that allows a human person to achieve self-fulfillment and a community to grow in the personalistic value. Wojtyła concludes: “The commandment of love is also the measure of the tasks and demands that have to be faced by all men—all persons and all communities—if the whole good contained in the acting and being ‘together with others’ is to become a reality.”⁴⁰⁹

The treatment of the commandment of love is the last part of Wojtyła’s sketch of intersubjectivity accomplished by participation. The outline of the sketch is that, based on shared humanity, a human person should fulfill themselves when acting with other members of a community. The community should not inhibit an individual’s personal fulfillment. Through intersubjectivity by participation, both the community grows in its personalistic value and the human person increases the possibility of greater personal fulfillment.

IV. Summary

Inner human experience is complex. There is a constant need to raise psychosomatic dynamisms to the level of the person through integration. Interpersonal interactions are authentic if each person does and is able to do integration.

Throughout *Person and Act*, Wojtyła maintains the distinction between philosophy and theology. His inclusion of a biblical precept in *Person and Act* illustrates the consonance between a philosophical anthropology and revelation, without admitting of a confusion between the two. The consonance of the two is foundational to the *Theology of the Body*.

⁴⁰⁸ PA, 298.

⁴⁰⁹ PA, 299.

Chapter 4

Karol Wojtyła's Philosophical Anthropology: *Love and Responsibility*

The *Theology of the Body* takes up questions of marriage ethics, as well as of anthropology. *Person and Act* details much of Wojtyła's philosophical anthropology. *Person and Act* offers a description of the human acts of an individual. *Love and Responsibility* offers a description of interpersonal relationship, especially the ethical implications of interpersonal human action. *Love and Responsibility* details Wojtyła's understanding of marriage ethics.⁴¹⁰

This chapter examines *Love and Responsibility* and Wojtyła's treatment of the personalistic norm.

I. Love and Responsibility

Love and Responsibility is primarily concerned with a philosophical treatment of the ethics of sexuality, marriage, and parenthood, rather than anthropology. *Love and Responsibility* is an earlier work than *Person and Act*.⁴¹¹ Yet the philosophical anthropology of *Love and Responsibility* is consistent with his later work, *Person and Act*, with regard to the analyses of human experience, even if in his later work there is an increased precision in his technical language. In this way, *Love and Responsibility* can be seen as a particular application of his general philosophical anthropology—an application of action in the context of interpersonal human love—as well as an analysis of action in terms of morality. Wojtyła justifies this perspective in *Person and Act* when discussing the integration of the soma, he says: “The point of view of ethics on the need for controlling the sexual drive was discussed more fully by the author in another book, the theme of which is human love and the ensuing responsibilities, where

⁴¹⁰ Karol Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, tr. H.T. Willetts (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993). I will denote all subsequent citations from the work as “LR.”

⁴¹¹ *Love and Responsibility* was first published in 1960. *Person and Act* was first published in 1969.

also the purely somatic structures, whereby the instinct of sex manifests itself, are considered.”⁴¹² Furthermore, given that *Person and Act* ends by opening up to the question of intersubjectivity, *Love and Responsibility* might be seen as an articulation of the analysis of intersubjectivity, albeit in terms of the specific case of human sexuality. In *Love and Responsibility*, Wojtyła draws the connection between philosophical anthropology, normative ethical values, and interpersonal communion.

In terms of methodology, in *Love and Responsibility* Wojtyła acknowledges the role of experience. In the text, certainly, there is an awareness of standards of sexual ethics, especially from the Catholic Tradition. But Wojtyła does not appeal to them as the starting point of the analysis. Instead, *Love and Responsibility* is the fruit of many years of Wojtyła’s pastoral work, of persons sharing their experiences with their pastor and confidant. Through the experiences of others, Wojtyła was able to reflect on and synthesize an understanding of love—love between persons, between man and woman.⁴¹³ This synthesis is used to create a general understanding of the love between man and woman rather than casuistically looking at the individual experiences of men and women, “all of which,” Wojtyła says, “are in some way accommodated within the general view.”⁴¹⁴ It is the synthesis of thought and experience that he presents as the basis of the norms of Catholic sexual morality.

A. The Personalistic Norm: Responsibility and Love

The foundational insight and ethical reference point of *Love and Responsibility* is the personalistic norm.

⁴¹² PA, 219.

⁴¹³ cf. LR, 15.

⁴¹⁴ LR, 17.

1. Positive Formulation of the Personalistic Norm

Wojtyła offers both a negative and a positive formulation of the personalistic norm.

Negatively formulated, the norm is: the person “cannot be treated as an object of use.”⁴¹⁵

Positively formulated, it is: “the person is a good towards which the only proper and adequate attitude is love.”⁴¹⁶ Wojtyła offers another version of the positive formulation, where he says: “a person is an entity of a sort to which the only proper and adequate way to relate is love.”⁴¹⁷

The significant difference between these two positive formulations is the words “attitude” and “relate.” Given that attitude and relation are not exactly the same thing, these two terms amplify the positive formulations. This amplified understanding of the personalistic norm can be captured with this reformulation: The only proper and adequate response to a person is love. This reformulation introduces the term “response.” Admittedly, Wojtyła never uses the word “response” in this context. He never uses a formulation of the personalistic norm that includes “response,” despite the fact that the title of the work includes “responsibility.” This reformulation is justified by the precision in language of his later anthropological work. “Reaction,” or even “attitude,” does not adequately articulate the process of integrating psychosomatic dynamisms to the level of the person. “Response” is more consonant with his anthropology to describe the action of a person than “reaction” is. Moreover, the description of interpersonal relationship as response aligns with the analyses Wojtyła goes on to offer in *Love and Responsibility* itself.

The personalistic norm identifies each individual as a person in the interpersonal relationship. And each person has a subjective and objective reality. Wojtyła says: “We must, then, be clear right from the start *that every subject also exists as an object, an objective*

⁴¹⁵ LR, 41.

⁴¹⁶ LR, 41.

⁴¹⁷ LR, 41.

'something' or 'somebody.'"⁴¹⁸ As a person, a subject has an inner life, a spiritual life. Wojtyła says, "A person is, of course, among all the varied objects of the visible world, that unusual one which is endowed with an inner self of its own, and is capable of an inner life."⁴¹⁹ The dual subjective and objective reality is true for both persons in an interpersonal relationship. In one sense, the other person is an object. In another sense, the other person is a subject. The personalistic norm acknowledges the subjectivity of the other. The other person is not simply an object, a stimulus that stirs one's psycho-somatic dynamism. The other person has both an objective and a subjective reality, with the subjective reality being primary. Wojtyła says: "We know already that the subject and the object of the action alike are persons."⁴²⁰ A subject interacts with the world outside of themselves as objects, but some of those objects are subjects, as well.

In the positive formulation of the personalistic norm, Wojtyła uses the words "proper" and "adequate." The subjectivity of the other conditions one's response. It is appropriate (proper) to respond in love to the other, and any other response to the person would be inadequate. Love is the only proper and adequate response, when a subject is the object of one's action.

2. Love

Love is central to the positive formulation of the personalistic norm. Wojtyła offers an analysis of love in *Love and Responsibility*. He recognizes that "love" can be applied to any number of contexts. So he narrows the focus to interpersonal love between a man and a woman.

⁴¹⁸ LR, 21.

⁴¹⁹ LR, 114. Along the same lines he says, "*A person is an objective entity, which as a definite subject has the closest contacts with the whole (external) world and is most intimately involved with it precisely because of its inwardness, its interior life,*" (LR, 23).

⁴²⁰ LR, 24.

He begins his analysis of this sort of love with a metaphysical analysis. After describing love as attraction (i.e. to like another, captured by the Latin philosophical phrase, *amor complacentia*) and desire (i.e. to want and to need to be one with another, captured by the Latin philosophical phrase, *amor concupiscentia*)—and offering a phenomenological description of these experiences—Wojtyła considers love as goodwill (captured by the Latin philosophical phrase, *amor benevolentiae*). He describes goodwill this way: “*Good will is the same as selflessness in love:... ‘I long for that which is good for you’.* The person of goodwill longs for this with no selfish ulterior motive, no personal consideration.”⁴²¹ Love as goodwill has metaphysical consequences. Wojtyła says: “Such love does more than any other to perfect the person who experiences it, brings both the subject and the object of that love the greatest fulfillment.”⁴²² He further describes love in this way: “love is the fullest realization of the possibilities inherent in man. The potential inherent in the human person is most fully actualized through love. The person finds in love the greatest possible fullness of being, of objective existence.”⁴²³ The appropriate response to a person is selfless goodwill, which, consequently, results in the fulfillment of persons.

Wojtyła furthers his analysis of love with a psychological analysis. He acknowledges that a subject perceives both the existence of and the value of objects. These perceptions take place on the psychic level of the person, with a spectrum of experiences. Wojtyła says: “A sense impression is a reaction to content, an emotion is a reaction to value.”⁴²⁴ Specifically in terms of love, Wojtyła says, “Thus there arises a sort of ‘external’ image of the other person. Is this image merely a reflection of a ‘body’? No, it is a reflection of a ‘human being’, a human being of the

⁴²¹ LR, 83.

⁴²² LR, 84.

⁴²³ LR, 82.

⁴²⁴ LR, 103.

other sex.”⁴²⁵ The subject’s perception of the other stirs up psychic reactions. And, this perception, even of the sexual value of the other, is amoral.⁴²⁶ Wojtyła calls one perception of the sexual value of the other sensuality, and another he calls sentimentality. He says, “When this emotion has as its object a sexual value residing in the ‘body’...it is a manifestation of sensuality,” whereas a reaction to a “non-material value” of the other is sentimentality.⁴²⁷ Neither sensuality, nor sentimentality, is the same as love. In the case of sensuality Wojtyła says, “At the same time, we must recognize that when man and woman come together, sensuality, as the natural reaction to a person of the other sex, is a sort of raw material for true, conjugal love.”⁴²⁸ As the basis of love, sensuality demands integration. Wojtyła says, “The yearning for a sexual value connected with ‘the body’...demands integration: it must become an integral part of a fully formed and mature attitude to the person, or else it is certainly not love.”⁴²⁹ Sentimentality likewise demands integration.⁴³⁰ Wojtyła notes that integration requires freedom. He says, “That which does not derive from freedom, that which bears the marks not of free commitment, but of determination and compulsion, cannot be acknowledged as love, lacks its essential character. Therefore, the process of psychological integration which accompanies sexual love...involves not only commitment of the will, but unconditional commitment of the will.”⁴³¹ But love as the integration in freedom of sensuality and sentimentality is a great drama.

Wojtyła says:

Love is certainly a drama in the sense that it is made up of happenings and of action (to do, to act is the meaning of the Greek word ‘drao’, from which ‘drama’ comes). Thus, the ‘*dramatis personae*’ discover the plot of this drama in themselves, perceive their love as

⁴²⁵ LR, 104-105.

⁴²⁶ cf. LR, 106.

⁴²⁷ LR, 109.

⁴²⁸ LR, 108.

⁴²⁹ LR, 108.

⁴³⁰ cf. LR, 113.

⁴³¹ LR, 117.

a psychological situation unique of its kind, and one of great and absorbing importance in their inner lives.⁴³²

Wojtyła's psychological analysis of love reveals that there is much taking place in the inner life of a person before there is a manifestation (proper and adequate) of love.

Wojtyła offers the details of this drama. The drama begins with the stirring of the sexual urge. There is an immediate tension with freedom, which has moral significance.⁴³³ Wojtyła comments on this experienced inner conflict saying, "*Man is by nature capable of rising above instinct in his actions. ...If it were otherwise, morality would have no meaning in this context.*"⁴³⁴ The question of morality raises the question of responsibility. Wojtyła says, "Man is not responsible for what *happens* to him in the sphere of sex since he is obviously not himself not the cause of it, but he is entirely responsible for what he *does* in this sphere."⁴³⁵ In the drama of love, in response to the other, the one must act. Wojtyła says: "For although love grows out of the sexual urge and develops on that basis and in the conditions which the sexual urge creates in the psycho-physiological lives of concrete people, it is none the less given its definitive shape by *acts of will at the level of the person.*"⁴³⁶ Once again, the only proper and adequate response to a person is love.

In a summary statement of his analysis of love, Wojtyła says: "love develops on the basis of the totally committed and fully responsible attitude of a person to a person, erotic experiences are born spontaneously from sensual and emotional reactions."⁴³⁷ In terms of his later work, this summary describes the psychosomatic dynamism and the levels of the person— the need to raise the psychosomatic dynamism (e.g. emotivity) to the level of the person, to the level of action. In

⁴³² LR, 114.

⁴³³ LR, 45.

⁴³⁴ LR, 46.

⁴³⁵ LR, 47.

⁴³⁶ LR, 49.

⁴³⁷ LR, 145.

this way, love is the integration of the psycho-somatic spiritual unity of the person, specifically with regard to sexual stirrings.⁴³⁸

B. Use and the Negative Formulation of the Personalistic Norm

Wojtyła also offers an ethical analysis of love, which incorporates his presentations on use and virtue, hinging on the negative formulation of the personalistic norm.

In the negative formulation of the personalistic norm, which states that the person cannot be treated as an object of use, use is a central concept. Wojtyła defines use in this way: “*To use means to employ some object of action as a means to an end*—the specific end which the subject has in view...the means serves both the end and the subject.”⁴³⁹ Use is when a person chooses to not respect the subjectivity/personhood of the other, relating to them in an improper and inadequate way. One moral problem, Wojtyła says, with subjecting the other person to the ends of the subject is that it might not “allow for the fact that he or she, too, has, or at least should have, distinct personal ends.”⁴⁴⁰ To treat another person as a means to an end attempts to reduce the other to an object, disregarding their subjectivity. The other is not treated as an equal but is subservient to the one.

One particular way in which one may use the other of the opposite sex is enjoyment. Wojtyła says, “man...can, in his actions, not only clearly distinguish pleasure from its opposite, but can also isolate it, so to speak, and treat it as a distinct aim of his activity. His actions are then shaped only with a view to the pleasure he wishes to obtain.”⁴⁴¹ Furthermore, Wojtyła says:

⁴³⁸ In his chapter on “Sexology and Ethics” (LR, 265-288), Wojtyła returns to the topic of the sexual urge (LR, 268-270), adding some detail to the physical and psychological character of the stirring of the sexual urge. But he maintains there the same philosophical, ethical conclusions expressed here.

⁴³⁹ LR, 25.

⁴⁴⁰ LR, 28.

⁴⁴¹ LR, 33.

“If actions involving a person of the opposite sex are shaped exclusively or primarily with this in view, then that person will become only the means to an end—and ‘use’ in its second meaning (=enjoy) represents, as we see, a particular variant of ‘use’ in its first meaning.”⁴⁴²

Wojtyła takes for a fact that in a relationship between a man and a woman there is pleasure. He notes “the particular richness, variety and intensity of those emotional-affective experiences and states which occur when the object of activity is a person of the opposite sex.”⁴⁴³ The presence of pleasure is not immoral but making it a distinct aim of the relationship is. A person uses the other when their own physical or psychological satisfaction, for instance, is the aim of the interaction. On one hand, Wojtyła says, one may “attempt artificially to divorce body and sex from the person, so that they are left alone as a ‘possible object of use’ or else,” on the other hand, one may reduce the other in their perception “to a valuation of the person exclusively as ‘body and sex’, as an object for use. In either case, we have something completely incompatible with the value of the person as such.”⁴⁴⁴ The separation or removal of the value of the person can easily result in one person using the other. Wojtyła says regarding the absence of the value of the person as such in a relationship of love: “This further means that sensuality by itself is not love and may very easily become its opposite.”⁴⁴⁵

Wojtyła offers a solution to the moral problem of using the other, of subjecting the other to the one, by sharing a common good.⁴⁴⁶ Wojtyła says, “*When two different people consciously choose a common aim* this puts them on a footing of equality, and precludes the possibility that

⁴⁴² LR, 33.

⁴⁴³ LR, 32. He adds, “Pleasure appears in different guises or shades—depending on the emotional-affective experiences with which it is connected. It may be either sensual satisfaction, or emotional contentment, or a profound, a total joy” (LR, 32).

⁴⁴⁴ LR, 107.

⁴⁴⁵ LR, 108.

⁴⁴⁶ cf. LR, 28.

the one of them might be subordinated to the other.”⁴⁴⁷ The other ceases to be a means to the end or the one. Sharing a common good prevents use. To complete his analysis of use, Wojtyła considers utilitarianism and its particular application to the question of love.⁴⁴⁸ In this context, Wojtyła names the utilitarian principle as the “greatest possible pleasure for each of the two persons.”⁴⁴⁹ In this instance, it might seem that there is a common good: the greatest possible pleasure for both. But, in reality, Wojtyła says, “utilitarianism introduces into their relationship a paradoxical pattern: each of the persons is mainly concerned with gratifying his or her own egoism, but at the same time consents to serve someone else’s egoism, because this can provide the opportunity for such gratification—and just as long as it does so.”⁴⁵⁰ Wojtyła says that choice is to replace the human person as the basis of ethical norms to using pleasure “as a superlative value and the proper basis for a norm of behavior.”⁴⁵¹ Use and love are opposites.

Wojtyła continues his ethical analysis of love by speaking of love as a virtue. He says that the proper and adequate response to a person is especially found in the “affirmation of the value of the person.”⁴⁵² Love as a virtue is found in responding to the whole person, especially primarily the level of the person. Wojtyła says, “The person as such must be the real object of choice, not values associated with that person, irrelevant to his or her intrinsic value.”⁴⁵³ The non-intrinsic values of the other include his or her body, and the cause of physical and psychological pleasure. While Wojtyła accounts for these non-intrinsic values having a proper place in love,⁴⁵⁴ these values, independent of the affirmation of the value of the person, do not

⁴⁴⁷ LR, 28.

⁴⁴⁸ Wojtyła mentions Immanuel Kant as an opponent of utilitarianism (cf. LR, 37). For a more detailed comparison between Wojtyła and Kant, see Waldstein, *Man and Woman He Created Them*, 34-63.

⁴⁴⁹ LR, 39.

⁴⁵⁰ LR, 39.

⁴⁵¹ LR, 43.

⁴⁵² LR, 121.

⁴⁵³ LR, 133.

⁴⁵⁴ cf. LR, 127.

form the basis of love. He says that sexual values, which act upon the senses and the emotions as “the sole or the main motive for choosing a person...would be faulty and invalid, since it would not conform to the full truth about the object of choice, the person. Such a choice is inevitably the starting point for a love incapable of integration, a love that is defective and invalid.”⁴⁵⁵ Wojtyła continues: “True love, a love that is internally complete, is one in which we choose the person for the sake of the person,—that in which a man chooses a woman or a woman chooses a man not just as a sexual ‘partner’ but as the person on whom to bestow the gift of his or her own life.”⁴⁵⁶ The moral choice of love is found in not yielding to the stirrings on the somatic and psychic levels. Wojtyła says, “The sexual instinct wants above all to take over, to make use of another person, whereas love wants to give, to create a good, to bring happiness.”⁴⁵⁷ At its core, in a relationship of love, a person can either affirm the value of the person or use the other. A person can either follow the personalistic norm or not. Because of free will, because of the possibility of virtue, the person is responsible for whether they grow in virtue or commit sin. Wojtyła says, “Nowhere else in the whole book, perhaps, is its title, *Love and Responsibility*, more to the point that it is here.”⁴⁵⁸ Moral choices are his focus here.

Wojtyła ends his ethical analysis on love with the statement that it is a gift and a task. The man and woman must choose to increase in the virtue of love. Wojtyła says, “Love should be seen as something which in a sense never ‘is’ but is always only ‘becoming.’”⁴⁵⁹ Love can increase in a relationship. Choosing love and growing in love as a virtue is the responsibility of the person.

⁴⁵⁵ LR, 133.

⁴⁵⁶ LR, 134.

⁴⁵⁷ LR, 138.

⁴⁵⁸ LR, 130.

⁴⁵⁹ LR, 139.

II. Application of the Personalistic Norm

In terms of Wojtyła's philosophical anthropology, the difference between love and use is the presence or absence of the integration of the psychosomatic sexual dynamism with the personal dynamism. With his ethical considerations, Wojtyła expands the meaning of integration and disintegration to include both the "integration of love 'within' the person and 'between' persons."⁴⁶⁰ Wojtyła says that failure to observe the personalistic norm results in "a love incapable of integration," incapable of being a relationship of love.⁴⁶¹ The possibility of relationships that lack integration within and between the persons is significant. Wojtyła says, "These reflections on love have, however, repeatedly reminded us that there is an insidious possibility of disintegration in relationships between men and women."⁴⁶² Moreover, Wojtyła acknowledges that "the sexual relationship presents more opportunities than most other activities for treating a person...as an object of use."⁴⁶³ Wojtyła uses the phrase "the value of the body and sex" or "sexual values" to refer to both the visible aspects and the psychological aspects of the other that are sexually attractive, the woman for the man, the man for the woman.⁴⁶⁴ "The value of the body and sex" or "sexual values" are what can bring physical or psychological satisfaction. The "value of the person" refers to the inner life of the person that his anthropology reveals. Wojtyła says, "We should not think of this manner of seeing and desiring as 'a-sexual', as blind to the value of 'the body and sex'; it is simply that this value must be correctly integrated with love of the person—love in the proper and full sense of the word."⁴⁶⁵ The

⁴⁶⁰ LR, 140.

⁴⁶¹ LR, 133.

⁴⁶² LR, 140.

⁴⁶³ LR, 30.

⁴⁶⁴ He says: "So in every situation in which we experience the 'sexual' value of a person, love demands integration, meaning the incorporation of that value in the value of the person, or indeed its subordination of the value of the person" (LR, 123).

⁴⁶⁵ LR, 159.

integration of the sexual value with the value of the person is an ethical integration between the persons. Use is the cause of disintegration.

A. Chastity

Integration between persons is often achieved through chastity. By recognizing that the other is a subject, chastity ensures that a person acts on the personal level and not reacts. While presenting chastity as a virtue, Wojtyła refers to Aquinas' treatment of chastity as a virtue, where chastity is subordinated "to the cardinal virtue of moderation."⁴⁶⁶ Wojtyła points out that central to Aquinas' understanding of chastity is that it is effective, "a matter of efficiency in controlling the concupiscent impulses."⁴⁶⁷ Isolated cases of integration are not enough to be considered a virtue. Wojtyła credits Aquinas' treatment with revealing that chastity as virtue ensures that effectively, habitually, integration is achieved. In the practice of chastity, Wojtyła acknowledges that chastity is often understood as an "inhibition of sensuality and of physical impulses."⁴⁶⁸ As an expression of the virtue of moderation, however, chastity can be seen as something more than inhibition. Wojtyła says, "For by 'moderating' the feelings and actions connected with the sexual values we serve the values of the person and of love."⁴⁶⁹ While Wojtyła associates chastity with the virtue of moderation, he wants to underscore its association with the virtue of love.⁴⁷⁰ Love is the affirmation of the other. Wojtyła says, chastity "is above all the 'yes' of which certain 'no's' are the consequence. ...The essence of chastity consists in quickness to affirm the value of the person in every situation, and in raising to the personal level all reactions

⁴⁶⁶ LR, 168.

⁴⁶⁷ LR, 169.

⁴⁶⁸ LR, 170.

⁴⁶⁹ LR, 171.

⁴⁷⁰ cf. LR, 169.

to the value of ‘the body and sex.’”⁴⁷¹ Rather than understanding chastity as inhibition of the unclean, Wojtyła understands chastity as affirmation of the other.⁴⁷² He says: “Love must be so to speak pellucid: through all the sensations, all the actions which originate in it we must always be able to discern an attitude to a person of the opposite sex which derives from sincere affirmation of the worth of that person.”⁴⁷³

Wojtyła furthers his presentation on chastity with a phenomenological description of some of the dynamics involved in exercising the virtue of chastity. He recognizes that there are particular challenges to chastity—on the level of the soma and on the level of the psyche. Prior to the moral choice to love or to use, is the stirring of sensuality, which is, in the words of Wojtyła, the arousal of “sensual interest or even absorption in the sexual values connected ‘with the body.’”⁴⁷⁴ Usually, the body is the first sexual value encountered. Wojtyła says that sexual values “impinge upon the subject, while concupiscence implies that the subject actively seeks the value in question.”⁴⁷⁵ The shift from arousal of interest to concupiscence is the shift from “it happens” to “I act.” This seeking of the sexual value of the other is not yet the desire to possess that value for the satisfaction of pleasure, which is the next step. The desire to possess the sexual value of the other is a closely connected inner dynamism to sensual concupiscence. Wojtyła says: “The obvious ease of transition from each stage to the next—from the arousal of interest to sensual concupiscence, from sensual concupiscence to carnal desire—is the source of great tensions in the inner life of the person.”⁴⁷⁶ Carnal desire might then progress to the use of the sexual value of the other for the satisfaction of pleasure. Wojtyła says, “Carnal concupiscence

⁴⁷¹ LR, 170.

⁴⁷² cf. LR, 146, where Wojtyła notes that the etymology of “chaste” is related to “clean.”

⁴⁷³ LR, 146.

⁴⁷⁴ LR, 148.

⁴⁷⁵ LR, 148.

⁴⁷⁶ LR, 148.

impels, very powerfully impels, people towards physical intimacy, towards sexual intercourse.”⁴⁷⁷ The temptation to use the other is not limited to physical satisfaction. A person might also use another for their psychological satisfaction, as a distinct way in which concupiscence can lead to use. Wojtyła says: “Let us add that emotional egoism can be the cause of unchastity in a relationship between a man and a woman just as surely as sensual egoism, though in a different way.”⁴⁷⁸ Intimacy that is rooted in the desire for self-satisfaction is the negation of love.⁴⁷⁹

1. Aide to Chastity: Shame

The progression from attraction to use can be overcome through the virtue of chastity. Wojtyła continues his phenomenological description of chastity by examining shame and continence, as components of chastity.⁴⁸⁰ A first aide to exercising the virtue of chastity is shame. Different than a moral sense of being ashamed or guilty, Wojtyła defines shame this way: “*Shame is a tendency, uniquely characteristic of the human person, to conceal sexual values sufficiently to prevent them from obscuring the value of the person as such.*”⁴⁸¹ In this way, shame covers over one’s own physical and psychical sexual values, so as not to be used, so as to be responded to as a person.⁴⁸² Wojtyła further defines shame: “shame is a natural *form of self-defence for the person* against the danger of descending or being pushed into the position of

⁴⁷⁷ LR, 150.

⁴⁷⁸ LR, 158. The way to use, in this case, starts with sentimentality and not sensuality, but follows similar stages: arousal of sentiment based on the sexual value of the other, emotional concupiscence, emotional desire, and the satisfaction of psychological pleasure.

⁴⁷⁹ cf. LR, 150.

⁴⁸⁰ cf. LR, 173.

⁴⁸¹ LR, 187.

⁴⁸² An illustration of this might be modest dress. In this section, Wojtyła discusses modesty, the covering over nakedness with clothes (LR, 175-176), but asserts that the two are not synonymous.

an object for sexual use.”⁴⁸³ Shame keeps sexual values from overshadowing the value of the person.

2. Aide to Chastity: Continence

A second aide to chastity is continence. If shame helps to prevent the stirring of sensuality and sentimentality, then continence is what “contains” the stirrings when present. Continence results in the absence of sexual intimacy. Continence is self-mastery, self-determination. When the happenings of sensuality and sentimentality are felt, continence raises these psycho-somatic dynamisms to the level of the person and ensures that one responds to the other. When physical intimacy would be an instance of use, continence ensures that the response to the other does not include physical intimacy or sexual intercourse. Continence is not a denial of sensuality and sensibility, but a placing of the value of the person above sexual values. Wojtyła says: “There is no valid continence without recognition of the objective order of values: the value of the person is higher than the values of sex.”⁴⁸⁴ An act of continence is a human action that is “contained” within the interiority of the person.

Wojtyła continues his phenomenological description of chastity by contradicting an understanding of chastity, shame, and continence, which sees their ideal as seeking to eliminate psychosomatic dynamisms because of the challenge that they pose. He says: “If we have a realistic conception of man we must acknowledge that both sensual excitability and sentimental susceptibility are natural to him, fundamentally consonant with his nature, and therefore do not fundamentally contradict the realization of love in the world of persons, especially the love

⁴⁸³ LR, 182.

⁴⁸⁴ LR, 197.

which unites the man and the woman.”⁴⁸⁵ Wojtyła articulates this point more fully, when he acknowledges the specific challenge that psychosomatic dynamisms can present to a response of love. He comments on the dynamisms saying, “Indeed, every man must effectively deploy the energies latent in his sensuality and his sentiments, so that they become allies in his striving for authentic love, for they may, as we know, also be its foes.”⁴⁸⁶ Wojtyła emphasizes that both components of chastity, shame and continence, facilitate the response of love, recognizing the other as a person, and not as an object of use. Wojtyła says, “The essence of chastity consists in quickness to affirm the value of the person in every situation, and in raising to the personal level all reactions to the value of ‘the body and sex.’”⁴⁸⁷ Chastity—rather than a negation or devaluing of physical and psychical happenings—is the affirmation of the value of the other person and the raising of one’s own reactions to the level of action, as a response of love.

At several points during his treatment of chastity, Wojtyła points to the integration of psychosomatic dynamisms into love, specifically the integration of sensuality and sentimentality into married love. He says, “*For the value of the person must be not merely understood by the cold light of reason but felt.*”⁴⁸⁸ Through shame and continence, the person is affirmed. Wojtyła says, the “affirmation of the person influences the emotions in such a way that the value of the person is not just abstractly understood but deeply felt.”⁴⁸⁹ The language here of the affirmation of the person being deeply felt in love corresponds to the description of the integration of the psychosomatic dynamisms in action. Wojtyła says: “This is the point at which love is psychologically complete and sexual shame can be thoroughly absorbed.”⁴⁹⁰ In the virtue of

⁴⁸⁵ LR, 195.

⁴⁸⁶ LR, 200.

⁴⁸⁷ LR, 171.

⁴⁸⁸ LR, 199.

⁴⁸⁹ LR, 184.

⁴⁹⁰ LR, 184.

love, sensuality and sentimentality are integrated (i.e. “absorbed”) on the personal level as an affirmation of the person.

Given the realities of the mutual relationship of love between a man and a woman, Wojtyła offers further treatment of shame as it relates to love. Sensuality and sentimentality are to be integrated and not rejected. Wojtyła says of these dynamisms:

Since it is particularly likely to become an object of use because of its sexual values, the tendency to conceal them comes into being—but to conceal them only to a certain extent, so that in combination with the value of the person they can still be a point of origin for love.⁴⁹¹

Shame ensures the affirmation of the person. As each person is confident that one is making a response in love to the other, then the covering over of the reactions can be uncovered. In a response of love, Wojtyła says, “the man and the woman are no longer ashamed to be sharing their experience of sexual values.”⁴⁹² That which was covered over, through shame and continence, can be uncovered in a relationship of love. The virtue of love demands that each new stirring of sensuality and sentimentality be a response in love, because each new stirring presents the possibility of use. In this light, Wojtyła says, “The shared experience of sexual values is always attended by circumstances which demand a measure of concealment.”⁴⁹³ This realistic understanding of the role of shame in love, however, does not negate the proper place that sensuality and sentimentality have in married love.

Wojtyła ends his treatment of chastity with a description of tenderness. Wojtyła says: “*Tenderness is the ability to feel with and for the whole person, to feel even the most deeply hidden spiritual tremors, and always to have in mind the true good of that person.*”⁴⁹⁴

⁴⁹¹ LR, 187.

⁴⁹² LR, 181.

⁴⁹³ LR, 181.

⁴⁹⁴ LR, 207.

Tenderness is a particular expression of the integration of sensuality and sentimentality in love.

Tenderness is an integral part of the fruit of chastity that leads to love.

B. Marriage and Virginity

In *Love and Responsibility*, Wojtyła diverges from his philosophical treatment in a way: he makes a connection between his philosophical anthropology and some points from a theology of marriage and of virginity.

1. Marriage Ethics

Wojtyła recognizes the personalistic norm as the foundation of monogamy and indissolubility. He says that their mutual adherence to the personalistic norm is the framework “which permits the full development of the sexual relationship [i.e. monogamy] while ensuring the durability of their union [i.e. indissolubility].”⁴⁹⁵ Since monogamy means that a person has only one spouse (so long as that spouse is alive), Wojtyła asserts that having another sexual relationship (e.g. extra-marital affair or divorce and remarriage), while a spouse is still living, equates to using that spouse and is thus a violation of the personalistic norm.⁴⁹⁶ Furthermore, he says that the principle of strict monogamy and indissolubility “is a difficult principle to observe, but an indispensable one if the life together of persons of different sex (and ultimately human life at large, which is to such a great extent based on this relationship) are to be raised to level of the person and accommodated within the bounds of love.”⁴⁹⁷ In his analysis of sexology, where he details some the physical and psychological aspects of sexual intercourse, details largely

⁴⁹⁵ LR, 211.

⁴⁹⁶ cf. LR, 216.

⁴⁹⁷ LR, 215.

supplied by a medical, clinical view of sexual intercourse, Wojtyła asserts that the principles of monogamy and indissolubility align with clinical sexology.⁴⁹⁸

With these principles established, Wojtyła speaks of marriage as an institution, as having a place in society. He says, “Marriage is in fact both an inter-personal and a social concern.”⁴⁹⁹ But the institution of marriage is distinct from society. Wojtyła says, “Marriage does not possess the structure of a society, but an inter-personal structure: it is union and a community of two persons.”⁵⁰⁰ Marriage is an independent, and prior, institution. Yet, the interpersonal relationship of love is a relationship that requires societal recognition as it matures. As love matures, it needs to be visible to others. Wojtyła says: “On the one hand, there is a need to keep private the sexual relations deriving from love, and on the other a need for social recognition of this love as a union of persons. Love demands this recognition, without which it does not feel fully itself.”⁵⁰¹ The institution of marriage communicates to society, and the man and woman themselves, that their relationship is fully following the demands of the personalistic norm. Wojtyła says: “This then is the meaning of marriage as an institution. In a society which accepts sound ethical principles and lives in accordance with them (without hypocrisy and prudery), this institution is necessary to signify the maturity of the union between a man and a woman, to testify that their love is a love on which a lasting union and community can be based.”⁵⁰² The maturity in following the personalistic norm is signified both to the man and woman themselves, as well as, to society as a whole.

⁴⁹⁸ cf. LR, 278.

⁴⁹⁹ LR, 216.

⁵⁰⁰ LR, 217.

⁵⁰¹ LR, 219.

⁵⁰² LR, 220.

Wojtyła says of marriage: “It retains its distinct existence as an institution whose inner structure is different from that of the family.”⁵⁰³ With the birth of a child, the institution of marriage becomes a society, a family. Wojtyła is concerned that procreation might be understood as reproduction as can be found in the animal world. Avoiding a biologically-restricted understanding of procreation, Wojtyła writes: “Thus, in the sexual relationship between man and woman *two orders meet: the order of nature*, which has as its object reproduction, and *the personal order*, which finds its expression in the love of persons and aims at the fullest realization of that love.”⁵⁰⁴ These two orders cannot be separated, such that Wojtyła says, “the marital relationship is therefore not just a union of persons, a reciprocal relationship between a man and a woman, but is essentially a union of persons affected by the possibility of procreation.”⁵⁰⁵ Moreover, Wojtyła writes: “Sexual relations between a man and a woman in marriage have their full value as a union of persons only when they go with conscious acceptance of the possibility of parenthood.”⁵⁰⁶ Following the personalistic norm means accepting the inseparable connection of marriage and family. Accepting the connection between marriage and family helps to ensure the following of the personalistic norm. Wojtyła says: “Willing acceptance of parenthood serves to break down the reciprocal egoism...behind which lurks the will to exploit the person.”⁵⁰⁷

Wojtyła underscores the connection between marriage and family, by asserting the connection between every sexual act and the possibility of parenthood.⁵⁰⁸ The personalistic norm demands that the acceptance of the possibility of parenthood must be present at each act of

⁵⁰³ LR, 217.

⁵⁰⁴ LR, 226.

⁵⁰⁵ LR, 226.

⁵⁰⁶ LR, 227.

⁵⁰⁷ LR, 230.

⁵⁰⁸ cf. LR, 225.

sexual relations. Of the possibility of procreation, Wojtyła says: “Sexual relations between a man and a woman entail the possibility of conception and procreation, which are the natural consequence of the marital relationship. It is not, however, an inevitable consequence.”⁵⁰⁹

Significantly, the institution of marriage does not exclude the possibility of one spouse using the other in any given instance of sexual intercourse. The acceptance of the possibility of procreation helps to ensure the following of the personalistic norm. Procreation is a result of love, even if it is not the result of each sexual act in marriage.

