Inner Song Phenomenological Description of a Musical Object of Phantasy

Ellen Moysan

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INNER SONG

PHENOMENOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION OF A MUSICAL OBJECT OF PHANTASY

A Dissertation

Submitted to the College of Liberal Arts

Duquesne University

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for

the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

By

Ellen Moysan

August 2022
INNER SONG

PHENOMENOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION OF A MUSICAL OBJECT OF PHANTASY

By

Ellen Moysan

Approved May 24th, 2022

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ABSTRACT

INNER SONG

PHENOMENOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION OF A MUSICAL OBJECT OF PHANTASY

By

Ellen Moysan

August 2022

Dissertation supervised by Professor Lanei Rodemeyer

This dissertation is the phenomenological description of a musical object of phantasy I call “inner song,” i.e., the music that the musician “sings in his or her head” while practicing his or her instrument. It describes the specific inner song of a single musician playing a melodic instrument, and rehearsing in a solipsistic situation. The description is based on three resources: my personal experience as a cellist; the third person experiences of other musicians I have interviewed on that topic since 2010; and the Husserlian corpus. Each chapter starts with excerpts of interviews focusing on specific aspects the inner song. Within each chapter, each section starts with a short, italicized description of my experience as a cellist. An introduction defines the terms and explains the methodology. The description unfolds in five chapters: first, it describes the double epoché through which the musician switches from the natural attitude into the
musician’s attitude, a form of phenomenological attitude; it then describes the presentification of the inner song in phantasy, and the presentation of the actual song in perception; thirdly, it explains the various layers of the embodied ego playing the musical instrument, perceiving the performance, and phantasizing the inner song; finally, the last two chapters describe the process of spatialization and temporalization of the inner song, as well as its unfolding in consciousness through the perception of its realization in performance. The conclusion opens research possibilities focusing on the inner song itself, or on using the inner song to explore consciousness.
DEDICATION

To all who could not live without music
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

My gratitude goes to my advisor Doctor Lanei Rodemeyer who helped me to refine my ideas, as well as my readers, the Professor Frederik Evans, Professor Jay Lampert, Professor Alessandro Bertinetto, Doctor Sacha Carlson and Doctor Jessica Wiskus who patiently read and commented on my work.

I am also grateful to two professors who crossed my path and encouraged me to pursue my original project and develop it. First, Doctor Daniel Selcer at Duquesne University who took me into this wonderful program giving me the chance to develop my education. Second, Professor Alexander Schnell at Paris-Sorbonne IV (now Professor at the Bergische Universität Wuppertal) who encouraged me to invest in research supporting my application for the Erasmus Mundus Program, supported my application for this PhD program at Duquesne University, gave me the opportunity to present my work at his seminar in Wuppertal in the Fall of 2020, and offered me his faithful support any time it was necessary; my gratitude is immense.

Finally, all my gratitude goes to two important figures of my intellectual formation that I had the chance to meet, who introduced me to and gave me a love for phenomenology: Professor Jean-Luc Chrétien (†) and Professor László Tengelyi (†).

In addition to my academic support, my deepest gratitude goes to each of the musicians who have agreed to engage with me in dialogue. First, to Michel Oriano, creator of the review “Le Violoncelle” who gave me the idea for the interviews when he interviewed me about my master’s project, and afterward put me in touch with Frédéric Borsarello and Xavier Gagnepain. Then to each of my interlocutors: Frédéric Borsarello,
Xavier Gagnepain, Claire Bernard, Anne-Marie Morin, Marguerite France (†), Madoka Sato, Roland Pidoux, Manuel Rocheman, Jean Fassina (†), Raphaël Pidoux, Xavier Phillips, Luigi Grasso, Massimo Paris, Alexandre Bénéteau, Jean-Philippe Vivier, Dagmar Ondracek, Olivier Calmel, Pascale Jaupart, Pietro Francesco Toffòleto, Antoine Tamestit, Camille Poupat, Jerôme Pernoo, Mavel d’Aviau, Martial Le Corre, Armand Amar, Giovanni Bertelli, Patrick Delabre, Vincent Segal, Nicolas Pfeiffer, Sarah Nemtanu, Yaron Herman, Edouart Oganessian, Yan Wagner, YOM, Joachim Govin, Zachary Smith, Philip Pandolfi, George Balderose, Jeff Turner, Lorna McGhee, Sylvia Kummer, Marylene Gingras-Roy, Reza Vali, Jesse Stiles, Marianne Dumas, Michael Crescanta, Yan-Pascal Tortelier, Maxime Tortelier, Stephen Ester, James Nova, David Sogg, Andrew Reemer, Eugene Forish, Stephen Nelly, Marcello Cormio, Robert Kirkman, Narek Hakhnazaryan, Vasileios Papadopoulos, Julius Kircher, Rémi Métral, Pedro Antonio Reyes Linares, Thierry Escaich, François Moysan, Aārp, Matteo Belli, István Fazakas, Stéphane Finetti, Paul Gossart, Emmanuel Boos, Florent Forestier, René Mogensen and Hugh Steinmetz. Each interview was a beautiful encounter during which a passionate conversation took place; each one constitutes a unique memory for which I am grateful.

Among all these musicians, I would like to single out a couple of them toward which I am particularly grateful: Frédéric Borsarello, the first musician I met who agreed to begin a very experimental project when I did not really have an accurate idea of what I was looking for; Xavier Gagnepain who spent three hours with me in 2010 to read my master’s thesis from the Sorbonne, page by page, patiently offering his critiques and allowing me to use his expression *chant intérieur* which became the phenomenological
concept that I have investigated in my dissertation; and Zachary Smith who I met on a snowy day with his French horn in the T in Pittsburgh and who put me in touch with his fabulous colleagues from the Pittsburgh Symphony Orchestra.

In addition to these musicians that I formally interviewed, I would like to also thank family members, friends and colleagues who agreed to answer my questions and share their experience of performing music… some of them for more than ten years, and more than regularly: my parents, my three brothers first, but then also Angel Alvarado Cabellos, Quddus Kamooshi, Seongkyeong Joung, and Simon Müller, as well as István Fazakas and Stéphane Finetti during hours-long discussions. Our conversations have had a real impact on my understanding of the inner song, I would not have written this dissertation without them.

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I would like to give a special thank Benoît Baron who has worked on the digital presentation of my project since 2013 (www.ellenmoysan.com), to Joel and Dana Boyer
who have proofread all my works in English, dissertation and interviews included, but also to Lorenza D’Angelo, Anna Kemper, Alessio Rotundo, and Matteo Belli who transcribed the other interviews into English or Italian.

Finally, my gratitude goes to those who have taught and immersed me in music: first and foremost my beloved maternal grand-father Tadcoz (†) who gave me the love for the cello, then, the delightful André Plouvier who had me as a seven years old child and taught me how embrace my instrument, Cécile Buffet who was there during my childhood and adolescence, and moreover Svetlana Kossyreva who helped me entirely rework my technique and taught me to listen to the inner song, an experience that changed my life and gave birth to this present work. In addition to them, I would like to thank Philippe Frémont who directed the choir of the Maîtrise of Chartres Cathedral and accepted me among the first girls, and finally Eugene Forish, a dear friend and teacher, who asked me to generously serve the community through my talents, helped me to blossom as a musician, giving me the opportunity to sing and play cello during the liturgies taking place in Duquesne University Chapel, and moreover, offered me the unique chance to participate to the ceremony in honor of the victims of the Pittsburgh Synagogue “The Tree of Life” in October 2018 by performing the Kol Nidrei with him. Performing the cello for this assembly in such a moving moment was a breakthrough which gave me forever the impulse to serve through music; I will never forget it.

I must close this section even if I could expand it much more. I have certainly forgotten some other important people, but I hope that they will forgive me.
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2011

None.

2012

- Interview with Claire Bernard, Violonist, (in French), 02.27.2012, Paris, FRANCE.
- Interview with Anne-Marie Morin, Violonist, (in French), 03.03.2012, Paris, FRANCE.
- Interview with Marguerite France, Violonist, (in French), 06.03.2012, Tokyo, JAPAN.
- Interview with Madoka Sato, Flutist, (in French), 07.08.2012, Yokohama, JAPAN.

**2013**

- Interview with Jean Fassina, Pianist, (in French), 02.11.2013, Paris, FRANCE.
- Interview with Raphaël Pidoux, Tenured Cello Professor at the Paris Conservatory, (in French), 02.11.2013, Paris, FRANCE.
- Interview with Luigi Grasso, Saxophonist Jazz, (in French), 02.15.2013, Paris, FRANCE.
- Interview with Massimo Paris, Violonist, (in Italian), 04.08.2013, Aachen, GERMANY.
- Interview with Alexandre Bénéteau, Composer, (in French), 04.14.2013, Chartres, FRANCE.
- Interview with Jean-Philippe Vivier, Clarinettist at the Orchestre Philharmonique du Luxembourg, (in French), 06.16.2013, Köln, GERMANY.

**2014**

- Interview with Dagmar Ondracek, (in French), 04.16.2014, Paris, FRANCE. (This was never completed because of a lack of time therefore it has not been included).
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- Interview with Pascale Jaupart, Cellist, (in French), 05.22.2014, Paris, FRANCE.

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2015

- Interview with Mavel d’Aviau, Folk musician from Brittany, (in French), 03.11.2015, Skype conference from Chartres, FRANCE.

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- Interview with Yaron Herman, Internationally Awarded Jazz Pianist, (in French), 06.09.2015, Paris, FRANCE.
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- Interview with Yan Wagner, Composer, (in French), 06.30.2015, Paris, FRANCE.
- Interview with YOM, Internationally Awarded World Music Clarinetist, (in French), 07.05.2015, Paris, FRANCE.

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- Interview with Zachary Smith, French Hornist at the Pittsburgh Symphony Orchestra, (in English), 01.20.2016, Pittsburgh, PA, USA.
- Interview Philip Pandolfi, Principal Oboist at the Pittsburgh Symphony Orchestra, (in English), 02.17.2016, Pittsburgh, PA, USA.

- Interview with George Balderose, Bagpiper, (in English), 03.25.2016, Pittsburgh, PA, USA.

- Interview with Jeff Turner, Principal Bassist at the Pittsburgh Symphony Orchestra (in English), 03.21.2016, Pittsburgh, PA, USA.

- Interview with Lorna McGhee, Principal Flutist at the Pittsburgh Symphony Orchestra, (in English), 04.02.2016, Pittsburgh, PA, USA.

- Interview with Sylvia Kummer, Singer (in German/French), 07.22.2016, Sonntagberg, AUSTRIA.

- Interview with Marylene Gingras-Roy, Violist at the Pittsburgh Symphony Orchestra (in French/English), 09.19.2016, Pittsburgh, PA, USA.

- Interview with Reza Vali, Composer, Faculty Member in the School of Music of Carnegie Mellon University (in English), 10.03.2016, Pittsburgh, PA, USA.

- Interview with Jesse Stiles, Composer, Professor at Carnegie Mellon University (in English), 10.26.2016, Pittsburgh, PA, USA.

- Interview with Marianne Dumas, Cellist, (in French), 11.07.2016, Pittsburgh, PA, USA.

2017

- Interview with Michael Crescanta, Violist (in English), 03.09.2017, Pittsburgh, PA, USA.
- Interview with Yan-Pascal Tortelier, Chief Conductor Iceland Symphony Orchestra, (in French), 03.19.2017, Pittsburgh, PA, USA.

- Interview with Maxime Tortelier, Associate Conductor of Bournemouth Symphony Orchestra, (in French), 07.06.2017, Paris, FRANCE.

2018

- Interview with Stephen Esper, Cantor at St George Orthodox Church, (in English), 01.17.2018, Pittsburgh, PA, USA.

- Interview with James Nova, Trombonist at the Pittsburgh Symphony Orchestra (in English), 03.10.2018, Pittsburgh, PA, USA.

2019

- Interview with David Sogg, Co-Principal Bassoon at the Pittsburgh Symphony Orchestra (in English), 01.31.2019, Pittsburgh, PA, USA.

- Interview with Andrew Reemer, Principal Percussionist at the Pittsburgh Symphony Orchestra (in English), 02.08.2019, Pittsburgh, PA, USA.

- Interview with Eugene Forish, Chapel Master at Duquesne University Chapel of the Holy Spirit (in English), 02.12.2019, Pittsburgh, PA, USA.

- Interview with Dr. Stephen Nelly, teaching Dalcroze Eurythmic Method at Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh (in English), 02.12.2019, Pittsburgh, PA, USA.
- Interview with Marcello Cormio, Composer (in Italian), 05.31.2019, Lexington, KY, USA.

- Interview with Robert Kirkman, Fiddle Player and Faculty Member in the School of Public Policy at Georgia Institute of Technology (in English), 11.02.2019, Pittsburgh, PA, USA.

- Interview with Narek Hakhnazaryan, Internationally Awarded Cello Soloist (in English), 12.02.2019, Pittsburgh, PA, USA.

2020

- Interview with Vasileios Papadopoulos, Pontian Lyra Teacher, Maker, Player (in English), 06.21.2020, Skype Conference from Heidelberg, GERMANY.

- Interview with Julius Kircher, Clarinetist (in English), 06.27.2020, Heidelberg, GERMANY.

- Interview with Rémi Métral, Drummer (in French), 09.01.2020, Chartres, FRANCE.

- Interview with François Moysan and Rémi Métral, François Moysan Duo (in French), 09.01.2020, Chartres, FRANCE.

- Interview with Pedro Antonio Reyes Linares, Philosophy Researcher, Singer (in English), 11.02.2020, Skype Conference from Heidelberg, GERMANY (The recording did not work, the interview was lost therefore it has not been included).

2021
- Interview with Thierry Escaich, Organist, Composer, (in French), 01.03.2021, Paris, FRANCE.

- Interview with Matteo Belli, Composer, (in Italian), 04.21.2021, Skype conference from Heidelberg, GERMANY.

- Interview with François Moysan, Pianist, Composer, (in French), 04.29.2021, Skype conference from Heidelberg, GERMANY.

- Interview with Aārp, Electronic Music Composer, (in French), 04.30.2021, Skype conference from Heidelberg, GERMANY.

- Interview with István Fazakas, Philosophy Researcher, (in French), 05.07.2021, Skype Conference from Heidelberg, GERMANY.

- Interview with Stéphane Finetti, Philosophy Researcher, (in French), 06.14, 2021, Skype conference from Heidelberg, GERMANY.

- Interview with Paul Gossart, Piano Tuner and Restorer (in French), 08. 02. 2021, Skype conference from Heidelberg, GERMANY.

- Interview with Emmanuel Boos, Ceramist, (in French), 08. 04. 2021, Mannheim, GERMANY.

- Interview with René Mogensen, Composer, (in English), 10. 23. 2021, Ascea, ITALY.

- Interview with Hugh Steinmetz, Saxophonist, (in English), 10. 25. 2021, Ascea, ITALY.
Introduction
§1. Background of the research on the inner song.

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§9. Additional resources.

§10. Writing format.
J. T.: I think people who are just teaching auralization are only thinking to hear each moment as a sound, that sometimes they don’t incorporate the architecture, the larger narrative. So, inner song, I think the American academics call it auralization, they use the word to mean: “you are hearing it in your head”.

*Interview with Jeff Turner (bassist, English, Pittsburgh, PA, USA, 03.21.2016)*

***

P. P: It is almost like you are singing it in your mind to yourself, beforehand. It is sort of striving for the ideal. A lot of times, it is just about the sound, the intonation, the tone quality, the quality of the sound.

**E. M.: Do you think there is also a mood?**

P. P.: Maybe a little bit but it is more about, “how can I give the impression of this mood”, not so much that I am feeling that mood. You want to do what you can with whatever control you have over your music making, to give the impression of this mood, this atmosphere.

*Interview with Philip Pandolfi (Oboist, English, Pittsburgh, PA, USA, 02. 17. 2016)*

***

Z. S.: When you said inner song I knew exactly what you were talking about—that’s a perfect expression for it. It’s hearing the music and, in a lot of ways, an idealized version of the music and the sounds that you want to hear. [...] That inner voice is what you really use when you’re playing your instrument. You don’t make the sound and then react to it, you order that sound, that ideal of what you want, and that’s the
sound that comes out of your instrument. That inner voice has to dictate the sound that you are going to make with your instrument; you have to do it all in advance.

E. M.: So, how does it work and where does it come from?

Z. S.: It is like you have a recording in your head and you hear that music, you block everything out and you hear that idealized version of what you want it to sound like. Even if it’s just a single tone, a single note, you hear that note, and order your body to produce that sound. You call that “inner song,” but it is an inner voice as well.

E. M.: For me it is a sound which has a voice; the voice is the way to express it. As a cellist I hear it as a melody, but I can easily imagine that for some other people it is more harmonic.

Z. S.: The harmony is the whole thing for me. It is almost an internal resonance that you physically feel. All art to me is very physical. When I see a painting, I respond to it not in any kind of intellectual way, I physically feel it. There is an energy that comes from it; even if it is flat and two-dimensional, it’s not really. The elements that go into the painting have a physical impact on me. There is a real physical presence to it. Sculpture is more obvious than painting because it is three-dimensional, physical thing. But I feel music in the same way and I talk about it as an internal resonance. It is more than just I hear an orchestra, I physically am feeling what that sensation is like. But that is how I respond to art.

E. M.: But that is the sensation that results from external sound; when you are reading a score, what happens to you?

Z. S.: Once I physically feel that, it is like it is inside of me. It becomes a part of your own kinetic sense. And if I think about one of Rodin’s sculptures, “Torso of a young
girl”, it was so beautiful, and I would laugh because there was a sign that says “don’t touch,” but it was like it was begging to be touched, the shape, the body. Even years later, I can physically feel that sensation. That recording is inside of me. The music is recorded within me in exactly the same way. We just played Beethoven’s 6th and there is a kind of valedictory...you’ve had the a storm, this kind of thanksgiving, and the song starts, based on a simple motif and the orchestration gives off a physical feeling. And when I hear it in my head, it is like I am sitting on stage hearing it. I have absorbed it and it is in there and in the right circumstances when it is quiet I can feel all of that again, just like I am experiencing it live. This external thing becomes an internalized in this way.

E. M.: That means that you had a previous external experience.

Z. S.: Everything that you absorb. Anything becomes part of you.

*Interview with Zachary Smith (French Hornist, English, Pittsburgh, PA, USA, 01. 20. 2016)*
§1. Background of the research on the inner song.

The present research on the “inner song,” (a very common reference in music performance) is grounded in a shift in my musical experience as a cellist: when I reached the age of 20 years old, I realized that, while my understanding of music and my ear were good, I kept playing with an inaccurate intonation and musicality. I went to a different teacher who had a completely different approach\(^1\) and it changed everything. After a couple of lessons, my new teacher pointed out the problem of intonation and the lack of expression. She asked me to sing and observed a musical gap between my singing and my playing: I sang very musically but still played flat and not attuned. She concluded that there was a disconnection somewhere and quickly saw that I was going from the score to the performance, associating a sign on the score with a gesture, without transitioning through the inner representation of the note, i.e., without transitioning through the inner song. Consequently, my attention was neither catching the real sound I was playing, nor the inner song, and the performance was far from what it could be. In order to change this, she taught me how to go from the score to the performance, transitioning through the “note in my head,”\(^2\) i.e., through the inner song. During her lessons we would dedicate a lot of time to just a few notes: (1) playing once, (2) closing my eyes and singing the inner song “in my head,” (3) actually singing it aloud, (4) performing the tune, (5) stopping when it was not right, (6) singing the note I was about to play “in my head” again, (7) playing it again, and

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\(^1\) My first teacher was French and from the Paris Conservatory whereas the second one was Russian from the Moscow Conservatory; even independently to the teachers themselves, these are two different schools of cello.

\(^2\) This expression requires thinking about the notion of the **phantasy voice**: the voice through which I sing the inner song to myself. I describe it in more detail in Chapt. 4 where I speak about the phantasy Body phantasizing the inner song.
so on. The purpose of all these exercises was to model the actual performance on what I was “hearing in my head,” i.e., on the inner song, at a broad level as well as at a very particular level (rhythm, color of the note, intonation, hint, etc.). Those exercises were teaching me to focus my attention inward, then outward, and finally associate the real sound with the inner song by going back and forth between the two. This shift of attention made a huge change in my daily practice, still going on today: my intonation as well as the density of the sound were enhanced, the musicality improved in general, and I finally connected with my instrument.

How could these exercises have improved the sound so quickly after I had already been playing for ten years? What was this inner music that I was trying to grasp? How could focusing inward have changed the real sound so effectively? At that time, I was in the first year of a master’s program in contemporary philosophy at the Sorbonne; while I was going through this improvement in my musical practice, I was registered in a course on Husserl’s *Cartesian Meditations* offered by Jean-François Courtine. We spent the semester learning about phenomenology as a method of investigation and description of phenomena, exploring the structure of consciousness. 3 It opened a new world to me. I

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3 Bernet provides this very clear and concise definition of inner consciousness to which I subscribe: “The inner, implicit consciousness of the performance of an intentional lived experience that Brentano called an “inner representation” (innere Vorstellung) (and not “observation” (Brentano 1973, p. 128), is renamed “absolute” (time-) consciousness by Husserl from 1906/07 onwards.) This new terminology draws attention to the fact that from then on Husserl attributes to inner (time-) consciousness a transcendental-constitutive function with respect to intentional acts and the noematic correlates of acts and also, in particular, to their temporality. This absolute time-consciousness is a flow of continually new “originary impressions” (Urimpressionen) which are united with each other in a weave of retentional and protentional intentionality. Accordingly, every originary-impression is “inseparable” from retentions and protentions which relate themselves, in a process of “intentional nesting” of each in the other (intentionale Verschachtelung), both to those originary-impressions of the same living flow of consciousness which have already been absorbed and to those which are still coming. In every phase of this inner time-consciousness a temporally enduring act is consciously known (bewusst) and in the gathering continuation of these phases the temporal forms of the simultaneity, succession and duration
realized that there was a branch of philosophy dedicated to the description of concrete experiences. I also realized how this branch was able to provide a conceptual structure and a vocabulary to understand and describe my own experiences. The phenomenological tradition opened a space for the individual experience of reality, while maintaining the alterity of the things themselves. This branch of philosophy appeared to me as the perfect way to engage with my musical questions. Going from my cello lesson to my philosophy class and from my philosophy class to my cello lesson, my practical music problems encountered a science to address them while my philosophical reflection discovered a new world to explore. In the following semesters I pursued my education and dedicated a couple of essays to time, intonation, and interpretation in music while pursuing my cello practice, integrating the precious teaching of the musicians I encountered into my own approach, and developing a better connection with my instrument as well as a more dedicated love for music.

Almost ten years after the beginning of my musical and philosophical research, I can formulate the following claims: (1) there is a specific musical phenomenon within phantasy which is the object of the musician’s attention when s/he practices and performs; I call it “inner song”; (2) besides myself, other musicians are able to grasp it and describe it; (3) the shift of consciousness toward this phenomenon has an immediate impact on musical performance; and (4) the inner song offers new challenges and paths to phenomenologically explore the structure of consciousness.

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of the whole intentional life of a subject’s acts constitute themselves” (“Unconscious consciousness in Husserl and Freud,” pp. 334-5).
§2. The notion of inner song.

I give specific boundaries to the notion of inner song⁴ that I want to draw here in order to make clear what I am going to analyze in my dissertation. The inner⁵ song is a

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⁴ Cf. the lexicon of terms used in the present dissertation at the end of this introduction.

⁵ As there is properly speaking no inner and no outer in the phenomenological attitude, the notion of interiority presupposed by the expression inner song is problematic. As I will make clearer later in this introduction, I am unfolding my description of the inner song within a Husserlian framework.

Husserl brings the notion of interiority within a discussion on intersubjectivity in his writing from the summer of 1921 (Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie des Intersubjektivität, text N. 1, p. 3 sq. in the German edition). These texts are written after the publication of the Logical Investigations, but before the publication of Ideas 2; in this sense, they are situated in a crucial moment of Husserl’s development of the notion of embodiment. In these texts, Husserl demonstrates: (1) how the perception of the other is a perception of the body of the other, and (2) how that perception presupposes the co-existence of an interiority. Husserl writes: “it (the interiority) doesn’t belong to the framework of what should give itself perceptively and is required as such, although it is required as copresent, cobelonging, and related to the lived-body in coexistence” (“so gehört sie [die Innerlichkeit] nicht in den Rahmen des wahrnehmungsmässig Selbst-zu-gegeben und als das Geforderten, obschon sie gefordert ist als seine Mitgegenwart, als Mitzugehöriges, in der Koexistenz Verbundenes am Leib.” Idem, p. 4). In this quote, Husserl describes interiority as something that is not given through perception but goes along with the lived-body; it is in no way separated from the body, or even situated within it. Here, Husserl breaks once again the distinction between an inner and an outer by identifying the inner with the body that is also outer.

He adds: “My fleshy corporeity, which appears externally, is always related to an impressive interiority (associative-apperceptive)” (Idem, “Meine Leiblichkeit als äusserlich Erscheinendes ist beständig mit einer impressionalen Innerlichkeit verbunden (assoziativ-apperzeptiv)”). This quote is more accurate than the previous one. Indeed, Husserl explains that the exteriority of the appearance relates to the interiority of the impression through an associative-apperceptive connection. This period of time in which Husserl discusses the notion of intersubjectivity (in between 1918-26), is also the time in which he writes the texts that will be published later as the Passive Synthesis. In these texts, the term association indicates “the lawful regularity of immanent genesis that constantly belongs to consciousness in general” (Husserl, Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, §26). As these texts were written around the same time, I can legitimately argue that, when Husserl uses the expression associative-apperceptive, he intends by associative a law of consciousness related to the passive synthesis. On the other hand, the concept of apperception indicates something founded in perception (Cartesian Meditations, §55). Indeed, in the Cartesian Meditations written later in 1930, Husserl explains more precisely how the horizon of sense is co-intended in perception. If I join these two concepts, then I can legitimately define interiority as something related to the body through a connection that (1) happens passively, and (2) is a horizon of perception.

In those same texts about intersubjectivity, Husserl adds: “Whatever dwells in my interiority has to be given through impression, or given as a remembering as past or future, in the latter case happening through impression. My interiority can have several other connections, there can be several connections between what appears as corporeal (leibkörperlich) and what is univocally spiritual. However, in any case, everything that is univocally spiritual, and moreover ‘conscience’, is given through an inner experience (which means through impression, remembering) as mine, what I do, what impacts me etc., is given, even if I don’t know yet what goes along with it empirically” (Zur Phänomenologie des Intersubjektivität, Zweiter Teil, no.1, p. 5). “Was in der meinen liegt, das ist eben notwendig impressional gegeben oder erinnerungsmässig als vergangen oder künftig gegeben, im letzteren Falle als kommend durch Impression. Es kann in meiner Innerlichkeit sich vielerlei Verbindung noch knüpfen, vielerlei noch möglich sein zwischen leibkörperlich Erscheinendem und Eigengeistigem, aber jedenfalls ist alles Eigengeistige, und zwar “Bewusstsein,” innerlich erfahrungsmässig (d.i. impresional und erinnerungsmässig) als mein, als
phenomenon in the sense that it is given in the phenomenological consciousness;\(^6\) of phantasy in the sense that it is not a phenomenon of perception and also not an intuitive positing of past or future as true;\(^7\) teleologically oriented toward a performance\(^8\) in the

was ich tue, was ich affiziert etc., gegeben, nur Weiss ich noch nicht, was empirisch zusammengehört."

This section describes interiority with a new angle, as an object given through impression. My interpretation is that interiority is given through the senses, along with the receptive constitution of the body.

As Husserl mentions in the Appendix to the 6\(^{th}\) Logical Investigation (Logical Investigations, Volume Two, p. 335-6), this definition of the inner greatly differs from the understanding of interiority as something enclosed within the limits offered by my senses (psychical data, spiritual data). Husserl’s interiority is embodied, grounded in sense-perception, and as such, it breaks the limit between the inner and the outer, the physical and the psychical. I go along with Husserl on that question. Indeed, this understanding of interiority is exactly how I conceive the inner dimension of the inner song, and therefore more generally musical interiority. For me, the inner song is in no way something within, enclosed in the body. Quite the opposite: as I demonstrated first through the notion of inner rhythm, and as I demonstrate later through my description of the voice as medium of the inner song, the inner song is a phenomenon of interiority in the sense that it is an embodied phenomenon, grounded in the lived-body. Thus, following the Husserlian definition, I understand interiority as a presence to myself through sense-perception, through feeling, hearing, breathing, moving with the music, touching the instrument etc. Husserl mentions how even the spiritual is grounded in the body; I go in the same direction and argue that the interiority of the inner song is an embodied interiority.

Even if I provide a draft of an analysis of the Husserlian notion of interiority in the present footnote, I want to highlight the fact that it is too important of a problem in phenomenology to be left to a so simple an analysis. Indeed, underneath, there is the whole problem of the interiority of the living experience [intériorité du vécu], explored not only by Sartre (1905-1980) in Being and Nothingness, but also by Marc Richir in Méditations Phénoménologiques, Le Corps: Essai sur l’Intériorité, and “La question du vécu en phénoménologie,” as well as in other works. There is also, at an even broader level, the problem of subjectivity.

Hence, the problem of the interiority of the inner song certainly deserves an independent study. In this study, I would need to raise the following questions (explored up to a certain extent in Chapter 3 of the present dissertation): who the subject is who phantasizes the inner song; how the phantasy-world is constituted in between interiority and exteriority; what the specific interiority of the inner song is; how the realization of the inner song is an externalization of an internal phenomenon; how there is the constitution of a shared interiority as musicians play together. If I performed this analysis, I would want to explore it focusing on the problem of affectivity, and more broadly on the problem of the musician’s Body. I would base my investigation on the phenomenology of Marc Richir who focused a lot on the problem of affectivity, both for itself and in phantasy.

\(^6\) And studied as a phenomenon of one consciousness in the sense that I do not take into consideration orchestral music, chamber music, or any practice involving several musicians. In these cases, I would argue that there is both an individual inner song of the piece and the constitution of a common inner song; but one can also argue that there is the constitution for each subject of one inner song modified by the intersubjective relationship. In any case, that question is one of the potential extensions of my work and is not part of the present dissertation.

\(^7\) Even if the intertwining of perception and phantasy is more complex than that as I will demonstrate.

\(^8\) As observed during a conversation with István Fazakas, stressing the teleological orientation of the inner song is both an asset and a curse. On the one hand it pushes the description of the realization of the inner song further. It becomes necessary to explain what this Realisierung means; what type of relationship exists between the musician and the musical instrument; how the realization is not simply the expression
sense that it is given as a part of the act of performing;\textsuperscript{9} \textit{constituted through an intention} in the sense that chance plays a very little role in its constitution;\textsuperscript{10} and \textit{sonorous but not necessarily linguistic} in the sense that it is composed of sounds but language might or might not be involved (I don’t take into consideration vocal music or music with lyrics as it would add linguistic problems that requires a separate dissertation).\textsuperscript{11}

Within that phenomenological framework of sonorous phantasy objects, some musical forms of phantasy\textsuperscript{12} are excluded from my definition of the inner song. First, any kind of free playing with sounds in phantasy which would not be oriented toward a musical performance. Then, any sonorous object of phantasy which would not be bound by the reality of a doable technical realization.\textsuperscript{13} Finally, any type of sonorous phantasy object that is related to a performance giving a large space to casual sound associations or

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\textsuperscript{9} This involves the notion of “training” for the purposes of clarity of focus in this dissertation.

\textsuperscript{10} Following the 2021 Wassard Elea Conference on “Music Improvisation and Creation; Human and Computational.”

\textsuperscript{11} Concerning the final one, the reason is the following: the lyrics are a feature added to the essential structures of the phenomenon of the inner song, and not part of these essential structure. As a consequence, the analysis of the inner song of the singer or the composer of lyrical music is not necessary within the present description and should be part of the extensions of this original research project.

\textsuperscript{12} I take \textit{imagination} in the generic sense here, not distinguishing between imagination and phantasy.

\textsuperscript{13} I am thinking here about all types of sonorous imaginative objects that go beyond the limit of what instruments are technically capable to perform.
belonging purely to artificial intelligence computation. The inner song, as I am working with it here, is related to the performance and, as a consequence, it presupposes the trained consciousness of a practicing musician.

This stricter definition still covers a large variety of possible inner songs. In the present study, I want to focus on one specific type of inner song, thus making the description deeper and more exact, while opening the possibility of further studies. First of all, within the category of inner songs that are phantasized with the intention, and the possibility of being played, I want to focus on a type of inner song which is actually played. This means that I focus on an inner song which comes to be (the notes are not lost, the phantasy is not forgotten, etc.). Within that category, I want to focus on a type of inner song which is immediately played. The musician is not phantasizing an inner song which will come to be later in the day or even beyond that, but one s/he is currently attempting to play. Within that category, I want to focus on the inner song in play during a practice session and not during a final recital in front of an audience. It means that the attention of the musician is distributed in order to work on the best possible realization of the inner song: the musician may stop playing, listen to the inner song, and go back to playing, but also have a straddling consciousness. In addition, as the musician is not playing in front of an audience, the level of stress is also significantly lower. Then, I

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14 I am thinking here about all types of music that see sounds coming together casually without answering to an intention (this is a question that I discuss with Jesse Stiles who has created music through the electronic capture of a dancer’s moves for example: http://www.ellenmoysan.com/interview-with-jesse-stiles-en/).

15 In his paper, “What is skilled copying?”, p. 59 sq., Simon Høffding analyses what happens when the musician performs under stress. In my own analysis, I am not taking that into consideration because I focus on the situation of a musician working at home, relaxed, not under pressure.
want to specifically address the inner song of a musician practicing a specific melodic musical instrument. It presupposes the formation of a musician’s Body as well as the acquisition of a technique. Thus, it excludes the specific cases of the conductor or the composer phantasizing a piece involving several instruments that they don’t necessarily play themselves. Finally, I will describe the inner song of this practicing musician in a solipsistic situation. It means that the inner song of the musician neither includes other accompanying parts, nor unfolds through an intersubjective process. It excludes the case of a musician rehearsing in the presence of a professor or with other musicians.

§3. Stages of the description of the inner song in the present work.

The inner song is a phenomenon. This means that it is given under the epoché, a switch from the natural to the phenomenological attitude which, as Husserl argues,  

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16 Focusing on the playing of a melodic instrument allows me to describe the phantasy of sounds that form a unity in succession and not a unity in simultaneity. In the present dissertation, I won’t address the problem of the perception of the phantasy of chords. This should be the object of further research investigating specific types of inner song. However, I want to refer to Jay Lampert’s *Simultaneity and Delay: a Dielectical Theory of Staggered Time*, for a deeper investigation of the problem of the perception of simultaneous sounds.

17 I could develop my description of this problem using Merleau-Ponty’s (1908-1961) analyses of the subject-object dialogue, working on how the Body never exists except as an opening onto an “other” (inner or outer object), onto that which simultaneous solicits our engagement with it. However, as I explain later in this present introduction, the description of the inner song in this dissertation remains mostly in a strictly Husserlian framework. This is a deliberate choice which aims to provide a clearer description of the phenomenon which is already complicated enough.

18 I mention all these cases, but it is only to focus on the one that interests me here. All other types of inner song should be the object of separate study.


20 I will mention Merleau-Ponty, Michel Henry (1922-2002), Marc Richir, and other thinkers several times along the way. However, I won’t go deeply into their philosophy. As it would certainly be very appropriate to explore certain problems related to the inner song from their perspective, I will still try to mention them when necessary. I will mention Merleau-Ponty more specifically when I discuss the problem of the Body,
uncovers “a new scientific domain”; the “region of individual being.” In the case of the inner song, the epoché is of two kinds: it is a theoretical epoché bracketing the thesis of the existence of the world on hand, and a practical epoché which is a conversion of the attention from the world on hand into the phenomenological world. Through this

21 §32 of Ideas 1, p.60.
22 §33 of Ideas 1, p. 64.

23 This situation touches upon the problem of simultaneity. In Simultaneity and Delay, Jay Lampert lists seven types of simultaneity. He writes: “simultaneity is defined (1) by starting- and stopping-points or by indefinite duration, (2) by abstraction to a changeless time-line or by speeding up concrete changes to a level of unnoticeability, (3) by static or dynamic temporal maps, (4) by immediate natural identity or by artificial intersubjective construction, (5) by qualitative indifference or by quantitative combination, (6) by the conjunction and contraction of moments, the disjunction and repulsion of moments, or the equation and stabilization of moments, and (7) by the things themselves or by a frame of reference” (p. 8). He then argues that “Husserl grounds simultaneity in succession” (p. 8), explaining how: “Husserl’s account of simultaneity in his Lectures on Internal Time Consciousness begins with the structure of retention-protention, with its hinge in the transient now. The capacity to recognize that several objects exist ‘all together at once’ is correlated with our capacity to experience several objects ‘at the same time’. The experience of temporal succession works by way of retentions and anticipations based on the ways that particular objects present themselves over time. Each object unfolds along its own temporal stream. So how are several objects experienced as being present at the same time? Simultaneity consists in the convergence of different time streams, and it is extremely difficult to determine what it means to say that a large number of complex objects exist as a whole simultaneously. There is a staggered plurality in the now. Simultaneity is not an identity of what is present in a moment, but the differential between two or more time sequences. We might have concluded that simultaneity can never be contained in a single now, except for the fact that the now itself is precisely this not-yet-coordinated plurality. Simultaneity operates in two ways. On the one hand, it ‘stabilizes’ flux into a congealed moment; a whole series of retentions and protentions is contracted into a singular moment of time. Simultaneity extracts a point in the history of each object from which to coordinate its other points. On the other hand, simultaneity coordinates situations in which one object has come to a natural stopping-point while another is in flux. Consider a pair of events with some shared and some unshared metrics, like a human walking beside a small dog in traffic: how exactly would we determine precisely what stage of the human’s step is occurring simultaneous with a precise situation in the traffic jam? Husserl’s view is that ‘simultaneity is never without temporal succession and temporal succession never without simultaneity’. But as we will see, both succession and simultaneity are undermined: succession because it is filled with delays, and simultaneity because it is filled with indivisible fluxes. If pressed, this becomes a Derridian point. The difficulty in lining up points in the temporal rhythms of a plurality of objects makes it hard to isolate the temporal location of any part of any object. The simultaneity of the parts of a single object will be subject to many-streamed rhythms, down to the smallest parts. It will not even be possible to name the part-object claimed to be simultaneous, since somewhere in that part are subsidiary parts with different rhythms. It may not even be possible to speak of retentions and protentions, since each state of a succession is a many streamed staggering of fluxes and stopping-points. Husserl attempts to define
double gesture, the musician switches from the *natural attitude* into the *musician’s attitude*. There are then two ways to look at the inner song: either focusing on how it manifests during a music practice session, or how it manifests during a final performance in front of an audience. It is not exactly the same even if it can sometimes overlap. Indeed, the surrounding is not the same in the two situations, and the inner song is also not given in the same way when it arises and develops in the backstage, or when it goes with an aesthetically satisfying public performance. The musician also does not

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simultaneity as a stopping-point in a succession of retentions and protentions, but succession depends on the very coordination of simultaneities that had depended on it. The lesson from Husserl is that simultaneity is built out of the collection into unity of moments and rhythms in successive time-streams. The indeterminacy in the ordering of those streams is both the problem for simultaneity as well as the framework out of which simultaneity has to be rebuilt” (pp.8-9).

I can identify several occurrences of the problem of simultaneity in the description of the constitution of the inner song in the consciousness of the musician practicing his or her musical instrument: (1) the simultaneity of the natural attitude and the musician’s attitude; (2) the simultaneity of the experience of the actual song and the inner song as the musician practices; (3) the simultaneity of the now as a “not yet coordinated plurality.” In the first two cases, I will attempt to address the problem of simultaneity thanks to the notion of attention. In the first case, I will demonstrate that the musician experiences a simultaneity of the natural world/the phenomenological world, but is busy in one attitude or the other thanks to a conversation of attention which pushes one or the other world into the background. In the second case, I will demonstrate that the musician, busy in the musician’s attitude, can either experience the actual song and the inner song successively thanks to a back and forth between the two (in this case, simultaneity tends towards the experience of a succession), or consciousness can straddle and have an unclear understanding of the distinction between the perceptual and the phantasy object because one is experienced *through* the other (in this case, the necessary distinction between two elements characterizing simultaneity seems to be annulled so that the two objects are apprehended in the unity of one single experience). Finally, I will address the third case of simultaneity by working on the notion of *now* both in the perception and in the phantasy, introducing the notion of Ur-Phantasie as the specific moment of givenness of the flowing object of phantasy (in this case, the simultaneity of the now is indeed what (1) “stabilizes flux into a congealed moment,” cf. above, and (2) “coordinates situations in which one object has come to a natural stopping-point while another is in flux,” cf. above).

It would be possible to analyze the whole experience of listening to the inner song while practicing music from the specific angle of the problem of simultaneity and delay. It is indeed a question that comes back under different forms (temporal as I just demonstrated, but also spatial because the temporal analysis should involve a reflection on the Body, both *Wahrnehmungsleib und Phantasieleib*). As I can’t do this in the present dissertation in which I intend to focus on the constitution of the inner song itself, I will only address the question when I cross the three situations mentioned above. Hence, the problem of the simultaneity of the two attitudes will be addressed in Chapter 1; the problem of the apprehension of two phenomena will be addressed in Chapters 2, 4, and 5; the problem of the simultaneity in the now will be addressed mostly in Chapter 4. As I am performing my description within a strict Husserlian framework, in the main, following lines set by Bernet’s interpretation, I will try to address these issues from a Husserlian viewpoint.
apprehend it exactly in the same way. In the present dissertation, I will focus on the moment of the constitution of the inner song during the rehearsing and practicing sessions preceding the final representation. I study therefore how the inner song arises and develops as the musician practices their instrument (Chapter 1: Accessing the Inner Song through the Epoché).

Two phenomena are given in this attitude: the *inner song* which is a phenomenon of phantasy, and the *actual song*, which is the perceptual object given in consciousness through listening to the realization of the inner song in performance. These two phenomena are distinct: the inner song is a phenomenon of *phantasy*, and the actual song is a phenomenon of *perception*. However, they are also related: the performance is the realization [Realisierung] of the inner song. Thus, the inner song is the model of the actual song, and the actual song is the image of the inner song; perception refers to phantasy, and phantasy to perception (Chapter 2: Perceiving and Phantasizing).

During a practice session, one single ego apprehends these two phenomena. It is a phenomenological ego, embodied, both perceiving the performance as coming from the movements of its Body, and phantasizing the inner song, the two phenomena being given against the primary layer of the constitution of the inner rhythm (Chapter 3: The Various Layers of the Musician’s Ego).

During the music practice process, the musician works closely with the musical instrument, thus producing the melody. As he or she plays, a *musician’s Body* is constituted as a specific type of perceptual Body in the impressional consciousness. In the reproductive consciousness, the inner song appears from a primary phantasy (*Ur-Phantasy*) and is developed temporally in the *quasi-temporality* of the reproductive
consciousness. It is given as an embodied phenomenon in the sense that the trained musician not only hears the inner song in phantasy, but also feels it and the movements necessary to perform it (Chapter 4: Time and Space of the Impressional and Reproductive Consciousness).

From the primary awakening, the inner song is further developed. As the musician plays, there is a co-constitution of the musical instrument with the melody in the impressional consciousness. The melody is experienced as being produced by the movement of the trained musician on the instrument; it is experienced as *his* or *her* melody. In the reproductive consciousness, the correspondent of this actual song, the inner song, is awakened through passive associations as a co-constitution of an inner musical instrument and an inner melody. It is then further developed and modified as the musician practices and works on the performance (Chapter 5: Constitution of the Inner Song through Music Practice).

§4. Husserlian phenomenology as a method.

The present description of the inner song is a *phenomenological* description, and moreover, it is grounded specifically in *Husserlian phenomenology*. In the introduction to *Ideas I*, Husserl presents two major attributes characterizing his phenomenology: first, it is a science of *essences* aiming at the “cognition of essences”\(^\text{24}\) which can be reached through an eidetic reduction, and second, the phenomena are characterized as “irreal”\(^\text{25}\) because they have undergone a transcendental reduction. Husserlian phenomenology is

\(^{24}\) *Ideas I*, Introduction, p. XX.

\(^{25}\) *Ideas I*, Introduction, p. XX.
therefore, on the one hand, eidetic, and on the other, transcendental. Each characteristic is related to a specific reduction: the eidetic reduction, and the transcendental reduction. Thus, phenomenology is a science a priori made of non-empirical descriptive claims. In Ideas 1, Husserl introduces phenomenology as a science through the description of the epoché. This gesture is the necessary moment that leads from the natural attitude to the phenomenological attitude.

In his description of the epoché §32 of Ideas 1, Husserl mentions two objects: first, the real objects, and second, the presence of the objects in consciousness. The epoché as a bracketing puts the first one in parenthesis. Thus, the existence of the world is not questioned anymore. That does not mean that the world is not there; it is on hand, but not as an object of investigation. In this sense, phenomenology is not about being, it is distinct from ontology. Consequently, the object of study is not the real objects but the phenomena. A phenomenon can be defined as an object as it appears in consciousness. The analysis that describes it is called eidetic analysis. It describes eidos, essences. It covers two different tasks: clarifying the phenomenon with its inner connections and adjusting the language so that it fits the phenomenon itself. There are then two types of analysis: static analysis considering the object as fully constituted, and genetic analysis considering the process of the constitution of the phenomenon. Husserl starts with the static analysis but the two are intertwined while being structurally different. Indeed, what is now constituted at some point underwent constituting, and what is undergoing

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26 §65 of Ideas 1, p. 150

27 Husserl describes this linguistic work later in §66 of Ideas 1, I will come back to this question later on.

28 Husserl, “Static and genetic phenomenological method.”
constitution will at some point be fully constituted. In this sense, they lead toward one another. However, they correspond to two different kinds of phenomenology. Husserl distinguishes *explanatory phenomenology* which explains the genesis of objects, thus including a reflection on the *history* of consciousness and the notion of apperception, from *descriptive phenomenology* which seizes the object in its intentional accomplishment.²⁹

The phenomenological tradition offers a large panel of interpretations of Husserl. Among them, I chose to read Husserl predominantly through the lens of Rudolf Bernet’s work. Indeed, his attention to remaining close to the original text and the conceptual clarity of his works together offer a strict framework facilitating a creative phenomenological analysis. In addition, his particular understanding of the dual consciousness—both the impressional/retentional/protentional and the reproductive—which does not give primacy to one type of consciousness over the other,³⁰ is particularly

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²⁹ Husserl writes: “In a certain way, we can therefore distinguish “explanatory” phenomenology as a phenomenology of regulated genesis, and “descriptive” [i.e., static] phenomenology as a phenomenology of possible, essential shapes (no matter how they have come to pass) in pure consciousness, and their teleological ordering in the real of possible reason under the headings, “object” and “sense.” Husserl, “Static and genetic phenomenological method,” 138.

³⁰ In the following long quote, Rudolf Bernet provides a very succinct and complete description of his account on the Phantasy. In “Unconscious consciousness in Husserl and Freud,” Bernet says:

“For Husserl, the similarity between phantasy and memory lies above all in their distanced relation to an object that is merely presentified and thus not bodily present. In the case of memory, this distance is derived from the fact that its object belongs within the original context of an earlier act of perception. The presentification of a past object is the achievement of a reproduction that one could call a present repetition of an earlier act. In the case of phantasy the distanced relation to an object of the phantasy world comes to expression above all through the fact that one does not believe in the reality of this object, that is to say, one forestalls or neutralizes positing it as a real being. This absence of belief no longer results from the conflict between the perceptual world and the phantasy-world, for there can be no talk of a conflict as long as the phantasized does not extend into the perceptual world or give itself out to be a supposed perception. Knowledge of the phantasy qua phantasy obviously belongs to the performance of phantasy itself. Phantasy knows itself as phantasy because it is an inner reproductive consciousness of a (quasi-) perception.

But what does this mean and what does talk of “reproduction” mean in the case of phantasy? In phantasy, unlike memory, there is no past perception that is presently reproduced. Instead, a present
perception is experienced as nonpresent or experienced as belonging to a life of phantasy because it is
innerly performed in the mode of “as-if” or “quasi-performance.” Nevertheless, this phantastial
reproduction of a non-present perception has in common with a memorial reproduction the fact that it
gives itself as the modification of an original present perception. However, this “modification” used in the
context of memory and phantasy does not have exactly the same meaning. Memory is the modification of
an earlier perception which it bears within itself as reality in the manner of an intentional implication.
Phantasy, by contrast, is the modification of a perception that is implied as a possible and not an actual
act. In its phenomenological genesis memory presupposes a real experience of a remembered object
whilst phantasy is only related to the mere possibility of a real experience of its object, a possibility that it
freely creates.

Phantasy, as intuitive presentification, is therefore a productive form of reproduction. It is a
modification that implies something unmodified which need not exist prior to or independently of this
modification. It is a modified form of perception which indicates the possibility of a perception without
presupposing its factual givenness. Hence the reproductive modification that makes up the essence of
phantasy does not explain how the presentifying phantasy is derivable from a present perception but
rather the other way around. In other words, this reproductive modification explains how phantasy
implies the possibility of a perception.

However, it is not thereby contended that every perception presupposes an actual phantasy as
the condition of its possibility. Just as phantasy is not derivable from a perception, so perception is not
derivable from a phantasy. Nevertheless, it can be said both that the essence of a real perception is
codetermined by the possibility of its phantastial modification and also that it belongs to the essence of a
real phantasy that it implies the possibility of an unmodified perception of its object. That is to say, an
object can never be simultaneously both really perceived and really phantasized, even though it is
nonetheless true that real perception implies the possibility of phantasy and that real phantasy implies
the possibility of perception. Thus, phantasy and perception can never be reduced the one to the other,
although they are still necessarily related to each other in the form of a relationship of modification.
Husserl would certainly emphasize, in addition, that for perception phantasy signifies a negative
possibility which is to be excluded and that perception is contained in phantasy as a positive possibility
which is to be striven for. One can therefore claim that phantasy is the repressed of memory and that
perception is the repressed of phantasy, even though for Husserl the “repression” would not in both cases
have exactly the same meaning.

The reproductive consciousness operative in phantasy is also characterized by the possibility of a
distanced and symbolic self-consciousness. This possibility is absent in the impressional inner
consciousness operative in perception. Accordingly, perceptual consciousness, in which the subject
immediately gives itself over to its drive to see, appears to be a type of loss of self (Selbstverlust) or, more
precisely, a loss of the distanced self-representation (Selbstdarstellung) of drive. Regarded from this point
of view, phantasy enjoys a privilege over perception and there are therefore good grounds to doubt
Husserl’s prioritizing of perception over phantasy. Dreaming is a typical example of a symbolic self-
representation of drive that is made possible by phantasy, but of course language is also one. If
immediate, impressional inner consciousness were the only form of self-awareness then it would be
impossible to understand how a human being could become a speaking subject which, in speaking – even
before beginning to speak about itself – always already represents itself symbolically. Of course it is not
thereby claimed that dreaming and speaking are nothing other than a kind of fantasizing. But the
possibility of language and of the linguistic expression of perception in particular, appears to be
inextricably interwoven with the possibility of fantasizing,” (pp. 339-341).

In my dissertation, I will address various points mentioned by Bernet: the distinction between
memory and phantasy; the notions of reproduction, quasi, modification, presentification; the question of
the possibility; finally, although in a lesser degree, the problem of the distanced and symbolic self-
consciousness related to the phantasy. All of these will be thematized as the description of the inner song
progresses.
suitable to describe the specific type of phantasy in play in the constitution process of the inner song through the perception of its realization in performance. For these reasons, even if I might refer to other Husserlian thinkers along the way, my own reading of Husserl will be heavily impacted by that of Rudolf Bernet.

This framework that I quickly explained is very rich but also limited. Indeed, Husserl never mentions an object of phantasy related to music performance like the inner song, and therefore a lot of his analysis fall short when it comes to describing this specific phenomenon. In order to describe the inner song accurately, while leading the description within a framework which is good but restrictive, it is necessary to let the

As this question is mentioned in the present quote, I want to point out the possibility of a parallel between dreaming, and phantasizing the inner song here. I do not investigate this parallel in my dissertation because I want to focus on the description of the inner song itself. However, this problem constitutes a potential interesting extension of my work. To investigate the question, I would try to distinguish the inner song in phantasy, from a potential dreamed inner song, for instance, searching to see if the mode of consciousness of the musician listening to the inner song cannot be related to the mode of consciousness of a subject who is daydreaming. A parallel between music consciousness and dreaming is investigated in Høffding, *A Phenomenology of Musical Absorption*, p. 145, sq. In my analysis, I would use Husserl’s analyses of the active and passive synthesis, or his descriptions of the structure of consciousness, looking to Ludwig Binswanger’s, *Traum und Existenz*, as well as Richir’s “Le sensibile dans le rêve.”

As is made clear in the paper, Richir proceeds to a complete reworking of Husserl’s account of phantasy. Carlson explains indeed that: “les analyses husserliennes concernant la phantasie permettent à Richir de déployer, dans la continuation de ses propres travaux, une phénoméno logie non intentionnelle, qui s’attache à décrire un champ lacunaire de phénomènes dans leur émergence originaire: des phénomènes qui ne sont donc pas encore des phénomènes d’être ou d’objets, mais des ‘phénomènes comme rien que phénomènes’, lesquels surgissent et s’évanouissent de manière plurielle et dispersée dans leurs apparitions en intermittence, constamment fluctuantes et revirantes” (p. 47).

As it appears from this quote, Richir tries, in his work, to grasp the phantasy in its pure phenomenality, at the roots of its process of phenomenalization (he dedicates his book *Phantasia, imagination, affectivité* to this problem, as well as several articles). My analysis of the inner song of the musician rehearsing and practicing tries to grasp the phenomenon in its stability, its clarity, and its continuity. In this sense, I approach the phantasy in the opposite way to Richir in his phenomenology. For this reason, even if I discuss Richir in the present dissertation, I don’t read Husserl through his lens, but through the lens of Rudolf Bernet.

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31 In “Phantasia et imagination: perspectives phénoménologiques (Husserl, Sartre, Richir),” Sacha Carlson provides a general description of phantasy in Husserl. He points out the proteiform character, the discontinuity, the floating character of the phantasy. He then explains the Richirian elaboration of the phantasy based on that description.

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object itself lead the description, and not the Husserlian corpus. If the object is not forced to fit in, it is indeed described more accurately.

§5. The eidetic variation.

The particularity of phenomenology is its reliance on the experience itself to analyze the object as it appears to consciousness, and to describe its essence. Part of this includes using the method of free imagination described in §4 and §70 of Ideas 1. In this paragraph, Husserl demonstrates that there are two possible ways to access to the essence of the object: experiential data, and imagination. Thus, he underlines the intertwining of perception and imagination, and demonstrates that imagination helps to determine the essential structures of perception. Indeed, systematically varying the ideas of the object with imagination through the method of eidetic variation allows the phenomenologist to identify the features that are necessary to make it what it is; the recurring of certain traits marks their belonging to the essence of the phenomenon.

My work which similarly aims to identify the essential structures of the phenomenon of the inner song is based on an eidetic variation. I do it in two ways: first,

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32 Husserl writes: “The Eidos, the pure essence, can be exemplified for intuition in experiential data – in data of perception, memory, and so forth; but it can equally well be exemplified in data of mere phantasy. Accordingly, to seize upon an essence itself, and to seize upon it originaily, we can start from corresponding experiencing intuitions, but equally well from intuitions which are non-experiencing, which do not seize upon factual existence but which are instead ‘merely imaginative’” (§4 of Ideas 1, p. 11).

33 The problem of the eidos of the phantasy object itself deserves a deep investigation. In “Imagination et Phantasie chez Husserl,” Richir writes: “Le moyen d’accéder aux eídè comme noyaux de congruence de l’expérience est en effet, on le sait, la variation éidétique, qui, à partir d’un exemple en principe quelconque, imagine une infinité d’exemples congruant en un noyau d’invariance qui est l’eidos. Cela va si loin qu’au § 70 des Ideen, Husserl n’hésite pas à écrire que "la fiction est la source d’où la connaissance des “vérités éternelles” tire sa nourriture" - "la fiction": c’est-à-dire, ici, l’imagination. Peut-on dès lors dire que tel ou tel centaure imaginé peut être pris comme l’exemple d’une infinité de centaures imaginés dont l’invariant serait l’eidos centaure? Pour répondre de manière circonstanciée à cette question, il faudrait reprendre le texte n° 19 déjà mentionné de Hua XXIII. Contentons-nous de répondre en disant
I use my personal experience of the inner song, reenacting the experience of hearing it (these sections come at the beginning of the paragraphs and are italicized); and second, I also use the experiences that other musicians have of the inner song that I have gathered through interviews in the last ten years (these sections come at the beginning of each chapter and are situated within a frame). This double approach allows me to vary the points of view on the inner song and identify the recurring traits that indicate the essential features of the phenomenon.

As Marc Richir observes, this problem is related to the problem of the doxic or non doxic imagination. In other words, it is related to the problem of knowing or not knowing what the object is (I mention this problem in a footnote in Chapter 2, §8). In my description of the inner song, I must raise this question as follow: when the musician phantasizes the inner song, does the musician know what the inner song is? I can’t answer that question in the following work because I argue that it depends on the type of inner song. In the case of interpretation, if I am phantasizing the line of the jazz standard “Sometimes, I feel like a motherless child,” (in a case of interpretative improvisation), if I know the melody, then I would argue that I also know what the inner song of that melody is. If I am phantasizing a compositive interpretation, it is less certain. If I am harmonizing a composition, maybe I know, but if I am at the beginning of the process of composition, maybe less. Thus, in order to answer the question of whether or not the imagination of the musician is a doxic imagination, it would be necessary to analyze each type of situation separately.

If the musicians can talk about it, if we can have a dialogue on this thing called inner song [die Sache], I argue that there is an eidos of the inner song. In other words, the possibility of the interviews about the inner song attest to its essence. Hence, the phantasy of the inner song is, for me, always doxic up to a certain level (I will come back to the problem of the clarity and stability of the object in the final chapter of the present dissertation). I will keep this presupposition all along my dissertation.

34 I will also use scattered information about the inner song that I have gathered in books, interviews, master classes, workshops, or other musical resources.
Concerning the reenacting of the experience of hearing the inner song, one of my core references is the recent French development of “phenomenological praxis” by Natalie Depraz. Depraz proposes a “phenomenological praxis,” based on Husserl, but deepening the methodological side of his phenomenology. Her approach proceeds from the first-person point of view and uses various situations as experimental support to describe probation of concepts, and phenomenological philosophical analysis. Her goal is to propose an embodied understanding of the phenomenological texts, by elucidating her own experience while reading the phenomenological description, mainly the one by Husserl. This leads Depraz to propose several texts on the method of introspection, the analysis of the phenomenological experience, and the notion of example in phenomenology. In “The phenomenological reduction as a praxis,” Depraz writes: “I am proposing to bring to light a renewed reductive method, whereby the spectator is given a specific embodiment, and where the operation inherent in the reductive gesture is taken up again through the logic of its own reflexivity.” She explains here how her method aims to reenact the experience itself because, as she says, “reflection and incarnation, contemplation and action are not opposed until each begins to fertilize the other thereby identifying each other to the point of becoming virtually indistinguishable from each other.” More concretely, Depraz aims to explain “layers of the experience” and to free herself “from the object in order to take note of the act of consciousness

35 Depraz, “The Phenomenological reduction as a praxis.”
36 Idem, p. 97.
37 Idem.
directed toward this object.” Similarly, I reenact my experience of hearing the inner song in a session of cello practice in order to have a conscious experience of the inner song as a musician that I can describe as a phenomenologist. My goal is to make conscious the unconscious aspects of the inner song, focus my attention on aspects of the phenomenon that I don’t necessarily observe, and pay attention to the embodied part of it. I want to understand the content of the inner song as well as how I actually grasp it. In the body of the text of this dissertation, I therefore include paragraphs dedicated to the actual description of this or that aspect of consciously playing the cello in a music room.

38 Idem, p. 98.

39 Even if this experience can happen without a musical instrument, or with another musical instrument, I tend to reenact it mostly with my cello. As I have been playing for more than twenty years now, I have to say that my inner song is deeply related to the actual sound, practice, and sensation of playing cello. My cello practice has evolved a lot with time. As I previously mentioned, I transitioned from focusing on the score to focusing on the inner song. Nowadays I usually play with closed eyes, focusing on the inner song, only keeping the score at hand in order to check the accuracy of the rhythm, the pitch, and the character of the phrase. I also spend consequential time (perhaps the majority of my practice time) just listening to music and improvising or learning the cello part of a piece by ear, without score, in order to be penetrated by the music without the constraint of a text (when it is jazz or soul, I do the bass, if it is a cello piece I find the notes by ear, singing it and playing it on the instrument). The duration of each session is between one and two hours. My goal is of course to play not only with technical correctness but also with musical correctness. I work on improving single notes as well as improving their connections with one another in the context of a musical sentence. In other words, it is a hermeneutic process: I go back and forth between the part and the whole. As the sound is very related to the position of the body, I also try to find the best and easiest posture in order to enable better movements and therefore free the musicality. My goal is to accompany the music with my body, working on the close connection with my instrument, in order not only to hear the music I play but moreover to feel the embodied side of the inner song.

40 Either by an act of consciousness or directly through a gesture.
Concerning the series of interviews started in 2010 which is still ongoing,⁴¹ they
are inspired by Gadamerian hermeneutics,⁴² and reflect the conviction according to which

⁴¹ In September 2010, I defended my first master’s thesis under the supervision of the Pr. Dominique Pradelle at Paris-Sorbonne IV under the title: *L’Interprétation comme double Révélation du Texte par l’Interprète et de l’Interprète par le texte*. This thesis was composed of two parts: (1) the Inner Song, (2) the right distance from the text. In the first part, I described the four stages of interpretation: (1) reading, (2) listening, (3) playing and (4) interpreting. In the second part, I analyzed the two aspects of musical hermeneutics: (1) interpretation as a translation, and (2) respect for the truth of the text imposes the right distance from the text. In this thesis, I closely analyzed the Prelude to the Fourth *Suite for cello solo* by Bach and described the inner song as a resonance defined as image consciousness.

In this primitive understanding, I heavily used the small pedagogical text written by Xavier Gagnepain: *Du violoncelliste en particulier au musician en général* in which the French cellist uses the expression *inner song* and explains how to grasp it and use it in the performance process. After the defense and following a discussion on the forum of the French cello review *Le Violoncelle*, its director Michel Oriano invited me to present my project through an interview. He then proposed that I meet with Xavier Gagnepain and another cellist, Frédéric Borsarello, to discuss the concept of an inner song. I accepted, sent my master’s thesis to Xavier Gagnepain, and conducted my first interview later published in the review *Le Violoncelle* with Frédéric Borsarello. Later, Xavier Gagnepain sent my thesis back with comments and we spent three hours discussing it together. This was my second interview. During our discussion, Xavier Gagnepain mentioned the book written by Dominique Hoppenot, *Le Violon Intérieur*. I then contacted two of her students, Anne-Marie Morin and Claire Bernard. Both of them explained the concept received by their professor and helped me to understand the inner song through the particular experience of the violinist.

During the Spring Semester 2012 with the Master Erasmus Mundus at Hosei University, Tokyo, Japan, I had to write three essays relating a topic to phenomenology. I used this opportunity to investigate the concept of the inner song. I wrote three essays on it. The four interviews from the previous years were a precious help to grasp the concept of inner song. By doing interviews, I also realized how I could use third person testimony to understand a philosophical object.

I took advantage of my Japanese experience to meet more musicians in order to understand whether the inner song was experienced differently in other contexts. Through a couple of friends, I had the chance to be in touch with two local musicians: Marguerite France (violinist) and Madoka Sato (flautist). The former told me about her experience as a western classical musician working in a Japanese orchestra during the introduction of classical music in the 70s; the latter gave me the point of view of a young Japanese musician interpreting western classical music. Both were beautiful encounters which opened my mind to other realities. Passionate about my new activity as an interviewer, I started to share them with friends and family members.

Discussing my interviews in France and Japan, learning a lot through them as a person and as a musician, I felt the desire to share them with others. I created a blog where I published them. A friend of mine, more experienced in technology offered to improve it. He created the prototype of the current website. In 2013, Benoit Baron, another friend who is also professional developer, took over the control of the website and improved it again. He bought the name, designed it, and has worked with me since then. I started the website as a presentation of my philosophical project, but it became progressively what it is now: a digital archive of interviews about the inner song.

For now, the interviews are collected according to the instrument family and type of music practice. This classification aims to separate various forms of the inner song. There are nine categories: (1) String Instruments, (2) Wind Instruments, (3) Plucked Instruments, (4) Percussion, (5) Singers, (6) Composition, (7) Traditional Music, (8) Music related practices, and (9) Direction. I single percussion out because of the particularity of the production of the sound which does not seem to be so obviously melodic as in the case in string instruments. I also single out singers as the inner song is accompanied by
linguistic features. I separate composition as a form of inner song that correspond to the phenomenological concept of pure phantasy. I distinguish traditional music from other forms of music as the cultural factor seems to be more relevant. Finally, I separate direction from other practices as the musician expresses their inner song through other musicians, which implies the philosophical problem of intersubjectivity. I recently added another section for interviews with phenomenologists. The website is in French, the language in which my research started. However, it includes interviews in English and Italian as well. Benoît and I are currently working on an English version in order to make the project available to more readers.

In Spring 2013, I defended a second master’s thesis under the supervision of the Pr. Lazlo Tengelyi, with the title: Le Chant Intérieur comme Condition de Possibilité de l’Interprétation Musicale in order to graduate from the Master Erasmus Mundus Europhilosophy. This master’s thesis developed the first part of my previous master’s thesis and focused explicitly on the phenomenon of the inner song and its role in the interpretative process, situating the research within the phenomenological tradition. The dissertation was composed of three parts: (1) Reading: the textual hermeneutics, (2) Hearing: the constitution of the inner song, and (3) Playing: the expression of the inner song. Hundred pages of the fifteen interviews made between 2010 and 2013 are added to the thesis in annex.

The interviews still have a subordinated role in this research: they are only an annex, and they are made to serve the philosophical reflection. However, the collection already has the features that it has today: (1) diversity of musicians with classical or jazz music background, (2) diversity of practices with interpretation, improvisation, and composition, (3) diversity of languages with interviews in French and Italian, and (4) diversity of experiences with soloists, jazz ensemble musicians, orchestral musicians, and teachers.

I conducted a number of important interviews between 2012 and 2013. The sample began to be sufficiently substantial to mark the beginning of an actual collection. Personally, I also started developing the habit of asking around if musicians are available for an interview, using both my experience as a musician and my research as a ground for it.

In the Summer 2014 I decided to pursue my research on the inner song within a PhD program either in the UK or the USA. The necessity of presenting a research project forced me to think about the role of the interviews in my description and increase their number in order to give more weight to my research. Consequently, I (1) increased the collection by interviewing a dozen musicians between the winter 2014 and my departure to the US at the end of the Summer 2015, and (2) diversified it by interviewing folk musicians, more composers among whom was the famous soundtrack composer Armand Amar, and musicians with an international fame like the French cellist Vincent Ségal. At this point, I had founded the base of an archive.

The Pittsburgh years from 2015 to 2020 don’t present any novelty: I only continued my work by interviewing the musicians who crossed my path. Circumstances brought me to interview several musicians from the same ensemble: the famously awarded and eminent Pittsburgh Symphony Orchestra. The eight interviews with the PSO musicians constitute a sub-collection which offers the reader the benefit of hearing from musicians in such an important orchestra.

All the first interviews up to the end of the year 2014 are reconstituted from notes. In other words, I took notes during the discussion with the musicians, transcribed them at home, asked the musicians to check the result and edit if necessary, and published the edited version on my website. However, this method which corresponded to an experimental collection was not sustainable if the project was to become serious. Indeed, if musicians accept that their words would be approximately transcribed for an anonymous project, they require more accuracy if their words are made public through a website publication. Internationally awarded musicians are also more used to being interviewed, less available to work on the postproduction, and require more professionalism on the part of the interviewer. Taking notes instead of recording required working a lot from memory, and therefore that the transcription be done within a couple of days of the interview. The cadence of the interviews as well as the busy schedule I had in 2014 forced me to change my method to make sure that the words of the musicians were not deformed by time and inaccurate notes. The interview with Jérôme Pernoo who
“dialogue is a source of truth in its own right,” in other words, it is by having a dialogue about the inner song that the truth of the phenomenon comes out. As the inner song is not experienced by just anybody, but is rather an experience related to music practice, and therefore proper to practicing musicians, I almost exclusively meet people who have a close relationship with practicing music, even if it is only at a good amateur level.

These musicians need to be capable and willing to share their experience, knowing that it will be made public, spend a couple of unpaid hours to discuss a specific topic, and asked me to review a lot the transcription because he found it not accurate enough made me change my method. After him all the interviews have been recorded and transcribed almost word for word. There is only one change: I started to add interviews with phenomenologists working on the notion of phantasia in 2021. This means that there are now two sets of interviews: the one with musicians, and the one with musician-phenomenologists.

42 The primary Gadamerian ethics of dialogue is well described here: “Dans l’Ethique dialectique de Platon, ce qui intéresse Gadamer en particulier, lorsque l’on considère l’analyse phénoménologique du discours dialectique, c’est de mettre en relief ce qu’il nomme: ‘die mitweltlichen Motive der Sachlichkeit’, les ‘implications interrelationnelles de l’objectivité’. En effet, le questionnement orienté sur la recherche du vrai exige un mode spécifique d’interlocution qui implique une attitude particulière des partenaires du dialogue. Celui qui questionne pour la vérité n’a pas intérêt à échanger une opinion pour une autre, tant qu’il ne s’est pas mis à la recherche des raisons qui parlent en faveur d’une affirmation plus qu’une autre. C’est ainsi que s’engage une forme de discussion où les interlocuteurs sont interrélisés par un objectif commun: faire la lumière sur la chose visée par l’interrogation. Lorsque Gadamer parle de ‘Sachlichkeit’ du dialogue, il entend cette visée commune des interlocuteurs qui les associe dans un même intérêt, ainsi que les attitudes requises correspondant à l’exigence spécifique du discours dialectique. Dans l’intérêt purement commun, les partenaires du dialogue sont invités à mettre de côté tous les aspects purement subjectifs pour se consacrer à l’étude exclusive des raisons objectives permettant d’éclairer la chose à connaître. Non seulement le dialogue permet-il ici de comprendre la contribution critique d’autrui, de saisir le sens productif de son intervention, en tant qu’il répond de la teneur ‘objective’ du discours, soit en y acquiesçant ou en le contredisant, mais la constitution du discours dialectique rend aussi manifeste le pouvoir du langage lui-même. Cet aspect mérite d’être souligné, parce qu’il permet de préciser en quel sens le discours dialectique effectue la fonction de rempilissement des significations. Ainsi nous rejoignons ici notre point de départ, à savoir le rapport entre intuition et langage à l’intérieur de la processualité dialogique” (Thérien, “Gadamer et la phénoménologie du dialogue,” pp. 174-5).

This first understanding evolves all along the unfolding of Gadamer’s thought but I am not going to develop that point here. Indeed, the problem of the role of the hermeneutical dialogue in the arising of the truth of the inner song would deserve a separate study that I cannot conduct in the introduction; it needs to be postponed to a later project.


44 There are two exceptions: Emmanuel Boos, ceramist, and Florent Forestier, writer and philosopher working on the notion of phantasy in Richir and Husserl.
eventually spend a little time reviewing and editing the text if they want to change some aspects of it; they engage with me freely and in a selfless manner. Then, even if it is for scientific purposes, I try to approach the interlocutor from our common ground, namely, not as an interviewer but as a musician-phenomenologist who has a common passion for music. My goal is indeed to find out, with the other, the truth of the inner song. My questions therefore invite the interlocutor to focus on their personal experience of the inner song, while trying to grasp the universality of it. Afterward, transcribing the interview almost word for word, asking the musician to control it, and making it public as it is, with a couple of multimedia resources added, aims to present the dialogue in its richness, hesitations, trials, and errors. In the text itself, the clear separation between the two sources of the ideas (the words of the interviewer are in bold) aims to underline the two sources of contribution of the description, giving credit to each of partner in the dialogue for their originality.

§6. Some particular methodological challenges.

There are various theses behind my approach that I will now address directly. First, I share the same inner experience with other musicians; in other words, we all have the experience of a similar phenomenon in our respective consciousness. Second, we can have access to our experiences and report them accurately through language. Third, objectivity emerges from a unity made of subjective points of views. Fourth, the structure of the phenomenon is co-experienced, and I need to be aware of others’ experience to understand

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it correctly. The first two were confirmed through the interviews I conducted; the last two are argued by Husserl.

The first two theses related to the use of the interviews with musicians contain two different problems: on the one hand, the universality of the experience, and on the other hand, the sharing of the experience.

When I started the interviews, my goal was to confirm my own experience of the inner song. After a couple of interviews, I quickly realized that this experience of the inner song was shared with a large majority of musicians. Thus, I received the confirmation of my experience and that musicians generally base their performance on the inner song. Given that we were able to discuss this common experience during the interview, it became clear that we have access to the inner song, and it can be shared.

The ability to share that experience is related to the adequacy between experience and language. It touches a point raised by Husserl in the §66 of Ideas 1. In this paragraph, Husserl relates the linguistic problem with the question of the scientific nature of the discourse.46 Husserl argues that it is necessary to choose words that contain as few ambiguities as possible, and that “coincide” with what is intuitionally given, in order to produce a scientific discourse.47 The philosophical question behind this claim is the

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46 “In phenomenology [...] we perform acts of seeing essences immediately in given example of transcendentally pure consciousness, and fix them conceptually and terminologically. The words used may derive from the common language; they may be ambiguous and their changing senses may be vague. As soon as they ‘coincide’ with the intentionally given in the manner characteristic of an actual expression, they take on a definite sense as their actually present and clear sense hic et nunc; and starting from there we can fix them scientifically” (Ideas 1, p. 151-2).

47 For Merleau-Ponty, every phenomenon is intrinsically ambiguous to one degree or another, and this is positive because it allows us a degree of primordial creativity/freedom to fashion the object a variety of diverse ways that are still compatible with it. It is like a half-completed pattern that rules out arbitrariness while still permitting a diversity of (momentary) completions of the pattern. This suggests an ontology different than that of the world of essences. Using that framework could be beneficial to the description of the inner song. However, I want to remain in a Husserlian framework in order to have a consistent
following: how can we describe a pure essence using a common vocabulary that has ambiguities? Husserl answers by claiming that we need to decide on definite and clear senses that will be related to those essences unambiguously; in other words, we need to reduce the possibilities of the fulfillment of those words by various data. Indeed, the term should not be vague, and should correspond to the most specific experience possible. Husserl ends the paragraph by reminding us of the importance of being cautious and re-examining frequently in order to see “whether what was fixed in the earlier context is actually employed in the same sense in the new one”:\(^{48}\) the phenomenologist needs to make sure that the concepts keep their extension of meaning.

In my own research I must be careful with the use of terminology. First, I have to make sure during the interview that the musician and I are actually talking about the same phenomenon by asking accurate questions and make sure that we agree on the terms we are using from the beginning to the end of the discussion (the resolution of this problem comes with the acquisition of skills related to conducting interviews).\(^{49}\) Second, as the process of writing is extended in time and my research requires the constitution of a particular vocabulary that fits the phenomenon, I have to regularly check the consistency of the use of my personal vocabulary (the resolution of this problem comes with the verification of the consistency of the text itself during the writing process, and the

\(^{48}\) Ideas 1, p. 152.

\(^{49}\) It is particularly important as I am doing interviews in French, English, Italian, and sometimes German too; the intercultural communication makes misunderstandings more frequent and requires therefore a real attention.
verification of the accuracy of the vocabulary within musical and philosophical literature through reading and talking with musicians and phenomenologists about the phenomenon of inner song.\textsuperscript{50}

The next two theses are related to the role of intersubjectivity in access to the truth of a lifeworld, a topic approached by Husserl in the \textsuperscript{5} Cartesian Meditation.

The relationship with the other is based on empathy; the other is one that I cannot seize upon, it is an \textit{alter ego}\textsuperscript{51} that also performs intentional acts. In §43 of the Cartesian Meditations, Husserl mentions two philosophical problems: empathy, and the constitution of the Objective world.\textsuperscript{52} He demonstrates how they are deeply intertwined as the other exists for me, but I also exist for the other, because we \textit{co-experience} the world, that the so-called Objective world is constituted. The world is constituted not only by me, but by \textit{us}; it is co-constituted. In this particular paragraph, Husserl mentions the constitution of objects like “books, tools, works of any kind.”\textsuperscript{53} He does not mention a phantasy object like the inner song. The question for me is therefore: how could a phantasy object be co-experienced? To answer that question, I have to go back to the notion of \textit{alter ego}. As \textit{alter},

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{50} I actually spend a lot of time \textit{asking around} about the inner song, and I thank anybody who had the patience and generosity to listen and share with me about that topic.
  
  \item \textsuperscript{51} Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, “Fifth Meditation,” §42.
  
  \item \textsuperscript{52} Husserl writes: “Thus, the problem is stated at first as a special one, namely that of the ‘thereness-for-me’ of others, and accordingly as the theme of a \textit{transcendental theory of experiencing someone else}, a transcendental theory of so-called ‘empathy’. But it soon becomes evident that the range of such a theory is much greater than at first it seems, that it contributes to the founding of a \textit{transcendental theory of the Objective world} and, indeed, to the founding of such a theory in every respect, notably as regards Objective Nature. The existence-sense \textit{(Seinsinn)} of the world and of Nature in particular, as Objective Nature, includes after all, as we have already mentioned, thereness-for-everyone” (Cartesian Meditations, “Fifth Meditation” §43, p. 92).
  
  \item \textsuperscript{53} Idem.
\end{itemize}

the other is both the different and the similar, s/he is somebody who experiences an inner song that has a different content than mine, but s/he is also somebody who experiences an inner song that has the same structure as mine; the content of our consciousness might be different, it remains that its structure is identical. Thus, the inner song is not part of a common world, it is a phenomenon that can be commonly experienced in our respective consciousnesses; we can relate to one another because we have the same intimate experience in a different way. In this sense, the experience of this particular object of imagination can be compared to the experience of pleasure and pain.

As intersubjectivity is a key for me because of the interviews and the numerous dialogues with various people about the inner song, I must also ask the question of limit. At what point should I consider that I have gathered enough information to provide an accurate description? How do I integrate the infinite possibility of the variation in the description itself? Those two problems are related to the very heart of phenomenology: intentionality. In Ideas I §87, Husserl describes consciousness as a “consciousness of something”; every intentional act has two poles: the “I-pole” and the “object-pole.” There are two correlated elements: the “noesis” which is the intentional act, and the “noema” which is the intentional object. The noema is seized upon with horizon intentionalities, contributing to the givenness of the object without being actually thematized. The intentional analysis is then what distinguishes the object’s various layers of sense as well as the intentional relations they have; it aims to uncover the “potentialities ‘implicit’ in

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54 §87 of Ideas I, p. 212

55 §19 of the “Second Meditation” in Cartesian Meditations, pp. 45-46.
actuality of consciousness,”\textsuperscript{56} potentialities that are partly offered by the horizon. The actuality, given in the evidence, is the realization of these potentialities. It is “the experience of the agreement between what is meant (the emptily intended sense) and what is given (the fulfilling sense”\textsuperscript{57}). Raising the problem of limits means asking if the actualization, the realization of the intention, is possible. Husserl addresses these issues in his “Third Meditation” of his Cartesian Meditations, exploring the problem of constitution, and pointing out the fact that a world could be an “‘infinite idea’, related to infinities of harmoniously combinable experiences – an idea that is the correlate of the idea of a perfect experiential evidence, a complete synthesis of possible experiences.”\textsuperscript{58} This infinity of potentialities has to be taken into consideration in the phenomenological description, however, it doesn’t imply that the description cannot be completed; it just means that the phenomenologist closing the description of the phenomenon is aware of the potential developments of his or her work. In my own research I have to consider the possibility of experiences of the inner song, the possibility of eidetic variation, as \textit{potentially infinite}, as an \textit{endless task} of convergence toward a better inner song apprehended with always new eyes.\textsuperscript{59} This doesn’t mean that there is no possible definition of the inner song. It doesn’t mean that my description cannot be achieved. The analysis needs to include not only the object itself, but also the endless possibilities of the horizon of the given. However, I can produce an analysis of the inner song while integrating the fact that the intentional analysis

\textsuperscript{56} §20 of the “Second Meditation” in Cartesian Meditations, p.46.

\textsuperscript{57} Drummond, \textit{Historical Dictionary of Husserl Phenomenology}, p. 70.

\textsuperscript{58} §28 of the "Third Meditation" in Cartesian Meditations p.62.

\textsuperscript{59} To borrow a Nietzschean expression.
could be without end. Indeed, in the conclusion of this work I will have to point out the potential developments, highlighting the fact that they are not essential enough to be included in the present description.

§7. The Husserlian framework.

My research is primarily based on Husserl’s texts even if there is no specific text where one could find a phenomenological analysis of something like the inner song in the Husserlian corpus. All through my work, I produce my own description of the inner song using Husserl’s analyses of certain aspects of consciousness that are implied by an analysis of the inner song, or Husserl’s analyses of phenomena related to the inner song.

The introduction of the inner song as an object given in the phenomenological consciousness is mostly based on the Husserlian description of the epoché and of the structures of consciousness in Ideas 1 (1913). When the description focuses on the inner song as an object of phantasy, and as the counterpart of the actual song given in perception, the texts coming from Phantasy, Image-Consciousness, and Memory (1898-1925) are more often used. However, the grasping of the specificity of the ego perceiving the actual song and phantasizing the inner song build on Husserl’s analysis of the ego in Ideas 2 (1912-1917). Ideas 2 continues to be the main reference as the description moves to the problem of the constitution of the musical instrument as an object like any other object [Körper] and the musician’s Body as a particular type of living Body [Leib]. Then, when it comes to the description of the apprehension of the musical instrument, with the melody as one of its possibilities, the Husserlian references are mostly from Analysis Concerning the Active and Passive Synthesis (1920-1926) as well as On the
Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1904-1905), and Studien der Struktur des Bewusstseins (1908-1915). These three texts remain the reference until the end of the dissertation, in the last chapters focusing more specifically on the problem of time. The only added Husserlian resource is Experience and Judgement (1938).

The diversity of that corpus illustrates the constant effort to relate specific aspects of the inner song to specific Husserlian developments. It requires being able to juggle the evolutions of Husserl’s notions across time and engage at a deeper level with the various interpretations of these texts within the phenomenological tradition. As for my own work, I remain mostly faithful to the European, and more specifically the French speaking interpretation, in which I became familiar with Husserl.

§8. Phenomenology of music beyond Husserl.

After Husserl himself comes the development of a phenomenology specifically oriented toward music. Apart from Alfred Schütz, who deals more with the social aspect of playing music and is therefore not truly relevant for me, Roman Ingarden is one of the major representatives of this tendency. In his primary study, he details what are the essential features required to consider an object a work of art, focusing primarily on the literary work of art. After that, he develops his theory of the musical object, describing it as a purely intentional object having its “source of being in the creative acts of the composer and its ontic foundation in the score,” thus adopting the ontological point of

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60 If I extend my analysis to the performance of the inner song in the future, then my work might intersect with his project, however for now it does not really intersect with my description.

61 Ingarden, *The Ontology of the Work of Art*, p. 91.
view. In her paper on “Sense and limit of the ontological analysis in the aesthetics of Ingarden,” Patricia Limido-Heulot points out the limits of this approach, demonstrating how Roman Ingarden, stuck in the ontological analysis of the aesthetic object, does not take into consideration the constitution of the phenomenon, which is the main focus of my research. She shows how Ingarden’s approach leaves two questions open: first, how the concretization of the object happens; and second, what about the variations of the concretizations? How can a variation of intentional objects be constituted based on the same work of art?62 My intention is to address those two questions demonstrating how: the description of the inner song explains how the concretization happens on the one hand, and on the other hand, how the very essence of the phenomenon explains the variations of concretizations. In addition to this, given that I consider the inner song mainly an immanent object in consciousness, I have a limited consideration for the transcendental object which is part of Ingarden’s definition of the musical object.

After Ingarden, phenomenology of music further developed with Giovanni Piana in the 90’s in Italy. In his main work Filosofia della Musica, Piana proposes a general reflection on music through four chapters: “Content,” “Time,” “Space,” and “Symbol.” Here, the chapter on time as well as the chapter on symbol are particularly useful for me.63 Indeed, Piana situates his reflection on time in the Husserlian tradition, including the notion of stream of consciousness and the question of the articulation and the duration of the musical phenomenon in his reflection. He also reflects on the question of imagination and the sense of music defining imagination as a synthesis of association like


63 Chapter 2 of Piana, Filosofia della Musica.
in the Husserlian tradition. However, my approach differs from his: my focus is not on music in general but on the constitution of a very specific musical phenomenon in consciousness, I anchor my description in a stricter Husserlian framework starting with the epoché, and finally, I predominantly use the technical vocabulary from Husserl’s works.

Lastly, I want to mention a recently published book entitled *A Phenomenology of Musical Absorption*, by Simon Høffding. This is probably the closest current initiative to what I am doing in the phenomenological branch. Høffding is indeed the only other scholar that I am aware of working by interviewing musicians and studying the practice of music from a phenomenological point of view. Our two research topics seem to intersect. Indeed, he deeply analyses some situation that I mention in a more superficial way (for example, the problems of attention, absorption, agency, etc.). On the contrary, I focus on the problem of imagination that he mentions several times but does not really address. In his work, he uses close interviews with the Danish String Quartet, and other musicians. It allows him to describe the phenomenon of music absorption, and how the senses and consciousness are altered by it. This leads him to elaborate a reflection on the self, the sense of agency, and the notion of mastery (between letting go and controlling).

Although I share the use of interviews, Simon Høffding uses qualitative research in a more rigorous way than I do. Indeed, he conducts semi-structured interviews, but with...

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64 For instance, he writes in *A Phenomenology of Musical Absorption*: “It is as if my head is always partially ahead of what I am doing...and then it is as if the body is more in the now, such that I have an imagination of what I want to do and then the body brings forth that which I have imagined” (p. 50), quoting a musician. “I imagine a colour and then it emerges, while if I focus technically...bowing faster, vibrating slower...I imagine the colour and then the technical sub-elements fall into place automatically” (p. 59). Or: “Frederik Ø, while playing a specific passage, can imagine how he might want to play that same passage in a different way later on” (p. 76).
one specific chamber music ensemble, whereas I meet as many musicians as I can; he uses the “case study methodology” developed by Bent Flyvberg and analyzes data in a way that is close to “theoretical reading” (Kvale and Brinkmann), whereas I use my interview material differently, relying first on my own experience, and then enlarging my perspective through listening to others (which leads me to the particular writing format that I already mentioned in this introduction). In addition to a divergence of method, we also investigate the notion of the self in dissimilar ways. While I focus solely on the inner consciousness and the formation of the inner song within consciousness, his work focuses on the performance and the intersubjective aspect of music.

§9. Additional resources.

As I am talking about a musical phenomenon, I need to mention the field of aesthetics as well. In 1735, Baumgarten introduced aesthetics as a branch of philosophy and, after two previous definitions, he ended up defining it with these words: “Aesthetics (the theory of the liberal arts, lower gnoseology, the art of thinking beautifully, the art of the analog of reason) is the science of sensitive cognition.” The field addresses notions like aesthetic object, aesthetic judgement, aesthetic attitude, or aesthetic experience. My own approach differs from this: first, because I am not trying to evaluate music as it functions within a system of fine arts, and second because I am not trying to analyze music as an

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66 As I said, intersubjectivity is part of my concern, especially because of my methodology, but it not central.

art. Indeed, I do not really address “music” as such, I address a specific musical phenomenon. In my description of the inner song, I do not focus on the question of beauty, or the question of judgement, essential to the concept of aesthetics. Finally, I also do not situate my description in a specific context, a specific time or place. On the contrary, I argue that the essential structures of the inner song are not imposed by a particular context, they are necessary and universal, and that is why I interview musicians from any horizon. For this reason, a consequence of this argument is the second claim according to which there is an inner song in play in any musical performance, whether I am performing music in Europe with a violin, or in Korea with a Gayakun, whether I perform folk music learned through the oral tradition or classical music passed on through scores, whether I play music now or two hundred years from now. In this sense, as long as the music is cantabile, there is an inner song, and this inner song is defined by the essential structures that I describe in my dissertation.

My approach also differs from psychology of musical consciousness. From the Logical Investigations, Husserl developed his understanding of phenomenology, distinguishing it from psychology. Later, in Ideas I, he demonstrates how, even if both psychology and phenomenology address an object in consciousness, the later differs from the first thanks to the epoché. Indeed, through his critique of Brentano, Husserl demonstrates how psychology still belongs to the natural attitude, postulating the existence of the transcendental world, thus describing the object subjectively, whereas

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68 And in this sense can lead me to take into consideration the secondary passivities mentioned by Husserl.

69 On the notion of cantability cf the little essay by the music director Christophe Schlüren, “Cantability.”
phenomenology can seize upon the object as itself, as phenomenon with its necessary and universal essential structures, thus being authentically scientific and objective. In my dissertation I am not trying to describe the subjective experience of the inner song, but the essential structures of the inner song, how the phenomenon is constituted in consciousness necessarily and objectively; my approach is therefore distinct from psychology.

Finally, as the inner song is made of sound, my work would supposedly belong to the interdisciplinary field of “sound studies.” It is a broad field, therefore very inclusive. However, this field tends to take any sound into consideration, exploring therefore the question of the production and the reception of sound through hearing or technology, and taking into consideration the sound in its environment (space and time). If my research is interdisciplinary, and for sure includes a reflection on hearing necessary at least to explain the perception of sound, it differs from other already existing works. First, the inner song is a very specific kind of sound: it differs from sounds that are perceived, it differs from sounds that are memorized, it differs from any sound that is close to an illusion. Then, I am using a specific method which is the phenomenological method: I am not describing a sound transcendental to consciousness, but rather an immanent sound. In other words, my research differs from what already exists because it is a phenomenological description of a phenomenon of phantasy. However, despite that difference, the field of sound studies still helps me to figure out the technical aspect of the sense of hearing, and therefore of hearing the inner song. Two of the various important resources are *Reason and Resonance: A History of Modern Aurality*, by Erlman Veit, and *Sound and Hearing* by Steven Stanley.
In summary, I tend to engage more with music performance, or even more generally performance studies, than with any other field touching upon musical topics. In this field, I must mention the very distinct attempt to create a phenomenology of music performed by the Romanian conductor Sergiu Celibidache. His opus Über musikalische Phänomenologie, as well as other writings and claims supported in his master classes testify to an attempt, from the musical side, to reconcile music performance and phenomenology. This approach has been continued by his disciples from the musical as well as from the philosophical side: Patrick Lang (his former student and the former student of Marc Richir, currently Director of the Philosophy Department of the Centre Atlantique de Philosophy of Nantes), Daniel Gazon (Director of Orchestra), Christoph Schlüren (Director of Orchestra), Konrad Von Abel (Director of Orchestra who is holding master classes in phenomenology of music), are all maintaining a unique tradition within the musical and phenomenological worlds. Although I am interested in this work as well, and its musical descriptions inform my own description, my work remains distinct from that of Celibidache. If Celibidache uses some Husserlian notions like the notion of “phenomenon,” or “reduction,” he provides a very personal definition of these concepts far from the original Husserlian definition. In contrast, I intend to remain close to the Husserlian framework and modify the definitions as little as possible. I also elaborate on a unified phenomenon that Celibidache may mention in other terms but does not work on as such. Besides this particular resource I am aware of an extensive literature in music which is useful to understand the inner song. During the interviews, it is not rare to hear musicians mentioning books on music practice or performance arts. These books have been very helpful because they complete whatever the musicians are
saying. Indeed, they are part of these musicians’ teaching tradition, part of their individual history, thus influencing their way of thinking, who they are as musicians, and how they constitute their imaginative world. They also represent other first-person testimonies I can rely on. Among the classics mentioned by musicians in the French tradition I would quote Constantin Stanislavski’s books on the work of the actor. Even if it is written for actors, this book is used by many musicians, especially in interpretation, to learn how to embody their music, to feel what the score calls them to feel. I use it for my research because it explains how to develop imagination, enrich the vision of a piece of music, and feel the emotions that it produces instead of faking them on stage. Among the English language references given by musicians I met in Pittsburgh, I would mention Thomas Carson Mark’s *Motion, Emotion, Love: The Nature of Artistic Performance*, and Stephen Nachmanovitch’s *Free Play: Improvisation in Life and Art*. These two books enter into the heart of music artistry. They teach musicians how to technically enhance their music practice, and free themselves within the rules imposed by the music and the technique of the instrument. I use them in my research because they explain the backstage of music improvisation, more particularly demonstrating how imagination is not free from structure but follows a certain number of rules. Those references help me with the description of the emotional side of the inner song.

§10. Writing format.

I want to close this introduction by saying some words on the particular writing format of the present dissertation.
Within the main text, each chapter has three elements: specific citations of the interviews, a first-person description, and finally the phenomenological description itself. This is a late decision that organically appeared as necessary in the later stages of the writing of this dissertation. It is originally inspired by the reading of Natalie Depraz, *Lucidité du Corps*, in which each chapter starts with five to ten italicized lines describing a daily life experience leading to the actual phenomenological analysis. Following that example, my description of the inner song provides specific citations from interviews, and first-person experience descriptions, before the actual phenomenological work. The interviews are framed and the literary descriptions are italicized, while the scientific description is in a standard writing style. The intent is to distinguish two types of discourse (a philosophical from a non-philosophical), underline the role of the interviews and the first person experience as an important source of inspiration for the actual phenomenological description, and highlight the scientific nature of the Husserlian corpus.

In addition to that main work, my dissertation offers a large appendix composed of the various interviews. This appendix aims to highlight the practical aspect of gathering information on the inner song, which led to the theoretical description of the phenomenon, as well as the importance that I give to discussing the matter with others to write about it. It also shows the development over ten years of work on the inner song. As was said earlier, the interviews were first constituted as a digital archive accessible with this link: [http://www.ellenmoysan.com/](http://www.ellenmoysan.com/), however, joining a printed version of it to my dissertation highlights its weight in the research process, and introduces it as a potential project in its own right.
Notions related to the Description of the Inner Song
Actual song: The phenomenological object constituted in consciousness through listening to the performance. The actual song is made of two co-constituted elements: the musical instrument, and the melody; this co-constitution allows the performance to be given as my performance.

Inner Instrument: The reproduction of the perceivable musical instrument in phantasy; it is one of the two co-constituted elements of the inner song.

Inner Melody: The phantasized melody; it is one of the two co-constituted elements of the inner song.

Inner Rhythm: An auto-affection given through primal-sensation. It gives the pre-egoic temporality through a kinaesthetic synthesis of the biological rhythms like the heartbeat and the respiration.

Inner Song: In the broader sense of the word, the inner song is the phantasy object reproducing the possible perception of the realization of the inner song in performance. It is made of two co-constituted elements: the inner instrument and the inner melody. It belongs to the trained consciousness of the musician, it can lead to composition, improvisation, or interpretation, and it is phantasized with the intention of being played.

There can be several declinations of that inner song which require a distinct type of phenomenological analysis. First, the inner song that is phantasied during practice or rehearsal, so that the actual song is being played alongside the phantasy (this is the focus of the present dissertation). Second, the inner song that is phantasied during the final performance. Third, the inner song that is usually played in reality, but the playing is not immediate to the experience of the phantasied inner song (for instance, when an interpreter imagines playing a song while having a walk, and plays the song later, or a
composer who imagines several renditions, but only plays it after deciding on a particular one). Fourth, the inner song that is intended but, for whatever reason, is not ever actually played. I will be focusing of the inner song of the practicing musician rehearsing and playing the inner song immediately.

**Melody:** The sonorous musical object co-constituted with the *musical instrument* in the field of perception of the phenomenological consciousness of the musician, but would be apprehended and constituted as a mere sonorous object for the audience who is not performing it. It is distinct from the *sound* of the *musical instrument*. The term “melody” does not have the meaning that it has in music theory, the *melody* can here be melodic as well as harmonic.

**Musical Instrument:** The transcendent perceivable musical instrument.

**Musician:** In the present description, it is the synonym of the practicing musician, the one rehearsing and apprehending both the *actual song* and the *inner song* given in the phenomenological consciousness. It is distinct from the *performer*.

**Musician’s Attitude:** The particular phenomenological attitude which the musician takes on during a practice session or a rehearsal. In this attitude, the musician grasps the *inner song* and the *actual song*, in order to verify the inner song through its *realization* and evaluate how the *actual song* realizes the *inner song*.

**Musician’s Body:** The phenomenological Body [*Leib*] constituted through the transcendent perception of the *musical instrument*. It is made of several layers of kinaesthetic sensations as well as some particularly developed aspects of the body (specific muscles, calluses on the fingers for the string instruments, throat muscles for the
wind instruments, etc.). Among the various organs of that Body, I single out the **natural voice** which plays an essential role in the realization of the inner song.

**Musician’s intention:** The specific intention seizing upon the **inner song** as a succession of phantasies incorporating the corresponding **actual song**.

**Natural Attitude:** The particular attitude which the musician is in before the *epoché*. In this attitude, the musician is absorbed in the perception (for instance, the movements performed on the instrument, but also any kind of other perception of the natural world on hand).

**Untrained voice:** The embodied voice which is constituted through a synthesis of perception between feeling the voice in the Body and hearing it through the ear.

**Performance:** The final representation in front of an audience.

**Performer:** The musician performing on stage in front of an audience.

**Performer’s Attitude:** The particular phenomenological attitude which the musician is in during the final **performance** in front of an audience. In this attitude, the musician is absorbed in listening to the **inner song** in order not to fail the **performance**. There is as little as possible of this back and forth between the **inner song** and the **actual song**.

**Phantasy Body:** The Body through which the musician phantasizes the **inner song**, feeling the **musical instrument**, the distance of the moves, the tensions, etc. It is made of several layers of kinaesthetic phantasms. Among the various organs of that Body, I single out the **phantasy voice** which plays an essential role in the realization of the inner song.

**Phantasy voice:** The voice through which the musician sings the **inner song** to him- or herself. This voice is part of the constitution of the phantasy Body. It both temporalizes
and spatializes the inner song as it provides the temporal continuity as well as the flesh of the inner melody.

Primal-Phantasy [Ur-Phantäsie]: The now of the inner song corresponding to the coincidence between the present beat of the inner pulse and a particular moment of the unfolding of the inner song.

Realization [Realisierung]: The process through which the musician works on performing the inner song through the musical instrument. It implies a structure of reference between the inner song and the actual song as respectively the model [Vorbild] and the image [Abbild], and the apprehension of one through the other.

Sound: The specific voice of the musical instrument which both belongs to the instrument itself and is issued by the musician. It is the result of a particular encounter between the instrument and the musician.

Technique: The acquired capability to play a specific musical instrument. It is constituted thanks to the retaining of the kinaesthetic sensations. It is a system of appearances and includes possibilities of new appearances in perception.

Trained voice: The voice as the musical instrument of the singer.

World of the Inner Song: The phenomenological world in which the inner song and the actual song are given as correspondent, the first one in phantasy, and the second one in perception.
Chapter 1: *Accessing the Inner Song through the Epoché* ⁷⁰

⁷⁰ I want to thank Pedro Antonio Reyes Linares who offered me some of his time to figure out the various difficult questions of this chapter. I am extremely grateful for this fruitful and thought-provoking collaboration.
The *inner song* is the musical phantasy of what the musician would like to perform with the musical instrument. In other words, it is the phantasy representation of the perceivable possible performance. As the musician realizes it in rehearsal, the musician can hear what is played, and a second object is given phenomenologically: the *actual song*.

During a music practice session, the musician grasps the inner song by paradoxically disengaging from the natural world in which s/he plays the musical instrument, in order to engage fully in the phenomenological world in which the inner song and its perceivable counterpart are given. In the present chapter, I will investigate the distinction between natural and phenomenological world, analyze the two attitudes that lead to them, and introduce the notion of *musician’s attitude* which gives the inner song and its perceivable counterpart phenomenologically. This will lead me to show how the natural attitude is the ground of the phenomenological attitude.
§1. The natural attitude as a starting point.

§2. The various layers of perception in the natural attitude.

§3. The natural attitude gives a world for me.

§4. The world of the inner song as opposed to the natural world.

§5. The natural world as a noisy world.

§6. The role of attention.

§7. Simultaneous presence of the natural world and the inner song world.

§8. Disconnection between the natural world and the other worlds.

§9. Continuity in the givenness of the world in the natural attitude.

§10. A gesture of suspension and not negation of the world.

§11. The epoché as the opening of a new region of consciousness.

§12. The epoché as a praxis.
X. G. : Celui qui joue faux est en fait quelqu’un qui soit ne se chante pas ce qu’il va jouer, soit qui ne s’écoute pas. Ce peut-être parce qu’il est trop concentré sur le geste à produire et qu’il n’arrive pas à faire deux choses à la fois, ou qu’il pense en termes de place du doigt et non en termes de note à entendre. Il n’écoute donc pas ce qu’il fait et se contente de mettre le doigt sur le bon emplacement. Il peut aussi avoir une difficulté à entendre les sons les uns par rapport aux autres, il faut alors travailler sur la voix et l’oreille.

*Interview with Xavier Gagnepain (Cellist, French, Paris, France, 12.04.2010)*

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E. M. : Comme l’indique l’expression, le chant intérieur relève du domaine de l’intime. Que pourriez-vous nous dire de ce lieu où il habite ?

C. B. : Le chant intérieur trouve sa source dans l’être intérieur auquel on a accès par l’écoute de soi-même et l’observation, non pas une observation narcissique de soi mais par un regard interne.

E. M. : Quelle importance revêt cette intimité dans l’expression instrumentale ?

C. B. : Le plus important est de s’orienter, de s’ancrer à l’intérieur. C’est la condition première pour exprimer ensuite quelque chose de consistant, mais aussi pour être conscient de ce qu’on est en train de jouer. Plus on s’intériorise plus on est conscient de l’extérieur.

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E. M. : Qu’est-ce qui pourrait venir limiter l’expression du chant intérieur ?
C. B. : Et bien le fait de n’être préoccupé que de l’extérieur, entièrement tendu vers un « je fais », plus que vers un « comment je vais faire ». Cette accumulation d’activité empêcherait alors de s’intérioriser et de développer quelque chose. Mais en principe je ne pense pas qu’il y ait des limites à l’expansion du chant intérieur.

*Interview avec Claire Bernard (Violinist, French, Paris, France, 02.27.2012)*

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E. M. : Pourtant on désire parfois bien jouer, on a une idée de ce qu’on veut faire, et on n’y arrive pas. Le résultat est décevant.

A.-M. M.: Dans ce cas je dirais que c’est une autoprotection de ne pas s’écouter : on préfère être sourd plutôt que d’affronter la différence énorme entre ce qu’on voudrait jouer et ce qu’on joue réellement. On ne s’entend pas. Il y a donc un effort d’écoute intérieure à faire pour résoudre cela. Il faut équilibrer en permanence nos deux écoutes, la première projection venant de l’écoute intérieure suivie quasi simultanément par l’écoute extérieure qui nous permet d’aller au plus près de notre désir en adaptant la bonne énergie du geste.

E. M. : Il s’agit bien d’une écoute « intérieure ».

A.-M. M. : Oui, dans la mesure où pour y accéder il faut rentrer en soi, puis se laisser conduire. Elle vient dans la paix intérieure, pas dans l’agitation.

*Interview avec Anne-Marie Morin (Violinist, French, Paris, France, 03. 03. 2012)*

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P. P.: It is almost like you are singing it in your mind to yourself, beforehand. It is sort of striving for the ideal. A lot of times, it is just about the sound, the intonation, the tone quality, the quality of the sound.
E. M.: Do you think there is also a mood?

P. P.: Maybe a little bit but it is more about, “how can I give the impression of this mood”, not so much that I am feeling that mood. You want to do what you can with whatever control you have over your music making, to give the impression of this mood, this atmosphere.

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E. M.: So it is interesting because you have a kind of double ear: one that listens to what you have inside you, and another that focuses on the surroundings.

P. P.: Yes.

E. M.: You are always commuting between the two.

P. P.: Yes. Eventually, after studying for a long enough, you sort of need to become your own teacher. So you have to be good at doing the playing and also having the one ear over across the room being the teacher listening to yourself. You need this double hearing. It is probably related in a way to the idea of anticipation. It is another kind of double hearing, not just the anticipation that we talked about before, where you do a sort of pre-hearing in your own mind, but it is more like when you are playing to be able to be honest with yourself and to have one ear being objective and removed in a way from what you are working–listening and playing—you’re trying to have a beautiful sound and whatever and the other ear is here there listening and thinking :”hm, that part went well but that next part wasn’t so good”.

E. M.: So a critical instance?

P. P.: Yes. And hopefully in a good way. But honest with yourself.

Interview with Philip Pandolfi (Oboist, English, Pittsburgh, PA, USA, 02. 17. 2016)
M. D. : Qu’il aille [l’élève] chercher au fond de lui son chant intérieur, quelque chose de vrai pour lui.

Interview with Marianne Dumas (Cellist, French, Pittsburgh, USA, 11.07.2016)


M. T. : Personnellement je ne m’interdis pas la parole, le chant. Papa fait pareil, et même plus que moi, cela nous arrive à tous les deux de lire, de travailler une partition, et à un moment donner de travailler un son, de donner une sorte de rendu de ce qu’on a dans la tête pour accompagner notre représentation. Ce n’est pas un silence absolu du type : je me tais et je me force à entendre à l’intérieur. De temps en temps je commence à me chanter ce que je lis, à donner un peu de force à un accent, à vocaliser une mélodie par des onomatopées ou autres.

E. M. : Ça c’est un premier type de silence (chanter ou ne pas chanter en lisant), un silence extérieur. Mais il y a un autre type de silence, non plus extérieur mais intérieur.

M. T. : Tout à fait ! Les deux n’ont d’ailleurs rien à voir. Le silence extérieur joue pas mal dans notre travail de la partition.

E. M. : Comment cela ?
M. T. : Et bien par exemple en ce moment je vis dans un appartement où il y a pas mal de travaux et cela peut me distraire. Mais ce qui distrait encore plus c’est une autre musique par exemple. Ça c’est encore pire.


M. T. : Finalement le pire ennemi de l’écoute intérieure, du chant intérieur, c’est peut-être une musique autre que celle que l’on est en train de travailler.

E. M. : Pourquoi ? C’est une question de concentration ?

M. T. : Oui. Et c’est aussi parce que lorsqu’on a l’oreille absolue, dans la mesure où l’oreille absolue fonctionne un peu comme un aimant, notre oreille est attirée par les autres hauteurs de sons que l’on entend.

E. M. : C’est vrai. Votre père me disait d’ailleurs qu’il trouvait les musiques de fond dans les hôtels assez insupportables à cause de cela.

M. T. : Tout à fait. On est attiré, on entend tout, c’est vraiment rare qu’on soit totalement passif et du coup les mélodies de fond peuvent être très fatigantes.

