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Techno-Racism: Heidegger's Philosophy of Technology and Critical Philosophies of Race

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TECHNO-RACISM: HEIDEGGER'S PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY
AND CRITICAL PHILOSOPHIES OF RACE

A Dissertation
Submitted to the McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts

Duquesne University

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By

James Taylor

December 2016
TECHNO-RACISM: HEIDEGGER’S PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY AND CRITICAL PHILOSOPHIES OF RACE

By

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ABSTRACT

TECHNO-RACISM: HEIDEGGER’S PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY AND CRITICAL PHILOSOPHIES OF RACE

By

James Taylor

December 2016

Dissertation supervised by George Yancy

Racism continues to be a pressing problem in Western Society. In some ways it even makes a great deal of sense to think about racism as a tool of political power. My dissertation explores the way in which racism is informed by the underlying social structure of whiteness, and the way that modern technology is informed by the underlying structure of the enframing. I draw on the works of George Yancy, and Cornel West to demonstrate that the everyday problems we face in racism are informed and guided by the systemic problem of whiteness. I then use the work of Martin Heidegger to demonstrate that the everyday problems that exist in modern technology are informed and guided by the systemic problem of enframing. By further demonstrating that the language of sin, as it is used in the works of Augustine, can be applied to both whiteness and enframing I show that these systems are manifestations of an underlying cultural attitude, technoracism. The original work in my dissertation involves defining the
concept of cultural attitude and demonstrating that cultural attitudes present a dominating force in how western society has thought, lived, and worked throughout history. I then argue that our current attitude is that of technoracism, and I locate technoracism at the advent of historical modernity. Technoracism can be understood as a vice that is instantiated in the historical moments of Christian Supremacy, the drive for precise scientific categories, and the emphasis on individualism. These moments arise out of the pre-rational characteristics of violent exclusivity, precise particularity, and absolute subjectivism. I ultimately conclude that an ethical resolution to technoracism is necessary. To that end I work out a virtue ethics based on the ideal of humanity as multiplicitous and lay out the virtues of religious diversity, aesthetic mystery, and community to counter the vices of technoracism. Finally, I end my dissertation by explaining how these virtues can be brought about through the practices of detachment, tarrying, vigilance, and dialogue.
DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my partner in all things Brigid, to our son Matthew, and to Della Rymer.
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Introduction

Perhaps one of the most difficult parts of any project is the beginning. Indeed, one of the problems facing this dissertation is precisely how to form the beginning of the project, especially since this project appears to be such a massive undertaking. This dissertation will cover no less than race and racism, technology and the dangers of technological advancement, and the underlying attitude which links these two spheres.

Of course it cannot be taken as a given that race and technology are related or even that they present any special problems. And while history and our contemporary moment speak to us of the problems that both have wrought, as philosophers, we must show this to be so. Both topics are clearly significant topics for philosophical analysis and discussion. Race has to do with one of the most basic ways in which human beings have been categorized. To understand the concept of race is to understand its logic, the ideas that justify race categories, and the social implications that are entailed. Therefore, race is an issue that also deals with ontology, epistemology, and ultimately ethics. Likewise, technology raises significant philosophical questions about how human beings relate to their world, how they make use of that world and what this means for their understanding of that world. Thus, technology raises issues that also deal with ontology, epistemology and ultimately ethics.

It is not enough to see these spheres as mere issues for philosophical curiosity. The questions that one poses, and the deeper issues that arise, when discussing race and technology are profoundly important because both issues raise deep ethical concerns. To demonstrate the ethical nature of race, one needs look no further than a brief study of the history of the past several hundred years. Even in our contemporary moment, race, and questions of race, continues to raise moral dilemmas and problems in society. On the other hand, technology is not always so
clearly value laden. This might be because the ethical problems it does raise are dismissed as secondary issues, or the result of ethical failures in some other sphere. Technology is supposed to be morally neutral, since it is supposed to consist of nothing more than the manipulation or use of human tools and the goals to which humans direct such tools. If technology raises any ethical concerns, then those concerns should be related to the goals that humans have in using technology or in the improper use of technology. Of course we could say the exact same thing about the issue of race. It can be claimed that there is nothing intrinsically ethically problematic about identifying or categorizing human beings according to racial types. Rather, the only problem that arises is when such types are mishandled or else made to serve some nefarious purposes. Indeed, the ethical concerns regarding technology and race seem all-too-reasonable.

For example, consider how racial classification works. If I identify someone correctly as being of Asian descent and more specifically as originating from the island regions of Japan, then I have simply made an obvious scientific observation. In short, if I claim that they are of the Asian race then I have not yet done anything wrong or even problematic, so long as my claim remains factual. Epistemological error, not ethical concerns, seems to arise only if I then draw conclusions about this person based on their race, and then the error only exists if said conclusions are the wrong ones. If I were to erroneously declare that an Asian person of Japanese descent will be a skilled harmonica player, then the mistake is that I assume that one's race has to do with one's musical talents. So long as I only draw the correct scientific conclusions from a person's race, that is, conclusions about propensities for contracting certain diseases and simple observations about "normal" height and weight ratios, then I seem to have done nothing wrong.

In the same way technology, at first, seems to pose no real ethical problems. A classic example of this would be a case of an accidental death by use of a firearm. It would be clearly
unethical to use a firearm to kill an innocent person. Yet it also seems obvious that there is nothing ethically wrong if I properly discharge a firearm at a firing range when aiming at a stationary target. The concerns raised in this second scenario are concerns of safety. A gun presents certain risks and if a person is not properly trained in the correct use of a gun then they are liable to accidentally hurt themselves or others. The same logic can be applied to driving a car or working on machines in a factory. In each case it seems that there is nothing ethically problematic in the basic use of the technological device, and that technology only becomes problematic when it serves an immoral purpose. This may occur in one of two ways: first if I use a firearm without receiving the proper training, and I know that I should receive that training, then I am being unethical, which is to say willfully negligent. Second, if I use a firearm properly but for purposes which are immoral such as the murder of a helpless person who has done me no wrong, then I am also being unethical. In the first case I am immoral by a kind of willful inactivity, in the second case I am immoral by a more common intentional evil. However, there seems to be nothing in the making, designing, or basic use of a firearm that even raises any ethical issues. In the same way race might be used to intentionally cause harm, and it may through negligence come to harm someone. Thus, we are led to casually assume that technology and race exist in a morally neutral state. Also, that any ethical inquiries are circumstantial, owing to specific cases, rather than to the fundamental nature of the thing.

The ethical implications of both technology and race need to be brought forth and uncovered. So, the first step in this dissertation is to demonstrate the extent of the ethical problems inherent in these areas – race and technology.

Although racism is commonly accepted as a moral wrong, the notion of race itself seems morally neutral, and this supposed neutrality must be investigated. We begin with racial
stereotypes as a practical catalogue for racial categories. The advantage of starting here is that racial stereotypes do not at all seem to be neutral. These stereotypes are loaded with value claims and serve to reinforce certain social norms. So if there is something inherently value laden in these types, then that might shed some light on how race itself is value laden. We begin by delineating some of those stereotypes which our contemporary western, and especially American, society makes readily available to us. One such type is "The Wigger - the white person who acts like a black person." Crispin Sartwell expounds on the nature of this stereotype in his article of the same name. He describes a television commercial in which the wigger is portrayed by "three white guys speaking in black argot and dressed in parody Hip Hop wear - sweat suits, head scarves, and sideways baseball caps...." Sartwell explains that the wigger is often portrayed ironically or sarcastically as a figure in modern American comedy, "The comic effect is achieved partly by the slight flavor of transgression that still attends the figure; the wigger plays with and in a variety of stereotypes." The point for Sartwell is that the wigger represents a notion about what it means to be black because the wigger is actually a white male. Sartwell claims that the character is almost always a male, who is simply acting black. The effect, then, is to draw forth and illuminate the stereotype of the black male as seen through the comedic lens of the sardonic white male. This is of course not the only racial stereotype available to us, and one might just as easily draw on the notion of the "day laboring immigrant" who is typically Hispanic, or even the "upper class socialite" who is typically white.

These stereotypes abound in comedy, but we also encounter them in drama and in music. Consider how the song "Lord Have Mercy on a Country Boy", presents a clear image of a poor, ostensibly white, young American male and his daily experiences of life. At the same time the song "Ridin" presents a very different figure of a poor, ostensibly black, young American male
and his struggles with racial profiling. Despite the obvious differences between these two songs, each presents very interesting profiles of race in American society.

"Country Boy" is a country song which focuses on the rural experiences of a man who remembers using guns to hunt for game, and who experienced a free and unhindered access to nature. Like other works of the genre, this song depicts the story of transition from a rural youth, to a troubled and anxious adulthood in an urban environment. The song also raises a lament for a simpler lifestyle, one which is ultimately overrun by encroaching urban advancement.⁴

"Ridin", tells a very different story. It’s a rap song which focuses on the experiences of a man who is being racially profiled by the police. While driving his car, with his tinted windows and his loud music, the police pull him over to search his car for weapons and drugs. They pull him over specifically because he is black and fits the profile of someone they think will be an easy arrest. Although the police go away without finding anything, the singer also raps about how he in fact secretly has both drugs and guns, but that he is too clever to be caught by the police.⁵

Although it may be easy to say that these songs are not about racial stereotypes but rather reflect different types of poverty from different community backgrounds, this rejoinder would be naive. Each of the recording artists in their respective songs take up a first person perspective, and the race of the recording artists becomes a major point of influence. "Country Boy" was originally sung by Don Williams, a white country singer. "Ridin" was originally performed by Chamillionaire and Krayzie Bone, both of whom are black recording artists. In neither case do the artists try to take themselves out of the music but instead they step forward as the very stereotypes about which they sing. The artist’s performance is meant, in some way, to give a presentation of a type of being white and a type of being black.
Chamillionaire’s song actually reflects an important social notion about racial stereotyping, the idea that stereotypes are wrong in one sense, but also correct in another. This reveals the basic moral tension that exists when determining whether or not race actually presents a moral issue in and of itself. We may claim that racial categories are morally neutral, but we are only able to do so as long as we maintain that these categories are correct. Although the police officers in "Ridin" are unjust in their racial profiling, even the singer admits, albeit sarcastically, that the police are incidentally correct in their assumptions, at least in this one case. But of course the singer is far too clever to ever get caught "ridin dirty", so the song becomes an anthem of empowerment even as it stands as a critique of racism. Yet it is precisely this notion that racial stereotypes are ultimately justified which opens the way to an understanding of the ethical problem with race.

Those who wish to maintain that “racial types” make good empirical or logical sense, and yet continue to criticize the use of these types as racist, will find themselves in a strange quandary. They end up encountering a serious conflict between their ethics and their ontology. This is a contradiction that they attempt to resolve by appealing to the primacy of facts over moral feelings. They claim that ethics must give way to science and truth, and if someone has ethical problems with racism then these problems simply show our ignorance. If I then racially stereotype immorally this is ultimately reduced to a problem of whether or not the racial categories are being properly or improperly applied. If racism can be reduced to a kind of childish name-calling, then all racial tensions should merely result from ignorance. The way to resolve racism is the same way we resolve any kind of ignorance, education. They who know better must instruct those who do not know any better. So racism turns out to be little more than a problem for science and logic, and not even an ethical problem at all. At least that is what we
encounter when we think about race as an everyday sort of problem, and that is how we encounter race on the lowest level of philosophical inquiry.

However, this view of racism does not even begin to explain the violence and degradation that has accompanied this notion over the years. Beatings, lynching, castration, and rape are a small sampling of the various types of violent acts that have been performed from racist intentions. Some of the most powerful examples of racism, Trans-Atlantic Slavery and the Holocaust, show us that racism involves so much more than a mere social faux pas. We may be tempted to dismiss the more extreme examples as things of the past, as anomalous, or as extreme cases of racial profiling. Yet none of these excuses quite measure up to the scope and extremity of the threat that racism presents to us. So philosophical inquiry now turns to a deeper look through the everyday problem of race, and, more specifically, down to the problem of whiteness.

We may initially say that the deeper problem of race is that racial categories identify people as fitting into types and kinds within a hierarchy. In general, this hierarchy determines that people are essentially different according to what race they are and that these differences come with certain advantages and liabilities. On the everyday level, this seems non-problematic if we assume that our racial categories are fair and balanced. The science that establishes the racial categories presumably turns a disinterested eye to the adding up of racial traits which make up the races. From a scientific standpoint, there is nothing inherently better or worse about having a greater number of “twitch” muscle fibers in your legs. If we can determine that a person should have a surplus or deficiency of these fibers, then we can better categorize their natural aptitude for certain kinds of athletic achievements. Yet we should be uneasy about the results of this kind of categorizing. This kind of racial profiling does not limit itself to what traits are useful for athletics, and what traits are appropriate for intellectual pursuits. Rather, this profiling is
absolute and it encompasses every feature of the person. The individual is swallowed up and
subsumed by their category and there are also certain categories which are valued as “better”
than others. Without engaging in pointless racial stereotyping ourselves it is not too difficult to
conjure up the ideas of certain races being “naturally gifted athletes,” or “naturally gifted in
mathematics,” or “naturally gifted in dance.” Alongside these stereotypes are the more insidious
assumptions, too. We are equally aware of the races which are typed as prone to “laziness,”
“naturally poor at driving,” “stingy with money,” or even “oversexed.”

The result of this profiling is that we tend to assign a social score to members of the races
as though they were in some kind of competition. Thus racism is obviously a system which
assigns value and significance to certain traits and practices, all the while devaluing others.
Furthermore, this racist attitude then reduces an individual to their racial traits, all the while
completely ignoring whatever accomplishments they have made as an individual. Whatever
work, sacrifices, education, dedication, and overall commitment a person has made to their
profession, they each must face the racist calculations of society. These calculations involve
evaluating people of different races as if they were better or worse than each other in virtue of
some “natural essence” which is determined by their race. It is this need to force people into the
appropriate categories which spark racist violence. The deeper problem of racism is that racism
categorizes people as better and worse, superior and inferior, and it punishes people severely for
deviating from their natural categories.

Yet in all this the one race that is conspicuously absent from the contests, and indeed the
one race which seems to have no particular traits at all, is the white race. When we chart the
history of racism we find that whiteness is originally associated with intellect, sophistication,
civilization, and having the “proper” religion. It is in the work of Hegel that we gain just such an
account of the white race, or as Hegel puts it, the Caucasian. "It is in the Caucasian race that the mind first attains to absolute unity with itself... (it) achieves self-determination, self-development, and in doing so creates world-history." Hegel is not satisfied to end the distinction there, as he further divides the Caucasian race into the Western Asiatics, which he identifies by their religion of Islam, and the Europeans which he identifies by their religion of Christianity. It is clear from what Hegel writes that Christianity is to be preferred. Hegel claims that the followers of Islam, who are unable to rationally organize the universe, are still given over to irrational drives. "So it is that here, along with the noblest sentiments, there exists the greatest vindictiveness and guile."

Yet as the years pass it becomes increasingly difficult to identify a member of this “Caucasian” race. We turn right and left and never encounter a white. Instead we encounter the Irish, the Swedish, the British, the Italian, the German, etc. but never the White. The reason for this evasiveness is that whiteness stands as the ultimate category, the standard against which all other categories are judged. This does not mean that “whites” excel in all the contests, but rather they excel in the contests that matter. Where members of the white race prove “inferior” to members of the other races, the nature of the contest itself is deemed irrelevant as a criterion upon which the distinction between “superior” and “inferior” is even necessary. Contests where a white person prove “superior” become the sorts of contests which stand as the only significant judge of what any person of any race should aspire to be. In short, whiteness exists as the social and cultural standard in terms of which we think about how others are raced. George Yancy characterizes whiteness as "the transcendental norm, the good, the innocent, and the pure, while Blackness is the diametrical opposite." Yancy claims further that whiteness is not to be found as a substance, but rather as a "relationally lived phenomenon..."
When we turn a critical eye to understanding what whiteness is, we see it stand out as a grotesque image of unfairness. Yet this sudden apparition is all-too-brief, for whiteness disappears just as quickly as it shows up. We cannot anywhere find a white. It seems that when we do run across that racist violence, which characterized racism for so long, that such violence is considered to be rare. Yes, incidents of racist violence do occur, but these incidents are viewed as outliers, since the culture on the whole is thought to have transitioned into one of tolerance and color-blindness. Now although we would be naive to think that violence motivated by racism is obsolete, whiteness on the whole tends to take a somewhat different shape in our current society. According to Shannon Sullivan, after the success of the Civil Rights movement in the 1960's there was a shift from violent white-centered oppression to a subtler mode of life. "The shift from *de jure* to *de facto* racism corresponds with a related shift from habits of white supremacy to ones of white privilege...In the early twenty-first century, white domination increasingly gains power precisely by operating as if non-existent."\(^{12}\) Whiteness still characterizes people in society in terms of their “superiority” and “inferiority,” but it now does so in subtle social ways. This is precisely why Yancy calls it the transcendental norm. Whiteness does not show up as whiteness, but rather it appears as "normal". Actors are never asked about how being "white" contributed to their landing the lead role in a film that is supposed to be about the average working class male. Musicians do not need to explain how being white contributed to their affection for the Beatles, or the Rolling Stones. A question that very few politicians ever have to answer is how being "white" contributed to their understanding of politics and American Society. Whiteness is set as the social default, and because it is the default then we are rarely aware that it exists, or even how it continues to function and operate as a controlling factor in our society.
Yet it is this elusiveness which opens the path to the greatest danger that race holds for us as human beings. Race threatens us to always see a world that is raced in terms of whiteness. Whiteness hides itself as the normative standard for society, but then everywhere we encounter people who are raced. This is true even for those who think of themselves as white. Certain styles of clothing and art identify one as non-white. There is no restaurant that serves "white food" but all serve the food of some ethnicity or geography. One can never be rich enough, or smart enough, or physically gifted enough to truly be "white", and yet that normative standard constantly presses us. Whiteness seems forever out of reach. It seems to remain always visible, but somehow perpetually unattainable. One of the facts proclaimed of George Zimmerman, the man acquitted of the murder of Trayvon Martin, was that he was "not white", but rather he was Hispanic. This fact was often claimed as evidence that the killing was not in any way motivated by race. Though one does wonder if George Zimmerman's grandparents had been Russian, Italian, German, French, or Lebanese, would people have still claimed that he was "not white"? We seemed doomed to live in a world that is defined by a default standard of whiteness, but a standard which is so intractable that no one ever appears white, and yet to be white carries with it very visible privileges. The meaning of this is profound. If our society is one that is dominated by whiteness as the transcendental norm, and if no one appears to be white, then we are all delivered over to an immovable standard. At its core, racism is the problem of identity and we find that we are forcibly identified by what we are not, that we are not "white". The tension exists between those who chase whiteness as this unattainable aspiration, and those who benefit from whiteness and also insist that they do nothing of the sort. Although whiteness is perpetually out of reach for some, for others it seems to be something they rarely, and then only with great trepidation, admit to being. In a sense, no one is truly white because there are many who are not
white enough, and those who are so white that they use their whiteness as a concealing cloak. They then mask their whiteness behind layers of class, wealth, power, and the great illusion that they have earned all that they possess.

Yet since none of us are truly white, and since our society is one ruled by whiteness, then we are living in a world where one must gain their identity and their belonging in white society by turning against themselves. In order to have an identity in a society ordered by whiteness you must abandon non-white habits or traits whenever possible. The supreme danger of race as whiteness is that we will live in a world where no one is white, but where everyone secretly wishes that they were. That is not to say that having fair skin is believed to be more desirable than having darker skin, but rather that even a person with fair skin, blonde hair, and blue eyes can be considered "non-white" if they are poor or speak with a regional dialect. The trouble with whiteness is that it becomes so all pervasive as to disappear entirely from view, because it becomes the view. Whiteness becomes the gaze of normality, and so we do not encounter it anywhere since it is right before our eyes filtering the world into white and non-white. Yet while we can see nothing else, the supreme threat of whiteness is that we will forget that whiteness is a "seeing", and that it is a process of knowing the world. It threatens to swallow up all other modes of knowing and transform even the most non-raced aspects of the world into racial ones.

But surely this is too much? After all, how can I claim that we only ever see the world in terms of race when we also see the world in terms of sex, sexuality, religion, science, or any of the other gazes that dictate our view? To answer this question, I must slightly modify my claim and say that the supreme danger of whiteness is that it does indeed swallow up all of the ways we have of seeing the world and substitute one overarching gaze in place of all others. Yet although this gaze at first appears to be the gaze of whiteness, whiteness is really just a further layer of
deception. Whiteness is a manifestation of a cultural attitude that is deeper than race, and also more insidious. This attitude manifests itself through many different ways of seeing the world, all the while attempting to reduce all of our gazes to one singular look. In order to further explain this I must now turn my attention to a different mode of seeing the world, the technological gaze.

We may now return to the question of what ethical problems technology presents for us? As previously mentioned, technology does not obviously present any real ethical dilemmas in and of itself. Indeed, it may prove difficult to even establish that technology can be viewed as a singular kind of entity. So our first step into the question of technology requires us to analyze the devices and tools which we consider to be technological.

Our primary experience of technology is that it is a simple category denoting any number of different tools, devices, and machines. All of these things appear to possess only an artificial nature in common. In the first place, technology is little more than a human creation designed to perform tasks or enable humans to carry out tasks. Technology is the computer that sits on the desk, the phone ringing down the hall, and even the pen that is used to sign a check. Thus we experience technology as an unproblematic collection of tools. Technology seems to be neutral; after all, it sits inert without any intentionality of its own. The hammer can be used to build a house, or it can be used to tear one down. A gun may be used for defense of an innocent person, or else it may be used to murder an innocent person. An airplane is a marvelously efficient means of transportation, but in the hands of hijackers it can be turned into a missile of deadly destruction. The moral conclusion of such experiences seems obvious enough. There is nothing really wrong with technology so long as it is being used “properly”, that is, so long as it is being used in the way that human society has defined for it.
Perhaps one of the best illustrations of this approach to technology can be found by examining the work of Alfred Nobel. Nobel is well known today for establishing the Nobel prizes, which award immense prestige to a few select individuals in fields such as Medicine, Physics, and in the continuing pursuit of peace. Nobel was also a famous inventor and scientist in his own right. Dynamite was his most famous invention, and Nobel initially intended his invention to be used in mining. This is evidenced from the fact that Nobel fought for control and patenting of his inventions and oversaw the use and distribution of his product to various mining and blasting companies for primarily positive purposes. The sheer power and destructive force of Nobel’s invention has often been viewed as part of the inspiration for his peace prize. Whatever part it may have played, Nobel clearly wanted to encourage the development of science for peaceful, rather than destructive, ends. He saw nothing inherently wrong with the development of powerfully destructive explosives, so long as those explosives could be put to good use. “It was the idealist in him that drove Nobel to bequeath his fortune to those who had benefited humanity through science, literature and efforts to promote peace.” Nobel would certainly have understood the potential for technology to be dangerous, but he also focused on the potential that technology had to be beneficial. By looking at Nobel’s dedication to peace and his dedication to industry we are pulled into agreeing that technology is only bad when misused and only good when properly applied. Thus technology, at first, stands over and against us as inert and morally neutral.

Despite its apparent neutrality there is a further problem which technology poses to us, as discussed in the works of Martin Heidegger. According to Heidegger, technology is not simply the threat of machines that can be misused, but rather there is something about technology itself which is threatening. Heidegger claims that technology is an attitude, and thus primarily a way of
thinking or understanding the world. “Technology is therefore no mere means. Technology is a way of revealing…i.e., of truth.”18 Heidegger claims that throughout history technology has always been a way of seeing and revealing the world. At times it has even been poetic and beautiful, but Heidegger detects something different in what he calls modern technology.19

The danger and threat of modern technology is not that it will be misused but that, as a fundamental way of thinking, it reveals a world of resources and nothing else. The technological attitude is one that is always looking at a world full of people, plants, animals, and minerals as a “nature” that is full of resources to be unlocked and stored in the most efficient way possible. Thus a mountain is viewed as potentially coal, diamonds, gold, or whatever other materials that can be mined from it. Heidegger’s term for these resources is “standing-reserve.”20 The threat of technology here is that the entire world exists only as a resource waiting to be plundered.

Now Heidegger is clever enough to understand that this plundering cannot happen without the driving force of human interaction. Technology also challenges human beings as well as nature. While humanity is using technology to reveal the resources in the natural world, technology is also revealing humanity. Heidegger explains this by introducing the notion of the “enframing”.21 We find ourselves pushing technological advancement, precisely because we have no way to stop it or are completely unaware of it. The danger of technology is that we will continue to push technological activity till everything in the world has been mined, exploited, and expedited all so that it can be stored up as energy for ever more technological activity. Even humans may be stored up as energy to drive some further technological achievement.22

This danger in technology seems to have the same characteristics as the dangers of white racism. The idea that human beings might be turned into commodities, viewed in terms of our utility, and otherwise treated as resources to be exploited or culled, is precisely how racism has
historically worked, especially white racism. Besides this there are numerous examples of how this technological attitude has long been at work. The lumber industry, the oil industry, the mining industry, and all such industries concerned with supplying energy are simply the latest examples of this enframing.

Yet even in light of this threat, Heidegger claims that there is a greater danger, the supreme danger. The supreme danger of modern technology is that this way of looking at the world completely and utterly denies every other possible truth. The supreme danger is that we forget that the technological attitude is just an attitude. We will be so busy turning the world and ourselves into resources that we will be unable to realize that the technology we created and used is just a creation. This also occurs with race, insofar as those who have invented and successfully used the racial categories seem to forget their artificial nature. Thus the origins of race and technology are concealed and covered over while both are presented as though they were part of the natural order of the universe.

Originally technology, as a way of seeing the world, was a human and social construction. It applied to some things and not others. Yet at a certain point in human history technology became central to our existence and it began to dominate all other ways of seeing the world. It is no coincidence that the birth of modern technology correlates with the birth of colonialism and racism as whiteness. While the threat of the enframing is that it creeps in upon everything, the supreme danger of technology is that it conceals its true nature from us. Thus we are left only with the everyday understanding of technology as good or bad according to its use. This also applies to race, and the everyday problem of race deludes us into thinking that we can be nice non-racist people as long as we properly apply the racial categories. And yet the thunderous moment of realization passes us by. We find ourselves in a racialized and
technological world, unable to remember how we got here and unable to discover a way out, even though we have done it ourselves.

So ultimately I argue that the problems of race and technology are two manifestations of the same root problem. In this dissertation this root problem will be continually referred to as the cultural attitude of technoracism. The everyday problem of technoracism is that we will misuse our devices and tools, be they “universal categories” or electronic machines, for social and political power. The deeper problem of technoracism is that technoracism springs from a fundamental attitude of dominance and imperialism which grows out of western “white” culture, and which always seeks to reinforce that cultural dominance. Although there have been many societies that also sought to enforce the dominance of their cultures, still the culture of whiteness is unique. It is unique in part because of its ambition, but also because the dominance of whiteness, through exact science and modern technology, seeks mastery over all aspects of the physical world. Technoracism is a cultural attitude that is forever pushing to see ourselves as masters of a natural world full of resources waiting to be exploited. Thus it is also a supremely ethical mindset, as it determines the value of all of our actions and behaviors in light of what it denotes as good.

This ethics is generally worked out in a re-evaluation of agents as objects. Technoracism sees that there is no difference between coal and those who mine it, as they are both natural resources. The more that we push to reveal the world as a resource, the more we are pushed right back to being resources ourselves. Our identity becomes completely subsumed under the process of resource gathering as we all become gatherers, and our worth becomes determined by whether or not we “make a contribution to society.” Yet just as Heidegger claims with technology, the supreme danger of technoracism is that this attitude will conceal itself so that we forget that it is
just an attitude and a way of looking at the world, while we are left to see nothing but a world of natural resources waiting to be exploited. In practical terms the results of this concealment is that the average person comes to regard the various races as “natural kinds”, and they further seek to order their life according to a model of technological efficiency. While this model makes them a productive member of society it also undermines the value of rest, art that is not entertainment, and ultimately categorizes one’s existence in terms of the “practical” and the “useless”. The exceptions to this mode are only found in those rare individuals who stand outside of, or else above and beyond, the general reach of these social norms.

Now that technoracism has been revealed as the object of my investigation I will briefly outline the course that this investigation will take in the next seven chapters. In chapter one of my dissertation, I will begin by working out a genealogy of race. This will involve tracing the roots of the concept back to its origins in seventeenth and eighteenth century European Colonialism. From there I will pay special attention to the relationship of race and the emergence of the American Nation. This chapter will also include a brief survey of the relationship of race and science, which will involve looking at how science has attempted to prove, disprove, and utilize the racial categories over the years.

This allows me to go beyond the everyday problem of racism to my second chapter and the emergence of whiteness and the non-white. This dichotomy has been present in race all along, even though it is a continually collapsing dichotomy. The white race is socially construed as “normal” and all other races are construed as abnormal. This marks “whiteness” as the invisible race. It does not show up as a race but rather as the gaze of normativity, which defines itself simply by not being anything else. This leads me to a discussion of the ultimate danger posed by racism as whiteness, that the racial category will become the only significant way of
seeing ourselves in the world. Thus we become doomed to be seen as white or not-white. But of course this is only one side of the issue of normativity, and in the next chapter I discuss how normativity takes on a different form under the guise of technology.

In chapter three, I analyze the notion of whiteness as a tool by investigating the technology of race. This will involve an examination of how Falguni Sheth argues that race can be used as a political tool of power and oppression. This examination will also involve a phenomenological approach to the subject by looking at how it is reflected in the arts. From this I will analyze the ways in which the idea of race resists rational discourse as a function of a basic cultural attitude. Since race is technological, then a full understanding of it is only possible by investigating the idea of technology, and to that end I turn my project over to Martin Heidegger’s philosophy of technology.

In chapter four, I introduce Martin Heidegger’s philosophy of technology, beginning with a brief exposition of the salient features of Heidegger’s genealogy of technology. Heidegger at first explains that we encounter two kinds of technology in human history, the handiwork and the Modern. Although handiwork technology has always been a part of humanity, “modern” technology emerges only in the past few hundred years. Heidegger explains that technology comes to exist first as a cultural attitude, which then allows for the coming forth of the exact science necessary to make complex machines. That normativity is what, to use Heidegger’s term, *challenges* us to reveal the world and all its objects as “standing reserve”, mere resources to be exploited and put into storage. For Heidegger, this attitude is a destining of being itself, revealed through the guise of modern machine technology. However, even while technology threatens to turn human beings themselves into resources this is not yet its supreme danger.
For Heidegger the greatest threat of technology is that it will conceal its true nature as a normative gaze under the mask of mere instrument. This is the gaze of the enframing, and it is the reason that we are set up and forced into this way of seeing the world. The threat is that we will only ever encounter technology as a means to our ends, and will never understand that technology is in many ways out of our hands, and operating under its own autonomic forces. Whenever we find humanity threatened in such a complete and overwhelming sense, especially by their own actions, then that threat to humanity has become a sin.

In chapter five, I turn from examining technology and race as normative, to understanding them as sins. To that end, I will begin with an analysis of religious language. This analysis will demonstrate how religious language can hint at the foundation of modern technology and racism in the common cultural attitude of technoracism. This will involve looking at Augustine’s views of the two different kinds of sin, the religious and social. To sin against God would be to commit a sin that is religious in nature by loving the lesser goods of the world more than the great good of God. To sin against society is to elevate one’s own importance over the importance of maintaining social unity. Racism as whiteness can be understood as a sin against society, as a sin against the people it seeks to define. Whiteness is also a religious sin, as the sin of idolatry. It asserts itself as the supreme category by which all people are to be judged, and in so doing causes a disordered state of values in our intentions. Modern technology as the enframing can also be understood as a religious sin. It takes no care for the world and retains no respect for it, and so it too operates as a kind of idolatry in asserting its supremacy over every other consideration. It can also be understood as a social sin, especially since the supreme danger in it consists in how it closes humans off to every other kind of knowing. By looking at whiteness and enframing through the lens of sin we see that they operate in the same fashion.
The problems of the enframing and whiteness are manifestations of an underlying cultural attitude, the attitude of technoracism. This attitude is the fundamental cultural attitude which holds sway in our contemporary society.

Chapter six formally introduces and explains the concept of technoracism. I will argue that there exists a cultural attitude, technoracism, which exists logically prior to whiteness and modern technology. A cultural attitude contains both discursive and non-discursive elements, so it is both rational and also pre-rational insofar as it defines its own conditions for rationality. I will then argue that technoracism is such a cultural attitude and that it is in fact the true cultural attitude which underlies both whiteness and the enframing. I will show that technoracism is the cultural attitude which comes to predominate in most aspects of European society at the start of the modern age, roughly the late sixteenth century. Technoracism is instantiated discursively by a shared Christian European cultural identity, an emphasis on reason and universal categorization, and the assertion of the value of the subject as individual. It is characterized by the non-discursive aspects of violent exclusivity, precise particularity, and absolute subjectivism. Technoracism arises from the historical and emotional conditions of fear and paranoia and it is an attempt to resolve those feelings. In my analysis of the discursive and non-discursive elements of technoracism, I will determine that an ethical resolution to this attitude must also involve both discourse and non-discourse. In order to resolve the tension of technoracism we must undo it in all of the various ways that it has been done. This leads to my last chapter, the discussion on virtue ethics.

The final chapter explores the possibility of an ethical resolution to technoracism by means of a virtue ethics of multiplicity. By translating the language of discourse into education and non-discourse into habit, I will have the foundations of a virtue ethics for resolving
technoracism. I will offer a brief analysis of virtue ethics from Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*. I will determine that the human ideal should be best understood as the ideal of multiplicity. Even in the most rigorously constructed of human identities there arises a tendency to define ourselves in terms of a vast diversity of concepts, entities, beliefs, practices, desires, and relationships. This will enable me to define three virtues which oppose the three main characteristics of technoracism. I will present the virtues of religious diversity, aesthetic mystery, and community as the virtues which can counter the effects of technoracist conditioning. Since virtue is acquired through practice, then I must also set out and describe those four different practices which will help to bringing about the virtues of multiplicity. This will lead to a discussion of how the practices of detachment, tarrying, vigilance, and dialogue can begin to bring about the ideal of multiplicity through the creation of its virtues.

Now that the beginning is complete we are ready for the first chapter, the genealogy of race.
Chapter 1 – Genealogy of Race

If the concept of race truly seems to present a problem on so many levels then perhaps the best solution would be to do away with it. If we just all agreed to stop using the concept and classifying each other into races then perhaps we could resolve the ongoing historical legacy of racism and the terrible violence associated with it. On the other hand if we try to eliminate the concept of race we must not eliminate our knowledge of the history and the evolution of the concept. That history must be investigated if we ever hope to have a workable ethical solution to this problem. So for now, we should place in abeyance the idea of eliminating the concept of race, even as we fight against how it continues to create so much misunderstanding, hatred, and violence. We should also keep in mind that eliminating the concept of race by fiat will not be an easy task.