Wojtyła acknowledges that there are times when the spouses should avoid the possibility of becoming parents. At these times, the appropriate response is continence—avoiding sexual intercourse because it is essentially connected to the possibility of parenthood. Wojtyła further acknowledges that continence can be difficult for a couple. He says: “Marital continence is so much more difficult than continence outside marriage because the spouses grow accustomed to intercourse, as befits the state which they have both consciously chosen.”⁵¹⁰ Sexual intercourse is an important part of the institution of marriage. Wojtyła says: “Intercourse is necessary to love, not just to procreation.”⁵¹¹ A way that sexual intercourse can still be part of the marriage relationship, while also avoiding parenthood, is periodic continence. Wojtyła offers a definition of periodic continence: “a man and a woman time their periods of continence to coincide with the...[woman’s cyclical] periods of fertility, and so have sexual intercourse only as and when they expect procreation to be biologically impossible.”⁵¹²

An issue with this definition is that the behavior thus defined does not reveal the ethical choice of the spouses. It is possible for the spouses to practice periodic continence to expressly

⁵⁰⁹ LR, 233.

⁵¹⁰ LR, 237.

⁵¹¹ LR, 233.

⁵¹² LR, 240.

separate parenthood from sexual intercourse. In this case, Wojtyła says, they “deprive marital intercourse of the value of love and leave it only the value of ‘enjoyment.’”⁵¹³ The acceptance of the possibility of parenthood is what overcomes the possibility of use in periodic continence. Wojtyła says: “This acceptance of the possibility of becoming a father or a mother must be present in the mind and will even when the spouses do not want a pregnancy, and deliberately choose to have intercourse at a period when it may be expected not to occur.”⁵¹⁴ In the case of avoiding parenthood in a marriage, periodic continence is morally acceptable if it retains the acceptance of the possibility of parenthood. Only in this way is periodic continence an affirmation of the person.

Wojtyła also acknowledges that another answer to the question of how to continue sexual intercourse, while also avoiding parenthood, is contraception. In his evaluation of sexology, Wojtyła offers a rather detailed presentation on fertility and contraceptives, along with some psychological implications of both, leading him to state that “the value of the person is distinct and higher than any utilitarian value.”⁵¹⁵ Since Wojtyła affirms that the “very fact of deliberately excluding the possibility of parenthood from marital intercourse makes ‘enjoyment’ the intention of the act,” contraception is contrary to love.⁵¹⁶

2. Virginity and Marriage

Included in his discussion of ethics within marriage, Wojtyła turns to the implications of sexual ethics based on a relationship with a personal God. Wojtyła says, “the central theme of our discussion so far...[is] what might be called ‘*horizontal justice*’. There still remains the

⁵¹³ LR, 244.

⁵¹⁴ LR, 243.

⁵¹⁵ LR, 279.

⁵¹⁶ LR, 235.

separate problem of ‘*vertical justice*’: the justification of the whole sexual behavior of man in the eyes of God.”⁵¹⁷

a. Justice to the Creator

Commenting on the rights of God, Wojtyła says: “if I want to be completely just to God the Creator, I must offer him all that is in me, my whole being, for he has first claim on all of it.”⁵¹⁸ The person’s relationship with God is most properly understood as one of love, rather than of justice. For some, this love is expressed through spiritual virginity. Wojtyła says, the essence of spiritual virginity is “*conjugal love pledged to God Himself*.”⁵¹⁹ Spiritual virginity can be connected with physical virginity, which Wojtyła names as the “condition of one who abstains completely from marriage and from sexual intercourse.”⁵²⁰ As always for Wojtyła, the interior life of the person is his focus. Wojtyła says, “It is possible to remain physically virginal to the end of one’s days without this physical virginity ever becoming spiritual virginity.”⁵²¹ Although spiritual virginity is expressed through physical virginity, because of their distinction, Wojtyła gives further clarification to what he understands spiritual virginity to be. He says, “Spiritual virginity, in the perspective of eternal life, is...[a] movement towards final union though love with a personal God...[anticipating] that final union in conditions of the physical and temporal life of the human person.”⁵²² He asserts that a person’s need for interpersonal communion only has its fulfillment and satisfaction in eternal existence. The need for a person to give oneself finds its fulfillment in the unending relationship of love with a personal God. In

⁵¹⁷ LR, 245.

⁵¹⁸ LR, 249.

⁵¹⁹ LR, 251.

⁵²⁰ LR, 251.

⁵²¹ LR, 252.

⁵²² LR, 254.

other words, he says: “Spiritual virginity, the self-giving of a human person wedded to God Himself, expressly anticipates this eternal union with God and points the way towards it.”⁵²³

Although spiritual virginity has a special ability to point towards eternal union with God, Wojtyła says that marriage is able to be a response of love to God, as well. Comparing the two responses, Wojtyła says: “The movement towards final union through love with a personal God is...[in spiritual virginity] more explicit than in marriage.”⁵²⁴ Marriage is not to be understood as a renunciation of God for a human person. Wojtyła says, “The union of person with person here takes place in the physical and sexual sense, in accordance with man’s physical nature and the natural effects of the sexual urge. Nevertheless, the need to give oneself to another person has profounder origins than the sexual instinct, and is connected above all with the spiritual nature of the human person.”⁵²⁵ The anticipation of final union with God is more explicit in spiritual virginity, yet nevertheless, is an integral part of marriage as well.

The personalistic view of spiritual virginity and marriage articulated by Wojtyła leads him to address briefly the question of vocation, of a calling from God. He says: “the person fulfills itself most effectively when it gives itself most fully.... *Hence both virginity and marriage understood in an uncompromisingly personalistic way*, are vocations.”⁵²⁶ He continues saying that each is “*a call to self-perfection through love.*”⁵²⁷

b. Spiritual Parenthood

If spiritual union with God can be found in spiritual virginity and marriage, then, Wojtyła says, the union with God contains a call to spiritual parenthood, spiritual paternity and maternity.

⁵²³ LR, 255.

⁵²⁴ LR, 254.

⁵²⁵ LR, 253.

⁵²⁶ LR, 257.

⁵²⁷ LR, 257.

He says: “Spiritual parenthood as a sign of the inner maturity of a person is the goal which in diverse ways all human beings, men and women alike, are called to seek, within or outside matrimony.”⁵²⁸ Within marriage only, however, is found physical paternity and maternity.⁵²⁹

Wojtyła underscores that physical parenthood finds its fulfillment in spiritual parenthood, saying “A father and mother who have given their children life in the merely biological sense must then supplement physical parenthood by spiritual parenthood, taking whatever pains are necessary for their education.”⁵³⁰

In his theological considerations in *Love and Responsibility*, Wojtyła introduces statements that are other than the philosophical insights of this work, e.g., vocation a response to God. Nevertheless, Wojtyła remains focused on his philosophical conclusions. He says: “*Man can only be just to God the Creator if he loves his fellows*. This principle has a special relevance to the conjugal and sexual life of men and women. ...It is impossible for a man and a woman to behave justly towards God the Creator if their treatment of each other falls short of the demands of the personalistic norm.”⁵³¹ Even in context of a response to God, the demand of the personalistic norm, Wojtyła says, is this: “*Man must reconcile himself to his natural greatness. ...he must not forget that he is a person.*”⁵³² The ethical norms that the human person must follow have their foundation in a philosophical understanding of the human person. So, even as Wojtyła introduces theological considerations in *Love and Responsibility*, he primarily considers them in light of his key philosophical insights.

⁵²⁸ LR, 261.

⁵²⁹ Earlier in *Love and Responsibility*, as well, Wojtyła articulates an understanding of physical parenthood as procreation, as connected to spiritual parenthood, as cooperating with God, cf. LR, 54-57.

⁵³⁰ LR, 260.

⁵³¹ LR, 247.

⁵³² LR, 236.

C. Sexology and Ethics

Wojtyła says that sexology “can only furnish a supplementary view” to ethics.⁵³³ He says that sexology is “a view of man and woman and of love which approaches the whole problem solely or mainly from the point of view of ‘the body and sex’...which deals with problems of sexual life from the medical or physiological point of view.”⁵³⁴ The limit of sexology is that its view is restricted to biological and psychological details.

Wojtyła includes in his discussion of sexology the topics of sexual psychopathology and therapy. With regard to sexual psychopathology, a list of illnesses exists. Rather than considering the various illnesses individually, Wojtyła focuses on the causes of these illnesses in general. While sexology may suggest that a lack of sexual intercourse is the cause of sexual neuroses, Wojtyła says that “it is not continence, as such, that produces real diseases, but the lack of it.”⁵³⁵ The integration of psychosomatic sexual stirrings helps to avoid sexual psychopathology. Wojtyła insists: “The sexual urge in man is a fact which he must recognize and welcome as a source of natural energy—otherwise it may cause psychological disturbances.”⁵³⁶

Therapy, then, is the treatment for sexual psychopathology. Wojtyła articulates some principles which should direct therapy for sexual psychopathology.⁵³⁷ These principles are not entirely distinct from the basic principles of the ethics that Wojtyła has developed in *Love and Responsibility*. In general, the ethical principles guide education. He says, “all correct sex

⁵³³ LR, 266.

⁵³⁴ LR, 265.

⁵³⁵ LR, 285.

⁵³⁶ LR, 285.

⁵³⁷ One of the articulated principles is: “The most important thing is to transmit the right hierarchy of values, and to show the position occupied by the sexual urge in that hierarchy. Its use will then be subordinated to the end which it exists to serve. People must be further persuaded of the possibility and necessity of conscious choice. We must, as it were, ‘give back’ to people their consciousness of the freedom of the will and of the fact that the area of sexual experience is completely subject to the will” (LR, 287).

education, including that which must take the form of therapy, cannot take as its starting point only the ‘natural’ plane of the sex instinct, but must proceed from the plane of the person, with which the whole subject of ‘love and responsibility’ is bound up. And it appears in the last analysis that there is no other cure and no other pedagogic remedy.”⁵³⁸ In the case of therapy, Wojtyła says: “The methods of treatment must therefore be more specific than those which we use in ordinary sex education.”⁵³⁹ In the end, except for differences in specificity, Wojtyła sees a deep consonance between the communication of ethics and a therapy for sexual psychopathology.

Wojtyła asserts that, given their difference as independent intellectual disciplines, the primary relationship of sexology to ethics is to provide physiological and psychological details. Wojtyła says: “The idea that procreation must base itself on love is not derivable from a biological analysis of sex, but only from the metaphysical (i.e. ultra- and supernatural) fact of being a person.”⁵⁴⁰ The information supplied by sexology can easily be a complement to ethics, offering further support to the philosophically-derived ethics. Wojtyła says: “Indirectly, however, sexology itself consistently favours natural and marital morality, because it attaches so much importance to the psychological and physical health of man and woman.”⁵⁴¹ Without the philosophical reflection, however, sexology can contradict ethics. One example that Wojtyła describes is when “there are times when the doctor’s advice is just what turns the patient into a neurotic, in that it blatantly contradicts the real nature of man.”⁵⁴² Wojtyła asserts that sexology must function within its limitations, remembering that “its immediate concern is with the sexual

⁵³⁸ LR, 288.

⁵³⁹ LR, 288.

⁵⁴⁰ LR, 267.

⁵⁴¹ LR, 276.

⁵⁴² LR, 287.

act as a limited physiological or at most psycho-physical process.”⁵⁴³ While Wojtyła does express the need for sexology to not go beyond its limits, he is quick to approve of its phenomenological import. And, as a conclusion to the entire work of *Love and Responsibility*, Wojtyła says: “A thorough knowledge of biological and physiological sexual processes is very important, very fitting, very valuable, but it cannot, either in education or in sexual therapy, achieve its proper end unless it is honestly grounded in an objective view of the person and the natural (and supernatural) vocation of the person, which is love.”⁵⁴⁴ For Wojtyła, sexology, properly limited, does not contradict ethics, but is an aide to ethics.

III. Relationship and Responsibility

In *Love and Responsibility*, Wojtyła uses the term, responsibility, in a number of interconnected ways. He speaks of the responsibility of the person to grow in the virtue of love. He speaks of the responsibility to receive—and to share—a proper sex education. He focuses on the raising of psychosomatic stirrings to the level of the person: to respond and not to react, to integrate love within the person. He insists that love is an affirmation of the personhood of the other: the only proper response to the other is love. Love contains a sense of responsibility for the other person, for their well-being. And Wojtyła develops a sense of integrating love between persons, of responding to the other. Love is a mutual response.

A. Reciprocity

The personalistic norm does not apply to only one person in a relationship of love. Both persons are obliged to respond in love to the other. Both individuals, self-possessed, being free

⁵⁴³ LR, 276.

⁵⁴⁴ LR, 288.

of self-interest, and not yielding to the desire to use the other, make an act of self-donation. This mutual gift of self is reciprocity. One-sided, unrequited love is not love in its fullest sense. The reciprocal gift is love. Wojtyła says, “The fact is that a person who desires another as a good desires above all that person’s love in return for his or her own love...reciprocity is in the very nature of love, since the interpersonal character of love depends on it.”⁵⁴⁵ As a result, the mutual gift of self-donation creates a unification of persons. Wojtyła writes, “Numerically and psychologically, there are two loves, but these two separate psychological facts combine to create a single objective whole.”⁵⁴⁶ This unification of loves implies both giving and receiving. Wojtyła writes, “Betrothed love comprises on the one hand the gift of the person, and on the other hand, acceptance of that gift.”⁵⁴⁷ The mutual response of the persons must be the same on the part of each. Each must both give and receive.

Wojtyła speaks of reciprocity as a mystery. He says, “in all this is the ‘mystery’ of reciprocity: acceptance must also be giving, and giving receiving.”⁵⁴⁸ The mystery is that giving is receiving. The philosophical impasse of how distinct actions are one, implied by the word, mystery, is clarified (at least in part) by the recognition that after a gift of self, given in a reciprocal act of love, the person is able to come to a new act of self-possession. Wojtyła writes: “In giving ourselves we find clear proof that we possess ourselves.”⁵⁴⁹ Wojtyła further articulates the new experience of self-possession, in reciprocal love, through the “law of *ekstasis*.”⁵⁵⁰ He says, “The person no longer wishes to be its own exclusive property, but instead to become the property of that other. This means the renunciation of its autonomy and its

⁵⁴⁵ LR, 85.

⁵⁴⁶ LR, 84.

⁵⁴⁷ LR, 129.

⁵⁴⁸ LR, 129.

⁵⁴⁹ LR, 98.

⁵⁵⁰ LR, 126.

inalienability. Love proceeds by way of this renunciation, guided by the profound conviction that it does not diminish and impoverish, but quite the contrary enlarges and enriches the existence of the person.”⁵⁵¹ This is the law of *ekstasis*, according to Wojtyła: “The lover ‘goes outside’ the self to find a fuller existence in another.”⁵⁵² Love is co-created through the mutual gift of self. Reciprocity creates the opportunity for a new act of self-donation. Married love is experienced and expressed through a free, mutual response to the beloved.

B. Masculinity and Femininity

In *Love and Responsibility*, Wojtyła restricted his focus to love between a man and woman. The personalistic norm applies to the man and woman both equally. The increased self-possession through reciprocity grows in both the man and the woman. All of the principles articulated by Wojtyła about “love” and “responsibility” direct both the man and the woman.

Yet, Wojtyła describes the phenomenological fact that, in love, a man responds to a woman, and a woman responds to a man. Wojtyła says: “the choice of a person of the other sex as the object of betrothed love, and as the co-creator of that love by way of reciprocity, must depend to a certain extent on sexual values....Sexual values, as we know, are connected not just with the impression made by ‘the body...’, but also with the total impression made by a ‘human being of the other sex’—by the ‘womanliness’ or ‘manliness’ of that other person.”⁵⁵³ Wojtyła names the psychological characteristics of man and woman as masculinity and femininity, respectively.

In love, a man is presented with both physical (bodily) and psychological characteristics (femininity) of a woman. These stimuli stir psychosomatic reactions within the man, reactions

⁵⁵¹ LR, 125.

⁵⁵² LR, 126.

⁵⁵³ LR, 132.

which must be raised to the level of the person. Likewise, in love, a woman is presented with both physical (bodily) and psychical characteristics (masculinity) of a man. These stimuli stir psychosomatic reactions within the woman, reactions which must be raised to the level of the person. While the need to raise both sensuality and sentimentality to the level of the person remains for both the man and the woman, Wojtyła acknowledges that man and woman may each experience the tasks with a different level of difficulty. He says, “It is pretty generally recognized that woman is ‘by nature’ more sentimental, and man more sensual.”⁵⁵⁴ By way of illustration, Wojtyła would say that a challenge for man when presented with the body and sex of woman is to overcome the possibility to use the woman for sensual satisfaction. A challenge for woman when presented with the body and sex of man is to overcome the possibility to use the man for sentimental satisfaction.

Wojtyła offers further meaning to the differences between man and woman. He says, “Sexual attraction makes obvious the fact that the attributes of the two sexes are complementary...Consequently, there exists for each of them not only the possibility of supplementing his or her own attributes with those of a person of the other sex, but at times a keenly felt need to do so.”⁵⁵⁵ The keenly felt need can refer to the psychic intensity experienced in love as well as a spiritual need for self-fulfillment. Wojtyła says, “A man therefore needs a woman, so to say, to complete his own being, and woman needs man in the same way.”⁵⁵⁶

In his treatment of love and of responsibility, Wojtyła consistently asserts that the articulated principles need to apply to concrete relationships. The principles are equally valid for both man and woman, even if the challenges are experienced differently for each person. And, for some, there can be the challenge to see the difference between man and woman as differences

⁵⁵⁴ LR, 111.

⁵⁵⁵ LR, 48.

⁵⁵⁶ LR, 81.

of physiology simply. The importance of Wojtyła’s insistence on referring to masculinity and femininity is that the psychological differences between man and woman not be overlooked—as an aide to recognize the whole person, not just their body, not just their masculinity or femininity.

C. Sacred Scripture

Love and Responsibility is primarily a philosophical work. But given its connection to Wojtyła’s pastoral work⁵⁵⁷ and his academic work at the Catholic University of Lublin,⁵⁵⁸ it is not surprising that there are doctrinal and Scriptural references throughout the work. Rather than using the Bible as an authority that dictates the content of his reflections, Wojtyła uses it as a “frame of reference.”⁵⁵⁹ Practically all of the biblical references are used as points of contact with each topic. For example, when Wojtyła is speaking of desiring to use another as satisfaction, he says: “This is precisely what Christ had in mind when He said (Matthew 5:28): ‘Whosoever looketh upon a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her already in his heart.’”⁵⁶⁰ Using citations simply serves to underline and illustrate the point that he is making, especially since Wojtyła sometimes makes use of Scripture without specific mention of which book of the Bible he is referencing. For example, with regard to self-donation, he writes: “As we know already, it means disposing of one’s whole self, in the language of the Gospels, ‘giving one’s soul,’” without any citation⁵⁶¹ Throughout *Love and Responsibility*, the development of the themes is done in a philosophical manner, with the Scriptural citations as signaling to the reader connection between the philosophical point and a reference from the Christian faith.

⁵⁵⁷ cf. LR, 15.

⁵⁵⁸ cf. LR, 9.

⁵⁵⁹ LR, 16.

⁵⁶⁰ LR, 81.

⁵⁶¹ LR, 126.

In *Love and Responsibility*, the most significant point of contact with Scripture and philosophy is with regard to the personalistic norm and the commandment to love “laid down in the New Testament.”⁵⁶² Of their connection, Wojtyła says: “Strictly speaking the commandment says: ‘Love persons’, and the personalistic norm,” which demands a response of love, provides “...a justification for the New Testament commandment. And, so, if we take the commandment together with this justification, we can say that it is the same as the personalistic norm.”⁵⁶³ Wojtyła asserts a strict alignment with a key philosophical principle and the theological commandment. Despite its deep connection with Christian Revelation, the personalistic norm can be accepted through strict philosophical criteria. Wojtyła says, “believers and unbelievers alike are capable of discovering in it the affirmation of a great human good, which can and must be the portion of every person.”⁵⁶⁴

IV. Summary of Wojtyła’s Philosophical Anthropology

The philosophical anthropology of Karol Wojtyła is most completely articulated in *Person and Act* and *Love and Responsibility*. Taken together, these two works complete the picture of Wojtyła’s philosophical understanding of the human person.

In *Person and Act*, Wojtyła describes the inner experience of a human person, as a psycho-somatic spiritual unity, who must raise happenings to actions. A person fulfills oneself through an act of self-determination. In *Love and Responsibility*, Wojtyła articulates the dynamics of raising passive experiences to the level of the person in action, within a relationship of love. Love provides an unequalled opportunity for a person to act as a person, to respond.

⁵⁶² LR, 40. The commandment is “You shall love your neighbor as yourself” (Lev. 19:18, Matt. 22:39, Mk. 12:31, Lk. 10:27).

⁵⁶³ LR, 41.

⁵⁶⁴ LR, 18.

And, since love is between two persons, each person must be responding—giving and receiving their very selves—in a way that is conditioned by the personalistic norm. A person fulfills oneself through an act of self-donation. Personal fulfillment is found in an interpersonal relationship, through participation and reciprocity.

A key insight in anthropology, however, is that the human person is incommunicable. One's own inner life is one's own. It cannot be experienced by another, nor can it be exercised by another. Wojtyła describes the incommunicable attribute of the human person:

The Latin of the philosophers defined it in the assertion that personality is *alteri incommunicabilis*—not capable of transmission, not transferable. The point here is not that a person is a unique and unrepeatable entity, for this can be said just as well of any other entity—of an animal, a plant, a stone. The incommunicable, the *inalienable*, in a person is intrinsic to that person's inner self, to the power of self determination, free will. ...I am *incommunicabilis*. I am, and I must be, independent in my actions. All human relationships are posited on this fact.⁵⁶⁵

While a given, the incommunicability of the person is in direct philosophical conflict with an anthropology that understands that the fulfillment of the human person is found in intersubjectivity, in mutual self-donation. Wojtyła offers a resolution to this conflict. He says that a person:

cannot be ceded to another or supplanted by another in another in any context where it must exercise its will or make a commitment affecting its freedom. (It is *alteri incommunicabilis*.) But love forcibly detaches the person, so to speak, from this natural inviolability and inalienability. It makes the person want to do just that—surrender itself to another, to the one it loves.⁵⁶⁶

Through the interpersonal relationship of love and mutual self-donation a human person is able to act with another. The phenomenological experience of the person is that incommunicability is transcended and intersubjectivity created.

⁵⁶⁵ LR, 24.

⁵⁶⁶ LR, 125.

Despite the tension between incommunicability and intersubjectivity, intersubjectivity is experienced. The theoretical tension is resolved through experience. Wojtyła points to the experience of intersubjectivity in his philosophical anthropology, even if his description is anemic. With regard to his treatment of intersubjectivity in *Person and Act*, Wojtyła says: “The present author is well aware that his attempt is incomplete, that it remains but a ‘sketch.’”⁵⁶⁷ He does not describe the inner experience of an interpersonal relationship. In *Love and Responsibility*, Wojtyła does treat the theme of an interpersonal relationship. He acknowledges that reciprocity creates a unification of persons. With the focus being on the personalistic norm, however, the inner dynamics of reciprocity are not treated in detail. In neither work, individually or together, does Wojtyła articulate the dynamics of intersubjectivity with the same level of detail that he presents an individual’s inner experience in action.

Wojtyła’s resolution to the tension between incommunicability and intersubjectivity is found in the integration of love between persons. The resolution is found “in the order of love and in the moral sense.”⁵⁶⁸ Physically and ontologically, two persons remain two persons. Morally, though, they can become one. Wojtyła says, “Love is impossible for beings who are mutually impenetrable—only spirituality and the ‘inwardness’ of persons create the conditions for mutual interpenetration, which enables each to live in and by the other.”⁵⁶⁹ Especially through ethics, Wojtyła offers a resolution to the tension that an individual remains an individual, yet, that same person can and must have interpersonal relationship. Furthermore, Wojtyła asserts the importance of morality for anthropology, when he says, “The experience of morality is thus an integral component in the experience of man. Without it no adequate theory of the acting

⁵⁶⁷ PA, 299.

⁵⁶⁸ LR, 96.

⁵⁶⁹ LR, 131.

person—of the person and the action—would indeed be possible.”⁵⁷⁰ Intersubjectivity is demanded by the personalistic norm, by the commandment to love. Intersubjectivity is made possible and experienced by mutual self-donation in love.

For Wojtyła, an adequate anthropology is one that recognizes the human person as a psycho-somatic spiritual unity in a relationship of mutual self-donation in love. In *Person and Act* and in *Love and Responsibility*, Wojtyła offers a significant philosophical contribution towards developing an adequate anthropology.

The interaction of anthropology and ethics at work in Wojtyła’s philosophical anthropology is equally present in the *Theology of the Body*. The Catecheses likewise take up the question of interpersonal relationship, under the heading of *communio personarum*. In contradistinction to *Person and Act* and *Love and Responsibility*, the *Theology of the Body* incorporates biblical revelation to develop its themes.

⁵⁷⁰ PA, 252.

Chapter 5

John Paul II's *Theology of the Body*: The Human Person Before the Fall

With regard to the overall content and purpose of the *Theology of the Body*, John Paul II says, “one must find *that biblical, theological sphere* to which we allude when we speak about the ‘redemption of the body and the sacramentality of marriage.’”⁵⁷¹ To achieve this purpose, John Paul II divides his work into two major parts: “The Words of Christ” (TOB 1:1-86:7) and “The Sacrament” (TOB 87:1-133:4). Based on the anthropology and ethics presented in the First Part, John Paul II applies those conclusions specifically to a phenomenological, ethical, and spiritual understanding of the sacrament of marriage in the Second Part. With the overall goal of developing the Church’s understanding of the sacrament of marriage, the *Theology of the Body* is a presentation of, a development of, and a companion to Catholic sexual ethics and sacramental theology on marriage. John Paul II grounds the sacramental theology on a theological anthropology. Following the model of John Paul II, I will draw out the anthropological insights of the *Theology of the Body* in this chapter and the next. Another chapter will treat the sacramental conclusions of the Catecheses.

In this chapter I focus on the anthropological conclusions that John Paul II makes based on his interpretation of the first chapters of Genesis.

I. The Words of Christ

To develop his theological anthropology, John Paul II points to three Scripture passages in which Christ speaks about marriage: Matt. 19:3-8 (when the Pharisees ask Jesus about the

⁵⁷¹ TOB 133:4. Unless otherwise noted, Biblical citations are from the *New American Bible Revised Edition* (NABRE).

indissolubility of marriage);⁵⁷² Matt. 5:27-28 (when Jesus speaks about adultery in the heart during the Sermon on the Mount);⁵⁷³ and Matt. 22:24-30 (when Jesus speaks about no marriage in the resurrection of the body).⁵⁷⁴ John Paul II uses these three passages as a sort of triptych. At their foundation is the biblical revelation that the human person is created in the image of God, which is what leads John Paul II to describe this anthropology as a theological anthropology. John Paul II articulates this anthropology through his interpretation of the words of Christ.

John Paul II begins his Catecheses with the question of the indissolubility of marriage that the Pharisees posed to Jesus (cf. Matt. 19:3-8).⁵⁷⁵ In his response, Christ points to Genesis. John Paul II says, “Twice during the dialogue with the Pharisees who questioned him about the indissolubility of marriage, Jesus Christ appealed to the ‘beginning.’”⁵⁷⁶ John Paul II asserts that Christ’s response is addressed to our contemporary audience, who, like the Pharisees, ask questions about sexual ethics and the theology of marriage. Not only does Christ speak to his own contemporaries, he also, as John Paul II says, addresses human beings “of a definite moment in history, and...all human beings belonging to the same human history.”⁵⁷⁷ So the *Theology of the Body* is not simply an analysis of biblical texts in their own contexts but is an address to a contemporary audience. The Catecheses are meant to articulate Christ’s response to the questions of contemporary humanity.

⁵⁷² TOB 1:2.

⁵⁷³ TOB 25:1

⁵⁷⁴ TOB 64:1.

⁵⁷⁵ Matt. 19:3-8 reads: “Some Pharisees approached him, and tested him, saying, ‘Is it lawful for a man to divorce his wife for any cause whatever?’ He said in reply, ‘Have you not read that from the beginning the Creator “made them male and female” and said, “For this reason a man shall leave his father and mother and be joined to his wife, and the two shall become one flesh”? So they are no longer two, but one flesh. Therefore, what God has joined together, no human being must separate.’ They said to him, ‘Then why did Moses command that the man give the woman a bill of divorce and dismiss [her]?’ He said to them, ‘Because of the hardness of your hearts Moses allowed you to divorce your wives, but from the beginning it was not so.’”

⁵⁷⁶ TOB 1:2.

⁵⁷⁷ TOB 25:1. John Paul II repeats this point throughout, e.g. TOB 1:4, 23:2, and 59:5. 5

A. Christ Appeals to the “Beginning”

The first part of the triptych that John Paul II considers is the dialogue between Jesus and the Pharisees concerning the indissolubility of marriage, where Christ references the beginning. John Paul II notes that Jesus is referring to Gen. 1:27 (“God created mankind in his image; in the image of God he created them; male and female he created them.”) and Gen. 2:24 (“That is why a man leaves his father and mother and clings to his wife, and the two of them become one body.”).⁵⁷⁸ Thus, after having acknowledged the starting point as the dialogue with Christ, John Paul II turns his attention to the accounts of creation contained in these verses of the first chapters of Genesis.

1. Two Creation Accounts

John Paul II highlights some essential elements of the two creation accounts for a theology of the body.⁵⁷⁹

With regard to the first creation account (cf. Gen. 1:1-2:4), John Paul II identifies some of the significant theological content of Gen. 1:27. He asserts that in the context of the seven days of Creation, the human person is declared to not be equivalent to the rest of creation (which especially includes animals). Concerning the contradistinction of the human person to the rest of creation, John Paul II says: “Already in the light of the Bible’s first sentences, man can neither be understood nor explained in his full depth with the categories taken from the ‘world,’ that is,

⁵⁷⁸ TOB 1:3.

⁵⁷⁹ John Paul II acknowledges the view held by modern biblical scholars that the two Creation accounts have different authors, cf. TOB 2:2. Nevertheless, in his interpretation of these passages, John Paul II integrates the two accounts to form a unified theological anthropology.

from the visible totality of bodies.”⁵⁸⁰ John Paul II continues, saying: “the biblical narrative does not speak of his [the human person’s] likeness with the rest of creation, but only with God.”⁵⁸¹ Even though the human person has a body, like the rest of the visible creation, the human person alone is in the image of God.

In this one verse, the first creation account contains a theology that is concise and developed. John Paul II unpacks the theological meaning of this verse throughout the course of the rest of the *Theology of the Body*. But for the time being he writes that “the first chapter of Genesis has formed an incontrovertible point of reference and solid basis of a metaphysics and also for an anthropology and an ethics...Of course, all this has its own significance for theology as well, and above all for the theology of the body.”⁵⁸²

Comparing the two creation accounts, John Paul II says that “the first account...is much more mature both with regard to the image of God and in the formulation of the essential truths about man.”⁵⁸³ In this way, the first creation account has a more precise theology and theological anthropology, which is both objective and cosmological. But since Gen. 2 is more subjective and phenomenological, it reveals more fully the inner life of the human person. John Paul II says: “Chapter 2 of Genesis constitutes in some way the oldest description and record of man’s self-understanding and...is the first witness of human consciousness.”⁵⁸⁴ Because Gen. 2 uses ancient and stylized language, John Paul II devotes some time to articulate the inner life of the human person as revealed in these verses, especially in the verses of Gen. 2:5-25.⁵⁸⁵ Overall,

⁵⁸⁰ TOB 2:4. Here John Paul II notes that the Hebrew *‘adam* means “human being” and not necessarily a “male.”

⁵⁸¹ TOB 2:3.

⁵⁸² TOB 2:5.

⁵⁸³ TOB 2:2. The comparative “more” is with regard to the second creation account, reflecting his conclusion that between the two accounts, the second is older, thus allowing some theological reflection to have occurred by the time the canonically first account is written.

⁵⁸⁴ TOB 3:1. To this he adds that these verses are “in some way psychological” (TOB 3:1) and contains the elements to which “contemporary, philosophical anthropology is sensitive” (TOB 3:1).

⁵⁸⁵ TOB 3-22.

the subjectivity revealed in Gen. 2 complements and completes the cosmological statement of Gen. 1:27. John Paul II says, “this subjectivity corresponds to the objective reality of man created ‘in the image of God.’ And, also, this fact is—in another way—important for the theology of the body.”⁵⁸⁶ The two accounts taken together are significant for a theological anthropology.

With the focus on the inner experience of the human person, John Paul II adds a gloss about the importance of experience for theology. He notes: “we must reach the conviction that in this case, *our human experience is in some way a legitimate means for theological interpretation* and that, in a certain sense, it is an indispensable point of reference to which we must appeal in the interpretation of the ‘beginning.’”⁵⁸⁷ A theological anthropology, i.e. a theology of the body, needs to take experience into account.

John Paul II also notes that the inner human experience of the beginning to which Christ appeals, and which is described in Gen. 2:5-25, is beyond the threshold of the Fall (cf. Gen. 3:1-7). He says: “we have every right to be convinced that this ‘historical’ experience of ours must in some way stop at the threshold of man’s original innocence, because it remains inadequate to it.”⁵⁸⁸ John Paul II acknowledges the tension between the fact that the inner human experience before the Fall is beyond our direct human experience and that our human experience is an “indispensable point of reference.”⁵⁸⁹ Gen. 2 is significant because it describes the inner human experience that is no longer directly accessible to us. But Gen. 2 is also significant because it describes the roots of human experience, which are accessible. John Paul II writes: “The important thing, therefore, is not that these experiences belong to man’s prehistory (to his

⁵⁸⁶ TOB 3:4.

⁵⁸⁷ TOB 4:4.

⁵⁸⁸ TOB 4:4. cf. TOB 3:3, which reads: “systematic theology was to see two different states of human nature, ‘*status naturae integrae*’ (state of integral nature) and ‘*status naturae lapsae*’ (state of fallen nature).”

⁵⁸⁹ TOB 4:4.

‘theological prehistory’), but that they are always at the root of every human experience.”⁵⁹⁰

Further justification for turning to the original situation is found in Christ’s dialogue with the Pharisees. John Paul II says: “Christ’s words, which appeal to the ‘beginning,’ allow us to find an essential continuity in man and a link between these two different states or dimensions of the human being.”⁵⁹¹

2. Original Human Experiences

Having established a connection between “historical” human experience and the prelapsidary experience of the human person, having established the continuity of the interiority of the human person before and after the Fall, John Paul II articulates the characteristics of that original situation.

John Paul II analysis of the state of the human person before the Fall includes original solitude, original unity, and original nakedness. John Paul II adds these original experiences as complements to the theological principles of original innocence and original sin.

a. Original Solitude

In Gen. 2 the human person is described as being alone. On one hand, the solitude of the human person is a declaration made by God (Gen. 2:18 reads, “The LORD God said: It is not good for the man to be alone.”).⁵⁹² On the other hand, the human person discovers its own solitude (Gen. 2:20 reads, “none proved to be a helper suited to the man.”).⁵⁹³ The declaration

⁵⁹⁰ TOB 11:1. In the same passage he comments further on historical experience saying that it “also seems to rest on an ontological depth that is so great that man does not perceive it in his own daily life, even if...he presupposes it” in his daily actions.

⁵⁹¹ TOB 4:1.

⁵⁹² TOB 5:2.

⁵⁹³ TOB 5:6.

and the discovery come from the fact that, despite being surrounded by the rest of creation, the human person is alone. The verses of Gen. 2:18 and Gen. 2:20 precede the creation of woman, which is a separate act of creation in Gen. 2. The declaration (i.e. the status of solitude is not good) and the discovery (i.e. there is the absence of a helper) give a negative connotation to solitude in this context.

For John Paul II, the negative reading of solitude in Gen. 2 does not fully reveal the meaning of original solitude. Its limitation is that the negative reading could seem to apply only to the male, which has limited value for an anthropology.⁵⁹⁴ A more complete understanding of the biblical revelation on original solitude has a more positive meaning and can be applied to every human person, male and female. John Paul II comments: “Man is alone because he is ‘different’ from the visible world, from the world of living beings.”⁵⁹⁵ Original solitude reveals the uniqueness of the human person among the rest of the visible world: it alone is a person. As a person, the human person has its own subjectivity, with self-consciousness and the power of self-determination.⁵⁹⁶ Original solitude reveals this essential structure of the human person. The positive meaning of original solitude (applicable to every human person) derives, as John Paul II notes, from “*man’s very nature.*”⁵⁹⁷

In addition to revealing human subjectivity, original solitude also reveals a meaning of the human body. John Paul II highlights that the meaning of original solitude is discovered by the human person in Gen. 2 through the body. Even though the body is the source of an identification of the human person with the rest of the visible world, in none of the other bodies, including the animals, did the human person recognize another person—another being with an

⁵⁹⁴ TOB 5:2. John Paul II points out that this limitation is avoided in the first creation account, which states a simultaneous creation of male and female.