E. M. : Et les bruits aussi ?

M. T. : Si les sons, les bruits n’ont pas de hauteur de notes identifiable, si ce ne sont pas des notes « do-ré-mi-fa-sol-la-si-do », c’est moins gênant. Il y a vraiment une échelle. Cela me fait penser à un livre assez amusant qui s’appelle Petit éloge des amoureux du silence de Jean-Michel Delacomptée[2], un petit pamphlet où l’auteur s’insurge contre le bruit quasi-permanent de notre vie quotidienne, et la quasi impossibilité d’un vrai silence. Le vrai silence n’existe pas, n’existe plus, et il a des tas d’anecdotes à raconter à ce propos : il parle du volume des réacteurs d’un avion, des engins de la Propreté de Paris pour aspirer les feuilles qui font plein de bruit, et il
rappelle quels sont les seuils de douleur grave, de douleur modérée. On s’aperçoit alors qu’il y a beaucoup de bruits qui sont élevés et dérangeants.

E. M. : Oui tout à fait. Cela veut dire que pour entendre ce chant intérieur il y a tout un travail de préparation qui est requis, afin d’avoir en soi ce silence qui permettra l’émergence du « chant intérieur » comme entité distincte. Pour moi il a été très long d’apprendre à vraiment écouter la note avant de la jouer.


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M. T. : Dans la phase de préparation ce n’est donc pas le silence absolu. Il y a aussi une part d’écoute, d’enregistrement.

E. M. : De toute façon ce serait naïf, ce serait une lecture naïve d’aborder l’œuvre sans aucune connaissance.

M. T. : Tout à fait. Ce serait un peu artificiel. Surtout aujourd’hui ! C’est en cela que le travail de chef a pas mal évolué. Il y a eu une époque où il s’agissait de faire jouer un orchestre dont aucun des musiciens n’avait entendu l’œuvre avant : soit parce qu’elle venait d’être écrite (et cela arrive encore aujourd’hui parce qu’on continue de créer des œuvres), soit parce qu’il n’y avait pas de radio, ni tous les moyens de retransmission que l’on a aujourd’hui, et, même si c’était l’œuvre d’un grand compositeur, elle avait été jouée dans telle ville ou telle autre ville, mais pas plus. Le travail du chef était alors un travail d’enseignement. A cette époque c’était plus important d’avoir une représentation intérieure. Aujourd’hui c’est plus facile.

Interview with Maxime Tortelier (Conductor, French, Paris, France, 07. 06. 2017)

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E. M.: In Augustine’s *Confessions*, in the third chapter, when he’s a student, there’s this wonderful transition from the outer man, enjoying his life in Carthage and then suddenly he realizes that God is inside of him and has this change in his life, from the outside to the inside. For me, that was what changed things: when instead of focusing on the score outside, I started to have this reverse movement. And what is fascinating about Augustine is that he discovers God by listening. I think it’s this capacity to be inside of yourself that makes a difference to you. That’s why it’s not necessarily a question of age. It’s like dwelling on yourself.

E. F.: It is the journey of honestly knowing yourself. Our Chapel Choir sings a song, *O Beauty Ever Ancient*, based on St. Augustine’s *Confessions*. The students identify with the text very thoughtfully and prayerfully.

E. M.: That’s exactly the passage, where it says, *I was outside and You were inside of me*. The condition for him to create this intimacy with Him was to go inside and listen.

E. F.: In our society and culture today, many people hear sounds, but they don’t listen. There needs to be a time for quiet, there needs to be time for prayer. It is not a matter of quantity, but more important quality. In working with college students, I see some students spending time in the chapel and some feel that the quantity of time is better and “demonstrates” their devotion. I cannot say they are they are wrong. They are on their journey. It is for them a pilgrimage journey and they have to go through it.

E. M.: I think it’s also a certain understanding of religion. I think the key is this: listen. Augustine says, *Knowing is remembering. If you seek something, it’s because you had this experience before*. He says, *God was always there, that’s why I was*
seeking Him, because I had this experience before. But he needed to start listening.

And I think that’s what makes a musician too, it’s someone who is able to listen to this inner song, before actually starting to play, before performing.

E. F.: That moment before playing is important. I face a challenge every Sunday morning with Chapel Choir. My musical circumstances are good, but not perfect.

Sunday morning, the Chapel Choir arrives and we have a short time together to prepare. I must be extremely efficient in our preparations. After racing through our rehearsal time, I dash to the organ loft to play the prelude. Take a deep breath to center myself musically and spiritually…and then enter into my musical prayer. Sometimes the rush makes it difficult. I sometimes feel disappointed because I know it was not the quality I strive for. While over the years I can enter the “inner song” more quickly and efficient, it still requires an intentional and mindful effort.

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N. H.: In the end it always comes to actually playing it and soaking in the experience of it.

*Interview with Narek Hakhnazaryan (Cellist, Armenian, Pittsburgh, USA, 12.02.2019)*

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E. M.: I think, for me, the sacred silence would mean creating this space of openness and listening, creating this space when you gather with yourself, because we can be physically somewhere and mentally somewhere else.

E. F.: We do not practice silence well here, Increased silence in our liturgies would be beneficial. We have some, but I would like to have more.
E. M.: So you need this time of stepping back and preparing before actually saying something. I was watching a young French cellist the other day, playing Bach’s Suites, and he had his eyes closed the whole time, and you can see that he’s inside. If the music is so touching, it’s because there’s a conversion, you know.

E. F.: Music is very spiritual. There is a spiritual dimension among musicians who do not participate in organized religion. They find it in their lives. My religion is directly linked to my musical conversation.

E. M.: What do you think changes for us, in the music, if we engage spiritually in the liturgy?

E. F.: Without that connection, the music is not authentic. It does not have soul. It does not have that life. I have observed that with some choir choirs and musicians. I call it “on” and “off” approach to liturgy – like a light switch – on and off. The musicians prepare to make music. They turn “on” their music. It is all technique. They have perfect vowel sounds, exact accurate rhythm, clean diction and rehearsed to perfection. The music ends and they go into “off” mode. The achievement is notable, but not authentic. By embodying the spiritual and theological components, the music has a fuller and meaningful message that can be felt. It is higher dimension.

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E. M.: One bassoonist from the PSO told me, “For me the inner song is this breath that I take before playing” and I think it’s because you gather yourself, in one breath, and you channel things. That was an interesting transition for me: how, instead of listening to this song that you are playing with the cello, if you listen here, you will be more available to listen to what you’re actually playing. If
you connect with this inner song, then you also see the difference between what is here and what you are actually playing and you can learn. I think that’s what rehearsing is, reducing this difference between the inner music and outer music by going back and forth between I play – I hear – I want to do that differently, and progressively you reduce this difference. And the great musicians are the ones who have such a tiny difference between what they actually hear in the inner song and what they play. That’s why we have so many interpretations of the same piece.

E. F.: Yes, and they feel different to me, we receive them different. This “inner voice” is active when making music, but also active in receiving music. In our society we are bombarded with noise. I get in a car with various people and when the engine starts, the radio is playing. No one is intentionally listening to the sounds. During conversation, we need to talk louder than the radio volume. There is all this noise. It affects the conversation and communication. This constant commercial dimension has deadened the artistic experience with music. Many do not know how to listen to music. Listening is vital finding our “inner voice.” People hear sounds, but they are disassociated. Individuals sit in office cubicles with ear buds in their ears, hearing sounds, but “block out” the sounds so they can concentrate on something else. They have never learned to listen.

E. M.: Right. So two things come to my mind: first when Augustine says I was outside and You were inside, he was outside in the noise. When you listen to the voice of God, in order to listen to something, you have to be in a quiet place to be. That connects me to the Gospel when Jesus says, “When you want to pray, go in
your room, close the door”. And that’s the condition, I think, to hear this inner song.

E. F.: We hear a similar message in scripture when Elijah is searching for the presence of God. God is not in the wind, God is not in the earthquake, God is not in the fire. Elijah finds God in the gentle whisper. Scripture informs us and validates this experience. Thomas Merton wrote his Seven Story Mountain about conversion and his experience with self-actualization. He speaks of sacred silence and how it informs our soul. It is part of mysticism. It is getting rid of all the garbage, moving beyond our human defects and limitations. Achieving a state of mind that is authentic and true.

*Interview with Eugene Forish (Church Cantor, American, Pittsburgh, PA, USA, (02. 12. 2019)*
§1. The natural attitude as a starting point.

I am in the empty room of a Music School in Chartres. I am tired because I just came back from school. I am here by myself. I asked for the key downstairs at the entrance. They gave me the practice room from 4 to 6pm. I will rehearse alone until my teacher arrives for the weekly lesson. I brought my cello; it is the cello that used to belong to my grand-father. It is not easy to play but I know it well because I have been playing it for several years now. I like it a lot. I grew up with its sound performed by my favorite grand-father, the one who awaken the attraction for the cello for me.

There is nothing unnecessary in the room where I am: no decoration hanging on the wall, no window open to the outside, just a door with a blurred window, and four plain walls painted in an undetermined color. There is a piano; it is not the best one, but I can use it to tune my instrument. There are also a couple of music stands; I can take one of them to put my own scores. Finally, there is a table and a couple of chairs along the wall. I install the chair and the music stand in the middle of the room, leaving a space on my right for the chair that my teacher will use when she comes. Now, I am sitting in front of the door, there is the piano on my back. The door is closed. I put the music scores on the music stand, I sit with my cello, the neck of the instrument on my left side, the bow on my right hand. I am ready to play.

I am sitting in the middle of the room. I relax and close my eyes. I can experience the empty room of the music school, with no character, closed off from the world, belonging to me. I do not see it though; I just feel it around, or more precisely I have the feeling of being in the room. I can feel the cello against my chest. I can feel the weight of my right hand on the bow lying on the strings on the one hand, and the weight of my left
hand on the neck on my left side on the other hand. I rub the bow against the string, my eyes close to hear the sound better. Two senses are primarily at play, and they play together: I touch the cello and I hear the sound that it produces. In the background of that perception, I can smell the smell of the music room and hear the sound of the people passing on the corridor. I feel good. I am tired but being there with my cello gives me energy. I had school this morning. I am tired but I am also happy. Music gives me energy.

Husserl starts his introduction of phenomenology with the human being who is “living naturally, objectivating, judging, feeling, willing ‘in the natural attitude’”. Similarly, I want to begin my description of the inner song in the natural attitude, and from this describe how the musician practices a phenomenological epoché which gives access to the inner song given in consciousness as phenomenon.

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71 The sense of smell and taste are also active, but I set them aside because they do not have a definite role in the cello practice.

72 Ideas 1, §27, p. 51

73 Listening and describing the inner song as a phenomenologist requires two types of epoché: first, the phenomenological epoché bracketing the world as existent (this is the epoché practiced by the phenomenologist), and second, the epoché of the natural attitude happening during a performance session (this is the epoché practiced by the musician). As I am both describing the phenomenon and using my experience as a cellist to do it, I practice the two of them. However, as I explained at the beginning of this chapter, I focus more on the second one.

74 Dan Zahavi argues in his paper “Applied Phenomenology: Why is it Safe to ignore the Epoché,” that it is safe to ignore the epoché when it comes to non-philosophical applications of phenomenology. As I demonstrate in my paper “Grasping the Inner Song through the Method of the Phenomenological Epoché; From the Subjective Experience of the Object to its Eidetic Description” presented at the ICNAP 2021 conference, even if the description of the inner song is a case of application of phenomenology to a musical phenomenon, I consider the epoché as necessary. Indeed, I argue that the necessity of the epoché does not depend on the type of phenomenology that is practiced but on the object of the phenomenology itself.

If I go back to the music practice, I can observe that any performance, rehearsal, or even daily practice at home, starts with a moment of suspension necessary to grasp the inner song: the cellist sits and tries to hear the note to tune the instrument, the conductor raises his baton before starting the performance in order to let each musician hearing the proper note, the saxophonist breathes before
The Husserlian description of the *epoché* starts with the seizing upon of the natural subject. At this stage, the subject looks at himself: he goes from the perception of the world around him to the consciousness of himself perceiving the world around. This stage is also the first step in the process of the phenomenological reduction.\(^{75}\) Natalie Depraz, French contemporary phenomenologist, calls it a *psychological reduction*. She describes it as a reflective conversion, a “return of the perceiving subject to itself, that is, more precisely, to its acts of lived awareness stemming from the perceptual apprehension of a giving object.” \(^{76}\)

As I write the present dissertation, I am a writer describing the experience of listening to the inner song during a session of music practice (and when I refer to my personal case, describing the experience of listening to the inner song during a session of blowing into the instrument, the composer turns within to hear what he is searching, etc. I interpret this gesture as an *epoché*, thus arguing that even at the moment in which I am actually playing my cello, I need to practice an *epoché* if I want to listen to my inner song. If the inner song is grasped through an *epoché* by the musician, then its phenomenological description needs to start with the description of the *epoché* as well.

My description of the inner song starting with the description of a practical *epoché* follows Natalie Depraz’s footsteps. Depraz labels her approach as “transcendental empiricism” and defines it as “attention toward the experience under the *epoché*” (Depraz, *Lire plus sur Husserl: une Phénoménologie Expérientielle*. p. 11, p. 18 [my own translation]). The first expression indicates a type of philosophy that accesses the transcendental through the empirical. The second describes a method of access. From this very definition, it is clear that the *epoché* is a crucial element conditioning the whole analysis. Indeed, the attention toward the experience is conditioned by the *epoché*. For me as well, the attention toward the experience of the inner song is conditioned by the *epoché*, thus, I start my dissertation with the description of that suspension.

\(^{75}\) Here I need to underline a distinction between two concepts: the concept of *epoché* as a suspension on the one hand, and the concept of reduction on the other hand. The identity or distinction between the two is a complex question as sometimes Husserl uses them equally, and some other times he differentiates the *epoché* as a suspension from the reduction which could be understood as its effect. In my dissertation, I am going to keep the ambiguity and use *epoché* when I want to talk about the relationship between the subject and the world, and then reduction when it comes to the uncovering of the subject itself.

\(^{76}\) Depraz, “The Phenomenological reduction as a praxis,” p. 100.
cello practice). I can identify two experiences there: (1) the experience of the phenomenologist reading Husserl to understand the cellist’s experience, and (2) the experience of the cellist listening to the inner song. The phenomenological description of the inner song requires me to go back and forth between the two, reenacting my experience of playing the cello while sitting at my desk and trying to describe it. In the description of the inner song, I want to push aside my experience of reading Husserl and interpreting his text, in order to focus on the reenacting of the experience of playing cello: I am currently writing at my desk but from now on, I will understand by \textit{natural attitude}, the attitude in which I am when I play and practice the cello in my music school (the reenacted experience).

In the natural attitude discovered through the psychological reduction, I am an embodied subject in a perceivable world: I am feeling, willing, judging, etc. In this attitude, there is an immediacy with the world around. This immediacy stems from the way I relate to the world. Indeed, despite the mediacy of the senses, the world is paradoxically experienced as immediately present at hand. Paradoxically, the senses are \textit{not} \textit{mediately} relating me to the world, but \textit{immediately} relating me to the world. In other words, for Husserl the perceptual experience in the natural attitude is immediate.

In the natural attitude, when I turn my attention away from that world toward myself, I observe myself making the experience of: (1) a state of awareness of the subject for what is around, (2) the consciousness that this world around is endless in space and time, (3) the experience of a world made of objects that are distributed according to
where I am, and (4) the experience that I can do something with these objects,\(^{77}\) i.e., the experience of an *I can*.\(^{78}\)

§2. The various layers of perception in the natural attitude.

*Now I start rehearsing Saint Saens’s Swan. I perceive the sound issued by the instrument. In addition to what I immediately perceive, the world is present on hand with two infinite horizons of perceptions endlessly extended in space and time. The infinite horizon in space is made of the potentialities that I can perceive in the room where I am, such as the distant melody of the other people rehearsing, the steps in the corridor, and so on and so forth as I extend my understanding of my position in the space. The infinite horizon in time is made of temporal potentialities such as that music that I am about to play, the lesson to come with my professor, the sound that I want to produce, but also the remembering of the sound of the rehearsal yesterday at home, the sound of my grandfather playing cello in his office, this particular record of a cellist that I love and so on and so forth as I go deeper into the windings of my memory or of my future.*

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\(^{77}\) This experience of the *I can* has been then explored extensively by Merleau-Ponty. In her paper: “L’intercorporéité au-delà du ‘je peux,’” Paula Lorelle underlines how this possibility can designate the “logical possibility” of the presentation, the “actual possibility” of intuiting this possibility; the doxical possibility of the existence of an object as well as the possibility to manipulate it; or also the possibility of a *leib*-subject, related to a co-possible intersubjective world. Concerning the last two, she refers to Husserl, *Husserliana IV: Ideen zur einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*, p. 261-262. In the present paragraph, the *I can* refers to the possibility to apprehend and act on the objects around.

\(^{78}\) Husserl writes: “I am conscious of a world endlessly spread out in space, endlessly becoming and having endlessly become in time. I am conscious of it: that signifies, above all, that intuitively I find it immediately, that I experience it. By my seeing, touching, hearing, and so forth, and in the different modes of sensuous perception, corporeal physical things with some spatial distribution or other are *simply there for me*, ‘on hand’ in the literal or the figurative sense, whether or not I am particularly heedful of them and busied with them in my considering, thinking, feeling, or willing” (*Ideas 1*, §27, p. 51). I will come back to the problem of the “I can” several times in my dissertation, but more specifically in Chapter 5.
In *Ideas 1*, Husserl shows how perception includes three elements: the *perceived* which is what is immediately at hand (for instance, the bottom of my cello);\(^{79}\) the *co-perceived* which is given with the perceived (for instance, the rest of the bow that I am not touching but are still part of the object); and the *horizon* which is the background of the perception (for instance, the other objects given in this room where I am).\(^{80}\) Each layer presents a degree of clarity inferior to the previous one: the perceived is clearer than the co-perceived, which is clearer than the horizon of perception. Similarly, each one presents a degree of determinateness inferior to the previous one.

Despite the lack of clarity of some parts of the perception, Husserl argues that I have the possibility to bring into clarity something that was only part of the horizon, thus shifting the previous perceived into the cloud thanks to a different orientation of my attention.\(^{81}\) In this process, attention is the key mechanism that brings the perceived into the foreground or shifts it into the background.\(^{82}\) This is true in space: I can “bring” some objects in the room to clarity by paying attention to them. This is also true in time: I can “bring” some objects from my memory into the present. When attention brings an object

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\(^{79}\) The *perceived* implies the *a-perceived*, but I am going to address this problem when I will focus on the perception for itself, and not in the context of the description of the natural world.

\(^{80}\) Husserl writes: “What is now perceived and what is more or less clearly co-present and determinate (or at least somewhat determinate), are penetrated and surrounded by an *obscurely intended to horizon of indeterminate actuality*” (*Ideas 1*, §27, p. 52).

\(^{81}\) Husserl says: “I can send rays of the illuminative regard of attention into this horizon with varying results. Determining presentations, obscure at first and then becoming alive, haul something out for me; a chain of such quasi-memories is linked together; the sphere of determinateness becomes wider and wider, perhaps so wide that connection is made with the field of actual perception as *my central surroundings*” (*Ideas 1*, §27, p. 52).

\(^{82}\) Cf. § 6 of the present chapter on the problem of attention.
into the foreground, it associates things together, and new connections are made. The definition of perception is therefore more accurately a *net of perceptions*.

The three elements constituting perception (the perceived, the co-perceived, and the horizon), so clearly distinguished from one another in the Husserlian description are not *actually* so sharply distinct. For this reason, Husserl blurs the picture after having identified and distinguished sharply the various layers of perception: he shows how perceptions can be rather unclear, while the underlying structure which makes perceptions possible, the world, still remains clear. This allows him to underline how reality tends to be more obscure and indeterminate than what the language expresses through cuts and definitions. For instance, the horizon should be understood as a sum of potentialities that can or cannot be brought to actuality. These potentialities are “intuited possibilities”, “likelihoods”, and that even more as the world is infinite in time and space.

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83 Husserl pursues: “an empty mist of obscure indeterminateness is populated with intuited possibilities or likelihoods; and only the ‘form’ of the world, precisely as ‘the world,’ is predelineated. Moreover, my indeterminate surroundings are infinite, the misty and never fully determinable horizon is necessarily there” (*Ideas 1*, §27, p. 52).

84 This brings the question back to the problem of language in the phenomenological description. It is not the central focus on my reflection, I will not therefore address it here. However, I want to keep present the idea that there is a gap between the language of the description and the object of the description.

85 This question refers to Husserl’s theory of intentionality, and more specifically the problem of the synthesis of fulfilment in perception (cf. Chapter 2, §4 of the present dissertation). Already in the *Logical Investigations*, VI, §14, Husserl explains how the synthesis of perception is fulfilled by an intuition in which parts of the object are presented (directly perceived), whereas other parts of the objects are only apperceived (given as possibilities of perception). The “intuited possibilities” to which Husserl refers here are these potentiality that are involved in the appearance of the objects without being directly intuited, even if they can also be brought to actuality if they become the focus of the attention. As the notion of intentionality is a crucial one, I will return to it several times in the present dissertation in distinct moments of the description.
When it comes to time, potentialities are broken down into two states: the present (of the now), and the non-present (of the not present anymore and not present yet). The subject in the natural attitude experiences the world at hand temporally, i.e., in the present. The present at hand is also the known. As known, it is also alive. This present is experienced in a horizon of presence extended in two directions, behind, and in front of me, or in other words as the things that already passed, and things to come. The non-present is the unknown in the sense that it is not known in the present of the right now (interestingly enough the past is actually on the side of the unknown). It is also the lifeless.

Husserl argues that the temporal horizon is infinitely extended in the two directions. It does not mean that I have an infinite past behind me and an infinite future potentially coming, but it means that, because of the possibility of an infinite regress through the continuous modifications of protentions and retentions, the two directions have the ideal possibility of infiniteness even if it is not actually so. Similarly, with time

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86 As Husserl writes: “This world, on hand for me now and manifestly in every waking Now, has its two-sidedly infinite temporal horizon, its known and unknown, immediately living and lifeless past and future. In the free activity of experiencing which makes what is present intuited, I can trace these interrelations of the actuality immediately surrounding me.” (Ideas 1, §27, p. 52).

87 Husserl says: “The intuition of time that arises through original association is not yet an intuition of infinite time. It undergoes further development, and not only with respect to the past: it acquires an entirely new branch through the addition of the future. On the basis of the appearance of momentary memory, phantasy forms the representations of the future in a process similar to that by which, under the appropriate circumstances, we arrive at representations of certain new sorts of colors and sounds by following known relations and forms. In phantasy, we are able to transpose into other registers a melody that we have heard in a definite key and on the basis of a completely determined tonal species. In making such a transposition, it could very well happen that, proceeding from familiar tones, we would come to tones that we have never heard at all. So in a similar way phantasy forms – in expectation – the representation of the future out of the past. It is simply a mistaken view that phantasy is capable of offering nothing new, that it exhausts itself in the repetition of moments that have already been given in perception. Finally, as far as the full temporal representation – the representation of infinite time – is concerned, it is every bit as much a formation of conceptual representation as the infinite number series, infinite space, and the like” (On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, p. 14).
as it is the case with space, a shift of attention can present remote things to my experience by bringing them back into the now. Thus, I can play with the foreground or the background of my experience. I can experience the world presently at hand as well as some parts of the past or future horizon of that world. Attention is the mechanism which brings the background to the foreground or pushes the foreground to the background here as well.\textsuperscript{88} Finally, besides what Husserl already mentioned, I would like to add that this horizon is also constituted of unactualizable potentialities, i.e., all the elements that I forgot, cannot predict, do not perceive, but are still included there.

\section*{§3. The natural attitude gives the world for me.}

\emph{In the room in which I rehearse the cello, all the objects are meaningful to me: the music stand is the music stand that I use to support my music scores; this chair is the type of chair I need to play cello; the person coming in the room in about an hour is my cello teacher; the cello is my grand-father’s cello, and now mine, mine with this connection to a beloved. Nothing in this room stands there in a meaningless fashion. In some way, the world I have on hand is organized in a certain way by me, for me. I use the objects and see them according to who I am, with particular spatial and temporal extensions.}

Husserl describes the natural world as something known, alive. In a way, it seems to undergo changes: first, because it appears to me in different ways according to the focus of my attention, and second because I can produce changes on it.\textsuperscript{89} However,

\textsuperscript{88} Again, this notion is addressed in §6 of the present chapter.

\textsuperscript{89} In this specific context of \textit{Ideas 1}, §27, the question of my capacity to produce changes in the world refers to my capacity to experience object and manipulate them. This problem is related to Husserl’s transcendental idealism. Indeed, it raises the issue of the status of the experience of the object in
Husserl argues that it fundamentally does not change in the sense that it keeps a fundamental unity of identity. Indeed, the fundamental unity of the identity of the world is not altered, despite the fact that some objects are brought in the foreground or pushed in the background spatially or temporally through the mechanism of my attention, and despite the changes that I can operate in it.⁹⁰

The world offered to my perception has a fundamental unity of identity because it is a structure underlying all experiences and as such, it is not altered by any experience.⁹¹ This comes out in three ways. First, the world does not stop being “on hand” for me, i.e., it does not stop being the object of my “I can”. Second, I do not cease to be part of this world wherever I am situated in it. In other words, there is an alteration of my relationship with the world without any essential change concerning my position within it and without any essential change of the world itself. Third, as Husserl explains when he writes: “Moreover, this world is there for me not only as a world of mere things, but also

⁹⁰ Husserl writes: “In my waking consciousness I find myself in this manner at all times, and without ever being able to alter the fact, in relation to the world which remains one and the same, though changing with respect to the composition of its contents. It is continually ‘on hand’ for me and I myself am a member of it” (Ideas 1, §27, p. 53).

⁹¹ Husserl’s account on the notion of world already appears already in the Logical Investigations but is more developed in the later phenomenology of the Crisis. In the present context of §27 of ideas 1, Husserl speaks about the world as it is experienced in the natural attitude. It is a structure in the sense that it is the world in which I find myself, which is the background of my experiences, and as a consequence the condition of possibility of intentional acts. As this world as it is given in the natural attitude is the ground from which I perform the epoché which gives access to the ego and its ego life, it is also the ground from which I can have the experience of other worlds like the world of number, or in the present study, the world of the inner song.

In the present chapter, I work on the distinction between the natural world and the world of the inner song as a phenomenological world given in the musician’s attitude. In the next chapters, particularly in Chapter 2, §10, I will work on the distinction between the perceptual world, and the phantasy worlds. I will explain the distinction between the phenomenological world in which the actual song is given in perception, and the phenomenological world in which the inner song is given in phantasy.
with the same immediacy as a world of objects with values, a world of goods, a practical world,"⁹² the various contents⁹³ of this world are given to me. This means that the world appears to me according to who I am as a subject: it is not a world of general possibilities but a world of possibilities for me. In other words, despite the unity of the identity of the world, the world is not uniform: who I am colors the world according to what it represents for me and what I can do with it.

Then, the world is not only subjectively apprehended, but I can also use its objects in ways that are specific to me. Husserl explains this a little further: “I simply find the physical things in front of me furnished not only with merely material determinations but also with value-characteristics, as beautiful and ugly, pleasant and unpleasant, agreeable and disagreeable, and the like.”⁹⁴ In this quote, Husserl focuses on two ways to relate to the world: first, through my judgements and for this reason they carry a value for me; the judgement can be esthetic, a judgement of pleasure or pain etc.; and second, through the practical; according to what I can do or cannot do with them as Husserl says when he

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⁹² Ideas 1, §27, p. 53. In German, Husserl speaks about: “Wertwelt, Güterwelt, praktische Welt,” cf. Hua III, p. 58. He is simply saying that things in the world are more or less valuable for me, and because of that, I tend to be drawn to them or reject them. I apprehend them according to who I am and the feeling that I can hold toward them when they are presented to me. However, they cannot be reduced to that subjective apprehension, they also have an independence from the judgements and apprehensions that are related to them. Here also, the issue brings back to the problem of Husserl’s transcendental realism.

⁹³ The notion of “world content” is very broad. In the quotation above footnote 19, it translates the German “inhaltlichen Bestande.” This “content” can designate various types of world: “geistige Welt,” “Lebenswelt,” “Umwelt,” “Heimwelt,” “Welt der Normalität,” “Interessenwelt,” “Allwelt,” “Weltvernichtung,” “Verweltlichung,” “Weltlichkeit der Welt,” etc. Analyzing these contents is beyond the study I am able to lead in this chapter. However, on that question, cf. Bernet, La vie du sujet, and more specifically, the chapter on “The World,” pp. 93-118.

⁹⁴ Ideas 1, §27, p. 53.
writes: “Immediately, physical things stand there as Objects of use, the ‘table’ with its ‘books,’ the ‘drinking glass,’ the ‘vase’, the ‘piano,’ etc.”\textsuperscript{95}

These various ways to relate to the world demonstrate that it is not the case that things would first stand as they are (objectively), and then be apprehended in a certain way (subjectively).\textsuperscript{96} Objects in the world are never objectively given in the same way for everybody. Instead, they are always given subjectively as they appear to me. In other words, it is part of what they are to appear for a certain subject. They are therefore \textit{objective} in the sense that they are in the world and shared by everyone, but they appear to each person based upon the profiles that face them (perspective) along with values, uses, etc., which integrates subjectivity into how they appear.

This claim echoes a thesis already present in the \textit{Logical Investigations V}: consciousness is intentional, it is a consciousness \textit{of} something, and the world is a world for somebody.\textsuperscript{97} It means that, even in the natural attitude, perception always puts two elements in relation, two elements which take on a meaning according to each pole of the correlation. Thus, even before the phenomenological turn, still in the natural attitude, I always experience things \textit{in a certain fashion}, and things are always given \textit{for me} as a

\textsuperscript{95} \textit{Ideas 1}, §27, p. 53.

\textsuperscript{96} Husserl writes: “These value-characteristics and practical characteristics also belong \textit{constitutively to the Objects ‘on hand’ as Objects}, regardless of whether or not I turn to such characteristics and the Objects. Naturally this applies not only in the case of the ‘mere physical things,’ but also in the case of humans and brute animals belonging to my surroundings. They are my ‘friends’ or ‘enemies,’ my ‘servants’ or ‘superiors,’ ‘strangers’ or ‘relatives,’ etc.” (\textit{Ideas 1}, §27, p. 53).

\textsuperscript{97} Husserl’s \textit{Logical Investigations} propose three characteristics of consciousness: “1. consciousness as the entire, real (\textit{reelle}) phenomenological being of the empirical ego, as the interweaving of psychic experiences in the unified stream of consciousness; 2. Consciousness as the inner awareness of one’s own psychic experiences; 3. Consciousness as a comprehensive designation for ‘mental acts’, or ‘intentional experiences’, of all sorts” (\textit{Logical Investigations}, V, §1, p. 81).
specific subject, even other people. From this description comes out a certain vision of the subject in the natural attitude: the subject in the natural attitude is a subject who enters in contact with the world: (1) immediately, (2) through meaning and (3) receives it according to who s/he is.

This Husserlian description helps to clarify the experience I have as a cellist when I am playing in the room of the music school. The room is there for me, I can manipulate its objects, and these objects are not the same for me as they could be for somebody else. For instance, having this cello on hand does not mean the same as it means for somebody who would know neither how to use it nor to whom it used to belong. This particular cello is a cello with which I fight to play and produce the sound I want, as well as the cello of my grand-father who passed away. In this sense the instrument is also colored by the memory of my vacations at this particular house, of the sound of the cello distantly resonating from the office of my grand-father in the back of the house. It would not be apprehended on the same way by a strangers who did not have this experience. I apprehend it in a way proper to me, I therefore issue a sound from it, in a way that is also proper to me.98

§4. The world of the inner song as opposed to the natural world.

98 The question of the affective relationship with the instrument is a very interesting one. It is related to the notion of “touche” in French. I discuss this issue in the interview with Stéphane Finetti and in the interview with Anne-Marie Morin for instance (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entrevue-avec-anne-marie-morin-03-03-12-paris/).

In the present dissertation, I will come back to it in Chapter 5, when I explain how the constitution of the musical instrument in the impressional consciousness is involved in the constitution of the inner song in the reproductive consciousness, and how associations and affectivity are part of that constitution process.
As I play the Swan with my cello, I experience two distinct worlds: on the one hand the natural world that I perceive made of a cello, a chair, a sound, the particular smell of the music school rooms, and on the other hand the world of the inner song which is not given objectively through perception unless I sing or perform it with my instrument. I experience the first world with my senses, and the second one internally.

Husserl notices that I can relate to the world in other ways. I can let myself be absorbed by the world, but I can also in some way abstract from it in order to focus on other things. Husserl explores this possibility using the example of busying myself in the arithmetical world, a typical example of something that cannot be perceived. He writes: “I busy myself, let us say, with pure numbers and their laws: Nothing like that is present in the surrounding world, this world of ‘real actuality.’” In this case, I experience two very distinct worlds: on the one hand, a world that is “real” and on hand through perception, and on the other hand, a world that cannot be present in the surrounding real world

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99 *Ideas 1*, §28, p. 54.

100 Husserl speaks about reality distinguishing in German: “das Reales,” and “das Reell.” These terms refer to Husserl’s account on the immanence and the transcendence, in the understanding of reality. *Real* refers to objects of nature, whereas *reel* refer to non-intentional objects: “By the real phenomenological content of an act we mean the sum total of its concrete or abstract parts, in other words, the sum total of the partial experiences that really constitute it. To point out and describe such parts is the task of a pure descriptive psychological analysis operating from an empirical, natural-scientific point of view. Such analysis is in all cases concerned do dismember what we inwardly experience as it in itself is, and as it is really (*reell*) given in experience, without regard either to genetic connections, or to extrinsic meaning and valid application. Purely descriptive psychological analysis of an articulated sound-pattern finds only sounds and abstract parts of unifying forms of sounds, it finds no sound-vibrations or organs of hearing etc.; it also never finds anything that resembles the ideal sense that makes the sound-pattern to be a name, nor the person to whom the name may apply. Our example suffices to make our intention clear. The real (*reell*) contents of acts are of course only known through descriptive analysis of this kind. That obscurities of intuition or inadequacies of descriptive conception – faults, in short, of method – may lead to much ‘manufacture’ of sensation (to use Volkelt’s phrase) cannot be denied. This, however, only concerns the legitimacy of particular cases of descriptive analysis. It is clear, if anything is clear, that intentional experiences contain distinguishable parts and aspects, and this alone is of importance here” (Logical Investigations, V, §16, p. 112.)
because its elements are not perceivable but is still there for me in some way. This possibility of two radically different experiences shows that consciousness can either busy itself with the perceivable world, or with other things that are not perceivable.

That is what happens when I practice music. Indeed, I can either busy myself with the world around, let myself be taken by it and immersed within it through the senses, but I can also busy myself with the inner song which is not given through perception. There are therefore two distinct worlds when we are talking about the inner song: first, the natural world, and second, the world of the inner song which is part of the phenomenological world. In order to understand the world of the inner song and how I relate to it, I want to explore the example of the arithmetical world used by Husserl. Indeed, the arithmetical world and the world of the inner song have in common not to be perceivable through the senses. Husserl writes:

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101 As I will explain later on, as the inner song is part of the performance process, and as I am studying it as apprehended during a rehearsing session, there is also the perceivable realization of the inner song which is given in consciousness. There is therefore more specifically: (1) the natural world, and (2) the phenomenological world with (2.a) the inner song given in the phantasy field, and (2.b) the realization of the inner song given in the perceptual field. At this stage of the description, I am just trying to distinguish the world of the inner song from the natural world, I therefore don’t want to get into that degree of accuracy yet.

102 As Rudolf Bernet explains in Conscience et Existence, there is a relationship between mathematical and imaginative objects in the Husserlian corpus. Indeed, both of them demonstrate a certain freedom toward the empirical world: “C’est, contre toute attente, au sein de son interrogation sur l’être des objets mathématiques (c’est à dire arithmétiques et géométriques) que Husserl a d’abord rencontré la question du statut de ces objets dont l’existence – faute d’une possibilité de vérification dans la réalité effective – est simplement assumée. Cette question ne concerne pas seulement le statut de ces nombres particuliers que les mathématiciens appellent précisément ‘imaginaires’, mais tous les objets auxquels se rapportent les concepts idéaux de la géométrie. Cet imaginaire des mathématiques relève d’une démarche de ‘construction’ exacte qui met en jeu ce que Husserl appellera plus tard des ‘fictions idéalisantes’. Même si ces ‘fictions’ des mathématiques ont un autre statut que les fictions qui se rapportent à l’existence mythique de ‘centaures’, elles mettent déjà bien en valeur que c’est la liberté prise avec le monde empirique qui forme le trait le plus marquant et le plus général de toute forme de conscience imaginante. On sait que Husserl continuera à questionner jusque dans ses derniers textes – tels que Sur l’origine de la géométrie – cet acte de liberté qui se trouve à l’origine de l’institution de la science géométrique. Il établira, d’une part, que la non-existence empirique du cercle, tel qu’il est défini par la géométrie, loin de devoir lui être imputée comme une carence, est au contraire une condition essentielle de l’ampleur du
The world of numbers is likewise there for me precisely as the Object-field of arithmetical busiedness; during such busiedness single numbers of numerical formations will be at the focus of my regard, surrounded by a partly determinate, partly indeterminate arithmetical horizon; but obviously this factual being-there-for-me, like the factually existent itself, is of a different sort. *The arithmetical world is there for me only if, and as long as, I am in the arithmetical attitude.*

Through this quote it appears that the arithmetical world is also *on hand*, despite the fact that it is not perceivable because I cannot touch or feel numbers. It means that I can busy myself with it and, similarly to what happens in the real world, I can bring certain things to the foreground through attention, push others in the background, these things being given with a certain horizon. While the natural world and the arithmetical world seem to function in a similar way, they differ for their mode of access. Indeed, while the real world is given *in the natural attitude* through the attention to the senses and by the body as a medium of perception, the arithmetical world is given *in the arithmetical attitude* if I shift consciousness away from the body and sensory input in order to grasp an ideal

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103 *Ideen* 1, §28, p. 54.
world of numbers. In other words, numbers appear to me only if I switch from the natural attitude into what Husserl calls the arithmetical attitude.

In the experience of music practice, I can distinguish the natural attitude from another attitude: the musician's attitude.\(^{104}\) I can switch into that attitude by turning my attention away from the sensory world, and thanks to that move, focus on the listening of the inner song in imagination. If the attention to the senses and the use of the body as a medium of perception characterize the natural attitude, a disengaged attitude toward the natural world and the activation of an internal listening, characterize the musician’s attitude.

§5. The natural world as a noisy world.

\(^{104}\) As mentioned earlier in the introduction, I distinguish this attitude characterizing the practicing moment, from the performing attitude which I am in when I realize the inner song in the final performance in front of an audience. As I focus on the practicing dimension of the musician’s activity in the present work, I must explain how the consciousness of the musician has some particular features: it not only experiences hearing, but also reflects on that hearing, and analyses that hearing (I will develop this question in the last two chapters). This very particular situation uncovers a specific aspect of the musician’s consciousness.

Indeed, if in “Introduction à la phénoménologie du vécu musical.” Patrick Lang writes: “La conscience musicale ne réfléchit pas, elle vit dans l’écoute (sie erlebt hörend), et elle vivra avec d’autant plus de force, de netteté et d’univocité qu’elle sera pleinement disponible pour et absorbée par cette écoute, qui ne laisse aucune place à la réflexion ni à l’analyse.,” in my dissertation, I both agree and disagree with the author. On the one hand, it is true that the musical consciousness experiences listening as the author is saying. On the other hand, I argue that the expression musical consciousness, should also integrate the experience of the musician reflecting and analyzing which is the type of listening proper to the situation of a musician not performing but practicing music. Indeed, the musical consciousness can both be absorbed in listening and reflect as well as analyze. This is what the musician does when he or she stops playing, listens to the inner song, restarts, etc., or experiences listening as consciousness straddles, and associations are formed between the performance, the memory of past performances, and inner songs corresponding to this performance. Hence, I propose a broader understanding of the musician's consciousness than the one offered by Patrick Lang.
I am in the music school. I rehearse Saint Saens with my cello. I stop playing and take a break in order to try to listen to the inner song. I am tired. My muscles are slow to start moving. I also feel the weight of the cello on my chest. I have to silence this pain.

My teacher is now sitting next to me. She intimidates me. I try to ignore her and behave as if I would be alone. I feel her presence, I hear her breath, I know she listens to me to judge how I play, if it is musical or not, if I play the right notes. Her presence changes my playing and my concentration ability. I have to make an effort if I want to focus on the music and not on her sitting there. I need to silence her too.

Remotely I hear a group of kids having a solfege lesson in the classroom next door. I hear them chatting and learning but only as a light background. It does not bother me that much now. However, as soon as five o’clock rings my attention is suddenly called in their direction as they start leaving the room talking with each other, pushing, and playing with each other in the corridor. They might not be immediately present in the room, but they are still here in some way, part of the world that surrounds me. They bother me now. I cannot hear the inner song. I need to calm down and deviate my attention from all this noise if I want to pay attention to my inner song.

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105 Of course, the impact of the teacher on the student’s playing is greatly dependent on the relationship itself. As mentioned in the introduction (§2), I will not develop the question here, but it is clear that the more the student trusts the professor, the more freedom there will be to play “like at home,” with the same fullness of expression and movement. Self-confidence also matters a lot in the sense that it depends on me to have enough confidence to play for the others on the same way as I play for myself in my room. I discussed this question with the great soloist Narek Hakhnazaryan (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/narek-hakhnazaryan-cellist/).

106 In the present study, I exclude any presence of another because, as I will partially demonstrate here, it changes the mode of apprehension of the inner song; I shall do a separate study in the future in order to address that specific question.
In order to understand the specificity of the experience of the inner song in music practice, it is necessary to look at the specific way in which this switch of attitude happens. If I go back to my experience of playing the cello, I can observe that I cannot hear the inner song in my imagination, unless a silence is somehow established. As Husserl focuses more on the visual imagination than on the auditory one, he does not notice that parameter. However, this is a common experience both for the audience and the performers: without a preestablished silence, it is impossible to hear music. Thus, it is necessary to establish a silence in order to listen to the inner song.\textsuperscript{107}

When I am in the natural attitude and I have immediate experience of the world, I am absorbed by the \textit{noise} of the world. For the performer, being busy with the world means that the attention is called by the natural world, the ears are muddled by its noise.

\textsuperscript{107} In “Introduction à la phénoménologie du vécu musical,” Patrick Lang writes: “Trois points d’une évolution musicale tiennent donc une place privilégiée: le commencement, le point culminant et la fin. Le commencement se détache sur le silence, c’est-à-dire sur fond de repos. Si nous attribuons au repos la tension 0 (zéro), le commencement, quant à lui, incarne la tension 1. C’est un point d’origine pour tous les systèmes réferentiels à l’intérieur desquels des contrastes peuvent être vécus. Ces contrastes peuvent être de nature rythmique, métrique, périodique, mélodique ou harmonique, ou encore (à un niveau supérieur intégrant plusieurs de ces paramètres) thématique. La première impression étant produite par le commencement, tous les contrastes seront reliés à lui. […] Le premier son agit sur nous (sur moi, exécutant; sur moi, auditeur); il se produit une certaine identification de notre monde affectif à ce son. Le vécu est celui d’une certaine stabilité; tout est encore ouvert; il ne s’agit pas encore d’un mouvement musical. Le deuxième son vient après le premier: je vis le temps qui est révélé par ces deux phénomènes non simultanés. Je suis aussi dans un état plus instable – qui me fait éprouver le besoin d’un retour à la stabilité. Le moteur qui garantit qu’on puisse suivre les éloignements, c’est le fait de quitter la stabilité en ayant le désir de la regagner. Sinon, il pourrait ne s’agir que d’observer et d’enregistrer; or il s’agit d’autre chose: nous sommes pris, nous sommes au cœur d’une relation musicale (en l’occurrence: active extravertie), c’est-à-dire pris par des liens qui dépassent l’unidirectionnalité. Ce que le premier son a réveillé en nous reste présent au moment où le deuxième son arrive; chaque relation musicale, répétons-le, est ainsi caractérisée par les deux directions, discursivité et récursivité. C’est donc parce que la conscience a été arrachée au repos qu’elle éprouve le besoin d’y retourner. Mais c’est précisément parce qu’elle est engagée dans des relations musicales que la seule voie de retour possible vers le repos consiste à suivre l’évolution de ces relations” (p. 14).

In my own description, I want to take after Lang’s description of musical evolution but understand the role of silence in a different way. For me, music is not experienced against a silence, but against the experience of the pure auto-affection of the inner rhythm. In this sense, what the author defines as a “rest” (repos) is not empty for me, it is on the contrary the experience of the fullness of life itself.
The noise takes the attention of the performer through the senses: I am seeing, touching, hearing, and the like. In some way, it speaks to me through the senses. It does not speak to everybody in the same way, it speaks to me in the sense that it is for me, things are distributed according to me, whether I busy myself with them or not. It is in this particular way that the world calls my attention through the senses. The problem is then that this unmuted noise is simultaneously muting the world of the inner song: I cannot hear the inner song.

The lack of distance proper to the natural attitude is experienced by the musician as a lack of quietness. Silence needs to be primarily auditory, but as the noise comes from all senses, it is not only an auditory silence. Indeed, everything that is noisy, bothering me, calling my attention, needs to be silenced. This includes, for instance, the smell of the room, the visual details on the wall, my own fatigue after a day at school, etc. In order to

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108 Husserl writes: “I am conscious of a world endlessly spread out in space, endlessly becoming and having endlessly become in time. I am conscious of it: that signifies, above all, that intuitively I find it immediately, that I experience it. By my seeing, touching, hearing, and so forth, and in the different modes of sensuous perception, corporeal physical things with some spatial distribution or other are simply there for me, on hand in the literal or the figurative sense, whether or not I am particularly heedful of them and busied with them in my considering, feeling, or willing” (Ideas I, §27, p. 53).

109 In the present study, my understanding of the natural world as a noisy world is influenced by the Augustinian description in the Book X of the Confessions where Augustine describes how he could not hear the voice of God because he was too immersed in the noise of the world. It is only when he is able to turn away from the world into the inner man, that Augustin discovers God. In other words, it is only when he is able to create a silence by turning away from the world that Augustine hears what is happening in his interiority.

In order to investigate this question further, it would be necessary to compare Augustine and Husserl in the question of the epoché and access to interiority. The metaphor of the voices of the world could be developed further but it would lead me astray if I did it here. If I were to perform that analysis, I would not only work on how the world is a call, but also how the phantasy-world could be constituted through a soliloquy, in a dialogue with myself. Isn’t the phantasy-world a story that I tell myself and which I can transform and modify freely?

If I pursue the description of how the world is a call, I would like to work with Fred Evans’s The Multivoiced Body, as well as Adrianna Cavaro’s A più Voci, Filosofia dell’Espressione Vocale, or Don Ihde’s Listening and Voice.
silence this natural world, it is necessary to deviate the attention away from the “noise”
toward the inner song. As I perform that gesture, things are still there around, they are
still noisy, but I neutralize their impact on my listening. Hence, my attention is still
called, but I make the effort not to answer that call.

What is true for noise of all types is also true for animate beings populating this
world. In my previous description, my cello teacher for instance. When I am in the
natural attitude, I also perceive these animate beings through my senses. They also make
noise in the sense that they also call my attention. They are for me in the sense that they
are also interpreted by me for what they do, think, believe etc. They are present in
actuality in the sense that they are real, parts of the real world. In some way, not only the
presence of things but also the presence of others murmurs in the world, resonates around
me, calls me, and that whether I want it or not. Animate beings are also noisy.
Consequently, they also participate to mute the phenomenological world. Here as well,
silencing the world requires silencing the presence of others through an act of
neutralization.

Besides things and animate beings immediately perceivable in my horizon of
perception, Husserl identifies other objects which are not immediately on hand. In my

110 Husserl explains: “Animate beings too – human beings, let us say – are immediately there for me: I look
up; I see them; I hear their approach; I grasp their hands; talking with them I understand immediately
what they objectivate and think, what feelings stir within them, what they wish or will. They are also
present in actualities in my field of intuition even when I do not heed them” (Ideas 1, §27, p. 51).

111 Husserl describes: “Along with the ones now perceived, other actual objects are there for me as
determinate, as more or less well known, without being themselves perceived or, indeed, present in any
other mode of intuition. I can let my attention wander away from the writing table which was just now
seen and noticed, out through the unseen parts of the room which are behind my back, to the verandah,
into the garden, to the children in the arbor, etc., to all the Objects I directly ‘know of’ as being there and
here in the surroundings of which there is also consciousness – a ‘knowing of them’ which involves no
conceptual thinking and which changes into clear intuiting with the advertence of attention, and even
then only partially and for the most part very imperfectly” (Ideas 1, §27, pp. 51-2).
previous description it would be the furniture of the room next door where other kids follow their solfege lesson. This last category of objects present in my surroundings differs from the previous two in the sense that their apprehension is not direct. I know they are there but I cannot perceive the chairs and tables in the other room for instance. These objects are present without being perceived, just there, in the background, or more precisely in the *horizon* of my perception. As opposed to the furniture, the kids that I can hear are, them, directly perceivable: I can hear them on the horizon of my attention I do not direct my attention directly to them. However, as they are there and I can hear their voice, they also busy me potentially. They are part of the noise of the world even if their presence is lighter than the directly on hand things and others. They matter in the sense that it takes almost nothing for them to call my attention. For instance, one kid shouts louder than the others and I turn my attention to his voice. Thus, I can say once again that the world of the inner song can be *muted* only if the natural world is *unmuted*. Silencing the world means silencing what is immediately there on hand but also what is given in the *horizon of my attention*.

Husserl describes this horizon as a sort of halo.\[^{112}\] He shows how the natural world is always *potentially* calling my attention even when it does not *actually* do it. Hence, because it is on hand, it surrounds me whether it is *directly* or *indirectly*. The natural world is also *constantly* there, whether I want it or not.\[^{113}\] As a consequence, 

\[^{112}\] Husserl writes: “But not even with the domain of this intuitionally clear or obscure, distinct or indistinct, *co-present* – which makes up a constant halo around the field of actual perception – is the world exhausted which is ‘on hand’ for me in the manner peculiar to consciousness at every waking moment” (*Ideas* I, §27, p. 52).

\[^{113}\] Husserl continues his description as follows: “In my waking consciousness I find myself in this manner at all times, and without ever being able to alter the fact, in relation to the world which remains one and
every waking moment is accompanied by a tension with the world. Thus, even if I am able to turn my attention away from it in order to listen to my inner song, it is difficult to remain attentive to the inner song and not switch my attention to the world again as soon as I hear a little noise. The subject is powerless in the natural attitude: even if I become to create a distance with the perceivable world, I cannot change the fact that the world will always be there, potentially calling me back to the natural attitude. As a consequence, anything that would go against that tension toward the natural attitude requires a real effort: I need to constantly bring my attention away from the world back to the inner song. Silencing the world is therefore something very precarious.

This description of the natural world as a noisy world points out to the necessity to establish a silence by turning the attention away from the natural world, into the world of the inner song. This switch of attention away from the natural world toward the world of the inner song is a silencing that corresponds to a neutralization of the noise around. However, silencing the world does not mean that the world should become actually silenced. Indeed, as I listen to the inner song, I sometimes continue to play my cello (in the natural world/attitude), thus realizing my inner song through practice. That possibility to both listen to the inner song and perform it demonstrates that, when I listen to the inner song, I am in an attitude in which even the sound of my cello is not absorbing my attention so completely that I become unable to listen to my inner song. In other words, when I listen to the inner song, my own performance is not disturbing that listening. Thus, it means that even the sound of the performance is somehow suspended,

the same, through changing with respect to the composition of its contents. It is continually ‘on hand’ for me and I myself am a member of it” (Ideas 1, §27, p. 53).
neutralized. It does not disappear. If it would be the case, I would lose my technical ability completely and be totally unable to play correctly. Thus, I can still hear myself playing. However, I have a distance with what I hear. I hear myself playing with a distance. I am not absorbed by it. It is given differently in consciousness: as a transcendental object in the phenomenological consciousness.¹¹⁴

There are therefore two distinct worlds: the natural world, and the world of the inner song, reached in two different attitudes which are the natural attitude and the musician’s attitude. In order to be able to play, the musician needs to disengage from the natural world on hand through perception, and engage with the world of the inner song given in the phenomenological consciousness.

When the musician turns the attention away from the natural world toward the world of the inner song, a distance is created with the natural world: the musician is not totally absorbed by the perception anymore, he or she is disengaged from the natural world *enough* to listen to the phenomenological one, but not so much that he or she is disconnected with it and cannot play anymore. In this attitude, he or she is now able to apprehend the world differently, not focusing on what is perceived, but focusing on how it is experienced in the phenomenological consciousness. As the musician practices, he or she hears his or her own performance, without being absorbed by the performance itself, but focusing on how it sounds to him or her, thus becoming also capable on working on it.

¹¹⁴ Here, I understand *transcendental* in the sense that the object is given, in the phenomenological attitude, as part of the objective world; I will come back to this problem when I distinguish the *actual song* corresponding to the hearing of the realization of the inner song in performance, from the *inner song* which is a phantasy object.
In the phenomenological attitude, here the *musician’s attitude*, the natural word, and more specifically the performance itself, are given differently: they are given phenomenologically. They are also given *along with the inner song*. As a consequence, two phenomena are given in consciousness: the phenomenon of the inner song given in phantasy on the one hand, and the phenomenon of the perceivable realization of the inner song issued by the instrument on the other hand. Both of them are reached by switching from the *natural attitude* into the *musician’s attitude*. Both are experienced with a certain energy and in a structural unity.

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115 Chapter 2, “Perceiving and phantasizing,” is dedicated to the description of the interaction between the inner song and the actual song which is the realization of the inner song in performance.

116 I will describe this in more detail in the rest of the dissertation. However, I want to single out these two dimensions already here in order to provide a more accurate understanding of these two phenomena. In “Introduction à la phénoménologie du vécu musical,” Patrick Lang writes: “En considérant l’œuvre musicale de l’intérieur, dans son devenir, l’approche phénoménologique a toutes les chances d’être plus éclairante que toute esthétique qui examine, du dehors, l’œuvre achevée, ses propriétés et ses effets.

La notion de départ pourrait être celle d’énergie musicale, force à la fois physique et psychique, qui conditionne le mouvement, mais aussi les états de tension. Une mélodie, par exemple, est une force qui coule (eine strömende Kraft); elle est un tout originaire, dont se détachent des notes, et non pas un regroupement de notes. Le rythme, lui aussi, est la trace vivante d’une forme d’énergie, qui le précède et le conditionne. La répartition des moments accentués et non accentués n’obéit pas à une grille préétablie, elle est fonction du mouvement. Plus précisément, il est possible d’identifier deux types d’énergie fondamentaux, le flux et l’accumulation (Fluss und Stau), ou encore l’énergie ‘cinétique’ et ‘potentielle’. La musique se forme par une interaction incessante de ces deux formes.

La notion d’énergie doit être complétée par celle d’unité structurelle; la conscience saisit la mélodie non comme sommation de processus multiples, mais immédiatement comme unité. C’est ce que la psychologie appelle une forme (traduction approximative du mot allemand Gestalt). Il en va de même pour un complexe polyphonique: celui-ci engage un flux d’énergie unifié, qui est manifestement d’une autre nature que les flux d’énergie qui portent chacune des voix. À l’intérieur d’un complexe polyphonique, nous n’entendons pas des sons, mais des flux dynamiques que nous suivons sans trop de peine.

Un morceau apparaît dès lors comme l’unité structurelle d’un mouvement, une Gestalt faite de mouvement, mais aussi le mouvement d’une Gestalt: chaque son est en relation dynamique avec tous les autres, et notamment avec le commencement et la fin ainsi qu’avec le point culminant. Chaque écoulement de mouvement engendre un centre de gravité fédérant des tensions qui viennent de lui ou qui vont vers lui. Ces observations nous conduisent au concept d’image du mouvement (Bewegungsbild), image ne s’entendant pas ici en un sens visuel, mais traduisant le fait que nous avons la capacité à apprêhender dans la simultanéité le déroulement d’une mélodie ou d’un mouvement; il s’agit de la présentification simultanée d’un contenu qui se déroule temporellement, mais qui, se conservant en nous en tant que forme, se conserve plus aisément et avec plus de netteté que ses éléments. La Gestalt se conserve à travers de nombreuses modifications de ses composantes (transposition, accélération,
§6. The role of attention.

I am practicing the Swan in my room. I can either focus my attention on what I am doing or let my attention go astray and hear what I am playing without properly listening to it. I can also listen to my performance, absorbed in the perception of it through my ears, my fingers, etc., or listen to it with a focus on how it appears to me, whether it is attuned, musical, or in rhythm. Finally, I can listen to my performance through the inner song, with the inner song in the background, or listen to my performance without being aware of the inner song.

As I focus or unfocus my attention, I bring certain elements into the foreground while others are pushed into the background. When I perform, I am constantly switching...
from the phenomenological givenness of the performance to the inner song, focusing on one or the other, comparing one with the other, and modifying the phantasy thanks to the perceived or the performance according to the phantasy representation.

The switch from the natural attitude into the phenomenological attitude, here the musician’s attitude, happens at two levels: it is both a theoretical and a practical switch. In Ideas 1, Husserl calls the switch from the natural attitude into the phenomenological attitude the epoché and defines it as a suspension of the thesis of the existence of the world on hand. As the French phenomenologist Natalie Depraz underlines, this theoretical epoché is also a praxis of a conversion of attention. Thus, the epoché is not only a theoretical switch, but also a practical one, both leading the subject away from the natural world into the phenomenological world. Through the epoché, understood both as a theoretical and a practical gesture, one’s relation to the natural world changes and the phenomenological world is uncovered.

I will now demonstrate how the musician performs an epoché both at a theoretical and at a practical level in order to access the inner song. At a theoretical level, the musician suspends the thesis regarding the existence of the world on hand and, at a practical level, the musician turns their attention away from the natural world and into the world of the inner song in which both a perceived and a phantasy object are given.

As Husserl demonstrates in Ideas 1, attention is the mechanism which modulates the acts of consciousness and allows me to perform the switch which leads from the natural world into the phenomenological world. There are various forms of attention. In his writings, Husserl distinguishes three of them: (1) Zuwendung: a conversion of attention, (2) Aufmerksamkeit: the apperceptive activity of noticing, and (3) Attention,
which is a tension toward. In *Ideas 1*, Husserl writes: “We spoke metaphorically of the pure Ego’s ‘mental regard’ or the ‘ray of its regard,’ of its advertings toward and turning away from.” Here, attention is intended as a conversion, *Zuwendung*, and Husserl speaks about *Zuwendungen* and *Abwendungen* to designate this capacity to turn away from something. He clarifies:

> The relevant phenomena stood out unitarily for us with perfect clarity and distinctness. Wherever ‘attention’ is spoken of originarily, they play a major role without being separated phenomenologically from certain other phenomena; and, mixed with these others, they are usually designated as modes of attention.

Thus, as is made clear in this quote, attention is a phenomenon that *accompanies* other phenomena. It is not a phenomenon *as such.* In other words, phenomena are given accompanied by a *certain mode of attention.* In the present part of the description, I am not interested in attention as accompanying the givenness of phenomena in consciousness yet. Instead, I am interested in attention as *Zuwendung* in the specific moment of the switch from the natural attitude into a phenomenological attitude; I focus on attention as a *method.*

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118 *Ideas 1*, §92, p. 222

119 Cf. Hua II, p. 211.

120 *Ideas 1*, §92, p. 222.

121 Except if I choose to direct my attention to attention itself.

122 I will address this problem more in the final chapter of the present dissertation.
As Husserl demonstrates in his description of the natural attitude, I am spontaneously oriented toward the natural world. The natural world calls me, my ears are spontaneously attracted by any noise around and, for this reason, I need to make an effort to redirect my attention toward something else, here, the phenomenological region of consciousness. This situation of being in the natural attitude is a first spontaneity. A second spontaneity allowing me to focus on something else can be added to it.

In the case of music practice, it is also a switch of attention which gives access to the inner song. I start my practice session distracted by the world around, my attention called by various noises, thoughts, bodily tensions, etc., and it is only through a switch of attention which disengages me from the world and engages me with what is given in consciousness that I am able to access the inner song given in phantasy and hear how what I am playing appears to me as well. In this new attitude, the sound of my own performance is not apprehended in the same way: I am not engaging with the perception of it, I am grasping how it appears to me in consciousness.

§7. Simultaneous presence of the natural world and the inner song world.

I am rehearsing Saint Saens in the room in my conservatory. I hear noise around me. My teacher is also there, listening to me playing. As I am relatively shy, her presence tends to distract me and makes me lose focus. However, I try to maintain my attention inward,\textsuperscript{123} toward the world of the inner song, to be attentive to the inner song and the perception of its realization. I want to remain in the musician’s attitude.

\textsuperscript{123} I intend inward in the sense that interiority corresponds to the \textit{phenomenological}. Cf. Introduction, Footnote no.5.
While I perform this switch from the natural attitude into the phenomenological attitude, I remain in the natural attitude. In other words, this switch happens from the ground of the natural attitude and is situated in it. Husserl explains how the natural world remains on hand without interruption because I continue to live naturally, i.e., to judge, feel, and the like. The subject accesses the ego and its ego-life from the ground of the natural ego. Thus, I continue to have the conscious experience that the world is there for me, endlessly extended in time and space, meaningful, and the theater of my possibilities, even if my attention is oriented away from the natural attitude toward another attitude. Hence, switching into another attitude does not take something away from the natural attitude, but adds something to it. Concerning the inner song, this means that I remain in the world as I am imagining the inner song, feeling happy or sad as I listen to it, or while I compare the inner song with its realization in performance. I continue to live naturally while my attention is directed toward the world of the inner song.

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124 Husserl says: “The complexes of my manifoldly changing spontaneities of consciousness then relate to this world, the world in which I find myself and which is, at the same time, my surrounding world — complexes of investigative inspecting, of explicating and conceptualizing in descriptions, of comparing and distinguishing, of collecting and counting, of presupposing and inferring: in short, of theorizing consciousness in its different forms and at its different levels. Likewise the multiform acts and states of emotion and of willing: liking and disliking, being glad and being sorry, desiring and shunning, hoping and fearing, deciding and acting. All of them — including the simple Ego-acts in which I, in spontaneous advenence and seizing, am conscious of the world as immediately present — are embraced by the one Cartesian expression, cogito” (Ideas 1, §28, pp. 53-4).

125 Husserl describes: “Living along naturally, I live continually in this fundamental form of ‘active’ [aktuellen’] living whether, while so living, I state the cogito, whether I am directed ‘reflectively’ to the Ego and the cogitare. If I am directed to them, a new cogito is alive, one that, for its parts, is not reflected on and thus is not objective for me” (Ideas 1, §28, p. 54).

126 Husserl explains: “The natural world, however, the world in the usual sense of the world is, and has been, there for me continuously as long as I go on living naturally. As long as this is the case, I am ‘in the natural attitude,’ indeed both signify precisely the same thing” (Ideas 1, §28, p. 54).
As the switch from one attitude toward another does not impact the givenness of
the world through perception,\textsuperscript{127} there is no alteration of the natural attitude when there is
a switch into another attitude such as the musician’s attitude in the sense that the
givenness of the phenomena does not change. In other words, orienting my attention
toward something that is not real\textsuperscript{128} does not alter the fact that the world is still on hand
for me. Hence, if the world remains on hand while I am in another attitude, it means that I
can still manipulate objects in the natural world while I am busy with another attitude;
this is what happens when I play the cello \textit{while} listening to a phenomenon in the
musician’s attitude. More precisely, it is not the case that I am \textit{either} in the natural
attitude \textit{or} in another attitude; when I practice my cello, I am able to \textit{always} maintain the
natural attitude, “undisturbed,” as a background position. In this sense, the natural
attituded remains there, \textit{pushed into the background}, so that I can busy myself with
another attitude in the foreground.

When I am turning my attention toward the world of the inner song I am still in
the natural attitude, sometimes playing the cello. I can still hear noises around me, I can
hear the sound of my cello realizing the inner song. However, all these sonorous elements
that I perceive are in the background in the sense that they are there without being the
focus of my attention. The natural attitude is the ground for the musician’s attitude: I am
conscious that I hear other sounds, I am conscious of the sound of my cello, I am

\textsuperscript{127} Husserl pursues: “That need not to be altered in any respect whatever if, at the same time, I
appropriate to myself the arithmetical world and other similar ‘worlds’ by effecting the suitable attitudes.
In that case the natural world \textit{remains ‘on hand:’} afterwards, as well as before, I am in the natural
attitude, \textit{undisturbed in it by the new attitudes}” (Ideas 1, §28, pp. 54-5).

\textsuperscript{128} In the Husserlian sense of being part of the world. Cf. Chapter 1, Note 85.
conscious of feeling the instrument weighing on my chest, however, my attention is not oriented toward these noises, this sound, or this feeling in the world; my attention is oriented toward the ego and its ego-life in which these noises are given phenomenologically.

In this new attitude, I am not interested in what is given but in how it is given; this takes precedence. Thus, even if the natural world and the phenomenological world are both there, simultaneously present, one has priority over the other. One world does not disappear in order to let the other appear, the two worlds are there, however, my attention is not oriented with the same intensity toward the natural world and the world of the inner song: one is in the background not receiving my attention, and the other is in the foreground receiving my attention. As I cannot be fully focused on the two worlds together, one takes precedence over the other. The two remain; however, I do not let myself be absorbed within the natural attitude even if this one is constantly calling me back. Instead, I remain conscious of the natural attitude while busying myself in the phenomenological sphere.

In this attitude, as I am conscious of the natural world even while it is not the focus of my attention anymore, the natural world is silenced. I hear it without listening to it. I disengage from it enough to be engaged in the phenomenological attitude. Thus, it is there but does not disturb me anymore. Indeed, thanks to that silent background, I can

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129 The jazz pianist Keith Jarrett singing during his concerts or the jazz pianist Barry Harris in this video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a37rQGLuOxQ&fbclid=IwAR30VCGBD_N1BbPkb31IYuu26t9wCwQWz1ZXbwTR5MqvlPqO750G-dp5Rc are an example of that.

130 Here I want to refer to the very interesting work by Simon Høffding on musical absorption: A Phenomenology of Musical Absorption.
hear the phenomena given in the musician’s attitude. This disengagement from the
natural world which goes with an engagement in the phenomenological attitude happens
through the orientation of attention.

§8. Disconnection between the natural world and the other worlds.

As I work on the Swan, I can either focus on how I experience my own
performance of that Swan, or on the correspondent inner song in the phantasy. When I
focus on the performance side, I try to play it with my heart, musically, both attuned and
in rhythm, respecting the musical sentence, and breathing through the bow. When I focus
on the inner song, I try understanding how I phantasize this piece, how I would like it to
sound if it were performed. As I focus on the perceived performance, I also hear other
noises, in my room or outside, I don’t see the room because I practice with closed eyes,
but I am aware of it. I am not absorbed by all of that though, it does not busy me so much
that I cannot practice. Quite the contrary, a certain degree of disengagement with it
allows me to be present to the performance as I experience it.

The notion of background which I just mentioned when I described the natural
world is important. It is distinct from the notion of horizon that I mentioned earlier when
I was briefly describing the problem of perception. Indeed, when I am in the arithmetical
attitude, for example, the natural world remains in the background without being a
horizon of perception.131

131 Husserl says: “If my cogito is moving only in the worlds pertaining to these new attitudes, the natural
world remains outside consideration; it is a background for my act-consciousness, but it is not a horizon
within which an arithmetical world finds a place. The two worlds simultaneously present are not
connected, disregarding their Ego-relation by virtue of which I can freely direct my regard and my acts into
the one or the other” (Ideas 1, §28, p. 55).
The elaboration on the two notions as two distinct concepts is already present in earlier passages where Husserl demonstrates that there are various layers in perceptions: the *perceived*, the *apperceived* which is a co-perceived, and the *horizon of perception* which is still given with the perception. The notion of horizon differs from the notion of background because it presupposes a *continuity* within the same world while the background does not suppose this continuity.\(^{132}\) When it comes to the natural attitude and the arithmetical attitude, one cannot be the horizon of the other because they are related to two different worlds that are not connected with one other. Indeed, a switch is necessary to go from one to the other. However, they are still *in touch* with one another in some way because it is the *same ego* that directs its regard toward one or the other and does the switching. The ego is the point of contact between the two, but this does not imply a continuity between the two.

As I described earlier, it is certain that I can simultaneously listen to the inner song and play the cello. In this sense, there is a juxtaposition of experiences.\(^{133}\) However, the natural world and the world of the inner song are distinct for me: I have, on the one hand, the natural world, a perceivable world, in which I am playing and on the other hand, the world of the inner song, not perceivable through the senses, which is given when the natural world is silent, and my attention is turning *inward* in the sense that it is turned toward the phenomenological world. As the natural world and the

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\(^{132}\) Although the *co-perceived*, being there without benefitting from the focus of my attention, also qualifies as a kind of *background*. There are therefore two understandings of the notion of background: (1) the co-perceived not benefitting from my attention when I am in a specific attitude, and (2) a specific attitude when I am in another attitude (for instance, the natural attitude when I am in the musician’s attitude).

\(^{133}\) Jay Lampert talks about this notion in *The Many Futures of a Decision*, 71-72.
phenomenological world do not fuse into one another, neither world can be the other’s horizon. They are not connected despite the fact that it is the same I that hears the inner song and plays the cello. I go from one to another through a switch in the orientation of my attention. Thus, they are not horizon but background/foreground for one another.

In order to realize my inner song through an appropriate performance in the future, as I practice in my room now, I listen to the two phenomena, while maintaining the effort of staying in the musician’s attitude. Remaining conscious of the natural world as a background while busying myself in the musician’s attitude (with both the inner song and its counterpart in perception) is key in the interpretation. Indeed, if I remain in the natural attitude, busying myself with it, I am so caught up by the perception that I cannot hear what is given in the inner song world. Conversely, if I let my attention be entirely caught up with the world of the inner song, losing my consciousness of being also in the natural attitude, I take the risk of playing badly because I also lose the connection with the natural world in which I play my cello. Then, within that world of the inner song, I need to also keep this back and forth going. If I listen only to the inner song, my performance can derail because I no longer hear how what I play sounds. Conversely, if I listen only to the perceivable counterpart of the inner song, I am unable to play correctly because I lose sight of what I want to do. The performance requires, therefore, that I remain conscious of the natural attitude, while being in the musician’s attitude,

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134 Here, there is a distinction between what happens during the final performance, and what happens during the daily practice. If during the final performance I should stay absorbed in the inner song without going back and forth between the actual song and the inner song, in the practice room, I need to go constantly back and forth between the two, straddling between the two, in order to evaluate the technical aspects and the distance between the sound produced and the sound desired. As mentioned earlier, this activity involves a reflection and analysis of the perception.
busy with two phenomena and going back and forth between them, or straddling between them, checking on one through the other almost imperceptibly.\textsuperscript{135}

§9. Continuity in the givenness of the world in the natural attitude.

\textit{As I practice my cello, focusing on how I experience the performance and the phantasy I have of Saint Saens, I am still perceiving the world around me. It is there. It is the situation from which I access the inner song and its correspondent in perception. However, I don’t engage with it.}

That there remains a residue of the natural world \textit{while I busy myself in another attitude} indicates that I never cease to be embodied and part of the natural world.\textsuperscript{136} This is what Husserl demonstrates when he argues that the subject keeps his spatiotemporal dimension while accessing another world through a switch of attitude. It is from the place of the natural being that I switch into another attitude in which another world is given.

For this reason, the world never ceases to be given to me. Consequently, I can at any time be brought back into the natural attitude while I busy myself in another attitude.\textsuperscript{137}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{135} The attention \textit{straddles} the two so that they are apprehended one through the other; I will explain this type of attention as the description goes on, explaining more particularly in Chapter 5 how it goes along with associations in consciousness.

\textsuperscript{136} Husserl writes: “Once more, in the following propositions we single out something most important: As what confronts me, I continually find the one spatiotemporal actuality to which I belong like all other human beings who are to be found in it and who are related to it as I am. I find the ‘actuality’, the word already says it, as a \textit{factually existent actuality and also accept it as it presents itself to me as factually existing}” (Ideas 1, §30, p. 56-7).

\textsuperscript{137} The jazz musician Keith Jarrett is well known for interrupting his recitals if there is some noise coming from the public. I interpret that as a disturbing call to \textit{come back} into the natural attitude. When he plays, he is busy in the phenomenological attitude with the inner song and its counterpart, if somebody coughs or if a phone rings it sounds like a brutal return to the natural world which attracts his attention, and that makes him lose the direction of his improvisation. If he wants to perform appropriately, he needs to engage with how his performance and the inner song are given to him in consciousness, not being absorbed by perception, yet being engaged enough with the natural world through perception that he can still perform. Unlike him, many musicians can be so absorbed in the musician’s attitude that we don’t
\end{quote}
This claim impacts the understanding of the epoché. Indeed, the epoché, a parenthesizing of the natural world on hand so as to access the transcendental, is a component that makes doubt possible. Even if his gesture is inspired by Descartes, Husserl differs from him in his understanding of the suspension\(^{138}\) because he does not negate the existence of the world. He performs a suspension and does so from a place of embodiment.\(^{139}\)

This claim also impacts his definition of science. Husserl argues that positive sciences, Descartes’ philosophy included, remain in the natural attitude.\(^{140}\) They keep a naïve relationship with the world because they are not able to turn away from it appropriately: they study the world while being still taken by it. As opposed to them, Husserl argues that phenomenology is an actual science because, while I remain in the world as a natural subject, I am able to neutralize it through the epoché and therefore free myself from the naivety of the positive sciences. Thanks to this switch into the

notice the call of the natural world at all. For instance, I can be so absorbed listening to the inner song that I don’t smell my cake burning in the oven. To investigate this problem further, cf. Simon Høffding’s notions of absorbed not-being-there (p. 81) and ex-static absorption (p.85) in A Phenomenology of Musical Absorption.

\(^{138}\) I go deeper in their differences later in the present chapter when I focus on the epoché as a reduction performed to find an apodictic evidence.

\(^{139}\) Husserl says: “No doubt about or rejection of data belonging to the natural world alters in any respect the general positing which characterizes the natural attitude. “The” world is always there as an actuality; here and there it is at most “otherwise” than I supposed; this or that is, so to speak, to be struck out of it and given such titles as “illusion” and “hallucination,” and the like, <it to be struck out of “the” world> which -according to the general positing – is always factually existent” (Ideas 1, §30, p. 56-7).

\(^{140}\) Husserl pursues: “To cognize ‘the’ world more comprehensively, more reliably, more perfectly in every respect than naïve experiential cognizance can, to solve all the problems of scientific cognition which offer themselves within the realm of the world, that is the aim of the science belonging to the natural attitude” (Ideas 1, §30, p. 57).
phenomenological attitude operated by the *epoché*, phenomenology is given as a proper
science approaching the world through a new kind of objectivity.

§10. A gesture of suspension and not negation of the world.

*I am in the Music School. I am still here, in this room, holding my cello, playing
and potentially hearing the sound, while I switch to the musician’s attitude. The switch of
attention does not cut me off from the world. However, the natural world is not the
horizon of the perception of the inner song, it is the background. This background is not
part of the same world as a horizon is; it is a world which is a background for another
world. Once I am in the musician’s attitude, the natural world does not impact my
hearing of the inner song, or, if it does, as little as possible. I still feel my cello, I hear my
teacher and the students outside of the room, but these sounds do not much impact my
listening to the inner song; they are here, but parenthesized, neutralized, given to me as
something remotely there.

The switch which opens the world of the inner song is a neutralization and not an
annihilation of the natural world. The world remains despite the change of attitude.
However, if the world as a fundamental unity does not change, the switch of attitude
introduces an alteration of the *general positing* belonging to the natural attitude\(^\text{141}\) and
asserting the existence of the world at hand. This alteration, occurring through the change
of attitude, is not a counter-argument positing that the world does not exist. It does not
negate what other sciences could establish and, in this sense, phenomenology does not
*replace* positive sciences. Indeed, it is not even a “particular act” or an “articulated

\(^{141}\) I explain this in more depth in the following paragraph.
judgement about existence.” Instead, the switch of attitude is only an “attempt to doubt” inspired by the Cartesian gesture. Husserl writes: “We do not give up the positing we effected, we do not in any respect alter our conviction which remains in itself as it is as long as we do not introduce new judgement-motives: precisely this is what we do not do.” Thus, the gesture differs from Cartesian doubt because it is a suspension of judgement, not a positive judgement of negation.

If the natural world remains, this means that it is not completely lost, it is merely altered. Once parenthesized, the world is not subject to judgement anymore. It is there, but out, not in. To go back to the previous example, this means that while busying myself with numbers in the arithmetical attitude, while writing these numbers, I still feel my desk under the pen in my right hand, but this feeling does not affect the way I can play with and manipulate the numbers. Quite the opposite: the switch into another attitude adds something to the natural attitude in the sense that there is now the natural attitude plus another attitude. Thus, the world at hand, the real world, changes its value.

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142 *Ideas 1*, §31, p. 57.

143 *Ideas 1*, §31, p. 58


145 Husserl writes: “Nevertheless the positing undergoes a modification: while it in itself remains what it is, we, so to speak, ‘put it out of action’ we ‘exclude it,’ we ‘parenthesize it’. It is still there, like the parenthesized in the parentheses, like the excluded outside the context of inclusion [wie das Ausgeschilitete ausserhalb des Zusammenhanges der Schaltung]” (*Ideas 1*, §31 p. 59).

146 Husserl continues: “it is a matter of indicative designations of a definite, *specifically peculiar mode of consciousness* which is added to the original positing simpliciter (whether this is or not an actional [aktuelle] and even a predicative positing of existence) and, likewise in a specifically peculiar manner, changes its value” (*Ideas 1*, §31, p. 59).

147 Husserl pursues: “This changing of value is a matter in which we are perfectly free, and it stands over against all cogitative position-takings coordinate with the positing and incompatible with the positing in the unity of the ‘simultaneous,’ as well as over against all position-takings in the proper sense of the term” (*Ideas 1*, §31, p. 59).
From that, it follows that the gesture of suspension has two characteristics: on the one hand, it is characterized as a free act in the sense that I might or might not accomplish, and on the other hand, it takes precedence over the judgements made under the natural attitude. Consequently, there is a change of value in the sense that the natural attitude becomes secondary while remaining there, present, yet parenthesized. It can take me back at any moment.

This is what happens when I switch from the natural attitude into the musician’s attitude. It is not the case that switching into the musician’s attitude replaces one attitude with another. Quite the opposite, it adds another attitude to the natural attitude. I am conscious of myself playing; however, I am focused on how this performance appears in consciousness. As a consequence, even if I am listening to the inner song and its counterpart in the phenomenological consciousness, this listening impacts what I do in the natural attitude: when I listen to the inner song while playing, far from being disconnected from my playing, I instead connect with it at a deeper level. Paradoxically, disengaging from the natural attitude in order to engage in the musician’s attitude enhances the performance. As I do so, my performance becomes more musical, more attuned, and as I will explain later, also more embodied.

§11. The epoché as the opening of a new region of consciousness.

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148 This is an interesting point going beyond what Husserl is doing with the attitude, properly related to the situation I am describing.

149 I work on that Chapter 4.
I am sitting with my cello in the conservatory. I have performed the epoché and turned my attention toward the world of the inner song. This world is a place where music resonates, I can hear a variety of music, of tunes and sounds, and along with these, some images or memories from the past. My inner song arises from this world like a wave from the ocean. It arises like a definite melody in a world made of many other things.

The epoché alters the relationship to the world and provides a new posture to the subject. It is this new posture, maintaining the natural world while parenthesizing it and creating access to the transcendental world not connected with the natural world but simultaneously given, which allows Husserl to finally introduce two things in §32 of Ideas 1: on the one hand, a new region of consciousness distinct from the world given under the natural attitude, and on the other hand, a new science, distinct from the positive sciences performed in the natural attitude.

Husserl explains: “our purpose is to discover a new scientific domain, one that is to be gained by the method of parenthesizing which, therefore, must be a definitely restricted one.” The Husserlian parenthesizing does not pertain to everything, and in this sense, it is not a radical one. Husserl restricts the parenthesizing because otherwise

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150 I will come back in several places on the notion of memory which is crucial to understand the constitution of the inner song in phantasy.

151 I discussed more specifically this question of the imaginary from which arises the inner song in my latest interviews in French with the pianist François Moysan (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-francois-moysan-pianiste/), the electronic composer Aärp (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-Aærp-compositeur-de-musique-electronique/), and the phenomenologist István Fazakas (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-istvan-fazakas-chercheur-en-philosophie-phenomenologie/). In the present dissertation, I come back to it in Chapter 2, §10.

152 Ideas 1, §32, p. 60.
nothing could be certain, and nothing could be used as a basis for a science. As he emphasized earlier, Husserl wants to keep the factuality of the real world on hand. Husserl describes his gesture as follows:

*We put out of action the general positing which belongs to the essence of the natural attitude; we parenthesize everything which that positing encompasses with respect to being: thus the whole natural world which is continually ‘there for us’, ‘on hand,’ and which will always remain there according to consciousness as an ‘actuality’ even if we choose to parenthesize it.*

The world is parenthesized as the judgement pertaining to its existence is suspended. Through this claim, Husserl reverses the correlation between consciousness and the world. Indeed, instead of considering consciousness as it is in the world, he suspends the natural assumption that the world exists in order to observe how the world is for a consciousness, how is it given to it. It follows that the world remains a reality but is relieved of its ontical value, i.e., its value as a world: existing, endlessly extended in space and time, and manipulable.

Husserl explains it more in detail:

The whole prediscovered world posited in the natural attitude, actually found in experience and taken with perfect ‘freedom from theories’ as it is actually experienced, as it clearly shows itself in the concatenation of experience, is now without validity for us; without being tested and also without being contested, it shall be parenthesized. In like manner all theories and sciences which relate to this

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153 *Ideas 1, §32, p. 61*

world, no matter how well they may be grounded positivistically or otherwise, shall meet the same fate.\(^{155}\)

In this quote, Husserl underlines how the world is first taken through experience before being parenthesized. He reminds us how this gesture is a neutralization in the sense that it does not “test” nor “contest” the world, it adopts a neutral attitude through the suspension of judgement. Then, all theories grounded in an experience of the world in the natural attitude should undergo the same neutralization, here Husserl targets positive sciences.

The *epoché* appears as a movement that has a double effect: the natural world is neutralized, while the phenomenological is given as a world of possibilities. The two go together. Indeed, it is only because there is a neutralization that possibilities are given. However, this neutralization happens from the natural attitude: the subject remains conscious of the natural world, and it is while being conscious of it that the subject neutralizes the natural world. In the case of the inner song, this gesture is a gesture of silencing: I remain conscious of the natural attitude in which I play the cello, however, I disengage from that attitude and silence the perceivable noise while I orient my attention into the phenomenological attitude in which the inner song and its counterpart are given as *phenomena*. This does not mean that the world is, indeed, silent. It only means that I *mute* it by not paying attention to it. Simultaneously, this silencing opens the possibility of listening to the inner song. Thus, the gesture of muting the natural world *unmutes* the phenomenological world.

To access to the inner song, it is also necessary to perform an *epoché* which suspends the general positing. This gesture marks the switch into the *musician’s attitude*.

\(^{155}\) *Ideas 1*, §32, p. 62.
This attitude is a specific type of *phenomenological attitude*: it is given through the same process, but it uncovers the specific world of the inner song related to music performance. The *epoché* uncovering the phenomenological region, can uncover, within this region, the specific world of the inner song. In this world, both the inner song and its counterpart in perception are given. As objects given in a specific type of phenomenological attitude, as *phenomena*, they can be studied *phenomenologically*. Hence, the description of the inner song participates in the development of phenomenology as a science.

The background of this givenness is the natural world to which I belong and which I never cease to have *on hand*, even if it is not connected to the phenomenological world; it is just there, both necessary and suspended. The process of the *epoché*, which is, for the musician, a *silencing*, goes along with a loss of the natural world as existent (not complete, but still a loss). Indeed, through the suspension I lose a specific access to the world which is the access that one has in the natural attitude. This loss is the condition necessary to regain the world, this time scientifically, as a phenomenon. When one switches into the musician’s attitude, the *epoché* that one performs as a musician goes along with a loss of the world. However, this loss is necessary to then allow the musician to access the inner song to compare it eventually with its perceivable counterpart, and consequently use it as an ideal to realize the inner song in performance.

§12. The *epoché* as a praxis.

*I am still practicing Saint Saens. At first, I am distracted from my inner song. All along my practice session, I have moments of distraction in which I orient my attention*
toward something which is not the inner song or the experience of my performance. To refocus, I must make an effort, and repeat that effort throughout my rehearsal session.

Natalie Depraz describes the experience of attention during the praxis of the epoché, identifying three elements: (1) inattentive action, the natural attitude; (2) concentration of consciousness thanks to (a) the setting or context, (b) the will and effort to regain control and focus, or (c) an unpredictable stimulus; and (3) suspension of the unnatural character of attention, the epoché of concentration.

In Depraz, Varela, & Vermersch, “The gesture of awareness: An account of its structural dynamics,” p. 123-126, Natalie Depraz presents a slightly different understanding of these three phases. In this understanding, she skips phase one and divides phase 2 into two stages. She identifies: “A. A phase of suspension of habitual thought and judgement. This is a basic precondition for any possibility of change in the attention which the subject gives to his own experience and which represents a break with a “natural” or non-examined attitude. B. A phase of conversion or redirection of attention from “the exterior” to “the interior”; C. A phase of letting-go or of receptivity towards the experience. [...] We call epoché the ensemble of these three organically linked phases, for the simple reason that phases B and C are always reactivated by and reactivate phase A.” She adds concerning the third stage: “The principal obstacle to this third phase resides in the traverse of an empty time, a time of silence, of the lack of take-up of the immediate givens, which are available and already assimilated to consciousness.”

I can find these three phases in the act of listening to the inner song. The difficulty of the third phase is one that musicians would encounter. However, I do not retain this understanding in my current description because I want to stress the stage of the natural attitude which does not appear here but appears in the description of “La Double Attention, pour une Pratique Phénoménologique de l’Antinomie” quoted in the body of the text here.

These three triggers are also presented slightly differently in Depraz, Varela, & Vermersch, “The gesture of awareness: An account of its structural dynamics,” p. 124. Depraz speaks about how “an external or existential even may trigger the suspending attitude […], - the mediation of others can also be decisive, for example a direct injunction to accomplish the act, or a rather less directive attitude, as it the case when someone plays the role of a model. - exercises initiated by the individual, presupposing a self-imposed discipline including long phases of training and learning until the newly acquired habits are stabilized.”

Here too, one can find these three triggers in music practice. Indeed, (1) a wrong note or some kind of unsatisfaction with the real sound can lead me to my inner song; this would be the first situation. Or (2) my teacher may tell me directly “listen to your inner song,” thus bringing me back “inside”; that would be the second situation. Or, (3) I may also train myself to redirect my attention to the inner song in rehearsal or during music practice, and that’s what I personally have done since 2010 when I “discovered” the inner song. I prefer the version in Depraz, Natalie “La Double Attention, pour une pratique phénoménologique de l’antinomie,” which understands the triggers more from the angle of attention.

Depraz, “La Double Attention, pour une pratique phénoménologique de l’antinomie,” pp. 5-6.
This identification is particularly appropriate for me to describe the praxis of the *epoché* that uncovers the inner song. Indeed, when I turn my attention toward the inner song: (1) I am caught up by the world and its various noises, not really paying attention to anything in particular (this is the situation described earlier in the Music School when I immediately relate to the world through the perceptual experience); (2) but then I can focus on the inner song creating a distance with the world on hand if (i) the silence of my environment makes it possible, (ii) I make the effort of focusing on it so I am actually *silencing* the world, or (iii) something clicks and brings it to my attention (for example I play something that I don’t like and the difference between the *perceivable* sound and the inner song brings me back to the inner song that I want to perform); and (3) I deepen my focus on the inner song and therefore my attitude of receptivity toward it, trying to hear how it sounds, what colors it has, which emotions it carries, the tune, the rhythm, etc.

When attention takes part in the process of the *epoché*, Depraz speaks of an *epoché of the natural attitude*. In this *epoché*, the natural attitude is not only the object of a suspension of judgement, but it is also intended as the immanent place of the

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159 The notion of rhythm is a complex one that deserves a phenomenological analysis for itself. In “On the Petite Phrase of Proust and the Experience of Empathy,” Jessica Wiskus defines rhythm as “ordering” (p. 8). She writes: “Every melody has a rhythm – indeed, even one note has a rhythm, since even the briefest expression has its own beginning, middle, and end. For a rhythm is not constituted simply as a stimulus that I receive in the moment; nor is a rhythm reducible to a particular series of independent aural sensations that I notate or hold in my memory as if they were so many points along a line. Rather, it is the transcendence of the past (and future) – the life beyond the present – that makes possible the flowing order of time. Rhythm, which we feel in our bodies and express through our musical gestures, is not in the notes (as a quality specific to each vibration or frequency) but, in a certain sense, between the notes. The movement that we perceive in music arises through relation to what is not present – i.e. through potentiality” (p. 8).

In the present dissertation, I will also intend rhythm as an ordering, as something which comes between the notes. My understanding will therefore contrast with another important theory on rhythm, Alfred Schütz’s theory, doubting the fact that rhythm belongs to music (Patrick Lang discusses this claim in “Introduction à la phénoménologie du vécu musical,”)

performance of the *epoché*. Thus, the gesture of the *epoché* is directed “toward (and against) the natural attitude intended as its object.”\(^{161}\) This *epoché* is, for Depraz, an *immanent epoché* in the sense that it is an *epoché* performed within the world.

I argue that this *epoché of the natural attitude* is part of the process of the *epoché* of the musician because the inner song is a phenomenon which is part of the performance process, so the musician always listens to the inner song either before or after playing or during the performance itself. This specificity of the phenomenon requires, in order to perform musically, that the musician first, listen to the inner song, and second, listen to the counterpart of the inner song given in perception alternatively. When I practice, I am constantly listening to both. As I am potentially, and sometimes actually, playing the cello *at the same time*, it means that I am still engaged with the world, at least in a way. Indeed, listening inwardly does not imply losing touch completely with the natural attitude. As Husserl says, the natural attitude is always there as a background, however, it is not the focus of my primary attention.

The consequence of the *epoché* happening during a music practice session is what Depraz calls “double attention.” She differentiates it from “divided attention” and characterizes it as a “psychical conflict.”\(^{162}\) The possibility of using two different expressions to describe the action of paying attention to two things simultaneously raises the following question: are there two simultaneous full attentions or is there one attention focusing on two objects? In other words: is it necessary to make a choice or is it possible to live through this conflict? It is crucial to address this question in the description of the

\(^{161}\) “La Double Attention, pour une pratique phénoménologique de l’antinomie,” p. 8.

\(^{162}\) “La Double Attention, pour une pratique phénoménologique de l’antinomie,” p. 9-12.
inner song because the inner song is understood as a part of the performance process, and because performing requires this ability to multitask, i.e., to perform and listen to the inner song, to listen to the inner song and correct the failures I am making while performing, etc. Indeed, if I lose touch with the inner song while I am performing, the performance might lose its life, its soul. Inversely, if I lose touch with my act of performing because I am too absorbed in the inner song, the performance might lose its directionality. My attention needs to therefore turn away from the natural attitude, constantly switching between the imaginative and the perceptual fields where the inner song and its counterpart are given, while remaining engaged in performing. This supports one of the core arguments of my dissertation which is the following: a performance is musical because there is: (1) the possible givenness of two phenomena in consciousness which are the inner song and its counterpart, (2) along with the actual act of performing.

The problem which remains is then the potential division of the attention between: (1) the natural attitude in which I am engaged as I play the cello, and (2) the phenomenological attitude in which I am engaged as I practice, listening to the phenomenon, and eventually comparing it with its perceivable counterpart in order to realize it. The answer to the problem lies in the question of the status of the two attitudes under the epoché. The Husserlian epoché differs from the Cartesian one for several reasons, one of them being that the world remains there on hand while being bracketed.

\[163\] Obviously, I can also listen to the inner song before or after performing; in this case the role of attention is not as complex. As explained in the introduction, in the present dissertation I focus on the inner song which is immediately played. However, I would like to investigate these other types of relationship between the inner song and the performance (the inner song, which is not performed, the inner song which is performed long after it is given in the reproductive consciousness, etc.) in further studies.
This means that, while I am busying myself in the phenomenological attitude, I am still engaged with the world through my senses. As I already argued, the natural world and the phenomenological world are distinct; in this sense the natural world is not part of the horizon of the phenomenological world. However, the natural world remains as a background when I am in the phenomenological attitude, and the phenomenological world always represents a possibility given by the natural attitude. This remaining of the natural world might be an issue in the attention process. That is what Depraz underlines in “The Phenomenological Reduction as Praxis,” when she describes a resistance to the absorption within the world and explains how staying in the phenomenological attitude is easily challenged by my very being in the world.\textsuperscript{164} Indeed, as I do not cease to feel the natural world, my attention is consequently being continuously brought back to it. This is the reason why the phenomenological reduction needs to be continuously renewed: it is the continuous renewal of the gesture of the epoché which ensures the “quality of presence”\textsuperscript{165} for the exploration of the experience.

As a musician playing, I am continuously drawn to the natural world in which I am playing. However, I busy myself in the phenomenological attitude while I play. Thus, I am present in perception within the natural attitude while focusing more on the inner song in phantasy and eventually on its counterpart in perception in the phenomenological

\textsuperscript{164} Within her description of the psychological reduction, Depraz demonstrates that under the epoché, I am more dis-interested by the world on hand. However, “Even more than in the context of the Cartesian way, the world continues to exist; more still, it exists for me and not simply in itself as a legitimate reality from which I have, at all costs, to detach myself. I can be all the more involved in it, the more I have conclusively left it to itself. I am all the more capable of acting and entertaining specific goals the less I remain attached to it” (“The Phenomenology as a praxis,” p. 104).

\textsuperscript{165} This expression comes from Depraz, Varela, & Vermersch, “The gesture of awareness: An account of its structural dynamics,” p. 123.
attitude. I am situated in the natural world but busied with the phenomenological one. My attention is oriented toward the world of the inner song and within this world, listen to the two phenomena equally important for the performance. As I will demonstrate later, the two fields in which they are given are in conflict [Widerstreit]. Thus, my attention needs to straddle between the two.

166 I work on that in the chapters on the “Various layers of the performing ego” and “Time and Space of the Impressional and Reproductive Consciousness.”
In this chapter, I distinguished two worlds: first, the natural world in which the musician perceives and hears him or herself playing, and second, the world of the inner song in which the inner song and its perceivable counterpart appear. I identified two attitudes related to these two words: first, the natural attitude which gives the world on hand, and second, the musician’s attitude which gives the inner song in phantasy as well as its counterpart in perception. I explained how the musician goes from the natural world to the world of the inner song through an epoché, both theoretical and practical, involving a conversion of attention. However, I also indicated how the musician remains embodied in that world, and how that world continues to be given to him or her.

At first it may look as if practicing an instrument means switching between the natural attitude and the phenomenological attitude. I argue instead that practicing an instrument requires performing the epoché and then working on the improvement of the performance through a listening of both the phenomenon of the inner song being constituted in phantasy through the perception of its realization and the perceivable counterpart of the inner song also phenomenologically given. Thus, the listening of the inner song and the actual song might is a listening of a perceptual and a phantasy object in the phenomenological attitude, grounded in the natural attitude.

In order to enter into a deeper investigation of the inner song itself, it is necessary to first understand the inner song and the actual song for what they are, how they differ, and how they are given in consciousness. This static analysis clearly separating the two objects will make possible, later on in the description, to understand how they intertwine, and more specifically, how the inner song is constituted temporally through the apprehension of the actual song.
Chapter 2: Perception and Phantasy
As the musician works in the practice room, two phenomena are given in the phenomenological sphere uncovered by the *epoché*: the actual song corresponding to the perception of the realization of the inner song on the one hand, and the inner song given in phantasy on the other hand. The two elements are part of a structure with two poles: the pole of the perceived on the one hand, and the pole of the phantasy on the other hand. In this structure, the perceived object refers to the phantasy object as a model, whereas the phantasy object refers to the perceived object as an image.

The actual song and the inner song are two ways of *singing* the same melody: the actual song sings the melody through the musical instrument, while the inner song

167 It would be possible to analyze the realization of the inner song, or actual song, as a perceptive phantasy (even if it is not about music, Husserl mentions this type of phantasy in *Phantasy, Image-Consciousness, and Memory*, Text no. 18, p. 599 sq.).

Marc Richir writes in “Imagination et Phantasia chez Husserl”: “Le phénomène complet de la phantasia "perceptive" est donc constitué par le réel en transition dans la phantasia (c'est-à-dire rendu fictif et non posé comme tel) et ce qui, infigurable, y est aussi "perçu" de manière non positionnelle (non susceptible, sans altération de son essence, de passer en position d'objet et même en quasi-position de Bildsujet)” (p. 27). Hence, understanding the actual song as a perceptive phantasy would imply to understand it as a *real on its way to the phantasy*. In this paper, Marc Richir adds, addressing more specifically the musical case: “Quant à la musique, bien que sa seule Darstellung "intuitive" le soit par des sons ou des groupes de sous produits par des instruments eux-mêmes manipulés par des musiciens, on pourrait à peu près dire d'elle ce que nous avons dit, avec Husserl, du théâtre, la musique elle-même, qui est autre chose qu'une succession temporelle de sons et de groupes de sous, étant assimilable à l'intrigue du drame théâtral, et les musiciens étant, comme les comédiens, les interprètes, non pas certes (en général) de tel ou tel personnage (instrumental), mais de la musique elle-même en son infigurabilité qui est aussi "perçue" en phantasia - les sons ou groupes de sons émis par les instruments étant pour leur part transitionnels, entre leur réalité effectivement émise et perçue et leur irréalité "phantastique,” toute l'interprétation musicale se jouant dans cet 'entre” (p. 30).

I see this quote as an invitation to deepen that perspective, adding into it the notion of the inner song. Here, there is, maybe an apperception of the inner song in the perception of the actual song. I don't want to go further into this analysis, but I want to point out the possibility of an interesting phenomenological investigation.

168 In “On the Petite Phrase of Proust and the Experience of Empathy;” Jessica Wiskus observes: “We experience the melody rhythmically – as a whole – through its incomplete or non-independent parts. We do not perceive it as an object, which would be perceived as numerically one. What distinguishes music as music (and not mere sound) is its dimension of order: that the second moment is heard in relation to the first and the third, etc. – a sense of succession made possible through the reciprocal implication of moments within moments. It is the potentiality of the first and third notes that make the second, second. This is how music is expressed as a movement, and a music that does not move – a music that would be reduced to the notation or representation of its sounds in the present, for example – would not be music,
sings it in phantasy. Although the two phenomena are distinct because one is given in perception and the other in phantasy, they are apprehended through one another: the musician listens to the actual song in perception through the phantasy of how it should sound and listens to the inner song in phantasy through the perception of how it actually sounds.

As the musician practices, he or she can either play, stop playing to listen only to the memorized actual song or only to the phantasized inner song,\(^{169}\) restart playing, etc. (this is one way to practice), or play and work on the piece while playing (this is another way to practice). Most of the time, musicians do a mix of both. However, the possibility of these two types of practices highlights something important for the phenomenological description: it indicates that attention can either focus on one or the other phenomenon if the musician decides to orient their attention on the perceived object alone or on the phantasized object alone (in this case, two clearly distinct objects are given in consciousness and a static analysis would be more successful to describe them), or straddle between the inner song and the actual song as the musician plays the instrument (in this case, the inner song is less clearly distinct and more deeply intertwined with the actual song, and a genetic analysis would be more successful for an accurate description).

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\(^{169}\) Both of them overlap up to a certain extend in the situation that I am studying, I will explain that more as the description goes on.
In the present chapter, I will investigate the actual song and the inner song separately, to highlight, through a comparison with the mode of the perceptive apprehension, the specific mode of givenness of the inner song in phantasy. This will require working on the distinct modes of apprehension of the two phenomena; I will therefore mostly perform a static analysis.
§1. Distinction between the inner song and the actual song.

§2. The structure of image.

§3. Distinction between the positing in perception and the positing in imagination.

§4. The structure of imagination as *Einbildung*.

§5. Correspondence between the act positing the inner song and the act positing the actual song.

§6. The synthesis of fulfilment of perception; perceiving the actual song.

§7. The two types of imagination in the earlier Husserlian account.

§8. The notion of *phantasy*.

§9. Awakening of the inner song in phantasy.

§10. The phantasy-world of the inner song.
G. B.: Il canto interiore è molto di patos. Di solito usiamo il termine “immaginazione”.
Quando tu vuoi scrivere un pezzo che hai in testa, hai un’idea di come deve suonare. Il canto interiore l’userei più riferendomi alla mia esperienza da pianista. Tu hai un pezzo di Beethoven, dopo un po’ di studi, tu devi immaginare come vuoi che sia quella suonata, immaginarla proprio nella testa e poi sono le tue mani che devono realizzare quello che hai in mente.

E. M.: Quindi è qualcosa di immaginato?

G. B.: Diciamo che quello che abbiamo in testa, almeno per quello che mi riguarda, è un’idea, che suona effettivamente, poi tutto quello che tu fai è avvicinarti a quello che hai in testa. Ma secondo me non ci arrivi praticamente mai.

E. M.: Perché?

G. B.: Perché è ideale. Perché quando tu hai in testa qualcosa, è esattamente questa idea platonica, idea di quello che vorrei, idea mia che poi passa alla gente che la suona. Non la posso raggiungere perché ci sono degli errori che faccio, o il tempo di ripetizione del pezzo con i musicisti non è mai abbastanza. Di conseguenza, il 99% delle volte uno si accontenta di qualcosa che non è perfetto.

Interview avec Giovanni Bertelli (Composer, Italian, Paris, France, 05. 05. 2015)

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E. M.: A proposito di questo tema, man mano che faccio le mie interviste sento diversi avvisi sull’alternativa fra interpretazione-creazione e interpretazione-trasmissione. Lei cosa ne pensa?
M. P.: Non dobbiamo scegliere fra un’interpretazione creazione o un’interpretazione trasmissione. Forse la trasmissione è più essenziale…però c’è anche una creazione, visto che l’artista comunica la sua propria visione.

E. M.: Intendevo dire che non c’è creazione paragonabile all’improvvisazione.

M. P.: Be’, alla fine trasmettere è suonare un’improvvisazione su un suono scritto quindi è quasi la stessa cosa. In teoria c’è creazione: perché c’è cambiamento nella misura in cui dovremmo riuscire a trovare tutti giorni un’altra chiave di lettura del testo.

E. M.: Come?

M. P.: La curiosità, la ricerca e la volontà di progredire non si dovrebbero mai fermare. Non può essere la stessa cosa ogni giorno. Ci si deve interrogare sul perché si ripete un pezzo. La rilettura varia anche a seconda dell’umore, per esempio.

E. M.: Quali parametri entrano in gioco?

M. P.: Ci sono due aspetti importanti nello studio di un pezzo:

1. Tecnico, ginnico, che è la base sulla quale uno si appoggia;
2. La lettura del testo.

E. M.: Capisco, sono questi due aspetti che danno poi la base di appoggio nell’inventare, necessaria per l’improvvisazione. Ho già incontrato due musicisti di jazz che mi hanno parlato un po’ della loro pratica di improvvisazione.

Secondo lei l’approccio è diverso nel caso del barocco?

M. P.: Non lo so… improvisare è come respirare, avere l’idea di una ricerca infinita nel corso della quale non si ripete mai la stessa cosa.

*Intervista con Massimo Paris (Violist, Italian, Aachen, Germany, 04. 08. 2013)*
E. M.: Cependant, on ne joue ensuite pas directement ce qu’on se chante, c’est un travail progressif, n’est-ce pas ? Comment cela se passe ?

J. P. : On peut commencer par travailler en chantant et jouant de manière alternative. De cette manière, de même que le regard du peintre va de la toile au modèle, l’oreille du musicien va du Chant Intérieur au son instrumental.

E. M.: Est-ce que vous entendez « chanter » au sens où il chante les choses réellement ?

J. P. : Je crois qu’on a effectivement besoin de chanter en vrai pour comprendre le Chant Intérieur.

E. M.: Pourquoi ?

J. P. : Cela permet de mieux prendre conscience des choses : lorsqu’il dit les notes sans les chanter par exemple, lorsqu’il ne chante pas quelque chose, lorsqu’il fait de mauvaises onomatopées.

E. M.: C’est ce que dit aussi Xavier Gagnepain. Je me souviens qu’il conseille des petits exercices dans son livre[3].

J. P. : Le travail de l’oreille relative est fondamental. On peut faire comme cela : 1) chanter en vrai, 2) chanter en jouant, 3) jouer en chantant à l’intérieur, 4) chanter plus fort dans sa tête.

E. M.: Qu’est-ce que cela apporte ?

J. P. : Lorsqu’il fait plus attention à son Chant Intérieur on fait beaucoup mieux les articulations, les départs etc.

Interview with Jérôme Pernoo (Cellist, French, Paris, France, 12. 18. 2014)
V. S. : Mais la musique n’est pas dans la partition. La partition n’est qu’une aide. C’est un aide-mémoire, une aide technique qui permet d’aller plus vite. En fait, même les musiciens qui les ont écrites n’en avaient pas besoin, ils avaient tout dans la tête. L’essentiel est là, dans ce jeu.

**Interview avec Vincent Ségal (Cellist, French, Paris, France, 05. 14. 2015)**

Y.- P. T.: La partition est un bouquin : vous le jetez dans le feu et ça brûle. Il faut la faire vivre ! C’est exactement comme un acteur avec son texte.

**Interview Yan-Pascal Tortelier (Conductor, French, Pittsburgh, PA, USA, 03. 19. 2017)**

E. M.: Vous avez appris en conservatoire ?

M. L. C. : Non, en fait je ne lis pas la musique, je joue d’oreille.

E. M.: Ah oui, c’est une toute autre approche de l’instrument. Lorsque j’ai rendu visite à une amie à Straznice en République Tchèque, à un moment les violonistes de son groupe traditionnel m’ont dit « vas-y, improvise », j’étais totalement incapable de jouer sans partition, et je ne savais pas non plus jouer par accords. Je pouvais reproduire la mélodie mais je n’avais pas le même rapport intuitif à l’instrument.


E. M.: Comment ça se passe quand on fait ça ?
On écoute d’abord les morceaux, on fait la sélection, on adapte ensuite les chants à danser à la tessiture de la clarinette, il y a un gros travail de mémoire à effectuer.

**E. M.: Qu’est-ce qui rend une mélodie plus intéressante qu’une autre ?**

**M. L. C.:** L’implication du musicien à vouloir nous faire découvrir une mélodie de son terroir, mélodie apprise par un voisin (ou une voisine) plus ou moins proche, il y mettra ses « tripes » et toute sa sensibilité dans son jeu, le son émis par la clarinette sera celui de son cœur.

*Interview avec Martial le Corre (Clarinettist, French, Skype, 03. 18. 2015)*

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**E. M.:** Un collega mi diceva: andiamo sempre dall’immaginazione allo strumento, dallo strumento all’immaginazione. All’inizio del mio lavoro ho pensato: dimentico la mia *performance* e mi concentro sull’immaginazione, però poi ho realizzato che l’immaginazione è sempre legata alla realizzazione, non è che immagini nel nulla e poi ti metti a suonare, andiamo sempre dall’uno all’altro. Direi che il canto interiore mi aiuta a realizzare qualcosa, ma anche il realizzare qualcosa mi aiuta a capire cosa immagino. Il modo in cui suono mi aiuta a capire e immaginare in modo diverso, no?