In this first chapter, I begin by working out a genealogy of race.

1 This chapter begins with a brief discussion of the method of genealogy as conceived by Friedrich Nietzsche. In order to use the method we will begin by tracing the concept of race back to its origins in seventeenth and eighteenth century European Colonialism. We will look at the origins of the concept in the writings of Francois Bernier, Immanuel Kant, and Johann Herder. Bernier is credited as the originator of the concept of race. Kant was the first to present a science of race and resolve some of the initial intellectual difficulties that had already arisen with the concept. Herder was the first real critic of the concept, although ultimately he still favored similar notions. Yet rather than continuing on to the next historical figure in what would be a long history, this chapter will instead go behind the origins of race to the social conditions which made such a notion possible. Those social conditions are the advent of the scientific revolution and the creation of the scientific method. The concept of race clearly arises in the eighteenth
century and can be linked to the preceding seventeenth century Cartesian, scientific, and Eurocentric view of the world. Since this view of the world is concerned with mastery, then the idea of race begins within the context of race deployed as a tool of mastery, that is, racism and especially white supremacy. In turning to investigate the rise of white supremacy, we then look at the work of Cornel West. He argues that white supremacy first emerges through the area of natural history with the invention of the category of race as a means of classifying human beings. White supremacy then becomes further solidified with the introduction of pseudo-sciences like phrenology and physiognomy. Yet those pseudo-sciences owed more to the sentiments of Europeans who idealized a certain kind of classical Greek and Roman form of humanity in their artwork. The rise of white supremacy made the concept of race possible both in terms of the pragmatic value of race for colonizing, and in terms of the methodological value of race as a scientific category for “understanding” humans. Quite beyond the origins of the concept of race, and the idea of race as a simple category, the understanding of race leads on to the deeper problem of whiteness.

We begin with the notion of genealogy as a method, and how this involves history and philosophy in a unique sense. The origins of the genealogical method itself should be attributed to the writings of Friedrich Nietzsche, and his work *On the Genealogy of Morals*. The defining feature of this text involves Nietzsche’s attempt to trace the origin and development of the idea of morality. Nietzsche wanted to show that the simple moral notions of good, bad, evil, etc., had their origins in certain kinds of historical movements. His starting point is an etymological survey of the word good and its origins in various languages. Nietzsche’s project presents a critical understanding of morality as historically developed, without necessarily referring to the influence of any specific historical events. History is to be understood, not as a timeline of
various moments, but more as the fluid working out of various human ideas. Thus a genealogy will do several things. First, a genealogy is critical and it aims to uncover the hidden assumptions and structures of a concept, especially when that concept has become mired in cultural myths or obscured by scientific methodology. Second, a genealogy charts the history and development of a concept. It does this while paying special attention to the origins of the idea and how the original meaning still pervades throughout its developmental stages. Finally the goal of a genealogy is to reveal how the concept under consideration informs and creates the contemporary societies in which we live, and attempts to show how a particular concept, say, race, can obfuscate its origins.

Thus a genealogy of race will prove essential to understanding the problems of racism which we face in our own society. In order to grasp how we can resolve race as an ethical problem we must first explicate its hidden meanings, its tangled history, and its complex agendas. To that end it is also helpful to consider that we are performing a genealogy of race in much the same way that Cornel West explains it in his book *Prophesy Deliverance*. “I call this inquiry a ‘genealogy’ because, following the works of Friedrich Nietzsche and Michel Foucault, I am interested in the emergence (*Entstehung*) or the ‘moment of arising’ of the idea of white supremacy within the modern discourse in the West.” Following Cornel West, then, we too must think about race through the lens of genealogy. As an everyday phenomenon, race presumes to function as a scientific category used to define the apparent physical differences between various groups. So an investigation and genealogy of race must involve a questioning of the origins of the scientific discourse which defines race in the first place. West characterizes the driving force behind race as deriving from a supreme notion of rational ordering. “To put it crudely, my argument is that the authority of science, undergirded by a modern philosophical
discourse guided by Greek ocular metaphors and Cartesian notions, promotes and encourages the activities of observing, comparing, measuring, and ordering the physical characteristics of human bodies." This ordering force points both to the origin and the goal of race, and will ultimately lead us to an understanding of the notion of race as whiteness, and how whiteness is the site of the supreme gaze of normality.

Before we can trace the origins of the history of race, we must address a potential objection. The objection is that such a history is either impossible or else it is a history that is inclusive of the whole of humanity. The claim is that human beings have always been racist, and that historical examples of this racism can be cited. One of the simplest examples of this line of thinking can be found in an etymological survey of the word “barbarian.” In modern usage, the word has a pejorative connotation and is used to refer to foreigners who are so different from ourselves as to seem monstrous in their habits and cultural practices. Barbarism is synonymous with brutality, and with strange acts of violence for which those “barbarians” seem to have no moral qualms. The Oxford English Dictionary informs us that historically this word derives from an ancient Greek word which was used to denote foreigners who did not speak Greek. This word was then later used to denote anyone outside of the Roman Civilization, then the medieval Christian Civilization, and so on throughout the ages. This, or so the argument would go, is proof enough that the idea of race is an old one. It is presumed that the Greeks and Romans thought of their neighbors and enemies as being members of other races. Yet we should not be so quick as to include other forms of discrimination as racial in nature. The idea of race is something unique in the history of the world, and it has a relatively recent origin.

The first person to use the term race to define “a major division of humanity displaying a distinctive combination of physical traits transmitted through a line of descent...” was Francois
Bernier. In 1684, Francois Bernier anonymously published *A New Division of the Earth*. Robert Bernasconi and Tommy Lott comment that Bernier was a remarkable world traveler and that he is the first person to use the term race to define the various peoples he encountered in his travels.

Although in the exterior form of their bodies, and especially in their faces, men are almost all different one from the other, according to the different districts of the earth which they inhabit, so that those who have been great travelers are often never mistaken in distinguishing each nation in that way; still I have remarked that there are four or five species or races of men in particular whose difference is so remarkable that it may be properly made use of as the foundation for a new division of the earth.7

Bernier’s treatise is quite short and a thorough analysis of it is unnecessary, but a few points are worth mentioning. It is important to note that Bernier’s expressed aim is geographical categorization, not of human beings but of the earth itself. His breakthrough is that the various “races” of humanity seem to be unique to certain geographic locations of the world. Thus a clever new way to classify a landmass or country would be according to the race of people one finds living there. To his credit Bernier did, by all accounts, visit many of the regions and peoples he is describing so that his system seems to be driven only by his own curiosity, rather than some political agenda.

The second point to be made about Bernier’s treatise is that the most obvious categorization on which he hits is the primary difference between black and white.

For although the Egyptians, for instance, and the Indians are very black, or rather copper-coloured, that colour is only an accident in them, and comes because they are constantly exposed to the sun…What induces me to make a different species of the Africans are…the blackness which is peculiar to them, and which is not caused by the sun…for if a black African pair be transported to a cold country, their children are just as black….8

Elsewhere Bernier describes the peoples who are native to areas like Japan and China as, “truly white”.9 Bernier describes many physical traits, and it is clear from the beginning that the defining aspect of race cannot be reduced to mere skin color. Rather it is *natural* skin color that defines race. In analyzing Bernier’s work we need the historical context, and also the
philosophical context of the natural kind. Bernier easily dismisses the blackness of the Egyptians since they are not *naturally* black, but the blackness of the Africans is part of their nature since when they are forcibly removed from their country their blackness does not fade, nor does the blackness of their children.

The final point that needs to be made about Bernier’s account of race is that it involves more than just the European gaze, it also involves the male gaze. Bernier also undertakes to determine whether or not the women of the various races can be considered beautiful. Some women Bernier finds to be beautiful, despite their race, since they seem to be exceptionally unlike the rest of their people. Others are handsome precisely because they are exotic and strange, and still others are beautiful because they resemble women from France or other parts of Europe. It is also worth noting that many of the women that Bernier describes are being sold into slavery, or else have already been slaves. “I have seen at Moka many quite naked for sale, and I may say that I have never seen anything more beautiful; but they were very dear, for they wanted to sell them three times dearer than the others.” Bernier’s observation is important; the monetary value of these women is determined by their beauty and attractiveness to those men who buy and sell them. Thus the implications for many of these beautiful slaves seems to be that these women are to be sold into sexual slavery, hence their great value. It is important to point out that the gaze that categorizes, stacks, measures, and gauges is also the gaze that determines value. Bernier is deeply interested, not perhaps in acquiring any of these women for himself, but certainly in assigning worth and significance to them based on how attractive he finds their bodies. The gaze which determines race is necessarily an evaluative one, and it is no mere scientific curiosity.
Bernier makes a major mistake when he conflates the notion of species and race. Modern science is easily able to distinguish the difference between an ape and a human being, and then further between someone raced as white as opposed to someone raced as black. So a further investigation of the origin of the scientific idea of race is required. Before we can begin to ask ethical questions, and indeed Bernier’s work brings up several, we must arrive at that idea of race which creates the everyday problem of it. So to that end we must look to the work of the philosopher who began the Copernican Revolution in philosophy, Immanuel Kant.

In *The Idea of Race*, Bernasconi and Lott comment that, “One finds in Kant not only a clear and consistent terminological distinction between race and species that was lacking in his predecessors but also an insistence on the permanence of racial characteristics across generations.” Kant resolves the puzzle of the relation of species and races. He is also able to explain why race seems to be both environmental in origin, but nonetheless resistant to assimilation into new environments.

“To many observers in the eighteenth century, it seemed that if environment accounted for the races, then whites who moved to America or Africa would, after a number of generations, take on the characteristics of Native Americans or Africans…By arguing that the original human beings carried the seeds of all four races, that one of those seeds was actualized as a result of environmental conditions, and that there could be neither a reversion to the original stem nor a change to another race, Kant provided an…explanation.”

In 1775, Immanuel Kant published *Of the Different Human Races*, an essay which he revised and expanded to be republished in 1777. We also have in Kant a scientific account of the origins of the various races, as well as a simplified and streamlined vision of only four basic races. Although Bernier lists at least five races, he really only displays confidence in the diversity of the first three, using the last two to explain the existence of unique groups of people who he could not easily class with the other groups. What we will investigate in Kant’s essay is his
understanding of the difference between species and race, his characterization of the four races, and the arguments he uses to attempt to prove the “natural superiority” of the white race.

Kant begins his essay by explaining that all humans are of the same species but are not all from the same race.

…Buffon’s rule, that animals that produce fertile young with one another belong to one and the same physical genus (no matter how dissimilar in form they may be), must properly be regarded only as a definition of a natural genus of animals in general…all human beings on earth belong to the same natural genus because they always produce fertile children with one another…14

In fact Kant’s assessment here is so obvious to the contemporary mind that it seems remarkable that such a claim would ever have needed to be proven. However, for Kant the human ability to reproduce is perhaps the only universally human trait, and Kant now needs to make sense of the vast differences which seem to occur between the various distinct groups of humans. “At long last, then, the condition of the earth (dampness or dryness), along with the food that a people commonly eat, eventually produces one hereditary distinction or stock among animals of a single line of descent and race, especially with regard to their size, the proportion of their limbs (plump or slim), and their natural disposition.”15 For Kant, as well as for Bernier, race is a matter of nature, although Kant has a more detailed explanation of that nature.

This idea of one hereditary stock is precisely what is meant by the notion of race, so in one sense race is initially explained by a combination of environmental influences and selective breeding. “Those features that belong to varieties – which are, therefore, by themselves hereditary…can, through marriages that always take place within the same families, even produce, in time, something that I call the family stock.”16 Now Kant is not nearly as radical as some of his contemporaries. According to Kant, Maupertuis argued that the family stock could be used to control the selective breeding which supposedly creates races in the first place.
Maupertuis wanted to selectively breed a superior stock of humans within any race which had the features of intelligence, hard work, and good morals. Kant comments on this when he writes: “His (Maupertuis) view rests on the possibility that an enduring family stock might eventually be established through the careful selection of the degenerate from the normal births.”¹⁷ Yet Maupertuis’ program of eugenics is not completely original. The basic idea of creating a superior population through selective breeding certainly goes all the way back to Plato’s *Republic*, if not further. Though what makes Maupertuis’ plan unique is that the science of race seems to make a program of eugenics ever more feasible. Plato’s plan for a perfect society may have involved selective breeding, but Plato is rather vague on how this is to be done. After all, the selective breeding program in the *Republic* is to be carried out on one’s own population. Maupertuis’ plan seems designed to be carried out on other populations so as to create that trifecta of European civility: intelligence, hard work, and manners.

Kant does not share Maupertuis’ optimism, and instead he thinks that it is likely that the natural process which brings races about might be far too complex to be co-opted by human plans. Yet before one begins to praise Kant for his refusal to participate in genetic manipulation, we should see why he thinks such a scheme will not work. “I think, however, that even though such a scheme is, strictly speaking, certainly practicable, nature, in its wisdom, acts to hinder it rather well. This is because major driving forces lie even within the mixing of evil with good that set the sleeping powers of humanity into play. These forces require that human beings develop all of their talents and approach the perfection of their calling.”¹⁸ Kant disagrees with Maupertuis, not because genetic manipulation is morally wrong, but because it is inherently difficult. Kant explains that nature is already working to produce distinct races, and so a person would have to work rather hard against the natural world to make such a scheme work. So in
principle Kant agrees with Maupertuis that such a feat is possible, but it seems impractical. In short, nature has already conditioned certain races so that it would be quite difficult for members of those races to become intelligent, hard-working, or well-mannered, at least not to the level of those other races which are naturally suited for it.

Having established for Kant that nature determines the races, we should turn now to what races it has established. Kant describes the four basic family stocks, and his four basic races. “I believe that we only need to assume four races in order to be able to derive all of the enduring distinctions immediately recognizable within the human genus. They are: (1) the white race; (2) the Negro race; (3) the Hun race (Mongol or Kalmuck); and (4) the Hindu or Hindustani race.”

Unlike our contemporary assumptions, the white race is much more inclusive for Kant. It contains the Europeans, Moors, Arabs, Turkish-Tartars, Persians, and any other Asian peoples who do not fit into one of the other races. Although a thorough accounting of Kant’s races is not necessary, it is important to investigate Kant’s two basic races. Kant’s entire argument for this consists of one sentence. “The reason for assuming that Negroes and whites are the base races is self-evident.” When we seek his reasons or his method, all he has to say is that the reason is “self-evident”. Yet we must have a clearer explanation. If indeed there are only two basic races, then Kant will have to do slightly better than “self-evident”.

The answer may be found in Kant’s account of how the races come to develop. “The causes lying in the nature of an organic body (plant or animal) that account for a specific development are called seeds when this development concerns a particular part of the plant or animal. When however such development only concerns the size or the relationship of the parts to one another, I call them natural predispositions.” Kant’s terminology appears to form the philosophical precursor to the science of genetics. Well before Darwin, the idea that different
species could adapt themselves to different environmental conditions was already in the works. The basic idea is that there are pure natural kinds of different animals and plants, but that owing to the need to survive in climates which are foreign from one’s original habitation, one finds that these pure kinds must adapt and evolve. Of course Kant stresses that such adaptation must in fact be evidence of a special act of creation, rather than some chance mechanism. Yet this does more than merely defend God’s involvement in nature. This idea places even more emphasis on the notion of natural kinds, even going so far as necessary natural kinds. For Kant each adaptation is not foreign to a creature but is in fact always beneficial, “Such development makes it possible for things to turn out well for the creature and for it to preserve itself continually.” Now the human races come about in the same way, so that there must have been some kind of pure basic human being which has adapted to various environmental conditions so as to better survive. These adaptations over the years resulted in the four basic races and all their variations.

Here we will take a moment and bring up a few details which Kant uses to prove his theory on how the races develop. He remarks how Native Americans are not a fully formed race and then uses this evaluation to explain why they make very poor slaves since they seem to lack the physical endurance which Negroes naturally possess. He lauds the strength and agility of Negroes while at the same time explaining that the excess iron in their blood is what gives them their black color and is also the cause of their bodily odors, “which explains why all Negroes stink”. Indeed, Kant even accounts for the common illnesses of Asian-Indians as resulting from their inadequate racial adaptation, rather than any cultural practices or direct environmental factors. Given that Kant explains race in the context of slavery and colonialism it is important to remember that his conception of race is not simply a finding that results from an objective curiosity, but is also politically situated.
Having explained the origins of the races, Kant turns to define the pure kind of the original human. “We must conclude that this lineal root genus is already extinct or that we can find evidence of it among the existing stock, from which we can generally construct a comparative account of the lineal root genus.” Kant dismisses the idea that the root genus still survives, especially since all of those original humans had to adapt to varying environments and extreme conditions. Yet there is a part of the world which Kant thinks still retains the ideal weather conditions. In that special climate the humans who live there have needed to adapt very little, and are thus very close to the root genus. In true scientific form Kant gives the geographical coordinates for this region, rather than simply declaring where it is outright. “The only part of the earth that we can justifiably think to have the most fortunate combination of influences of both the cold and hot regions is the area between 31 and 52 degrees latitude in the old world (which also seems to deserve the name old world because of the peoples that inhabit it).” Incidentally, the area which Kant has marked out denotes the southern and northern limits of the continent of Europe. His justification for this rationale includes not only the climate of Europe, but also the European propensity to colonize. Europeans seem to be “already well-prepared to be transplanted into every other region of the earth.” Thus due to the ideal European climate and the apparent success of European colonization, Kant concludes that the lineal root genus was white with brown hair. He goes on to claim that the first deviation from this is the white and blonde race, which Kant states is native to northern Germany. All of the other races clearly descended from the lineal root genus. Kant even laments the fact that the noble blonde race has been unable to develop entirely on its own due to “interbreeding with alien stocks….” So the original humans were apparently white, and the first racial variation of this
purity was an improvement. Since then subsequent racial variations served only to taint the
development of the blond race with their alien stock.

So it seems that the origin of race begins with whiteness. While Bernier was content to
describe the races Kant determines the scientific justification for race, and it seems to begin with
the pure European White. It is rather telling that Kant justifies the “purity” and “supremacy” of
the white race based on the success of colonization. How else would Kant be able to provide
solid evidence for the originality of whiteness unless he could say: “See? Whites can adapt
themselves to every other environment on earth and there they may thrive and continue to build
their great civilizations!” The same cannot be said of Native Americans. Kant found them far too
weak for field work, that is, forced field work, and he thought they were a people who were only
half-alive. Writing of the Black race, Kant praises them for their strength and at the same time
chastises them for their laziness.\(^{30}\) He justifies this by claiming that Africa is a land that is so-
well supplied in natural resources as to make the inhabitants lazy. If this is even remotely
accurate, then it would seem that Africa has a better climate than Europe. Kant might explain this
away by agreeing with Maupertuis and argue that “hard work” is an essential feature of a noble
and good people.\(^{31}\) Writing of the white race Kant claims that they alone possess the natural
features of intellect, work ethics, and an industrious morality. He claims that these features are so
natural to the white race that the attempt to cultivate them in other races must necessarily fail
since nature itself will not allow it.\(^{32}\) It would seem from this that Kant has no moral problem
with the eugenics which he earlier dismissed. Instead, he thinks that one cannot fight or reform
one’s true nature as raced. For Kant, race becomes destiny, and all that we are capable of
becoming is contained within the seeds and natural predispositions of our race.
By examining Bernier and Kant we have seen the how the everyday problem of race emerges as a search for a proper identification and categorization of the apparently different humans in the world. Yet this search leads inexorably to the problem of race as whiteness. It is easy enough to understand that European intellectuals of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were trying to make sense of the vast diversity of peoples and civilizations beyond their own. It is also worth mentioning that explorers and conquerors had been “dealing” with the problem as far back as the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Yet if we can trace the origin of the idea of race to these European intellectuals then the everyday problem of race seems to emerge with grand simplicity. The everyday problem of race is how best to categorize people, and so this inspires the European to first ask “what are you?” of the other. This must be the case since once I understand fully what you are, then I will be capable of knowing how I ought to treat you. This categorical curiosity is the very basis for almost all scientific inquiry, especially since observation and understanding of natural entities must lead to application. This quest for a category turns from initial curiosity into a desire for control. Then that objectifying gaze which first emerged in Europe and seeks to order the world, is the same objectifying gaze that is complicit in the ordering of people according to the concept of race. Yet this gaze is never a mere curiosity. Science is always looking for clear and practical solutions to its various problems, solutions which will give way to technologies. So this applies to the everyday problem of race, since the idea of race begins as a quest for identity. The concept of race begins as a scientific pursuit of truth and knowledge, an epistemological quest for certainty about one’s neighbors, as well as oneself. Indeed, the initial developments of the idea of race follow these lines of scientific inquiry, and the idea takes on a different form of violence than the one practiced by medieval conquerors and explorers.
Race begins as a scientific category that is meant to denote the diversity and variety of humanity into distinct, and altogether separate, groups. Thus the everyday problem of race, the quest for proper human categories, begins right along with the birth of the concept of race itself. From the start we struggle with how to properly identify and apply race in the various peoples of the world. For example, Bernier struggles with how best to categorize the inhabitants of the nations of Japan, China, and the Philippines since they are all “truly white; but they have broad shoulders, a flat face, a small squab nose, little pig’s-eyes long and deep set, and three hairs of a beard.” When Bernier encounters their whiteness what can he do, since he already knows they may be truly white, but that doesn’t seem to make them really white in the same way as Europeans. He decides to focus on other features in order to create a proper category for these people who are not really white, despite their appearance. It is telling that he resorts to language that describes animals in order to define and describe the peoples of this non-white race. We see that what is at stake in categorizing those other types of humans is the necessary work of dehumanizing them. Bernier no doubt reasons that if these others were truly human, as we ourselves must be, then they would be exactly like us and not look like inhuman animals.

In trying to properly apply our understanding of the racial categories, the problem which first appeared to be value-neutral now shows itself as ethical. There is a profound undercurrent of paranoia and violence in the notion of race. Bernier and Kant both describe how the notion of race seems to provide a logical justification for slavery. Bernier explains that the women of those other races who are beautiful are understandably enslaved because of their beauty. Kant explains why Native-Americans make poor slaves and why Negroes make superior slaves, at least when it comes to fieldwork. Not only were the horrific practices which these two thinkers described in themselves abhorrent, the casual manner in which they talk about such practices
should make us pause. Still, perhaps the conceptual mistakes that Bernier and Kant committed regarding their use of race could be corrected if someone had resolved their improper identification of the races with identifications which were more accurate. Consider the work of Johan Gottfried von Herder.

According to Bernasconi and Lott, if Kant was the first to truly invent the scientific notion of race, then Johan Gottfried von Herder was the first to deny it. In 1784, Herder published *Ideas on the Philosophy of the History of Humankind* in which he simply rejects the notion of dividing people into races. Herder instead favors a division into what he calls peoples and this is in some way quite different than the concept of race. Herder “maintained that every nation contributed to humanity and thereby provided the framework from which to argue that any action…that interfered with that people’s capacity to fulfill its historical mission is destructive of humanity as a whole.” Herder takes great pains to communicate that there are variations of Negroes that are not ugly, not stupid, with an olive rather than black complexion, and whose hair is “but little wooly”. Of course this account also shows that he thinks there are some Negroes who in fact have all of those traits. Despite succumbing to the racism he is trying to critique, it is at least clear that Herder is doing his best to counter the already strong racial stereotypes which persist about the inhabitants of Africa. He details the various scientific reasons which can account for almost all of the superstitions and facts which apply to the notion of the African race. Herder also attributes the key racial marker, skin color, to little more than prolonged environmental exposure to wind and sun. In some ways at least Herder is a kind of apologist for those people whom Kant deems inferior.

However, even Herder, through our contemporary lights, seems to have been blinded by certain racist stereotypical assumptions. A key function of Herder’s understanding of Africans is
his claim that they are somehow more sexualized than Europeans. Herder begins by explaining
the apparently more sensuous body parts of Africans. He writes, “According to various
physiological observations, the lips, breasts, and private parts, are proportionate to each other;
and as Nature…must have conferred on these people, to whom she was obliged to deny nobler
gifts, an ampler measure of sensual enjoyment, this could not but have appeared to the
physiologist.”\(^{40}\) The argument is deeply problematic, but Herder aims to show that the Negro has
been “naturally gifted” to enjoy sensuality simply because it is the experience of sexuality which
most makes the Negro happy. The argument is teleological, and seeks to prove that certain “body
types” (for example, the Negro body) are better equipped, naturally, to be sexual. To his credit,
instead of conceptualizing Negro sexuality in negative terms, Herder argues that these “facts”
indicate a kind of natural superiority, at least in the practice of sexual pleasure. Yet it must be
admitted that Herder is arguing that this natural sexuality is present in people who lack the
“nobler gifts”. It seems clear that Herder is convinced that natural sexuality is inferior to other
more advantageous natural abilities.

Part of the cost of this thinking is that the African loses intelligence, and this is due to
nature’s ability to counterbalance the environment with its inhabitants. Herder supposes that
since Africa is so rich in resources that a “finer intellect” would have been unnecessary, and
instead nature compensated by making stronger bodies which were naturally as fruitful as the
land they occupied.\(^{41}\) On this point, strangely, Herder and Kant are in agreement. We have to
pause here and try to remind ourselves that Herder is at least attempting to counter many Kantian
assumptions regarding the concept of race. Hence, he challenges some of the racist notions held
regarding people who inhabit Africa. Yet if this is his goal then why does his approach serve to
refute one stereotype while maintaining another? Herder seems to be no better for praising the
supposedly “natural” sexuality of the Africans rather than condemning it. Herder also agrees
with Kant that Africa’s rich resources inspires a natural kind of laziness in its inhabitants. Still,
he does disagree with Kant on some aspects and this brings us to understand that the original
racial identities were never completely agreed upon in this early scientific speculation. Kant
disagrees with Bernier, Herder disagrees with Kant, and Kant also disagrees with Herder. There
is no simple consensus on the proper identification of the peoples of Africa or Europe.

Yet a look into the work of Herder reveals that the philosophical issues which surround
race seem to exist even before the concept has been formally discussed. It is easy enough to see
that the types and categories that Herder uses to try to identify and distinguish Europeans and
Africans are neither more nor less racist than the categories of Kant or Bernier. Herder may be
more sympathetic to the peoples of Africa but he directs the same quantifying gaze over them. In
Herder’s attempt to explain how the African might understand the European he applies the same
structures and categories. He assumes quite simply that the African must understand the
European in precisely the same way that the European understands the African.

The characteristics of this bias are easy enough to analyze when reading Herder’s thought
experiment on how the African might view the European. “Since whiteness is a mark of
degeneracy in many animals near the pole, the negro has as much right to term his savage
robbers albinos and white devils, degenerated through the weakness of nature, as we have to
deem him the emblem of evil, and a descendant of Ham, branded by his father’s curse. I, he
might say, I, the black, am the original man.”

Although in one sense Herder seeks merely to humble Kant by proposing that Africans might have a similarly bad opinion of Europeans from
their perspective as Africans, this argument goes further. It reveals, in one sense, how Herder
understands the steps of the normative gaze. First, in order to identify the other it is necessary to
assume of ourselves a kind of primary importance. I am the measure by which I may judge all others. Second, my primary source of ideas and information are the “natural observations” I make of those who inhabit my world. Thus, when I observe the natural world from the position of assuming myself as the primary and first kind, I easily deem all others to be inferior, if not threatening, to my own original “purity.” Herder, while only inviting us to engage in a thought experiment, seems to indicate that such a discursive strategy is in fact universal. Yet why on earth should I assume that a discourse which identifies myself as “normal”, and through observation identifies all the rest of the world as other, is to be expected from other peoples? Perhaps because I have already assumed that this stance is normal since I operate within a normative framework for understanding the world, the framework of whiteness. This problem of whiteness then is the deeper problem of race, and it hides behind the everyday problem of race as identification, since even in Herder we are already looking at others from the perspective of a normalizing gaze, the white gaze.

At this juncture, having gotten a sense of the emergence of the concept of race, it is important that we explore the normalizing gaze of European whiteness and how it is directed towards a world of “objects” whose natures are then measured against the European notion of the “self” as primary. So we must step back behind the notion of race as identification in order to determine how the deeper problem of race as whiteness first emerges.

The easiest place to begin is with the concept of the European “self,” which seems to be linked with the advent of the scientific revolution. Cornel West writes, “The scientific revolution is noteworthy… primarily because it signified the authority of science. This authority justified new modes of knowledge and new conceptions of truth and reality; it arose at the end of the era of pagan Christianity and set the framework for the advent of Modernity.” West identifies the
scientific revolution as beginning in the seventeenth century with thinkers like Galileo, Copernicus, and Rene Descartes. It is not surprising then that near the end of the seventeenth century Bernier publishes his book on how the world might be geographically ordered by race. Bernier sees race as the latest scientific breakthrough in how one might go about structuring the geography of the world. West goes on to argue that this scientific revolution is significant in determining a genealogy of race because of its two most fundamental methodologies, that is, “observation and evidence.” The scientific method depends on the presumed validity of determining truth by making observations about the world and determining that such observations stand as facts which are reliable.

This new scientific method formed a further basis for a revolution in philosophy, and this is especially demonstrated in the works of Rene Descartes. West claims that, “Descartes is highly significant because his thought provided the controlling notions of modern discourse: the primacy of the subject and preeminence of representation.” Here we may have found the origination of the all-important concept of the modern self. Descartes’ method, as practiced in his Meditations and in his Discourse, demonstrates that the goal of philosophy is absolute certainty. That certainty is only achievable by beginning with that which is most certain and clear to us, our idea of ourselves. Yet what is this Cartesian self? It is a mind without a body, and a mind that has all of the powers of knowing, choosing, and thinking unhindered by the physical uncertainties of sentiment or interrelatedness. The Cartesian self is alone and depends on nothing except, perhaps, on God. According to West, Descartes placed great emphasis on the ability of the philosopher to represent the world perfectly via the mind. “In this view the fruits of scientific research do not merely provide more useful ways for human beings to cope with reality; such research also yields a true copy of reality.” On the scientific side of his ideas Descartes was
most determined that the end goal of research, of observation seeking evidence, would be the formation of a practical philosophy. This would become the means by which one could know the laws of nature as well as the technique of any given craft, “and thus render ourselves the masters and possessors of nature.”

Descartes was highly influential in the philosophical revolution of the seventeenth century, and we find in his work the precursors of modern science which prepared the way for the concept of race.

West summarizes the historical forces which bring about the rise of the idea of race thusly: “In short, modern discourse rests upon a conception of truth and knowledge governed by an ideal value-free subject engaged in observing, comparing, ordering, and measuring in order to arrive at evidence sufficient to make valid inferences…and verify true representations of reality.”

This discourse implies that the European self is in possession of a normative gaze, which is based on the recovered and reconstituted notion of the classical world, which gets reinterpreted through the institution of science. According to West, it is science which gives the original authority to the idea of white supremacy, without which whiteness might remain merely a cultural bias.

The initial basis for the idea of white supremacy is to be found in the classificatory categories and the descriptive, representational, order-imposing aims of natural history. The captivity of natural history to…the ‘normative gaze’ signifies the first stage of the emergence of the idea of white supremacy as an object of modern discourse.

The evidence for this claim is clear in the works of all the thinkers we have thus far investigated.

Bernier may be the first to use the term race, Kant may be the first to defend a science of race, and Herder may even be the first to counter the science of race with a “better science.” However, all of these thinkers proceed from a Cartesian, scientific, and Eurocentric view of the world. They use the methods of observation and identification, they all invoke the notion of natural kinds and types, and they all tend to agree that the world is a kind of problem which
needs to be understood in order to be controlled. This is the same world which is made up of strange and unknown entities, entities which the methods and systems of science must bring within its scope. If Descartes is to be believed then the aim of science is mastery of the natural world. According to Francis Bacon, another great pioneer of the scientific method, the aim of philosophy and science is “to give humankind mastery over nature by means of scientific discoveries and inventions.”

Descartes also discusses the idea that the major advantage of science lies, not in its correctness or exactness, but in its applicability through technology. Descartes envisions a world of the future where, thanks to technological advancements, humanity has cured almost all diseases, divested the earth of most of its resources, and enabled itself to live a trouble-free life, even one that might not end in death. This ultimate goal of absolute mastery necessarily includes mastery over humanity. On the one hand this mastery is personal, one must use the mind to master the body, but it is also cultural and the notion of a master race is not far behind. Now while Descartes does not argue that this mastery is available only to the Europeans, Kant assumes that the white is the original form as well as the superior stock. Bernier also insists on the mastery by the European. Even Herder claims that the white is superior in intellect, the mark which indicates the race best suited to carry out the work of science. If the aim of science is really mastery over the world then only those who are gifted with intellect are capable of carrying this out. This notion even gives way to ideas like “manifest destiny” and the “white man’s burden”. It is on the shoulders of that race whose burden it is to carry out the work of this mastery. Yet all the while the problem with this notion of whiteness is that those carrying it out seem unaware that they were its inventors.

The everyday concept of race emerges out of the scientific drive to master and order the world through proper categorization. Yet this science seems to be already driven by an
underlying set of assumptions and structures which order the world from a white European perspective. The assumed supremacy of the white race is not discovered by the science of race but instead forms the foundations of it. So in moving behind the everyday problem of racial categorization we come upon the structures which underlie and make possible that science of race. The idea here is that the idea of whiteness exists, in an unrefined fashion, already in European culture prior to the invention of the science of race. It first exists in the form of white supremacy, even though the rational discourse which justifies this is not initially explained. Cornel West investigates the rise of white supremacy by delineating the historical forces linked to the assumptions embedded within the sciences and also in the arts.

In West’s genealogy of race, the idea of white supremacy first emerges through the claims of natural history with the invention of the category of race as a means of classifying human beings. So West begins with a discussion of the role that Bernier and Carolus Linnaeus have in the development of this idea. Linnaeus refrains from explicitly ordering the races according to some kind of natural ranking, though his language does reflect a preference for the European over the African. He describes the European as ruled by laws, exhibiting gentleness, and as inventive. He then describes the African using terms that indicate he thinks of them as lazy, capricious, and that the woman are oversexed. “Linnaeus’ use of evaluative terms revealed, at the least, an implicit hierarchy by means of personal preference. It is also important to note that he included some remarks about the African Woman, but that he said nothing about the European woman (nor the American and Asiatic woman).” So in Linnaeus we also find the seeds of racism alongside the idea of race.