⁵⁹⁵ TOB 5:6.

⁵⁹⁶ TOB 6:1.

⁵⁹⁷ TOB 5:2.

inner subjectivity with self-consciousness and the power of self-determination.⁵⁹⁸ Only in the woman did the man recognize a person like himself (cf. Gen. 2:23)

John Paul II identifies another way that the human body reveals original solitude: specifically human activity. Gen. 2 distinguishes the human person from the rest of creation. With regards to the discovery of this uniqueness, John Paul II says: “The premise of this self-distinction on man’s part is the fact that only he is able to ‘cultivate the earth’ (see Gen 2:5) and to ‘subdue it’ (see Gen 1:28).”⁵⁹⁹ But for John Paul II the anthropological meaning of the ability to cultivate and to subdue the earth is not most deeply found in a superiority of the human person with regard to the rest of creation. The anthropological meaning of the biblical reference to specifically human actions is that the body is part of the human person’s subjectivity. A human person is only a human person if the person has a body. John Paul II underscores: “*The structure of this body is such that it permits him to be the author of genuinely human activity.*”⁶⁰⁰ Put simply, John Paul II says, “the body expresses the person.”⁶⁰¹ Through original solitude, the human person discovers the structure of human nature as a simultaneous inner subjectivity and a bodily expression.

John Paul II further identifies a meaning of original solitude with regard to the relationship of the human person and God. Alone among the rest of creation, the human person is in a relationship with God, a partner of God. John Paul II says: The human person “is manifested in the second account *as a subject of the covenant*...constituted according to the

⁵⁹⁸ cf. Gen. 2:19-20, which reads: “So the LORD God formed out of the ground all the wild animals and all the birds of the air, and he brought them to the man to see what he would call them; whatever the man called each living creature was then its name. The man gave names to all the tame animals, all the birds of the air, and all the wild animals; but none proved to be a helper suited to the man.”

⁵⁹⁹ TOB 7:1. Gen. 2:5 reads, “the LORD God had sent no rain upon the earth and there was no man to till the ground.” And Gen. 1:28 reads, “God blessed them and God said to them: Be fertile and multiply; fill the earth and subdue it.”

⁶⁰⁰ TOB 7:2.

⁶⁰¹ TOB 7:2.

measure of ‘*partner of the Absolute*,’ inasmuch as he must consciously discern and choose between good and evil, between life and death.”⁶⁰² This unique partnership with God reveals a similarity to God. John Paul II says that this revelation in Gen. 2 “in its own way approaches the theological definition of man that we find in the first creation account (‘Let us make man in our image and our likeness,’ Gen 1:26).”⁶⁰³ The similarity and partnership with God is revealed through original solitude. But original solitude also reveals that, unlike God, the human person has a body and has the potential to experience death.⁶⁰⁴

b. Original Unity

Original unity is based on both the somatic homogeneity and the somatic heterogeneity of the human person created as male and female.

In the creation account, when the man sees the woman, he exclaims: “This one, at last, is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh” (Gen. 2:23). John Paul II emphasizes that the language in this passage reveals a discovery of the somatic homogeneity of the man and the woman.⁶⁰⁵ They are both human persons. When the man recognizes through the body (i.e., flesh and bone), that this is a helper for him, he is recognizing the whole person of the woman. As a continuation and a consequence of original solitude, the one discovers in the other a similarity, a unity, a homogeneity. Original unity responds to the negative connotation of original solitude, insofar as the man discovers in the woman (and vice versa) one who overcomes the status that it is not good to be alone. John Paul II says that original unity “expresses itself as an overcoming of the frontier of solitude and at the same time as an affirmation—for both human beings—of

⁶⁰² TOB 6:2. To this point, John Paul II cites Gen. 2:16-17.

⁶⁰³ TOB 6:2. Despite their distinct language and origins, John Paul II unites the two creation accounts in his biblical interpretation.

⁶⁰⁴ cf. TOB 7:3.

⁶⁰⁵ TOB 8:4.

everything in solitude that constitutes ‘man.’”⁶⁰⁶ The man and the woman are both the same in having a body and an interiority. They recognize in one another a unity among themselves. They both share in original solitude. Said another way, John Paul II writes: “man and woman *come forth from the mystery of creation* first of all *as brother and sister in the same humanity.*”⁶⁰⁷

Gen. 2 also reveals that between the man and the woman there is a somatic heterogeneity: God created the human person as male and female. Acknowledging this sexual difference, John Paul II says that original unity “is based on masculinity and femininity, which are...two ways in which the same human being, created ‘in the image of God’ (Gen 1:27), ‘is a body.’”⁶⁰⁸ Somatic homogeneity is complemented by somatic heterogeneity, by the fact that God created the human person with sexual difference. The overcoming of original solitude by original unity is further made possible by somatic heterogeneity. John Paul II writes, “The unity about which Genesis 2:24 speaks (‘and the two will be one flesh’) is without doubt the unity that is expressed and realized in the conjugal act.”⁶⁰⁹ In the future tense of “will be” of Gen. 2:24, John Paul II recognizes that the “one flesh” is a union of persons. Original unity is established by mutual self-gift, mutual acts of self-determination. John Paul II continues: “The formulation of Gen. 2:24 itself indicates not only that human beings, created as man and woman, have been created for unity, but also that precisely this *unity, through which they become ‘one flesh,’ has from the beginning the character of a union that derives from a choice.*”⁶¹⁰ Original unity overcomes original solitude through a mutual self-gift.

⁶⁰⁶ TOB 9:2.

⁶⁰⁷ TOB 18:5.

⁶⁰⁸ TOB 8:1.

⁶⁰⁹ TOB 10:2.

⁶¹⁰ TOB 10:3.

John Paul II points out that in Gen. 2 the human person discovers an absence of someone to which to give oneself. That is, the discovery of original solitude included a discovery that the human person was created to give oneself to another. Original solitude revealed an openness to another who is absent. Gen. 2:18 (“I will make a helper suited to him.”) and 2:20 (“none proved to be a helper suited to the man.”) define the other person as a help. John Paul II says that original unity is found in “*precisely the ‘help’ that derives in some way from the very fact of...existence of the person ‘for’ the person.*”⁶¹¹ The man and the woman find in each other a help to overcome their solitude by discovering a being in the visible world that shares somatic homogeneity and somatic heterogeneity.

In his discussion of original unity, John Paul II thematically introduces the concept of the communion of persons, *communio personarum*. The mutual self-gift between the man and the woman, which involves the whole person, is more than sexual intercourse. Original unity is more than the conjugal act. John Paul II says: “the communion of persons could form itself only on the basis of a ‘double solitude’ of the man and the woman, or as an encounter in their ‘distinction’ from the world of living beings (*animalia*), which gave to both the possibility of being and existing in a particular reciprocity.”⁶¹² As a *communio* of persons, unity involves the whole person of both the man and the woman. As a communion of *persons*, unity is a relationship of a reciprocal self-gift.

One implication of original unity is that it connects the procreation of children with the conjugal act. Original unity, John Paul II says, “allows them, when they become one flesh, to place their whole humanity at the same time under the blessing of fruitfulness.”⁶¹³ Another

⁶¹¹ TOB 9:2.

⁶¹² TOB 9:2

⁶¹³ TOB 10:2. John Paul II is commenting on Gen. 2:24.

implication of original unity is that it is open to a moral evaluation.⁶¹⁴ Moreover, it is a task for the human person.⁶¹⁵

Original unity also has specific significance for a theological anthropology. Using the language of Gen. 1, John Paul II says that “we can deduce that *man became the image of God not only through his own humanity, but also through the communion of persons.*”⁶¹⁶ Human beings image God in our choosing a mutual self-gift.

Throughout his discussion of original unity, John Paul II speaks about the mystery of creation. Specifically, God’s choice to create the human person as male and female is a mystery. Nevertheless, in the image of God, God created the human person as male and female. The mystery of creation is found in the homogeneity and heterogeneity of the human person. John Paul II articulates that the heterogeneity is not simply a difference of bodily structure. He says that masculinity and femininity being “‘constitutive for the person’ (not only ‘an attribute of the person’), shows how deeply man...is constituted by the body as ‘he’ or ‘she.’”⁶¹⁷ The differences of masculinity and femininity affect every level of the person. The man “embodies” masculinity, and the woman “embodies” femininity. At the same time, John Paul II asserts strongly that the difference and complementarity between male and female does not erase homogeneity. He says:

Bodiliness and sexuality are not simply identical. Although in its normal constitution, the human body carries within itself the signs of sex and is by its nature male or female, *the fact that man is a ‘body’ belongs more deeply to the structure of the personal subject than the fact that in his somatic constitution he is also male or female.*⁶¹⁸

Somatic heterogeneity complements somatic homogeneity.

⁶¹⁴ cf. TOB 9:1.

⁶¹⁵ TOB 10:5.

⁶¹⁶ TOB 9:3.

⁶¹⁷ TOB 10:1.

⁶¹⁸ TOB 8:1.

c. Original Nakedness

Based on Gen. 2:25, which reads, “The man and his wife were both naked, yet they felt no shame,” John Paul II adds original nakedness to original solitude and original unity as the third essential element of the “*biblical sketch of anthropology*,”⁶¹⁹ of the “beginning.”

Given that Gen. 2 mentions shame, John Paul II notes that the reader is taken directly into the subjectivity of the human person before the Fall. With the Fall, shame enters into human experience. There is a shift in human experience. A boundary is crossed, which is captured by the word “shame.” John Paul II identifies the shift as “a *radical change in the meaning of the original nakedness* of the woman before the man and of the man before the woman...[and a change in] the experience of the meaning of one’s own body before the Creator and creatures.”⁶²⁰ With the entrance of shame, there is a shift in one’s experience of the body and in the experience of the other.⁶²¹

Even though the biblical account describes an experience that is across the threshold of shame entering human experience (cf. Gen. 2:25), John Paul II undertakes to “*in some way reconstruct the original meaning of nakedness*” in the relationship between the man and the woman.⁶²² He immediately notes that the phrase, without shame, does not denote shamelessness or a lack of shame, which may be found in the case of individuals lacking full self-consciousness (e.g. a child). In the case of original nakedness, John Paul II says that the words of Gen. 2:25 “indicate a particular fullness of consciousness and experience, above all the fullness of

⁶¹⁹ TOB 11:2.

⁶²⁰ TOB 11:5.

⁶²¹ cf. TOB 11:4-5.

⁶²² TOB 11:6.

understanding the meaning of the body.”⁶²³ That full consciousness of oneself and of the other, the full consciousness of the bodies of the man and the woman experienced without shame is achieved through both the external vision of eyesight and the vision of the interior gaze. John Paul II says: “They see and know each other, in fact, with all the peace of the interior gaze, which creates precisely the fullness of the intimacy of persons.”⁶²⁴ Original nakedness reveals the mutual communication between the man and the woman that creates the *communio personarum* that is free from the experience of shame. John Paul II says that shame “carries it with it a specific limitation of vision through the eyes of the body.”⁶²⁵ It is a limitation that is caused by the presence of the fear of threat in the face of the other. Original nakedness allowed the man and woman to know the fullness of the meaning of the body and to share “the fullness of humanity, which shows itself in them as reciprocal complementarity...a mutual gift.”⁶²⁶ To be without shame is to be on the other side of that threshold of the experience of the meaning of the body in the human person’s subjectivity, to be on the other side of the threshold of the fullness of the *communio personarum*. John Paul II says: “The original meaning of nakedness corresponds to the simplicity and fullness of vision in which their understanding of the meaning of the body is born from...their community-communion.”⁶²⁷

II. Spousal Meaning of the Body

Throughout the *Theology of the Body*, John Paul II expresses the need for an “adequate anthropology.”⁶²⁸ He sees the original human experiences as forming a basis of such an

⁶²³ TOB 12:2.

⁶²⁴ TOB 13:1.

⁶²⁵ TOB 13:1.

⁶²⁶ TOB 13:1.

⁶²⁷ TOB 13:1.

⁶²⁸ TOB 13:2.

adequate anthropology.⁶²⁹ John Paul II calls the meaning of the body, as revealed in the original human experiences, the spousal meaning of the body.⁶³⁰ His development of the spousal meaning of the body employs the concept of the gift, as a key concept in John Paul II's theological anthropology.

A. Hermeneutics of the Gift

In his dialogue with the Pharisees, Jesus refers to the beginning of creation (Matt. 19:3, "He said in reply, 'Have you not read that from the beginning the Creator "made them male and female"'). In the same passage God is referred to as the Creator. In his continued analysis of "the beginning" referred to by Jesus, John Paul II takes up the theme of Creator and creation. John Paul II asserts that creation is a gift of God. The status of the gift is not simply that God created out of nothing, but that God created out of love. John Paul II says: "As an action of God, creation thus means not only calling from nothing to existence...but, according to the first account...it also signifies *gift*; a fundamental and 'radical' gift, that is, an act of giving in which the gift comes into being precisely from nothing."⁶³¹ In Gen. 1, we see the mystery of creation. We see, as John Paul II says, "the beginning of the world by the will of God, who is omnipotence and love."⁶³²

1. Creation as Gift

In his introduction of the concept of gift, John Paul II underscores its significance. He speaks of creation as a gift:

⁶²⁹ cf. TOB 13:2.

⁶³⁰ cf. TOB 14:5.

⁶³¹ TOB 13:3.

⁶³² TOB 13:4. In the previous paragraph, TOB 13:3, John Paul II incorporates a reference to 1 John 4:8, which reveals that "God is love."

We should now turn anew to those fundamental words that Christ used, that is, to the word “created” and to the subject, “Creator,” introducing into the considerations carried out so far *a new dimension, a new criterion of understanding and of interpretation that we will call “hermeneutics of the gift.”* The dimension of gift is decisive for the essential truth and depth of the meaning of original solitude-unity-nakedness. It stands also at the very heart of the mystery of creation, which allows us to build the theology of the body “from the beginning,” but at the same time demands that we build it in precisely this way.⁶³³

The hermeneutics of the gift is a key for interpreting human experience, is key for John Paul II’s theological anthropology. The essential elements of the concept of the gift are giver, receiver, and the relationship between the two.⁶³⁴ In the creation of the human person as a gift, God is the giver, and the receiver is the human person.

Since only the human person, in all of creation, is created in the image of God, the creation of the human person is unique. John Paul II says: “In the account of creation of the visible world, giving has meaning only in relation to man. In the whole work of creation, it is only about him that one can say, a gift has been granted.”⁶³⁵ John Paul II finds language that resonates with the understanding of creation as a gift in *Gaudium et Spes* 24:3. Paraphrasing, he says, “We recall here the text of the most recent Council in which it declares that man is the only creature in the visible world that God willed ‘for its own sake,’ adding that this man cannot ‘fully find himself except through a sincere gift of self.’”⁶³⁶ The gift of creation is God’s willing of the human person, for its own sake. The human person is the receiver of the gift. In this anthropological statement, the Council affirms that every human person is a gift. God wills the human person for its own sake. The human person receives the gift. And the human person is called to give oneself as a gift, which is indicative of the relation between God and the human person. Both the giving and the receiving are essential to anthropology as articulated by the

⁶³³ TOB 13:2.

⁶³⁴ cf. TOB 13:4.

⁶³⁵ TOB 13:4.

⁶³⁶ TOB 15:1.

hermeneutics of the gift. In addition to the elements of the giver and of the receiver, the third element of the hermeneutics of the gift is the relation between the giver and the receiver. John Paul II seems to refer to this relation as “living the world as a gift.”⁶³⁷ At this point, John Paul II does not take up the theme of the relation between the human person and God, in terms of the hermeneutics of the gift. Instead, he turns to the *communio personarum* of the man and the woman and their mutual gift and relation. He turns to their communion, which is created in the image of God, as a specific gift in the mystery of creation.

2. Mutual Gift of Self

Besides helping to articulate the relation of the human person to God, the hermeneutics of the gift is also key to John Paul II’s theological anthropology with regard to the communion of persons of the man and the woman.

Considered separately, the individual (man or woman) is the giver. In terms of *Gaudium et Spes*, the gift is the individual himself (or herself) in a disinterested gift of self to the other. John Paul II articulates that the disinterested gift is one that is made in freedom. Connected to original nakedness and the original absence of shame (cf. Gen. 2:25), the freedom, which is the basis of the gift, is self-mastery. John Paul II says, “Here we mean freedom above all as *self-mastery* (self-dominion). Under this aspect, self-mastery is indispensable *in order for man to be able to ‘give himself,’* in order for him to become a gift.”⁶³⁸ The disinterested gift is the freedom of the gift of self. The hermeneutics of the gift demands that the giver in giving himself or herself is not constrained, especially interiorly, and is in possession of oneself.

⁶³⁷ cf. TOB 14:1.

⁶³⁸ TOB 15:2.

The negative connotation of original solitude reveals that it was not good that the man was alone (cf. Gen. 2:18). The man was lacking someone to which he could give himself as a gift (cf. Gen. 2:20). John Paul II underscores that though his body, the man in Gen. 2 recognized that he was created to give himself to another human person. Until the creation of woman, he was alone. John Paul II says that the essence of the human person is revealed by “existing ‘for someone.’”⁶³⁹ The human person is for another, and the other receives that gift. Gen. 2 also illustrates the act of receiving the gift. John Paul II says of the man of Gen 2., “he welcomes her within himself..., welcomes her as she is willed ‘for her own sake’ by the Creator, as she is constituted in the mystery of the image of God through her femininity.”⁶⁴⁰ The receiving of the other for their own sake John Paul II speaks of as welcoming the gift and affirmation of the person. Receiving is defined by John Paul II as a “power and deep availability for the ‘affirmation of the person,’ that is, literally, the power to live the fact that the other—the woman for the man and the man for the woman—is...someone willed by the Creator ‘for his own sake’...someone chosen by eternal Love.”⁶⁴¹ In an interpersonal human relationship, the one who receives the gift receives the other for the other’s own sake. The hermeneutics of the gift and original nakedness indicate that the receiver is free, with the same freedom possessed by the giver.

The relationship established between the man and the woman is the communion of persons. The *communio personarum* requires mutuality, a reciprocal giving and receiving of the self. In Gen. 2, the human person realizes the need for mutuality through the recognition of the specific nature of the creation of the human person for its own sake. John Paul II says that,

⁶³⁹ TOB 14:2.

⁶⁴⁰ TOB 15:3. This passage continues with “and, reciprocally, she welcomes him in the same way, as he is willed ‘for his own sake’ by the Creator and constituted by him through his masculinity.”

⁶⁴¹ TOB 15:4.

though the body (cf. Gen. 2:20), the human person recognizes that “none of these beings (*animalia*), in fact, offers man the basic conditions that *make it possible to exist in a relation of reciprocal gift*.”⁶⁴² In the original situation the man and the woman both gave themselves to each other and received the gift of the other, at the same time. Of this communion of persons, John Paul II says: “Communion of persons means living in a reciprocal ‘for,’ in a relationship of reciprocal gift. And, this relationship is precisely the fulfillment of ‘man’s’ original solitude.”⁶⁴³

The hermeneutics of the gift underscores the spousal meaning of the body. In Gen. 2, the discovery that the somatic structure of each, the male body and the female body, reveals that the human person is created to be in a mutual relation of gift. This discovery is what John Paul II calls the spousal meaning of the body.⁶⁴⁴ The human person is created to be a gift for another. In the original situation (cf. Gen. 2:25), the spousal meaning of the body was fully understood and lived. And the spousal meaning of the body perdures even after the Fall. John Paul II asserts that every human person can discover the meaning to live in mutual relation, even if the gift is not fully lived. He says: “In fact, in the whole perspective of his own ‘history,’ man will not fail to confer a spousal meaning on his own body. Even if this meaning does undergo and will undergo many distortions, it will always remain the deepest level...as a sign of the ‘image of God.’”⁶⁴⁵

At the foundation of the spousal meaning of the body is the discovery of the mystery of the human person created male and female (cf. Gen. 1:27). This discovery is more than a recognition of the somatic difference between male and female. The *communio personarum* is established by masculinity and femininity, which are characteristics of the human person beyond

⁶⁴² TOB 14:1.

⁶⁴³ TOB 14:2.

⁶⁴⁴ cf. TOB 15:5.

⁶⁴⁵ TOB 15:5.

simply the somatic level. John Paul II says, “The body, which expresses femininity ‘for’ masculinity and vice versa, masculinity ‘for’ femininity, manifests the reciprocity and the communion of persons.”⁶⁴⁶ The human body reveals more than the male and female sexes, it reveals masculinity and femininity. Masculinity is a characteristic of the whole male human person, femininity is a characteristic of the whole female human person. John Paul II further says of the spousal meaning of the body:

The human body with...its masculinity and femininity... is not only a source of fruitfulness and of procreation, as in the whole natural order, but contains ‘from the beginning’ the ‘spousal’ attribute, that is, *the power to express love: precisely that love in which the human person becomes a gift* and—through this gift—fulfills the very meaning of his being and existence.⁶⁴⁷

The mutual gift of self of the communion of persons is only possible through freedom, the freedom to give and the freedom to receive. The danger is that the spousal meaning of the body, which includes procreation, can be understood in an animal way. Original nakedness reveals that the man and the woman were free (cf. Gen. 2:25). John Paul II says, “both are ‘naked,’ because they are *free with the very freedom of the gift*.”⁶⁴⁸ They were able to give a sincere gift of self. John Paul II names this relationship as love, saying, “One can define this ‘beginning’ also as the original and beatifying immunity from shame as the result of love.”⁶⁴⁹ The communion of persons, John Paul II says, which includes the body and procreation (cf. Gen. 1:28 and Gen. 2:24), is “in both accounts (though in each in a different way) also raised in some way to the level of the ‘image of God’ and to the level of the person.”⁶⁵⁰ It is only the free, mutual gift of self—of the communion of persons—that is love that is in the image of God.

⁶⁴⁶ TOB 14:4.

⁶⁴⁷ TOB 15:1.

⁶⁴⁸ TOB 15:1.

⁶⁴⁹ TOB 16:2.

⁶⁵⁰ TOB 14:6.

The human person is in the image of God, not only individually, but as a communion of persons. Based on Gen. 1:27 and Gen. 2:24), the assertion that the mutual exchange of the gift of self is in the image of God is an essential element of John Paul II's theological anthropology.

B. Communio Personarum as Task and Sign

After establishing the mutual exchange of the gift in a *communio personarum* as an integral part of an adequate anthropology, John Paul II further articulates the dynamics of the mutual exchange of the gift as a corollary to the spousal meaning of the body, while at the same time introducing a moral evaluation of the exchange of the gift of self.

The man and the woman in the original situation are described as being in a state of original innocence (cf. Gen. 2:23-25). John Paul II comments that innocence is a moral term, saying that “Innocence ‘of heart’—and, as a consequence, innocence of experience—signifies a moral participation in the eternal and permanent act of God’s will,” God, who wills the man and the woman each for their own sake.⁶⁵¹ In the original situation, the moral choices of the man and the woman were contained in the mutual exchange of the gift in freedom. That is, the man and woman recognized the spousal meaning of the body and, according to their conscience, responded simply according to the “*ethos of the gift*.”⁶⁵² The ethical demands of the spousal meaning of the body were not erased with original sin, even if they are no longer simply followed. John Paul II says, the spousal meaning of the body “was to *remain as a task given to man by the ethos of the gift*, inscribed in the depth of the human heart as a distant echo...of original innocence.”⁶⁵³ For the man and the woman—and for everyone since—the moral

⁶⁵¹ TOB 17: 3.

⁶⁵² TOB 19:1. The human moral choices were also buoyed by God’s grace, as John Paul II notes that the original exchange of the gift of creation is a “participation in the inner life of God himself, in his holiness” (TOB 16:3).

⁶⁵³ TOB 19:2.

demand of the mutual exchange of the gift is that the exchange be innocent. Even though original innocence was lost after original sin, the ethical obligation to live the mutual exchange of the gift remains.

John Paul II describes the mutual exchange of the gift in the original situation of original innocence as free from shame, that is, a gift given in freedom and free from reducing the other to an object. From the perspective of the man in Gen. 2, the sincere gift of self without shame is a gift that is given free from any internal constraint. The receiving of the woman's gift of self is the acceptance of her for her own sake. Commenting on receiving the other through its negation John Paul II says: "The contrary of such 'welcoming' or 'acceptance' of the other human being as a gift would be a loss of the gift itself and thus a transmutation and even reduction of the other to an 'object for myself' (object of concupiscence, of 'undue appropriation,' etc.)."⁶⁵⁴ With original innocence (cf. Gen. 2:23-25), the reception of the other is for their own sake—and not for one's own sake. Giving and receiving, in their deepest meaning, are not directed towards self-fulfillment. Even though one finds oneself through self-donation, the mutual exchange of the gift must remain a mutual disinterested gift of self, and receiving of the other, for the sake of the other.

The moral demand of the gift is confirmed by the continuation of the mutual exchange of the gift. The mutual exchange of the gift is not a single, reciprocal encounter between the man and woman. The encounter continually repeats itself. *Gaudium et Spes* 24 says that the human person finds oneself through a sincere gift of self. John Paul II says that "this *finding of oneself in one's own gift becomes the source of a new gift of self.*"⁶⁵⁵ A result of self-donation is that the person "finds himself" (cf. *Gaudium et Spes* 24), achieves self-fulfillment. John Paul II

⁶⁵⁴ TOB 17:3.

⁶⁵⁵ TOB 17:5.

describes this self-fulfillment as “an enrichment...[where the person] *reaches the innermost depth of ‘self-possession.’*”⁶⁵⁶ John Paul II furthermore says, “The exchange is reciprocal, and the mutual effects of the ‘sincere gift’ and of ‘finding oneself’ reveal themselves and grow in that exchange.”⁶⁵⁷ With the reciprocal gift of self, the individual is then able to discover oneself once again, able to receive oneself more fully, and with greater self-possession more able to give once again in self-donation. Each mutual self-gift creates the possibility of a new mutual self-donation. This continuing mutual self-gift must continue in freedom for the *communio personarum* to continue.

In light of the description of the dynamics of the mutual exchange of the gift, John Paul II comments on the distinct actions of giving and receiving. He says: “These two functions of the mutual exchange are deeply connected in the whole process of the ‘gift of self’: giving and accepting the gift interpenetrate in such a way that the very act of giving becomes acceptance, and acceptance transforms itself into giving.”⁶⁵⁸ In the *communio personarum*, there is a deep coherence between giving and receiving. Even though the two actions can be considered separately, the experience in innocence removes the distinction.

The mutual gift of self includes the body. In Gen. 2:24, the union of the man and woman is described as a union of “one body.” Conjugal union is acknowledged in Gen. 4:1, which states, “The man had intercourse with his wife Eve, and she conceived and gave birth.”⁶⁵⁹ John Paul II notes that the literal biblical term used, in Gen. 4:1, for “intercourse” is “to know.”⁶⁶⁰

⁶⁵⁶ TOB 17:6.

⁶⁵⁷ TOB 17:6.

⁶⁵⁸ TOB 17:4.

⁶⁵⁹ TOB 20:2. Even though the content of Gen. 4:1 takes place after humanity has crossed the threshold of sin and death, John Paul II asserts that its inclusion in an analysis of the “beginning,” is justified because Christ allows us to cross that threshold in his dialogue with the Pharisees in Matt. 19. Moreover, John Paul II says, “Thematically, knowledge is closely tied to the blessing of fruitfulness inserted in the first account of the creation of man as male and female (Gen 1:27-28)” (TOB 20:1).

⁶⁶⁰ TOB 20:2.

Even though “knowledge” is not used in a modern context to refer to conjugal union, John Paul II notes that in the ancient text “knowledge” underscores that fact that bodily union of the man and the woman was the result of human choice. He says: “Thus, the term ‘knowledge’ used in Gen. 4:1-2 and often in the Bible, *raises* the conjugal relation of man and woman...*and brings it into the specific dimension of the persons.*”⁶⁶¹ John Paul II further notes that “knowledge” in Gen. 4:1 refers to the consciousness of the meaning of the body, especially with regard to procreation. The connection between Gen. 4:1 and Gen. 2:24 makes clear the inseparable connection of union and procreation in the *communio personarum* of the man and the woman. John Paul II says: “Consequently, ‘knowledge’ in the biblical sense signifies that man’s ‘biological’ determination, on the part of his body...reaches a level and content specific to self-conscious and self-determining persons...[and] a particular consciousness of the meaning of the human body bound to fatherhood and motherhood.”⁶⁶²

III. The Human Person as the Image of God

The inclusion of the body in the *communio personarum* and the connection of union and procreation has further implication for the image of God. The communion of persons, which includes conjugal union and parenthood, is in the image of God. John Paul II says, “biblical ‘knowledge’ seems to take on a still greater dimension...the first account of the creation of man, concerning ‘male’ and ‘female’ made ‘in the image of God.’”⁶⁶³

The body is a sign. John Paul II says: “The body, in fact, and only the body, is capable of making visible what is invisible: the spiritual and the divine.”⁶⁶⁴ In the original situation (cf.

⁶⁶¹ TOB 20:3.

⁶⁶² TOB 21:4.

⁶⁶³ TOB 22:7.

⁶⁶⁴ TOB 19:4.

Gen. 2:23-25), the communion of the man and the woman—as created and as a result of inner moral choice—is communicated through the body, through conjugal union and procreation. John Paul II says: “the exchange of the gift, in which their whole humanity, soul and body, femininity and masculinity, participates, is realized *by preserving the inner characteristic...of self-donation and of the acceptance of the other as a gift.*”⁶⁶⁵ This theology of the body culminates in the understanding of the body as a sign of the moral union of the man and the woman and as a sign of the image of God.

John Paul II’s anthropological and ethical conclusions about the *communio personarum* are rooted in his interpretation of the revelation concerning the creation of the human person found in Gen. 1 and Gen. 2. In contemporary experience, the human person is called to follow the moral demands of the “beginning” (cf. Matt. 19:4), while at the same time being situated on this side of the threshold of original sin. This reality results in a tension within the human person. In the next chapter, I present John Paul II’s consideration of this inner tension.

⁶⁶⁵ TOB 17:4.

Chapter 6

John Paul II's *Theology of the Body*: The Historical Experience of the Human Person

John Paul II continues his theological anthropology by focusing on the post-lapsidary state of the human person (cf. Gen. 3), the “historical man,” every human person, who must struggle to live the moral demands of the disinterested gift of self.⁶⁶⁶

In this chapter, I present John Paul II's discussion of the inner tension of the human person and its resolution through the experience of the resurrection in this life.

I. Christ Appeals to the Human Heart

This second part of the triptych of the words of Christ, which includes Matt. 19:3-8 and Matt. 22:24-30, is based on Christ's words in the Sermon on the Mount, Matt. 5:27-28: “You have heard that it was said, ‘You shall not commit adultery.’ But I say to you, everyone who looks at a woman with lust has already committed adultery with her in his heart.”

A. Sermon on the Mount

Since Matt. 5:27-28 references an Old Testament commandment (“You shall not commit adultery,” Ex. 20:14, Dt. 5:18), questions of morality immediately come into focus. John Paul II says that this statement of Christ “confirms the principle of human morality contained in the commandment ‘You shall not commit adultery,’ and, at the same time, it shows...the condition for its adequate ‘fulfillment.’”⁶⁶⁷ The pope also says that, even though Christ addresses a man, the moral content equally applies to the woman.⁶⁶⁸ After making these initial comments, John Paul II postpones further ethical analysis of Christ's words. Instead, at this point, he turns to a

⁶⁶⁶ cf. TOB 25:1.

⁶⁶⁷ TOB 24:2.

⁶⁶⁸ TOB 25:5.

description of the inner human experiences, in the state after original sin. He turns to the “heart” that Christ mentions in Matt. 5:28 and the anthropological ramifications of Christ’s words.

1. Shame and Concupiscence

If the original situation of the human person was without shame (cf. Gen. 2:25), then the historical situation is affected by the experience of shame (cf. Gen. 3:7). John Paul II identifies concupiscence as a mark of the entry of shame into the experience of the human person, and as an effect of original sin. John Paul II presents 1 John 2:16 as a biblical passage that sheds light on the experience of concupiscence.⁶⁶⁹ This passage names a threefold concupiscence: “the concupiscence of the flesh, the concupiscence of the eyes, and the pride of life” (cf. 1 John 2:16).⁶⁷⁰ The pope does not enter into an analysis of this Johannine text but presents it as offering a biblical articulation of the inner experience of the human person.

To continue the analysis of shame and concupiscence, John Paul II returns to a reading of the second creation account, especially Gen. 3. He sees in this biblical account a description of sin as casting doubt on the gift that was received from God. In yielding to the temptation to be “like God” (cf. Gen. 3:5), the man and the woman violate their status as creatures. John Paul II says: “By casting doubt in his heart on the deepest meaning of the gift, that is, on love as the specific motive of creation and of the original covenant (see Gen 3:5), man turns his back on God-Love, on the ‘Father.’”⁶⁷¹ The effect of sin is that there was a change in the human person’s relationship with God, the beginning of a doubt of God’s love. Moreover, there was a break in the completeness of that original communion with God, a loss of the gift. The pope says,

⁶⁶⁹ TOB 26:1.

⁶⁷⁰ TOB 26:1. John Paul II seems to accept the meaning of a threefold concupiscence as self-evident. Instead of explaining what each of the three means, the pope inserts this Johannine passage into the present analyses, cf. TOB 26:1-3.

⁶⁷¹ TOB 26:4.

referring to Gen. 3:9-11, “In reality, what shows itself through ‘nakedness’ is man deprived of participation in the Gift, man alienated from the Love that was the source of the original gift.”⁶⁷²

Concomitant with the break in the communion with God, an inner division is experienced by the human person, an effect on one’s relationship with oneself. John Paul II says that the story in Gen. 3 reveals “a certain constitutive fracture in the human person’s interior, *a breakup, as it were, of man’s original spiritual and somatic unity.*”⁶⁷³ The pope continues: “The concupiscence of the body is a specific threat to the structure of self-possession and self-dominion, through which the human person forms itself. ...In any case, *the man of concupiscence does not rule his own body in the same way, with the same simplicity...as the man of original innocence.*”⁶⁷⁴ The break in the spiritual and somatic unity makes it difficult to receive simply the gift of one’s own self.

In addition to the rupture in relationship with God and a rupture of inner unity, the human interpersonal *communio personarum* is likewise injured through original sin. This rupture is indicated biblically by the covering of themselves with fig leaves (cf. Gen. 3:7). The pope says: “That *reciprocal communion in humanity itself through the body* and through its masculinity and femininity...is *overturned* at this moment, as if the body in its masculinity and femininity ceased to be ‘free from suspicion’ ...as if its original function were ‘called into doubt.’”⁶⁷⁵ After original sin, the ability to live the gift is replaced with desire. Pointing to Gen. 3:16 (“your urge shall be for your husband, and he shall rule over you”), the pope says, “*the communion of persons*—which consists in the spiritual unity of the two subjects who gave themselves to each

⁶⁷² TOB 27:2. Gen. 3:9-11 reads: “The LORD God then called to the man and asked him: Where are you? He answered, ‘I heard you in the garden; but I was afraid, because I was naked, so I hid.’ Then God asked: Who told you that you were naked? Have you eaten from the tree of which I had forbidden you to eat?” John Paul II also notes that in this biblical passage is a change in the relation of the human person to the rest of the non-human creation.

⁶⁷³ TOB 28:2.

⁶⁷⁴ TOB 28:3.

⁶⁷⁵ TOB 29:2.

other—is replaced by a different mutual relationship, namely, by a relationship of possession of the other as an object of one’s own desire.”⁶⁷⁶ John Paul II restates this change in the relationship in terms of the gift: he says, “*The relationship of the gift changes into a relationship of appropriation.*”⁶⁷⁷ The change in the relationship between the man and the woman was a loss of the freedom of the gift. Doubt is cast on the disinterested gift of self. Doubt is cast on the ability to receive the other as a gift. The pope says: “Concupiscence as such is not able to promote union as a communion of persons.”⁶⁷⁸ The presence of concupiscence casts doubt on the mutual self-gift. The change in the relationship with original sin, in the pope’s words, is described by the experience of the human person “as male *or* female—before then it was rather male *and* female.”⁶⁷⁹ He describes this change as introducing an insatiability into the relationship between the man and the woman, introducing a “failure to satisfy the aspiration” to establish a full communion of persons.⁶⁸⁰ The man and woman are still in a relationship, but can never cross back over the threshold into the original experience without shame. They can never satisfy the desire to return to the original situation.

With original sin, the recognition and acceptance of the spousal meaning of the body was also changed. Rather than conjugal union being an expression of a disinterested mutual self-gift, it becomes something other. The pope describes concupiscence “as a limitation, violation, or complete deformation of the spousal meaning of the body.”⁶⁸¹ This change is revealed in the shift in meaning of the other person as “mine,” the shift away from the original meaning of the other as “my flesh and bone” (cf. Gen. 2:23). Instead of the *communio personarum* of the

⁶⁷⁶ TOB 31:3.