**M. B.:** Chiarissimo, e concordo in linea di principio e di azione. Per me funziona così sia da esecutore che da compositore, le due dimensioni si compenetrano. Sicuramente l’esperienza pianistica, un’esperienza strumentale ti consente poi una maggior libertà da essa e quindi l’immaginazione è più infiammata e anche più diretta…sei più
confidente, più sicuro di quello che stai immaginando. Al tempo stesso nel comporre c’è anche la parte più fisica…non voglio dire di controllo…

E. M.: …di verifica…

M. B.: …di verifica dell’impatto fisico con il suono, questo sì, che poi re-influenza a ruota l’immaginazione. Le due sfere si alimentano. Infatti personalmente la parte più astratta della scrittura, immaginativa, mi è stata possibile negli ultimi anni quando ho acquisito una certa indipendenza dal comporre al piano. Ma nei primi anni sarebbe stato fasullo e sterile immaginarmi delle composizioni senza una pratica strumentale. Non avrei saputo come decodificare l’immaginazione. Mentre, come dici tu, la pratica musicale ti struttura l’autocoscienza musicale, quindi poi l’immaginazione si lega ad una memoria, ad una pratica, e anche ad una conoscenza più precisa di quello che la mente ‘folle’ si immagina. Per cui la pratica serve a dominare la follia…per follia intendo dire questo sostrato quasi profetico che abbiamo dentro, questa immaginazione che non sappiamo da dove venga e che nel tempo, con la pratica, si riesce a canalizzare. Per questo io mi sento più sicuro adesso nel comporre in maniera astratta, perché so come decodificare la mia immaginazione, questo pre-canto interiore che sento.

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E. M.: …poi più pratichi, più suoni, più hai una visione chiara di quello che immagini. Io nel mio lavoro descrivo il canto interiore come la percezione di una cosa come dovrebbe essere divenga progressivamente più chiara. Quindi, se tu dici che all’inizio non potevi comporre così perché non avevi la pratica pianistica,
vuol dire che la percezione aiuta. Cosa diresti che aiuta, perché sei più bravo a
comporre al tavolo adesso?

M. B.: Un primo aspetto è che chiaramente la pratica strumentale ti struttura la mente
musicale e ti permette di passare, se mi permetti di usare questa espressione, dalla
follia al logos, dal magma informe a una capacità di organizzazione perché la memoria
dello studio delle partiture, dello studio strumentale, lo studio dell’orchestrazione,
insomma lo studio della Composizione in generale, ti permette di dominare… o forse
dominare è un termine sbagliato, vorrei dire di organizzare e strutturare questo magma
informe.

*Intervista con Matteo Belli (Pianista, compositore, Italiano, Skype, Heidelberg, 21.04.2021)*
§1. Distinction between the inner song and the actual song.

I am practicing Fauré’s Sicilienne on my cello. On the one hand, I clearly hear the sound of my cello through perception. On the other hand, I can also hear my inner song clearly in phantasy. The two experiences are distinct.

Two objects are given in the world of the inner song that I access through the *epoché* when I am in the musician’s attitude: first, the *actual song* corresponding to the perception of my performance, and second the *inner song* that I hear in phantasy.¹⁷⁰ As I will demonstrate in this chapter, the two objects are given intentionally,¹⁷¹ in two

¹⁷⁰ A musician can play without hearing the inner song, or more exactly, without producing an act of reflection on it, and therefore practice without it (this was actually my case for many years; I was practicing focusing on what I was playing with my cello, on the realization, without paying attention to the inner song, i.e., on how I wanted my performance to sound). However, this inner song and, as I will show, reflecting on and analyzing of the inner song and the actual song, are necessary to make the interpretation musical (I discuss this question with Xavier Gagnepain from whom I get this notion: http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-xavier-gagnepain/, and with his former student Jérôme Pernoo: http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-jerome-pernoo-violoncelliste/).

¹⁷¹ In order to help for further description of the actual song and the inner song, I want to add a note about Husserl’s description of the intentional consciousness through the notions of noesis and noema in *Ideas 1*.

Concerning perception, Husserl explains how: “Owing to its noetic moments, every intensive mental process is precisely noetic; it is of its essence to include in itself something such as a ‘sense’ and possibly a manifold sense on the basis of this sense-bestowal and, in unity with that, to effect further productions [Leistungen] which become ‘senseful’ precisely by this sense-bestowal” (*Ideas 1*, §88 pp. 213-4). Here, he says that *every intensive process is noetic*, and for this reason, understanding that structure of perception necessarily helps to understand what happens in the phantasy. As for perception, mental processes are seizing upon a unity of meaning on the basis of the sense bestowal. The intention is then fulfilled, i.e., becomes senseful, thanks to this sense-bestowal. This leads to further productions.

Husserl explains that “Such noetic moments are, e.g., directions of the regard of the pure Ego to the objects ‘meant’ by it owing to sense-bestowal, to the object which is ‘inherent in the sense’ for the Ego: furthermore, seizing upon this object, holding it fast while the regard adverts to other objects which appear in the ‘meaning’ [‘Vermeinen’]; likewise, producings pertaining to explicatings, relatings, comprisings, multiple position-takings of believings, deemings likely, valuing; and so forth” (*Ideas 1*, §88 pp. 213-4). In other words, the noetic moments are *directional* in the sense that they *direct* the ego toward the object which conversely, means something for the ego. This noetic moment can then lead to the apprehension of other meanings related to this first meaning.

As a consequence, Husserl can write: “All of these are to be found in the mental process in question, not matter how differently structured and varied they are. Now, no matter to what extent this series of exemplary moments refer to really inherent components of mental processes, they nevertheless also refer to what is *not really inherent*, namely by means of the heading of sense” (*Ideas 1*, §88 pp. 213-4). The primary and the secondary meaning pertaining to that primary meaning, are part of the mental process seizing upon the object. They are part of the noetic. These moments can refer to *really inherent components* or *not really inherent* components of the mental process, but they are always part of it.
different fields: the actual song is given in the field of perception as part of the objective world, and the inner song is given in the field of phantasy. However, the two objects are also intertwined. Indeed, as the practicing musician rehearses, improvises, or composes, their attention straddles between the two objects, and the inner song is progressively constituted in phantasy through the perception of its performance, while the interpretation, the improvisation, or the composition unfolds: the interpreter corrects his or her interpretation through listening to the inner song, thus refining the inner song; the improviser unfolds the performance while having an inner song progressively constituted; and the composer edits the work through listening to the inner song and refining his or her inner song. In these activities, whether the inner song arises from the movement, or the movement realizes the inner song, in the consciousness of the trained musician, listening to the inner song in phantasy goes along with listening to the performed inner song in perception. For instance, when I practice my cello, I listen to my performance

The noetic moments have their correlate in noematic moments. Husserl explains indeed: “Corresponding in every case to the multiplicity of Data pertaining to the really inherent noetic content, there is a multiplicity of Data, demonstrable in actual pure intuition, in a correlative ‘noematic content’ or, in short, in the ‘noema’—terms which we shall continue to use from now on” (Ideas 1, §88, p. 214.) Here, the noematic is a constituted unity in the sense that it is the unity of the multiplicity of data pertaining to the really inherent (what will become in Husserl’s later writing the hyle). The unity is given by the unity of the pure intuition. Thus, it is the unity of the intuition which apprehended the multiplicity of data which makes it one correlate of the noetic.

In the situation that I am studying, there is a noetic pole of the impressional consciousness correlated with the noematic pole of the actual song on the one hand, and the noetic pole of the reproductive consciousness correlated with the noematic pole of the inner song on the other hand. In the inner consciousness, the act of phantasy is given in a specific moment of the temporality of the impressional consciousness (it has a temporal position), but the noema correlated to this act is given in the reproductive consciousness in a quasi-temporality. Thus, the noetic act of phantasy can eventually be recalled in the impressional consciousness, but as its noematic correlate is not given in the continuity of the impression, the possibility of its being recalled is still a debatable question. Even if these two fields are related as I will show in the later parts of the present work.

In some cases that I am not taking into consideration in the present dissertation, the musician is not able to play because there is no instrument available, and he or she therefore must work on a piece with the inner song alone (for instance, when a musician rehearses a piece by reading the score in the metro before the concert). In this case, the musician can make progress even without actually working with the instrument. Indeed, as I will explain in the final two chapters of the present dissertation, the phantasy is
of the *Sicilienne* through the inner song of how it should sound, and I listen to my inner song through the perception of how I am performing this *Sicilienne*. The same melody is given in two modes: in the mode of the perception on the one hand, and in the mode of the phantasy on the other hand.¹⁷⁴

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¹⁷⁴ As is well known, Husserl uses the example of the melody in his work on the inner time consciousness. However, he does not describe the perception of a melody from the point of view of the musician playing it. I will analyze the constitution of the actual and the inner song in the final chapter of the present dissertation. However, I want to provide an overview of Husserl’s description here, in order to be able to later adjust it to the situation that I am describing.

In his work, Husserl explains that the melody has its own temporality, and in this sense, is a *temporal object* containing a temporal extension in itself. Husserl writes: “By *temporal objects in the specific sense* we understand objects that are only unities in time but that also contain temporal extension in themselves. When a tone sounds, my objectivating apprehension can make the tone itself, which endures and fades away, into an object and yet not make the duration of the tone or the tone in its duration into an object. The latter—the tone in its duration—is a temporal object. The same is true of a melody, of any change whatsoever, but also of any persistence without change, considered as such” (*On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time*, §7, p. 24).

Bernet explains the distinction between the temporal objects and tempo-objects as follows: “Husserl frühe, erst von Heidegger und dann in kritischer Neuausgabe (*Husserliana* Band X) von Rudolf Boehm veröffentlichte Texte zur Phänomenologie des Zeitbewusstseins nehmen ihren Ausgang bei der Beschreibung der Wahrnehmung von zeitlichen Gegenständen (dauernder Ton) bzw. Zeigegenständen (Dauer des Tons).” *Hua* XXXIII, “Einleitung der Herausgeber,” (p. XXXII). From this it becomes clearer that the melody I am studying is a temporal object [*zeitliche Objekte*]. However, there is also the temporal data of duration involved in the constitution of that melody which is the tempo-object [*Zeitobjekte*].

In his earlier work on the inner time consciousness, Husserl describes very accurately the constitution of a melody in perception. He explains how each note constituting the flowing melody is taken purely as a “hyletic datum” (*On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time*, §8, p. 25). As he says, it “begins and ends” (*On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time*, §8, p. 25). “After it [hyletic datum] has ended, its whole duration-unity, the unity of the whole process in which it begins and ends, ‘recedes’ into the ever more distant past” (*On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time*, §8, p. 25). As Husserl shows: “In this sinking back, I still ‘hold onto it,’ have it in a ‘retention’” (*On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time*, §8, p. 25). This means that the note remains what it is, but is synthetized with the next one and changes into a retention. The tone remains *identical* as “as long as the retention lasts, the tone has its own temporality: it is the same, its duration is the same” (*On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time*, §8, p. 25): the quarter note remains a quarter note, the half note a half note, etc. As a consequence, the melody does not get mishapen by its flowing, and it is therefore later recognizable or can be recalled as it was. There is therefore a consistency of the melody throughout the change in succession.

This melody is given in the impressional consciousness as one and flowing, while keeping its unity. The immanent perception of the presented moment of the melody lasts as long as the external perception lasts. Husserl writes: “The tone is given; that is, I am conscious of it as now. But I am conscious of it as now ‘as long as’ any one of its phases is intended as now” (*On the Phenomenology of the*
As the musician practices, he or she has the experience of two phenomena simultaneously: the musician perceives the actual song and phantasy the inner song at the same time. However, although they happen simultaneously, these two experiences do not happen simultaneously. The experience of the actual song is given in consciousness, whereas the experience of the inner song is not given in consciousness. However, when this time-point of the tone-duration, this now, elapses, then it remains in consciousness, but not as the now, as a now having elapsed. Husserl writes: “if any temporal phase (corresponding to a time-point of the tone-duration) is an actually present now (with the exception of the initial phase), then I am conscious of a continuity of phases as ‘immediately past’ and of the whole extent of the temporal duration from the beginning point up to the now-point as elapsed” (On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, §8, p. 26). It is then synthetized in the flow of consciousness. The notes of the perceived melody are dynamically related to one another through the musical phrasing. They make sense through the unfolding of the interval, and therefore make sense one with the other (Jessica Wiskus explains this in her paper “On memory, nostalgia, and the temporal expression of Josquin’s Ave Maria... virgo serena,” Camille Poupat notices it in the interview: http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-camille-poupat-saxophoniste/).

Husserl says that: “I can direct my attention to the way in which it is given. I am conscious of the tone and of the duration it fills in a continuity of ‘modes,’ in a ‘continual flow.’ And one point, one phase of this flow is called ‘consciousness of the commencing tone’; and in this phase I am conscious of the first time-point of the tone’s duration in the mode of the now” (On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, §8, p. 25). This means that, when the musician practices and as the melody flows in consciousness, the ego can direct his or her attention to the way the melody is given in the impressional consciousness, and perceive that object immanently. This is how the ego apprehends the melody with its musical order, its phrasing, and its temporal shaping. The vitality of the tone of the melody flowing in the impressional consciousness is related to the moment of its presentation through sensation. Husserl says that: “The whole extent of the tone’s duration or ‘the’ tone in its extension then stands before me as something dead, so to speak – something no longer being vitally generated, a formation no longer animated by the generative point of the now but continuously modified and sinking back into ‘emptiness.’ The modification of the whole extent, then, is analogous to or essentially identical with the modification that the elapsed part of the duration undergoes in the transition of consciousness to ever new productions during the time that the tone is actually present” (On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, §8, p. 26). Thus, as it gets temporally pushed back, its vitality decreases. Conversely, if it is recalled in consciousness through remembering, it gets its vitality back.

Husserl points that out when he says: “the same duration is present duration actually building itself up and then is past ‘elapsed’ duration, duration that is still intended or that is produced in recollection ‘as if’ it was new” (On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, §8, p. 26). It means that, as the ego perceives the melody through sensation, the melody is constituted in the stream of consciousness in a continuity of succession. The note which is given in the now of the impression is the most lively one, and as it flows in the past and gets retained, it looses its vitality while keeping its identity throughout this change. As a consequence, when the musician plays, the vitality of the tones of the melody flowing decreases, but as the musician rehearses, repeats, practices, recalling the melody and playing it again, the vitality of the tones comes back as the tones are presented again in consciousness.

In Simultaneity and Delay, Jay Lampert defines simultaneity as follows: “Simultaneity covers ‘happening at the same time,’ whether that time is in the past, present, or future. I allow myself to refer to ‘simultaneous’ events or to ‘a simultaneity,’ that is, a network of simultaneously existing events” (p. 2). He adds that: “Simultaneity is a convergence of time-lines, a mark of the coexisting rhythms of related events; this property of simultaneity is the source of the ontology of delay. Delay occurs when a single
not end in a cacophony. Indeed, the two objects are given in two distinct fields, the one of perception and the one of phantasy. These fields are in conflict as there is not a continuity of impression between the perceptual field and the phantasy field. They have also two distinct temporalities: the temporality of the hyletic flow on the one hand, and the quasi-temporality of the phantasy on the other hand. Here, the melody of the inner song and event both extends away from its starting point, yet is prevented from progressing to its conclusion” (p. 14).

When the musician is in the musician’s attitude, he or she both perceives the actual song and phantasizes the inner song. Here, there is a simultaneity in the apprehension of the phenomena in the sense that they are given in the same objective moment of consciousness. In this sense, they are given simultaneously in a loose sense. However, they are not given simultaneously in a strict sense because they are not given in the same now of the constituted time of the impressional consciousness. Indeed, the actual song is given in the temporality of the impressional consciousness whereas the inner song is given in the quasi-temporality of the reproductive consciousness.

176 I work on this problem in the last paragraph of the present chapter.

177 The quasi-temporality is this type of temporality which is paradoxically given from a specific temporal moment of the impressional consciousness (for instance, I phantasize the inner song, now), but in which intentional objects are given without a temporal position (my inner song of the cello piece that I am practicing does not have a temporal position in the impressional consciousness).

In The Many Futures of a Decision, Lampert elaborates on this notion. He says: “The first exception that Husserl gives to the thesis that every intended object has a “fixed position in one time,” is the case of fictional objects: Fikte, “lived experiences of imagination, which are directed toward fictions” (167/195). There is an obvious sense in which fictions are not fixed in time. As they are not descriptions of actual objects and events in the actual temporal world, they cannot be tied to a fixed time. Even if, inside the fiction, it is said that an event occurs at a fixed time, that time is designated in the fictional world, and is still not fixed to the actual time. A story written in 1948 may say “now,” or may say “1984,” but that does not fix the fictional event either to the real 1948 or to the real 1984, or to the real 2017 when it is being read. In addition, imaginary objects are even less datable: The centaur which I now imagine, and a hippopotamus which I have previously imagined, and, in addition, the table I am perceiving even now have no connection among themselves, i.e., they have no temporal position in relation to one another (keine Zeitlage zu einander) ... the centaur is neither earlier nor later than the hippopotamus. (Husserl 168/195–6) To be sure, there can be temporal relations within the fiction— the hippo can age within the fiction. Moreover, there are always temporal relations in the subject who invents the fiction and in the subject who reads it, and between writer and reader, and in the history of the book. “The object of imagination is present to consciousness as temporal and temporally determined, enduring in time: but [Here is the interesting point] its time is a quasi-time” (168/196). Quasi-Zeit. “It is a temporal object, it has its time. And yet it is not in time” (168/196). Again on the next page: “Time is certainly represented in imagination, and even represented intuitively, but it is a time without actual, strict localization of position (Örtlichkeit der Lage)—it is, precisely, a quasi-time” (169/197)” (p. 67-8).

In this quasi-time of the phantasy, there are various phantasy-worlds, various segments of inner songs, and therefore, various segments of quasi-temporalities which can be awakened together in associations. This is what happens when the inner song is constituted (cf. Chapter 5 of the present dissertation).
the melody of the actual song unfold with the same temporal value (it is the same melody). For instance, as I play the *Sicilienne*, the melody in the phantasy is not faster or slower than the melody in perception. However, there is not a complete matching up of the two melody. Indeed, the melody of the inner song *anticipates* its realization, and therefore the givenness of the actual melody in perception.\(^{178}\) For instance, as I breath in, I start hearing the inner song of the *Sicilienne* before my bow starts playing it on the cello. In addition, the two objects do not receive the same attention: attention modulates the acts of consciousness so that one phenomenon is given more in the foreground while the other more appears more in the background.\(^{179}\)

The very ability to constitute a rich inner song goes along with learning to perform: if the *interpreter* practices daily, the more technique he or she has, i.e., the more he or she can integrate tactual sensations into the inner song,\(^{180}\) the more he or she can phantasize and enhance the inner song,\(^{181}\) if the *improviser* learns the combinations that works step by step by trying them out regularly, he or she can integrate them in the inner song once he or she knows how to do them, i.e., once that the tactual sensations in the Body have been memorized;\(^{182}\) if the *composer* learns to compose by having the

\(^{178}\) I address the problem of the futural dimension of the inner song in the last chapter of the present dissertation.

\(^{179}\) I investigate this problem in the last chapter of the present dissertation.

\(^{180}\) I develop this notion in the fourth Chapter (§6-7)

\(^{181}\) This is something that comes out in the interview with Antoine Tamestit for instance (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-antoine-tamestit-altiste/).

\(^{182}\) This is something that comes out in the interview with Joachim Govin for instance (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-joachim-govin-contrebassiste/).
experience of hearing and rewriting what does and does not sound good, he or she can learn how to ingrate such elements that are feasible into the inner song. This demonstrates how performing is both a realization of the inner song, and a way to verify it.

The inner song and the actual song are ontologically related. Indeed, as the inner song is a phenomenon of imagination which is constituted in consciousness as a part of the process of music practice, it is part of the essence of the inner song that I am investigating to be oriented toward a performance which realizes it and participates in its further constitution. The phantasy is grounded in tactuality in the sense that the

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183 This is something that comes out in the interview with Matteo Belli for instance (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/intervista-con-matteo-belli-compositore-it/).

184 This is a point that I make in the introduction of the present work: I define the “inner song” as this specific musical object of phantasy involved in music practice and related to a performance. The inner song is aimed at being realized through performance, even if it is, phenomenologically speaking, the reproduction of the perception of a possible performance. Here, it is more precisely the reproduction of a real possible performance: a possibility which is realized.

Bernet explains the notion of real possibility by saying: “Soyons plus précis, et faisons, avec Husserl, la distinction entre le cas d’une possibilité idéale (ideale Möglichkeit) et d’une possibilité réelle (reale Möglichkeit) ! […] Husserl dit que la possibilité réelle (reale Möglichkeit) se caractérise par le fait qu’elle n’est pas une simple possibilité, mais une possibilité pour laquelle quelque chose plaide et plaide, selon le cas, d’une manière plus ou moins forte.” Qu’est ce qui, dans le cas d’une possibilité réelle, plaide et plaide en faveur de quoi? L’enjeu du plaidoyer est clairement que l’objet possible pourrait s’intégrer dans le champ de la réalité. Mais qu’est-ce que la réalité pour la phénoménologie, sinon l’ensemble des objets dont le cours précédent de notre expérience commune a établi l’existence? L’objet réellement possible est donc l’objet dont nous pouvons assumer que, s’il était effectivement donné, il s’intégrerait harmonieusement dans cette réalité effective qui est le champ de notre expérience commune. L’objet réellement possible n’est donc pas encore un objet effectif, mais c’est déjà plus qu’un objet idéalement possible ou purement imaginaire, car c’est un objet pour lequel nous avons de bonnes raisons non pas encore de poser (Setzen) l’existence effective, mais du moins de supposer (Vermuten) l’existence probable. Qu’est ce qui peut plaider pour une telle existence probable, sinon le cours de notre existence précédente? Est donc réellement possible un objet dont nous posons l’existence comme étant probable et cela sur la base de notre expérience effective précédente. L’objet réellement possible est un objet dont la possibilité d’existence est ’motivée’ par ce que nous avons déjà perçu” (Conscience et Existence, Chapt. 5. “L’idéalisme husserlien: les objets possibles ou réels et la conscience transcendante,” pp. 150-2).

This notion of realized possibility is crucial to understand the inner song. Indeed, the inner song is the phantasy of a performance which should possibly be integrated in the field of reality and is/was/will be integrated as the performance goes. The inner song is therefore not a real object, but it is more than a purely phantasized object. It is an object for which we have good reasons, not to posit the effective reality, but to suppose a probable existence. The existence of the inner song is in this case motivated by
performance realizing the inner song is given to the musician in consciousness as his or her own, i.e., the melody is perceived as produced by the movements of his or her Body. Here, the performance realizes the inner song in the sense in which realization [Realisierung] means making real [Real]: the phantasy becomes perceivable and part of the objective world thanks to the movements of the Body. It follows that, even when the inner song is not actually realized, the actual song is still always present in consciousness as a potentiality, as an inner song; in this sense, the givenness of the actual song in perception is a real possibility [reale Möglichkeit], a possibility which is realized. In other words, when the musician phantasizes but is not actually performing, he or she always has present in consciousness how the actual song should sound; the actual song is still co-given as a possibility. Conversely, when the musician practices and rehearses, and therefore when he or she hears the realization of the inner song through perception as his or her own, he or she can either practice with the awareness of the inner song (listen to the performance through the awareness of how the performance should sound, noticing a gap between what is being played and what should be played in terms of rhythm, pitch,

what was already perceived (other processes of realization of the inner song, or the current process of realization of the inner song). I will come back to this problem in more detail in the last chapter of the present dissertation.

185 I explain this in Chapter 4: “Time and Space of the Impressional and Reproductive Consciousness” and 5: “Process of Constitution of the Inner Song through Music Practice.”

186 I work on the notion of realization more extensively in the last chapter.

187 In the present dissertation I am describing the inner song which is realized. However, I would like to investigate unrealized inner songs in further research in the future.

188 This is where I agree with Bernet claiming that perception is not derivable from phantasy, phantasy is not derivable from perception, but they presuppose one another as a possibility. In the situation that I am studying in which the inner song is a real possibility, and the actual song a realization, this is particularly clear.
character, etc. thanks to associations\textsuperscript{189}, or without it (and in this sense, he or she is absorbed in the perception as what the perception \textit{is}, independently of what it \textit{should be}).\textsuperscript{190}

§2. The structure of image.

\textit{If I do not pay attention, I tend to hear a better version of what I am playing (at the moment the Sicilienne) rather than hearing what I am actually playing. In other words, my perception of my playing is colored by the apprehension of what I would like to hear, i.e., the inner song. Conversely, if I have a kind of blurred and fleeting inner song at the beginning of my practice session, the more I practice, the better and clearer my inner song becomes. In other words, its apprehension is also colored by the perception of its realization.}

The actual song and the inner song are related to one another through a double movement: the performance is not musical\textsuperscript{191} unless the musician listens to the inner song and practices to actualize it, but conversely, there is no elaborated inner song without the capacity to nourish phantasy with how the inner song actually sounds. In other words, the inner song and the performed actual song nourish and enrich each other: the performance

\textsuperscript{189} I explain this in the last chapter of the present dissertation.

\textsuperscript{190} In the present work, I investigate mostly the situation in which the musician practices \textit{while being} aware of the inner song. I don’t explore in depth the situation in which the musician \textit{is not} aware of the inner song here. However, it would be interesting to develop a study analyzing the differences between performing while being mindful of the inner song and performing without being mindful of it. I would say that, in the second case, the performance is merely \textit{mechanical}, and is no longer \textit{musical}.

\textsuperscript{191} I discuss the idea of musicality in the last chapter of the present dissertation.
is enriched and nourished by the quality and the richness of the inner song, while the inner song is refined through its performance.

As I mentioned earlier, this double movement is, more precisely, a structure of *reference*: the inner song refers to the actual song and vice-versa. Given that the inner song is realized by the performance, and that the performance needs to be as close as possible to the inner song, this structure can be understood as a structure of *image* in which the inner song as a model [*Vorbild*] and the actual song as an image [*Abbild*] refer to one another. If a static analysis can clearly distinguish these two poles, a genetic analysis highlights a more complex picture.\(^{192}\) Indeed, it is true that the musician can listen to the melody flowing in perception on the one hand or can play the melody and have it flow in phantasy on the other hand; in this case, the attention *focusses* either on one or the other, and the structure of reference appears as made of two clearly distinct poles. However, it is also true that the musician can practice, and, as the practice goes on, have their attention caught by the fact that some elements don’t sound *as they should* (for instance, the pitch is wrong, the rhythm is disorganized, it sounds flat, etc.).\(^ {193}\) In this case, the attention *straddles* between the two melodies unfolding in their respective temporalities (the temporality of perception and the *quasi*-temporality of phantasy), the two objects are so deeply intertwined that they are not clearly distinct in consciousness

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\(^{192}\) As the description goes, I address the problem of time in more detail. In the last two chapters, I highlight especially how the inner song is constituted through the perception of its realization in performance, and therefore how it is, at first, vague, and then, richer.

\(^{193}\) As I explain in the final chapter of the present dissertation, this happens through associations: the present actual song awakens inner songs or parts of the inner song, through identity of distinction (what I am playing does not correspond, or the opposite, it does correspond to the inner song of the same melody).

Here, I want to thank Stéphane Finetti who helped me to understand the role of associations in this process.
anymore, and consciousness can, in the process of listening, only notice a satisfaction (the performance sounds as it should) or a dissatisfaction (the performance does not sound as it should). Here, it is affectivity as “the allure given to consciousness – the peculiar pull that an object given to consciousness exercises on the ego,”\textsuperscript{194} which causes consciousness to notice this satisfaction or dissatisfaction as associations are awakened.\textsuperscript{195}

In that structure of reference, the perceptual object given in the phenomenological consciousness (the \textit{real} object), is the image of the inner song (the \textit{phantasy} object). This does not mean that the inner song comes prior to the actual song, or that the actual song is founded on the inner song. It just indicates a structure of reference in which the inner song is re-presenting what the actual song could be or should be. This structure is temporal: as the practice goes, the performance improves on the one hand, and the inner song is progressively constituted on the other hand. This means that the inner song is less accurate, more unsteady, and aesthetically less musical in its earlier stages than in its later stages. Thus, the musician can phantasize an inner song which, in the earlier stages, is made of wrong moves sequences of sounds that do not sound good together, or which has poor rhythm, but as the practice goes, and as the musician hears the actual song which realizes the inner song, the inner song is modified and becomes a better model of a possible performance.\textsuperscript{196}

\textsuperscript{194} \textit{Analysis Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis}, §32, p.196.

\textsuperscript{195} This is an important part of the description of the final chapter of the present dissertation.

\textsuperscript{196} I develop all of that more in the last two chapters; in the present chapter, I just want to focus on the structure of reference between the perceptual and the phantasy object.
Through this temporal evolution, the intertwining of perception and phantasy is reinforced. This means that a complex interplay between the givenness of the object as present in perception, and the reproduction of possible future and past perceptions in phantasy takes place.\(^{197}\) Here, the inner song can arise from the tactual sensations as I perform the actual song (in this sense it would come \textit{from} the actual song), or instead, it may be constituted first in phantasy and then realized (in this sense it would be the ontological foundation of the actual song). This does not change what it is (the representation of what I \textit{want to hear} or \textit{how I would like to improve} the performance) however it arises in consciousness. For this reason, the inner song remains a model [\textit{Vorbild}] given through phantasy re-presentation in consciousness.

§3. Distinction between the positing in perception and the positing in imagination.

\textit{I am practicing Fauré at home. I hear the sound of my cello. I also feel it with my body against my chest. I can also phantasize the inner song. The sound of my cello is real: others can hear it; it is given in objective time. As opposed to it, the sound of my inner song is only given in phantasy, in my inner temporality.}

In the \textit{Logical Investigations}, Husserl distinguishes perception and imagination through their positing, arguing that the perception posits the object as \textit{existent}, whereas imagination does not posit the object, leaving the problem of its existence unsettled. In other words, he distinguishes acts that are “positing and existentially committed” from non-positing and therefore not existentially committed\(^{198}\) acts.

\(^{197}\) I elaborate more deeply on that in the last chapter.

In *Logical Investigations* V, Husserl writes:

The former [positing acts] were after a fashion existence-meanings: they were either sensuous percepts, or percepts in the wider sense or pretended apprehensions of what is, or other acts which, without claiming to seize an object ‘itself’, in ‘full-bodied’ or intuitive fashion, yet refer to it as *existent*.

As opposed to that, Husserl defines the non-positing acts as follows:

The other [non positing] acts leave the existence of their object unsettled: the object may, objectively considered, exist, but it is not referred to as existent in them, it does not *count* as actual, but rather as ‘merely presented’.

In his description, Husserl opposes positing from non-positing acts. He writes:

In all this there is a law to the effect that to each positing nominal act a non-positing act, a ‘mere presentation’ of like matter, corresponds, and vice-versa, this correspondence being understood as the ideally possible.

According to this quote, the two categories of presentation have a relation of correspondence. Indeed, one should presuppose the other, at least ideally. They are a possibility for each other. Thus, to an object posited in the flesh, there might correspond an object which is merely presented with a contingent existence, and vice versa.

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199 *Logical Investigations*, V, §38 pp.159.

200 *Logical Investigations*, V §38 pp.159.

201 *Logical Investigations*, V, §38 pp.159.

202 As I will demonstrate later, this claim is important to understand the inner song because the inner song as a phantasy object has a correspondent in perception. The situation is not what Husserl describes here, but the Husserlian description helps to understand the notion of “correspondent.”
This primary account of the distinction between perception and imagination, establishing the possibility of a correspondence between the two acts, is crucial to understanding the relationship between the inner song and the actual song. Indeed, as the actual song is posited in perception (and even more, as it is perceived tactualy through the sensation of my Body moving and manipulating the instrument in order to issue the sound) it pretends to give the object *in full body*, whereas the inner song being given in phantasy has its status of existence unsettled. Despite this distinction, there is still the possibility of a correspondence between the two acts. In other words, to the acts posited in the flesh, i.e., to the perceptual act, might correspond a non-posing act, i.e., a phantasy act.\(^{203}\)

§4. The structure of imagination as *Einführung*.

In his earlier account of imagination, Husserl understands imagination as *Einführung*, elaborating on it by comparing this form of imagination with perception. Even if the inner song cannot be understood through the notion of *Einführung*, this earlier account helps to understand the other notion of imagination as phantasy (as a consequence the notion of inner song), and a possible interplay between perception and phantasy through the notion of *image* (as a consequence, it gives a theoretical basis from which to understand the distinct relationship of image between actual song and inner

\(^{203}\) I will come back to the relationship between the two objects throughout the description. As it appears from the interviews, the musician can either perform what is phantasized, or phantasize while playing. Thus the inner song can be the ontological origin of the performance, or vice versa. There is therefore a relationship of correspondence which does not necessarily indicate an ontological origin of the phantasy or the perceived object. This leads me to agree with Bernet’s understanding of Husserl who does not give a primacy of perception over phantasy, or of phantasy over perception, but only notices how one presupposes the possibility of the other (cf. Footnote 31 Introduction, §4).
song); I therefore want to explain it first before going into the detailed description of the phantasy.²⁰⁴

According to Husserl, perception is: “an act in which something objective appears to us in its own person, as it were, as present itself.”²⁰⁵ As opposed to that, in imagination the object “does not appear as present. It is only re-presented; it is as though it were there, but only as though. It appears to us in Image. The Latins say imaginatio.”²⁰⁶ Here, Husserl is deriving his understanding of imagination from the theory of image. He distinguishes two modes of givenness among which one is less related with image theory: on the one hand, there is the “internal image presentation”²⁰⁷ when an image is represented in consciousness (for instance, I am imagining my cousin), and on the other hand, there is the “mental image”²⁰⁸ when a perceived object presents another object in

²⁰⁴ As Bernet explains, after 1904-05, Husserl “repeatedly doubted the determination of phantasy and memory as variants of pictorial consciousness and from 1909 onwards definitely rejected this conception,” he provides two reasons: “1. The failure of the ‘apprehension of a content of apprehension’ schema, derived from the analysis of perception, in the clarification of the acts of intuitive presentation; 2. the analysis of the temporal character of inner consciousness and its impressional and reproductive form” (“Unconscious consciousness in Husserl and Freud” p. 332).

In Husserl’s earlier conception of imagination (as Einbildung) imagination forms a structure with the percept, while being its counterpart. However, imagination is founded in perception. In the case of the inner song, the phantasy forms a structure with the percept, however, the percept realizes the phantasy and the phantasy is modified by the perception of that realization, there is therefore no foundation of the phantasy in perception, or even vice versa.

Hence, even if it is necessary to understand the notion of pictorial consciousness in order to understand the phantasy, and therefore the inner song as an object of phantasy, even if I describe the relationship of the inner song and the actual song as a structure of image with a correspondent between the two poles of the structure, the notion of the inner song needs to be understood thanks to Husserl’s description of the phantasy, and not thanks to his description of imagination (Einbildung).

²⁰⁵ Husserl, Phantasy, Image consciousness, and Memory, Text no1, §8, p. 18. This description is actually consistent with his definition in the Logical Investigations.

²⁰⁶ Phantasy, Image-Consciousness and Memory, Text no1. §8, p. 18.

²⁰⁷ Phantasy, Image-Consciousness and Memory, Text no1. §8, p. 19.

²⁰⁸ Phantasy, Image-Consciousness and Memory, Text no1. §8, p. 19.
imagination (for instance, I am imagining my cousin by looking at his picture). The first one is a pure phantasy whereas the second one is based on the perception of an image. The first case is the most distant from the theory of image because it is actually not directly based on the perception of an image. The second case is directly related to the theory of image because it is an *imagining through perceiving*.

Husserl describes the structure of imagination in the second case as a structure involving three elements:

1. the physical image, the physical thing made from canvas, marble, and so on;
2. the representing or depicting object; and (3) the represented or depicted object.

For the latter we prefer to say simply ‘*image subject*’; for the first object, we prefer ‘physical image’; for the second, ‘representing image’ or ‘image object’.

As usual, here Husserl takes an example from the visual field. Then, he does not really focus on the first kind of object; he is not really interested in the physicality of the object. For him, it is the relationship between the second and the third kinds of object which are the essential elements.

So, if I put aside the physical object, there are still three aspects to take into consideration: the *depicting object*, the *depicted object*, and their *relationship*.

Concerning the latter, Husserl establishes that the difference between the two objects can vary from one case to another; they have a loose connection. This means that the representing or depicting object can be relatively far from the represented or depicted object and therefore that a type of *hermeneutics of the object is involved*. The most important thing here is the relationship of likeness: the likeness between the *depicting

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209 *Phantasy, Image-Consciousness and Memory*, Text no1. §9, p. 21.
object and the *depicted* object is indeed what provides the character of image. In this structure, the appearing object does not matter for what it is, but only as it represents another object with which it has a relation of likeness; in other words, it is not the *perceived* but the *co-perceived* which matters. The likeness goes then in two directions: (1) *likeness of the sign with what it represents*, and (2) *likeness of the presented object with the signified represented*.

The relationship between the inner song and the actual song also presents a structure of image, with a relationship of likeness between the two poles of the structure. However, it is not the phantasy object, which is the image of the perceived, but the perceived which is the image of the phantasy. Here too, a hermeneutic of the object is in play. Indeed, the musician needs to be able to grasp the inner song by focusing on it, singing it, paying attention to the feeling of satisfaction or dissatisfaction that comes as it is heard or performed, in order to realize it in performance. However, it is the hermeneutic of the phantasy object which is necessary to realize it in a perceivable performance. This hermeneutic comes with various questions: what do I hear (this requires paying attention to the performance); what would I like to hear (this requires to pay attention to the inner song); why am I not satisfied by what I hear (this requires to understand the feeling related to the perception); and what would be the correct way to play it (this is related to the rules of harmony, the cultural context of the piece, the style of the music, the purpose, and other aesthetic questions)? The process of the constitution of the inner song in phantasy, and realization of the inner song in performance, unfolds

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210 *Phantasy, Image-Consciousness and Memory*, Text no1., §9, p. 21.
thanks to that hermeneutic. Throughout that process, the structure or image is reinforced.\textsuperscript{211}

§5. Correspondence between the act positing the inner song and the act positing the actual song.

\textit{I am practicing the Sicilienne. I listen to the actual song. I also listen to my inner song. Sometimes, I am satisfied, and I play further, at other times, I am dissatisfied so I correct my moves. I correct my performance according to the inner song, trying to make it more attuned, more flowing, more musical. At the same time, I improve my representation of the inner song, correcting it when what I was phantasizing was not so good, or not feasible.}

When Husserl starts his investigation of imagination in the \textit{Logical Investigations}, he mostly has in mind imagination as \textit{Einbildung}. Here, both positing acts in perception and non-positing acts in imagination are part of the same genus despite their differences.\textsuperscript{212} both belong to the concept of “presentation.”\textsuperscript{213} The two acts are distinct, but they should still be able, ideally, to at least correspond. This correspondence makes possible a switch from one to the other: a switch from an object that exists to an object

\textsuperscript{211} The understanding of that particular relationship and more precisely the understanding of how the inner song can be constituted as a \textit{Vorbild} and be \textit{realized} in performance and therefore perceived as an \textit{Abbild} will come progressively with the unfolding of the description, and more particularly in the last two chapters.

\textsuperscript{212} A parallel reflection exists then at the level of the judgement as the object can be posited as existent or merely represented (in the second case there is no specific truth-value).

\textsuperscript{213} \textit{Logical Investigations}, V, §38, p. 160.
that may or may not exist and vice versa. Husserl calls this switch from positing acts to non-positing acts a *modification*.\footnote{\textit{Logical Investigations}, V, §38, p. 159.}

In this earlier account, Husserl understands imagination \([\text{Einbildung}]\) as a modification of perception.\footnote{Husserl writes: “Each act of belief has a ‘mere presentation’ as its counterpart, which presents the same object in precisely the same manner, i.e., on the ground of the same matter, and only differs from the former act in that it leaves the presented object in \textit{suspense} and does not refer to it positingly as existent. Such a modification can of course not be repeated, as little as it makes sense in the case of acts not ranged under the notion of belief. It therefore creates a quite peculiar connection between acts of this quality and their counterparts” (\textit{Logical Investigations}, V, §39 p. 163-4).} In other words, an object of imagination is \textit{a-perceived} through an object which is \textit{perceived}. As I demonstrated in the previous paragraph, this is possible because of a relationship of likeness between the two objects.\footnote{Husserl explains: “The likeness-presentation plainly has the peculiarity that, when it achieves fulfilment, the object which appears before it as likeness gets identified through similarity with the object given in the fulfilling act. Having held this to be the peculiarity of a presentation by way of likeness, we have admitted that \textit{fulfilment of like by like internally fixes the character of a synthesis of fulfilment as imaginative}” (\textit{Logical Investigations}, VI §14, pp. 219-20).}

This is different from what happens in the process of constitution of the inner song. Indeed, even if the inner song incorporates a modification of perception into the process of its constitution because it is the reproduced modification of a possible perception,\footnote{As has been said, the inner song is not to be understood through the notion of \textit{Einbildung}, however, it does include a modification of perception in the course of its constitution. Indeed, as I perceive my performance, i.e., as the actual song is constituted in perception in the phenomenological consciousness, this perception is reproduced in phantasy; cancelling out its existence-value, it is reproduced and incorporated into the inner song. Thus, the inner song which is a phantasy-expectation (I explain this notion in the final chapter) of the possible perception given through performance, is being modified by the incorporation of a possible past perception given through performance.} this specific phenomenon is not, properly speaking, a modification of perception in imagination as Husserl describes with the structure of \textit{Einbildung}. Indeed, even if my inner song is modified by the perception of the performance, it is not the same as what Husserl
describes in the case of the perception of a picture because it is not an imagining through seeing.\textsuperscript{218}

Despite this difference from what Husserl describes, the inner song that I describe is also a \textit{mere presentation}, exactly like an object of imagination is. In other words, as opposed to the actual song in which the status of existence of the object is primordial in the act of belief related to the object, the inner song influences consciousness “purely artistically,” as \textit{an object of phantasy}. This means that there is no act of belief concerning the existence of the object attached to its apprehension.\textsuperscript{219} What matters is the inner song, as such, for its aesthetical\textsuperscript{220} qualities: how it sounds, whether it is soft, beautiful, harmonious, tense, etc.\textsuperscript{221}

\textsuperscript{218} The only case that could be analyzed as a pictorial consciousness is the case in which I interpret a score, and therefore phantasize the inner song from the visual perception of the score. However, in this case the score is not exactly an image as Husserl intends. Indeed, it is \textit{prescriptive through a sign}; it is therefore closer to a sign-consciousness than an image consciousness.

\textsuperscript{219} Husserl writes: “A positing percept of recollection, e.g., has its counterpart in a corresponding act of ‘mere’ imagination having the same matter, as in, e.g., the intuitive percept of an image, the consideration of a painting that we allow to influence us purely artistically, without in any way responding to the existence or non-existence of what is represented, or the intuition of some mental picture where we drop all stances toward existence and lose ourselves in fantasy” (\textit{Logical Investigations}, V, §39 p. 164).

\textsuperscript{220} I address the problem of aesthetics in the final chapter of the present dissertation.

\textsuperscript{221} In the \textit{Letter to Hoffmannstahl}, Husserl explains the aesthetical attitude, underlining the similarity with the phenomenological attitude, as follows: “the intuition of a purely aesthetic work of art is enacted under a strict suspension of all existential attitudes of the intellect and of all attitudes relating to emotions and the will which presuppose such an existential attitude. Or more precisely: the work of art places us in (almost forces us into) a state of aesthetic intuition that excludes these attitudes. The more of the existential world that resounds or is brought to attention, and the more the work of art demands an existential attitude of us out of itself (for instance a naturalistic sensuous appearance: the natural truth of the photography), the less aesthetically pure the work is. (To this also belong all kinds of ‘tendency’.) The natural stance of the mind, the stance of actual life, is ‘existential’ through and through. Things that stand before us in a sensuous way, the things of which actual scientific discourse speaks, are posited by us as realities, and acts of mind and will are based on these positing of existence: joy—that this \textit{is}, sorrow, that this \textit{is not}, wish, that it could \textit{be}, etc. (= existential attitude of the mind): the opposite pole of that stance of the mind that belongs to pure aesthetic intuition and the corresponding emotional state. But just as much the opposite pole of the pure phenomenological attitude of the mind, which is the only one whithin which philosophical problems can be solved. For the phenomenological method too demands a strict suspension of all existential attitudes. Above all in the critique of knowledge. […] The artist, who
In his description of the *Einbildung* structure, Husserl also says that, as opposed to the presentation of the act, the modification is characterized by the fact that it cannot be repeated.\(^{222}\) The modification is therefore an ultimate end in the sense that there cannot be a regression *ad infinitum* of representations. So, presentation and modification belong to the same category, they are two counterparts which modify the act in different ways. However, after the modification from perception to imagination that characterizes imagination as *Einbildung*, there is no further modification. Thus, the only possible trajectory is to switch from belief to imagination, and imagination to belief. There can be no modification of the modification.\(^{223}\) As a consequence, any further act related to imagination is necessarily a different act, not a modification of the act; if consciousness seizes upon the act of imagination, it is a brand-new category of act.\(^{224}\)

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\(^{222}\) Husserl explains: “‘Mere’ presentation has here no further counterpart: it is unintelligible what such a presentation could mean or achieve. If belief has been transformed into mere presentation, we can at best return to belief. There is no modification that can be repeated in the same sense, and carried on further” (*Logical Investigations*, V, §39 p. 164).

\(^{223}\) A modification of this claim is announced by the end of *Ideas I*.

\(^{224}\) This leads him to argue in Hua XXIII that the object of imagination is not “recalled” but “reconstituted” in consciousness. I will come back to this problem in the final chapter of the present dissertation. Indeed, the possibility of a recalling of the object of phantasy is problematic. On the one hand, it should seem legitimate to argue that an object that had been represented should be possibly represented again as it flowed and was retained in consciousness. On the other hand, as the object of phantasy is not given in the continuity of an impression, and appears in the *quasi*-temporality of the phantasy, it is equally legitimate to argue that it is not properly “recalled” but only “reconstituted.”
Husserl presents the relationship between the original act of perception and its modified counterpart in imagination as a unique structure. Indeed, as the matter does not change (for instance it is the same little boy that I see in the picture and I imagine), there is necessarily a strong commonality between the two acts. Moreover, they form a unitary structure despite the difference in the fulfillment of their meaning: the act and its counterpart are part of the same structure of apprehension, part of the same judgement. However, this structure of apprehension is made of two acts that differ because they are counterparts qualitatively: the object and the act seizing upon the object are distinct because the re-presentation as a counterpart is the counterpart of the act seizing upon the object, and not the counterpart of the object itself. Thus, even if it is its counterpart, imagination as image-consciousness forms one structure with the percept.

This characteristic is the essence of the structure of imagination intended as *Einbildung*. However, despite a clear distinction between the inner song’s structure of unity with the percept, and that structure introduced by Husserl in the *Logical Investigations*, the inner song, and its counterpart in perception, which is the actual song,

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225 Husserl writes: “Community of kind among qualities coordinated by conformative modification [...] one or other of these qualities pertains to all acts, entering essentially into the unitary structure of each qualitatively unmodified or modified judgement whether we consider acts of mere significant intention or acts which fulfil meaning.” Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, Volume II, V, §39 p. 164).  

226 Husserl pursues: “It is obvious, further, that the mere presentations of any act whatever, which we distinguished above from the qualitative counterparts possible only in the case of positing acts, are, as mere presentations, themselves qualitative counterparts, but not to their acts of origin, which are rather their presented objects. The mere presentation of a wish is no counterpart of a wish, but of any positing act, e.g. a percept, directed upon this wish. This pair, percept and mere presentation of a wish, are of one kind, whereas the wish and its percept or imagination or any other presentation which relates to it, differ in kind.” (*Logical Investigations*, V, §39 p.164-5).
also present a unique type of structure in consciousness. Indeed, an act of phantasy has its counterpart in an act of perception, and the matter of the two acts does not change (it is the same melody that I apprehend in perception and in phantasy). Thus, even if the two acts fulfil their meaning differently, the inner song and the actual song (both giving the same melody in two different ways in consciousness) are part of one single intention that I call the musician’s intention.\textsuperscript{227}

§6. The synthesis of fulfilment of perception; perceiving the actual song.\textsuperscript{228}

\textit{I am playing Fauré and hearing the actual realization of the inner song through the instrument. I hear a unity of sounds that are played successively. I issue one sound after the other, unfolding a musical phrase that leads the music piece further. I am careful to perform the appropriate intonation. I am also careful to respect the particular rhythm of the piece of music I am working on, or the rhythm I want to hear, the rhythm I phantasize in my inner song. I work on the accents, and the increase or decrease of energy by feeling them in my body and performing them as I feel them. Altogether, these sounds constitute one single unity: the unity of the melody.}

As Husserl describes in the \textit{Logical Investigations} VI using a visual example, the object of perception is given with visible and invisible parts: I see some aspects of the

\textsuperscript{227} I will come back to the problem of the fulfillment of this intention in the last two chapters.

\textsuperscript{228} I will come back to study the problem of perception in more depth in Chapter 4 as I describe the specific perception of the musical instrument and of the melody produced by this musical instrument when the musician practices. Here, I just want to highlight the two distinct types of fulfilment of the intention and explain how Husserl’s understanding of phantasy builds upon his understanding of perception.
table in front of me, but I do not see others. However, the invisible parts are not totally absent, they are still given, but as absent, they are re-presented. In other words, they are suggested, but are not part of the percept. Because I can perceive the object in an

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229 Husserl says: “It [the object] is not actually given ‘from the front’, only ‘perspectively foreshortened and projected’ etc. While many of its properties are illustrated in the nuclear content of the percept, at least in the (perspectival) manner which the last expressions indicate, many others are not present in the percept in such illustrated form: the elements of the invisible rear side, the interior etc., are no doubt subsidiarily intended in more or less definite fashion, symbolically suggested by what is primarily apparent, but are not themselves part of the intuitive, i.e., of the perceptual or imaginative content, of the percept. On this hinge the possibility of indefinitely many percepts of the same object, all differing in content. If percepts were always the actual, genuine self-presentations of objects that they pretend to be, there could be only a single percept for each object, since its peculiar essence would be exhausted in such self-presentation” (Logical Investigations, VI, §14, pp. 220-21).

230 In his description of the perceptual process in the Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, Husserl speaks about “indication.” He says: “what is identical is a constant x, a constant substrate of actually appearing table-moments, but also of indications of moments not yet appearing. These indications are at the same time tendencies, indicative tendencies that push us toward the appearances not given” (Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, §1, p. 42).

The present appearance is not only presented but it also points out toward, indicates, the potentially presented perceptual data. In other words, the presented indicates something beyond its present appearance and, through this indicative tendency, it pushes the process of perception further. For instance, as I play my cello, its particular voice, which is given to hear as I play it, pushes toward more possibilities, other possibilities. In this sense, it is indicative.

These possibilities of perception are not unrelated. Indeed, they are all intertwined with the not-yet-given possibilities. Husserl says: “They are, however, not single indications, but entire indicative systems, indications functioning as systems of rays that points toward corresponding manifold systems of appearance. They are pointers into an emptiness since the non-actualized appearances are neither consciously intended as actual nor presentified. In other words, everything that genuinely appears is an appearing thing only by virtue of being intertwined and permeated with an intentional empty horizon, that is, by virtue of being surrounded by a halo of emptiness with respect to appearance. It is an emptiness that is not a nothingness, but an emptiness to be filled-out; it is a determinable indeterminacy. For the intentional horizon cannot be filled out in just any manner; it is a horizon of consciousness that itself has the fundamental trait of consciousness as the consciousness of something” (Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, §1, p. 42).

These possibilities are emptiness, not nothingness [Nichts], but emptiness [Leere]: they are empty but call out to be filled by new apprehensions. An empty horizon marks therefore a limitation in the constitutive process of the musical instrument in the impressional consciousness, but a limitation that can be pushed back: consciousness can perceive more, by perceiving differently. In the situation that I am studying, the possibilities of the sound of the instrument are not nothingness, they are there, and even when the instrument is silent, they call out to be revealed by a performer. It is even more true that the instrument calls because the instrument needs to be played. It is bad for it if it remains unplayed for too long because it starts losing its possibilities. Thus, there is really a reciprocal movement: the musician needs the instrument, and the instrument needs a musician. Conversely, consciousness apprehends it with a horizon of possibilities of perceptions in front of it. Only the possibilities that are already co-present can participate in the constitution of the unity of that particular object in perception. Husserl says indeed that: “in spite of its emptiness, the sense of this halo of consciousness is a prefiguring that
infinite way by endlessly turning it or moving around it thus making new parts of it visible as others become invisible, there are infinite possibilities for the fulfilment of the intention in perception, or at least more than one could actually identify and count.

The actual song is presented in consciousness as one object of perception: perception of the melody as mine, and therefore perception of the musical instrument and through it, of the melody. Concerning the perception of the musical instrument, these are mostly visual and touch perceptions. Concerning the perception of the melody, it is made of the perception of a succession of tones, each being made of three elements: attack (the beginning buildup of the note), delay (the time in which the frequency remains at its peak loudness), and sustain (the fading away). As it resonates, some parts of it are not perceived because they have just elapsed or are yet to come. This perception of the musical instrument with the melody produced through it is a temporal process, the possibilities of perception are therefore infinite temporal possibilities.

prescribes a rule for the transition to new actualizing appearances” (Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, §1, p. 42).

Then, the actualization of the possibilities of perception participates in the determination of that particular object. Together, several actualizations give the object, this particular cello, more closely. Husserl says that: “only appearances that adumbrate things of that kind and that determine more closely what is indeterminate in the framework of this prefiguring can be integrated concordantly; only they can stay the course of an identical x of determination as the same, being determined here newly and more closely” (Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, §1, p. 42). These possibilities are autonomous but also essentially linked to the horizon which goes along with them. Husserl explains indeed that: “In the concordant coinciding of sense, they would bring the same object as being ever newly determined to actual, fulfilling givenness. To our mind, the aspects are nothing for themselves; they are appearances-of only through the intentional horizons that are inseparable from them” (Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, §1, p. 43). Here, Husserl distinguishes two elements: the inner horizon of the respective aspect-appearances on the one hand, and the outer horizon on the other hand. This distinction corresponds with the distinction between “determinations with respect to the content of the object [a] that are actually there, appearing in the flesh, and [b] those that are still ambiguously prefigured in full emptiness” (Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, §1, p. 43). In other words, a distinction between what is presented and what is co-presented, what is given in full body, and what is not.

I describe that in chapter 4.

I will come back to that in detail within the last two chapters.
In his description of perception, Husserl explains: “ordinary perception is composed of countless intentions, some purely perceptual, some merely imaginative, and some even signitive, it yet, as a total act, grasps the object itself, even if only by way of an adumbration.” Thus, despite the possibility of perception open ad infinitum, the act of apprehension of the object in perception always grasps the object itself. In other words, even if it does not grasp the essence of the object itself, as it is, the perception gives the object itself. There is therefore a distinction between the givenness of the object itself, and the complete fulfilment of the intention, i.e., the adequate percept. In the case of perception, the object is given as itself, but in adumbration, through a partial fulfilment of the intention. When it comes to the actual song as a sonorous object grounded in tactuality, this fulfilment of the intention is temporal.

What is not actually perceived is filled through apperception, or appresentation. This means that it exists as a possible direct perception, even though it is now not directly perceived; it is co-perceived as actual, but not in my immediate perception. Husserl calls what I actually perceive, the content which is presented and not a-presented, “purely perceptual content.” In the perception of a cube for example, the purely perceptual content is the face of the cube I actually see. All the rest is only re-presented. It follows that: “In the ideal, limiting case of adequate perception, this self-presenting sensed

233 Logical Investigations, VI, §14, p. 221.

234 Husserl writes: “The ‘purely perceptual’ content in ‘external’ perception is what remains over when we abstract from all purely imaginative and symbolic components: it is the ‘sensed’ content to which its own, immediate, purely perceptual interpretation is given, which evaluates all its parts and moments as self-projections of corresponding parts and moments of the perceptual object, and so imparts to its total content the character of a ‘perceptual picture’, a perceptual adumbration of the object” (Logical Investigations, VI, §14, p. 221).
content coincides with the perceived object.”\textsuperscript{235} The full perception of the object would imply a grasping of all the possibilities; however, this does not happen because the object is always given with unperceived aspects, only partially.

The perceived object is given in consciousness as a unity. However, it is a \textit{constituted} unity.\textsuperscript{236} Indeed, this unity is constituted through a continuous flux of fulfilment.\textsuperscript{237} The perceptual synthesis therefore contains a temporal value; the object in perception is given through succession, through time. In this temporal succession the fulfilled intentions correspond to what is actually perceived, whereas the unfulfilled intentions correspond to the a-perceptions. Husserl says that all of them “are identifications binding self-manifestation of an object to self-manifestation of the same object.”\textsuperscript{238} In other words, all of them contribute to the identification of the object as what it is, as the same object.

In the case of the perception of \textit{a melody as mine} (the practicing musician perceives the melody as a sonorous object founded in tactuality, the actual song is constituted through the co-constitution of the musical instrument and the melody produced through it)\textsuperscript{239} the object is also perceived through a synthesis of fulfilment with perceivable and unperceivable parts. For instance, if I focus on the perception of the

\textsuperscript{235} \textit{Logical Investigations}, VI, §14, p. 221.

\textsuperscript{236} Husserl says: “In each percept […] one and the same object is ‘there’, in each it is intended in the complete range of its familiar and of its perceptually present properties. To this corresponds phenomenologically a continuous flux of fulfilment or identification, in the steady serialization of percepts ‘pertaining to the same object’” \textit{(Logical Investigations}, VI, §14, p. 221).

\textsuperscript{237} I come back to this several times in the present dissertation.

\textsuperscript{238} \textit{Logical Investigations}, VI, §14, p. 221.

\textsuperscript{239} Cf. Chapters 4 and 5 of the present dissertation.
musical instrument, I observe that I perceive some parts of my cello but not others. If I focus on the perception of the melody, I observe that I perceive some parts of the melody but not others. Here, the specific sonorous realm differs from the visual realm. Indeed, the synthesis of perception is a synthesis of time in the sense that I perceive the object progressively, and that it is a temporal object. When I perceive the melody that I am issuing with my cello, I perceive the part of the melody issued by the cello right now, but the aspects of the melody that are only appresented, given as possibilities, are the parts of the melody that had just been given (retentions), or are going to be given (protentions). Here, the perception of the actual song is therefore a perception in adumbration. It involves time not only because the object has a temporal value, but more deeply because it is a temporal synthesis which presents the object in consciousness in the now of the impression. Here, the intentions of perception of the musical instrument or of the tone or melody are partially fulfilled in the sense that perception cannot get their full unfolding all at once.

The understanding of the perception of the actual song, i.e., the understanding of the apprehension in perception, is crucial for the understanding of the inner song, i.e., the understanding of the apprehension in phantasy. Indeed, the inner song is constituted as a perception in phantasy: in phantasy, it reproduces a perception. In addition, the inner

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240 I describe this in more detail in the chapter 4.

241 I come back to these issues in Chapters 4-5.

242 That is why Husserl uses this specific example to develop his understanding of the On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time; I will come back to this problem later on in the chapter on the temporality of the inner song.

243 This is also a question that I address in the last two chapters.
song is sketched in phantasy thanks to the perception of the actual song: the perception of
the performance is part of the constitution of the phantasy. As a consequence, the
description of the inner song needs to go first through the description of the actual song in
order to highlight the specificities of the phantasy.\textsuperscript{244}

§7. The two types of imagination in the earlier Husserlian account.

\begin{quote}
I can phantasize the inner song of the Sicilienne by sight-reading the score.
\end{quote}

However, as a trained musician, I can also phantasize an inner song without any score,
just in my phantasy and with no perception involved, when I am composing or
improvising in a compositive way.\textsuperscript{245} I am not a composer or an improviser, but I have
seen and interviewed composers who are capable of much more. I can also phantasize an
inner song from what I am currently playing, developing the motifs and playing with
them when I am improvising in an interpretative way. As I am just an amateur, I cannot
go very far. I don’t have enough technique to be able to develop my ideas or even have
refined ideas.\textsuperscript{246} However, I know and have interviewed musicians who do. In these three
cases, the inner song is foreseeing a possible performance, its possible realization, in a

\begin{footnotesize}
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\textsuperscript{244} Again, the question whether the inner song or the actual song comes first should not really matter
because it depends on the context of the constitution of the inner song (if the musician can sight-read the
score first for instance), and on the type of musician (some musicians are more tactile they phantasize by
trying things out), whereas others are more theoretical (they need to have the general sense of the inner
song before playing). The question of primacy is not as interesting as the question of the hearing of the
actual song through the lens of the inner song, and of the inner song through the lens of the actual song.

\textsuperscript{245} As the Organist Thierry Escaich helped me understand, there are two types of improvisation:
compositive improvisation which is built up without any previous theme or tune, and interpretative
improvisation which develops a theme or a tune: \url{http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-thierry-
escaich-organiste/}. I come back to this at the end of the present chapter.

\textsuperscript{246} I will come back on that issue in the last chapter.

\end{footnotesize}
creative way; I am perceiving the performance in phantasy.\textsuperscript{247} In addition to that, the inner song continues to be modified as the performance goes on; it is therefore more exactly a creative process.\textsuperscript{248}

From the description of the synthesis of apprehension in perception that I just described, Husserl develops his understanding of imagination. Within §3 of the Sixth Investigation, dedicated to expressive acts, Husserl distinguishes two types of imagination: artistic imagination on the one hand, and intuitive imagination on the other hand. \textit{Artistic imagination} corresponds to “modified acts which serve as counterparts which correspond to the actual judgements that might be expressed in the same words,”\textsuperscript{249} whereas \textit{intuitive imagination} corresponds to “perceptions,” “rememberings,” and “expectations.”\textsuperscript{250} As is evident in the expression itself, the first is explicitly related to art, whereas the second is related to the category of intuition; intuitive imagination opens therefore a broader domain than the artistic while also including it.

Regarding artistic imagination, Husserl uses the German expression “\textit{künstlerischen Phantasie},” whereas he uses the expression “\textit{anschaulichen Einbildungen}” for intuitive imagination.\textsuperscript{251} He distinguishes, therefore, the notion of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{247} I explain that later in the present chapter as well as in the next one.
\item \textsuperscript{248} This is the object of the final chapter.
\item \textsuperscript{249} \textit{Logical Investigations}, VI, §3, p. 193.
\item \textsuperscript{251} In addition to those two expressions translated as “imagination” in English, the German word “Imagination” exists as well and is used in other contexts.
\end{itemize}
imagination as “Phantäsie” which interests me, from imagination as something related to the image: “Bild,” “Einbildung.” Künstlerischen Phantäsie and anschaulichen Einbildungen correspond respectively to the English expressions “imagine consciousness” and “imaging consciousness.” As is made clearer in the English translation, the two can be based on the perception of an image. However, the perception of the image is not what matters in the first category, to which the inner song belongs. Indeed, Husserl’s brief description points more to the aesthetic framework. In addition, by identifying intuitive imagination as something that corresponds to “perceptions,” “rememberings,” and “expectations” in this early understanding of the Logical Investigations, Husserl brings here a dimension of temporality which is not as clearly included in the other category. The two types of imagination are both related and fundamentally different. Indeed, they are related because the two types of imagination belong to the same category of expressed act and seem to be based on image in the sense that they are based on sensuous contents; consequently, the two can be artistic. However, the main characteristic of the first is just that it matters specifically for its aesthetical effect, regardless of the existence of the object, whereas the second matters as it is based on perception, and therefore is founded in an object posited as existent.

These two notions are important for understanding the inner song as a phantasy object. Indeed, the inner song is part of the performance process, and because of this, it is


253 Husserl will move away from integrating imagination with remembering and expectation over the years, specifically in On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time. However, it remains linked to perception as a type of re-presentation, though not so directly connected with perception as are recollection and expectation.
constituted through the incorporation of perceptual data coming from the performance which reflects the inner song. In this structure of reference uniting a percept and a phantasy, the inner song is the model [Vorbild] and the actual song the image [Abbild]; the notion of image therefore plays a role in the understanding of the phenomenon. However, even if it does involve the perception of the performance, the inner song is a phenomenon of artistic phantasy involving perception, not an imagining through perceiving. In this sense, to elaborate on that concept, it is necessary to take into consideration both the notion of künstlerische Phantäsie involving the artistic dimension, and the anschaulischen Einbildungen involving the theory of image.

§8. The notion of phantasy.

As I play Fauré and phantasize it as an inner song, I am both the one creating that phantasy, and the one to which it appears. The phantasy is both produced and awakened in me, by myself. When I perform it publicly, I offer it to others to hear a realization of that phantasy, and this awakens new phantasies for my audience. For now, I am alone, and this phantasy is still only for me.

Even if he mentions imagination as Einbildung in the Logical Investigations Husserl develops the notion of imagination as phantasy more in “Phantasy and Image Consciousness,” a text which is part of his lectures from the Winter Semester 1904/05 on “Principal parts of the Phenomenology and Theory of Knowledge.” In §1 of that text, he develops his account of phantasy by way of “common life,” namely, the understanding of a natural science operating outside of the epoché. He notices how the expression

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254 Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory, Text no. 1, §1, p. 1.
phantasy here vaguely designate “now a certain mental disposition or ability and now again certain actual experiences, activities, or results of activities, which arise from the disposition or testify to the ability.”

According to him, psychology classifies, under one single notion (phantasy) a mental disposition or ability, as well as various things related to this ability which are experiences, activities, or results of activities. It is therefore a very vast but vague notion. In addition to this understanding, there is another understanding which identifies phantasy more specifically with an ability [vermögen] and “expressly contrasts phantasy, the activity of phantasy, and the work of phantasy – differentiating their significations – just as one distinguishes understanding, the activities of understanding, and the work of understanding.” In this understanding, there are clearly three elements: the faculty, the activity related to this faculty, and what is produced by this faculty.

From these two acceptations, Husserl distinguishes a third: the “phantasy of an artist” which corresponds to “certain psychic experiences that he produces in himself or that he awakens in us by means of his works.” Here, Husserl distinguishes the act of producing a phantasy from the act of having a phantasy awaken through the phantasy. He explains:

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255 This goes back to his reflection on the lack of adequation of language in respect to what it designates that I already mentioned in the introduction.

256 Phantasy, Image-Consciousness and Memory, Text 1, §1, p. 2.

257 Phantasy, Image-Consciousness and Memory, Text 1, §1, p. 2.

258 Phantasy, Image-Consciousness and Memory, Text 1, §1, p. 2.
As far as the meaning of these ‘works’ is concerned, we will not, in general, call the externally visible works phantasies, though we will indeed call the formations brought to appearance by means of them phantasies: the human beings or fabulous creatures, the actions, passions, situations, and so on, that the poet invents for us. These formations are also designated as works of phantasy (or phantasy in the first sense), and one even prefers to call works in this sense phantasies.259

Here, Husserl explains how phantasies are internal. In other words, they are given in the phenomenological consciousness. In this specific quote, he takes the example of poetry, a visual representation, and more specifically the representations that are evoked in the reader by the reading of a poem. He identifies these phantasies as “formations brought to appearance” and uses the German word Gestalten, form. Thus, he seems to describe a sort of shaping: through the artist’s process of invention, some kind of content gains a form.260

The work of definition continues as Husserl puts aside three types of phantasy: the “phantasy understood as ability,” the “phantasy activity in the genuine sense, as a psychic action,” and “the result of the action, of the work of phantasy considered as the result of the action, of the work of phantasy considered as the result of a causal process.” 261 He does so because he situates his description within a phenomenological framework, i.e., he

259 Phantasy, Image-Consciousness and Memory, Text 1, §1, p. 2.

260 This resonates with what Husserl says in the letter mentioned earlier: the artist appropriates the meaning intuitively, in order to gather, out of its plenitude, materials for the creation of aesthetic forms, or said differently, to reshape it in the phantasy.

As I will demonstrate in the last chapter, the “gathering of the material for the creation of aesthetic form involves a co-implication of the impressional and the reproductive consciousness, whereas the “reshaping” involves associations and affectivity.

261 Phantasy, Image-Consciousness and Memory, Text 1, §1, p. 2.
is interested in what is given within the phenomenological sphere uncovered after the *epoché*, reducing the sphere of the certain to the *pure ego* and its *ego-life*. As a result, what interests him are “intentional, or better, objectivating experiences – so-called ‘phantasy presentations,’” often simply termed ‘presentation,’ which we are also in the habit of apprehending under the ambiguous title of ‘phantasy activity:’”  

In other words, the constitution of the object of phantasy in the phenomenological consciousness. To make that claim clear, Husserl illustrates it, writing: “for example, the experiences in which the artist sees his phantasy formations, or more precisely, that peculiar internal seeing itself or bringing to intuition of centaurs, heroic characters, landscapes, and so on, which we contrast to external seeing, to the external seeing that belongs to perception.” In this quote, Husserl uses the vocabulary of perception, only translating it *inside*. By doing so, he contrasts phantasy as an *internal seeing* with perception which is an *external seeing*. Phantasy is an internal seeing because it does not refer to an object posited as transcendentally existent to consciousness, whereas perception is an external seeing because it refers to an object posited as transcendentally existing, as an object which is part of the objective world.  

In the case of phantasy, Husserl says that: “The re-presenting of something to oneself internally, the ‘hovering of something before one in phantasy,’ here stands opposed to the external appearing of something as present.” Here, a new distinction

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262 *Phantasy, Image-Consciousness and Memory*, Text 1, §1, p. 2.

263 *Phantasy, Image-Consciousness and Memory*, Text 1, §1, p. 2-3.

264 Cf. Appendix to the Sixth *Logical Investigation*.

265 *Phantasy, Image-Consciousness and Memory*, Text 1, §1, p. 2.
arises in relation to the definitions of perception and imagination in the Logical Investigations. In the Logical Investigations, Husserl distinguishes two types of presentation: positing and non-positing presentations. Here, he makes a distinction between internal re-presenting and external presenting.\textsuperscript{266} This distinction highlights two modes of objectivation: the giving of the object through re-presentation in phantasy on the one hand, and the giving of the object through presentation in perception on the other hand. In the second case, the object is presented, given as present, whereas it is not in the first case.\textsuperscript{267} The distinction between the two notions is therefore in two aspects: first, their mode of objectivation, and second, the temporality of their object. Despite this difference, the two of them are truly given in the sense that they are given phenomenologically, as part of the ego-life.\textsuperscript{268} This means that the two of them are experienced, and, as such, are the object of a judgement.\textsuperscript{269}

Even if Husserl focuses more on the object of phantasy evoked by an artwork than in the object of phantasy involved in the constitution of an artwork, he does not focus on that only, putting aside the phantasy of the artist him- or herself. Indeed, he pursues his description of the various types of phantasy by mentioning a larger understanding of

\textsuperscript{266} Husserl comes back on these two notions in Ideas 1 as well.

\textsuperscript{267} I describe the temporality of the inner song from the investigation of the possibility of a presentation of the inner song in the last chapter.

\textsuperscript{268} Husserl writes: “The phenomenological sphere is the sphere of what is truly given, of what is to be met with adequately, and the sphere of the real components of what is truly given” (Phantasy, Image-Consciousness and Memory, Text 1, §1, p. 3).

\textsuperscript{269} Husserl pursues: “On the other hand, the phantasy experience, the so-called phantasy presentation, is a phenomenological datum. It obviously belongs in the sphere of objectivating experiences; objectivities are brought to appearance in phantasizing and are perhaps meant and believed” (Phantasy, Image-Consciousness and Memory, Text 1, §1, p. 3).
phantasy, not restricted to the artistic sphere but including it. He calls it productive phantasy. This type of phantasy which can be in play in many types of activities (Husserl mentions the work of the historian for example), is also the type of phantasy that the artist uses when s/he creates.

Husserl defines productive phantasy as follows:

Productive phantasy is phantasy that gives form arbitrarily [willkürlich]; it is precisely phantasy in this sense that the artist particularly has to use. However, one must distinguish two further concepts here, one wider and one narrower, depending on whether or not one understands the arbitrariness [Willkürlichkeit] of the forming in the sense of free imagining (inventing). In this definition, phantasy corresponds to the formation of an object in the sense that some content receives a Gestalt. As the artist gives form to content, her or his work is also included in the meaning of the concept of productive phantasy. However, Husserl distinguishes two definitions of the productive phantasy, indicating two degrees of

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270 As demonstrated by Maldiney (1912-2013) in “L’imagination,” the understanding of imagination as productive or reproductive exists already in Kant who understands the representation of something that has never been seen in original as a productive imagination, whereas he understands the capacity to imagine something already perceived as reproductive. As I demonstrate in the present chapter, Husserl uses these terms but changes their meaning. On Kant and Husserl, cf. Pradelle, Par-delà la Révolution Copernicienne.

271 Husserl continues: “The popular concept of phantasy, however, does not refer just to the sphere of artistic phantasy from which our examples are taken. At least, a narrower and, to be sure, very common concept of phantasy, which psychology has taken up under the title of productive phantasy, stands in close relation to this sphere” (Phantasy, Image-Consciousness and Memory, Text 1, §1, p. 3).

272 Phantasy, Image-Consciousness and Memory, Text 1, §1, pp. 3-4. Here, I modify the translation and translate Willkürlich as “arbitrarily” instead of “voluntarily.” In this quote, it is not clear which type of phantasy corresponds to the narrower or the larger sense. The question of the involvement of the will in the formation of the phantasy is a problem that I cannot investigate in depth here; I therefore only point it out. My gratitude goes to Stéphane Finetti who helped me to change the translation and see the complexity of this difficult passage.
involvement of perception in the formation of the object, one being more arbitrary than the other.

As opposed to the “perceiving,” and “intuitive positing of past and future as true,” Husserl demonstrates that the phantasy object is not tied to reality. Quite the opposite; phantasy expresses “unreality,” “pretence.” Thus, as he writes about phantasy, “The source of the semblance must lie in the subject; the semblance must be ascribed to the subject, to its activities, its functions, its dispositions.” In other words, the process of formation of the object, the process through which the object of phantasy receives a form, a Gestalt, depends on the artist him- or herself. Consequently, the constitution of the object depends on the degree of arbitrariness, or on the freedom of the subject. When phantasies are founded in physical basis or external nature, Husserl calls them phantasy appearances.

Finally, in his work on the Phenomenology of Consciousness of Internal Time, Husserl refines and develops his concept of the phantasy, understanding it as a reproductive modification [reproduktive Modifikation]. He says:

Perceiving is the consciousness of an object. As consciousness, it is also an impression, something immanently present. To this immanently present something, to the perceiving of an A, corresponds the reproductive modification: re-presentation of the perceiving, perceiving in phantasy or in memory. But such a

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273 Phantasy, Image-Consciousness and Memory, Text 1, §1, p. 4, cf. Chapter 1 of Part 1 of this dissertation.

274 Phantasy, Image-Consciousness and Memory, Text 1, §1, p. 4.

275 Phantasy, Image-Consciousness and Memory, Text 1, §1, p. 4.
‘perception in the phantasy’ is at the same time the phantasy of the perceived object. In perception, an object – let us say a physical thing or physical event – stands before us as present. The perception is not only present itself, therefore; it is also a making-present: in it something present – the physical thing, the event – stands before us. Similarly, a re-presentation modification of perception is also a re-presentation of the perceived object: the object, the physical thing, is phantasied, remembered, expected.  

Here, he describes how the phantasy modifies the perception, reproducing it with its full temporal extension (impression, retentions, protentions), and enlivening it for the subject again [wieder]. In this case, it is a perception in phantasy as the phantasy phantasizes the object as it would be if it were perceived. By doing that, the phantasy makes that object present, standing before us. The object is not simply perceived, it is perceived in phantasy: it unfolds, one tone after the other, these tones being grounded in tactual sensations, in the specific quasi-temporality of the phantasy.

Finally, reflecting on the source of the figures of the phantasy, Husserl distinguishes in his later text the positional from the non-positional phantasy. In the

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276 On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, §42, p. 94.

277 Here, I am paraphrasing and translating this quote: “La modification reproductive dans laquelle consiste la représentation-de-phantasia modifie au contraire une perception au sens où elle la reproduit dans toute son extension temporelle (avec ses impressions, ses rétentions et ses protentions): elle la fait vivre au sujet une nouvelle fois (wieder, re-).” in Finetti, Stéphane, “La transformation de la conception husserlienne de la représentation-de-phantasia à la lumière de la méthode réductive.”

278 Phantasy, Image-Consciousness, and Memory, Text no. 19, p. 658 sq.

279 In “Imagination et Phantasia chez Husserl,” Marc Richir explains: “l’imagination peut être dite doxique dès lors qu’elle consiste en un arrêt sur le présent où elle est censée savoir ce qu’elle imagine, même dans la quasi-position qui la caractérise, alors que, en général, sinon pour ainsi dire par accident, l’appréhension de phantasia, qui appréhende le phantasme, d’une part ne s’arrête pas sur un présent, et d’autre part ne sait pas, ou ne sait que très vaguement ce qui apparaît comme radicalement "ailleurs"
first case, imagination is supposed to know what it imagines, even if it is a quasi-positionality. In the second case however, the phantasy apprehension doesn’t know, or only vaguely, what is given as somewhere else in the phantasy field. The phantasm is non-present.\textsuperscript{280}

Husserl’s account of imagination as phantasy is the understanding that I want to keep in order to understand the inner song. Indeed, the inner song is not simply a phantasy, it is a perceiving of a performance in phantasy. This means that, when I phantasize the inner song, I perceive the possible performance in phantasy. In this case, perceiving the performance in phantasy means aiming to be able to also reproduce the Bodily sensations given in the touching and the manipulating of the instrument; it is an ability pertaining to a musician with a trained consciousness.\textsuperscript{281} At the beginning of the process, this perception in phantasy cannot be really accurate. However, as I work on the piece of music and rehearse, the perceiving becomes more accurate: I hear the sound better, I can feel it more with the instrument, etc.\textsuperscript{282} I would add that, when the musician is focusing on the inner song, the phantasy apprehension seems to be a type of doxic phantasy, whereas when consciousness straddles the phantasy and the perceived, and the phantasy seems to be given somewhere else, not present, it is more a type of non-doxic

\textsuperscript{280} I will come back to the problem of the present in chapter 4.

\textsuperscript{281} I introduce and explain the notion of “Trained consciousness” coming back to that issue in the third chapter.

\textsuperscript{282} I address this in the last two chapters.
phantasy. Hence, the inner song seems to be possibly given in various ways in the phantasy, according to the mode of apprehension in consciousness.\textsuperscript{283}

§9. Awakening of the inner song in phantasy.

I am improvising with my cello, performing some invented inner song. My inner song develops as I perform it with my cello, as I hear the performance that I am issuing from it. It is a succession of sounds that appear in my consciousness, one after the other. It follows my mood. Sometimes, the melody leads me to some parts of an actual song that I already heard and somehow memorized, at other times, it is brand new. At some point the melody seems to dry out by itself and there is nothing singing in me anymore.

The description of the specific type of phantasy in play with the constitution of the inner song requires paying attention to how the inner song is produced on the one hand (the activity of the performer) and what the inner song is on the other hand (the constitution of the object of imagination, the phantasy object). The inner song can be constituted in three ways: first, interpreting from a score; second, composing; and third, improvising either in a way closest to interpretation (it is an interpretative improvisation), or to composition (it is a compositive improvisation).\textsuperscript{284} In these three cases, the inner song is awakened in way that may or may not involve a perception, and is constituted through the back and forth between the apprehension of the inner song in phantasy, and the apprehension of the actual song in perception. In other words, the inner song is not

\textsuperscript{283} This is a presumption which should be investigated further, focusing on the problem of the institution of the phenomenon. If I investigate this problem, I will approach it using Marc Richir’s as well as Alexander Schnell’s phenomenological approaches.

\textsuperscript{284} On improvisation, cf. Bertinetto, Alessandro, Estetica dell’Improvizzazione.
necessarily *based on a perception*, but its constitutive process certainly *involves* the perception of its realization in performance.\(^{285}\)

As the three forms of awakening of the inner song in consciousness differ according to their perceptual basis, it means that the difference between the three kinds of activity lies in the variation of the degree of *arbitrariness of the forming*.\(^{286}\) Indeed, when the phantasy is based on the perception of a score, the interpreter is less free in what s/he invents than the composer who does not have to interpret a score and can invent as s/he wants. When it comes to improvisation, this form of arising of the inner song differs from both interpretation and composition because of its temporality. While there may be a delay between the process of sketching the inner song and the process of having it performed in the case of both interpretation and composition, improvisation necessarily unfolds during the performance and, as it goes on, consciousness straddles between the inner song and the actual song. As a consequence, the constitution of the inner song is related to the straddle of consciousness in a greater way than in composition or interpretation.

Regardless of how it *is awakened* in consciousness, the productive phantasy in play with the inner song needs to be distinguished from two other phenomena: perceiving on the one hand, and intuitive positing of past and future as real on the other. Indeed, a phantasy object (the inner song) is distinct from the object constituted through perception (the actual song). It is also distinct from any other phenomenological object given in consciousness as *real*: the *past* perception of what I just performed (a retention), as well

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\(^{285}\) This is the object of my final chapter.

\(^{286}\) I come back to this question in the final two chapters.
as the future perception of what I am about to perform (a protention). In contrast to these three cases (perception, positing of past and future as real) which posit the object as present, the inner song may or may not be present, it may or may not be real; its status of existence does not matter. This does not mean that the inner song is not present. The status of existence is not negated, but it is unsettled: neither affirmed nor negated. In other words, it might have been already given, it might be given in the future, but it is not given in consciousness as necessarily present.

From that elaboration, it follows that the inner song is: (1) an internal hearing co-constituted with the instrument mediating the sound and therefore founded in tactuality, (2) through which the musician invents an object more or less freely, (3) that might or might not be given as present. There are then three variations of the inner song which each involve various degrees of freedom in the constitution, as well as various types of temporal distance between the sketching of the phenomenon in phantasy, and its realization given in perception as an actual song.287

§10. The phantasy-world of the inner song.

I am at home, practicing the Sicilienne again. I have learned it by memory and recently practiced it with a friend who plays the piano. I like it. It is very romantic. As I am playing the inner song in my phantasy, I can hear the sound of the piano in addition to the inner song of my cello part. The two go together. I can visualize the living room of my Russian teacher where I used to play it accompanied by the piano. I can also hear something of the Isserlis interpretation of that piece. I phantasize my own interpretation

287 This will definitely be the object of further research.
but there is much more than that, and all these pieces seem to somehow flow together, then get disconnected from one another, and flow with other elements of my phantasy-world.

I want to finish this introduction of the structure of reference constituted of the inner song and the actual song, by addressing the question of the world in which these phenomena are given. Concerning the actual song, it is given in the world of perception that I describe in the first chapter of the present dissertation, and I will keep describing as the explanation of the constitution process of the phenomena goes on. Concerning the inner song, which is the phenomenon that interests me the most, it is given in a phantasy-world distinct from the world of perception.288

Husserl explains that: “In spite of the essential disconnectedness of all intuitions of imagination, unity is still possible to some degree even here, namely, as far as in all imaginings – speaking in terms of the modification of neutrality – there is constituted a single quasi-world.”289 Here, he distinguishes the quasi-world of the imaginary from the world of perception. The two differ because there is an essential continuity between the various perceptual objects given in the world of perception, and an essential discontinuity between the various phantasies which are part of the phantasy world.290 The phantasy contrasts with the perceptual in which all perceptions are given in the unity of the world.

288 I will not analyze this aspect here, but it could be interesting to explore how historical, cultural, or social norms are part of the constitution of the imaginary, and of the constitution of the inner song given as a part of this imaginary. An aspect of this analysis would be to identify the forces and powers in play in the constitution of the phenomenon.

I would work on this question using Marc Richir’s phenomenology, and more especially his two papers describing the structuration of the imaginary through senses in “La vision et son imaginaire.”

289 Husserl, Experience and Judgement, §40, p. 171.

290 I will address this question in more detail in the last chapter of the present dissertation.
The multiplicity of the phantasies still constitutes a world. However, as there is no unity of the intuition and fulfilment of the intention, Husserl does not consider this world an actual world but a quasi-world. This world is for Husserl another world, broader than the actual world, certainly indissociable from reality, but at the same time independent from it.291

For Husserl, the unity of the phantasy in the Phantasiewelt is not given by the unity of the world of perception but by the unity of the experience itself in which the intention is freely partially fulfilled by the re-presentation of the object of phantasy.292 For instance, the unity of the phantasy world in which inner songs appear does not come from the world itself, but from the unity of the experience of the inner song in which the intention is partially fulfilled by the appearance of an inner song. Thanks to the example of the novel, Husserl explains how:

There is thus a formation of unity in all free imaginings belonging to a fairy tale, which, in order to have an unencumbered imagination, we conceive to be free from all relation to the actual world. Whether our imagination runs through the story at one stretch or in separate sections, each new stretch is linked to the preceding one by an obscure horizon, but one capable of further development,

291 This is what Marc Richir observes in “Imagination et Phantasie chez Husserl ”: “Le "monde" de la phantasie - le Phantasiewelt - est un autre monde qui, non seulement est plus large, plus vaste que le monde de la réalité, mais en est aussi, dans ses profondeurs, indépendant..” (p. 17).

292 Husserl writes: “To be sure, it remains within the province of our freedom to allow the indeterminateness of these horizons to be quasi-fulfilled in an arbitrary way by imaginings. But this changes nothing regarding the fact that, so far as this is the case, all these imaginings have a connection in the unity of an object-consciousness which encompasses all of them, a consciousness actual and possible. The ‘unity of an imagination’ is manifestly nothing other than the unity of a possible experience or modification of neutrality of a unity of experience. But this unity affords precisely the ground for the essence: unity of experience” (Experience and Judgement, §40, p. 171).
whereby the obscure memories are for me, the continuing reader of the tale, actual memories of what I have already read and which have been imagined by me, while in the course of my engagement in the tale the linkage takes place in ‘memories in imagination,’ which are themselves quasi-memories.293

This example is useful to understand the constitution of an inner song in pure phantasy. Indeed, there are similarities between the example used by Husserl, and the musical phenomenon I am studying: as is the case with a fairy-tale, the inner song is also a freely developed object which unfolds following the successive events of the narration, thus linking various twists and turns together.294

In his example, Husserl explains how phantasies are linked together because they are given in an “obscure horizon” but moreover because they all refer to an actual experience in perception. In other words, there is a modified reproduction of a perception, and if the phantasy has a certain temporal consistency, it is because it reproduces the actual consistency of the perception. I can also quasi-remember295 things that happened

293 Experience and Judgement, §40, pp. 171-2.

294 Many musicians say that, in order to perform, it is necessary to have a story to tell. The discussion with the director Maxime Tortelier is an example (https://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-maxime-tortelier-chef-dorchestre/). I don’t want to develop the parallel between the inner song and a story too deeply; it should be the object of a separate article. However, I want to highlight that the quasi-temporality of the inner song is given from the temporal position of the impressional consciousness in the same way as a fictive story is given from a temporal position. In addition, the phantasy-worlds of the inner song are also certainly constituted by “grace of the imagination” in the same way as the phantasy-world of Hansel and Gretel is (cf. Experience and Judgement, §40, p. 173).

295 Memory and imagination have it in common to bring something back from the past, either actually or potentially. However, they differ in their relation to reality. Indeed, memory brings back from the past something which was presented in consciousness through impression and therefore has a pretention to reality, whereas phantasy relates to a past object as a possibility, which means that there is no pretention to reality. Bernet argues that the “mise en evidence des analogies structurelles entre ressouvenir et phantasia a aussi pour effet de liberer la conscience imageante de toute forme de dependance vis-a-vis des objets d’une realite presente ou absente” (Conscience et existence, Chapt. III, 3, p. 93). Indeed, these two distinct ways to relate to a past object demonstrate that there is an analogy between memory and phantasy, but not an identity.
in phantasy (which shows how object of past phantasies flowing in consciousness are still available to consciousness). For instance, I can remember the story in the previous chapters when I pick up my book and continue reading. Or, when I pick up my cello to practice today, I can quasi-remember my inner song from yesterday. I can then freely modify it by reconstituting new inner songs thanks to the dislocation and reshaping of parts of other phantasy objects. This free modification is possible because the object of phantasy is not attached to any existential value. In other words, the object does not need to be recalled necessarily as it was primarily given, quite the opposite. Indeed, the further modification of the phantasy constitutes an essential part of music practice.

For Husserl the unity of one (of many) phantasy worlds comes with the convergence of several phantasies intuited as one in the same act of imagination.

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296 The case of the inner song remains a limit-case because, as I practice and realize my inner song, and as the perception of the actual song enriches the inner song, it is difficult to clearly identify if, when I am bringing back my inner song from yesterday, I am actually remembering my performance of it, or quasi-remembering my inner song. This brings up the problem of the remembering of an act of phantasy, I will address it in the final chapter of the present dissertation.

297 This appears in discussions with improvisers and composers. The clarinetist Yom mentions it, underlining how improvising is or can be very close to plagiarism, and therefore how phantasy can be very close to memory (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-yom-clarinettiste/).

298 Memory and phantasy don’t have the same relationship with the pretention to reality. The phantasy, not being connected with a primary impression, does not have a pretention to reality. Hence, it is free. Bernet underlines this aspect in Conscience et Existence, Chapt III, 4), “La presentation d’un object fictive et la phantasia comme conscience reproductive neutralisée.” He says: “[une phantasia pure] est un acte dont la liberté peut être dite absolue, en ce sens qu’elle ne dépend plus d’aucune motivation directe par la perception de la réalité. Même si l’imagination d’objets fictifs (tels que le centaure) se sert généralement d’éléments puisés dans la perception de la réalité, on ne peut pas dire, en effet, que cette perception (d’un homme ou d’un cheval) soit ce qui motive ma présentification imaginaire de l’objet fictif. Rien, dans mon expérience de la réalité, ne peut me pousser à m’imaginer la lutte d’une horde de centaures avec une troupe d’amazones” (p. 109). I argue that the freedom of phantasy is a freedom in associations in phantasy; I work on this point in the last chapter of my dissertation.

299 I talk about this in the final chapter.

300 Husserl explains: “A single act of imagination – this encompasses, therefore, an arbitrary ‘complex’ of imaginings which, precisely by their specific sense, converge to form an intuitively possible, unitary act of
instance, as I improvise with my cello, several parts of a phantasized inner melody come
together and are intuited together. They form, then, one single world, or in the case of the
inner song, one inner song.\textsuperscript{301} Husserl says that these singularities are situated in time and
this leads him to speak about flowing presents.\textsuperscript{302} In my own description of the inner
song, I go further and introduce the idea of a temporal flow of the phantasy. This
presupposes that for me, and as opposed to Husserl, there is a unity of the phantasies in
the single temporality of the flow.\textsuperscript{303} This temporality of the inner song is the same as

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{301} The inner song could be understood as a \textit{world} in the sense in which the director Yan-Pascal Tortelier
says that the Mime Marceau creates a \textit{world} with his hands, and the musician opens a \textit{world} with his or
her music (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-yan-pascal-tortelier-chef-dorchestre/).
In order to develop this idea, it would be necessary to work on the notion of \textit{phantasy-worlds},
and question both the constitution of the phantasy-world, and its transmission to the other through the
performance. Such an investigation would require investigating the problem of the constitution of the
phantasy-world, its transmission through the performance, the notion of intersubjectivity, and of
perceptive phantasy.
I would work on this problem with Marc Richir’s phenomenology, his reflection on the
constitution of the phantasy-world, and his account of the notion of institutionalization.

\textsuperscript{302} Husserl pursues: “Within such a world of imagination we have, for every individual object of
imagination (as quasi-actuality), and ‘individual singularization’ [\textit{Vereinzelung}] for every temporal point
and every duration. We have it first of all in the most strictly defined unity of an act of imagination,
namely, within a single presence [\textit{Präsenz}]; in it, like is distinguished from like on the basis of individuality.
But, in addition, there is an ‘individual’ singularization in imagination, \textit{as far as} it is possible in general (in
the unity of interrelated individual imaginings) to convert this act into an intuitive unity, into the unity of a
single presence in the extended sense (as a continuum of flowing presents), without supplementation by
new imaginings relative to new objects and extending the imagined world” (\textit{Experience and Judgement},
\S 40, p. 172).

\textsuperscript{303} In this sense, I believe that the phantasy world given through an act of phantasy in the present \textit{now} of
the inner time consciousness is interconnected with the retentions of the perceptions that I have
accumulated since my childhood, and the reproduction in phantasies. This is particularly obvious in music.
Each improver or composer has a \textit{style} which ultimately expresses the unity of that phantasy-world
constituted by the sedimentation of various phantasies. These phantaisies are sedimented because,
ultimately, they are all the phantasies of one single \textit{ego}.
In my work, I argue that the phantasies as transcendent objects cannot be \textit{recalled} (even if the
act of phantasy can be, because it belongs to the inner time consciousness), but they are constantly being
reconstituted, associated, participating to institutions of meanings in the phantasy. The cellist Vincent
Ségal speaks about it, broadening the horizon by saying that our phantasy-world is also \textit{cultural}
(http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-vincent-segal-violoncelliste/).
that of the perceived world because, as it too belongs to consciousness, inner time
consciousness underlies them both. The two of them have a before and an after that are
synthesized through retention and protention. However, they are experienced differently.
The unity of the phantasy world seems more floating, vague, and having a unity not
because there is a unity of the world itself, but because there is a unity of the experience
of the phantasy world experienced from the foundation of the inner rhythm.

As opposed to objects of perception that are given in the same horizon, and
therefore necessarily unified, Husserl says that “in the nature of any two imaginings there
is nothing at all to imply that they require to be unified in a single act of imagination.”
In other words, there is a great freedom in the constitution of the phantasy-world in which
contradictions and oppositions can easily cohabit.

Here, Husserl is still thinking about the fairy-tale. However, it is the same with the
inner song. Various elements, which do not necessarily go together in the perceptual
world, can cohabit as phantasy gives them through a modified reproduction (various
music styles, instruments, chords, etc.). This allows the musicians to renew their
repertoire, try out new combinations, and be creative from one piece or improvisation to
another. Husserl says that “the unity of time plays its special role as the condition of

304 *Experience and Judgement*, §40, p. 172.

305 Husserl says: “As soon as we move intentionally within a single complex of imaginings, correlative, within a single imaginary world, there is agreement and contradiction, there is incompatibility, and all the relations of spatial and temporal position which we have pointed out for objects within an actual world are also equally possible here: everything is now carried over to the quasi. But between complexes of disconnected imaginings there is nothing like this. For the ‘things’ the events, the ‘actualities’ of one world of imagination have ‘nothing to do’ with those of the others. Better: the fulfillments and disappointments of intentions constitutive of one of these worlds can never extend to intentions which are constitutive of another, in connection with which it does not matter that we are dependent on quasi-intentions” (*Experience and Judgement*, §40, p. 172).
possibility of a unity of the world, as the correlate of the unity of ‘one’ experience and, so to speak of the ground on which all incompatibilities occur in the form of ‘conflict’.”

In the case of the inner song, one inner song is indeed constituted as a unity as there is an uninterrupted chain of succession.

As one inner song is being constituted in consciousness, it makes no sense to question the consistency of various elements with others. The phantasy-world is not subject to the same requirement of consistency as the world of perception is. For instance, I can start with a certain motive, and this motive leads me to the phantasy of something else, unrelated, the modified reproduction of a totally different type of phantasy. In this sense, the various musical phantasy-worlds can be all connected and unified, there are doors to pass from one into another. Here comes the major distinction between the actual world and the phantasy world: “In the actual world, nothing remains open; it is what it is. The world of imagination ‘is,’ and is such and such, by grace of the imagination which has imagined it; a complex of imaginings never comes to an end that does not leave open the possibility of a free development in the sense of a new.

306 Experience and Judgement, §40, pp. 172-3.

307 Husserl writes: “How are the singularizations of temporal points, temporal durations, etc., related to one another within different imaginary worlds? We can speak here of the likeness and similarity of the components of such worlds but never of their identity, which would have absolutely no sense; hence, no connections of incompatibilities can occur, for these would indeed presuppose such identity. It makes no sense, e.g., to ask whether the Gretel of one fairy tale and the Gretel of another are the same Gretel, whether what is imagined for the one and predicated of her agrees or does not agree with what is imagined for the other, or, again, whether they are related to each other, etc. I can stipulate this – and to accept it is already to stipulate it – but then both fairy tales refer to the same world. Within the same tale I can certainly ask such questions, since, from the very beginning, we have a single imaginary world; but the question ceases to make sense where the imagination ceases, where it does not supply more precise determinations; and it is reserved to the development of imagination, in the sense of the pursuance of the unity of a complex of imaginings, to seize upon determinations arbitrarily (or, in the case of instinctively continuing again, to leave open the possibility of such determinations)” (Experience and Judgement, §40, p. 173).
In other words, the phantasy-world is always open to further developments. Thus, an improvisation can go on endlessly, and a composition as well.

Here, the main boundary of the phantasy is the capability to renew the phantasy by the creation of further associations. This capacity is related to the training of the musician. Indeed, a well-trained musician who has learned to improvise can certainly keep constituting new possibilities whereas an amateur would have difficulties renewing his or her vocabulary, and therefore going on without repeating him or herself, thus becoming annoying or at best boring. Husserl says about these limitations:

But, on the other hand, there is still, in the essence of the connection which constitutes the ‘unity’ of imagination, an abundance of essential limitations, which must not be overlooked. They find their expression in this: that in the continuation, although free and open, of the unity of a complex of imaginings, it is the unity of a ‘possible world’ which is constituted with an encompassing form of the time of imagination pertaining to it.\footnote{Experience and Judgement, §40, p. 173.}

Here, we come back to the definition of the phantasy as the reproduction of a possible perception: the limitedness of the phantasy comes from the limitedness of that possibility. In the case of the inner song, the freedom of my phantasy is limited by my I can, or more precisely, the idea that I cannot will what I cannot do.\footnote{I develop this idea in the last two chapters.}

The openness of these possibilities in the phantasy leads Husserl to say:

\textit{“Individuation and identity of the individual, as well as the identification founded on it, is}
possible only within the world of actual experience, on the basis of absolute temporal position. 311 In other words, it is impossible to properly individualize, or speak about the identity of a phantasy object. Indeed,

The experience of imagination in general provides no individual objects in the true sense but only quasi-individual objects and a quasi-identity, namely, within the fixed unity of an imaginary world. Thus our initial exclusion of the sphere of neutrality for the purpose of laying the foundation of a theory of judgement must begin precisely with the experience of the individual as yielding ultimate self-evidence, and such experience of the individual does not occur in imagination or in general in a neutral consciousness. 312

Here, the description of the inner song needs to contradict Husserl. Indeed, as the inner song is the reproduction of a possible performance, each inner song, as soon as it is realized in performance, can be individualized thanks to that correspondent in perception. Consequently, even if it is true that the inner song in its primary form, as obscure phantasy, cannot be individualized, this is not true anymore in the further stages of the constitution of that process. 313 Each inner song is then distinct from any other due to the melody, but also the mode of temporalization of that melody. The temporal object has a beginning and an end which cuts into the phantasy world, thus detaching one inner song as a temporal unity, from the floating quasi-temporality of the phantasy-world in which it is given. For instance, I hear this specific inner song as a distinct object in the flow of the

311 Experience and Judgement, §40, p. 173.
312 Experience and Judgement, §40, p. 174.
313 I explain this in the last two chapters.
phantasy because I experience the object as one temporal succession with a beginning and an end, distinct from other objects.\footnote{314}

In order to close the description of the phantasy world of the inner song I want to add that, as the perception always already presupposes the phantasy, and as the phantasy also always already presupposes the perception, so it is also the case for their respective worlds of givenness. This means that there is a correspondence between the world of perception and the phantasy-world. This correspondence is the process of association in play as the musician practices and rehearses the instrument. Indeed, as the musician plays, it is not only an inner song, or a segment of inner song which is awakened, it is an inner song \textit{with} its phantasy-world.\footnote{315} In other words, the inner song is not given only as a co-constitution of an inner melody played on an inner instrument, but also as a musical phenomenon given in a certain atmosphere made of feelings, images, sounds, silences, etc. This atmosphere characterizing the world of phantasy, potentially corresponding to a given world of perception is given as fully part of its process of constitution through associations and thanks to affectivity.\footnote{316}

\footnote{314} This idea comes from the interview with the Italian guitarist Pietro Francesco Toffoletto who compares the inner song to a \textit{concept} understood as \textit{delimitation} (\url{http://www.ellenmoysan.com/intervista-con-pietro-francesco-toffoletto-it/}).

\footnote{315} This is something that Vincent Ségal (\url{http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-vincent-segal-violoncelliste/}) or Aārp (\url{http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-Aārp-compositeur-de-musique-electronique/}) describe very accurately.

\footnote{316} In Richir’s “De la ‘perception’ musicale et de la musique.”, the author says that with music “il ne s’agit évidemment pas d’’exprimer’ des sentiments, car ceux-ci, comportant toujours une part de mise en scène imaginaire – ne fût-ce que dans la posture toute narcissique de celui qui est censé les éprouver, et qui est évoquée par des signaux sonores très élémentaires qui invitent aux ‘transports’ , relèvent dans nos termes plutôt de l’affect où ils se fixent que de l’affection. Et avec l’affect et la posture, le présent de l’acte d’imagination, la présence possible d’un phénomène de langage en temporalisation est rompue et interrompue. Pour comprendre ce qui est en question, il faut se départir, encore une fois, de la représentation de la musique comme succession de signaux sonores ou de sons chaque fois présents pris en perception, pour accéder à son articulation interne, dans un rythme de tensions et de détentes au sein d’une présence sans présent intrinsèquement assignable. Or là, précisément, rien n’a pour ainsi dire ‘le
In this chapter, I demonstrated how the actual song and the inner song are both distinct and related through one another as two elements of one single temporal structure of reference unifying a model given in phantasy [Vorbild] and an image given in perception [Abbild]. In this structure, I identified the inner song as an object of phantasy, and more specifically as the modified reproduction of a possible perception of the performance. I therefore highlighted how the understanding of the inner song requires an analysis of the apprehension of the actual song in perception.

temps’ (le présent) de se fixer, les rétentions et protentions internes à la présence, et sans tête dans un présent, s’échangent incessamment et en métamorphoses. Cela justifie, nous l’avons dit, le recours à la phantasia. Mais cela vaut aussi de ce qui les habite ou les transit, à savoir des affections, qui clignotent entre surgissement et évanouissement – si le surgissement aboutit en surgi, l’affection se transmue en affect, et il en va de même si l’évanouissement aboutit en évanoui, et cet affect est celui de la perte. C’est donc trop de dire que l’affection est fluente (Husserl), mais c’est assez de dire que, avec la phantasia, elle est fugace ou éphémère, qu’elle ‘vit’ ou ‘vibre’, ‘fluctue’ de cette fugacité. Les mouvements de l’âme ne sont pas mouvements d’un quelconque ‘corps mobile’, fût-il celui de l’affect lui-même, mais en quelque sorte mouvements purs, élans multiples et changeants, irisations infigurables en intuition, fût-elle imaginative, de l’affectivité. Mouvements, donc, que l’on ne peut fixer sans les perdre dans leurs simulacres, et que l’on ne peut fixer dans quelque bio-graphie, fût-elle de soi-même. Mouvements qui, cependant, nous sont familiers pourvu que nous y prêtions attention, mais qui défient la description. Or ce sont ces mouvements-là qui peuvent être mis en langage, c’est-à-dire en présence, dans cette étrange Sachlichkeit immatérielle qu’est la musique, et dont la musique composée en langue n’est déjà plus que la mimèsis. Ce qui, donc, pour ainsi dire, dans la musique, dans ses phénomènes comme phénomènes de langage, n’en relève pas, y constitue le ‘référent’, n’est rien d’autre que la ‘vie’ extraordinairement complexe et fugace de l’âme, de la psyché en général, de celle-là même qui constitue le compositeur, non pas tant comme X ou Y que comme humain, avec, certes, l’énigme radicale de sa singularité, qui est le style inimitable (spéculairement) d’un imprévisible qui lui appartient irréductiblement, et que nous avons toujours à redécouvrir, le nom propre ne servant que d’index pour la reconnaissance de ce style. Énigme de ce que Nietzsche nommait idiosyncrasie: mais comme celle-ci est humaine, nous avons le pouvoir, sûrement pas de la représenter ou de la construire, mais, quant aux expressions dont elle est capable, d’y accéder par une mimèsis non spéculaire, active et du dedans, du sens de langage en train de se faire.”

In my own description of the inner song, I also want to distinguish affect from affectivity, going along with Richir’s identification of affects with feelings (sentiments). Once again, I believe that the notion of the inner song can bring a new clarity to Richir’s distinction. Indeed, I believe that the inner song is precisely this type of phantasia which brings life to the interpretation as Richir describes. It is the inner song which makes possible the constitution of meaning [le sens se faisant]. In other words, it is because the inner song given in the phantasy-world, is affectivity, that it has this transformative effect on the interpretation itself. As I identify the phantasia that Richir mentions with the inner song, I therefore argue that it is not especially “blurred” [nèbuleuse], otherwise it could not be realized. The realization is certainly always below the meaning that it carries, but it is possible.
This description shows how, as the musician practices the instrument and as he or she realizes the inner song, the same melody is given in the phenomenological consciousness in two different ways: in perception, and in phantasy. However, as the musician rehearses, the performance is modified by the phantasy because it realizes it only progressively, while the phantasy is modified by the perception of its realization because the realization shows what sounds good or not. This means that, the perceived actual song is incorporated in the constitution of the inner song in phantasy. Thus, the actual song is apprehended in perception through the phantasized inner song, and the inner song is apprehended in phantasy, and constituted in phantasy through the perceived actual song.

In the coming chapter, I am going to investigate the two objects for what they have in common: the ego apprehending them.
Chapter 3: *The Various Layers of the Performing Ego*
The ego phantasizing the inner song and perceiving the actual song is the ego which both performs the *epoché* and is *under* the *epoché*. In the particular situation of music practice, the ego is both a natural ego engaged through perception with the performance experienced as mine, i.e., *produced by me*, and oriented toward the phenomenological sphere in which the actual song and the inner song are given as *phenomena*.

The inner song as a phenomenon of consciousness, is related to the consciousness which re-presents it. Consequently, it is necessary to go through a description of the various strata of the ego in order to understand the phantasizing of the inner song. This description needs to analyze the phenomenological ego as the place from which the ego performs the *epoché*, and then also give a renewed definition of the *ego* after the *epoché*.

In the coming chapter, I will describe the various strata of the ego, focusing on how it appears in the situation of music practice in which the musician practices, hears the performance, and phantasizes the inner song. This will allow me to better understand the subject phantasizing the inner song, and consequently, the inner song as it is constituted in the consciousness of that subject.
§1. The problem of the *ego* in the constitution of the inner song.

§2. The paradoxical status of the *ego* after the *epoché*.

§3. External and internal perceptions.

§4. The psychic ego.

§5. The pure ego.

§6. The ego phantasizing the inner song.

§7. The trained consciousness of the musician.
E. M.: Qu’est-ce que le chant intérieur pour vous ?

M. F.: Il est uniquement affectif. C’est cela qu’il faut faire sortir. On peut pratiquer la musique quel que soit le niveau. C’est ce qui vient qui est important. Cela peut unir les personnes au-delà des langues parce que cela vient du fond de la personne.

*Interview with Marguerite France (Violinist, French, Tokyo, Japan, 06. 03. 2012)*

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E. M.: C’est quelque chose de l’ordre d’une sensation alors.


E. M.: Mais dans ce cas-là, comment ça fonctionne ? On imagine ? C’est une sorte d’acte ou quelque chose qu’on entend spontanément ?

V. S.: Je pense qu’on a une mémoire tellement puissante de ce qu’on a entendu comme intervalles, comme fréquences, comme sonorité, que lorsqu’on imagine la sensation est presque reproduite. Elle ne l’est pas bien sûr ! Il y a une différence quand même. C’est une sorte de phantasme.