Cornel West notes that white supremacy is also made possible through the rise of, now outmoded, sciences like phrenology and physiognomy and the ways in which those systems are
based in art. Phrenology involved determining aptitudes and traits based on the shape and disposition of skulls, while physiognomy involved determining those same traits based on the reading of faces.\textsuperscript{57} According to West, the breakthrough in this stage is not to be found in the methods of science so much as it is to be found in the influence of Greek aesthetic ideals vis-à-vis the idea of race. West tirelessly lists the major thinkers and influential figures of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries who propagated the idea of race based on this marriage of art and science. For example, Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, a founder of modern anthropology, held that the symmetrical face was the most beautiful since it most closely approximated the Greek ideal as portrayed in classical sculpture. “Applying the classical ideal of moderation, he claimed that the more moderate the climate, the more beautiful the face. The net result was that since black people were farthest from the Greek ideal and located in extremely hot climates, they were, by implication, inferior in beauty to Europeans.”\textsuperscript{58} Many great philosophers from this era and even well into the nineteenth century, all seem to back up these emerging ideas about race. Hume, Hegel, and Kant all seem spellbound by the notion of white “supremacy” and black “inferiority” despite their own insistence on a critical and rational approach to philosophical thinking. West concludes that the emergence of white supremacy was inevitable for two reasons. First, the idea of whiteness as superior is practical in that it justifies colonization and white domination of non-whites. Second, the only way to combat the emergence of white supremacy would have involved a method of “detailed observation, measurement, comparison, and ordering of the natural and human kingdom by autonomous subjects in the light of aesthetic and cultural ideals of classical antiquity.”\textsuperscript{59} That is, if there ever was some original critique of white supremacy, then that critique would have relied upon the same rational foundations as white supremacy in order to make its arguments. Thus such a critique would have been possible but it
ultimately would have also been abandoned for being self-defeating. Not only is the emergence of white supremacy pragmatic, it does so based on the only method available. We can now understand that even thinkers like Herder, who mean to debunk race of the Kantian sort, must fall back on the methods which establish white correctness and superiority. Before Herder can even combat Kant’s concept of race he finds himself caught up within it. He may adamantly deny it, and modify it, but he does so within the context of a normative gaze that in fact pre-exists Bernier’s attempt to trouble the concept of race itself. The normative gaze of whiteness is already working even before the European explorer has encountered the rest of the non-white world.

By now the problem of race as identity has faded from view, as we have moved deeper into the problem of race as whiteness. It is clear enough from the writings of Cornel West that the proper identification of races into their appropriate categories proceeds already from a categorical mindset which pre-exists the racial categories. This mindset is aptly called whiteness and it is forms the deeper problem of race.
Chapter 2 – Whiteness

Of course the problem of race as whiteness is not the problem of there being people who phenotypically have light skin, any more than that there is some intrinsic problem of there being people who phenotypically have dark skin. That thinking is still firmly entrenched within the everyday problem of race as racial identification. The deeper problem of whiteness is precisely the normative gaze which Cornel West discusses. Whiteness is the originary stance which invents, adapts, and maintains racial identities in an evaluative hierarchy. As Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks notes, and she is worth quoting in full: “The structure of racial difference is founded on a master signifier – Whiteness – that produces a logic of differential relations. Each term in the structure establishes its reference by referring back to the original signifier. The system of race as differences among black, brown, red, yellow, and white makes sense only in its unconscious reference to Whiteness, which subtends the binary opposition between ‘people of color’ and ‘white.’”

1 Whiteness is not dead, despite our social advances, precisely because whiteness continues to stand behind those advances. In his book, Black Bodies White Gazes, George Yancy writes on the continued survival of whiteness. “To engage the issue of whiteness as a process of racialization is not to fall into a problematic and unwanted essentialism. The fact is that whiteness continues to exist within the socially and existentially lived sphere of our experiences.”2 The deeper problem of race as whiteness is precisely that this ethical problem of racism not only persists, it thrives. Whiteness exists and continues to function in our society as it perpetuates racial hegemony, privilege, and power over black people and people of color. “Even if science provided an exhaustive list of reasons why we should abandon race-talk and how race is a fiction, the everyday performance of that fiction would not necessarily change.”3 It is worth
mentioning that science has yet to furnish us with that list. So in practice the problem of race as identification continues, though in different forms than it did for Kant or Herder. Yet engaging in or evading this ongoing identification is not the way to resolve the deeper problems which cause it to surface in the first place. The deeper problem of whiteness precedes this everyday encounter with race as identity, and so it is into this deeper problem that we must go.

In this chapter, I investigate the notion of whiteness as the deeper problem of race, and the numerous ways that racial categories are offshoots of an original white standard. The normative gaze of whiteness is explored through a discussion of white privilege and the process of how whiteness creates other “races.” This will involve an investigation into the key factors and defining features that make up whiteness, as well as the reason that whiteness is difficult to define. Although whiteness is constitutive of all the other racial categories, as Seshadri-Crooks argues above, it constructs itself in such a way as to evade detection or identification. Thus whiteness exists not only as normative, but also as invisible. Whiteness is socially constructed and must constantly reconstruct and reinforce itself. This reinforcement involves the process whereby some people become white and, by extension, where other people become non-white.

Finally, in this chapter, I explore those arguments that contend that whiteness is not a problem. These arguments are steeped in a naïve assumption that racism has somehow already been resolved. Despite the rhetoric of a post-race America, I will show that racism has merely shifted from overt to subtle. Racism as whiteness remains threatening since whiteness retains the ability to invisibly continue as the supreme normative category. Since this chapter deals so closely with the question of raced identity, I will engage my own raced identity as white. I conclude this chapter with the argument that whiteness precedes the categories of race and exists as a tool for constructing race.
We begin the investigation into the deeper problem of whiteness by discussing George Yancy’s evaluation of whiteness as the transcendental norm in his work *Black Bodies, White Gazes*. Yancy explains that whiteness exists as a “transcendental norm – where whiteness takes itself to be that which remains the same across a field of difference – in relationship to the social ontological implications of racial embodiment.”4 Whiteness can be described as the look, glance, perspective, gaze, standpoint, or vantage point qua ordinary. In drawing out this distinction Yancy emphasizes personal narrative as a means of analyzing racial issues. “Narrative has a powerful capacity to communicate lived and imaginative dimensions of reality.”5 So in that spirit I now present a part of my own narrative on race in an effort to elucidate the concept of whiteness as Yancy describes it.

As a young undergraduate, I once engaged several friends in a discussion on what it meant for us to be white. One of my more confident friends boldly stated that whites had no culture and no artifacts which identify them as interesting or exciting. He explained that this is why they often feel the need to appropriate “black culture” and listen to rap music or adopt “black” styles of dress. Their own culture was dull, flat, and without any mark of interest or appeal to recommend it. He argued that in response to the dullness of being white, young whites had to seek out the culture of the “other,” in this case the culture of black people. A less confident friend thought that this idea was preposterous, and he insisted that there was a white culture. Although when he was pressed for details and examples by my confident friend, my less confident friend could not produce them. Each attempt he made to carve out a unique example of white culture inevitably led back to black innovators who were the originators of music, art, and “slang.” Feeling desperate, my less confident friend declared that European civilization and classic forms of art and music were white culture. The confident friend easily dismissed this by
saying that those cultures were not white but rather they were German, or Italian, or else British. The effect of this conversation on me was that I was left quite uncertain as to what had become of whiteness. On the one hand I thought of myself, and all of the friends involved in the conversation, as white. Yet, apparently, on the other hand, to be white meant to be nothing at all, since whiteness had no mark. In that discussion whiteness presented itself as the un-presentable, the invisible, the imaginary, or else the thief, the assimilator, the flattener, and the colonizer of culture.

Yancy is able to account for that experience I had of my own whiteness by explaining that whiteness constructs and reconstructs itself time and time again all while evading notice. “The presumption is that whiteness is lived as pure mind, while Blackness is lived as pure body. As Robert Birt argues, ‘Whiteness is the privilege of exclusive transcendence.’ Hence whiteness is not only a form of bad faith because it assumes the position of exclusive transcendence but also by implication it is a form of bad faith because it denies transcendence to blacks’.”6 Those who identify as white, and who identify with whiteness, are somehow able to avoid having a race, and, according to Birt, evade questions of embodiment. Thus it is only non-whites who are raced and who have a raced and racialized body, while whites exist as the site of exclusive transcendence.

Through an elaborate ideology that sustains the appearance of truth (that whites are pure transcendence) whites are not only able to conceal the truth about themselves (that they are located, invested in their lived embodied situation as white) but they also attempt to convince Blacks of the appearance of this truth…indeed the lie of whiteness is dialectically embedded in the lie about “Blackness”.”7

Returning to my personal experience above, what was so telling, though I did not understand it at the time, is that I did in fact have a culture as white. One of the facts about that culture was that I was in the position of observer, able to pass judgment and scrutinize the cultures of the other
races. I functioned as the site of a racially neutral background against which raced others were foregrounded in terms of their “exotic” raced identities, art, music, and idiomatic expressions, that is, “their language.” Yet I, being white, had no fashion, art, or music since I, as white, had unfiltered access to all fashions, arts, music, and languages. All of these cultural artifacts were available to me and all remained available from my vantage point as the invisible neutral, non-raced observer.

The deeper problem here is that whiteness eludes being identified as raced. The white knows all and sees all as raced, as other, and as not itself. Whiteness claims to have no identity, thus escaping the power of its own gaze, but it maintains an invisible identity as superior, intellectual, disembodied, political, and above all ethical. The gaze of whiteness is ethical in the sense that it is a normative gaze since, from the perspective of whiteness, the world is seen in terms of black (or nonwhite) and white. The world and all its objects are available to the pure and disinterested white gaze. However, this is an illusion, and one which John D. Caputo precisely explains when he claims that,

White is not “neutral.” “Pure” reason is lily white, as if white is not a color or is closest to the purity of the sun, and everything else is “colored.” Purification is a name for terror and deportation, and “white” is a thick, dense, potent cultural signifier that is closely linked to rationalism and colonialism. What is not white is not rational. So white is philosophically relevant and needs to be philosophically critiqued — it affects what we mean by “reason” — and “we” white philosophers cannot ignore it.  

If whiteness presents itself as invisible then this seems to have profoundly negative implications for people who identify as white. When whiteness fails to see itself as embodied it escapes the accountabilities created by its own created systems. This reinforces a kind of ethical failure or refusal of white people to see themselves as involved in racism. Yet the white apologist must protest this apparent reverse racism which would demonize all white people. They might claim that not all whites are culpable in whiteness since it was white people who played such important
roles in the abolition of slavery, and who championed the cause of peace and an end to hostilities shown toward Native Americans. The apologist maintains that there must be some good whites and that also the position of power and influence afforded to whites gives them the opportunity to enact great social reforms. Yancy responds by pointing out that this apology is an example of the distinction between good and bad whites, or between the non-racist and the ultra-racist.

Evoking the power of narrative again, Yancy details an incident where he attempted to confront his fellow students about the issue of whiteness while discussing some texts in an African-American Literature class. As they discussed the *Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglas, an American Slave, Written by Himself* and Harriet Jacobs *Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl*, Yancy recalls that his own reaction to these texts was one of anger. He explained to his fellow students, who were almost exclusively white, that he was angered as a black male when he read these texts and he wondered if they felt anything via their own whiteness. When the class remained silent, Yancy reflected on the meaning of this silence. He later determined that the students felt uneasy at the associations with the white racist individuals in these narratives. “The white students distanced themselves from these figures through a process of juxtaposing the ‘good white’ with the ‘bad white.’ They saw themselves as ‘good whites’ incapable of such acts of racial brutality.” In their minds they were not racist or at least they weren’t guilty of that vicious racism practiced by white supremacists.

Now we come to it, and the moment threatens to slip away, as we begin to wrap ourselves up in the cool distinction between ethical and unethical whiteness. For example, the temptation for me to slide back in and congratulate myself on overcoming the evils of racism, and the evils of racism committed by my white ancestors, is absolutely intoxicating. I now have the wherewithal to respond to the racism of Kant, Bernier, Hegel, Hume, Herder, Linnaeus, and
all the other thinkers mentioned thus far. I am tempted to declare that I, as are all whites in contemporary society, am no-longer-racist. The evidence for this hasty claim need be nothing more than my lack of brutality against blacks, Hispanics, Asians, and (for the sake of appeasing Bernier) the Sami people (whom he referred to as the Lapps). So, modern white people stand vindicated and the problem of racism has apparently been resolved by the inevitable progress of our “advanced” thinking.

This celebration is both premature and also extremely dangerous. Here there is a growing danger and a rising threat as whiteness threatens to slip away and disappear again. If I am not a racist, a bad white, then I am able to slip away and avoid being white altogether. I may then say, as my confident friend claimed of white culture, that I am not white but I am instead European or else American. Yancy points out the trouble with this escape as he continues to break down the distinction between good and bad whites, and by extension good and bad whiteness.

Through this process of subterfuge, however, they failed to locate their own center of power, a center that enabled them to make such a distinction without any recognition of their own whiteness as a species of white racism. When whites take it upon themselves to define what is and is not a racist act, is this not tied into the very power of whiteness? After all this is another way that whites exercise their power to nullify the epistemic and affective certainty in terms of which a Black person, for example, knows that he/she has just been subject to white racism.10

Part of the basic power of whiteness lies in its ability to create and construct the world while hiding from or evading the fact that whiteness is also a creation and construction. It was white European thinkers who invented the concept of race in order to define all the others of the world against themselves. This creation not only defines the other as non-white, it also calls forth the invention and the creation of the self as white. In a movement reminiscent of Descartes, the white-self first creates the world of non-white raced identities in all the variations that appear before its disinterested gaze. Only after this creation could it begin to discover itself operating at
the center of the universe as the identity behind the gaze; an identity that is defined by an
idealistic image of the disembodied mind. It is worth establishing, at this point, that of course
Europeans are not alone in their attempts to declare themselves supreme. Yet whiteness
accomplishes more than claims of political, national, or even ethnic supremacy. That is,
supremacy is certainly a part of the claim of whiteness, but while other forms of supremacy are
boastful and arrogant, whiteness extends a kind of mock humility. It extends itself everywhere
and applies to a multitude of people, and yet these people seem almost afraid to claim their own
whiteness.

Then why do white people hide from their whiteness and what does this evasion
accomplish? Yancy claims that one possible reason for this evasion is that it enables whites to
maintain their identity as atomic individuals while also giving them the freedom to “distance
themselves from whiteness as a governing racial ideology…”11 Thus, actually being white comes
to mean that one cannot be racist, it means that one is not the perpetrator of a racist society or an
ideology that maintains some kind of power structure based on whiteness. The rationale used to
avoid one’s whiteness and the racial privilege that this whiteness involves is often quite simple.
A person will boldly proclaim, “I can’t be white, since my ancestors were Norwegian, or British,
or German, or French, or….” Now I don’t mean to denigrate the cultural diversity that
accompanies all of these ethnic backgrounds, nor imply that the historical treatment for all such
peoples has been identical. Rather in the attempt to confront someone who is white regarding
their whiteness, one finds that the whiteness is absent, and that as an individual a person’s
identity is deemed much more complex. Perhaps this may be true of attempting to confront
anyone on their race, but in the case of whiteness this defense seems to be more effective.
Whiteness vis-à-vis white people is not like the artist’s canvas, but rather it is more like the clear
glass of the picture frame. It defines the entirety of the space and delimits all of the expressions contained by the individuality of the artists’ brush strokes. This glass is invisible, and we are not even aware of it unless it becomes smudged, printed, marked, or stained. Yet whether we are aware of it or not it is what defines the painting and even makes it available to the experience of an audience.

Yancy further explains that declaring whiteness as raced is problematic insofar as it often shows up as merely another race among other races. It shows up in precisely the way its European architects intended, as simply another category to define and organize the human being. Yet if we accept this understanding then we lose out on the realization that before Bernier discovered the other races, he was already white. Bernier was already operating from the “transcendental norm, or that site from which racial differences are established and identified.”\(^{12}\) Still, the process of declaring whiteness as raced can be a turning point, and Yancy explains that racializing whiteness also imperils it. Once whiteness is named as a race then it shows up as a category which is deeply invested in reinforcing its supremacy and survival. As a racialized marking, whiteness loses its invisibility and shows up as the historical perpetrator and architect of some of the worst racialized violence ever committed in the world. It cannot be denied that the Trans-Atlantic slave trade of the sixteenth through the nineteenth centuries was a form of systematic brutality where those who were raced as white benefitted from the desolation of those who were raced as black. Yancy writes that when whiteness is named and marked, its “presumed fixed metaphysical essence, [is reduced] to a sociohistorical status whose power is not ahistorically given, but selfishly and brutally maintained through human practices.”\(^{13}\) Once whiteness is no longer invisible, it loses its claim to being natural, pure, virtuous, and even its simple claim to being normal. Having lost that power phenotypically white people are forced to
confront their identity as recipients of white privilege that has been purchased at a horrendous cost to Black people and people of color. A white person might try to maintain that he is innocent of racism because he himself never owned slaves. Yet if we confront the reality that whiteness continues to operate as a site of racial hegemony then one’s individual innocence is swallowed up by a history that is not merely past but also present.

Yet if we do encounter whiteness as raced, as white supremacy, then we encounter the socially constructed nature of whiteness and how it has historically come to be what it is. Yet this might be a path toward our “salvation,” since if whiteness is a historical construct then we might engage in forms of historical deconstruction and resistance against it. We could speculate that it was done away with when slavery was abolished, or at least when the civil rights laws were passed, or at the very latest when an African American male was elected president. Can we not finally hold our heads up and say we are done with racism, and also with the idea of white or black? Such a celebration is likely to be very premature in light of any number of recent historical events. Part of the problem of listing these events lies in their appearance as anomalous. The white apologist is quick to point out how the perpetrators of hate crimes are ignorant, or else few in number, or at least not like the apologists themselves. However, this attempt to rationalize away whiteness is precisely part of the ongoing practice of whiteness. This rationale reinforces categories of normality and racial neutrality. Such forms of rationale, which are forms of evasion, remind us and others that the police only arrest people who are dangerous or criminal. We are reminded that those people who get hired for a job are those who most deserve it because of their neutral (read non-raced) qualifications. Reiterated is the narrative that there are no white people, just a mixture of many different ethnicities. Indeed, the process of
rationalizing away whiteness often involves substituting ancestry and ethnicity as a way of trying to define one’s identity as complex, diverse, or anything other than white.

In order to illustrate the way that whiteness is rationalized away, let me once again interject my own narrative to discuss my own search for a complex, and non-white, identity. As a young boy growing up in the Southwest United States I was told a family story about how my ancestors had been Cherokee Indians. I remember being fascinated by this at the time since it gave my origins some interesting diversity. As a boy, being white meant being boring, ordinary, and normal, and I was quite disinterested in an identity that was so common. Of course, the origins of my European ancestry had always been better known to me. As my ancestors had been so I also was English, German, French and Norwegian, and at the same time I suffered no ill effects from any of these associations. As a child I imagined that being Indian meant being dangerous, interesting, exciting, and, quite strangely, privileged. To be some fraction Indian meant that I had a claim to what I thought was the privilege of victimization. Whenever conversations about racism came up I could simultaneously be the victim, and thus the offended party, and also still be the white speaker whose voice would and should be heard. Furthermore, I looked into the extent of my racial roots, as I neared college age, in hopes that this might give me the special treatment of affirmative action, or at least access to some scholarships which were put aside for those who had been historically disadvantaged. As a teenager, “being Cherokee” meant that I could not be racist since I identified with the victims of racism. I saw it only as an advantage, a tool to be used for my own personal advancement in life. It provided a source of righteous indignation towards violence against Native Americans, and at the same time I was able to pick up and put down this tangential identity as it suited me. However, as I got older I found no genealogical evidence of that diverse ancestry for which I longed. I ultimately had to
resign myself to being European, or American, and yet somewhere along the way I had become white. I was the recipient of a set of privileges tied to my race, even though these were privileges of which I was not always aware. I may have failed to rationalize away my whiteness, but in that failure I had managed to gain access to the very thing which all of my European ancestors had struggled to gain, white privilege.

Before I engage the implications of white privilege, I will explore the processes whereby a person becomes white. If whiteness is a historical and social construct then perhaps some clue to its continued power can be found in its initiation rites. Yancy explains that becoming white involves not only phenotypical whiteness of one’s skin color but also certain deliberate activities and practices designed to erect barriers between whites and non-whites.

Becoming white involves acquiring, in some sense, the appearance of whiteness in terms of one’s physiology. One way to do this would be to be born white, to two white parents. Besides the obvious there may be other ways to gain access to the appearance of whiteness. Through the intermarriage of whites and non-whites, and due to the inconsistencies of genetic expression, the children of these marriages may exhibit more phenotypically white traits than their non-white parents. This contributes to the phenomenon known as racial passing, where one is described as being able to pass for white even though, and this is important, the assumption is that one is not really white. The idea behind passing is that a person can appear to be phenotypically white in all of the ways in which we stereotypically think of whites. Thus such a person is able to be mistaken for a white, while the racist category of whiteness maintains that the person is not “truly white.” Allyson Hobbs investigates the history of racial passing in her book A Chosen Exile: A History of Racial Passing. In an interview with Nate Sloan, Hobbs explains that passing is not simply a way of getting ahead or blending in. “I'm not as interested in what people gained
by being white, but rather in what they lost by not being black,’ Hobbs said. ‘To understand passing we can't just look at the story of the person who passed, we have to look at their whole social world, because everyone is going to be impacted.” Yet even this first step reveals the impossibility of whiteness, for who could honestly say that their heritage is pure and unmixed back to the very origin of the species? Nonetheless, whiteness survives as the image of purity, and its essence, as it were, houses the illusion of the unspoiled and untainted.

By far the most important aspect of becoming white, however, is to be found in the practices and institutions which define whiteness. This is a much clearer system since within a white society the suspicion of merely passing as white is ever present. Yancy writes that “one grasps the oppressive nature of the discursive and nondiscursive modalities through which whiteness (or whiteliness) becomes a deeply political, existentially lived, social category that shapes the subjectivities and future racialist/racist practices of whites.” Yancy gives three anecdotes told by Thandeka, a Unitarian Universalist theologian and minister, which give examples of how various phenotypically white children engage in the process of becoming white. What the stories all have in common is that they detail events whereby young children discover race, and, by extension, their own whiteness as something which is under threat. Through their experiences, the children in these stories learn what socially acceptable behavior is and what it is not. Primarily, they learn how the normative gaze of race informs many previously unknown aspects of their lives. My own experience of becoming white was likewise determined by the social imposition of a certain form of racialized propriety around the observations of the differences of other people.

I distinctly remember the first time in my own life when I was instructed on the meaning of white and black skin. My father was a minister in a Baptist Church, and as a young boy of not
more than five years old I was often at our church for various functions, services, and ministry programs. One such event saw us welcoming a missionary from Africa. I remember this event distinctly because he was the first black person I had ever seen in the flesh. I am not sure what categories very young children have which seem to take into account the differences between themselves and others, yet I must have had those categories at that age. Upon seeing this dark skinned man up close I was quite interested in his appearance. I was curious in my discovery that the palms of his hands were of a different color than the backs of his hands. I was so interested in this that I had the unmitigated audacity, as often children have, to ask him if there was something wrong with his hands. I recall that he laughed and said something in a good-natured way, no doubt as this was not the first time some wide-eyed white child had asked him questions about why he seemed to be so different. Scarcely a moment seemed to pass between his response and my initiation into whiteness as an adult quickly took me aside and chastised me for asking that question. They even went so far as to educate me and say that I was not allowed to ask such questions of people “like him,” as it was considered rude. I do not know if the adult meant well, and I do not remember if this adult was a teacher, a parent, or a stranger, only that the adult was white. In their whiteness they were teaching me what it meant for me to be white also. In this case being white meant you were not allowed to ask questions about why people were not white, as this was simply a cruel reminder to those non-whites that they were not like us.

The phenomenon I encountered is explained by Yancy when he writes that whiteness involves creating distinctions and barriers between whites and non-whites. For me it meant becoming aware that people with dark skin were also sensitive about it and that it was apparently rude to remind them of it. “The process of becoming white in this sense has nothing to do with a so-called genetic racial substratum, but everything to do with what happens at the level of social
constitutionality, how the human being comes to be the white self that is both constituted by and constitutes white racism.”¹⁷ Yancy reminds us that race is in some ways already operating even before a young child begins to develop a sense of themselves as white against the non-white. Thus the white identity is created through a process of negation and abstraction, since the white shows up through a contrast vis-à-vis the non-white. I came to know myself as white through negation: I was not-African. Yet even as whiteness revels in the other as “dangerous,” “dark,” and “base,” whiteness itself is under the real danger of dissolution. Like the term “Cracker,” whiteness has a certain fragility. Whiteness must constantly recreate and reform the black body as the site of terror in the white imagination. “Rather, the dark body as the phantasmic object of the white imaginary regulates production of the white self. Before long, the authority and power of whiteness, through white ideological sleight of hand, appears devoid of a beginning or an end. White reactionary values become the universal measure of the human.”¹⁸ The result is that we live in a world where whiteness becomes established as the norm through an arduous and continuous process of negation and degradation. All the while it remains invisible and undetected as the norm. Yet perhaps whiteness is no longer invisible given the recent “social progress” we have made in eradicating racism from the world. I turn now to the question of how visible whiteness has perhaps become and whether or not this means that the problem of whiteness is now in the past.

Perhaps one simple response to this ongoing critique that race is a problem and that racism and therefore whiteness is a problem could be that we have resolved these problems. One might claim that there is some racism left in the form of white supremacist hate groups but that these groups exist only on the fringes of society. We could point towards Barack Obama as a shining example that racism is obsolete if a black man can become the President of the United
States. Furthermore, we could point to the Civil Rights act and affirmative action laws that by now must have leveled the playing field and eradicated the problem of whiteness and racism once and for all. One might even go so far as to claim that whites too can be victims of racism. Since black people are now in positions of power in society, the reasoning would go, then surely they could discriminate against whites. In short we are everywhere confronted by the loud and fervent cry that racism is no more. We congratulate ourselves on this victory and then treat incidents of racial violence, aggression, rape, and murder as anomalies. We explain these incidents by claiming that evil people will continue to commit evil acts, but that these acts no longer have anything to do with race. If the majority of society insists that it is time to move on from the topic of race and racism, then perhaps racism is truly dead. However, the announcement of the death of racism should be delayed while we consider whether or not white privilege is keeping it alive.

Shannon Sullivan explains that although racism has undergone some changes, it is not finished so much as it has been transformed. From the inception of race in the seventeenth century all the way up through the rise, decline, and dismantling of slavery in the latter part of the nineteenth century, racism has gone through its historical paces. In her book *Revealing Whiteness* Shannon Sullivan writes that in the twentieth century white domination was very visible. Slavery may no longer have been legal, but the idea of white supremacy still informed culture and law. Sullivan recounts how public lynchings of black men, which had all of the legal sanction of mob murders, were well attended by hundreds and sometimes thousands of white spectators. Yet there was a decided shift away from this attitude in response to the gains of the civil rights movement. Sullivan writes that “After the civil rights movements of the 1960’s the move from de jure to de facto racism meant not the end of white domination, but a significant
shift in its predominant mode of operation.”

Racism fell out of public favor, or at least the active social practice of racial aggression, violence, and degradation fell out of public favor. Yet whiteness did not fall out; indeed, it proved too deeply embedded in social and cultural identities to disappear so easily. Instead, there was a quiet social shift from habits of white supremacy to white privilege. While Sullivan acknowledges that violent white supremacy continues to exist, she also claims that it becomes increasingly marginalized. Because whiteness as a site of hegemony continues to exist and unconscious white habits and privileges continue to shape our lives, then a form of white supremacy continues to exist. However, white privilege, and its source whiteness, continues to function in increasingly invisible but simultaneously pervasive ways. “As unconscious, habits of white privilege do not merely go unnoticed. They actively thwart the process of conscious reflection on them, which allows them to seem non-existent as they continue to function.”

Sullivan gives an example of how, at a conference of intellectuals discussing racism and the Roma people, one interlocutor kept referring to the Roma by using the term Jews. Even upon being corrected and admitting his or her mistake the speaker continued to make the mistake and insert the term Jews when discussing the Roma. For Sullivan this was a troubling reminder of the invisibility of white privilege and the unconscious nature of the racism it supports and perpetuates. “The association instead is the product of a constitutive relationship between psyche, soma, and world in which historical events have shaped the way the Roma and the Jews are negatively perceived; reciprocally, deprecatory stereotypes of the Roma and the Jews have been used to facilitate and justify their oppression.” The speaker was too deeply entrenched in the unconscious habits of racism for any conscious thinking, public correction, or even logical difference to penetrate and correct the mistake.
Still the tendency to see this kind of thinking as isolated to those few “racist” individuals is an assumption that is difficult for many people, especially white people, to shake. White people, and people more generally, tend to become defensive about the implication that they somehow benefit from an invisible system of privilege, especially when they think that their moral sense of themselves is being challenged. Those who are most defensive about white privilege are invariably categorized by the broader society as white, even though such people have trouble admitting to that classification and would rather see themselves as simply human. There are broad implications for this kind of ignorance, vis-à-vis the invisibility of whiteness. This kind of ignorance is itself one of the symptoms of white privilege. Critical whiteness scholar Peggy McIntosh wrote an influential article on white privilege, and its intersections with male privilege and heterosexual privilege. In her article, McIntosh, a self-described white woman, provides a list of forty-six different examples of white privilege in contemporary American society. What follows are a few of those examples which are especially pertinent to this discussion.

- When I am told about our national heritage or about “civilization,” I am shown that people of my color made it what it is.
- I can do well in a challenging situation without being called a credit to my race.
- I am never asked to speak for all the people of my racial group.
- I can remain oblivious of the language and customs of persons of color who constitute the world’s majority without feeling in my culture any penalty for such oblivion.
- If I declare that there is a racial issue at hand, or there isn’t a racial issue at hand, my race will lend me more credibility for either position than a person of color will have.
- My culture gives me little fear about ignoring the perspectives and powers of people of other races.23

George Yancy expounds on this list by claiming that in order to understand the lack of privilege faced by non-whites, one need only negate one of those statements. The simple way to do this would be to add the phrase, “It is not the case that” to any item on that list.24 Yancy is quick to
point out that this system of privileges does not extend equally to all whites and in all areas. This is clear enough when one considers that white privilege is tempered by gender and class privilege. McIntosh also includes a brief list of heterosexual privileges in her article. Depending on one’s sexual identity, for example, certain white privileges may be curtailed because one may have the “wrong” sexual partner. My own personal experiences provide support to the ways in which, as a white male, being white comes with various benefits in the form of white privileges.

In thinking about the nature of white privilege I realized that I could compile my own personal list. The value of compiling such a list strikes me as pointedly ethical. The sheer act of confronting situations where I have been the recipient of white privilege forms a basis for beginning to also confront the existence of whiteness and racism as an unconscious part of my own psyche. If the issue at hand with racism and white privilege, and ultimately technoracism, is ethical, then the practices of anti-racism must begin now. In my own research into whiteness, it is important that I name white privilege and that I refuse to approach whiteness under the assumption that it is best to do so from a disinterested, objectivist viewpoint. My list is obviously not exhaustive, but it does lay out several of the ways in which whiteness and racism have shaped not only my mode of thinking and living, but also my education and even my understanding of philosophy.

1. I have never been the recipient of hostility or suspicion over whether or not I am the father of my young son.
2. Almost all of the racist statements I have made in my life have been publicly excused, by people who took offense to them, based on the assumption that I came from an ignorant background where I was not better educated about such matters. In short, my white ignorance saved me.
3. If I am even slightly well-dressed in a public place it will be assumed that I am an authority figure.
4. Although a girl I was dating was once reprimanded by a member of her family for dating a man outside of her religion, she was immediately afterwards congratulated on dating a man from her own race, a fact which could only have been apparent from my name and photograph.
In making such a list I attempt to confront the most difficult and insidious fact about whiteness, its invisibility. As a recipient of white privilege I am often blind to the ways in which that privilege is extended to me or to those like me. Yet even though white privilege functions as crucial and more than effective evidence for showing the continued existence of racism as whiteness, there are untold numbers of white people in our culture who continue to deny that white privilege exists. The primary counterargument is that white privilege really amounts to little more than class privilege. The result is that any system of privileges in the western world is primarily based upon one’s wealth and social status. It is further argued that poor whites suffer from lack of privilege in the same way as poor blacks, and that rich blacks benefit in the same way as rich whites.

Yancy provides an example of how this denial works where he shares a discussion that he had with a white philosopher.

I recall a white philosopher recently denying the legitimacy of many Black people’s claims that they still experience inordinate discrimination and have not substantially benefitted from the civil rights movement…To make his point, he argued that since the antiracist movements of the 1960’s, Blacks have done extraordinarily well…(he) both assumed the authority to speak for the majority of Black people and conveyed the message that Blacks ought to stop complaining and start doing for themselves…

There are many mistakes made by Yancy’s white philosopher, not the least of which is the obvious racist move to speak for an entire group of people. It is worth noting that any attempt to speak on behalf of an entire race, whether solicited, unsolicited, and regardless of one’s own experiences, is deeply problematic. In fact, McIntosh actually argues that she has the privilege of never being asked to speak for all the people of her racial group. One possible reason for this particular privilege is that white people don’t often see themselves as operating in a group, they are almost always able to function as individuals. Not only do white people presume to speak on behalf of all Black people, Black people lack the privilege of not being asked to speak for their
entire group. Caputo addresses this problem when he criticizes whites who attempt to appropriate blackness and claim to speak of the lived experience of being black.

You can’t be an “intentional” victim, adopt it freely, because that means you are always free to walk away from it if the going gets rough, take a few weeks off for a holiday, or just you change your mind. So it ends up making a mockery of the oppressed — the biting edge of oppression is that is not of your own choosing! People who try to walk a mile in the shoes of the other, to live among and dedicate their lives to working with the oppressed, are also sensitive to the fact of their own privilege. They know they can never truly identify with them.28

Additionally, Yancy points out that the claims made by the white philosopher are simply not true, they are not borne out by the facts. Particularly telling are how the facts about the situation of poor whites and poor blacks are not at all equivalent. “In 2001, for example, 11.7 percent of the total population lived in poverty. Significant here is that in the white population, only 9.9 percent lived in poverty…whereas 22.7 percent of Blacks lived in poverty…”29 Yet if the facts speak so loudly then how is it possible that the myth of the death of race and white privilege continue to proliferate?

Shannon Sullivan explains that the persistence of whiteness and the difficulty of revealing it lie in how it operates as an unconscious habit. “…habit is an organism’s subconscious predisposition to transact with its physical, social, political, and natural worlds in particular ways…Habits…are [those features of the self that] which [constitute] the self…because habit is transactional, in a raced and racist world, the psychosomatic self necessarily will be racially and racistly constituted.”30 Sullivan argues that whiteness persists precisely because we continue to transact in a world that is constituted by whiteness. Our identity as individual white selves within such a society is only possible through our understanding of race, and how race positions us into the broader culture. Race continues to operate as whiteness precisely because it is the fact of being white or non-white which creates and recreates a certain
fixed form of the self-understanding. White privilege, then, is a logical social extension of one’s identity as white. Who and what we are is the “justification” for our set of privileges, especially privileges which proceed from an assumption about our “natural, superior selves.” The origins of race and the continued work of whiteness attempt to establish race as a natural category. That is at least part of the reason for the continued existence of race; it tied to personal identity, an identity that is held onto at all costs. I might well be willing to lose my social status as raced, but I might not even be in a position, psychologically speaking, to give up my personal identity as raced. Sullivan explains that race easily and often functions on this subconscious level.