⁶⁷⁷ TOB 32:6.

⁶⁷⁸ TOB 32:6.

⁶⁷⁹ TOB 30:5.

⁶⁸⁰ TOB 30:5.

⁶⁸¹ TOB 31:6.

original situation, where there is a “reciprocal belonging of persons...the reciprocity of giving...the equilibrium of the gift,”⁶⁸² with original sin the other person becomes “a material object-thing.”⁶⁸³ John Paul II further says: “Concupiscence...attacks precisely this ‘sincere gift’: *it deprives man...of the dignity of the gift...and in some sense ‘depersonalizes’ man, making him an object ‘for the other.’*”⁶⁸⁴ One effect of concupiscence is that the human person has “*difficulty in identifying oneself with one’s own body*, not only in the sphere of one’s own subjectivity, but even more so *in regard to the subjectivity of the other human being*, of woman for man and man for woman.”⁶⁸⁵ This relationship of possession makes the other an object of use. The pope describes the effect of a relationship of possession saying: “the object I possess gains a certain significance for me inasmuch as it is at my disposal and I put it to my service, I use it.”⁶⁸⁶ The change in the meaning of the body is that the body is treated separately from the person, with regard to the self and the other.

The man and the woman covering themselves with loincloths (cf. Gen. 3:7) indicates that the body becomes the means by which one uses the other, instead of being part of the expression of the communion of persons.⁶⁸⁷ They hide what had been the basis of their communion. The presence of shame in the relationship between the man and the woman marks the entrance of a fear of being used by the other in their relationship. The covering-up reveals the self-recognition of the value of one’s own being, one’s own dignity, one’s own need for affirmation and acceptance. Concerning this value of the human person, John Paul II says: “Shame has a twofold

⁶⁸² TOB 33:3-4.

⁶⁸³ TOB 33:4.

⁶⁸⁴ TOB 32:4.

⁶⁸⁵ TOB 29:4.

⁶⁸⁶ TOB 33:4.

⁶⁸⁷ cf. TOB 28:4. The text of Gen. 3:7 reads, “Then the eyes of both were opened, and they knew that they were naked; and they sewed fig leaves together and made themselves aprons [loincloths].”

meaning: it indicates the threat to the value and at the same time it preserves this value.”⁶⁸⁸ The pope expounds on the positive role of shame. He says that “through shame, man and woman almost remain in the state of original innocence. In fact, they continually become conscious of the spousal meaning of the body and intend to protect it, so to speak, from concupiscence.”⁶⁸⁹ Shame thus corresponds to the effects of sin and concupiscence, opening avenues to establishing a disinterested mutual gift of self. Shame ensures that the mutual self-donation is disinterested. Because of shame, the relationship of possession does not totally replace the original *communio personarum*. The pope says: “The spousal meaning of the body has not become totally foreign to that heart: *it has not been totally suffocated in it by concupiscence, but only habitually threatened*. The ‘heart’ has become a battlefield between love and concupiscence.”⁶⁹⁰ An authentic *communio personarum* remains possible.

2. Fulfillment of Commandment

Complementing the above anthropological statements, John Paul II turns to some ethical considerations based on Matt. 5:27-28.

Christ is revising how to fulfill an Old Testament command.⁶⁹¹ So John Paul II examines biblical evidence of how the commandment against adultery would have been heard by the original audience of the Sermon on the Mount, who the pope describes as those who were “educated in the tradition of the Old Testament, that is, in the tradition of the legislative texts, as well as Prophetic and Wisdom literature.”⁶⁹² As is revealed by the conversation with the Pharisees concerning divorce (cf. Matt. 19:3-9), the heritage of the Old Testament is colored by

⁶⁸⁸ TOB 28:6.

⁶⁸⁹ TOB 31:1.

⁶⁹⁰ TOB 32:3.

⁶⁹¹ TOB 24:1.

⁶⁹² TOB 58:3.

living the hardness of the heart. The pope says: “*The hardness of heart*’ indicates that which, according to the ethos of the people of the Old Testament, *had given rise to the situation contrary* to the original design...according to Genesis 2:24.”⁶⁹³

In the example of the biblical Patriarchs, John Paul II points out that conjugal union with another man’s wife is considered adultery. In the same context, however, polygamy is not considered adultery. Adultery can only be committed with a married woman, who is not one’s own wife. John Paul II explains: “The whole tradition of the Old Covenant indicates that the effective necessity of monogamy as an essential and indispensable implication *of the commandment ‘You shall not commit adultery’* never reached the consciousness and ethos of the later generations of the Chosen People.”⁶⁹⁴

In the books of the Prophets, John Paul II sees a morality that is closer to Christ’s command. As the prophets align idolatry and adultery in terms of Israel’s relationship with God, there an analogy in human interpersonal relationships and an intended exclusivity in monogamy.⁶⁹⁵ But the pope also points out that this analogy does not get a legal status, saying, “In the texts of the prophets, the background of effective and legalized polygamy does not change the ethical meaning of adultery.”⁶⁹⁶ The Law does not prohibit polygamy. Moreover, the Law is focused on procreation. The pope says, “Taken in its entirety, the marriage law of the Old Testament places the procreative end of marriage in the foreground.”⁶⁹⁷ The prophets, through analogy, reveal a sense of adultery that is a violation of a personal covenant between the man and the woman.⁶⁹⁸

⁶⁹³ TOB 34:1.

⁶⁹⁴ TOB 35:3.

⁶⁹⁵ TOB 36:5.

⁶⁹⁶ TOB 37:4.

⁶⁹⁷ TOB 36:2.

⁶⁹⁸ TOB 37:4.

In the Wisdom literature of the Old Testament (e.g. Proverbs, Sirach, Ecclesiastes), John Paul II identifies moral perspectives that also come close to Christ's command. They present a moral psychology, an evaluation of desire.⁶⁹⁹ The pope says: "The authors of these books use their knowledge of human interiority to teach morals within the limits of the ethos that prevailed in their historical period."⁷⁰⁰ The pope says that the Wisdom literature reveals that desire, "springing from carnal concupiscence, suffocates the deepest voice of conscience in the 'heart' ... the man *whose will is occupied with satisfying the senses* does not find rest nor does he find himself."⁷⁰¹ Even here, since it is largely pedagogical, it does not become a moral norm.⁷⁰²

Christ fulfills the Law. The Old Testament Law is not equal to the original beginning. The new ethos of the Gospel fulfills the Law. The pope references Matt. 5:20, where Christ says that he wants justice that exceeds that of the scribes and Pharisees.⁷⁰³ On the mountain as the new lawgiver (cf. Matt. 5:1), Christ gives a new commandment. The Sixth and Ninth Commandments focus the moral norms on actions with one who is not one's wife, e.g. Ex. 20:14, "You shall not commit adultery" and Ex. 20:17, "You shall not covet your neighbor's wife." In the case of adultery, John Paul II notes that the law is fulfilled by adhering to the commandment literally (e.g. not committing adultery) and by "fulfilling the justice that should

⁶⁹⁹ TOB 38:3.

⁷⁰⁰ TOB 38:5.

⁷⁰¹ TOB 39:2. John Paul II is considering here Sir. 23:16-22: "Two types of people multiply sins, and a third draws down wrath: Burning passion is like a blazing fire, not to be quenched till it burns itself out; One unchaste with his kindred never stops until fire breaks forth. To the unchaste all bread is sweet; he is never through till he dies. The man who dishonors his marriage bed says to himself, "Who can see me? Darkness surrounds me, walls hide me, no one sees me. Who can stop me from sinning?" He is not mindful of the Most High, fearing only human eyes. He does not realize that the eyes of the Lord, ten thousand times brighter than the sun, Observe every step taken and peer into hidden corners. The one who knows all things before they exist still knows them all after they are made. Such a man will be denounced in the streets of the city; and where he least suspects it, he will be apprehended. So it is with the woman unfaithful to her husband, who offers him an heir by another man."

⁷⁰² TOB 38:6. In TOB 35:5, John Paul II notes that, in the case of the woman caught in adultery (cf. John 8:1-11), Jesus does not appeal to the Law but to the conscience of those who desire to stone the woman.

⁷⁰³ TOB 35:1. Matt. 5:20 reads: "I tell you, unless your righteousness surpasses that of the scribes and Pharisees, you will not enter into the kingdom of heaven."

‘superabound’ in man himself, that is, that should reach its specific fullness in him.”⁷⁰⁴ The new commandment of Matt. 5:28 (“But I say to you, everyone who looks at a woman with lust has already committed adultery with her in his heart.”) shifts the moral focus to a look with desire. The pope says that Christ stops at the threshold of the look. Christ points to desire as an action that “has not yet transformed itself into an external act, it has not yet become an ‘act of the body’; it is still an interior act of the heart: it expresses itself in the look.”⁷⁰⁵

Adultery in the heart is committed by looking with desire at a woman who is not one’s wife. A look of desire is a reduction of the full meaning of the other, a negation of the spousal meaning of the body.⁷⁰⁶ It reduces sexual attraction to a desire to use the other. Looking with desire is a moral choice, an intentional choice to make the other an object.⁷⁰⁷ Such a choice, constrained by the sexual urge, results in a loss of the freedom of the gift.⁷⁰⁸

The fulfillment of the Law, the abounding of the Law, that Christ teaches in Matt. 5:27-28 is that adultery in the heart can be committed against any woman, even one’s own wife. The pope says that adultery in the heart “is not committed only because the man ‘looks’ in this way at [to desire] a woman who is not his wife, but *precisely because he looks in this way at a woman. Even if he were to look in this way at the woman who is his wife, he would commit the same adultery ‘in the heart.’*”⁷⁰⁹ A look with desire can be committed by a man or a woman.⁷¹⁰

Since the moral norms concerning adultery involving bodily action do not apply in the case of a married couple, the moral norm of Matt. 5:27-28 illustrate that the violation or the

⁷⁰⁴ TOB 24:2.

⁷⁰⁵ TOB 39:4.

⁷⁰⁶ TOB 39:5.

⁷⁰⁷ TOB 41:1.

⁷⁰⁸ TOB 41:5.

⁷⁰⁹ TOB 43:2.

⁷¹⁰ cf. TOB 25:5. John Paul II follows the biblical content, which primarily addresses males, using similar language, while always being clear that the moral norms apply to man and woman. His choice facilitates a clearer presentation, especially as it cites biblical texts. But the struggle of the heart is experienced by both man and woman.

fulfillment of the new law is primarily a question of the heart. The pope says that this study “makes us, at one and the same time, enter into the depth *of the norm itself and descend into the interior of man, the subject of morality.*”⁷¹¹

3. The Human Heart

The new norm of Christ concerning adultery in the heart points to purity of heart (cf. Matt. 5:8, “Blessed are the clean of heart, for they will see God”) as a basis for a communion of persons.⁷¹² The reality of concupiscence creates a conflict between desire and communion, in the heart of the human person. John Paul II examines some perspectives that purport to resolve that internal conflict. Through his evaluation of these perspective, the pope is answering the question if the human heart is defined by desire or by communion.

One answer is Manichaeism. This answer is advanced by the original and later perspectives that view the human body and the conjugal act as bad, as a source of evil.⁷¹³ To this answer John Paul II responds that the body is good, and, in the case of adultery in the heart, the body is a value that is underappreciated. The pope says: “‘Adultery committed in the heart’ can and should be understood as a ‘devaluation’ or impoverishment of an authentic value, as an intentional privation of that dignity to which the integral value...[of the other] corresponds.”⁷¹⁴ The body is not a source of evil, but is a value to be appreciated. The human heart is called to not yield to concupiscence, but to recognize the spousal meaning of the body.⁷¹⁵

Another answer to the question of internal conflict comes from modern psychology. John Paul II accepts a name applied to these psychologists (e.g. Freud, Marx, and Nietzsche) as the

⁷¹¹ TOB 24:3.

⁷¹² TOB 43:5.

⁷¹³ TOB 44:5.

⁷¹⁴ TOB 46:5.

⁷¹⁵ TOB 45:2.

“masters of suspicion.”⁷¹⁶ This perspective corresponds to the threefold concupiscence, and defines the human person by one or more of the expressions of concupiscence named in 1 John 2:16 (“the concupiscence of the flesh, the concupiscence of the eyes, and the pride of life”).⁷¹⁷ John Paul II says that Nietzsche’s perspective corresponds to the pride of life, that Marx’s perspective corresponds to the concupiscence of the eyes, and that Freud’s perspective corresponds to the concupiscence of the flesh.⁷¹⁸

To the answer given by the masters of suspicion, John Paul II responds that this perspective is an inadequate anthropology. He says: “*Man cannot stop at casting the heart into a state of continual and irreversible suspicion* due to the manifestations of the concupiscence of the flesh.”⁷¹⁹ Instead, the pope says, “*Man must feel himself called to rediscover, or even better, to realize, the spousal meaning of the body and to express in this way the interior freedom of the gift, that is, the freedom of that spiritual state and power that derive from mastery over the concupiscence of the flesh.*”⁷²⁰

Another answer to the question of internal conflict comes from the philosophical language of eros. Primarily the language of eros is used to describe the sexual attraction of the man and the woman, one to the other.⁷²¹ Eros can correspond to the biblical ethics of Matt. 5:27-28, if, in the words of the pope, eros “implies the upward impulse of the human spirit toward what is true, good, and beautiful, so that what is ‘erotic’ also becomes true, good, and beautiful.”⁷²² Moreover, concerning the sexual attraction that spontaneously manifests itself, the pope says: “the inner man is *called by Christ to reach a more mature and complete evaluation*

⁷¹⁶ TOB 46:1. In this passage, John Paul II attributes Ricoeur with coining the title for these thinkers.

⁷¹⁷ TOB 46:2.

⁷¹⁸ cf. TOB 46:2.

⁷¹⁹ TOB 46:4.

⁷²⁰ TOB 46:4.

⁷²¹ TOB 47:2.

⁷²² TOB 48:1.

that allows him to distinguish and judge the various movements of his own heart.”⁷²³ Eros would remain on the level of concupiscence, without an elevation of sexual attraction to the freedom of the gift.

John Paul II asserts that the words of Matt. 5:27-28 offer a resolution to the internal conflict in the heart of the human person. The human heart is not just accused by the Gospel, it is also called.⁷²⁴ The human person is capable of and is made capable of overcoming desire, of living the *communio personarum*. This perspective leads John Paul II to speak of the human person as living in the “*status naturae lapsae simul ac redemptae* [the state of fallen and at the same time redeemed nature].”⁷²⁵

4. Purity of Heart

The internal conflict of the human person can be resolved through a purity of heart (cf. Matt. 5:8, “Blessed are the clean of heart”).⁷²⁶ John Paul II summarizes his presentation on the purity of heart with these words:

If this “*purity of heart*” discussed by us is understood according to the thought of St. Paul as “*life according to the Spirit*,” then the Pauline context offers us a complete image of the content of the words Christ spoke in the Sermon on the Mount. These words contain a truth of an ethical nature, warning us to guard against evil and pointing out the moral good of human behavior; indeed, they direct the listeners to avoid the evil of concupiscence and to acquire purity of heart.⁷²⁷

The pope recognizes in St. Paul the contrast between “life according to the flesh” (cf. Rom. 8:5) and “life according to the Spirit” (Rom. 8:5, Gal. 5:16) as language that captures the contrast

⁷²³ TOB 48:4.

⁷²⁴ TOB 46:5.

⁷²⁵ TOB 45:3.

⁷²⁶ In TOB 58:4, John Paul II notes that he is making a specific application, to the experience of adultery in the heart (cf. Matt. 5:28), of the more general notion of purity of heart found in Matt. 5:8.

⁷²⁷ TOB 58:4.

between concupiscence in the heart and purity of heart.⁷²⁸ Purity of heart is realized in a life according to the Spirit. St. Paul explicitly takes up the theme of purity in 1 Thess. 4. The pope says: “The purity about which Paul speaks in 1 Thessalonians (see 1 Thess 4:3-5, 7-8) shows itself in the fact that man ‘knows how to keep his own body with holiness and reverence, not as the object of lustful passions.’”⁷²⁹ The pope explains that self-mastery, as abstinence from lustful passion, is overcoming that which is “born spontaneously [in the human person]...in the sphere of the senses...[and] in the affective-emotive sphere.”⁷³⁰ Identifying another significant term from the passage of 1 Thess. 4, the pope comments on reverence: “*from shame is born ‘reverence’ for one’s own body.*”⁷³¹ Reverence is expressed through temperance and modesty. The pope says: “Christ shows clearly that the way to attain this goal must be the way of temperance and of mastery of desires.”⁷³²

Life according to the Spirit involves both the work of the Holy Spirit and the human spirit, as St. Paul indicates in Gal. 5:16-17⁷³³ and Gal. 5:22-23.⁷³⁴ John Paul II says: “If mastery in the sphere of ethos manifests itself as ‘love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, generosity, faithfulness, gentleness, and self-mastery’—as we read in Galatians—then behind each of

⁷²⁸ TOB 50:5.

⁷²⁹ TOB 54:2. 1 Thess. 4:3-8 reads: “This is the will of God, your holiness: that you refrain from immorality, that each of you know how to acquire a wife for himself in holiness and honor, not in lustful passion as do the Gentiles who do not know God; not to take advantage of or exploit a brother in this matter, for the Lord is an avenger in all these things, as we told you before and solemnly affirmed. For God did not call us to impurity but to holiness. Therefore, whoever disregards this, disregards not a human being but God, who [also] gives his holy Spirit to you.”

⁷³⁰ TOB 54:3.

⁷³¹ TOB 55:5. John Paul II is using “reverence” instead of “honor” in his translation of 1 Thess. 4:4, “in holiness and honor.”

⁷³² TOB 49:4.

⁷³³ Gal. 5:16-17 reads: “I say, then: live by the Spirit and you will certainly not gratify the desire of the flesh. For the flesh has desires against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh; these are opposed to each other, so that you may not do what you want.”

⁷³⁴ Gal. 5:22-23 reads: “The fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, generosity, faithfulness, gentleness, self-control.”

these...moral virtues, stands a specific choice, that is, an effort of the will, a *fruit of the human spirit* permeated by the Spirit of God.”⁷³⁵ Purity is a human virtue and a divine gift.

The pope further draws on Pauline language to discuss the purity of heart and the life according to the Spirit. Life according to the Spirit is possible because of the redemption of the body, cf. Romans 8:23, “We ourselves, who have the firstfruits of the Spirit, we also groan within ourselves as we wait for adoption, the redemption of our bodies.”⁷³⁶ The redemption of the body is what allows the human person to live the ethical requirements of the hermeneutics of the gift, even after losing original innocence. It allows the human person to experience, as the pope says, “the gradual victory over this ‘disunion in the body,’”⁷³⁷ the disunion connected to the experience of shame. The grace given to the human person, fallen and redeemed, is what makes the human person able to live the purity of heart. The human person is able to fulfill the commandment of Matt. 5:27-28 because of Jesus Christ. The pope says: “It is precisely in this man, in his ‘heart’ and thus in all his behavior, that the redemption of Christ bears fruit, thanks to the powers of the Spirit that bring about ‘justification,’ that is, that cause justice to ‘abound’ in man, as the Sermon on the Mount insistently teaches (Mt 5:20), that is, to ‘abound’ in the measure God himself wills and expects.”⁷³⁸ He continues, “The fruit of redemption is indeed the Holy Spirit, who dwells in man and his body as in a temple. In this Gift, which makes every human being holy, the Christian receives himself anew as a gift from God.”⁷³⁹ Interwoven, especially, with insights based on his interpretation of Gen. 2-3, John Paul II articulates his

⁷³⁵ TOB 51:6.

⁷³⁶ TOB 49:2.

⁷³⁷ TOB 55:7.

⁷³⁸ TOB 52:1.

⁷³⁹ TOB 56:4.

conviction that the human person, through the experience of redemption (cf. Rom. 8:23), is capable of inner freedom.⁷⁴⁰

II. Christ Appeals to the Resurrection

John Paul II continues the *Theology of the Body* by focusing on a third state of the human person—life in the Resurrection. In the Gospel, Matt. 22:24-30, Christ speaks of this dimension of the human person, the reunion of body and soul after their separation in death.⁷⁴¹ In his treatment of the third part of the triptych (the other two passages of the triptych being Matt. 19:3-8 and Matt. 5:27-28), John Paul II examines both words from Christ in the Gospel and words from St. Paul, which together reveal insights into both marriage and celibacy.

A. Christ and St. Paul on the Resurrection of the Body

John Paul II employs Matt. 22:24-32 and 1 Cor. 15:42-49 to convey a biblical understanding of the resurrected body.

1. Divinization

In a dialogue with the Sadducees, they present to Christ a question about a woman who, upon the death of an older brother to whom she was married, marries a younger brother, thus in

⁷⁴⁰ cf. TOB 58:5.

⁷⁴¹ TOB 64:1. In TOB 64:4, John Paul II also notes that the same dialogue is reported in Mark 12:18-27 and in Luke 20:27-40. Matt. 22:24-32 reads: “On that day Sadducees approached him, saying that there is no resurrection. They put this question to him, saying, ‘Teacher, Moses said, “If a man dies without children, his brother shall marry his wife and raise up descendants for his brother.” Now there were seven brothers among us. The first married and died and, having no descendants, left his wife to his brother. The same happened with the second and the third, through all seven. Finally the woman died. Now at the resurrection, of the seven, whose wife will she be? For they all had been married to her.’ Jesus said to them in reply, ‘You are misled because you do not know the scriptures or the power of God. At the resurrection they neither marry nor are given in marriage but are like the angels in heaven. And concerning the resurrection of the dead, have you not read what was said to you by God, ‘I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob’? He is not the God of the dead but of the living.’”

consequence marrying seven brothers (cf. Matt. 22:24-28). They present this situation as a counterexample to a belief in the resurrection of the body.⁷⁴² In response, Christ asserts the reality of the resurrection of the human body (cf. Matt. 22:29-30). He says to the Sadducees that God is God of the living (cf. Matt. 22:31-32). John Paul II says:

The full meaning of this testimony, to which Jesus appeals in his dialogue with the Sadducees, could be gathered (still in the light of the Old Testament alone) in the following way. He who is—he who lives and is Life—constitutes the inexhaustible fountain of existence and of life... Although, due to sin, bodily death has become man's lot... *when the living God enters his covenant with man* (Abraham, the patriarchs, Moses, Israel)...in some way opens up again the access to the tree of Life.⁷⁴³

God is alive and gives life. By missing this interpretation of the Old Testament covenant, Jesus says to the Sadducees that they are in error. In the words of John Paul II: “Jesus first shows them a mistake in their method: *they do not know the Scriptures*; and then an error of substance: they do not accept what is revealed by the Scriptures—*since they do not know the power of God*.”⁷⁴⁴

In this dialogue Christ is revealing in what way the body will take on a new meaning in the resurrection. John Paul II comments on the human person's relationship with God in the resurrection as part of this new meaning. Based especially on Luke's version of the dialogue, where Christ asserts that the human person will be of God (cf. Luke 20:36, “They can no longer die, for they are like angels; and they are the children of God because they are the ones who will rise”), John Paul II comments on the divinization of the human person. In the resurrection, God will give himself to the human person in a new way. The pope says that this gift will be “*God's self-communication in his very divinity, not only to the soul, but to the whole of man's psychosomatic subjectivity*.”⁷⁴⁵ In receiving the gift of God himself, the human person will

⁷⁴² cf. TOB 64:2.

⁷⁴³ TOB 65:5.

⁷⁴⁴ TOB 65:3.

⁷⁴⁵ TOB 67:3.

respond by one's one self-donation—living a mutual interpersonal exchange of the human person with God.⁷⁴⁶

2. Spiritualization

John Paul II adds to his theological anthropology of the human person in the eschatological state with comments on this new state of the human person. In this new state, the internal conflict of concupiscence will be definitively resolved in a spiritualization of the human person. The pope says: “‘*Spiritualization*’ signifies not only that the spirit will master the body, but...that *it will also fully permeate the body and the powers of the spirit will permeate the energies of the body.*”⁷⁴⁷ The pope further explains spiritualization: “The resurrection...will consist in the perfect realization of what is personal in man.”⁷⁴⁸ The inner disunion experienced by the human person will be perfectly overcome, achieving perfect self-possession and self-donation. John Paul II further notes that, in the resurrection of the body, the body retains its original psychosomatic character, its masculinity or femininity, albeit with a new meaning. The pope says: “The words ‘take neither wife nor husband’ seem to affirm, at one and the same time, that human bodies, which are recovered and also renewed in the resurrection, will preserve their specific masculine or feminine character and that *the meaning of being male or female in the body will be constituted and understood differently.*”⁷⁴⁹ In the resurrection, there is a new meaning to the spousal meaning of the body.

Given the centrality of marriage for the *Theology of the Body* and for the human person in the historical state, John Paul II emphasizes its relative state, with regard to the resurrection. He

⁷⁴⁶ TOB 68:3.

⁷⁴⁷ TOB 67:1.

⁷⁴⁸ TOB 67:2.

⁷⁴⁹ TOB 66:4.

says, “*marriage...belongs exclusively ‘to this world.’* Marriage and procreation do not constitute man’s eschatological future.”⁷⁵⁰ But, again, the spousal meaning of the body is retained in the resurrection. The pope says, “It is thus evident that the meaning of being...male or female in the ‘future world’ should be sought outside of marriage and procreation, but there is no reason to seek it outside of that which...derives from the very mystery of creation.”⁷⁵¹ The mystery of creation reveals that the human person is created to be in a *communio personarum*. In the resurrection, through the perfect spiritualization and divinization of all human persons, a communion of persons is established between every human person. John Paul II says that we should think of the resurrection “in the categories of the rediscovery of a new, perfect subjectivity of each person and at the same time of the *rediscovery* of a new, *perfect intersubjectivity of all*. In this way this reality means the true and definitive fulfillment of the ‘spousal’ meaning of the body.”⁷⁵² With regard to interpersonal human relationships in the resurrection, in this state will be the full realization of the *communio personarum*, with each person able to make a mutual, total, and disinterested gift of self to the other.⁷⁵³

The above analyses take into account Christ’s response to the Sadducees in terms of its meaning at the time of its delivery—before Christ’s own Resurrection, and in the terms of his adversaries who denied a resurrection. In 1 Cor. 15:42-49, John Paul II finds a passage that articulates a biblical understanding of the state of the human person in the resurrection in light of Christ’s own resurrection.⁷⁵⁴ This passage from St. Paul adds a perspective that is not found in

⁷⁵⁰ TOB 66:2. Later in the *Theology of the Body*, John Paul II describes how marriage points to eschatological hope, cf. TOB 101:7-11.

⁷⁵¹ TOB 69:3.

⁷⁵² TOB 68:4.

⁷⁵³ TOB 68:4. With reference to the articles of faith expressed in the Creed (e.g. the resurrection of the body, the communion of saints, and eternal life), John Paul II describes here the eschatological communion of persons as the communion saints (*communio sanctorum*).

⁷⁵⁴ TOB 70:4. 1 Cor. 15:42-49 reads: “So also is the resurrection of the dead. It is sown corruptible; it is raised incorruptible. It is sown dishonorable; it is raised glorious. It is sown weak; it is raised powerful. It is sown a natural

Matt. 22:24-30. St. Paul writes after Christ's own resurrection. John Paul II says that Christ's resurrection "is the answer by the God of life to the historical inevitability of death."⁷⁵⁵ 1 Cor. 15:42-49 asserts the continuity of the human person in the three states that John Paul II has described. The pope says:

The humanity of the "first Adam," the "man of earth," carries within itself... a *particular potentiality* (which is capacity and readiness) *for receiving all that the "second Adam" became*, the heavenly Man, namely Christ.... It is the same humanity, which... is "perishable"—since it is fleshly—while being burdened with the heritage of sin, and yet carries in itself at the same time the potentiality of "incorruptibility."⁷⁵⁶

The potentiality of the human person to experience the resurrected body is realized in Christ.

The pope says concerning St. Paul's treatment of the resurrected body: "in his authentic bodiliness, 'spiritual body' should signify precisely *the perfect sensitivity of the senses, their perfect harmonization with the activity of the human spirit* in truth and freedom. The 'natural body'... by contrast indicates sensuality as a force that often undermines man inasmuch as... he is often urged... toward evil."⁷⁵⁷ In this way, the basic content of St. Paul's treatment of the state of the human person is the same as the content articulated from the dialogue with the Sadducees. John Paul II, however, sees in 1 Cor. 15:42-49 a more explicit description of the psychosomatic constitution of the human person in the state of the resurrection.⁷⁵⁸ The detail supplied in this passage from St. Paul takes into account the work of Christ and of the Holy Spirit for a theological anthropology concerning the resurrection of the body.

body; it is raised a spiritual body. If there is a natural body, there is also a spiritual one. So, too, it is written, 'The first man, Adam, became a living being,' the last Adam a life-giving spirit. But the spiritual was not first; rather the natural and then the spiritual. The first man was from the earth, earthly; the second man, from heaven. As was the earthly one, so also are the earthly, and as is the heavenly one, so also are the heavenly. Just as we have borne the image of the earthly one, we shall also bear the image of the heavenly one."

⁷⁵⁵ TOB 70:3.

⁷⁵⁶ TOB 71:3.

⁷⁵⁷ TOB 72:4.

⁷⁵⁸ TOB 71:5.

2. Christ and St. Paul on Celibacy

John Paul II employs Matt. 19:11-12 and 1 Cor. 7 to describe a biblical understanding of celibacy

a. Celibacy as Union with God

Connected to Christ's words on marriage (cf. Matt. 19:3-9) and on the resurrection (Matt. 22:24-30) is Christ's statement in Matt. 19:11-12, concerning celibacy. The text reads:

Not all can accept [this] word, but only those to whom that is granted. Some are incapable of marriage because they were born so; some, because they were made so by others; some, because they have renounced marriage for the sake of the kingdom of heaven. Whoever can accept this ought to accept it (Matt. 19:11-12).

The passage of Matt. 19:11-12 speaks about three kinds of eunuchs: two are based on physical defect and one is based on choice.⁷⁵⁹ John Paul II notes that the consideration of celibacy for the sake of the kingdom of heaven was an option that is foreign to the Old Testament and Covenant, which recognized marriage as “*a religiously privileged state.*”⁷⁶⁰ Thus, the primary reference point for the disciples to understand celibacy for the sake of the kingdom of heaven would have been Christ's own example.⁷⁶¹

John Paul II further articulates an understanding of celibacy as a choice made in light of the future reality of the resurrection. He says: “Continenence ‘*for*’ the kingdom of heaven is certainly related to the revelation of the fact that ‘*in*’ the kingdom of heaven ‘they take neither wife nor husband’ (Mt 22:30). *It is a charismatic sign.* ... This way of existing as a human being (male and female) points out the eschatological ‘virginity’ of the risen man.”⁷⁶² Moreover, the pope says, “The one who consciously chooses such continence chooses in some sense a

⁷⁵⁹ TOB 74:1.

⁷⁶⁰ TOB 74:3.

⁷⁶¹ TOB 75:4.

⁷⁶² TOB 75:1.

particular *participation in the mystery of the redemption (of the body)*.”⁷⁶³ One who chooses celibacy chooses it as a way of anticipating the state of the human person in the resurrection. Such a choice means a renunciation of marriage and procreation. The renunciation of marriage is not a commandment by Christ to be followed by all.⁷⁶⁴ John Paul II notes that the choice of celibacy involves sacrifice. For those who make the voluntary choice of celibacy for the kingdom of heaven, it involves “*spiritual effort*”⁷⁶⁵ and travail. The pope says that Christ “does not even attempt to hide *the travail* that such a decision and its long-lasting consequences can have for man, for the normal (and also noble) inclinations of his nature.”⁷⁶⁶ Moreover, this vocation is born from human choice and divine grace.⁷⁶⁷ John Paul II says:

contenance “for the kingdom of heaven,” the choice of virginity or celibacy for one’s whole life, has become in the experience of the disciples and followers of Christ the act of *a particular response to the love* of the Divine Bridegroom, and therefore *acquired the meaning of an act of spousal love*, that is, of a spousal gift of self with the end of answering in a particular way the Redeemer’s spousal love; a gift of self understood as a *renunciation*, but realized above all *out of love*.⁷⁶⁸

In love, Christ gives himself to the man or woman who chooses celibacy, and that same person responds in love to Christ. Celibacy is only lived out by communion with the divine Persons, which is the gift and grace needed to make the choice.

Understanding celibacy for the sake of the kingdom of heaven deepens the understanding of the spousal meaning of the body. On one hand, the spousal meaning of the body is understood as the human person called to a *communio personarum* of male and female, which is a union of one flesh and is open to procreation.⁷⁶⁹ And, this spousal meaning is fully lived by a free gift of

⁷⁶³ TOB 76:3.

⁷⁶⁴ TOB 73:4.

⁷⁶⁵ TOB 74:5.

⁷⁶⁶ TOB 76:5.

⁷⁶⁷ TOB 76:4.

⁷⁶⁸ TOB 79:9.

⁷⁶⁹ This is the primary way that the spousal meaning of the body is used in the *Theology of the Body*. John Paul II articulates both anthropological and ethical implications of this understanding.

self. On the other hand, the full freedom of the gift of self can be lived without creating an exclusive *communio personarum* of male and female. The gift of self in celibacy does not include marriage and procreation. Both marriage and celibacy are based on freedom. Both are based on, as the pope says, “*subordinating the sinfulness of his own humanity to the powers that flow from the mystery of the redemption of the body.*”⁷⁷⁰ John Paul II notes that understanding the human person as not distinct from the rest of creation, as having a sexual instinct exactly like the animals, obscures the spousal meaning of the body. He says, “the application of the concept of ‘sexual instinct’ to man—given the dual nature in which he exists as male and female—nevertheless greatly limits and in some sense ‘diminishes’ what the same masculinity-femininity is in the personal dimension of human subjectivity.”⁷⁷¹ The spousal meaning of the body leads a person to give oneself in freedom—either in marriage or in celibacy. Self-possession allows the person to give themselves in marriage or not. In the case of celibacy, as a free choice (assisted by grace), the person does not give themselves in marriage, but still gives themselves fully, thus living the spousal meaning of the body.⁷⁷² Holding these divergent expressions of self-donation in tension, succinctly, John Paul II says: “this body possesses a full ‘spousal’ meaning.”⁷⁷³ And celibacy bears spiritual fruit. The pope says: “Only little by little did it consciously take root that *for ‘the kingdom of heaven’ a special significance attaches to man’s spiritual and supernatural fruitfulness—which comes from the Holy Spirit...and which...is served precisely by continence.*”⁷⁷⁴

⁷⁷⁰ TOB 77:4.

⁷⁷¹ TOB 80:4.

⁷⁷² TOB 77:2.

⁷⁷³ TOB 15:5.

⁷⁷⁴ TOB 75:4.

In 1 Cor. 7, St. Paul speaks about celibacy. John Paul II points to this chapter as further articulation of the understanding of marriage and celibacy, as offering an answer to “*a question that troubled the minds of the first generation of the confessors of Christ.*”⁷⁷⁵

As with Christ’s words about that unfamiliar state of life, here St. Paul asserts that virginity is a counsel, not a commandment,⁷⁷⁶ and is the result of a free choice.⁷⁷⁷ Although St. Paul does speak of marriage as having difficulties,⁷⁷⁸ he does not devalue marriage in relation to celibacy. Instead, he focuses on the value of celibacy. St. Paul says, “I should like you to be free of anxieties. An unmarried man is anxious about the things of the Lord, how he may please the Lord” (1 Cor. 7:32). The concern of the unmarried person is the kingdom of Jesus Christ, and all that contributes to its growth.⁷⁷⁹ The unmarried person is concerned with their relationship with Jesus Christ.⁷⁸⁰ The pope says that the unmarried person is “characterized by an *inner integration*, by a unification that would allow him to devote himself completely to the service of the kingdom of God.”⁷⁸¹ The person who devotes themselves to “pleasing the Lord,” as a synonym of “love,” is able to love God undistractedly. The pope says: “The spousal character of ‘contenance for the kingdom of God’ becomes in some way apparent here. Man always tries to please the person he loves.”⁷⁸² As with Christ’s words on celibacy, St. Paul is

⁷⁷⁵ TOB 82:1.

⁷⁷⁶ TOB 82:2. cf. 1 Cor.7:25, “Now in regard to virgins, I have no commandment from the Lord, but I give my opinion as one who by the Lord’s mercy is trustworthy.”

⁷⁷⁷ TOB 82:5. cf. 1 Cor. 7: 36-38, “If anyone thinks he is behaving improperly toward his virgin, and if a critical moment has come and so it has to be, let him do as he wishes. He is committing no sin; let them get married. The one who stands firm in his resolve, however, who is not under compulsion but has power over his own will, and has made up his mind to keep his virgin, will be doing well. So then, the one who marries his virgin does well; the one who does not marry her will do better.”