E. M.: … parce que vous ne vous contentez plus de redire exactement la même chose à l’identique mais que vous reproduisez la chose telle que vous l’avez entendue, perçue. Du coup il y a un peu de vous.
V. S. : Exactement. Ce qu’on entend, à l’intérieur de soi, est lié à la manière d’entendre de chacun. Il y a des fréquences dont on ne va pas se souvenir parce qu’elles ne vont pas libérer assez d’harmoniques pour nous. Et c’est la même chose avec le rythme.

E. M.: Comment ça ?

V. S. : Avec le rythme on va entendre quelque chose dans sa tête qui n’a pas de notes, et qui a plutôt à voir avec le déplacement, la danse. D’ailleurs je ressens une sorte d’euphorie si je me mets à associer des sons avec ces rythmes.

E. M.: Donc cette musique intérieure est constituée par ce qu’on a travaillé avec les partitions, ce qu’on a entendu à l’extérieur, et ensuite la forme vient de notre manière propre d’agencer le tout. On fait donc quelque chose qui nous est propre à partir d’un matériel qui ne nous est pas propre.

V. S. : … c’est pour cela que ça nous est vraiment personnel. J’ajouterais que cette musique est aussi liée à notre mémoire culturelle.

Interview avec Vincent Ségal (Cellist, French, Paris, France, 05. 14. 2015)

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Z. S.: That sound that I am hearing in my head, that I am trying to make, is related to someone else’s sound. But it is always personal because everyone is made up differently, I am physiologically different from the other horn players that I heard growing up, and in this way you discover your own voice.

Imitation is a very important learning tool. Even though I’m imitating, a better word to use is influence.
E. M.: Each inner song is different. So influence is a better word to use than imitate.

Z. S.: Yes. Because every sound you’re hearing is influencing the kind of sound that you want to make. I wanted to sound like this horn player at this certain point in time but then I wanted to sound like that different horn player at another point in time, or this player, or that orchestra.

E. M.: You are led by a desire.

Z. S.: Right. It gives you an idea of the ranges of sounds that you can create. And that’s why it is not really imitation at that point, it is more influence.

E. M.: So the difference between influence and imitation is what? How can you give them different definitions?

Z. S.: If you are imitating something, you are “aping” (like ape, the animal, plus -ing) you’re trying to make it just like this thing. But if you are influenced, you are including the elements that you like, in order to move you in that particular direction and to be a part of your voice.

*Interview with Zachary Smith (French Hornist, English, Pittsburgh, PA, USA, 01. 20. 2016)*

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L. M.: Something I find really interesting is when you start really existing internally. This is something I’m really interested in in lessons.

E. M.: Being inside our playing… Not outside.

L. M.: You know, the way I describe this internal hearing to my students is not just generating the sound but receiving it. This hearing in your head is like inviting the
sound. You generate the sound, but you also receive the sound. There is a receptive state and not only an active state.

E. M.: I am sure it is mostly receptive. For me, this is the difference between imagination and hearing inner song. For me, it is receptive.

L. M.: It makes a huge difference, doesn’t it?

E. M.: Yes. If it is something you receive, that means that we have an inner space where we receive the world, the sound. And when we express it, we make that sound come out. If we receive the sound, the problem of self-expression, ego and so on, is gone!

L. M.: It is! You used the word “unity” before. Like when you receive the sound at the same time you generate, there’s some kind of unity that happens. That wholeness.

E. M.: And if I sing what I am going to play, it is the same! I receive the sound from my ear. It comes out and back to me. The receptive part is obvious at this point. If someone ask me “what do you imagine?” I don’t know, but if he asks, “what do your hear”, then I know. I have something already. I have to try to grasp it.

L. M.: If I just generate the sound, [plays] I press it. If I receive it, it is different. [plays] There is something so beneficial about the receptive process. It is not self-consciousness. It is not the same as reacting to the sound. Because then, that can also be a block, fussing, where you play a note and immediately react or adjust. [plays] Like a flat. That is reacting. That is different from receiving. [plays] It is so illusive; It has more to do with inviting, and allowing, and receiving.
E. M.: There is a sort of passivity. A welcoming attitude. I receive something. It changed me when I started to think: “I can play what I heard,” and not “I have to imagine something” with the stress of not having anything to say. If it doesn’t work, the problem is not anymore that I am not creative; it is more that I am not attentive.

L. M.: I understand.

E. M.: I am sure that the very good musicians are able to grasp that. To be attentive. I remember my teacher telling me: “close your eyes and listen.” It changed me. It opened my own inner world.

L. M.: It is like an invitation to go internally. It is like this porous membrane between the internal and the external.

Interview with Lorna McGhee (Flautist, Scottish, Pittsburgh, USA, 02.04.2016)

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E. M.: So it is the perception of music that is different for everyone?

J. T.: Yes. And maybe even the capacity to process. Not just to think of it, but even to realize it, even to understand it, to grasp it.

Interview with Jeff Turner (Bassist, English, Pittsburgh, PA, USA, 03. 21. 2016)

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T. E.: C’est intéressant car si vous êtes trop dans la perception il y a quelque chose en moins… il faut faire attention car on peut perdre quelque chose à être trop dans la perception… C’est dur de trouver cet équilibre.

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T. E. : oui. Ce monde intérieur ne prendra pas complètement la… Il y a toujours un moment où je suis dans la perception… Par exemple, si on me demande à la radio d’improviser deux minutes, trois minutes, il y a toujours un moment où je sais. D’ailleurs je ne regarde pratiquement pas quand je suis en direct comme ça. Je sais improviser dans les deux minutes. Je sais partir dans mon délire comme ça… mais dans les deux minutes.

E. M.: C’est un équilibre entre la perception et l’imagination…

T. E. : …oui…

E. M.: … et un retour dans la perception…

T. E. : Voilà : si je suis trop dans la perception, là je vais être en train de me regarder et ça ne va pas être bon, mais si je suis trop dans le monde… ça risque de ne plus être audible…

*Interview with Thierry Escaich (Organist, composer, French, Paris, 03. 01. 2021)*
§1. The problem of the ego in the constitution of the inner song.

_I am rehearsing the last movement of Brahms’ Cello Sonata no.1 in E Minor op. 38 at home._ I practice the epoché. I try to play the inner song in my phantasy before starting to play it with my cello. On the one hand, I feel part of the reality of the world around me because I am holding my cello, prepared to play, and engaged with the musical instrument. On the other hand, I feel withdrawn from the real world, immersed in the world of the inner song in which I can listen to Brahms’ melody as I would like to hear it.

It is characteristic of the specific type of inner song we are analyzing here to be a musical object of phantasy to be _teleologically oriented toward its performance_: the musician practices and rehearses, experiences the inner song within the music practice process in the sense that he or she listens to the actual song through the lens of the inner song, and listens to the inner song through the lens of the actual song. This means that it is part of the phantasy to aim at its own realization, which, if it is not _actual yet_, is given as _possible_, as a _real possibility_. This implies a particularity in the formation of the inner song. When the musician phantasizes it, there is an additional dimension in comparison to other objects of sonorous phantasy: up to a certain extent which varies according to training, the musician phantasizes the Bodily movement of the performance.

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317 Although the cellist also hears the piano part in phantasy, it is in a different way than the inner song because this sonorous object of phantasy is not grounded in tactuality unless the cellist is also a pianist. I will not focus on this other phantasy which is part of the cellist’s inner song. This would require another description built upon the description of the inner song and explaining how the phantasy of the inner song can come along with a phantasy of other sonorous objects.

318 I analyze that in the last chapter.

319 I explained that notion in a footnote in the previous chapter on “Perceiving and Phantasizing.”
which will or could realize the inner song. Hence, the musician not only hears the inner song, but also phantasizes how to perform it with their instrument.\textsuperscript{320} He or she phantasizes an embodied sound, feels how to hold the instrument, grasp it [it is what is called in the French language, \textit{le toucher}], how to move to produce the note, how to cross certain distances, how to play the tones, etc. In this phantasy, there may or may not be a mental picture of the cello, or of the fingertips moving across the instrument, but there is at least, for the trained musician, a certain degree of tactuality.\textsuperscript{321} The inner song is therefore constituted of two elements: a phantasized inner instrument and a phantasized inner melody.\textsuperscript{322}

The inner song, as a particular embodied musical phenomenon of phantasy, can be constituted in phantasy due to the experience of perceiving the performance as mine, i.e., thanks to the perception of the actual song. The musician apprehends the actual song as the \textit{realization of the inner song},\textsuperscript{323} as the sound that \textit{he} or \textit{she} produces him- or herself, as \textit{his} or \textit{her} own performance.\textsuperscript{324} Describing this very quickly because it is important to

\textsuperscript{320} As I said in the introduction, I am describing the more elementary situation here: when a musician phantasizes an inner song that he or she will play through only one musical instrument. Of course, it is more complicated for a conductor who needs to phantasize the inner song of a symphony or for the composer who phantasizes an inner song that has various voices, etc. It is also slightly different for the singer whose instrument is their own voice (although Sylvia Kummer says in the interview how she feels her throat moving when she phantasizes her inner song: \url{http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-sylvia-kummer-chanteuse/}).

As I state in the conclusion of the present dissertation, in order to fully understand the inner song, it would be necessary to enter into the particularities of the various types of inner song. Here, I will simply establish how the musician not only phantasizes the sound but also phantasizes the way to produce it.

\textsuperscript{321} I explain this in the last two chapters of the present dissertation.

\textsuperscript{322} I discuss this at length with the pianist François Moysan (\url{http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-francois-moysan-pianiste/}), but also with several other performers.

\textsuperscript{323} This process of realization is the object of the last chapter.

\textsuperscript{324} I explain it in more depth in the last chapter.
understand it at least roughly in order to focus on the ego, this means that the actual song is given in perception not only as a sonorous melody like any other musical tune, but as the melody that *the musician produces thanks to the manipulation of the musical instrument*. In other words, the musician experiences a *coincidence* between the melody and the moves that *he or she is performing* on the instrument. For instance, as I play the cello, I perceive the melody as *mine* because I perceive it as being produced by my moves with the cello. To constitute this actual song (Brahms’ *Sonata*) as *my* performance, the instrument through which I issue the melody needs to be co-constituted with the melody in perception. In other words, due to the co-constitution of these two elements (the actual melody and the instrument that produces it) the actual song performed is constituted phenomenologically as *mine*.

Because of the co-constitution of the instrument and the melody, together forming the actual song, the actual song is given in consciousness, not only as a sonorous object, but as a sonorous object founded in tactuality through the mediation of the manipulation of the instrument. These tactual data acquired through perception are fully part of the inner song as it is constituted in phantasy. Indeed, when the musician

325 I describe this in the last chapter: “Process of Constitution of the Inner Song through Music Practice”

326 This comes out more specifically in the interviews with the pianist François Moysan (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-francois-moysan-pianiste/) and the piano tuner and restorer Paul Gossart: (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-paul-gossart-restaurateur-de-pianos-anciens-accordeur-chercheur-en-philosophie/).

327 As discussed with Lanei Rodemeyer, and both István Fazakas and Stéphane Finetti, this brings up the problem of the phantasy consciousness as a *reproductive* consciousness (or “presentifying consciousness” as Bernet says in “Unconscious Consciousness in Husserl and Freud” p. 347). What kind of reproduction are we talking about here? I will analyze the Husserlian view more closely later in this chapter. However, for reasons of clarity, I want to make my position clear now.

As I already said, I follow Bernet’s interpretation of Husserl here. Bernet characterizes the reproductive consciousness as: “consciousness of a modificational connection between two acts and not
phantasizes the inner song, there is a co-constitution of a phantasized musical instrument with the phantasized melody issued through it. For instance, as I phantasize the inner song of Brahms’ Sonata, I phantasize the kinaesthetic sensations of the cello, the motions on the instrument, the distances, how my moves produce the sound, etc. Then, the more accurate my phantasy is, the better model [Vorbild] the inner song will be, and the better image [Abbild] the performance will be. For now, my phantasy is still limited, but if I keep working on that piece, little by little, it will become more and more accurate and rich.

From that it follows that both the inner song and the actual song given in the phenomenological consciousness during the performance process are made of two co-constituted objects: the actual song is a co-constitution of the actual musical instrument

the consciousness of an act that directs itself towards another act” (“Unconscious consciousness in Husserl and Freud,” p. 337-8). As Bernet underlines, there are two reproductive modes of consciousness. One the one hand, there is the reproduction in remembering in which “the presentification of a past object implies the reproduction of the original experience of that object” (“Unconscious consciousness in Husserl and Freud” p. 336). On the other hand, there is the reproduction in phantasy which is a reproductive presentification “best compared with a neutralised remembering which would not be related to a past perception of an object but to one that is both present and absent” (“Unconscious consciousness in Husserl and Freud,” p. 338).

In my dissertation, when I use the notion of “reproduction” related to the phantasy, I do not intend that the phantasy gives again what was previously given in perception. In other words, the inner song is not a copy, in phantasy, of the perceptual experience of the performance. This would indeed give a primacy to perception over phantasy. Instead, I intend reproduction in the sense of a neutralized remembering. It is, as Bernet says, “a productive form of reproduction. It is a modification that implies something unmodified which need not exist prior to or independently of this modification. It is a modified form of perception which indicates the possibility of a perception without presupposing its factual givenness. Hence the reproductive modification that makes up the essence of phantasy does not explain how the presentifying phantasy is derivable from a present perception but rather the other way around. In other words, this reproductive modification explains how phantasy implies the possibility of a perception” (“Unconscious consciousness in Husserl and Freud” pp. 339-40).

328 I will not come back to that question in detail, but this capacity to co-constitute the instrument with the sonorous inner song depends also on the profile of the musician and on their training. Some musicians learn music from practice, and therefore go from the sensation to the sound. Other musicians, those with a classical background for example, first learn theory, and then practice, and therefore need to learn how to associate the sight-reading of the score with actual movements. This is the object of my last two chapters.
and the actual melody issued by it, and the inner sonorous song is a co-constitution of an inner instrument with an inner melody. Because of that co-constitution, the inner song can be characterized as teleologically oriented toward its realization in performance. Indeed, the grounding of the sonorous in the tactual embodies the inner song. Listening to the inner song in phantasy therefore does not mean only hearing a melody but also feeling the instrument and performing moves in phantasy.

This constitution of a phantasy object as an embodied object is made possible by the fact that it is the same ego which both performs and apprehends the objects in the phenomenological consciousness. In other words, it is the same ego which engages in the performance through perception (in the natural attitude) while grasping the inner song and the actual song given under the epoché in the phenomenological consciousness (in the musician’s attitude). Paradoxically, it is due to that engagement with the natural world through perception that there is something like an object of phantasy related to the

329 The French pedagogue Dominique Hoppenot, cited several times during interviews with violinists from the French tradition, speaks about the “inner violin” (Le violon intérieur). The interview explaining that question the best is the interview with François Moysan, (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-francois-moysan-pianiste/).

330 In the present work, I have a very restricted definition of the inner song. However, as I have mentioned several times already, the teleological orientation which contributes to restricting the definition of the notion could be set aside. This would open the understanding of the inner song to a type of musical phenomenon less tied to its realization, in which phantasy is not so bounded by the reality of an actual givenness. For instance, the investigation of the inner song would then include the inner song of a composer, which does not necessarily consider the reality of the playing of each instrument, but which does consider the balance of the sounds in the ensemble, etc. In this case, the inner song has a looser definition.

331 This is an ability more developed by trained musicians as I explain at the end of the present chapter.

332 From now on, unless I am more specific, the notion of actual song will be understood in the broadest sense of the perception of the sound as issued through the instrument, i.e., constitution of the sonorous with the tactile, while the notion of inner song will be understood in the broadest sense of a phantasy sound associated with a phantasy musical instrument.
production of the performance which can be given in the phenomenological consciousness, but it is also due to the disengagement from the world through the gesture of the epoché that the musician can apprehend these objects phenomenologically.\textsuperscript{333}

§2. The paradoxical status of the ego after the epoché.

I am in my practice room with my cello. I close my eyes, I abstract from the world around me, I turn my attention inward. I listen to the inner song without even raising the question of whether it exists or not. What interests me is only how I experience the phenomenon.

To describe the type of ego related to music practice, I want to start with the investigation of the Husserlian ego performing a short digression on the Cartesian ego. In Ideas I, following the radical and methodological Cartesian doubt, Husserl’s searches for a scientific starting point, and looks for a science that would be the foundation of all sciences. However, he differs from Descartes in four ways:\textsuperscript{334} first, instead of negating the world because it cannot be the starting point of apodictic evidence, Husserl integrates it as a phenomenon of the intentional consciousness; second, instead of dismissing the external world in favor of an absolutely certain ego, Husserl maintains the world in parentheses; third, instead of excluding the ego from the epoché thus remaining in the

\textsuperscript{333} This is probably something that is true of any artistic practice. Indeed, the painter, the ceramist, and the dancer probably share this same kind of disengaged engagement with the world (I discuss that with the ceramist Emmanuel Boos: \url{http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-emmanuel-boos-ceramiste/}). At a more theoretical level, I also discuss that question with Stéphane Finetti (\url{http://www.ellenmoysan.com/interview-avec-stephane-finetti-chercheur-en-philosophie-phenomenologie/}).

\textsuperscript{334} This clear and synthetic distinction between Husserl and Descartes comes from the reading of Pascal Dupond’s “Husserl; remarques sur la cinquième des Méditations Cartésienne,”, pp. 2-4).
natural attitude, Husserl extends the *epoché* to that which is proper to me, i.e., the sphere of the *ego*, thus transitioning to the phenomenological attitude; and finally instead of using the notion of *evidence* without questioning it, Husserl uses it, investigating its possibilities of being fulfilled. To say it briefly, the question of the status of the *cogito* is central both for Descartes and Husserl, however, if Descartes makes it the starting point of a stable science because the *ego cogito* is the only element which cannot be an object of doubt, Husserl includes it within the sphere of what can be doubted.

That creates a specific philosophical issue for Husserl. The Cartesian split line between what can be an object of doubt and what cannot be an object of doubt moves from a split *between the world and the ego*, to a split *within the sphere of the ego itself*. Thus, the Husserlian sphere of the *ego* is made both of a part that can be the object of doubt on the one hand, and a part that cannot be the object of doubt on the other. As Husserl moves this split line within the ego itself, he needs to perform a reduction, or more precisely a series of reductions. He suspends the positing of existence and then, any additional reductions are additional exercises to tease out any assertions or implicit presumptions of existence in order to carry out analyses of the relation of consciousness and the world considered purely as possible. Here, the limits of the *purely possible* also include part of the *ego* in the sense that some aspects of the ego are suspended by the *epoché* while other aspects of the ego are not.

In the natural attitude, the natural ego is the ground in which the *ego* remains while undergoing a change and switching into the phenomenological sphere. Husserl explains in §33 of *Ideas I*: “I, the actual human being, am a real Object like others in the natural world. I effect cogitationes, acts of consciousness in both the broader and the
narrower sense and these acts, as belonging to this human subject, are occurrences within the same natural actuality.” ³³⁵ Here, Husserl underlines how I am both a real object, part of the natural world, and the subject performing the *epoché*. The natural ego (I myself, as a real object like any other in the world) is bracketed, but the ego is still from that place that the ego effects acts of consciousness, and therefore, in the case of the inner song, phantasizes the inner song. The ego is here both what is *included in the world* as an object, therefore parenthesized, and what *has the capacity to perform acts of consciousness*, therefore resisting the parenthesizing. Here, the acts of consciousness, *cognitiones*, belong to the *I*. This *I* is in the world as a natural being. The *cognitiones* belonging to the phenomenological ego could not be possible without a natural ego. Thus, in the natural attitude it is the natural *ego* which is the bearer of the *cognitiones*.

However, Husserl also notices that “likewise all my other mental processes, out of the changing stream of which the specific Ego-acts flash in so specifically peculiar a manner, pass over into one another, become connected in syntheses, become incessantly modified.” ³³⁶ He notices here a second characteristic of consciousness: if consciousness is the bearer of *cognitiones*, it is also the bearer of other mental processes that are connected to one another, changing into one another, thus constituting a constantly modified stream of consciousness.³³⁷ At this stage, still in the natural attitude, the conclusion is that the natural ego is therefore the bearer of a consciousness which itself

³³⁵ *Ideas 1*, §33, p. 64.

³³⁶ *Ideas 1*, §33, p. 64.

³³⁷ I will come back to this later in the chapter 4.
goes with a stream of consciousness made of mental processes.\textsuperscript{338} The relationship of consciousness with these mental processes is the following: “In a \textit{broadest sense}, the expression \textit{consciousness} comprehends (but then indeed less suitably) \textit{all} mental processes.”\textsuperscript{339} In other words, this flow of constantly changing mental processes belongs to consciousness.

This claim is consistent with what Husserl says earlier the \textit{Logical Investigations} when he affirms that consciousness is “something that comprehends mental processes.”\textsuperscript{340} Consciousness comprehends mental processes either as the sum of them, or the pole that allows them to constitute a unity. At this point in \textit{Ideas 1}, Husserl is not yet designating consciousness as a \textit{pole of unity}. However, he still says the following: “\textit{consciousness has, in itself, a being of its own which in its own absolute essence, is not touched by the phenomenological exclusion.}”\textsuperscript{341} In other words, consciousness for him does not need anything to support a being, and as such, is not bracketed through the \textit{epoché}. Hence, this “sphere of mental processes”\textsuperscript{342} is what remains after the reduction.

Husserl describes this sphere as follows: “It therefore remains as the \textit{‘phenomenological residuum,’} as a region of being which is of essential necessity quite

\textsuperscript{338} This conclusion will change when Husserl focuses on the phenomenological attitude, where consciousness as perceiving is what makes the appearance of anything in the world possible.

\textsuperscript{339} \textit{Ideas 1}, §33, p. 64.

\textsuperscript{340} Husserl’s \textit{Logical Investigations} proposes three characteristics of consciousness: “1. consciousness as the entire, real (\textit{reelle}) phenomenological being of the empirical ego, as the interweaving of psychic experiences in the unified stream of consciousness; 2. Consciousness as the inner awareness of one’s own psychic experiences; and 3. Consciousness as a comprehensive designation of ‘mental acts’, or ‘intentional experiences’, of all sorts” (\textit{Logical Investigations}, V, §1, p. 81).

\textsuperscript{341} \textit{Ideas 1}, §33, p. 65.

\textsuperscript{342} \textit{Ideas 1}, p. 64.
unique, and which can indeed become the field of a science of a novel kind: phenomenology.” In other words, what remains after the reduction is also the starting point of a new science. As such, the type of consciousness remaining after the *epoché* and uncovering the phenomenological region can also be designated as “an originary seizing upon the objectivities;” the primal point from which all objectivities are apprehended. These objectivities are whatever belongs to the phenomenological sphere.

Thanks to that Husserlian description, it becomes clear that the natural ego of the musician performing or rehearsing with a musical instrument is bracketed, whereas the ego as the bearer of the perceptual actual song and the phantasized inner song resists the *epoché*. The natural ego matters in the constitution of the inner song during a music practice session. Indeed, after the first stage of the constitution of the inner song which does not necessarily involve a perception, the inner song continues to be sketched through the perception of its realization in performance, i.e., as the musician practices. The perception of the musical performance is therefore fully part of the constitution of the inner song phantasized by the practicing musician. The description of the phantasizing of the inner song therefore needs to include the awareness that the musician, while phantasizing, is still engaged with the natural world through perception. This situation is indeed the ground of the phantasy. Consequently, it should be part of the

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343 *Ideas 1*, §33, p. 65-6.

344 *Ideas 1*, §33, p. 65.

345 I explain this in chapter 4.

346 In this sense, and to make it clear one more time, the *realization* is not the expression of an already constituted inner song: the performance is modified thanks to the inner song, and the inner song is modified thanks to the perceptual experience of the performance, the realization is therefore a progressive process with a dual modification.
description of the process of the constitution of the inner song in phantasy; without this minimum degree of engagement with the natural world, the process of the constitution of the musical phantasy could not be pursued further.

§3. External and internal perceptions.

Through the conversion of attention, and the maintaining of the orientation of the attention toward the inner song as a phenomenon, I break through the natural attitude and enter into the phenomenological attitude. I feel my cello; I continue to perform the first movement of Brahms’ Cello Sonata through it. However, I am focused on the experience of these movements and the sound that they produce, as well as the phantasy related to that perception.

As it appears from the analysis of the epoché, breaking through the natural attitude into the phenomenological attitude happens through a change in the relationship with the world through perception. Instead of focusing on the perceived world immediately through perception, holding the perceptual as existent, the focus is on the perceived experience of the world, while the natural world as existent is parenthesized. For the musician practicing at home, the switch into the musician’s attitude happens as the musician disengages from the perception of the instrument (the moves, the sound, etc.) as existent, in order to engage in how they are experienced in consciousness, near the inner song, regardless of their status of existence.

There is therefore a change in the way of relating to perception. However, as Husserl writes in §30 of Ideas I, “I continually find the one spatiotemporal actuality to which I belong like all other human beings who are to be found in it and who are related
to it as I am.” 347 In other words, I never cease to be related to the world through the experience of a perception intensified by attention directed toward it. The difference is only that, I am not stuck in that attitude when I have switched into the phenomenological attitude, or in the case of music practice, into the musician’s attitude: the musician is engaged enough to be able to practice, and disengaged enough to be able to be busy with the inner song and the actual song in the musician’s attitude.

As Husserl explains, the psychological reflection on the perception itself introduces a first degree of withdrawal from the world. He says: “We begin with a series of observations which we shall make without troubling ourselves with any phenomenological epoché. We are directed to the ‘external world’ in a natural manner and, without relinquishing the natural attitude, we effect a psychological reflection on our Ego and its mental living.” 348 In other words, the psychological act through which consciousness becomes aware of itself with its mental processes, i.e., as an intentional consciousness, is also freeing me from the immediate business with the world that characterizes the natural attitude. 349

This Husserlian description helps us to understand the specific ego of the musician. In the phenomenological attitude, which I identify here more specifically as a musician’s attitude, the perceptual experience in the natural attitude is pushed into the

347 Ideas 1, §30, p. 56-7.

348 Ideas 1, §34, p. 67.

349 As Bernet explains, thanks to his investigations of remembering, Husserl later drops this theory of reflection as an inner perception in order to introduce a new one in which “reflection is not an inner perception but an objectifying presentification of a lived experience that has already ‘flowed away’” (“Unconscious consciousness in Husserl and Freud,” p. 336). In this first elaboration of the inner song, I follow Husserl’s earlier account, but I will progressively adopt the later one as my description goes on.
background, while the musician, under the *epoché*, engages with *phenomena* in the phenomenological world. Thus, as the musician practices, he or she relates to the performance focusing on the *experience* of that performance. In this new attitude in which consciousness seizes upon the mental processes *for themselves*, i.e., independently of whether they exist or not, consciousness, which was originally living in the cogito *without being conscious of the cogitatio itself*, starts living in the *cogito as being conscious of itself giving the cogitatio*. In other words, the musician becomes aware of him or herself perceiving the performance, phantasizing the inner song. As a cellist, I become aware of how I experience listening to the performance or playing the inner song in my phantasy.

Husserl explains:

When living in the cogito we are not conscious of the cogitation itself as an intentional Object; but at any time it can become an Object of consciousness; its essence involves the essential possibility of a *reflective turning of regard* and naturally in the form of a new cogitation that, in the manner proper to a cogitation which simply seizes upon, is directed to it. In other words, any ‘cogitatio’ can become the object of a so-called ‘internal perception’ and in further succession the Object of a *reflective valuation*, an approval or a disapproval, etc.\(^{350}\)

In this quote, Husserl is explaining how, once consciousness is directed to itself and its mental processes, consciousness can also take *itself* into consideration, therefore producing new cogitationes. Husserl introduces here the notion of *internal perceptions* designating the perception of consciousness by itself, immanently. This type of

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\(^{350}\) *Ideas* I, §38 p. 78.
perception differs from external perceptions, or more exactly, perceptions of transcendent objects, which are directed toward things transcendent to consciousness.\textsuperscript{351} Immanent perceptions are directed toward things immanent to consciousness and do not involve the immediate relationship with the world through perception, whereas perceptions of transcendent objects\textsuperscript{352} refer to objects independent of consciousness, i.e., objects given in the world and therefore presupposing it. With the immanent perceptions characterizing the phenomenological attitude, the existence of the world is bracketed so that what matters is the mode of givenness of the object within the phenomenological sphere. It is through the second type of perception that consciousness is able to break through the natural attitude in order to switch into the phenomenological attitude. Indeed, as the status of existence of the object is bracketed, what matters is now primarily the thing itself as it is experienced in consciousness, i.e., as a phenomenon. In other words, it is by approaching perception through the experience of it in consciousness, that the musician switches into the musician’s attitude.

If the notion of perception is central here, Husserl mentions how perception is not the only type of immanent act which participates in breaking through the natural attitude. He writes: “The same holds in a correspondingly modified way not only for actual acts in the sense of act-impressions, but also for acts of which we are conscious ‘in’ phantasy, ‘in’ memory, or else ‘in’ empathy when we are understanding and living another’s acts

\textsuperscript{351} As I will explain in the next paragraph, there are two meanings of “transcendent” in Ideas 1: (1) transcendent refers to objects that are real, however (2) it refers also to objects that exceed immediate consciousness. In this particular case, I believe that “transcendent perceptions” designate perceptions of real objects.

\textsuperscript{352} Ideas 1, §38, p. 79.
after him.” In other words, any act in which the object is apprehended regardless of its transcendent existence (namely, in which it is the experience of the object that matters first) is part of this breaking through the natural attitude. Here, Husserl is more specifically thinking about memory or imagination as modifications of perception, however, this claim will remain in his later accounts when he adds the notion of phantasy to the notion of imagination in his descriptions. Thus, phantasizing is also part of that breaking through the natural attitude of the musician.

In music practice, external and internal perceptions are involved in the constitution of the inner song but in different ways. External perceptions which are directed to transcendent objects are involved as the musician is rehearsing, realizing the inner song, and becomes able to feel and hear that realization, thus constituting the actual song in consciousness, absorbed in that perception. Then, internal perceptions are

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353 Ideas 1, §38 pp. 78-9.

354 Husserl’s account of imagination evolves a lot over the years. In his primary understanding, that of the Logical Investigations, particularly V and VI, as well as the Text no.1 of Phantasy, Image consciousness, and Memory, imagination is understood as Einbildung, i.e., a modification of the act of perception, and not as Phantäsie. The second account emphasizing the definition of imagination as Phantäsie comes later, by the end of the Text no.1, when Husserl distinguishes perception from phantasy through their contents (sensations for perception and phantasm for imagination) in later texts as well as in the Analysis Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis. In my description of the inner song, I am more interested in the later account. Thus, even if I acknowledge the earlier Husserlian works, I don’t focus on them.

355 In the present quote, Husserl mentions memory, phantasy, and empathy. Even if she does not mention the phantasy, in “On the Petite Phrase of Proust and the Experience of Empathy,” Jessica Wiskus uses Husserl and Stein to explore how we can empathize with music by experiencing it not as an object but rather as a subject, because we experience it as motivated whole. Within her description, the author articulates the notions of empathy and memory, and underlines how memory is also creative. She says: “I am not restricted to experiencing the past just as it was before: the differentiation between first and second – the flowing movement or change of the Längsintentionalität – means, rather, that I am able to experience something that I have never known; and in this way, recollection, far from being an act concerned solely with the past, always partakes of that-which-is-yet-to-come (i.e. that which pertains to protention).” (p. 11). This is an interesting observation which helps to emphasize the creativity not only of the phantasy, but also of memory, and therefore of the reproductive consciousness in a broader sense.
involved as the musician seizes upon both the actual song and the inner song given
immanently in consciousness and becomes absorbed in the experience of these
phenomena. Both the actual song and the inner song are given as transcendent in the
sense that they exceed consciousness (consciousness cannot apprehend them all at once).
However, they are not objects of an external perception. In other words, when the
musician seizes upon the actual song and the inner song in consciousness, focusing on the
experience of the phenomenological consciousness, he or she accesses them through an
internal perception, apprehending them immanently and becoming able to produce
reflective valuations of them.

§4. The psychic ego.

I am now rehearsing the second movement of the Sonata. I can hear the inner
song and I realize it through my instrument. I move my hands and arms according to the
music, progressively playing the melody as I want to hear it.

As the description of the ego phantasizing the inner song goes on, the problem of
the Body comes very quickly into question. Indeed, the ego is not an abstract one: the
musician plays, performs, feels, phantasizes, etc., and it is difficult to describe that
without going into the problem of the Body.

Husserl observes in §20 of Ideas 2 how: “Among material things there are certain
ones, or from an eidetic standpoint there are certain ones a priori possible, which are
soulless, ‘merely’ material. On the other hand, there also are certain ones which have the
rank of ‘Bodies’ and as such display a connection with a new stratum of being, the
psychic stratum, as it is called here." In other words, perception apprehends two types of object in the world: objects that do not have consciousness for themselves on the one hand, and not merely material bodies related to a psychic stratum on the other hand. In the situation of music practice, the musical instrument and the melody do not have consciousness for themselves, whereas the musician apprehends him- or herself as having a psychic stratum.

Husserl defines the psychic stratum as follows:

a *stream, with no beginning or end, of ‘lived experiences,’* of which manifold types are well known to us from inner perception, ‘introspection,’ in which each of us grasps his ‘own’ lived experiences in their originality. And when these are no longer originary and ‘actual,’ we can still grasp them intuitively in inner remembrance, inner free phantasy, inner imaginary representation. Similar lived experiences are further given, with more or less clear intuitiveness, in the form of an interpreting grasp of others’ psychic lives as present actualities.

Here, he goes back to the definition of consciousness as bearing a flow of mental processes, underlining how these processes are accessible through inner perceptions, how they are apprehended as my mental processes, and how I have the capacity to recall them and apprehend them, not only through remembering, but also through a type of

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357 I will come back to this later in the chapters 4.

358 I analyze this in the last two chapters.

359 *Ideas 2*, §20, p. 98.

360 I will come back several times to the notion of flow, but more specifically in the chapter 4.
“free” phantasy, and an “imaginary representation,” i.e., a type of phantasy related to an image.361

Husserl explains how lived experiences are given in this stream as united by essence:

As the image, stream of lived experience (or stream of consciousness), already indicates, the lived experiences, i.e., the sensations, perceptions, rememberings, feelings, affects, etc., are not given to us in experience as annexes, lacking internal connection, of material Bodies, as if they were unified with one another only through the common phenomenal link to the Body. Instead, they are one by means of their very essence; they are bound and interwoven together, they flow into one another in layers and are possible only in this unity of a stream. Nothing can be torn away from this stream; nothing can be separated off as, so to say, a thing for itself.362

This means that these unities of meaning are not given in this flow as unrelated unities. They have a first level of unity as they are constituted through the Body.363 Husserl also says that these unities of meaning are given by means of their very essence, i.e., as part of the same stream of consciousness, flowing into one another and therefore related to one another as a result the unity of that stream.364 In the situation of music practice, the unity

361 I investigated this distinction between the two forms of perception in the chapter on the “Perceiving and Phantasizing.”

362 Ideas 2, §20, p. 98.

363 Here the notion of Body [Leib] is introduced that I will investigate in Chapter 4.

364 Alexander Schell writes: “L’unité – ou plutôt: l’identité – de l’objet appréhendé n’est pas due, pour Husserl, à l’identité de la conscience de soi (de l’aperception transcendantale au sens de Kant, cf. la première déduction des catégories) parce qu’elle est ‘quelque chose de trop vide et d’indéterminé pour qu’elle puisse répondre de l’unité déterminée que nous rencontrons phénoménologiquement’, mais à
of the object is given due to the synthetic unity of apprehension which temporally gives and unfolds the object in the continuity of succession. So, as I apprehend the melody of the actual song of the second movement of Brahms Sonata, for instance, I apprehend it through my ears as one melody, and the unity of the object in consciousness is given through the unity of apprehension in succession.

In addition to that stream constituted through perception, Husserl notices other unities that can be grasped intuitively and are part of the constitution of the ego. He identifies various layers of unity: (1) the unity of the pure ego which is the residuum discovered through the process of reductions, (2) the unity of the real psychic ego which is the “empirical subject affiliated with the soul, whereby the soul is constituted as

365 I will come back to this in the last two chapters.

366 This layer is uncovered through the description of the epoché and the reductions that I perform in Chapter 1.

367 This layer raises the classical soul-body problem. “According to Husserl’s definition ‘the soul’ is the ‘unity of qualities of the mind founded on the basic perceptual qualities’ and receives its reality due to the fact that as the unity of the life of the soul it stands in combination with the body as the unity of bodily being, which is itself part of nature. This ‘interrelationship between the events of mind and body’ implies that matters relating to the soul can never be experienced as separated from the ‘nature’ of bodily experience,” (Köchler “The Relativity of the Soul and the Absolute State of the Pure Ego,” p.95).

So, according to Husserl, the soul animates the Body, and the Body is animated by the soul, both being the object of one single empirical experience. The specificity of this unity is that it is a unity given through empirical experience: I experience myself as being a Body animated by a soul, a soul animating a Body, one being inseparable from the other. I cannot investigate this problem in depth here, even if it would be interesting to describe how this problem appears within a close study of music practice.
a reality bound together with Bodily reality or interwoven in it,” and (3) the unity of the I as a human, i.e., “the Ego which not only ascribes to itself its lived experiences as its psychic states and likewise ascribes to itself its cognitions, its properties of character, and similar permanent qualities manifest in its lived experiences, but which also designates its Bodily qualities as its ‘own’ and thereby assigns them to the sphere of the Ego.”

As the acknowledgment of the Body as part of the ego sphere is necessary for the musician perceiving the actual song and phantasizing an embodied inner song, this latter layer of the I as a human [Ich-Mensch] is the one that interests me. Indeed, it is the layer of the ego which says I and attributes to itself a Body as mine. It is composed of a unity of body and soul which are not “two realities externally linked with one another but instead as most intimately interwoven and in a certain way mutually penetrating” and consequently “states and properties of either of these components count as ones of the whole, of the ‘I as a man’ itself.” As such, this I which hears and moves is the psychological I, I as a human, a whole made of parts. In his description, Husserl

368 Ideas 2, §20, p. 98.

369 Ideas 2, §20, p. 99.

370 In this section, Husserl frequently uses the expression “Ich-Mensch,” translated in English as “I-as-man.” In the context of my description, this expression could sound odd because I am a woman, and because we don’t use “man” as a universal concept anymore. I would like to keep it because it closely reflects the one used by Husserl in the original text, and because other concepts which look similar refer to other philosophical contexts or have other definitions (the notion of “person” for instance). In the Husserlian context, “I-as-man” refers to me as a human being.

371 Ideas 2, §21, p. 100.

372 This claims refers to Husserl’s understanding of the relationship between parts and whole. In the Third Logical Investigation, Husserl writes: “We have independent contents wherever the elements of a presentational complex (complex of contents) by their very nature permit their separated presentation; we have dependent contents wherever this is not the case” (Logical Investigation, III, §2, p. 6).
demonstrates through the example of the ghost that the Body is not separable from this I. According to him, my Body is not just a Body like any other body in the world: it belongs to the *spirit* because it is *animated* by it. Therefore, it belongs to the sphere of the Ego and can be qualified as *Ego-like*.\(^{373}\) This notion of *animation* which comes out in the description of *I as a Human* is crucial for further phenomenological descriptions. Indeed, it is a first step in the distinction between the *Körper* [body] and the *Leib* [Body] which is necessary to understand the situation I am working on.\(^{374}\)

A closer look at the Husserlian description shows how Husserl considers that whatever is *animated* belongs to the psychical and is *apprehended as mine*. Here, the notion of belonging is the ground that allows the investigation of the notion of *Leib* as a *living*, i.e., *animated* body. Husserl describes it as follows:

> It is the special quality of the animation which accounts for the fact that what is Bodily and ultimately *everything* Bodily from no matter what point of view can assume psychic significance, therefore even where at the outset it is not phenomenally the bearer of a soul.\(^{375}\)

This quote emphasizes how it is characteristic of what Husserl calls *Body* to be animated. Here, *I as a human* and the psychical ego are one and the same.

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\(^{373}\) Husserl writes: “The Body is not only in general a thing but is indeed expression of the spirit and *is at once organ of the spirit*. [...] everything properly ‘subjective’ and Ego-like lies on the side of the spirit (this side comes to expression in the Body), whereas the Body is called ‘Ego-like’ only in virtue of this animation, and its states and qualities are only thereby called ‘my’ qualities, subjective, of the Ego” (*Ideas* 2, §21, p. 102).

\(^{374}\) I perform a detailed analysis of the phenomenological body in Chapter 4.

\(^{375}\) *Ideas* 2, §21, p. 102.
This psychical ego in which the Body is apprehended as belonging to the Ego is the ground from which the musician experiences acts of consciousness. In other words, it is from this situation of having a Body belonging to me, animated by the spirit, that I can perceive what I am playing with my cello, and phantasize the inner song.

§5. The pure ego.

I am in the musician’s attitude. I hear the inner song. I feel the cello. I am the one hearing the inner song. I am also the one playing the cello. I can apprehend myself in two ways: as the I performing, or as the I having a body which makes it able to perform actions.

The first layer that I just described, the psychical ego, is the ego corresponding to the first reduction, the psychological reduction. The second layer that I am analyzing now corresponds to the second reduction which uncovers the sphere of the pure ego with its ego-life. In the first layer the Body is given as animated by the spirit; in the second layer, the problem of the Body is more complex. Indeed, Husserl decides to abstract from the Body. He writes:

What we find then is ourselves as the spiritual Ego related to the stream of lived experiences – ‘spiritual’ here is used in a mere general sense, referring to the Ego that has its place precisely not in Corporeality; e.g., I ‘think’ (cogito), i.e., I perceive, I represent in whatever mode, I judge, I feel, I will, etc., and I find myself thereby as that which is one and the same in the changing of these lived experiences, as ‘subject’ of the acts and states.376

376 Ideas 2, §22, p. 103.
As it appears from this quote, the pure ego is an ego with no Body in the sense in which the Body relates to the ego in other strata. Indeed, Husserl says that it “has its place precisely not in Corporeality.” This indicates that it does not have a Body [Leiblichkeit] in the sense in which the psychical ego has one, but it is only the unitary subject of various possibilities, among which are the bodily possibilities of feeling and moving. As opposed to the psychical ego that still has a Body apprehended as mine, this pure ego is not apprehending itself as a unity of body and soul. It experiences itself as a pole of identity, as a unitary pole of various actions including perception but also any type of other representation like that of phantasy.

This pure ego is an intentional ego, i.e., a consciousness oriented toward an object. Husserl explains how this intentional character of the ego appears in the correlation between an ego directed toward an object (i.e., an ego perceiving, phantasizing, judging and the like) and an object attracting the ego in a particular direction (i.e., an object perceived, phantasized, judged, etc.) Here, the activity of the ego is characterized by the mode in which a particular intentional act radiates toward the object: each specific radiation is a specific act of consciousness. There are therefore acts of perception, acts of phantasy, acts of remembering, etc.

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378 Husserl writes: “As what is absolutely given, or what can be brought to givenness in the a priori possible view of fixating reflection, it is by no means whatsoever something mysterious or mystical. I take myself as the pure Ego insofar as I take myself purely as that which, in perception, is directed to the perceived, in knowing to the known, in phantasizing to the phantasized, in logical thinking to the thought, in valuing to the valued, in willing to the willed” (Ideas 2, §22, pp. 103-4).

379 Husserl continues: “In the accomplishment of each act there lies a ray of directedness I cannot describe otherwise than by saying it takes its point of departure in the ‘Ego,’ which evidently thereby remains undivided and numerically identical while it lives in these manifold acts, spontaneously takes an active part in them, and by means of ever new rays goes through these acts toward what is objective in their
This bodiless intentional pure ego is given to itself as free. Indeed, it apprehends itself as the free decider of the possibilities it accomplishes. In other words, without this I, the practical action cannot happen. Husserl explains how:

in activity, I am ‘into’ the thing in a practical way; in the ‘fiat’ I am first of all engaged in setting the scene; the action which now unfolds is constituted as having happened according to my will, as happening through my agency as a freely willing being; I am constantly there as bringing about the strived for, as aiming in will. And every phase of the aiming itself is such that in it the pure willing subject ‘attains’ the willed as such.

As Husserl shows here, the radiations of the ego seizing upon the objects are free in the sense that the ego accomplishes them from its own agency, and not motivated by something else. This freedom involves two poles: a consciousness which engages with the object through a fiat on the one hand, and an object that attracts this consciousness on the other hand.

Here, intentionality does not presuppose a correlation between act and object as a correlation between an active act and a passive object. Indeed, the act can radiate

\[380\] I am stressing the I because I am speaking here about the practical possibility of the ego. However, I am aware that music practice engages the musician with other musicians, starting from the chain of teachers who passed on the knowledge, or the co-performers. As I said in the introduction of this work, and as I will develop a little more in the conclusion, I set aside the problem of intersubjectivity in order to better study it, for itself, in a future work.

\[381\] Ideas 2, §22, pp. 104-5.

\[382\] Again, I will come back to this fiat in the chapter 4 and 5.

\[383\] Husserl writes: “The pure Ego not only lives in singular acts as accomplishing, as active, and as passive. Free and yet attracted by the Object, it goes forth from act to act, and it experiences excitations from the
actively as well as passively while the object can be passively apprehended or actively attract the act through *excitation* [*Erregung*]. The freedom of the pure ego is therefore not related to the activity of an ego apprehending a passive object. Instead, it lies in the interplay of passivity and activity between the two poles of the correlation: the ego radiates toward the object and the object attracts the ego because of its specific qualities (for instance, with the inner song, if it is pleasant to hear, etc.).

The Ego is the point from which the acts are originated. However, it needs to be distinguished from its acts, even if only abstractly. The *pure ego* as identity pole is both interwoven with its acts and distinct from them to the point that it could even be *without any act*. This paradoxical connection is necessary because if the cogito was enmeshed with its acts, it could not be the identity pole of several acts, but conversely, if it was totally distinct from them, they could not belong to it as its *life*. On account of this paradox, Husserl elaborates this *abstract distinction* between the *cogito* on the one hand, and the *acts of the cogito* on the other hand.

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Object constituted in the ‘background;’ without immediately giving in to them, it allows them to intensify, to knock at the door of consciousness; and then it surrenders, perhaps even ‘completely,’ turning from the one Object to the other. In doing so, in the change of its acts, it accomplishes particular turns and freely builds up for itself these or those many-layered act-unities” (*Ideas 2*, §22, p. 105).

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384 This is related to the notion of affectivity. I come back to the problem much in more depth in the last two chapters.

385 Husserl says: “On the one hand, we must definitely distinguish the pure Ego from the acts themselves, as that which functions in them and which, through them, relates to Objects; on the other hand, this distinction can only be an abstract one. It is abstract to the extent that the Ego cannot be thought of as something separated from these lived experiences, from its ‘life’, just as, conversely, the lived experiences are not thinkable except as the medium of the life of the Ego. In this connection it is important to notice that the pure Ego is not only an accomplishing one, such as we up to now have considered it exclusively: that is, in acts in the specific sense, those of the form, ‘cogito’” (*Ideas 2*, §22, p. 105).
At this point arises the notion of life and life of the ego as what characterizes the sphere of this layer of the ego as such. These two notions of life and life of the ego go along with the notions of actuality and inactuality. Husserl explains how the ego is more than an ego radiating in various ways through acts. The ego has the capacity to withdraw from the act, in other words, not to be attentive, and therefore, to go from actuality into inactuality.\footnote{Husserl writes: “Just as the cogito of the moment sinks down into inactuality, in a certain sense the pure Ego also sinks down into inactuality. It withdraws from the act in question, it is no longer in this act as an accomplishing Ego, and perhaps it is not carrying out any act at all. But in that case it is not something separate from all lived experience, as if now the consciousness that is not accomplishing any act and the pure Ego would be without any connection between themselves” (Ideas 2, §22, p. 105-6).}

Husserl explains this distinction between the two terms as “a distinction in the essential structure of intentional lived experiences and consequently at once to a distinction, inseparable from them, in the ‘how,’ in the manner in which the Ego has lived experiences.” \footnote{Ideas 2, §22, p. 106.} In other words, actuality and inactuality correspond to two modes of being of the ego with its acts. It is possible to understand that by reminding how, as a pole of identity, the ego can never disappear, thus, it either engages with the act (actuality), or withdraws from it, thus becoming latent\footnote{As Husserl says: “if it is, so to say, a latent Ego, then it does not cast an active regard onto something; it does not actively experience or have an effect on, or undergo, anything” (Ideas 2, §22, p. 106).} (inactuality). The state of latency of the ego which Husserl characterizes as an unconscious,\footnote{The notion of unconscious could be a very interesting one in developing the research on the inner song.} is essential to the

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structure of the pure ego as a pole of identity. Indeed, Husserl specifies that it “is not a
nothing or the empty potentiality of the alteration of the phenomena into ones of Ego-
actuality but instead is a moment of their structure.”

When it comes to the specific case of the inner song, the pure ego is perceiving
the perceived actual song, phantasizing the phantasized inner song, and apprehending
itself moving and issuing a melody realizing that inner song through the musical
instrument. As the musician practices, the inner song is realized through the movements
of the body manipulating the instrument, and the melody is perceived through the ears. It
is the same ego which performs these various acts, in this sense, the acts are related.
However, the acts are also distinct in the sense that they are acts of perception, or acts of
phantasy, etc. Here, perception is involved in various ways: immanent internal
perceptions give the actual song and the inner song phenomenologically, while
transcendent external perceptions apprehend the performance as mine as an object of the
objective world.

As I mentioned earlier, Husserl abstracted the body to describe the pure ego.
However, the body is part of the constitution of the objects in the phenomenological

objective self-consciousness, that is to say, an impressional self-affection of one's own conscious life
which, according to Husserl, is combined with a “unique,” and likewise impressional, form of
intentionality (Bernet 1994, pp. 321ff). If one calls this self-affection of subjective life “drive” or
“instinctual drive” (Trieb) then this inner time-consciousness clearly merits the name which Husserl
actually uses: “drive-intentionality” or “intentionality of instinctual drive” (Triebintentionalität). As an
inner experience of intentional life this is both instinctual drive and representation (Repräsentation) of
drive in one” (Idem, p. 335).

In an extension of this work, I would like to show how the constitution of the phantasy object in
the reproductive consciousness involves the unconscious, thanks to a careful analysis of the instinctual
drive in play in this constitution. I would like to work on this problem using Bernet’s paper on
“Unconsciouss consciousness in Husserl and Freud” as well as his book Force, Pulsion, Désir.

390 Ideas 2, §22, p. 106.
consciousness because the constitution of these objects (and more specifically the constitution of the musical instrument and the realization of the inner song in the actual song) presupposes moving and feeling. These movements and sensations of the performing body fully participate in the constitution of the phantasy object as a model [Vorbild] while the inner song is realized through the sensations and movements of that same body as an image [Abbild]. Here, it is because of the central position of the body that the actual song is given to the musician as his or her own performance, a performance that realizes his or her inner song, because of the movements that he or she performs with the instrument. This presupposes a new understanding of the embodied ego, with a specific type of corporeality. If the pure ego is without Leiblichkeit in the sense in which the natural ego has one, then this means that it somehow has another type of relationship with the body.

§6. The ego phantasizing the inner song.

I am practicing Brahms. I phantasize how I would like the performance to sound. I phantasize the moves with my cello, the corresponding feeling I would have, and the type of melody that should emerge. I can feel the moves on my cello, along with the sounds that they produce, and as the inner melody is played, it unfolds as a meaningful

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391 I analyze this in Chapter 4.

392 I demonstrate this in the last chapter.

393 In the final two chapters of the present dissertation, I work on the articulation between Wahrnehmungsleib and Phantasieleib in the constitution process of the actual song in the impressional consciousness, and the inner song in the reproductive consciousness.
musical phrase, constituted of smaller unities, characterized themselves by their proper rhythm, intensity, etc.

The ego involved in music practice requires an additional consideration in comparison to the ego described by Husserl. It is not only an ego practicing music and therefore being anchored in its naturality, but also an ego oriented toward the phenomenological region of consciousness, radiating toward the actual song and the inner song, namely, an ego phantasizing a possible perception, or, said differently, an ego perceiving in phantasy.

In Text no. 6 of Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory Husserl writes:

The difference between perception and fiction does not consist in the fact that in both cases we have the same sensation and the same apprehensional sense, though in such a way that the apprehension of the same sensation would at one time be impressional apprehension and at another time modified apprehension in the sense of phantasy. Of course, one might well say: In the case of fiction, I have only a phantasy; the object is only a phantasy object. And this is explained by the fact that I do indeed have sensation as a foundation but that I apprehend it, in the manner of phantasy, not as something present but as something present as it were.

In other words, the ego has actual sensations in the case of perception, but these sensations are given in the mode of the as if [als ob] in the case of phantasy. Thus, if I

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394 Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory, Text no. 6, p. 297.

395 The as if, the mode of fiction, is a central theme in aesthetics, starting from Kant. Cf. Vaihinger, Die Philosophie des Als Ob. I will not analyze the historical evolution of this concept further here; I just want to mention and use it as Husserl does.
have the actual sensation of touching the cello as present in perception, I only have the
sensation of the musical instrument as if it were present in phantasy.\footnote{Husserl comes back to that mode of the quasi in \textit{Experience and Judgement}, §39-40.}

In perception, the object of phantasy \textit{stands there} as Husserl says.\footnote{Husserl writes: “For the object in fact stands there as present, as there itself and as actually there, just as much as it does in perception. The appearance is an appearance of the present, a perceptual appearance, precisely as it is in normal perception” (\textit{Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory}, Text no. 6, p. 297).} In perception as well as in phantasy, I then have the sensation of the whole instrument with its various characteristics, its specific sound, etc. However, it is only in perception that the sensations are harmoniously given\footnote{I describe this in the last two chapters.} in a system of sensations.\footnote{Husserl explains: “In both cases, therefore, the appearance is an impression. In one case, however, the apprehension intention is unimpeded, existing harmoniously in the system of intentions relating to one another, and so the impression has the characteristic of harmony” (\textit{Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory}, Text no. 6, p. 297).} In the case of the phantasy of the inner song, the following quote from Husserl applies: “apprehension intentions are checked, annulled, and in this sense modified, and consequently we have the characteristic of a figment or the characteristic of conflict between two apprehensional possibilities.”\footnote{Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory, Text no. 6, p. 297.} the actual cello or the inner cello. This does not mean that the phantasy nullifies by converting a belief into a disbelief; in this sense, the inner cello is not an actual cello potentially not existing. The phantasy is still an \textit{impression},\footnote{Husserl writes: “Hence, these modifications that convert belief (that is to say, the characteristics of harmony) into disbelief, doubt, are \textit{fundamentally different} from the modifications by means of which impression is converted into reproduction. The first of these modifications all occur within impression: normal impression, illusionary image consciousness as fiction, vacillating perceptual consciousness are all \textit{impressions}” (\textit{Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory}, Text no. 6, pp. 297-8).} there is still a belief in the case of the phantasy, but a modified belief, not a belief in the existence of the
phantasied object.\textsuperscript{402} It is also not the case that the same sensuous content would in one case undergo an impressional apprehension and in the other a reproductively modified apprehension because there is no sensuous content in phantasy in the same sense as in perception.\textsuperscript{403} Indeed, questioning the notion of \textit{schema of apprehension}\textsuperscript{404} by pointing

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\textsuperscript{402} Husserl pursues: “Obviously one cannot get by with saying: A phantasy appearance serves as the basis here, only in one instance a moment of belief is present while in the other it is not. Just as little as one could describe, say, the illusionary consciousness of a figment in contrast to perception by saying that the belief is absent in the former and present in the latter” (\textit{Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory}, Text no. 6, p. 298).
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\textsuperscript{403} As Husserl explains: “It will not do to say the following either: In one instance the phantasms undergo an impressional apprehension, and in the other a reproductively modified apprehension. (And likewise in the other case: In one instance the sensation undergo an impressional apprehension, in the other a modified apprehension)” (\textit{Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory}, Text no. 6, p. 298).
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\textsuperscript{404} Up to this point of Husserl’s elaboration on the structures of consciousness, the phenomenological consciousness had been described as an intentional consciousness. This means that consciousness apprehends sensuous data in an objective way, thus constituting the object. This implies the notion of the \textit{schema of apprehension}, a notion that evolves a lot as Husserl’s work goes on. At first, Husserl elaborates on that notion in the \textit{Logical Investigations} V, VI but also, in \textit{Logical Investigation} I §23 (Cf. Schnell, \textit{Temps et phénomène}, p. 22). In these early works, the notion of the \textit{schema of apprehension} is linked with the notion of temporality and that primarily because, as I mentioned earlier, the \textit{content of apprehension} is temporal. In other words, Husserl elaborates on the \textit{schema} primarily to understand the problem of the perception of a transcendent object and its givenness in consciousness. As a consequence, the temporality of the schema is related to the temporality of the content of apprehension of the object apprehended. This is important to understand the constitution of the perceptual object, and therefore, the constitution of the \textit{actual song}. However, as I underlined in the preceding chapter, the actual song does not have a temporal content, it is also temporally constituted, thus, it is necessary to go beyond this first account.

The later account in the first text of \textit{Phantasy, Image Consciousness and Memory} goes further (cf. Text 1. In \textit{Phantasy, Image-Consciousness and Memory}, p. 1-113). In this work, Husserl comes back to the question of the temporality of the schema of apprehension from a different angle, clarifying and criticizing his previous account. Indeed, in addition to the temporality of the content of apprehension, Husserl proposes two other perspectives: (1) the temporality of the perception, and (2) the temporality of apprehension (cf. Schnell, \textit{Temps et phénomène}, p. 26). In this new account, Husserl makes the hypothesis of a second type of temporality of the schema, not related to the perception of a transcendent object, but immanent to consciousness. This renewed understanding of the schema in Text no.1, mentions two types of perceptions: (1) inner and outer perceptions—immanent constituted entities\textsuperscript{404} — and (2) adequate and inadequate perceptions—constitutive phenomena of these entities. Husserl explains how the schema only applies to the second type of perception. In other words, it never applies to \textit{already constituted objects}. For this reason, it does not apply only to objects of transcendent perception, but also to immanent tempo-objects (Cf. Schnell, \textit{Temps et phénomène}, p. 27). Thus, it applies to objects like the actual and the inner song.

A closer analysis of the schema shows that there are various \textit{types of apprehension} (perception, phantasy, and the like) which could apprehend various \textit{contents of apprehension} (contents of perception, contents of imagination, and the like). However, Husserl establishes that not just any type of apprehension can apprehend just any type of content of apprehension. For him indeed, there is a \textit{functional dependence} between apprehension and contents of apprehension (Cf. Schnell, \textit{Temps et phénomène}, p. 27). Thus, a

out the difficulty in separating the apprehension and the content of apprehension so clearly, Husserl asks: “Can one somehow separate sensuous material and apprehension in such a way that each could be modified independently in the manner peculiar to phantasy?”

In order to analyze that problem further, Husserl compares phantasy and memory through an example. He writes:

For example, memory of a soaring bird and phantasy of ‘the same’ = a bird the same in content within phantasy surroundings the same in content. In both cases, we have the same appearances (the unity of the same appearance, including the background), and yet not full equality such that we could say that in one instance the moment of belief is added and in the other instance it is absent or is modified in the manner peculiar to phantasy. For if in one case memory presents itself by virtue of which the event is taken as past, then obviously we must distinguish in the memory: 1) the event running its course as it were, which appears there in the manner of phantasy; and 2) that which makes it into a ‘representant,’ into a recollective re-presentation of a just past event.

perceptive apprehension cannot apprehend an imaginative content. Rather, the perceptual imagination apprehends perceptual content, and the imaginative apprehension apprehends content of imagination. Then, Husserl also demonstrates that it is also necessary to take into consideration the attitude [Einstellung] in which the object is apprehended in order to fully appreciate the problem of the schema (Cf. Schnell, Temps et phénomène, p. 31-2). As a consequence, there are now three parameters in play with the schema: (1) the apprehension, (2) the content of apprehension, and (3) the attitude; the distinction between perception and imagination is to be understood with these three notions.

My analysis of the inner song starts with the earlier Husserl but moves progressively to the later Husserlian understanding of consciousness. It therefore tends to use the vocabulary and the framework related to the schema of apprehension in the first two chapters, but it clearly moves to an explanation which has got rid of the schema from the present chapter by the end of the dissertation.

405 Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory, Text no. 6, p. 299.

406 Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory, Text no. 6, p. 299.
In other words, in the case of memory, a split consciousness [Ichspaltung]\(^{407}\) between two activities: the consciousness presenting the object as past, and the consciousness representing the object now as a past event. For instance, my consciousness can be split into presenting the actual melody of that *Allemande* that I just played with my cello as past, and re-presenting, now, this *Allemande*, as having been already perceived.

Here, Husserl identifies challenges in the schema-apprehension model. He notices, “the semblance, the figment, ‘is not taken to be something self-sufficient.’ We represent something else in it, we look at something else representatively; that is to say, a new intention is there that has the character of a ‘representing intention.’”\(^{408}\) In other words, there is a split consciousness with memory, both presenting the object, and representing it, i.e., the object represented is not self-sufficient, it depends on the former presentation. Husserl notices that: “So too what appears in phantasy, the event referred to above that is running off as it were, is a representant of a past event. That is to say, a founded consciousness is there; specifically, an impressional intention that refers to a nexus of intentions through which the relation to the actual now is brought about.”\(^{409}\) I can use Husserl’s observations to argue that, in the specific case I am studying, the phantasy presents a split consciousness between a presentation and a re-presentation. As I phantasize the inner song, I re-present in phantasy how the song would be *presented* in perception if I played it.

\(^{407}\) This notion belongs to Hua VIII p.114 but also Hua VII p. 262. It is mentioned in Stéphane Finetti, “La transformation de la conception husserlienne de la représentation-de-phantasia à la lumière de la méthode réductive.”

\(^{408}\) *Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory*, Text no. 6, p. 299.

\(^{409}\) *Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory*, Text no. 6, pp. 299-300.
In this description, Husserl notices a distinction between memory and phantasy. He says that:

The ‘belief’ is not belief in what appears in phantasy; it is rather the consciousness of harmony belonging to the representing apprehension. The apprehension is unchecked intention. Specifically, impressional intention. But as far as pure phantasy is concerned, which forms the basis here, the consciousness is a modification ‘phantasms in such and such an apprehension.’

That is to say, in the pure phantasy I don’t really re-present the perception in phantasy, but more the neutralized harmony of the system of sensations constituting this perception. Thus, when I phantasize the moves on the cello in a pure phantasy, I am not re-producing the actual sensations of that cello, but more the neutralized harmonious system of localized sensations acquired in the perception of the musical instrument. Thus, as Husserl says, “The whole appearance is something modified (something reproductive, something derived), and so are its intentions.”

Despite this distinction, there is still a link between the apprehension in phantasy and the sensuous. As Husserl says: “a sensation (any impression) immediately allows only impressional apprehension, just as a phantasm immediately allows only phantasy apprehension.” It is the notion of re-presentation which makes this distinction possible.

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410 Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory, Text no. 6, p. 300.

411 I describe the apprehension of the instrument and the melody in the last chapter: “Process of Constitution of the Inner Song through Music Practice”

412 Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory, Text no. 6, p. 300.

413 Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory, Text no. 6, p. 300.
Husserl says: “mediately, in the form of representation, in symbolically intuitive apprehension and symbolically empty apprehension (analogizing internally and designating externally), it can be otherwise. Unmodified and modified intentions can fit here.” In other words, sensations and phantasms are now distinct because one gives the object as a presentation of perception while the other gives the object in a re-production of a possible presentation.

The distinction between the two happens through a conflict [Widerstreit] of representation. Indeed, the melody of the phantasy conflicts with the melody given in perception. For instance, although both are the melody of the same Brahms Sonata, the melody of the inner song conflicts with the melody of my performance because the melody of the inner song can in no way be given in the objective time and space of the actual melody. Husserl questions whether the phantasy object should in this case be considered a nullity. He says: “Annulment of positing, of the whole positing not only as a whole but with respect to all its parts, would yield the appearance of an object that would include nothing whatsoever of positing: pure presentation (pure nothing, pure figment).”

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414 Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory, Text no. 6, p. 300.

415 Husserl writes: “Impressional phenomenal belief – taken concretely, perception – can be annulled by conflict, and in different ways, of course. In the case of the mannequin/human being, we have continuous component parts of the appearance that are not annulled (clothes, hair, and the like, and above all: an actual physical thing, a physical body). We then have a) a deceptive object proper. Perhaps vacillation over whether the object is this thing or that (supposing that no decision occurs making one of the members, one of the possibilities, appear as a deception). b) In other cases, conflict obtains throughout; namely, in such a way that no concrete part of the appearance remains accepted, not even an intentional core of appearance: No physical body whatsoever is there; there is nothing. In spite of the nullified intention, the appearance nevertheless continues to exist. The belief, the intention belonging to actual experience, is annulled, but the appearance is preserved. Now, indeed, we do have precisely a deceptive object. A nullity” (Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory, Text no. 6, p. 301).

416 As I explained further, the inner song is given in a quasi-temporality, and a quasi-world.
This means that, in this case, the phantasy object would be a pure nothing even if I can hear the melody of the inner song as soft or deep, or feel the moves on the inner instrument pretty accurately.

Answering this problem, Husserl says:

According to the interpretation, memories are supposed to conflict with memories. In the previous case, elementary intentions belonging to actual experience conflicted with one another within the sphere of perception and were alternately annulled (which, of course, is far from being a serious description). In the present case, we would have phantasy modifications (‘memories’) and here too the conflict of memorial intentions, and, in the case of pure memory, complete annulment: It is nothing, pure imagination. (Or, on the other hand, what is remembered did exist, but not as it appears here; this and that in the appearance is pure ‘phantasy.’) – The interpretation therefore actually seems to work. We would only have to add that memory here would not first of all have to signify consciousness of the past but instead, so to speak, reproductive consciousness of being, whatever more precise developments it may then permit.\textsuperscript{418}

In other words, Husserl deduces something crucial here: phantasy does not reproduce an actual apprehension but a being. This means that, when the musician phantasizes the inner song, he or she reproduces the consciousness of the being of a possible performance. As opposed to memory, the object given in phantasy is therefore not an actual performance given through a primal perception which flows into the past and is

\textsuperscript{417} Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory, Text no. 6, p. 301.

\textsuperscript{418} Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory, Text no. 6, p. 302.
recalled. When the musician phantasizes the inner song, there is no previous impression. Instead, the phantasy re-produces the being of a possible impression either past or future.419

This leads Husserl to write: Accordingly, we would have:

1) perception, semblance consciousness, partial and total semblance consciousness, pure perceptual fiction;
2) memory = reproduction; partial semblance-memory and total semblance memory, the latter pure memorial fiction, ‘mere phantasy.’

Thus it is in the case of harmonious acts of perception and memory; that is, I disregard cases of vacillation and ‘doubt’.

Accordingly, ‘phantasy’ would not be an original and primitive modification.

Memory would be something simple, and phantasy would obviously not be something simpler. Phantasy would be the mode of ‘nullified’ memory.420

Perception, memory, and phantasy are distinct. The first two are related to a primal impression, the last one is not. In phantasy, consciousness is split between the ego phantasizing the reproduction of the being of the perception, and the consciousness perceiving in phantasy, in the specific case that I am studying, split between the ego phantasizing the inner song, and the ego perceiving the performance in the phantasy in the mode of the as if. In the specific case of the inner song, and as I mentioned earlier, the musician can focus on the actual song or the inner song, but also play while phantasizing. In this latter case, I say that the attention straddles between the perception and the

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419 I will explain this in the last chapter.

420 Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory, Text no. 6, pp. 302-3.
phantasy, the distinction between the two phenomena becoming more blurred and
difficult to establish. This is an example of what Husserl disregards in the quotes that I
just mentioned but should be taken into consideration for a more accurate description of
the inner song.

Finally, in both the constitution of the actual song in the impressional
consciousness and the constitution of the inner song in the reproductive consciousness,
the consciousness of the musician is characterized by the fact that it is a unifying
consciousness.\(^{421}\) In other words, it constantly constitutes a whole with parts. For
instance, as I am performing the beginning of Brahms’s Sonata, the sounds unfold in
specific intervals with their own color, the first theme develops, progressively the whole
movement, both in the impressional and the reproductive consciousness, simultaneously,
and yet not in a cacophonous way, each one in its proper field of givenness, as a distinct
unity of meaning. It is only thanks to this unifying process that sounds become music.\(^{422}\)

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\(^{421}\) I take this expression from Patrick Lang who writes: “La conscience musicale est une conscience
unificatrice, ou intégratrice; s’il y a relation musicale, la dualité des sons se succédant ne demeure pas ce
qu’elle était: elle s’intègre dans une unité nouvelle, qui (pour reprendre un topos classique de la
psychologie de la forme) est plus et autre chose que la somme de ses parties. Par anticipation, indiquons
dès à présent que cette fonction intégrante de la conscience musicale s’exerce à tous les niveaux; les sons
 simultanés sont intégrés en accords, les sons successifs en intervalles, en phrases, en périodes, en
 thèmes, etc., les accords s’intègrent dans l’enchaînement de fonctions harmoniques, par exemple dans
 une cadence, etc.; de manière générale, la pluralité est résorbée en unités supérieures, jusqu’à l’unité
 même d’un mouvement (au sens de Satz et non de Bewegung) musical” (“Introduction à la
 phénoménologie du vécu musical” p. 7).

\(^{422}\) Patrick Lang explains: “La relation musicale est donc caractérisée par deux directions complémentaires,
que nous pouvons appeler la discursivité et la récursivité. La discursivité correspond à la succession
physique des phénomènes; mais celle-ci n’est pas seule en jeu; elle est complétée par une rétro-relation
de l’ultérieur à l’antérieur. Si l’on en restait à la seule discursivité, les sons se succéderaient, certes, mais
daucune relation musicale ne pourrait jamais s’instaurer; chaque phénomène serait perçu en soi, dans une
juxtaposition, dans un ‘l’un-après-l’autre’ stérile. Il faudrait que le vécu d’un premier son puisse être
neutralisé et comme supprimé; or ce vécu subsiste d’une certaine façon, car il a activé les relations spatio-
temporelles de l’affectivité de l’auditeur, ou – pour le dire en termes plus conventionnels, quoique moins
rigoureux – il a laissé une trace dans la sensibilité” (“Introduction à la phénoménologie du vécu musical”
p. 6).
§7. The trained consciousness of the musician.

It is the end of my practice session. I want to relax and play something as it comes to me. I phantasize this beautiful standard, Violet for your Furs (Billie Holiday’s version) trying to improvise with the recording. I always practice in the same way: I first learn the theme, then I phantasize secondary voices. Grasping the theme is difficult because Billie Holiday’s voice is not stable, and I can hardly grasp the pitch. I turn to Frank Sinatra’s version which is much clearer. Once I have the theme in my fingers, I go back to Billie Holiday’s version which I like better. I phantasize the bass. I sing some parts of it with my voice. I struggle because I don’t know enough combinations of moves to play something interesting. I pause the recording, try some combinations on the cello, and restart. I play again. Now I stop with the cello and I just sing with the recording.

Sometimes trying out with cello helps me to improvise, other times it is my voice.

423 There is an important possible extension of the description of the inner song that I want to mention here: the work around the notion of voice. I do it partially at the end of Chapter 4, but it could be done in a much deeper way. In fact, I could work on the interaction between the notions of voice and the notion of inner song in many different ways: working on the voice of the inner song (that’s what I attempt to do at the end of Chapter 4), on the voiced inner song, but also on the inner song of the singer, or even the problem of the instrumental voice.

Each of these extensions would bring distinct issues. In the first case, the problem of dialogue with myself, but also on the inner voice versus the outer voice for instance. In the second case, the problem of the definition of the untrained voice (cf. Chapter 4) versus the trained voice or the voice as a musical instrument, for instance. In the third case, some problematic issues already mentioned but also potentially the problem of language. Finally, I would explore the last problem by investigating whether objects can have a voice, whether the musical instrument responds to me, whether the playing of the instrument is a dialogue.

In such a description, I would need to work closely with the current philosophical books addressing the notion of voice. This would include: Evans, The Multivoiced Body; Ihde, Listening and voice; Cavarero, A più Voci, Filosofia dell’Espressione Vocale.; Pettman, Sonic Intimacy; and Leconte, “L’entrexpression charnelle.” I would also work with the notion of gap [écart] in Richirian phenomenology, more particular as he develops it in his conversation with Sacha Carlson in L’Ecart et le Rien. Finally, I would try to critically analyze Richir’s description of the voice, the ear, and other organs related with vocality in “La vision et son imaginaire,” pp. 96-99.
To conclude the investigation of the ego constituting the inner song, I want to investigate how the consciousness that I have been describing (capable of playing a musical instrument, perceiving what he or she plays, and phantasizing an inner song grounded in tactuality) is a musically trained consciousness. In the specific case that I am studying which is the situation of a musician practicing, the consciousness performing the acts is a consciousness trained in music practice. This means that the musician has introjected both sonorous and tactual combinations through the co-constitution of the musical instrument with the melody,\(^\text{424}\) and is able to reproduce these combined elements and rearrange them in phantasy.\(^\text{425}\) This complex capacity comes only through progressive training,\(^\text{426}\) namely with learning possible associations of moves and sounds. This goes along with the constitution of habits, or even the constitution of automatisms, as well as with a process of sedimentation of sensations.\(^\text{427}\)

There are various aspects involved in the training of a musician (technical, emotional, or interpretative when it comes to the reading of a score and it is necessary to understand the context of its composition, etc.) Generally, training improves at least two abilities:\(^\text{428}\) first, the technical capability to manipulate the instrument through complex

\(^{424}\) This is the object of Chapter 5.

\(^{425}\) François Moysan describes that introjection in depth in the interview (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-francois-moysan-pianiste/).

\(^{426}\) As I explain in the conclusion, I don’t address the problem of the history of the ego in my present description because it would require working on a whole new set of notions, and on Husserl’s later phenomenology. However, I will mention that aspect when it is necessary. I thank Florian Forestier who pointed out this problem to me during a phone conversation.

\(^{427}\) I address that in the last two chapters.

\(^{428}\) This was discussed in the interview with István Fazakas: http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-istvan-fazakas-chercheur-en-philosophie-phenomenologie/.
movements (this is related to the problem of the Body as I can)\textsuperscript{429} and second the
emotional capability to disclose emotions through the music.

It is a temporal process. As it improves, the musician comes closer to their
instrument and is more able to express the inner song better, while the inner song
becomes closer to the reality of the performance and is charged with a stronger
kinaesthetic dimension in phantasy. The more extensive the training, the better the
musician can phantasize an inner song not only as a sonorous object, but as a sonorous
object produced through certain actions;\textsuperscript{430} in other words, not only a melody but also the
action necessary to realize that melody.\textsuperscript{431}

\textsuperscript{429} I work on this in Chapter 5 §4.

\textsuperscript{430} I address this question in the last chapter.

\textsuperscript{431} This is where an extension on the study of the inner song into the field of dance would be interesting.
Dance makes even clearer how the phantasy is bound to the movement, and therefore how the
movement both sets boundaries and enlarges the possibilities of the phantasy.
Figure 1. Some scales for cello students with various bowing exercises.\textsuperscript{432}

Figure 2. Classical study for cello solo to train the left hand in the upper part of the instrument.\textsuperscript{433}

\textbf{No. 39}

\textsuperscript{432} Rüdinger, \textit{Technische Studien für Violoncell}, p. 7.

\textsuperscript{433} Popper, \textit{Hight School of Cello Playing}, p. 83.
The technical training of the musician is based on the capability of the remembering Body. The musician can phantasize a certain inner song because his or her Body knows, and the Body knows because it has learned and remembered various moves and combinations. For instance, during previous sessions of practicing the cello, I spent a good amount of time training my Body and my ears by practicing scales and studies for learning how to combine unities in various ways by the repetition of specific movements. As I was doing that, I experienced kinaesthetic sensations of various kinds, as well as my capacity to play the instrument. These experiences flowed into the past as data of impressions. As they are still retained in the inner time consciousness (part of the flow of consciousness) they constitute the sedimented knowledge that the musician can bring back, and reproduce in phantasy, thus creating new inner songs.

In the specific case of the inner song, memory is not only a sonorous memory, I am not only memorizing sounds, but moreover memorizing sounds coinciding with moves. Thus, the memory is a sonorous memory founded in tactuality. This memory is localized and tangible. For instance, for me as a cellist, it is this specific part of my

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434 As Lanei Rodemeyer observes, Husserl tends to focus more on the visual and therefore often restricts the descriptions to one paradigm. In the case of remembering, she highlights how the Body is also at play in this activity. Cf. Rodemeyer, “The Body in Time/Time in the Body.”.

435 The saxophonist Camille Poupat speaks about that explaining how he learns new combination, thus integrating them into his own dictionary, thus enriching his vocabulary (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-camille-poupat-saxophoniste/).

436 This is the object of Chapter 5.

437 Again, I develop this in more detail in Chapter 5.

438 As Lanei Rodemeyer observes: “With touch we do not seem to have the same ‘panoramic’ type of experience as we find with vision. Instead, our sensory experience is much more localized, much more tangibly immediate. Touch requires a closeness that may not give a whole object at once, and so it seems more natural to claim that we touch an object from moment to moment, based on what is under our fingertips, rather than to claim that there is a wholeness to touch as well. However, while we may find it easier to assert that we see whole objects than to say the same about touch, the sensation of touch is no
finger which participates in the production of this sound, it is this fingertip and therefore the memory of this succession of movements which allows me to play this combination, etc. Remembering is involved during the continuous process of uncovering the possibilities of perception of the object. For instance, as I play the instrument, there is a continuous synthesis of time of the present with the just-past and with the just-coming. Then, as I keep practicing my instrument, this training through scales, studies, and other practices affects my Body and changes it.

This sedimentation of the movement continues long after the actual practice session. The musician keeps learning even when he or she is not actually practicing, and

Lanei Rodemeyer writes in her paper: “Each tactile experience is contextualized through those that are just-past and those just-coming, giving me, overall, the experience of the whole object. [...] even the most rudimentary tactile sensations are experienced within the context of some type of objectivity, whether we know what that object is in advance, or we are touching something in order to figure out what it is, or something (or someone) is touching us. It is always something that is being touched or touching us. In this way, retention is part of the phenomenological structure of touch, since touch is a perceiving of whole objects rather than sensory data, and retention is necessary for that perception of objects as wholes. [...] while I am retaining the momentary tactile perceptions of these objects, synthesizing them as belonging to the whole objects, I am also doing the same with my own body, taking the inner sensations of my fingers and their movements as belonging to my body as a whole” (“The Body in time/time in the Body,” pp. 130-1).

Lanei Rodemeyer pursues: “Experiences that have just passed affect my body in its posture, its gait, its expression, its approach, and in its attentiveness and sensitivities right now and in what is coming. If my body were not to retain what it had just experienced and integrate it with the present, I would always ‘blindly’ approach what is happening now. [...] our bodies are always, implicitly, hearkening back to what they recently experienced” (“The Body in time/time in the Body,” p. 131).

This is more visible when it comes to ballet: as an amateur ballet dancer, I am walking, standing, and sitting in ways that are affected by my daily practice. This example coming from another artistic practice shows how the artistic practice affects the body not only during the actual training time, but constantly. I can unwillingly keep acting as a ballet dancer outside of my ballet training time. Similarly, I can unwillingly continue to act as a cellist outside of my cello training time (by sitting in a certain way, holding objects in a certain way, hearing music with a certain attentiveness to the bass line instead of the melodic line, etc).
sometimes long after. For instance, even if I don’t have my cello with me right now, I can continue to sight-read scores and improve my interpretation of some pieces. Or, even if I am not playing, the Body is still working on remembering and forgetting, thus changing my way of playing the cello. In this sense, training is a continuous process of sedimentation of body memory.

Then, as the memory remains in the body, the musician is able to recall these moves and continue training thanks to recollection. For instance, as I sit with my cello, I can willingly recall certain moves, or, if I improvise, some sound or partial moves will recall others. This is what is described by the expression having the music in the fingers. Husserl would say with his own terminology that we have a “past in the flesh.” From that, the protentional Body can then expand beyond the present and move into moves that are just-coming or will come.

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442 Camille Poupat notices even how there can be an improvement of the move despite the absence of regular training, and therefore how the body continues to learn without actual exercise. He describes how he went for a 9 month trip without his saxophone, and how his abilities had improved without touching the instrument, only by the sedimentation of the knowledge into his body. (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-camille-poupat-saxophoniste/).

443 Lanei Rodemeyer says: “This memory, along with all sensory experiences, is constituted through an integrated, embodied consciousness (just consciousness alone)” (“The Body in time/time in the Body,” p. 131).

444 Rodemeyer continues: “We can think of many cases where a touch, an aroma, a sound brought forth another bodily memory […]. Recollections are not just maintained by an isolated consciousness; rather, they are integrated in an ‘embodied consciousness’ that associates different situations, various sensations, based on their connected experiences” (“The Body in time/time in the Body,” p. 131).


446 I analyze this in Chapter 5.
This training would be only a mechanical one\textsuperscript{447} if it did not serve the music.\textsuperscript{448} namely, enhance the expressive possibilities of the playing.\textsuperscript{449} Along with the mechanical aspect, or more exactly through it, serving the music requires the musician to train the

\textsuperscript{447} In Richir’s “De la ‘perception’ musicale et de la musique,” the author makes an interesting observation related to this question of the mechanical interpretation.

He writes: “alors que l’interprète doit mettre en action son Leibkörper, la part corporelle ou matérielle de son corps vivant et y maîtriser les difficultés techniques d’exécution dans des habitus corporels (leibkörperlich) ou kinesthétiques dont il ne doit plus même avoir conscience, ces habitus kinesthétiques ne sont ‘reçus’ par l’auditeur qu’en phantasie, c’est-à-dire sans mise en action de son Leibkörper – de la même manière que lorsqu’on écoute ou lit une expression linguistique, à ceci près que la distance est encore plus grande dans le cas de la musique puisque la plupart des auditeurs, qui ne sont pas eux-mêmes musiciens, n’ont en général pas la moindre idée de tout le travail très concret qu’il a fallu à l’interprète pour intégrer les difficultés techniques d’exécution en habitus kinesthésiques subconscients, et c’est cette ignorance, facilité par l’aisance virtuose de l’interprète, qui, au-delà de la virtuosité, lui donne pour ainsi dire un accès plus ou moins direct à la musique. Le mauvais interprète est en effet, tout comme le mauvais comédien, soit celui qui ne ‘joue’ que mécaniquement ce qui relève de la convention (des codages symboliques), soit celui qui, pris par l’excès de son narcissisme, met en valeur sa propre virtuosité, sans s’effacer lui-même devant la musique, et ce, par des accentuations ou des emphases destinées à le mettre en valeur comme musicien.”

In the first part of the quote, Marc Richir observes how the musician, through instrumental practice, progressively creates habits of which he or she becomes unconscious (I explain this in Chapter 5). However, he then claims that the listener, more particularly the one who has no idea of the technical work behind the performance, because of his or her ignorance of that process, has a more or less direct access to the music. Finally, he distinguishes the good from the bad interpreter with two elements: mechanical playing, and narcissism.

I believe that the notion of inner song would be helpful in discussing Marc Richir’s claim. First, it would bring the attention to a specific kind of listener: the practicing listener. In other words, the listener who is able to listen to a Mazurka by Chopin, having him- or herself a knowledge of the piano technicality. According to what several musicians have told me in interviews, especially Sylvia Kummer (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-sylvia-kummer-chanteuse/), this kind of listener might listen without putting into action the Wahrnehmungsleib, but the Phantasieleib is definitely put in action. For instance, as a cellist, if I listen to a cellist, I will be able to relate to the musician’s experience, feeling the weight of the bow, the volume of the instrument, etc. I would then argue that the ignorance of those without such musical training does not necessarily involve a more direct access to music. Finally, I would propose distinguishing the good from the bad interpreter by putting the two elements that Richir mentions into perspective with the notion the inner song: I think that the musician who plays mechanically or the musician who expresses more of his or her own virtuosity than expressing the music itself are two types of musician who do not realize their own inner song in the interpretation, do not serve the music with their technique, and therefore let other elements of the interpretation take first place. The trained consciousness that I describe in the present paragraph is the consciousness of the musician whose primary purpose is to realize the inner song in the act of playing.

\textsuperscript{448} I come back to that question in the final chapter as well.

\textsuperscript{449} The flautist Lorna McGhee speaks abundantly about this in our discussion (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/interview-with-lorna-mcghee-en/).
expressive ability so that they can express emotions through playing a melody. Here, the training is not about learning the right move, it is about learning how to *let go through* the music, to open a personal interiority to the other through the music. This presupposes first having something to express: not only emotions, but also simply a phantasy, something from my phantasy world. This presupposes the ability to express emotions, and therefore, a certain letting go of my inner states. It also requires the technical capability to produce a move so easily that it does not block the expressive ability (*in this sense* it requires *possession of* the instrument so that it is *at the musician’s disposal*). There is therefore both a movement of openness to let myself be penetrated by the transcendent world, and an openness to invest that world with what I can offer to it.

As the Body acquires this knowledge through technical and emotional training, phantasy can *reproduce* past experiences, and freely play with them, thus constituting new inner songs. As it appears here, and as it will become clearer as the description goes on, the training is both what *limits* the possibilities of the phantasy, and what *enhances* them. Indeed, it limits the possibilities of what I can perceive in phantasy by reducing

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450 I don’t investigate the problem on intersubjectivity in the present dissertation. However, I announce this as a potential extension of the description in the conclusion.

451 The cellist Vincent Ségal shares about his constitution of the imaginary through observation, travels, availability to what can happen and what can be experienced (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-vincent-segal-violoncelliste/). I also discuss this question in the interview with István Fazakas and we underline how the formation of the imaginary depends also on my capacity to let myself be penetrated by experiences (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-istvan-fazakas-chercheur-en-philosophie-phenomenologie/).

452 The drummer Rémi Métral observes how some students struggle with this because they don’t know how to open up (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-remi-metral-batteur/).

453 I explain this in Chapter 5.

454 The flautist from the PSO Lorna McGhee speaks about it as a form of generosity or joy to share (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/interview-with-lorna-mcghee-en/).
them to what I can perform. For instance, if I don’t have very good training, the richness of my inner song will be limited. However, no matter the level of technical ability, it also enhances my phantasy by offering a sum of possibilities that can be recombined freely in phantasy, thereby pushing the possibilities further. For instance, even basic technical training along with the phantasy which can phantasize something more complex, allow me to improve, learn new moves, and enlarge my possibilities.
The ego of the practicing musician (playing, perceiving, and phantasizing) is an ego with various strata, performing the *epoché* from the ground of the natural ego, but then made of a psychical embodied ego, and a pure ego performing acts of consciousness. Among these acts, there is the act proper to the trained consciousness of the musician which is capable of perceiving the possible performance in phantasy.

This specific understanding of the ego can be the base of a more accurate understanding of what happens then in the phenomenological consciousness as the musician practices music, while listening to the inner song and the actual song in the musician’s attitude. Indeed, it shows who the ego is when performing these acts. It also helps to identify the various problems that need to be investigated more deeply in a further analysis more focused on the notions of *Body*, perception, time, and phantasy through perception. It shows what the capabilities of the ego are, how it is embodied, and how it appears in the specific situation that I am describing.

If the musician is able to perceive the actual song and phantasize the inner song, it is because he or she has the experience of performing: the experience of holding the instrument, manipulating it, issuing a sound (a shaped melody), and experiencing that melody as his or her own. This activity of performing involves an ego which is not only perceiving and phantasizing, but which is furthermore an *embodied* ego. In the coming chapter, I will introduce the notion of the musician’s *Body*, and analyze its constitution.
Chapter 4: *Time and Space of the Impressional and Reproductive Consciousness*  

I want to thank Stéphane Finetti who offered me some of his time to figure out the various difficult questions of this passage. I am extremely grateful for this fruitful and thought-provoking collaboration.
As it appears from the previous chapter, it is necessary to investigate the problem of the Body in order to understand the constitution of the inner song in phantasy as the reproduction of the being of a performance. As we have seen, in Husserlian phenomenology the problem of the Body is a paradox, and it is that even before starting to contextualize it in the specific framework of the description of the inner song. Indeed, the Body is both included under the *epoché* as parenthesized but also is part of the gesture of the phenomenological *epoché* in parenthesizing itself. Thus, a careful analysis of its relationship with the pure ego performing the *epoché*, and more precisely, a careful analysis of the problem of the embodiment of the pure ego as well as of the problem of the phenomenological constitution of the Body is required.

In the specific context of the description of the inner song, this classic phenomenological issue becomes more specific: as the inner song is constituted in the consciousness of a practicing musician playing music, perceiving this performance, and phantasizing; and as the inner song reproduces a possible performance in all its complexity, i.e., with the color of the sound, the movement, the touching of the instrument, it has a bodily dimension. However, what kind of embodiment is in play here? What is the relationship between this Body which is part of the constitution of the inner song, and the Body which is part of the constitution of the actual song and any other perceivable object in the world? As the sensuous is both what localizes and spatializes the phenomenon, investigating this problem requires raising, more fundamentally, the problem of the spatial and temporal constitution of the inner song.

In the coming chapter, I will question how the inner song is spatially and temporally generated in the reproductive consciousness. As the constitution of the inner
song in phantasy is related to the constitution of the actual song in perception, I will articulate the analysis of that question with a careful study of the constitution of the actual song in the impressional consciousness.
§1. From the problem of the *ego* to the problem of the *inner consciousness*.

§2. The *now* of the actual song in the impressional consciousness and the *now* of the inner song in the reproductive consciousness.

§3. The *Ur-Phantasie* of the inner song.

§4. Articulation of the temporality of the impressional consciousness and the *quasi-*temporality of the reproductive consciousness.

§5. The layer of the inner rhythm as a common layer between the perceptual Body and the phantasy Body.

§6. The perceptual Body sensing the musical instrument.

§7. The perceptual Body manipulating the musical instrument.

§8. The spatial and temporal constitution of the *Wahrnehmungsleib* and *Phantasieleib*. 
E. M.: Quel est la base de cette liberté qui permet ensuite le passage de l’intérieur vers l’extérieur ?

C. B.: Le chant intérieur est comme une onde qui se propage effectivement de l’intérieur vers l’extérieur. En raison de cette continuité il n’y a pas vraiment de limite entre les deux. Cela dit, s’il fallait en placer une ce serait la respiration, c’est elle qui permet le passage de l’un à l’autre.

*Interview with Claire Bernard (Violinist, French, Paris, France, 02. 27. 2012)*

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E. M.: Et l’arythmie ?

M. F.: Pour cela ne je saurais vous répondre car c’est un phénomène que je ne comprends pas. C’est une question de corps, de pulsation.

*Interview with Marguerite France (Violinist, French, Tokyo, Japan, 06. 03. 2012)*

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E. M.: Ma se ci pensiamo bene, questo separare viene già dall’origine. Ho incontrato dei musicisti che mi hanno detto: “sento sempre qualcosa che canta dentro di me”. Secondo me la nostra interiorità è fatta di suoni. Poi, da questo fondo emerge il canto, la melodia. Quando cantiamo separiamo questa melodia del nostro caos musicale interiore.

P. F. T.: In questo senso che stai dicendo ora, il canto è come il concetto: è delimitazione, taglia, fa emergere qualcosa di preciso dal flusso indistinto del sonoro.

*Interview with Pietro Francesco Toffoletto (Guitarist, Italian, Skype conference from Chartres, France, 11. 08. 2014)*
V. S.: C’est très intéressant de voir que des musiciens qui ne se connaissent pas peuvent arriver tout de même à jouer ensemble.

E. M.: En pratique, qu’est-ce qui rend cela possible à votre avis ?

V. S.: Je pense qu’il faut une grande attention au son, aux fréquences et au rythme, une pulsation commune.

--- Interview with Vincent Ségal (Cellist, French, Paris, France, 14. 05. 2015) ---

E. M.: Alors… je vais commencer notre discussion par te demander ce qu’évoque pour toi l’expression « chant intérieur ».

N. P.: Je crois qu’elle pourrait évoquer deux choses différentes : entendre et ressentir. Dans le premier cas l’expression fait référence à quelque chose qui ne passerait que par l’oreille, un travail des intervalles, le fait d’apprendre à entendre quelles sont les couleurs, les notes dissonantes : une technique musicale. Dans le deuxième cas elle souligne une dimension plus émotion qui se situe au niveau du ressenti corporel : l’effet que provoquent les notes lorsqu’on les joue, ce qu’on ressent en soi.

E. M.: La première est ce qu’on peut apprendre au cours de notre formation tandis que la deuxième est plus du vécu.

N. P.: Je dirais plus exactement que la première c’est mettre des mots sur des choses tandis que la deuxième c’est mettre des émotions sur des sons.

E. M.: Je comprends. Et tu crois qu’il y a une dimension plus importante que l’autre ?
La deuxième je crois. On voit ça quand on débute et qu’on a assez peu de bagage : on peut passer à côté de la première mais être quand même hyper investi dans la musique parce qu’on éprouve du plaisir à entendre les notes résonner entre elles. L’aspect corporel, sensitif, me semble plus fondamental.

E. M.: Mais si on peut ressentir ce qu’on fait sans entendre pour autant toutes les complexités techniques, est-ce que tu penses qu’à l’inverse, on peut entendre des notes sans les ressentir ?

N. P.: Oui bien sûr : on peut être un brillant instrumentiste sans ressentir vraiment la musique. Cependant, pour atteindre l’excellence, on a vraiment besoin des deux.

_E. M.: Comme avec chacun des musiciens, je vais commencer par te demander ce que signifie pour toi l’expression « chant intérieur ».  

Y. H.: Alors, le « chant » est déjà un élément musical, il suppose qu’il y a déjà quelque part des éléments musicaux auto-organisés ainsi qu’une intention, et des émotions._

E. M.: Parfois l’expression désigne la pensée musicale, l’audition intérieure, penses-tu que ce soit la même chose ?

Y. H.: L’audition intérieure est composée de purs éléments : le développement de l’oreille qui reconnaît les notes, les intervalles, les structures harmoniques complexes, une pluralité de voies et le rythme dans la mesure où il n’y a pas de musique sans temporalité. Le chant intérieur me semble plus large que cela. D’autant plus qu’il peut être compris autrement : comme « champ »._

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_**Interview with Nicolas Pfeiffer (Bassist, French, Chartres, France, 05. 22. 2015)**_
E. M.: Comment cela ?

Y. H. : Lorsqu’on travaille on élargit une sorte de « champ », de banque intérieure. On l’enrichit pour pouvoir avoir à tout moment un choix de plus en plus large de matière pour créer. C’est la largeur de ce champ qui permet de ne pas être trop déterminé, limité, d’avoir une liberté de créer.

E. M.: Donc si c’est quelque chose qui s’élargit, quel est l’élément premier ? Celui à partir duquel on commence à apprendre ?

Y. H. : Au niveau technique, c’est déjà apprendre les notes, lire la musique, apprendre à entendre, comprendre les proportions entre les sons c’est-à-dire les intervalles : développer le rapport entre soi et le son.

E. M.: Le rendre plus personnel ?

Y. H. : Le digérer je dirais. Si tu parles d’oreille intérieure cela signifie qu’il y a un endroit où le son laisse quelque chose de durable.

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E. M.: Qu’est-ce qui nourrit le son ? Quelque chose d’affectif ?

Y. H. : Oui je pense. Cela a à voir avec la sensibilité de chacun. C’est la première chose que l’on entend, avant le discours, avant la structure. C’est un peu comme la respiration. C’est un peu la respiration même.

E. M.: Comment cela ?

Y. H. : Et bien avant de parler, on respire. Pour avoir de l’air. Le son c’est l’air du musicien. Il vient avant le discours. La manière dont tu respires se sent dans la musique. Ton son marque ta musique.

E. M.: C’est ce qu’il y a de plus personnel. On porte son « son » avec soi-même.
Y. H.: De la même manière qu’on porte ses angoisses, ses peurs, ses espoirs, ses idées, son imagination. On est notre propre son.

*Interview with Yaron Herman (Pianist, French, Paris, France, 06. 09. 2015)*

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J. G.: Personnellement je travaille beaucoup devant la glace.

E. M.: Ah bon ? Qu’est-ce que ça t’apporte ?

J. G.: J’essaie d’être le plus détendu possible, de reproduire la main droite des contrebassistes que j’aime bien.

*Interview with Joachim Govin (Bassist, French, Paris, France, 12. 19. 2015)*

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Z. S.: Your physical set up, in conjunction with this idea you want to play creates your sound. I think that the concept is more important than anything, but what then changes it is then your physical makeup. That influences your sound in a way that makes your voice your voice. There was a horn player I used to love when I was growing up, I was trying to sound like him, but I’m not built like him, so even though I was hearing his sound in my head, what came out of my body was my voice, my sound. I may want to sound with my voice, when I sing, like Paul McCartney, if I sing opera, I want to sound like Pavarotti, and I may hear Pavarotti, but what comes out of my voice is not like Pavarotti, but he’s got a body that’s that big but his head is enormous! His sound, his physical structure, is ultimately going to dictate what that voice sounds like. He may grow up hearing Carlo Bergonzi, or his father, and may want to sound like his father...(implied-but he won’t b/c his physical structure is different). Bergonzi-it’s a lighter voice than Pavarotti, but it’s classic.
S. K. : Cette voix est aussi constituée du souffle, apprendre le chant c’est aussi apprendre à respirer. Le chant est la continuité de la respiration [Das Singen ist eine Verlangsamte Ausatmen]. La plupart des gens ne savent pas respirer comme il faut.

E. M.: Mais pourtant, c’est quelque chose de naturel !

S. K. : Oui… mais on respire en général en haut, et pas par l’estomac, alors que c’est très important de respirer par l’estomac pour chanter bien, se sentir mieux etc. C’est d’ailleurs la première chose que j’apprends à mes étudiants : apprendre à respirer [reflektorische Atmung]. Si tu veux je te montre cela en te donnant un petit cours quand on a fini.

E. M.: Oui ! Bien sûr !

S. K. : En allemand on dit : le chant est une respiration modelée [Singen ist gestaltenes Ausatmen].

E. M.: Le souffle est formé en son.

S. K. : Oui. La respiration est quelque chose d’essentiel. Et c’est difficile car il suffit d’être enrhumé pour que la respiration change. Le corps est ton instrument. Toi, tu peux mettre ton violoncelle dans un coin et il est sans vie tant que tu ne le joues pas. Moi je suis mon instrument. Je suis ma voix. La technique aide à pouvoir chanter même si ça ne va pas. Mais seulement dans une certaine mesure : le timbre n’est pas le même selon que tu es heureuse ou malheureuse.
J. S.: There is a kind of variety. Some of it is rooted in the tradition of just notation, organizing notes over time. But some of it is more scientific, where if you ask me, “what does the sound of a saxophone look like?” I would probably draw you a waveform the same thing you would see on the oscilloscope. If you ask somebody else that question, maybe they would draw you a sunrise or something more about the feeling of that sound. But because I have this experience rooted in digital audio, I would first think about a waveform. That’s another way that I visualize sound: not only as notes which have pitch and duration, but I think about the actual waveform. And then another way that I would visualize it is in terms of a spectrogram, which is a way of looking at the sound in the frequency domain. And when we think of the sound in that way, we can look at the note of a guitar and see the fundamental frequency of the note, and then all the harmonics stacked up and they would all be separate lines in the spectrogram. These are a few ways that I would visualize a sound. And then I am pretty interested in audio-visual artwork, where we can have one idea that is expressed through multiple modalities. So, if I wanted to express a musical idea in a visual way, I would take one of those three representations as a sort of structure, and then try to express it in a way that is more beautiful or compelling. Something that would add some layers to it, beyond just a scientific representation.

Interview with Jesse Stiles (Composer, English, Pittsburgh, PA, USA, 10. 26. 2016)

M. C.: The song within my heart starts at the moment the conductor gives the downbeat.
Interview with Michael Crescenta (Violist, English, Pittsburgh, PA, USA, 03. 09. 2017)

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E. M.: Quelle est cette « autre dimension » ?

Y.- P. T. : C’est l’humanisme que les grands artistes arrivent à faire passer par la projection des sentiments et de l’émotion. Vous connaissez le Mime Marceau ?

E. M.: Oui ! Je l’aime beaucoup d’ailleurs !

Y.-P. T. : Et bien lui, vous voyez, c’est le génie dans sa plus pure expression : il ne fait que des gestes, mais il va réussir à nous faire pleurer avec des gestes.

E. M.: En fait c’est parce qu’il créé un monde... non ?

Y.-P. T. : Oui. Il créé le monde qu’il a en lui.

Interview with Yann-Pascal Tortelier (Conductor, French, Pittsburgh, PA, USA, 03. 19. 2017)

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J. N.: The way you breathe sets up the sound. When I’m playing solo, I have a couple of different types of breaths. A lot of brass players will rely entirely on the rhythm breath to play in time and that is not always enough time to fill up completely. And if you watch someone like Bill Caballero, the principal horn player, he does something that he calls getting rid of stale air. Before a solo, he exhales, then inhales so it’s all fresh air that he just took in and gets rid of any stale air in his lungs. I combine those and I do three breaths when I have a big solo, I always get rid of the dead air (exhales) and then I slowly start (breathes) and then I do my rhythm breaths, 3 motions. That’s what I teach and that’s what I do.

E. M.: So the second one gives the impulse?
J. N.: The third one actually gives the impulse. The first one is clear out the dead air. Now you breathe slowly in to fill up. And then number three. And you do them all together. Doesn’t that make your whole body feel kind of relaxed? And then that translates to the sound, makes the sound much more easy and warm. But I only do that when I have something high stress, a solo, or exposed or a concert. But in a normal concert or passage I don’t necessarily do it that way.

E. M.: So is there a rhythm breath that is always there?

J. N.: Yeah, everyone does that most of the time. But I feel that you don’t always get a good breath that way.

*Interview with James Nova (Trombonist, English, Pittsburgh, PA, USA, 03. 10. 2018)*

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Finally—the one I think is really interesting—is that there is always a way to embody with self. *Self-with-self*. You can be out of sync with yourself or in synchronicity with yourself. A lot of my teaching with my conservatory students starts there. I have them do multiple things at once, and we look to see if they are able to do them in sync with themselves or if they were out of sync. We do very simple things where they all have to learn conducting patterns—four pattern or three pattern—and we use them constantly. One of the things they have to do is sway inside their conducting. So that they have to do two at the same time. And then I’ll have them sing or read over that. Sometimes we just have a conversation. For some students… one out of five students in an earlier class will start off okay, and then all I have to do is distract them with some task and all of a sudden the body and the arm get apart from each other. And it’ll separate. What I’m doing is then looking for ways to bring that back together. So that
their *entrainment*, or their embodied self-with-self, starts to lock in and be tight. That is the beginning of what I would call an inner song.

**E. M.: So do you think that this last one is the condition for the others?**

S. N.: I think it would have to be, because if you don’t have that first, then it’s really hard to know if you’re with the other if you don’t even know if you’re with yourself. Anybody can learn a four pattern, and yet not everybody knows what it feels like. Even though they’re doing it. So they can make their arm make a shape in the air and yet it doesn’t have to carry any weight with it.

**E. M.: Because I think it needs more than just your hand. It needs your whole body.**

SN: That’s the point. The reason I make them sway, walk, lean, and gesture in all kinds of ways is because I’m trying to say that this isn’t just a shape outside of you. It’s a model for a hierarchy of weight in you. And so, the whole reason for meter is not so we would learn to count to three or four or whatever the beats in the bar are. The number is the last thing that matters. Most important is that that down beats feel heavy. If it’s a four pattern, a beat two is less heavy. A beat three, heavy arm across the body, secondly heavy, and then the upbeat is light. And so, I m not asking you to learn to count. I’m asking you to feel a hierarchy of weight, where down beats are quite heavy, and then not so much, and then more, and then the least. When you actually know the conducting pattern, what you know is not the shape of a plus sign. What you know is this sensation. And when I ask them to conduct and sway, I’m trying to get them to pay attention to the bodied performance, not the logical, visual, or listening performance.
It’s not an auditory thing. I think that the sound is to just encourage the feeling. So of those four, *self-with-self* is the first thing I’m teaching.

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**E. M.: So the embodiment is not just through rhythm.**

S. N.: Embodied is feeling; and feeling requires motion which we experience as a shift of weight. The only way you recognize that you’ve moved is by experiencing a shift. I had to feel heavy here, then light, then heavy again. There’s no digital version of me moving there. I can’t feel digital: I can only feel analog. Analog is the sine wave. The only way I can move is to recreate a sine wave in my body. I pick up my foot, I toss it into the air, so for a moment I lift off the floor, and then for a moment I’m heavier as I land. That’s motion; a shift of weight. To move is to create a shift. This requires a lightness and a heaviness. So a shift of weight is, I think, the base experience of all experience. An experience cannot occur except that you felt motion which is a shift of weight. So rhythm is one way of feeling a shift of weight. So if I say ‘di-di-di-di-dee-di-di-di-di-dee’ you lean into all those longs. That’s called the agogic accent. The accent of duration. The thing you find yourself gravitating towards are all those heavies. Whereas if I just go ‘di-di-di-di-di-di-di-di’ it just feels like nothing. But if I give you any long note, that will attract your attention. That’s the experience of a shift of weight in rhythm. All rhythm is a bunch of longs and shorts. If all we were listening to was a rhythmic piece without pitch or harmony and only one timbre, then all you would be able to do is gravitate towards things that were long and look for patterns. The patterns would be experienced as heavies and lights. When you add pitch to it then you have two layers that create heavies and lights. If I play a melody for you with no
rhythm, there will be certain notes that will feel heavier and others that will feel lighter in their relativity to each other. And then if I play harmony for you—either implied or explicit—this is a third tier that creates weight. Timbre is another tier. So if we orchestrate it, having flutes play one thing, bassoons play another, and cellos play a third, the different timbres will create shifts of weight. All these things are just trying to make you feel. And what I think all those things are doing is not trying to create sound but to create shifts of weight. If you stack them all up together where you make a long note on a tonic harmony on the highest note of the line, where everybody in the orchestra plays it at once, that’s going to be a very heavy note. And if you take the long note and put it at this point in time, and tonic pitch at another, and orchestration that scatters it at other points in time, the audience will feel lost. They won’t know what was heavy. You can obscure the heavy by diffusing it. That’s what composers do. That’s their game. They draw your attention here and take it away from there. They make this moment feel impactful and then they make you feel scattered and lost, loose and tense. They create the up, like when I lift my foot from the floor, where you suspend for a while. They haven’t resolved the chord yet. And in some cases they’ll make you hang up there for a really long time and wonder if this piece is ever going to end. Then, finally, ta-da and you get the heavy and come back down. And so what I think is going on in music is not so much about the sound but it’s to make you feel heavies and lights.

*Interview with Stephen Neely (Dalcroze Instructor, English, Pittsburgh, PA, USA, 02.12.2019)*

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R. K.: That’s what improvising in my head is like. Partly it’s the context and the confidence, but it is also partly having the facility on the fiddle that I can go wherever I want to—wherever attention takes me, I can play—but my hands don’t operate that well, and that’s why I need to go back and practice my chords and arpeggios.

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E. M.: When you were playing before, you were sitting.

R. K.: I was sitting, but the one thing I’ve learned is that to keep the rhythm consistent, you have to internalize it. And you internalize through the torso, experientially. There was one workshop I took where the musician leading it insisted on this point: rhythm has got to be centered. It’s this bodily experience. We would get up and play and get the whole body moving. If I’m sitting I slightly do this [moving torso] in time to the music.