For example, to be a white person means that one tends to assume that all cultural and social spaces are potentially available for one to inhabit…(this) also severely limits (one’s) ability to treat others in respectful ways. Instead of acknowledging other’s particular interests, needs, and projects, white people who are ontologically expansive tend to recognize only their own, and their expansiveness is at the same time a limitation.31

This ontological expansiveness is the perfect example of white privilege. Indeed, this privilege precludes the kind of vulnerability necessary to admit that one doesn’t know the extent of the impact of whiteness on one’s identity. As expansionist, whiteness occupies the always already occupied. So, there is nothing new to know; it is already known. So, not only is whiteness ontologically expansionist geographically or socially, but also epistemologically.

One way of explaining white privilege is that white people come to see their privileges as expectations to which they are entitled in virtue of being white. It is not always the case that those of pale skin are unaware of their privilege, but rather that they are unaware of their privilege as being born out of their race, their whiteness as such. If you return to the list of white privileges, you can understand this very easily by adding in an explanation for each privilege. If I am being taught that people of my race made my nation’s history what it is then I defend this by claiming that these are simply the historical facts. If I try to make sense of people assuming that I
am an authority figure, I will explain it as reflecting my natural confidence or knowledge base. There is a ready-made list of alternative explanations (really, rationalizations) for situations in which one is a recipient of white privilege. This list evokes almost every possible explanation, including sex and religion. One of the quick justifications for hatred of dark-skinned men and women from the Middle East is that they must be adherents of the religion of Islam. The supposed justification for hating followers of Islam falls under the assumption that it is a violent religion. This bias is reinforced by references to the actions taken by extremist political groups who claim to be strict adherents to the religion of Islam. Falguni Sheth writes in her book, *Toward a Political Philosophy of Race*, that Muslims themselves are becoming a racialized group of people, a race which is subject to increasing hostility and scrutiny. The danger and risk posed by this emerging “race” resembles the danger and risk which has been attributed to blacks, Africans, Hispanics, Asians, the Japanese, Russians, Palestinians, Mexicans, and American Indians. The telling thing about the list in the prior sentence is that we are quick to realize that some of those groups are not traditionally defined as races but as ethnicities or nationalities. Yet the hostility and disparaging gaze of whiteness falls on these groups with much the same result. One example of this effect, given by Joe Feagin in an interview with George Yancy, illustrates the way that racist images are used within whiteness to reinforce negative emotions towards the various non-white races. Feagin discusses the imagery of apes being used to stereotype and degrade Black people. He also describes the ways that whiteness casts the images of these other races in racist and sexist fashion. “One good example of this emotionally laden framing that has some research is the extraordinarily racist sexualization that white men often direct at Asian women, Asian-American women, and U.S. and other Latinas, such as on the Internet websites exoticizing these women for white male sexual and related purposes.” The
effect is that all of these groups become non-white and therefore also the centers of violence and dehumanization.

In the face of the work of racializing other bodies and thereby subjecting them to violence, whiteness does the strangest thing, it disappears. Rather than boldly identifying itself as master and supreme, whiteness makes a calculated move to always hide itself behind the gaze of normality. This is as true now as it was in the age of Bernier and Kant. Whiteness disappears, and the greatest threat and the supreme danger of whiteness comes to the fore when whiteness no longer shows itself. The greatest ethical problem posed by race is that we will be unable to see a world as anything other than raced, and racialized through the lens of whiteness. If whiteness remains hidden then we become victims of a white and racialized worldview which nonetheless continues to elude our attempts to discover it and make it known. To be sure, unconscious habits are difficult, and sometimes impossible to discover. Yet we might expect people who lack the habits of whiteness, that is, non-white people, to be the loud voices of opposition to whiteness. Now it certainly remains true that non-white voices have made their opposition to whiteness known. Despite this, the telling power of whiteness can also emerge when its rhetoric is being espoused by persons who would ordinarily be considered non-white. How is it that the institutions, identities, and habits which oppress, belittle, and denigrate non-whites also inculcate in them a strong sense of reverence for whiteness? This line of questioning itself seems to emerge from deep within the power and structure of the white gaze which turns its eye on all it surveys and boldly declares that all before it is non-white and thereby inferior. Yet the looker attempts to remains unlooked at, continuously obfuscating its presence despite all of our efforts to bring it into the light. So we begin to wonder what power is at work in creating the world of
race, and dooming us to systems of whiteness, while at the same time remaining invisible to our sight.

Although the operations of whiteness may be undeniable, people still work to deny it. Even though whiteness seems to exist most strongly as white privilege, there is still a way in which it pre-exists that privilege. The very idea of race itself seems to pop up spontaneously as Europeans began to wander the world and meet new people. There might be a case to be made for the idea that race is not an immoral concept, any more than any other outdated scientific theory. It seems that thinkers like Bernier and Descartes already understand themselves within a social and cultural context before the idea of race can even begin to emerge. The origin of race is not to be found solely in the works and travels of seventeenth century academics, nor is the survival of race to be understood solely through the continued persistence of white privilege. Sheth insists that race can be redeployed to create a new race of people, based on ideas of shared culture and religion, and her chief example of this is the recent re-invention of the Muslim.34 There is something mysterious to this claim, and the idea that race is capable of being *used* by a larger social and political structure makes race out to be a kind of tool. Yet if race is the construction of whiteness, insofar as the races were conceived to explain the glorified position of white Europeans in the natural world, then it seems obvious to say that whiteness must pre-exist race.

Yet in order to understand this idea, that whiteness somehow comes before the very idea of race within which whiteness is a category, we must understand the connection between race as an idea and race as a tool. To that end this project will now turn towards an investigation into the nature of tools and the problem of deploying technology to bring about social change and create a social class of people.
Chapter 3 – The Technology of Race

Race may be understood as a kind of technology, a technique, and a tool. Falguni Sheth develops this idea in important ways in her book *Toward a Political Philosophy of Race*. This in turn raises the issue of how technology is to be understood, and what kinds of philosophy serve to unpack it? Sheth provides the connection between our initial critique of race and its connection to a critique of technology. She uses Martin Heidegger’s philosophy of technology to directly explicate her own philosophy of race as a tool of political power. Still there is much in Heidegger’s thinking that needs to be explored in order to understand the full range of his ideas on technology and the essence of technology. To that end, I take a closer look at how Heidegger explains the distinction between technology as a tool and the essence of technology as the Enframing.¹ My aim here is to explore delineating a preliminary genealogy of technology, even though a full genealogy may be impossible, especially insofar as a division needs to be made between ancient and modern technological devices.

In this chapter, I will investigate the notion of whiteness as a tool by uncovering the technology of race. This will be the initial point of contact between the genealogy of race and a phenomenology of technology. We begin with the work of Falguni Sheth and her idea that race is a political tool. Sheth argues that the technology of race is a tool of political discourse, that race is able to conceal its political nature behind some more official purpose, and that race conceals our actual relationship with the government behind a supposedly objective morality. In order to construct a rich phenomenological approach to the subject, I will also explore Sheth’s analysis by looking at how it is reflected in the arts. In simple terms phenomenology here should be understood as a complete investigation, a “looking at” from all available sides. Husserl defines this process as imaginative variation, and if these problems are to be completely
elucidated then we must consider how they appear in various contexts and from various perspectives in order to get to the core principle under consideration. Understanding how race is a tool of political discourse which is concealed behind an official purpose can be shown in the writings of Joseph Conrad and Rudyard Kipling. I will also demonstrate that race conceals itself behind morality by examining Robert K. Fullinwider’s defense of affirmative action against the moral language of colorblindness. This phenomenology reveals that whiteness and racism resist rational discourse as functions of a basic cultural attitude. In order to initially explain the idea of the cultural attitude, I will turn to the critical project of Immanuel Kant. This investigation will be aimed now at uncovering the conditions which make race possible in the first place. Since race is technological, then a fuller understanding of it is only possible by investigating the idea of technology, and to that end I will turn my project to a full investigation of Martin Heidegger’s philosophy of technology.

We must begin to think about technology by first thinking about its relation to race. Falguni Sheth explains that one way of looking at the problem of race is by trying to determine its function. She likens this to the function of technology.

> Technology, commonly considered as equipment, facilitates the production of certain ‘goods’. It requires the input of certain raw material, which, mediated through a device, is transformed into a ‘new’ product. In turn this product is thought to meet certain needs that we might have. Similarly, within a juridico-political context, race becomes an instrument that produces certain political and social outcomes that are needed to cohere society.2

As a point of contact between a genealogy of race and a phenomenology of technology, Sheth raises a very valuable insight. She argues that race is not so much a descriptive category as it is an actively constructive one. The invisibility and persistence of race as whiteness reveals it as a framework of thought which both creates and reinforces social norms. She claims further that race is not a politically benign social construction but an active political one. “Legal and political
institutions as representations of state power – produce race, understood as the vehicle by which populations are distinguished, divided, and pitted against each other.” Sheth argues that the political forces in contemporary societies are still actively involved in creating raced and racialized identities, and that race continues to be deployed as a technique of power. Sheth argues that the “Muslim race” was invented in the recent history of western, and specifically American thought. In the wake of the destruction of the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, the Muslim race was invented to serve as an enemy of the state. In order to ensure their natural white citizens of their continuing safety, the government of the United States needed to deploy a new category of fear and alienation, that of the Islamic terrorist. The effect of this category all but criminalizes the religion of Islam, and by extension, all members of that religion who find themselves within the borders of the United States. This criminalizing also mirrors the military mindset of declaring Muslims, Islamic Nations, and nations with a predominantly large Muslim population, as enemies of the United States.

In this political context, the category of race serves to identify those who are good with those who are natural Americans, that is to say white Americans. It also serves to automatically identify all non-whites as non-American. Being non-white here means so much more than merely being a member of a certain religion. The racializing of Muslims also reinstitutes and reinforces the racializing of all non-whites as centers of violence and danger. It is especially telling when you consider that Barack Obama, the forty-fourth president of the United States of America, was accused of being Muslim while running for office in 2008. This particular story seems to have been started by a simple misunderstanding about his education, and whether he ever attended a madrassa, a Fundamentalist Islamic School. In the editorial from the Chicago Tribune, Kim Barker explains the sheer futility of trying to debunk this account.
Attention on U.S. Sen. Barack Obama's childhood in Indonesia has so far focused on whether he was a Muslim and whether one of his schools was a fundamentalist Islamic madrassa. Although his campaign has denied that Obama was a practicing Muslim, the "Islam" issue is not likely to go away soon for the presidential candidate. Some Americans link the religion with terrorism and see Indonesia, the world's most populous Muslim nation, as being an alien place, a world away from the White House.8

Islam is seen as an anti-American religion, and in politics the perception of the public is a key measure of whether or not a candidate has a fighting chance. Now if Sheth is right then Islam is being used as a race and the issue of Obama’s faith is deployed as a racialized weapon against him. It is telling that at least some of the people who were questioning the president’s integrity and commitment were themselves important and powerful political personalities, rather than merely fringe social figures. Yet what is the underlying reason for all of this suspicion? The reason is clear, the president is non-white, and as such falls under the greatest suspicion. The political issue of Obama’s religion does not actually come from questions regarding his personal beliefs, but instead it follows from the suspicion regarding his race. This must necessarily include accusations of secret affiliations with the very enemies which the United States has sworn to eliminate. Thus, in the context of political power and social status, race continues to be deployed and used as a tool of oppression and marginalization, even on the most powerful and influential of people.

Having looked at the practice of producing race, it is important to understand how Sheth sets up the theoretical framework behind this production. Sheth takes her lead from Heidegger in explaining how race can function as a tool, or a technology. As suggested above, she argues that the technology of race is a tool of political discourse, that the technology of race is able to conceal its political nature behind some more official purpose, and that the technology of race conceals our actual relationship with government behind a supposedly objective morality.
Sheth’s first point is that race is a tool of political discourse. “…first, it is a vehicle deployed by law to channel certain elements in order to produce a set of classifications that constrain us to think about human beings as belonging to races.” Sheth further classifies these elements, which the law channels, by using the term unruly. The idea here is that in the first place there are legal institutions and organizations of power in societies which make use of race in the political sphere. In this first sense, race is the tool which those in power invent and continue to use in public discourse and law-making activities in order to define that part of the population which is dangerous. On this score, the race of Black people is invented and used by European and American governments in order to initially justify the slave trade. If Black people are deemed “dangerous,” “childlike,” “warlike,” “uncivilized,” “ignorant,” and “dumb brutes,” then enslaving them is not only justified, it might even be the most moral action one can take. However, even after the abolition of slavery, the political tool of race was far too valuable for governments to dispense with. They continue to find new and valuable uses for it, all of which serve to justify the continually racialized power structure in society. Race becomes ever more important to political powers since race now serves to justify that power structure itself. Perhaps a better way to illustrate this point is with an example from literature. In carrying out a phenomenology of both race and technology it is telling that one should address the issue from as many vantage points as possible, hence why a detour into literature is no detour at all. I turn now to Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, which was first published in 1899. This novella illustrates the governmental power present in creating and justifying racial discourse.

Whatever else may be said of Conrad’s short novel, it certainly does contain a deep look at the ways in which race is deployed as a tool for political power. Even in the opening chapter, Conrad’s chief character and narrator, Marlow, reminisces on the conquest of Britain by the
Romans. Marlow attempts to imagine what it would have been like for a Roman Legionary and his soldiers when they first set foot upon the farthest point in their empire, the British Isles. He uses language that is meant to foreshadow the tale of his own journey, which he will recall later in the book, and then attempts to justify the difference between Romans and British Imperialists.

Mind, none of us would feel exactly like this. What saves us is efficiency—the devotion to efficiency. But these chaps were not much account, really. They were no colonists; their administration was merely a squeeze, and nothing more, I suspect. They were conquerors, and for that you want only brute force—nothing to boast of, when you have it, since your strength is just an accident arising from the weakness of others. They grabbed what they could get for the sake of what was to be got. It was just robbery with violence, aggravated murder on a great scale, and men going at it blind—as is very proper for those who tackle a darkness. The conquest of the earth, which mostly means the taking it away from those who have a different complexion or slightly flatter noses than ourselves, is not a pretty thing when you look into it too much. What redeems it is the idea only. An idea at the back of it; not a sentimental pretense but an idea; and an unselfish belief in the idea—something you can set up, and bow down before, and offer a sacrifice to. . . .

Now the risk in analyzing a work of literature is that one may conflate the views and actions of characters with the idea that the author condones or approves of such views. Despite this possible slippage, a phenomenological survey of Conrad’s text reveals a profound critique of the spirit of both imperialism and racism. The Romans were not exactly racist in the simple sense that the idea of race did not exist for them. Though it must be readily admitted that they were nationalists. Yet for Marlow and the nineteenth century British there seems to be almost no other way to understand or justify the violence inherent in colonizing. It is telling that Marlow invokes racial identifiers to try to explain the Roman mindset, while at the same time distancing himself from the Romans behind the idea of efficiency. It is that notion of efficiency which so greatly unpacks the technological aspect of racism in this sense. The only difference between the brutality of the Romans and the attitude of the British is that the British are models of technological efficiency in their colonization efforts. Marlow even pushes the idea of efficiency
to religious heights, and very tellingly invokes the language of sacrifice. That is to say, the barbarism of colonization is self-justifying to those involved in it, on the grounds that it is being carried out in the most technically proficient manner possible.

One other rather illuminating incident from Conrad’s novel details the exchange between Marlow and his Aunt. Marlow’s Aunt had used what social influence she had to get Marlow a job as the captain of a river steamboat on the Congo River, in what was then the Belgian Congo in Africa. Marlow’s interest in the job was pragmatic. He wanted work and the job fit his skill set. His Aunt’s interest in the job was more complex, and reflected her own racial bias.

It appeared, however, I was also one of the Workers, with a capital—you know. Something like an emissary of light, something like a lower sort of apostle. There had been a lot of such rot let loose in print and talk just about that time, and the excellent woman, living right in the rush of all that humbug, got carried off her feet. She talked about 'weaning those ignorant millions from their horrid ways,' till, upon my word, she made me quite uncomfortable. I ventured to hint that the Company was run for profit. Marlow’s Aunt got him the job by representing Marlow as a man of deep moral convictions. The most important of these convictions had to do with the desire to “civilize” the people of Africa. Marlow is unsettled by this account since, as a practical man, he understands that the Company is interested only in making money. Marlow’s aunt is laboring under the assumption that her racism is justified since it places a special moral burden on her and others. To those who are civilized, educated, and white, there is a great moral obligation to reform, salvage, and otherwise improve the lot of those who are not-white. Rudyard Kipling immortalized this notion of the moral obligation of whites in his famous poem, The White Man’s Burden. This poem was also released the same year as Conrad’s novel, and Kipling’s prose touches on the very same themes. “Take up the White Man’s burden—Send forth the best ye breed—Go send your sons to exile, To serve your captives' need…” On this account, the white man is in the position of power and
privilege due to his high moral status. In contrast, the non-whites have no moral sense of their duty to enrich the lives of white men; indeed, as “savages,” it is said that they are devoid of a moral sense. It is the whites who understand that their superiority comes with the moral conscience of needing to support, save, and civilize the non-whites. It is this very notion that whiteness has some grand design which forms the basis for Sheth’s second point about the theoretical framework behind a technology of race.

Sheth establishes that the technology of race is able to conceal its political nature. “The second dimension by which race can be considered technologically is through the juridical capacity to conceal the first function, behind a more “official” or “procedural” one.”15 That first function was to produce a set of classifications to constrain us in thinking of others as raced. This concealment goes unnoticed since the newly deployed categories of the races hide the actual legal processes which instantiate race behind the visage of natural science. There are social institutions, like religion and science, which justify and prove that racial categories are a natural part of the world and as such are essential to the running of our society. These social institutions cooperate, sometimes in an organized way but also through a culture which deploys and reinforces specific stereotypes, with the political power structures of society. This in turn creates and reiterates the racial categories as “lofty and ambiguous”16, so that we stand indebted to them in a way that is not accessible to most kinds of thinking. Thus the average person will understand race very well, insofar as they can identify and properly categorize people into their various races. This is the everyday problem of race which was introduced earlier. Yet those same people will be largely ignorant of how race functions on the deeper level of whiteness and certainly ignorant of the social structures which created the races in the first place. This is exactly what is happening with regards to why Marlow’s Aunt seems unaware of her own racism. From her
perspective, the civilization and ennobling of the Africans is exactly why Europeans even have colonies in Africa. She does not see what Marlow sees, that this is simply a capitalistic endeavor to gain wealth, power, and prestige for Belgium at the expense of African bodies. Marlow himself is not entirely aware of all of the political motivations and forces behind the colony, and indeed he shows little interest in these racialized forces. Instead, Marlow dismisses his Aunt’s naïveté by claiming that she is simply an ignorant woman, and therefore insulated from the practical realities of the world. Marlow himself understands that there are certain “confounded facts” which men live with every day, of which women know nothing. The idea here is that in the broader cultural context Marlow is aware of the racism inherent in his new job and the larger society. However, he has no real interest in changing it; his only interest is in working with it. Marlow’s disinterest strikes us as very revealing, especially since it must be thoroughly willed in the face of all the moral dilemmas he encounters in Africa. Marlow may begin his journey as morally disinterested but it is exactly the problem of race as ethical which ultimately confounds him. This raises Sheth’s third and final point regarding the ways that technology of race conceals our political situation.

The final way in which Sheth argues that race is technological is to be found in the direct relationship between citizens and governments. “The third way in which race functions as a technology is that it conceals our relationship to law and sovereign power behind seemingly objective moral and political judgments.” Sheth explains further that in a liberal society racism is masked behind what appear to be fair, equal, and unbiased agreements between the governors and the governed.

A most brilliant example of this concealing of racism is discussed by Robert K. Fullinwider in his article, “Affirmative Action and Fairness.” Fullinwider attempts to make sense
of why various Americans in positions of political power in the 1980s and 1990s were so
disseminative of the idea of quotas in reducing racial discrimination. Fullinwider comments that
William Bradford Reynolds, the head of the Office of Civil Rights in the Department of Justice
during the Reagan administration, was a particularly strong opponent of quotas.

The debate about preferential treatment he said, is between those [like himself] who
believe in equality of opportunity and those who believe in equality of results. Those who
oppose preferential treatment believe in individual rights and a colorblind, genderblind
society. Those who support quotas believe in group rights and dividing up social benefits
by race and gender. Fullinwider’s critique of such

Reynolds opposed Affirmative Action quotas, which would force businesses to hire women and
non-whites, on the basis that such quotas were racist and sexist. To give preferential treatment to
members of groups, who have been historically discriminated against, is the worst kind of
discrimination according to Reynolds. Instead Reynolds opposes these programs in order “to
prevent discrimination and secure equality of opportunity. Reynolds says that using racial and
sexual preferences to end discrimination is nonsense; the way to end discrimination is not to
discriminate in reverse but simply to stop discriminating.” Fullinwider’s critique of such
thinking is that the problem lies precisely with the supposed optimism Reynolds has in his
society’s ability to stop discriminating. Fullinwider gives several historical examples of
American businesses that, even in the wake of the Civil Rights Act, continued to discriminate
against hiring women or non-whites. It is impossible to stop discriminating when we have
constructed our society, our laws, and our government around this very discrimination. In fact, to
prevent and stop programs that demand quotas, whose goal is to increase the number of women
and non-whites in the workforce, essentially means that one wants the workforce to remain as it
is. One might try to justify this by claiming that those who have already made various
achievements have done so based upon their own social status using hard work and
determination, and that the same principles should be applied to everyone. Of course, in so doing, those in positions of power and wealth cover over and conceal the system of race (whiteness) and gender privileges (maleness) that have enabled them to be successful.

Fullinwider creates an analogy for our unfair society and explains what it would be like living in the Land of Giants. In this analogy, human beings have been suddenly transported to a world made by and for Giant sized creatures. The giants might look at us as charming but we would be judged inept and helpless since we could not do even the simplest tasks. “But we would know that the problem does not lie in us, it lies in the fact that everything in Giant Land is built to the scale of Giants…Giants see their world as the world. They just naturally measure us against it, so they see the problem to be in us.”

We can now say that the racism and sexism inherent in Reynolds’ position is concealed under the guise of being colorblind and genderblind. Race is only effectively deployed as a tool for political power if it is concealed under the incredibly hypocritical image of being non-racist. It is not enough to hide one’s racism, but rather the political institutions which survive on racism, in a world created by and for them, even go so far as to claim that their racism is no racism at all. Their racism is, at least in their rhetoric, a fair and just application of racial categories to human problems. In effect, they claim that they have done all that they can to make the world fair and balanced and now it is up to us to do the real work for ourselves and achieve success in their society. Of course, that success will come easier to some than it will to others. Yet rather than admitting that this is the result of an uneven field, where some have privileges and advantages that others lack, the official story will be that the successful people are simply more hard working. This in turn will come to reflect the narrative of the “hard-working” white and the “lazy” black. Race returns ultimately as a justification for a racist system of government and power, but it returns in the guise of the
everyday problem of race. It returns as the illusion of an improper application of the real scientific categories of race.

As the problem of race goes deeper than the everyday problem of race as mis-categorization, so also the problem of technology is more than its misuse. A rather obvious interpretation of technology at this point would be that some tools, like race, threaten human society. Sheth’s three divisions show us that at least certain technologies can be misused and cause harm to a society by reinforcing corrupt and immoral political powers. The problem of race is more than its misuse, and it also seems that the problem of race as a tool must be likewise more than mere misuse. The problem of race is also the deeper problem of whiteness and the supreme danger that whiteness will cover over every other way of seeing the world, and reveal only that we always will be raced. This same kind of problematic can be applied to the philosophy of technology. There is an everyday kind of problem with technology, its misuse, but this also gives way to deeper problems and systematic ways of thinking and seeing the world. Whereas whiteness tends to constantly re-evaluate human bodies under the terms of race, the deeper problems of technology go beyond human bodies to strike at our most basic understanding of the natural and social world. In order to understand the dangers posed by technology, there is the need to delve into an understanding of the nature of technology, its causes and effects, and ultimately the kinds of thinking which underlie it.

Since Sheth has introduced us to how the problems of technology connect to the problems of race, it is fitting that Sheth takes the initial inspiration for her project from the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. Sheth actually begins the first chapter of her book by paraphrasing a quote from Martin Heidegger’s essay on technology, the “Question Concerning Technology”. Sheth explains that in her paraphrasing of Heidegger’s quote that she has
substituted the term racial for technological, and the term race for technology. The effect of this is that Sheth understands that for Heidegger technology operates as a kind of system of thought, rather than as a system of objects. “Heidegger’s 1950’s lectures on technology are notable for distinguishing between technology and the essence of technology. Our attempts to find the ‘essence’ of a thing by looking at it directly often lead to its obfuscation; instead by looking to the ‘Gestell’ or the enframing of an epoch, the truth of a particular thing might be more readily revealed to us.”23 This understanding of Heidegger is what leads Sheth to search for the function of race in society, as she seeks for the essence of race. This is better than merely searching for the scientific or objective grounds for race, especially since race often functions in a way that is utterly independent of any scientific evidence for it.

Part of the problem of the continuation of racism lies in the way that it resists active scholarly work which is meant to resolve it. One of the great academic blind-spots is the supposition that the way in which scientists, scholars, and academics have discussed an issue is the way in which that issue really exists. There is often an emphasis placed on the notion that scholarly work establishes truth, and that whatever most people in society naively think can be dismissed as mere ignorance. Part of the mistake of such thinking is to ignore the way in which society at large influences academic research. The most egregious aspect of this mistake, however, is to be found in the troubling way in which certain ideas in the broader social context actively resist scholarly insight. Even when scholars in a particular field reach a strong consensus on an issue, the culture at large may still be quite resistant to pick up and accept those scholarly findings. While there may be numerous reasons for this, the point I wish to make here is that this is not the result of a lack of information or lack of education. Instead there are cultural attitudes at work in a society which determine, prior to any scholarly work being done, whether or not
something is going to count in the practical working out of social life. This is precisely the problem that Heidegger raises by working out the essence of technology, and that Sheth raises by working out the essence of race and technology. There is a truth about these notions (race and technology) which is more basic than any objective attempt to properly define them in the scholarship. This basic truth is worked out in a cultural attitude which defines the conditions under which these ideas are able to emerge as meaningful.

Within the philosophical tradition, the idea of the underlying truth certainly goes back as far as Immanuel Kant and his search for the possible conditions for the synthetic a priori. Though we have already addressed Kant’s contribution to the genealogy of race, it is also important to look at how Kant has contributed to a history of philosophical ideas in other aspects of philosophy. Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason investigates whether or not synthetic a priori judgments are possible. These are the kinds of judgments which would be based in pure a priori forms of sensible intuition, and thus involve ideas which can be known to be true independently of any particular sense impressions. This would also involve synthetic judgments, which are all judgments that expand our knowledge about a subject and whose truth value cannot be determined by the rules of logic alone. So before I can know anything in the physical sciences I must have certain synthetic a priori judgments which make science possible. These judgments must be more basic than anything in the sciences, and in one sense the synthetic a priori is simply an example of the conditions for knowledge. This idea of the conditions is what Kant terms Transcendental Logic. This approach seeks out the conditions which make the knowledge we gain through experience even possible in the first place. So those conditions are essential for the knowledge we gain through our experiences of the world, and at the same time those conditions are more basic than any of that knowledge. Although Kant does not use
Heidegger’s terminology, since he predates Heidegger by several centuries, nonetheless Kant might be quite comfortable with saying that in looking for the conditions of knowledge we are, in a sense, finding the true essence of it.

In a similar fashion the true essence of race is not the scientific categories of race, but indeed it is the conditions, found in the broader cultural understanding of a European self and the selves of others, which make the scientific categories of race even possible. Yet since we have seen how, in the work of Sheth, race is technological, then it seems we must gain a fuller understanding of the problem of race by investigating the problem of technology. As Heidegger introduces Sheth to this kind of thinking, then our project must involve an investigation into the philosophy of technology of Martin Heidegger.

However, before we begin to investigate Heidegger’s philosophy of technology, I must address a serious issue which confronts any scholar who attempts to use Heideggerian analysis on the problem of race, namely Heidegger’s own racism. Historical evidence unequivocally point to the fact that Martin Heidegger was a member of the Nazi party in Germany prior to and during World War II. Jeffrey Van Davis explored Heidegger’s Nazism in his documentary film *Only a God Can Save Us.* The degree to which Heidegger’s philosophy was influenced by his Nazism has also been extensively explored by Tom Rockmore in his book *On Heidegger’s Nazism and Philosophy.*

Perhaps one of the more troubling problems with Heidegger’s racism, which is not always raised about Kant’s racism vis-à-vis the African slave trade, is its connection to the violent movement of National Socialism in Germany. It may be said of Kant or Hegel that they were racist but theirs was racism at a distance. They themselves were not involved directly in the slave trade or in actual instances of violence against blacks and other non-whites. Yet without
excusing Heidegger, it is worth mentioning that this kind of defense is incredibly weak. Certainly these philosophers all had profound social and cultural impact thanks to their writing and their lecturing. Their rationalizing of racism and slavery on the whole may have done more collective evil in justifying and allowing racism to continue in all of its violent forms, than any singular slave-owner or slave trader ever did. Of course, since Heidegger was also an intellectual caught up in justifying and defending Nazi ideology, including Anti-Semitism, then Heidegger too bears as much guilt as his intellectual predecessors. Perhaps the answer to all of this is to claim that Heidegger, like every other philosopher before him, was merely a product of his own unique place and time. Heidegger himself would emphasize how much we are the recipients of a world and a way of thinking into which we are thrown. Yet this kind of defense rings rather hollow in the face of the ongoing racial degradation of human beings. That Heidegger or Kant may not have been fully aware of the extent to which racial violence was occurring in their own societies does not excuse their active participation in the perpetuation of racism. Besides, unlike Kant who had very little direct interaction with those harmed by German colonialism, Heidegger knew Jewish colleagues and had Jewish students. So, again, the question must be raised: how can I justify using the philosophies of such extreme racists in a dissertation which attempts to, at least in part, critique racism?

My answer to this question is twofold; first, I find a certain justice in re-appropriating the ideas and rhetoric of racists to critique racism, and, secondly, all intellectual exercise always involves an act of transcendence. Firstly I am in a sense re-appropriating the writings of Martin Heidegger and applying them to my own project. This dissertation is no mere exposition or in-depth analysis of the work of Martin Heidegger. If it were to involve that then I should certainly look at how the entire catalogue of his works addresses the issue of his philosophy of
technology. Yet rather than attempting to provide a complex apology for Heidegger’s body of work I will be honest and admit that I, like Sheth, take Heidegger as a starting point. Heidegger’s work is deeply inspirational and influential for the project of this dissertation, but this dissertation is going to take Heidegger’s ideas and attempt to reconstitute them within a new argumentative framework. The issue at hand in this dissertation is that of how technoracism is a cultural attitude which manifests itself in the issues of racism and the enframing. So to that end I am not using Heidegger’s work to justify, excuse, or defend racism. Indeed, I find in Heidegger a very compelling critique of blind ideologies, and even if Heidegger was himself a believer in such ideologies, nevertheless his critique offers important insights.

Secondly, it must be affirmed that any intellectual effort involves transcendence and universalizing. To be sure, my own project places a great deal of importance on lived experience and writing that entails personal and ethical involvement. Yet even the most basic attempts to use language makes an appeal to the notion that words transcend our own personal and private endeavors. Thinking out loud, which must form the poetic soul of writing, requires me to use ideas and words in ways which their creators and inventors may not have designed them. Heidegger may prove unable to escape his Nazi ideology, even in his writings on the philosophy of technology. Yet we can and must use his language and his ideas to go beyond the path he has laid out for them. We can communicate something new, and something more than Heidegger’s own poisoned politics. In the words, in the works of a Nazi we may yet find a compelling critique of racism and modern technology, despite the limitations of their author.

This chapter began by discussing the work of Falguni Sheth and demonstrating how race can be applied as a tool of political power. To further elaborate on this we also investigated how a critique of race could show up in the works of Conrad and Kipling. This lead us to a discussion
of how race contributes to socio-economic inequality as we looked at the arguments against and for affirmative action. Finally, we determined that since race can be presented as technological, and since Sheth was influenced by Heidegger’s philosophy of technology, then an investigation of the essence of technology is needed in order to delve further into these problems.
Chapter 4 – Heidegger and the Danger of Technology

In this chapter I introduce Martin Heidegger’s philosophy of technology. I begin with a brief exposition of the salient features of Heidegger’s genealogy of technology. According to Heidegger we first encounter two kinds of technology in human history, the handwork and the modern. To illustrate the handwork I show how Heidegger describes the making of a silver chalice as the working of Aristotle’s four causes. This lead to a preliminary definition of technology as an instrument and a tool for human work. In the activity of ancient, or handwork, technology the work of the crafter reveals something hidden and natural in the silver. This revelation is called *poiesis* and this *poiesis* is the true essence of ancient technology. Yet the activity of modern technology is not merely an instrument nor a true *poiesis*, but rather it challenges and forces the natural world to yield up its resources. These resources, in turn, become the whole reason that motivates modern technological advances and changes. When workers of modern technology are driven to yield up the resources of the world, then we see that there is a different revelation that occurs in modern technology. The revelation of the world as merely full of useful materials and resources is driven by a cultural attitude called the enframing. It is in the enframing that we find the great danger posed by modern technology.

For Heidegger, the greatest threat of technology is that it will conceal its true nature as a normative gaze under the mask of mere instrument. He sees this supreme danger threatening human beings insofar as they are set up and forced into one way of seeing the world. That while they are the agents which cause the enframing to reveal the world as mere resource, they are at the same time losing their agency. They are losing the very thing which most makes them agents, their ability to choose. The threat is that they, and perhaps also ourselves, will only ever encounter technology as a means to ends, and will never understand that technology is in many
ways out of our hands, and operating under its own autonomic forces. What may be even worse is the danger of forgetting that technology is merely one way of seeing the world, as our options become absorbed by the normative gaze. The entire world, including ourselves, is endangered by the normative gaze of technology.