⁷⁷⁸ TOB 83:3, where John Paul II notes that “*true conjugal love...is also a difficult love.*” cf. 1 Cor. 7:28, “If you marry, however, you do not sin, nor does an unmarried woman sin if she marries; but such people will experience affliction in their earthly life, and I would like to spare you that.”

⁷⁷⁹ TOB 83:8.

⁷⁸⁰ TOB 83:9.

⁷⁸¹ TOB 84:2.

⁷⁸² TOB 84:1.

describing celibacy as a relationship with God in which the person is living the spousal meaning of the body.

b. Marriage and Celibacy

John Paul II further comments on the relationship between marriage and celibacy. At its root, celibacy is an affirmation of marriage. John Paul II says that celibacy for the sake of the kingdom of heaven is “*a particular form of affirmation of the value* from which the unmarried person consistently abstains by following the evangelical counsel.”⁷⁸³ A celibate renounces marriage for the kingdom of heaven—for a different value—not because of a devaluing of the good of marriage and procreation. Moreover, the pope says, “these two fundamental situations, or... ‘states,’ in some sense explain or complete each other with respect to the existence and (Christian) life of this community, which as a whole and in all its members is realized in the dimension of the kingdom of God and has an eschatological orientation proper to that kingdom.”⁷⁸⁴ In the Christian community, celibacy and marriage help the individuals living whichever state to understand and live a communion of persons⁷⁸⁵ and the fruitfulness of parenthood.⁷⁸⁶

John Paul II also notes that 1 Cor. 7 shows the deep connection and complementarity of marriage and celibacy. Like with celibacy, marriage is blessed by God. St. Paul indicates in 1 Cor. 7:7 that those who are married receive grace from God, when he says, “But each has his own gift from God.”⁷⁸⁷ John Paul II says: “The gift received by persons who live in marriage is

⁷⁸³ TOB 81:3.

⁷⁸⁴ TOB 78:2.

⁷⁸⁵ TOB 78:4.

⁷⁸⁶ TOB 78:5.

⁷⁸⁷ TOB 84:8. 1 Cor. 7:7 reads: “Indeed, I wish everyone to be as I am, but each has a particular gift from God, one of one kind and one of another.”

different from the one received by persons who live in virginity...nevertheless it is a true ‘gift from God.’”⁷⁸⁸ The gift given to both counters concupiscence. The pope says: “In fact, in one as well as the other...vocation—the ‘gift’ is at work that each one receives from God, that is, *grace, which brings it about that the body is ‘a temple of the Holy Spirit’ and remains such in virginity (continence) as well as in marriage.*”⁷⁸⁹ John Paul II asserts that marriage and celibacy “provide a full answer to one of man’s underlying questions: namely, the question about the meaning of ‘being a body,’ that is, the meaning of masculinity and femininity.”⁷⁹⁰ The connection and complementarity of marriage and celibacy is found in the inner life of the human person.

III. Synthesis of the Triptych

John Paul II summarizes his theological anthropology in light of the “redemption of the body” (cf. Rom. 8:23):

In his everyday life, man must draw from the mystery of the redemption of the body the inspiration and strength to overcome the evil that is dormant in him in the form of the threefold concupiscence. Man and woman, bound in marriage, must daily undertake the task of the indissoluble union of the covenant they made with each other. In addition, men and women who have voluntarily chosen continence for the kingdom of heaven must give a daily living witness of faithfulness to such a choice, listening to Christ’s directives in the Gospel and those of the Apostle Paul in 1 Corinthians. In any case, what is at stake is *the hope of the everyday*, which in the measure of normal tasks and difficulties of human life helps to overcome “evil with good” (Rom 12:21). In fact, “in hope we have been saved”: the hope of everyday shows its power in human works and even in the very movements of the human heart, clearing a path in some sense for the great eschatological hope tied to the redemption of the body.⁷⁹¹

In fact, the text of this entire Audience (TOB 86:1-8) offers a summary of the triptych of the words of Christ that he treated in the *Theology of the Body*.

⁷⁸⁸ TOB 84:8.

⁷⁸⁹ TOB 85:4.

⁷⁹⁰ TOB 85:9.

⁷⁹¹ TOB 86:7.

One of the expressed purposes of the Catecheses is to establish an adequate anthropology. At this point, the contours of John Paul II's theological anthropology are clear. They are these: In terms of the biblical beginning, the human person, including as a communion of persons of man and woman, is in the image of God. In terms of Vatican II, Christ reveals the human person to itself (*Gaudium et Spes* 22), the human person who is called to establish a communion of persons through a disinterested self-donation (*Gaudium et Spes* 24). And, especially in light of the virginal reality of the resurrection, the human person should not be thought of simply in terms of marriage and procreation. In light of redemption and resurrection, the inner activity, and inner struggle, of the human person is where Christ's victory over sin and death is experienced.

In his interpretation of the triptych of the words of Christ (i.e., Matt. 19:3-8, Matt. 5:27-28, Matt. 22:24-30), John Paul II articulates his key anthropological and moral insights. The human person is created for communion (cf. Gen. 1-2), and, while struggling with concupiscence (cf. Gen. 3), is also capable of living a mutual exchange of the gift of self with the help of God's grace (cf. Rom. 8:23).

Chapter 7

John Paul II's *Theology of the Body*: The Sacrament of Marriage

John Paul II's theological anthropology is rooted in biblical revelation and Magisterial teaching (e.g. *Gaudium et Spes*). His application of this theological anthropology to a theology of marriage is likewise based on biblical revelation and Magisterial teaching, specifically Paul VI's Letter, *Humanae Vitae*.

In this chapter, I present John Paul II's analysis of Eph.5:21-33 and *Humanae Vitae* as they pertain to a theology of marriage and to marriage ethics.

I. The Sacrament

For John Paul II, his previous analyses in the Catecheses lead him to an evaluation of Christian marriage. And the Catholic teaching of marriage as a sacrament, thus, leads him to unite theological anthropology and sacramental theology. John Paul II identifies two main aspects of the sacrament of marriage: the dimension of grace and the dimension of sign.

To complete his evaluation of the sacrament of marriage, rooted in an interpretation of Eph. 5, John Paul II also identifies some other Scriptural passages that help to reveal the Church's teaching of marriage as a sacrament, namely Tobit and Song of Songs.

A. Ephesians 5 and the Dimension of Grace

At the nexus of both theological anthropology and sacramental theology of marriage, John Paul II identifies the passage from Eph. 5:21-33.⁷⁹² The text reads:

⁷⁹² In a Footnote of TOB 87:3, John Paul II recognizes the debate about Pauline authorship of Ephesians. He was careful to say "Ephesians" and not "Paul." Nevertheless, John Paul II will refer to the letter as "Pauline," at times, recognizing its place in the Pauline corpus.

Be subordinate to one another out of reverence for Christ. Wives should be subordinate to their husbands as to the Lord. For the husband is head of his wife just as Christ is head of the church, he himself the savior of the body. As the church is subordinate to Christ, so wives should be subordinate to their husbands in everything. Husbands, love your wives, even as Christ loved the church and handed himself over for her to sanctify her, cleansing her by the bath of water with the word, that he might present to himself the church in splendor, without spot or wrinkle or any such thing, that she might be holy and without blemish. So [also] husbands should love their wives as their own bodies. He who loves his wife loves himself. For no one hates his own flesh but rather nourishes and cherishes it, even as Christ does the church, because we are members of his body. 'For this reason a man shall leave [his] father and [his] mother and be joined to his wife, and the two shall become one flesh.' This is a great mystery, but I speak in reference to Christ and the church. In any case, each one of you should love his wife as himself, and the wife should respect her husband (Eph. 5:21-33).

This passage from Eph. 5, throughout, connects the mystery of Christ to the union of husband and wife in marriage.⁷⁹³ As commentary on the context of this passage within the Letter as a whole, John Paul II writes, "the essential content of this 'classical' text appears at the intersection of the *two main guiding lines* of the whole letter to the Ephesians: the first is the mystery of Christ...; the second is the Christian vocation as the model of life of baptized persons and particular communities," e.g. the family.⁷⁹⁴ At this intersection, John Paul II asserts that Eph. 5:21-33 "focuses...*on the spouses and on marriage*, while points regarding the family in the wider sense are found nearby."⁷⁹⁵

John Paul II takes up the mystery of Christ, the analogy of Christ's love, as it is expressed throughout Eph. 5:21-33. This passage from Ephesians speaks of Christ's love in two ways: as Head (cf. Eph. 5:23)⁷⁹⁶ and as Bridegroom (cf. Eph. 5:22-25).⁷⁹⁷ On one hand, as Head, Christ's love does not find an imitation in what marriage should be. As Creator, as superior to the Body,

⁷⁹³ TOB 87:1.

⁷⁹⁴ TOB 88:3.

⁷⁹⁵ TOB 88:5.

⁷⁹⁶ Eph. 5:23 reads: "For the husband is head of his wife just as Christ is head of the church, he himself the savior of the body."

⁷⁹⁷ Eph. 5:22-25 reads: "Wives should be subordinate to their husbands as to the Lord. For the husband is head of his wife just as Christ is head of the church, he himself the savior of the body. As the church is subordinate to Christ, so wives should be subordinate to their husbands in everything. Husbands, love your wives, even as Christ loved the church and handed himself over for her"

this is a relationship that is one-sided.⁷⁹⁸ As Creator, John Paul II says, “*The first dimension of love and election, as a mystery hidden from ages in God, is a fatherly dimension and not a ‘conjugal’ one.*”⁷⁹⁹ The unsolicited grace of God is captured by the analogy of Christ as the Head. Despite cultural (historical and contemporary) expressions of marriage, where a submission of the wife to the husband can be expressed in a one-sided manner, Ephesians says that the relationship between husband and wife should be otherwise. Ephesians says that Christian marriage is characterized by mutual submission (“Be subordinate to one another out of reverence for Christ” Eph. 5:21). John Paul II, commenting on the words, “Husbands, love your wives” (Eph. 5:25), says: “Love excludes every kind of submission by which the wife would become a servant or slave of the husband, an object of one-sided submission. Love makes the husband simultaneously subject to the wife.”⁸⁰⁰ The pope continues, “Reciprocal submission ‘in the fear of Christ’ ...always forms the deep and firm supporting structure of the community of the spouses.”⁸⁰¹

On one hand, the analogy of Christ as the Head-Creator does not find imitation in marriage. On the other hand, Christ as the Head is a somatic analogy: in a human person the head and body are one. John Paul II says: “If the author of Ephesians sees *the analogy of the union of the head with its body* also in marriage, this analogy...regards above all marriage itself as that union through which ‘the two will form one flesh’ (Eph 5:31; cf. Gen 2:24).”⁸⁰² Even though the head and the body can be considered separately, the analogy in Ephesians points to

⁷⁹⁸ cf. TOB 90:5.

⁷⁹⁹ TOB 95:5.

⁸⁰⁰ TOB 89:4.

⁸⁰¹ TOB 89:6.

⁸⁰² TOB 91:3.

the somatic unity of the human person, head and body. The husband and wife, though distinct human persons, form a somatic union, one flesh in marriage.⁸⁰³

There is a continuity between the ancient Covenant of God and humanity (the work of creation) and the new covenant of Christ and the Church (the work of redemption). The pope says, “This *continuity of God’s salvific initiative* constitutes the essential basis of the great analogy contained in Ephesians.”⁸⁰⁴ The grace of God is given in both creation and redemption. Eph. 5:21-33 speaks of the saving gift of Christ in specifically spousal terms. The analogy of Christ’s love as Bridegroom is spousal. Through his interpretation of this Eph. 5:21-33, the pope says that Christ’s “*saving love, which consists in his gift of self for the Church, is a spousal love by which he marries the Church and makes her his own Body.*”⁸⁰⁵ In this dimension, the dimension of grace, the mystery of Christ is the grace given to the husband and the wife—which brings about the redemption of their bodies, the grace needed to overcome concupiscence. The pope says: “*Redemption* means, in fact, a ‘*new creation,*’ as it were, it means *taking up all that is created* to express in creation the fullness of justice, equity, and holiness planned for it by God and to express that fullness above all in man, created male and female ‘in the image of God.’”⁸⁰⁶ In imitation of Christ, the husband and wife should give themselves to each other in the freedom of the gift.⁸⁰⁷ In the sacrament of marriage, the husband and the wife receive the grace of the mystery of Christ.

⁸⁰³ cf. TOB 91:1.

⁸⁰⁴ TOB 93:3.

⁸⁰⁵ TOB 95:7.

⁸⁰⁶ TOB 99:7.

⁸⁰⁷ cf. TOB 102:5.

B. The Dimension of Sign

John Paul II cites the traditional understanding of the sacraments as “signs instituted by Christ and administered in the Church, which express and confer divine grace on the person who receives [them].”⁸⁰⁸ Marriage is a sacrament of the Church. The pope says: “In his dialogue with the Pharisees (see Mt 19), Christ not only confirms the existence of marriage instituted from the beginning by the Creator, but he declares *also that it is an integral part of the new sacramental economy.*”⁸⁰⁹

In the dimension of sign, a sacrament makes visible the grace of God. In understanding marriage as a sacrament, the dimension of sign must be added to the dimension of grace.

1. Ephesians 5 and the Dimension of Sign

Eph. 5:21-33 acknowledges the sacraments of the Church: namely, Baptism⁸¹⁰ and Eucharist.⁸¹¹ Ephesians speaks of these sacraments as sacraments, even if in an undeveloped way. John Paul II does not see Eph. 5:21-33, especially Eph. 5:32 (“This is a great mystery”), as a simple affirmation that marriage is a sacrament.

Ephesians speaks of marriage in terms of a “great mystery” (cf. Eph. 5:32), in terms of the mystery of Christ’s love. John Paul II comments on understanding marriage as a sacrament in light of the great mystery. On one hand, Ephesians does not speak of marriage as a sacrament. The pope says: “‘Sacrament’ is not synonymous with ‘mystery.’ ... The sacrament consists in ‘*manifesting*’ that *mystery in a sign.*”⁸¹² By calling it a mystery, Ephesians is speaking of

⁸⁰⁸ TOB 98:7.

⁸⁰⁹ TOB 98:3.

⁸¹⁰ cf. TOB 91:6. John Paul II points to Eph. 5:26, “cleansing her by the bath of water with the word.”

⁸¹¹ cf. TOB 92:8. John Paul II points to Eph. 5:29, “For no one hates his own flesh but rather nourishes and cherishes it, even as Christ does the church.”

⁸¹² TOB 93:5.

marriage in broader terms than strictly as a sacrament of the Church. On the other hand, Ephesians, in the words of the pope, “*confirms and deeply explains* the sacramentality of marriage.”⁸¹³ Marriage is a sign of God, who is Creator, and of Jesus Christ, who is Redeemer.

John Paul II says:

the Mystery hidden from all eternity in God—a mystery that in the beginning in the sacrament of creation became *a visible reality through the union* of the first man and the first woman in the perspective of marriage—becomes in the sacrament of redemption *a visible reality in the indissoluble union of Christ with the Church*...as the spousal union of the two, husband and wife.⁸¹⁴

Marriage is a sign of the “great mystery,” that is, a sign of a two-fold sense of mystery: creation and redemption.

Based on Eph. 5:21-33, John Paul II speaks of marriage as both the sacrament of creation—which he interchangeably calls the primordial sacrament—and the sacrament of redemption. He says: “On the basis of the sacrament of creation one must understand the original sacramentality of marriage (the primordial sacrament). In a further step, on the basis of the sacrament of redemption, one can understand the sacramentality of [marriage as]...a real *renewal...of what constituted the salvific content...of the primordial sacrament.*”⁸¹⁵ The pope continues, the sacrament of marriage “is presupposed as the sacrament of the human ‘beginning,’ united with the mystery of creation. It is rediscovered, by contrast, as the fruit of the spousal love of Christ and the Church, linked with the mystery of redemption.”⁸¹⁶ The theological anthropology of the human person before original sin is inferred in the concept of the primordial sacrament. Even though the experience or original innocence is lost, the sacrament of marriage is still able to be a sign of it, especially with the grace of the mystery of redemption. Marriage as

⁸¹³ TOB 99:3.

⁸¹⁴ TOB 97:4.

⁸¹⁵ TOB 98:8.

⁸¹⁶ TOB 102:1.

a great mystery is that it is a sign of all that was contained in the original situation, and at the same time, is a sign of Christ's love for the Church. Eph. 5:21-33 both acknowledges marriage as a sacrament of the church, and as something other. The pope says, "we have to conclude that all the sacraments of the New Covenant find their prototype in some way in marriage as the primordial sacrament."⁸¹⁷ Eph. 5:21-33 presents marriage as a sacrament of redemption, over and above Baptism and Eucharist. Ephesians speaks of Baptism and the Eucharist as acquiring their efficacy because of the great mystery of Christ's redemptive, spousal love, but it does not speak of either as a great mystery.⁸¹⁸ In a special way, marriage manifests the grace of the New Covenant.

With this perspective of the dimension of sign, John Paul II is able to more fully articulate the dimension of grace in the sacrament of marriage. He says:

*As a sacramental expression of that saving power, marriage is also an exhortation to gain mastery over concupiscence (as Christ speaks about in the Sermon on the Mount). A fruit of this mastery is the unity and indissolubility of marriage and, in addition, the deepened sense of the woman's dignity in the man's heart (as also the man's dignity in the woman's heart), in conjugal life together and in every other sphere of reciprocal relations.*⁸¹⁹

Further commenting on the grace of the sacrament of marriage, the pope says: "Through marriage as a sacrament (as one of the sacraments of the Church), *both of these dimensions of love, the spousal and the redemptive*, penetrate together with the grace of the sacrament into the life of the spouses. The spousal meaning of the body in its masculinity and femininity...is united...with the redemptive meaning."⁸²⁰ Especially in the bodily union of the husband and the wife, the communion of persons in freedom, marriage is a sign of the "great mystery" (Eph.

⁸¹⁷ TOB 98:2.

⁸¹⁸ TOB 99:1.

⁸¹⁹ TOB 101:1.

⁸²⁰ TOB 102:4.

5:32) is an efficacious sign of the grace of redemption.⁸²¹ And the language of the liturgy is modeled on the words of Ephesians.⁸²²

2. The Language of the Body

As a sacrament of the Church, the beginning of marriage follows a ritual. John Paul II comments on this ritual. At the heart of the ritual is the exchange of vows.⁸²³ The words of the vows express the total commitment of the husband and wife to each other. The pope says that the vows are “an intentional expression on the level of intellect and will, of consciousness and the heart.”⁸²⁴ These words are an expression that points both to the covenant of the life-long union of the spouses and of humanity’s covenant with God in Christ.⁸²⁵ In terms of traditional sacramental theology, every sacrament has matter and form. In the case of marriage, the form is the exchange of vows. The matter of the sacrament of marriage is the husband and wife themselves. The matter is the bodies of the husband and wife.⁸²⁶ The bodies of the husband and wife are taken up into the dimension of the sign of the sacrament of marriage. The words of the vows assert the commitment of the mutual total gift of self. The words of the vows have a bodily expression, consummation, where the husband and wife become one flesh (cf. Gen. 2:24). In consummation, the body speaks the language of the vows. The husband and wife not only embody the vows in consummation, at the beginning of marriage. Throughout their married,

⁸²¹ cf. TOB 96:7 and TOB 102:2.

⁸²² cf. TOB 117:5.

⁸²³ In TOB 103:1, John Paul II paraphrases the vows as “I...take you...as my wife”; “I...take you...as my husband.”

⁸²⁴ TOB 103:5.

⁸²⁵ TOB 103:7.

⁸²⁶ TOB 87:5.

conjugal life they minister the sacrament of marriage until death.⁸²⁷ The vows in the liturgical ritual, and then the consummation of the vows, also point to a possible future procreation.⁸²⁸

The language of the exchange of vows demands that the bodies of the husband and wife speak the same words. The words of love require bodily expression.⁸²⁹ Conjugal union, as an embodiment of the vows spoken in freedom, takes on the dimension of sign in the sacrament of marriage—a sign of the grace of the sacrament.⁸³⁰ But, bodily actions, as external actions, are ambiguous. Borrowing from the tradition of the prophets,⁸³¹ the pope says that the body speaks “with the mysterious language of the personal gift...both in the language of faithfulness, that is, of love, and in the language of conjugal unfaithfulness, that is, of ‘adultery.’”⁸³² The pope adds, “*the body tells the truth* through faithfulness and conjugal love, and, when it commits ‘adultery’ it tells a lie, *it commits falsehood.*”⁸³³ The body expresses the person, so the intentions of the husband and wife are embodied in their individual actions.

The words of the spouses in the exchange of vows are a sign that points to a total, mutual self-donation. The pope says that the body speaks a language that it is not the author: there are human authors in the spouses,⁸³⁴ and God is the divine author.⁸³⁵ Conjugal union is a sign that points to a meaning that has been defined from Genesis (cf. Gen. 2:24). The one and the same action of conjugal union can speak a language—can tell a truth or a lie—depending on a human author’s intention. John Paul II explains:

If the human being—male and female—in marriage (and indirectly also in all spheres of mutual life together) *gives to his behavior a meaning in conformity with the fundamental*

⁸²⁷ cf. TOB 107:3.

⁸²⁸ cf. TOB 105:6.

⁸²⁹ cf. TOB 104:7.

⁸³⁰ cf. TOB 103:3.

⁸³¹ cf. TOB 104:8.

⁸³² TOB 104:4.

⁸³³ TOB 104:8.

⁸³⁴ cf. TOB 105:6.

⁸³⁵ cf. TOB 105:4.

truth of the language of the body, then he too 'is in the truth.' In the opposite case, he commits lies and falsifies the language of the body.⁸³⁶

The ambiguity of the language of the body is that the one and the same action can be an expression of truth and freedom or of a falsity and concupiscence.

Concupiscence does not determine and define the relationship of marriage. The language of the body can be spoken in truth, because the human person is not only fallen, but also redeemed. The pope says that the “‘hermeneutics of the sacrament’ allows us to draw the conclusion that man is always *essentially 'called' and not merely 'accused,'* even inasmuch as he is precisely the ‘man of concupiscence.’”⁸³⁷ The pope says that “there is always the possibility of passing from ‘error’ to the ‘truth’ as well as the possibility of return, or of conversion, from sin to chastity as an expression of life according to the Spirit (see Gal 5:16).”⁸³⁸ A divine grace of the sacrament is the ever-present possibility of speaking the truth in the spoken word and in the language of the body.⁸³⁹ Married love—from the exchange of vows and consummation, daily throughout married life, until death—the language of the body can be spoken in truth, through faithfulness, integrity, tenderness, and union.⁸⁴⁰

The dimension of sign and the language of the body, speaking the truth of the sign, implies ethics. The pope says: “Through marriage as a sacrament of the Church, man and woman are explicitly called to bear witness—by correctly using the ‘language of the body’—to spousal and procreative love.”⁸⁴¹ The communion of persons that is established in marriage is a reality and an obligation.⁸⁴² The pope says: “Precisely *to this man of concupiscence* there is given in marriage *the sacrament* of redemption *as grace* and sign of the covenant with God—and

⁸³⁶ TOB 106:3.

⁸³⁷ TOB 107:6.

⁸³⁸ TOB 107:3.

⁸³⁹ cf. TOB 105:1.

⁸⁴⁰ TOB 106:2. John Paul II attributes part of this list to *Gaudium et Spes*, 49.

⁸⁴¹ TOB 106:4.

⁸⁴² cf. TOB 106:2.

it is assigned to him as an ethos.”⁸⁴³ The ethos of redemption presents the possibility of the language of the body to be spoken in truth. The ethical obligation to speak the language of the body in truth can be demanded because of the grace of the sacrament of marriage.

3. Song of Songs

John Paul II sees in the Song of Songs a detailed biblical articulation of the inner experiences of the human person. This articulation corresponds to the language of the body speaking the truth. It is a biblical articulation of the mutual gift of self in the *communio personarum* of marriage.

John Paul II notes that the language of the Song of Songs is poetic, e.g., in the analogies used to describe the beauty of the bride (Song 4:3, “Like pomegranate halves, your cheeks behind your veil”). The pope notes the limitation of poetic language.⁸⁴⁴ At the same time, he praises the poetic language of the Song of Songs, when it describes spousal love. The pope says, “The language of metaphors—poetic language—seems to be especially appropriate and precise in this sphere.”⁸⁴⁵ Poetry expresses a beautiful truth in beautiful language.⁸⁴⁶

Quite early in the Catecheses, John Paul II comments on the exclamation that the man makes when he sees the woman for the first time (cf. Gen. 2:23). The pope says: “In this way, for the first time, the man (male) shows joy and even exultation for which he had no reason before, due to the lack of a being similar to himself.”⁸⁴⁷ The pope then describes the words from

⁸⁴³ TOB 100:7.

⁸⁴⁴ cf. TOB 108:8. The citations for this section will correspond to the numbering found in Waldstein’s translation of the fuller, undelivered Audience. All of the quoted text, however, will be from the delivered Audience.

⁸⁴⁵ TOB 110:8. John Paul II also notes, in a footnote to TOB 108:2, that the Christian tradition has read the Song of Songs in terms of the spousal relationship between God and humanity. The pope mentions St. John of the Cross, along with others who are part of this tradition.

⁸⁴⁶ TOB 110:6.

⁸⁴⁷ TOB 8:4.

Gen. 2:23 as a “biblical prototype of the Song of Songs.”⁸⁴⁸ Without a clear intertextual justification, John Paul II connects the biblical encounter of the man and the woman and Genesis with the bridegroom and bride in Song of Songs through an understanding of inner experience.⁸⁴⁹ The pope describes the import of the Song of Songs: “What was barely expressed in the second chapter of Genesis (vv. 23-25) in just a few simple and essential words is developed here in a full dialogue.”⁸⁵⁰ The dialogue and the duet of the bride and bridegroom is expressed throughout the entire biblical poem.⁸⁵¹ In the duet of the bride and bridegroom of the Song of Songs is a fuller articulation of the fascination succinctly expressed in Genesis (cf. Gen. 2:23). The pope adds: “The point of departure as well as the point of arrival for this fascination—reciprocal wonder and admiration—are in fact the bride’s femininity and the bridegroom’s masculinity, in the direct experience of their visibility.”⁸⁵² As in Genesis, in the Song of Songs there is a fascination with the visibility of the beauty of the other—with the body—but it is a look that also sees the interiority of the person.⁸⁵³

The language of the bridegroom confirms its coherence with the language of Gen. 2. The bridegroom refers to the bride as “friend” (Song 4:7) and “sister” (Song 4:9).⁸⁵⁴ John Paul II comments on each of these terms. He says: “The *term ‘friend’* indicates what is always essential for love, which puts *the second ‘I’ beside one’s own ‘I.’* ‘Friendship’...signifies in the Song a

⁸⁴⁸ TOB 9:1.

⁸⁴⁹ cf. TOB 108:3.

⁸⁵⁰ TOB 108:5.

⁸⁵¹ cf. TOB 108:5.

⁸⁵² TOB 108:6.

⁸⁵³ cf. TOB 109:2.

⁸⁵⁴ TOB 109:3. Song 4:7-10 reads: “You are beautiful in every way, my friend,/there is no flaw in you!/With me from Lebanon, my bride!/With me from Lebanon, come!/Descend from the peak of Amana,/from the peak of Senir and Hermon,/From the lairs of lions,/from the leopards’ heights./You have ravished my heart, my sister, my bride;/you have ravished my heart with one glance of your eyes,/with one bead of your necklace./How beautiful is your love,/my sister, my bride,/How much better is your love than wine,/and the fragrance of your perfumes than any spice!

particular movement near each other, felt and experienced as an interiorly unifying power.”⁸⁵⁵

The term, friend, indicates that the two are equal, sharing in the same humanity, and sharing in a mutual attraction. Regarding the next term, sister, the pope says: “The expression ‘sister’ speaks of union in humanity and at the same time of the feminine diversity and originality of the same humanity.”⁸⁵⁶ “Sister” speaks of both somatic homogeneity (as does “friend”) and somatic heterogeneity.

The dissimilarity between Genesis and the Song of Songs is that the bride and groom of the Song of Songs are in the state of concupiscence. The pope adds a further comment about the term “sister.” He says: “The ‘sister’ in some sense helps the man to define and conceive himself, becoming a kind of challenge in this direction.”⁸⁵⁷ The man is challenged to overcome concupiscence, to maintain a vision of the femininity of the woman, which sees her equality with himself. For this reason, the Song of Songs brings together the terms, bride and sister, e.g. “How beautiful is your love,/my sister, my bride” (Song 4:10).⁸⁵⁸

In his continued analysis of the text, John Paul II highlights the dynamics of the mutual exchange of the gift as found in the Song of Songs. In possession of himself, the bridegroom acknowledges his bride as “A garden enclosed, my sister, my bride,/a garden enclosed, a fountain sealed!” (Song 4:12). Of that declaration, the pope says: “The ‘sister bride’ is for the man the master of her own mystery as a ‘garden closed’ and a ‘fountain sealed.’”⁸⁵⁹ John Paul II finds her response to the bridegroom as Song 2:16, “My lover belongs to me and I to him.”⁸⁶⁰ In possession of herself, the pope says, “The bride answers him with the words of the gift, that is,

⁸⁵⁵ TOB 109:4.

⁸⁵⁶ TOB 109:4.

⁸⁵⁷ TOB 109:4.

⁸⁵⁸ TOB 109:6.

⁸⁵⁹ TOB 110:8.

⁸⁶⁰ TOB 110:8.

of entrusting herself. ... The freedom of the gift is the response to the deep consciousness of the gift expressed by the bridegroom's words. Through this truth and freedom, the love is built up that one must call authentic love."⁸⁶¹ They share a mutual, disinterested self-donation. Nevertheless, the sincere gift is not devoid of mutual fascination. The pope says: "The truth of the increasing closeness of the spouses through love develops in the subjective dimension 'of the heart,' of affection and sentiment."⁸⁶² Their repeated, reciprocal self-gifts lead up to spousal union, the union of the persons that is expressed in conjugal union. At the threshold of the culmination of their union, John Paul II notes: "The bride... goes to meet him with the readiness of the gift of self (see Song 7:8-13) because the love that unites them is of a spiritual and sensual nature together."⁸⁶³ It is a love that is ecstatic and peaceful. Commenting on the mention of peace in Song 8:10,⁸⁶⁴ the pope describes the "*disinterested tenderness* [as]... above all the *peace of the encounter* in humanity as the image of God—and the encounter *by means of a reciprocal and disinterested gift*."⁸⁶⁵

Despite the bridegroom and bride speaking the language of the body in truth, they are still in the state of concupiscence. The pope comments that, "In the Song of Songs, human eros reveals the face of love ever *in search* and, as it were, *never satisfied*."⁸⁶⁶ On one hand, the insatiability of their love ensures that the relationship between the man and the woman will be a constant, mutual self-gift, without the one ever appropriating the other.⁸⁶⁷ This love reaches ever-deeper into the interiorities of the man and the woman, in ever-deeper freedom. On the other hand, the pope comments further on the insatiability, saying, "One has the impression that

⁸⁶¹ TOB 110:9.

⁸⁶² TOB 111:2.

⁸⁶³ TOB 111:5.

⁸⁶⁴ Song 8:10 reads: "I became in his eyes/as one who brings peace.

⁸⁶⁵ TOB 110:2.

⁸⁶⁶ TOB 112:3.

⁸⁶⁷ cf. TOB 113:3.

in encountering each other, reaching each other, experiencing closeness to each other, *they ceaselessly continue to tend toward something.*”⁸⁶⁸

Song of Songs describes a love that is insatiable. As eros, their love is self-contained. John Paul II says that the horizon of human eros is “opened further, through Paul’s words, to another horizon of love that speaks another language...and which calls, invites, to another communion. *This love has been called ‘agape,’* and agape brings eros to fulfillment while purifying it.”⁸⁶⁹ The fulfillment of their love, of eros, is found in Christ, in agape (cf. 1 Cor. 13:4-8).⁸⁷⁰ The love described in the Song of Songs stops at the threshold of a horizon that is beyond the state of concupiscence, beyond even ideal human love (cf. Gen. 2:23-25). It is unable to attain the fulfillment of love that is found in Christ (cf. Matt. 5:28).

4. Tobit

John Paul II continues discussing the dimension of the sign of the sacrament of marriage, commenting on the story of the marriage of Tobias and Sarah found in the book of Tobit (cf. Tob. 7:9-8:21). His central focus is on the prayer found in Tob. 8:5-8.⁸⁷¹

This passage from Tobit contains a biblical articulation of aspects of married life that are not found in the Song of Songs. In the case of Tobias and Sarah, they are literally facing a life-or-death situation, where seven of Sarah’s previous husbands died on their wedding night, killed

⁸⁶⁸ TOB 112:1.

⁸⁶⁹ TOB 113:5.

⁸⁷⁰ 1 Cor. 13:4-8 reads: “Love is patient, love is kind. It is not jealous, [love] is not pompous, it is not inflated, it is not rude, it does not seek its own interests, it is not quick-tempered, it does not brood over injury, it does not rejoice over wrongdoing but rejoices with the truth. It bears all things, believes all things, hopes all things, endures all things. Love never fails. If there are prophecies, they will be brought to nothing; if tongues, they will cease; if knowledge, it will be brought to nothing.”

⁸⁷¹ Tob. 8:5-8 reads: “They started to pray and beg that they might be protected. He began with these words: ‘Blessed are you, O God of our ancestors; blessed be your name forever and ever! Let the heavens and all your creation bless you forever. You made Adam, and you made his wife Eve to be his helper and support; and from these two the human race has come. You said, ‘It is not good for the man to be alone; let us make him a helper like himself.’ Now, not with lust, but with fidelity I take this kinswoman as my wife. Send down your mercy on me and on her, and grant that we may grow old together. Bless us with children.’ They said together, ‘Amen, amen!’”

by a demon (cf. Tob. 6:14).⁸⁷² While the circumstances of their situation are quite unique, John Paul II identifies a reality that is present in every marriage. Tobit helps to reveal that there is a fight between good and evil in marriage.⁸⁷³ This is a struggle that can be both external and experienced internally by the man or the woman. Tobias and Sarah are able to overcome death and evil through their love. It is a love that is expressed through moral choices and through prayer (cf. Tob. 8:5-8).⁸⁷⁴ John Paul II says that their “*love supported by prayer is revealed as stronger than death.*”⁸⁷⁵

The passage from Tobit reveals the elements of the prayer that conquer sin and death: praise (e.g., “Blessed are you, O God” (Tob. 8:5), thanks (Tob. 8:6 expresses gratitude for the creation of the union of the husband and the wife, referencing both Gen. 1:27 and Gen. 2:18), and petition (“Send down your mercy on me and on her” (Tob. 8:7)).⁸⁷⁶ The prayer of Tobias and Sarah reveal how they understand their union. The pope says: “Their conjugal covenant is in fact the image—and the primordial sacrament of the covenant of God with man, with the human race—of the covenant that draws its origin from eternal Love.”⁸⁷⁷ They understood their marriage as a sign of God’s covenant with humanity. That understanding directed their actions and their prayer.

John Paul II comments further on the comparison between Tobit and the Song of Songs. In both cases, the man acknowledges the woman as sister or kinswoman (Song 4:9 and Tob. 8:7), who is an equal in personhood and in the moral responsibility of speaking the language of the

⁸⁷² TOB 114:6. The citations for this section will correspond to the numbering found in Waldstein’s translation of the fuller, undelivered Audience. All of the quoted text, however, will be from the delivered Audience.

⁸⁷³ cf. TOB 115:2. This fight mirrors the choice between immortality or death before the original sin, cf. TOB 7:4.

⁸⁷⁴ cf. TOB 115:3.

⁸⁷⁵ TOB 114:6.

⁸⁷⁶ TOB 116:1.

⁸⁷⁷ TOB 116:4.

body in truth.⁸⁷⁸ In the case of the prayer in Tobit, the man and woman are not engaged in a duet, instead, Tobias and Sarah are speaking in unison in prayer to God (cf. Tob. 8:5). Their words are not colored by their emotive experience, but of their awareness of the dimension of sign of their spousal union.⁸⁷⁹ In this way, they reveal the spiritual unity that is the foundation and the fruit of spousal union. Beginning their marriage with prayer, Tobias and Sarah speak the language of the ministers of the sacrament of marriage. John Paul II says that “the ‘language of the body’ becomes *the language of the ministers of the sacrament*, who are aware that in the conjugal covenant the mystery, which has its source in God himself, is expressed and brought into being.”⁸⁸⁰ The language of the liturgy captures the language of the body, which speaks, in the words of the pope, of spousal love “both in the subjective dimension of the truth of human hearts and in the objective dimension of the truth of living in communion.”⁸⁸¹

In the Song of Songs and Tobit, John Paul II identifies two Old Testament expressions, which describe spouses who live the anthropology and ethos of the primordial sacrament. While they are in the state of concupiscence, they live the ideal, the moral norm declared in the Sermon on the Mount (Matt. 5:27-28), but was not demanded in the Law. Their unions open up to the fulfillment, the abounding, of the Law in Christ in the New Covenant.