E. M.: So he says that the rhythm is not in your hand, and it’s not in your head, and it’s not in your legs and feet?

R. K.: Well, it can be, but even if you think of the movement of walking, your whole body is moving. As Laurie Anderson puts it, ‘you’re falling forward’ in this piece she did called “Walking and Falling.” She makes the point that whenever you’re walking, you’re falling. Every time you take a step, you’re falling forwards slightly and catching yourself from falling. There’s this impetus to it that is in the torso.

E. M.: Actually, in ballet dancing, the center is here. So when you have to make a movement, they tell you to open your torso. Your head is there, but you don’t lead your body through your head. You lead from your torso.
R. K.: I know one English country dance instructor who said you’re being pulled by a string attached to your navel.

E. M.: It’s the same in tango.

R. K.: That’s my experience of it. If I’m playing, there’s definitely this slight movement of my torso in association with the other movements I’m making. It’s got to be there.

E. M.: So the inner song would be embodied because of that?

R. K.: I think it doesn’t have to be, but it’s clearer if it is. I can’t hold very still and remember and reconstruct a melody. I think the exception is when I am intentionally rehearsing the inner song. I’m reconstructing or playing deliberately in my head. And if it’s an earworm that’s involuntary, it doesn’t have movement. In fact, if I’m really annoyed by the tune, I actively try to resist the rhythm of it to disrupt it.

*Interview with Robert Kirkman (Fiddle Player, English, Pittsburgh, PA, USA, 11. 02. 2019)*

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E. M.: I met a musician last week and he was saying, “well I hear that,” then I was asking him, how do you know you hear it if you don’t sing it?

S. N.: I think that it’s not just hearing. It’s feeling, in a literal tactile, weighted, touchy, visceral sense. So I think Gordon’s term ‘audiation’ is a bad term because it gives the impression that music is sound and I disagree. I don’t think music is sound. I think that music often uses sound, but it also uses silences. It uses in-tune pitches, but it also uses atonal pitches, scratches, whispers and noises of different sorts and that you can make music from those. And what all musical settings have in common, in my opinion, is
less about the sound in the room and more about the feeling that the sound creates in you.

Then we can talk about Merleau-Ponty and the body and about the visceral, the touch and the participatory. Those are things that the Dalcrozian classroom values highly.

I’m not an expert in Gordon, but in the States all types of people use his term ‘audiation’ because what they are trying to talk about is inner hearing. I do think that there is a hearing component to it, but the sterile hearing of this pitch versus that pitch is not yet music. Music is the reason for the study of music. What makes it music is when what I hear starts to become something that I feel. When I can feel the shifts of weight in my body, at that point we have shifted from something that I’ve heard into something that is aesthetic and that I feel. I can also recall traffic sounds and dogs barking.

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E. M.: So if audiation is not a good word, what do you think about ‘inner song’?

For me, finding an expression was very hard. There was ‘oralization,’ ‘audiation,’ and ‘music thought,’ but it’s not about thinking. ‘Song’ poses some problems, ‘inner’ poses some problems too because feeling is not just within versus without.

Its not inside versus outside. The expression is not the best.

S. N.: I’m okay with it. I was asking this exact question within the last five months, trying to think, well if audiation is inner hearing, and I don’t think it’s about hearing exclusively, I think it’s about feeling, then what is this idea of inner feeling? The inner versus outer? I think I’m okay with saying it’s inner. That what we are describing is something that is in me. Because I’m sitting here experiencing and I haven’t shared it
with you, then it’s not outer. I’m experiencing it in me. Now there is a way I can manifest, by making sound, by making gesture, or by engaging you in some manner where now it’s shared inner-outer. I don’t think it’s ever only outer. If they are going to play music in the other room while we talk and I don’t pay attention to it, then that is outer. That is distant from me and I’m not even paying attention to it. Then, I can just sit here and bring myself to tears by the music I’m experiencing and you wouldn’t know why I was crying. Then, if I share it with you, that is a mixture of both what I feel and what I share, so that’s inner-outer. And that is what performance is. Performance would be in and out. ‘Inner song’ isn’t bad.

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S. N.: The eurhythmics course work starts with an assumption that music is supposed to feel, and I challenge my students regularly: is what you are trying to do try to make sound or a feeling? And my bias is, the sound is just a vehicle to actually make you feel things, not to make sounds. There are noise makers in the world, and traffic and dogs barking, that generally we don’t think of as music. The point where it turns from noise into music is when it somehow gets into the body and you feel it. It makes you feel heavy, it makes you feel light, it creates a sense of motion in the felt body. When you get to that threshold is when you start to open the door to what I’ll call musical experience.

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E. M.: The way I relearned was by closing my eyes and moving with my cello and having more body motions. Some musicians I met—and those were the musicians
who mentioned Dalcroze—were telling me that I needed to connect with the instrument.

S. N.: The way I teach it is I try to convince my students that their instrument is nothing but a tool to share what they are already experiencing. So it’s always driving their attention to their inner song. That is a huge part of what I teach, maybe everything I teach. Notice your inner song. Then get so good at noticing it that you can manipulate it. You could be skillful in your noticing of the inner song, so that you can rehearse and be better and notice when it’s off versus when its on, when it’s accurate versus when it is inaccurate. So that you can continue to be virtuosic at inner song, is really what I’m trying to do. Then you have a reason to learn technique. Why do you need more technique on your cello? It’s useless if you don’t have a song to play. But if you are passionate and understand what you would like to accomplish musically, then the appropriate frustration for a conservatory student is “I know the music I want to play, but I’m not good enough to play it.” That is a good frustration. Musically I’m awake and have a reason to practice more to make my technique stronger. Because I have realized I have more to say than my instrument technique allows.

_面试 Stephen Neely (Dalcroze Instructor, English, Pittsburgh, PA, USA, 02. 12. 2019)_

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R. M. : Par contre s’il y a un problème de pulsation intérieure ça ne changera rien, là on s’en rendra compte. Le problème avec la pulsation intérieure c’est qu’à un moment donné il faut l’exprimer très clairement. Et comment l’exprimer ? […] Il y a une manière de le faire avec le chant intérieur, c’est ce que tu fais quand tu chantes. Il y a
une manière physique [il montre en faisant de très grands gestes et en faisant remarquer que c’est ce que l’on apprend à faire avec la méthode Dalcroze]). La corporéité et le chant intérieur sont là pour exprimer cette pulsation, pour qu’elle se retrouve où ? Moi, en tant que batteur, je la mets là [il montre une partie du corps]) parce que je sais que ça je ne l’utilise pas en batterie.

E. M.: …je pense que je la mettrais dans le ventre, mais ça c’est parce que je fais de la danse classique…

R. M.: Oui, ça marche très bien. Quand un élève est droit comme ça et qu’avant une interprétation il ne respire pas, ce n’est pas possible.

*Interview with Rémi Métral (Drummer, French, Chartres, France, 09. 01. 2020)*
§1. From the problem of the ego to the problem of the inner consciousness.\footnote{As Bernet underlines in “Unconscious consciousness in Husserl and Freud,” there is a particular relationship of the phantasized with the ego: it “belongs to the self” but “the self cannot immediately lay claim to [it] as a real presence” (p. 341). As I move to the analysis of the ego with its act, to the analyses of the passive and active syntheses in play in the constitution of the inner song, I want to change my terminology and start using “impressional” or “reproductive” consciousness, instead of “ego.”}

I am practicing the Prelude of Bach’s Suite no. 3, trying to perform what I hear in my phantasy as an inner song. I try to feel the emotions through my cello, to express the rhythm as I feel it with my body. At first, it is obscure. However, as I play, and try the music out with my cello, it becomes clearer in my phantasy. It feels that the most important part of my music practice happens in this close connection between my finger and the instrument. It is as if they were glued together, but not so much that my finger could not move freely on the neck of the instrument. Sometimes it feels easy to express things through my cello, other times, when I have technical difficulties, I apprehend my instrument as an obstacle, and it is therefore easier to phantasize the passage I am working on. All the work is there, in the creation of this direct continuity between how the inner song sounds in my phantasy, and how it sounds when it is issued by the cello.

As was established in the preceding chapters, the ego of the musician is an ego practicing a musical instrument,\footnote{In the case of the singer, the instrument is the voice. As the voice is part of the Body, this would require a specific analysis that I am willing to do in a future work. When it comes to a conductor or a composer, there are not one but several instruments. However, the Body still plays a role as they are supposed to know by empathy what is feasible, how the music is realized through the instrument, and write or conduct their music accordingly. I discuss these questions with Matteo Belli, composer (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/intervista-con-matteo-belli-compositore-it/), as well as Marcello Cormio, conductor (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/intervista-con-marcello-cormio-direttore-dorchestra-it/). Both of them can also use the piano or the voice itself as a voice synthesizing all the voices of the orchestra.} perceiving the actual song issued through the instrument, and phantasizing the inner song. It is capable of this because it is an embodied ego: first, the Body is involved in music practice through sensing and moving.
In this case, the ego is the agent of the performance because it is an embodied ego. Second, it is involved in the perception of the performance through various senses, especially touch or hearing. In this case, the Body participates in the constitution of the phenomenological world of perception, it is a perceiving Body. Third, it is involved in the phantasy reproducing these sensations and movements in the phantasy. In this case, the Body participates in the phantasy because the phantasy reproduces the sensations and the moves of the performance at least up to a certain extent; it is a phantasy Body.

To understand how the ego is embodied, it is necessary to go back to the definition of the ego itself. The intentional correlation characteristic of the phenomenological consciousness is made of two elements that are two different poles of identity: the ego-pole on the one hand, and the object-pole on the other hand. The Ego-pole is a numerical identity, and a center of intentional acts. This means that it is not only a center of actions (the ego performs the action), but also a center of affects (the ego senses). Among these affects, Husserl mentions in *Ideas II* §25, enjoyment and distress, hope and fear, doing and suffering, etc. Here, affects are related to the pure ego as an

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458 Husserl says: “The Ego is the identical subject functioning in all acts of the same stream of consciousness; it is the center whence all conscious life emits rays and receives them; it is the center of all affects and actions, of all attention, grasping, relating, and connecting, of all theoretical, valuing, and practical position-taking, of all enjoyment and distress, of all hope and fear, of all doing and suffering, etc. In other words, all the multi-formed particularities of intentional relatedness to Objects, which here are called acts, have their necessary terminus a quo, the Egopoint, from which they irradiate” (*Ideas II*, §25, p. 112).

intentional ego because they underlie the passive synthesis involved in the intentional act. They stimulate associations in the act of consciousness striving toward the object. In other words, affectivity is part of the intentional act. Concerning the intentional act, it is a “two-fold radiation” which goes from the ego to the object and vice-versa. Since the radiation goes into two directions, it follows that the ego is not only a radiator, but also a receiver; there is therefore a passivity and an activity in the immanent consciousness. Husserl completes his description by explaining how: “The structure of the acts which radiate out from the Ego-Center, or, the Ego itself, is a form which has an analogon in the centralizing of all sense-phenomena in reference to the Body.”

This claim brings back the notion of the Body in the sense that it is characterized by an analogous position to the ego. Indeed, the Body is also a center. More precisely, it

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460 Husserl provides the following definition: “By affection we understand the allure given to consciousness, the peculiar pull that an object given to consciousness exercises on the ego; it is a pull that is relaxed when the ego turns toward it attentively, and progresses from here, striving toward self-giving intuition, disclosing more and more of the self of the object, thus, striving toward an acquisition of knowledge, toward a more precise view of the object” (Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, §32, p. 196). I will come back to the notion of affectivity in the last chapter of the present dissertation. For now, I just want to mention it as a component of the embodiment of the ego.

461 Husserl explains: “Often, if not always, we find here, properly spoken, two-fold radiations, running ahead and running back: from the center outward, through the acts toward their Objects, and again returning rays, coming from the Objects back toward the center in manifold changing phenomenological characters. Thus in theoretically interested experience there is the working toward the Object, appropriating it, penetrating into it; but there is also here constantly the being incited by the Object, being captivated, thrilled, determined. The coincidence of all acts in the numerically identical Egocenter lies on the noetic side” (Ideas 2, §25, p. 112).

462 Ideas 2, §25, p. 112.
is both a center of orientation,\textsuperscript{463} with peculiar manifolds of appearances,\textsuperscript{464} and an integral part of a causal nexus.\textsuperscript{465} Thus, an analogy can be established between the ego

\textsuperscript{463}The Body is a center of orientation. For instance, already when I grab my musical instrument, the cello is presented to me in a certain way. As Husserl says: “Each Ego has its own domain of perceptual things and necessarily perceives the things in a certain orientation” (Ideas 2, §41, p. 165). In other words, as I am sitting on the chair, I have the cello between my knees and against my chest, the upper part of the object is made of the strings in tension above the bridge, the under part is hidden from my eyes. I hold the neck of the cello in my left hand, I have the bow in my right. I need to grab the neck in a certain way to have freedom of movement, I need to hold the bow in a certain way so that it does not weigh more on the frog and less at the tip. Under the fingers of my left hand, I feel the string and the wood of the neck of the cello, under my right hand, I feel the bow and the pressure on the strings. According to the way I am currently sitting, the lower part of the cello is further from me, the neck is closer, the cello is above my chest and the bow is under my hand. When I play the melody, I feel the instrument resonating against my body, and I hear the melody coming out of the sound-hole and being projecting in front of me. Husserl says that: “The things appear and do so from this or that side, and in this mode of appearing is included irrevocably a relation to a here and its basic directions. All spatial being necessarily appears in such a way that it appears either nearer or farther, above or below, right or left. This holds with regard to all points of the appearing corporeality, which then have their differences in relation to one another as regards this nearness, this above and below, etc., among which there are hereby peculiar qualities of appearance, stratified like dimensions.” (Ideas 2, §41, a) pp. 165-6).

Here, the disposition of the objects around show how: “the Body then has, for its particular Ego, the unique distinction of bearing in itself the zero point of all these orientations” (Ideas 2, §41, a) pp. 165-6.). In other words, everything is situated according to the position of the Body. For the musician, two essential elements are situated according to the Body, the instrument and the melody which resonates from playing. However, the horizon of perception of these two essential elements is broader: I also perceive the other objects around, I hear the sounds outside of my room, I can smell the cake that my neighbor is baking, etc. Husserl writes: “One of its spatial points, even if not an actually seen one, is always characterized in the mode of the ultimate central here: that is, a here which has no other here outside of itself, in relation to which it would be a ‘there.’ It is thus that all things of the surrounding world possess an orientation to the Body, just as, accordingly, all expressions of orientation imply this relation” (Ideas 2, §41, a) p. 166.) Thus, as the space is constituted with my Body as a center, and as, thanks to my Body, I am the center of the world, if I move, the center of that space moves. This does not mean that I am moving in the space; it is the space which is resituated around me according to my Body as a zero point.

As I move, and change the orientation of my Body, new appearances are given in perception. In other words, “In virtue of its faculty of free mobility, the subject can now induce the flow of the system of its appearances and, along with that, the orientations” (Ideas 2, §41, a) p. 166.). For instance, I can pivot my body slightly to the left to play the A-string more easily. When I do so, the system of appearances is reorganized around me. Thus, I can certainly move my cello, but my Body also moves around the cello, and, in this last case, through the alteration of the position of the Body in space, things are oriented differently around it. Husserl writes that: “These changes do not have the significance of changes of the things of the environment themselves, and specifically, they do not signify a movement of the things. The Body of the subject "alters its position" in space; the things appearing in the environment are constantly oriented thereby; all appearances of things preserve their fixed system according to form. The form of intuition, the lawful character of the adumbrations, and, therewith, the form of the order of orientation around a center, all this is necessarily preserved. But whereas the subject is always, at every now, in the center, in the here, whence it sees the things and penetrates into the world by vision, on the other hand the Objective place, the spatial position, of the Ego, or of its Body, is a changing one” (Ideas 2, §41, a) p. 166). That’s the case as I play the cello: things are constantly given in new ways around me. As Husserl
says: “I have all things over and against me; they are all ‘there’ - with the exception of one and only one, namely the Body, which is always ‘here’” (Ideas 2, §41, a) p. 166). In other words, everything changes, the only thing which does not change is my Body.

464 The Body is given with peculiar manifolds of appearances in the sense that, as opposed to any other objects given in the world, the Body conceals itself to my perception, not because I don’t orient my attention toward it, but because I cannot alter my position to perceive it better. Indeed, I cannot see my own head, I cannot touch certain parts of my back, etc. Husserl says that “Whereas, with regard to all other things, I have the freedom to change at will my position in relation to them and thereby at the same time vary at will the manifolds of appearance in which they come to givenness for me, on the other hand I do not have the possibility of distancing myself from my Body, or my Body from me, and accordingly the manifolds of appearance of the Body are restricted in a definite way: certain of my corporeal parts can be seen by me only in a peculiar perspectival foreshortening, and others (e.g., the head) are altogether invisible to me. The same Body which serves me as means for all my perception obstructs me in the perception of it itself and is a remarkably imperfectly constituted thing” (Ideas 2, §41, b) p. 167). In music practice, this means that I sometimes don’t perceive wrong postures or tensions as I am playing, which contribute to technical problems which impact the melody. To overcome this intrinsic poverty of the perception of myself, I need to practice with a mirror, or ask a teacher to give me feedback and help me. Without the gaze of another or even myself as another through the mirror, I cannot really improve in my practice (as I mention in the conclusion of my dissertation, intersubjectivity is an important blind spot of the present work.

I don’t address it here because it would unnecessarily complicate this work, and because I hope to be able to produce a separate work on how the other is involved in the constitution of the inner song as a phenomenon of phantasy. In that future work I would address the problem of the relationship with the teacher, the relationship with music partners, and finally, the relationship with other musicians, present or past, who participate in the constitution of a musical culture and therefore of subjective taste). Improving the performance requires not only paying attention to the melody, but also examining the shape of the Body playing it.

465 The Body is integral part of a causal nexus in the sense that “we find it integrated into the causal nexus of material nature” (Ideas 2, §41, c) p. 167.) Husserl reminds how: “We spoke of the peculiarity of the Body has (as Body) of being moved ‘spontaneously’ or ‘freely’ by the will of the Ego” (Ideas 2, §41, c) p. 167). In other words, the Body is certainly capable of moving spontaneously or freely, by the activity of the Ego, thus producing changes in the world. There is a free agency. However, Husserl adds that: “Besides these free kinesthetic processes, others emerge which, instead of being ‘done by,’ are characterized as being ‘done to,’ Le., as passive processes in which spontaneity plays no part” (Ideas 2, §41, c) p. 167). In other words, exactly as the Body acts, it also endures, as it actively perceives, it also passively senses. I simultaneously experience active and passive processes. As I play the melody, I both produce it, and endure its production in my flesh, as I listen to it I both actively grab it and receive it. This leads Husserl to say that: “movements of my Body are apprehended as mechanical processes like those of external things, and the Body itself is apprehended as a thing which affects others and upon which the others have effects” (Ideas 2, §41, c) pp. 167-8). In other words, there is always a double movement, a simultaneous experience of activity and passivity: as the physical object can endure my actions, I also endure its actions When I play the cello, the skin of my fingers is hardened by the contact with the strings, as I learn how to listen the melody, my ears become able to distinguish more sounds, to hear the intonation better, my fingers can produce a noise if I slap them in time with the inner rhythm, etc.

Husserl notices how for some cases, there is no “transformation from causal to conditional process”: “The last two cases, however, are different from the earlier ones where there was a psychophysical process that could be split apart abstractively into a physical process and its ‘psychical’ consequence (or vice versa). But the physical process, ‘red illumination of my hand,’ is not followed by the sensation of red in the same way that the sensation of warmth follows the heating of my hand, and the
and the Body: both have a similar position as a center. The pure ego is the center of intentionality, “the center whence all conscious life emits rays and receives them [the acts of the same stream of consciousness],” and the Body is a “center of orientation” in the sense that it “has, for its particular Ego, the unique distinction of bearing in itself the zero point of all orientations.” The Body is then involved in the activity of the ego because, as consciousness seizes upon objects intentionally, these objects are given in a perceptual field, spatially. This field is spread out according to the situation of the Body in the space. Thus, the Body is part of the phenomenological givenness of the object in the intentional consciousness.

physical process to which the sensation of the color is linked - red light rays striking my eyes-is not given to me at all. The ‘turning point,’ which lies in the Body, the point of the transformation from causal to conditional process, is hidden from me” (Ideas 2, §41, c) p. 168), i.e., a perception leading to a sensation localized in the Body. When it comes to hearing, Husserl says that the “ear is ‘involved,’ but the sensed tone is not localized in the ear” (Ideas 2, §37, 156). In this sense, it could be apparently the case that there is no transformation from causal to conditional process. However, by looking more closely at the specific case in which I produce the melody through my playing, it is different. Indeed, not only does my ear vibrate with the contact of the melody, making me actually hear, but I can also feel the sound being issued by my cello (that’s how deaf people can hear as this interesting study shows: Carré, Musique et surdité). Indeed, hearing is both hearing through the ear and feeling with the whole Body (Cf. Interview with Paul Gossart in which he explains how he tunes the piano in the deeper sounds by putting his leg against the instrument to feel the vibration; http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-paul-gossart-restaurateur-de-pianos-anciens-accordeur-chercheur-en-philosophie/). For instance, as a cellist, my whole Body vibrates when the production of the sound occurs. In addition to that, it is the case with some instruments that the Body is directly in contact with the source of production of the melody (clarinet, saxophon, cello, etc.). In this sense, touch is also involved, foundational not only because I have the sensations of touching of the instrument which inform me of how the melody is produced, but also because I can feel the melody with and sometimes against my Body. My Body endures the melody as it plays it (this is even more true when it comes to singing or playing a wind instrument; I mention the inner song of the singer quickly in the conclusion) Through that proximity with the melody through touch, the melody is given as mine, and co-constited with the musical instrument.

466 Ideas 2, §25, p. 112.

467 Ideas 2, §41, p. 166.

468 Husserl writes: “In absolute consciousness there is always a ‘field’ of intentionality, and the spiritual ‘focus’ of the attention ‘directs’ itself now onto this, now onto that” (Ideas 2, §25, p. 112).
The specific phenomenological world of the practicing musician, distinct from the phantasy-world\textsuperscript{469} and constituted through perception, is constituted in consciousness \textit{intentionally}, and \textit{spatially}. Thus, when my consciousness is \textit{directed toward} the object of perception, for instance, I perceive myself sitting \textit{in the middle of} the music room, the door is \textit{in front} of me, the window is \textit{to my back}, the piano is \textit{at my left}, etc. Closer to me, I also perceive my cello according to the position of my body in the space, and how it is situated with the instrument. I perceive it as this object in front of me, more exactly against my chest, going along with the bow in my right hand. I perceive the two of them through touch in my fingers, but also through light contact at the level of my chest and knees. I also feel the weight of the instrument and become aware of its manageability by holding it and playing it. This spatial disposition of myself in the room and in relation to the musical instrument is part of the constitution of the phenomenological world. It is a similar spatial disposition which is given in the \textit{quasi}-world of phantasy.

Even if the world around is not necessarily part of it, a similar disposition of myself with the musical instrument within a given context is part of the constitution of the inner song. For instance, as I phantasize playing the melody, I phantasize how I position myself with the instrument, the volume of the instrument against me, etc. Here, the perceiving ego is related to \textit{Leiblichkeit} in the sense that there is a \textit{Wahrnehmungsleib} which perceives. In other words, it is because objects are given \textit{spatially}, around the perceiving ego, that there is a constitution of the phenomenological space in the inner consciousness. Similarly, I would say that it is because there is a \textit{phantasieleib}\textsuperscript{470} which

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\textsuperscript{469} Cf. §10 of the Chapter on “Perceiving and Phantasizing.”

\textsuperscript{470} The notion of \textit{Phantasieleib} is particularly developed by Marc Richir. In “De la ‘perception’ musicale et de la musique,” he writes: “c’est cette \textit{Sachlichkeit} [la musique] que l’interprète se doit de saisir sur la...
is phantasizing the inner song spatially given around the phantasizing ego that there is the constitution of a *quasi*-phenomenological space in the reproductive consciousness.\(^{471}\)

Then, the perceived objects given phenomenologically through intentionality are *constituted* in the inner consciousness, in the sense that they are *filled out*\(^{472}\) with a series of intentionalities, as a unified phenomenon potentially given under various aspects. In other words, the object is constituted in the phenomenological consciousness as a *spatial object* thanks to the Body because its constitution happens through a spatial variation of partition, au-delà et entre les signes qui se sont écrits, pour la faire entendre comme telle, au-delà de la simple performance technique. Il doit, comme on dit, ‘prendre le rythme’, et comme nous l’avons dit, jusque dans les plus infimes détails, jusqu’à la manière d’attaquer les sons, de les faire durer, de les intensifier, ou de les affaiblir, de les faire fluctuer à l’intérieur d’eux-mêmes. Cela suppose une ‘adaptation’ remarquable du corps vivant (Leib) de l’interprète tout à la fois à l’instrument (virtuosité) et à la musique (interprétation), et dans la mesure où cette dernière ne peut être que de l’ordre de la *phantasia*, ce qui y est en jeu est le corps vivant de *phantasia*, le Phantasieleib. Et comme, par ailleurs, il n’est pas de *phantasia*, dans son infigurabilité de principe en intuition, qui ne soit habité ou transie des affections de l’affectivité, on doit ajouter que la musique ne sera effectivement fait que si les affections tombent juste où elles doivent tomber (dans les condensations et dissipations de sons et dans les tensions qui en résultent), avec les *phantasias*, et c’est ce que l’on appelle communément la ‘sensibilité’ de l’artiste: affectivité primordiale, c’est-à-dire avec ce que nous entendons par *Leibhaftigkeit*. La vivacité de l’interprétation met en jeu tout cela ensemble. L’interprète se doit de ‘jouer’ depuis la musique et non depuis les sons.”

There is a lot to say about this quote. I will work on the notion of musician’s Body later in my dissertation. I will describe how it is constituted through the instrumental practice, emphasizing the problem of virtuosity, or *technique*, but not really highlighting another important aspect of that constitution which is the role of the music itself in the constitution of that Body. I argue that, when he says that music [*die Sache*] can be only a kind of *phantasia*, he touches the problem of the inner song without really entering into it. If I work on his words using the notion of inner song, I bring some new clarity in what he is describing. Indeed, instead of describing one type of Body, there are now two types of Body interconnected with each other (the *Wahrnehmungsleib* and the *Phantasieleib* of the musician), two types of affectivity interpenetrating each other and a common ground, the inner rhythm, against which the musician can take the rhythm of music (I develop all of this in §4-8 of Chapter 4).

\(^{471}\) This would be an interesting topic to develop. Indeed, the acoustic, the disposition of the room, and other parameters are certainly part of the spatial constitution of the quasi-world of the phantasy in which the inner song is given, and therefore, they are part of the constitution of the inner song as well. I can’t provide a deeper analysis of the constitution of the phantasy world of the inner song in the present dissertation. Neither can I provide an explanation of how the *phantasieleib* participates to that constitution. This should therefore be the object of another research project in the future.

\(^{472}\) Which means that it is also temporal process. This question deserves a deep analysis, I perform it in the final chapter.
possible perceptions.\textsuperscript{473} The Body is the \textit{zero point of all orientations}. When the Body moves, the orientation changes. It is that very possibility of changing the orientation via the movements of the Body which makes the apprehension of the object in multiple ways possible. For instance, if I move my chair in the music room, all the objects will be spatially organized in a different way around me.\textsuperscript{474} Similarly, when I perceive the cello against my chest, I can see only certain aspects of it, but if I rotate my body around the cello, I have a different perspective of the same object. I can have a sense of the head and the neck of the instrument that I am unable to see because they are too close to my left ear through tactuality, and if I manipulate the instrument differently, it is given to me in new ways.

From this, it appears that this givenness of the objects from different perspectives involves spatiality as well as temporality: it involves temporality because there is a \textit{temporal process} of generation in consciousness, and it involves spatiality because the process of generation of the object involves the Body as a spatial center. Along and through that process of perceptual constitution of the world, there is a process of temporalization and spatialization of the inner consciousness. This consciousness of the practicing musician is a double inner consciousness: there is on the one hand the

\textsuperscript{473} Husserl explains: “Certainly there is a multiplicity of interconnected lived experiences and of intentional givenneses, and consequently a ‘field,’ to which changing attentional modifications are joined. Each attention-series is, as a series, something like a ray, and in each series ‘the same thing’ is intentionally grasped. It is a series grasping one and the same thing ever more richly and more perfectly, analogously to the way in which I, by coming closer to an Object, hence in the corresponding series of orientations, gain an ever more rich knowledge of the Object and grasp it always better and more fully. Thus the metaphor: I bring the matter (even if it is non-spatial) closer to me. If we abstract from this analogy, then what is given is a progressive series in which the grasp of an Object approaches the ideal, and this takes place in each process of an attentive grasp of an Object. And all these rays emanate in lived experience from the one single point of departure, the identical Ego” (\textit{Ideas 2}, §25, pp. 112-3).

\textsuperscript{474} I come back on the problem of movement later in this chapter and the following.
impressional consciousness (which is the perceptual consciousness), and on the other hand the reproductive consciousness (which is the phantasy consciousness).\textsuperscript{475} The impressional consciousness constitutes the object through the perceptual Body [\textit{Wahrnehmungsleib}], whereas the reproductive consciousness constitutes the object through a phantasy Body [\textit{Phantasieleib}].\textsuperscript{476}

As I will demonstrate, the inner song is embodied through a phantasy Body. However, this Body is related to the perceptual Body in the sense that consciousness can phantasize an embodied inner song only because it also has the experience of holding the instrument, of feelings related to various ways of holding it, of awareness of its manageability, and of the instrument’s own way to fill the space if it is played in different ways (e.g., holding of the bow with more or less weight), etc. What does this mean? Of what type is this relationship? Is it a relationship of foundation? Is it a relationship of temporal priority of one upon the other? Is there a ground prior to the impressional and reproductive consciousness in which both may have a common foundation?

\textsection{2}. The \textit{now} of the actual song in the impressional consciousness and the \textit{now} of the inner song in the reproductive consciousness.

\textsuperscript{475} Concerning the understanding of the inner consciousness as double, I follow here the Bernet’s interpretation of Husserl, more specifically in \textit{Conscience et Existence} and \textit{La vie du sujet: Recherches sur l’interprétation de Husserl dans la phénoménologie}.

\textsuperscript{476} This notion of \textit{Phantasieleib} is particularly developed by the French speaking phenomenologist Marc Richir, for example in his paper “Les structures complexes de l’imagination selon et au-delà de Husserl,” or in more detail in \textit{Phénoménologie en Esquisse}. I want to remain within the Husserlian framework, and more particularly within the heritage of Rudolf Bernet. For this reason, I won’t enter in a Richirien analysis in the present dissertation. However, I want to point this author out as a possible resource to investigate the problem of the \textit{Phantasieleib} in the constitution of the inner song in further research.
I can hear myself playing Bach’s Prelude. I can also hear it in inner song. In perception, the sound of the melody resonates and flows in my consciousness. In phantasy, the sound of the inner melody also resonates and flows, one note being given after the other. It is as if the two melodies were given at the same time. However, in the beginning of that practice session in which I play the whole piece once to identify the issues, I try to remain focused on the inner song itself.

As the musician practices, the actual song is perceived while the inner song is simultaneously (in the loose sense of the word) played in the phantasy. Here, the two objects unfold simultaneously, and flow in two distinct flows from two distinct *nows*. In the impressional consciousness, the actual song is given from the *now* of a sensation, whereas in the reproductive consciousness, the inner song is given from the *now* of a phantasm. In the situation of music practice, the actual song is given in the impressional consciousness through *sensations*, whereas the inner song is given in the reproductive consciousness through *phantasms*. As I will demonstrate, a sensation has not only a spatial value, but also a temporal value. Indeed, sensations, which are spatially localized in the Body, also present the object in the *now* of the absolute time of consciousness.

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477 The question of the *now* of the givenness of the actual song and the inner song is the third occurrence of the problem of simultaneity that I mentioned in my introduction to the present dissertation. Jay Lampert discusses it in the second chapter of *Simultaneity and Delay* (p. 21 sq.). He argues that, for Husserl: “Simultaneity is, first, everything that exists together in the Now; and second, it is what elapses into the past together.” (p. 25). In other words, simultaneity is to think through the description of the impressional/retentional/protentional consciousness, as well as through the problem of memory.

In the present dissertation, I will address this problem of simultaneity in the *now* by attempting to explain the process of the constitution of the actual song in the impressional consciousness, but moreover the problem of the flowing of the inner song in the reproductive consciousness.

478 In this sense, it is precisely the notions of sensation and phantasm which make it possible to articulate space and time in the phenomenological explanation I am performing here.
When the musician is performing, this moment of the *now*, the *now* of the presentation of the actual song through *sensations*, is the moment when touching the cello coincides with hearing the sound impressed in the Body. In the temporal impressional consciousness or inner time consciousness, this moment of the *now* flows into the past and is replaced by the next one. This means that each present of impression carries its retention (what had just been) and its protentions (what is about to come). In the reproductive consciousness, the inner song is given through *phantasms* and the question of its *now* constitutes as itself a phenomenological problem. As the inner song is a temporal object, its moment of presentation in reproductive consciousness *should function* similarly to perception: the melody of the inner song should also flow in consciousness from a *now* moment of the melody, carrying its retentions and protentions, and be replaced by the next.

Looking at what happens in the reproductive consciousness constituting the inner song, it appears that the inner song flows in consciousness exactly like the actual song flows in the impressional consciousness. For instance, the inner song of Bach’s piece flows in consciousness from its beginning to its end, one note after the other. There is a clear *now* of the inner melody, carrying the protentions of what is to come, and the retentions of what has just been. However, if the actual song flows in the impressional consciousness from the standpoint of the *now* of impression, there is no such thing in the case of the phantasy. Indeed, the reproductive consciousness does not *present* the inner song, it *re-presents* it.\(^{479}\) Hence, phantasms do not mark a now of presentation as is the

\(^{479}\) I work on this problem in the chapter on “Perceiving and phantasizing.”
case in the impressional consciousness. Without primal-impression, there is no presentation of the object and yet, the inner song is experienced as flowing.

Husserl acknowledges that there can be a temporality of the reproductive consciousness. However, he does not understand this temporality as a time but as a “quasi-time,” clearly distinct from the absolute time of the impressional consciousness. This understanding of the temporality of the reproductive consciousness prevents him from describing how an object like the inner song, oriented toward its perceivable realization in performance, can flow in consciousness. The description of the inner song therefore requires going beyond the Husserlian framework. To describe the temporality of the inner song beyond Husserl, I want to first understand the Husserlian framework, work through it, and highlight its inadequacy in my own work. Through this method, I will be able to provide both an accurate description of the inner song, and a broadening of the phenomenological understanding of phantasy-time.

First, I want to work on the problem of the temporal constitution in perception. Husserl shows in the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, and more specifically in Appendix I, that the now of the impressional consciousness is linked to the presentation of the object in sensation. Indeed, the impressional consciousness presents the object both in the sense that the object is presented and that the object is given as present. Then, once the object has been presented in the impressional consciousness, i.e., once there has been a now of that object for consciousness, the object can then be

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480 Husserl, Experience and Judgement, §39-40. I will come back to temporality as time vs. as quasi-time in more detail later on.
presented again in memory, i.e., it can be re-presented. In both cases, there is a now, the now of the impression.\footnote{Bernet writes: “la conscience interne de l’accomplissement d’un acte de phantasia, loin d’être (comme c’est le cas pour le ressouvenir) la conscience impressionnelle d’un acte en tant que modification intentionnelle d’un autre acte impressionnellement vécu antérieurement par la même conscience, est la conscience d’un acte qui reproduit un acte imaginaire, c’est-à-dire un acte qui n’a jamais été et ne sera jamais impressionnellement vécu par la conscience qui accompagne l’accomplissement présent de l’acte de phantasia” (Conscience et Existence, p. 97).

In my own work, I maintain a clear distinction between phantasy and memory and also between remembering and quasi-remembering because it is this freedom of the phantasy toward the primal-impression which makes the phantasy creative, capable of playing with the object apprehended regardless of its existential-value. I will pursue this argument throughout this chapter.}

This crucial relation between impression and temporal present is explained through the idea of a flow\footnote{I investigate this in more depth in the next paragraph.} in which a now, corresponding to a primal impression, is continuously flowing into the past of the retention, and being replaced by the next now. As the primal impression falls into the past, there is a continuous production as well as a continuous replacement of one modification by the next, the previous modification leading to the next modification.\footnote{Husserl writes: “The time-constituting continuum is a flow of continuous production of modifications of modifications. The modifications in the sense of iteration proceed from the actually present now, the actual primal impression I; but they go forwards continuously and are not only modifications in relation to I but also, in succession, modifications of one another in the order in which they flow away. This is what characterizes continuous production. Modification continuously generates ever new modification” (On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, Appendix 1, p. 106).}

Here, time and presentation are linked because the now is the temporal dimension of the primal impression through which something is presented. The primal impression is a central point of the temporal process. Indeed, it is the starting point, the now, the beginning, because it is generating without being generated.\footnote{Husserl explains: “The primal impression is the absolute beginning of this production, the primal source, that from which everything else is continuously produced. But it itself is not produced; it does not arise as something produced but through genesis spontanea; it is primal generation. It does not spring from anything (it has no seed); it is primal creation. If it is said: A new now continuously forms on the now
because, without this primal impression, no continuous modifications and therefore no temporal flow is possible.\footnote{As I will demonstrate later, this is not so clear as a regression is still possible from the primal impression to a deeper layer of unification.}

From this framework it becomes possible to think about the problem of the temporality of the phantasy. In the description of the primal impression in Appendix III of the work previously mentioned, Husserl speaks about the possibility of a sort of primal impression for the object of imagination that he calls \textit{primal phantasy}. He mentions two possibilities to look at this notion of \textit{now}.\footnote{Husserl continues: “Now depending on whether it is a question of the primal source for the respective now of the constituted content or of the spontaneous productions of consciousness in which the identity of this now is maintained on into the past, the moment of origin is either primal impression or primal memory, primal phantasy [\textit{Ur-Phantasie}], and so on” (\textit{On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time}, pp. 106-7).} First, Husserl speaks about the “question of the primal source for the respective now of the constituted content.”\footnote{\textit{On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time}, pp. 106-7.} Here, the \textit{now} is understood as the primal source for some content; the emphasis is on the constitutive content to which the \textit{now} belongs. Hence, the \textit{now} is apprehended as the present of \textit{impression}. This moment of impression is not the same as the succession of tones which are given in consciousness (for instance, as the actual song is given). Here, the \textit{now} is one note corresponding to a tone, after which comes another \textit{now} corresponding to the next tone. Second, Husserl mentions “the spontaneous productions of consciousness in which the identity of this \textit{now} is maintained on into the past.”\footnote{\textit{On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time}, pp. 106-7.} Here, the \textit{now} is given in

\footnote{that becomes modified into a not-now, or a source quite suddenly engenders it or originates it, these are metaphors. It can only be said: Consciousness is nothing without impression” (\textit{On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time}, Appendix I, p. 106).}
consciousness as this particular present that flows into the past; the emphasis is on the remaining of the identity of the now while change happens: the now is taken as this moment of the apprehension that flows and remains identical while flowing. Here, the now is this one note which is present but flowing and therefore becoming past.

Husserl later modifies his account. He notices that arguing that the now remains identical while flowing leads to an infinite regress because there is a constant need of a deeper stratum from which the various moments can be synthetized. However, this earlier account is interesting for my description of the inner song. Indeed, the second case, the one in which “the spontaneous productions of consciousness in which the identity of this now is maintained on into the past,” stresses the now as a primal moment flowing in consciousness, and not the now as a moment of presentation. Thus, it helps to understand a phenomenological notion of a now, which may or may not be related to impression but is characterized primarily by its situation in the temporal flow of consciousness. In this case, the focus is on the now, not as an impressional moment of presentation, but for its function in the temporal flow of consciousness (whether it is the temporal flow of the impressional consciousness, or the quasi-temporal flow of the reproductive consciousness). This focus makes it possible to think something like a primal phantasy [Ur-Phantasie], a moment of origin with or without a presentation of sensory content through impression but characterized by its situation in a temporal flow. This now in its second meaning, is the primal-moment of the givenness of the object in the reproductive consciousness.490

489 On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, pp. 106-7.

490 And here I intend only the reproductive consciousness, only in the quasi-temporality of that presentifying consciousness.
§3. The Ur-Phantasie of the inner song.

I am rehearsing Bach in my room, focusing on the inner song. I am silent. The inner melody starts and grows in my consciousness. At the moment in which it starts growing, I can identify a sort of present. However, it sort of fades away and totally loses its temporal structure as it passes. I feel that it is only at the very moment in which I grasp it that the melody is temporally defined.

If there is the equivalent of this now of the impressional consciousness for the reproductive consciousness, then it follows that the succession of single moments of origin in the reproductive consciousness also creates a continuity by having each moment blending into another through succession without melting into the other. In other word, I should also hear the inner song through a blending of primal phantasies with other primal phantasies, without a dissolution of one primal moment into the next. However, in order to identify that type of succession in the reproductive consciousness, it is necessary to understand from which now the inner song flows, and therefore, identify a primary moment in the reproductive consciousness fulfilling the same role as the one of the impressional consciousness. The primal-moment of the reproductive consciousness

491 Here, the role I am talking about is the presence of the essence of the object in a particular now point. This leads to the problem of repetition in infinite iteration in time, and therefore, to the problem of recalling the inner song. I address this question several times in my dissertation. Although it can be said that the inner song is recalled in the broader sense of the term (i.e., brought back), I argue that it cannot be recalled in the strict Husserlian sense of the word because it is not related to a primary-impression, although, as I demonstrate here, it is related to a primary-moment.

The philosophy of Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) would be interesting to use in exploring the problem of iterability that I just mentioned. In Margins of Philosophy, Derrida defines iterability as a particular type of repetition in which the repeated (or the mark) can still be identified although it undergoes modifications and transformations in a new context. It would be interesting to analyze the
that I am describing *functions* in the same way as the primal-impression, while not being related to an impression, and therefore differing from the notion of *primal-moment* in the impressional consciousness. In other words, it is the presence of the essence of the inner song in a particular now point, of the *quasi*-temporality of the reproductive consciousness.

First of all, the *Ur-Phantasie* of the inner song *functions in the same way* as the now of the impression because it is not a *constituted* but *constituting* moment. This means that the succession is made of points of constitution of specific strata succeeding one another. Each now is extended with specific retentions andprotentions. In other words, as I hear the inner song of Bach, each tone is a primal moment in my phantasy. This primal moment remains through changes as it gets replaced by the primal moment of the next stratum. Thanks to it, the inner song is constituted as a continuity, despite the discontinuity of the moments of which it is made. Each *Ur-Phantasie* of the inner song is therefore a now, which passes from one moment into the next, blending in without being dissolved. For instance, if I listen to my inner song of the *Prelude*, each tone is distinctly flowing in the reproductive consciousness, blending with the next in a continuity of succession without being dissolved.

Secondly, this now experienced in the reproductive consciousness *differs from* the now experienced in the impressional consciousness. Indeed, if there is a coincidence of the *now* of impression with the present because the *now* corresponds to the presentation of the object, things are different when it comes to the reproductive consciousness. The inner song through this concept in order to reflect on the problem of the possible *repetition* of the inner song, despite its creative modifications in the reproductive consciousness.
reproductive consciousness does not present the object, it re-presents it; there is no impression. If there is no presentation through impression, and the now is related to presentation, then the object of phantasy cannot have a now. This contradicts the experience of the inner song. Indeed, when the inner song flows in the reproductive consciousness, it is experienced as flowing like a melody. Thus, there is a now, or a series of nows, in the reproductive consciousness, without a presentation through impression.

By looking more closely at the various layers constituting consciousness, it appears that there is a deeper layer of temporality than that of the constitution of the actual song or the inner song: the layer of the inner rhythm. This layer, that of the temporality of the inner bodily rhythms, belongs to the impressional consciousness; it is its deepest layer. It has a spatiality in the sense that it is experienced as part of the

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492 In “Merleau-Ponty through Mallarmé and Debussy” Jessica Wiskus makes this interesting observation: “Despite our common notion of rhythm as a series of definite, articulated sounds, the musician knows rhythm in quite a different way: as the silent interval that binds articulated sounds together. A single sound – a single note – does not generate a rhythm. It is the relation of a second note to the initial note that creates a rhythm. This is why a conductor who leads an orchestra never begins a piece of music from the first note; before the first note there must be a gesture (sometimes only a breath) that, when placed in relation to the first note, will initiate a rhythm or a pulse for the entirety of the musical movement. Rhythmically, the first gesture is never the beginning; it is the second gesture that discloses the fact that there was a beginning. For a rhythm can be instituted only retroactively; it turns back from the second note to the first in order to recover the interval of silence between the two, even as it then lays forth a new structure that would support the anticipated articulation of an unfurling melody. Rhythm promises an ongoing, dynamic process that works by looking both forward and in retrospect, arising through the non-coincidence of each sound.” (p. 233).

I won’t disagree with what the author says. I actually understand rhythm as she does. However, I would argue that the example of the conductor demonstrates not only that rhythm is retroactively instituted, but also that it is experienced against the deeper experience of the ongoing embodied inner rhythm which is always already instituted. In other words, the rhythm that starts the musical phrase thus marking its beginning, appears against the living ongoing inner rhythm of the musician’s Body. Hence, before the perceptual experience of the rhythm, there is the experience of auto-affection (in this sense, it involves the Body).

493 In this sense, if there is something like a simultaneity of experiences in the inner consciousness, this simultaneity is always experienced against that very first coincidence of the ego with itself. Here as well, we touch upon the problem of simultaneity through the paradox of auto-affection: when the ego experiences itself living, there is both otherness and sameness, the ego is one and double. The whole phenomenology of Michel Henry investigates that paradox. I won’t address it in my present research; however, I want to point it out for the sake of deepening my research in the future.

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perceptual Body (the Body experiences itself). However, it also has a temporality in the sense that it is experienced as a succession, and therefore part of the inner time consciousness. This spatiality and this temporality are given within the relationship of the embodied consciousness with itself, prior to the phenomenological constitution of space and time through perception and a condition of it. Indeed, it is on the ground of this experience of consciousness with itself that consciousness experiences the world. This is a crucial point. Indeed, it is through the notion of inner rhythm that it is possible to phenomenologically analyze the double consciousness, both impressional and reproductive, their interaction, and their two types of embodiment (one with a *Wahrnehmungsleib* and the other with a *Phantasieleib*). Thus, it is due to the notion of inner rhythm that it is possible to explain how the inner song is constituted in the reproductive consciousness *against* the layer of the constitution of the inner rhythm in the impressional consciousness and prior to the constitution of space and time through perception by this impressional consciousness.⁴⁹⁴

Here, it is necessary to perform a first type of description of this layer of *inner rhythm* in order to then understand the *quasi*-temporality of the inner song. In music practice, two of the constituting rhythms of the Body stand out: on the one hand, the heartbeat (or inner pulse), and on the other hand respiration. The first provides the regular structure of the beat (almost mechanically, one beat replacing the previous), while the second gives a periodical rhythm (the rhythm of the phrase which unfolds as long as my

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⁴⁹⁴ Of course, the musician can hear a phantasy disconnected from this primordial feeling, however, the interpretation would sound out of step with the beat. As I am describing here the inner song experienced within the music practice session, it is essential that the musician who will perform the inner song anchors the phantasy of the inner song in the Body which will then play.
respiration goes on\(^{495}\)). Together, they form the temporal layer of the inner rhythm of consciousness, constituted of rhythmical successions in the Body. This inner rhythm is constituted of primal moments as well as of their flowing in the Body. For instance, I breathe in, and then out, or I feel one pulse after the other. Thus, before any constitution of the time in the impressional consciousness perceiving the world, a temporality is already given in the passive experience of the Body with itself.\(^{496}\) This temporality of the Body is also made of a present, of retentions, and of protentions.\(^{497}\)

It is from this temporal Body that consciousness experiences the actual song as well as the inner song. Both are constituted in consciousness against the experience of the inner rhythm which constitutes a primary experience (a coordination of pulse and respiration for some music, or respiration but no pulse for some others\(^{498}\)). Hence, being in the now of the inner song means listening to the phenomenon in phantasy from the experience of the inner rhythm. In other words, the now of the inner song flows in the reproductive consciousness as consciousness experiences a breathing in.\(^{499}\) This does not

\(^{495}\) The Gregorian plainchant is an example of a music which is not pulsed but is still breathed through. It shows how a melody can be disconnected from the regular structure of a beat, while being still founded in the Body through respiration (I thank my parents Bruno and Isabelle Moysan who underlined that to me as I was discussing the notion of inner rhythm with them).

\(^{496}\) This is a thesis investigated in Rodemeyer Lanei: “The Body in Time/Time in the Body.”

\(^{497}\) Hence, it appears here that the Body itself has a History. I am not going to investigate this question here because it would lead me astray from my description of the inner song. However, it is a very interesting question which certainly impacts the process of performance itself. Indeed, a musician’s Body with twenty years of experience playing music certainly does not play in the same way as a musician’s Body with less experience. Other rhythms certainly play a role too (the cycle for the woman or circadian rhythms for instance). There is a sedimentation of habits in the Body which certainly participates in the constitution of the inner song. In my conclusion, I mention History as a topic of possible further developments of the description of the inner song.

\(^{498}\) I mentioned this earlier when I spoke about Boulez’s distinction between pulsed and non-pulsed music.

\(^{499}\) As opposed to out of step. In French we would say être dans le temps as opposed to être à côté du temps.
mean that the inner melody necessarily follows a rhythm that matches the inner rhythm.\textsuperscript{500} It just means that the rhythm of the inner melody unfolds within, and from the experience of the inner rhythm. Here, I would highlight the movement of respiration.\textsuperscript{501} Indeed, if the music may or may not be pulsed,\textsuperscript{502} respiration remains fundamental. It is through respiration that the musician anchors the rhythm of the inner melody in the time of the Body and thus becomes capable of performing the melody through the movements of the Body.\textsuperscript{503} Hence, the regular pre-egoic (because before space and time) temporality

\textsuperscript{500} Otherwise, the inner song of folk music with uneven rhythm as is the case in Bulgarian or Romanian folk music would be impossible for instance.

\textsuperscript{501} It would be interesting to analyze the relevance of that claim when it comes to electronic, minimalism or twelve-tone music. In the interview with Aârp it sounds like there is a reanchoring of the music in the Body (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-aarp-compositeur-de-musique-electronique/). It is also what Yann Wagner who plays music in clubs and therefore makes people dancing says (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-yan-wagner-compositeur-musiques-actuelles/).

\textsuperscript{502} In my dissertation, I focus on the notion of “inner rhythm” in general. I don’t analyze respiration or pulse in particular because this requires a deeper analysis that I cannot provide in the present work. I also tend to focus more on respiration than on the pulse, because not all music is necessarily pulsed. In Lang, Patrick, “Introduction à la phénoménologie du vécu musical.” Annales de phénoménologie 7, 2008, the author argues that: “le rythme est la trace, la matérialisation d’une forme d’énergie, il est une certaine qualité de mouvement, caractérisée par une unité de base que nous appelons la pulsation. C’est par l’appréhension d’une pulsation que passe nécessairement le premier contact avec un processus musical; si j’entends un orchestre jouer au loin, j’assimilerai la pulsation de ce qu’il joue, et je marcherai, ou danserai, ou battrai des mains cette pulsation. Lorsque j’entame l’étude d’une nouvelle partition, la pulsation est la première dimension que je cherche à susciter dans mon vécu; elle conditionne l’accès à tout le reste. D’après ce qui précède, il est clair également que l’identité du geste et du son, en quoi consiste le principe de la technique de la direction d’orchestre, repose avant tout sur le fait que le chef bat une pulsation proportionnée: une succession de battements dont chacun est composé d’un impact engendrant sa ou ses résolutions selon une relation spécifique” (p. 12). He then provides a very detailed analysis of the experience of pulsation (that he understands as “l’unité de force qui caractérise [...] le movement rhythmic”).

Although I want to acknowledge it, I don’t want to discuss it further because I do think that the experience of the inner song may or may not be accompanied by the experience of the pulse, and it is therefore not necessarily an essential feature of the phenomenon that I am studying. For this reason, I will keep speaking about the “inner rhythm” in a broader sense.

\textsuperscript{503} I study this more deeply in the final chapter.
of the inner rhythm is foundational for the temporality of the inner song, but also for the performance itself.\footnote{I distinguish (1) the rhythm of the inner rhythm (\textit{pre-egoic}) and (2) the now of the primal-phantasy (\textit{constituted}), from the (3) feeling of an alteration between strong beat/weak beat, also called preparation/stress, which is indicated through the measure 3/4, 4/4, etc., is already on the side of the \textit{constituted temporality}, and then (4) the rhythm of a specific piece of music that is unfolded within this structure.}

Two notions stand out in the description at this point: the notion of \textit{Ur-Phantasie} on the one hand, and the notion of inner rhythm on the other. The inner rhythm, and the now of the \textit{Ur-Phantasie} from which the inner song flows are both constituted but constituting temporalities. However, in the first case, the temporality is a constituted and originary temporality in the sense that it is a pre-egoic temporality against which other temporalities unfold in consciousness, whereas in the second case, the temporality is a constituted but constituting temporal moment in the sense that this moment is constituted by no other moment in the constituted reproductive consciousness. Both the temporality of the inner rhythm and the quasi-temporality of the phantasy are made of a succession. However, it is a different type of succession: the succession given by the inner rhythm matters for its almost mechanical regularity,\footnote{It is not always regular as it can speed up if I am anxious, or slow down if I am relaxed. However, in order to start phantasizing or playing music, I try to install a certain regularity.} for how one beat replaces the next (what matters is how the rhythm provides a regular structure and in this sense, I understand it as a \textit{static} temporality\footnote{In this particular context, I use the word “static” in a distinct meaning from Husserl’s understanding. I just want to describe the mechanical nature of the heartbeat and breathing.}), and for how there is a breathing in, and then out, whereas what matters with the succession given by the \textit{Ur-Phantasie} is how the music is led through the succession and how the temporal movement progresses (in this sense, I understand it...}
as a *dynamic* temporality). In other words, the inner rhythm matters as it provides a stable ground through its regularity, whereas the inner song leads the movement forward through the replacement of one moment by the next. Both are un-generated and generating, but in different ways; the temporality of the inner rhythm is given in a deeper layer (the bodily layer of consciousness) than the temporality of the quasi-temporality of the reproductive consciousness.

§4. Articulation of the temporality of the impressional consciousness and the quasi-temporality of the reproductive consciousness.

*I continue to rehearse Bach’s Prelude. The two melodies are given in consciousness. Sometimes, the melody of the actual song and that of the inner song seem to flow in a parallel way, distinct but corresponding with one another. In this case, the flow of perception is very clear, whereas that of the phantasy seems harder to grasp. I experience the latter as disorganized and it seems to vanish without being deeply retained. Sometimes, I cannot really distinguish the flowing of the actual song and the flowing of the inner song. I feel as if I am straddling two not clearly distinguishable phenomena.*

The inner song is constituted in the reproductive consciousness against the inner rhythm, and in relation with the temporality of the impressional consciousness (as I said earlier, consciousness could not *reproduce* a possible performance, if there were not also the experience of the performance; this is true for spatiality but for temporality as well). When it comes to the impressional consciousness, it is through the flowing of the *nows* that the temporal flow of consciousness is constituted.
In §34 of the Third Section of the *Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time* dedicated to “The Levels of Constitution pertaining to Time and Temporal Objects,” Husserl identifies three levels of constitution of which the deeper layer is this “absolute time-constituting flow of consciousness.”\(^507\) In his analysis, Husserl describes this “absolute consciousness that lies before all constitution”\(^508\) through the problem of change. He starts by noticing first how individual objects *endure in time*, and therefore have a temporal existence. He shows that, as a consequence, they are given through phases of a process, as parts of a whole. For him, the melody can be given as the phrase of the whole piece, or as itself. However, it can always be apprehended in smaller phrases, measures, etc. Each part of that process, however small, is still a process that is flowing.\(^509\)

Husserl also notices how any phase of change can be itself either in a process of change or at rest and, in principle, expanded into its opposite. For instance, the melody can be at rest (when I am apprehending it in its totality for instance, given as it is in the

\(^{507}\) Husserl writes: “1. the things of empirical experience in objective time (in connection with which we would have to distinguish still different levels of empirical being, which up to this point have not been taken into consideration: the experienced physical thing belonging to the individual subject, the intersubjectively identical thing, the thing of physics); 2. the constituting multiplicities of appearance belonging to different levels, the immanent unities in pre-empirical time; 3. the absolute time-constituting flow of consciousness” (*On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time*, §34, p. 77).

\(^{508}\) *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time*, §35, p. 77

\(^{509}\) Husserl explains: “1. Each individual object (each unity, whether immanent or transcendent, constituted in the stream) endures, and necessarily endures - that is, it continuously exists in time and is something identical in this continuous existence, which at the same time can be regarded as a process. Conversely: what exists in time continuously exists in time and is the unity belonging to the process that carries with it inseparably the unity of what endures in the process as it unfolds. The unity of the tone that endures throughout the process lies in the tonal process; and conversely, the unity of the tone is unity in the filled duration, that is, in the process. Therefore, if anything at all is defined as existing in a time-point, it is conceivable only as the phase of a process, a phase in which the duration of an individual being also has its point” (*On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time*, §35, p. 78).
flow), or in flow (as it is given it still flows because it is a temporal object). In other words, I can apprehend the Bach piece as one object (in this case it is at rest) or play it through in my phantasy (in this case, it is in a process of change). In the temporal consciousness, whatever is given in a process of change can be apprehended as at rest from a deeper layer, and what is given at rest can conversely be apprehended as flowing from an upper layer.\textsuperscript{510} I can therefore apprehend in consciousness the inner song of the Sonata as a whole, or play it chunk by chunk in my phantasy.\textsuperscript{511} This is possible because it is always possible to grasp the object from a deeper layer for which it is given as at rest. This deeper layer is the layer of the absolute consciousness which grounds all these different temporal experiences, and which identifies both change and rest.

This observation concerning the possibilities of apprehension of the temporal object from various temporal layers of consciousness leads Husserl to distinguish two elements: the constituted, on the one hand, from the constituting on the other. If there is always a deeper layer from which the object can be apprehended as at rest, it means that the constituting can always be constituted from a deeper layer. This observation allows Husserl to establish that the hyletic flow of the impressional consciousness is made of continuous changes but still flows \textit{as it flows}, i.e., without following the same process of modifications which is in place with the constituted. In this sense, the absolute consciousness of which the hyletic flow is a stratum, stops the infinite temporal

\textsuperscript{510} Husserl continues: “2. Individual or concrete being is necessarily changing or unchanging; the process is a process of change or of rest, the enduring object itself a changing object or one at rest. Moreover, every change has its rate or acceleration of change (to use an image) with respect to the same duration. As a matter of principle, any phase of a change can be expanded into a rest, and any phase of a rest can be carried over into a change” (\textit{On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time}, §35, p. 78).

\textsuperscript{511} This is what I do if I practice some specific passages.
regression because it is the ultimate layer of temporality.\footnote{The temporality of the inner rhythm is a deeper pre-egoic layer, so the flow is the ultimate layer in the constitution of the absolute time of consciousness.} Because of the specific definition of the *hylé* as non-intentional aspect of the intentional object, it is impossible to identify specific objects which would need to be constituted in this flow. Thus, even if it is not itself constituting, the hyle is still on the side of the constituting consciousness. The hyletic flow is neither constituting nor constituted, instead, it simply flows. However, although not itself constituting, it is still on the side of the constituting consciousness.\footnote{Husserl describes: \textit{“Now if we consider the constituting phenomena in comparison with the phenomena just discussed, we find a flow, and each phase of this flow is a continuity of adumbrations. But as a matter of principle, no phase of this flow can be expanded into a continuous succession; and therefore the flow cannot be conceived as so transformed that this phase would be extended in identity with itself. Quite to the contrary, we necessarily find a flow of continuous "change"; and this change has the absurd character that it flows precisely as it flows and can flow neither "faster " nor " slower." If that is the case, then any object that changes is missing here; and since "something" runs its course in every process, no process is in question. There is nothing here that changes, and for that reason it also makes no sense to speak of something that endures. It is therefore nonsensical to want to 35 find something here that remains unchanged for even an instant during the course of its duration” (On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, §35, p. 78).}

For Husserl, this flow of the impressional consciousness is the source-point.\footnote{Husserl says: \textit{“This flow is something we speak of \textit{in conformity with what is constituted}, but it is not ‘something in objective time.’ It is \textit{absolute subjectivity} and has the absolute properties of something to be designated \textit{metaphorically} as ‘flow’; of something that originates in a point of actuality, in a primal source-point, the ‘now,’ and so on. In the actuality-experience we have the primal source-point and a continuity of moments of reverberation. For all of this, we lack names” (On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, §36, p. 79).} To describe it, he goes back to his originary description of consciousness as a stream in the *Logical Investigations* and introduces the idea of an immanent time \textit{“which is one; and in this time the unities can be simultaneous or have durations of equal length […]}. Moreover, the unities have a certain determinability with respect to before and after.”\footnote{On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, §37, p. 80.}

The stream of consciousness is one, there is only one temporal synthesis, one hyletic
flow. However, it is a unity made of multiplicities (for instance with the melody, multiple rhythms, multiples unities, patterns, chords, parts of melodies, etc.), of multiple noematic layers. Thus, the hyletic flow is: “a single flow that breaks down into many flows, but this multitude nevertheless has a kind of unity that permits and requires us to speak of one flow.” In other words, the stream remains the same, identical to itself (there is therefore a unity of likeness), while enduring change (there is therefore a unity despite the change). The multiplicity of data constituting this flow is a multiplicity of sensations. For instance, in music practice, there are tone sensations, color sensations, sensations of cold, warmth, pain, etc. Together, these sensations don’t constitute one flow, but a multiplicity of flows, flowing into one flow. In this one flow, there are as many flows as there are data of primal-sensations. These sensations flow then according to a certain path, and they also have their own duration. Despite this multiplicity, the stream remains an immanent unity bearing a multiplicity of immanent processes. It is not modified by the multiplicity, but instead remains in its own mode that Husserl characterizes as “the mode of having elapsed.”

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516 On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, § 38, p. 81.

517 Husserl explains: “We find many flows because many series of primal sensations begin and end. But we find a connecting form because the law of the transformation of the now into the no-longer - and, in the other direction, of the not-yet into the now - applies to each of them, but not merely to each of them taken separately; there rather exists something like a common form of the now, a universal and perfect likeness in the mode of flowing. Several, many primal sensations occur ‘at once.’ And when any one of them elapses, the multitude elapses ‘conjointly’ and in absolutely the same mode with absolutely the same gradations and in absolutely the same tempo: except that, in general, one ceases while another still has its not-yet before it - that is, to say, its new primal sensations that further prolong the duration of what is intended in it” (On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, §38, p. 81).

518 Husserl writes: “What is a being-together as an ensemble of primal sensations remains a being-together in the mode of having elapsed” (On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, §38, p. 82).
This detailed description of the hyletic flow of the impressional consciousness helps to understand the flowing of the inner song in the reproductive consciousness. Indeed, even if it is essentially different, the flow of the reproductive consciousness functions in the same way as the hyletic flow: there is also a primal moment, the Ur-Phantasie that I described above, which is accompanied, in the situation that I am studying, by the flowing of the inner song, or other phantasy objects and data. However, as opposed to what happens in the impressional consciousness, the flow of the phantasy is not a flowing of sensations, it is a flowing of phantasms, sensory data of tone, sensations, etc.\textsuperscript{519} As was said earlier, the distinction between sensations and phantasms is that sensations are given through primary impression, whereas phantasms are a modified reproduction of sensuous data in phantasy (apprehended regardless of their existential value). Despite not presenting the object through a now of impression, these phantasms have a temporal value, and they also flow temporally.

As the inner song is the modified reproduction of a possible perception of the performance, and as the givenness of the performance as mine in the impressional consciousness entails the co-constitution of a melody and the musical instrument through which it is produced,\textsuperscript{520} the inner song is given in the reproductive consciousness through various primarily sonorous-phantasms of the inner melody associated with other types of phantasms like visual or smell-phantasms, but more specifically touch-phantasms which constitute the inner instrument.\textsuperscript{521} As the inner melody is played in the reproductive

\textsuperscript{519} I will describe them in more detail later in this chapter.

\textsuperscript{520} I will explain that further in the next chapter.

\textsuperscript{521} I will come back to this point later in this chapter.
consciousness, the notes, half notes, quarter notes, sixteenth notes, thirty-second notes, unfold according to a particular synthesis of time which links them together. Then, because the inner musical instrument is co-constituted with the inner melody in the trained consciousness of the practicing musician, the inner melody of the inner song is associated with more or less accurate tactual data. The notes therefore have not only temporal values, but they are also given with a sensation of pleasure or pain, of liberation, they have an intensity, a timbre, they carry emotions as they get linked with one another in a particular way; they can be related to a color for me, or the suites that they represent can remind me particular events.

The relationship between this flow of consciousness in which the inner song appears, and the hyletic flow is the following: the flow of the reproductive consciousness is made of modified reproduced data of perception which are represented in consciousness cancelling out their existential status. Thus, the phantasms are sensations that are modified and reproduced in the phantasy. For instance, the actual song is given in the impressional consciousness, specific tones resonate in the reproductive consciousness, consciousness plays with them, extends them, modifies them, and they become part of a new inner song. When phantasms flow into the quasi-past of the reproductive consciousness, one replaces the next. Then, as these phantasms are not given in sensation in objective time, as they are not given in continuity with a primal-impression, they cannot be, properly speaking, recalled through memory as happens in remembering. This means that, in order to be given again, they need to be

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522 Bernet explains remembering as follows: “In remembering, by contrast with reflection, intentional interest is directed towards a past object and not an earlier perception. Nevertheless, an earlier perception is intentionally implied by a memorially presentified past object. Expresed in Husserl’s terminology: the presentification of a past object implies the reproduction of the original experience of
reconstituted. In other words, the coming back of objects in the reproductive consciousness, for instance, the recalling of my inner song from yesterday, is more accurately a reconstitution in a new phantasy, of a past phantasy, identified through reflection as the same. As the temporal consistency of the flow of constituting the reproductive consciousness requires a reflective judgement identifying various objects as the same, or as intentionally connected thanks to an additional intentional act, the constituted flow is more fleeting than the flow of the impressional consciousness, and therefore, the phantasy worlds do not present the same consistency as the perceived world. Indeed, phantasms flow in the past, are brought back, but they can be modified that object. I experience the memorial appearance of an object as a reproductive modification of an earlier perceptual consciousness in which the object was self-given in its bodily presence. The inner consciousness of a memory is therefore not an impressional consciousness of a perception but a reproductive consciousness which bears within itself the earlier perception in the manner of an intentional implication (and not as a real (reell) component). What I experientially live through in remembering is neither simply a past perception nor a present memory but a present memory as a reproduction of an earlier perception. Consequently, the object appears as presentified, that is, it gives itself ("originarily") and not as an image, all the while maintaining its temporal distance from the present. Husserl says that it “hovers” before me (mir vorschwebt) without me being really able to grasp it bodily (“Unconscious consciousness in Husserl and Freud” p. 336-7). This explanation helps to understand how remembering can involve reproduction, as phantasy does, but in a distinct way. Phantasy, as a “non-positing form of reproductive presentification [...] gives the impression of being distinguished from the corresponding perception merely through its neutralised position-taking” (“Unconscious consciousness in Husserl and Freud” p. 337). However, it is more exactly “a reproductive consciousness of a presentation, that is to say, a reproductive modification that produces the modified in such a way that it modifies it” (“Unconscious consciousness in Husserl and Freud” p. 338). Both in remembering and phantasy, there is an alterity of the object, which is presentified, not bodily present.

523 Husserl explains this in the Logical Investigations when he works on the correspondence between the perception and the phantasy and demonstrates that the perception can be modified in phantasy, but the phantasy cannot be modified further. As a consequence, it is re-constituted. I explain this in the chapter on “Perceiving and phantasizing.”

524 In this sense, the meaning of the inner song would change from day to day and perhaps never be stabilized.

525 I address this problem in the next chapter.

526 I explain this in Chapter 2 on “Perceiving and Phantasizing.”
through a capacity for free playing. For instance, I can reconstitute my inner song of the Sonata from yesterday and, as I practice it, modify my inner song, make it softer, faster, more brilliant, etc.\textsuperscript{527}

§5. The layer of the inner rhythm as a common layer between the perceptual Body and the phantasy Body.

\textit{I am sitting in my chair, eyes closed. I already know Bach’s Allemande melody because I have been learning it in recent days with my cello. I know how fast it should go and I can phantasize its beginning well. I grasp the inner rhythm, the tempo of the melody within it, feel the rhythm in my body, situate myself within this rhythm, and when I am well situated in it, I sing my inner song, poise the bow on the string, and start playing. I try to play in an attuned, rhythmically correct, and musically meaningful way. I repeat the same measure over and over again, trying to fix it. As I do, I become more and more aware of my body, and the sensations offered through practice with the instrument. I try to remain connected to my sensations and my movements, so that the phenomena remain grounded in the body, embodied, and I am then able to phantasize my inner song including these sensations in it.}

To understand the Phantasieleib involved in the constitution of the inner song, it is necessary to go back to the notion of Wahrnehmungsleib. Husserl mentions it in the second Section of Ideas 2, in which he studies the constitution of “man as a nature,” i.e., “the constitution of man as he presents himself to a naturalistic point of view: as material

\textsuperscript{527} I work this through in more detail in the coming chapter.
body upon which are constructed new strata of being, the Bodily-psychic.” Here, Husserl points out a paradox: the Body is both material like any other object, but also, as a material object, the bearer of the psychical. As a material object, the body is parenthesized and should be studied under the *epoché*. However, as the bearer of the psychical, it participates in the gesture of the *epoché*. In other words, the Body is the point, within the ego, where Husserl moved the line between what can be suspended with the *epoché*, and what participates in the stable ego discovered after the *epoché*. Hence, the phenomenological constitution of the Body differs from the constitution of an object like the musical instrument. Indeed, the impressional consciousness constitutes the Body as *my Body*, and this Body *through which*, for instance, I can perform and play music, this Body that would realize my inner song.

Husserl says that “in all experience of spatio-thingly Objects, the Body ‘is involved’ as the perceptual organ of the experiencing subject.” In other words, it is thanks to the Body that I can perceive and experience the world through perception. To develop this point and issue a description of the phenomenological constitution of the Body, Husserl does not use the example of a Body touching another object given in the world, but the example of the Body touching itself, touching itself as an object given in the world. This example in which the Body is both *perceiving* and *perceived*, allows

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528 *Ideas* 2, §35, p. 151.

529 I develop this question in Chapter 3 on the “Various layers of the musician’s Ego.”

530 *Ideas* 2, §36, p. 152

531 This is a very famous and classical analysis that does not directly help my description of the inner song. For this reason, I will just summarize it in this footnote. Husserl says: “Touching my left hand, I have touch-appearances, that is to say, I do not just sense, but I perceive and have appearances of a soft, smooth hand, with such a form” (*Ideas* 2, §36, p. 152). In other words, perceiving through touch gives the object with certain features, which is true for any kind of object. For instance, as I play my cello, my
Husserl to provide a phenomenological description of the Body, and also isolate tactuality as a specific kind of perceptual sense. Husserl shows how, whenever two parts of the Body are in contact with each other, there is a double sensation with two types of localizations in the Body. Thus, the Body is constituted in two ways: as a matter

perception gives me the cello as a large instrument connected to my body. However, touching my own hand gives a different kind of sensation than touching my instrument. Husserl pursues his description highlighting a paradox: what is different in the touching of an object (my cello for instance) and the touching of my hand is that, with the touching of my own hand, I have, in addition to the feeling of touching, the feeling of being touched (Ideas 2, §36, p. 152). Hence, as one of my hands touches the other, I attribute some characteristics to my left hand, even if these characteristics are given in the right hand, and therefore belong to this right hand. In this way, I constitute the object left hand by attributing to it characteristics that are felt with my right hand. Husserl explains more accurately how, in the case of the hands touching each other, the hand touching becomes a Body through the action of touching (Ideas 2, §36, p. 152). So, the left hand is given as touched, like any other object, but Husserl demonstrates that the right hand is also given, as touching, i.e., as a place where sensations are localized.

Husserl adds: “Similarly, if the hand is pinched, pressed, pushed, stung, etc., touched by external bodies or touching them, then it has its sensations of contact, of being stung, of pain, etc.” (Ideas 2, §36, p. 153). In other words, at the receiving hand of the action there are also sensations. Husserl deduces then: “And if this happens by means of some other part of one’s Body, then the sensation is doubled in the two parts of the Body, since each is then precisely for the other an external thing that is touching and acting upon it, and each is at the same time Body” (Ideas 2, §36, p. 153). Husserl observes: “All the sensations thus produced have their localization, i.e., they are distinguished by means of their place on the appearing Corporeality, and they belong phenomenally to it” (Ideas 2, §36, p. 153). In other words, one sensation is distinct from another as a result of its localization in the Body, and it is given as belonging to the Body. It is also thanks to localization that I get a sense of the shape of my own Body. In other words, my arm becomes mine when it gets touched, and I start to sense where my arm begins, where it ends, and where the world begins.

This question of tactuality and the simultaneous constitution of the Body and the world became central in Phenomenology, particularly in the French tradition which produced a very fruitful reflection on this problem with Merleau-Ponty (Phenomenology of Perception), Jean-Luc Nancy (L’intrus), or more recently Didier Franck (Chair et Corps). I want to single out Merleau-Ponty because of his development of the notion of “dynamic-Body image” or in French, “schema-corporel.” He works particularly on that notion in his Lectures at the Sorbonne from 1949-1952, and in the Phenomenology of Perception. Throughout his work, Merleau-Ponty underlines the proximity between us and the world, thanks to the senses. He shows how there is a unity of the Body, and how this unity constitutes a dynamic unity with the world thanks to motricity. Cf. Danilo Saretta Verissimo, “Sur la notion de schéma corporel dans la philosophie de Merleau-Ponty.” I choose to remain in the Husserlian framework to describe the inner song. However, it would be interesting to pursue the analysis further by enlarging this original framework with other phenomenologies.
like any other matter that has certain characteristics, but also as capable of sensations and more specifically, of localized sensations.⁵³³

This localization is related to movement and given through kinesthetic sensations.⁵³⁴ Indeed, as a bodily organ explores the world through tactuality, sensations are given with the action of touching, these sensations are localized in the Body, and thus constitute the interior spatial sense of the Body. For instance, as I play the cello, manipulate the instrument, issue a sound, and practice some specific moves, localized sensations are given in my Body with the movement. Through these sensations, I get a sense of my fingers, my arms, my knees, etc. I also feel where the world begins as my knees are in touch with the cello, my fingers too, etc. As these sensations are given during music practice, some sensations are stronger than others: the finger in contact with the instrument, the movement of my arm holding the bow, etc. It is through these sensations that the particular interior spatial sense of the perceptual Body is constituted; in the case of music practice I call it: the musician’s Body.⁵³⁵

⁵³³ Husserl writes: “Hence the Body is originally constituted in a double way: first, it is a physical thing, matter; it has its extension, in which are included its real properties, its color, smoothness, hardness, warmth, and whatever other material qualities of that kind there are. Secondly, I find on it, and I sense ‘on’ it and ‘in’ it: warmth on the back of the hand, coldness in the feet, sensations of touch in the fingertips. I sense, extended over larger Bodily areas, the pressure and pull of my clothes” (Ideas 2, §36, p. 153).

⁵³⁴ Husserl says: “Moving my fingers, I have motion sensations, whereby a sensation in an ever-changing way extends itself over and traverses the surface of the fingers, but within this sensation-complex there is at the same time a content having its localization in the interior of the digital space” (Ideas 2, §36, p. 153).

⁵³⁵ This idea of the “musician’s Body” was mentioned first by Camille Poupat and was discussed later on during other interviews as well (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-camille-poupat-saxophoniste/). It has its equivalent in other artistic practices or simply other praxes engaging a specific development of the body related to a particular activity. This is something that I discussed in the interview with the ceramist Emmanuel Boos (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-emmanuel-boos-ceramiste/).
The phantasy Body involved in the constitution of the inner song is related to this perceptual Body. Indeed, as the musician practices, the awareness of the movements that are performed during the practice sessions increases. Then, the more the musician is aware of the movements that produce this or that type of melody, the more s/he is capable of phantasizing an embodied inner song, involving a reproductive modification of that nexus of sensations acquired through the perception of the musical instrument, and the perception of their own manipulation of it. This capability relies on the fact that the Body remembers; there is a “Body memory.” In other words, the Body is temporal and it is possible to recall past sensations relying on the Body. The inner song is then further constituted in the phantasy as these past or present sensations given through impression are reproduced, cancelling out their existential status, and allowing them to be freely modified.

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536 This is obviously the best-case scenario. A musician can also practice in the wrong way, not raising their awareness of their own movements. Such a practice session is not as efficient. I will describe this better later in the next chapter.

537 I develop these ideas through the coming chapters, but it is extensively discussed in the interview with François Moysan (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-francois-moysan-pianiste/).

538 I take this expression from Fuchs, Thomas, “The Phenomenology of Body Memory.” I will come back to this question more specifically in the chapters on the "Musical instrument" and the "Realization of the inner song."

539 I will investigate this process later on. The work of the phantasy with Bodily sensations is described more particularly by improvisers or composers who explain how they acquire a vocabulary and dispositions and freely play with them in phantasy (cf. the interviews with the organist and composer Thierry Escaich: http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-thierry-escaich-organiste/, the classical and jazz drummer Andrew Reamer: http://www.ellenmoysan.com/interview-with-andrewreamer-symphony-percussion-player/, and the folk bagpipe player George Balderose: http://www.ellenmoysan.com/interview-with-george-balderose-bagpiper-en/).
As I underlined earlier, there is a layer of constitution underneath that of the perceptual Body which is also part of the constitution of the phantasy Body.\textsuperscript{540} the deeper layer of the \textit{inner rhythm} which has both a spatiality and a temporality.\textsuperscript{541} Having investigated its temporality earlier in this chapter, I want now to investigate its spatiality. Consciousness experiences itself as an embodied consciousness through the experience of inner rhythm, an auto-affection through which it is given to itself as alive, and rhythmically animated. Consciousness experiences a coordination of various rhythms, more specifically respiration and heartbeat, in the situation of music practice that I am describing.

Husserl does not analyze this kind of auto-affection so crucial for music practice.\textsuperscript{542} However, he mentions heartbeat and respiration in his works\textsuperscript{543} in order to

\textsuperscript{540} Even if Pierre Sauvanet, both philosopher and practicing musician, argues in \textit{Le Rythme et la Raison}, that the connection between rhythm and pulse is exaggerated, I want to argue that there is no practice of music, and therefore no formation of an inner song, without a primary contact with the rhythm of the Body, even if it is only a simple breathing in. The musician may only touch base with the bodily rhythms and then deform, and reform the rhythm; I am not arguing for more. My point is just to highlight how music starts with this primary embodiment. Here, coming back to the first and the third person experience leads me to this claim. My approach is therefore to ask both what happens and what it is (Sauvanet mentions the two approaches of the ethnomusicologist and the philosopher and demonstrates how their work is led by two different questions, and therefore how they have a different relationship to their object of investigation, Pierre Sauvanet, "L’ethnomusicologue et le philosophe: quand ils se rencontrent sur le phénomène ‘rythme.’")

\textsuperscript{541} The inner rhythm was brought to my attention by the drummer Rémi Métral: \url{http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-remi-metral-batteur/}.

\textsuperscript{542} It would be interesting to study the notion of inner rhythm in the medical context. In such an analysis, it would be necessary to distinguish the \textit{inner rhythm} of music practice which designates the internal rhythms of respiration and heartbeat, from the notion of \textit{pulse} which designates the apprehension of the rhythm of the heartbeat only. However, working through the notion of inner rhythm as what indicates the life of the subject would certainly enrich a phenomenological description of the living Body, and of the notion of the life of the subject.

\textsuperscript{543} To be able to focus on the specific notion of inner rhythm in the main text of my dissertation, I will provide here an overview of a couple of Husserl’s related analyses which could help to understand the notion of inner rhythm. These can be found in §44 of \textit{Ideas 2}.

Here, Husserl mentions how perceptual objects (thus, individual objects, objects that have a temporal presence and a temporal duration) break down into: “1) objects which can be primally present
not just to one subject, but, if they are primally present to one, can be given identically as primally present ideality to all other subjects (as soon as these are constituted). The totality of objects that can be given as primally present and that make up a domain of common primal presence for all communicating subjects is nature in the first and original sense. It is spatial-temporal material nature: the one space, the one time, the one world of things for all: the one that can be given as primally present to all. 2) what is subjective over against the Objective. And the subjective is the individual-unique, the temporal, the total content of original presence which can be given to only one subject in primal presence. Each subject belongs here itself along with all its acts, states, noematic correlates, and, further more, with the Corporeality and the properties, or faculties, constituted in it in the inner attitude" (Ideas 2, §44, p. 171). Husserl distinguishes between body as Körper on the one hand (in music practice, my cello as a musical instrument, or the melody as a sonorous object issued by my manipulation of this musical instrument), and body as Leib on the other (in music practice, the Body bearing the kinesthetic sensations acquired through, for instance, the playing of the instrument).

Then, he investigates a second type of object from the point of view of intersubjectivity (I will ignore that aspect because I am describing the solipsistic experience of practicing music. However, this does not mean that intersubjectivity plays no role in that process. It is just a whole other set of phenomenological questions that I cannot address in the present analysis). Husserl underlines how: “There are realities that cannot be given to several subjects in primal presence, namely, animalia, for subjectivities are included in them.” (Ideas 2, §45, pp. 171-2). These animalia are a kind of reality that cannot be presented to other subjects through impression because they include the subject him- or herself. Hence, they are not given externally through tactuality or other senses because they are included in the Body of the subject. Consequently, they are given only to the subject of the Body to which they belong. For Husserl: “They are Objectivities of a particular kind, given originally in such a way that they presuppose primal presences, whereas they themselves cannot be given in primal presence” (Ideas 2, §45, p. 172). As they presuppose primal presences, but cannot be given in primal presence to other subjects, they are instead appresented (Ideas 2, §45, p. 172).

Husserl approaches the problem by working out the notion in the intersubjective context. He describes how I perceive other Bodies similar to mine (Ideas 2, §45, p. 172), and how I transfer over to these Bodies the system of localization that I experience through kinesthetic sensations in perception, both the sense-fields (the sense of sensing), and the sense-regions (the sense of moving), along with my spiritual activities (Ideas 2, §45, p. 172) understood as the fact that I attribute to the other what I experience with myself (Husserl works out this problem in more depth in the Cartesian Meditations, V, §51, when he develops the notion of “pairing”). This observation leads him to describe the continuous coordination of the physical with the psychical, going through particular expressions of that connection (Ideas 2, §45, p. 172). In the course of his analysis of what the other can apprehend of myself, Husserl observes that certain localizations are not experienced but appresented by the other. In other words, they are co-present as a potentiality of perception: others cannot access them through tactuality, they cannot be presented in perception through sensations to the other, and they are not the bearer of the field of touch for the other (Ideas 2, §45, pp. 172-3).

These observations lead Husserl to show: “The Body as physical Object is subject to physical influences to which psychic ‘consequences’ are linked without my knowing precisely how they are connected” (Ideas 2, §45, p. 173). Then, Husserl explains through the example of the appresentation of the brain (Ideas 2, §45, p. 173) how other subjects apprehend animalia as necessarily connected to the parts of the body that are presented to them in perception. For him: “this is originally an empirical coordination which belongs to appearances, and then it is an empirical coordination that belongs to what has been worked out theoretically” (Ideas 2, §45, p. 173). This shows how there is something, in the subject, that can only be experienced in primal presence by the subject themselves. In other words, this specific kind of perception shows how some experiences of the Body are part of the very private connection of the embodied ego with itself. That’s the case of the inner rhythm. Indeed, heartbeat or respiration are given in primal presence only to me. They are experienced directly through sensation. I also experience them as connected to each other and connected to the localized sensations.
show how there is a layer of constitution underneath the surface of the

_Wahrnehmungsleib_ with its localizations. This layer is constituted of feelings belonging
to a deeper layer of the _Leib_, a layer of visceral feelings, with a diffuse, spread-out
localization, accessible in primal presence only to the subject themselves.\(^{544}\)

This is the layer that I identify as a layer of _auto-affection_; the inner rhythm
belongs to it. Even if it is made of particular types of _auto-affections_ not clearly
distinguishable from one another, Husserl chooses to single out among these visceral
feelings the specific experience of the heart.\(^{545}\) He explains how: “For example, I ‘feel
my heart’. When I press the surface of the Body ‘around the heart,’ I discover, so to say,
this ‘heart sensation,’ and it may become stronger and somewhat modified.”\(^{546}\)

For Husserl: “the system of appresentations, which, on the one hand, in the case of the solipsistic
subject, has its original basis in original connections of regular co-existence in such a way that the
connected members and the series of members in their _co-presence_ are not just there together but _refer
to one another_” (Ideas 2, §45, p. 173). That system “develops as a system of ordered indications only by
means of continuous experience of other people, who are already constituted by empathy (Ideas 2, §45,
p. 173). These special kinds of feelings that Husserl calls _common feelings [Gemeingefühle]_ (“Beim
solipsistischen Subjekt haben wir das ausgezeichnete Tastfeld in Komprésenz mit der erscheinenden
Leibesoberfläche, in eins damit das Wärmefeld; in zeiter linie die unbestimmte Lokalisation der
Gemeingefühle (auch der geistigen), ferner der leiblichen Innerlichkeit, vermittelt durch die
Tastfeldlokalisation” (Ideen 2, §45, p. 165), are part of a system of elements which imply and refer to one
another, until the deeper layer of the _interior Body_ (Ideas 2, §45, pp. 173-4).

These feelings are “common to all organs and limbs and thus cannot be ‘localized’ in one part of the
body, say, in the hand. [...] these feelings pervade the whole body; they are a total feeling of one’s bodily
disposition, for instance hunger, thirst or tiredness. These feelings emerge from various bodily sensations
but cannot be reduced to any of them” (Pokropski, “Affectivity And Time,” p. 165).

Husserl does not mention respiration here but later in _Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie_, p. 105:
“Der Hyletisch-gefühlsmäsig-kinästhetitsche Prozess ist aber als instinktivein Strebeingente Prozess, und
zwar im Essen im Urmodus der Erfüllung. So ist es natürlich in jedem anderen Fall des Instinks, und
zunächst eines ‘sinnlichen’ Instinks. Das Riechen – unwillkürliche Bewegungen des tieferen Einatmens,
des sich körperlichen Hinwendens etc. Ebensog visuelle Daten – Augenbewegungen,
Körperbewegungen.” Here, respiration is mentioned in Husserl’s investigation of the problem of instincts.
I will not enter into this specific part of Husserl’s phenomenology as I am describing how the inner rhythm
plays a role in the perception of the melody, and not analyzing this notion for itself.

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\(^{546}\) Ideas 2, §45, p. 174.
description of how I can discover the heart sensation through various experiences, can be applied and modified to the other case which matters to understand the notion of inner rhythm: the case of respiration. Indeed, it is possible to experience respiration, for instance if I put my right hand in front of my mouth, I can feel the air being breathed out. Husserl explains: “it [the heart sensation] does not itself belong to the touched surface, but it is connected with it.” As Husserl shows here, this feeling of the heart is underneath the surface of the Body (the touchable part of the Body) but related to it. Similarly, the respiration coming from my lungs does not belong to the hand feeling it, but it is connected with it.

For him, this connection between the surface layer and the deeper layer can be experienced because:

if I not only simply contact the surface of my Body but press on it more strongly, press into the flesh, i.e., with my touching finger ‘feel through’ to my bones or inner organs (just as, similarly, with other bodies I feel through to their inner parts), then particular new sensations, which are attributed to the relevant felt-through Bodily parts, join to the general sensations of pressure and touch. And I would add that, similarly, if I breathe in or out strongly, I can feel my lungs filling up or emptying, my shoulder moving, my diaphragm being contracted, etc. This means that localized sensations can be given with these common feelings. Consequently, there should be a connection between the surface and the deeper layer of the Body. It is this connection that the musician experiences when making contact with the inner rhythm in

\[547\text{ Ideas 2, §45, p. 174.}\]

\[548\text{ Ideas 2, §45, p. 174.}\]
order to perform or perceive. Then, it is this whole that gets reproduced in the reproductive consciousness.

So, within the process of the constitution of the musician’s Body as a specific type of Wahrnehmungsleib part of the impressional consciousness, the inner rhythm, understood as a synthetic unity of the various rhythms of the Body through which the Body is experienced as both alive, and alive because rhythmically animated, belongs to this category of common feelings only appresented to other subjects but presented to me through auto-affection. In the situation I am describing, the inner rhythm is experienced essentially by the co-activity of two interior rhythms given together thanks to the coordination of their activities: the heartbeat and respiration. This inner rhythm varies if I am at rest or in activity, if I am running a marathon or I staying peacefully in my room, if I am young or old, etc. It also includes other biological rhythms, less important for music practice than the two I just highlighted. As such, is part of the deeper layer of the Body, experienced through auto-affection. However, it is also connected with the layer of the Wahrnehmungsleib made of localized sensations. Indeed, the musician can experience it by snapping his or her fingers, marking the rhythm by tapping their foot on the ground, walking according to its rhythm, etc. This possibility of apprehending the inner rhythm through the perception of some other movements of the Body highlights an intimate

549 I am not going to properly take them in consideration here because they don’t directly impact the performance. These are, for instance, the alternation between sleep and wakefulness, the woman’s periods, etc.

550 This is an experience that the Dalcroze solfege stresses particularly; I discussed it with Stephen Neely: http://www.ellenmoysan.com/interview-with-stephen-neely-professor-of-dalcroze-eurhythmics/.
connection between the inner rhythm as the layer underneath that of the constitution of
the Body, and the localized sensation given at the surface of the Body.551

This inner rhythm plays an essential role in music practice. Indeed, it is the
deepest layer against which the impressional consciousness perceiving the world, and the
reproductive consciousness phantasizing, are constituting something like, for instance,
the *tempo* of a melody. This means that the musical tempo552 which is related to what the

551 No one other than me can have access to that inner rhythm in primal presence. Others can have access
to it if they press their hand on my heart, or put their hand on my stomach (that’s what a doctor does to
check the patient), if they observe me playing, or if they try to grasp it by empathy, but I am the only one
who can experience it through auto-affection, as a feeling of myself for myself, in primal presence (if I
have a cardiac problem, I am the only one who can directly feel the heart racing and slowing down too
much, and that’s the same with respiration: somebody who is having an asthmatic issue will be the only
one feeling the problem, others can only grasp it externally). Consequently the tempo I give to my
interpretation is also properly mine. Of course, in the case of intersubjective practices, I can be called to
follow the tempo of another musician. In this case, the deepest rhythmical reference is not given by my
inner rhythm, but by another’s inner rhythm. The question of playing music together has been
investigated in more depth by Alfred Schütz in *Collected Papers I*, or “Making Music Together: A Study in
Social Relationship.”

552 In “Introduction à la phénoménologie du vécu musical,” Patrick Lang analyses the notion of tempo
saying: “le tempo a un corrélat dans le temps physique; mais il ne se confond pas avec lui. On se souvient
que l’enchaînement de deux sons dans la continuité d’un intervalle mélodique est fonction du temps,
dans la mesure où l’attaque qualifiée du deuxième son intervient à un moment approprié de la résonance
du premier: or, cette résonance est déterminée par l’attaque, je n’ai aucune influence directe sur elle, je
ne puis la ‘modifier’ qu’en amont: avec une autre attaque, la résonance sera différente; mais, dès lors que
l’attaque a eu lieu, la résonance se déroule selon une temporalité qui lui est propre, à laquelle je peux
seulement être attentif (ou non – si je ne le suis pas, j’attaquerai le deuxième son d’une façon telle que les
deux sons resteront séparés, juxtaposés dans une simple succession physique, qui n’est pas une
continuité musicale). La temporalité du phénomène n’est donc pas seulement physique, elle est aussi une
temporalité du vécu: l’intervalle se constitue dans la durée. Si la seconde attaque vient trop tôt, ‘coupant
la parole’, pour ainsi dire, à la résonance du premier son, les harmoniques du deuxième son se
superposant à ceux du premier, la continuité ne pourra naître, pas davantage que si la seconde attaque
vient trop tard alors que la résonance du premier son est devenue trop faible et/ou trop terne pour
’appeler, ‘engendrer’ le deuxième. En d’autres termes, le tempo est une condition du vécu de la
continuité dans une situation déterminée. Si le dépassement de la succession plurielle des phénomènes
dans une structure simultanée n’a pas eu lieu, ce n’est pas que le tempo était faux, c’est que les
sensations sonores qui apparaissent les unes après les autres dans le temps restent ce qu’elles étaient et
n’ont pas pu être intégrées à une relation musicale: en toute rigueur, le tempo, en tant que condition, n’a
pas même existé. Le tempo n’est donc pas indépendant de la richesse sonore: il y a interdépendance
entre la richesse des phénomènes sonores et la vitesse à laquelle ils peuvent se succéder, ou plus
exactement, la ‘vitesse’ (cette fois entre guillemets) à laquelle la conscience est en mesure d’en vivre
l’enchaînement, de les vivre dans la continuité. Interdépendance, disons-nous: la richesse sonore produite
par une conduite d’archet dense et abondante (comme chez Oistrakh) requiert plus de temps qu’une
conduite d’archet virtuose et superficielle (comme chez Heifetz). Mais inversement, la vitesse a des effets
melody requires (for instance, langsam, moderato, allegro assai, etc.) is experienced from the primary experience of the inner rhythm. It is then, within that tempo, constituted from the inner rhythm that the inner song flows in the reproductive consciousness.

In an analysis of the tempo related to the inner song, I would rework this description trying to integrate the description of the Wahrnehmungsleib and Phantasieleib, showing how embodiment participates in the choice of a specific tempo of the performance.

I am not entering into detail on this question which I discussed with the conductor Maxime Tortelier (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-maxime-tortelier-chef-dorchestre/) in which we compare two distinct interpretations of Rachmaninov’s third Piano Concerto in D minor op. 30) because it requires a separate study moving from a phenomenological analysis into a hermeneutical analysis. However, I want to highlight that the feeling of the tempo against the inner rhythm might require, especially in the case of the practice of interpretation, performing a hermeneutics of the paratext. This question of the interpretation of the score is largely studied by the conductor, composer and arranger René Leibowitz in Le compositeur et son double. It is a classical topic of discussion in master classes (among the multiple available on the internet, I can refer to Celibidache master classes that are very interesting to watch because of the famous demanding guidance of the Maestro) but also of works on music interpretation written by musicians themselves (among many, the composer and conductor Pierre Boulez, the cellist interpreter Pablo Casals, or the conductor Nikolaus Harnoncourt).

I would like to add that, through that rhythm, the inner consciousness experiences itself as alive (an interesting extension of this present description would be to turn toward Husserl’s late phenomenology, but maybe even leaving Husserl to go to Michel Henry’s phenomenology and, through the framework that he provides, investigate the notion of inner rhythm as auto-affection which points to life itself. It would require working closely with Michel Henry's Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body, Seeing the Invisible: On Kandinsky, and Incarnation: A Philosophy of Flesh). This experience is given in a specific internal sensation which is an auto-affection proper to the embodied pure ego. It corresponds to the deepest and most fundamental experience of being alive which is given at the deepest layer of the constitution of the ego, prior to any temporality or spatiality. Said differently, as the inner rhythm particularly points to the heart or respiration, which indicate that the Body is still alive, the inner rhythm points to life itself; it is a manifestation of the Body as alive. Hence, through it, the subject not only experiences a particular rhythm, but moreover experiences the internal
§6. The perceptual Body sensing the musical instrument.

tension of life itself, running throughout my living Body. This auto-affection experienced with the inner rhythm is given by internal sensations, before the constitution of space through perception; as a consequence, it is given therefore before spatiality. This type of auto-affection is the form of embodiment characterizing the pure ego which does not have its place in the Leiblichkeit. As such, it is also the deepest layer from which the ego phantasizes the inner song. Consequently, the inner song, grounded in the inner rhythm, is an embodied phenomenon of phantasy. I can’t go further because, to give a more detailed description of it, it would be necessary to enter Husserl’s later phenomenology of drive [Trieb] and instinct [Instinkt], as well as investigate the problem of the life of the ego. As I am studying the inner rhythm as the foundation of the perception of the melody through movement, I will not enter into that sort of description. For now, I just want to establish how this auto-affection is a foundation for the ego.
Figure 3. How to hold the cello.\footnote{Allen et al., \textit{Essential Elémentes for Strings}, p. 4.}
Figure 4. How to hold the instrument.  

Figure 5. How to hold the bow.

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556 Allen et al., *Essential Eléments for Strings*, p. 6.

The cello is connected with my body at the level of the chest as well as the knees. The instrument is large but small enough so that I can move along with it as I perform. Thanks to the endpin that was added a couple of centuries ago, I don’t have to hold the instrument only using the strength of my knees; it weighs primarily on the ground and I only maintain it with my knees. With my left hand, I can feel the delicate neck of the instrument. It does not touch my shoulders, but I like posing my left ear almost on its head to perceive the sound better. The cello’s neck narrows the closer it is to its head and farther from its body. Closer to my head, the strings are thinner, and the sound is supposed to be acute. Thus, when I play the deeper notes of the melody on the thicker bass strings, I need to press the string more with my fingers. In my right hand, I hold the bow. The bow is long and delicate. I need to hold it so that it produces a full sound without deadening it. To do that, I need to use the natural weight of my body in weighing on it. I press the string differently according to the type of sound I want to issue. Similarly, I hold and push or pull the bow differently according to the sound I want to produce. When I touch my hand, I also have some specific sensations. If I play baroque music, I won’t have the same sensations as if I play a romantic concerto.

The constitution of the layer of the Wahrnehmungsleib is part of the process of constitution of the impressional consciousness. In the particular situation of music practice, the kinesthetic sensations constituting the musician’s Body are related to the perception of the musical instrument. As I demonstrated earlier, Husserl provides an analysis of tactuality when he works out the problem of the two hands touching each other.

558 The specific case of singing would require an additional analysis to really fit into the description. As I voluntarily set aside this particular case from the very beginning of my analysis, I am not going to perform it here.
other. However, that analysis allows him to explain then, by distinction, the specificity of the constitution of transcendent perceptual objects through touch.\textsuperscript{559}

Looking at the specific situation of music practice, it appears that, when I play the cello, for instance, I not only experience the cello as an object, but I have at the same time the experiences of specific sensations localized in my body: the touching of the A-string with the point of my finger, the stronger pressing-sensation that I need to produce when I play the C-string, the distinct feeling of playing the E with the first finger of the D-string, or with the third finger of the G-string, the connection with the bow, more particularly with my index finger because it is the finger which gives the direction of the movement, the energy that passes in my body when I push and pull the bow, etc. All of that is what Husserl intends by \textit{sensing}. As he observes: “Such occurrences are missing in ‘merely’ material things.”\textsuperscript{560} In other words, other objects [\textit{Körper}] don’t offer the same possibility: it is proper to the constitution of the Body to be constituted \textit{with} and \textit{through} localized sensations acquired when touching objects.\textsuperscript{561}

\textsuperscript{559} Husserl says: “My hand is lying on the table. I experience the table as something solid, cold, and smooth. Moving my hand over the table, I get an experience of it and its thingly determinations. At the same time, I can at any moment pay attention to my hand and find on it touch-sensations, sensations of smoothness and coldness, etc. In the interior of the hand, running parallel to the experienced movement, I find motion sensations, etc. Lifting a thing, I experience its weight, but at the same time I have weight-sensations localized in my Body. And thus, my Body’s entering into physical relations (by striking, pressing, pushing, etc.) with other material things provides in general not only the experience of physical occurrences, related to the Body and to things, but also the experience of specifically Bodily occurrences of the type we call sensings. Such occurrences are missing in ‘merely’ material things” (\textit{Ideas 2}, §36, p. 153).

\textsuperscript{560} \textit{Ideas 2}, §36, p. 153.

\textsuperscript{561} I am not developing this analysis with Merleau-Ponty here, but he mentions the problem in the \textit{Phenomenology of Perception}, Part I, Chapter 2, through the example of typing or playing the organ. Thomas Fuchs comments on that in his paper on “The Body Memory.” I will develop this question more in the final chapter of the present dissertation.
Here, there is a distinction between the layer of auto-affection characteristic of the inner rhythm, without specific localization, and the sensations of the Leib, given through tactuality, situated at the surface of the body, which are effect properties of the Body. The latter are given with localized sensations as the Body moves and perceives. They don’t belong to the perceptual Body as an object, but as an organ of perception, and more specifically, as a tactual organ. As opposed to auto-affections which are given prior to the givenness of space in the phenomenological consciousness, these sensations belong to the Body in the sense that they are spatially and temporally localized on or in it. Thus, they are situated in the space and time of the Body. As Husserl demonstrates, the same sensation gives both the table and the finger to me. In other words, touching, e.g., the cello gives me a sense of its smoothness and cold temperature, but it also shows the limit of my finger, whether it is cold or hot, and whether it is rough or smooth, with calluses or without, etc. These sensations function both as touch-effect, by marking the effect that

562 Husserl explains: “The localized sensations are not properties of the Body as a physical thing, but on the other hand, they are properties of the thing, Body, and indeed they are effect-properties. They arise when the Body is touched, pressed, stung, etc., and they arise there where it is touched and at the time when it is touched: only under certain circumstances do they still endure after the touching takes place. Touching refers here to a physical event. Even two lifeless things can touch one another, but the touching of the Body provides sensations on it or in it” (Ideas 2, §36, pp. 153-4).

563 I will address the notion of temporality in the next chapter.

564 Husserl continues: “We must now give heed to the following: in order to bring to perception here the tactual thing, paperweight, I touch it, with my fingers, for example. I then experience tactually the smooth surface of the glass and the delicate crystal edges. But if I attend to the hand and finger, then they have touch sensations which still linger when the hand is withdrawn. Likewise, my finger and hand have kinesthetic sensations, and precisely the same sensations which function as indicational or presentational with respect to the thing, paperweight, function as touch-effects of the paperweight on the hand and as sensing produced in it. In the case of the hand lying on the table, the same sensation of pressure is apprehended at one time as perception of the table’s surface (of a small part of it, properly speaking) and at another time produces, with a ‘different direction of attention,’ in the actualization of another stratum of apprehension, sensations of digital pressure. In the same way are related the coldness of the surface of a thing and the sensation of cold in the finger” (Ideas 2, §36, p. 154).

565 I describe the perception of the musical instrument in the final chapter.
the object has on me, and as sensing that object through impression. Here, it is the directionality of the attention which distinguish the two roles. Attention can be either directed toward the object (indicational), or the sensation of that object (presentational). As I will demonstrate later, the capacity of the sensation of the object to be presentational will be crucial to distinguish perception from phantasy, and then understand the temporality proper to perception as distinct from that of phantasy.

In this constitution of the Body through sensations, Husserl isolates the sense of touch as a sense having a special role. As he explains, the sense of touch is the only one which constitutes the body while also constituting other objects. The other senses are then correlative participating in that constitution. In the specific case of the constitution of the musician’s Body, the Body is constituted through touching the instrument, and it is only correlative that the other senses participate in that constitution. To explain this, Husserl distinguishes two notions: the notion of

566 Through that notion the problem of time appears. Indeed, the object is presented through impression which belongs to these sensations described here. As opposed to that, Husserl says that the phantasy does not present the object because it lacks this moment of the impression. I will come back to these problems throughout the next chapters.

567 Husserl says: “In the tactual realm we have the external Object, tactualy constituted, and a second Object, the Body, likewise tactualy constituted, e.g., the touching finger, and, in addition, there are fingers touching fingers. So here we have that double apprehension: the same touch-sensation is apprehended as a feature of the ‘external’ Object and is apprehended as a sensation of the Body as Object. And in the case in which a part of the Body becomes equally an external Object of an other part, we have the double sensation (each part has its own sensations) and the double apprehension as feature of the one or of the other Bodily part as a physical object” (Ideas 2, §37, p. 155).

568 I will come back to the various sense-perceptions in the final chapter of the present dissertation.

569 Here too, it would be interesting to have a specific look at the constitution of the voice as a musical instrument, i.e., the trained voice. As I explain in the introduction and in the conclusion, I set aside the description of the specific inner song of the singer in the present work, however, I would like to develop it in a later work. Several points to develop are already apparent in the interview with Sylvia Kummer (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-sylvia-kummer-chanteuse/) who describes not only her
localization of sensing which is spread out and into space on the one hand, and the notion of extension which characterizes the res extensa on the other. This helps to understand that, as opposed to my cello which is an object constituted through the impressional consciousness thanks to a sensuous schema and by adumbrations, there is nothing like that in the constitution of the Body: no schematization and adumbration are involved in its constitution. Indeed, the organ touching itself is given as belonging to me as a subject sensing. This does not happen when the organ touches another kind of object in the world. Indeed, in this later case, I do not experience the object as being mine. It is the place of the contact with the object which is experienced as my Body. Thus, when I play with my cello, I perceive the cello while experiencing the hand touching the cello as my hand pressing the string on the neck of the instrument and moving on and with the instrument in a certain way.

interpretative work and what the inner song is for her, but also her sensations while singing, how some contextual parameters play a role in these feelings (for instance if she is sick, if it is cold outside, etc.).

Husserl explains how the “localization of sensings is in fact something in principle different from the extension of all material determinations of a thing. The sensings do indeed spread out in space, cover, in their way, spatial surfaces, run through them, etc. But this spreading out and spreading into are precisely something that differs essentially from extension in the sense of all the determinations that characterize the res extensa. The sensing which spreads over the surface of the hand and extends into it is not a real quality of a thing (speaking always within the frame of intuitions and their givenness) such as, for example, the roughness of the hand, its color, etc. These real properties of a thing are constituted through a sensuous schema and manifolds of adumbrations” (Ideas 2, §37, p. 157).

I will investigate this in the next chapter.

Husserl writes: “The touch-sensing is not a state of the material thing, hand, but is precisely the hand itself, which for us is more than a material thing, and the way in which it is mine entails that I, the ‘subject of the Body,’ can say that what belongs to the material thing is its, not mine. All sensings pertain to my soul; everything extended to the material thing. On this surface of the hand, I sense the sensations of touch, etc. And it is precisely thereby that this surface manifests itself immediately as my Body” (Ideas 2, §37, p. 157).
According to Husserl, all the types of sensations accompanying this touching of the object participate in the constitution of the Body. However, he highlights the primacy of touch. In music performance, the constitution of the Body of the performer is made primarily from the act of touching the instrument. For instance, in my case as a cellist, the constitution of my cellist’s Body happens through touching the cello and eventually the bow (I say eventually because we can also play pizzicato, i.e., only with the fingers). However, the sensations of tension and relaxation of the muscles acting on it, the fatigue of playing if I haven’t played for a while, the pain in my fingers on which I need to rebuild calluses because I haven’t played for months, the strength in my right arm holding the bow, the vibration of the instrument against my Body, the specific tiny more accurate vibration of my ear hearing that melody, etc., also participate in that constitution by correlation. All these sensations are localized in the organ where contact with the object happens. Consequently, they are experienced as localized in specific places.