To understand Heidegger’s “Question Concerning Technology,” we must begin with the idea of questioning itself. Heidegger begins his essay by claiming that he is asking questions when it comes to the idea of technology. This move is Socratic-like, since such questioning seems to imply that we begin with a kind of ignorance of the truth we wish to learn. However, the interrogative nature of Heidegger’s essay should not be read as proceeding from ignorance, but rather from a point of philosophical caution. It is tempting to rush into things, define the categories, label the terms, and delineate the subject matter of technology. Yet this temptation to rush, label, and categorize is precisely the thing we must resist. That urge to push the world of ideas and intellect to spill their secrets and yield up the knowledge contained within them is already a kind of technological thinking. So Heidegger urges us to begin by questioning, since questioning sets out the way that we will approach the issue, that is, a way of thinking. “All ways of thinking lead through language in a manner that is extraordinary. We shall be questioning concerning technology, and in so doing we should like to prepare a free relationship to it. The relationship will be free if it opens our human existence to the essence of technology.”¹ We want a free mode of thinking, which rightly implies that our natural impulse to think in certain ways is not already free. We are caught up in ways of thinking and living which make us blind and ignorant to the nature of what lies behind and informs our thinking. In the tradition of Kant, Heidegger is interested in the conditions which allow the possibility of knowledge. We are concerned with the conditions which allow the possibility of thinking freely about an idea, the
essence of technology, an idea which threatens to determine all of our ways of thinking. Heidegger knows that the reader of his text is coming to the issue of technology already within a mindset and a way of living which supposes that he/she understands the true nature of technology. So the first step is to attempt to free our thinking, as much as possible, from the temptation to apply the categories we already have to the issues which Heidegger wants to critically engage and lay bare. This temptation is felt most keenly in our efforts to use language, especially a language whose definitions contain an unavoidable bias. It is important to note that Heidegger does not advise us to do away with bias itself, as a move to escape one bias would inevitably lead to submission to a different bias. Instead he cautions patience, and deliberate thought applied to an understanding of the essence of technology.

According to Heidegger, the essence of technology is not in itself some kind of device, or some kind of technological apparatus. Nor are we to find the essence of technology, that which technology most truly and basically is, by looking at machines. “According to ancient doctrine the essence of a thing is considered to be what the thing is. We ask the question concerning technology when we ask what it is.” The immediate answer we might bring to the question, that is, the answer which we have ready formulated before we have begun to heed Heidegger’s caution to think, is that the essence of technology is that of the tool. Anthropologists often study ancient human societies by considering the archaeological evidence of the tools that those early humans used. We look at the behavior of chimpanzees using rocks to break open nuts or sticks to get termites out of their mounds and we say that the essence of technology must be its “tool-ness.” “Technology itself is a contrivance, or, in Latin, an instrumentum.” This encapsulates the ideas that technology is both a means to an end, and also a uniquely human activity.
Yet what do we make of the chimp using tools, if technology is a human activity? The answer is so simple that we at first do not even remark on such genius. That chimps use tools is to us evidence of their sentience, and their evolutionary nearness to our own species. Never mind that other creatures use tools, the point of saying that a chimp does is not to diminish the human activity of tool making and using, but to emphasize how human nature spreads even further than our species. Humanity is to be found not only in our genetic similarity, but in a set of practices and activities which we define as the human. We elevate the chimp and privilege its using of sticks and stones as evidence that our theories about such creatures, and their similarity to us, are correct theories.

To return to the instrumental definition of technology, Heidegger explains further that it holds just as well for both handwork and modern technology. This distinction is pivotal in Heidegger’s understanding of technology since it allows him to show how technology has been set into human history. The distinction also opens us up to the possibility of discussing a genealogy of technology in a similar fashion to how we previously introduced a genealogy of race. Yet if we proceed from an understanding of technology as mere instrument then no such genealogy is possible. The reasons for this are clear once we investigate the ancient tools of our primitive ancestors. It seems that technology is one of those rare things which, to borrow the phrase, actually goes back as far as the dawn of time. More realistically it goes back at least as far as the dawn of our species in time. We have defined ourselves as the toolmakers and users and so if technology is a mere instrument then we, who have always been using such instruments, cannot mark the origins or the development of them. If we have always used technology then there is no point in our recorded history or collective memory when we can recall the time before its use. Thus technology seems to be always present, simultaneously with
our experience of being human. The only exception here would be to chart a level of increasing complexity throughout history, and to note how our devices become more advanced. This is normally how we proceed when we compare the stone tools of the past to the electronic and mechanical machines of the present. We remark on how our ancient predecessors used the spade and the trowel to dig in the earth. We then turn to our contemporary age and point to how we use the backhoe or the excavator to dig. In so pointing we naively claim that the spade is no different than the backhoe, except in magnitude and efficiency. Yet Heidegger makes a division between handwork, or ancient, technology, and machine, or modern, technology. If a genealogy of technology will be successful then this historical division must be explored.

Since handwork technology is the oldest then that makes it the logical place to begin. Heidegger introduces us to the distinction between ancient and modern technology when he writes, “The instrumental definition of technology is indeed so uncannily correct that it even holds for modern technology, of which in other respects, we maintain with some justification that it is, in contrast to the older handwork technology, something completely different and therefore new.” Heidegger also gives several examples of modern and ancient technology in juxtaposition to each other throughout his essay. Examples of ancient technology include the weather vane, as opposed to the modern invention of the radar station, and sawmill, as opposed to the hydroelectric plant. He also gives the example of a windmill and farming by hand as ancient technologies, which he contrasts to modern agriculture as the “mechanized food industry.” Additionally there is a brief mention of a wooden bridge over the Rhine River as the ancient technological counterpart to the complex interlocking parts of the Hydroelectric Dam on that same river. Although Heidegger gives us these examples, the origins of ancient technology remain obscure. Heidegger does, however, place the origins of machine power technology in the
second half of the eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{8} David Krell elaborates further: “Historians and social scientists define ‘modern technology’ as the application of power machinery to production. They locate its beginnings in eighteenth-century England, where large coal deposits provide a source of energy for the production of steam, which in turn propels machinery in textile and other mills.”\textsuperscript{9} Krell admits that the exact reasons for this sudden explosion in technological advancement are complicated by numerous social and scientific factors. So he is unsure as to why it happened there and then. In contrast, handwork technology has presumably been around as long as human beings have been around. Now if there is to be a technoracism of any kind, then it must be demonstrated that the attitude and idea of technoracism precedes both the historic arrival of race and the historic arrival of machine technology. Thus the distinction between handwork and machine technology is crucial to an understanding of Heidegger and also for the continuation of this dissertation.

Heidegger explains the nature of the distinction between handwork and modern machine technology most thoroughly in his discussion of Aristotelian causality. Heidegger explains that the instrumental definition of technology is perhaps correct, but not quite true. In order to engage what that distinction means, Heidegger proposes an analysis of instrumentality itself via the work of Aristotle’s \textit{Physics}. In his commentary on Heidegger’s philosophy of technology, \textit{The Gods and Technology}, Richard Rojcewicz explains that the distinction between ancient and modern technology hinges on the understanding of Aristotle’s four causes. “Ancient technology, in essence, \textit{is} the theory of the four causes; ancient technology is the disclosure of things in general as subject to the four causes. Heidegger’s path to an understanding of ancient technology thus proceeds by way of the sense of causality of the four causes.”\textsuperscript{10} In his investigation into an
ancient understanding of causality and instrumentality, Heidegger also lays out the essential and unique features of handwork technology.

Heidegger discusses the four causes by giving an example of how a silver chalice comes to be made in the ancient world. There is the *causa materialis*, the matter and stuff out of which the chalice is made, this is often referred to as the material cause. The material cause includes the silver, but it also includes the physical tools which the crafter will make use of in the crafting process. The next cause is the *causa formalis*, the formal cause, and this is best understood as the shape that the chalice takes, its chalice-ness, that is the shape of a cup. The next cause that Heidegger describes is the *causa finalis*, which we translate as the final cause. This is best understood as the purpose for which the chalice is made, and also as the primary motivation for the crafter to make the chalice. The final cause is in fact the cause which most importantly determines the material and formal causes. If the silver chalice is made for display then different materials will be used to make it and it will be put into a more ornamental form. If the chalice is made for practical everyday use then it must be built from sturdy materials and shaped so that it can withstand the rigors of frequent drinking. The last cause Heidegger turns to is the efficient cause, “the *causa efficiens*, which brings about the effect that is the finished, actual chalice, in this instance, the silversmith.” Once he has finished listing the causes, Heidegger points out that the peculiar thing about causality is that we only think of causality in terms of the efficient cause. “Our contemporary understanding of causality is what, by its own agency, produces an effect. Hence for us the cause of the chalice is not the silver but the artisan who imposes on the silver the form of the chalice.” Rojcewicz here explains that the problem of how we understand causality in our current society, a society where modern technology predominates, is that we think that only an agent, a catalyst, or a precipitating event can truly be considered a cause. The
other factors which Aristotle dreamed up, and which Heidegger mentions, may be important in some peripheral sense, but they are not considered to be true causes. Yet Heidegger intends to teach us the error of our ways by revisiting the example of the silver chalice in order to demonstrate that only the four causes together can rightly be considered causality. In so doing he demonstrates the true nature of ancient, or handwork, technology.

Heidegger explains that what each of the four causes has in common is that the silver chalice owes its existence to each of them equally and communally. Lovitt translates Heidegger’s term here as indebtedness, and he displays this first in how the silver chalice is indebted to its materials. “Silver is that out of which the chalice is made. As this matter (hyle), it is co-responsible for the chalice. The chalice is indebted to, i.e., owes thanks to, the silver for that out of which it consists.” Heidegger explains that this indebtedness exists between the chalice and the formal and final causes, and here Heidegger redefines the formal cause as the eidos or idea of the chalice. The final cause he redefines as the telos, that which truly begins and completes the chalice. Lastly, Heidegger argues that the silversmith is the fourth cause, but not as an efficient cause of any sort. Rojcewicz explains that another way to interpret Heidegger’s language here may shed additional light on the ideas at play. Rather than using the word indebted, Rojcewicz explains that it may be better to say that the chalice is obliged to its causes.

We are obliged to another not for creation or for taking away our accomplishment by accomplishing it himself or herself, but for abetting us in our own accomplishment. That is the nuance that Heidegger is trying to express: the four causes are ways of abetting...the causes provide the conditions, the nurture, out of which the thing can come forth. Heidegger is all too aware that the ordinary language used to describe causality is biased. The foundations of our communication are themselves caught up within a modern and technical way
of understanding the world. So our impulse is to understand causality as being relative to the force which effects change, and through sheer effort of will brings something into existence.

Heidegger wants to resist this and so he insists on basing his terms in German on some terms in ancient Greek, terms which are closer to a handwork definition of technology.

…let us clarify the four ways of being responsible in terms of that for which they are responsible. According to our example, they are responsible for the silver chalice’s lying ready before us as a sacrificial vessel. Lying before and lying ready (hypokesthai) characterize the presencing of something that presences…The principal characteristic of being responsible is this starting something on its way into arrival. It is in the sense of such a starting something on its way into arrival that that being responsible is an occasioning or an inducing to go forward [Ver-an-lassen].

Although it may seem that Heidegger’s language is obscure, in actuality he has chosen his words with the greatest logical urgency, so as to avoid vagueness and ambiguity. Lovitt understands this and so he provides the original terms, along with his translations, whenever he thinks that an idea of particular value is conveyed by Heidegger’s language. Now a full analysis of the meaning and interpretation of Heidegger’s language would involve another project. So, we must limit ourselves to a more direct approach to the meaning behind Heidegger’s terms. Rojcewicz explains that hypokesthai can also be translated as a lying underneath. Then we may understand that the four causes create the grounding, and act like the soil in which what they bring forth may be allowed to grow. With regards to the term Ver-an-lassen, Rojcewicz explains that the principal meaning of the word can be found in the root lassen which is “the word for ‘let’ in German…” According to Rojcewicz the use of hyphens by Heidegger is critical since such a use distinguishes the term from the more ordinary German word Veranlassen, which is well translated by the word occasioning. Yet, for Rojcewicz, when Heidegger hyphenates the word he places special emphasis on the letting involved in the word. “As applied to the four causes the sense of the terms is as follows. Los-lassen: the four causes let something loose or release it. An-
lassen: they then let it go on to its path of development. Ver-an-lassen: their letting escorts the thing all the way to the end of its development.”  

All of this answers the question of what the four causes are engaged in, this act of releasing, but it raises the further question of exactly what they effect. Heidegger’s answer to that further question is that they are releasing and effecting a poiesis.

The notion of poiesis is exactly what forms handwork technology in the first place, and ultimately the lack of poiesis is what makes modern machine technology different. For Heidegger, a reading of Plato actually sheds more light on Aristotle’s understanding of the four causes, since it is in Plato that Heidegger encounters the term poiesis, translated here as bringing-forth. “It is of utmost importance that we think bringing-forth in its full scope and at the same time in the sense in which the Greeks thought it. Not only handcraft manufacture, not only artistic and poetical bringing into appearance and concrete imagery…Physis also, the arising of something from out of itself, is a bringing-forth poiesis.”  

This bringing forth is not unique to handcraft technology, though it is essential to it. Poiesis rules over artistic production too, for the work of art can also be seen to issue forth from the four causes just as well as the craft or the practical production. Yet for Heidegger it is the bringing forth of Physis, of nature, which is actually “the paradigm case of Poiesis.”  

The way that Heidegger explains it is that in nature the bringing forth is a bursting forth, such as we see when the flower blooms. This bursting out of the bloom, the emergence of the butterfly from the chrysalis, and the breaking out of the baby bird from its egg is the emergence of what a thing itself really is. “In contrast what is brought forth by the artisan or artist…has the bursting open belonging to bringing forth not in itself, but in another (en alloi), in the craftsman or the artist.”
So the work and production of ancient technology ultimately is a bringing-forth but of an indirect kind. It is the kind of emergence we find in abetting and aiding a thing to come out. The work of the windmill is an excellent example of this. Heidegger writes that, “Its sails do indeed turn in the wind; they are left entirely to the wind’s blowing. But the windmill does not unlock energy from the air currents in order to store it.” The windmill produces, but it would be more accurate to say that it aids and abets, the grinding of wheat into meal and flour. This is an aiding precisely because the windmill cannot force the grinding without the aid of natural forces, on which the windmill is dependent. The windmill brings out what is already there in the wind, wheat, and mill stone. It brings out the possibility of flour and of food. Yet this is indirect, and is not exactly the same thing as the tree bringing forth of fruit in its season. When a flower blooms in nature, the bloom is the result of the work of the flower. When fruit grows naturally on a tree it is the production or work of the tree which brings out the fruit. Yet when a farmer grows wheat in a field and then grinds it at the windmill, it is fair to say that the flour is not the natural production of anything. Instead it is the working of the farmer which brings out the flour. Yet this working and bringing out can only bring out what is in some sense, available. The farmer cannot bring atomic energy out of his farming and milling. Rather this bringing forth of the farmer is limited by the process and technique, and technology, which the farmer uses to work on the wheat. She can only bring out what is near and available in the thing on which she works. The key feature of ancient technology is its dependence on natural, as opposed to artificial, forces for its effectiveness. In that sense ancient or handwork technology is always inefficient since it lies at the mercy of forces beyond its control. The work of ancient technology involves a bringing forth of what is in some ways already present, but simply waiting to come out. For
Heidegger what, is brought out by the work of ancient technology, and what forms the essence of technology itself, is truth.

If instrumentality is the nature of technology then Heidegger explains that an instrument is a way of revealing truth.23 “Technology is a mode of revealing. Technology comes to presence…in the realm where revealing and unconcealment take place, where aletheia, truth, happens.”24 Heidegger claims that technology as revealing the truth of the world is what forms the essence of ancient or handwork technology. This is the truth of the grain in the windmill as flour, and the truth of the dirt under the shovel as a shallow ditch. In his book, Martin Heidegger, George Steiner explains that Heidegger’s notion of technology as truth comes from the ancient Greek understanding of the relationship between art and technique. “…all shaping, all construction of artifacts, is a focused knowing. A technique is a mode of knowledge which generates this or that object, it is a re-cognition toward truthful ends.”25 Yet as much as ancient technology involves this revealing, Heidegger is not so sure that modern technology can be said to reveal anything at all about nature.

So far the understanding of ancient, or handwork, technology has turned on the idea of revealing something natural and hidden about the world. Yet this revelation is indirect and needs the aid of a worker, and a crafter to bring it about. Thus ancient technology reveals certain indirect or hidden truths about the natural world through the aiding and abetting of a skilled crafter or artist. Heidegger does make a distinction, however, between ancient and modern technology. So this project must now turn to the idea of modern technology in order to discern whether or not the definition of technology as revealing will also apply to complex machines.

Heidegger will give us numerous examples of modern machine technology. We have already seen this in his mention of the radar station, the hydroelectric plant, and modern
agriculture as the “mechanized food industry.” All of these are given in contrast to the simpler handwork versions of technology which seem to accomplish the same tasks. Heidegger also gives examples of machine-power technology which do not readily admit of simpler handwork counterparts. He gives examples of the jet aircraft and coal mining as evidence of how modern technology is something quite different. The hydroelectric plant may be a more complicated version of the old sawmill, and the lumber industry may simply be a more complex form of woodcutting. Efficiency, speed, and magnitude are certainly characteristics of modern-machine technology, but only by degree. Perhaps one of the greatest problems with trying to establish a distinction between modern and ancient machines is that they seem to be based on the same principles. Even the jet aircraft may be understood as a more complex, faster, and more efficient means of travel. The airplane is simply a complicated kind of shoe, as the shoe is one of the simplest and most ancient aids to transport. Yet the shoe, in so far as it is ancient handwork technology, is an excellent example of how that kind of technology exists as an aid to a natural process. The human species is naturally gifted for walking and the shoe abets and aids us in revealing our ability to walk or run over great distances. The endurance of the human runner is naturally in our bodies, and with the aid of the shoe we find this endurance bursting forth into bloom. Yet the airplane is something different, and it seems to do more than merely aid us in travel, it seems to go beyond aiding and abetting into a new realm, the realm of creation. Steiner locates this new dimension by explaining that the value of techne and technology has been reconstituted thanks to, “…the Aristotelian-Cartesian mastery over knowledge, or more precisely, use of knowledge in order to exercise mastery…”

Despite their apparent differences, Heidegger still maintains that the essence of modern technology is as much a revealing as the essence of ancient technology. Yet the work of
revelation in modern technology is not the work of poiesis. “The revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging [Herausfordern], which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as such.”29 This challenging, which is also translated as a challenging-forth, is no poetic revelation. It employs a force, a violence, and a dominating attitude to the world and the objects within it. In handwork technology, the language is passive, reflective, and encouraging. In modern technology, the language is active, directive, and restricting. Rojcewicz explains that “Power-machine technology is precisely powerful; it enforces its will upon matter, imposes a form onto matter, rather than merely nurturing a form from latency to visibility.”30 What is so telling about the distinction between ancient and modern technology is that Heidegger has given up the language of the four causes in describing machine-power. There is no inviting matter, pregnant form, and encouraging end to draw in the crafter to aid and abet. There now exists only the crafter enforcing his form onto the matter for whatever purposes to which he wishes to put his product. This is technology as production, and this is the kind of technology with which we are familiar. To read Heidegger’s account of ancient technology one would think that he was describing art. His language is the typical example of the whimsical artist who claims that she must wait for the canvas to speak to her before she can begin to paint. Yet this is not the attitude of the civil engineer who has been tasked with designing an ever more efficient power plant for the city. The engineer does not wait, he has deadlines. The engineer is not reflecting on what form the power plant wants to take, rather he is following the proper method for building power plants to meet the power demands of an expanding city. The language of demand, and even the language of power, tells us everything about modern technology. It tells us that there is no cooperation of four causes, there is only the enforcement of a will.
To better explain this challenging nature of modern technology, Heidegger must also explain how technology challenges. Heidegger explains that the challenge to nature is an expediting. “It expedites in that it unlocks and exposes. Yet that expediting is always itself directed from the beginning toward furthering something else, i.e., toward driving on to the maximum yield at the minimum expense.”

Rojcewicz explains that the term which is translated as expedite (Fördern) can have various meanings. In one sense it can simply mean that which moves something along. “But fördern can also suggest the use of brute force. In this sense, it doesn’t simply mean to transport but to drag out (against resistance), to hoist up (as dead weight), to extract (with effort).” Fördern is also related to the term Heidegger uses to convey the challenging (herausfördern). The essence here is clear, modern technology employs violence and force as it unlocks and strips the world bare. Steiner explains how Heidegger’s example of the hydro-electric dam accomplishes this kind of violence. “The dam across the living stream, on the contrary, is an enslavement and a deconstruction. The energies and natural lineaments of the river are coerced through artificial apertures into the servitude of turbines. Flora and fauna go to ruin in the inert reservoir behind the dam.”

The language of force and enslavement may seem strong when referring to machines, but for Heidegger this language is essential to explaining the real purpose behind modern technology. The violence that these machines perform fulfills a kind of economic end. The more brutally the machine exposes and strips bare the natural world, the more efficiently it fulfills its function, to store up energy. Although it may be tempting to theorize that these machines are only at fault when their operators drive them to barbarous ends, nonetheless the machine is already purposed towards that destruction. It may be inert and inactive, but if it is being used then it must be used to rip out the things of the world and transform them into resources.
However, Heidegger has not abandoned the idea of technology, even in the modern sense, as revealing. The driving force behind machine-power is a rational one, at least in the sense of working towards a definite plan. “That challenging happens in that the energy concealed in nature is unlocked, what is unlocked is transformed, what is transformed is stored up, what is stored up is, in turn, distributed, and what is distributed is switched about ever anew.”\textsuperscript{34} Ancient technology uncovers and reveals some natural truth and beauty that bursts forth onto the world. It is a midwife, helping the mother and infant to bring forth the event of the birth in their due time. Modern technology is an obstetrician performing a cesarean section, working out a forced cutting and expeditious separation of the infant from the mother. It is a harvesting of the valuable resource of the future patriarch, and the technical apparatus of the knife, the anesthetic, and the sterilized operating table all serves this final cause. Modern technology reveals the world, and the things in it as resources waiting to be mass-produced. Heidegger’s term for this production is \textit{Bestand}, translated by Lovitt as standing-reserve. Modern technology is a way of knowing the world. What modern technology knows is that every single thing everywhere in the world is waiting to be stored up and turned into efficient energy in order to even more effectively power the storing up of ever greater energy. There is a definite sense of economic gain and motivation here, especially under an economic system where wealth is defined as capital. If wealth is simply the power to earn more wealth, then the purpose of amassing capital must be always to amass even more capital, with no end in sight. Rojcewicz comes to our translational aid again and gives us a term in English which very closely approximates what Heidegger has in mind philosophically. “What Heidegger is suggesting in the term \textit{Bestand} is not only that nature as a whole is approached today with a consumer mentality but that this is even the most disrespectful consumer mentality. The things of nature are not only consumables, they are \textit{disposables}.”\textsuperscript{35} The
world and all of its inhabitants stand over and against the gaze of modern technology not as mere resources but as resources whose sole purpose is to be used up and discarded. When one considers the rising landfills, the idea of treating nature and all the things we encounter as so much trash makes more sense. These landfills exist because we consume and dispose of valuable resources as though they were mere trash, as though they had always only ever been mere trash. “Not only are natural things resources, supplies of which we can avail ourselves, but they are not even deserving of respect as supplies; they are negligible, since they can be discarded at will.”

Because Heidegger has the term **Bestand**, he is able to distinguish between the idea of these disposables, and, more generally, other objects in the world. Although modern technology takes part in challenging everything to stand by as a disposable item, there is still something which seems to escape this claim to disposability. There is at least one thing left in the world which is not disposable, and which seems to have great significance, if only because without it, there is no modern technology. That thing is us.

Heidegger emphasizes the idea that humanity itself, and human beings as individuals, never quite become disposables, they never quite become standing-reserve. The work of modern technology which churns the earth up and stores it as a resource is ultimately and always driven by human beings. Yet it seems simple enough that human beings could become resources, and this seems already obvious in the context of modern slavery. The fact that Heidegger does not address this is rather telling, and it may reveal his own racist bias at work. Surely, isn’t enslaving people the precise effort and work of how modern technology turns people into resources? It seems that a slave is valued only because he is regarded as a resource, a being that is waiting to be disposed of in the service of some economic gain. However, Heidegger explains that human beings are challenged by the essence of modern technology, they are challenged to order the
world and all the things in it as mere resources. “Yet precisely because man is challenged, more originally than are the energies of nature, i.e., into the process of ordering, he never is transformed into mere standing reserve.” There is something mysterious at work here, but a careful analysis will reveal the truth. It is all-too-easy, and all-too-misleading, to think of the relationship of slave owners and slaves as one of simple mastery and servitude.

Slave owners are themselves being challenged by the system of slavery, a system which they by and large inherit rather than create. This is even true for that first generation of Europeans who began the trans-Atlantic slave trade, the apparatus of slavery was already historically available, like some ancient technology. Yet the new race based slavery came from a different place, and put slavery, an already horrible system, into to use in the service of racism. We need not excuse their behavior, or make the argument that slave owners suffer as much as slaves. Instead, what I am arguing is that slave owners are not absolute masters, they themselves are being mastered by the system and the society of slavery. The slave, and the slave owner likewise, find themselves mastered within a complex social structure of rules, expectations, demands, obligations, and consequences which to a large degree are beyond either of their controls. Though it must be added that the slave masters believe themselves to be in control of this system, and that even though they are subject to this discourse they still think it is within their power. The difference is that the slave is mastered to produce the cotton from the field, they are mastered to pick, clean, and bring up the cash crop. The slave owner, on the other hand, is mastered to produce the slave. The owner goes out and brings up the human as a tool for economic advancement. Indeed this reminds us of the meanings of the word fördern, discussed by Rojcewicz above. “But fördern can also suggest the use of brute force. In this sense, it doesn’t simply mean to transport but to drag out (against resistance), to hoist up (as dead weight), to
extract (with effort).” The slave trade itself involves just this sort of violence which drags out of Africa, hoists up in the murderous practice of lynching, and extracts economic value from a living person. Yet that person, the slave, is never completely mastered into being a tool or a resource precisely because they themselves must master the crop. The actual fact of slavery in the Western Hemisphere is that the slaves were essentially very highly skilled laborers. They were expected, and indeed driven, to produce pounds upon pounds of various resources every day that they labored. They were called upon to yield these in the most expedient manner possible, and this entire system could not have prevailed if the slaves had been “lazy” or “incompetent,” which is the racist discourse that we are fed. The sheer economic efficiency of slavery depended on a large group of highly skilled laborers. No amount of force, coercion, or terror can turn a person into an efficient and skilled worker unless they already have the ability and the propensity to develop the necessary skills. Insofar as the slave remained a skilled worker they resisted completely being subordinated to the category of tool. Though of course this skill was driven by a need to survive rather than some pure Marxist impulse to creative energy. They did what could not be done by others, and they did it better than anyone else. However, this system was not just some advanced labor program, it also used up and disposed of its members. It treated those who lacked proficiency with extreme measures like beating and starvation. Yet even those who were skilled and proficient were treated the same way, since the system thrived on the brutality of always instilling fear and desperation in those people it mastered. Now the mastery which was enforced upon the slaves seems to be very similar to the mastery which is enforced upon all human beings within a society dominated by modern technology. The slave masters might have a different relationship to this mastery, but they are still mastered by it in
some ways. This mastery has a special name, and it is the word for which Heidegger’s philosophy of technology is best known, the enframing.

The enframing is the essence of modern machine technology, and it reveals that technology is out of our hands. The actual question concerning technology, “what is the essence of modern technology?” is not answered by the instrumental definition. The idea that technology appears before us as a tool for our use must be abandoned when technology begins to order us into doing its work. Modern technology pushes us and makes a claim to mastery against human beings. For instance, the old handwork technology functions at our speed according to our intent, and according to the natural capacity of the objects on which we work. So if I am using a hammer to pound a nail into a piece of wood, then the speed with which I do this depends on the wood, the nail, the hammer, and myself. While the invention of the nail gun may depend on me to plug it in, maintain it, and load it up with the proper nails, the gun itself fires the nail into the wood in one swift stroke. Because the nail gun is so much faster, and so much more efficient than the hammer, then the carpenter who still uses the hammer becomes outpaced by his business rivals who use the nail gun. There is a kind of pressure being applied on him and the carpenter is being challenged into using the nail gun. Now he may claim that he is only responding to the pressure applied by his business rivals, but what then is their reason for adopting the nail gun? They may in turn claim that they are responding to other business rivals, but ultimately there is a broader social force being applied. Once the new technology is available, the possibility of using the old technology becomes overridden. Some people still use the old handwork technology for various tasks, but just as soon as there is a more efficient, faster, and stronger tool available, the society on the whole will almost inevitably adopt it. The mistake here would be to think that people adopt the tools simply because they are better instruments. Yet machine-power
technology is not merely a better instrument, it is of a different kind because there is a different
cultural attitude behind it. We must adopt the newest phones, the most destructive weapons, and
the latest drugs to cure our various diseases. In fact we lose our freedom to choose against these
things. It is the essence of modern technology which locks us into a categorical way of seeing the
world as resource, as disposable. Again, the essence of modern technology is what Heidegger
calls the enframing.

The term that Heidegger uses to denote the essence of modern technology is *Ge-stell*,
famously translated by Lovitt as *enframing*. “We now name that challenging claim which gathers
man thither to order the self-revealing as standing-reserve: ‘*Ge-stell’* [Enframing]. We dare to
use this word in a sense that has been thoroughly unfamiliar up to now.” Heidegger explains
that the ordinary use of the word can denote anything from a skeleton to a bookshelf. It basically
means a frame or structure on which to hang something. Steiner explains that Heidegger’s use of
this term is meant to conjure up darkly negative images. “In it (enframing) he concentrates the
sterile, mendacious connotations of ‘scaffold,’ ‘gimmick,’ and ‘armature.’” Rojcewicz explains
how the notion of the frame gives way to the notion of the enframed.

…in the age of modern technology beings are given to us configured in a certain way (as
use-objects) and we are ourselves imperiously called to take them under that
configuration. The ‘enframing’ amounts to this, that just as the frame of ribs gives an
umbrella its shape, and our frame of bones gives us our shape, so things today appear in a
certain shape because they are enframed in a certain way, namely as there merely for our
use.

The work of modern technology is the work of revealing a world of disposables, a world of
resources. Yet, before this work can be carried out there must be a way of thinking about the
world and the things in it which reveal themselves as disposables. The machines and technical
apparatus of modern technology are the expression of an attitude, and a way of thinking about
the world. The term for this way of thinking is enframing, and it carries the notion of a
framework for our ideas. The enframing is the way in the sense of being the only way that the world shows up for us. Long before we ever had atomic bombs, smartphones, or steel mills the worldview of enframing was already at work in our society and culture. We have actually been living with this technological way of seeing the world for some time now. Heidegger explains that before we can have the machines, we need the exact science which makes such machines possible, and before we can have that exact science we need the enframing which makes it possible.

The first glimpse we have of the enframing challenging us to reveal the world is in the birth of modern science.

Modern science’s way of representing pursues and entraps nature as a calculable coherence of forces…Because physics, indeed already as pure theory, sets nature up to exhibit itself as a coherence of forces calculable in advance, it therefore orders its experiments precisely for the purpose of asking whether and how nature reports itself when set up in this way.\(^{43}\)

In working out a genealogy of technology what we find is that handwork technology and ancient technology even now continue to be in use, and they have not altogether disappeared. We also find that their use is subordinate to and overwhelmed by the use of machine-power technology. Still, these machines could not come about before the exact science which makes them possible. The machine of the airplane requires quite a bit of exact science to justify and explain how powered lift is even possible. The medical marvel of the vaccine is not possible without an exact science of medicine to calculate just how much exposure to a disease is enough to develop immunity to that disease. The scientific revolution begins about two hundred years prior to the industrial revolution, and the explosion of machine technology owes its origins to the calculations of the scientists. It was the scientists who first began to see the world as orderable, calculable, decipherable, and categorical. We have already discussed the goal of modern science
as mastery over the world and its entities. Recall that for Descartes the goal of science was a world where scientists have used technological advances to cure almost all diseases, convert the objects in the world into a useable stock of resources, and do all this to enable human beings to live a long and trouble free life.

For these notions made me see that it is possible to arrive at knowledge that would be very useful in life and that, in place of that speculative philosophy taught in the schools, it is possible to find a practical philosophy, by means of which, knowing the force and actions of fire, water, air, the stars, the heavens, and all the other bodies that surround us just as distinctly as we know the various skills of our craftsmen, we might be able, in the same way, to use them for all the purposes for which they are appropriate, and thus render ourselves, as it were, masters and possessors of nature.\textsuperscript{44}

The emphasis on the last phrase is my own, but for Descartes that is the goal of a practical philosophy, and what we eventually call a natural science. Speculative philosophy is not productive, and only a practical philosophy can enable the philosopher to master and possess the natural world, and to use its entities for all of their “appropriate” purposes. Yet this is propriety in the modern, rather than the ancient, sense; this is a propriety dictated by the attitude of the enframing. Recall also that Francis Bacon holds that the goal of science and philosophy is “to give humankind mastery over nature by means of scientific discoveries and inventions.”\textsuperscript{45}

Mastery, mastery, and mastery is the goal of science. It is no wonder that in this context the development of race and the Trans-Atlantic slave trade comes into being. If the essence of modern technology is truly the attitude of the enframing, then the threat of technology as mastery exists long before the machines which begin to affect this mastery. “The modern physical theory of nature prepares the way first not simply for technology but for the essence of modern technology. For already in physics the challenging gathering-together into ordering revealing holds sway.”\textsuperscript{46} Yet despite this obvious appearance of this will-to-mastery, Heidegger maintains that the true origins of the enframing remain hidden. This strikes at one of the most essential
problems of the enframing, and the issue which gives way to the supreme danger of modern
technology.

The enframing is both revealed, under careful philosophical scrutiny, but also concealed
in the everyday use of technological machines. We are so inundated by technology that we come
to think that it is a mere tool and instrument for getting around in the world. Yet as Heidegger’s
analysis of language and the differences between ancient and modern technology reveal, there is
much more to technology than its use as a tool. There is a way in which this is a tool that uses us.
Enframing involves the idea that technological tools master us into mastering them, and
mastering them for the purposes of ordering the world and its objects into various disposable
categories. Despite this, the enframing itself is not reducible to any particular piece of
technology. “… (The enframing is) nothing on the order of a machine. It is the way in which the
real reveals itself as standing-reserve.”47 In fact, the enframing of modern technology seems to
accomplish the same basic task as does the poiesis of ancient technology. Both are simply
destinings of being, although the enframing seems to present greater problems.

We must turn now to investigate Heidegger’s notion of destining in order to understand
the true threat posed by technology. “Always the unconcealment of that which is goes upon a
way of revealing. Always the destining of revealing holds complete sway over man…But when
we consider the essence of technology then we experience enframing as a destining of
revealing.”48 The destining of revealing is the idea of the attitude and way of seeing and dealing
with the world which holds for humanity during our particular age of history. Rojcewicz
comments that for Heidegger the notion of destiny is historical but it also shows that humanity
exists at the mercy of forces beyond ourselves. “What is primarily responsible for technology as
an understanding of what it means to be in general is the self-showing of the gods, the self-
offering of being. That is, our current disclosive looking upon things as disposables is encompassed by a more general imposition which disposes of us.” Heidegger hints at a mysterious power behind the various ways in which we as human beings come to see the world. This power gives to us the various ways, or modes of revealing, that we use to see and interact with the things in the world.