John Paul II completes his reflection on the dimension of the sign of marriage with a final comment on the language of the body. With a fuller description from Song of Songs of the mutual fascination between the man and the woman, John Paul II comments once again on chastity, as a virtue and a gift. He says, “*the reciprocal fascination* of masculinity and

⁸⁷⁸ cf. TOB 114:3.

⁸⁷⁹ TOB 116:4.

⁸⁸⁰ TOB 116:4.

⁸⁸¹ TOB 116:5.

femininity *matures spiritually through the virtue* and even more so *through the gift* ('life according to the Spirit')."⁸⁸² Speaking the language of the body in truth is the result of moral choice and of divine grace. The inner experiences of the struggle with concupiscence and the receiving of grace, the mutual fascination experienced in emotion and eros is contained in the prayer and liturgy of marriage. John Paul II says:

through the "language of the body," man and woman encounter the great '*mysterium*' in order to transfer the light of this mystery, a light of truth and of beauty expressed in liturgical language, into the "language of the body," that is, into the language of the praxis of love, of faithfulness, and of conjugal integrity, or into the ethos rooted in the "redemption of the body" (see Rom 8:23). On this road, conjugal life in some sense becomes liturgy.⁸⁸³

Marriage is a sign of God's covenant in creation and of Christ's covenant in redemption, everyday. Daily, the husband and the wife in marriage are an efficacious sign of God's grace efficacious in their visibility to others and in their inner experiences. Daily, the husband and the wife receive God's grace through the sacrament of marriage.

III. Contemporary Ethics

The *Theology of the Body* culminates in a discussion of *Humanae Vitae*, which was written by Paul VI.⁸⁸⁴ In this final series of Audiences, John Paul II comments on some aspects of the daily living of the sacrament of marriage, in both the dimensions of sign and of grace. The turn to *Humanae Vitae* is meant to address the questions of a contemporary audience⁸⁸⁵ and to

⁸⁸² TOB 117b:5.

⁸⁸³ TOB 117b:6.

⁸⁸⁴ Paul VI, *Humanae Vitae*, Liberia Editrice Vaticana, 1968.

⁸⁸⁵ cf. TOB 133:4. In TOB 133:2, John Paul II notes that the absence of a pacific reception of Paul VI's encyclical, when he asserts: "The reaction the encyclical stirred up confirms the importance and difficulty of these questions."

offer a specific application of the previous Audiencies to the area of marriage and family ethics.⁸⁸⁶

John Paul II lends his voice to the pastoral concerns expressed by the Magisterium for the people of today, at the same time by affirming the teachings on faith and morals.⁸⁸⁷ John Paul II contextualizes the pastoral concern in this way: “Pastoral concern means seeking the *true* good of man, promoting the values impressed by God in the human person...in the certainty that the *one and only true* good of the human person consists in putting this divine plan into practice.”⁸⁸⁸ John Paul II develops a pastoral response to the concerns of husbands and wives, in light of a theological anthropology rooted in the true good of the human person.

A. The Spousal Meaning of Conjugal Union

The central focus of John Paul II’s analysis of *Humanae Vitae* is on the passage that names the unitive and procreative meanings of the conjugal act.⁸⁸⁹ In light of speaking the language of the body in truth, John Paul II notes: “What is at stake here is the *truth*, first *in the ontological dimension*...and then...in the *subjective and psychological dimension*.”⁸⁹⁰ John Paul II underscores, as a moral norm and ontological truth, “the ‘*inseparable connection*’ between the transmission of life and authentic conjugal love from the point of view of the ‘two meanings of

⁸⁸⁶ cf. TOB 118:1.

⁸⁸⁷ cf. TOB 120:6. John Paul II also notes the statement of Vatican II, *Gaudium et Spes* 51, which is from a pastoral constitution and preceded Paul VI’s statement about the unitive and procreative meanings of marriage (cf. TOB 120:1).

⁸⁸⁸ TOB 120:6.

⁸⁸⁹ cf. TOB 118:3. John Paul II identifies the specific passage as *Humanae Vitae* 11-12: “The Church teaches that each and every marriage act must remain through itself open to the transmission of life. That teaching, often set forth by the magisterium, is founded upon the inseparable connection, willed by God and unable to be broken by man on his own initiative, between the two meanings of the conjugal act: the unitive meaning and the procreative meaning” (as cited in TOB 118:2).

⁸⁹⁰ TOB 118:6.

the conjugal act.”⁸⁹¹ This is expressed by Paul VI in the statement that each and every conjugal act must remain open to conception (cf. *Humanae Vitae* 11). The unitive and procreative meanings of the conjugal act, together, constitute the spousal meaning of the conjugal act.⁸⁹²

The inseparable connection is affirmed by the act itself, through reason, and from God’s plan, through divine revelation.⁸⁹³ In the lived experience of the husband and wife, they can find it difficult, subjectively and psychologically, and in the state of concupiscence, to ensure that every conjugal act is open to the transmission of life. Attention to this difficulty is the focus of the Magisterium concerning the spousal meaning of the conjugal act.⁸⁹⁴

B. Responsible Parenthood

One expression of the difficulty of following the Church’s teaching on the spousal meaning of the conjugal act is that it seems to imply that every conjugal act should be done with the intention to conceive. While the teaching does insist that regulating births should have a good reason, it also asserts that it is morally right (more than simply licit) to regulate births.⁸⁹⁵ Husbands and wives are called to responsible parenthood, which ultimately relieves any tension experienced by attempting to maintain the inseparability of the unitive and procreative meanings of the conjugal act.⁸⁹⁶

Responsible parenthood does concern the regulation of births. But for John Paul II, the primary ethical question here is not the method of the regulation of births, but the ethical attitude

⁸⁹¹ TOB 120:2.

⁸⁹² John Paul II does not state explicitly the terminology as I am using it here. In other words, sometimes, “spousal,” can refer to the unitive meaning alone.

⁸⁹³ cf. TOB 119:4.

⁸⁹⁴ cf. TOB 120:3.

⁸⁹⁵ cf. TOB 122:2.

⁸⁹⁶ cf. TOB 129:1.

of the husband and wife.⁸⁹⁷ The ethical evaluation of responsible parenthood requires attention to the inner experiences of the human person. This responsibility is expressed through continence.⁸⁹⁸ The method of periodic continence is the limiting of the conjugal act to infertile periods. The method of periodic continence is morally licit because it respects the spousal meaning of the conjugal act, by not doing anything to separate the unity of the unitive and procreative meanings of the conjugal act.⁸⁹⁹ However, the moral evaluation of the method does not yet address the moral evaluation of the specific act by the husband and wife. Addressing this evaluation, John Paul II write: “In the case of a morally right regulation of fertility brought about by periodic continence, the point is clearly to *practice conjugal chastity*, that is, a certain ethical attitude.”⁹⁰⁰ The virtue called for by responsible parenthood is not seen most clearly by periodic continence, which is simply a method, but in continence, as a virtue.

John Paul II describes the inner experience of conjugal chastity. He says that in interpersonal relations, between masculinity and femininity, arises within “the *psycho-emotive subject...a reaction...‘arousal’...[and] another reaction...‘emotion.’*”⁹⁰¹ Using broad strokes, arousal is bodily,⁹⁰² and emotion is affective.⁹⁰³ The virtue of chastity is the mastery of these reactions. It is the mastery over concupiscence.⁹⁰⁴ This mastery requires inner freedom. John Paul II says that this interior freedom “presupposes that one is able to direct sensual and emotive reactions in order to allow the *gift of self...on the basis of the mature possession of one’s own ‘I’*

⁸⁹⁷ cf. TOB 125:4.

⁸⁹⁸ cf. TOB 124:2. In this paragraph, John Paul II cites *Humanae Vitae* 21, which presents the method of periodic continence.

⁸⁹⁹ cf. TOB 122:1.

⁹⁰⁰ TOB 124:6.

⁹⁰¹ TOB 129:4.

⁹⁰² cf. TOB 129:4.

⁹⁰³ cf. TOB 129:6.

⁹⁰⁴ cf. TOB 128:1.

in its bodily and emotive subjectivity.”⁹⁰⁵ Self-possession is the foundation of either self-donation in the conjugal act or of continence.

Moreover, John Paul II underscores that self-mastery is not only about abstaining from the conjugal act. But that, as the ability to direct sensual and emotive reactions, self-mastery intensifies the conjugal act. He says: “In the conjugal act, the intimate union should bring with itself a particular intensification of emotion, even more, the deep emotional stirring, of the other person.”⁹⁰⁶ The communion of persons is deepened by mutual self-donation in the freedom of self-mastery, which includes the sensual and emotive dimensions of mutual attraction. This reality contradicts the perspective that the use of contraception ensures the emotional connection of the spouses by expressing the unitive meaning singularly, absent the procreative meaning.⁹⁰⁷

Contraceptives are also used to regulate births. Paul VI, however, identifies contraception as a morally illicit method for regulating births, even in the case where the regulation of births is morally right. John Paul II notes that the difference between the practice of periodic continence and the use of contraception “concerns their intrinsic ethical qualification.”⁹⁰⁸

With contraception, the spousal meaning of the conjugal act is divided. It is the removal of the procreative meaning from the conjugal act. Contraception is the violation of the unitive meaning, as well. John Paul II asserts that “when the conjugal act is *deprived of its inner truth* because it is deprived artificially of its procreative capacity, it also *ceases to be an act of love*.”⁹⁰⁹ The pope asserts this because, with a contracepted conjugal act, “one can speak neither

⁹⁰⁵ TOB 130:4.

⁹⁰⁶ TOB 130:2.

⁹⁰⁷ cf. TOB 128:4.

⁹⁰⁸ TOB 122.2. This position has been formulated in moral theology along the lines of “The use of contraception is an intrinsically act” (cf. *Catechism of the Catholic Church* 2370).

⁹⁰⁹ TOB 123:6.

of the truth of the reciprocal gift of self nor of the reciprocal acceptance of oneself by the person.”⁹¹⁰ Contraception treats a person (a subject) as an object. John Paul II says: “This extension of the sphere of the means of ‘the domination...of the forces of nature’ threatens the human person for whom the method of ‘self-mastery’ is and remains specific. It...*breaks* the constitutive dimension of the person, deprives man of the subjectivity proper to him, and turns him into *an object of manipulation*.”⁹¹¹ By not directing the sensual and emotive reaction in freedom, the use of contraception reduces both the husband and the wife to an object. The truth of the human person is found in its subjectivity, that is, in self-mastery and self-donation, in freedom.⁹¹² For John Paul II, rooted in his theological anthropology he says, “a violation of the inner order of conjugal communion...*constitutes the essential evil of the contraceptive act*.”⁹¹³

Responsible parenthood allows for the regulation of births. The method of contraception is a morally illicit method of regulating births, while the method of periodic continence is morally licit. However, John Paul II addresses the fact that periodic continence can also be used with a contraceptive mentality, by not having good reason to regulate births,⁹¹⁴ or with the intention of separating the unitive from the procreative meanings of the conjugal act.⁹¹⁵ John Paul II calls such moral acts “abuses”⁹¹⁶ Even though he does not explicitly make the connection, the moral evaluation of a contraceptive mentality is at least tangentially related to the moral evaluations made in the context of “adultery in the heart” (cf. Matt. 5:27-28).⁹¹⁷

Responsible parenthood means exercising the knowledge of and dominion over biological and psychological processes according to the truth of the spousal act, which may mean

⁹¹⁰ TOB 123:7.

⁹¹¹ TOB 123:1.

⁹¹² cf. TOB 123:5.

⁹¹³ TOB 123:7.

⁹¹⁴ cf. TOB 122:3.

⁹¹⁵ cf. TOB 125:4.

⁹¹⁶ TOB 125:3.

⁹¹⁷ One such connection can be found in TOB 59:5.

either limiting or increasing the size of the family.⁹¹⁸ The source of the moral norms of responsible parenthood comes from reason and from God. John Paul II says, “the virtuous character of the attitude expressing itself in the ‘natural’ regulation of fertility is determined...by faithfulness...to the personal Creator, the source and Lord of the order that is shown in this law.”⁹¹⁹ In *Humanae Vitae*, an appeal is made to the nature of the human person and to natural law. John Paul II defines nature and natural law in this way: “The qualifier ‘natural,’ which is attributed to the morally right regulation of fertility..., is to be explained by the fact that the way of behaving in question corresponds to the truth of the person and thus to the person’s dignity.”⁹²⁰ John Paul II underscores that the norms, rooted in philosophical and theological anthropology, aide the development as a person and as the communion of persons of the husband and wife.⁹²¹ John Paul II notes, “The relevant principle of conjugal morality is thus faithfulness to the divine plan manifested in the ‘innermost structure of the conjugal act.’”⁹²²

C. Sacramental Conjugal Spirituality

To live out the spousal meaning of the body, and to overcome concupiscence, is not easy. To assist, the grace of God is given in marriage.⁹²³ That grace is given through God’s love. John Paul II says: “While *the powers of concupiscence* tend to *detach* the ‘language of the body’ from the truth...*the power of love, by contrast, strengthens it* ever anew in that truth, so that the mystery of the redemption of the body can bear fruit in it.”⁹²⁴

⁹¹⁸ cf. TOB 121:5.

⁹¹⁹ TOB 124:6.

⁹²⁰ TOB 125:1.

⁹²¹ TOB 130:5.

⁹²² TOB 121:6.

⁹²³ cf. TOB 126:1. In this paragraph, John Paul II quotes *Humanae Vitae* 25.

⁹²⁴ TOB 127:1.

The grace of God, the power of love, to overcome concupiscence is given through the gifts of the Holy Spirit. John Paul II says: “At the center of conjugal spirituality, therefore, stands chastity, not only as a moral virtue...but equally as a virtue connected with the gifts of the Holy Spirit—*above all with the gift of reverence for what comes from God* (*‘donum pietatis’*).”⁹²⁵ He adds that the gift of reverence “sustains and develops in the spouses a singular sensibility for all that in their vocation and shared life carries *the sign of the mystery of creation and redemption*...particularly...the two inseparable meanings of the conjugal act.”⁹²⁶ The Holy Spirit gives to the husband and wife the gift of reverence for each other and for the spousal act, with the gifts of unity and of procreation. John Paul II adds: “This gift brings with it a deep and all-encompassing *attention to the person* in her or her masculinity or femininity, thus creating the interior climate suitable for personal communion,”⁹²⁷ which ensures the direction of sensuality and emotion into a sincere self-gift.⁹²⁸

The sacramental life of the Church is a special way that husbands and wives receive God’s grace. John Paul II names their own participation in the sacraments of marriage,⁹²⁹ the Eucharist, and Penance⁹³⁰ as offering grace to the spouses. The grace of the sacraments penetrates every aspect of the *communio personarum*. John Paul II says of the sacraments: “With their help, that essential and *spiritually creative ‘power’ of love* reaches human hearts and, at the same time, human bodies in their subjective masculinity and femininity.”⁹³¹ It is a grace that does more than overcome concupiscence in any particular spousal act. It is a grace that increases the love of the spouses. John Paul II says that the gift of conjugal chastity “reveals

⁹²⁵ TOB 131:2.

⁹²⁶ TOB 131:4.

⁹²⁷ TOB 132:5.

⁹²⁸ TOB 132:4.

⁹²⁹ cf. TOB 126:3 and TOB 127:3.

⁹³⁰ cf. TOB 126:5.

⁹³¹ TOB 126:5.

itself as a *singular ability* to perceive, love, and realize those meanings of the ‘language of the body’ that remain completely unknown to concupiscence itself and progressively enrich the spousal dialogue of the couple by purifying, deepening, and at the same time simplifying it.”⁹³² This constantly deepening love is the true good of the person and of the communion of persons in marriage.

The gift of the Holy Spirit gives to the husband and wife the inner strength needed for a mutual self-gift on their wedding day, throughout their married life, and in each and every spousal act. The dimension of the sign of the sacrament of marriage is sustained by the dimension of grace.

IV. Conclusion

Despite the detailed analysis of the communion of persons, presented over a number of years, John Paul II also acknowledges that the anthropology of the *Theology of the Body* is not an all-encompassing anthropology: there are details and applications missing. He says: “One must immediately observe, in fact, that the term ‘theology of the body’ goes far beyond the content of the reflections presented here. These reflections do not include many problems belonging, with regard to their object, to the theology of the body (e.g., the problem of suffering and death...). One must say this clearly.”⁹³³

Despite this stated limitation, a complete picture emerges from the Catecheses.

⁹³² TOB 128:3.

⁹³³ TOB 133:1.

A. John Paul II's Summary of the *Theology of the Body*

Several of the Audiences serve as summaries of the content of the Catecheses (e.g. TOB 23, 58, 86, 133). In some of these, more than simply summarizing content, John Paul II presents a broader vision of the context and application of the content. In two such instances, he speaks to theologians and comments on pedagogy.

Recognizing the need for continued analysis and development of a theological anthropology, especially to address the lived experienced of individuals, John Paul II states the need that theologians take up anthropological, ethical, and sacramental questions and answers based on an adequate anthropology.⁹³⁴ The *Theology of the Body* is a contribution to the work asked of theologians: grounding the Church's teachings, in this case, of marriage and family ethics and sacramental theology, on their biblical and personalistic aspects.⁹³⁵ John Paul II presents the biblical roots to the Church's teachings and underscores what constitutes the authentic development of the human person. The biblical analysis presents the history of the struggle with concupiscence. John Paul II says that it "is a history of good and evil..., and, at the same time, it is the history of salvation whose word is the Gospel and whose power is the Holy Spirit."⁹³⁶

A theology of the body, then, is not only a revelation of an understanding of the human person. It is also a method by which to help a human person live an authentic communion of persons. It is a pedagogy. John Paul II asserts: "The theology of the body is not merely a theory, but rather a specific evangelical, Christian pedagogy of the body."⁹³⁷ He explains further the nature of this pedagogy:

⁹³⁴ cf. TOB 44:3.

⁹³⁵ cf. TOB 133:3.

⁹³⁶ TOB 59:1.

⁹³⁷ TOB 122:5.

And, this *theology* of the body is the basis of the most appropriate method of the *pedagogy of the body*, that is, of man's education.... This takes on particular importance for contemporary man, whose science...is very advanced. Yet, this science deals with man under a certain "aspect" and is thus partial rather than comprehensive. ...in and of itself such *science does not yet develop* the consciousness of the body as a sign of the person, as a manifestation of the spirit. ... When one uses such one-sided knowledge of the body's functions as an organism, it is not difficult to reach the point of treating the body...as an *object of manipulations*; in this case, man no longer identifies himself subjectively...with his own body, because it is deprived of the meaning and dignity that stem from the fact that this body is proper to the person.⁹³⁸

As pedagogy, the *Theology of the Body* is intended to speak to the lived experience of the human person. It invites living according to a certain ethics, rooted in the truth of the human person and by the fruit of the grace of a reverence for God as Creator and Redeemer.

B. The Foundation of an Adequate Anthropology

The driving focus of the *Theology of the Body* is understanding the communion of persons of the husband and wife in anthropological and ethical terms. In the Catecheses, John Paul II presented a number of Scriptural passages that helped to detail this focus in light of God's plan and grace for humanity. With this vision he developed the foundation of an adequate anthropology, which is a theological anthropology.

1. Elements of John Paul's Theological Anthropology

In the *Theology of the Body*, John Paul II articulates the foundations of an adequate anthropology. He presents his own adequate anthropology. These are some of the key elements.

John Paul II presents the human person as having physical, psychological, and spiritual levels. The methodology he uses is reading the selected biblical passages together with the inner experience of the human person, which involves all of the levels of the person. This detailed

⁹³⁸ TOB 59:3.

phenomenological description of the person marks some of John Paul II's unique insights. He also weds this perspective with a more general one. Acknowledging a more general understanding of the person as body and soul and commenting on the basic relationship between body and soul, he says, "the *Creator has assigned the body to man as a task, the body in its masculinity and femininity.*"⁹³⁹ Specifically, this task is found in the human person mastering concupiscence. The body is not just a task, it is integral to personal development. He says that the body expresses the person.⁹⁴⁰ The fruit of the body mastered by the spirit, as an expression of the whole person, can be seen in the beatifying beginning of the man and the woman in Genesis⁹⁴¹—and in the mutual fascination of the bride and bridegroom in the Song of Songs.⁹⁴² Especially the inner experience of the human person reveals that the body has a spousal meaning, is meant for another. It is the power to express love.⁹⁴³ This revelation is especially clear when concupiscence is mastered. Presenting a theological anthropology, rooted in his methodology, John Paul II also comments that the person, through the body, is in the image of God, is a sign of God.

Another mark of John Paul II's theological anthropology is that he fully takes into account the dynamics of interpersonal communion. He says, "in masculinity and femininity he [God] assigned to him [the human person] in some way his own humanity as a task, that is, the dignity of the person and also the transparent sign of interpersonal 'communion' in which man realizes himself through the authentic gift of self."⁹⁴⁴ The deepest truth of the meaning and ethics of the bodily union of persons is that it is a sign of God, as a communion of persons. John Paul

⁹³⁹ TOB 59:2.

⁹⁴⁰ cf. TOB 7:2.

⁹⁴¹ cf. TOB 14:3.

⁹⁴² cf. TOB 117b:5.

⁹⁴³ TOB 15:1.

⁹⁴⁴ TOB 59:2.

II says: “While setting before man the requirements that correspond to the task entrusted to him, the Creator at the same time points out to man—male and female—the ways that lead to accepting and carrying them out.”⁹⁴⁵ In this context, John Paul II references *Gaudium et Spes* 22, which states that Christ reveals the human person to itself. God does not only reveal the truth of the human person, God gives the grace to live the ideal. The ability to be a sign of God is because of God’s grace, God’s divine initiative in creation and redemption. It is especially marriage where the ethics and the grace of God allows the man and the woman to be sign of God.⁹⁴⁶

Another unique part of John Paul II’s theological anthropology is that, based on divine revelation, he incorporates the reality of the human person as male and female, as an essential part of an adequate anthropology.⁹⁴⁷ While fully confirming an anthropology and ethics that would speak of “the human person,” intending every human person irrespective of masculinity or femininity, John Paul II notes the significance of the difference between male and female.⁹⁴⁸ Addressing one or the other separately, he comments on some ethical considerations that would apply to only one or the other. For instance, John Paul II notes that shame affects the man and the woman differently.⁹⁴⁹ Moreover, he mentions responsibilities of a man or a woman, responsibilities particular to each.⁹⁵⁰ Especially key to the incorporation of the diversity of male and female into an anthropology is that the diversity is not simply somatic. It is part of every level of the person, body, soul, and spirit.⁹⁵¹ John Paul II notes that masculinity is characteristic

⁹⁴⁵ TOB 59:2.

⁹⁴⁶ cf. TOB 103:7.

⁹⁴⁷ cf. TOB 14:3.

⁹⁴⁸ cf. TOB 10:1.

⁹⁴⁹ cf. TOB 31:4.

⁹⁵⁰ cf. TOB 33:2. In this paragraph, the pope comments on the biblical formulations that seem to point to the man’s responsibility to ensure self-donation. Also see: TOB 17:6, TOB 92:6, and TOB 109:1 (this paragraph was not delivered).

⁹⁵¹ cf. TOB 15:4.

of the whole male person, and femininity is characteristic of the whole female person. In other words, this diversity is a spiritual reality that has a somatic expression. This diversity, however, does not contradict the equality of male and female, their homogeneity. Their obligation to find themselves through a sincere gift of themselves. It is their union as a *communio personarum*, which requires their diversity and complementarity, that is in the image of God. The inclusion of the difference between male and female into an anthropology defies a philosophical anthropology. Thus, there is a certain mystery of creation, a certain mystery of God having created the human person as male and female. For this reason, Gen. 2:24 can be seen as the foundational scriptural passage for the *Theology of the Body*, even in a theoretical way over and above the obvious citations of that verse in the other passages considered (e.g. Matt. 19, Matt. 22, Eph. 5, Tobit).⁹⁵² In emphasizing the inner experiences which express the exchange of the gift and the ethics required, John Paul II asserts that these truths and requirements apply equally to a man or a woman. However, in the mystery of creation, there is a heterogeneity between the man and the woman. Only in a non-thematic way does John Paul II ever comment on the differences. But, one point seems significant, if only, at most, implied in the *Theology of the Body*: masculinity embodies giving and femininity embodies receiving.⁹⁵³ A basic revelation from God about what it means to be a person—male *and* female (cf. Gen. 1:27)—is seen visibly through the body, which expresses the person. The spousal meaning of the body is seen through the heterogeneity of the man and the woman—even if every human person is called to give and to receive.

⁹⁵² cf. TOB 93:1. John Paul II's comments on Gen. 2:24 presuppose its inseparable connection to Gen. 1:27.

⁹⁵³ cf. TOB 9:5.

2. The Human Person as Gift

A single word that captures John Paul II's theological anthropology is "gift."

John Paul II names the hermeneutics of the gift as "*a new criterion of understanding and of interpretation,*"⁹⁵⁴ calling the dimension of the gift the foundation upon which a theology of the body is built. Intimately connected with understanding the human person a gift is *Gaudium et Spes* 24.⁹⁵⁵ This conciliar definition of the human person states that the human person—male or female—reaches human fulfillment through a communion of persons. It states that a human person is given to oneself, and that a human person must give oneself. Two essential moments for a human person, for an adequate anthropology, then, are giving and receiving. In a communion of persons, each must give oneself to the other, and each must receive the gift of the other. These two moments are the foundation of the dynamics of a constantly-deepening, mutual self-gift. These two moments are the foundation of the ethics found in the *Theology of the Body*, as well. In a communion of persons, especially the *communio personarum* of the husband and wife, a mutual self-gift is necessary. John Paul II does not develop what an ethical receiving of the gift of the other might be. Especially by underscoring the struggle with concupiscence, and the moral need to do so, John Paul II does detail what an ethical self-donation is. The human person is called to be a gift. By underscoring the redemption of the body, and the dimension of grace in marriage, John Paul II makes clear that the power to live according to these ethics, the ethos of the body, is found in receiving the gift of grace from God, by receiving the gift of the Holy Spirit.

Moreover, John Paul II comments on the relationship between the act of giving and the act of receiving. Regarding giving and receiving, John Paul II says: "These two functions of the

⁹⁵⁴ TOB 13:2.

⁹⁵⁵ cf. TOB 15:1.

mutual exchange are deeply connected in the whole process of the ‘gift of self’: giving and accepting the gift interpenetrate in such a way that the very act of giving becomes acceptance, and acceptance transforms itself into giving.”⁹⁵⁶ In the dynamics of the mutual exchange of the gift, the spiritual stance of giving is the same as that of receiving. That stance expressed through the body, is what establishes and maintains the communion of persons, and is the stance that ethics requires. The communion of persons is created through the freedom of the gift, the post-lapsidary access to the state without shame. John Paul II says of the man and woman in Gen. 2, “the exchange of the gift, in which their whole humanity, soul and body, femininity and masculinity, participates, is realized *by preserving the inner characteristic (that is, precisely innocence) of self-donation and of the acceptance of the other as a gift.*”⁹⁵⁷ In the mystery of creation and of redemption, the man and the woman preserve and maintain the mutual self-donation in freedom. Reverence given to God is expressed by accepting the sacredness of the image of God found in the person and in the communion of persons.

An adequate anthropology is one that understands the human person as a gift. An adequate anthropology can only be lived with the grace of God if it is a theological anthropology. An adequate anthropology understands what it means to be a person and to grow as a person, within the mystery of creation and of redemption. As a consequence of an adequate anthropology, for John Paul II, marriage, as a true *communio personarum*, is a privileged place— if not the privileged place—where the mystery of creation is fulfilled in the mystery of redemption.

⁹⁵⁶ TOB 17:4.

⁹⁵⁷ TOB 17:4.

In his presentation on the sacrament of marriage, John Paul II applies the key insight of his theological anthropology, which is to say that, with God's help to overcome concupiscence, the husband and wife are capable of living a full, mutual *communio personarum* (cf. Eph 5:21-33).

Chapter 8

Concluding Remarks

The *Theology of the Body* is often associated with marriage and family ethics. And it is a work that expounds on Catholic moral principles. The Catecheses, however, should not be limited to their ethical content. In them, John Paul II also presents a developed vision of the human person.

This chapter shows some of the contours of John Paul II's theological anthropology. Its definition is deepened by the philosophical anthropology of Wojtyła. And it is an understanding of the human person that is rooted in Scripture.

I. The Role of Pontiff

A guiding question in my analyses is in what way to consider the *Theology of the Body* as a work of Wojtyła.

Throughout his life, John Paul II lived many roles. Of the role of a play actor (in the Rhapsodic Theater), Wojtyła writes, "The actor is a rhapsodist. ... The rhapsodic actor does not become a character but carries a problem."⁹⁵⁸ The actor takes on the material presented in the play as their own. John Paul II accepted this responsibility of an actor, even as he accepted other roles.

Throughout his life, as Wojtyła's roles changed, what he wrote and how he wrote changed. The role as an artist was largely diminished as Wojtyła accepted his vocation to the priesthood and his life as a professor. His published work primarily became pastoral and academic. Nevertheless, Wojtyła consistently published poems and plays in the years prior to and during his time as priest, bishop, and cardinal. The work of the artist, while reduced and

⁹⁵⁸ Wojtyła, *The Collected Plays and Writings on Theater*, 374.

changed, never ceased. He wrote his final plays while bishop and archbishop. After 1967, the number of poems he published was noticeably reduced, and he wrote no more plays. In 2003, John Paul II published a series of poems, *Roman Triptych*, underscoring the fact that the role of artist remained a role that he accepted.⁹⁵⁹ Rice comments that, in the Rhapsodic Theater, “Kotlarczyk taught Wojtyła not so much to entertain an audience, as to transmit to it the truth of life.”⁹⁶⁰ Rice further notes about Wojtyła’s involvement in the Rhapsodic Theater, “The project became energized by a powerful asceticism, which would resonate, in Wojtyła’s life, with the new perspective that he was just then beginning to discover in the poetic works of John of the Cross.”⁹⁶¹ St. John of the Cross wrote and commented on poetry, as part of his transmission of the truths of life. Wojtyła wrote poetry and plays and commented on poetry, including that of St. John of the Cross, as part of his transmission of the truths of life.

Rice offers a comment on Wojtyła’s philosophical work: “Wojtyła’s methodological approach to philosophy is arguably based on a notion of Philosophy itself as an *actus personae*. Put another way, minds don’t do Philosophy, persons do, and the person, for Wojtyła, is fundamentally a subject of morality, relatively autonomous, that is, autonomous only in *truth*.”⁹⁶² Doing philosophy is a human act. It is not dissimilar to the role of an artist. Rice says: “Perhaps what is most characteristic of the vision that he brings from poetry to philosophy is that it is *primarily* a vision not of analysis and posterior synthesis, but of synopsis.”⁹⁶³ More than Wojtyła exercising simultaneous roles of philosopher and artist, Wojtyła exercised the same role in these two expressions.

⁹⁵⁹ John Paul II, *Roman Triptych: Meditations*, tr. Jerzy Peterkiewicz (Vatican City State: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2003).

⁹⁶⁰ Rice, “On the ‘Proper Weight of a Man’”, 302.

⁹⁶¹ *ibid.*, 302.

⁹⁶² *ibid.*, 299. Emphasis in original.

⁹⁶³ *ibid.*, 299. Emphasis in original.

At his papal election, John Paul II took on the role of pope. In choosing his name John Paul II expressed continuity with his predecessors and their papal ministry.⁹⁶⁴ With regard to the Catecheses, Luke Timothy Johnson says: “It is appropriate, then, to treat John Paul II’s words as those of a theologian and to test them for their intellectual adequacy, especially since his approach is in some ways characteristic of others who are seeking a ‘theology’ of the body.”⁹⁶⁵ While Johnson is justified in engaging the *Theology of the Body* as a theological text, the role of catechist should be considered as primary. His primary role was catechist, not theologian. In the case of the *Theology of the Body*, the role of pontiff is expressed as the role of catechist. The *Theology of the Body*, as an exposition of the complex inner experiences of the human person, of every human person, has a universal audience.

In presenting the Catecheses, John Paul II is not exercising the role of philosopher or theologian. In any case, extending Rice’s comment, the work of a catechist is a human act, an *actus personae*. The delivery of the Catecheses was done during his pontificate, which suggests that they should be considered as the work of John Paul II.

II. John Paul II’s Use of Scripture in the Catecheses

Understood as distinct from Wojtyła’s philosophical anthropology, the theological anthropology of the Catecheses has Scripture as its point of departure. In fact, John Paul II uses many Scriptural texts in developing the themes of the *Theology of the Body*.⁹⁶⁶

However, some authors have commented on his use of Scripture.

⁹⁶⁴ Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, 254.

⁹⁶⁵ Johnson, *The Revelatory Body*, 625.

⁹⁶⁶ A complete list of biblical texts referenced in the Catecheses can be found in the “Scripture Index” of the *Theology of the Body*, cf. Waldstein, *Man and Woman He Created Them*, 725-730.

A. John Paul II's Use of the Historical-Critical Method

Luke Timothy Johnson critiques the use of Scripture in the *Theology of the Body*.

Johnson challenges how John Paul II treated specific passages, especially Matt. 19 and 1 Cor. 6.⁹⁶⁷ Johnson offers a commentary on 1 Cor., which presents the complexities that Johnson does not find in John Paul II's evaluation of the same text, and which then serve to advance his own theological anthropology.⁹⁶⁸ In general, this evaluation of John Paul II concerns the pope's use of the historical-critical method in biblical interpretation.

Other commentators have defended John Paul II's method of biblical interpretation. Kupczak states that "the pope consistently uses interpretative tools provided by the historical-critical method in his reading of the Bible. This scientific exegesis leads to an integral reading of biblical texts and takes into account both the richness of their original meanings and their roots in ancient cultures."⁹⁶⁹ In addition to affirming the pope execution of the scientific tools in biblical interpretation, Kupczak asserts that John Paul II does an integral reading of the Bible, which is a point found in other commentators. Echeverria describes John Paul II's integral reading of Scripture in this way: "the pope assumes a hermeneutical approach to Scripture that treats it *as a whole*, a canonical whole."⁹⁷⁰ A basic principle in an integral reading of Scripture, Echeverria writes, is that "the unifying principle of the Scripture as a canonical whole is Christ."⁹⁷¹ John Paul II interprets Scripture from the basic principle of the fundamental unity of divine revelation. In response to criticism that John Paul II presents incomplete passages, Echeverria says that

⁹⁶⁷ Johnson, *The Revelatory Body*, 673.

⁹⁶⁸ *ibid.*, 1370. It is beyond the scope of this work to discuss Johnson's statements on the specific biblical passages mentioned.

⁹⁶⁹ Kupczak, *Gift and Communion*, 210. On the same page, Kupczak describes John Paul II's approach as being a third way between Bultmann and Barth.

⁹⁷⁰ Echevarria, 94. Emphasis in original.

⁹⁷¹ Echevarria, 95.

being selective is not the same as being arbitrary, especially given an understanding of Scripture as an organic whole.⁹⁷²

B. The Role of Experience in Biblical Interpretation

In the end, Johnson's critique of the method of biblical interpretation used by John Paul II is other than his skill with scientific tools. Johnson challenges the relationship of experience and Scripture. He challenges the priority given to Scripture as a source of divine revelation. Johnson says: "Scripture is made not merely necessary but also sufficient for theology, and this it cannot be."⁹⁷³ For Johnson, biblical interpretation that leads to moral, doctrinal statements, like those found in the *Theology of the Body*, cannot be founded on biblical interpretation alone. He would say that biblical passages alone are not a sufficient source for theology. Human experience must have a more significant, and prior, place. In a word that includes, but also goes beyond, the *Theology of the Body*, Johnson writes: "If...revelation is not exclusively biblical but occurs in the continuing experience of God in the structures of human freedom, then at least an occasional glance at human experience as actually lived might be appropriate even for the magisterium."⁹⁷⁴ For Johnson, human experience is the primary source for the revelation of God. Theology should not start from the principle that Scripture norms human experience.

With this understanding of the relationship between Scripture and experience, Johnson offers further criticism of the *Theology of the Body*. He writes:

John Paul II claims to be practicing "phenomenology," but from the evidence of these homilies, he seems to have paid little attention to actual human experience. Instead, he dwells on the nuances of words in biblical narratives and propositions, while fantasizing an ethereal and all-encompassing mode of mutual self-donation between man and woman that lacks any of the messy, clumsy, awkward, charming, casual, and yes, silly aspects of

⁹⁷² Echeverria, 97.