The modified reproductions in phantasy of this harmony of sensations constituted against the primary experience of the inner rhythm depends on the training of the musician and his or her own approach to the instrument: some musicians go from the sensations arising with touching the instrument to the sound, others from the sound to the realization with the instrument. The perception of the performance, and therefore the

573 Husserl continues: “The Body as such can be constituted originarily only in tactuality, and in everything that is localized with the sensations of touch: for example, warmth, coldness, pain, etc. Furthermore, the kinetic sensations play an important role. I see how my hand moves, and without it touching anything while moving, I sense kinetic sensations, thought as one with sensations of tension and sensations of touch, and I localize them in the moving hand” (Ideas 2, §37, p. 157).

574 This is very apparent throughout the interviews. For instance the interpreter Jean-Philippe Vivier (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-jean-philippe-vivier-koln-16-juin-2013-par-ellen-moysan/) or the film composer Armand Amar (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-armand-amar-compositeur/) spend an extensive amount of time explaining their technique in playing the musical instrument, thus orienting their description of the inner song on the process of realization itself. As
harmony of sensation can be part of the phantasy at lesser or greater degrees,\textsuperscript{575} however, they are definitely part of the phantasy, even when they are only in the background and not the object of attention.\textsuperscript{576} This means that, when the musician phantasizes the inner song, he or she experiences the inner rhythm through auto-affection, and from the standpoint of that auto-affection, he or she phantasizes the inner song as one phenomenon made of the co-constitution of an inner instrument with an inner melody, which indicates that there is not only a reproduction of a melody in phantasy, but also of the sensations of the performance. Here, the inner song can be experienced as an embodied phenomenon because it is grounded in the inner rhythm,\textsuperscript{577} and it reproduces actual sensations acquired through past or present perceptions. In other words, it is thanks to that

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\textsuperscript{575} This relates to the notion of “trained consciousness” that I address in the second chapter of the present dissertation.

\textsuperscript{576} This is related to the question of attention that I discussed in the first chapter of the present dissertation.

\textsuperscript{577} There is no reproduction of the inner rhythm. The inner rhythm is the temporal ground both of the impressional and the reproductive consciousness. However, there is a continuity of perception in the impressional consciousness, whereas there is no continuity, but a switch from an impressional to a reproductive consciousness in the case of the reproductive consciousness. This switch, how it occurs, and how there can be a continuity of experience despite the discontinuity in the mode of consciousness, is a problem that I am not able to solve yet. However, if I were to address it, I would work again on the relationship between the impressional and reproductive consciousness, remaining within Bernet’s interpretation of Husserl, working on the various levels of the ego.
experience in perception that the inner song can be experienced in phantasy, as an embodied phenomenon.\textsuperscript{578}

§7. The perceptual Body manipulating the musical instrument.

\textsuperscript{578} As I will explain later, the phantasy does not have this same primacy of touch. Indeed, not all musicians have the experience of an embodied inner song in the same way. Classical musicians who are trained first through the reading and the hearing of the note don’t necessarily have an embodied inner song in the way folk or other types of musicians may have. Cf. Interview with Paul Gossart: http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-paul-gossart-restaurateur-de-pianos-anciens-accordeur-chercheur-en-philosophie/
Figure 6. How to use the bow.\textsuperscript{579}

\textit{Elbow Energy}

Figure 7. How to play the instrument.\textsuperscript{580}

\textit{Strummin' Along}

\textsuperscript{579} Allen et al. \textit{Essential Elément\'s for Strings}, p. 8.

\textsuperscript{580} Allen et al. \textit{Essential Elément\'s for Strings}, p. 9.
Over more than twenty-five years, I have learned how to apprehend my instrument, manipulate it, and produce multiple sounds or a continuation of a sound. As I have progressed in learning the technique, I have a better sense of the instrument: it is less an obstacle in the realization of the inner song, and more this marvelous medium through which I can realize my phantasy. The more I learn to manipulate it, the more I like it as well. Through the years, my cello has become my friend, a living presence, the means of producing the inner song, the voice of my inner song. After long classical training, I started to become comfortable playing other kinds of melodies from other types of repertoire: jazz standards, but also folk melodies. When I practice, as soon as I sit with my cello, I feel an intense pleasure with only the contact with the instrument. I like it. It makes me happy to have it and play it. As I play today, I have a sensation of liberation. I free all my tensions of the day, forget about my anxieties, express all these pent-up feelings that had no chance to come out today. However, after an hour playing, I also feel the fatigue of my muscles, especially my left arm, my fingers are red for having pressed the thin string too long, my knees wear the mark of the instrument that they were holding... Finished. Time to stop for today!

As it appears from the previous analyses, the sensuous contact with the musical instrument, especially through tactuality, goes along with a double constitution: of myself as the subject touching on the one hand, and of the musical instrument as an object on the other hand. However, in performance there is not just a sensuous contact with the musical instrument. Indeed, the musician plays the musical instrument, manipulates it in a certain way to produce certain sounds. For instance, for me as a

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581 I am going to describe the constitution of the instrument and the melody in the last chapter.
cellist, the experience of the cello is accompanied by the experience of the manipulation of the cello, namely, of a movement.

In order to understand this problem, it is necessary to restart the description going back to the notion of the sensing Body. As Husserl writes in §37 of *Ideas 2*: “The Body as such can be constituted originarily only in tactuality and in everything that is localized with the sensations of touch: for example, warmth, coldness, pain, etc.”

As I described earlier, the musician’s Body is constituted originarily in tactuality, through touching the instrument. This means that touch-sensations are given, along with other types of less localized sensations like the sensations of cold or warmth, pleasure, or pain. In addition to this sensing of the instrument through touch, a layer of kinetic sensation plays an important role. Husserl describes it as follows: “I see how my hand moves, and without it touching anything while moving, I sense kinetic sensations, though as one with sensations of tension and sensations of touch, and I localize them in the moving hand.”

As it appears in this quote, these kinetic sensations have the specificity that, even when there is no actual tactual contact, they can be grounded in tactuality. In the specific situation that I am studying in which the musician practices, it means that the musician can move their hand to materialize the tempo for instance, and experience sensations of weight grounded in tactuality, *without actual tactual contact* with an object.

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582 *Ideas 2*, §37, p. 158

583 *Ideas 2*, §37, p. 158

584 Husserl writes: “If, while moving, I do touch something, then the touch-sensation immediately acquires localization in the touching surface of the hand. At bottom, it is owing only to their constant interlacing with these primarily localized sensations that the kinetic sensations receive localization” (*Ideas 2*, §37, p. 158).
For instance, as I learn Bach’s *Courante*, detaching from my cello and trying to get the rhythm of the piece by materializing it by moving my hands, arms, legs, etc., I experience kinetic sensations of weight shifts in the body *without actual tactual contact* with any object.\(^{585}\) When I touch my cello for instance, the sensation is localized in my fingers, my chest, etc. It is from these primarily localized sensations that the kinetic sensations, warmth, coldness, tension, etc., receive their localization. These kinesthetic sensations of temperature, resistance, pressure, etc., are not as accurately localized as the other sensations of contact, as is, for instance, the specific sensation of the A-string that I touch with the end of my finger. They are more diffuse. However, the unity between the body and the musical instrument which is constituted through touch is reinforced by these additional sensations through which I experience my *musician’s Body*, its muscular capacity as it performs movements, its various possibilities, etc.\(^{586}\) In other words, thanks to kinesthetic sensations, I am more one with my instrument [*fais corps avec mon instrument*].

As it appears from a close observation of what happens in tactuality, the phenomenological constitution of the perceptual Body [*Wahrnehmungsleib*] is the foundation of the constitution of all objects in consciousness, because the ego constitutes

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585 The importance of these type of sensations is especially apparent when it comes to folk music in which music is made for dance, and therefore goes with bodily movements. The fiddle player and philosopher Robert Kirkman speaks about this in an interview ([http://www.ellenmoysan.com/robert-kirkman-fiddle-player/](http://www.ellenmoysan.com/robert-kirkman-fiddle-player/)).

586 Husserl continues: “because there obtains here no parallelism which is exactly stratified as there is between temperature sensations and touch sensations, so the kinesthetic sensations do not spread out in a stratified way over the appearing extension, and they receive only a rather indeterminate localization. Yet this is indeed not without significance; it makes the unity between the Body and the freely movable thing more intimate” (*Ideas 2*, §37, p. 158).
the object \textit{spatially} thanks to sensations.\footnote{Husserl claims: “The distinctive feature of the Body as a field of localization is the presupposition for its further distinctive features setting it off from all material things” (Ideas 2, §38, p. 159).} This constitution happens through a constitution of a field of localization, and from this field, the Body is experienced as a body \textit{moving}, i.e., as an \textit{organ of the will}.\footnote{Husserl says: “the precondition for the fact that it, already taken as Body (namely, as the thing that has a stratum of localized sensations) is an \textit{organ of the will}, the \textit{one and only} Object which, for the will of my pure Ego, is \textit{moveable immediately and spontaneously} and is a means for producing a mediate spontaneous movement in other things, in, e.g., things struck by my immediately spontaneously moved hand, grasped by it, lifted, etc. \textit{Sheer material things are only moveable mechanically and only partake of spontaneous movement in mediate way}” (Ideas 2, §38, p. 159).} So, when the musician plays the musical instrument, localized sensations are given, and as the musician moves, he or she experiences his or her Body as an organ of the will, capable of playing. For instance, when I play the cello, I experience the musical instrument through touch, I also have the sensations of pressure, warmth, tensions, etc. From that field of sensations, I experience my Body as manipulating the cello, properly, \textit{playing it}.

This constitution of the body as object \textit{[Körper]} is different from the constitution of other objects (for instance, of the constitution of the musical instrument). First the Body receives localized sensations and is not constituted through a schema and adumbration as is the case when other spatial objects are constituted. Second, the Body is not only experienced with localized sensations, but it is also experienced through the \textit{I can}. In other words, the body is not only an \textit{organ of perception}, but it is also an \textit{organ of the will}: it is through the body that I can manipulate objects \textit{immediately} and \textit{spontaneously}. For instance, I perceive my cello in playing Bach’s piece, and I experience my Body in trying to perform the song \textit{as I want to hear it} (as I hear it in the perception in the phantasy, namely, as my inner song gives it in phantasy).
More precisely the musician has the experience of moving on the instrument, and
the experience of the capability of the body with the instrument.\textsuperscript{589} For instance, I
experience my body holding the cello in a certain way, between my knees and against my
chest, crossing over various distances as the music goes, pressing the string more or less
according to where the notes are issued on the instrument, using certain muscles, giving
weight or strength to certain movements in particular manners, etc. In other words, when
I play the cello, I not only experience my body sensing the musical instrument, but also
my body freely moving. It is the combination of these two experiences of the Body
sensing and the Body moving which constitute the perceptual Body as a musician’s Body,
and in the case of the cellist, a cellist’s Body. This experience of the Body sensing and
moving creates the specificity of the Body as object.\textsuperscript{590} Then, thanks to the experience of
the I can, the experience of a free Ego moving, there is something like an Object-world, a
world of spatial-corporeal things.\textsuperscript{591} In other words, and as I already mentioned when I
described the natural attitude,\textsuperscript{592} it is part of the experience of the world to be experienced
through the senses, and through the free movements of my Body moving within and with

\textsuperscript{589} The beginner or the experienced musician who did not play for a long time has a more unsecure, and
blinded experience than the trained musician who knows where the fingers need to go, but any musician
can have this experience of manipulating, playing the instrument, even at an elementary level.

\textsuperscript{590} Husserl writes: “Only Bodies are immediately spontaneously (‘freely’) moveable, and they are so,
specifically, by means of the free Ego and its will which belong to them” (Ideas 2, §38, p. 159).

\textsuperscript{591} Husserl continues: “It is in virtue of these free acts that, as we saw earlier, there can be constituted for
this Ego, in manifold series of perceptions, an Object-world, a world of spatial-corporeal things (the Body
as thing included). The subject, constituted as counter-member of material nature, is (as far as we have
seen up to now) an Ego, to which a Body belongs as field of localization of its sensations. The Ego has the
‘faculty’ (the ‘I can’) to freely move this Body – i.e., the organ in which it is articulated – and to perceive an
external world by means of it” (Ideas 2, §38, p. 159).

\textsuperscript{592} I address this in a footnote in the first chapter.
it. This constitution of the perceptive world happens thanks to and through the Body. Indeed, it is due to the musician’s Body that there is something like a cello, a bow, a score, a melody, etc.\textsuperscript{593}

When it comes to the constitution of the inner song, as the reproductive consciousness reproduces the possibility of the being of a performance, the sensing and manipulating of this perceptual experience are involved in the constitution of a quasi-world, and the constitution, in phantasy, of the inner song. Indeed, when the musician phantasizes the inner song, his or her richly phantasized inner song reproduces this dynamic bodily schema so well that \textit{quasi-sensations} are constituted.\textsuperscript{594} For instance, as I practice my cello, I can stop my moves in order to focus on the inner song, I can \textit{quasi-feel} my cello, even if I don’t have it. Thus, I feel the moves of the bow, I know where the tones are, and I hear how they should successively unfold as I perform them.

Taking part in the constitution of this perceptual musician’s Body, and therefore part of the constitution of the \textit{Phantasieleib} of the inner song, are not only the physical sensations, but also the sensations of pleasure and pain, well-being or discomfort, that I feel \textit{as I play}, i.e., as I move with the instrument. These sensations are fully part of the constitution of the musician’s Body because they are fully part of the technique\textsuperscript{595} which allows the musician to perform. For instance, a discomfort should indicate some kind of technical issue, a tension, and should be solved by finding a better solution in playing

\textsuperscript{593} I will come back to the constitution of the musical instrument in the next chapter.

\textsuperscript{594} I witnessed this during the interview with David Sogg (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/david-sogg-pittsburgh-symphony-orchestra-co-principal-bassoon/) who, as he was describing his experience playing the bassoon, was miming having a bassoon in hand and playing it.

\textsuperscript{595} I will come back to the notion of technique in the next chapter.
technique. The pleasure or the pain when I learn how to improve the succession of my movements and play them faster or slower take part as well. The pleasure of the contact with the instrument participates in the experience of playing and gives the desire to pursue the same direction and make more effort.\textsuperscript{596} As these sensations are part of the phenomenological Body, Husserl considers them as foundational for valuing.\textsuperscript{597} It follows that, primary sensations (the sensation of the wood of the cello, of the strings, etc.) are the grounds for the constitution of the object as are the sensations like tension, pleasure, pain, etc. So, when I manipulate my cello to play it, the touch-sensations that are given in contact with the instrument are linked with the sensations of pleasure and pain, discomfort, liberation, etc.\textsuperscript{598}

Husserl goes even further and says that: “all kinds of sensations, difficult to analyze and discuss, belong here as well, ones that form the material substrate for the life of desire and will, sensations of energetic tension and relaxation, sensations of inner restraint, paralysis, liberation, etc.”\textsuperscript{599} This means, for the musician, that the desire to play in an attuned, rhythmically correct way, to release that amount of energy, or free those

\textsuperscript{596} Paul Gossart underlines that as we talk about the playing of various types of musical instruments (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-paul-gossart-restaurateur-de-pianos-anciens-accordeur-chercheur-en-philosophie/)

\textsuperscript{597} Husserl writes: “Thus, here belong groups of sensations which, for the acts of valuing, i.e., for intentional lived experiences in the sphere of feeling, or for the constitution of values as their intentional correlates, play a role, as matter, analogous to that played by the primary sensations for what is intentionally lived in the sphere of experience, or for the constitution of Objects as spatial things” (Ideas 2, §39, p. 160).

\textsuperscript{598} And more ultimately, as I said earlier, in the inner rhythm as auto-affection.

\textsuperscript{599} Ideas 2, §39, p. 160
emotions in playing.\textsuperscript{600} are also part of the constitution in the impressional consciousness. In this sense, these diffuse sensations fully \textit{belong to the Body}.\textsuperscript{601} In other words, the variety of sensations accompanying the free movement of the Body in contact with objects, and localized in the specific point of contact between the Body and the object, appears far broader than a simple sensation of touch: around the sensation of touch, there is indeed a \textit{halo} of other sensations.

Despite being fundamental, these kinds of sensation going \textit{with} touch are more confusing and less easy to analyze. Indeed, if it is easy to describe the sensations of touching the cello for instance, it is not so easy to describe all the other strata of sensations experienced as I perform: the pain in my finger, the tension of the muscles in my hand, back, etc. However, even if they are hard to grasp, and despite this unclarity, these sensations are part of the musician’s Body, belonging to it. As such, they can be the support of judgements and other intentional acts.\textsuperscript{602} Hence, I can, \textit{reflect} on these sensations, for instance, and through this reflection, further modify my inner song; this is what the musician does during a music practice session, as s/he works on playing a move correctly (especially when the musician plays, stops, listens to the inner song, starts playing again, etc., clearly separating the apprehension of the actual song from the

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\textsuperscript{600} I discuss the problem of the disclosing of the emotion in playing especially with Lorna McGhee (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/interview-with-lorna-mcghee-en/)
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\textsuperscript{601} Husserl writes: “All these groups of sensations, as \textit{sensing}, have an immediate Bodily localization. Thus, for every human being, they \textit{belong in a way that is immediately intuitable, to the Body as to his particular Body}, i.e., as a subjective objectivity distinguished from the Body as a mere material thing by means of this whole stratum of localized sensations” (Ideas 2, §39, p. 160).
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\textsuperscript{602} Husserl explains: “\textit{The intentional functions, however, are bound to this stratum}; the matter receives a spiritual forming, just as, discussed above, the primary sensations undergo \textit{apprehension}, are taken up in perceptions, upon which, then perceptual judgements are built, etc.” (Ideas 2, §39, p. 160).
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apprehension of the inner song). Then, this reflection of the move can participate in the
constitution of a more elaborate, more accurate, or more adjusted inner song for a given
piece of music.  

This layer of sensation is foundational in the sense in which the ego is bound to
the Body thanks to these intentional acts founded on the perceptual data. These
secondary acts are not localized. However, they are founded on data that are localized.
This means that the secondary acts are bound to the Body, without, properly speaking,
being one of its strata. Here, perception is founded on the Body, without being
necessarily localized in the Body. It is this nexus of specific sensations which
constitutes the musician’s Body. Then, thanks to the re-production of these present, past,
or possible future sensations constituting the musician’s Body, the reproductive
consciousness can constitute something like a phantasy Body. As the musician

603 This is what the pianist Hélène Grimaud says in the documentary on Living with Wolves (2002) when
she says that she almost does not need her piano to prepare an interpretation, because “everything
happens in the head”: the moves have been integrated so well that she can work on improving an
interpretation by rehearsing mostly in phantasy. I investigate the role of reflection in the modification of
the inner song in the coming chapter.

604 Husserl says: “In this way a human being’s total consciousness is in a certain sense, by means of its
hyletic substrate, bound to the Body, though, to be sure, the intentional lived experiences themselves are
no longer directly and properly localized; they no longer form a stratum on the Body” (Ideas 2, §39, pp.
160-1).

605 Husserl explains: “Perception, as the touching apprehension of form, does not have its seat in the
touching finger in which the touch sensation is localized; thinking is not actually localized intuitively in the
head, the way the impressions of tensions are, etc. That we very often speak as if it were so is no proof
that we actually apprehend it that way in intuition. The co-intertwined contents of sensation have a
localization which is actually intuitively given, but the intentionalities do not, and only metaphorically are
they said to be related to the Body or to be in the Body” (Ideas 2, §39, p. 161). (It is in this sense, there is a
Leiblichkeit of the pure ego, distinct from that of the psychological ego.)

606 I will come back to this question of the combination of sensations in the next chapter. Again, the inner
song can either come out through touching the instrument, or result in touching the instrument, the
possibility of phantasizing an embodied inner song varies according to the type of musician and their
training, it can be very elementary, or very accurate (Cf. Interview with Paul Gossart
http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-paul-gossart-restaurateur-de-pianos-anciens-accordeur-
phanstasyizes the inner song, he or she can phantasyize ways of playing, even creating new ways of playing by combining various moves; this is what the free playing of the phantasy can do.607

§8. The spatial and temporal constitution of the Wahrnehmungsleib and Phantasieleib.

I restart playing the cello after more than a year without playing at all. As I take the cello and try out some combinations, I realize that I have lost my cellist’s Body in the meantime. The calluses on my fingers have disappeared and after an hour I have blisters on my skin, I don’t have as much strength in my arms, especially in the right one normally holding the bow, and I find myself immediately falling into my old postures, for instance using my strength instead of the natural weight of my Body to press the strings and produce a sound with the bow. To reattain my previous abilities, I must rebuild my cellist’s Body, being careful to do it correctly without creating unnecessary tension. As I have lost my abilities, my inner song seems even more ahead of what I am able to play, the gap between what I would like to hear and what I actually hear is even bigger. To reduce this gap, I have to rebuild the Body which allows me to perform the kind of sound I want to hear, and as I rebuild it and perceive these sounds again, I can phantasyze a stronger inner song, more accurate and more embodied, sharper, and more dynamic. I feel the inner rhythm, I can snap it with my fingers. I play the main line of Bach’s piece, chercheur-en-philosophie/). However, whatever comes first, the perception and the phantasy are deeply intertwined because they are part of the same performance process.

607 This is what I argue in my paper and response to Alessandro Bertinetto’s Paper for the Wassard Elea 2021 Conference: the ability to improvise is based on embodied habits, and therefore on these sedimented sensations in the musician’s Body, which are modified and reproduced in the phantasy which freely plays with them, thus creating new moves and new melodies.
tap the rhythm on the wood body of the cello, mark the tempo with my foot. It is like a
dance. I feel it. I can imagine the people dancing with their local costumes. I can see the
color, hear the sound, and feel as if I am in a place that I have never visited. The richer
my phantasy, the better I can play my cello; I feel comfortable playing the line,
embodying it. I know that I was not able to do that even ten years ago, when my

technique was weaker, and I did not practice playing only by ear yet. At that time, I was
stuck with the score. Now, after years practicing without the score, freely exploring my
instrument, I feel I have more possibilities to phantasize and a better capacity to realize
my inner songs. This is because my cello has become a better prolongation of my Body,
and more deeply, a prolongation of my embodied inner song.

This musician’s Body that I am describing, which is a specific type of
Wahrnehmungsleib is not given as a sum of unrelated sensations. On the contrary: it is
experienced as a spatial and temporal unity of sensations. For instance, if I press the A-
string with the first finger of my left hand to issue a B, I first have the sensation of one
finger pressing the string with the thumb holding the instrument lightly underneath, I feel
the thin string, my arm opened and not lying along my body, and my shoulder relaxed. If
I produce a C by adding my second finger, I feel this whole equilibrium and sum of
sensations slightly changing, the weight of the body on the instrument being distributed
differently. The first movement, and then the first movement unified with the second,
give me the experience of a unified body moving. Husserl observes that: “The physical
Body is, of course, a constituted unity, and only to it does the stratum of sensings
belong.” In other words, it is the unity of the Body given through a sensuous synthesis

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608 *Ideas 2*, §40, p. 162.
which allows the stratum of sensing to progressively build up. In the situation that I am
studying, in which the musician rehearses, the multiplicity of the sensations acquired as
the Body senses and manipulates the musical instrument constitutes the unity of the
perceptual *musician’s Body*. This constitution is involved in the phantasy of the inner
song which represents the modified reproduction of the possible performance, not only
how the performance sounds, but also how this sound is produced, if I will hold the bow
in this or that way to produce it, if I will weigh as much as I can on the instrument, or be
lighter, etc.

Questioning this unity, Husserl notices how the constitution of the Body is related
to the circumstances of the apprehension of specific objects.\(^{609}\) Hence, in the case of the
musician’s Body that I am describing, the specific constitution of the Body is related to
the movement of apprehension of a specific instrument (*le toucher de l’instrument* or the
touch of the cello, for instance) along with the act of hearing the sound produced when I
play it (the melody), the act of learning the technique (for instance the positioning of the
hand holding the bow), the type of music played, etc. Learning an instrumental
technique\(^{610}\) builds up a specific kind of Body because it goes along with the acquisition
of specific sensations which are interrelated and participate together in the performance.
In music practice, the “circumstances” are also given by the music itself. For instance, the

\(^{609}\) Husserl explains: “All this is ‘obvious,’ it is there in the apprehension; precisely under such
circumstances this Corporeal body behaves in such a way that it is not to be stimulated in just any way but
is stimulatable in a definite way under definite circumstances, and such that all effects of stimulation have
their system, and to the system of thingly bodies appearing in it there correspond distinctions as to place,
whereby, however, to each such place pertains a definite, dependent on the type of the stimulation-
effect, further dimension of possible distinctions” (*Ideas* 2, §40, p. 162).

\(^{610}\) This learning also has a cultural and historical dimension involving intersubjectivity. I mention this
aspect in my conclusion but don’t explore it in the present dissertation because it is a whole set of new
questions.
type of sensations, and the progressive constitution of the unity of the sensations, will be
different according to whether the musician plays Bach on a baroque cello, Rachmaninov
on a romantic cello, the bass line of a folk song with pizzicato technique on a modern
cello, or whether the musician performs Cage on a prepared piano, plays electronic
music, composes, conducts, improvises, etc. Indeed, if I just analyze the first example,
the playing of Rachmaninov requires a different technique, and therefore different types
of sensations and moves than the playing of a Vivaldi piece on a baroque cello. This
means that, along with the given context of sensation, other senses like that of smell, but
also other less localized and more diffused sensations like being tired, energetic,
enthusiastic, etc., participate in the constitution of the Body, although in a less direct way.
That’s how, when the inner song as a phantasy expectation is constituted in phantasy,
there can be an association of various elements that may have nothing in common but the
same context (for instance, I will associate this chord with the happiness I had when I
was playing that concert), or to carry the same sort of diffuse sensations (I feel the same
tension when I perform these two moves).

In his description, Husserl explains how, “To the place in the extension
corresponds a place-moment in the sensation, and to the degrees of stimulation and kinds
of stimulation correspond definite moments which render the sensation concrete and
modifiable according to more or less known ways.”611 This is a crucial observation.
Indeed, it links the notion of sensation with the problem of time, thanks to the notion of
place-moment:612 sensation is not only localizable in the Body, but also in the flow of the

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611 Ideas 2, §40, p. 162.
612 I will work on this in the next chapter.
inner time consciousness. So, not only does sensation present the object as I mentioned earlier, but it also gives the object *now*. For instance, as I am playing the cello, I simultaneously feel the move on the cello, and hear the sound produced through that move (although there might be a small delay between the action and the result of the action, not perceivable). If I play two strings at the same time, there is a chord, made of more than one sound. In this case, I feel a more complex move and hear a more complex sound. If I play an arpeggio, the tones come one after the other, unfolding the music, each tone being connected with the other through the association between what *had just been* and what *is about to come*, and the temporal unfolding is more apparent.613

This coincidence of the various sensations (of a move with a sound produced by this move) in the *now*, leads to a temporal constitution of the Body. In other words, the Body is progressively constituted as a unity as the sensations are given during music practice. The various sensations *coincide* in the *now*, they are given following a certain order of succession, and therefore, the Body itself is progressively given in a temporal unity of sensations.614 So, as the musician performs, the musician’s Body is given as a unity through this coincidence of various sensations related to the manipulation of the instrument in a particular moment. Some are given simultaneously (for instance, as a cellist I simultaneously feel my cello against my chest, between my knees, and the bow in my right hand), while others are given one after the other (for instance, as I play, I

613 I investigate the problem of the relationship between the move and the melody in the next chapter.

614 Husserl explains: “there lies in the sensations an order which ‘coincides’ with the appearing extension; but that is already implicit in the apprehension from the outset, in such a way that the simulation-effects do not appear as something alien and as just an effect, but rather as something pertaining to the appearing Corporeal body and to the extensive order, and as something ordered in a coincident order” (Ideas 2, §40, p. 162).
perform one tone after the other, and the sensations are therefore succeeding one after the other). Over a broader timespan, this constitution of the musician’s Body continues time after time (from childhood to adulthood for instance), and even after the musician stops playing (an old musician can still feel the moves in the Body after having stopped playing for a while because they are sedimented in the Body’s memory). This shows how a sensation is not only apprehended by itself, but also within a temporal nexus of sensations (from which comes the notion of the harmony of the sensations that I mentioned earlier), sensations function together as a nexus.

It is this entire complex nexus which is modified as the movement progresses. Indeed, as Husserl explains: “the fields of sensation in question here are always completely filled, and each new stimulation does not provoke a sensation as if for the first time, but rather, it provokes in the sensation-field a corresponding change in the sensation.” For instance, as I play my cello and I add the pressure of the second finger to the pressure of the first finger on the A-String, the balance of the hand is modified as the sensation of pressure is spread in between two fingers and not one. Then, when the Body undergoes a change somewhere through movement, it is the whole nexus that

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615 I mentioned this question earlier in the present chapter. This problem of the temporality of the Body can be also further elaborated relying on Fuchs, Thomas “The Body memory.”

616 Cf. the chapter on the “Various layers of the performing ego.”

617 Husserl writes: “In each Bodily sensation, the mere sensation is not grasped, but it is apprehended as belonging to a system of possible functional consequences which corresponds exactly to the extensive order, consequences that the material real must undergo in constituent parallels with possible material effects” (Ideas 2, §40, p. 162).

618 Ideas 2, §40, p. 162.
undergoes a change. It follows that there is an interdependency of the sensations constituting the Body.

Husserl observes how: “the Body […] always has states of sensation, and which particular ones it has depends on the concomitant system of real circumstances under which it senses.” Here, he underlines how the apprehension of the Body as a thing goes with the co-apprehension of the sensation field. For the practicing musician, all the sensations localized in the points of contact with the instrument go with the co-

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619 This is something that is particularly clear when it comes to the search for the right posture (I discuss this with the cellist Roland Pidoux who observes both that all cellists more or less hold the cello in the same way, while adjusting their posture to their particular Body type, http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-roland-pidoux-20-09-2012-fait-a-paris-france/). Indeed, there are various ways to play an instrument, and therefore, various types of nexuses of sensations that can be experienced as playing the instrument. In music practice, finding the adequate posture requires positioning the Body so that this nexus is experienced as free and with as little tension as possible. Even if there are traditional postures passed on in various schools, the French or Russian cello school for instance (I mention the problem of the historical consciousness in the conclusion, this question should be part of another study on the inner song expanding on this study), the right posture mostly depends on each musician (The French cellists Xavier Gagnepain (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-xavier-gagnepain/) or Roland Pidoux (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-roland-pidoux-20-09-2012-fait-a-paris-france/) discuss this in our interviews). Indeed, each one is responsible for finding the Body position which will respect the free movements of his or her particular Body, without creating unnecessary tension somewhere (for instance, playing acute sounds on the A-string of the cello should not tense the shoulder or misshape the left hand). A posture is a good posture when one sensation does not go along with the creation of a tensed sensation somewhere else. For instance, I should not move my bow in a certain way, even if it is practical for me at this moment, if it results in tension in the right shoulder. This shows how the whole map of the Body is impacted by the changes that happen in some specific localizations. These changes are related to the real circumstances of the sensations, in my case for instance, how I entered into contact with my cello.

620 Husserl explains: “the field undergoes an apprehension as something changeable in manifold ways and as dependent on extension in the type of its changeableness. The field receives localization, and in the field each new change receives localization as a consequence of the particular stimulating circumstances. The new stratum the thing has received by means of the localization of the field acquires, with respect to the constancy of the field, the character of a real property” (Ideas 2, §40, p. 162).

621 Ideas 2, §40, p. 162.

622 Husserl says: “The sensitiveness of the Body thus is constituted throughout as a ‘conditional’ or psychophysical property. And that enters into the apprehension of the Body, as it is perceived ‘externally.’ To the apprehension of Corporeality as such belongs not only the apprehension of a thing but also the co-apprehension of the sensation fields, and indeed these are given as belonging, in the mode of localization, to the appearing Corporeal body” (Ideas 2, §40, p. 163).
apprehension of the sensations that are experienced simultaneously. In the case of music practice, these sensations belong to the musician’s Body in the sense that Husserl explains that belonging “expresses relations of the phenomenal ‘if-then’.”623 For instance, if I hold my bow too lightly, then I will have to force it with my arm, it will create tension in my right shoulder, this tension will require compensation from the other shoulder, etc. Husserl calls this unity of interdependent sensations between the Body as external object and the field of sensations, a “physical-aesthesiological unity.”624

From this unity, other sensations like vision, or hearing are added. Taking the example of vision, Husserl explains how, along the specific sensations related to this particular field “are constituted new real properties of the Body, which, thereby, is obviously involved as already constituted from elsewhere.”625 In other words, it is only because the Body is already constituted as a physical-aesthesiological unity that the other senses can participate in its constitution. For instance, it is only because the musician’s Body of the organist626 is constituted through the unity of external apprehension of the organ, the various keyboards, the pedalboard, that a field of interdependent sensations is constituted, that hearing (both hearing through the ear and in the vibration of the whole Body) can then participate in the constitution of that specific form of Body, and that, in addition to it, the sensation of a specific context can be added (for instance, the intent of

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623 Ideas 2, §40, p. 163

624 Ideas 2, §40, p. 163.

625 Ideas 2, §40, p. 164.

626 The organist Thierry Escaich mentions this coincidence of sensations in our interview and explains how it participates in his improvisations (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-thierry-escaich-organiste/).
the religious service, the calm and depth of a Sunday mass, etc.). In other words, it is only thanks to that nexus of sensations that the melody of the actual song can be experienced as *my* melody, or, a sonorous object issued from my playing of the instrument, and therefore founded in tactuality. This particular nexus of sensations participates, then, in the formation of an original inner song in the sense that the musician *quasi*-feels them as he or she phantasizes the inner song of a particular piece.

For Husserl: “Through this new group of real properties which display themselves as real insofar as they are constituted through a relation to real circumstances within the real, the material Body is intertwined with the soul.” In this quote, Husserl both avoids dualism and a reduction of the phenomenological ego to the psychological ego. Indeed, he demonstrates how the constitution of the phenomenological Body is an integral part of the constitution of the Ego because it engages the Ego as *I can*, thus maintaining the Ego as distinct from the Body, while showing how they are inseparable within the constitutive process of consciousness. For him, the pure ego is related to the constitution of the Body through the experience of real circumstances: contact with objects (the musical instrument, for instance), and interactions with the world through perception (the visual perception of the music room, the smell of that room, etc.), co-constituted with the apprehension of the Body as an object in the world (the experience of the *musician’s Body*).

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627 I develop this description in the next chapter.

628 I will explain that more in the next chapter.

629 *Ideas 2*, §40, p. 164.
This constitution belongs to the stream of the impressional consciousness, and it also participates in its modification.630 Indeed, there is certainly a constituted perceptual Body, but it is constituted thanks to the various built-up experiences that the sensing subject has acquired (repeating the same moves to learn them for instance), and related to these particular real circumstances (the context of sensations when I am playing this specific piece by Bach in my room, for example), all of this being constantly modified through time (as I play day after day).631 This means that each Body is constituted in a special way related to these circumstances. For instance, the improvising saxophonist experiences the constitution, the musician’s Body as a specific kind of constitution, related both to the reality of the musical instrument as an object (the saxophone must learn how to breathe in a certain way, with a certain amount of strength, it develops the muscles of the throat that the cello does not require), and to their own personal interactions with their particular instrument (if the musician has short hands, strong arms, and natural strength, the Body will not develop in the same way as for a musician who has long fingers, and is naturally slender), and the particular type of music performed (jazz, free jazz, bebop, etc., do not go with the same feeling with the instrument).

630 Husserl says: “To say that this Ego, or the soul, ‘has’ a Body, does not merely mean that there exists a physical-material thing which would, through its material processes, present real preconditions for ‘conscious events’ or even, conversely, that in its processes there occur dependencies on conscious events within a ‘stream of consciousness’” (Ideas 2, §40, pp. 164-5).

631 Husserl writes: “Causality belongs, if the word is to retain its pregnant sense, to reality, and conscious events participate in reality only as psychic states or as states of the psychic Ego. Soul and psychic Ego ‘have’ a Body; there exists a material thing, of a certain nature, which is not merely a material thing but is a Body, i.e., a material thing which, as localization field for sensations and for stirrings of feelings, as complex of sense organs, and as phenomenal partner and counter-part of all perceptions of things (along with whatever else could be said about it, based on the above), makes up a fundamental component of the real givenness of the soul and the Ego” (Ideas 2, §40, p. 165).
From the grasping of the inner rhythm, and due to the manipulation of the musical instrument, the musician becomes progressively able to play the musical instrument better, or in various ways. This playing of the musical instrument goes along with an experience of the Body not only as a sensing-Body, but also as a capable-Body, as a Body capable of playing a melody thanks to the movements on the musical instrument.

I want to close the description of the Body by singling out a specific organ: the voice, sometimes used to voice the inner song, and certainly always part of the constitution of the Leib. The word voice can designate two different elements: first, the voice as the Bodily organ that I am the only one to feel, namely, a part of my constituted Leib [die Stimme], and second, the voice [der Laut] as the sonorous object that others as well as I myself can hear, namely, the voice as Körper, like any other Körper. Even if these two elements can be separated (for example when the voice is recorded), the musician experiences them together when he or she is singing, humming, solfeging and the like. Together, and as one, the voice as Leib and the voice as Körper constitute one

632 Although written with a very different intention, Don Ihde’s phenomenological work on listening and the voice crosses some thematic that I am just going to touch here. Ihde, Listening and voice.

633 In “Et la voix s’est faite chair...” quoted above, the author Claire Gillie-Guillbert explains how the latin distinguishes vox (speaking voice) from vocis (singing voice), English distinguishes voice from speech (discourse), and German die Stimme (morphological, physiological, and acting capability to elaborate a vocal gesture felt by the speaker, from der Laut (result audible by the listener), with a close connection between the notion of Stimme (voice) and Stimmung (mood). In the present analysis, I follow the German distinction, highlighting how one is given as Körper (der Laut) and the other as Leib (die Stimme).

634 I speak about it as a Körper in the sense that this sound object can be experienced as distinct from the Body producing it, for example if I record it. In this case, the voice can be experienced as Körper, and this experience can be distinct from the experience of the voice as Leib producing it. Hence, I intend the voice as Körper, in the sense in which a melody or other kinds of sounds are Körper. The French musicologist, sound technician, engineer Pierre Schaeffer studies the recorded voice as a “sound object,” isolating it from the Body producing it, in Schaeffer, "Le Laboureur et ses enfants. He develops the concepts of “sound object” in Schaeffer, In Search of a Concrete Music.. Here, I intend the voice as Körper in the sense as Schaeffer says that it is a sound object.
single element: the *untrained voice*. This untrained voice is *felt* throughout the Body: even when the musician speaks out loud, he or she feels the throat vibrating, the sound in the chest, and other sensations. It is also *heard* through the ears: in addition to these multiple sensations situated more or less clearly in the Body, the ear also vibrates at the sounds which are produced, and this causes the musician to hear his or her own voice through the organ of the ear as well. In summary, feeling and hearing the voice are two distinct and autonomous modes of access to one single experience: the experience of my *untrained voice*.

When the voice [*die Stimme*] is felt, given in the “interior of the body,” it is given as an object very different from any other objects. Indeed, multiple sensations which point to it can be localized: for instance, I feel the cavity of my mouth vibrating, my stomach emptying itself, my lungs breathing, if I shut my mouth I feel differently than if I sing with my mouth opened, if I block my ears and sing again I have another kind of experience, if I sing an acute sound it vibrates differently than if I sing deeper sounds, etc. These sensations belong to me as a unity with other sensations. As a consequence, through a sensuous synthesis in which they *coincide*, the *untrained voice* is constituted as a Bodily organ, as a part of my *Leib*. I experience this organ through *auto-affection*.

When the voice is given as an object like any other object [*der Laut*] not only to the musician him- or herself, but also to others, it is properly *presented*. Indeed, it is given through a perception belonging to a nexus of sensations. As such, as a sound object, the voice is primarily heard through the ear. However, it is not only heard through

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the ear, but also through the whole Body which reacts to the sound that is heard.\textsuperscript{636} In his description of the Body in \textit{Ideas 2}, Husserl clearly distinguishes tactuality from whatever happens with seeing and hearing. He explains how tactuality implies a localization “within” the organ itself, whereas hearing or seeing do not imply such a localization (I would say with the same degree of accuracy in the localization). Hearing and seeing also involve a kind of touch; their sense organs are also “fields of localization.”\textsuperscript{637} For example, Husserl explains how seeing is touching the object with the eye. However, there is no double apprehension because, in order to present a double apprehension, the sense-data needs to be given within the organ. In other words, when I touch my hand for instance, the sense-data of touch is located in my hand, but when I “touch” a sound object with my ears for instance, the sense-data is where the object is, external to the organ itself. Concerning \textit{hearing}, Husserl says that: “the ear is ‘involved’ but the sensed tone is not localized in the ear,”\textsuperscript{638} the sense-tone is localized in the object. So, when the voice is heard, the sense-tone is localized in the object \textit{voice}. In this sense, there is no localization as it happens with touching (even if there is some localization in the ear and more broadly in the whole Body because they vibrate through sound; indeed, this type of localization is not as accurate as the situation which is given in touch).\textsuperscript{639} So, when the voice is given as \textit{Körper [der Laut]}, it is given as a sound object “from the outside.”\textsuperscript{640}

\textsuperscript{636} This is why deaf can also play music. Cf. Carré, \textit{Musique et surdité}.

\textsuperscript{637} \textit{Ideas 2}, §37, p. 156.

\textsuperscript{638} \textit{Ideas 2}, §37, p. 156.

\textsuperscript{639} The German psychiatrist Manfred Spizer describes in details the experience of hearing and practicing music in \textit{Musik in Kopf: Hören, Musizieren, verstehen und erleben in Neuronalen Netzwerk}.

\textsuperscript{640} \textit{Ideas 2}, §36, p. 152.
the case with the hearing of the tone of the cello, the sense-tone is localized in the object, in the voice [der Laut]. Hence, there is only one apprehension.

In the phenomenological constitution of the untrained voice in consciousness, the experience of the voice as Körper is founded in the experience of the voice as Leib. In other words, the tone-sensations are founded in the sensations of auto-affection. Indeed, somebody who is deaf can solely feel the voice without hearing it but the reciprocal is not true; the voice can never be heard only as a Körper by the one voicing it. The untrained voice is constituted through two syntheses of sensations: on the one hand, a general unification of all the sensations located in different parts of the body involved when the musician voices something, and in addition to that, a particular unification of the voice heard with the voice felt when the subject is not deaf. So, if I start humming the inner song of the folk song “Avinu Malkeinu,” the sensations in my chest, my throat, and the sensation of hearing of the tone of my voice resonating in the room will be the object of a first synthesis of continuity, but then, this unified layer of various sensations in the Body is going to be further unified with the tone sensations of my own voice resonating into the music room.

641 There is a similar dynamic here between the voice [der Laut] and the voice [die Stimme]. Indeed, the musician experiences the voice [der Laut] as a possibility of the Body.


643 When the voice is recorded through technology, and is apprehended as a physical object like any other object; it is in some way “disembodied.” That’s probably why it sounds so strange: it is a hearing without feeling, and therefore the constitution of the voice only as Körper. This situation is similar to the one that Husserl describes in the footnote of Ideas II §37 about the eye seeing itself in a mirror. He explains how, in this case, I only judge by “empathy” that this eye is my eye. Similarly, when I hear my voice recorded I only judge by “empathy” that it is my own voice. Ideas 2, §37, p. 155.
The experience of the *untrained voice* is given against inner rhythm in the sense that the musician experiences the inner rhythm, and on the foundation of that primary experience, a voiced phenomenon. What is produced by the voice is related to that inner rhythm. For instance, if my heart is beating normally and my respiration is regular and calm, I will also voice my inner song calmly. However, if I have just run a marathon, if my heart is beating wildly, and I cannot breathe, what I voice will be jerky, and I will not be able to speak correctly. This inner rhythm provides the spatial and temporal foundation of the melody voiced by the untrained voice. Indeed, the sensations of the voice voicing are given against those primary sensations, and the temporality of the melody voiced by the untrained voice is given against that primary structure of the inner rhythm.

As part of the Body, this untrained voice is distinct for each subject, and related to the *historicity* of consciousness. Indeed, it has a history in the sense that it keeps changing from childhood to old age, accompanying the changes of the body. For instance, my voice has a certain pitch: it is low, acute, or medium. It has a certain intensity: it is loud or soft. It has a certain timbre: it is round, full, bright, light, smoky, breathy, rough. It expresses certain emotions: it is soothing, angry, nervous, joyful. It has also a certain historicity in the sense that it is related to the historical subject. For instance, it is broken if I am sick, it seems to be my mother’s voice because I learned to

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644 This relationship between breathing and the voice is nicely described in a non-phenomenological way in Smith and Chipman, *The Naked Voice: A Wholistic Approach of Singing*.

645 As I explained in the conclusion, I don’t address that dimension because it should be the object of a separate study, but I am aware that this analysis would deepen my understanding of the inner song.

646 This goes back to the notion of the temporality of the Body, Cf. Rodemeyer, Lanei, “Body time/Time in the Body”
speak with her and as we are part of the same family, I bear certain characteristics that she has, it speaks with an accent and an intensity which indicate my birth-country, it changed during puberty as the hormonal change lost me my child’s voice and gave an adult voice. The flesh of the untrained voice is totally unique. For me and for others, it makes a certain voice recognizable as my voice, and moreover, as the voice that I have now. In this sense, the voice has a spatiality and a temporality.  

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647 As Derrida famously works on the notion of voice in *Speech and Phenomenon*, I want to spend some time working on his personal account in this footnote, while unfolding my own description of the voice within the Husserlian framework (I come back to that notion in footnote 814).

In *Speech and Phenomena*, Derrida says: “For it is not in the sonorous substance or in the physical voice, in the body of speech in the world, that he [Husserl] will recognize an original affinity with the logos in general, but in the voice phenomenologically taken, speech in its transcendental flesh, in the breath, the intentional animation that transforms the body of the word into flesh, makes of the Körper a Leib, a geistige Leiblichkeit. The phenomenological voice would be this spiritual flesh that continues to speak and be present to itself – to hear itself – in the absence of the world.” This is translated from the French which says originally: “Car ce n’est pas à la substance sonore ou à la voix physique, au corps de la voix dans le monde qu’il reconnaîtra une affinité d’origine avec le logos en général, mais à la voix phénoménologique, à la voix dans sa chair transcendantale, au souffle, à l’animation intentionnelle qui transforme le corps du mot en chair, qui fait du Körper un Leib, une geistige Leiblichkeit. La voix phénoménologique serait cette chair spirituelle qui continue de parler et d’être présente à soi – de s’entendre en l’absence du monde” (Derrida, *La voix et le Phénomène*, p. 16). First of all, Derrida makes a distinction between the *phenomenological voice* and the *sonorous substance*, or the *physical voice*. Second, his reflection is situated in a linguistic context because, as opposed to my own analysis of the *untrained voice* which is based on a description of the Body, Derrida analyzes the voice primarily as it carries a language, i.e., in relation to a word.

Even if Derrida is mostly interested in the linguistic voice, the *untrained voice* is not totally put aside in his work. This is clearer in the French. Indeed, the French uses only one word, *voix*, whereas the English uses two words *voice* and *speech*. As a consequence, there is more room for interpretation in the French language as opposed to the English in which the use of the word *speech* immediately situates the reflection in the linguistic context. This is clear when Derrida mentions the *body of speech*: he uses *corps de la voix* in French which sounds more embodied than in English. Formulated as *corps*, this idea also resonates more obviously with the expression *chair transcendantale, transcendental flesh* that comes a couple of lines later. Here, I argue that Derrida is not only addressing a linguistic issue, but also bringing to light various modes of embodiment of the voice. He mentions indeed two types of voice: (1) a physical voice that he defines as *Körper*, and (2) a phenomenological voice that “makes of a Körper a Leib”; even if he is not addressing the voice as a physical embodied voice like I do, I can still identify the Husserlian distinction between the body as *Körper*, and the body as *Leib*.

In this work, Derrida describes the voice both as a Körper and as something that “makes a Körper a Leib” but in the second case, he is describing a process, a dynamic of transformation, and not a certain state. As a result, it is not the case that there are two understandings of the voice: as Körper and as Leib in Derrida’s description. There is instead the voice as Körper and a transformative voice. For him, the voice as Körper is the one that occupies the space and is subjected to causal laws. It is a voice that I hear through my sensory-organ of the ear, and that somebody else can hear too. On the other hand, the voice that “makes of the Körper a Leib” would be the voice as an organ of perception. The difference between
my understanding of the voice as Leib and Derrida’s understanding of the voice as what “makes a Körper a Leib” dwells in the fact that I argue that the voice as Leib is primarily “alive” because it is part of the lived-body, whereas Derrida argues that the voice as Leib is “alive” because an “intentional animation [..] transforms the body of the word into flesh.” In other words, when Derrida situates his description of the voice in a linguistic context, he says that it is the intention that animates the word, and therefore has this transformative power.

Derrida writes: “The word is a body that means something only if an actual intention animates it and makes it pass from the state of inert sonority (Körper) to that of an animated body (Leib). This body proper to words expresses something only if it is animated (sinnbelebt) by an act of meaning (bedeutet) which transforms it into a spiritual flesh (geistige Leiblichkeit). But only the Geistigkeit or Lebendigkeit is independent and primordial. As such, it needs no signifier to be present to itself. Indeed, it is as much in spirit of its signifiers as thanks to them that it is awakened or maintained in life. Such is the traditional side of Husserl’s language” (idem, p. 81). In this quote it looks like Derrida identifies the word with the voice. In other words, the word itself is identified with what carries it. He says indeed: “the word is a body” and not the word has a body. Afterward, he transitions toward the question of meaning. In this description, we are clearly in a linguistic context: it is not the voice but the word that is Körper, and then becomes Leib; and it is the intention that transforms the Körper in Leib, not something else. Thus, the corporeality of the word depends on its signifier.

However, Derrida also writes: “The subject does not have to pass forth beyond himself to be immediately affected by his expressive activity. My words are “alive” because they seem not to leave me: not to fall outside me, outside my breath, at a visible distance; not to cease to belong to me, to be at my disposition ‘without further props.’ In any event, the phenomenon of speech, the phenomenological voice, gives itself out in this manner” (Speech and Phenomena, p.76). This quote presents a situation that is very different from the previous one. Indeed, Derrida does not speak now from the perspective of embodiment but describes an immediacy of the subject with himself given in the Leib through the constitution of the lived-body. Indeed, he mentions here how I am affected by the activity of the voice, and how this proximity, this immediacy, is the condition of possibility of the life of the word itself. The phenomenological voice is alive because it is constituted as part of the lived-body, it is a Leib. This constitution happens through passive syntheses, the subject being affected by something. These passive syntheses are characteristic of the givenness of the Body, and it is also the mode of constitution of the untrained voice as a part of this Body.

From these two quotes, it is clear that the voice is for Derrida what “makes a Körper a Leib, a geistige Leiblichkeit” (Speech and Phenomena, p. 16), in two senses: first, in the sense that the word is animated by the intention, and second, in the sense that the voice belongs to the body not only as a perceived object, but as part of the constitution of the lived-body.

For me, the two perspectives need to be distinguished and valued for what they are. There is, on the one hand the linguistic perspective wherein we can speak about the body of the word, and the intention animating it, thus transforming the Körper in Leib by introducing a presence to oneself through talking to oneself: and on the other hand, the perspective of embodiment in which the voice makes of the Körper a Leib because it is embodied in the lived-body, and the subject is auto-affected and present to himself through this embodiment. As was said, the voice as word animated by an intention is not the focus of my description; I voluntarily put that aspect aside. However, I am interested in the corporeality of the voice as an organ of perception.

This embodied aspect is not totally bypassed by Derrida. Indeed, he qualifies the voice as auto-affection, and even pure auto-affection. In order to understand what he means by that, it is important to remember that Derrida looks at the voice not only as an embodied organ like any other organ, but mostly as a voice that carries a meaning, a word animated by a bedeutung. It is this particular function of meaning-carrier added to the auto-affection which makes of the voice “an auto-affection of a unique kind” (Speech and Phenomena, p. 78). Derrida says: “On the one hand, it [the operation of “hearing oneself speak”] operates within the medium of universality; what appears as signified therein must be idealities that are idealiter indefinitely repeatable or transmissible as the same. On the other hand, the subject can hear or speak to himself and be affected by the signifier he produces, without passing through an external detour,
In phantasy, the phantasy voice is constituted as a part of the Phantasieleib. This voice both quasi-temporalizes and quasi-spatializes the inner melody of the inner song when it is sang. Indeed, the inner melody is temporally unfolded through succession, and its sonorous flesh is constituted through that voice. When the musician sings the inner melody in the phantasy, he or she can apprehend the rhythm, the tempo, as well as the color of the melody. The inner voice is also the medium through which the musician can enter into a dialogue with him- or herself, singing to him- or herself what the world, the sphere of what is not “his own.”” (Idem.). The first characteristic, meaning carrier, refers to a logical context and designates the ideal that can be grasped through an “act of ideation based on intuition” (Husserl, Logical Investigations, Volume Two, §39). In other words, Derrida explains how the access to universality is given through the voice. The second characteristic, auto-affection, refers to this previously mentioned radical and unchangeable proximity in play with the lived-body. Together, these two characteristics constitute a paradox. Indeed, the voice is both what provides access to the universal, and what is the most individual. It is therefore at the same time the most disembodied, and the most embodied. Moreover, it is both what breaks the solipsism by projecting meaning within the world, and what dwells within the most solipsistic sphere as it can be heard “in the absence of the world.”

Derrida continues, describing in more depth what he intends by pure auto-affection: “As pure auto-affection, the operation of hearing oneself speak seems to reduce even the inward surface of one’s own body; in its phenomenal being it seems capable of dispensing with this exteriority within interiority, this interior space in which our experience or image of our own body is spread forth. This is why hearing oneself speak [s’entendre parler] is experienced as an absolutely pure auto-affection, occurring in a self-proximity that would in fact be the absolute reduction of space in general. It is this purity that makes it fit for universality. Requiring the intervention of no determinate surface in the world, being produced in the world as pure auto-affection, it is a signifying substance absolutely at our disposition. For the voice meets no obstacle to its emission in the world precisely because it is produced as pure auto-affection. This auto-affection is no doubt the possibility for what is called subjectivity or the for-itself, but, without it, no world as such would appear” (Speech and Phenomena, p. 78).

I previously mentioned how Derrida defines the voice as what makes “a Körper a Leib, a geistige Leiblichkeit” (Speech and Phenomena, p. 16). in two senses: as the word is animated by an intention, and as the voice takes part in the constitution of the lived-body. In this quote, it looks like he is explaining how those two claims relate to one another. Indeed, he uses the expressions: Dispensing with this exteriority within interiority, Absolute reduction of space, no determinate surface, and describes the pure auto-affection of the voice as an auto-affection without spatiality, and thus as a purity.

All these expressions seem to relate the body. They are more precisely related to the notion of interiority. According to Derrida, the Husserlian auto-affection is an exteriority within interiority, so for him, the pure auto-affection is a pure interiority without exteriority, an interiority without space. Reducing auto-affection to a bodily passivity allows him to introduce the idea of a pure auto-affection deprived of space. Even if it looks like Derrida is getting rid of the notion of space, I claim that he is falling back into the conception of interiority that Husserl was precisely criticizing in Brentano: a psychological interiority, an interiority within. It is problematic as Husserl’s point was precisely to maintain together embodiment and interiority, without separating them into a within and a without, without discriminating the object of investigation according to these criteria. Derrida seems here to negate embodiment by negating the dimension of space.
performance could be or should be. As this voice is a phantasy voice, it is characterized by the freedom of the phantasy. It means that various segments of inner songs can be awakened, therefore voiced together, constituting new inner songs associated through vocalization.648

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648 There is more to say about the voice as a Bodily organ, and the phantasy voice. If I were to deepen my description and extend this investigation, I would work with Marc Richir’s descriptions of the body, for instance of the vocal organs in “La vision et son imaginaire,”, but also more generally of the living Body in Richir’s Le Corps: Essai sur l’Intériorité.
This chapter explained how the inner song is given in the reproductive consciousness from the now of the Ur-Phantasie, flowing through a replacement of one now by the next, thus constituting a quasi-temporality, similar with the temporality of the hyletic flow constituting the impressional consciousness, but distinct from it.

The chapter also explained how this now of the phantasm constitutes a Phantasieleib, similar from the Wahrnehmungsleib, and more specifically to the musician’s Body which is a specific kind of perceptual Body, also made of sensuous data of touch, color, sounds of a Body sensing, as well as the tension, release, sense of distances, etc., of the Body manipulating the instrument.

At the end of this chapter, consciousness appears as a double consciousness, both impressional and reproductive, embodied both in a perceptual and a phantasy Body, and unfolding two temporalities which are the temporality of the hyletic flow and the quasi-temporality of the phantasy.

This chapter leaves some problems unaddressed. Indeed, the interaction of these two consciousnesses is still unclear. It was said that the inner song could not be constituted without the perceptual experience of playing music. However, what exactly does that mean? Does it indicate a temporal primacy of the impressional consciousness? Then, it was also said that the inner song is constituted throughout the performance apprehended as mine. How is the performance apprehended in such a way? Does saying that the inner song is constituted throughout the performance mean that there is a constant interlacing of the two modes of consciousness? How does the act of practicing music participate in the constitution of the inner song? Exploring these problems will be the object of the coming chapter.
Chapter 5: The Process of Constitution of the Inner Song through Music Practice
The previous chapter focused on the impressional and reproductive consciousness, their modes of embodiment, and therefore their modes of constitution of the object. From this explanation, mostly focused on consciousness itself, I want to move to an explanation of the inner song, describing how it unfolds and undergoes modifications in the reproductive consciousness through music practice.

According to the definition I established earlier, the constitution of the inner song reproduces the possible perception of a performance. As the musician practices, rehearses, the inner song is modified in consciousness, adjusting, and clarifying the musician’s understanding of the piece of music. As appears here, there is a complex interplay between hearing oneself playing the inner song, and phantasizing the inner song. Indeed, it is thanks to the inner song that the musician can build up his or her musical interpretation of a piece, but it is also thanks to hearing him- or herself playing that the musician can build up this understanding of the piece. When the musician practices and rehearses, he or she experiences the performance as his or her own performance. This means that the actual song is constituted in the impressional consciousness as a co-constitution of the musical instrument and the melody. In other words, the actual song is constituted as a temporal object through an association of tone-sensations (the melody) and touch sensations (the musical instrument). Part of this association is the act of learning the instrumental technique: the musician needs to learn how to hold and manipulate the instrument to issue the melody as he or she wants to hear it.

Through repetition and the creation of habits, the musician becomes able to phantasize the inner song further. More exactly, the inner song is constituted in the
reproductive consciousness as a temporal object made of tone-phantasms (the inner
melody) and touch-phantasms (the inner musical instrument). It develops as the music
practice progresses, through a co-implication of the constitution processes in the
impressional and reproductive consciousness, and due to a reflexive aesthetical
judgement of the musician on both his or her playing and inner song. A temporal process
then leads the inner song from the stage of an obscure phantasy to a more refined type of
phantasy object.
§1. Awakening of the inner song in the reproductive consciousness.

§2. The constitution of the musical instrument with its voice.

§3. The constitution of the *melody* through the movements on the instrument.

§4. Acquiring a technique as a process of getting to know the instrument’s possibilities.

§5. Further constitution of the inner song through the co-implication of the constitutions in the impressional and retentional consciousness.
E. M. : Finalement ces trois choses sont aussi les trois dimensions du chant intérieur. La première que vous avez citée est le rythme.

M. R. : Oui. Dans le jazz le développement se fait sur 32 mesures.

E. M. : Puis il y a l’harmonie.

M. R. : Voilà, on entend, on imagine quelque chose qui a une structure harmonique. C’est la base qui permet la croissance d’un monde sonore.

E. M. : Et sur ce fond se détache la mélodie. Est-ce que pour vous elle a un son particulier, celui du piano ?

M. R. : Je crois que oui. D’une part parce que j’y suis habitué puisque c’est mon instrument, d’autre part parce qu’entendre le son du piano me stimule puisque c’est l’élément par lequel le chant intérieur s’exprimera.

E. M. : C’est le piano qui vous aide à trouver le chant intérieur ?

M. R. : La voix aussi est importante : les lignes mélodiques doivent pouvoir être chantées.

E. M. : Si je comprends bien ça veut dire que votre instrument est partie intégrante du chant intérieur.

M. R. : Effectivement. D’autant plus que, plus on maîtrise l’instrument mieux c’est, plus le chant intérieur est clair parce qu’on l’éclaire en jouant. Cela dit il ne fait pas tout non plus : l’instrument n’est qu’un outil.

*Interview with Manuel Rocheman (Pianist, French, Paris, France, 21.09. 2012)*

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E. M. : C’est un travail entre soi et l’instrument alors. Et en même temps c’est indépendant de l’instrument. Cela m’étonne toujours de voir qu’un autre musicien a un son totalement différent du mien sur mon violoncelle à moi.


E. M. : A quoi est-ce dû ?

R. P. : Je ne crois pas qu’on puisse le dire exactement. C’est un équilibre entre le poids du bras et la vitesse, le temps de réaction à l’attaque un peu comme le pincé au clavecin, une manière propre à chacun de mettre la corde en résonance. La recherche de sonorité est comme le travail manuel du potier qui galbe son vase. C’est comme notre propre voix (intérieure !), chacune a un timbre différent.

E. M. : Est-ce que c’est surtout l’archet qui le détermine ?

R. P. : C’est par lui qu’on maîtrise la tension et le rebond c’est-à-dire la durée de vibration qui donne la chaleur du son. La main gauche joue aussi car la pâte du son vient également du volume de la main : la paume carrée donne plus de son par exemple. Selon ce qu’on est on a une sonorité différente, ensuite c’est une question de technique.

*Interview with Raphaël Pidoux (Cellist, French, Paris, France, 02. 11. 2013)*

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M. P.: Il suono è una produzione d’energia che viene dall’artista. Non viene da zero: per ottenere un suono chiaro bisogna raffinare la propria tecnica E’ un prodotto personale, come il timbro per un cantante. Per i cantanti non è la stessa cosa usare la
voce di gola o di testa. Poi, insieme a questo suono che è prodotto da me, ce n’è anche uno prodotto dallo strumento stesso.

E. M.: Il suono non appartiene soltanto allo strumento, allora.

M. P.: No, nasce della relazione tra lo strumento e il musicista. Anche a proposito di questa cosa le posso raccontare una storia: Heifetz aveva fatto un concerto e una signora era venuta a fargli i complimenti dicendo: “Che meraviglia il suono del suo strumento!” Heifetz l’avrebbe preso, messo vicino all’orecchio e avrebbe risposto: “Mah, io non sento niente”. Questo spiega come, da solo, lo strumento non sia nulla.

E. M.: Anche uno strumento meraviglioso può produrre un suono comune allora?

M. P.: Forse sì. Però non esageriamo… Sarà comunque buono, credo. È come se io guidassi una Ferrari: con me va bene perché è una bella macchina… però se la guida Alonso è meglio, no? Le affinità sono diverse, è così!

Intervista con Massimo Paris (Violist, Italian, Aachen, Germany, 04. 08. 2013)

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E. M.: Allora, comincerei col chiederti se si usa in Italia l’espressione “canto interiore”.

P.-F. T.: Direi di sì; o meglio, penso di cogliere il senso che le si può attribuire quando, per esempio, in ambito strumentale il maestro dice all’allievo: “prova a cantare questa frase, quando la suoni”. Si riferisce probabilmente a quello che chiami “canto interiore” – anche se questo termine, di per sé, credo venga usato in altri ambiti (penso alla meditazione e all’uso che essa può fare del canto).

E. M.: In questo senso il maestro cosa intende ottenere?
P.-F. T.: Vuole aiutare l’allievo a rendere quel pezzo più suo, più personale, o anche solo più còlto nelle sue parti.

E. M.: E perché è più facile con il canto?

P.-F. T.: Per esempio perché è più facile eseguire il legato. Quando non c’è il problema « meccanico » dello strumento è più facile cogliere la melodia nella sua unitarità.

E. M.: E poi?

P.-F. T.: Poi perché aiuta a capire dove sono i silenzi, le pause. Mi ricordo un episodio accadutomi ad un corso con Paolo Pegoraro, chitarrista classico italiano tra i più importanti al mondo e didatta straordinario del suo strumento: eravamo alle prese con la prima pagina del Nocturnal after John Dowland Op. 70 di Benjamin Britten, brano tra i più affascinanti e difficili di tutta la letteratura moderna per chitarra, ed io non riuscivo a rispettare le lunghe pause tra una melodia e l’altra – fondamentali per l’espressione -. Lui intui che il problema era un impaccio con lo strumento, che non mi permetteva di « sentire » fino in fondo e quindi realizzare la relazione tra la melodia e il silenzio; mi suggerì di cantare e, in modo anche a me inaspettato, riuscii ad eseguire tranquillamente tutti i passaggi melodici, con fraseggio e pause adeguati. Poi tornare a lavorare con lo strumento è stata un’altra cosa!

E. M.: Il fatto che non ci sia nessun ostacolo fra l’intenzione e il suono fa della voce il mezzo più facile per cogliere e far uscire il canto interiore?

P.-F. T.: Sì, lo si potrebbe dire così. Ma c’è anche qualcosa di ancora più originario: la voce è il primo mezzo di espressione dell’uomo, è quindi lo strumento con il quale siamo più familiari. Non dobbiamo imparare una tecnica per usarla, è qualcosa di immediato, spontaneo (anche se per imparare ad usarla bene certamente occorre una
tecnica, che però è una evoluzione di quella naturale). E’ così che, starei per dire, la voce è il medio fra l’idea e la materia.

E. M. : Capisco.

P.-F. T.: Aggiungerei anche che può essere una via che rende possibile un obiettivo fondamentale – riprendendo una cosa che ho imparato dai miei maestri Marco Bonfanti e Paolo Pegoraro -: il fatto di non essere dominati dalle asperità dello strumento. Un altro esempio eccezionale di musicista, tra quelli che ho potuto conoscere, che testimoniano questa unità tra intento espressivo e realizzazione sonora, con lo strumento che si plasma, esaltandosi, nel suo essere « cantato », è Lorenzo Micheli. Comunque: la voce va in armonia con il proprio corpo. Cantare prima di suonare permette di avvicinare lo strumento con qualcosa che appartiene a noi.

E. M. : In termini filosofici – ne approfitto perché parlo con un professore di filosofia –, non c’è un’estraneità.

P.-F. T.: Giusto. Direi anzi che c’è una vera coincidenza fra personalità e modo di cantare. Lo vedo bene quando faccio cantare i miei allievi: la maturazione umana si può vedere nel modo in cui si usa la propria voce. Provo a spiegarmi. Mi è accaduto varie volte che, ascoltando cantare uno stesso brano o una stessa parte vocale dalla stessa persona ma in momenti diversi, mi accorgessi che, soprattutto di fronte a musica o parole di spessore, la persona non potesse nascondere nemmeno a se stessa un certo intimo sentimento di sé; come se « registrasse » quel che la propria personalità è in quel momento, limpidamente, senza poter « barare » come capita invece quando ci si descrive nel linguaggio parlato. Quando parliamo di noi possiamo mettere schermi,
quando cantiamo – soprattutto alcune cose in alcuni momenti – questi vengono trapassati.

Mi accorgo che non è facile da spiegare, mi scuso…

E. M. : Allora – se capisco bene – se la voce è legata alla personalità, e se, suonando, proviamo a rifare quello che cantiamo, è una ragione in più per affermare che la nostra interpretazione è legata alla nostra personalità. Più si riproduce quello che si canta, più l’interpretazione è personale.


E. M. : Ma sai che la voce è personale anche perché è risonanza corporale? Ho letto che la nostra morfologia influenza la nostra voce. Perciò abbiamo qualche volta una voce simile a quella dei nostri genitori. Non è soltanto perché abbiamo riprodotto, ma anche perché siamo fatti come loro.


P.-F. T.: E il segno di questa vita è, giustamente, la respirazione…

E. M. : Così torniamo all’idea secondo la quale la voce aiuta a mettere i silenzi al posto giusto.

E. M.: Il passaggio fra interiorità e esteriorità che è la voce si fa con il ritmo regolare della respirazione.


Purtroppo quando suoniamo lo dimentichiamo spesso e produciamo qualcosa di soffocante.

*Interview with Pietro-Francesco Toffoletto (Guitarist, Italian, Skype, 08. 11. 2014)*

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E. M.: Est-ce qu’on prépare tout à l’avance ?

C. P.: Non bien sûr. Improviser c’est justement ne pas penser. Lorsqu’on improvise on est dans la musique. Ce n’est pas quelque chose d’intellectuel.

E. M.: Oui. Cela dit, c’est grâce au travail qu’on a fait avant qu’on est capable de ne plus penser justement.

C. P.: C’est ça.

E. M.: Comment se fait ce travail ?

C. P.: On relève des solos principalement. Au début c’est fastidieux et puis ensuite, avec l’habitude, on y arrive beaucoup plus facilement.

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C. P.: En fait, si tu veux, l’improvisation ça comprend des variations de mélodie, harmonie, rythme, son. Tout cela se structure dans l’introspection, le travail en solo chez soi. Puis vient le moment où l’on joue et à ce moment-là on ne pense plus. Charlie Parker disait : « apprenez les grilles et oubliez-les ».

*Interview avec Camille Poupat (Saxophonist, French, Chartres, France, 12. 11. 2014)*

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E. M. : Vous dites toujours « chanter », quel est le rapport du Chant Intérieur avec la voix ?

J. P. : En fait ce qui sort par les cordes vocales doit sortir par l’instrument.

E. M. : Comment ?

J. P. : Exactement en suivant le même chemin : cela part de la respiration, de la posture. L’instrument doit devenir un organe, un prolongement du corps. Tout doit se passer comme si je chantais à l’instrument.


J. P. : Oui. Si on ne fait pas ce travail cela ne sert à rien de passer par l’extérieur et de dire des trucs du style « remonte ton coude » à l’élève. Il risque de ne pas le faire.

E. M. : Pourquoi ?


E. M. : De quelle manière ?

J. P. : En faisant appel à la sensation : lorsque le coude est dégagé le son est meilleur par exemple, la note a plus de sens.

E. M. : On a une plus grande liberté dans le geste.

J. P. : C’est cela. Il est fondamental d’être dans un état détendu.

*Interview with Jérôme Pernoo (Cellist, French, Paris, France, 12. 18. 2014)*

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N. P. : Ça, ce dont tu parles, ça relève d’un apprentissage. Chacun se constitue progressivement un vocabulaire musical à partir duquel il va pouvoir ensuite improviser.

E. M. : Comment tu pourrais définir l’improvisation ?
N. P. : J’aime bien ce que dit Thelonius Monk : « Improviser c’est rejouer des choses qu’on connaît déjà dans un ordre qu’on ne connaît pas ». Bien entendu, il parle ici d’une improvisation dans un cadre tonal, rythmique, auquel s’ajoute une trame mélodique improvisée qui vient épouser la trame harmonique.

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E. M. : En ce sens le chant a un rôle dans le processus de créativité.

N. P. : C’est cela. Mais se chanter quelque chose intérieurement n’aide pas seulement à mieux jouer, ça aide aussi à respecter les silences. On ne peut pas jouer de manière ininterrompue. Les moments de pause dans la mélodie sont très importants. Être bien imprégné de la grille d’accord permet d’improviser mais aussi savoir laisser des silences.

E. M. : Comment ça ?

N. P. : Improviser c’est parler et se taire. Les deux. La difficulté est donc à la fois de savoir commencer quelque chose, mais aussi de savoir ne pas jouer.

*Interview avec Nicolas Pfeiffer (Bassist, French, Chartres, France, 05. 22. 2015)*

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E. M. : Alors comment se forme ce son intérieur que tu vas exprimer lorsque tu joues ?

J. G. : Je m’inspire beaucoup d’autres instruments : beaucoup de saxophonistes, et moins de bassistes.

*Interview with Joachim Govin (Bassist, French, Paris, France, 12. 19. 2015)*

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L. M.: Yes. What I notice with the flute is when you get people to sing in lessons: everyone has a particular natural voice. It was quite interesting, I remember once a girl having this beautiful singing voice, a light, soprano voice, and her voice on the flute was also like a sparkling light. For example, my teacher William Bennett, he’s a big guy, he’s got this wonderful baritone voice. I think I am a kind of alto. Everybody’s physiology is different.

E. M.: Sure, when I play, there is a relationship between how I play the instrument and my voice. And maybe more so with singers. What is this inner voice we use to sing inside of our head? Is it the same voice?

L. M.: This is just an idea, I think it might be because it brings into play the linguistic part of the brain. For example, when you are playing the cello, the sound production is so far away from your speaking voice. And then when you sing it, maybe it activates the linguistic part of the brain. Maybe it becomes more integrated. I was at a lesson with an alexander technique teacher. He said to me: “you can take a breath on the flute to get from A to B, like putting fuel in the car, functional, so this would be the functional one. [She plays]. “Or, you can take a linguistic breath, where it is not just for getting from A to B,” but when you totally identify with what you are going to say. [She plays her flute].

*Interview with Lorna McGhee (Flautist, English, Pittsburgh, PA, USA, 04. 02. 2016)*

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E. M.: So when you play jazz, how does the music come to you?

J. T.: There is a wonderful thing about that. Do you know Kenny Werner? The jazz pianist? He talks about that process. He talks about…at first you just build, you play
the changes, and then you begin to build your own ideas about some improvisation and it stacks…but he says that, at some point when you cross into the real music making, something happens where the subconscious begins to assimilate these ideas, and something different is happening, and you are no longer…what’s his word…he says it’s no longer derivative. It is no longer only synthesis. Something else comes in, he says.

E. M. : So how do you learn to improvise?

J. T.: At the very beginning, you always copy, of course. Like language. The same idea.

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E. M. : I’ll therefore start by asking you to tell me more about the process of composing music.

R. V.: When I start thinking about a piece that I want to compose, I kind of imagine the whole piece being performed in my mind. If it is an orchestral piece, I hear the orchestra playing it. It is like, if it is for an ensemble, I imagine it as being performed, and I imagine that it is alive, being there [i.e. that the ensemble actually exists/is present.] Gradually, I get the idea, and I write down “die Gestalt,” the envelope of the piece, so that I don’t forget it.

E. M. : What exactly is this envelope?

R. V.: I write down how the piece should start, where the piece should go, and what it should do, where is the peak of the piece, and then, how should it end. I really have to
know how a piece should end, I am obsessed with endings. I always read the end of a
book before starting it.

E. M. : So do I! Even with thrillers… I know how bad this habit is but I can’t
change it!

R. V.: I cannot read a book until I know the end. And it is the same with my music, I
have to know how the piece ends, or at least have an idea of how the piece should end.
And then, I gradually put the piece together, then I spend a lot of time on details. The
details take up the majority of my time, 95/98% of the compositional process. But I
have to have the image of the piece in my mind before I go into the details.

E. M. : So you go from the general to the particular.

R. V.: Right. The general idea is, just as the piece [i.e. solely considering the piece
itself], how it should move. It is a kind of a general large envelope of the sound of the
piece. But then, when I go into the details, I might have to change some of the details.
Sometimes I have to change a little bit of the general idea.

E. M. : The general envelope is the mood? The tonality?

R. V.: Everything! Let me give you an example. When you were a kid, did you
imagine that you were a character in a movie and you played the whole movie by
yourself? I did! I used to do that. So I would be Tarzan, going up the trees, I would be
King Arthur fighting …and so on. When you are doing this, you are imagining the
movie in your imagination. It is very similar in a way, that I imagine the whole piece
being performed in my head. Sometimes, I use digital technology. I make a rough draft
of the piece as it should sound. Then I go into the details. For a recent piece I am
doing, I am actually doing the opposite process. I have improvised in certain modes,
and I have recorded it, I did that for five or six years. As I’m going through those as a musician, I am listening to them, and I’m selecting some of those, and then putting what I choose together as a draft of the piece. It has to be much more refined. It is a kind of draft of the movements that I want to do. But this is a new kind of process that I started recently. I like to explore different approaches to write music.

Interview with Reza Vali (Composer, English, Pittsburgh, PA, USA 10.03. 2016)

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Y.- P. T. : Bien évidemment l’expression « chant intérieur » me rappelle énormément l’enseignement de madame Hoppenot[1]. Je l’ai extrêmement bien connue et alors elle, elle parle non pas du « chant intérieur » mais du « violon intérieur ».

E. M. : Qu’est-ce qu’elle entend par là ?

Y.- P. T. : Je crois qu’elle parle d’une manière d’aborder le violon en faisant en sorte qu’il devienne un organe intérieur, comme c’est le cas pour les chanteurs. Par définition les chanteurs ont le chant intérieur, c’est le plus bel exemple. Pour nous autres instrumentistes il faut que cela « devienne » intérieur, parce que c’est en premier lieu « intérieur »

E. M. : Je comprends. Comment cela a lieu alors ?

Y.- P. T. : Pour elle cela se faisait par le biais de la technique. Elle enseignait l’art de jouer du violon en donnant les moyens d’exprimer son chant intérieur. Elle était très axée sur les moyens techniques aidant à faire résonner le violon, obtenir la meilleure résonance. Elle nous aidait à parvenir à la meilleure résonance instrumentale par la technique.
E. M. : Elle insistait sur la posture par exemple ?


E. M. : Où avait-elle appris cela ?

Y.- P. T. : Elle s’inspirait du grand violoniste Henryk Sczering. Il était pour elle le modèle technique parfait pour faire résonner l’instrument.

Ici je ne parle pas du chant artistique, émotionnel, mais de la résonance instrumentale.

E. M. : Comment passe-t-on de la résonance artistique à la résonance instrumentale alors ?

Y.- P. T. : C’est une très bonne question. Ici je crois qu’il faut que je fasse référence à mon père parce que lui, avait les deux. Faire résonner son instrument ne suffit pas bien sûr. Le but est, à travers la résonance de l’instrument, de faire résonner son âme. C’est de cela qu’il s’agit.

*Interview with Yann-Pascal Tortelier (Conductor, French, Pittsburgh, PA, USA, 03. 19. 2017)*

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E. M. : Et l’expression [chant intérieur] vous convient ?

M. T. : Personnellement j’utilise plutôt l’expression « oreille intérieure », « écoute intérieure ». Je le fais peut-être par déformation professionnelle, parce que je fais de la
direction d’orchestre et que mon instrument, c’est l’oreille, pas un instrument mélodique.

E. M. : Comment cela ?

M. T. : En tant que chef d’orchestre je dois entendre une pluralité de sons ensemble. C’est ce qui fait la difficulté du métier d’ailleurs : on entend une multitude de sons de 30 à 100 musiciens, c’est une pluralité de sons déjà organisée car ce sont des musiciens qui savent ce qu’ils font, et c’est à nous de les recevoir, de les analyser et d’y apporter les inflexions que l’on juge nécessaires.

E. M. : De quelle façon ?

M. T. : Au moment de la répétition ; mais l’oreille intérieure est engagée plus en amont, avant le moment de la répétition, au moment du travail avec la partition.

E. M. : Je comprends. Déjà lorsque vous lisez la partition vous entendez un ensemble de sons organisés.

M. T. : Oui. D’ailleurs c’est cela, le défi du chef : se représenter cette simultanéité de sons. Pour cela, la connaissance de l’harmonie est cruciale. Elle permet pour le coup une vision plus verticale de la musique, par opposition à la vision horizontale que suggère la notion de chant intérieur.

E. M. : Oui. Mais pourquoi dites-vous que votre instrument est l’oreille, et non pas l’orchestre ? Pourtant dans la définition d’« instrument » on entend souvent le média servant à transmettre la musique, n’est-ce pas ?

M. T. : C’est vrai. Là j’entends « instrument » dans le sens d’« outil ». L’oreille est comme l’outil principal d’une boîte à outil. Le chef a sa boîte à outil et il triture, il répare, il organise les sons. Ensuite l’instrument qui joue et est joué c’est l’orchestre,
en effet ; instrument le plus complexe car il est constitué de plusieurs êtres humains qui agissent les uns avec les autres.

**E. M. :** Si l’on reprend le déroulement du travail il y a donc d’abord la phase de préparation qui est plus mentale, puis la phase de répétition, plus la phase de restitution, de représentation.

**M. T. :** Voilà, exactement. C’est peut-être pendant la première phase que cette notion d’oreille intérieure est la plus forte.

**E. M. : Pourquoi ?**

**M. T. :** C’est une phase extrêmement importante parce que plus on la pousse, plus on étudie sa partition, plus l’image mentale (même si le mot « image » renvoie à quelque chose de fixe), la représentation mentale de l’œuvre, du phénomène sonore, sera précise, affinée, et plus on sera à même, au moment de la répétition, d’évaluer les éventuelles différences entre ce que propose l’orchestre et l’image, la représentation idéale qu’on s’est faite de l’œuvre.

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**M. T. :** L’oreille absolue permet de brûler une étape, de ne pas avoir besoin qu’on nous donne un « la » ou un autre réfèrent. On peut vraiment, en silence, se faire une représentation assez exacte. Bien évidemment cela permet ensuite d’identifier beaucoup plus facilement d’éventuelles fausses notes.

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M. T. : Personnellement je ne m’interdis pas la parole, le chant. Papa fait pareil, et même plus que moi, cela nous arrive à tous les deux de lire, de travailler une partition, et à un moment donner de travailler un son, de donner une sorte de rendu de ce qu’on a dans la tête pour accompagner notre représentation. Ce n’est pas un silence absolu du type : je me tais et je me force à entendre à l’intérieur. De temps en temps je commence à me chanter ce que je lis, à donner un peu de force à un accent, à vocaliser une mélodie par des onomatopées ou autres.

E. M. : Et lorsque vous chantez la voix n’est qu’un moyen de « faire sortir » ce que vous entendez ou est-ce qu’il y a plus que cela ?

M. T. : C’est un moyen, c’est sûr, les sons que je chante sont ce qu’ils sont mais au moins ils sont justes du point de vue de la hauteur – du moins je fais de mon mieux pour qu’ils le soient ! Ça m’énerve lorsque je chante et que j’ai conscience de n’avoir pas chanté le bon intervalle. Je rechante jusqu’à ce que j’aie chanté la bonne version. Mais cela reste un moyen, une représentation approximative.

E. M. : Cela aide quand même, n’est-ce pas ?

M. T. : Oui ! Disons que « ça fait du bien quand ça sort ». Vocaliser aide. Et on le fait très spontanément. Ça sort tout seul presque. On regarde la musique et tout à coup on se met à chanter.

E. M. : Ça concrétise les choses finalement.

M. T. : Tout à fait. Ça concrétise, ça réalise une idée qu’on se fait du son dans un passage donné.

_Interview with Maxime Tortelier,(Conduction, French, Paris, France, 06. 07. 2017)_
E. M. : So you sing it in your head and then out loud too?
D. S.: No, I’ve never really done that. I don’t like my voice. But I hear it in my head.
E. M. : How strong is it? Because that’s exactly my research topic, this singing in my head.
D. S.: Another very specific thing I hear in my head—and I tell my students, if you want to play in tune, you have to have a good sense of pitch and you have to hear it in your head. If you can hear the right pitch, then you will play it.
E. M. : That’s the magical thing that made me start my research ten years ago when I was really starting to learn cello. My teacher made me discover this new world—singing in my head—I was playing so much better and the intonation was so much better, and I couldn’t understand how just singing makes you put your finger in the right place.
D. S.: Yes, it’s amazing. And with the bassoon, it allows you to blow just the right amount of air—the right intensity—to affect the pitch, it will be right. I always say, if you can hear it correctly, you will play it correctly.
E. M. : What’s interesting about singing is that there is this closeness between my inner music and my ability to just sing it without any obstacles. When you say that what inspires you is more singers than anything else, I guess it’s because they have this closeness
D. S.: Well, it’s literally two inches from the brain to the vocal cords.
E. M.: And it’s very spontaneous. You can just start singing without even noticing it.

D. S.: And without technique and ability, everyone sings. I do sing, but not when anyone is listening.

*Interview with David Sogg (Bassoonist, English, Pittsburgh, PA, USA, 01.31. 2019)*

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E. M.: When you hum the tune, do you feel it as if your instrument is there?

R. K.: Not exactly. That’s a peculiarity of my relationship with the fiddle. When I’m humming a tune, I’m either humming it in my own voice as it were, or hearing it as if it were being played by the fiddle. Being a self-taught fiddler I can’t automatically associate the melody with fingering. When I try to do imaginary fingering, I have trouble working it out. But as soon as I have the instrument itself in my hands and actually generating the notes through the instrument, the melody falls into place and I figure out where it is. Then when I have the tune in my fingers, I need to start the tune, I sometimes just start the tune and my fingers unlock the inner voice so I remember how the tune goes. It’s this curious relationship. I don’t have this facility with singing the names of notes or being able to automatically work out the fingering just from imagining.

*Interview with Robert Kirkman (Fiddle Player, English, Pittsburgh, PA, USA, 11. 02. 2019)*

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F. M. : J’ai développé intentionnellement une oreille qui était très instrumentale parce que je me suis rendu compte, par exemple, que lorsque je lisais des pièces pour piano ou pour orgue, mais même lorsque je faisais de l’orchestration, je voyais les choses… en tout cas, c’est peut-être une déformation professionnelle, mais je me suis rendu compte que tous mes examens ont toujours été sans piano, et du coup je me suis dit que la meilleure chose à faire pour ces choses-là – et ce sont des choses que j’ai ensuite vues dans d’autres bouquins par exemple chez Joseph Levine ou Joseph Hoffman, c’était de développer une oreille instrumentale. Je me suis rendu compte que j’entendais beaucoup plus de choses, même sans instrument, quand je pensais par l’instrument. C’est ce que j’appelle le « piano virtuel », ou le « piano intérieur ». C’est quelque chose que j’ai repris de ton travail mais moi, je l’appelle le « piano intérieur ». Le clavier.

E. M. : C’est quoi ?

F. M. : C’est cette capacité à entendre l’instrument sans l’instrument. Et d’ailleurs, on s’en rend bien compte quand on rêve. Je suis quasiment sûr que, lorsqu’on joue de l’instrument la nuit, quand on rêve, c’est un véritable instrument en fait. On chante juste. On joue juste. Les hauteurs sont les bonnes. Si vraiment on a une mémoire qui fonctionne, je suis quasiment sûr que, lorsqu’on rêve que l’on joue du piano, c’est un véritable piano que l’on est en train de jouer.

E. M. : Qu’est-ce que cela veut dire concrètement ? Il n’y a pas de sons inventés ?

Pas de doigtés impossibles à jouer qui ne correspondent à rien ?

F. M. : Cela veut dire que, lorsqu’on a une pratique assidue de l’instrument, je suis quasiment sûr que l’instrument est en chair et en os dans la tête. Et quand je pense
« chant intérieur », ça dépend des gens bien sûr, mais en ce qui me concerne, j’ai détaché mon oreille du chant pour arriver à quelque chose de plus large. Par exemple, quand j’écris, je pense un instrument, vraiment physiquement. Un instrument en chair et en os, devant moi. Je m’en suis rendu compte quand j’ai pris le train récemment : j’ai pris le train pour aller en Vendée, j’ai pris une Fugue de Bach, et je me suis rendu compte que si j’imaginais l’instrument devant moi, et le pédalier aussi – parce que moi je ne suis pas organiste donc pour moi le pédalier est moins intégré physiquement, j’entendais vraiment quasiment directement ce que je voyais.

Alors que si j’essayais d’intellectualiser, d’isoler une voix, peut-être de chanter les choses, j’entendais une voix, maximum deux, et en plus c’était très fatigant intellectuellement. Par contre, quand j’ai vraiment cette espèce de conscience, dans un état second, de l’instrument en face de moi, j’entends beaucoup plus de choses. Je les entends parce que je les sens physiquement en fait. Ça, c’est parce que j’ai passé un temps énorme, presque volontairement, à lire des partitions, notamment de clavier, dans les parcs, dans la rue, dans le métro, en essayant d’imaginer le plus possible les sons sur l’instrument. Avec un diapason souvenir. Et encore, pas toujours le diapason…

Le chant intérieur, si je peux résumer ma pensée, est différent quand on a vraiment une pratique instrumentale régulière, ou au moins qu’on l’a eue pendant une certaine période. En ce moment, je ne joue pas beaucoup par exemple. Par contre, je suis toujours en train de jouer virtuellement.

E. M. : Cela veut dire que tu as littéralement intériorisé ton piano.
F. M. : Oui c’est ça ! Au début j’appelais ça le « piano virtuel », puis « piano mental » mais je trouvais cette expression beaucoup trop abstraite, puis, en suivant ton travail, j’ai appelé ça le « piano intérieur ». C’est vraiment ce qui marche le mieux je crois.

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E. M. : D’un sens, ce qui fait que c’est personnel, c’est que ça finit par se détacher de là d’où ça vient, tu oublies que c’est du Bach ou du Bartok, ça se mêle dans ton monde à toi, avec tes propres trucs à toi, ta sensibilité, et au bout d’un moment c’est digéré.

F. M. : Bien sûr !


F. M. : Bien sûr ! C’est exactement ça. Ça ne peut pas être la même chose parce que c’est passé par un autre filtre. Ça ne pourra jamais être la même chose. C’est le filtre de la perception. Ça ne pourra jamais être la même chose.

E. M. : Ça ne peut être la même chose que si ça reste à la surface de toi. Si ça rentre vraiment en toi, si ça devient vraiment une partie de toi, ça ne peut jamais être la même chose. Si, pour une raison ou pour une autre, les choses ne pénètrent pas vraiment en toi parce que pour une raison ou pour une autre tu es bloqué, ou tu n’es pas assez perméable, j’imagine qu’effectivement tu dois avoir tendance à refaire la même chose que d’autres. D’un sens, la créativité c’est la capacité à être complètement perméable. Si tu n’es pas du genre à laisser les choses pénétrer en
toi parce que tu as une bonne vieille carapace, tu vas répéter ce que les autres
disent parce que ça n’aura pas pu être digéré finalement.

F. M. : C’est vrai oui. En tout cas moi, je marche à l’affectif musicalement. Donc c’est
plutôt comme ça que ça se passe.

E. M. : Je dirais que les enfants sensibles sont plus créatifs parce qu’ils sont plus
perméables. Ils digèrent plus et du coup, comme c’est digéré, ça devient leur truc
à eux.

F. M. : Oui, je pense que c’est vrai. C’est tout à fait vrai.

E. M. : Quand je regarde des petits enfants jouer, je me dis qu’ils sont créatifs
parce qu’ils sont sensibles.

F. M. : Oui, c’est vrai que ça va ensemble.

E. M. : C’est la perméabilité qui fait qu’on est capable de refaire du nouveau je
drais.

F. M. : Oui. Après, encore faut-il se souvenir de ce qu’on a entendu, ce qu’on a perçu.
C’est le rôle de la mémoire. C’est très important la mémoire. C’est un allié très
précieux.

Introduction with François Moysan (Pianist, French, Paris/Heidelberg, 29.04.2021

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P. G. : Après il y a quand même quelque chose : le piano marche ou ne marche pas.
J’en ai un à l’atelier par exemple, un piano de 1922, pourtant c’est hyper courant, la
mécanique, on m’avait prévenu, un de mes collègues m’avait dit : « si tu es capable de
régler ça, c’est que vraiment tu es fort ». J’avais demandé si la mécanique était
d’origine ou si c’était quelqu’un qui l’avait mal remplacée. Il m’avait dit : « non, c’est
d’origine ». Je l’ai remplacé, ça fait deux semaines que j’essaie de régler ça, et si tu
changes un dixième de millimètre, ça ne marche plus. Si tu changes un marteau,

E. M. : Mal bât ! [Elle rit]

P. G. : Par contre, j’ai un Erard, j’ai une marge, au moins trois manières différentes de
le régler, à tel point que même des gens qui trouvent qu’il est difficile arrivent quand
même à le jouer. Il marche. D’ailleurs, au 19ème siècle, il n’y a pas de réglage dans les
livres. C’est une invention du vingtième. Pour eux, un piano, ça se répare. Ça veut dire
que, ou le piano marche, c’est d’usine, ça se voit, c’est d’usine, et une fois qu’il ne
marche plus on est dans la « réparation ». Ce que l’on appelle « régler », ou ça
n’existait pas, ou, lorsque ça existait, on considérait ça comme des interventions de
réparation. Ça en dit long sur le rapport au jeu que l’on a aujourd’hui.

Interview with Paul Gossart (piano tuner, French, restorer, Heidelberg, Germany, 02.
08. 2021)

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M. B.: A questo punto dobbiamo tornare alla tua espressione iniziale, il canto interiore,
perché canto presuppone delle unità connesse, e non sto parlando di melodia in senso
classico, ma uso il tuo termine in senso universale, nel senso di coesione
discorsiva…se penso a questo termine così, allora questo ha a che fare con la forma. È
l’arrivare ad un’idea formale che aiuta a strutturare le componenti di base
dell’immaginazione, che rimarrebbero altrimenti sconnesse. È stato proprio lo
sviluppare un’idea della forma personale che mi ha permesso di dare un’organicità…di inserire questi tasselli dell’immaginazione sonora, armonia e timbro, dentro un quadro che gli desse un senso compiuto. Per questo dicevo dalla follia al logos, dal magma informe a qualcosa che ha una sua logicità, una sua discorsività, una sua narrativa, e questo include anche sviluppare una sensibilità su una componente spesso dimenticata e di cui si parla poco a livello compositivo, che è il ritmo.

E. M.: **Non l’hai menzionato prima, però è molto importante.**

M. B.: Assolutamente, chi ha ascoltato i miei lavori sa quanto sia importante. Non lo è all’inizio nella parte immaginativa perché vedo questi blocchi verticali, li sento, vedo queste cose sconnesse…il ritmo è quello che mi permette poi di creare una narrativa, una propulsione nel tempo. Infatti, per questo il ritmo andrebbe studiato come parametro non secondario ma importante nello sviluppo, nella tenuta della narrativa.

E. M.: **Perché articola, no?**

M. B.: Certo, certo, il ritmo come articolazione. Se usiamo la metafora linguistica, è come la differenza tra dei fonemi, delle sillabe che magari appartengono ad una lingua ma che non vogliono dire niente, con dei fonemi che vengono messi insieme a formare delle parole, con degli accenti, con dei piedi ritmici, questo sia in poesia che letteratura, che quindi danno un’articolazione e un significato a quei fonemi che altrimenti resterebbero asemantici.

E. M.: **Perché crea una successione, no?**

M. B.: Esatto.
Intervista con Matteo Belli (Pianista, compositore, Italiano, Skype, Heidelberg, 04. 21.

2021)

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Aārp: je pense que c’est un contenu mélodique avec un enchaînement de notes, d’accords, d’harmonies, mais dans le chant intérieur il y a aussi une caractéristique texturale c’est-à-dire que je dirais que le chant intérieur ce sont aussi des timbres. C’est-à-dire qu’il y a du son, la matière brute avec les fréquences et tout ça, et il y a aussi la texture qu’il a c’est-à-dire s’il est plus ou moins rugueux, s’il est plus ou moins filtré, plus ou moins doux, plus ou moins aérien… en fait toutes les caractéristiques qu’on pourrait donner à un son. Donc pour moi le chant intérieur c’est le mélange à la fois d’un contenu mélodique et du contenu timbral.

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Aārp: Voilà. Pour moi, c’est très important ce passage du musical au visuel. Parce que lorsque j’imagine, j’imagine des mondes, et des mondes dans lesquels je me sens bien. Ça peut correspondre à des moments. Par exemple, des coups durs vont correspondre à de la musique plus agressive, et des moments d’exaltation de la musique plus exaltée. Du coup les choses vont se retraduire d’une certaine manière parce que tes émotions sont retraduites électroniquement d’une certaine manière : la tristesse tu vas mettre des sons assez désaccordés pour évoquer l’instabilité… Des sons qui doivent évoquer la fête, tu vas utiliser les codes culturels en mettant des sons clairs, de gros accords, des tierces, parce que dans la tête des gens le club est associé à des tierces et des accords simples… Quand tu vas vouloir recréer une ambiance contemplative tu vas mettre
beaucoup plus de réverbération, tu vas essayer de perdre un peu le rythme, tu vas essayer de perdre le son, le faire aller de gauche à droite, qu’il soit plein etc. Si tu veux une ambiance contemplative mais comme dévastée, tu vas rajouter de la distorsion sur le son, et ça va évoquer un environnement instable pour les gens parce que tout ce qui est distorsion, désaccord des instruments, tout cela va correspondre à l’instabilité.

Quelque chose de festif ou joyeux, tu vas utiliser des sons clairs, assez justes etc…

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Aārp: Après tu peux créer des sons artificiels. Par exemple le son de moteur est fait de pleins de paramètres aléatoires. Il faut comprendre quels sont les différents éléments du son. Par exemple le clap [il frappe dans ses mains] est composé de plusieurs sons : le son du choc, mais différent du choc que tu entends lorsque tu frappes ta main avec un chaussé pied, parce que l’« excitateur » (ce qui va frapper l’objet – marteau, baguette) est différent. Si tu tapes sur une tasse avec ton doigt ou avec un crayon, le son n’est pas le même, parce que l’objet qui frappe n’est pas le même. Tu peux donc synthétiser les sons de sorte de reproduire ce qui se passe lorsque tel ou tel objet frappe telle matière.

*Interview with Aārp (Electronic Music Composer, Paris/Heidelberg, 30.04.2021)*
§1. Awakening of the inner song in the reproductive consciousness.

It is a beautiful spring day, and I am feeling happy. I am at home with my cello, silent, not moving. I start phantasizing a joyful melody. A song grows in me. I sing in my phantasy. I try to pay attention, find technical ways to realize it, give it a form maybe. As I just sing it, it comes out easily, spontaneously. At this point, I don’t really have any inner song in my phantasy. I just take my cello, the bow, and I start issuing a sound. Progressively, it is as if the movements perform things by themselves. I have partial memories of things I had been playing earlier. I play the notes as they come. It brings me to other melodies. A long song resonates in my consciousness, made of a patchwork of melodies phantasized or remembered. One flows into the next, and it keeps going. My inner song is like the vision of the painter. I see something that is not there yet, but that I want to make real and which, through patient and dedicated work, will become real. My inner song leads me progressively to Brahms’s first Cello Sonata that I learned years ago. I start playing it as I can. Things are not clear yet. The rhythm, the pitch. It is obscure. However, the more I play, the more I am able to play it well, and the more its inner song is clear in my phantasy.

As the musician practices music, there is a co-implication of the constitution in the reproductive consciousness and the constitution in the impressional consciousness. There are two possible co-implications: it is either the case that the reproductive consciousness constitutes an inner song from the movements of the Body with the instrument, or the inner song is first constituted in the reproductive consciousness, and

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649 This is the expression that best represents the experience described by the musicians, and especially composers. In fact, they seem to describe a continuity of association between various segments.
then *realized through the movements* of the Body with the instrument.\footnote{This was discussed in the interview with Paul Gossart (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-paul-gossart-restaurateur-de-pianos-anciens-accordeur-chercheur-en-philosophie/).} The priority of the constitution in the impressional consciousness over the constitution in the reproductive consciousness, or vice-versa, depends on various elements. First of all, the profile of the musician: if a highly trained musician is able to definitely phantasize a complex inner song before starting to realize it through the instrument, most musicians start phantasizing the inner song by working closely with the instrument with sustained attentiveness. Then, it depends on the approach of the music practice itself. When it comes to interpretation which is a hearing the inner song through reading the score, the music practice session can start with a deciphering with the instrument which helps a progressive sketching of the inner song, but a highly trained musician could also work on the score merely with the inner song before actually engaging with the technicality of the instrumental practice.\footnote{When it comes to composition, it is possible to compose new pieces by trying them first with the instrument or, alternatively, to compose them entirely in phantasy as Beethoven was able to do at the end of his life. When it comes to improvisation, the inner song and its realization are temporally so close that, even if it is tempting to say that the inner song grows out of the fingers, there is probably more exactly a constant intertwining between perception and phantasy thanks to a succession of immediate retentions and protentions.} In any case, in the particular situation that I am studying which is that of the practicing musician rehearsing, the inner song is always further constituted in an interlacing of the constitutions in the impressional as well as in the reproductive consciousness.

If the inner song is constituted first in the reproductive consciousness, and not by a primary constitution of an actual song in the impressional consciousness, it is
constituted as a **pure phantasy expectation**, namely, a reproductive modification of how the object *would sound if* it were perceived, a re-presentation of a real possible *future* perception (the inner song is given in phantasy, i.e., its existence-value is cancelled, but it is a real possibility in the sense that it is realized through practice). My hypothesis to explain the awakening of a new inner song in the reproductive consciousness is to claim that it is constituted in consciousness by **triggers**. I call triggers the elements, constituted in the impressional consciousness, which call for a

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652 Husserl writes: “What appears in image in memory, provided that it shows no contradiction with what is present and is therefore uncontested memory, 20 is accepted without further ado as having existed. What is expected “will exist.” What is phantasied is not accepted at all. If it can find a place within the nexus of a field of memory, then it did exist. If it can find a place within the nexus of a field of expectation, then it will exist. If it conflicts, then it does not exist” (*Phantasy, Image-Consciousness, and Memory*, Appendix VII p. 172).

653 The notion of **phantasy-expectation** is complex, especially in the Husserlian framework. Indeed, it is a notion that Husserl uses and then drops. In my own description it is a crucial one, because of the interplay between the constitution of the inner song in the reproductive consciousness and the constitution of the actual song as the realization of the inner song in the impressional consciousness. I will come back to this problem at the very end of the present chapter, when I analyze how the inner song is modified through practice, i.e., through the perception of its realization.

654 This hypothesis of the awakening of the inner song in phantasy through perceptual triggers, or more precisely, through passive association opens a wide field of research. To identify the various possibilities of awakening of the inner song it would be necessary to proceed to a separate study of each of the three categories of inner song related to the three musical practices (interpretation, composition, and improvisation). Indeed, each of them presupposes a different type of association and a different mode of interplay between the various data of the perceptual hyletic flow and of the phantasy flow.

The study of the mechanism of association in interpretation would uncover how the visual perception of a sign can awaken a specific sound in the trained consciousness of the musician. The study of the role of association in composition would uncover how the associations are ruled by music codes and would require a deeper study of harmony and composition practices. Finally, the study of the mechanism of association in improvisation would require an analysis more focused on the relationship between the performer and the instrument, and how the contact with the instrument through touch can awaken new expectations. As it appears from this very short overview of the various declinations of the problem, each study would be an important work. I cannot pursue that research in the present dissertation. However, this more detailed analysis of one aspect of the inner song is obviously a very rich development of the study of that particular phantasy object.
certain association, thus provoking a new inner song. The phenomenological analysis of that problem requires working on the notion of association. In the Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, Husserl defines association as “awakening.” This awakening is not understood as a causality, but as a phenomenon experienced by consciousness under the *epoché*. Hence, understanding the problem of the awakening of the inner song in the reproductive consciousness does not mean understanding what causes the inner song, but understanding the immanent genesis of the inner song through association and affectivity.

The awakening of a phenomenon in consciousness happens through motivation. Genetic phenomenology consists in providing the:

Genesis of the motivations and the intentional implications of all foundation of validity as they involve a sedimented history of meanings, i.e., a transition

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655 I discussed the question of the creation of a new inner song with the improviser and composer Thierry Escaich (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-thierry-escaich-organiste/?fbclid=IwAR1LMC5UAJP92Gj-lf9q9ja5D0py68hBrlq92YSyucaOecjRkwAGXvKj).

656 Husserl writes: “Association is awakening. Awakening is not only awakening through resonance. The resonating element awakens its entire nexus of its coexistence and succession according to the measure of its immediacy and mediacy. The awakened element necessarily awakens its surroundings and what is or was awakened in them gets privileged” (Analyses Concerning passive and active synthesis, Section 2, Appendix 18, p. 508).

657 Husserl explains: “The rubric ‘association’ characterizes for us a form and a lawful regularity of immanent genesis that constantly belongs to consciousness in general; but it does not characterize, as it does for psychologists, a form of objective, psychophysical causality; it does not characterize a regulated manner in which the emergence of reproductions, of rememberings, is causally determined in human and animal psychic life. For we are working within the framework of the phenomenological reduction in which all objective reality and objective causality is ‘bracketed.’ What is there for us is not the world taken as reality with its psychophysical beings and its causalities, but only the phenomena of them, thing-phenomena, human-phenomena, etc., in their intentionality” (Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lecture on Transcendental Logic, p. 162).

658 Ideas 2, §56, p. 231 sq.
involving ‘constitutive operations’ [konstitutive Leistungen]’ from something temporally prior to something temporally posterior.\textsuperscript{659}

Husserl then distinguishes two types of motivation: active and passive motivations. The first ones are motivations of reason [Vernunftmotivationen].\textsuperscript{660} It is not necessary to investigate them to understand the constitution of the inner song in phantasy. The second ones are immanent motivations, also called associative motivations, and cover “the entire realm of associations and habits.”\textsuperscript{661} They are the ones that are in play in the constitution and the realization of the inner song. This second type of association is primarily understood as a phenomenon related to perception, i.e., a phenomenon of the impressional, retentional, protentional consciousness constituted in the flesh.\textsuperscript{662}

Association is also proper to the temporal structure of consciousness. According to Husserl, associative motivations happen in the present of the impressional consciousness and connect two segments of two different temporal moments together.\textsuperscript{663} In other words,
they are given in the hyletic flow of consciousness or in the now of the impression, extended with its retentions and protentions, by virtue of the flowing in consciousness of the impression. Here, there is an association through contiguity.

There is a first type of association which is the association of the present with what has just been (it is an association with the retentions). This first type of association has its equivalent in what will happen right now (in an association with the protentions). For instance, as I am playing, a melody is constituted in the impressional consciousness, and each note is given as connected with the next one. Here, both the note that has just been and the note that will be are associated with the note that is being given right now. There is then a second type of association, when the temporal association goes further back in the flowing of consciousness, beyond the association through immediate succession. Here consciousness brings something back from memory. In this case, there is an association between the present of impression and a remembering: the two elements are not associated through an immediate temporal connection, but rather consciousness crosses a temporal distance in order to associate two elements that are only

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664 Husserl says: “pasts can also enter into present consciousness through remembering. Put more precisely, in the unity of a consciousness that is streaming in the present, we find concrete perceptions with their retentional components, as well as concrete retentions—all of that in the flow of retention fading away into the distant horizon of retention” (Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, pp. 162-3).

665 On the various types of associations cf. Holenstein, Phänomenologie der Assoziation. I cannot explore all the types of associations in play with the constitution of the inner song here. I will only mention a couple of them. However, this is certainly an interesting and necessary extension to the work of this present dissertation.

666 Husserl observes: “Between the noematic components of something present and something remembered we find a phenomenologically peculiar connective trait that can be expressed in the following way: Something present recalls something past” (Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, p. 163).
mediately related through the succession of the retentions (the distance between the two segments is so large that they got disconnected). For instance, the melody that I am playing now which is constituted in the impressional consciousness awakens a melody that was heard in the past. Finally, there is a third type of association: an association between two past rememberings.\(^{667}\) Indeed, consciousness can, in the present, connect two rememberings together through association. For instance, as I am playing now, two past melodies are awakened together under my fingers.

In these three cases (association with the protentions or retentions; between a present of impression and a remembering; between two rememberings), the process of association is the characteristic of the temporality of the inner consciousness in the sense that it is proper to inner time consciousness to experience associations.\(^{668}\) Association is part of the constitution of the actual song in the impressional consciousness. In other words, the actual song is constituted as a song through the immediate association of the

\(^{667}\) Husserl notes: “Likewise, a second remembering can occur while a remembering runs-off; the second remembering can occur along with the first one in a nexus that is characterized noematically by the fact that the first recalled event recalls the second recalled event” (Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, p. 163).