Although Heidegger’s language is deeply mystical, the concept of Being is well steeped in the history of philosophy. Consider Plato’s discussion of the forms in the Republic. “And what is the main thing, we speak of beauty itself and good itself and so in the case of all the things that we set down as many, we turn about set down in accord with a single form of each, believing that there is but one, and call it ‘the being’ of each.” Plato emphasizes the notion that there is something behind the entities we encounter in the world. This power is what causes all of those entities to exist and possess the particular features that they possess. He called this something a form, and the idea was that any beautiful thing in the world could only exist, could only “be”, if there also existed the form of beauty in order to give the being of beauty to beautiful things. Plato further claimed that there was an ultimate form, the form of the good, which was responsible for all beings. “…for you’ve often heard it said that the form of the good is the most important thing to learn about and that it’s by their relation to it that just things and the others become useful and beneficial.” Problematically enough, Plato claims that no one possesses an adequate knowledge of the form of the good. Yet he theorizes that if anyone did, they would know everything, for they would know how it is that things in the world become useful, that is how they become available to be known by ourselves as human knowers. So in that sense the form of the good is what makes the entities in the world and the entities of our knowledge, both existing and knowable. Plato compares the form of the good to the sun, and explains that just as
the sun enables our sight to work, so also the form of the good enables our mind to work. “So what gives truth to the things known and the power to know to the knower is the form of the good.” Now Plato’s form of the good is not identical to Heidegger’s concept of being, but they do function in similar ways in their respective philosophical worldviews. As the form of the good makes the world and its objects knowable, so also for Heidegger “Being” gives us our ways of thinking and knowing the world.

Heidegger treats the concept of Being, and more specifically human beings as Dasein in his classic work Being and Time. A more engaging explanation of that work is far beyond the scope of the present dissertation. It will suffice for now to say that Heidegger is still interested in the idea of Being even here in his much later work the Question Concerning Technology. George Steiner summarizes the goal of Heidegger’s philosophy as it is laid out in Being and Time. “It is the unique and specific business of philosophy, wherein and at all times referential to its Greek inception, to be incessantly astonished at and focused on the fact that all things are; that there is a universal and totally determinate attribute to things, which is that of existence.” Heidegger acknowledges that Plato and Socrates were perhaps the first philosophers to truly question and attempt to think about what being is. However, Heidegger rejects Plato’s forms, and also the idea of the form of the good, as the ultimate answer to what being is. Heidegger understands Plato’s forms as constituting a forgetting of being. It is this forgetting which has made possible, “…the alienated, unhoused, recurrently barbaric estate of modern technological and mass consumption-man.” Yet as much as Plato has missed the primordial sense of being, which for Heidegger still remains mysterious, the enframing does not yet exist in the ancient world. Philosophy is not yet exact science, though it may be on its way.
Descartes explains this aptly when he writes that practical philosophy must supplant speculative philosophy. The forms of Plato are still well within merely speculative philosophy, but the scientific revolution begun by Descartes and others is the realm of the new practical philosophy, the new natural science (or nova scientia). In terms of the problems that the enframing presents, one of the greatest is that we are losing sight of Being itself. As we push our machines, and especially our thinking, we see the world of only disposable resources, and so the actual being of entities, and indeed Being itself, becomes obscured. “We have compelled nature to yield knowledge and energy, but we have given to nature, to that which is live and hidden within it, no patient hearing, no in-dwelling. Thus our technologies mask being instead of bringing it to light.” The work of technology is to reveal the world, and in that sense technology is concerned with uncovering the being of the world and the being of entities. So it seems to be our destiny in this current age to know the world through the lens of modern technology. In that sense we know what the world is, because of the guiding light of the enframing. Yet that enframing poses a threat to us that is more than just the threat of machines and the threat of stripping the world of all its resources.

Heidegger accepts that the enframing is our present way of knowing the world, and thus it reveals what the world is, it reveals the being of the entities of the world. “The essence of technology lies in Enframing. Its holding sway belongs within destining. Since destining at any given time starts man on a way of revealing, man, thus under way, is continually approaching the brink of the possibility of pursuing and pushing forward nothing but what is revealed in ordering, and of deriving all his standards on this basis.” The enframing is the attitude and systematic way of thinking and living which underlies all of our activity in the modern world. Whenever people engaged in the sciences of phrenology and physiognomy they were comparing and
measuring bodies to meet a standard of use. The black body was useful for one thing, and the white was, in a sense which was always meant to be quite different, useful for another. Whenever I hunt down knowledge, so to speak, I am hunting practical or useful knowledge. Whenever I construct art, I do so technically and according to the established methods for making art that will be mass consumed. The forest is revealed to me as a national park which functions as a site of political power, as an educational tool, or as means to control natural gas and oil deposits. The forest is also revealed as a site for logging and mining, and as a storehouse of future goods and consumer products. In all this, it is apt to say that I know the forest, and that I know what the forest is, at least in a limited way. However, that limitation restricts me as a human being, and I find myself being ordered by the enframing to see nothing but a world of *useful things*. In a very similar fashion the white gaze feels threatened by the black body which will not fit its expectations. When the black body refuses to be useful in the ways proscribed by that measuring objectifying gaze of whiteness then that gaze strives to reassert the restrictions on black usefulness. In fact, the only alternative I can conjure to the useful is the useless, which seems to be little more than the absence or privation of usefulness. “…man is endangered from out of destining. The destining of revealing is as such, in every one of its modes, and therefore necessarily danger.”58 I am threatened by the enframing, but that danger is not the same danger which out of control technology threatens. Deforestation, nuclear war, environmental pollution, and rising mounds of trash are problems of modern technology. Yet the danger of the enframing is worse and more basic than any of those problems, since indeed those problems only exist because of the threat which the enframing poses in the first place. For Heidegger, the enframing is not just the danger, it is the supreme danger.
The enframing threatens us in two ways: first, it threatens our identity as humans and second, and, more importantly, it threatens to eradicate truth itself. In the first place, the danger of the enframing converts us into standing-reserve, while simultaneously giving us the delusion that we have finally conquered the earth. Heidegger phrases it this way, “…he (humanity) comes to the very brink of a precipitous fall; that is, he comes to the point where he himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve. Meanwhile man, precisely as the one so threatened, exalts himself to the posture of the lord of the earth.”

The supreme danger of the enframing, in the first sense, is that human beings will be conquered and dominated by the very instruments which they believe give them mastery over the earth. In his book *The Abolition of Man*, the noted theologian C.S. Lewis examines this first way in which the enframing threatens humanity. Lewis claims, “…what we call Man’s power over Nature turns out to be a power exercised by some men over other men with Nature as its instrument.” For Lewis, the chief problem of rapid technological growth, and the scientific attitude which sees the world in terms of its use, is the threat of some humans against others. Lewis makes this danger concrete by theorizing that advances in eugenics, education, and machine power technology will eventually create a generation of humans who have been entirely engineered to meet some ideal. Those humans who have been driving the process of engineering the perfect human will eventually succeed but of course their idea of the perfect human will be perverted to the ends of absolute technical efficiency. Of this supposedly perfect generation Lewis writes, “They are not men at all: they are artefacts. Man’s final conquest has proved to be the abolition of Man.” It is worth mentioning that both Lewis and Heidegger have greatly overestimated the rate at which humanity can resist this urge to turn technology on itself to its own ruin. For it seems clear in their constant use of the term “man” that neither Lewis nor Heidegger are aware that this kind of reduction has already been done for
centuries. Certainly this is the danger that exists in slavery and in racism. Yet it is also clearly the
danger that exists in sexism and the enforced domesticity of gender roles which relegate women
into subordinate positions. Despite their near-sightedness, both Heidegger and Lewis do raise the
valid point that this is precisely one of the great dangers in the attitude of the enframing.

Beyond even Lewis’ concerns lies an even greater danger, and it is a further
manifestation of the danger in the enframing. Heidegger sees that since the enframing is a
destining, since it is the way in which being and beings are revealed in our era of history, then its
ture danger is not to us, but to being itself. “As a destining, it banishes man into that kind of
revealing which is an ordering. Where this ordering holds sway, it drives out every other
possibility of revealing…Where enframing holds sway, regulating and securing of the standing-
reserve mark all revealing. They no longer even let their own fundamental characteristic appear,
namely this revealing as such.” The supreme danger of the enframing is that we will lose our
access to truth. To be human means to be involved in knowing, doing, and living in the world
and with the world. The being of humanity, our being human, has to do with how we open
ourselves to all of the possible ways of seeing the world and everything in it. We come from
diverse cultures, with diverse languages, we have different modes of dress, different modes of
art, and different modes of habitation. In every way, human beings encounter a world that is
never the same and always different. We reflect that difference in ourselves, but the enframing
 crushes all of that into dust. There now remains one way of seeing the world, and only one way
of thinking about the world. This even seems to lead ultimately to one kind of language, and
indeed the English language is already dominant in much of the world. This gives way to a mode
of dress, art, and habitation that is in every way efficient, technical, and mass produce-able. So it
is not surprising then that race is invented as a means for reducing the vast differences between
people and groups down to four or five basic categories. The concept of race, in short, follows the logic of reduction, of efficiency in our perception, and our dealings with “fixed” peoples.

At first it seems that the threat posed by racism is that great domination of all of those who are “inferior,” by those who deem themselves “superior.” The threat in technology seems to show up in the way that natural handwork technology is run out by the faster and more efficient machine-power technology. These are threats, but they are secondary to the more primordial threat, for once we lose our ability to see a world as colorful, beautiful, old, new, mysterious, vague, unknown, mystical, and even divine; we see a world that is merely, useful. Yet the useful is a binary, and to it is always opposed its failure and its opposite, the useless. Heidegger summarizes it in this way:

The threat to man does not come in the first instance from the potentially lethal machines and apparatus of technology. The actual threat has already affected man in his essence. The rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.63

What threatens us most in enframing is that we will lose our ability to see a world beyond that frame. We may become lost, and in so doing the world and the beings of the world also become lost.

In summation, this chapter has given us an overview of Martin Heidegger’s philosophy of technology in order to prepare the way to see that the attitude of the technological enframing is strikingly similar to the attitude of whiteness. A genealogy of technology revealed a distinction between ancient and modern technology. Ancient technology was concerned with the work of poiesis, of revealing the world in its natural state. Modern technology was concerned with enacting an enframing on the world and its entities. The enframing is the cultural attitude, and way of looking at the world, which drives people in contemporary society to challenge and
reveal a world of resources. These resources are disposable and thus have no lasting significance. Furthermore the enframing threatens humanity in two ways. It threatens to turn us into resources, which thanks to slavery and racism has already happened, and it threatens to destroy every other way of looking at the world. We have the capacity to see the world in many ways. One example of this is the fact that children often imagine the world to be much more mysterious and magical than the adults who raise those children. Children can see a world that is not full of resources, but full of mysteries. This seems especially true when one considers how “inefficient” children are in their use of the time and resources allotted to them. Yet as they grow older children become conditioned to see the world of disposable resources and to do the work of storing up those resources. The supreme danger of the enframing is finally that we will lose our ability to be human insofar as we lose our ability to see the world in a diverse or artistic way. That we ourselves and all future generations may only ever see a world of resources is indeed a great tragedy.

Yet this tragedy is not different from the threat posed by whiteness. Within whiteness, we are likewise challenged to see a world that is raced with whiteness setting the standard for which group is “superior.” Whiteness threatens humanity in that everyone is always at risk of becoming non-white. Even the most fair-skinned, elite, wealthy members of society are constantly threatened in their affiliation with whiteness. The threat of whiteness is greater still when you realize that we may be delivered over to a way of looking at the people in the world as perpetually racialized. Whiteness hides itself and conceals itself behind the mask of class difference, ethnic difference, and cultural difference. All the while whiteness defines and orders these differences in a hierarchy which privileges light-skinned, upper class, and western-cultured individuals. Whiteness is so significant that even those light skinned members of society who
lack wealth and culture are deemed superior to people of color who are wealthy and cultured. The lowest member of society who is white is afforded the privileges and protections of whiteness which are denied to even the most important non-white member of society. So there are clear parallels between the problem of race as whiteness and the problem of technology as the enframing.

Whenever human beings are threatened in such a complete and overwhelming sense, especially by their own actions, that threat to humanity has become a sin. Even though the issue with race and technology is an ethical one, the term “sin” resides very firmly within the language of religion. Rather than handing the ethical issues of philosophy over to the methods of theology, the discussion of sin will instead transplant a theological notion into the realm of philosophical questioning. This transfer is necessary since there is something special at stake in the supreme dangers of whiteness and enframing. In most ordinary ethical discussions, the remedies for unethical behavior require some type of reform. In certain extreme cases reform may not be preferable or even possible. Whiteness and the enframing cannot be reformed, and there is no special fix for these problems. There can be no program of gradual change or slow improvement to remedy these issues. They are a danger, but that danger is a sin.
Chapter 5 – Sin and Ethics

The idea of sin immediately strikes us as an ethical one. Sin is a term so deeply value-laden as to have unavoidably ethical connotations. Thus far I have showcased the problems of race and technology as the problems of whiteness and enframing. Now, if I claim that racism is a violation of ethics, or that the enframing violates ethics, then I must make clear what my ethical system is. However, this is not something I can do just yet. Hence, the ethical theory on which my critique is based will remain delayed. The reason for this delay is that the problem of whiteness and enframing has not yet been fully delineated within this dissertation. There is an underlying schema beneath the grounding of whiteness and enframing in western history and culture. This schema is neither reducible to the idea of whiteness nor to the idea of enframing. There is a deep cultural attitude which allows for the simultaneous historical emergence of whiteness and the enframing. To be sure, we see the evidence of racism emerging only in the late seventeenth century, and we see the evidence of modern technology emerge one hundred years later. Yet prior to the existence of slavery based on racism lies the attitude of whiteness, and prior to the industrial revolution lies the enframing.

Yet we have not arrived at ethics in our analysis. The words and language of whiteness and enframing begin to pile up. The problem eludes us because we see the categories, and the very thinking which we are trying to criticize has framed us into this act of categorization. The work of philosophy itself becomes a logical analysis and a phenomenological exploration of concepts, structures, and ideas. The fundamental attitudes behind these ideas are vague and obscure. Like Rene Descartes we are seeking ideas that are clear and distinct. We suspect that if we had perfectly clear and distinct notions of the ideas of whiteness and the enframing then we would see the clear path to the resolution of these ideas. Yet that suspicion is merely the mask of
an assumption that would reduce this problem to one of epistemology. We are tempted to say that “There is no real ethical problem here, the problem is one of ideas and proper thinking.” The methods of analysis, observation, and logical inference make us confident that we need only to get clear about our words in order to resolve any issues with them. I have fallen into this way of addressing the issue. I have engaged in linguistic and textual analysis. I have presented contrasting viewpoints and dismissed counter-arguments. In short, I am so far from being ethical about these issues precisely because they present themselves to me as mere ideas for analysis and reflection. This is why the problem must be recast using the language of sin.

In this chapter, I will investigate the nature of whiteness and modern technology by viewing them through the religious language of sin. An initial analysis of religious language will reveal the ways that it can uniquely illustrate the problem. The goal of this analysis will be to show how religious language can explicate technoracism as the source of both whiteness and modern technology. So to that end I will turn to the ideas of sin as presented in the works of Augustine. He argues that sin is a matter of intention, and what is good or bad has everything to do with the object of our desire. He also distinguishes between sins against God and sins against society. We sin against God when we love the lesser goods of the world more than the great good of God, and this is a religious sin. We sin against society when we elevate our interests over and against society’s interests, and this is the sin against society. Both whiteness and modern technology will be shown to be religious and social sins. In the end I argue that using religious language to explain these concepts creates a kind of moral aesthetic. This means that the mode and means through which a thing is described has an ethical unique value since the way that something is addressed reveals what is of vital importance. In the second place this
analysis of sin shows even more intensely how similar are the problems of technology and race, and this prepares the way for the underlying concept of technoracism.

The concepts of sin and guilt are very near to me. Their nearness evokes feelings, biases, concerns, and anxieties. The word sin, for example, causes me to shift uneasily in my seat. In one sense that uneasiness may result because I have “polluted” the work of philosophy with religious language and symbolism. A sudden rush of paranoia pushes me to retract the word. I know that the use of the word sin is a kind of theoretical transgression as it breaks the rules of “accepted” philosophical discourse. My use of sin, however, need not break those rules so long as I use it in that cold and distant manner with which the intellectual process de-stigmatizes language. Yet I want the concept of sin to have its full meaning; I want the concept of sin to be unsettling. To say that racism is a sin is not merely to put one thought into a religious category. To say that the enframing is a sin is not meant solely to evoke the image of some kind of environmental duty. Sin evokes the language of death and fear. Sin can, and should, galvanize us to action. The danger that often exists in philosophy is the risk of intellectual complacency. As a thinker I become accustomed to the game of ideas and the play of categories. I flirt carelessly with Nietzsche; I drift easily in and out of Aquinas, and I float effortlessly past de Beauvoir. I am no expert in any of these thinkers or their works and yet even if I were that expertise might avail me nothing. To engage with Nietzsche is to feel the madness of Zarathustra and to be driven to excesses of rage. To enter into Aquinas is to find oneself mathematically enfolded into a geometry of perfection and stability. To read de Beauvoir is to wake up from the dream of Modernity to the rising sun of oppression. These thinkers never intended to be thought of as mere idols to be worshipped or admired as mere static categories of thought in the canon of
ideas. They meant to change the world, and their words sparkle with the intellectual fire which incites the mind to passions and activities.

So my personal excursion has lead me to invoke the language of sin in order to showcase what is truly problematic in the deepest possible sense about whiteness and enframing. The language of religion is not meant to scaffold a tower of abstract theological terms. It is meant to push, pull, and prod one into action, and especially into a more active mode of thinking. We must come to see whiteness and enframing as problems that demand active solutions, rather than as mere ideas for passive reflection. This is not meant to commit us to some system of theology, or even to religion itself as a more accurate way of seeing the world. The use of sin to discuss whiteness and enframing will serve as a kind of poetic performance of religious language. Rather than take up the study of theology, the language of sin opens us up a more active way of approaching the problems of whiteness and enframing as ethical problems. So despite my excursion I have no intention of abandoning the methods I have used thus far. This current project is a work of philosophy and as such I will continue to use the tools of philosophy to convey the ideas at hand. Yet by casting the ethical problem as one of sin I also engage in this performance. I perform religion in an attempt to make the problem which unites whiteness and enframing clearer. While I am attempting to clear up those problems, the language of sin will help to illuminate the common schema which underlies both. The ultimate goal of this illumination will be to show that there really is only one problem, the problem of technoracism.

So in order to begin an investigation into sin within the context of religious language, it will be necessary to start with an understanding of the nature of religious language. The most pressing obstacle in using religious language to discuss ethical problems is that religion, and by extension its language, may also have certain ethical problems already loaded into it. Beyond
that the work of religious language might further obscure our ideas if we are not careful. So we also need to make sense of the way in which religious language is deployed to convey or capture meaning.

In the first place religion, and by extension religious language, raises certain ethical concerns. In one rather obvious sense religion may itself stand as an over-arching all-encompassing way of seeing and knowing. In just the same way as racism and the enframing, one can say that monotheism also threatens human beings by closing off all other ways of seeing the world. In this light, Rosemary Radford Ruether claims that, “Male monotheism has been so taken for granted in Judeo-Christian culture that the peculiarity of imaging God solely through one gender has not been recognized. But such an image indicates a sharp departure from all previous human consciousness.”¹ Ruether’s claim is that religion is reduced to the idea of monotheism, but even more so to a patriarchal monotheism which is designed to reinforce male-dominated power structures. Certainly when we say “Religion” we tend to tacitly assume Monotheism. That assumption comes from a place of western cultural domination which tends to shut out non-monotheistic worldviews. Beyond this what remains as monotheism is itself further subsumed under the hierarchy of Christianity. We find a perfect example of this hierarchy of religion in the work of Hegel. In the same essay where he discusses race, Hegel distinguishes between the major monotheistic traditions. As we saw in the introduction to this project, Hegel divides the Caucasian race into the Western Asiatics, which he identifies by their religion of Islam, and the Europeans which he identifies by their religion of Christianity. For Hegel, only Christians understand God as God ought to be truly understood, and Muslims are perhaps better off than other religious groups, but they are still impoverished monotheists.² So the danger inherent in whiteness and the enframing seems to also be present in monotheistic religion. That
danger is that we will lose a multiplicity of ways of seeing the world and all of our thinking will be subsumed under one single reductionist mode, the monotheistic mode. It sounds hollow to try to reassure people that monotheism does not seek to control the world, especially in light of the aggressive program of conversion which typifies it. Indeed this is a point which Islam and Christianity have very much in common, that of their mutual desire to convert all peoples to their particular brand of religion. Now whether this is merely the political way in which religion is being expressed in our modern era or an essential feature of those religions is at this point immaterial.

However there is a way of looking at religion which fits very much into the critical project we have been carrying out thus far. It should be obvious that the expression of racism, the expression of modern technology, and the expression of monotheism are all deeply similar. This does not invalidate religious language any more than it invalidates the language of race or the language of technology. This makes our link all the more crucial. Religion seems to be driven by the same underlying schema which facilitates the arrival of race and modern technology. Indeed monotheism seems to predate both race and modern technology and so in that sense it is closer to this hidden schema. The bias of religion is not something we wish to ignore, but neither does it invalidate the idea of using religious language. Though my turn may seem sudden, I am emboldened into using the language of sin all the more in light of the fact that monotheism is older and seems to bear the notion of power and dominance in a more original fashion.

Now we can look more closely at how religious language functions to convey meaning. Paul Tillich, an eminent philosopher and theologian from the early twentieth century, writes in his “The Nature of Religious Language” of a loss of meaning in words. Tillich attempts to get
clear about some basic concepts which are essential to understanding how religious terms and phrases carry meaning. He begins by explaining the distinction between symbols and signs.

Symbols are similar to signs in one decisive respect: both symbols and signs point beyond themselves to something else. The difference, which is a fundamental difference between them is that signs do not participate in any way in the reality and power of that to which they point. Symbols, although they are not the same as that which they symbolize, participate in its meaning and power.³ Tillich’s example is that the letters of an alphabet operate as signs, since they do not actively join in on the proper pronunciation or speaking of those letters. Instead the letter merely signifies, or signs, the sound or idea which is conveyed. A stop sign is merely a reminder of where the traffic laws of a society preside. Yet the sign itself can be readily destroyed and the laws remain perfectly intact. On the other hand, Tillich explains that a flag is not a sign for a nation but rather a symbol of its power and authority. Hence when a flag is lowered to half-mast then the flag actively participates in the grief felt by the citizens of that nation. When a town or city is seized in warfare then the flag is replaced with the conquerors flag because the flag symbolizes the occupation of a new political power. When we burn a flag, we are also attacking the political powers for which that flag stands. Tillich explains further that “The symbol represents something which is not itself; for which it stands and in the power and meaning of which it participates.”⁴ Yet Tillich rightly argues that a symbol can never completely represent the thing to which it points. A flag may symbolize a nation but the flag cannot be tasked with completely representing a nation, as there is no flag whose loss would destroy a nation. For Tillich this limitation points to the more essential nature of symbols. “Every symbol opens up a level of reality for which nonsymbolic speaking is inadequate.”⁵ Tillich claims that this opening up is unique to the symbol being used, and that the meaning that is opened up, or revealed, by that symbol cannot be accessed in any other way.
Religious language functions in a symbolic way that opens us up to a meaning which would be in any other way inaccessible.

The same (symbolic meaning) is true also in the relationship of poetry and philosophy. The temptation may often be to confuse the issue by bringing too many philosophical concepts into a poem. Now this is really the problem; one cannot do this. If one uses philosophical language or scientific language, it does not mediate the same thing which is mediated in the use of really poetic language without the mixture of any other language.\(^6\)

The opening up of levels of reality that we find in certain kinds of symbolic language corresponds also to what Tillich calls the opening of “…levels of the soul, levels of our interior reality.”\(^7\) This opening up of levels of reality is a process in which the thinker participates with the symbol. The symbol reveals something hidden about nature and the thinker also discovers something hidden about him or herself. Tillich goes further and claims that religious language opens up the true nature of reality in a way that is more penetrating than philosophical or scientific language. However it is not my intent to commit myself, or this current dissertation, to the “metaphysical superiority” of religious language. As a symbolic way of interacting with the world, religious language, especially the concept of sin, opens up new possibilities for understanding the problems which plague us in whiteness and in the enframing.

However, I take religious language to be more limited than Tillich as it appears to lack clear or unmitigated access to the being of reality. We do well not to forget the unstable nature of language. Although this instability is something which Tillich decries, nonetheless this instability of meaning is what is also important about religious language. Because words have symbolic meanings, we can access a deeper layer of meaning in both the world and ourselves. Yet, because such meanings are unfixed and changeable, the meanings to which we are opened are ones that are able to constantly surprise or even overwhelm our thinking. This surprise is not some pure chaos, but rather it creates, as Heidegger would put it, the way.
Another way of looking at religious language comes to us through the *Tao Te Ching*, attributed to Lao Tsu. The concept of the Tao itself is often translated as the way, and although that way might appear singular it is open and branching. In the *Tao Te Ching*, we find that “The Tao that can be told is not the eternal Tao. The name that can be named is not the eternal name. The nameless is the beginning of heaven and earth. The named is the mother of ten thousand things.” Although Taoism is not a religion per se, nonetheless the idea of language being unable to fix on the true nature of reality is still very useful here. So while Tillich points out that religious language functions as a symbol to open us up to a hidden reality, Lao Tsu explains that language creates a fixity for our dealings in the world. Yet this fixity is not, and cannot claim to be, truth in some absolute sense.

The point of this excursion into language can now be summarized, I do not think religious language has a pure claim to supremacy in terms of its access to truth, especially given the vague and evolving nature of all language. However religious language does open up a new way of thinking. That new way is to be found in how this language presents certain ideas as symbols, and I intend to use one of these potent symbols to reveal some hidden truths about whiteness and enframing. That most valuable of religious symbols for my current discussion is the symbol of sin.

To begin a discussion of sin, it seems that I must define precisely what I mean by the deployment of this word. Suffice to say that sin is an idea which we find most keenly expressed in the religion of Christianity, though Christianity is not the only religion to lay a claim to this concept. Here I explore my own indebtedness to the term’s importance. The idea of sin as an idea which can help to explain the problem of technoracism finds its origins in the works of St. Augustine of Hippo. More specifically, as it should be noted, my aim here is to discuss sin as it
pertain to technoracism. Before I can explain how sin relates to the problems of technology and the problems of race, I demonstrate how I am obliged to the work of Augustine for my own definition of sin.

For Augustine, sin is a matter of intention, and what is good or bad has everything to do with the object of our desire. To that end he organizes the things in the world according to a hierarchy of goods with God at the top, followed by intellectual things, and then with physical goods at the bottom. He also distinguishes between sins against God and sins against society. To sin against God would be to commit a sin that is religious in nature by loving the lesser goods of the world more than the great good of God. To sin against society is to elevate my own importance over the importance of maintaining social unity.

In On Free Choice of the Will, Augustine defines evil, or sin, as the result of a disordered love. The text itself is a dialogue between Augustine and Evodius, written in the style of the Platonic dialogues, with Augustine playing the role of Socrates. Although in this text Augustine is mostly interested in presenting a theodicy, he also provides a very clear and simple version of what constitutes moral evil, or sin. In the first chapter of the dialogue Evodius introduces the concept of sin when he asks “It seems that no one could sin unless he had first learned how to sin. And if that is the case, I must ask this: From whom did we learn to sin?” Augustine explains that since evil is nothing then when we sin, or do evil, we are involved in the process of turning away from the good. In the first place, the word sin is used to define the kinds of evil actions which people intentionally commit. The words evil deeds, evil acts, and sins all mean the same thing, and Augustine explains that the best understanding of evil is to be found in the notion of libido. Thomas Williams, the translator for this text, informs us that there is no suitable English word for the Latin term libido, but the best translation he can offer is that sin is inordinate
desire. Augustine further explains that evil is inordinate desire for those things that you can lose against your will. Sin is not dependent on the consequences of my actions, or even the kinds of actions I take. Rather sin is the result of my psychology; it comes from what I want and how I let those wants direct my actions. I sin, that is, I do an evil deed, based on the intent or desire behind my deed rather than the merit of the deed itself. The significance of my will is very profound here, since Augustine will lay the blame for sin firmly on the person who has such inordinate desires. This could only be possible if our will was free and if we are thus free to choose to sin or not to sin. Though in this sense what we are free to choose is not our actions, so much as the objects of our desires. That is, freedom consists in choosing the object to which I will intentionally extend my affections, and sin occurs when I have extended my affections inappropriately.

Augustine writes on how the problem of sin is most keenly felt whenever we direct our affections towards temporal bodily things, rather than eternal mental things. “Then it is clear that some human beings love eternal things while others love temporal things; and we have also found that there are two laws, one eternal and one temporal….” Augustine argues that those who live morally, love the laws, since those laws enable them to live as they do, and what they love best is the eternal and unchangeable law. In Augustine’s Confessions he shows his platonic roots when he explains that what is at stake in loving the temporal over the eternal is actually loving the physical world more than one loves God.

But in our quest of all these things, we must not depart from You, Lord, or deviate from your Law. This life we live here below has its own attractiveness, grounded in the measure of beauty it has and its harmony with the beauty of all lesser things…Yet in the enjoyment of all such things we commit sin if through immoderate inclination to them – for though they are good, they are of the lowest order of good – things higher and better are forgotten, even You, O Lord our God, and Your Truth and Your Law.
This passage contains all of the key insights from *On Free Choice of the Will*, and adds a very
vital element in the form of the proper object of our desire. Augustine explains that the things we
encounter in the world are good, after their fashion, but they are of a lower order of goods. There
is nothing evil in wealth, sex, food and drink, or the society of others in and of themselves. Evil,
or sin, enters into the picture when I desire any of these lower order, temporal, goods more than
the higher order, eternal, goods. The eternal law makes an appearance as one of the higher goods,
and yet it is subordinate to the highest good of all, God Himself. The proper object of our love,
and the proper end of all of our desires should be God. God’s eternal law exists primarily as the
most helpful guide to a true and genuine love of God Himself. God is the proper object of our
desire, and all actions we take must be motivated by a love of God as the highest, greatest, and
most important good.

For Augustine, then, morality exists as a system of hierarchies and priorities. The good
Christian need not hate the beautiful lower order temporal goods of the world. After all these
things have a value and a purpose, and they are good insofar as they are God’s creations. The
temporal goods only become harmful and cause us to sin when we love them as though they
were eternal. Our problem then is that we love them with the fear that we will lose them, and
thus our actions are dominated by fear, suspicion, anxiety, and desperation. However, if we love
God and His law, then we will use the things of the world for their right purposes. The basic
moral principle is that sin is a matter of intention, and that what is good or bad has everything to
do with the object of our desire. Augustine claims that our actions are motivated by our loves and
desires, rather than any rational principles. Even when we are doing good actions and behaving
rationally, it is only because in a more basic way we are directing our love towards God and His
perfect eternal law. Now beyond the basic natural morality of properly loving God, there is a secondary morality based on the customs and traditions of one’s society.

In the *Confessions*, Augustine draws a further distinction between the natural moral law and customary moral law. Although the natural law of God always stands as the most significant law, it is still possible to sin by breaking the laws of society. “In no time or place could it be wrong for a man to love God with his whole heart…and his neighbor as himself. Therefore those sins which are against nature…are in all times and places to be detested and punished.”

Augustine argues that there are sins which are wrong universally because the motivations for such sins are a violation of the God-designed human nature. Again, that which defines an act as a sin for Augustine is not so much what I do, but rather the internal psychological motivations I have in doing it. “Actions which are against the customs of human societies are to be avoided according to the varieties of such customs; so that which is agreed upon by the custom, or decreed by the law, of state or people, is not to be violated at the mere pleasure whether of citizen or alien.” In contrast to sinning against God, sinning against society is relative to the laws and customs of that society. Augustine declares that the laws of a society ought to rule over everyone within the bounds of that community, whether they are citizens or aliens. The fundamental principle which justifies these laws of society is the notion of harmony. “For every part is defective that is not in harmony with the whole.” Augustine also says that sins against society are motivated by, “complete contempt of the existing order of society…” To sin against the customs and laws of society is sin, precisely because in so doing a person asserts their own significance over the greater significance of a unified and just society. Augustine will also claim that there is a problem with any social customs which violate the natural law of God. Augustine clearly places an emphasis on the significance of the proper love and devotion to God, and God’s
laws and reasons, above any other affiliation. Yet where there is no conflict one should also follow the laws of society. It is possible that Augustine makes too little of the lack of conflict between sins against God and sins against society. He claims that God’s laws are always to be held as more important, and yet the absolute devotion to a love of God may in fact put one at the greatest odds with society.

Augustine describes the notion of sin as a matter of proper love, but he also distinguishes between sins against God and sins against society. To sin against God would be to commit a sin that violates the sacred sphere of God’s direction and is thus religious in nature. This sin occurs whenever I love those lesser things, though they are good in their way, more than I love God. The sin against God occurs whenever I allow my inordinate desire to distract me from proper love of God and into an improper love of lesser goods. Yet when I sin against society I do not love some lesser goods more than I love society, though it is easy to see how that may be possible in cases like theft or murder. Sins against society violate the social sphere which involves my direct interactions with the lives of those humans with whom I have to live. These social sins disrupt the lives of my neighbors and the ordained structure of society, but because they are not violations of God’s natural laws then they are not religious sins. Instead the sin against society is essentially one where I elevate my own importance over and against the importance of maintaining unity within society.

Given the delineation of Augustine’s concept of sin before us, how does that concept apply to the issues of whiteness and enframing? To answer this, it is important to determine whether or not whiteness and enframing vis-à-vis sin has a social or religious dimension. Certainly, Augustine thinks that the worst dimension is sin against God. However, insofar as a
society is able to function, where all of its inhabitants do not share the same religion, the second view of sin as the violation of social unity may, at first, be more applicable.

So, the important questions is: “In what sense can racism be seen as a sin against society?” This is a rather thorny problem, especially if society depends on certain racial categories for its cohesion in the first place. The majority of the ruling parties in the societies of Europe and America don’t see racism as a sin throughout much of their development in the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries. As a way of avoiding the claim that race brings with it a form of social sin, one might argue that the concept of race began as a pragmatic building block of social identity, as a way of making sense of human beings within their diverse phenotypic appearances. However, the concept of race was never quite free of value-laden assumptions, assumptions that imperiled and threatened that same society. Recall that the greatest danger posed by whiteness is how it makes us unable to see a world as anything other than racialized through its own lens. In politically, economically, and aesthetically structuring a society where whiteness is the norm, whiteness sins against all of the members of that society, even those considered to be white. It creates an arbitrary category of white supremacy, against which everyone is judged and by which everyone is harmed. The Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. held to this idea and expressed it clearly in his Letter from a Birmingham Jail. “Moreover, I am cognizant of the interrelatedness of all communities and states. I cannot sit idly by in Atlanta and not be concerned about what happens in Birmingham. Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere. We are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny. Whatever affects one directly, affects all indirectly.”20 The standard of whiteness is used by police officers to evaluate the “perceived threat” of non-white bodies. It is used by security and military forces to evaluate the “perceived threat” of foreign, though essentially still non-
white, bodies. It is deployed as the social standard for economic success and used to criminalize poverty and dehumanize the poor as “lazy” and “useless.” Whiteness is a sin against the entire society which miserably carries it forward. It brings harm in political practice, foreign policies, and economic policies. Whiteness asserts its own importance over the benefit and well-being of all of those non-white members of society. Whiteness is far from harmonizing with the whole of society, and though it seems integral to the history of society it continues to persist in a way that damages and destroys social cohesion and unity.