⁹⁷³ Johnson, *The Revelatory Body*, 913.

⁹⁷⁴ *ibid.*, 651.

love in the flesh. Carnality, it is good to remember, is at least as much a matter of humor as of solemnity. In the pope's formulations, though, human sexuality is observed by telescope from a distant planet. Solemn pronouncements are made on the basis of scriptural exegesis rather than living experience. The effect is something like that of a sunset painted by the unsighted.⁹⁷⁵

For Johnson, John Paul II does not adequately take into account human experience—both methodologically and the variety that is experienced specifically each day throughout a relationship.

Echeverria addresses the question of the relationship between Scripture and human experience, even specifically engaging Johnson. Echeverria writes: "Johnson's position is representative of an approach to biblical authority that is widely influential today..., namely, making an appeal on behalf of 'experience' as that alternative source of moral conviction to override scriptural authority and hence the clear teaching of Scripture."⁹⁷⁶ Framed a different way, the question about the relationship of priority between Scripture and experience is whether human experience is a source of theology, in a technical sense. Echeverria states:

experience is *not* a foundation, a source of revelation, a final arbiter of truth and falsehood in the Church, from which the belief-content (*fides quae*) of the historic Christian faith can be inferred and known. ... This epistemic order of things is grounded in the fact that experience is not a source of knowledge, but an organ of knowledge.⁹⁷⁷

Echeverria asserts that with an understanding of experience and Scripture, like Johnson's, then, "Religion becomes privately engaging, a personal life-style choice, and nothing more—obviously not about making truth claims regarding the living God who in an act of revelation manifests and communicates something of himself and his plan of salvation, calling us to share

⁹⁷⁵ *ibid.*, 632.

⁹⁷⁶ Echeverria, "*In the Beginning...*", 2. Echeverria offers a sustained response to Johnson's position, specifically in dialogue with Johnson, from page 2 to page 25 and again from page 127 to page 132.

⁹⁷⁷ *ibid.*, 124. Emphasis in original.

in his divine life.”⁹⁷⁸ For Echeverria, human experience on its own cannot be considered as divine revelation.

Nevertheless, Echeverria acknowledges that experience is significant for theology as an aide in “discerning the Word of God.”⁹⁷⁹ This relationship of human experience assisting the interpretation of biblical revelation is consonant with John Paul II’s approach. Echeverria says that John Paul II “argues that the authority of God’s Word revelation does not exclude experience, but rather it is *in* the experience itself that the authority is acknowledged and confessed.”⁹⁸⁰ In the *Theology of the Body*, John Paul II says that experience is “an indispensable point of reference.”⁹⁸¹ With regard to the role of experience in theology, the conclusion here is that experience complements the Scriptures.

Noting John Paul II’s comments about the methodological importance of human experience in biblical interpretation, Echeverria, linking the two, turns to the writings of Wojtyła concerning experience.⁹⁸² Echeverria notes that, for Wojtyła, phenomenology is concerned with experience of the personal subject and that this “experience is something irreducibly subjective, personal, defying reduction, and so we must pause cognitively before man’s lived experience.”⁹⁸³ Wojtyła’s evaluation of lived experience culminates in the description of the integration of the person, as a psychosomatic-spiritual unity, in the action, which points to the body, and which Echeverria links with the *Theology of the Body*.⁹⁸⁴ Echeverria’s analysis of John Paul II’s biblical interpretation makes another connection between the writings of Wojtyła and the *Theology of the Body* precisely concerning the significance of experience.

⁹⁷⁸ *ibid.*, 165.

⁹⁷⁹ *ibid.*, 146.

⁹⁸⁰ *ibid.*, 126. Emphasis in original. cf. TOB 4:4.

⁹⁸¹ TOB 4:4.

⁹⁸² Echeverria, “*In the Beginning...*”, 175.

⁹⁸³ *ibid.*, 176.

⁹⁸⁴ cf. *ibid.*, 187.

Other authors have made similar observations concerning the role of experience in John Paul II's biblical interpretation. Waldstein notes that for John Paul II, despite his facility with historical-critical scholarship, "His primary perspective, even as a reader of Scripture, is that of a philosopher and a systematic theologian."⁹⁸⁵ The integral reading of Scripture points John Paul II to the truth of the matter. And Kupczak writes: "In the papal 'hermeneutics of gift,' the Word of God is accepted in faith, and then undergoes 'philosophical exegesis,' and its 'biblical images are translated to philosophical notions,' so that the Word can shine with all the radiance of its truth."⁹⁸⁶ For John Paul II, the "philosophical exegesis" often takes the form of the description of human experience.

III. Scripture and Anthropology

In his philosophical anthropology Wojtyła acknowledges its point of contact with biblical revelation.

Throughout *Love and Responsibility*, Wojtyła mentions biblical passages, both explicitly⁹⁸⁷ and obliquely.⁹⁸⁸ However, in *Love and Responsibility*, Scripture is parenthetical to the theme and its development. Scripture passages are mentioned as points of contact with the philosophical-ethical point being made. One clear example of this is how Wojtyła presents the Gospel commandment to love, "You shall love your neighbor as yourself" (Lev. 19:18, Matt. 22:39, Mk. 12:31, Lk. 10:27), without specific citation. He says: "if the commandment to love, and the love which is the object of this commandment, are to have any meaning, we must find a

⁹⁸⁵ Waldstein, *Man and Woman He Created Them*, 19.

⁹⁸⁶ Kupczak, *Gift and Communion*, 40.

⁹⁸⁷ For example, see the following (the page number of *Love and Responsibility* is in parentheses): Genesis 1:27 (212); Genesis 2:24 (184, 212, 237); Matthew 5:28 (81, 188, 221); Matthew 5:48 (168); Matthew 19:8 (258); Matthew 22: 23-30 (212); 1 Corinthians 7 (255, 258); Galatians 4:19 (260); and 1 John 4:8 (248).

⁹⁸⁸ For example, see the following (the page number of *Love and Responsibility* is in parentheses): "one flesh" from Genesis (30); the Gospel command to love (40-44); the Decalogue, specifically the Sixth and Ninth Commandments (147-148, 221).

basis for them other than the utilitarian premise and the utilitarian system of values. This can only be the personalistic principle and the personalistic norm.”⁹⁸⁹ While the Gospel is explicitly acknowledged, Wojtyła maintains a philosophical, not a theological, analysis—in this case developing the personalistic norm. One less clear example is the chapter dedicated to justice to the Creator.⁹⁹⁰ In that chapter there are clear biblical and theological themes as points of departure (e.g. marriage as sacrament and vocation). Though even in this case, Wojtyła asserts the theological principles but offers philosophical-ethical explanations and comments. The focus of *Love and Responsibility* remains on philosophical analysis, even when biblical passages and theological themes are present.

Wojtyła also used the commandment to love as a point of reference in *Person and Act*. Wojtyła says, “our aim is only to emphasize the confirmation it contains for our claim that the reference system centered on ‘thy neighbor’ has a crucial significance in any acting and existing ‘together with others.’”⁹⁹¹ In other words, the biblical commandment coincides with the philosophical anthropology that he is developing.

When Wojtyła considers the commandment to love with regard to love of God, however, the connection between the personalistic norm and the commandment to love can only be accepted in faith. In this context, Wojtyła quotes the whole commandment, writing “It is worth recalling the commandment to love in its full form: ‘Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and all thy mind and all thy soul, and thy neighbor as thyself.’”⁹⁹² The response to God is made with the recognition of God’s work of redemption and sanctification. Wojtyła says: “Revelation enables us to understand...that God relates to man as a person to a person, that his

⁹⁸⁹ LR, 41.

⁹⁹⁰ LR, 211-261.

⁹⁹¹ PA, 295.

⁹⁹² LR, 246.

attitude to man is one of 'love'. Thus the personalistic norm' may be said to have its fullest justification and its ultimate origin in the relationship between God and man."⁹⁹³ In this way, the personalistic norm, as united to the commandment to love, can be understood in a theological context. Despite this very strong connection between philosophy and theology, however, the personalistic norm is understood on philosophical terms and is presented throughout *Love and Responsibility* with regard to its strict philosophical content.

In the introduction of *Love and Responsibility*, Wojtyła comments on the role of Scripture in his ethical writing. He says that his book, which is the fruit of pastoral work, is an exposition of "an incessant confrontation of doctrine with life."⁹⁹⁴ In his role as a spiritual advisor he helps to unite doctrine and revelation with the moral life. He further admits that concerning sexual ethics he recognizes as a "frame of reference" these biblical texts, namely, "Matthew 5:27, 28, Matthew 19:1-13, Mark 10:1-12, Luke 20:27-35, John 8:1-11, I Corinthians 7 (throughout), Ephesians 5:22-33."⁹⁹⁵ Despite naming these Scripture passages in the introduction, they do not enter thematically into the ethical analysis of *Love and Responsibility*. However, the list of Scriptures noted in the above passage are found in the *Theology of the Body*. In the Catecheses these passages are certainly more than a frame of reference, as they are taken up thematically. And they are commented on through John Paul II's philosophical exegesis.

IV. Reading the *Theology of the Body* in Terms of Philosophical Anthropology

The insights of the *Theology of the Body* come into greater relief through an intertextual analysis with *Person and Act* and *Love and Responsibility*. This reading of the *Theology of the Body* indicates the philosophical exegesis that he employed.

⁹⁹³ LR, 245

⁹⁹⁴ LR, 16.

⁹⁹⁵ LR, 15-16.

A. Theology of the Body and Person and Act

The *Theology of the Body* describes the human person in three states: the original situation (Gen. 2), in the state after original sin (Gen. 2-3), and life in the Resurrection (Matt. 22:24-30, Mk. 12:18-27, Lk. 20:27-40). In *Person and Act*, Wojtyła articulates inner human experiences in detail, and these can elucidate what John Paul II says about each of these states.

1. Original Human Experiences

In the *Theology of the Body*, John Paul II describes the situation of the human person before the Fall in Gen. 2, the original human experiences of original solitude, original unity, and original nakedness.

Original solitude indicates the uniqueness of the human person in relation to the rest of creation. Original solitude is revealed through subjectivity and self-determination.⁹⁹⁶ In terms of *Person and Act*, subjectivity is the recognition of the interiority of the human person, the level of nature and the level of the person.⁹⁹⁷ Self-determination, as the power of free will, of freedom, is based on that interiority. Wojtyła says that “self-determination...provides the key to the reality of the person we are attempting to reach.”⁹⁹⁸ The uniqueness of the human person is seen in specifically human acts. In the inner life of the person, self-determination is a fundamental human act. Wojtyła describes human action as moving an experience of passivity to an experience of activity, an experience of “it happens” to an experience of “I act.”⁹⁹⁹ These

⁹⁹⁶ cf. TOB 6:1.

⁹⁹⁷ cf. PA, 107.

⁹⁹⁸ PA, 116.

⁹⁹⁹ cf. PA, 61.

passive and active experiences reveal the levels of the person that are at the foundation of the recognition of the distinct reality of the human person in the visible creation.

One part of John Paul II's description of original unity is somatic homogeneity, a recognition that the other human person is also a human person with an interiority.¹⁰⁰⁰ In Wojtyła's philosophical anthropology, the foundation of unity is the subjectivity of each person.¹⁰⁰¹

John Paul II describes original nakedness as a fullness of the experience of the body.¹⁰⁰² In the experience of integration, Wojtyła says that the person is fully present in human action.¹⁰⁰³ Being "naked without shame" (cf. Gen. 2:25) is experiencing the fullness of integration of every level of the person, without any disintegration. John Paul II says that in the original nakedness the man and the woman were free with the freedom of the gift.¹⁰⁰⁴ That is, in more philosophical language, there was no internal constraint on the human person, on the power of self-determination. The experience of the body, without shame, is an experience of the integration of the psychosomatic, spiritual unity of the human person.

In the Catecheses, after presenting original solitude, original unity, and original nakedness, John Paul II presents the spousal meaning of the body and the communion of persons. The content of these Catecheses more closely aligns with *Love and Responsibility*. Yet some points of contact can be noted with *Person and Act*. John Paul II says that "The human body...contains 'from the beginning' the 'spousal' attribute, that is, *the power to express love: precisely that love in which the human person becomes a gift* and—through this gift—fulfills the

¹⁰⁰⁰ cf. TOB 8:4.

¹⁰⁰¹ cf. PA, 293.

¹⁰⁰² cf. TOB 12:2.

¹⁰⁰³ cf. PA, 192.

¹⁰⁰⁴ cf. TOB 15:1.

very meaning of his being and existence.”¹⁰⁰⁵ In the language of *Person and Act*, this power of the human person to love is built on the power of self-possession. Wojtyła says: “Being in the possession of himself man can determine himself.”¹⁰⁰⁶ In similar language, John Paul II says that “self-mastery is indispensable *in order for man to be able to ‘give himself,’* in order for him to become a gift.”¹⁰⁰⁷ Love, as an act of self-determination, is possible because of self-mastery or self-possession.

The question of the self-gift of interpersonal love would be a question of “horizontal transcendence,” which only gets a brief mention in *Person and Act*.¹⁰⁰⁸ In the *Theology of the Body*, a mutual gift of self creates a communion of persons. The content of *Person and Act* that would be a proximate foundation for *communio personarum* is the notion of intersubjectivity through participation. Wojtyła says: “The ability to share in the *humanness itself of every man is the very core of all participation and the condition of the personalistic value of all acting and existing ‘together with others.’*”¹⁰⁰⁹ Participation aides the growing of the personalistic value of each person. Intersubjectivity aides the self-fulfillment of each person. Wojtyła notes that intersubjectivity by participation finds further direction in the commandment of love. He says: “The commandment of love is also the measure of the tasks and demands that have to be faced by all men—all persons and all communities—if the whole good contained in the acting and being ‘together with others’ is to become a reality.”¹⁰¹⁰ With its focus on the personalistic value, the measure of self-fulfillment in *Person and Act* is the integration of the person in action.¹⁰¹¹

Self-gift is only spoken of in terms of self-possession and self-determination.

¹⁰⁰⁵ TOB 15:1.

¹⁰⁰⁶ PA, 106.

¹⁰⁰⁷ TOB 15:2.

¹⁰⁰⁸ cf. PA, 119.

¹⁰⁰⁹ PA, 295.

¹⁰¹⁰ PA, 299.

¹⁰¹¹ cf. PA, 151.

2. The Experience of Concupiscence

John Paul II continues his theological anthropology by turning to the post-lapsidary state of the human person, the “historical man.” He turns to a description of the inner experiences of the human person, in the state after original sin. He turns to the “heart” that Christ mentions in Matt. 5:28.

If the original situation of the human person was without shame (cf. Gen. 2:25), then the historical situation is affected by an experience of shame and concupiscence. John Paul II describes this experience as “a certain constitutive fracture in the human person’s interior, *a breakup, as it were, of man’s original spiritual and somatic unity,*”¹⁰¹² which includes a “specific threat to the structure of self-possession and self-dominion, through which the human person forms itself.”¹⁰¹³ In Wojtyła’s language, this is an experience of the disintegration of the human person.¹⁰¹⁴

Regarding spousal meaning of the body, John Paul II notes that one effect of concupiscence is that the human person has “*difficulty in identifying oneself with one’s own body.*”¹⁰¹⁵ The inner division is reflected in a difficulty in raising the experience of passivity to the level of action.¹⁰¹⁶

The new commandment of Matt. 5:27-28 (You have heard that it was said...But I say to you) shifts the moral focus to a look with desire. John Paul II writes that Christ points to a look with desire as an action that “has not yet transformed itself into an external act, it has not yet

¹⁰¹² TOB 28:2.

¹⁰¹³ TOB 28:3.

¹⁰¹⁴ PA, 194.

¹⁰¹⁵ TOB 29:4.

¹⁰¹⁶ cf. PA, 195.

become an ‘act of the body,’” but is an action, nevertheless.¹⁰¹⁷ John Paul II says that such a choice, constrained by the sexual urge, results in a loss of the freedom of the gift.¹⁰¹⁸ The analyses of Wojtyła help to unpack the dynamics of the crucial moment of the encounter between the man and the woman. Original innocence allowed the man and the woman to see each other in the original nakedness free from any constrain of the sexual urge.¹⁰¹⁹ Yet Wojtyła illustrates that innocence does not mean a lack of complexity and depth. He says in *Person and Act*:

The drive of sex, which relies on the momentous division of mankind into male and female individuals, stems from the somatic ground and also penetrates deeply into the psyche and its emotivity, thereby affecting even man’s spiritual life. . . .this does not consist in somatic reactions alone but also in a special psychical urge of the emotive type.¹⁰²⁰

The encounter of the man and the woman stir up happenings, deeply—on psychic and somatic levels. In the experience of concupiscence, this stirring is not yet a choice. The choice is to raise these passive experiences to the level of action, to the level of the person, or to yield to the psychosomatic dynamisms and to “look with desire” (cf. Matt. 5:28). As John Paul II said, the look with desire is not yet an external act, but it already is a choice of the person, an inner action—a choice that abnegates self-determination.¹⁰²¹

There is a tension in that moment of making the choice to integrate the psychosomatic dynamisms or to yield to them. John Paul II notes that there is conflict between desire and communion, in the heart of the human person. John Paul II responds to some attempted

¹⁰¹⁷ TOB 39:4.

¹⁰¹⁸ cf. TOB 41:5.

¹⁰¹⁹ cf. TOB 8:4.

¹⁰²⁰ PA, 219-220.

¹⁰²¹ cf. PA, 233.

resolutions of the inner conflict.¹⁰²² Each, in their own way, accepts the disintegration of the human person, and denies the possibility of the integration of the psychosomatic dynamisms.

The *Theology of the Body* reiterates the possibility of freedom, the possibility of not being constraint by the sexual urge. John Paul II says that there is the possibility of a purity of heart. Of the possibility of a pure heart, which comes from the words of Christ (Matt. 19:3-6), the pope says:

Yet, Christ's words are realistic. They do not attempt to make the human heart return to the state of original innocence, which man left behind in the moment in which he committed the original sin; rather, they point out to him *the path toward a purity of heart that is possible and accessible* for him even in the state of hereditary sinfulness.¹⁰²³

To the perspectives that define the human person by concupiscence, John Paul II employs the theological perspective of the human person as in the “*status naturae lapsae simul ac redemptae* [the state of fallen and at the same time redeemed nature].”¹⁰²⁴ In *Person and Act*, the possibility of the human person not being defined by concupiscence Wojtyła would simply recognize as the possibility of the human person to choose freely between yielding to psychosomatic dynamisms or performing a human act. In *Person and Act*, Wojtyła offers detailed analyses of the integration of the soma and the psyche, which all assert the presence of self-determination and confirm the possibility of increased freedom.¹⁰²⁵ Wojtyła speaks of the process of the becoming of a human person¹⁰²⁶ and the possibility of increased psychosomatic-spiritual unity in the person,¹⁰²⁷ as particular examples of the general perspective that the human person is not defined by passivity.

¹⁰²² cf. TOB 44:1-48:5.

¹⁰²³ TOB 58:5.

¹⁰²⁴ TOB 45:3.

¹⁰²⁵ Wojtyła acknowledges the possibility of exceptional cases where a person is incapable of integration, due to structural or moral causes, cf. PA, 247.

¹⁰²⁶ cf. PA, 99.

¹⁰²⁷ cf. PA, 184.

3. The Experience of the Resurrection

John Paul II describes the state of the human person in the resurrection in these words (cf. Matt. 22:30): “The resurrection...will consist in the perfect realization of what is personal in man.”¹⁰²⁸ Calling this new state and experience “spiritualization,” the pope offers that spiritualization “signifies not only that the spirit will master the body, but...that *it will also fully permeate the body and the powers of the spirit will permeate the energies of the body.*”¹⁰²⁹ This is a part of the *Theology of the Body* that explicitly uses vocabulary that is likewise found in a technical sense in *Person and Act*. The foundation in *Person and Act* is found in the general recognition that the human person is a psychosomatic-spiritual unity that can increase that unity.¹⁰³⁰

Despite their difference, in light of the Resurrection, John Paul II says that celibacy and marriage have an anthropological similarity. In both cases, the human person must be attentive to psychosomatic dynamisms.¹⁰³¹ In both cases, the person must possess the freedom of the gift.¹⁰³² As has already been noted, in Wojtyła’s philosophical anthropology prior to any act of self-determination is an act of self-possession. Prior to the gift of self—in celibacy, in marriage—is self-possession. The connection and complementarity of marriage and celibacy is found in the interiority of the human person.

4. The Sacrament of Marriage and *Humanae Vitae*

While much of what John Paul II says concerning the sacrament of marriage is beyond the scope of *Person and Act*, some points of contact can be seen.

¹⁰²⁸ TOB 67:2.

¹⁰²⁹ TOB 67:1. cf. TOB 72:4.

¹⁰³⁰ e.g. PA, 258.

¹⁰³¹ cf. TOB 77:4 and TOB 85:8.

¹⁰³² cf. TOB 80:5.

When speaking of marriage in the dimension of grace, John Paul II says: “As a sacramental *expression of that saving power, marriage is also an exhortation to gain mastery over concupiscence* (as Christ speaks about in the Sermon on the Mount).”¹⁰³³ As an exhortation, the call to self-mastery refers to the action of the human person. Thus, mastery over concupiscence refers to the integration of the psychosomatic dynamism of the person raised to the level of the person through transcendence and self-determination.

With regard to the language of the body and marriage in the dimension of sign, the pope says that the external action of the spouses speaks self-gift.¹⁰³⁴ But it is only spoken in truth if the external action is an expression of an inner freedom.¹⁰³⁵ That is, in philosophical language of Wojtyła, interiorly the human person must be making an act of self-determination, rooted in self-possession, having integrated the psychosomatic dynamisms in the action. The evaluation of whether a lie or a truth was spoken by the language of the body is made through a consideration of the interiority of the person.

In his consideration of the sacrament of marriage John Paul II includes an analysis of the Song of Songs. The words of the Song articulate the inner experiences of the man and the woman in a relationship of love. They are words that articulate the original encounter of man and woman that was expressed in Genesis. The pope says: “What was barely expressed in the second chapter of Genesis (vv.23-25) in just a few simple and essential words is developed here in a full dialogue.”¹⁰³⁶ Building upon the exclamation of joy and exultation expressed in Gen. 2:23 (“This one, at last ...”), the Song of Songs adds a mutual fascination.¹⁰³⁷ John Paul II says: “The point of departure as well as the point of arrival for this fascination—reciprocal wonder and

¹⁰³³ TOB 101:1.

¹⁰³⁴ cf. TOB 103:4.

¹⁰³⁵ cf. TOB 105:1.

¹⁰³⁶ TOB 108:5.

¹⁰³⁷ cf. TOB 8:4.

admiration—are in fact the bride’s femininity and the bridegroom’s masculinity, in the direct experience of their visibility.”¹⁰³⁸ As in Genesis, in the Song of Songs there is a fascination with the visibility of the beauty of the other—with the body—but it is a look that also sees the interiority of the person.¹⁰³⁹ In other words, John Paul II says that, of the bridegroom and bride, “the love that unites them is of a spiritual and sensual nature together.”¹⁰⁴⁰ The pope further notes that it is a love that is ecstatic and peaceful.¹⁰⁴¹

The biblical encounter of love in Genesis and in the Song of Songs describes a look at the other that sees together the somatic and the spiritual elements of the other. These elements of the other stir the psychosomatic dynamism in the one. In a moment of personal integration, the one gives himself or herself to the other. The stirring of every level of the person accounts for the ecstasy. The integration of the person accounts for the peace.

A deeper look at the philosophical anthropology of *Person and Act* gives further articulation to the expression of the inner experience found in the biblical encounter. Wojtyła describes the dynamism stirred by a stimulus as an experience of passivity, that somatically, he calls, a reaction and psychically, he calls, an emotion.¹⁰⁴² In the biblical “look” (cf. Gen. 2:23), the one sees the male or female body, and, at the same time, the masculinity or femininity of the other. These physical and non-physical values stir up reactivity and emotivity. Wojtyła develops emotivity further. Emotivity can have a somatic expression that Wojtyła calls excitement, which does not require a physical stimulus,¹⁰⁴³ and can be intense.¹⁰⁴⁴ But emotivity can also have a psychic expression, which Wojtyła calls stirring emotions, or just emotions.

¹⁰³⁸ TOB 108:6.

¹⁰³⁹ cf. TOB 109:2.

¹⁰⁴⁰ TOB 111:5.

¹⁰⁴¹ cf. TOB 110:2.

¹⁰⁴² cf. PA, 200.

¹⁰⁴³ cf. PA, 236.

¹⁰⁴⁴ cf. PA, 237.

Stirring emotions bring to the fore the psychic level of the person.¹⁰⁴⁵ These dynamisms can have physical and non-physical causes, and, Wojtyła says, can be especially intense, “radiating internally...to the whole of man’s psychical sphere.”¹⁰⁴⁶ The mutual fascination of the Song of Songs¹⁰⁴⁷ and the beatifying beginning of Genesis¹⁰⁴⁸ carry the sense of the intensity of emotion.

Wojtyła comments further about emotivity in terms of the sexual urge. Originally discussed in the context of the integration of the soma, Wojtyła says that the sexual urge “does not consist in somatic reactions alone but also in a special psychical urge of the emotive type,”¹⁰⁴⁹ and is associated with excitement.¹⁰⁵⁰ The biblical look stirs up not just excitement but also emotion. With emotion directing the whole of the psychic sphere, the intensity in this case cannot be understated. Further underscoring the intensity, Wojtyła asserts that the “psychical strand in emotivity may be seen as running between corporality and spirituality, but far from dividing them it interweaves with the one and the other, bringing them together,”¹⁰⁵¹ adding a “special vividness” to human action.¹⁰⁵² The entire psychosomatic-spiritual unity of the person is integrated in the biblical look.

These same insights from *Person and Act* apply to John Paul II’s treatment of *Humanae Vitae*—and an understanding of the human person contained in it—when he says that “in interpersonal relations in which the reciprocal influence of masculinity and femininity expresses itself, what is set free in the *psycho-emotive subject...is...a reaction ...[and] another reaction...‘emotion.’*”¹⁰⁵³ These dynamisms must be integrated. John Paul II says that the

¹⁰⁴⁵ cf. PA, 239.

¹⁰⁴⁶ PA, 240.

¹⁰⁴⁷ cf. TOB 108:3.

¹⁰⁴⁸ cf. TOB 14:3.

¹⁰⁴⁹ PA, 220.

¹⁰⁵⁰ cf. PA, 238.

¹⁰⁵¹ PA, 227.

¹⁰⁵² cf. PA, 246.

¹⁰⁵³ TOB 129:4.

freedom of the gift “presupposes that one is able to direct sensual and emotive reactions in order to allow the *gift of self...on the basis of the mature possession* of one’s own ‘I’ in its bodily and emotive subjectivity.”¹⁰⁵⁴ The gift of self is dependent on self-possession, is dependent on the integration of psychosomatic dynamisms on the level of the person.

John Paul II defines the pastoral concern of *Humanae Vitae* to be about “the *true good of man*,”¹⁰⁵⁵ the “authentic development of the human person.”¹⁰⁵⁶ The pastoral concern at work in the *Theology of the Body* is the concern of being a human person individually and in community, especially through the gift of self that creates the communion of persons. Wojtyła concludes *Person and Act* with a sketch of interpersonal participation. Wojtyła says, “The ability to share in the *humanness itself of every man is the very core of all participation and the condition of the personalistic value of all acting and existing ‘together with others.’*”¹⁰⁵⁷ Wojtyła’s description in *Person and Act* shows that authentically human action increases the psychosomatic spiritual unity of the human person, and action, together with others, “serves the fulfillment of persons in *any community* in which they act and exist.”¹⁰⁵⁸ The communion of persons of the man and the woman in marriage, their true good, is built upon each performing authentically human action.

B. *Theology of the Body and Love and Responsibility*

As an analysis of interpersonal relationships, *Love and Responsibility* has clear connections with the *Theology of the Body* and its hermeneutics of the gift.¹⁰⁵⁹

¹⁰⁵⁴ TOB 130:4.

¹⁰⁵⁵ TOB 120:6.

¹⁰⁵⁶ TOB 133:3.

¹⁰⁵⁷ PA, 295.

¹⁰⁵⁸ PA, 295.

¹⁰⁵⁹ cf. TOB 13:2. John Paul II introduced the hermeneutics of the gift as part of his evaluation of Matt. 19:3-9.

1. The Communion of Persons

The words of *Gaudium et Spes* 24 highlight the essential human actions in a *communio personarum*: giving and receiving. Wojtyła also notes the same in *Love and Responsibility*.¹⁰⁶⁰ The disinterested gift of self can only be given if the person is in self-possession. From the perspective of the same individual, receiving is the reception of the other—the affirmation of the other—which is the recognition that the other is a subject, not an object. That affirmation likewise is possible only with self-possession, which has integrated the psychosomatic dynamisms, which otherwise if yielded to, would reduce the other to an object of use. Because of the same self-possession required for self-gift and affirmation, John Paul II says that the actions are the same, that is, “the very act of giving becomes acceptance, and acceptance transforms itself into giving.”¹⁰⁶¹ Wojtyła says the same, when he says that that in the mystery of reciprocity “acceptance must also be giving, and giving receiving.”¹⁰⁶² The act of self-determination, made in full self-possession, then, is the gift of self, named by the Council, which include receiving. In terms of *Love and Responsibility*, which does not contain the phrase communion of persons, giving and receiving are contained in the response of love to the other. Wojtyła says the proper and adequate response of love to a person is found in the “affirmation of the value of the person.”¹⁰⁶³

John Paul II says that the spousal meaning of the body (cf. Gen. 2:23-25) is revealed in the necessary gift of self,¹⁰⁶⁴ which is the response of love. If human love has its paradigm in the love of husband and wife, then, the necessary response of love informs the person of the spousal

¹⁰⁶⁰ cf. LR, 129: “Betrothed love comprises on the one hand the gift of the person, and on the other hand, acceptance of that gift.”

¹⁰⁶¹ TOB 17:4.

¹⁰⁶² LR, 129.

¹⁰⁶³ LR, 121.

¹⁰⁶⁴ cf. TOB 15:5.

meaning of the body. *Person and Act* notes an ethical ramification of the act of self-determination and its opposite.¹⁰⁶⁵ *Love and Responsibility* would underscore the ethical obligation of self-gift and the affirmation of the other through the personalistic norm, which is connected to, if not synonymous with, the ethos of the gift.¹⁰⁶⁶ In considering love as goodwill, Wojtyła says goodwill longs for that which is good for the other.¹⁰⁶⁷ To find oneself, in the words of the Council, is found in the reciprocal relationship of self-gift, is found in being for another.

2. Concupiscence and Shame

With original sin, the ability to live the world as a gift was impaired (cf. Gen. 3:15-19). John Paul II notes that an authentic communion of persons “*is replaced by a different mutual relationship, namely, by a relationship of possession of the other as an object of one’s own desire,*”¹⁰⁶⁸ an object which can be used.¹⁰⁶⁹

The anthropological need and the ethical obligation to give a disinterested gift of self remains, even after original sin. That is, the obligation of the personalistic norm can be discovered, even outside of theology. Significantly, not only the need and the obligation remain, but the human ability to give a sincere gift of self also remains. The power of freedom is the confirmation that authentically human acts are possible.

Freedom is aided by the positive meaning of shame. John Paul II says: “Shame has a twofold meaning: it indicates the threat to the value and at the same time it preserves this

¹⁰⁶⁵ PA, 322.

¹⁰⁶⁶ cf. TOB 19:2.

¹⁰⁶⁷ LR, 83.

¹⁰⁶⁸ TOB 31:3.

¹⁰⁶⁹ cf. TOB 33:4.

value.”¹⁰⁷⁰ Shame opens avenues to establishing a sincere mutual gift of self. Shame ensures that the mutual self-donation is sincere. Wojtyła says, “shame is a natural *form of self-defence for the person* against the danger of descending or being pushed into the position of an object for sexual use.”¹⁰⁷¹ In a relationship of love, shame does not serve as a permanent wall of defense. It is a temporary one to ensure that the gift of self and the affirmation of the other is sincere.¹⁰⁷²

Not yielding to psychosomatic dynamisms can be an intense challenge. The task is difficult. The pope notes: “The spousal meaning of the body has not become totally foreign to that heart: *it has not been totally suffocated in it by concupiscence, but only habitually threatened.* The ‘heart’ has become a battlefield between love and concupiscence.”¹⁰⁷³ The difficult task that occurs between the conflict of love and concupiscence is a life-long task. Wojtyła writes, “the integration of the acting person is a task that lasts until the end of a man’s life.”¹⁰⁷⁴ He continues, “Love should be seen as something which in a sense never ‘is’ but is always only ‘becoming.’”¹⁰⁷⁵

4. Justice to the Creator

In the *Theology of the Body*, John Paul II grounds the practice of celibacy in Christ’s revelation of the Resurrection: the renunciation of marriage for the sake of the kingdom of heaven (Matt. 22:24-30, Mk. 12:18-27, Lk. 20:27-40). Celibacy is a response in love to God.¹⁰⁷⁶ In *Love and Responsibility*, Wojtyła says that virginity is “*conjugal love pledged to God*

¹⁰⁷⁰ TOB 28:6.

¹⁰⁷¹ LR, 182.

¹⁰⁷² LR, 187. cf. TOB 12:1.

¹⁰⁷³ TOB 32:3.

¹⁰⁷⁴ PA, 253.

¹⁰⁷⁵ LR, 139. cf. TOB 10:5.

¹⁰⁷⁶ cf. TOB 79:9.

*Himself*¹⁰⁷⁷ and is “the self-giving of a human person wedded to God Himself,” which anticipates eternal union with God.¹⁰⁷⁸ The Catecheses take up this assertion in a thematic way further adding the element of God’s self-gift to the human person,¹⁰⁷⁹ while *Love and Responsibility* thematically takes up the question of justice to the Creator.

Wojtyła briefly states that marriage obscurely points to love of a personal God.¹⁰⁸⁰ But, the primary focus on marriage in *Love and Responsibility* is on justice to the Creator. Wojtyła says, “*Man can only be just to God the Creator if he loves his fellows.* This principle has a special relevance to the conjugal and sexual life of men and women. ...It is impossible for a man and a woman to behave justly towards God the Creator if their treatment of each other falls short of the demands of the personalistic norm.”¹⁰⁸¹

In the *Theology of the Body*, justice is fulfilled in Christ. The pope says: “It is precisely in this man, in his ‘heart’ and thus in all his behavior, that the redemption of Christ bears fruit, thanks to the powers of the Spirit that bring about ‘justification,’ that is, that cause justice to ‘abound’ in man, as the Sermon on the Mount insistently teaches (Mt 5:20), that is, to ‘abound’ in the measure God himself wills and expects.”¹⁰⁸² Through Christ, justice to the Creator is given and is fulfilled.

5. The Sacrament of Marriage and *Humanae Vitae*

The particular struggle of each person to give a sincere gift of self is a major focus in the *Theology of the Body* (cf. Gen. 3:15-19).

¹⁰⁷⁷ LR, 251.

¹⁰⁷⁸ LR, 255.

¹⁰⁷⁹ cf. TOB 79:9.

¹⁰⁸⁰ LR, 254.

¹⁰⁸¹ LR, 247.

¹⁰⁸² TOB 52:1.

Among the reasons given for the Church's rejection of contraception, the Catecheses assert that the error of contraception is that their use is based upon a failure to make a sincere self-gift. It is based on an anthropology that defines the person in some way as not free, in some way as governed by concupiscence. John Paul II says: "Concupiscence...attacks precisely this 'sincere gift': *it deprives man...of the dignity of the gift...*and in some sense 'depersonalizes' *man, making him an object 'for the other.'*"¹⁰⁸³ Even if the use of contraception does not necessarily imply the use of the other person, the one is already defined as not free, not fully capable of authentic human acts, as an object. John Paul II says: "This extension of the sphere of the means of 'the domination...of the forces of nature' threatens the human person for whom the method of 'self-mastery' is and remains specific. It...*breaks* the constitutive dimension of the person, deprives man of the subjectivity proper to him, and turns him into *an object of manipulation.*"¹⁰⁸⁴ In *Person and Act*, Wojtyła says, "the 'personalistic' value is prior to and conditions any ethical values."¹⁰⁸⁵ In *Love and Responsibility*, Wojtyła says: "*Man is by nature capable of rising above instinct in his actions. ...If it were otherwise, morality would have no meaning.*"¹⁰⁸⁶ Moreover, Wojtyła says that the person "as such must be the real object of choice, not values associated with that person, irrelevant to his or her intrinsic value."¹⁰⁸⁷ In the end, contraception depersonalizes both the man and the woman. By not directing the sensual and emotive reaction in freedom, the use of contraception reduces both the husband and the wife to an object.