\(^{668}\) Husserl says: “A perceptual consciousness, that is, a consciousness that is constituted originarily can accordingly be characterized as a consciousness that awakens, awakening a reproductive consciousness, and this consciousness can function as awakening in its turn as fetching a past of consciousness, as it were” (Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, p. 163). He also adds: “the phenomenology of association is, so to speak, a higher continuation of the doctrine of original time-constitution. Through association, the constitutive accomplishment is extended to all levels of apperception.” (idem).

In other words, if the phenomenology of internal time uncovers the unity of consciousness through time thanks to the hyletic flow, the phenomenology of association only pursues that phenomenology by showing how these elements that are unified in consciousness through time can be brought back to the present, either through an immediate association or through reproduction, the present being always the place from which this association takes place. It appears that the continuity of the inner time consciousness presupposes always already this possibility of the awakening through association. It is in this sense that association is not a causal process, even if it can actually motivate the formations of new phantasy-expectations, association is first and foremost a connection of two elements belonging to the same hyletic flow, either as an impression, a retention, or a protention, or as a remembering, or an expectation.
impression with its retentions and protentions; a past actual song can be remembered; and two past actual songs can be associated together. However, association is also part of the constitution of the inner song in the reproductive consciousness. In other words, the inner song is constituted as a song because of the immediate retentions and protentions of the now of the phantasms; an inner song given in the quasi-present can be associated with a past inner song reconstituted in phantasy; consciousness can recall the phantasies of past inner songs, play with them, and even reconstitute a new one.

Part of each of these associations is affectivity as “the peculiar pull that an object given to consciousness exercises on the ego.” Husserl defines association as an “augmentation of vivacity that is, of affectivity, radiating out from a place.” In other words, when two distinct segments are associated, they are awakened, through an increase of vivacity, from the field they were part of. For instance, a past actual song, is awakened through association: its vivacity increases and makes it come out of the field of perception constituting the hyletic flow.

To understand this, it is necessary to remember how the impressional consciousness is a consciousness in which there is a formation of “sense-fields.” For instance, as the musician plays the musical instrument, there is a building up of the touch-

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669 Cf. Chapt. 1, §5., footnote on Patrick Lang’s definition of the musical work as a structural unity of a movement.
670 The full quote says: “By affection we understand the allure given to consciousness, the peculiar pull that an object given to consciousness exercises on the ego; it is a pull that is relaxed when the ego turns toward it attentively, and progresses from here, striving toward self-giving intuition, disclosing more and more of the self of the object, thus, striving toward an acquisition of knowledge, toward a more precise view of the object” (Analysis Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, §32, p.196).
671 Analyses concerning passive and active synthesis, Appendix XIX, p. 515.
672 Analyses concerning passive and active synthesis, §31.
field in which various objects are separated by their forms, of the tone-field in which one tone is distinct from another in terms of its pitch, etc. According to Husserl, some elements of these fields are brought into relief under “favorable conditions.” In other words, they are awakened. For example, as the musician performs, and as he or she feels a certain sensation in performing a phrase on the instrument, a similar phrase previously learned comes up in his or her consciousness. In the situation that I am studying, these favorable conditions can be very diverse: a specific move on the instrument, a harmony, a tune, some sort of energy given by the music, even a visual or olfactory perception. For instance, as the musician sits with the instrument and plays a note, other notes naturally come under his or her fingers one after the other, thus being associated, because they are part of a learned harmonious chord.

As the musician practices, association can occur from an emotional motivation. For instance, walking up to the Heidelberg castle in the early morning can lead me to feel melancholic, and this feeling will awaken Wagner’s prelude to Lohengrin because I feel melancholic when I hear this piece. Then, the association can also happen by analogy, i.e., because of a likeness. For instance, I associate “Una furtiva Lagrima” with “E

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673 Husserl explains: “Consciousness constitutes partly explicit objects, that is, prominent and actually affecting, and partly implicit (parts and moments) that have not come or have not yet come into relief, but which, however, insofar as they can be brought into relief under ‘favorable conditions,’ are still taken into account under the standpoint of affection. In this respect we must distinguish between the actual affection and the tendency toward affection, the potentiality of affection that is not empty, but that is rooted 25 materially in essential conditions. Sensible data (and thus data in general) send, as it were, affective rays of force toward the ego pole, but in their weakness do not reach the ego pole, they do not actually become for it an allure that awakens” (Analyses concerning passive and active synthesis, §32, p. 196).

674 Analyses concerning passive and active synthesis, §32, p. 196.

675 Thierry Escaich speaks about the smell of incense for instance (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-thierry-escaich-organiste/).
lucevan le stelle” because they are two arias for tenors, and I heard the two of them interpreted by Pavarotti. Or an association can also awaken an actual song because it sounds pleasant or unpleasant. For instance, the jazz song “I Just Dropped by to Say Hello” by Johnny Hartman can come to mind because I find it pleasant, and the opposite, the “Queen of the Night” by Florence Foster Jenkins can come to mind because I find it unpleasant.676

In all these cases, the association is given in the impressional consciousness, and the source of affection is always in the primal-impression,677 which is also the temporal moment of the inner consciousness in which affectivity is the strongest (as Husserl demonstrates in his work on the consciousness of inner time, the tone loses its vivacity as it flows in consciousness).678 However, even if affectivity is the strongest in the present of impression, the affectivity is of course also related to the past value because it remains in the retention, without decreasing, but only transforming. For instance, as the melody

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676 In Lang, Patrick, “Introduction à la phénoménologie du vécu musical,” the author, inspired by the phenomenology of Carl Stumpf, enters more into detail in the analysis of the perception of sounds, explaining how the sounds are experienced according to the relations that they have. He mentions harmonic relationships, but also passive or active sounds, etc.

These elements participate in the affective motivations in consciousness and are therefore fully part of the awakening through association, both in the impressional and reproductive consciousness. An analysis of the specific question of association in the constitution process of the inner song would require a careful description of these dynamics, applied to the specific constitution process in the reproductive consciousness.

677 Husserl notices: “Insofar as the most original affection is to be seen as the affection generated in the impressional present, contrast is then to be characterized as the most original condition of affection. Connected to the gradation of contrast is a gradation of affection, but also already a trend in the direction of affection. The same contrast can, for instance, actually exercise an allure on the ego, another time it can be that the ego will not be reached by the affective tendency. Extremes of contrast are so strong, make such a forcefully efficacious prominence that they drown out, so to speak, all competing contrasts. Thus, there is something like a possible competition and a kind of concealment of active tendencies by especially strong ones” (Analysis Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, §32, p.197).

678 Cf. Footnote Chapter 2, §1.
flows in the impressional consciousness, it becomes more distant from the present of impression, but it still carries the same emotional, sensuous color. Finally, affectivity is also futural because it is related to a consciousness that moves forward, and goes beyond itself. For instance, as the melody flows in consciousness, consciousness is oriented toward what is to come, expecting the coming tone.

The experience of the inner song shows that this modality of the impressional consciousness has its equivalent in the reproductive consciousness, although with some differences. Indeed, as I mentioned, there are phenomena of association underneath the

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679 Husserl explains: "In the living present the primordially impressional emergence has ceteris paribus a stronger affective tendency than what is already retentional. For that very reason, affection has a unitary tendency toward the future where the orientation of the propagation is concerned, intentionality is predominantly oriented toward the future. Naturally, this should not mean that the progressive fading away of retentions is merely a weakening of affection; rather, it is the nature of retentional modification not to alter the affinities and contrasts with respect to content in the same way that a materially relevant modification takes place within clarity; rather it produces a new dimension of blurred distinctions, a growing cloudiness, a murkiness that essentially decreases the affective force. However, this does not preclude the fact that an awakening emanating from the more luminescent sphere of the affection that is still in full force works upon this penumbra, thus, a backward working affection in contrast to the affection that is constantly making its effect forward. If, for example, an acoustical object is awakened right when the entire field of acoustical data had been dormant, as it were, then the neighboring past is coawakened insofar as it has an acoustical affinity to what was especially awakened; as one can easily see, it points to a respective affective past-horizon. Every object structured in a completely undivided continuity would belong here, like a completely even tone, and similarly in the visual field, an even color. This does not preclude parts from subsequently coming to the fore precisely in and through an awakening—for example, when something that becomes a particular part by being set off through internal differentiation is placed next to uniform elements in similarity, or in another kind of uniformity, and when in overlapping or mere coinciding at-a-distance, this particular part carries out a kind of internal division of something continuous right within the consciousness of the absence of internal distinctions within the impressional sphere" (Analysis Concerning Active and Passive Syntheses, §32, p. 204-5). (Lanei Rodemeyer underlines this futural dimension in Intersubjective Temporality, it is about Time, p. 155 sq).

680 This is something that plays an important role in the act of listening to music in which there is a phenomenon of expectation, and deception or surprise. On this topic cf. Meyer, Emotion and Meaning in Music.

681 I analyzed the phantasy-world in Chapter 2, §10. However, a deeper analysis of the phantasm-fields in play with the constitution of the inner song would be necessary to have a better understanding of the constitution process of the inner song. I am not doing it here; I only mention the essential ones. However, I keep the topic as an interesting and necessary complementary study.
constitution process in the reproductive consciousness, and phantasms are also given with an affective dimension. First of all, the reproductive consciousness is also made of a quasi-temporality with retentions and protentions. As is the case in the impressional consciousness, they are linked through association. Thus, the musician hears the inner song in a continuity of succession. Then, as the inner song is the reproduction of a possible performance, either past or future, but essentially futural when the musician rehearses and works on the interpretation, the reproductive consciousness is always already oriented toward what is to come, (as I will show later in this chapter, this is especially true in the early stages of the constitution of the phenomenon). Affectivity lies in this futural dimension. Finally, the reproductive consciousness can also recall past inner songs, even if, as there is no present of impression, it is more exactly a reconstitution.\footnote{In other words, associations motivated by affectivity are possible within the quasi-flowing of the reproductive consciousness. However, there can also be association between the impressional consciousness, and the reproductive consciousness. For instance, there can be an association between what I am playing right now, and some phantasy melody.} Associations in the reproductive consciousness awaken elements of the quasi-sense-fields (of phantasm-fields), similar to the sense-fields of the impressional consciousness. These fields differ as they are made of phantasms and not sensations. In other words, they are data relieved from their existential value. These various phantasm-fields constitute together the imaginary.\footnote{Within this field, various segments can be}
awakened and brought into relief in some favorable conditions. For instance, as the musician practices phantasizing the inner song, there is a playing with tone-data, touch-data, and to a lesser extent with other types of phantasms, awakened in the reproductive consciousness in a similar way as sensations are awakened in the impressional consciousness. Through associations partial or fuller inner songs are constituted (musical phrases, chords, couples of intervals, chains of movements, etc.), motivated by affective connections (emotional, likeness, pleasant or unpleasant, etc.). Because of that process, the inner song is constituted as a temporal object, a unity of meaning, by the succession of quasi-retentions and quasi-protentions. As such, it can then be potentially associated with other inner songs.

In the very first stage of the constitution of the inner song, before its realization through the musical instrument, as there is no implication of the act of hearing it through playing the instrument yet, there is no co-implication of the constitution of the actual song and the inner song at this point. However, there can still be a co-implication of the impressional consciousness and reproductive consciousness in the sense that elements given in the present of impression in the impressional consciousness can motivate associations of phantasms in the reproductive consciousness. Or also, rememberings originally given through impression can be reproduced in phantasy with their existential value cancelled. Or also, two rememberings originally given through impression can be associated and lead to a playful new inner song in the reproductive consciousness. Finally, there can also be a reconstitution with modifications within the reproductive consciousness itself.
This early stage of constitution of the inner song prior to its realization in performance, even if it involves quasi-retentions and quasi-protentions along with the now of the reproductive consciousness, is the reproduction of a strict future possible performance. This is especially true in the situation that I am studying which engages an immediate performance. Indeed, the inner song is giving the expected realization of the inner song, in the reproductive consciousness. In other words, it is the perception, in phantasy, of its own expected realization. Hence, the inner song is a phantasy-expectation.684

In his “doctrine of the genesis of expectations” within the Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, Husserl qualifies expectation as the “higher level of association and doctrine of association.”685 He relates it to the “genesis of apperceptions to which belong the horizons of actual and possible expectations.”686 As is clear from his formulation, Husserl speaks here about the impressional consciousness, not about the reproductive consciousness. Indeed, he understands expectation as linked to perception through the notion of apperception. Here, Husserl understands expectations as apperceived, thus part of the perception, but to be actualized in the future through perception.687 As such, expectations are for Husserl related to inductive associations [induktive Assoziation]. They are the futural equivalent of the reproductive association

684 As I will explain, I use this term in my own way, distinct from what Husserl formerly elaborated and then dropped.

685 Analysis Concerning the Passive and Active Synthesis, p. 164.


687 In his work on Husserl’s phenomenology of instinct, Nam-In Lee observes how: “die induktive Assoziation, welche auf die Selbstverwirklichung des künftigen mitgegenwärtigen Sinnes durch die Wahrnehmung gerichtet ist” (Edmund Husserls Phänomenologie der Instinkte, p. 91).
[reproduktive Assoziation] (actualizing past experiences by reproducing them).\textsuperscript{688} These two types of association are distinct. Indeed, the reproductive association is directed toward the past, whereas the inductive association is directed toward the future in the sense that it takes past repeated experiences and makes a prediction about what is to come.\textsuperscript{689}

Although I am taking some elements of Husserl’s analysis in my description, my own understanding of the phantasy-expectation differs from his. In the case of the constitution of the inner song in the reproductive consciousness prior to any playing with the instrument, the inner song is a phantasy expectation in the sense that it is a pure inductive association in the reproductive consciousness, not related to the perception of an object through eidetic variations, and therefore not corresponding to an apperception. The inner song is an inductive association in the reproductive consciousness in the sense that it uses past repeated experiences of inner songs (combinations of moves on the inner instrument and/or inner melodies that have already been performed or/and heard).\textsuperscript{690} Then, it is futural in the sense that it a perception in phantasy of a possible performance to come. Together, these two dimensions make it a phantasy-expectation.

\textsuperscript{688} Nam-In Lee explains: “die reproduktive Assoziation, welche auf die Selbstverwirklichung des vergangen gegenständlichen Sinnes durch die Wiederwahrnehmung angelegt ist” (Edmund Husserls Phänomenologie der Instinkte, p. 91).

\textsuperscript{689} Husserl says: “All in all, it concerns the genesis of the phenomena of expectation, that is, of those specific intentions that are anticipatory. We could also call this association inductive association” (Analysis Concerning the Passive and Active Synthesis, p. 164).

\textsuperscript{690} The capacity to phantasize the embodied inner song comes from the training that I will describe later in this chapter. It is through repetition in the practice sessions that the musician is able to be creative. In this sense, the better the training, the better the capacity of the musician to experience inductive associations.
The particularity of the inner song at this early stage, when the musician starts working on a piece, is to be is an obscure phantasy. In other words, the inner song is fleeting, unsteady, until it is realized through the instrument, and the actual song is constituted in the impressional consciousness as its correspondent. In this stage, characterized by the immediacy of the givenness in consciousness, Husserl says that: “If the phantasy is at least relatively and partially clear, the intention aimed at the object has a basis, a fullness, in the representing traits (corresponding to the pictorializing traits in the mediate image consciousness). The rest of the traits are of no value; they are empty.” In other words, it is properly because of this lack of relation with perception that the obscure phantasy is so unstable.

When it comes to a phantasy, and specifically to obscure phantasies, the intention is not fulfilled by objects of a full intuition. The intuition of obscure phantasies is a

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691 Husserl studies them in §33 of *Phantasy, Image-Consciousness and Memory*. I claim here that the inner song is first given as an obscure phantasy, and then as the musician practices, and therefore as the musician hears the actual song which is the realization of the inner song, this phantasy becomes clearer. In Husserlian terms, this means that the first obscure phantasy fulfilled by a shadow of intuition, is progressively replaced by a clearer phantasy fulfilled by a clearer intuition and interpreted as the same. Of course, one could argue that there is no such a progression. In other words, that the phantasy remains obscure, or, the opposite, that it is always clear and never obscure. I hold the first case as possible. An always obscure inner song would be for me an inner song that does not have a correspondent in an actual song: it remains an unrealized inner song, with some features, but not much defined (unclear chords, inaccurate rhythm, unstable tonality for instance); as I focused on the inner song in play in music practice, that’s not the sort of inner song that interests me here. I don’t hold the second case possible. Indeed, even if there is a certain degree of clarity when the musician starts rehearsing (for instance, a first deciphering of the score by an excellent musician can be immediately good when it comes to intonation, rhythm, phrasing), no musician can reach a high degree of achievement without practicing, i.e., without doing that work of improving the performance through the inner song and the inner song through practice.

692 Husserl observes: “I might then believe, on the basis of abundant observation of the phenomena (which, to be sure are not very steadfast), that the presentation is normally not a mediate presentation (which would scarcely be understandable even on genetic grounds)” (*Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory*, Text 1, §43, p. 95).

693 *Phantasy, Image-Consciousness, and Memory*, Text 1, §43, p. 95.
“rudiment of intuition, a shadow of intuition.” In the very first stage of the constitution of the inner song in the reproductive consciousness, there is only a rudiment of intuition because the inner song has not been played yet, and therefore, does not have its correspondent in perception yet. This does not mean that the intention is empty. However, it means that the intention is only fulfilled by a shadow. That’s why it is unsteady and can easily be lost.

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694 Husserl notices: “In most cases, however, the image object does not become constituted in the present case, in spite of the difference. But then, of course, we also do not have a genuine intuition of the object. To be sure, we do not have a merely empty intention; on the other hand, we do not have a full intuition either. Rather, instead of intuition itself, we have a rudiment of intuition, a shadow of intuition” (Phantasy, Image-Consciousness, and Memory, Text 1, §43, pp. 95).

695 The fulfillment of the obscure phantasy that I am trying to describe here is problematic. Indeed, if the intention is obscure, how can we speak about a proper fulfillment? And then if the intuition is only a rudiment, a shadow, how can a shadow properly fulfill an intention? The problem continues further when Husserl speaks about a “sufficiently rich image.” What does that mean? What is the degree of richness from which an image can be said sufficiently rich?

This problem touches upon the larger problem of phenomenology as a science: the problem of language (I mention it §6 of the Introduction to this present dissertation). The question is the following: is natural language appropriate to describe the phenomenological experience? Reformulated and applied to the situation I am describing this problem becomes the following: is natural language appropriate to describe the phantasy experience of the inner song. Here, we speak about an “obscure phantasy,” a “shadow of intuition,” a “residue,” or an image “sufficiently rich.” All of these expressions seem to be rather unclear. At the same time, music is often described as being beyond language or even, sacred. Hence, it is normal that language would be essentially and necessarily inadequate to the experience it tries to describe.

As I perform the analysis of the inner song through the epoché, the distinction between perceiving and fantasizing, the various layers of the ego, the givenness of the two phenomena in consciousness, and now the process of constitution of the inner song through the perception of its realization, I both uncover the experience, and agree to let some parts of it go unexplained. My attempt to describe the inner song is similar to the attempt to explain to a public what happens behind the curtain of the theater play: on the one hand, it is exciting, but on the other hand, it also breaks the charm. Can the inner song be described? Up to a certain extent, yes. This is what I am trying to do here. Should the inner song be described? Yes, but only if its mystery (in the theological sense of a Truth inaccessible to reason) is respected. This presupposes the necessity or wisdom of respecting boundaries, and embracing the phenomenon within the limits of simple reason beyond which there is a mystery.

Here, as a former student and great admirer of the immensely respected phenomenologist and poet Jean-Louis Chrétien, I propose we solve the problem by engaging in a different type of phenomenology: a phenomenology in awe, a phenomenology which embraces the human clair-obscur, the mystery of an interiority which can and should never be fully unveiled, a phenomenology which might use a vocabulary never really adequate to its object but which can only approach it with, eventually, the language which is characterized by its ambiguity: poetry.
This is even more true when it comes to phantasies that are very obscure. Indeed, the re-presentation is, in this case, only a residue, and a residue that is so poor that it can disappear. For instance, I can phantasize an inner song during my practice session but be incapable of reconstituting it and performing it because it is too obscure to remain in consciousness. In this case, if the phantasm is interrupted, if I don’t play my new inner song immediately as it comes to my phantasy, the intention remains empty. In other words, the inner song can disappear. However, if the residue reappears, and if I am able to reconstitute my fleeting inner song, the intention remains despite the disappearance of the residue, and thus continues to be fulfilled. Husserl says that: “it [the obscure phantasy] turns into actual intuition only when a sufficiently rich image is given” or, in the case of the inner song, a sufficiently rich inner song.

In the case of a disappearance and reappearance of the inner song, the residue needs to be interpreted as the same as what was primarily given in order to continue to fulfil the primary intention. Hence, a reflective act is required. In other words, to fulfil the musician’s intention of the inner song, the new appearance in phantasy needs to be identified as the same as a previous appearance, in order to be interpretated as the same inner song. Here, association and affectivity are involved because a phantasy from the

696 Husserl writes: “In the case of very obscure phantasies, the re-presentation is reduced to a wholly insufficient residue; and if this residue is suppressed entirely, as it is when the phantasms are interrupted, then the determinate but empty intention aimed at the object remains. With the sudden reappearance of the impoverished residues, the empty intention is confirmed and is filled with respect to these moments or those” (Phantasy, Image-Consciousness, and Memory, Text 1, §43, pp. 95).

697 Phantasy, Image-Consciousness, and Memory, Text 1, §43, pp. 94-5.

698 I will come back to this problem in a different context at the very end of the present chapter when I analyze the process of modification of the inner song through the perception of its realization in performance.
past is experienced as similar to something being experienced in the present. However, it is the act of interpretation which takes the reappearance as being the same as the first appearance. This act is an intentional act on the phantasy. It is not an act of phantasy. Through it, a clearer phantasy replaces the previous one or, said differently, the phantasy is modified. Then, the clearer the phantasy is, the easier it is to identify this residue as a

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699 Again, I am not saying that the transcendental object is recalled, but only that the phantasy act is brought back into the present. In other words, I am speaking about the phantasy perception, and not the object perceived in the phantasy.

700 The notion of first appearance of the inner song is a problem as such because, as has been said several times, the temporality of the phantasy is a quasi-temporality. Hence, there is no temporal priority in the sense that there is one in the impressional/retentional/protentional consciousness. In Chapter 4., I demonstrated that there is a flowing in the sense that there is a continuity of appearances through associations. However, the associations through retentions and protentions, is not as clear as it is in the impressional consciousness. In addition, as there is not one phantasy world, but several phantasy-worlds, there are also several quasi-temporalities of the phantasy. It is from the inner temporality of the impressional consciousness that the act of phantasy is given (I phantasize the inner song now, or I phantasized the inner song yesterday).

Once established that there is no priority of one phantasy object in the reproductive consciousness, but that there might be a priority of the givenness of the act of phantasy in the inner time consciousness, it becomes possible to establish that the notion of first appearance depends on the type of inner song. In the situation that I am studying, that of an interpreter rehearsing with his or her musical instrument, this first appearance of the inner song would be when the musician perceives the musical score for the first time (interpreting through reading music), or hears the melody to be played for the first time (interpreting through hearing music), and starts phantasizing the corresponding inner song. For instance, the first appearance of my inner song of I put a Spell on You is when I start phantasizing my inner song of that jazz standard. The first appearance corresponds to the first time in which the act of phantasy perceiving the inner song is given in the impressional consciousness. In the situation of an interpretative improvisation, the same holds true. In the situation of a compositive interpretation, or a composition, the question of the first appearance of the inner song is more problematic. Indeed, is there really a first appearance? Can’t we argue that the inner song being awakened through association has legitimately no beginning and no end? Is the phantasy-consciousness itself not creative in the sense that there are continuous segments of inner song constituted, without clear beginning and clear end of the formation of the phantasy? Once the inner song is sufficiently clear (not obscure or very obscure) I would argue that we can talk about a first appearance. However, when would that moment be?

Marc Richir addresses the question of the now of the phantasy, speaking about a present without attributable present [present sans present assignable]. I would be personally interested in investigating this notion in order to see how it would fit the problem of the first moment of appearance, but also the problem of the moment of the appearance of the inner song. However, I would still think that here again we touch upon the limits of the phenomenological description, where the phenomenological description must admit that it cannot be clearly established if and when the created object starts to be constituted. This is a mystery in the highest sense of the term.

701 This process of modification of the phantasies is the object of the final section of this chapter.
residue coming back to continue the process of fulfilment of the intention, and not as a new residue.\textsuperscript{702} For example, after a few days working on the Sonata, it is easier to identify the inner song of today as being the same as the one of yesterday, because I have a clearer understanding of its pitch, rhythm, etc.

As it appears from this analysis, there is a paradox in this early stage in which the inner song is still an obscure, or very obscure phantasy: the inner song is poor and might disappear, however, its poverty is already the promise of something. This something becomes constantly clarified in consciousness as the inner song is played, and played again, as the actual song as a correspondent object of the inner song becomes constituted in the impressional consciousness, because this co-constitution of a musical instrument and a melody in the impressional consciousness enables the reproductive consciousness to reproduce a possible performance, or in other words, to constitute an inner song.

§2. The constitution of the musical instrument with its voice.\textsuperscript{703}

\textsuperscript{702} Husserl explains: “The gaps, the dissolving hues that disappear in the hollow light of phantasy’s field of vision, and so on, are objectivated only when we choose to objectivate them, only when we choose to interpret them on the analogy of real objectivity. Otherwise they simply remain without objective interpretation, and therefore they do not conflict and there is no double objectivity. But such an objectivity immediately occurs as soon as (89) a clear and stable phantasy image, partially coinciding with the phantasy intention though clearly deviating from it in certain points, rises to the surface. If occasion should arise, memory may subsequently operate modificationally on the intention and call forth the conflict. For example, a clear memory image bestows intuitiveness on an intention aimed at a friend, X. At first, however, the image quite clearly yields a black beard, and the intention, becoming modified precisely by the flow of memory, demands a brown beard. But in that case the image normally will not hold its own; it will become correspondingly modified in intuition” (Phantasy, Image-Consciousness, and Memory, Text 1, §43, pp. 95-6).

\textsuperscript{703} As indicated in the lexicon at the end of the introduction, I distinguish the voice of the instrument, which is its sound, from the melody which is the melodic sonorous object that I am playing.
I am practicing the first movement of Brahms’s first Cello Sonata. I have learned it by memory so that I can focus on the music and not on the score. As I play, I can feel and hear the instrument. I feel its weight on my chest; it feels light. I can apprehend the object through touch. I feel its curves, the various materials are sensed differently. Visually, I can see the lower part, but I can neither apprehend the back which is hidden by my chest, nor the endpin which anchors the instrument to the ground. If I want to see it fully, I need to turn the instrument around, and manipulate it to have a full apprehension of it. However, I never perceive it completely. My right hand holds the bow and my left hand plays on the neck of the instrument. I have my left ear almost glued to the neck of the instrument, as if having it so close to the instrument helps to hear it better… even if the sound actually vibrates against my chest, between my knees, and comes out from the f-hole of the instrument. This is the sort of instrument I phantasize when I phantasize my inner song. Not really all of it. Some parts. The neck. Around the bridge. The movements of the bow.

The reproductive consciousness constitutes the inner song as the reproduction of the being of a possible performance. Hence, it is by understanding what happens as the musician hears him- or herself playing that it is possible to understand what happens as the inner song is constituted. The impressional consciousness constitutes the actual song thanks to a co-constitution: the constitution of the musical instrument as a medium voicing the melody, and the constitution of the melody as being issued by the musical instrument. Due to that co-constitution, the musician can apprehend a particular performance as his or her own performance, distinct from any other performance, or
more broadly distinct from any other perceivable musical object. In the impressional consciousness, the musical instrument and the melody together constitute the \textit{actual song}.

Their relationship is the following: the instrument is played in order to voice the melody, and the melody resonates thanks to the playing of the instrument. In \textit{the reproductive consciousness}, the practicing musician reproduces the possibility of the performance, phantasizing an \textit{inner musical instrument}\textsuperscript{704} producing an \textit{inner melody}. In other words, the musician \textit{perceives in phantasy} how the performance would be or should be, hearing a melody but phantasizing also more or less accurately how it would be performed on the instrument.\textsuperscript{705}

The impressional consciousness constitutes the musical instrument with its possibilities of perception.\textsuperscript{706} For instance, I apprehend my cello \textit{in order} to voice the sound that I want to hear, and I listen to the sound \textit{with the awareness of the modalities in which I play the instrument through which I produce it}\textsuperscript{707} As I will explain in more detail

\textsuperscript{704} Here, I have to mention again this marvelous book which is also a reference for generations of French musicians: Hoppenot, \textit{Le violon intérieur}. Several former disciples of Hoppenot mention it in the interviews (Anne-Marie Morin, Claire Bernard, Yan-Pascal Tortelier, etc.)

\textsuperscript{705} Of course, phantasizing the inner musical instrument can be more or less accurate, and similarly its sound and the color of the melody which is phantasized. For instance, my phantasy of an inner cello is not as rich as the phantasy of a professional cellist who has dedicated his or her whole life to music and therefore spends more time, and has had a deeper formation than I, etc. I will investigate that later in this chapter.

\textsuperscript{706} I will come back to this at the very end of the present chapter, to explain how the constitution of habit through the sedimentation of sensations is part of the further constitution of the inner song. Here, I just give a quick description because I want to focus on how the instrument is constituted as an object with its own unique voice revealed differently when played by each musician.

\textsuperscript{707} Adding a dimension which is related to the type of music played, Dewitte explains: “C'est très exactement aussi ce qui ressort des différents usages de l'instrument et des inventions successives qui jalonnent son histoire. Il n'y a pas de harpe ni de clarinette en soi, mais bien différentes visées de l'instrument effectuées par les créateurs, la harpe pouvant être visée comme bonne à produire une cascade d'arpèges cristallins, ou bien comme produisant une résonance grave. Chaque visée provient d'un songe différent de musique, d'une rêverie sur l'instrument et à partir de l'instrument, mais elle révèle en lui des aspects bien réels que l'on ne soupçonnerait pas.” I cannot explore the question of musical
in the next sections, the musical instrument is given in the impressional consciousness as one. However, it is constituted through a multiplicity of possible apprehensions continuously synthetized and possibly unlimited in number.  

This means that the musical instrument is given through adumbrations, and never all at once.  

Hence, the constitution of a specific musical instrument with its sound in the impressional consciousness is a process: every single aspect of the object points to a continuity, a

hermeneutic in my description here, but it is a part of the instrumental approach: the musical instrument will be apprehended or intended differently according to the music played.

Husserl says: “it is inconceivable that external perception would exhaust the sensible-material content of its perceived object; it is inconceivable that a perceptual object could be given in the entirety of its sensibly intuitive features, literally, from all sides at once in the self-contained perception” (Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, §1, pp. 39-40).

In his explanations, Husserl distinguishes two elements: the actual perception on the one hand, and the variety of complexes of possible perceptions on the other. Husserl says that: “This fundamental division between what is genuinely perceived and what is not genuinely perceived belongs to the primordial structure of the correlation: External perception and bodily ‘object’” (Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, §1, p. 40).

That division between the genuinely perceived and the non-genuinely perceived goes along with a division of consciousness between “a genuinely original conscious-having [Bewussthaben] of sides and a co-conscious-having [Mitbewussthaben] of other sides that are precisely not originally there” (Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, §1, p. 40). It is a co-conscious-having in the sense that the invisible parts are still present, but as co-meant. Thus, Husserl can say that the fulfilment of the intention by the intuition of the object happens through an actual exhibiting which points to the variety of other possible perceptions.

The object is not given all at once but through a structure of reference of the primarily given to the not-given. Husserl says that: “Noetically speaking, perception is a mixture of an actual exhibiting that presents in an intuitive manner what is originally exhibited, and of an empty indicating that refers to possible new perceptions. In a noematic regard, what is perceived is given in adumbrations in such a way that the particular givenness refers to something else that is not-given, as what is not given belonging to the same object” (Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, §1, p. 41).

Husserl says: “External perception is a constant pretension to accomplish something that, by its very nature, it is not in a position to accomplish. Thus, it harbors an essential contradiction, as it were. My meaning will soon become clear to you once you intuitively grasp how the objective sense exhibits itself as unity <in> the unending manifolds of possible appearances; and seen upon closer inspection, how the continual synthesis, as a unity of coinciding, allows the same sense to appear, and how a consciousness of ever new possibilities of appearances constantly persists over against the factual, limited courses of appearance, transcending them” (Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, §1, p. 39).

Dewitte says in “L’invention instrumentale”: “Ce jeu n’est pas une aptitude acquise d’avance; sans parler du nécessaire apprentissage de la technique, qui en réalité ne se termine jamais, elle résulte, d’une compréhension intime des qualités de l’instrument, ce qui implique sans doute, comme le commerce avec
possibility of multiple perceptions. Thus, each musical instrument appears as a system of referential implications in the sense that a possibility actualized uncovers other possibilities to be actualized. This means that the parts of my cello that are not actually perceived are still there, co-present. They, together with the parts that are presented in perception, constitute the cello as an object. Without them, the cello is not constituted in consciousness as a cello.  

As he says, the mastery of the instrument is always improving, from the beginning of the training, throughout the life of the musician. There are therefore infinite ways to apprehend the musical instrument which correspond to infinite possibilities of perception. Dewitte elaborates on this. He writes in “l'invention instrumentale”: “A chaque fois, lors de chaque moment créateur, l’invention musicale est la découverte dans l’instrument de ‘possibilités’ ou de ‘potentialités’ nouvelles, ou de ce que l’on peut appeler également des possibles nouveaux. L’invention créatrice discerne dans l’instrument d’autres ‘possibles’ qui avaient été occultés par ses possibilités connues et répertoriées. Mais comment faut-il comprendre ces ‘possibles’? Existaient-ils déjà quelque part, ou bien ont-ils été purement inventés et donc créés ex nihilo? Si nous admettons qu’il y a, lors de chaque invention, une découverte soudaine d’aspects inaperçus de l’instrument, on est tenté de comprendre cet événement comme si se produisait alors une ‘révélation’ de certaines facettes cachées, une ‘exhumation’ de ‘richesses’ enfouies. Mais se pose alors la question: où ces ressources insoupçonnées peuvent-elles bien avoir résidé auparavant? Faut-il admettre qu’elles étaient ‘enfouies’ ou ‘tapies’ quelque part comme un ‘trésor’ ou un ‘gisement’ avant d’apparaître au grand jour? Doit-on supposer, pour recourir à une autre image, qu’elles ‘sommeillaient’ dans un état de torpeur, à l’instar de la Belle au Bois Dormant avant d’être réveillée par le Prince Charmant? Il ne s’agirait pas seulement de ‘révéler’ des potentialités, mais de les ‘réveiller’. Toutes ces métaphores ont en commun de présupposer une existence préalable qui serait seulement réactivée par l’acte créateur, une ‘potentialité’ qui serait alors ‘actualisée’. On suppose que les possibles révélés par la création menaient une existence latente et attendaient qu’on vienne les chercher. Bergson a mis en garde envers une telle idée en parlant ironiquement d’une ‘armoire aux possibles’ dont certains initiés seraient censés avoir la clé. Il faut aller plus loin dans le travail d’élucidation philosophique et penser de manière plus rigoureuse, en admettant que la création a quelque chose de radical; elle est l’apparition d’un ‘nouveau’ et non pas la simple extraction d’un ‘possible’ déjà réel. Mais alors guette un autre danger symétrique qui consiste à supposer qu’il n’y aurait absolument rien avant: l’instrument pour lequel on compose n’aurait en lui-même aucune propriété dont on aurait à tenir compte; on se trouverait dans une situation de table rase et de création ex nihilo. Or, une telle conception est tout aussi inacceptable que la précédente dans la mesure où elle ramène l’acte créateur à une pure construction du génie artistique qui n’admettrait plus aucune altérité, et notamment celle que constitue la matière sonore et la singularité d’un instrument. Il convient donc d’élaborer une conception plus complexe et plus nuancée susceptible d’articuler ensemble l’apparition d’un ‘nouveau’ et la reconnaissance d’un ‘déjà là’.

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712 Dewitte elaborates on this. He writes in “l’invention instrumentale”: “A chaque fois, lors de chaque moment créateur, l’invention musicale est la découverte dans l’instrument de ‘possibilités’ ou de ‘potentialités’ nouvelles, ou de ce que l’on peut appeler également des possibles nouveaux. L’invention créatrice discerne dans l’instrument d’autres ‘possibles’ qui avaient été occultés par ses possibilités connues et répertoriées. Mais comment faut-il comprendre ces ‘possibles’? Existaient-ils déjà quelque part, ou bien ont-ils été purement inventés et donc créés ex nihilo? Si nous admettons qu’il y a, lors de chaque invention, une découverte soudaine d’aspects inaperçus de l’instrument, on est tenté de comprendre cet événement comme si se produisait alors une ‘révélation’ de certaines facettes cachées, une ‘exhumation’ de ‘richesses’ enfouies. Mais se pose alors la question: où ces ressources insoupçonnées peuvent-elles bien avoir résidé auparavant? Faut-il admettre qu’elles étaient ‘enfouies’ ou ‘tapies’ quelque part comme un ‘trésor’ ou un ‘gisement’ avant d’apparaître au grand jour? Doit-on supposer, pour recourir à une autre image, qu’elles ‘sommeillaient’ dans un état de torpeur, à l’instar de la Belle au Bois Dormant avant d’être réveillée par le Prince Charmant? Il ne s’agirait pas seulement de ‘révéler’ des potentialités, mais de les ‘réveiller’. Toutes ces métaphores ont en commun de présupposer une existence préalable qui serait seulement réactivée par l’acte créateur, une ‘potentialité’ qui serait alors ‘actualisée’. On suppose que les possibles révélés par la création menaient une existence latente et attendaient qu’on vienne les chercher. Bergson a mis en garde envers une telle idée en parlant ironiquement d’une ‘armoire aux possibles’ dont certains initiés seraient censés avoir la clé. Il faut aller plus loin dans le travail d’élucidation philosophique et penser de manière plus rigoureuse, en admettant que la création a quelque chose de radical; elle est l’apparition d’un ‘nouveau’ et non pas la simple extraction d’un ‘possible’ déjà réel. Mais alors guette un autre danger symétrique qui consiste à supposer qu’il n’y aurait absolument rien avant: l’instrument pour lequel on compose n’aurait en lui-même aucune propriété dont on aurait à tenir compte; on se trouverait dans une situation de table rase et de création ex nihilo. Or, une telle conception est tout aussi inacceptable que la précédente dans la mesure où elle ramène l’acte créateur à une pure construction du génie artistique qui n’admettrait plus aucune altérité, et notamment celle que constitue la matière sonore et la singularité d’un instrument. Il convient donc d’élaborer une conception plus complexe et plus nuancée susceptible d’articuler ensemble l’apparition d’un ‘nouveau’ et la reconnaissance d’un ‘déjà là’.”
Surely, there is an appearance-core: the instrument is given in a way, and at the beginning, silent. However, it does call out to the musician: “take me and play me, try the bass and the treble, try to vibrate, try the unison, the fourth, the fifth and the octave, make me cry and make me laugh, make me resonate with pride and anger.” When the musician starts playing, he or she experiences a first contact with the instrument. However, the perceptual discovery continues then through practice.\(^7\) As it goes on, invisible but co-present aspects of the object are revealed. For instance, as I play my cello, the beauty of the fine-tuning, the perfection of the making, the artistry, as well as the expressive possibilities of my cello keep being revealed. An aspect of the instrument is given at each

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\(^7\) I will explain this at the very end of the present chapter when I speak about the technique and the constitution of habits.
This particular aspect is limited. Indeed, it is the same object that is meant, it is the same cello, and the present perception coincides with the other momentary appearances of the object. For instance, as I touch the instrument with my fingers and play it with the bow, I perceive the enchanting sound of its voice. This too is the same instrument; what is presented in the now of the impression is only a momentary aspect of the constitution of the object. The unity of the object remains despite the multiple possibilities of givenness of it. The object is given in full body, but the process remains an infinite process in the sense that perception goes always along with possibilities of apperceptions.

The constitution of the inner instrument in the reproductive consciousness is linked with the constitution of the actual instrument in the impressional consciousness. In the reproductive consciousness, the possibilities or apperceptions of the imaginary object are broader. As explained earlier, the phantasy is not constrained by reality. However, the possibilities are still bounded with what a cello actually is. Here, the phantasy of the inner instrument is not the same as the actual instrument. However, it should still have the essential features of the actual instrument in order to be a correspondent in phantasy. For instance, my inner cello needs to have the same essential features of an actual cello in order to be a phantasy cello. It needs to have a similar volume, space between two notes, etc.

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\(^{714}\) Husserl writes: "In the particular present perception, I have just these aspects and their modifications, and no others, just these aspects that are always limited ones. In each moment the objective sense is the same with respect to the object as such, the object that is meant; and it coincides with the continual course of momentary appearances, as for instance, this table here" ([Analyses Concerning passive and Active synthesis](https://doi.org/10.3138/HU9P.71225.71225.71225), §1 pp. 41-2).

\(^{715}\) Cf. Footnote Chapter 1, §4.
This process of perceptual discovery of the sonorous musical instrument is a *temporal* process. Indeed, there is a succession of actualizations of the possibilities of the instrument. Husserl says that: “This holds time and again for every perceptual phase of the streaming process of perceiving, for every new appearance, only that the intentional horizon has altered and shifted.”\(^7\) In the particular case of the perception of the cello with its own sound, this means that, as the instrument gets played and its possibilities are revealed by the performer, every new appearance constitutes a phase of the process of perception, and alters and shifts the horizon of possibilities offered by this same particular musical instrument. In other words, new horizons are constantly opened during the process of the constitution of the object.\(^7\) Temporally, this process happens through a continuity of succession in the impressional consciousness.

This process continues then, when the same is *perceived again*, either only a moment apart, or even tomorrow (recalled).\(^7\) For instance, if I play my cello again, this new perception of the same object, is not given in the continuity of the immediate retention. However, it still pursues the process of the constitution of the object in the impressional consciousness. In other words, the new appearances uncover, in the moment

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\(^7\) Husserl explains: “Proper to every appearing thing of each perceptual phase is a new empty horizon, a new system of determinable indeterminacy, a new system of progressing tendencies with corresponding possibilities of entering into determinately ordered systems of possible appearances, of possible ways that the aspects can run their course, together with horizons that are inseparably affiliated with these aspects” (*Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*, §1, p. 43).

\(^7\) Husserl continues: “The call resounds as well with respect to the side that is already actually seen: ‘Draw closer, closer still; now fix your eyes on me, changing your place, changing the position of your eyes, etc. You will get to see even more of me that is new, ever new partial coloring, etc. You will get to see structures of the wood that were not visible just a moment ago, structures that were formerly only viewed indeterminately and generally,’ etc.” (*Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*, §1, p. 43).
in which they appear, new appearances to be uncovered. That’s how the limits of the perception are constantly pushed back, even across the discontinuity of the moments of the presentation of the object. That’s also how the process of sedimentation of the perception happens, through continuity and discontinuity, identity, and change in the perceptual constitution. Similarly, there is a process of constitution of the inner instrument in the reproductive consciousness. The musician can play with the inner instrument in phantasy, perceive it in phantasy in various ways, and learn how to phantasize the distances, sounds, and effects, by reproducing in phantasy what happens when he or she actually rehearses and plays.

Throughout that temporal perceptual process, the musical instrument is constituted in the impressional consciousness as a potentially sonorous object. The musical instrument is distinct from other objects given in perception because of a particularity: it can be apprehended as a silent instrument if I don’t play it, or as an

719 Husserl continues: “even what is already seen – is constantly there as a framework prefiguring something new; it is an x to be determined more closely. There is a constant process of anticipation, of preunderstanding. In addition to this inner horizon there are then also outer horizons, prefigurings for what is still devoid of any intuitively given framework that would require only more differentiated ways of sketching it in” (Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, §1, p. 43).

720 There is a particularity of the musical instrument: the same instrument can be played now or later, by me or my professor, it will not sound the same (The cellist Xavier Phillips explains how he would never use his own cello to show something to his student because he does not want to show examples on an exceptional instrument, and he also wants the student to understand that the sound is not due only to the instrument, but more to how the instrument is being played (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-xavier-phillips-14-02-2013-fait-a-paris-france/). Nonetheless, because it is the same instrument, it will be the same voice, only a voice with a different color. Thus, the process of uncovering the possibilities of the perception of the instrument, and more particularity its own voice, can be a shared process involving intersubjectivity (I am not addressing this question here, it would lead me too far from the present explanation).

721 François Moysan describes this very accurately in our interview (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-francois-moysan-pianiste/).
instrument with a specific sound if I play it, to the extent I know how to play it.\textsuperscript{722} This means that the \textit{sound} of the instrument constitutes a \textit{possibility} of the instrument. This possibility of the instrument gets reproduced in the reproductive consciousness and is fully part of the essential features of the inner song.\textsuperscript{723} Interpreting is not solely a matter of playing what is written, or playing it well, but shaping the sound coming out of the instrument so that this sound serves the music. This shaping happens also in the inner song. For instance, as I phantasize the first phrases of the \textit{Sonata}, I hear them with the specific sound of the cello, and maybe even with the particular sound that I am used to hearing when I play my own cello.

When the musical instrument is given as a silent object, perception gives it through touching, seeing, smelling, but when it is given as a sonorous object, it is thanks to the touching of the instrument and the accomplishment of certain moves that the sonorous possibilities of the object are revealed. For instance, one can hear the sound of the cello by knocking on the instrument, using a bow on the strings, etc.\textsuperscript{724} Each instrument has a specific voice, although it is more exactly through the encounter

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\textsuperscript{722} This is the problem of \textit{technique}; I will be talking about it later in this chapter.
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\textsuperscript{723} A deeper analysis of this question could be performed here. Indeed, research into sound is very important as the musician works on a music piece (jazz musicians speak a lot about that in the interviews, Camille Poupat for instance, \url{http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-camille-poupat-saxophoniste/}).

In a phenomenological analysis of the research into sound in music practice, it would be very interesting to use the discoveries of contemporary music, for instance, what is being done in Paris with the IRCAM laboratory.
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\textsuperscript{724} These sonorous possibilities are widely used in contemporary music in which composer creates new ways to use the instrument. One can think of John Cage’s (1912-1992) prepared piano as an example of this.
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between a particular instrument and a particular musician that the sound comes out.\footnote{I discuss this question with Paul Gossard, piano tuner and restorer (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-paul-gossart-restaurateur-de-pianos-anciens-accordeur-chercheur-en-philosophie/).}

This particular sound of the instrument can be intended by the musician in various ways: consciousness can seize upon the melody for its aesthetical beauty (to appreciate it aesthetically), or consciousness can seize upon the melody as an object through specific moves (as something constituted in the impressional consciousness and modified according to the way it is played). Then, as the performer rehearses and practices, the way the sound is intended can vary within one single practice session. For instance, I can listen to the sound for itself, or as a part of a specific musical phrase I am working on.

In “L’invention instrumentale,” Dewitte explains how Stravinsky (1882-1971) goes even further, arguing that the instrument is nothing as itself, and putting the musical work in the center. He writes: “A une situation caractérisée par un subjectivisme implicite, puisqu’on suppose un sujet immuable et premier: l’instrumentiste, Stravinsky oppose une forme d’ objectivisme, celui de l’objectivité des œuvres, de leur existence autonome qui doit être posée comme première Cette inversion est donc un décentrement: ce n’est pas l’instrumentiste qui doit être placé au centre, et pas davantage le sentiment subjectif de l’auditeur, mais bien la nouvelle réalité inouïe – jamais entendue auparavant – qu’est l’œuvre musicale, même si elle n’existe vraiment que lorsqu’elle est jouée. Toute la séquence de la chaîne musicale telle qu’on la conçoit généralement (œuvre / instrumentiste / instrument) est remise en question. Le prius devient un posterius: il n’y a plus, préalablement, un instrument tout fait ni une technique instrumentale toute faite. Il y a, originairement, un acte de création et d’invention d’une œuvre qui requiert une capacité, non donnée à l’avance, de la jouer. C’est l’œuvre qui est mise au centre, mais, en même temps, elle est pour ainsi dire décentrée par rapport à elle-même, puisqu’elle est une invention et non le déploiement d’une réalité préalable: elle s’auto-anticipe pour ainsi dire. Si l’on retient le point essentiel de la déclaration péremptoire sur la mandoline et la guitare, il faut donc renoncer à l’idée qu’il y aurait un ‘instrument en soi’, existant préalablement à son emploi dans une œuvre. C’est l’œuvre elle-même, comme événement d’invention et de création, qui fait exister l’instrument. On pourrait presque parler d’un ‘existentialisme de l’instrument’ : son existence précède son essence, et elle est elle-même ‘en situation’. Pourtant, il est difficile de prendre cette déclaration au pied de la lettre. Peut-on en effet considérer que l’instrument ne serait, pour citer Stravinsky, ‘rien en lui-même’ (ou ‘rien en soi’) ? Si tel était le cas, on pourrait facilement en déduire que l’invention créatrice n’aurait affaire à rien d’autre qu’à elle-même, qu’elle s’exercerait dans le vide, sans être confrontée à aucun donné préalable. Telle ne pouvait pas être l’intention du compositeur, qui a toujours manifesté un grand intérêt pour la personnalité propre des instruments afin d’en tirer parti. Sa réinterrogation implique au contraire une prise en compte de la vie propre des instruments, et une remise à l’honneur de la dimension artisanale de la composition musicale.”

In my own description I don’t follow Stravinsky’s position, but I argue that the instrument has a potential, even if it is revealed through the playing by the musician (as the musician has a potential which reveals itself through the act of playing the instrument).
Similarly, in the reproductive consciousness the musician can focus on the flowing phrase, or on specific moments of this phrase.

As the sound is a possibility of the instrument, the mode of intention of the object impacts the perceptual approach to the instrument itself. Indeed, in a similar way to the case of the melody, the musical instrument can be apprehended in two ways: for the aesthetical beauty (the work of the instrument maker is a piece of artistry in itself, the sound can be seized upon in itself for its aesthetical beauty), but also as an instrument \textit{to produce the sound} (this is the primary approach in the context I am studying in which the musician apprehends the instrument with the intention of producing a sound with it).

When the musician apprehends the musical instrument in order to play it, the musical instrument is paradoxically given both as an instrument offering possibilities (I am capable of playing a sound \textit{thanks to it}), but also as an instrument resistant to its use (I have difficulties in hearing the sound that I want to hear \textit{because of} the technical difficulties).\textsuperscript{727} The discovery of the \textit{sound} of the instrument is linked to this apprehension because it is revealed throughout the process of perceptual discovery involving touching, seeing, smelling the instrument, but also, and more importantly

\textsuperscript{726} I don’t use the word “tool” as I understand the musical instrument as having its own voice, its own proper sound. The sound of the instrument is among its possibilities of perception, it essentially belongs to it. There is therefore more with the musical instrument than with a tool as I explain in §3 of the present chapter.

\textsuperscript{727} I investigate this question later in this chapter when I work on the problem of instrumental technique.
playing it, testing it, manipulating it, trying it out. Hence, the musical instrument is not just a tool to produce a sound, even if it is certainly a medium to issue it.

The sound which comes out of it and which can be an essential feature of the inner song when it is reproduced in consciousness, results from the encounter between a musician and an instrument. If each performer is responsible for his or her sound and how he or she voices the music, each musical instrument also has its proper sound, its proper voice. There is a double movement: the performer magnifies the beauty of the instrument by playing it in a certain modality, and the instrument magnifies the talent of the performer by expressing a specific sort of sound. Thus, what is called the sound of the instrument comes from the encounter between a musician capable of playing the instrument, and an instrument calling the musician to reveal what sounds it can have.

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728 This is what musicians do when they go buy an instrument in the instrument maker’s shop, the musicians not only look at the various instruments but also, and more importantly, try them.

729 In Dewitte, Jacques: “L’invention instrumentale,” the author writes: “Qu’est-ce qu’un instrument de musique? Un objet fabriqué par un luthier ou un facteur, qui est destiné à jouer de la musique. Davantage que tout autre ustensile technique, il est inerte et mort aussi longtemps qu’il reste à l’abandon. Exposé comme une curiosité historique ou un bel objet dans les collections d’un Musée Instrumental, ce n’est plus qu’une coquille vide, tout autant que lorsqu’il reste dans son étui. Mais qu’il rencontre quelqu’un capable d’en jouer, de le faire vibrer et de tirer parti de ses ressources, quelqu’un qui sache le connaître, le comprendre et l’aimer, et il se remet à vivre. Quelqu’un qui, surtout s’il s’agit d’un instrument à vent, sache littéralement lui insuffler le souffle et le ré-animer. Osons recourir à une notion vieillie et discréditée, et nous exposer en outre au reproche d’anthropomorphisme, et avançons l’idée que l’instrument a une âme – ce qui étymologiquement veut dire un souffle de vie (c’est ainsi qu’est appelée en français cette béance centrale du violon sans laquelle il n’y aurait pas de résonance). Jouer un instrument, sur un instrument ou d’un instrument (chacune des constructions grammaticales révèle une autre nuance de la relation), c’est donc lui insuffler une âme, l’animer. C’est un miracle permanent que celui par lequel un musicien fait vivre ou revivre un instrument, lui insuffle une vie qu’il perdrait bientôt s’il était délaissé.”

This is the approach that I want to adopt in my own description: the musical instrument is unanimated until it becomes animated by the musician who knows it, loves it, is able to potentialize its quality and diminish its flaws.

730 I discuss how the object calls the artist with Emmanuel Boos, ceramist (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-emmanuel-boos-ceramiste/).

Husserl mentions that kind of experience in the Analyses Concerning passive and Active synthesis, §1, p. 41. He says: “Let us first note that every perception, or noematically speaking, every single aspect of the object in itself points to a continuity, to multifarious continua of possible new perceptions, and
by playing it; the musician reveals him- or herself through the instrument, and the instrument reveals itself through the musician.731

As explained in the earlier chapter, for the practicing musician, hearing the sound is essentially dependent on his or her moves on the instrument.732 For instance, I only hear the sound of my cello if I play the cello. In other words, I cannot apprehend the sound without also tactually apprehending the instrument as an object producing the sound.733 As there is no perception of a sound of the performance through hearing without a simultaneous perception of the instrument through tactuality, it follows that the tone-data are necessarily associated with touch-data and sensations; the sonorous is constituted through tactuality; tone-data are associated with touch-data because they are given in the same now of the impression. This means that tactuality is foundational in the constitution of the actual song.

731 Any musician who walks into a music shop to choose an instrument has the experience of contemplating various instruments which seem to be calling for a perceptual discovery and has the experience of being eager to discover each of them through perception. Cf. Interview with Paul Gossard, piano tuner, and restorer (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-paul-gossart-restaurateur-de-pianos-anciens-accordeur-chercheur-en-philosophie/?fbclid=IwAR0dsK3NbtvDOg1ucrjTMQLInSmj0S19hq4VFMzJf9EusfMER7QSbxYP9o).

732 This is specific to the point of view of the performer. Indeed, the audience does not experience the sound in this way. The audience experiences the sound without the instrument, primarily as a sonorous object.

733 I come back to this question at the end of that chapter when I discuss the kinesthetic associations and their role in the further constitution of the inner song.
When it comes to the inner song, the musician also phantasize an instrument with a sound. This sound is both impacted by the actual sound of the instrument and shaped in phantasy. For instance, when I work on Brahms’s Sonata, I both phantasize the sound of my particular cello and play with the possibilities by phantasizing a softer, stronger, dryer sound. Then, as I practice, I try to realize this sound. Even in the shaping of the sound itself, there is an intention formed in the inner song and realized through practice. This intention is also formed from practicing. Thus, there is a co-implication of the constitution processes in the impressional and reproductive consciousness.

§3. The constitution of the melody thanks to the movements on the instrument.

I am playing my cello and shaping the melody through my movements. I feel the inner-rhythm of it in my Body, and I shape the flesh of the sound by my touching [toucher] of the instrument. As I move, I shape the melody in its sensuous form and temporal aspects. I particularly work on the bowing movements. Indeed, the push/pull movements, the contact between the bow and the strings, i.e., how I weigh on them with my right arm, reflect the way I feel the musical phrase. Now, I work on the fingering for Brahms’s Cello Sonata in E Minor op. 38. The first phrase is very deep. Traditionally, it is played only on the C-String, descending in the fourth position. Indeed, if it is played in this way, the sound is more profound than if it was played on the C-string, G-string, and so on and so forth. I choose the fingering and the bowing movements according to the sound I want to issue, and the shape I want to give to the melody. As I perform movements with my cello, I remember what I learned yesterday, try to correct my mistakes, and constantly anticipate the next move so that the melody remains consistent.
As the musician practices and hears the played melody, a melody which is the correspondent of the inner melody of the inner song is constituted in the impressional consciousness.\textsuperscript{734} It is experienced by the practicing musician as produced by his or her movements on the musical instrument. Consequently, it is also constituted as depending on the quality of his or her instrumental \textit{technique}. For instance, the melody is not the same if I hold the bow in the Franco-Belgian or the Russian way, if I play with flat fingers or if I curve them, if I play a particular phrase within one bow or if I do a push-pull movement instead, etc.\textsuperscript{735}

Because of the \textit{coincidence between the sonorous and the tactual} in the apprehension of the melody of the actual song, and because of the \textit{primacy of tactuality} in the phenomenological constitution of the perceptual world, the musician experiences the tone-data of the melody as founded in tactuality. For instance, when I hear the soft E-note which starts Brahms’s \textit{Sonata} and, as I am the one who performed it, I associate this sound with the perception of the low C-String, and the sensation of grabbing the neck softly with the flat part of my finger to produce a profound and delicate sound. In other words, the tactual data situated in the Body sensing and moving with the musical instrument \textit{coincide} with tone-data in the \textit{now} of the impression; if the musician plays, the melody unfolds, if the musician does not play, the melody stops. For instance, when I play the beginning of Brahms’s \textit{Sonata}, I hear: “mii-sol-si-do-si,”\textsuperscript{736} etc.

\textsuperscript{734} I provided a commentary of the Husserlian description of the constitution of the melody in the impressional consciousness in a footnote Chapter 2, §1. In the present section, I adjust this description to the situation that I describe in which the musician plays the melody that he or she perceives.

\textsuperscript{735} I address this question in the next section on the question of technique.

\textsuperscript{736} I learned to solfège in France and therefore often hear the names of the notes in this way, especially when it is a piece that have \textit{in my fingers}. 
Thus, the sonorous is *founded* in the moves of the musician, and the musician is responsible for the givenness of the melody as a temporal object in consciousness. This means that the melody is constituted in the impressional consciousness through the act of hearing the first *mi*, and then it unfolds temporally according to the succession of the notes constituting the musical phrase. However, it ceases to exist as soon as the musician’s movements cease. As the musician plays, the very length of the melody also depends on the musician’s moves. For instance, when I play Brahms’s *Sonata*, each note has a specific value: quarter note, half note, etc., but different musicians play this same exact sonata in various ways because they *embody* it in various ways, I am the one giving the length of the melody I play.\(^737\) Then, when the *reproductive consciousness* reproduces the possibility of the perception of a performance, it reproduces a melody founded in tactuality, phantasizing not only a sonorous object, but also one grounded in tactual phantasms. It is as such that the inner song is experienced as *embodied* in the *phantasieleib*.

The first layer of the constitution of the melody in the impressional consciousness is the layer of the inner rhythm.\(^738\) In music practice, this inner layer is experienced even more strongly because, before playing the instrument, the practicing musician prepares him- or herself by getting in touch with it: the musician breathes in and out, and eventually takes the pulse. The constitution of the musical instrument and the melody

\(^737\) I studied this question in my first master’s thesis at Paris-Sorbonne IV under the supervision of the Pr. Dominique Pradelle in 2010.

\(^738\) I described this in the chapter on “Time and Space of the Impressional and Reproductive Consciousness.”
happen against that very first constitution in consciousness. This means that the practicing musician puts him- or herself in touch with the inner rhythm, from that rhythm chooses a tempo, and within that tempo initiates movement issuing the melody.\textsuperscript{739} Each inner consciousness is characterized by its proper inner rhythm. Hence, different musicians play the same piece infusing a different temporality into it. They originally grasp their own unique inner rhythm, from this comes a tempo proper to themselves, within which the playing movements are adjusted. From this grasping of the inner rhythm proper to each musician, the musician can be on the beat (as is the case in the beginning of the first movement of Brahms’s \textit{Cello Sonata}), or off-beat (if the piece starts with an anacrusis, for instance the \textit{Gigue} of the second \textit{Suite for Cello Solo} by Bach), in the tempo, or losing it (for instance, by losing concentration).

The \textit{musician’s Body}, as a sensing and moving \textit{Wahrnehmungsleib}, is constituted against that inner rhythm, and then, as the melody is issued by the movements of the musician’s Body and constituted in the impressional consciousness \textit{along} with the movements of the Body, in a coincidence of sensations between touch-data and tone-data,\textsuperscript{740} it follows that the melody is also constituted in the impressional consciousness against the inner rhythm. Even if it is given through impression, as an auto-affection, the inner rhythm is the first layer of constitution, both of the actual song given in the impressional consciousness and of the inner song given in the reproductive

\textsuperscript{739} I am not resting on the question here because I am interested in a single musician rehearsing, but it would be interesting to extend the question to the ensemble playing to the tempo of the leader (in classical music, folk music, etc.), or to the importance of the leader’s inner rhythm in collective improvisation.

\textsuperscript{740} I go back to this problem later in the present section.
consciousness. As the musician practices and rehearses, the inner rhythm is the common ground from which both phenomena are given.

In the impressional consciousness, the melody is constituted as a temporal object.\textsuperscript{741} In the reproductive consciousness, the \textit{inner melody} is also constituted as a temporal object. It also flows, although it flows in a \textit{quasi}-temporality. It keeps its unity as flowing. The vitality of the tone decreases as the melody flows. And a past phantasy can be reconstituted in consciousness, thus getting its vitality back. However, an essential freedom characterizes the phantasy. Thus, the constitution of the \textit{inner melody} is essentially playful, can be dismantled and reconstituted in various ways, changed and modified. This is not the case of the melody given in the impressional consciousness, essentially related to its original givenness in impression.

As was said earlier, the melody which is constituted in the impressional consciousness through music practice is constituted \textit{as the musician performs it}. In other words, it is experienced as unfolding \textit{as the movements progress}. Thus, the sonorous melody is experienced in the impressional consciousness as grounded in tactuality. Husserl says that: “[I]n every voluntary movement I have a starting point with which this action begins, but the entire movement has not merely ‘arisen from a will, but is, in its entire course, volitional, in every phase characterized as volitional.”\textsuperscript{742} In the situation I am studying, which is that of music practice, the starting point of the movement is in the inner rhythm. Here, even if the movement does not, properly speaking, \textit{arise from a will,}

\textsuperscript{741} Cf. Footnote Chapter 2, §1.

\textsuperscript{742} Translation from Hua XLIII, 3, 3 by Spano, Nicola in “The genesis of action in Husserl’s Studien der Struktur des Bewusstseins,” p. 3.
it is still volitional in the sense that it is performed through an act of the will. This movement is characterized as an action in the sense in which Husserl says that: “the process is called action only insofar as it is characterized as a process of the will, namely it is action in and with this character of the will (creative character). Every action is therefore eo ipso a willing.”\textsuperscript{743} Here, it is interesting to notice how an action which is in and with this character of the will is considered by Husserl to be creative. In the specific case of music practice, the movement is creative both in the sense in which Husserl says that it involves the will, and in the sense that it creates a unique melody, non replicable through that action. Husserl says that:

It belongs to the essence of action to be this type of whole: to be fiat and productive action, that is, a springing forth from the fiat and, further, to be carried in its appearance by a certain volitional moment of the springing forth and in accordance with the sense of the course of the will [Willensverlaufs].\textsuperscript{744}

In music practice, the action is the playing of the instrument, and through this, the production and perception of the melody.

If the musician is conscious of what is being played, he or she is not yet conscious of what is \textit{going to be performed}. This is where the interlacing of the constitution processes in the impressional and reproductive consciousness comes in. Indeed, the melody \textit{that is to come} is already given in the reproductive consciousness, as a phantasy-

\textsuperscript{743} Translation from Hua XVIII, 3, 24 by Spano, Nicola in “The genesis of action in Husserl’s Studien der Struktur des Bewusstseins,” p. 3.

\textsuperscript{744} Translated from Hua XLIII, 3, 12-3. by Spano, Nicola in “The genesis of action in Husserl’s Studien der Struktur des Bewusstseins,” p. 3.
expectation, as a reproduction of a future possible perceived performance.\footnote{I analyze this later in the present chapter when I work on the process of modifications of the inner song.} In other words, the musician anticipates, in phantasy, what is going to be given, in perception. This futural part of the melody remains a possibility given in the reproductive consciousness only, until it is played, and therefore presented in the impressional consciousness through sensation. Only when it is given through impression is the musician conscious of it with its extension in perception.\footnote{Husserl says: “When the final point is reached, I am conscious of this point itself as the now-point and of the whole duration as elapsed (or I am conscious of it as elapsed at the beginning-point of the new extent of time, which is no longer a tonal extent)” \textit{(On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, §8, p. 26)}.} In other words, the intention in perception is fulfilled by the presentation of the object in the now of the sensation, then according to the forms of \textit{having elapsed}, and of \textit{yet to come}.

In the reproductive consciousness, the inner melody is given as an “object to-be-realized practically” by the playing of the musical instrument.\footnote{I will explore how in more detail in the following section on the notion of “technique.” Here, I want to focus on the givenness of the melody through movement more than on the movements producing the melody.} As Husserl says: “the productive positing of the \textit{fiat at

\footnote{Spano, Nicola in “The genesis of action in Husserl’s Studien der Struktur des Bewusstseins,” p. 3-4, Spano writes: “For Husserl, the ontic \textit{fiat} and the action springing forth from it are the ‘positum’ (Satz) of a phansic ‘realising positing of the will’ (realisierende Willenssetzung) or, as he also calls it, a ‘practical’ \textit{(praktische)}, ‘productive positing’ (schöpferische Setzung) (see Hua XLIII, 3, 8, 13; see also Hua XXVIII, 45, 155). In Husserl’s jargon, a ‘positum’ (Satz) is the objective correlate of an intentional act of consciousness qua ‘posited’ (gesetzt) in such an act. That is to say, a positum is the unity of the ‘sense’ (Sinn) and ‘validity’ (Geltung) that something exhibits qua the intended object of an intentional experience (See Hua III.1, §133). For instance, if the ego perceives a yellow lemon, in its act of sensible perception this intended object is posited as having the sense ‘a yellow lemon’ and the validity ‘actually existing object.’ Instead, the validity that pertains to the intentional object posited in act of memory is that of ‘previously existed object,’ while in expectation it is that of ‘object coming into existence’. In the case of the experience of action, the intended object is posited as having the validity ‘object coming-to-be’ and ‘object to-be-realized-practically.’}
the beginning of the simple action is such that the process is posited in advance as coming-to-be [seinwerdender] and as practical it-shall-be [praktisch seinsollender] (to be realized practically).” Husserl does not speak about the phantasy here. However, his quote helps to understand how the inner melody given in the reproductive consciousness is given as an intentional object of the act of the will because it is posited as a ‘volitional’ process, in the sense that the ego brings about the melody through the act of playing the instrument, it “brings about [wirkt] through its doing [Tun].” In the situation that I am studying, when the musician practices, the positing of the object through the action is not delayed, or potentially happening. Indeed, there is no noticeable time lapse between the playing of the instrument and the resonating of the melody. Instead, the melody is given as an immediate ‘consequence of the will’ [infolge des Willes], i.e., as a consequence of the ego’s performance of the fiat.” Here, the fiat is the intention of the will to play the cello and issue the melody.

749 Spano, Nicola in “The genesis of action in Husserl’s Studien der Struktur des Bewusstseins,” p. 4.

750 Spano, Nicola in “The genesis of action in Husserl’s Studien der Struktur des Bewusstseins,” p. 4.

751 Although there might be a very short time lapse between moving the bow across the strings and hearing the music.

752 In his paper, Nicola Spano observes: “Importantly, though, through the fiat a process is not just posited as something that, sooner or later, will be practically realized by the ego. More radically, the volitional process takes place immediately as a ‘consequence of the will’ [infolge des Willens] i.e. as a consequence of the ego’s performance of the fiat. Accordingly, Husserl often calls the fiat an ‘affirmation of the will’ [Willensbejahung], or ‘decision of the will’ [Willensentscheidung], and describes the relation between it and the action in terms of a ‘fulfillment of the will’ [Willenserfüllung] or ‘satisfaction of the will’ [Willensbefriedung]: the fiat is an empty ‘intention of the will’ [Willensintention] that is either fulfilled or disappointed by the givenness of the action (see Hua XLIII. 3., Ch. 2 §2). Furthermore, since the fiat is not the effect of an empirical cause, but is spontaneously performed by the ego (see Hua XLIII. 3, 5; 9-10), the action springing forth from it is ‘voluntary’ [willkürlich]” (“The genesis of action in Husserl’s Studien der Struktur des Bewusstseins,” p. 4).
The intention is formed or guided by the inner song in phantasy. As with any intention, this particular intention of the will can then be either fulfilled or disappointed by the givenness of the action of playing the cello, and the presentation of the melody in perception. For instance, the inner melody of the beginning of the Sonata is formed in the reproductive consciousness as an inner song, then, the movement can either fulfill the intention in this or that mode, thus issuing the corresponding soft or powerful melody, or the intention formed in the inner song can be disappointed if the movement fails, i.e., if the melody is not performed as it was supposed to be because of certain technical difficulties or lack of attentiveness.

Change is part of this process of realization which goes with a process of perceptual discovery. However, if perception can in some cases maintain the object as the same despite the change which occurs. This is what happens when the intention is fulfilled as I continue to play my cello, for instance. It is something else when this change is unexpected, and therefore ruptures the unity of the perceptual process. For instance, I grab my cello, and the whole instrument is out of tune, or I start playing and the sound comes out strident or creaky. In this case, prior to the perception of the

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753 Analysis of the Passive and Active Synthesis, Section 1, §5-15.

754 I develop this question more in the section on technique, and then further on the problem of the sketching of the inner song through practice. Here, I am interested in this notion to understand the problem of the movement.

755 Husserl argues: “change is a continuous process of becoming otherwise; however, this becoming otherwise maintains unity, namely, a unity of the object remaining concordantly the same as the substratum of its continuous alterations in and through which it becomes otherwise, and in and through which it becomes otherwise time and again” (Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, §5, p. 64).

756 Husserl says: “Let us now already assume a unitary object, be it unchanged or changed, that first abides ‘concordantly’ in the continuity of the original experience, ‘getting known’ better and better. But then all of a sudden, and contrary to all expectation, green rather than red shows up on the back side that
creaky sound, the perception’s referential indicators given in the representation in the reproductive consciousness were determinately directed toward a soft melodic sound. Rather than being fulfilled in this sense, and thereby being ratified, the intentional prefiguring and referential indicators are disappointed. In this case, Husserl says that: “The general framework of sense is retained and fulfilled, and only at this point, only after we have these intentions, does ‘something else’ occur; a conflict between the intentions still living, and the contents of sense being newly instituted intuitively along with their more or less full intentions.” In other words, it is only because I was expecting a certain sound, only because there was a system of intentions already constituted, that the disappointment can occur. And Husserl adds: “We have a system of continual concordance once again insofar as the insertion of this new framework into the old one restores concordance.” In other words, if the expected perception occurs, the system of intention is adequately fulfilled and therefore the concordance is maintained. Thus, if I correct the intonation, or do the appropriate movement, the perceptual concordance is restored.

As it appears here, there is therefore a constant interpenetration of the constitutions in the impressional and reproductive consciousness, through the fulfilment is now becoming visible; instead of a ball-shape indicated by the front side, an indentation or something angular appears, etc.” (Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, §5, pp. 64-5).

757 I adjust Husserl’s quote to my situation here “Prior to the ensuing perception of the back sides, perception in its living flow was intentionally prefigured toward red and ball-shaped; perception’s referential indicators were determinately directed toward red and ball-shaped. And rather than being fulfilled in this sense, and thereby being ratified, the intentional prefiguring and referential indicators became disappointed” (Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, §5, p. 65).

758 Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, §5, p. 65.

of the intention formed in the reproductive consicousness which is either fulfilled or disappointed as the musician plays. Through that interplay, the melody given in the impressional consciousness and the inner melody given in the reproductive consicousness interpenetrate each other, thus constantly modifying one another.

§4. Acquiring a technique as a process of getting to know the instrument’s possibilities.
First position is in the upper part of the neck.

Third position is when the first finger takes the spot of the fourth finger in first position.

Fourth position is when the first finger is one third up from the fourth finger in first position.

I have played the same cello for years; I am used to it, with its difficulties, its specific shape, and its technical aspects. Since the pandemic hit, I haven’t had my cello because it is stuck in the USA. As I was complaining that I could not play the cello for months because of the pandemic, one of my friends offered to lend me his cello. I became ecstatic: “What an opportunity; how beautiful it is!” The day came, he brought the instrument to the atelier of another friend, a painter, who gave me a room to practice in. I opened the case, took the cello, the bow, and started to play this Sonata. My fingers were weak, but still able to go spontaneously to the right place; my memory was sometimes failing me, but I was still able to recall the melody, the gestures, the moves. I was playing this new instrument as if it were mine, slightly adjusting, but as if this totally new cello was already familiar to me. Now, after a couple of weeks, I am able to play

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760 Allen et al. Essential Elements for Strings, p. 6
better again. Detached from the score, playing by memory, I am able to look for the best fingering for the piece I play. I choose the ones that are practical on the cello, and easy for my hands.

Now that it is clearer how the melody is played, it is important to change the focus from the melody itself to the issuing of the melody through movement. Playing a musical instrument presupposes first and foremost the freedom of the Body, namely, a perceptual Body understood as “I, this bodily subject, can.” The musician is able to issue the melody, it is through a physical move performed by an embodied subject. As the musician plays and the Body enters into contact with the musical instrument with the intention of playing it, the world is given as a world of meaning offering various paths of action, various possibilities. It is the temporality of the Body which makes them possible. As the Body is impressional, retentional and protentional, the physical possibilities that the musician has now with the musical instrument depend on what the

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761 Translation by Staiti, Andrea, “Husserl’s account of Action: naturalistic or anti-naturalistic; a journey through the Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins.”

762 In his paper, Andrea Staiti observes: “In order to choose a certain course of action and issue my fiat the course of action must be somehow pre-given to me, it has to be pre-constituted as a practical path that is consistent with my factual abilities. The world has to show up as the meaningful locus of various practical possibilities that are experienced as mine before the actual action-planning and action takes place. The source of this pre-constitution for Husserl is the body. Not so much the body as consciously governed and steered by a transcendental ego but the pre-egoic lived body, whose meaning-oriented interactions with the world delineate possible paths for action, i.e., the consciousness of the I-can, which precedes and makes actual volition possible. The body explores the world, as it were, and in so doing it brings into relief for the ego possible paths of action. The emergence of practical intentions is described as a kind of re-enactment of involuntary bodily movements that is not past-directed (as mere re-presentational recollection of a past bodily movement) but future-directed in the specific mode of willing” (“Husserl’s account of Action”).

763 I explored this in the previous two chapters on “The Various Layers of the Musician’s Ego” and “Time and Space of the Impressional and Reproductive Consciousness.”

musician has accomplished in the past with this musical instrument (the possibilities belong to this or that specific musician’s Body). In other words, as the musician develops a musician’s Body in contact with and manipulation of the instrument, and as sensations are sedimented throughout a temporal process of perception, new possibilities of perception as well as new possibilities of action are given.

The possibilities of action are practical possibilities uncovered as the musician experiences the world of perception. Here, Husserl says that “the spectrum of practical possibilities is grounded eidetically in the spectrum of bodily possibilities. It is the body in its myriad meaningful interactions with the world that pre-figures possible practical ways or paths for actual acts of willing to occur.”765 In the situation I am studying, this means that the musician improves his or her playing by increasing his or her practical possibilities through the training of the Body, a training particularly to increase bodily possibilities (among others like reading music, understanding its cultural context, etc.). This training does not consist in constant improvement. Indeed, the musician can also regress and lose the acquisitions of that training. For instance, I might stop playing my cello for a while and lose my abilities, or I might have an injury or a discomfort which leads me to not progress as anticipated. In this case, if the musician starts losing his or her bodility capacities, the possibilities of the will necessarily diminish as well because the “I will” is limited by the “I can.” For instance, if I start loosing my sensations, the calluses of my fingers, the strength in my arms, etc., my will to play will be limited as well.

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As I demonstrated in the previous chapter, the constitution of the musician’s Body happens as the musician learns how to touch, handle, and manipulate the instrument.\textsuperscript{766} This learning corresponds to learning an instrumental technique which is fully part of the perceptual process of discovery of the musical instrument and its possibilities. This learning is proper to \textit{each instrument}. There is a cello technique, a piano technique, a drum technique, etc. However, it is also proper to \textit{each particular instrument}. Indeed, there is a proper technique to play my cello, distinct from the technique required to play my friend’s cello. Indeed, even if the musical instrument can be \textit{held} in various ways, it can \textit{produce a sound} only under certain conditions, and it produces a \textit{beautiful sound} only under certain even more strict conditions.\textsuperscript{767}

The process of learning the technique which leads to the deep acquisition of the instrument at hand, is part of the playing of the instrument, but it cannot be its end. The technique should serve the music.\textsuperscript{768} Technique serves music when it allows the musician to realize the inner song as closely as possible. Thus, the better the technique the musician has, the better he or she can serve the music. Here, technique can be defined as: \textit{a process of reciprocal uncovering of the musician’s possibilities through the instrument},

\textsuperscript{766} Here, I will come back to some topics that I have already touched on in other parts of the dissertation, in order to understand the notion of “instrumental technique.”

\textsuperscript{767} A future phenomenological investigation of the process of “searching for the sound” should involve a deeper reflection on “musical technique.”

\textsuperscript{768} I discussed this in many interviews, especially the first ones from 2010-2012. In the interview with Yan-Pascal Tortelier, we compare the ballet dancer and the gymnast precisely noticing how the distinction between the two lies in the fact that the ballet dancer serves art through the technique whereas the gymnast researches the technique first and the aesthetical comes afterward (https://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-yan-pascal-tortelier-chef-dorchestre/).
and the instrument’s possibilities through the musician, in order to serve the music. As this process of acquisition of the technique progresses, the possibilities of the musician (what the musician’s Body can potentially do) are uncovered, and so, conversely, are the possibilities of the instrument (how the instrument can potentially sound).

First, the technique is limited, but it enlarges the Bodily possibilities of the musician. Indeed, through the technique, the musician learns how to play adequately, according to the musician’s Body that he or she has. In this sense, the musician’s Body limits the possibility of acquiring a technique. For instance, I have thin, long, but not so muscular hands, so my left hand can cover large distances, but I must work a lot to have a powerful sound because it is not naturally heavy on the neck of the cello. However, regular practice also develops the possibilities of the musician’s Body. For instance, daily practice of the cello develops the muscles in the back, the arms, and the strength of the hands, thus further pushing my technical possibilities.

Second, the acquisition of the technique is limited, but it pushes the possibilities of the musical instrument ever higher so that it can eventually give more than what it was.

769 Of course, the technique can be researched for itself, however, without the research of musicality, it becomes a mere sport, and is no longer an art. Cf. Interview with Yan-Pascal Tortelier in which we compare the technique in a mechanical or a musical interpretation to the technique in gymnastics or ballet: https://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-yan-pascal-tortelier-chef-dorchestre/.

770 Cf. interview with Anne-Marie Morin who noticed how several musician have physical defects, but sublime them and succeed in becoming good musicians: http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entrevue-avec-anne-marie-morin-03-03-12-paris/. For instance, Yo-Yo Ma had a severe scoliosis, or the saxophonist Luigi Grasso started the saxophone to help his asthma: http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-luigi-grasso-15-02-2013-fait-a-paris-france/.

There is also the famous story of guitarist Tommy Iommi who, on the last day in his job and before he was supposed to go on tour, lost the tips of his fingers on his fretting hand. However, inspired by the example of Django Reinhardt, he created prosthetic fingertips for himself, relearned guitar, and went on to found Black Sabbath and effectively created the sound of heavy metal guitar with his new playing style (I thank Joel Boyer for his suggestion).
supposed to give. Indeed, on the one hand the musician *adjusts* to the possibilities of the instrument. For instance, my French cello is strangely tuned which makes the B note on the A-string and the E note on the D-string not exactly parallel thus requiring special attention for the intonation. However, the musician also *pushes back* on the possibilities of the instrument. For instance, my French cello did not have a lot of sonorous power but when I learned to play it with the Russian bow technique this increased its possibilities.

For Husserl, kinesthetic sensations and perceptual appearances go together because I am *conscious* of the two of them together. For instance, as I am in the process of perceiving my cello, I am conscious of the correspondence between kinesthetic sensations and perceptual appearances because I experience them together: I hear that sound, I touch the string, and I have the kinesthetic sensation of touching the string and this specific sound in my body. Husserl speaks about this as a “constitutive duet being played.” In other words, two elements are constituted all at once: the Body on the one hand, and the perceived object on the other. In the situation I am studying,

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771 Cf. Interview with Paul Gossart. The famous example of an instrument that was pushed beyond what it was supposed to give is the Köln Concert by Keith Jarrett in 1975: the jazz musician came and found a piano with an awfully bad sound, he played with all he could give, this record became and remained his most famous: the best-selling piano album in any genre and best-selling jazz solo album.

772 Husserl explains: “they [the ‘movement-sensations’] do not simply run parallel to the flow of appearances there; rather the kinaesthetic series under consideration and the perceptual appearances are related to one another through consciousness. By viewing an object I am conscious of the position of my eyes and at the same time – in the form of a novel systematic empty horizon – I am conscious of the entire system of possible eye position that rest at my disposal. And now, what is seen in the given eye position is so enmeshed with the entire system that I can say with certainty that if I were to move my eyes in this direction or in that, specific visual appearances would accordingly run their course in a determinate order. If I were to let the eye movements run this way or that in another direction, different series of appearances would accordingly run their course as expected. This holds likewise for head movements in the system of these possibilities of movement, and again for the movement of walking, etc., that I might bring into play” (*Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*, §3, pp. 50-1).

773 *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*, §3, p. 52.
sensations are, on the one hand, ordered in the Body, localized through touch, thus creating a horizon of future possible appearances, appearing in that system, and belonging to the movements of my body. On the other hand, the system of free possibilities of movement with this instrument is constituted as a practical, kinesthetic horizon through the process of the perception of the musical instrument. In other words, as the musician becomes conscious of what he or she can do with the musical instrument and how he or she can uncover further possibilities, these possibilities are situated in a system. As it appears here, there is a double constitution of the musician’s Body through the musical instrument, and of the musical instrument through the musician’s Body, which not only unfolds in the impressional consciousness, but is also enriched in the impressional consciousness. It is through the duetting process of constitution that musicality develops.

The particularity of the situation I am studying is then the following: as the musician practices, he or she freely plays the instrument, and the melody resonates. Here, sensations of touch and tone are given in the same now in the musician’s Body, while the instrument is given as a sonorous instrument. As the musician practices, he or she gets to

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774 Husserl says: “(1) The system of my free possibilities of movement is intentionally constituted as a practical, kinaesthetic horizon. This system is actualized each time I run through single paths of movements with the character of familiarity, that is, of fulfillment. We are not only thereby conscious of every eye position that we have at the moment, every position of the thing-body as the momentary sensation of movement, but we are also conscious of them as a place in a system of places; thus we are conscious of them with an empty horizon which is a horizon of freedom” (Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, §3, p. 52).

775 The present research could be investigated further by changing the framework, according it to Merleau-Ponty’s ideas and develop the theory of the musical instrument as a prolongation of the living Body.
know the instrument thanks to the sensing-Body\textsuperscript{776} capable of performing movements which allow the perception to happen.\textsuperscript{777} As the musician plays the musical instrument, tone-data and touch-data coincide in the *now* of the impression, while a melody resonates from the musical instrument. Consequent to that experience of a coincidence, the musician expects *this perceptual appearance* (the sonorous musical instrument) and *this kinesthetic sensation* (the association of touch-data and tone-data) to go together.

It is this duet which is reproduced in the reproductive consciousness. Indeed, passive associations are formed in the impressional consciousness of the experienced musician, and other associations happen in the reproductive consciousness in the consciousness of the musician who is used to experiencing *that* sound and *this kinesthetic sensation*, which go along with *this specific move*. When the inner song reproduces the being of a possible real performance, there is an interplay going on thanks to passive associations of sounds with moves, experiences in the body and perceptual experiences. For instance, if I have the experience of the beginning of the *Sonata*, “mi-sol-si-do-si,” this experience can be reproduced and played with in phantasy, thus becoming part of an inner song.

The freedom characterizing the reproductive consciousness playing with sounds, sensations, etc. to create an inner song, has its correspondent in the impressional

\textsuperscript{776} Husserl argues: “The lived-body is constantly there, functioning as an organ of perception; and here it is also, in itself, an entire system of compatibly harmonizing organs of perception. The lived-body is in itself characterized as the perceiving-lived-body” (*Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*, §3, p. 50).

\textsuperscript{777} Husserl writes: “We recognize it then purely as a lived-body, subjectively movable and in perceiving activity, as subjectively self-moving. In this regard it does not come into consideration as a perceived spatial thing, but rather with respect to the system of so-called ‘movement-sensations’ that run their course during perception in eye movements, head movements, etc.” (*Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*, §3, p. 50).
consciousness, although to a lesser extent. Indeed, Husserl says that “Every series of kinaesthesis proceeds in its own way, in a manner totally different from the series of sensible data. It runs its course in such a way as to be freely at my disposal, free to inhibit, free to orchestrate once again, as an originally subjective realization.”\textsuperscript{778} This means that, according to him, there is an autonomy of this lived-body. In other words, I can freely inhibit the sensation (which means neutralize the impact of the sensation), recall it, or realize it for itself. For instance, as I play my cello, I can recall the sensation of the cello, I can inhibit it to focus more on the sound, and I can magnify it. Thus, it follows that there is a certain freedom of consciousness to constitute the sensing map of the perceptual Body, thanks to the movement of the Body in certain ways.\textsuperscript{779} For instance, I am free to perform movements with my cello, I am free to apprehend it as I want, and I am free to try new combinations. Consequently, the modality of constitution of the cello as \textit{one} object, as \textit{one’s own instrument}, depends on the subject him- or herself.

Through this free manipulation of the object, the instrument is given with visual, tactile, and other possibilities, among which is a potential \textit{voice} which is the specific sound that it produces when it is manipulated in a certain way. For instance, my contemporary cello from the Czech Republic has a strong concert \textit{voice} whereas my

\textsuperscript{778} Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, §3, p. 51.

\textsuperscript{779} Husserl notes: “The system of lived-body movements is in fact characterized with respect to consciousness in a special way as a subjectively free system. I run through that system in the consciousness of the free ‘I can’. It may happen that I involuntarily dwell upon something, that for instance my eyes involuntarily turn this way or that. But at any time, I can capriciously pursue such a path of movement or whatever path of movement I like. As soon as I have an appearance of the thing in such a situation, a system of internally coherent manifold appearances of the same thing is thereby prefigured in the original consciousness of the sequence of appearances” (Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, §3, p. 51).
French cello from the 19th Century has the hushed voice of an instrument best for chamber music. As mentioned, the way these perceptual and practical possibilities appear in consciousness depends on the movements of the Wahrnehmungsleib, and therefore, on the musician him- or herself. Indeed, as Husserl demonstrates,780 there is both an autonomy and a persistence of the appearance, despite the disappearance of the transcendent object (this is also part of the process of sedimentation). In other words, the temporality of consciousness is the temporality of an embodied consciousness: the impressional consciousness is temporal in the sense that perception persists in the Wahrnehmungsleib and can be recalled through this Wahrnehmungsleib (that’s why the Body is temporal). Husserl explains how, when the transcendent object is not given through perception anymore (when I am not manipulating my cello, for instance), the appearance will persist, because of the kinesthetic sensations localized in the body and retained in their unity in the temporal consciousness (the kinesthetic sensations are still retained in consciousness). The process of perception runs its course, the perceptions of the object are given in the concordance of their system of appearance (i.e., according to the law of continuity) but then, the object can be given again if I approach it through the same perceptual angle because the retention is integrated into the body.781

780 Husserl says: “When I undertake a series of movements in the free system, ‘I move myself,’ the appearances that are arriving are already prefigured. The appearances form dependent systems. Only as dependent upon kinaesthesis can they continually pass into one another and constitute a unity of one sense. Only by running their course in these ways do they unfold their intentional indicator. Only through this interplay of independent and dependent variables is what appears constituted as a transcendent perceptual object, precisely as an object that is more than what we directly perceive, as an object that can completely vanish from my perception and yet still persist” (Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, §3, pp. 51-2).

781 Husserl argues: “We can also say it [the object] is constituted as such only by the fact that its appearances are kinaesthetically motivated, and consequently that it is in my freedom, in accordance with the knowledge that I have acquired, to let the appearances run their course randomly as original appearances in their system of concordance. Through the appropriate eye movements and other lived-
This is also true in the reproductive consciousness in which there is a similar experience. Indeed, there is also a playing with the possibilities (in the Body/of the perception of the instrument). However, this playing is not bound by the reality of the object itself. There is a greater degree of freedom. Thanks to that free playing, new associations can be awakened, with different combinations of sensations, or different combinations of movements on the inner instrument. For instance, I can phantasize a new move, new tone-phantasms of the instrument going along with new touch-phantasms in the Body, or new combinations can be awakened. Then, when the musician practices, he or she can try to realize them with the instrument, see if they are really possible, and see if these combinations are aesthetically interesting. As he or she does so, new technical possibilities of playing the instrument are opened.

The opening of these possibilities presupposes, but also enlarges, the knowledge of the instrument. In other words, the musician needs to have, but also acquires, the instrument at free disposal through that free playing. This happens through a process, i.e., through a renewed contact with the instrument through the perception and the repetition of perception. This possibility of perceiving again characterizes the transcendent

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782 I will come back to this problem at the end of the present chapter.

783 This is something that composers and improvisers have described in a greater degree in interviews. For instance Thierry Escaich (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-thierry-escaich-organiste/), Matteo Belli (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/intervista-con-matteo-belli-compositore-it/), or with more cultural components added, Reza Vali (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/interview-with-reza-vali-en/).
object. In the situation that I am studying, this means that it is part of the musical instrument as a perceptual object to remain at the disposal of the musician for further perceptions, to be rediscovered through perception as it is played. The musical instrument is acquired through a process of bringing closer. This is also a process of re-cognition, in which the unfamiliar becomes progressively more familiar. It can be understood as a process of intending determinable indeterminacy: indeterminacy because there is no way to know exactly what will be perceived, determinable because the perceptions will be consistent with what was already perceived, and having the intention fulfilled by the presentation in perception.

Here, the foundational moment is the “primordial-institution” or “primordial-impression,” i.e., the now of the presentation, the moment in which the sensation is localized in the Body. In the now of the perception, a localized sensation is given in the Body, and flows in the temporal consciousness. From this now, intentions are

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784 Husserl says: “The fact that a re-perception, a renewed perception of the same thing, is possible for transcendence characterizes the fundamental trait of transcendent perception, alone through which an abiding world is there for us, a reality that can be pregiven for us and can be freely at our disposal” (Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, §3, p. 47).

785 Husserl explains how this is a “process of knowing something more closely” (Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, §2, p. 45).

786 Husserl writes: “every perceptual givenness is a constant mixture of familiarity and unfamiliarity, a givenness that points to new possible perceptions that would issue in familiarity” (Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, §3, p. 48).

787 Husserl says that: “empty pointing ahead acquires its corresponding fullness. It corresponds to the more or less rich prefigured possibilities; but since its nature is determinable indeterminacy, it also brings, together with the fulfillment, a closer determination” (Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, §3, p. 48).


789 Husserl notes: “there is something corresponding to every filled spatial point of the object in the entire series of appearances; they continuously pass into one another such that this point in the appearance
constituted in the impressional consciousness. From the primordial moment, which is a moment of intertwining of the temporal and the spatial, an “integral harmony [taking place] in the coinciding of adumbrations-appearances” \(^79^0\) is built up.

As intentions are fulfilled, there is a continuous emptying: \(^79^1\) the possibilities of the object are uncovered and what \textit{is} presented in perception becomes what \textit{was} presented in perception, the \textit{just perceived} is retained in consciousness and, being synthetically unified with the further perception, participates in the acquisition of the knowledge of the object. \(^79^2\) In other words, the primordial moment points toward new modes of appearance, new possible perceptions (perceptions \textit{to come}), and new retentions exhibits itself as a moment of the appearing spatial form” (\textit{Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis}, §3, pp. 49-50).

\(^79^0\) \textit{Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis}, §3, p. 49.

\(^79^1\) Husserl explains: “Now, it depends upon the direction of the perceptual processes as to which lines are brought to fulfillment from the system of unfulfilled intentions, that is, which continuous series of possible appearances will be realized out of the entire system of possible appearances of the object. Advancing along this line, the empty intentions are transformed respectively into expectations. Once this line is pursued, the series of appearances run their course in the sense of continuously arousing and steadily fulfilling expectations that stem from the current kinaestheses, while the remaining empty horizons are left in dead potentialities” (\textit{Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis}, §3, p. 49).

\(^79^2\) Husserl says: “as soon as a new side becomes visible, a side that has just been visible gradually disappears from sight, becoming finally completely non-visible. But what has become non-visible is not cognitively lost for us. Thematic perception does not merely drive at continually possessing some new aspect of the object that would be intuitively grasped from moment to moment, as if what was formerly given would slip away from the grasp of (perceptual) interest. Rather, in passing over the object, perception drives at fashioning a unity of originary acquisitions of knowledge through which the object, according to its specific content, would reach an original acquisition, and through it would become an abiding epistemic possession” (\textit{Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis}, §2, pp. 45-6).
(perception which just came),\textsuperscript{793} all of which participate in the knowledge of the object, and its \textit{presumed presentation in the flesh}.\textsuperscript{794}

As the process continues, the unity of the object is given as “the transition of appearances following one after the other are all in dynamic displacement, enrichment and impoverishment.”\textsuperscript{795} In the situation that I am studying, the musical instrument is constituted thanks to the transition of appearances of its various aspects, including its sound. The constitution of the object through the constitutional process in the impressional consciousness does not happen \textit{all together}.\textsuperscript{796} As Husserl explains: “if the

\textsuperscript{793} Husserl writes: “What is already given to conscious in a primordial-impressional manner points to new modes of appearance through its halo which, when occurring, emerge as partly confirming, partly determining more closely. By virtue of inner intentions – unfulfilled and those now in the process of being fulfilled – what has already appeared itself becomes enriched. In this progression, moreover, the empty outer horizon that was intertwined with the appearances achieves its new fulfilment, at least a partial one. The part of the horizon that remains unfulfilled passes over into the horizon of the new appearance, and it goes on like this continually. That aspect of the object that has already appeared is partially lost again as it moves away from givenness, i.e., the appearance: the visible becomes non-visible again. But it is not lost. I remain conscious of it retentionally and in such a way that the empty horizon of the appearance present at this time receives a new prefiguring that points in a determinate manner to what has already been given earlier as co-present. Having seen the back side and having turned back to the front side, the perceptual object has kept a determination in a sense for me; likewise in emptiness, it points to what was previously seen. They all belong now abidingly to the object” (\textit{Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis}, §3, p. 49).

Since the primordial moment points to its retentions and protentions, it is legitimate to raise the question of the boundaries of that moment: when does the \textit{now} start and when does it end? This is the problem of the definition of the primary impression in Husserl’s phenomenology. Because of the intentionality of consciousness, the characteristic of the primary impression is its capacity to extend beyond itself. In this account, the clarity of the definition of the primary impression decreases because its richness increases. In other words, it is because the primary impression extends beyond itself that there is a flowing of the inner time consciousness, but that also makes the definition of the concept itself much more blurred.

\textsuperscript{794} Husserl notices: “The process of perception is a constant process of acquiring knowledge that holds on to what was acquired epistemically in sense; it thereby fashions an ever newly altered and ever more enriched sense. During the ongoing perceptual process, this sense is added to the grasped object itself in its presumed [complete] presentation in the flesh” (\textit{Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis}, §3, p. 49).

\textsuperscript{795} \textit{Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis}, §3, p. 50.

\textsuperscript{796} Husserl describes: “The unfamiliar object is thereby transformed in the perceptual process into a familiar object: in the end. I have exactly what I had started with, namely, a perspectival appearance. And
object has moved entirely out of our field of perception, then we have an altogether completely empty retention of it. Nevertheless, we still have the entire epistemic acquisition of it, and we still have a hold on it in thematic perceiving.\textsuperscript{797} Thus, the object is entirely acquired, and acquired not only perceptually but also practically, while not being altogether given, thanks to a temporal process in adumbration. It follows that the object, as a whole, is constituted as a meaning thanks to the perception articulated through temporal syntheses which links each new appearance with the previous one.\textsuperscript{798}

This process involves a consciousness of recognition.\textsuperscript{799} Indeed, if I manipulate my cello again in the same way, for instance, playing the same notes in the same way, successively performing the same moves, pressing the same string with the same energy, or holding the bow with the same softness, consciousness is no longer in this previous process of determining the cello more closely, instead, it recognizes the cello as already apprehended in perception, and there is now a process of merely bringing to intuition. Through the sedimentations of the perceptions of the instrument through touching, manipulating, hearing, seeing where the note is, etc. I acquire this cello as an already

\textsuperscript{797} \textit{Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis}, §2, p. 46.

\textsuperscript{798} Husserl argues: “Our empty-consciousness now has an articulated, systematic sense that is sketched in – something that did not exist previously and especially at the beginning of the perception. What was previously a mere framework of sense, a wide ranging generality, is now specified meaningfully in an articulated manner; to be sure, it awaits further experience in order to take on still richer epistemic contents as contents of determination” \textit{(Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, §2, p. 46)}.

\textsuperscript{799} Husserl says: “If I turn back again to the perceptions of the earlier determinations, they will issue in the consciousness of recognition, in the consciousness: ‘I already know all that.’ Now, a mere bringing to intuition takes place, and with it, a fulfilling confirmation of the empty intentions, but no longer the process of determining more closely” \textit{(Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, §2, p. 46)}.
known cello, as my cello. According to Husserl: “By acquiring knowledge originally, perception also acquires permanent, lasting possession of what it has acquired, it is a possession that is at our disposal any time.”\textsuperscript{800}

This goes along with a continuous formation of habits through the repetition of movements. In other words, as the musician practices, performing continuous movements involving retentions and protentions, or repeating the same movements remembering the right ones, and forgetting the wrong ones, habits of perception are constituted in consciousness. Husserl says that the “process of acquisition [takes place] within knowledge that is abiding and that becomes habitual.”\textsuperscript{801} In the situation I am studying, it happens as follows: the musician repeats the same movement, quite the same sensation is impressed in the Body, which creates, in the temporal perceptual Body, a perceptual habit. For instance, as I repeat the first phrase of Brahms’s Sonata, through intentional movements performed on my cello, touch-data, visual-data, tone-data, and smell-data are being impressed in my cellist’s Body.

This claim applies for the knowledge of the musical instrument acquired through the perceptual and practical apprehensions, i.e., through technical training. Indeed, as the musician gets to know the instrument by playing with it, the instrument becomes his or her own, and is at his or her disposal, and this acquisition makes further inner songs possible thanks to the awakening of new associations. According to Husserl, the object is “freely at my disposal insofar as the empty retention remaining behind can be freely filled up at any time; it can be made present at any time by a re-perception in the sense of a re-

\textsuperscript{800} Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, §3, p. 47.

\textsuperscript{801} Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, §2, p. 45.
cognition.” In other words, I possess this cello once I am able to play it again, perform the same scale, and bring back the memory of the perception again.

That’s how the skilled musician has the possibility to further play with the phantasms, associating them in renewed ways in consciousness. Indeed, the more fully the musician has the instrument at his or her free disposal by mastering its possibilities through technique, the better he or she can experience new associations in phantasy, the better will be specific use of that instrument in performance, combining simple segments of movements, or tones, in order to constitute new associations, and awakening various elements together in order to constitute new inner songs. Here, highly trained musicians are, not surprisingly, also those who have a better ability to be creative in phantasy: their knowledge acquired through perception, sedimented in the Body, gives them the capacity to be so.

This acquisition of the musical instrument should allow extension to other instruments of the same kind. Through transposition, the possibility to be creative in phantasy through the acquisition of new possibilities of associations should also be extendable. In other words, because the musician has the knowledge of playing a particular instrument (I know how to play my cello), he or she should be capable of playing similar instruments (for example, other celli for me). This similarity allows him or her to transpose his or her knowledge onto the new instrument in order to get to know it at least up to a certain extent. For instance, if I borrow my friend’s cello, I apprehend

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802 Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, §3, p. 47.

803 Husserl says: “If we have become familiar with a thing and a second thing appears in our field of vision, and if, with respect to the side genuinely seen, it accords with the earlier and familiar thing, then according to an essential law of consciousness (by virtue of an inner coinciding with the earlier thing awakened through the ‘association of similarity’), the new thing receives the entire epistemic prefiguring
this new, unknown cello with a *consciousness of recognition* of the “I know this instrument well.” I sit as I learned to sit, take the bow as I used to do, grab the instrument, and play it *as if* I were playing my own cello. In doing so, I will have been able to *transpose* my knowledge of my own cello onto the knowledge of the present cello, thus it does not feel alien but familiar. This possibility presupposes a previous acquisition of a similar object through perception (that I know how to play *my* cello), and that the sensation remains after contact with the object (that this knowledge is *retained*). The phantasy musical instrument is then further constituted in the constitution of new phantasms brought together through associations. For instance, as I experience new celli, I can phantasize an inner cello combining distinct features of the various celli that I have experienced.

This transposition of a former experience to acquire a new object at free disposal does not necessarily happen: the acquisition of one instrument at free disposal does not necessarily entail the acquisition of another similar instrument at free disposal. As I mentioned earlier, and even if it is experienced in a more dramatic way if I try a new instrument, the process of acquiring the object at its best, as a continuous uninterrupted process of knowledge of the object, can be interrupted even if I only play my own

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804 Even if, as a cellist for instance, I can pick up another cello and know its idiosyncrasies, and even if my playing is not perfect the first time, I can still play the instrument. This is something that a non-musician could not do. I would also be more able to play a viola da gamba than a non-musician, or even a saxophonist, because it is an instrument close to the cello. The knowledge is therefore transferrable up to a certain extent.
In practice, the expected perceptual and practical possibilities might not appear. In other words, the musical instrument might not be given as it was intended to.

Husserl calls *disappointment* the expectation of a different fulfillment, and mentions it as an “occurrence that runs counter to determining more closely, namely, determining otherwise.” In the modality of disappointment, instead of acquiring or preserving my knowledge of the instrument by continuing to uncover new possibilities of perception, the knowledge is placed in question or annulled. In other words, in the situation that I am studying, perceptions are annulled by what the musician is currently perceiving. This is the case if I try to transpose my knowledge of the cello to play a baroque cello, trying to transpose the knowledge of a musical instrument into the process of getting to know and uncover the possibilities of another instrument. Indeed, these

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805 Husserl describes it as follows: “This expansion proceeds through discrete syntheses of perception in such a way that a thing, already fairly familiar through a previous perception, occasionally gets perceived again under a simultaneous remembering of previous perceptions, that is, in straightforward recognition. As we can easily see, the new acquisition of knowledge continues the previous acquisition with respect to new sides” (*Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*, §5, p. 63).

806 *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*, §5, p. 63.

807 Husserl writes: “Instead of the acquired knowledge being preserved and enriched further, it can be placed in question, annulled. In short, there is something like the difference between the modalized consciousness of being in distinction to the originally-modalized consciousness of being, and we are now in a position of gaining deeper insights into the structure of the modalities of being and their constitution, and noetically speaking, insights into the structure of perceptual belief and its modification such as ‘doubt,’ ‘supposition,’ ‘negation,’ etc” (*Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*, §5, pp. 63-4).

808 I had the chance to go to a cellist’s house back in September and try her baroque celli. As my greater surprise, I could not play the ones I tried. I was not able to use the bow appropriately, I did not really understand how to get a sound out of it. I felt very shameful. At first, I thought it was because I haven’t played my own cello for so long. Then, as I was talking with the piano-restorer Paul Gossart about the playing of ancient piano versus the playing of contemporary piano (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-paul-gossart-restaurateur-de-pianos-anciens-accordeur-chercheur-en-philosophie/) I understood that it was not my lack of musical ability which had been the problem back then, but the lack of knowledge of the instrument: I had never played a baroque cello before, I was trying to perform a melody before having had enough of that process of bringing it closer through perception.
possibilities might not be given by the new perception. The normal situation would be to be able to pursue the duet-constitution of the object and the Body, uncovering new possibilities of free movements, and new possibilities of kinesthetic sensations. When this does not happen, Husserl says that there is a “partial fulfillment.” According to him, there is in this case a unity of perception, but the process is deceived, broken, and the perceptual experience is different from what it was supposed to be. For instance, I take the baroque cello, start playing it exactly as I would with a modern cello, and I don’t know how to hold the bow anymore, or the instrument feels weird under my fingers. In a different situation from the one that I just mentioned in which the disappointment is not anticipated, there are cases in which the deception is anticipated. For instance, it is the case when I perform a move, but I am conscious that I am not doing it correctly and therefore that I won’t be touching the cello exactly where I should, and the intonation of

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809 Husserl says: “As we know, the intentional systems occurring in the normal case of perception that we have described (noetically speaking, the apprehension apperceiving the respective sensation-complexes) have the character of actual or potential expectations. That is, if in perceiving I instigate a kinaesthetic series, for instance, a certain head movement, the appearance will run their course in a motivated succession such that they accord to my expectation. Thus, in the normal case of perception, all fulfillment progresses as the fulfillment of expectations. These are systematized expectations, systems of rays of expectations which, in being fulfilled, also become enriched; that is, the empty sense becomes richer in sense, fitting into the way in which the sense was prefigured” (Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, §5, p. 64).

810 Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, §5, p. 64.

811 Husserl argues: “Without a certain measure of unity maintaining itself in the progression of perception, the unity of the intentional lived-experience would crumble. Yet despite the unity of the perceptual process occurring with this abiding, unitary content of sense, a break does indeed take place and the lived-experience of ‘otherwise’ spring forth” (Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, §5, p. 64).

812 Husserl writes: “There is also a lived-experience of ‘otherwise’ without a break, a disappointment of a regular style, which by virtue of its regularity can be anticipated and which thus can even be prefigured in the empty horizon. In other words, there is a steady consciousness of alteration whose phenomenological analysis is fundamental for [understanding] the constitution of a change” (Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, §5, p. 64).
the note will not be correct. Anticipated or not, the disappointment is certainly part of the process of acquiring the instrument and using this skill in order to play on a new instrument. As the musician gets to know the instrument through perception, and then plays an instrument that he or she is not used to playing, he or she is conscious of the possibility of that disappointment and is able to prepare him- or herself for it.

Disappointment in the technical process of learning to play an instrument (this particular one or potentially others) is also part of the constitution of the inner song and plays a role in the relationship of correspondence between the inner song and the actual song. The inner song made of an inner instrument and an inner melody is certainly tied to the actual instrument. In this sense, I phantasize the performance that I will perform with this specific instrument. However, it is not strictly tied to it. It might not be realized with the musical instrument as intended but the inner song is sufficiently blurred to admit the impression given when hearing this realization made of disappointment as the correspondent of the inner song.813 At a broader level, it means that there is, within the

813 On this question, the case of musicians who need to readjust to a new instrument for each performance is interesting. Organists are in a continuous process of readjusting their knowledge of the instrument in order to be able to play (cf. Thierry Escaich: http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-thierry-escaich-organiste/). When it comes to pianists, there are those who readjust for each performance like Paul Badura Skoda (1927-2019) who played on ancient and contemporary pianos but also those who move with their instrument like Arturo Benedetto Michelangeli (1920-1995) (cf.: http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-paul-gossart-restaurateur-de-pianos-anciens-accordeur-chercheur-en-philosophie/). This indicates that, for some the instrument leans more toward being a tool, and for others, the relationship with a particular instrument is definitely part of their interpretation, and therefore part of their inner song.