Judith Butler brilliantly sums up the devastating impact that Black people experience within the context of anti-Black racism, or where whiteness is the norm.

When we are taking about racism, and anti-black racism in the United States, we have to remember that under slavery black lives were considered only a fraction of a human life, so the prevailing way of valuing lives assumed that some lives mattered more, were more human, more worthy, more deserving of life and freedom, where freedom meant minimally the freedom to move and thrive without being subjected to coercive force. But when and where did black lives ever really get free of coercive force? One reason the chant “Black Lives Matter” is so important is that it states the obvious but the obvious has not yet been historically realized. So it is a statement of outrage and a demand for equality, for the right to live free of constraint, but also a chant that links the history of slavery, of debt peonage, segregation, and a prison system geared toward the containment, neutralization and degradation of black lives, but also a police system that more and more easily and often can take away a black life in a flash all because some officer perceives a threat.21

According to the United States Census Bureau, as of 2013 twenty-two percent of Americans were non-white.22 Of that twenty-two percent, over half were classified as African-American.23 Those numbers make up a statistically significant portion of the population. Yet in a nation dominated by whiteness and anti-black racism, the lives of that group are seen as less valuable than the lives of the other seventy-eight percent. One could be tempted to assert that there is no real sin in white racism since the majority of people, at least in the United States, are white, and thus the majority of that society is not harmed by this. However, even if one could so easily
dismiss almost a quarter of the population as insignificant, which would be sinful in and of itself, it is ludicrous to argue that whiteness does not harm those people who are considered to be white.

It is immensely psychologically damaging to be raised in a world where one is systematically taught that human lives do not have value if they are of the wrong “race.” Although the psychological damage of whiteness sustained by white people is not equivalent to the physical and psychological damage sustained by non-whites, the damage to white people is still a relevant issue. Whenever a society has evolved to suit an arbitrary power structure like race, this often goes hand in hand with other damaging power structures. Add to this the hazards of becoming white through cultural indoctrination, and the risk of discovery for those who can pass for white, then one comes to realize that many of those seventy-eight percent had to pay a high price to “become” white. That price was their heritage, history, ancestry, family, religion, culture, and language. As an example of this price I will once again share a personal story related to how whiteness affects the use of non-white language.

One aspect of the price of whiteness is the often subtle complicity white people have in dehumanizing and degrading non-whites. Some years ago, my partner and I had sat down to have dinner in a restaurant. This particular eatery was situated in a small city in East Texas, and that particular evening it had a small crowd of patrons. While I was sitting in the dining room, I happened to glance toward the kitchen. An employee had just walked through the door to the kitchen so I could see several signs posted on the inside of the kitchen door. These signs faced the kitchen and they would ordinarily not be seen by the customers except when someone briefly left the kitchen and entered the dining area. I thought nothing of this arrangement until I noticed one sign in particular. The largest sign, placed most centrally on the door, written in large capital
letters simply read: NO SPEAKING SPANISH BEYOND THIS POINT. The situation so
unnerved me that I felt compelled to seek some advice on the matter. In an e-mail explaining
what had occurred, George Yancy wrote,

    When I read your message, I thought of Sara Ahmed's works, especially her work around
    space and race. I agree with you. It is a very problematic sign. To get a feel for this, just
    imagine that you were Latino(a). Imagine how alienating this would feel, how you would
    feel unwanted and undesirable. It is a form of dehumanization. It is also a way of policing
    space. And it is a way of marking Spanish as that which does not belong in this
    (white) space. The sign communicated that while in "this space," you might as well leave
    yourself out. To belong, you must negate and an important part of yourself.

Presumably, the sign was written to those who are already passing. It was written for those who
can speak English, and who are going to work in that white space. Thus it was written for those
who have become white, and who must be reminded that the price of becoming white is the loss
of a form of speech. It is the censoring of language in an effort to create a space for those who
are white to be free of all that is non-white. Yet that sign does not merely harm those who are
passing, it also harms all the “white” customers by creating an artificial space which diminishes
and denigrates important members of their society. It creates the illusion of living in a “white”
America, free from the perceived “menace” of Spanish speaking immigrants. My partner and I
left and did not return to that restaurant, though I was haunted by the fact that I had been
complicit. I had participated in the whites-only space of the restaurant by patronizing them. In
that situation, my white, English speaking presence served as the model for the world of the
customer. I exemplified and instantiated that whites-only space even if I did so without any
malice, and even if I attempted to correct the mistake by avoiding that restaurant in the future.
Whiteness is clearly damaging to non-whites, and although the harm is different and lesser it also
damages those who identify as white. If the whole of society is damaged by a basic social
institution then it should be clear at this point that whiteness constitutes a sin against society, but it remains to be seen how whiteness can be a sin against God.

Whiteness is also a sin in the religious sense, and the initial problem that this poses concerns the notion of God. For Augustine, sin is ultimately an offense against God, and a misdirected love towards lesser entities which are not as deserving as God. However, one need not establish God’s reality in order to understand the potency of racism as a religious sin. Without making recourse to any particular set of theological teachings it will suffice to say that racism presents a sin against the universe itself as unknown or mysterious. Even Carl Sagan, a notable atheist and astronomer, understood the universe as a great and unknown entity. “The Cosmos is all that is or ever was or ever will be. Our feeblest contemplations of the Cosmos stir us — there is a tingling in the spine, a catch in the voice, a faint sensation of a distant memory, as if we were falling from a great height. We know we are approaching the greatest of mysteries.”

What Sagan is describing is the importance of humans gaining knowledge about the world in which we live. This sentiment is also echoed in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, when Nietzsche proclaims that if God is dead there would still be a mistake to be made by “sinning against the earth.” Nietzsche is arguing against any human attempt to seek out the mysteries of some unknowable God and Sagan is arguing that the only unknown worth investigating is the Cosmos, the world as we can know it through science. Yet even the Atheist can see that racism presents a kind of sin against the cosmos, especially insofar as it makes it impossible to know what it really means to be human.

Part of the trouble inherent in the racial categories is the need to bring the objects, entities, and beings in the world under an absolute system of categorization. As has already been observed, Cornel West directly links the problem of racism to the scientific need to categorize
and order the natural world. Rather than letting the entities in the world stand, or be as they are as Heidegger might say, this revolution demands that the world submit to certain categories and methodology. In this context, whiteness takes on the character of a religious sin because it proceeds from a place of arrogant domination over the entirety of the human world. Racism makes the unreasonable demand that the human should be available to the categories of race as a transparent object of inquiry. That is the human must always have a racial identity and there is no possibility of being human without being raced. However, the goal here is not to demonize science, though as West points out there are serious implications of Euro-centrism within the scientific method itself. Rather, the point of this inquiry is to shed light on the idea that race is a sin in the religious sense because it misdirects and reorders the human. It makes a claim to a power and an idolatrous authority over human beings by forcing each of us to conform to its arbitrarily created categories. By the creation and maintenance of whiteness as the transcendental norm, race takes on the character of an offense against the Cosmos. Whether or not there is a God to be offended by racism, the Cosmos itself is pushed and harmed by being forcibly remanded into these arbitrary racial categories. These categories cover up and conceal what we might otherwise be able to learn about our genetic heritage, our ancestral past, or even our human evolution. Thus the truth of our nature which is contained in the Cosmos is lost, and the Cosmos is represented in a false and broken fashion. The sin here is not so much the harm that racism does to humanity, but the very notion that racism sets itself over humanity as an authority and in so doing greatly limits human freedom, creativity, and our interrelatedness to other humans.

This religious sin would ordinarily go by the name of idolatry, for it is as an idol and a poor substitute that race stands in place of genuine knowledge of the human condition.
Whiteness obfuscates genuine knowledge and involves an epistemology of ignorance where whiteness qua ignorance actively militates against an accurate understanding of the world. This sin even goes so far as to drive a wedge between humans and other creatures by creating not only the idol of whiteness, but also the idol of the “natural human being” as an ideal white male. Race becomes an idol which denies the revealed mystery of the diversity of human appearances and experiences. It reduces all such experiences to the categories of white, which stands as the idol of the human, and non-white, which stands as the idol of the inhuman. Indeed the only real category left for humans to inhabit, who will not or cannot inhabit the racial type of the “human being as white”, is to be reduced to the level of the sub-human. Thus the long history of racism also includes the constant dehumanization of black bodies, and the reduction of that which is human to that which is bestial. Indeed this is precisely what Herder does when he attempts to make sense of the “over-sexualization” of the African race. According to Herder that race which is naturally lacking in intellect, the intellect being the mark of true humanity, is more naturally gifted in sexuality. Herder describes how the increased fertility of the African race makes Africans into sexually driven subhuman animals. One might say, especially given how Black women were exploited under American slavery, that they were treated as reproductive machines. In his attempts to praise the Africans, he reduces them to nature, a kind of natural, primitive, and exotic landscape against which whiteness stands. The idol of whiteness stands supreme among all racial categories as it sets the image in which humans are to be re-made. Yet by worshipping and reinforcing this idol, we sin against the cosmos and lose our ability to truly know the human. Although humans have a miraculous ability to dwell and thrive in all the corners of the earth, whiteness twists and distorts this success. It was not accidental that Europeans exported their art, architecture, language, and economy to all the parts of the world they colonized. Wherever white
colonizers encountered a non-white space that place became a New Amsterdam, or a New Jersey, and then the colonizers went about converting the land and resources into something which resembled their Old world counterparts. Yet these moves destroy and obscure all the knowledge we might gain about those rare forms of people who were able to more peacefully coexist with their environment. The knowledge that the cosmos may have offered is now lost and irretrievable. In its place stands the human world which whiteness has given us instead.

Whiteness attempts everywhere to reconstitute the meaning of the “human,” and, hence, the meaning of the “subhuman,” through the image of European civilization and technology. Since the colonization would have been incomplete without the technology to convert that world into its white ideal, then it seems that we must now consider how technology itself is a sin. It might make sense to start with the idea of technology as a religious sin, since technology seems most directly pitted against the natural world. In remembering how handwork technology approaches the entities in the world, Rojcewicz reminds us that the four causes oblige us to the natural world. Ancient technology does the work of letting that which is already present in nature come forth on its own into the light of human understanding and everyday life. Heidegger claims that what ancient technology mimics is simply the natural tendency of the physical world to reveal itself. The flower blooms, the egg hatches and both cases show how the world of nature, the world of *physis*, reveals itself in its own time as it chooses. In a way that is reverent and respectful of the natural order, the work of handcraft technology effects an indirect revelation through the basic assistance of the human crafter. This respect for the order of nature takes on the character of a religious reverence and, as Rojcewicz claims, a sense of piety.

Yet the work of modern technology, in the strongest sense possible, manifests itself in opposition to piety; it takes on the character of religious sin. Rather than allowing the natural
world to stand forth as it is, modern technology performs the act of forcing and challenging nature to yield energy. Thus, modern technology destroys any semblance of natural order, and it displays no reverence or respect. In that sense, modern technology also presents itself as a kind of idolatry. All the world must be made to serve the idols of productivity and “progress,” and all nature must be subjected to the endless drive for more and more power. Rather than approaching the world as an entity deserving of respect and consideration, the modern technological attitude replaces that world with the concept of Bestand. As Rojcewicz has explained, the things in the world have become not just consumable but ultimately disposable. When this happens, the world itself and all entities within it become disposable. What once inspired reverence now inspires greed. The sense of religious sin which prevailed in the discussion of race seems to be just as applicable to the concept of modern technology. We also recall that humanity narrowly escapes becoming altogether disposable at least insofar as humans are necessary to drive the work of ordering and revealing the world. Yet this escape is no real victory. It is the illusion of our freedom which most directly proves that modern technology is not just a religious sin, but also a social one.

When modern technology begins to make the claim of mastery over and against human beings, by ordering us to order the world, then we see how it is also a social sin. Though we believe ourselves to be in charge of technological progress, it is the cultural attitude of the enframing which drives us to the work of ordering the world as disposable. Now technology certainly poses a threat to human beings in terms of causing environmental destruction, producing and using weapons of modern warfare, and the increase of social alienation created by rampant information technology. Yet, as has been said before, the real danger posed to humanity is that the enframing will limit us in terms of framing the world as a resource, or as something to
be exploited. This profound limitation forebodes an end to history and the inevitable capitulation of human beings into the ordering of technology which they so precariously seek to master. Heidegger explains that the risk to humanity is that we will become lost to ourselves, and end up given over entirely to the brute domination of the attitude of enframing.\textsuperscript{33}

Has this project now become a sermon instead of a philosophical inquiry? In an effort to address the problems of whiteness and enframing have I created fantastic myths where there were once clear philosophical categories? To be fair, Heidegger uses similarly judgmental language in his estimation of the dangers posed by technological enframing. Cornel West uses similarly extreme, and also religiously laden, language in his estimation of the threats posed by racism and white supremacy. Richard Rojcewicz frames the question and significance of Heidegger’s critique of technology within the context of language about piety and proper reverence. Certainly my project is not alone in its use of such language, and indeed this language serves a dual purpose. First, religious language serves to emphasize the existential and ethical nature of the problems of whiteness and enframing. Second, a turn to religious language provides the final connection between whiteness and enframing which will make us ready to see their root cause through an analysis of technoracism.

First my use of religious language illustrates the need for a decisive ethical treatment of the problems posed by this philosophical inquiry. There is a great temptation to treat that which is complex as being beyond the mundane. Thus, one may carelessly discuss the historical ramifications of civil rights laws, or concerns about race wars in an academic context which can so easily forget about the impact of those ideas. It can be all too easy to think and write about how the political philosophy of Manifest Destiny created conflicts between European and Native Americans, as though the whole topic was merely an answer to a question on a quiz. When we
do this, and when we slip so casually into this style of abstraction and contemplation we lose the horrifying simplicity of the topic. We forget that people died. We forget that people were horribly mutilated by weapons that were designed for maximum technical efficiency in snuffing out human life. We lose the sense of horror, misery, fear, and anxiety which ought to accompany these considerations. In that sense then the point of the language of sin is to return us to the inescapably existential nature of these problems. I do not claim that sin is the only way to express this problem, nor is it the final way, but it is a way and that way does open up interesting possibilities for our future. It is intended to shake us out of the comfort of intellectual distance and bring us head on into the collision that is technoracism. In that sense, my project is an existential one and my use of religion is intended to create a kind of moral aesthetic.

A very good example of the kind of moral aesthetic I intend here can be seen when one watches films about the struggles with racism in America. Beautiful and compelling cinematic feats like Selma or Twelve Years a Slave draw us into to a confrontation with racism. These films take historical or literary license and they are clearly intended to dramatize rather than to merely inform. In a sense, these works are intended to inculcate a kind of bias in the viewer, although that bias exists to counter the danger of polite complicity in social indifference. It is hard to watch a black woman being whipped, even if you try to tell yourself that these are actors who are merely pretending. The violence and visceral nature of the scene sticks in your mind in a way that does not let you easily return to the world where you try to tell yourself that such practices are historically bygone events, and thus no longer relevant. In the same way my use of religious language is not meant to compel a person into any specific religious stance, but instead to convey my own moral aesthetic. So in the first place what I am doing is removing the discussion of
whiteness and enframing from its comforting intellectual underpinnings in an effort to shake us into a moral confrontation.

Second, my use of religious language serves to demonstrate how intensely joined the problems of whiteness and enframing are. In conducting a genealogy, I showed how the problem of race developed in a historical context. I also demonstrated how race attempts to present itself as a minor everyday problem about identity, but how this hides the deeper problem of whiteness as racism. Ultimately, my goal was to demonstrate that the greatest danger posed by whiteness as racism was the reduction of all human identity into a racially stratified one where whiteness serves as the invisible standard. In bridging the gap between a discussion of whiteness and enframing, I investigated how Sheth argues that race is produced as a tool of political power. Then in discussing Heidegger’s philosophy of technology, I investigated how Heidegger performs his own genealogy which differentiates handwork, or ancient, technology and machine-powered, or modern, technology. In the analysis of Heidegger, we once again saw the same layered structure as we encountered with the problem of race. Technology presents itself as an everyday problem of proper use, but the deeper problem of technology is the attitude of enframing which orders the entire world as mere resource. This leads to the realization that the greatest danger of the enframing is that human beings will be forced to only ever see and produce a world of mere resources. With both whiteness and enframing, the supreme danger is our blindness to the cultural attitude which is actually dominating, controlling, and even creating our lives. We are somehow unable to see or understand how race is a concept which whiteness both creates and denies just as we are unable to see that technology really means the enframing. Both problems have the same three fold structure, and the idea that race can be produced as a kind of tool begins to open us up to the possibility of understanding something more. When we
finally add the realization that whiteness and enframing operate as religious sins of idolatry and social sins which harm even those who think they benefit, then we are finally ready to understand why these problems are so connected.

As a sin of idolatry both of these forces assert themselves as supreme, in a sense they assert their divinity. Yet whether there is a divine or not these concepts claim more than is their due and they attempt to shove out every other mode of knowing the world. As a sin against society, whiteness and enframing damage the unity of society by creating internal strife where groups of people are arbitrarily pitted against each other in a bid for control and domination. Although these concepts do favor certain groups over others, they nonetheless damage everyone by destroying any potential peace and harmony. By looking at whiteness and enframing through the lens of sin we see that they operate in the same fashion. The problems of the enframing and whiteness are manifestations of an underlying cultural attitude, the attitude of technoracism. This attitude is the fundamental cultural attitude which holds sway in our contemporary society. Whether or not it is a necessary and objective feature of the universe, though, remains to be demonstrated. We now turn to an understanding of the definition, limitations, and ideas to which this attitude gives rise.
Chapter 6 – Technoracism

“We now name that challenging claim which gathers man thither to order the self-revealing as standing reserve,” technoracism.¹ This modification of Heidegger’s introduction to the notion of the enframing opens us up to the possibility of thinking through the cultural attitude which underlies both whiteness and enframing. Up till now this dissertation has focused on the ways in which racism as whiteness poses a problem and the ways in which modern technology as the enframing presents a problem. In this chapter, I will demonstrate that there exists a cultural attitude, which I name technoracism, which exists prior to whiteness and enframing.² Technoracism allows for, and facilitates, the emergence of both whiteness and the enframing as cooperative mechanisms for creating and enforcing a political power structure. That power structure is a European cultural dominance which eventually gives rise to a broader Western cultural dominance.

It is important to understand that this attitude in one sense exists prior to the structures, of whiteness and enframing, and calls them into being as the consequence of the effects of technoracism. For example, Francois Bernier did not invent the notion of race, and indeed the word itself was already in use prior to his writing. According to the Oxford English dictionary, the English word for race likely comes from the French word *rasse*, which is first used around 1480 to designate a “group of people connected by common descent.” It may have also originated from the Italian word *razza* which was in use even earlier, around 1388, to designate a species or kind.³ Prior to an intellectual or philosophical understanding that the world could be raced, the idea of race already existed in the late medieval French and Italian cultures. Indeed, prior to the industrial revolution there already existed the scientific revolution which had made such technology possible. Heidegger explains that even though machine power technology

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comes about nearly two hundred years after the advent of modern physics, it is the essence of technology, as enframing, which makes the science possible in the first place. This chapter will explore the definition, origin, and limitations of the cultural attitude of technoracism as a way toward the possibility of an ethical solution to that same attitude.

In this chapter, I argue that technoracism is a cultural attitude which is prior to whiteness and enframing. I begin by defining the idea of a cultural attitude via Heidegger’s notion of Geschick. A cultural attitude contains both discursive and non-discursive elements, so it is both rational and also pre-rational insofar as it defines its own conditions for rationality. I also investigate the idea of the cultural attitude by looking at how Cornel West and Fred Evans discuss the notions of white supremacy and oracular voices respectively. I then argue that technoracism is such a cultural attitude and that it is in fact the true cultural attitude which underlies both whiteness and enframing. In order to clearly demonstrate this, I will turn to an investigation of the historical and cultural forces which are found at the origins of technoracism. Such a cultural attitude comes to predominate in most aspects of European society at the start of the modern age, roughly the late sixteenth century. Technoracism is ultimately defined by the three main characteristics of violent exclusivity, precise particularity, and absolute subjectivism. These characteristics are historically instantiated through a shared Christian European cultural identity, an emphasis on reason and universal categorization, and the assertion of the supreme value of the individual. In my analysis of the elements of technoracism, I show that an ethical resolution must involve discourse and direct action and this in turn leads to a virtue ethics.

I begin by defining the notion of a cultural attitude itself in Heidegger’s notion of Geschick, or destining. Heidegger explains that the enframing, as the essence of modern technology, is just such a destining. “The essence of modern technology starts man upon the way
of that revealing through which the real everywhere, more or less distinctly, becomes standing reserve. ‘To start upon a way’ means ‘to send’ in our ordinary language. We shall call that sending that gathers…which first starts man upon a way of revealing, destining [Geschick].’

According to Heidegger, it is a destining which determines the possible ways that history may be enacted. This destining is what sets up the possibility for historical events by setting out the conditions which allow ideas and modes of existence to rise and fall in prominence and significance. Rojcewicz adds that this notion of destiny is a fundamental aspect of our identity as humans. “What we are destined to do, most fundamentally, is to look upon beings as a whole in a certain way. This – the way we understand what it means to be in general – is the foundation for any further vocation we may have.” The way that we are given to look upon these beings is our destining, it is what I am calling our cultural attitude, and this cultural attitude is technoracism. The most definitive aspect of what it means to be human is how we understand the things in the world, and ourselves, through a kind of overarching concept or set of concepts. This field of ideas is our destiny as humans since it is this way of thinking and knowing which determines the possible ways that we understand ourselves and everything in the world. Thus we are, in some sense, meant to live in the world in a way that is given to us by our destiny. The realm of any particular human society is fixed by how that society understands the objects in the world. Thus when we understand objects in the world as standing reserve then our destiny, and that which most particularly characterizes the historical moment in which we find ourselves, is the enframing. Thus far we have been focusing on the destining that leads to enframing, and to be sure non-European cultures and societies experienced other destinings. Yet it is also clear that the European destiny was not always the enframing.
This also opens us up to the possibility that there have been other destinies in human history, and that there may be other destinies in our future. While our technological age is dominated by the destiny of the enframing, at one point we were dominated by the destiny of monotheism. Certainly we can extend this concept over the European period of history known as the Middle Ages. We can then see that the most transformative and powerful ideas that dominated in that period were the doctrines of the monotheistic religions. We are free to see this even without an in-depth study of that period of history. Almost all of the major historical events in the Middle Ages, or medieval period, in Europe were dominated by the conflicts between, and supremacy of, the newly emergent monotheistic religions. Catholic Christianity initially emerges out of the diminishing Roman Empire as the force which unites Europe and gives it a shared cultural identity. The rise of the Islamic Empire and the Muslim conquest of North Africa and Spain brought the established Christian world into conflict with the newly emergent Muslim world. The Crusades were driven by Christian ideologies and countered by a unified Muslim ideology. Even the Black Death was understood as punishment from God, and the disease prompted religiously motivated violence against non-Christians in many parts of Europe. Of course it can be argued that the historical events of the Middle Ages were driven by many other factors besides religion. However as an example of an idea which lends itself to a complete cultural understanding of the world and the events within it, the Monotheism of the Middle Ages is a stellar choice.

Then it seems that the cultural attitude of technoracism first emerges into European society in a subtle but powerful fashion, and then becomes manifested through the dangers of whiteness and enframing. To demonstrate this we can for now look at how whiteness progresses. The danger of whiteness first becomes visible in the early use of the idea of race, and as
Europeans grow accustomed to the use of this idea it becomes formalized by thinkers like Bernier, Blumenbach, and Kant. Yet while race is becoming discursively formalized in one part of Europe it is already being actively put to use in other parts to enact and drive colonialism and the slave trade. As European society develops so also does race in terms of how it is thought and how it is enacted, and while race develops so also does the deeper problem of race, whiteness. Race is always the visible face of whiteness, and whiteness remains elusive and concealed. Yet when whiteness is brought to light and society threatens to undo it altogether, whiteness survives by redefining itself and evading sight behind a new discourse on race. So it is even in our own society that we are quite aware of how race enacts a rationale which is public and understandable, but at the same time is simply a concealment of the true nature of race as whiteness.

However, the notion of a cultural attitude conveys more than can be defined by rational or systematic thought. Rather, there is something that is exchanged and communicated through the structure of technoracism which is more of a passive kind of feeling than an active, or directed, thought. That feeling might be better explained when we understand that a system like technoracism, or monotheism, has both discursive and non-discursive elements.

It is in the writings of Cornel West that we encounter this dichotomy of the discursive and the non-discursive. In looking at the emergence of white supremacist racism as a dominating system of our modern age, West offers the idea of modern discourse as a way to understand that emergence. He found the attitude which will give rise to racism already present even before the white supremacist practices brought the categories of race into being. Whiteness in some way precedes the notion of race because “…in the very structure of modern discourse at its inception produced forms of rationality, scientifcicity, and objectivity as well as aesthetic and cultural ideals
which require the constitution of the idea of white supremacy."\(^{10}\) Just like the enframing, West’s concept of white supremacy operates as a destiny for how Europeans come to see themselves and everyone else in the world. West furthers this by demonstrating how the idea of white supremacy is so dominating that it excludes any sort of alternative discourse about “black equality in beauty, culture, and intellectual capacity.”\(^{11}\) Whiteness so dominates the entire mode of thinking that it comes to be synonymous with thinking itself; while relegating Blackness or Brownness exclusively to the domain of body. It sets the limits and boundaries for what is knowable and known.

This is not the same thing as saying that an individual person is automatically beautiful or ugly, since the cleverness of such discourse also allows for individuals who are exceptional members of their groups. It allows for the African who may be brilliant, according to the white standard of brilliance, and it also allows for the European who may be ugly, but he will be ugly according to the black standard for ugliness. Though it must also be added that the brilliance of the brilliant African can be downplayed, diminished, or eliminated altogether by reaffirming that this brilliance must be evidence of some bizarre anomaly at best or at worst some hint of miscegenation. “The concrete effects of this exclusion and the intellectual traces of this silence continue to haunt the modern West: on the non-discursive level, in ghetto streets, and on the discursive level, in methodological assumptions in the disciplines of the humanities.”\(^{12}\) West here opens us to the realization that certain modes of discourse operate to create these structured ways of living and thinking, but this also involves that which is not discursive. Also the modern discourse which clarifies the various races must in some way precede the formalization of those races, since it makes them possible. This modern discourse itself proceeds from the essence of race as whiteness, but since whiteness is not the beginning of all things then it too must proceed
from an earlier movement. Yet if whiteness arises from the discursive and non-discursive, then perhaps there is a more fundamental way of thinking about it. Thus far we have looked at three different kinds of destinings and discourses which have shaped the history of humanity, the enframing, monotheism, and whiteness. We will now turn to how each of these may be considered a cultural attitude by investigating the influence of the non-discursive.

Although Heidegger and West are right that a cultural attitude is most often instantiated through the practices of rational and systematic social institutions, there is an irrational side to cultural attitudes. West hints at this irrational, or non-discursive side of modern discourse, though if it is non-discursive then perhaps it makes more sense to talk about it in terms of that which motivates discourse. In that sense, a cultural attitude is the source for the kinds of discursive activities which we run into in society. It is more basic than the discursive forms of domination, as it involves those aspects which are spoken as well as the unspoken.

A brilliant example of the way that the attitude involves both the spoken and the unspoken side of these forms of cultural domination can be found in the concept of the oracular voice in Fred Evans’ *The Multivoiced Body*.

...society is an interplay among voices, each of which resounds within the rest....Because these voices are always 'in motion', that is exist as responses to one another, their interrelationship is more aptly characterized as 'interplay'...This interplay among the voices simultaneously keeps them separate and holds them together, that is, constitutes them as a social body. It is for this reason that I refer to society as a multivoiced body and contrast it with society as a univocal subject or a collection of individual subjects.\(^{13}\)

According to Evans what constitutes a society is an ongoing and ever changing dialogue between all of the constituent parts, individuals, and aspects of that society. Now this interplay of voices occasionally creates a rising sense of anxiety and a fear that one may become overwhelmed by the voices. This anxiety can move a society to repress its identity as multivoiced and raise one of its voices to the level of the oracle. "Those supporting an oracle tend to accept other social
discourses only insofar as they function in some technocratic or other way that helps reproduce the society and its dominant discourse. The adherents of the oracle also designate certain other voices as evil 'enemies'...(this) increases the acceptability of the oracles dominance of society."14

The oracular voice defines the same cultural force of domination as destining or modern discourse. This includes the unspoken or non-discursive, precisely because the dogmatic adherence to the oracular voice is irrational and often exists as an unquestioned norm. The oracular voice is discursive, setting the terms for what discourse and visible exchange is possible in society. Yet it is also non-discursive since it informs and guides the irrational, the active, and the unspoken aspects of society. Evans even claims that one version of an oracular voice is Heidegger’s notion of the enframing. The technological enframing reduces everything to the order of standing reserve, and ultimately Heidegger sees the enframing as a kind of "omnipresent framework within which we are destined to operate".15

In the very same section of his book, Evans also discusses the notion of whiteness as an oracular voice. "Whiteness consists in the usually subconscious attitude that 'being white' is the standard against which all other groups are to be measured."16 Yet the blaring voice of whiteness finds that it has competition in the form of resistance to white norms. Not everyone in a society dominated by whiteness will identify as white. We celebrate black history month during February, we identify non-white elements of pop culture, and we readily identify very powerful people, who are nonetheless not white. Even those who traditionally might identify as white in many cases resist whiteness in both their everyday and political lives. "These observations indicate that whiteness is not an omnipresent enclosure, but rather an oracle that furtively carries within itself the increasingly strident voices of opposition to it."17 The resistance which whiteness encounters serves to illustrate that whiteness does not exist as a completely discursive,
nor completely overarching, power. Instead this oracular voice involves an aspect that is non-discursively, or irrationally explicable given the nature of the voice itself. While whiteness as an oracular voice operates through and as discourse, this discourse arises as a reaction to the non-discursive. The non-discursive side includes the bodies of the people and the objects which inform and make up society. Thus whiteness is as much a response to those bodies which fail to fit its standards as it is the force which defines the standards of bodies in the first place. This informs how we can come to understand the idea of the attitude as both discursive and non-discursive.

If the rational side of a cultural attitude may be called the discursive, then the irrational side may be called the non-discursive. The source for the non-discursive may be human psychology, historical causality, or even the mysterious and the divine. The cultural attitude must employ both the rational discursive and the irrational non-discursive as a means of establishing itself. This irrationality is not merely a failure to be rational, such as one might find in the person who willfully adopts new technologies without thinking. Nor is this to be found simply in an attempt to be anti-rational, such as the person who clings to their racist bigotry despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary. In fact, the irrational side of the cultural attitude is best understood as involving a kind of historical motion which precedes and defines even the conditions for rationality. The non-discursive side of the cultural attitude exists at a formative level of thinking which determines what ideas, methods, systems, experiences, appearances, and entities will even count in the first place as sites of understanding. One way to unpack this is to try to make sense of the extent that emotions, feelings, and psychology play in establishing the conditions for the rational. Another way to understand this is to explain that each stage of human history is conditioned to be what it is by the prior stage through a chain of causality. In reference
to the schema that was introduced earlier one could argue that the non-discursive side of the cultural attitude was formed by the discourse of a previous cultural attitude. Alternatively one may seek for an explanation which goes beyond humans to the divine or the mysterious. Then one might claim that the non-discursive side of the cultural attitude stems from God, or as Heidegger seems to indicate, from Being itself. Rojcewicz explains this last possibility when he writes, “What is primarily responsible for technology as an understanding of what it means to be in general is the self-showing of the gods, the self-offering of Being…That is to say, humans, in their disclosive looking, are the followers, and Being is the leader.”18 (To be sure, for Rojcewicz this following and leading must be understood in a very nuanced sense.) To whatever extent we think that the non-discursive comes from human psychology, historical causality, or the mysterious and the divine, it remains clear enough that there is a non-discursive element to a cultural attitude. This element sets the conditions for the rational side of discourse and allows for the meaningful to be realized out of this unknown source. In laying out the definitions and limitations of a cultural attitude we will always have some understanding of the discursive methods which instantiate that attitude. Yet there will also remain, more or less hidden from view, the non-discursive side which only reveals itself after a prolonged philosophical investigation.

Now that we have defined the notion of a cultural attitude in general, it is important to turn to an investigation of the discursive side of technoracism as the cultural attitude which underlies both the enframing and whiteness. It might at first seem that we ought to continue to treat these attitudes as separate, following the course of study we have laid out thus far. However, what this project has so far revealed is that these two attitudes have an almost identical structure. We have found their historical origins in the scientific categorizing of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries primarily in the works of European men. The enframing and whiteness both present a kind of bland and innocuous everyday face which appears to do little more than apply “neutral” categorizations to natural phenomena. Yet in both cases this everyday face serves to do the work of concealing the totalizing truth of their nature as social and cultural forces for absolute domination of the world and all of its entities. These structures are threatening to humanity due to the violence which they both perpetuate, but even more so by annihilating all competing ideas and structures. This destruction removes all other ways of seeing the world and subordinates our understanding to these systems as ultimate and primary modes. Finally, both whiteness and the enframing exist as sins in the social sense, where they cause harm against all members of the population which fall under their hegemony. They are also sins in the religious sense, since both seek to establish a domination over the mystery of the cosmos. These systems set themselves up as superior, and the rationale of their processes will not tolerate any entity to fall outside of their mastery. To sum up, both whiteness and enframing have this idea of mastery in common, and both hide their mastery in the form of things proceeding as usual. They both function as universal sites of domination, and both of them define the world in such a way that we come to think that the world must be defined in that way as opposed to there being alternative ways that the world can be defined.

Now we have come to the crux of the matter, and the idea of technoracism hinges on the following argument. The enframing and whiteness make absolute and totalizing claims which seek to subordinate all human understanding unto themselves. Either there is a conflict between these two attitudes, and one of them is supreme over the other, or there is only one attitude present, of which both the enframing and whiteness are expressions or manifestations.
Technological enframing is clearly not the proper name for this attitude, for if it were then Heidegger would have understood that there is not some unknown future danger that humans may become disposables. Rather he would have realized that European slavery had already enacted this, and that the Nazi holocaust had been another clear example of it. Heidegger’s bias and his own racism may have blinded him to this realization. Beyond this it is clear enough that the enframing which reduces the world to resource already stems from a more basic approach that reduces the world to the scientific category of the knowable and the not yet known. That earlier reduction is predicated on the importance assigned to knowledge as a means of gaining power over the world. Recall that long before the historical era of machine power technology, Francis Bacon has already said that the aim of philosophy and science is “to give humankind mastery over nature by means of scientific discoveries and inventions.”