John Paul II also notes that the sincere gift of self is accompanied by an intense joy, a joy that is rooted in a mutual integration of the psychosomatic dynamism (cf. Gen. 2:23-25). In a

¹⁰⁸³ TOB 32:4.

¹⁰⁸⁴ TOB 123:1.

¹⁰⁸⁵ PA, 265.

¹⁰⁸⁶ LR, 46.

¹⁰⁸⁷ LR, 133.

first step towards that joy, Wojtyła says, “Indeed, self-determination...often require[s] that action be taken in the name of *bare truth* about good, in the name of values that are not felt. It may even require that action be taken against one’s actual feelings.”¹⁰⁸⁸ When self-determination is made as an act of freedom, not by the psychosomatic dynamism, when the gift of self is sincere, then, an act of true love can be made. Wojtyła says:

True love, a love that is internally complete, is one in which we choose the person for the sake of the person,—that in which a man chooses a woman or a woman chooses a man not just as a sexual ‘partner’ but as the person on whom to bestow the gift of his or her own life.¹⁰⁸⁹

In this case, the sincere gift of self, carries with it, in the words of Wojtyła, “the particular richness, variety and intensity of those emotional-affective experiences and states which occur when the object of activity is a person of the opposite sex.”¹⁰⁹⁰ The integration of the psychosomatic dynamism on the level of the person, in a mutual gift of self, again Wojtyła, is accompanied by “sensual satisfaction, or emotional contentment, or a profound, a total joy.”¹⁰⁹¹

In the *Theology of the Body*, the concern for the love between husband and wife is central and can be seen as a particular application of the Gospel command to love. In this way, the command to love is a unifying thread that runs through the philosophical works of Wojtyła and the *Theology of the Body*.

V. Characteristics of an Adequate Anthropology

A primary purpose of the *Theology of the Body* is to present the foundation of an adequate anthropology. The intersection of the philosophical anthropology of Wojtyła with the

¹⁰⁸⁸ PA, 233.

¹⁰⁸⁹ LR, 134.

¹⁰⁹⁰ LR, 32.

¹⁰⁹¹ LR, 32.

Theology of the Body reveals John Paul II's contribution to achieving that purpose through the unique aspects of his theological anthropology.

A. Incommunicability and Communion

In the philosophical anthropology of Wojtyła, a fundamental principle is that the human person is incommunicable. In *Person and Act*, he says that incommunicability is expressed as self-determination.¹⁰⁹² No one can act, from the inside, for another person. Participation by intersubjectivity creates a unity between persons. Wojtyła says: “The ability to share in the *humanness itself of every man is the very core of all participation and the condition of the personalistic value of all acting and existing ‘together with others.’*”¹⁰⁹³ In *Love and Responsibility*, Wojtyła affirms that, while incommunicability is certain, a unity can be created. Wojtyła says, “what is impossible and illegitimate in the natural order...can come about in the order of love and in the moral sense. In this sense, one person can give himself or herself, can surrender entirely to another, whether to a human person or to God, and such a giving of the self creates a special form of love which we define as betrothed love.”¹⁰⁹⁴ Concerning betrothed love, Wojtyła talks about the “law of *ekstasis*,” where “the lover ‘goes outside’ the self to find a fuller existence in another.”¹⁰⁹⁵ In a moral unity, Wojtyła admits of a unity of persons.¹⁰⁹⁶

In the *Theology of the Body*, however, the union of the husband and wife is spoken of in terms of communion, a communion that is in the image of the communion of Divine Persons (cf. *Gaudium et Spes* 24). The mutual, continual giving and receiving of the man and the woman creates a union of persons. The mystery of creation and the mystery of redemption creates a

¹⁰⁹² PA, 107.

¹⁰⁹³ PA, 295.

¹⁰⁹⁴ LR, 96.

¹⁰⁹⁵ LR, 125.

¹⁰⁹⁶ Moreover, John Paul II speaks of a moral unity in TOB 117:4.

communio personarum that is more than acting together or a moral unity. The spiritualization of the human person in the resurrection, which creates the communion of saints, is anticipated through grace in interpersonal relationships in this life.¹⁰⁹⁷ The communion of persons in marriage is created by God that in some way crosses the threshold of incommunicability.

The works of Wojtyła and of John Paul II are careful not to state the intellectual absurdity that somehow someone becomes able to act for another from the inside. Yet the alienation of incommunicability is able to be overcome in a real way. Wojtyła asserts: “Numerically and psychologically, there are two loves, but these two separate psychological facts combine to create a single objective whole.”¹⁰⁹⁸ Theologically, this overcoming of the separation is called a communion of persons.

B. Psychosomatic Spiritual Unity

Usually, philosophical and theological anthropologies discuss the human person in terms of body and soul. Even Wojtyła acknowledges the human person in this way. Nevertheless, Wojtyła has a very robust understanding of the body, speaking of it as a psychosomatic dynamism. In *Person and Act*, he goes into great detail concerning the psychic level and the somatic level of the person. *Love and Responsibility* likewise speaks of the unique workings of the psychical and somatic elements in the human person, especially in a relationship of love. In the *Theology of the Body*, John Paul II often refers to the psychosomatic element of the human person in way that is consonant with the insights of Wojtyła.

Even if the phenomenological insights and articulations do not challenge a hylomorphic metaphysical understanding of the human person, any evaluation of John Paul II needs to

¹⁰⁹⁷ cf. TOB 68:4.

¹⁰⁹⁸ LR, 84.

account for the various levels and dynamisms of the psychosomatic spiritual unity of the human person. An adequate anthropology cannot speak with less detail.

C. Male and Female

Anthropology is concerned with the human person. Usually, the human person is a concept that can and must be spoken about irrespective of existence as a male or a female. Neither the male, nor the female is anything other than a human person. Discussions of dignity and of the relation of the body and soul, for example, are spoken of about every human person equally.

In *Person and Act*, gender has no significant presence in the discussion of integrating the psychosomatic dynamism on the level of the person. In *Love and Responsibility*, the personalistic norm applies to men and women equally. Wojtyła makes some particular comments about moral concerns for men and for women, separately. Yet these distinctions do not enter the discussion in a way that would define their humanity differently.

In the *Theology of the Body*, John Paul II asserts clearly that the man and the woman share in somatic homogeneity. They are equally human persons.

At the same time, John Paul II acknowledges their somatic heterogeneity. On one hand this is a fact of creation: “male and female he created” (Genesis 1:27). The simultaneous creation underscores the communion of persons that is both a given and a responsibility of the human person, especially in the case of marriage. On the other hand, John Paul II implies a theological meaning to the creation of the human person as male and female.¹⁰⁹⁹ The fundamental human acts in a *communio personarum*, as an image of God, are giving and receiving. John Paul II never says, explicitly, what seems apparent here: the male and

¹⁰⁹⁹ cf. TOB 14:4.

masculinity embodies giving, the female and femininity embodies receiving. John Paul II is sure to not make such an explicit statement, lest it be taken out of context and overextended. In their shared humanity, the ability and the responsibility of the sincere self-donation and affirmation of the other is shared equally by the man and the woman. John Paul II asserts the complementarity of male and female, of masculinity and femininity, while likewise asserting their shared humanity.¹¹⁰⁰

In the mystery of creation, the human person existing as male and female is a fundamental revelation that, at the minimum, manifests the spousal meaning of the body,¹¹⁰¹ even if that meaning undergoes distortions.¹¹⁰²

Given Wojtyła's attention to the relationship of man and woman, of husband and wife—philosophically, theologically, and artistically—given the centrality of the same relationship in the *Theology of the Body*, an adequate anthropology, and its ethical implications, must have some awareness of the mystery of creation.

D. *Theology of the Body* and *Gaudium et Spes*

The theological anthropology of the *Theology of the Body* is not the same as the philosophical anthropology of Wojtyła. The content of the Catecheses goes beyond the content of *Person and Act* and *Love and Responsibility*. *Gaudium et Spes* offers an understanding of the human person that John Paul II incorporates into his theological anthropology. Two main characteristics of the theological anthropology of the *Theology of the Body* are an understanding of the human person, especially a communion of persons, as in the image of God, and as in a relationship with God.

¹¹⁰⁰ cf. TOB 10:1. Wojtyła also speaks of complementarity, cf. LR, 48.

¹¹⁰¹ cf. TOB 15:1.

¹¹⁰² TOB 15:5.

Gaudium et Spes 24 asserts that there is a likeness between the communion of the Divine Persons and a communion of human persons. A sincere mutual gift of self, a communion of persons, is in the image of the Trinity. John Paul II articulates this likeness with his focus on the primordial sacrament of the communion of persons of the husband and wife. A fundamental theme of the *Theology of the Body* is that the *communio personarum* of the husband wife is in the image of God.

Another point asserted by *Gaudium et Spes* 24 is that the human person is created by God for one's own sake. John Paul II articulates that this is a creation out of love and is an invitation to respond in love.¹¹⁰³ While the major content of the Catecheses focuses on interpersonal human love, John Paul II includes an understanding of a relationship with God as part of his theological anthropology. As the *Theology of the Body* unfolds, he notes the different aspects of a life in communion with God. John Paul II notes the relationship of God with the human person. He says that in Gen. 2, the human person is acknowledged as a “*partner of the Absolute*.”¹¹⁰⁴ He asserts that a life of virtue is a “*fruit of the human spirit permeated by the Spirit of God*.”¹¹⁰⁵ Those who choose celibacy for the sake of the Kingdom are in a relationship of love with God.¹¹⁰⁶ Those living the sacrament of marriage receive grace from God.¹¹⁰⁷ And the relationship with God reaches its fullness in the resurrection, in the experience of divinization, where the union with God “will thus be a *fruit of grace*, that is, *of God's self-communication in his very divinity*, not only to the soul, but *to the whole of man's psychosomatic subjectivity*.”¹¹⁰⁸

¹¹⁰³ cf. TOB 13:4.

¹¹⁰⁴ TOB 6:2.

¹¹⁰⁵ TOB 51:6.

¹¹⁰⁶ cf. TOB 84:1.

¹¹⁰⁷ cf. TOB 126:5.

¹¹⁰⁸ TOB 67:3.

John Paul II roots his understanding that a relationship with God is part of a theological anthropology in the words of the Council, which says that Jesus Christ reveals the human person to oneself (cf. *Gaudium et Spes* 22).

For John Paul II, an adequate anthropology is one that includes “vistas that are closed to human reason” (*Gaudium et Spes* 24).

VI. *Theology of the Body* and Rhapsody

If John Paul II jettisoned the role of philosopher in assuming the role of pontiff, he did not jettison the role of poet. He acted in that role in presenting the *Theology of the Body*.

The anthropology and ethics of the *Theology of the Body* are concentrated on the inner experience of the human person, even when considering an act of horizontal transcendence.¹¹⁰⁹

The seemingly intransitive character of this analysis can obscure the great drama of the formation of a sincere gift of self, of which the pope is conveying. It is a drama that is further explicated by considering the works of Wojtyła, especially when he says: “Love is certainly a drama.... Thus, the ‘*dramatis personae*’ discover the plot of this drama in themselves, perceive their love as a psychological situation unique of its kind, and one of great and absorbing importance in their inner lives.”¹¹¹⁰

Understanding love in this way also leads John Paul II to use language from artistic, and non-technical, expressions. Philosophical thought, i.e. human reason, along with the philosophical language, and human language in general, all reach a limit in their ability to convey the intensity of love. Artistic expression is more able to capture the immensity of the drama that takes place within the human person. For the *Theology of the Body*, Scripture is the

¹¹⁰⁹ cf. PA, 150.

¹¹¹⁰ LR, 114.

preeminent expression that can transcend the limits of human language, as it reveals the meaning of human experience.

In coming to understand the *Theology of the Body* and its treatment of biblical texts, it is worth noting a similarity with the artistic work of Wojtyła. In his plays, *Job* and *Jeremiah*, Wojtyła does not present a systematic analysis of the biblical books. Instead, he presents inner experiences of the title characters as the drama unfolds. As an example from Wojtyła's poetry, *Thought—Strange Space* considers the experience of Jacob. Wojtyła links the wrestling with God of Jacob (cf. Gen. 32:22-32) with the wrestling of finding adequate words to express truth.¹¹¹¹ On one hand, these artistic examples show the freedom with which Wojtyła analyses biblical texts—making connections based on the inner experience of the person. On the other hand, *Thought—Strange Space* names an explicit recognition of the limits of speech to express the deepest truths, especially about the human person.

This same free approach to a text can be seen in Wojtyła's dissertation on St. John of the Cross.¹¹¹² And it can be seen in the way that Wojtyła presents the works of Vatican II in *Sources of Renewal*. Again, he was not concerned with a systematic presentation of the various texts but reworked them according to themes for his diocese. With regard to the *Theology of the Body*, the last section on *Humanae Vitae* is likewise an example of allowing inner experience to dictate how a text is presented and analyzed. Borrowing from Rice, the *Theology of the Body* is synopsis.

Finally, the rhapsodic approach to material is seen in the way that John Paul II presents the biblical texts in the *Theology of the Body*. The ensemble of biblical texts, find their connection one to the other according to the question of the love of husband and wife in

¹¹¹¹ Wojtyła, *The Place Within*, 53.

¹¹¹² cf. Wojtyła, *Faith According to St. John of the Cross*. One example that illustrates this point is found on page 188, when Wojtyła is discussing the dark night of the soul, and pulls together about five disparate citations.

marriage, over and above the more obvious connection of Gen. 2:24 that can be found throughout the analyses. Matt. 19:5 and Eph. 5:31, for example, make explicit reference to Gen. 2:24. However, through his rhapsodic reading of Scripture, John Paul II underscores the connection of the inner experience of the biblical figures of these biblical passages, rather than the explicit intertextual citation.

Scripture itself justifies such a reading. John Paul II says that the second creation account has a mythic character.¹¹¹³ He says that Eph. 5:21-33 is centered around a metaphor.¹¹¹⁴ He notes that the Song of Songs is a poem.¹¹¹⁵ And the passage from Tobit that he discusses is a prayer.¹¹¹⁶

In at least these inclusions of biblical citations in the *Theology of the Body*, John Paul II chose texts that were artistic and rhapsodic of some form. He chose biblical passages that in their literary form go beyond the limits of human expression. Regarding artistic expression, Wojtyła says: “As in life, the word can appear as an integral part of action, movement, and gesture, inseparable from all human practical activity; or it can appear as ‘song’—separate, independent, intended only to contain and express thought, to embrace and transmit a vision of the mind.”¹¹¹⁷

As song, as rhapsody, Scripture transmits the full depth of the theology of the body. The richness of inner experience requires non-technical language. The world of inner experience needs words that cannot come from philosophical reflection. Scripture further adds the dimension of mystery, as an expression of divine revelation.

¹¹¹³ cf. TOB 3:1.

¹¹¹⁴ cf. TOB 87:3.

¹¹¹⁵ cf. TOB 108:4.

¹¹¹⁶ cf. TOB 115:3.

¹¹¹⁷ Wojtyła, *The Collected Plays and Writings on Theater*, 372.

VII. Conclusion

Throughout his academic career, Wojtyła encountered many anthropologies, but he was not entirely satisfied with many of the answers that he found. With a metaphysical anthropology he saw a lack in the details offered by a phenomenological description of the experience of the human person. With a phenomenological description of a person's experience, especially one's inner experience, he saw an inability to describe parts of the human person that go beyond experience, especially the spiritual element of the human person. With a socio-political anthropology, especially as articulated by the ruling parties of Poland during his lifetime, he saw a failure to acknowledge the whole human person—body, soul, and spirit—in the governing policies. Given his dissatisfaction with these other anthropologies, John Paul II offers his own, as a contribution towards an adequate anthropology.

As my above analysis shows, it is fruitful to compare the philosophical anthropology of Wojtyła with the *Theology of the Body*, especially as it assists in developing the philosophical exegesis of the Catecheses. This sort of analysis bears the fruit of revealing the Wojtyłan language and concepts that are at work in the Catecheses. More detail is given to the various passages and phrases of the *Theology of the Body* than to what can already be seen taken on their own. Such analysis shows the deep, consistent continuity of thought in the man who became pope with the academic work he did before his papal election. Through his analysis of inner human experience his thought consistently focused on the conditions necessary for the establishment and the maintenance of interpersonal communion.

The assertion of the continuity of thought in John Paul II, however, does not fully answer the apparent delineation that he maintained between his writings as pope and his pre-papal writings. As noted before, after his papal election, John Paul II did not intervene in any of the

work on his philosophical writings (e.g. the translation of *Person and Act*). Despite the major part of the Catecheses having come from a complete pre-papal manuscript, its existence was acknowledged only decades after the conclusion of the series—with the insistence that the Italian text is the authoritative text. It seems that for John Paul II ascribing a discontinuity between Wojtyła and the Pope is appropriate, which underscores the distinction that can be made between philosophical and theological anthropology.

For John Paul II, an adequate anthropology is one that recognizes and struggles with the limits of human ability to convey a theological anthropology. The major distinction between the anthropology of Wojtyła and the anthropology of the *Theology of the Body* is revelation. An adequate anthropology is one that incorporates both faith and reason, one that incorporates conclusions from both philosophical thought and biblical interpretation. By focusing on a revelation and a relationship that goes beyond philosophy, the theological anthropology of the Catecheses forms the basis of an adequate anthropology. From this perspective, for John Paul II, in the Church, an anthropology must be a theological anthropology. An adequate anthropology, examined by theologians and part of catechetical pedagogy, is one that takes Christian revelation into account.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Anselm Academic Study Bible: New American Bible Revised Edition. Winona, MN: Christian Brothers Publications, 2013.

Catechism of the Catholic Church. https://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/_INDEX.HTM.

Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. *On the Collaboration of Men and Women in the Church and in the World*. Vatican City State: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2004.

Curran, Charles. *The Moral Theology of John Paul II*. New York: T&T Clark, 2006.

Echeverria, Eduardo. *"In the Beginning...": A Theology of the Body*. Eugene, Oregon: Pickwick Publications, 2011.

Fedoryka, Damian. "The Gift of *Veritatis Splendor*", in *Social Justice Review* 85 (1994): 140-150.

Gneuchs, Geoffrey, ed. *The Legacy of Pope John Paul II: His Contribution to Catholic Thought*. New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 2000.

John Paul II. *Christifideles Laici*. Vatican City State: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1988.

---. *Evangelium Vitae*. Vatican City State: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1995.

---. *Faith According to St. John of the Cross*. Translated by Jordan Aumann. Eugene, Oregon: Wipf & Stock, 2009.

---. *Familiaris Consortio*. Vatican City State: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1981.

---. *Fides et Ratio*. Vatican City State: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1998.

---. *Gift and Mystery: On the Fiftieth Anniversary of My Priestly Ordination*. New York: Doubleday, 1996.

---. *Gratissimam Sane*. Vatican City State: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1994.

---. *Maestro en La Fe*. Vatican City State: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1990.

---. *Man and Woman He Created Them: A Theology of the Body*. Translated by Michael Waldstein. Boston: Pauline Books & Media, 2006.

---. *Mulieris Dignitatem*. Vatican City State: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1988.

---. *Redemptor Hominis*. Vatican City State: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1979.

- . *Roman Triptych: Meditations*. Translated by Jerzy Peterkiewicz. Vatican City State: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2003.
- . *Salvifici Doloris*. Vatican City State: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1984.
- . *The Theology of the Body*. Boston: Pauline Books & Media, 1997.
- Johnson, Luke Timothy. "A Disembodied 'Theology of the Body': John Paul II on Love, Sex, and Pleasure." *Commonweal* 128.2 (2001): 11-17
- . *The Revelatory Body: Theology as Inductive Art*. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2015. Kindle Edition.
- Klofft, Christopher. *Image and Imago: A Rational Defense of a Theological Anthropology of Gender, Studia Gilsoniana*. (2014): 523-535.
- Kupczak, Jarosław. *Destined for Liberty: The Human Person in the Philosophy of Karol Wojtyła/John Paul II*. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2000.
- . *Gift and Communion*. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2014.
- Kurz, William. "The Scriptural Foundations of *The Theology of the Body*." *Pope John Paul II on the Body: Human, Eucharistic, Ecclesial*. Editor: Avery Dulles. Philadelphia: St. Joseph's University Press, 2007: 27-46.
- Mannion, Gerard, ed. *The Vision of John Paul II: Assessing His Thought and Influence*. Collegeville, Minnesota: Liturgical Press, 2008.
- McLean, George, ed. *Karol Wojtyła's Philosophical Legacy*. Washington, D.C.: The Council for Research on Values and Philosophy, 2008.
- Moran, Dermot. *Introduction to Phenomenology*. New York: Routledge, 2000.
- Oddie, William, ed. *John Paul the Great: Maker of the Post-Conciliar Church*. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2005.
- Paul VI. *Humanae Vitae*. Vatican City State: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1968.
- Ross, Susan. "Male and Female, God Created Them: Rethinking John Paul II's Theology of the Body." *U.S. Catholic* (September 2005): 29-33.
- Schmitz, Kenneth. *At the Center of the Human Drama: The Philosophical Anthropology of Karol Wojtyła/Pope John Paul II*. Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1993.

- Shivanandan, Mary. *Crossing the Threshold of Love*. Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2005.
- Sokolowski, Robert. "God's Word and Human Speech." *Nova et Vetera*, English Edition 11, no. 1 (2013): 187-210.
- Spinello, Richard. *The Genius of John Paul II: The Great Pope's Moral Wisdom*. Lanham, Maryland: Sheed & Ward, 2007.
- Tóth, Beáta. "Love Between Embodiment and Spirituality: Jean-Luc Marion and John Paul II on Erotic Love." *Modern Theology* 29, no. 1 (2013): 18-47.
- Tranzillo, Jeffrey. *John Paul II on the Vulnerable*. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2013.
- Vatican II. *Apostolicam Actuositatem*.
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decree_19651118_apostolicam-actuositatem_en.html.
- . *Dei Verbum*.
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_const_19651118_dei-verbum_en.html.
- . *Gaudium et Spes*.
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_cons_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html.
- . *Gravissimum Educationis*.
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651028_gravissimum-educationis_en.html.
- . *Lumen Gentium*.
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_const_19641121_lumen-gentium_en.html.
- . *Sacrosanctum Concilium*.
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_const_19631204_sacrosanctum-concilium_en.html.
- Weigel, George. *Witness to Hope*. New York: Harper Perennial, 2005.
- West, Christopher. *Theology of the Body Explained: A Commentary on John Paul II's "Gospel of the Body"*. Boston: Pauline Books & Media, 2003.
- Williams, George. *The Mind of John Paul II: Origins of His Thought and Action*. New York: Seabury Press, 1981.

- Woelkers, Mary Angela. *Freedom for Responsibility: Responsibility and Human Nature in the Philosophical Anthropology of Karol Wojtyła*, *Studia Gilsoniana* 5:4 (2016): 633-647.
- Wojtyła, Karol. *The Acting Person*. Translated by Andrzej Potocki. Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979.
- . *The Collected Plays and Writings on Theater*. Translated by Boleslaw Taborski. Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1987.
- . *The Jeweler's Shop*. Translated by Boleslaw Taborski. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1992.
- . *Love and Responsibility*. Translated by H.T. Willetts. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993.
- . *Man in the Field of Responsibility*. Translated by Kenneth Kemp and Zuzanna Maślanka Kieroń. South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine's Press, 2011.
- . *Metafisica Della Persona*. G. Reale – T. Styczeń, ed., Bompiani, Città del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2003.
- . *Person and Community: Selected Essays*. Translated by Theresa Sandok. New York: Peter Lang, 1993.
- . *The Place Within: The Poetry of Pope John Paul II*. Translated by Jerzy Peterkiewicz. Vatican City State: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1982.
- . *Sources of Renewal: The Implementation of the Second Vatican Council*. Translated by P.S. Falla. San Francisco: Harper & Row Publishers, 1980.
- Woznicki, Andrew. *A Christian Humanism: Karol Wojtyła's Existential Personalism*. New Britain, Connecticut: Mariel Publications, 1980.
- Wright, William. "The Theology of Disclosure and Biblical Exegesis." *The Thomist* 70 (2006): 395-419.
- Zimmerman, Nigel. *Facing the Other: John Paul II, Levinas, and the Body*. Eugene, Oregon: Cascade Books, 2015.

APPENDIX

There are several notes to make concerning the numbering of the Catecheses.¹¹¹⁸

The *Theology of the Body* is the compilation of 135 Audiences.

The Addresses in Italian were compiled into one volume entitled *Uomo e donna lo creò* (UD), which gives the foundations of the numbering of the Audiences. 133 Audiences are numbered in the Italian volume. There are 134 Audiences included in UD. UD included one Audience as an appendix. Waldstein, in his volume, inserted that Audience into its proper place, numbering it TOB 95b.

Only 129 Audiences were delivered. UD contains the full text of TOB 108-116, even though when delivered these nine Audiences were shortened into four. UD includes TOB 117, which was not delivered, and does not include TOB 117b (according to Waldstein's numbering) which was delivered. TOB 95b and TOB 117b added to the 133 Audiences numbered in UD account for the 135 Audiences that form the *Theology of the Body*.

The above notes account for the Audience number. The paragraph numbers were inserted by John Paul II.

Not every Audience was included in the original Polish manuscript, for example TOB 10, TOB 23, TOB 133. The titles in brackets were not in the Polish manuscript and are supplied by Waldstein.

I have included here all of the headings and sub-headings of the *Theology of the Body* in one outline, which were not organized as such in *Man and Woman He Created Them*. I intend this synthetic outline to help the reader to appreciate in one glance the scope of the Catecheses.

¹¹¹⁸ cf. Waldstein, *Man and Woman He Created Them*, 5-11, 731-732. In these pages Waldstein explains in detail the indications that I note here.

Chapter 1: Christ Appeals to the “Beginning”	1-23
1. What Is Meant by “Beginning”?	1:1
Approaching Genesis	1:2
First Account of the Creation of Man	2:2
Second Account of the Creation of Man	3:1
The Perspective of the “Redemption of the Body” (Rom 8:23)	3:4
2. The Meaning of Original Solitude	5:1
A Twofold Context	5:2
Man on Search of His Essence	5:4
Solitude and Subjectivity	6:1
Solitude and the Meaning of the Body	6:3
The Alternative between Death and Immortality	7:3
3. The Meaning of Original Unity	8:1
The Unity of the Two	8:1
Dimensions of Homogeneity	8:4
“Communion of Persons”	9:2
“Flesh from my Flesh” (Gen 2:23)	9:4
The Unity of Becoming “One Flesh”	10:2
4. The Meaning of Original Nakedness	11:1
Introductory Observations about Genesis 2:25	11:1
Shame—A “Boundary” Experience	11:3
Attempted Reconstruction	12:1
Participation in the Visibility of the World	12:3
The Inner Dimension of Vision	12:4
Intimacy—The Hidden Meaning of Vision	13:1
5. Man in the Dimension of Gift	13:2
A. The Spousal Meaning of the Body	13:2
Creation as Giving	13:2
Giving and Man	13:4
Gift—Mystery of a Beatifying Beginning	14:2
Discovery of the “Spousal” Meaning of the Body	14:5
“Freedom of the Gift”—Foundation of the Spousal Meaning of the Body	15:1
The “Spousal Character” of the Body and the Revelation of the Person	15:3
The Spousal Meaning of the Body as the Fruit of Rootedness in Love	15:5
B. The Mystery of Original Innocence	16:3
Gift to the Human Heart	16:3
Original Innocence and Consciousness of the Spousal Meaning of the Body	16:4
Innocence at the Foundation of the Exchange of the Gift	17:1
Exchange of the Gift—Interpretation of Genesis 2:25	17:4
Theology of Original Innocence	18:1
The Root of the Ethos of the Human Body	18:4
The Foundation of the Primordial Sacrament—The Body as Sign	19:3
6. “Knowledge” and Procreation (Gen 4:1)	20:1
Between Poverty of Expression and Depth of Meaning	20:1
“Knowledge” as Personal Archetype	20:4
Fatherhood and Motherhood as the Human Meaning of “Knowledge”	21:2
Knowledge and Possession	21:7
Knowledge Stronger than Death	22:5
7. [Conclusion: An Integral Vision]	23:1

Chapter 2: Christ Appeals to the Human Heart	24-63
1. In the Light of the Sermon on the Mount	24:1
Matthew 5:27-28—"Whoever Looks to Desire..."	24:1
Matthew 5:27-28—Ethical Meaning	24:2
Matthew 5:27-28—Anthropological Meaning	24:4
Matthew 5:27-28 Indicates a Further Dimension	25:3
2. The Man of Concupiscence	26:1
A. The Meaning of Original Shame	26:4
Casting Doubt on the Gift	26:4
Man Alienated from Original Love	27:1
Change in the Meaning of Original Nakedness	27:3
"Immanent" Shame	28:1
Sexual Shame	28:4
B. Insatiability of the Union	29:1
Corruption of the Consciousness of the Unitive Meaning of the Body	29:1
A Deeper Dimension of Shame	29:4
The Meaning of "Insatiability of the Union"	30:5
Where Does the Insatiability of the Union Come From?	31:1
C. The Corruption of the Spousal Meaning of the Body	31:5
Meaning—"Measure of the Heart"	31:5
Threat Against the Expression of the Spirit in the Body	32:1
Loss of the Freedom of the Gift	32:4
The Inner Measure of Belonging	33:3
3. Commandment and Ethos	34:1
A. It Was Said, "Do Not Commit Adultery" (Mt 5:27)	35:1
The History of a People	35:1
Legislation	36:1
The Prophets	36:5
Covenant	37:3
B. "Whoever Looks to Desire..."	38:1
Shift in the Center of Gravity	38:1
The Wisdom Tradition	38:4
The Inner State of the Man of Concupiscence	39:1
Christ's Call to Halt at the Threshold of the Look	39:3
Concupiscence—Reduction of a Perennial Call	40:1
Concupiscence—"Communion" of Persons Versus "Urge" of Nature	41:2
C. "Has Committed Adultery in the Heart..."	42:1
A "Key" Change of Direction	42:1
A First Reading	42:5
A Second Reading	43:2
Purity of Heart as the Fulfillment of the Commandment	43:5
4. The "Heart"—Accused or Called?	44:1
A. Condemnation of the Body?	44:5
Manichaeism	44:5
The Correct Understanding	45:1
Anti-Value or Value not Sufficiently Appreciated?	45:4
B. The "Heart" Under Suspicion?	46:1
"Masters of Suspicion"	46:1
Essential Divergence	46:4

C. Eros and Ethos	47:1
Eros as the Source of the “Erotic”	47:1
Ethos as an Inner Power of Eros	47:4
The Problem of Erotic Spontaneity	48:1
5. The Ethos of the Redemption of the Body	49:1
6. Purity as “Life according to the Spirit”	50:1
“Purity” and “Heart”	50:1
“Body” and “Spirit” according to St. Paul	50:5
“Works of the Flesh” and “Fruit of the Spirit”	51:5
“Flesh” and “The Freedom for Which Christ Set Us Free”	52:4
Purity-“Keeping the Passions Away” or “Keeping the Body with Holiness and Reverence”?	53:4
Analysis of the Pauline “Description of the Body”	54:5
Purity as a Virtue and a Gift	56:2
Purity and Wisdom	57:4
7. The Gospel of the Purity of Heart—Yesterday and Today	58:1
Theology of the Body	58:1
Theology and Pedagogy	59:1
 Appendix: The Ethos of the Body in Art and Media	 60-63
 Chapter 3: Christ Appeals to the Resurrection	 64-85
1. The Resurrection of the Body as a Reality of the “Future World”	64:1
A. The Synoptics: “He is Not God of the Dead But of the Living”	64:1
The Third Part of the Triptych	64:1
Witness to the Power of the Living God	65:2
The New Meaning of the Body	66:1
Spiritualization	66:5
Divinization	67:3
B. Pauline Interpretation of the Resurrection in 1 Corinthians 15:42-49	70:1
Final Victory over Death	70:1
The First Adam and the Last Adam	70:5
2. Continenence for the Kingdom of Heaven	73:1
A. The Words of Christ in Matthew 19:11-12	73:1
Christ’s Word and the Rule for Understanding	73:1
Three Kinds of “Eunuchs”—Why?	74:1
Continenence for the Kingdom of Heaven and “Fruitfulness from the Spirit”	74:6
Change in Direction—Motivation “For the Kingdom of Heaven”	76:1
Continenence and Marriage—Vocation of “Historical” Man	77:1
Right Understanding of the “Superiority” of Continenence for the Kingdom of Heaven	77:5
Continenence for the Kingdom—Between Renunciation and Love	79:1
The Spousal Meaning of the Body as the Foundation of Christ’s Call to Continenence	80:2
Renunciation in the Service of Affirmation	81:3
B. Paul’s Understanding of the Relation between Virginity and Marriage (1Cor 7)	82:1
Christ’s Statement and the Teaching of the Apostles	82:1
Paul’s Argumentation	83:1
“Concupiscence” and “Gift from God”	84:8
 [Conclusion of Part 1: The Redemption of the Body]	 86:1

Part 2: The Sacrament

87-133

Chapter 1: The Dimension of Covenant and of Grace	87-102
1. Ephesians 5:21-33	87:1
A. Introduction and Connection	87:1
The Text of Ephesians 5:21-33	87:1
Ephesians 5:21-33 and Christ's Words	87:2
Ephesians 5:21-33—Two Meanings of "Body"	87:3
Does Ephesians 5:21-33 Speak about the Sacramentality of Marriage?	87:4
Sacrament and Body	87:5
Direction of the Following Analyses	87:6
B. Detailed Analysis	88:1
Ephesians 5:21-33 in the Context of Ephesians as a Whole	88:1
The Mystery of Christ and the Vocation of the Christian	88:2
The Atmosphere of the Christian Community's Life	88:3
Indications for the Community of the Family	88:4
The Spouses: "Reciprocally Subject in the Fear of Christ"	89:1
Analogy and Mystery (At the Foundation of the Sacramentality of Marriage)	89:5
An Additional Aspect of the Analogy—Head and Body	90:5
Two Subjects or One?	91:5
"...As Their Own Body" (Eph 5:28)	92:4
"This Mystery Is Great"	93:1
2. Sacrament and Mystery	94:1
The Mystery Hidden from Ages Revealed and Active in Christ	94:1
The Analogy of Spousal Love	94:6
Isaiah and Ephesians	95:4
The Reality of the Gift, The Meaning of Grace	95b:1
Marriage as the Primordial Sacrament	96:1
"The Sacrament of Redemption"	97:2
Marriage as Figure and as Sacrament of the New Covenant	98:1
The Sacraments of the Church	98:6
3. Sacrament and "Redemption of the Body"	99:4
A. The Gospel	99:4
The Words of Christ and the Mystery of Redemption	99:4
The Sacrament of Redemption and the Indissolubility of Marriage	99:6
Sacrament—Given as Grace and Assigned as an Ethos	100:5
Sacrament—Call to "Life according to the Spirit"	101:2
Sacrament and the Eschatological Hope of the "Redemption of the Body"	101:7
B. Ephesians	102:1
The Spousal and Redemptive Meaning of Love	102:1
Redemption of the Body and "The Sacrament of Man"	102:5

Chapter 2: The Dimension of Sign	103-117b
1. “Language of the Body” and the Reality of the Sign	103:1
The Marital Promise	103:1
“Prophetism of the Body”	104:1
“Language of the Body” Reread in the Truth	105:1
“Language of the Body” and the Concupiscence of the Flesh	106:1
“Language of the Body” and “Hermeneutics of the Sacrament”	107:3
2. The Song of Songs	108:1
Resuming Genesis: Wonder	108:1
“My Sister, My Bride”	109:3
“A Garden Closed, A Fountain Sealed”	110:5
Eros or Agape?	112:1
3. When the “Language of the Body” Becomes Language of the Liturgy (Reflections on Tobit)	114:1
The Marriage of Tobias and Sarah	114:1
Love as a Test	115:1
The Prayer of the New Spouses	116:1
When the Language of the Liturgy Becomes the “Language of the Body”	117:1
The Sacramental Sign—“ <i>Mysterium</i> ” and “Ethos”	117b:1
 Chapter 3: He Gave Them the Law of Life as Their Inheritance	 118-132
1. The Ethical Problem	118:1
The Moral Norm and the Truth of the “Language of the Body”	118:1
The Righteousness of the Norm and Its “Practicability”	119:3
Responsible Parenthood	120:6
The Truth of the “Language of the Body” and the Evil of Contraception	122:4
Ethical Regulation of Fertility (The Primacy of Virtue)	124:1
Ethical Regulation of Fertility: Person, Nature, and Method	125:1
2. Outline of Conjugal Spirituality	126:1
The Power that Flows from Sacramental “Consecration”	126:1
Analysis of the Virtue of Continence	127:4
Continence between “Arousal” and “Emotion”	129:2
The Gift of Reverence	131:1
 [Conclusion]	 133