Another example, some guitarists prefer to stick with one particular individual guitar for the majority of their work, but many others use different guitars for the various sounds that each type usually produces. I thank Joel Boyer who mentioned that David Gilmour of Pink Floyd (who usually plays electric guitars) spoke of how a particular acoustic guitar gave him the song Wish You Were Here and how different guitars ask you to play differently and provoke something new in you. However, the situation maybe gets more complex with electric guitars as the effects pedals (fuzz, overdrive, tremolo, delay, reverb, chorus, etc.) and amplifiers (Vox, Fender, Marshall, etc.) each have their own characteristic or even individual voices and can really be extensions of the guitar or even instruments to be learned and played artfully in their own right.
constitution of the inner song as the reproduction of a possible performance, the possibility of disappointment during the realization process. Consequently, the correspondence between the inner song and the actual song might be relatively loose.

This possibility of a loose correspondence between the two phenomena does not annul the fact that there is a relationship of correspondence between them. This correspondence depends on the technical realization. In other words, it depends on the capability of the musician to express the inner song through movements issuing the melody. If this realization is disappointed, it follows that there might only be a loose correspondence between the perceived and the phantasy object. However, with a highly experienced musician, this correspondence between the object given in the impressional consciousness and the object given in the reproductive consciousness is greater. As the musician practices the realization improves, but the inner song is also further modified. As the modification of the phenomenon happens thanks to the presentation of its correspondent in perception, and as this correspondence is greater as the process of realization improves, part of the description of the inner song includes the description of the realization process.

This process can start with a proto-realization of the inner song thanks to the untrained voice: the musician sings, it helps to get the inner song in a proto-form, before trying it out with the instrument.\(^{814}\) The advantage of the voice is that it takes away the

\(^{814}\) Voicing can be an important step in the process of realization. It is not an essential feature of the inner song in the sense that it is not systematically part of its constitution process, however, it is a very common practice. Indeed, the realization through the instrument(s) is not the easiest one because the instrument presents a resistance because, in order to issue a sound, it is necessary to master the technique of the instrument first. As opposed to that, a proto-realization of the inner song through the untrained voice (concerning the analysis of the untrained voice, cf. footnote 631) presents an immediacy which cannot be exceeded by any musical instrument. There is in truth an essential proximity between the untrained voice which is part of the constitution of the Leib, and the inner song. Despite that proximity, not all musicians
use it (for instance, the French Pianist Jean Fassina says that he does not use it because his singing intonation is not good even if he hears intonation well: http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-jean-fassina-pianiste-11-fevrier-2013-fait-par-ellen-moysan-a-paris/). Indeed, some work directly with the instrument (this is true also of composers or conductors. The two conductors Yan-Pascal Tortelier (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-yan-pascal-tortelier-chef-dorchestre/) and Maxime Tortelier (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-maxime-tortelier-chef-dorchestre/) explain how voicing helps them to grasp the main voice among the multiple voices of the orchestra, the voice leads the melody and needs to be highlighted). However, it is a precious tool in music practice.

The inner song reproduces the embodiment of the perception with a double constitution of the Body through the musical instrument and the musical instrument through the Body. However, as a phantasy object, it is embodied in the mode of the as if [als ob]. In other words, the embodiment of a perceptual object is an actual embodiment whereas the embodiment of a phantasy object is a quasi-embodiment. So, when the untrained voice voices the inner song, the inner song, which has a quasi-Leiblichkeit characterizing embodiment in the reproductive consciousness, is realized, it becomes perceivable, and through that process of realization, it gets an actual Leiblichkeit, the one characterizing embodiment in the impressional consciousness; the natural voice is what gives a Leiblichkeit to the phantasy. Thanks to the voice, the embodiment which was given through the mode of the as if in phantasy, is given in the mode of actuality in perception.

The process of embodiment of the phantasy object through voicing with the untrained voice, although more direct than what occurs with the instrument, cannot realize the object in its fullness. The possibilities of realization of the inner song through the voice are limited by the possibilities of the voice itself. For instance, I cannot sing with my voice some patterns that I can play with my cello because they are too fast or too complex. Similarly, the range of my cello goes beyond the range of my voice because it can play lower pitches as well as higher pitches (James Nova, trombonist in the PSO, underlines this problem with the voice: http://www.ellenmoysan.com/interview-with-james-nova-trombonist-en/). Also, the power of my instrument is far greater than the power of my voice. Despite this limitedness of the voice in its capacity to realize the inner song, there is still paradoxically something from the voice that I can try to imitate with my instrument: this flesh of the voice, and more exactly, the flesh as it is given when it is experienced as founded in the inner pulse because, as a part of the Leib, the voice is constituted against the very constitution of the inner pulse (David Sogg from the Pittsburgh Symphony Orchestra, explains abundantly how he tries to imitate tenor singers with his bassoon: http://www.ellenmoysan.com/david-sogg-pittsburgh-symphony-orchestra-co-principal-bassoon/). When I practice the cello, and I help myself by singing the melody out loud, it helps me to articulate the melody with the inner pulse, as well as to grasp the fleshy aspect of the melody. I try to grasp the rhythm as it is embodied, I try to grasp the color, timber, intensity, and pitch of that fleshy realization. In other words, singing the inner song with the natural voice helps to temporalize and spatialize the phantasy before it can be fully realized through a musical instrument.

I will not specifically investigate the problem of the voice in my present dissertation. I am putting it purposely aside. However, I want to mention Evans, The Multivoiced Body as a potential way to explore this very interesting topic. In his book, Fred Evans explores the various understandings of this concept, going from the problem of language to more political questions. This question of the role of the voice in musical gestures is also researched more particularly in ethnomusicology. Cf. for instance, Gillie-Guilbert’s “Et la voix s’est faite chair...’.”
instrument which is supposed to play it. For instance, the fuller realization of my inner song of Brahms’s *Cello Sonata* comes with its realization through the cello.

In his phenomenology of action, Husserl distinguishes various degrees of voluntariness of movements corresponding to various degrees of attentiveness: movements that involve attentiveness [*Achtmerksamkeit*], and movements that involve attention [*Aufmerksamkeit*]. With the second type of movement, the non attentive, the movement flows “quasi-mechanically [*gleichsam mechanisch*]” because it is the product of a mechanization. It is a process in which voluntary actions become progressively involuntary because they became habitual. As they are not the consequence of an empirical cause, these non-voluntary actions happening quasi-mechanically have the characteristic of freedom. Husserl explains that they do not “require the objectification of the act of will in reflection.”

815 Nicola Spano notices how: “Husserl remarks that there are different degrees to which an action can be voluntary. To exemplify this, he contrasts highly voluntary actions, such as carefully crossing a rickety bridge, which are, so to speak, executed with great ‘attentiveness’ [*Achtsamkeit*] and ‘attention’ [*Aufmerksamkeit*] (see Hua XLIII. 3, 11), with inattentive actions such the hand movements in piano playing or smoking, which can be executed without paying attention to them (see Hua XLIII. 3, 9-12)” (Spano, “The genesis of action in Husserl’s Studien der Struktur des Bewusstseins,” p. 4).

816 Spano continues: “Just as with non-voluntary doings and drives [...] inattentive actions are not attended to by the ego and flow ‘quasi mechanically’ [*gleichsem mechanisch*], yet they still count as voluntary actions; the only difference is that, in the case of inattentive actions, the ‘voluntariness (ontically: the volitionality) is at the same time of a different character’ (Hua XLIII. 3, 10). These actions, in fact, represent a case of the ‘mechanisation’ of acting. [That is, NS] the triggering of non-voluntary courses, which previously were voluntary’ [see Hua XLIII.3, 105 note 12]” (Spano, “The genesis of action in Husserl’s Studien der Struktur des Bewusstseins,” p. 5).

817 Husserl, as translated and quoted by Nicola Spano: “‘A movement volitionally flows, but ‘quasi-mechanically’ as in smoking or making a visit, or as in the movement of the hands in piano playing, etc. On the other hand, the motivation is not phenomenological-causal, namely in the ordinary empirical sense of how external processes of things phenomenally [*erscheinungsmässig*] motivate processes of things.’ (Hua XLIII. 3, 10)” (Spano, “The genesis of action in Husserl’s Studien der Struktur des Bewusstseins,” p. 5).

818 Nicola Spano explains how: “Husserl argues that the performance of action does not require the objectification of the act of will in reflection (see Hua XLIII. 3, 71-2): in order to act, I do not need to reflect on, and hence objectify, my own willing of the action, a fact already pointed out by Mertens. It is
act is the degree of involvement of the *fiat*.\(^{819}\) The *fiat* is either a “source-point of the will” [*Springpunkt des Willens*] in the sense that the positing of the object (here the melody), as realizing the act of the will (here the playing of the instrument), is the starting point. Or, it is a “creative launching-point” [*kreativer Springpunkt*]\(^{820}\) in the sense that the positing of the object results from the actions.\(^{821}\) There are two sorts of action then: simple [*Einfach*] (for instance if I perform one note only), or compound [*zusammengesetzt*] actions that are sufficient that I objectify the action as the intentional correlate of my act of will. Yet, Husserl argues that, in the case of mechanized actions, even the ego’s objectification of the action is unnecessary” (Spano, “The genesis of action in Husserl’s Studien der Struktur des Bewusstseins,” p. 5).

Husserl writes: “Let us take cases in which I do not only pay attention to the path but must pay attention to it, as opposed to cases in which the attention is indifferent and the flow of the action has the character of flowing ‘by itself.’ I walk along a shaky bridge, a beam over a creek: here I must constantly pay attention to the path, and each step is volitional in a specific manner. It may be that I go very slowly and I perform a particular *fiat* for each step; in that case, I have a compound action. It may be also that I go quickly, at a stride, but with ‘great attentiveness’. [...] attentiveness is obviously not merely attention [*Aufmerksamkeit*] to the action, but a character of activity in the will. The ‘pay attention!’ [*Sei aufmerksam!*], ‘be attentive [*Sei achtsam!*]’ that the teacher says to the student does not concern the mere attention [*Aufmerksamkeit*], but also the active manner of performance of the will in contemplating, in conduct in general. Likewise, when the boss shouts to the subordinate: ‘Mind out! [*Aufgepasst!*],’ the action should not proceed mechanically as in sleep, but the flow of the will should be characterized differently. [Hua XLIII. 3, 11; see also Hua XLIII. 3, 82]” (Husserl himself quoted by Spano in “The genesis of action in Husserl’s Studien der Struktur des Bewusstseins,” p. 6).

\(^{819}\) Husserl explains: “But where the action goes on ‘by itself,’ flows ‘quasi mechanically,’ there it proceeds ‘in the sense’ of the will (but also the natural and willed outcome of the primary action does this). Furthermore, it has a creative character, insofar as it has primarily ‘arisen from the *fiat*’ all over and is not merely a secondary natural following. In general, that which occurs in the primary action is not merely occurring, but creation of the will. But now there is, therein, the great difference that the action is continuous creation, either onetime or enduring [*einmalige oder beständige*], [i.e.; NS] that the practical positing of the *fiat*, the volitional thesis, either stands only at a point, at the starting point, and from it, so to speak, the entire primary action springs forth (in compound actions as many times as we find simple sub-actions [*Teilhandlungen*] of a primary kind), or that the thesis is something continuous, so to speak, covering the entire action is in each phase.” [Hua XLIII. 3, 12]” (Husserl himself quoted by Spano, in “The genesis of action in Husserl’s Studien der Struktur des Bewusstseins,” p. 6).

\(^{820}\) I modify Nicola Spano’s translation of this notion.

\(^{821}\) Husserl writes: “At the two opposite ends of an action there is, on the one side, the *fiat* which is designated as the ‘source-point of the will’ [*Springpunkt des Willens*], although Husserl also refers to it as an ‘impulse’ [*Impuls*] or ‘starting point’ [*Ansatzpunkt*] and, on the other side, the ‘creative end point’ or ‘goal point’ [*Zielpunkt*], which, once the action is done, has the ‘character of accomplished action’ [*Character der vollbrachten Absicht*], or an ‘achieved goal’ [*erreichtes Ziel*]” (Husserl himself quoted by Spano in “The genesis of action in Husserl’s Studien der Struktur des Bewusstseins,” pp. 6-7).
“made up of further actions”\textsuperscript{822} (for instance if I perform an interval). In the second case, “the ego can take full voluntary control by reapeating the performance of the \textit{fiat} as many times as there are sub-actions.”\textsuperscript{823} This means that the performance of each sub-action is accompanied by a renewed \textit{fiat}.\textsuperscript{824} In this process, involving both actions fully attended and mechanized action, “all the actions belonging to the spectrum count as voluntary insofar as irrespective of their exact degree of voluntariness, they start as a consequence of the ego’s spontaneous performance of the \textit{fiat} and are not just triggered by practical stimuli.”\textsuperscript{825} When actions engage full attentiveness, the fiat is not only the starting point of the action, but it also accompanies the whole process.\textsuperscript{826} As Husserl says then,\textsuperscript{827} “Every physical process belongs in such unities of motivational becoming and every

\textsuperscript{822} Spano, Nicola in “The genesis of action in Husserl’s Studien der Struktur des Bewusstseins,” p. 7.

\textsuperscript{823} Spano, Nicola in “The genesis of action in Husserl’s Studien der Struktur des Bewusstseins,” p. 7.

\textsuperscript{824} Nicola Spano argues: “For Husserl, in a compound action there must be, indeed, as many \textit{fiats} as there are independent sub-actions that make up the compound (see Hua XLIII. 3, 41). As an example, one can consider a voluntary bodily movement in which the ego compensates, by performing each time a new voluntary sub-movement, for the effects of forces that would otherwise interfere with the achievement of the final goal (cf. Hua XLIII. 3, 4), as happens in an obstacle course, where each hurdle hop is a sub-action of the compound action of running, whose goal is to cross the finish line” (Spano,”The genesis of action in Husserl’s Studien der Struktur des Bewusstseins,” p. 7).

\textsuperscript{825} Spano, Nicola in “The genesis of action in Husserl’s Studien der Struktur des Bewusstseins,” p. 7.

\textsuperscript{826} Nicola Spano says: “Husserl tells us that in the case of fully attentive actions the \textit{fiat} is not just, as in mechanized actions, the starting point of the volitional process, but rather it covers this process in its entirety, thereby mastering it in the most voluntary manner possible. Indeed, by continuously performing the \textit{fiat}, the ego brings about and directs each phase of the action, as in the case with, e.g., cautiously crossing a beam over a creek” (Spano,”The genesis of action in Husserl’s Studien der Struktur des Bewusstseins,” p. 7).

\textsuperscript{827} Husserl writes: “Jeder physische Vorgang gehört in solche Einheiten der Werdensmotivation, und jede Handlung ist auch physischer Vorgang und untersteht den Gesetzen und Eingentümlichkeiten physischer Vorgänge” (Husserl, \textit{Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins}, III, I, §1, p. 3).
action is also a physical process, standing under laws and peculiarities of physical processes.\textsuperscript{828}

The musician progressively learns to realize the inner song through an adequate musical instrument. With practice, the realization improves. The ability to realize the inner song is passed on from masters to students. In this sense, there is a historical horizon of this skilled consciousness.\textsuperscript{829} In this process of learning, the “I will” is limited by what “I can” or “I cannot.” In other words, the capacity to technically realize the inner song sets the boundaries of the will in the process of action.\textsuperscript{830} This means that the practical intentionality is subject to practical possibility. The realization of the inner song in performance is empirically limited by the \textit{fiat}.\textsuperscript{831} Or, said differently, “The limits of this possibility are dictated by the empirical nexus of nature in which the process is

\textsuperscript{828} Translation by Staiti, Andrea, “Husserl’s account of Action.”

\textsuperscript{829} I am not studying it here, but Nam-In Lee says that: “The second feature has significant implications for the determination of the intentionality in general. Basically as being practical, every intentionality has an intersubjective dimension. In this sense, there is no intentionality of a transcendental subjectivity that functions in a purely solipsistic way and contribute to the constitution of the objects and worlds, without being connected with intentionalities of other subjectivities. Moreover, every intentionality as a practical one has a historical dimension. By this I mean that the ways of its functioning in a transcendental subjectivity are handed down from past generations to this subjectivity and, after being modified in its own way, can be further handed down to the future generations. Thus, every intentionality is embedded in the horizon of intersubjectivity and historicity.” Lee, Nam-In, “Practical intentionality and transcendental phenomenology as a practical philosophy” (Husserl Studies 17 (1), 2000, p. 56).


\textsuperscript{831} Staiti, Andrea, “Husserl’s account of Action.”
expected to occur.”

For instance, as an amateur cellist, I can phantasize the inner song of a very complex passage of Brahms’s *Sonata*, but I cannot seriously issue my *fiat* and start initiating the process of the realization of my inner song as an action because I am aware of the empirical limits that make the success of the process impossible. Hence, as the musician practices to perform a certain melody, as he or she works on a specific passage, this *fiat* is repeated in the sense that the musician keeps positing the melody as the object fulfilling the intention given in the inner song through the realization of the action. As the musician practices, the practical possibilities increase.

The process of realization of the inner song involves two types of attention: attention [*Aufmerksamkeit*], which is merely attention (for instance when I am playing the cello focusing on my inner song), and attentiveness [*Achtsamkeit*] which engages the will (for instance when I am working on a specific passage paying attention to my movements in order to be able to play it cleaner and faster). On the one hand, as the musician practices, there can be a back and forth between the production of the melody through an act engaging *attentiveness*, but on the other hand, the production of the melody can also engage *attention* only. Before the musician can play the musical instrument without paying attention to the movements, i.e., with a lesser degree of involvement of the will in the action, he or she needs to have integrated the movements.

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832 Staiti, Andrea, “Husserl’s account of Action.”

833 Andrea Staiti observes: “For example, I can imagine to knock down a building with my bare hands. I can have a vivid fantasy of that action. However, I cannot seriously issue my *fiat* (‘so be it!’) and set out to initiate the process as an action because I am aware of the empirical limits that make the success of the process impossible” (“Husserl’s account of Action”).

834 During the final performance, the musician needs to be able to produce the melody engaging *attention* only, but I am not studying that particular situation here.
through an action involving a greater degree of involvement of the will. For instance, before I can play Brahms’s Sonata focusing on the inner song, without paying attention to the movements on the cello issuing the melody, I need to have worked out these movements with a greater involvement of the will, repeating them over and over again.

The whole process of issuing a melody is an action that entails two stages: (1) I perform a technical movement with the cello as a means, and (2) a melody resonates in the room. Here, segment (1) is a primary-action, or creative-voluntary action which “carries the property of ‘voluntariness’ in the immanent sense, whereas segment (2) is a mere physical event which could have occurred also under other circumstances, for instance, a melody also resonates in the room if my professor plays the melody that I am working on in order to show me the move. As it appears, the resonating of the melody is the secondary segment of a creative and voluntary action. Thus, the realization of

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835 As a reminder, I am not studying the situation in which the musician performs in front of an audience. This would raise the problem of attentiveness in the issuing of a melody in a totally different way. In Høffding, Simon: “What is skilled copying?” the author raises the problem of the immersion in the action in performance. In this paper, Høffding criticizes Dreyfus’s notion of “skilled copying” as “a way of being and acting in which one is immersed in one’s actions such that one is not thinking or reflecting” (p. 49). Here, the author is interested in music performance, and not in music practice. This situation is distinct from the one that interests me in the present dissertation. Indeed, I am interested in what makes the musician able to perform, in the before, not in the performance itself.

836 Staiti, Andrea, “Husserl’s account of Action.”

837 Husserl explains as follows: “The ‘If I want, I can’ pertains to the action both in its creative and in its secondary segments. If I want, I can raise the hand, sing a tune, etc., but I can also get that man over there to stand up (through my call) and such mediate consequences. And how about ‘causation’? If I carry out the call, the consequence occurs secondarily; if I hit with the cue in such and such a way, the ball rolls to the corner of the billiard table, etc. These are empirically necessary consequences, that is, they are conditioned merely as natural consequences (empirical consequences in nature), through the hit, etc. As far as the primary action, the creative action is concerned, however, it may or may not be conditioned in whatever way according to natural necessity. From a phenomenological point of view, it does not manifest itself as a merely physical consequence of another process. By contrast, the primary action is creative and voluntary” (Translation by Andrea Staiti, “Husserl’s account of Action”).

The original quote says: “Das ‘Wenn ich will, so kann ich’ betrifft die Handlung nach beiderlei schöpferischen und sekundären Abschnitten. Wenn ich will, so kann ich die Hand heben, einen Ton singen etc., aber auch den Mann dort (durch meinen Anruf) zum Stehen bringen und sonstige mittelbare Erfolge.
the inner song through the act of playing the instrument entails both a natural-causal component and a voluntary component.

In order to be able to issue his or her fiat, the musician needs to reduce the possibilities of the compound action to single actions that can be performed, and learn how to combine them in a way that makes that fiat possible. For instance, if I want to play that concerto, I need to learn how to perform the Sonata by working out the technical difficulties unity by unity, and then learn how to link these unities so that I can play the whole passage. If the musician truly possesses the musical instrument, this work can be done partly in the reproductive consciousness only, by playing in phantasy with the musical instrument with its sonorous possibilities, and phantasizing movements to produce the melody with it.838

The freedom of the will expressed in the fiat presupposes that the musician has the object musical instrument as his or her free disposal: the musician needs to have mastered the natural resistance of the instrument by learning the technique related to its playing. For instance, I need to be conscious that this particular cello cannot issue a nice sound if I play it in a certain way, and therefore that I need to play it in another way if I want to improve the sonorous possibilities. As the resistance of the musical instrument varies according to the instrument that the musician is manipulating, the musician needs to

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838 This is how musicians can say that they “practice” without the musical instrument. It is what the drummer Rémi Métral described (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-remi-metral-batteur/).
constantly readjust his or her perceptual knowledge of the instrument in general, to the prehension of that instrument in particular.

Here, learning the music piece involves a different process and relation to the inner song as perfecting it. For instance, well trained musicians can play scales of all sorts, forward, backward, quasi-mechanically, because they have practiced the movement in order to create this mechanization; the quasi-mechanization is necessary to be able to perform very fast phrases, or extremely technical passages with very little movement of the will. This repetition of movement which is part of the creation of habits and automatic movements is accompanied by a process of sedimentation of perception in the impressional consciousness. In other words, the musician’s Body constituted in a specific way through contact with the musical instrument, remembers the right actions and forgets the wrong ones, thereby integrating movements that allow the fulfillment of a specific intention in an action. For instance, I can learn how to attack with the bow in a certain way in order to produce a soft beginning of the melody. For that, I will try out various ways to attack, with more or less weight from the arm, various bow holds, and attacking from various parts of the bow (the middle or the tip if I want a softer attack, or the frog

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839 The question of the mechanization of the instrumental gesture is a problem itself. It is legitimate to raise the question whether it is a mechanization or an implementation of habits. I argue that it is both. Indeed, on the one hand there is a mechanization in which the musician is not free in his or her movements (this is the case if I am performing very quick passages and I should let my fingers go automatically), but there are other moments in which the musician relies on habits in which there is a greater degree of freedom in the performance (in this case I am able to correct myself in the moment).

840 In music practice, the notion of “attack” refers to the beginning buildup of a note, the manner in which the musician performs it, whether smooth or decisive, quick, or slow. It contrasts with the notions of “decay” which indicates how long the fundamental frequencies remain at their peak loudness, and “sustain” which indicates how they disappear (I discussed these three notions with the electronic musician Aārp: http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-Aārp-compositeur-de-musique-electronique/).
under my grip if I want a stronger one). Finally, the process of realization starting with fully attentive actions and evolving into the mechanization of the action continues throughout each practice session, and proceeds from one day to the next. It is the capacity to break down and play the movement which makes the musician able to phantasize an embodied inner song, associating movements with sounds, even in a creative way, or phantasizing new combinations to play a phrase. For instance, if I have been working toward performing Brahms’s Sonata in full awareness, if I know how to distinguish the right from the wrong movements, if I am aware of how they are made (the various simple movements that compose a complex one), then I am more able to phantasize not only how the inner song sounds but also how it can be performed, because the tone-data are clearly associated with movements in impression, and the reproductive consciousness is able to reproduce that association as well as awaken new ones.

§5. Further constitution of the inner song through the co-implication of the constitutions in the impressional and retentional consciousness.

I keep practicing Brahms’s Sonata. I refine my interpretation, measure by measure, phrase by phrase, indefinitely, improving the current rehearsal through the inner song, enriching the inner song through the performance. I work on the intonation (which is an endless task for string musicians), I try to respect the rhythm, and then to put my heart into what I play. I try to let my inner song guide my interpretation as much as I can. However, as I play and experience how my inner song sounds, the inner song is also modified in my consciousness. I am looking for the most beautiful realization of the piece I can give. All my work is about this: playing as beautifully as possible. To do that, I
soften, strengthen, smoothen my moves, my sound, the melody, I work on the intonation, the right rhythmical concatenation, etc.

As the musician practices, the constitution of the inner song in the reproductive consciousness continues through the playing of the instrument: the musician works on his or her interpretation, like a painter sketching a drawing, modifying the way he or she plays the piece, and simultaneously, the inner song is also being sketched in phantasy, modified through hearing its realization. As the musician practices, working on the piece through successive modifications of the interpretation, consciousness either goes back and forth between the object in the reproductive or the impressional consciousness (I play, I stop playing, listen to the inner song, restart playing), or straddles between the two (I play and listen to the inner song at the same time), always in the aesthetic mode. The mode of consciousness of the practicing musician rehearsing at home is a type of aesthetic mode, distinct from that of the musician performing in front of an audience, because here the work is about repeating in order to find the best way to play, not about giving, all at once, the best possible interpretation.

Husserl explains the aesthetic mode by saying: “We contemplate aesthetically the objects we see or hear. We can produce such a consciousness on the basis of immediate phantasy: We contemplate aesthetically what is phantasied, perhaps quasi-perceived objects and events.” As the musician practices, consciousness aesthetically

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841 I mentioned these two possibilities in the chapter on the “Accessing the inner song through the epoché.”

842 Phantasy, Image Consciousness and Memory, Text no. 15, h), p. 459. Husserl uses the word “aesthetic” in two distinct ways: (1) as a sensation, and (2) related to the experience and judgement; I am using it in the second sense here.
contemplates both the object perceived (the actual song) and the object phantasized (the inner song). Husserl explains that consciousness can be conscious of the object in various ways, and the object can therefore appear in distinct manners. The diversity of modes of appearance of the object in consciousness does not impact the identity of the given object (the object is still the same whether it is presented, or remembered, in the impressional consciousness, etc.). However, this is precisely what matters in the aesthetic mode of consciousness because, in the aesthetic mode, consciousness focuses on how the object appears, its manner of appearing, and how that induces aesthetic pleasure or displeasure. So, as the musician practices and listens to the actual song and the inner song, he or she is interested in the aesthetic pleasure or displeasure that it can provide. If it gives pleasure, it is strengthened throughout the process of modifications, whereas if it produces displeasure, it is inhibited throughout the process of modifications. Here, associations are in play. Indeed, what is being played now is associated through

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843 Husserl explains: “Depending on the circumstances, however, one is conscious of the same objects in different manners of appearing, different manners of presentation. Whether the object appears in this or that orientation is irrelevant for objective position taking, for the position taking directed toward the object, toward this identical object, ‘valuing’ it” (Phantasy, Image Consciousness and Memory, Text no. 15, h), pp. 461).

844 Husserl writes: “it is not irrelevant aesthetically. Aesthetic valuation is essentially connected with the distinction between the consciousness of an object as such and the object’s manner of appearing. Every object, in being given in a consciousness, is given in a manner of appearing; and it can then be the manner of appearing that determines aesthetic comportment, one appearance inducing aesthetic pleasure, another inducing displeasure, and so on” (Phantasy, Image Consciousness and Memory, Text no. 15, h), pp. 460-1).

845 Of course, there is also the case in which what I hear produces a pleasant displeasure, for instance if I don’t like what I hear but, as it is supposed to produce this kind of displeasure, it is still pleasurable.

846 I have to thank Stéphane Finetti here. He gave me part of his precious time to discuss the problem of the modifications of the inner song as the musician practices. I originally thought that the inner song was modified through acts of consciousness bringing it back, but I could not really figure out how. He is the one who suggested that the inner song was instead modified through a process of associations between what is being played, and past phantasies of similar inner songs.
pleasure and displeasure with possibilities given in the reproductive consciousness as
different possible inner songs. For instance, if I like this or that feature of my inner song,
they will remain, but if I realize while I play that it should be faster, or softer, a slightly
different inner song will be awakened in consciousness, which will impact the
instrumental realization. In other words, the perception in phantasy is informing the
performance which, in return, informs the inner song.847

Husserl notices how the manner of appearing depends “not on the isolated object,
but precisely on the object in the nexus of objects in which one is conscious of it, and the
manner of appearing belonging to this nexus.”848 In other words, the object appears in
consciousness in a context of givenness. For instance, as I practice my cello, I will
appreciate aesthetically a musical phrase, or even a measure or a chord, not in isolation,
but for how it sounds in its context of appearance, i.e., in respect to the whole of which it
is a part. The feeling of pleasure or displeasure will be related to that, in the sense that
something that can be pleasurable in a given context can be aesthetically not pleasurable
in another context (for instance, using strong full bowing movements fits a piece by
Rachmaninov but not by Vivaldi).

This mode of appearing of the object has an affective dimension as a certain
feeling is awakened by the experience of the actual or the inner song. Husserl says that
the object “receives an aesthetic coloration because of its manner of appearing; and

847 Here, I would argue that it happens almost unconsciously. In other words, the musician does not
reflect necessarily on what is heard, but passive associations are formed as the musician perceives. The
problem of the unconscious in the formation of the phantasy object is a thought provoking one, I would
address it through Bernet’s work.

848 Phantasy, Image Consciousness and Memory, Text no. 15, h), p. 461.
turning back to the appearance brings the original feeling to life.” Hence, as the musician practices and rehearses, there is a co-implication of the processes of constitution in the reproductive consciousness and the impressional consciousness, which goes along with the awakening of certain feelings, which are given again if the object is brought back into the present of consciousness. For instance, as I phantasize Brahms’s melody, I will have a feeling of pleasure or displeasure, because the specific musical phrase appears as pleasurable or not. Then, if I phantasize that specific piece again *in the same manner*, the same feeling will be awakened. Or also, when I play this melody with my cello, I will have another type of feeling (maybe I will like it, but I will dislike that it does not correspond to what had been phantasized as an inner song). This feeling is recalled if I keep playing the same passage, recalling it under my fingers. Here, as the melody is given as embodied, the feeling is not only related to how the object appears as a sonorous object in consciousness, but also to how it feels to play it.

According to Husserl, “*the content of the object itself is not aesthetically insignificant*” in the sense that the content has a significant difference from a different type in the same area. Indeed, he explains through this example: “whether or not it is an emperor, whether it is an important destiny or one that is commonplace, and so on, it is not a matter of indifference.” This is an interesting remark to consider in the

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849 Husserl argues: “If I do not reflect on the manner of appearing, I do not live in the feelings, I do not produce them. The appearance is the appearance of the object; the object is the object in the appearance. From living in the appearing I must go back to the appearance, and vice versa. And then the feeling is awakened: The object, however displeasing it may be in itself, however negatively I may value it, receives an aesthetic coloration *because of its manner of appearing*; and turning back to the appearance brings the original feeling to life” (*Phantasy, Image Consciousness and Memory*, Text no. 15, h), p. 462.

850 *Phantasy, Image Consciousness and Memory*, Text no. 15, h), p. 462.

851 *Phantasy, Image Consciousness and Memory*, Text no. 15, h), p. 462.
description of the inner song. Indeed, the *content of the object* in Husserl’s example is the emperor. In the case of the inner song, it is the *subject of the melody*. For instance, the fact that it is a symphonic poem, a sonata, a concerto, a romantic concerto, a baroque Folia, etc., certainly is not aesthetically insignificant. If, for example, the subject is an opera which may, e.g., be describing the life of Violetta in the Traviata or may not be describing anything, this can produce a feeling of pleasure or displeasure with the appearance which is aesthetically significant.

Finally, part of that aesthetic mode is the “Theoretical interest” or “delight in knowledge” related to aesthetic pleasure. In the case of music practice, there can be an aesthetic pleasure related to the perfection of the harmony, or the well elaborated form. For instance, as I hear the slow movement of Brahms’s *Sonata*, I can admire its

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852 The very definition of the notion of *subject* in music is itself controversial. Here, the question is the following: is it possible to translate the categories of painting into the musical realm? If I can admit that the *subject* of a painting is Napoleon, or a landscape, or abstract, can I apply this category to a Bach *Fugue*, a romantic concerto, or a dodecaphonic piece?

In the case of the Fugue, the notion of subject has a specific definition: a fugue is made of a subject, answer, and countersubject. For other types of music with a less specific definition, a subject is a full musical phrase, (Drabkin, “Theme.” ). Of course, there is music without a subject, without a theme. This is the case with twelve tone music for instance, or atonal work. In these cases, how can we talk about a *content* of the inner song? I would argue that the content is the singable phrase (Cf. Schlüren, “Cantability”).

The next question is then: but is music always singable? Even if it is a controversial and strong statement, I want to argue with Christoph Schüren, and confirmed by the interviews I conducted (especially the drummer of the PSO Andrew Reamer [http://www.ellenmoysan.com/interview-with-andrew-reamer-symphony-percussion-player/], or the fiddle player Robert Kirkman [http://www.ellenmoysan.com/robert-kirkman-fiddle-player/] that yes, music is indeed always singable… but in the phantasy. It means that it is singable partially, through segments, with the lability and freedom that characterizes the phantasy untied to reality.

The organ of the phantasy Body singing the inner song is the *phantasy voice*, I describe it in Chapt. 4. This voice is part of the definition of the *subject* of the music. Indeed, it is thanks to the voice voicing it that the inner song appears in consciousness as a unity of continuity in time, i.e., as a *melody*. It is also thanks to that voice that the inner song has a *flesh*, i.e., a sensuous consistency.


perfection for cello playing, the admirable flowing of its phrases, and the delicate dialogue with the piano. The opposite is true: I can have a feeling of displeasure when I phantasize an improvisation which has a chaotic development or is harmonically dissonant.855

This manner of appearing and the way the inner song is aesthetically appreciated contribute to the further modification of the perception in the phantasy. Indeed, the modifications of the inner song relate to the aesthetical feeling that accompanies the givenness of the phenomenon in the reproductive consciousness. If it feels pleasurable, it might not be modified, but if it does not, it might be given differently, with modifications, through different associations. For example, as I practice my cello, I hear myself playing this slow movement of the Sonata, the object given in the impressional consciousness is associated with the correspondent inner song, but as I am not very happy with what I hear, a new passive association, with a slightly different inner song (softer, smoother), is awakened in the reproductive consciousness. Here, it is the aesthetical appreciation which leads the process of modifications that the phenomenon undergoes.

This is also true for the modification of the performance itself. Indeed, the aesthetical contemplation of the inner song leads to the modification of the realization of the inner song because the musician tries to play in a way most adjusted to the inner song. He or she seeks to play in a clear and distinct way, but moreover, in a touching way (even if this beauty involves some ugliness, dissonances, or disturbing sounds). Hence, there are two types of aesthetic judgement which participate in the modification of the

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855 Jay Lampert explores the problem of dissonance as a simultaneity in Simultaneity and Delay. Although I don’t want to enter into this problem, I want to mention here that dissonance might also be pleasurable.
phantasy as the musician practices: on the one hand, the aesthetic judgement on the perception of the inner song in the reproductive consciousness, and on the other hand, the aesthetic judgement on the realization of the inner song which goes with the constitution of the actual song in the impressional consciousness.

The aesthetic judgement of one or the other can change with time. For instance, today I can feel pleasure hearing something that I gave me displeasure an hour ago. As the judgement changes, the phenomenon is strengthened or inhibited in the reproductive consciousness. For instance, if the appreciation does not change, the phenomenon is reconstituted close to the way it was previously given in phantasy. However, if the musician does not like it as it is anymore, the phenomenon undergoes a modification and appears differently in consciousness. Here, it would be possible to object that the process of discrimination of the good versus the bad features of the inner song is not made only according to my aesthetic judgement. This would be true. As the musician rehearses, there is certainly a conscious part of the discrimination process, but there is also a part of the discrimination process that seems automatic, or, unconscious. For instance, if I practice without breaks to listen to my inner song, absorbed in music, there are moments in which I correct myself automatically (the intonation for instance). In fact, when I play my cello, it can happen that the note is not perfectly attuned. As I play, I hear what I play, the present hearing is associated with the correspondent inner song, there is the apprehension of a gap between the two, and I immediately slightly move my finger to tune it better. This process is so immediate that it seems to happen in a blitz (that’s what the musician describes in Høffding’s A Phenomenology of Musical Absorption, “The ideal is that what is in the head can emerge effortlessly. That you can imagine a sound.
Find it without looking for it. That you can hit precisely…the ideal is to be able to imagine a sound and play it immediately. Just as if you are singing” p. 64). The process of discrimination/correction is almost instantaneous. Because of the rapidity of the sequence, it cannot be said really that an aesthetic judgement had been made. Instead, the move seemed to have been corrected automatically (that’s what the musician seems to describe in A Phenomenology of Musical Absorption, “I use my imagination very abstractly. It is not like I am thinking “in a second I will make a warm and round sound” and then do it. It reacts so quickly. What can I say? It is unconscious” p.60). If there is no conscious aesthetic judgement, what happens? I would say that the Body corrects the move by itself. In order to explain this, it is necessary to think about the notions of conscious Body or unconscious move. To work on the unconscious aspects of the formation of the inner song would be a great task that I would gladly do in the future; using particularly the work of Rudolf Bernet. I would also help myself with the previously cited work: A phenomenology of Musical Absorption. Indeed, as said earlier, the author analyses the instrumental work in a state of deep absorption.

This process of strengthening or inhibiting of the phenomenon can be understood as going back to the formation and fulfilment of the intention in consciousness. As the musician rehearses and practices, new expectations appear in the reproductive consciousness and are fulfilled by the appearance in the primordial impressional Now [Urimpression]. Husserl says that: “External perception is a temporal run-off of lived-

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856 Husserl explains: “In the continual progression of perception, as in the case of every perception, we have protentions that are continuously fulfilled by what occurs anew, occurring in the form of the primordial impressional Now. And here as well. As each external perceiving progresses, the protention has the shape of continuous anticipations becoming fulfilled. That is to say, out of the indicative systems of horizons, certain indicative lines are continually being actualized as expectations; the latter are
experience where appearances concordantly pass into one another and form the unity of coincidence corresponding to the unity of sense.”

In the case of music practice, as the musician plays the instrument, tone data grounded in tactual data, pass into one another thanks to the association of the *now* with its retentions and protentions, and form the unity of coincidence through which, e.g., the cello is given as *this particular cello* with *this particular sound* shaping *this particular melody*.

Throughout that process of realization, the intention of perception is fulfilled and flows. In other words, the intention (which is a *directionality toward* the object) is emptied and calls to be fulfilled by new intuitions. In the particular situation I am studying, this process involves an interplay between impressional and reproductive consciousness because the intention is formed as an inner song in the *reproductive consciousness* and fulfilled through the actual perception when the musician practices, by the givenness of the phenomenon in the impressional consciousness. In other words, there is a co-implication of the impressional consciousness and the reproductive consciousness in the process of fulfilment of the intention. Then, as the musician plays, new

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857 Husserl says: “We came to understand this flux as a systematic network of progressive fulfillment of intentions that obviously, when viewed from the other side, goes hand in hand with an emptying of intentions that are already full” (Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, §2, p. 44).

858 Husserl says: “it makes good sense to say that what is merely represented (or, in general represented, perceived, remembered, imagined, etc.) might also be actual, or that it might not be actual: namely, that something unreal, given in a representation or presented to the mind, and being identified according to rule, might conform, point by point, determination by determination, to something actual. The same thing holds in reverse, namely, that for each thing given regularly in normal perception we could construct a pure fiction which represented exactly the same object in exactly the same manner of representation” (Experience and Judgment, §39, p. 169).
intentions are constituted in the reproductive and impressional consciousness by associations. These intentions call for a new fulfilment, and therefore new movements.\footnote{This process, involving a sort of temporal \textit{knitting} (Bernet speaks about an “intentional nesting” in “Unconscious consciousness in Husserl and Freud” p. 334) between protentions/retentions/impression, and involving also the constitution of the object in the reproductive consciousness, realization, and fulfillment through perception, is particularly interesting in the case of improvisation. Indeed, when the musician improvises the intention is formed as the musician plays. Thus, the inner song develops as the musician feels the instrument under his or her fingers.}

The continuity of the fulfilment process sees new empty intentions being formed as the previous intentions are being fulfilled.\footnote{Husserl notices: “Every momentary phase of perception is in itself a network of partially full and partially empty intentions. For, in every phase we have genuine appearances, that is, a fulfilled intention, albeit only gradually fulfilled, since there remains an inner horizon that is unfulfilled and an inner horizon of indeterminacy that is still determinable. Moreover, proper to every phase is a completely empty outer horizon that tends toward fulfilment and, in the transition toward a definite direction of progress, strives toward it in the manner of empty anticipation” (Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, §2, p. 44).} In the situation I am studying, the continuity of the fulfilment passes through the horizon thanks to the interplay between outer and inner horizons. In other words, what was a horizon is becoming actual and uncovering a new horizon. Here it is important to keep in mind that the sonorous object, or more precisely, the melody depends on the tactual and therefore that the intention is complex, but its fulfilment depends also on the capacity of the musician to actually perform what is intended. In the case of the fulfilment of the intention in the impressional consciousness, the intention is fulfilled because of the perceptual process which is a “process of acquiring knowledge.”\footnote{Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, §2, p. 44.} In the case I am studying, the perceptual and practical knowledge of the instrument as producing a melody passes on into the constitution of an actual song. Then, in the reproducing consciousness, this intention of perception makes possible the formation of the intention of phantasy, the inner song with
its futural value. Especially when consciousness straddles between two objects that are not clearly distinguishable any longer, this intention of phantasy seems to be fulfilled by actually hearing the realization, and therefore thanks to the givenness of the correspondent of the inner song in perception.

This complex process of fulfilment involves indeterminacies, the “presentiment of what is to come,” the “primordial form of generality whose nature it is to be fulfilled in the coincidence of sense only by ‘specification.’” In other words, specific and not general expectations related to what was already given in perception are involved in this process of knowledge and sedimentation of perception in the living Body. For instance, as a musician I realize by playing the instrument in a certain way, and seeing that I can hear this particular sound, that if I play it differently, changing my move or my posture, some other specific sounds will come out of it. These new possibilities are still indeterminate because there is no accurate knowledge about what will be given. However, it can progressively “attain further specification, etc., in new steps;” that’s how the process of sedimentation happens, through the formation of habits of perception, and habits of movement, reproduced in phantasy, eventually constituting new patterns which will be then realized, etc.

The attention given to the actual song and the inner song plays an important role in this process of constitution of the inner song through the perception of its realization.

There can be two modalities of attention in play during the practice session: as the

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863 *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*, §2, p. 45.

864 *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*, §2, p. 45.

865 *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*, §2, p. 45.
musician plays, attention either goes back and forth between the object constituted in the impressional consciousness and the object constituted in the reproductive consciousness, or simply straddle between the two, making it difficult to clearly distinguish the two constituted object. Attention focuses on the object given in a certain horizon. One of these horizons is the horizon of perception, and the other is the more complex horizon of the imaginary. These two horizons, the horizon of perception and the horizon of the phantasy are temporal. However, one is made of the temporality of the hyletic flow, whereas the other is a quasi-temporality. Despite their distinction, the two temporalities are related because the act of phantasy is temporally given in a certain moment of the impressional consciousness (for instance, this inner song of the slow movement of Brahms’s *Sonata* is the inner song from yesterday, given in the reproductive consciousness as I was practicing at home in the afternoon). Then, both the inner song and the actual song are given in consciousness in a certain temporal order (they begin and end). This order expresses the musical meaning in the case of the constitution of the actual song in the impressional consciousness. In the case of the constitution of the inner song in the reproductive consciousness, the temporal order in the phantasy determines the musical meaning in the sense that one phantasy can flow into another, and the succession determines the meaning of the melody. For instance, if I let my phantasy guide my playing, I can start with one of Bach’s *Suites* and end up in another because the repetition of some patterns can make one phantasy flow into another.

As attention switches or straddles, there are two possibilities. Either the two phenomena are distinct. In this case, it is easy to distinguish the constitution in the impressional consciousness from the constitution in the reproductive consciousness.
However, they can also appear so close to each other that it becomes difficult to even
distinguish them. Here, the perception is given through the lens of the phantasy, and the
phantasy given through the lens of the perception. In the first case, thanks to the
distinction, it is easier to modify either the inner song or the realization because a
comparison between the two correspondents is possible. In the second case, the inner
song and its realization get modified almost imperceptibly, without an act of the will, i.e.,
passively, thanks to the formation of new associations in the reproductive and
impressional consciousness.

The inner song is given in the temporal consciousness which is necessarily
impressional. Here, it is difficult to understand the co-implication of the two constitution
processes leading to the constitution of the inner song. Indeed, the actual song and the
inner song are not given in consciousness in the same way and should therefore be clearly
distinguishable. In fact, Husserl says that: “one thing which distinguishes actually
existing objects is necessarily lacking in the mere fiction: *absolute temporal position,*
‘actual’ time, as absolute, rigorous uniqueness of the individual content given in temporal
form.” Even if the actual experience of the phantasy is in actual time, the phantasy
intentional object does not have a temporal position in consciousness. In other words, as
opposed to perceptual objects which are given in an absolute, because objective,
temporality, this is not the case with phantasy objects. Indeed, Husserl admits that “time
is certainly represented in imagination, and even represented intuitively, but it is a time
without actual, strict localization of position – it is, precisely, a *quasi-time.*” Thus, how

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866 *Experience and Judgment*, §39, p. 169
867 *Experience and Judgment*, §39, p. 169.
is an interpenetration of a phenomenon temporally situated and a phenomenon without
temporal localization even possible? And what’s more, how can consciousness straddle
temporality and quasi-temporality?\textsuperscript{868}

Going back to the experience of the practicing musician, it appears that both of
the phenomena are given against the primary temporality of the inner rhythm. Hence,
even if Husserl says that, in phantasy, “we also have intuitively in imagination
phenomenal places and distances, references relative to place or position. But
imagination still offers us no positions which allow themselves to be identified in the
sense of an “in-itself” and which can be distinguished accordingly,”\textsuperscript{869} I would still say
that phantasy offers a temporal position: the situation of the object with respect to the
inner rhythm. As I explained earlier, the inner song is given in the reproductive
consciousness, in an act of phantasy which is situated in the impressional consciousness,
itself constituting any object against the primary constitution of the inner rhythm. Hence,
as the musician practices, when attention is oriented toward the constitution in the
impressional consciousness, absorbed in the reproductive consciousness, or straddles the
two in a sort of semi-consciousness, it still apprehends the object in its situation with
respect to the consciousness’s space and time. As the constitution of the inner rhythm is

\begin{footnotes}
\item I believe that Husserl does not claim that there is a priority of the impressional temporality on
the quasi-temporality. However, the acts of the phantasy are given in specific moments of the inner time
consciousness. In this sense, even if the intentional object is given in a quasi-temporality, the act has a
temporal position in the flowing of the inner time consciousness (cf. footnote Chapt. 2., §3 on the notion
of quasi-temporality).

\item This question is very similar to the problem of the awakening when consciousness is in a state between
sleeping and being fully awakened. Here, the musician is between being absorbed in phantasy and being
present to perception.

\item Experience and Judgment, §39, p. 169
\end{footnotes}
the first layer of constitution in the impressional consciousness, and as any act of phantasy, is situated in a certain moment of this impressional consciousness, both the actual song and the inner song are given against that primary layer of the inner rhythm.

Here, there is a greater freedom of constitution in the reproductive consciousness than in the impressional consciousness. Certainly, as is the case in the perceptual field, objects are given separately in phantasy. However, as the perceptions in phantasy are not tightly tied with the reality of the object, there are more possibilities for an interplay of present phantasies with futural and past phantasies, and that new associations are awakened and given in a temporal succession in renewed ways. For instance, I can reconstitute the same inner song that I worked on yesterday, and as I imagine it, I can link it to another inner song thus creating a continuity between two discontinuous phantasies.

This newly created unity between various phantasies which flows in the imaginary can be connected or disconnected from other flowing phantasies allowing the musician to improvise new inner songs by playing with previous segments of other inner songs. Thus, segments of inner songs are associated with others, or modified, and a unity can flow in the imaginary in a chaotic, discontinuous, and fleeting quasi-temporality. In this process of constitution, the continuity between various phantasies is contingent not because it is related to impression, which is without absolute temporal position, but it is related to the constitution of a succession in respect to the now of the inner pulse. In this thesis, I radically differ from Husserl who writes:

Thus the sense of the affirmation of the disconnectedness of the intuitions of imagination lack absolute temporal position, and so they also cannot have a temporal unity among themselves, a unique temporal order like the objects of
perception – that is, insofar as we speak, as previously, of imaginings which do not constitute among themselves a cointented connection relative to consciousness [which do not constitute] a unity of imagination. Such a possible constitution of unity is external to the essence of imaginings. It is not part of their essence that they must appear in a continuous enchainment, which would be, as [a form of] unity, a continuity of imagination. Imaginings separate from one another have no necessary connection a priori and, as a rule, also have none in our actual experience. Hense, in such cases there is no sense in asking whether the object of the one precedes or follows that of the other. Every act of imagination, being divorced from all [temporal] connection, has its own imagination-time, and there are as many such, incomparable with one another (disregarding their general form, their concrete essence, in general), as there are or can be such imaginings, thus, infinitely many. No absolute position of one can be identical with that of another. However, what other relations are possible between them is still to be examined.870

I argue that it is only when these possible connections between various disconnected phantasies are realized through the musical instrument, perceived, and given as actual song in the impressional consciousness, that they acquire a continuity of form and a situation in the absolute inner time consciousness.

As was mentioned several times throughout the present study of the inner song, phantasy is characterized by its freedom. The exact same inner song might therefore not be properly recalled. That the act of the phantasy can be recalled in the inner

870 Experience and Judgment, §39, pp. 169-170
consciousness, that is certain; however, that does not entail that the intentional object perceived only in phantasy can be. Consequently, it is legitimate to wonder how an inner song can be identified as the same as what was given before. The question here is the following: when I practice the Sonata, for instance, is it each day a new inner song, or a reconstitution of the same inner song, and when can I say that it is a brand-new inner song? In order to speak about a modification of the same phantasy, one inner song, e.g. that of my current practice session, should be identified as the same as another, e.g., the one from my practice sessions yesterday. Without this possibility of identification, there would be a constant reconstitution of inner songs of the same piece but not a modification of the inner song (or more exactly, a modification of the perception in phantasy). To understand this point that the inner song can be modified, we must make the hypothesis that, just as there is a permanence through change in the perceptual realm thanks to the continuity of the flowing of the impression, there might be something similar but not identical in phantasy.

If this is the case, an object of phantasy like the inner song can be modified in two ways. First, purely in phantasy. In this case, it does not involve a temporal process because it does not involve the actual perception. For instance, I phantasize various ways to play the Sonata without performing it with my cello. Second, through a temporal process involving the co-implication of the impresional and reproductive consciousness. For instance, I phantasize that Sonata, I try it out, and through perception I realize that some aspects sound good but others do not, so my inner song is

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871 Sometimes, intersubjectivity can be involved, e.g., if my teacher sings the same melody in a different way, etc.; I am not entering into the problem of intersubjectivity now.
modified. In the first case, when the inner song is modified purely in phantasy, it is modified in virtue of the law of association in the immediate continuity of the appearance of the object. In other words, the object is modified by a succession of small changes still respecting the continuity of the givenness of the object. To understand the second case, it is important to go back to the constitution in the impressional consciousness.

When the musician practices their musical instrument, and as they play and perform, he or she perceives the performance as being his or her own (there is this co-constitution of the musical instrument and the melody). The perception of the performance then flows in the inner consciousness as it is, i.e., made of complex associated sensuous-data. Even if it sinks into the past, this data of consciousness does not disappear. Indeed, consciousness still “holds onto it,” I still “have it in my retention.” Husserl says that: “as long as the retention lasts, the tone has its own temporality; it is the same, its duration is the same.” From this, the attention can be directed to the object as a phenomenon, and can grasp its various moments as they

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872 In the two cases the modification happens under an aesthetic judgement, I will explain that later on.

873 Husserl writes: “It [the tone as pure hyletic datum] begins and ends; and after it has ended, its whole duration-unity, the unity of the whole process in which it begins and ends, ‘recedes’ into the ever more distant past” (On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, §8, p. 25).

874 Husserl observes: “In this sinking back, I still ‘hold onto it,’ have it in a ‘retention’” (On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, §8, p. 25).

875 On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, §8, p. 25.
However, the object gets devitalized as it passes, and this process of devitalization ends only with the end of the retention. At any moment of the process of temporal flowing in perception, the perceived object can be reproduced in the phantasy, either partly (by segments), or as a whole (as a segment which begins and ends), thus becoming part of an inner song.

As Husserl shows: “I can direct my attention to the way in which it is given. I am conscious of the tone and of the duration it fills in a continuity of ‘modes,’ in a ‘continual flow.’ And one point, one phase of this flow is called ‘consciousness of the commencing tone’; and in this phase I am conscious of the first time-point of the tone’s duration in the mode of the now. The tone is given; that is, I am conscious of it as a now. But I am conscious of it as now ‘as long as’ any one of its phases is intended as now. However, if any temporal phase (corresponding to a time-point of the tone-duration) is an actually present now (with the exception of the initial phase), then I am conscious of a continuity of phases as ‘immediately past’ and of the whole extent of the temporal duration from the beginning-point up to the now-point has elapsed. I am not yet conscious of the remaining extent of the duration, however. When the final point is reached, I am conscious of this point itself as the now-point and of the whole duration as elapsed (or I am conscious of it as elapsed at the beginning-point of the new extent of time, which is no longer a tonal extent). ‘Throughout’ this whole flow of consciousness, one and the same tone is intended as enduring, as now enduring. ‘Beforehand’ (in the event that it was not expected), it is not intended. ‘Afterward,’ it is ‘still’ intended ‘for a time’ in ‘retention’ as having been; it can be held fast and stand or remain fixed in our regard” (On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, §8, pp. 25-6).

Husserl explains: “The whole extent of the tone’s duration or ‘the’ tone in its extension then stands before me as something dead, so to speak – something no longer being vitally generated, a formation no longer animated by the generative point of the now but continuously modified and sinking back into ‘emptiness.’ The modification of the whole extent, then, is analogous to or essentially identical with the modification that the elapsed part of the duration undergoes in the transition of consciousness to ever new productions during the time that the tone is actually present” (On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, §8, p. 26).

Husserl writes: “What lies nearest to the actually present now, depending on its distance from it, perhaps has a little clarity; the whole [then] disappears into obscurity, into an empty retentional consciousness, and finally disappears altogether (if one is permitted to assert that) as soon as retention ceases” (On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, §9, pp. 27-8).

This advances the problem of the knowability of the intuition in its fullness. In other words, is the full intuition knowable, as such, in principle or in fact if there is this devitalization? I would argue that it is not knowable in fact because of the devitalization which makes consciousness somehow lose track, but also because of the simple inability to know the protentional part of it. Is it knowable in principle then? I would argue that it is, because of the very possibility of bringing back the past appearance, and bringing in the protentional one (even if there can be a disappointment).

In Wiskus, Jessica, “On memory, nostalgia, and the temporal expression of Josquin’s Ave Maria... virgo serena,” the author provides a phenomenological analysis of the performance of a specific medieval musical piece, looking in detailed way at how she relates to that performance, how the melody can be replayed in consciousness, how it unfolds in consciousness. The author explores that question focusing, in
In the situation that I am studying, the reproduction in phantasy is the reproduction either of a possible current impression, or of the past impression, or of a future impression. In other words, the constitution of the inner song is grounded in the experience of certain impressions given as the musician plays. This is a first possible type of relation between the object given in the reproductive consciousness and the object given in the impressional consciousness. In these three cases, the perception in phantasy is the reproduction of that perception given in objective time, but in phantasy, in a quasi-temporality, through phantasms, and not in the flesh but as a quasi-object, which means that it is essentially distinct from its counterpart.

Even if they are both reproductions, the reproduction in phantasy differs from the reproduction through remembering because it is free. In other words, there can be a play with the object. For instance, I can reproduce the past or present performance only partly, accelerate it, softening the sound in my phantasy, phrasing it differently, etc. I can also play the melody from a different now of its flowing, thus making it flow again in my detail, on the constitution process in the impressional consciousness. I would argue that an investigation of the constitution processes in both the impressional and reproductive consciousness is necessary to understand the experience of music performance.

880 Here, the distinction between the reproduction of a past perception and the reproduction in phantasy is not clear (exactly as the distinction between the reproduction of a future perception and the reproduction in phantasy is not always clear). I keep this unclarity because the inner song presents a similar porous boundary. Indeed, as I practice my cello, and work with the inner song, the re-presentation of the past perception of my performance and the reproduction of that performance in phantasy become intertwined up to a point at which it is difficult to clearly distinguish what belongs to the sound that was actually perceived, and what belongs to my phantasy.

881 Husserl says: “The original appearing and the flowing-away of the running-off modes in the appearing is something fixed, something of which we are conscious through ‘affection,’ at which we can only look (if we happen to achieve the spontaneity of looking). Re-presenting, on the other hand, is something free, a free running through: We can carry out the re-presentation ‘more quickly’ or ‘more slowly,’ more distinctly and explicitly or more confusedly, in a single lightning-like stroke or in articulated steps, and so on” (On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, §20, pp. 49-50).
That’s what I do when I practice: I play a part of the song, then I work on specific passages by running through them again and over again in different ways, modifying both the object and the way I make it flow in my consciousness.

In this mode too, as is the case in perception, there are various degrees of clarity. Husserl says that: “what is re-presented hovers before me in more or less clear fashion, and the different modes of this obscurity concern the whole object that is re-presented and its modes of consciousness.” For this reason, the musician might often find him- or herself playing a passage again in order to be able to re-present it with more clarity in the phantasy. For instance, I may phantasize the beginning of the melody, feel unsatisfied because it is unclear, play it again, and then be able to re-present it better in my phantasy. I can also have a re-presentation in memory, now, of what I played, yesterday. However, because of the distance between the moment of the re-presentation, and the moment of the original presentation, I am more susceptible to making mistakes, reproducing the melody with a wrong rhythm, or making some errors in the intonation. However, there is still a continuity between the moment of the presentation and the moment of the re-

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882 Husserl writes: “The representation itself is an event belonging to the internal consciousness and as such has its actually present now, its running-off modes, etc. And in the same extent of immanent time in which the re-presentation actually occurs, we can accommodate ‘in freedom’ greater or smaller parts of the re-presented even together with its running-off modes, and consequently run through it more swiftly or more slowly. When we do this, the relative running-off modes of the re-presented points of the temporal extent remain unchanged (presupposing that the identifying coincidence continuously occurs). I constantly re-present the same thing – always the same continuity of running-off modes of the temporal extent, always the temporal extent itself in its way of appearing [im Wie]. But if I thus return again and again to the same beginning-point and to the same succession of time-points, that beginning-point nevertheless continuously sinks further and further back in time” (*On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time*, §20, p. 50).

883 *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time*, §21, p. 51.
presentation because it is this, the same flow of inner time consciousness. For this reason, there is also a continuity between the now of the musical phrase that I am reproducing now, and the now of that musical phrase which was presented in the past; there is a coincidence between two nows which may cause the fulfillment of the intention to be fulfilled by the perception as past.

As opposed to what happens through memory, and even if the acts of phantasy are given in the same inner time consciousness, and can therefore be recalled, there is no continuity of impression in the reproduction in phantasy of a former perception of my performance from yesterday in the case of a phantasy-remembering. Regarding the contents (the object, the inner song itself) there is no continuity in the inner time consciousness, therefore no double intentionality (of a past appearance in the present)

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884 Husserl says: “If I remember something I experienced yesterday, then I reproduce the event experienced yesterday, perhaps following all the steps of its succession. I am conscious of a sequence while I am doing this: first one step is reproduced, then, following a determinate order, the second, and so on. But apart from this succession, which evidently belongs to the reproduction insofar as it is a flow of experience, the reproduction brings a past temporal flow to presentation. And it is indeed possible not only that the individual steps of the memorial present event deviate from those of the past event (the step belonging to the latter did not ensue in the way in which they are now re-presented), but also that the actual order of succession was other than what the memorial order now takes it to have been. Errors are therefore possible here; specifically, errors that derive from reproduction as reproduction and must not be confused with the errors to which the perception of temporal objects (of transcendent objects, that is) is also subject. That this is the case and in what sense it is the case has already been mentioned: If I am originally conscious of a temporal succession, there is no doubt that a temporal succession has taken place and is taking place. But this is not to say that an event – an objective event – actually does occur in the sense in which I apprehend it” (On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, §22, p. 51).

885 Husserl writes: “If I repeat c, d, this reproductive representation of the succession finds its fulfillment in the still living earlier succession” (On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, §22, p. 51).

886 Husserl says: “In mere phantasy no positing of the reproduced now and no coinciding of this now with a past now is given. Recollection, on the other hand, posits what is reproduced and in this positing gives it a position in relation to the actually present now and to the sphere of the original temporal field to which the recollection itself belongs. Only in original time-consciousness can the relation between a reproduced now and a past be brough about” (On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, §23 p. 51).
belonging to that continuity,\textsuperscript{887} and no unity of what is remembered in the case of that phantasy. If there is a recalling, as the temporality of the phantasy is a \textit{quasi}-temporality, it cannot be properly argued that it is exactly the \textit{same} inner song as yesterday.\textsuperscript{888} Despite this distinction between phantasy and remembering, the constitution of the inner song in the reproductive consciousness still involves a continuity between the perception and the phantasy, through reproduction, in a synthesis of succession. Indeed, the past perception of an actual performance that \textit{is, has been} or \textit{has just been}, is re-presented and reproductively modified in phantasy. This means that, without being temporal itself, and without giving the object in objective temporality, the inner song still draws components from recollection or far retention. Through that process, the perception in the phantasy is further modified, thanks to the associations of segments of inner songs given in quasi-lines of temporality.\textsuperscript{889}

As mentioned earlier in another descriptive context, the orientation of this phantasy made of recollective elements is then given from \textit{expectation}, and it is the object of that expectation which gets modified by being perceived in renewed ways in the

\textsuperscript{887} Husserl explains this later in §25, as the remembered is not my primary interest, I will not enter into detail on this notion.

\textsuperscript{888} As I mentioned several times, this question of the return of an object of phantasy is very debatable and would require further analysis. I tend to think that it is not the \textit{same} inner song, that there is a repetition of the phantasy, but not of the intentional object of that phantasy. I would also say that, if I phantasize an inner song of the same piece that I played twenty years ago, it might be a new inner song reconstituted.

\textsuperscript{889} As was said in Chapter 2 §10, I understand the phantasy-worlds as constituted of \textit{quasi}-lines of temporalities that can be awakened together through association, thus forming new temporal lines of inner songs. In that interpretation, I agree with what Jay Lampert argues in \textit{The Many Futures of a Decision}, p. 67 sq: there is an evolution in Husserl’s work about the time of the phantasy, the later Husserlian writings tend to argue that there is not one line, but several lines of temporality constituting the phantasy-words. These lines are \textit{quasi}-lines.
phantasy. In other words, in the specific case that I am studying of a practicing musician rehearsing, the modifications of the inner song in phantasy are guided by expectations. It is in virtue of the futural dimension of the inner song that the object can undergo modifications in phantasy. The renewed perception in phantasy is a striving toward what is coming, what I will play with my cello. There is no continuity with the objective time, no double intentionality belonging to that continuity, and no unity of the expected. The reproduced object does not exist yet, and it might never exist as it appears in the reproductive consciousness. However, it is already perceived in the phantasy as something that could be or will be given; this futural aspect is one mode of co-implication of the reproductive and impressional consciousness. Here, the very specific aspect of the situation that I am studying is that, in the reproductive consciousness, the inner song is given as futural, and the intention is expected to be fulfilled through the presentation of the actual song during the realization of the phantasy.

There are therefore two types of expectation in play: expectation in perception, and expectation in phantasy. The former are guided by the latter, and the latter are informed by the former. In the impressional consciousness, expectation can have two forms: on the one hand, there is a first type of future which is an immediate future, still

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890 Here, it must be highlighted that it is not always easy to distinguish the phantasy from the remembering, exactly as it is not always easy to distinguish the phantasy of a melody from the perception of that melody. Husserl notices this, saying: “in the case of certain phantasms, it is possible to fit them into the field of sensation. Normally we have a separation, although in certain limit cases we do have partial coinciding. A tone sounds: Do I still hear it (the ticking of the clock)? We have similar situations in phantasy as well: The intermittency of the ‘images’ and the doubt: Do I still have the phantasy image? The intention aimed at the object is continually there; the image fluctuates back and forth. We believe that we still have it. But we are not quite sure. ‘Am I only imagining that I still have the phantasy image?’ This imaging is not phantasing, of course” (Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory, Appendix XI, p. 195). These are limit cases. When I play and phantasize the inner song at the same time, I can experience a similar confusion.
connected with the present now as an extension of it (a not yet), and on the other hand a second type of future which is an expectation of something that will come but which needs to be brought into the present in a way similar to recollection (a reproductive expectation). It is this second mode which is important to understand the futural dimension of the inner song in the reproductive consciousness. With the inner song, there is a co-implication of the impressional and reproductive consciousness: the inner song is futural, as the musician plays, he or she realizes this phantasy-expectation, this realization is reproduced in phantasy so that new expectations are constituted. In other words, the phantasy-expectation is given, through reproduction, in a distinct temporality, the quasi-temporality of the phantasy. However, there is an expectation of a real possibility, realized through the playing of the musician.

It follows that the inner song involves the two types of future perception in phantasy: on the one hand, the not-yet when I am imagining and performing simultaneously, and on the other hand the reproductive expectation when the inner song and its perceptual realization are distant in time. In this last case, consciousness reaches beyond the protentions (extension of the now toward the future) and re-presents the experience of performing the inner song. In other words, it makes it present, but with the modification of yet to come. In her book, Intersubjective Temporality, Lanei

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891 Husserl writes: “The expectation of the ‘not yet’ connected with the ‘now’ is fulfilled” (On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, Text No. 13, p. 174).

892 Husserl explains: “reproductive expectation (not of the immediate future of the temporal field – what is immediately future in the temporal field is not the same as the more distant future” (On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, Text No. 13, p. 174).

893 I will not expand my description of this further, but the case of improvisation is interesting in this regard. Indeed, it is a realization of the phantasy in the instant.
Rodemeyer notices how there can be a possibility of an extremely detailed representation of the anticipated experience. This is exactly what happens in the case of the constitution of the inner song. Especially in the case of interpretation in which the constitution of the inner song is prescribed by a score, it is possible to phantasize a very detailed inner song of what could be performed. Indeed, I can phantasize the melody, but also feel the moves on the instrument that are associated with the production of that melody, visualize these moves and the distance to cross, see the note as it is symbolically represented in the score, etc.

As the musician plays, the inner song is being perceived in phantasy, while consciousness simultaneously perceives the actual song in perception. In consciousness, both phenomena run at the same time. As a consequence, in addition to expectations, there is also an interplay with near protentions; the inner song is given as the reproduction of what is being played almost at the same time. From that analysis of the temporal interplay between phantasy and perception through reproduction, it appears that

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894 Lanei Rodemeyer observes: “One could argue that consciousness’ experience of anticipated events could be as detailed as that of recollected events (if not more), even though no originary, or immediately direct, experience has yet taken place […]. In turn, the recollection of already experienced events can often be quite hazy […]. Husserl unfortunately relied upon the structural parallel between recollection and anticipation too heavily; often, he merely described anticipation as an inverted form of recollection, sometimes as ‘vaguer’ and, of course, going in a different direction with relation to the now. Unfortunately, such a description does not at all reveal the different ways these two activities of temporalizing consciousness function, nor their different meanings for the subject” (*Intersubjective Temporality*, pp.12-13).

895 This is extremely clear in the interview with François Moysan ([http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-francois-moysan-pianiste/](http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-francois-moysan-pianiste/)). As the composers usually do not rehearse with an orchestra more than a few times, this practice of phantasizing the inner song yet to come is very important for them (cf. interviews here: [https://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretiens-avec-des-musiciens/pratique-de-la-direction/](https://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretiens-avec-des-musiciens/pratique-de-la-direction/)).

896 This is what “anticipation” is. Music professors constantly remind their students that they have to “anticipate” while playing. This means that they need to be slightly ahead *with the inner song* of the actual song that they are playing.
the phantasy can reproduce an object given in perception in any moment of the flow, present, past, or future. However, it gives it in a distinct temporality, which is a reproduced modification of a possible perception. Therefore, even if there is a continuity in succession between perception and phantasy, this continuity involves a modification of the temporality of perception into the temporality of the phantasy.

The process of modifications of the inner song is related to the mode of the future which arises “from continuous and discrete protention according to the laws of the formation of expectation.”897 As Husserl says, expectation differs from the perceived, and equally from the remembered because it is given “as what is anticipated or as a projected image or model of being prior to its actual being.”898 Even if Husserl does not speak about artistic creation here, I consider the inner song to be a phantasy model of being prior to its actual being. In other words, the inner song appears in the phantasy as an expectation of a real event before it is realized through the performance, i.e., before it becomes actual.

Here, the inner song shifts from phantasy-expectation to a perceptual expectation. In the case of perceptual expectation, Husserl notices that expectation is built on habits, and therefore, involves a passive synthesis.899 Husserl does not speak about the specific


898 Husserl writes: “Obviously, the expectational presentation is characterized as a presentation of a new kind, specifically, as a presentation of a second level, as the replica of the more original presentation of the past. With respect to the object, what is expected is naturally not like what is perceived, that is, characterized as being in the flesh and as present; likewise, it is not characterized as what is remembered, as just-now, and in the subsequent expectation, what has previously been; but rather, it is characterized as in accordance with what has been, with its primordial image, as what is anticipated or as a projected image or model of being prior to its actual being” (Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, §40, p. 237).

899 Husserl explains: “It is further evident that the anticipatory belief of expectation has a differentiation of force, that is, a gradation, and that this force grows with the number of inductive ‘instances,’ that is,
case of artistic creation, he does not speak even about phantasy. However, because the inner song is a perception in the phantasy of a possible actual perception, and therefore as expectation *functions* in the same way as it does in the simple perception, I want to use his analysis in order to describe how there are also various degrees of force of the inner song as a phantasy-expectation.

As to what Husserl describes in the case of perception, the expectations in phantasy of the perception of the performance to come can have various degrees of force. For instance, I can know the song very well, and therefore have a strong expectation of the melody as it should sound, i.e., its pitch, rhythm, intensity, and timbre. However, I can also not be very sure of what will come, for instance, if I am improvising or composing, and in this sense, there is a greater degree of the realization of the expectation decided by the circumstances of the realization (e.g., what the other musicians will play in this specific improvisational phrase). Then, in the same way as in the example of the Husserlian description, that force also grows with the number of *inductive instances*. For instance, the more I hear a certain combination of sounds, a certain rhythmical succession, or the more I have rehearsed them and therefore have them in my fingers, the more I will tend to imagine an inner song reproducing this specific pattern and therefore being an accurate expectation of what will come. Conversely, the less I hear certain

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with the frequency of what has occurred under similar circumstances. It is likewise clear in the alternate direction that when under the Circumstances C, now q, now r, now s has occurred, exclusively, the motivated tendencies of expectation will be inhibited. It is likewise clear that the increase and the inhibition of intensity do not merely emerge in a contingent and arbitrary manner, but rather can be motivated in a necessary and evident manner” (*Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*, §41, pp. 238-9).
combinations of sound, the less I have played and retained this pattern, the less it is susceptible of being part of further phantasy-expectations.\textsuperscript{900} Husserl adds that, the clearer the remembering is, the more evident the motivations and their augmentation will be.\textsuperscript{901} Here again, even if the inner song is a specific kind of phantasy-expectation, I would like to say that the clearer the remembering of the patterns is (both at the level of the physical knowledge of the moves on the instrument, and the sonorous knowledge of the melody), the more evident the motivations and their augmentation will be when it is reproduced in phantasy, and conversely, the clearer the inner song is, the easier it will be to realize it. For instance, when I learn a piece of music by memory, including the names of the notes, the moves on the instrument, and the symbols on the score, the clearer my expectation of the whole piece is, the more I am able to reproduce in phantasy the realization of a further performance.

This means that the patterns that become the strongest elements in the constitution of my new inner song in phantasy are those best remembered, i.e., those most strongly impressed in my memory at different levels. Here, I must add that the kinesthetic elements can help the sonorous memory and vice versa in the process of remembering. For instance, I can be unsure about the melody but have a sure knowledge of the moves,

\textsuperscript{900} I don’t investigate these forms of inner song but I want to note here how this is how improvisation and composition can be learned by repetition: as I repeat certain patterns, as I learn them, I constitute a vocabulary that will be reinvested in further phantasy-expectations, i.e., in new inner songs (cf. Interview with Camille Poupat: \url{http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-camille-poupat-saxophoniste/}).

\textsuperscript{901} Husserl says: “If the motivational situation is clear, that is to say, if the awakened, previous situation of consciousness and what has occurred in it has resulted in a clear remembering, then the motivations and their augmentation are also given in evidence, that is, the confirmations and the corroborations in their graduation are also given in evidence along with every actual occurrence of a term of the series concerned” (\textit{Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis}, §41, p. 239).
or not be able to remember the moves but know how to sing the melody. Conversely, if the musician has a very clear inner song of what he or she wants to play (the moves, the distance, the sounds to hear, how to perform the song, with which muscles, etc.), the easier and smoother the playing will be.

Husserl notices that expectations are not always fulfilled. In the case of the inner song, the expectations in phantasy of the real performance to come are fulfilled by the actual givenness of the phenomenon through the perception of that performance that is being played. As the musician is responsible for that givenness, he or she also has the potential to repeat the move until the intention is fulfilled by the adequate perception. As the inner song is a sort of ideal of what the performance could produce, it must be highlighted that the work of the musician to get closer to an adequate fulfilment is actually never fully reached.

The work of the realization of the inner song is, by definition, endless. This means that the expectations are perpetually disappointed because they can always be fulfilled more fully, or in a better way. For instance, thanks to the awakening of new associations through the perception of the realization of the inner song in performance, I can endlessly refine my interpretation of a piece and therefore better fulfill the expectations of my inner song. I can also work endlessly on modifying a composition. Or, I can learn to improvise differently, or have genius intuition and disappoint my expectations in a good way, in the sense that what I actually play exceeds what I could have imagined. I would say that this

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902 Husserl writes: “If a has repeatedly emerged under certain circumstances or as a final term in a regular sequence, and if the corresponding expectation is there through associative awakening, then the absence, the non-occurrence becomes salient, the expectation is disappointed; the present temporal field, that is, the sense-field is filled out, but filled out “otherwise” (Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, §41, p. 239).
is the greatness and the curse of music practice: most of the time, the expectations are filled out “otherwise,” they come better than expected when things go well, or they require further practice to work on reducing the gap between the ideal and its realization when things do not go well.\textsuperscript{903}

Before closing this analysis, it is important to add that rehearsing, practicing, all these activities related to music practice do not necessarily work with an inner song that has been just given, or recently enough. This means that my expectations can be unclear because the remembering of the playing of the piece that should break into the phantasy object in order to constitute new phantasy-expectations is too far back, has faded away, or cannot be accurately recalled. For instance, if I play something again that I had been learning a long time ago, I will have difficulties having a clear and strong inner song of the further developments of the melody. To reinforce my expectations, I will have to play it more, and therefore create new rememberings that will be able to make these expectations stronger. This shows how a temporal gap between the first time when I work on a piece of music, and the second time, can potentially be great, and make the constitution of a new phantasy-expectation of that piece so difficult that the inner song will not be able to be identified as \textit{the same}, and in this sense, there will be a \textit{new inner song} of the \textit{same} musical piece. These could be different inner songs and distinct noematic correlates. However, they would still have the same noematic core since it is the same song. In other words, even if, regarding its meaning, it is the same object (the same piece), it will be a new noematic correlate and not be the \textit{same} inner song, with a

\textsuperscript{903} I discussed this question with the ceramist Emmanuel Boos (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-emmanuel-boos-ceramiste/). He explained how the unpredicted result is part of the process of creation.
modification of the perception of the object in the phantasy, but rather a new inner song, because the identification of the object in the perception of the phantasy will be impossible.

Here, what distinguishes the appearance of a new inner song of the same piece from the modification of the perception in the phantasy of the same inner song, is the possibility of a judgement of identification: in the first case, the object is too obscure to be identified as the same, there is therefore a new inner song, whereas in the second case, the object is identified as the same, the intention continues to be fulfilled. This judgement of identification is based on the experience, or lack thereof, of the phantasy object as being the same. When there is a judgement of identification which allows the same intention to be fulfilled, the second inner song is experienced as being the same as the first one because they are experienced as re-presenting the same melody.\footnote{The question of the inner song as being the same can be reformulated as follows: can a new intention be fulfilled by the same object that has fulfilled a previous intention? Jay Lampert discusses this problem at length both in \textit{Synthesis and Backward References in Husserl's Logical Investigations}, and in \textit{The Many Futures of a Decision}. In the latter, he analyzes this situation as “supertemporalities.” He writes: “A few pages later, Husserl gives a more precise definition of “supertemporality.” A “free ideality” is “repeatable” (wiederholbar) at different times. Fictional objectivities were earlier defined as objects unattached to any time; ideal objectivities are now defined as objects attached to all times. In addition, perhaps not surprisingly, objects very much like fictional objectivities, now designated as “cultural objectivities,” are put into the category of free idealities. Husserl’s examples include Goethe’s Faust and Raphael’s Madonna (266/319–20). Goethe’s Faust is a reprintable text “found in any number of real books.” And although Raphael’s painting is unrepeateable (Husserl is probably right not to be concerned that Raphael made many different paintings on the Madonna theme), its ideal image is in principle as repeatable as a text. Indeed, the scope of ideal objects, which started with mathematical objects, extends beyond fiction as well, and includes such objects as civil constitutions (266/320), presumably in the sense that a constitution is a precedent appealed to on all relevant occasions. The scope of objects without a unique fixed position in actual time is by this point so broad that it is no longer possible to consider them as exceptions to the normal relation between objects and time. Relaxed temporal fixity means precisely that (a) a given object can in different ways be both present and not present at a given time, and (b) a given time can in different ways contain both an actual object and that object’s non-actual variations. In one sense, super-time is closer to quasi-time than it is to juxtatime, in that it unfixes the temporal location of a given object so that it can be inserted at any point in the time line. However in another sense, super-time keeps no-longer and not-yet objects active in the time line, and so generalizes the memory-perception doubling, suggesting that juxtatime is the more fundamental form of time” (p. 73-4).}

\footnote{The question of the inner song as being the same can be reformulated as follows: can a new intention be fulfilled by the same object that has fulfilled a previous intention? Jay Lampert discusses this problem at length both in \textit{Synthesis and Backward References in Husserl's Logical Investigations}, and in \textit{The Many Futures of a Decision}. In the latter, he analyzes this situation as “supertemporalities.” He writes: “A few pages later, Husserl gives a more precise definition of “supertemporality.” A “free ideality” is “repeatable” (wiederholbar) at different times. Fictional objectivities were earlier defined as objects unattached to any time; ideal objectivities are now defined as objects attached to all times. In addition, perhaps not surprisingly, objects very much like fictional objectivities, now designated as “cultural objectivities,” are put into the category of free idealities. Husserl’s examples include Goethe’s Faust and Raphael’s Madonna (266/319–20). Goethe’s Faust is a reprintable text “found in any number of real books.” And although Raphael’s painting is unrepeateable (Husserl is probably right not to be concerned that Raphael made many different paintings on the Madonna theme), its ideal image is in principle as repeatable as a text. Indeed, the scope of ideal objects, which started with mathematical objects, extends beyond fiction as well, and includes such objects as civil constitutions (266/320), presumably in the sense that a constitution is a precedent appealed to on all relevant occasions. The scope of objects without a unique fixed position in actual time is by this point so broad that it is no longer possible to consider them as exceptions to the normal relation between objects and time. Relaxed temporal fixity means precisely that (a) a given object can in different ways be both present and not present at a given time, and (b) a given time can in different ways contain both an actual object and that object’s non-actual variations. In one sense, super-time is closer to quasi-time than it is to juxtatime, in that it unfixes the temporal location of a given object so that it can be inserted at any point in the time line. However in another sense, super-time keeps no-longer and not-yet objects active in the time line, and so generalizes the memory-perception doubling, suggesting that juxtatime is the more fundamental form of time” (p. 73-4).}
it is the same inner song of Brahms’s *Sonata*, because I can recognize the typical phrase and moves through which this song was constituted in my consciousness. This judgement of identification is based on the consistency of the flow in phantasy, despite the multiplicity of the phantasy-worlds, and therefore the multiplicity of quasi-temporal lines. Indeed, the inner song can be reconstituted in phantasy because there is a memory of the previous appearance in phantasy, along with a recognition of the same features. The reconstitution in the phantasy *functions* in the same way as the recollection in memory, even if the flow of phantasy presents a more chaotic temporality and a variety of flowings.\(^{905}\)

As it appears here, the process of modification of the inner song can go on infinitely as long as the musician has new aesthetical ideas which means, as long as I can phantasize a possible performance which would *sound better or differently*. Indeed, the musician interpreting a piece can keep working on it indefinitely, thus modifying the corresponding inner song; the composer can keep refining the composition, which can itself be then interpreted in various ways indefinitely; the improvising musician can keep going endlessly, ending only from fatigue or other external circumstances. For instance, I can phantasize the perception of the performance of Bach’s *Allemande* of the second

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\(^{905}\) I addressed this problem in the preceding chapter.
Suite for Cello Solo; in this case, I “phantasy simply.” However, I can also keep phantasizing this melody in different ways, bringing my attention to the perception in the phantasy, and modifying the possibilities of perceiving the object. As the fulfilment of the intention goes along with the constitution of new intentions to be fulfilled, I would argue that there is no ideal moment in which there is a complete fulfillment of the intention; the intuitive content of the ideal object never really fills the intention. In this sense, creation is a process without end. In addition, as there is a transformation but not necessarily an improvement, the fulfilment can take the form of a variation on a theme.

Husserl gives a description of this kind of modification but this case is distinct from the type of modification of the phantasy that I previously mentioned. Indeed, if the phantasy can be modified without reflection, by the interplay between perception and phantasy only, there is also a type of modification of the phantasy which involves reflection. In this case, the attention is, through the phantasy, directed toward the perception in the phantasy: I make an object of that perception in the phantasy. It is a reflection in the phantasy.

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907 Husserl says that: “I live’ in the reproduction of the direction; that is to say, my attention aims at the object” (Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory, Text no. 2, p. 227).

908 Husserl writes: “I can also direct my attention to the reproduced impressions: Just as in perceiving the house I can turn my attention to moments of the perception, for which a perception of the perception (a new apprehension) is needed, so I can generate a reproduction of this perception of the second degree, look at the reproduced perception, make the reproduced impression into my object. It is, however, necessarily a phantasied object, since the reflection that I carry out is not an actual reflection but the reproduction of the perception of the perception (hence, the reproduction of a reflection), and this is ‘to reflect in phantasy.’ I can then reflect in turn on this reproduction, reflect again in phantasy on a new level, <bring about> modification of a perception of a reflection (or perception of the third degree), and so on” (Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory, Text no. 2, p. 227).
With or without reflection, the modification of the inner song always implies a temporal process of strengthening or inhibiting the phantasy-expectation. This means that, the process of modification of the perception in the phantasy will always strengthen or inhibit some aspects of the perceivable object in the phantasy: it will appear rhythmically different, or be charged of a different emotion etc., according to an aesthetical modification. In other words, the performance perceived in the phantasy should progressively sound better or at least, different.
This chapter ends the explanation of the process of constitution of the inner song in the consciousness of the practicing musician. It started with the explanation of the awakening of the inner song in consciousness. It explained how the inner song can be brought out of the field of the imaginary, thanks to association, and underneath affectivity. Secondly, the chapter focused on the perceptual discovery of the musical instrument, to explain how the musician acquires the musical instrument at his or her free disposal, and how a correspondent in phantasy then becomes part of the inner song. Then, this chapter explained how the act of playing the musical instrument goes with the constitution of the melody in the impressional consciousness, as an embodied melody, and how this melody has its correspondent in the inner song in the inner melody. Finally, this chapter tried to explain the interpenetration of the constitution processes in the impressional and the reproductive consciousness, and how the inner song can be constituted, in the reproductive consciousness, thanks to its correspondent in the impressional consciousness.

At the end of this chapter, I want to underline how this explanation covers only a very restricted type of constitution of the inner song. Here, performing an analysis of the perceptual discovery of various musical instruments with their possibilities of perception would be an interesting way to develop the various types of givenness of the inner song. The analysis of the co-implication of the two types of consciousness, especially their temporal intertwining, would also need to be further elaborated in order to have a clearer understanding of the inner song. Finally, it would be necessary to further explore how touch-data and tone-data contribute to the awakening, and further development of the inner song in consciousness, one coming sometimes prior to the other. A further study on
the process of the modification of the inner song through practice would certainly pursue
the renewal of the understanding of the phenomenological Body (both
Wahrnehmungsleib and Phantasieleib) by grounding the analysis in a practical example.
It would also continue the work of the explanation of the interpenetration of the
constitution processes in the impressional and reproductive consciousness.
Conclusion
§1. On and thanks to the inner song.

§2. Some remaining phenomenological problems.

§3. From the inner song in general to the inner song in particular.

§4. Beyond the musical.

§5. Pursuing the task of constituting a digital archive of interviews.
§ 1. On and thanks to the inner song.

To conclude, the present work described the inner song from the conditions of possibility of its grasping in consciousness to its constitution in the reproductive consciousness thanks to co-implication with the constitution of the actual song in the impressional consciousness.

It started with the description of the natural attitude in which the musician is busy with the perception of the world on hand, attitude from which a double epoché is performed: the theoretical epoché which brackets the thesis of the existence of the world on hand, and the practical epoché which disengages attention from the natural world enough to engage it with the phenomenological world, more precisely in the situation I am studying, the world of the inner song (Chapter 1: Accessing the Inner Song through the Epoché). From this, the description explained how two phenomena are given in this new attitude: the actual song in perception, and the inner song in phantasy. These two phenomena are referring to each other in the sense that the actual song is the image [Vorbild] of the inner song [Abbild]; the inner song is realized in the performance which, conversely, verifies it (Chapter 2: Perceiving and Phantasizing). These two activities of perceiving and phantasizing are performed by the musician’s ego which both perceives the actual song, and perceives the possible performance in the phantasy (Chapter 3: The Various Layers of the Musician’s Ego). Afterward, the description starts focusing less on the conditions of possibilities of the apprehension of the inner song, and more on the inner song itself: the chapter explains how the inner song is constituted in the reproductive consciousness from a Ur-phantasie, how its constitution process is founded in the constitution of the primary layer of the inner rhythm, and how the inner song is
given as an embodied phenomenon thanks to the constitution not only of the musician’s Body as a type of *Wahrnehmungsleib*, but moreover of its correspondent in phantasy as a type of *Phantasieleib* (*Chapter 4: Time and Space of the Impressional and Reproductive Consciousness*). Finally, the last chapter explains the further constitution of the inner song thanks to a co-implication of the constitution of the actual song: how the inner song is awakened in consciousness through passive associations, unfolds as a co-constitution of an inner instrument with an inner melody thanks to the constitution of the musical instrument and its melody in the impressional consciousness, and keeps being refined thanks to its aesthetical contemplation (*Chapter 5: The Process of Constitution of the Inner Song through Music Practice*).

The description of the inner song that I have just outlined renews various fields of the phenomenological research. Indeed, as it focuses specifically on the rehearsing activity of the musician’s consciousness, and adopts the point of view of the artist who produces the work of art, it is not only able to propose a full understanding of the music practice process, but moreover able to uncover the role of the experience of the inner song, a specific phenomenon of phantasy never investigated until now. This phenomenological description, led by the object itself, is not only proposing an original description, but it is also the occasion of the creation of new phenomenological descriptions (for example the description of the musician’s *époque*, of the inner rhythm, or of the inner musical instrument), new phenomenological distinctions (between the perceptual Body and the specific musician’s *Body*), and notions (the notions of musician’s *attitude*, inner *pulse*, or musician’s *Body* for example).
Through that study, the main aspects of the Husserlian phenomenology are carefully analyzed, and reinterpreted. The process of the *epoché* which is the founding moment of phenomenology is studied in its particular form related to music practice; the activities of perceiving and phantasizing already described by Husserl, mostly through visual examples, are investigated together in the specific situation of music practice in which they refer to each other; some specific modes of embodiments of the ego playing music are uncovered; the awakening and unfolding of music phantasy is described; and finally, the description comes to an understanding of the further development of the perception of the possible performance in the phantasy, through the perception of the actual realization in performance, highlighting the constant co-implication between the activity of perceiving and the activity of phantasizing, as well as a temporal co-implication between the impressional, retentional, protentional consciousness, and the quasi-temporality of the reproductive consciousness.

§2. Some remaining phenomenological problems.

As I mentioned several time without truly entering into details about that, this description of the inner song, although already substantial, does not address three important aspects of the constitution of the inner song: first, the problem of the historicity of consciousness phantasizing the object, second, the role of intersubjectivity in the constitution of this phenomenon, and third the problem of the internal discourse which goes along with the work of the musician practicing with the inner song.

The first two aspects are linked. Indeed, the ego is historical in the sense that consciousness has a history, but also in the sense that it belongs to a shared history, an
intersubjective history. Husserl touches these topics in his later phenomenology, more specifically his *Crisis of the European Science and Transcendental Phenomenology* (1936). He introduces the question of history in the last paragraph of his *First Philosophy* (1923-1924) as follows:

Every *Ego* has its *history*, and it only exists as subject of a history, of its history. And every communicative community of absolute I’s, of absolute subjects – in full concretion, to which belongs the constitution of the world, has its ‘passive’ and its ‘active’ history and only *exists* in this history. *History is the grand fact of absolute being*; and the ultimate questions, the ultimately metaphysical and teleological ones, are identical with those as to the absolute meaning of history.

As he says here, consciousness *has* a history and *exists in* history. It has a history because consciousness is temporal, and it *exists* historically as part of a whole community of historical beings. The importance of that question is clear in the last sentence: it is through history that the ego exceeds its naturality, and through history that it is oriented in time.

On the one hand, the ego *has a history*, and it is in this sense that it *is* temporal. This is because the intentional consciousness is understood as a stream of lived experiences: consciousness is always given along with the depth of its protentions and retentions, and constituted as a stream flowing from a primal-impression. This primordial

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909 §28-73 dedicated to the notion of *Lebenswelt*, and more particularly starting from §53 on “The paradox of human subjectivity: being a subject for the world and at the same time an object in the world,” would be interesting to investigate that aspect of the ego of the musician and give a deeper perspective to the study on the inner song.

temporality of consciousness, and more specifically the consistency of that stream in which all objects are temporally related through succession, makes possible the recalling of past object in the present, but also the reproduction of specific possible or actual objects in the temporality of the phantasy. In the specific situation that I am studying, the history of the consciousness of the musician is this temporal consciousness phantasizing the inner song from the standpoint of its particular temporality: it is this particular stream of consciousness which offers specific possibilities of expectations, rememberings, and phantasies. As the ego is embodied, the Body also has a history. Hence, it has also a present, a retentional and a protentional dimension. This temporality of the embodied ego is founded in the inner pulse, auto-affection, which is also part of the hyletic flow, the deepest layer of consciousness. From this temporality, the ego with its living Body is constituted, with protentional and retentional possibilities, as well as a specific memory. Consciousness is able to phantasy that specific inner song because the inner song is constituted in that unique embodied temporal consciousness. That’s why my inner song of the six Bach’s Suite will never be the same of the inner song of any other musicians, and also why my inner song of these pieces years after their first learning will also be different from what it was the first time. My inner song in phantasy reflects the history of my embodied consciousness. In order to deepen the explanation of the constitution process of the inner song, it would be necessary to orient the research more specifically on that question of the historicity of consciousness, using the last Husserlian works on the structure of consciousness. I did it partly in this present dissertation, but a better understanding of the inner song would require further analysis.

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On the other hand, the ego exists in history because it exists in the objective time. This is the aspect that I totally bypassed in my dissertation. In order to address it, it is necessary to study consciousness in the perspective of the life-world, “the world constantly given to us as actual in our concrete world-life”. In other words, it is necessary to analyze consciousness not only as a consciousness constituting the world intentionally, but as a consciousness situated in the world. According to the unusual interpretation of Husserl by Laurent Perreau, consciousness is historical at three levels: it is consciousness of the past (traditional or generative consciousness); consciousness of the future (teleological consciousness); and consciousness of the present (responsible consciousness). In the particular situation that I am studying, the inner consciousness can be also described through these three layers. First, the inner song is the phantasy object of a traditional consciousness, and in order to understand that aspect, it would be necessary to investigate the socio-historical origins of the formation of meaning sedimented in the inner song. Analyzing this problem would require an attention to the problem of generativity, and how the constitution of the inner song in consciousness is

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912 Husserl, Crisis of the European Sciences and Trascendental Phenomenology, §9, h) p. 51.

913 I would be interested in crucially studying and eventually using this interpretation for the sake of the development of the description of the inner song in the ways I indicate in the present paragraph.

914 “Ainsi pourra-t-on distinguer successivement, en reprenant la lecture de ce texte célèbre: 1. Une caractérisation de la conscience historique du passé (comme conscience traditionnelle ou générative); 2. Une caractérisation de la conscience historique de l’à-vienir (comme conscience téléologique); 3. Et, enfin, une caractérisation de la conscience historique du présent (comme conscience de crise et conscience responsable. Il apparaîtra ainsi que le discours sur l’histoire est chez Husserl nécessairement distribué selon trois régimes distincts: celui de la phénoménologie générative, celui de la téléologie et celui enfin d’une crisologie, tendue entre le constat de l’existence de la crise et l’appelle au ‘Renouveau’” (Perreau, “Les modes de la conscience historique selon Husserl”).

915 Anthony Steinbock would be an interesting reference here: Cf. Home and Beyond.
impacted by the tradition (for instance, how the composer composes in a specific historical and cultural context, how the interpret learn to play the instrument from a certain tradition made of the succession of teachers and students etc.). Second, the inner song is the object of a teleological consciousness. Indeed, the phantasy is the product of a visionary consciousness in the sense that the historical depth of consciousness makes possible the formation of phantasy-expectations, tending consciousness toward a future which is not only particular, but also universal in its scope. Hence, when a musician interprets, composes, or improvises, they move the culture forward, proposing a new ways to understand the tradition, new ways to break from it, new ways to create (this is particularly interesting in the case of composition, if we observe how the great musicians both assimilate and break through tradition, thus moving history forward). Finally, the inner song is the object of a responsible consciousness in the sense that there is a responsibility of consciousness in the transmission of the past and in the opening of the future. This last aspect of the description would head toward a more ethical discussion and investigate again the problem of the relationship with the tradition, not as a passive conservation of the past, but as a reactivation of the elementary intentionality received from it. This would probably need to be stressed in distinct ways in the description of the inner song of the interpret (interpreting within a tradition distinguishing the correct from the incorrect interpretations), of the composer (inhiring their knowledge from the tradition in which they learned music), or the improvisor (improvising within a cultural tradition ruled by its own codes).916

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916 We could also argue that consciousness is historical at other levels: the level of my personal history, the level of the history of my community, and the level of the history of all of humanity, for example. These other possibilities only stress more how the description of the inner song could be deepened in this direction.
This problem of the historicity of consciousness leads to the notion of intersubjectivity. This is a burning question that I had to put aside in the description of this present dissertation, but came back multiple times. Although it is possible to study consciousness as a solipsistic consciousness, the inner consciousness is certainly not a solipsistic consciousness. In the practical situation I am studying, it cannot be ignored that the musician never learns or practice in full isolation. Thus, it is necessary to enrich the investigation of the consciousness constituting the inner song with an analysis of the problem of intersubjectivity. Husserl investigates the problem of intersubjectivity in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation, as well as in more depth in volumes 8, 13, 14, and 15 of the Husserliana. He works on the constitution of the other through the notion of pairing, and explains also how I constitute myself through the other. When the inner song is constituted in consciousness, it is always already impacted by intersubjectivity: the musician receives his or her capacity to phantasy an embodied inner song from others (the teachers or masters for instance), his or her inner song might involve inner songs of others (in chamber music, ensemble, bands, or orchestra for instance), and offers the fruit of his or her phantasy to others (the audience). The musician is therefore not phantasizing alone. Music is played with others and for others. The musician is always already part of a community of other beings. Hence, it appears that the consciousness phantasizing the inner song is intertwined with others subjects with whom it forms a community. The analysis of the inner song could therefore continue with questions like: how is the constitution of a phenomenon of phantasy, and phenomenon of the internal consciousness, intersubjective? The problem would be here the question constitution of an inner phenomenon through the other. This would engage a reflection on the
intersubjective aspect of the kinaesthetic sensations, as well as a deeper understanding of the role of intersubjectivity in the formation of the trained consciousness for instance.

These two notions, history and intersubjectivity, would provide a greater depth to the understanding of the inner song, and be the occasion to work through Husserl’s late phenomenology.

§3. From the inner song in general to the inner song in particular.

As the present dissertation focuses on a very restricted situation, there is another type of possible broadening of the investigation of the inner song. The notion of inner song comes from Gagnepain’s book From the Musician in General to the Cellist in Particular. I would like to take over that interesting formulation, in order to go now from the description of the inner song in general to the description of some particular forms of inner songs, and give directions that an extension of this present description of the inner song could take.

As I mentioned without properly elaborating it, the musician’s inner song can be related to three types of music practices: interpretation, composition, and improvisation (either interpretative improvisation or compositive improvisation). These three forms of inner song engage a different type of interplay between impressional and reproductive consciousness, and consequently also a different type of temporality.

Interpretation is a hearing through reading, it is a form of consciousness which involves a heavy work of textual hermeneutics. Many of the numerous interprets that I encountered highlight the importance of the knowledge of the context of the writing of the score in order to understand the score itself, in other words, the understanding of the score as part of a specific culture passed on from generation to generation throughout the tradition. To name only some of them, Xavier Phillips
constitution; however, it would be important to develop the specific hermeneutical aspect of the constitution process.\textsuperscript{918}

Then, composition is a form of \textit{pure phantasy} which either grows out of a perception (of the instrument, or any other form) or results in a perception (when the composer first phantasies and then verifies the inner song through performance),\textsuperscript{919} there can be a temporal gap between the formation of the phantasy and its final realization in performance; the process definitely involves intersubjectivity as the one who writes music might very often not be the one who performs it. Here, the problem of the historicity of the ego is crucial.\textsuperscript{920} Indeed, the constitution of the inner song presupposes a good knowledge of the musical instruments used in the composition with their specific

\textsuperscript{918} Some interpreters underline the specifically this closeness between their role and the role of the actor, explaining how they approach their practice in the same attitude, and even help themselves out with the reading of theater methods like the one of Stanislas Stanislavski. I think about Xavier Gagnepain (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-xavier-gagnepain/), but also Lorna McGhee (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/interview-with-lorna-mcghee-en/).

\textsuperscript{919} These two ways to start creating are underlined by the piano restorer and doctoral student in philosophy Paul Gossart (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-paul-gossart-restaurateur-de-pianos-anciens-accordeur-chercheur-en-philosophie/).

\textsuperscript{920} The Iranian-american composer Reza Vali highlights that aspect when he talks about the Iranian and western musical influences in his artworks (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/interview-with-reza-vali-en/)
possibilities (these instruments can be of any type, machine included), but not necessarily a personal ability to play each of them.

Finally, *interpretative improvisation* involves a primary hermeneutical work (the musician improvises from a theme) with then a simultaneous constitution in the impressional consciousness, whereas *compositive improvisation* involves a pure phantasy first with then this simultaneous constitution. In the last case, the inner song is realized and verified as it develops through a subtle interplay between immediate expectations and immediate rememberings of the actual impressions/retentions/protentions, reproduced in the phantasy. Even if the phantasy unfolds in the moment, the creative possibility given in the *now* lies on the previous training and therefore relies on the singular embodied cultural sedimented layers of the memory of the musician. The analysis of the

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923 The same could be said of the conductor who has an inner song made of various sonorities of instrument that they need to know without necessarily practicing them.


constitution of the inner song stressing the problem of historicity would be therefore extremely rich.926

In addition to these three forms of inner song, I would like to single out and reintroduce one type of inner song that I have been excluding from the very beginning of my study: the inner song of the singer. This type of inner song requires a specific study for two reasons: first, because the musical instrument is an organ of the musician’s Body, and second, because it involves the problem of languages. The investigation of the first aspect requires to distinguish two types of voices: the untrained voice on the one hand, and the singing voice in the other hand. In other words, the voice as an organ of the Body, and the voice as an organ of the Body shaped to be a musical instrument. In order to understand the second type of voice, it is necessary to transfer and readjust the description of the apprehension of the musical instrument to the apprehension of the voice as a musical instrument. This study, which could be based on Husserl’s Ideas 2 and the Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, would involve a deeper work on the notion of Body as a transcendent object with a sort of otherness involved in the relationship with the Body, as well as a renewed investigation of the problem of the Body sensing, capable of playing music, and therefore issuing various sonorous possibilities which are in the present case the possibilities offered by the Body itself. Concerning the problem of language, it is the second type of problem related more specifically to the specific inner song of the singer. Of course, there are lots of types of singing that do not involve words. In this sense, the analysis of language would not be essential to the

926 I started this analysis in a paper that I presented at a conference in Ascea, Italy, in October 2021.
phenomenological analysis of singing. It would rather be a tangential analysis. However, the problem of language would come through the problem of singing. It would bring in the general research on the inner song a problem that had been totally ignored in the present dissertation. This study, which could be based on Husserl’s early reflections on language in the *Logical Investigations* as well as Husserl’s analyses on poetry in *Phantasy, Image-Consciousness, and Memory*, would raise phenomenological questions related to the notions of sign, significations, and symbol, but also questions related to the problems of language or culture. In order to treat them, it would be necessary to do a specific set of interviews related to the practice of singing in the broad sense, in classical but also folk music, or liturgical music for instance.⁹²⁷

This type of renewed work on the inner song would not expand the research on specific aspects of the essence of the inner song as it is the case with the problems of history and intersubjectivity, but it would require investigating the inner song in its particular forms.

§4. Beyond the musical.

Finally, I would like to offer some perspective of the research on the inner song beyond the musical realm. Indeed, I see this description as the potential core of a broader study which could use, develop, and adjusts the distinctions and notions elaborated around the problem of the inner song, to other *praxis*.

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First of all, and as it was suggested by the Pr. Anthony Steinbock during a discussion at the SPEP Conference in November 2019, I would like to build up a description of the *inner dance* on the basis of the description of the *inner song*. I know dance through ballet, but to a lesser degree as I know music through singing and playing the cello. Developing such a description would therefore require from me a closer work with practitioners, which would probably happen through the making of a whole new set of interviews. This study could start with the renewed elaboration of the inner song oriented toward its realization through movements. It would develop more specifically the problem of the syntheses of association between the sonorous and the kinaesthetic, but the notion of *inner pulse* as the deepest layers of the temporality and embodiment of consciousness as well. The question I would raise would be the following: what kind of perception in the phantasy is in place in the consciousness of the dancer, is it a feeling of the movements, a *seeing of the realized movement* in a phenomenological phantasy spatial and temporal world, or a synthesis of association between the two?

Finally, less directly related but equally interesting, I would propose a broadening of the research of the inner song to other praxis. This enlarging of the primary research would revisit the various sections of the description of the inner song, adjusting them to the particular new situation. Hence, it would raise the problem of the artistic *epoché*, and from that, for each practice, go through the problems of the reproduction of the possible realization of the object (sculpture, ceramic, painting, theater play etc.), the role of

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928 I would meet with classical ballet dancer, but also folk, dancers, etc.

929 I already started it by interviewing the French Ceramist Emmanuel Boos (http://www.ellenmoysan.com/entretien-avec-emmanuel-boos-ceramiste/) as well as the writer and phenomenologist Florent Forestier (not published yet).
embodiment in the realization and therefore the perception of that object (what is the role of embodiment in the phantasy of a cartoon or a movie?), the constitution in consciousness of the instrument with its possibilities (is the tool of the ceramist fulfilling the same role as the musical instrument?), and then the form of interplay between the perception in the phantasy and the actual perception when it comes to the formation and the development of the phantasy object (is the oscillation of consciousness seeing the painting and phantasizing necessarily different from the oscillation of consciousness of the poet, and if yes, what are the specificities?).

§5. Pursuing the task of constituting a digital archive of interviews.

I cannot close this study without mentioning the enlarging of the set of interviews. The collecting of interviews on the inner song had been maybe the most enjoyable part of my work in the last ten years so far. The pleasure to enter in a dialogue with various practionners was absolutely unique in each encounter.

Some years ago, I thought that I had enough information on the inner song to stop that activity. However, I pursued it for the sake of adding more interviews to the collection, and for the pleasure of meeting artists, and offering their reflections to the public. Nowadays, I don’t intend to stop the constitution of that digital archive. Indeed, each interview always add something because it is the dialogue on a specific topic with the other that matters, and not gaining information about the inner song through the other.

Encountering the other and discussing the matter is an integral part of the philosophical activity. It is by doing so that one does not only learn philosophy, but also
practice philosophy, because the truth reveals itself in the intersubjective encounter.

Deeply believing in the virtue of dialogue for the philosophical activity, and in this sense going back to the original vocation of philosophy as elaborated by the Greeks, I will pursue the ongoing dialogue on the inner song in order to be able to say something about the inner song. Indeed, as Gadamer says:

A dialogue has, in theory, no end, but new elements can on the contrary always arise, and something new can always come to our mind, or as we say in German, *es kann einem etwas einfallen.* Each new idea, each unpredictable intuition, is in this sense, an opening.

I hope that this description of the inner song, and this kernel of interviews, are only the beginning of further exciting research enlarging the perspective on artistic and handcrafted creative practices.

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930 Mikhail Bakhtin (1895-1975) argues that Being is dialogically communicating, and when dialogues stop, everything stops, that’s why dialogue can and should never end (I paraphrase a quote from him cited in the following paper: Tylkowski, Irina: "La conception du dialogue” de Mikhail Bakhtine”). In the future, I would also like to develop a meta-reflection on the problem of dialogue in the constitution of the inner song, and the description of the inner song based on interviews with musicians. I would like to develop it basing my reflection on Martin Buber (1878-1965) as well as Mikhail Bakhtin whose views are very close to mine.

931 “Un dialogue n’a, en principe, aucune fin, mais de nouveaux éléments peuvent au contraire toujours surgir, et il peut toujours nous venir quelque chose de nouveau à l’esprit, ou, comme on dit encore en allemand, *es kann einem etwas einfallen.* Chaque idée nouvelle, chaque intuition subite est, en ce sens, une ouverture” (Gadamer, Poulain, and Poulain, “Interview de Hans-Georg Gadamer”).
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