Thus the enframing cannot be the more basic of the two attitudes.

Yet whiteness is also insufficient to stand as the true cultural attitude which dominates all in our age. Though it may be easy enough to see whiteness as dominating human affairs, yet when it comes to the human attitude towards plants or non-human animals a different kind of thinking appears to be employed. Although whiteness seems to proceed by dehumanizing the non-white through the categorization of blackness, in fact it must proceed by this dehumanization. That is, whiteness establishes the identity of human beings, white men, over and against other beings which are deemed subhuman, non-white non-men. Yet this accomplishment would have no meaning, fixity, or significance if the creation of white identity was in opposition to the identity of a carrot. The notion of white identity as significant is caught up in the notion of whiteness as supreme. The white is supposedly better than the black because she exceeds her in all relevant activities such as speech, culture, and intellect. There would be no
victory inherent in whiteness, and thus no certainty in the establishment of the white, without the threat of competition. The black competes with the white for intellectual superiority, the Black competes for athletic prowess, and the Black competes for political prominence. Of course, each of these competitions has been defined by and for the white body. For proof of this, recall Robert Fullinwider’s analogy of the land of giants. Thus the game is rigged, which means that even if a non-white individual is to win, he must win by approximating and achieving the white standard. However, even this sense of competition is part of the logic of whiteness, since it is whiteness which creates the conditions that draw nonwhites into competition. If one places oneself in the position of being supreme, then the other is always a potential threat to that supremacy. Ultimately, the standard of whiteness retains little meaning beyond the sphere of direct human interaction and comparison, and so it is not even as far reaching or as expansive as the idea of the enframing.

This dilemma could be made even more problematic if we also considered that there are other systems like sexism, Christian supremacy, or classism which vie for absolute control. To even construct this dilemma we must restrict our investigation to the two notions which have so far made this project what it is. The temptation is to say that there are innumerable competing attitudes, all of which vie for supremacy. Yet that very notion of competition and supremacy points to the realization that there exists some basic cultural attitude which underpins even our ability to understand the various systems as battling for domination. More basic than sexism, whiteness, or classism is the attitude which is comprised of supremacy, conflict, violence, domination, silencing of the other, the advocating of self-importance, and the ability to objectify and simultaneously create the self as subject. This attitude is what properly deserves the label of
actually being our cultural attitude, technoracism, and all the other systems thus far investigated should be understood as expressions, or manifestations, of that thinking.

This true cultural attitude I have defined by stipulating the term technoracism. This term is not absolute, and in an obvious sense this term exists as a placeholder and a first attempt to define something which is basic and essential to all the visible manifestations of this attitude. The term itself, technoracism, has been crafted from a union of “technology” and “racism”, and it illustrates the way in which the moral problem of racism proceeds from a more fundamental and technical way of seeing the world. The prefix techno evokes a mode, and a way of seeing a subject, and that subject is racism as whiteness. But this term also seeks to turn the analysis of the problem of racism as whiteness, back against the structure which puts it into play, back against that technical cultural attitude. Yet this attitude exists historically, and so to understand it we must first investigate its origins. Technoracism is the cultural attitude which comes to predominate in most aspects of European society at the start of the modern age, roughly the late sixteenth century. It is instantiated discursively by a shared Christian European cultural identity, an emphasis on reason and universal categorization, and the assertion of the value of the subject as individual. It is characterized by the non-discursive aspects of violent exclusivity, precise particularity, and absolute subjectivism.

Since technoracism is ontologically prior to whiteness and the enframing then it should be unsurprising that it shares a similar structure. The notion of the Christian European cultural identity presents itself as the everyday aspect and the visible surface of technoracism. In its non-discursive aspect Christian European Cultural identity is a force of violent exclusivity. Modern Atheists and Marxists alike are quick to point out that the failings of modern society may all be traced back to the dominance of the Christian religion over the development of western society.
This accusation is not far off, even if it is too simplistic, for the appearance of technoracism first shows up as the face of Christian Supremacy. Yet the deeper problem of technoracism is exposed when one sees the disconnect that exists between medieval and modern Christianity. At the advent of the modern age, and the dawn of technoracism, there is a different sort of character operating through European Christian culture. The deeper problem of technoracism, and the structure which lies below the face of Christian supremacy, is the emphasis on the universality of categorization. In its non-discursive aspect this universality can be understood as a kind of over-emphasis on precise particularity. The deeper problem is that the world, and everything in it, should become always available to the gaze which seeks to define, categorize, and reduce all things into terms and concepts which lend themselves to a sense of mastery. An insidious form of absolute rationality dominates technoracism, but of a sort which seeks to convert the world into concepts which can be mastered. However, the supreme danger of technoracism is not simply that the world is everywhere forced to bend and be rationalized into a system of power. Rather the supreme danger of technoracism is that in so categorizing the entities of the world such that one may master them, we ultimately lose the world altogether and are left with only ourselves. In discursive terms this is the assertion of the value of the subject as individual. In its non-discursive form this proceeds from a place of paranoia which can only be resolved by an absolute subjectivism. Much has been made of the subjectivist turn in philosophy, but in the cultural attitude of technoracism the subjectivist turn is a turn towards an absolute subjectivity. In the European quest to know the world and everything in it as it really is, and thus bring everything under the power of European society, the Europeans lose the world entirely and are left only with a hollow image of their own projected ego. By seeking to bring all truth under that power they are ultimately left with a picture of the world which only ever sees the human.
The non-discursive condition, that is the condition which exists outside of language and reason, which most definitively stands at the basis of technoracism is that of violent exclusivity. Violence has perhaps always been a part of human history, and violence has often been greatly influential on human events. Though of course violence can be discursive, the condition of violent exclusivity particularly denotes events and activities of a non-discursive nature. Warfare is perhaps the clearest example of the effective nature of violence in forging culture, since through the violence of warfare the other is annihilated and the identity of the self comes to the fore. Yet it will not do to trace the entire history of violence in order to locate technoracism. Instead, we must establish that a kind of violence was instrumental in creating a shared cultural identity. Certainly, Europe was not always Europe, in the sense that the various nations, cultures, languages, and peoples of Europe did not always understand themselves to be European, to be white. George Fredrickson explains this in his book *Racism: A Short History*. “The notion that there was a single pan-European or “white” race was slow to develop and did not crystallize until the eighteenth century. Direct encounters with Africans had of course made Europeans aware of their own light pigmentation, but in other contexts whiteness, as opposed to national and religious affiliations, was not a conscious identity or seen as a source of specific inherited traits.”

To return to those religious affiliations then we can see that prior to the modern age, and at the foundation of technoracism, lies Christian Supremacy. Now Christianity did not immediately conquer Europe, nor was it always actively engaged in warfare to conquer Europe. To be sure even the designation of “Christianity” is riddled with doubt and uncertainty insofar as the key identifiers of the movement do not seem to be clearly defined or always present. By the time of the rise of modernity, the time of the enlightenment, it must be an undeniable fact that European cultural identity was completely
intertwined with Christianity. In his work *Dominion of God: Christendom and Apocalypse in the Middle Ages*, Brett Whalen explains this complex picture of Christian supremacy.

In reality, regional diversity and political fragmentation characterized the Christian territories of medieval Europe. The self-declared members of Christendom nevertheless viewed themselves as a people unified through their shared faith, their use of Latin as a sacred language, their mutual observance of religious rites, and their obedience to the Roman papacy. Simply put, Christendom formed the “whole society of Latin Christians and the lands they occupied.”

What initially unifies Europe is a linguistic fact. In his book *The First Thousand Years: A Global History of Christianity*, Robert Louis Wilken writes that it was Latin which created the cultural foundations of Christianity. “What the syriac language was to Christians east of Jerusalem, Latin was to Christians in the West. Its geographical reach…would bind the peoples living in Germany, France, the Low Countries, Poland, Scandinavia, the British Isles, Spain, and Italy into a distinctive Christian civilization that we know as Europe.” Wilken explains that the Latin language came to dominate all intellectual, political, and religious life by the sixth century in Southern Europe. He then details how the Latin missionaries carried their religion, and their language, to Northern Europe. “A case can even be made that the great period of Christian expansion in Europe did not come to an end until the fourteenth century, when Jogaila, the grand duke of Lithuania, adopted the faith.” Certainly most of what we now know as Europe had become Christianized by the eleventh century. Through the decline of Christianity in the East and the rise of the Islamic Empire, the identity of Europe emerged as distinctly and inescapably Christian. Germany was the site of the beginnings of the Protestant Reformation, and from there Protestantism came to England, and eventually the United States of America. In one form or another the teachings and religion of Christianity eventually came to dominate all of Europe throughout the Middle Ages. Now, due to the vast diversity of theological viewpoints, even within Catholic Christendom, a full investigation of the Christianization of Europe is beyond the
scope of this current project. Yet this project can and must establish that European cultural identity comes about in the first place because of Christianity. There is no unified Europe without Christendom, and Christianity.

The force of European Christian cultural identity is made possible in the first place by the non-discursive aspect of violent exclusivity. It is violent exclusivity which is the first characteristic of technoracism.

It is widely recognized that the High Middle Ages formed an era of territorial growth and broadening horizons for Christian Europeans through their acts of conquest, crusading, settlement, and missionary activity across all of Europe’s frontiers. Leaving aside, for the moment, the Jewish communities that lived squarely within the territories of the Western Church, the borders of Christendom seem easiest to trace when set against the boundaries of lands where the inhabitants did not believe in Christianity (such as the Muslims) or did not practice their Christian faith in the same way as the followers of Rome (such as the Greek Christians of Byzantium).25

During the Middle Ages, Christianity defined itself through conquering and converting all who did not share its theology. In his book, Europe: the Emergence of an Idea, Denys Hay describes the slow conversion of Europe as the old Roman Empire collapsed.

Admittedly the Christianization we have outlined was accomplished painfully slowly and formed for long a mere official covering over habits of mind which were essentially pagan. Admittedly there were differences between one sort of Christianity and another…Yet by the thirteenth century the cross was a universal symbol from the Black Sea to the Atlantic and from the Mediterranean to the Arctic Circle.26

In a rather interesting turn, Hay also locates the creation of European identity in the Jewish and Christian theological understanding of the world as divided up between the sons of Noah. The myth of Noah’s ark and the survival of humanity through the descendants of Noah’s three sons, Shem, Ham, and Japheth is present in both the Hebrew and Christian Sacred texts. According to Hay, the first explicit link between the sons of Noah and the three continents of the world is found in the writings of the Jewish historian Josephus in the first century.27 The sons of Shem were given the Continent of Asia, and what we now think of as the Middle East, the sons of Ham
were given the continent of Africa, and the continent of Europe went to the sons of Japheth. Hays explains that this marks the first historical emergence of the global concept of Europe, and it very importantly emerges within the context of theology. Furthermore, this allocation of the continents sets the foundation for the emergence of white supremacy. “…a further step was taken in the establishment of that fearful tradition which was sometimes to justify in later ages an attitude to the African Negroes which precluded them from a full enjoyment of the Christian Tradition.”

The theological interpretation of this myth inevitably determined that the descendants of Ham were cursed to be “a servant of servants”, for the sin of Ham, the mocking of Noah’s naked drunken state. In this context, then, European Christianity is not just one possible identity, but rather it is the supreme identity.

The paradigm case of the spread of Christian Supremacy certainly was the Crusades. Indeed even the term itself, Crusade, continues to symbolize an act of absolute faith in one’s unassailable superiority. Indeed the Oxford English Dictionary notes that the word Crusade began as a verb, and it originally meant “…a crossing or marking with the cross…” Hay explains that the idea of being a Christian was synonymous with being a person, and that this was used to justify the Crusader’s attitude.

Yet the very existence of a vernacular noun ‘Christian’, meaning no more (and no less) than ‘person’ gives a vivid indication that religion rather than race or government or geography formed the common basis of all groups in western society…Above all this is the terminology of the Crusades, when the Latin West forcibly took cognizance of the outside world.

The term Christian was used, during the era of the crusades, to define the active crusaders and the violent military strategists whose aim was to conquer Jerusalem. It was occasionally used to talk about the Greek or orthodox Christians, but more and more the term “Christian” itself came to mean those in Europe alone. Bret Whalen also adds that Christendom was just as keen to
convert as it was to destroy. “...both Christian and non-Christian peoples had roles to play in the realization of history. The expectation of Christian world order relied—somewhat paradoxically—on mutually reinforcing languages of exclusion and inclusion, on the identification of God’s enemies and the promise of their ultimate redemption, or at least their opportunity to be redeemed.” Yet it must be emphasized that the need to convert others, the need to overturn the beliefs and systems of other people through rational rather than military means, remains a form of discursive violence. The tactics of conversion often involved discursive force, the force of argument, coercion, manipulation, or intimidation to overturn the beliefs of others. In a subtler sense, because the theological notions of Christendom are geared towards conversion as their end goal, then there is no satisfaction to be gained in mere agreement. It will not suffice for a person to assent to the teachings of Christianity, they must submit to its authority. This conversion and full transformation requires an abandonment of any previously held beliefs which conflict with that authority. One must go so far as to reject altogether whatever one’s former, Non-Christian, identity was. The exclusionary nature of the Christian cultural mindset demands that the Christian only ever encounters the world of Christianity itself. Thus all Non-Christian peoples, cultures, and societies must be brought under the dominion of Christian ideology. “Christendom was thought by contemporaries to be limitless in its potential. It would, they believed, reach everywhere and everyone before the end of time.” From such a perspective regarding the world, we already see the need for domination and the accompanying demand that all entities submit to a unified vision of the world.

However, the violent exclusivity in Christian supremacy would not have been enough to bring about technoracism by itself, quite simply because it existed without technoracism for hundreds of years. Although Christendom demanded submission, it ultimately demanded that
submission indirectly on behalf of another, that other being God. Thus the dominating claim of technoracism remained dormant while the middle ages were ruled by the claim of monotheism. Nonetheless, without the creation of a European Cultural identity through the work of Christianity, technoracism would not have been possible and so Christian supremacy stands as one of the major foundational forces for the emergence of technoracism as a cultural attitude.

From out of the first characteristic of technoracism, violent exclusivity, emerges a search for precise particularity as the Middle Ages gave way to the rise of modernity. While Christianity demanded indirect submission, modern science allows for the dominating claim to be issued more directly. We have already noted that racism would be impossible without the rise of science in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Cornel West explained that the advent of exact science preceded the advent of racism, since we see race emerge in the late seventeenth century but exact science seems to go back as far as the late sixteenth century.\(^36\) This also coincides with the rise of machine powered technology, and so it is here also that we must locate the emergence of technoracism. I am arguing that the cultural attitude of technoracism is what causes the emergence of both whiteness and enframing as particular manifestations of it. Yet it is not surprising to find that the origins of technoracism itself coincide with the same time period as the emergence of whiteness and enframing. A cultural attitude remains dormant unless it can become instantiated through a manifestation, and that manifestation is simultaneously the testament to its existence and its starting point in recorded history. The attitude always comes before the event, but as Heidegger pointed out, this precedence is often logical rather than simply chronological. So the second defining characteristic of technoracism is the precise particularity that characterized the rise of modern science in the enlightenment. In that sense technoracism is also the cause of the enlightenment, though it is the spiritual ancestor of that movement. West
explains that it is the age of enlightenment (1688-1789) which is responsible for the emergence of European modernity. Further, West explains that this modernity rose up within a prosperous system of European capitalism which depended on slavery for its profits. He sums up the mindset of this Enlightenment modernity as dependent on three key features, the authority of science, pagan neoclassicism, and the subjectivist turn in philosophy. Yet what is more basic about technoracism, is how its emphasis on precision created the universality of categorization.

The authority of science, neoclassicism and the subjectivist turn in philosophy depend on the simpler form of the universality of categorization. This is the idea that there exists a set of categories for all things in the world and that this set of categories is absolute and definitive. Yet the existence of such a set of categories in the first place cannot take on the character of universality without the confidence which stems from the violent exclusivity of Christian supremacy. This is accomplished by a conflation of the Christian moral laws and the notion of a Natural law which exists as God’s perfect ordering design on creation. Ernst Troelstch explains this in *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches*, when he writes, “The church proves the rationality and universal validity of her moral law by deriving it from the moral law of Nature, as it existed in its perfection at the dawn of the creation of humanity…” The natural law is a concept that goes back to the ancient philosophers, and found a great representative in Aristotle. Yet in the writings of Thomas Aquinas, as well as other important European theologians and philosophers, the natural law takes on a new form. When the natural law becomes equated with the order and systematicity with which God has created the world, then the world begins to emerge as something which can be known with certainty. Since God is good and consistent then He will neither alter His ideas nor change His mind. In his *Meditations*, Rene Descartes famously argues that since God is not deceptive then all knowledge which depends on God may
be seen as absolutely trustworthy, static, and determinate. Troeltsch explains that through the teachings of Aquinas, the natural law “presents itself as the law of Reason imparted to nature; which also as freedom is the effect of the Divine Law in man; thus the Aristotelian doctrine of virtue and of the end, as the Stoic doctrine of the Law of Nature and of Reason, are united and fused into one.” The natural law may be accessed by reason, and by reason alone it can be known. What is more important is that knowing how the world truly is also sets a precedent for determining our proper behavior in response to it. The idea that the world is knowable in a fixed and determined way is a necessarily moral one, since if the world is fixed then our knowledge of it will move us into the proper attitude and behavior towards it. So in the first place the emergence of the universality of categorization derives from a Christian ethos.

The emergence of the universal categorization occurs when the knowledge of the world as fixed renders human beings the masters of nature. If the world is fixed then it can be known, but if it can be known then in an even more important way it can be mastered. Recall that Descartes claimed that the goal of a practical philosophy, a knowledge of all things of which the mind is capable, is to master and possess the natural world. However, this desire to dominate the world cannot go forward if the Christian medieval notion of God as supreme remains intact. Thus the precise particularity which characterizes the rationalistic and scientific aspect of technoracism is also necessarily an atheist one. In his book *The Enlightenment, An Interpretation: The Rise of Modern Paganism*, Peter Gay defined the enlightenment thinkers as modern pagans. “…they, unlike the others, used their classical learning to free themselves from their Christian heritage, and then having done with the ancients, turned their face toward a modern world view. The enlightenment was a volatile mixture of classicism, impiety, and science; the philosophes, in a phrase, were modern pagans.” By distancing themselves from the
restraints imposed by Christian theology, and by embracing the return to pre-Christian texts and thinkers, the key thinkers of the enlightenment were able to take up a new tradition. This effected a shift from the medieval dependence on God, to an independence of the rational thinker.

The world remained a world of fixed knowledge and inquiry, and yet there no longer remained an automatic Christian ethos imposed by this knowledge. Thinkers like Descartes, Bacon, Voltaire, Hume, and Kant encountered the world as brimming with the kinds of knowledge which a rational mind could uncover. Yet at the same time this knowledge was now no longer burdened with some filial sense of duty and piety to God. To be sure this was a tension for many of these thinkers, as thinkers like Descartes and Kant still considered themselves to be Christian. Yet Descartes is perhaps one of the most telling cases since, as has already been discussed, he had a very clear notion of a scientific ethos. This ethos was guided by nothing less than the desire to possess all knowledge in order to conquer and subdue the earth, not through a non-discursive force of arms (though that does not mean the enlightenment Europeans were altogether peaceful) but by a discursive force of intellect. A system of universal categorization, a system of science, was now possible and this system was remarkably self-justifying in its ethical approach to the world. Under such a system any approach to the world which created more knowledge was to be praised, and any approach which imposed restraints upon thinking was to be condemned. The precise particularity which characterizes the emergence of a system for universal categorization ultimately lends itself to a view of the world which sees humans as autonomous subjects of power. “The men of the enlightenment united on a vastly ambitious program, a program of secularism, humanity, cosmopolitanism, and freedom, above all, freedom in its many forms…freedom, in a word, of moral man to make his own way in the world.”  

This emphasis on freedom is really an emphasis on autonomy. Yet it is not a democratic autonomy
which is being sought, rather it is autonomy for the self-determination of those who are already socially determined as selves. This will give rise to our final characteristic of technoracism, the assertion of absolute subjectivism.

The supreme danger and true essential nature of technoracism is found in the assertion of absolute subjectivism. As has already been noted in the writings of West and Descartes, there is a strong subjectivist turn in the work of philosophy at the onset of the enlightenment. "This quest, initiated by Descartes, gave first place to concepts of the subject, ego, or the self, and preeminence to the notion of representative knowledge. The subject, ego, or self supplied the principal means for subjects to make contact with objects, ideas to copy things, or concepts to correspond to the external world."45 West argues that this places philosophy in the position of being the strongest and most important of the newly emerging sciences. Philosophy stands as an overarching unifying system which brings the various sciences together so that knowledge may be collected. Yet this collection of knowledge does not serve merely to enhance our thinking, or even to bring humans into a relationship with the world where absolutely everything can be known. To be sure, the subjectivist turn seeks true, universal, and reliable knowledge. However, this knowledge is in service to something that is as noble as it is desperate. In his book, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, Ernst Cassirer explains the enlightenment quest for knowledge by drawing our attention to the ultimate object of this quest.

Yet its thirst for knowledge and intellectual curiosity are directed not only toward the external world; the thought of this age is even more passionately impelled by that other question of the nature and potentiality of thought itself. Time and again thought returns to its point of departure from its various journeys of exploration intended to broaden the horizon of objective reality. Pope gave brief and pregnant expression to this deep-seated feeling of the age in the line: "The proper study of mankind is man."46

This subjective turn is more than mere over-confidence in the face of the success of science and the return to classical art and literature. The turn to self is also no mere revolt against Catholic
dominance, in some novel effort to establish the superiority of Protestant Christianity in its stead. Peter Gay characterizes the enlightenment thinkers as modern pagans, a title which is meant to imply their interest in classical, or at least non-Christian, thought.47 To be sure, the emergence of Protestant Christianity also seems to precede the rise of technoracism, but insofar as that movement remained Christian, it continues to serve as the unifying cultural identity. Some blame might indeed be laid against the Protestant theological emphasis on the importance of individual faith or conversion. Yet in the end, the subjectivist turn also incites a turn away from Christian theology, even though Christian culture remains a defining aspect of technoracism. This turn becomes necessary since it is not possible to have an absolute subjectivism while a god or any supernatural entity retains dominion over a world which it has created. The absolute subjectivism which is the supreme danger of technoracism is also necessarily an atheistic subjectivism. This is not to say that atheism is somehow inherently problematic, but rather that technoracism emerged out of the decline of Christian Supremacy and the rise of Enlightenment Atheism.

It now becomes imperative to investigate the extent to which the subjective turn is made possible by subjectivism as absolute, as law. It is easy enough to see that many famous enlightenment thinkers still held themselves to be subject to greater powers, be they political, philosophical, or theological. So the notion of subjectivism as an absolute law and moral standard needs to be explained. Cornel West illustrates how Immanuel Kant took the subjectivism initiated by Descartes further. “Immanuel Kant deepened Descartes’s subjectivism by erecting new formal foundations upon a transcendental subject which builds an objective world by means of a universal conceptual scheme.”48 Kant’s system derives from the only trustworthy source of knowledge, one’s own capacity for reason. Descartes’ entire skeptical project is based on his experience of the untrustworthy and incomplete nature of the formalized
systems of education and knowledge in his society. Hume claims that knowledge of matters of fact depends on sensation, and he holds an intractable suspicion on anything which is unobservable. This famously leads him to claim that physical causality is something unknowable. The underlying reason for why subjectivity becomes not merely an option, but an inescapable law is that knowledge becomes certain or knowable only insofar as I myself am the one who knows it. The enlightenment thinkers reject the idea of knowledge derived from systems of authority, quite simply because those systems become suspect and uncertain. Thus the subjective turn takes on the nature of an absolute subjectivism out of a crisis of faith. For one reason or another, the enlightenment thinkers were united in the fact that the sources of information they trusted most of all were their own intellects. Even the empiricists of the movement trusted not so much in the senses in general, but in their own senses and in their own ability to comprehend the senses.

The result of this turn to autonomy is the construction of systems of knowledge which are inherently aggressive and appear to be ultimately driven by fear. The attitude of technoracism is founded on a deeply held sense of suspicion and anxiety. The impetus for this essentially rational movement in history is itself nothing rational, it is a mood and a feeling. The systems of whiteness and enframing are strong examples of the paranoid agenda inherent in technoracism. Whiteness racializes the humans in the world and it reiterates and protects these racial categories, since it functions from the well-founded fear that these categories are fragile. Whiteness must time and again be defended and purified against miscegenation, non-white ideas, and black bodies. It exists as a system which is under constant threat even though it also exists as a system of violent supremacy. The enframing is pressed everywhere to turn the world into functional and practical resources to serve the progress of modern society. Yet even while great advances are
made in raising the standard of living thanks to new technologies, that same standard is threatened by atmospheric pollution and destructive drive for resources. The very machines which are supposed to create the trouble free life which Descartes envisioned become the machines which create a world of new and pervasive troubles. The pain of technoracism comes from the sense that my identity is defined by how well I use my reason to gain mastery over the world and others. This threatens me in my own identity, so that I must always and everywhere make the world rational, knowable, and thus available to be mastered. The ultimate danger is that I will be so effective in converting the entities of the world into the tools and categories of my own reason that I will cease to encounter the world altogether. Instead I will only ever encounter the copies of my own intellect, and the entities of the world will present themselves to me as the constructs of my own imagination. This is especially threatening when that imagination is driven by a fear that it will never know the world and in not knowing the world will be helplessly delivered over to it.

An investigation into the origins of the fear which drive the quest for absolute subjectivism may yield strange and varied results. In Descartes the fear is driven by a desire to never be deceived but also by a fear of disease, the seemingly endless wars in Europe, and the dangers posed by a natural world out of our control. Perhaps this fear comes from the breakdown of medieval Christian society, or from the panic which was created by the black-death or the various diseases which plagued Europe. If it can be said that the mood of fear is the driving force behind technoracism then surely the origins of that fear are just as important. It is perhaps inevitable that any investigation into the non-discursive should encounter it as obscure in its origins. Although the rational elements of technoracism are easy enough to trace, the irrational elements only become apparent after thorough investigations into the rational. Perhaps the
origins of the fear which drives absolute subjectivism are difficult to locate because that fear is complex. It seems born from the medieval fear of God, the fear of devastating disease, the European fear of invasion, or any number of different sources. A full investigation into the feeling of paranoia in technoracism is beyond the scope of this current project, as it requires a longer look at the history of how human society has dealt with its various fears. Instead this dissertation now turns to our own present age and how we might respond to it.

I began this chapter by defining the idea of a cultural attitude via Heidegger’s notion of Geschick. A cultural attitude contains both discursive and non-discursive elements, so it is both rational and also pre-rational insofar as it defines its own conditions for rationality. Technoracism is just such a cultural attitude and it is the true cultural attitude which underlies both whiteness and enframing. To prove this investigated the historical and cultural forces which are found at the origins of technoracism and which give rise to it. Technoracism comes to predominate in most aspects of European society at the start of the modern age, around the late sixteenth century. It is defined by the three conditions of violent exclusivity, precise particularity, and absolute subjectivism. Violent exclusivity is the characteristic which emerges in a shared Christian European cultural identity. Europe slowly is made to convert to Christianity as competing beliefs are destroyed or altered. When this violent exclusivity is combined with the second characteristic, precise particularity, technoracism begins to take its full form. This precise particularity places an emphasis on the reason and universal categorization which characterize the rise of modernity and the sciences. Finally, this precise particularity, which characterizes the emergence of a system of universal categorization forms a worldview which sees humans as autonomous subjects of power. Thus the final characteristic of technoracism emerges in the form of absolute subjectivism, and the assertion of the supreme value of the individual.
Technoracism presents itself as an intellectual problem, insofar as it must be understood to be confronted, but it also exists as a profoundly ethical problem which must be dealt with in order to move forward with society. The need to confront and resolve technoracism is itself a desire born out of technoracism since it is a need to gain some kind of power over that which has power over us. Thus there are profound difficulties and limitations in attempting an ethical resolution to technoracism. Yet unless we make an effort to change the ways in which technoracism is a lived reality then we must stay firmly locked within its sway. While it remains the attitude which informs everything we know about the world then we remain helplessly delivered over to whiteness, enframing, and even other forms of oppressive categorization in terms of our sex and sexuality. So the next step, and the last chapter of this project, will involve an ethical approach to resolving the cultural attitude of technoracism by finding a way to live through a virtue ethics based on multiplicity.
Chapter 7 – The Virtue Ethics of Multiplicity

This chapter explores the possibility of an ethical resolution to technoracism by means of a virtue ethics of multiplicity. The language of discourse is now rephrased as education, and the language of non-discourse is now the habitual. Previously discourse had been used to refer to social movements and events which were rational and linguistic. Non-discourse had been used to refer to events that were non-rational and physical. I will begin with a brief analysis of virtue ethics from Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*. Ultimately, Aristotle claims that a life of virtue achieves happiness since it is a life of virtue which would best fulfill the ideal of being human. The human ideal should be best understood as the ideal of multiplicity. Even though our human identity has been largely constructed by technoracism, nonetheless there is an aspect of that identity which eludes that construction and which informs it. Based on the ideal of multiplicity I will define three virtues which oppose the three main constituent elements of technoracism. Within the sphere of religious belief, the virtue of religious diversity is raised up as the mean between the vices of Christian supremacy and religious indifference. In the sphere of understanding, the virtue of aesthetic mystery lies in the mean between the vices of universal categorization and total skepticism. The sphere of inter-subjectivity gives us our final virtue with community lying in the mean between absolute subjectivism and cultural appropriation. Since virtue is acquired through practice, I will also describe four different practices for bringing about the virtues of multiplicity. The practices of detachment, tarrying, vigilance, and dialogue begin to set us on the path towards our ultimate freedom from technoracism.

The way must now be prepared to approach technoracism as a matter of ethics. So far, I have evaluated the problems of race and technology from a critical philosophical standpoint. This approach has served mainly to elucidate the unique challenges involved in understanding
technoracism. If technoracism exists as a cultural attitude then some might think that it only ever remains an intellectual problem. Thus any sort of approach that seeks a resolution might take the path of argument, explanation, and education as it seeks to change only our thinking. Yet this purely abstract approach clearly misses out on the ways in which technoracism exists prior to rationality, and in fact frames the limits and grounds of our rationality. It is precisely because technoracism is a cultural attitude, which sets the conditions over and against which members of the culture may exercise their reason, that no intellectualist approach can be successful in completely dismantling it. Instead, the approach must involve getting at technoracism in its pre-rational form, through its practices. Every cultural attitude survives based on the ways in which it manifests itself through different cultural practices which are constantly reinforced in a given society. So the first step towards an ethical approach to technoracism requires us to find the cultural practices which instantiate and institutionalize it as a cultural attitude.

The practices which instantiate a cultural attitude first show up on the discursive side of that attitude, but the non-discursive also remains at work. The discourse which affects the cultural attitude of technoracism has taken on many forms over the years. However, this discourse does not grow out of isolated incidents. One of the more pervasive myths about all forms of discrimination is the narrative of the anomalous isolated event. An example of how technoracism underlies these events, both discursively and non-discursively, can be seen in the shooting death of Tamir Rice. In November of 2014, Cleveland Police Officers Tim Loehmann and Frank Garmback responded to a 911 call which described the twelve-year old Rice as “a guy with a pistol.”¹ Within seconds of seeing Rice, Loehmann fired his weapon, hitting Rice. Tamir Rice would later die of his wounds at the hospital. One of the officers radioed in the shooting saying, “Shots fired, male down, um, black male, maybe 20… Black hand gun.”² The effort to
identify the race and age of their victim is a moment of discursive technoracism. There must be a logical justification for their actions, and the identification of the “black hand gun” is thrown in after the victim is identified to show that the victim was armed. It was later discerned that the weapon in question was a toy replica which closely resembled a handgun. Initially, the story made headlines because Loehmann was white and Rice was black, and a minor. Here we see technoracism operating on the discursive level which through the news media seeks to explain tragedy in categorical and individualistically based terms. However, once it was revealed that Loehmann had been deemed unfit for service by his previous police department then a new narrative took over within the public arena.³ Loehmann was painted as mentally unstable, and his shooting was explained away as the isolated actions of a “troubled” individual. The incident began to be increasingly isolated from any larger discussions about racially motivated police violence, and the Cleveland Police Department was seen as negligent in their hiring of Loehmann. Here the non-discursive begins to bleed into the public discussion.

The attitude of technoracism is active in the minds of the public, moving them to accept the new story of the unfit cop over the old story of the racist cop. Although unfitness and racism are not mutually exclusive, nonetheless the narrative of a strange anomalous event starts to build. Now the public starts to become convinced that Loehmann did not shoot Tamir Rice because of a cultural and institutional bias against the image of violent and dangerous black bodies. They start to believe that Loehmann can’t be a racist and neither is the Cleveland Police Department who are at worst negligent in their hiring practices. The department would never advise their officers to shoot children just because they were black. Indeed, according to the Cleveland PD the officers involved told Rice to throw down his weapon and surrender, and that the officers were forced to shoot since Rice reached into the waistband of his pants.⁴
However, this new narrative has problems. The department’s claim that the officers told Rice to surrender is flatly contradicted by surveillance video footage of the incident, which shows them opening fire immediately. There is also the fact that when they called in the shooting, one of the officers described Rice, who at this point was still alive, as an armed twenty-year-old black male. Of course there is a way of interpreting these events which sees the Cleveland PD as acting unprofessionally and Tim Loehmann as simply mentally unstable. Yet that narrative isolates the incident from the broader cultural arc of racially motivated incidents of police violence. Besides this event, the language of the “isolated incident” continues to be deployed to cover over many events of police violence against black bodies. And yet, the incidents pile up almost as fast as the bodies and they begin to reveal what was concealed there all along. Rather than believe that there is a rash of anomalous and inexplicable incidents of racially motivated state sanctioned violence over the past fifty years of American history, one must come to see these incidents as connected. Yet this connection is not due to some complex rational conspiracy. Rather, the shooting of Tamir Rice grows out of the cultural attitude which defines certain bodies as ready-made sites of violence. What’s more, this attitude is not simply racist, since racism is one manifestation of the deeper cultural attitude of technoracism. Through broad rational categorization, police practices reflect and reinforce the assumptions about which bodies are dangerous and which bodies are not, and these assumptions are not only based on race. These categorizations are the most important ones since the mood of technoracism is one of paranoia. The need to categorize and control the world is driven by a fear of the danger and threat that the world poses. Tim Loehmann is not merely “unfit for duty”, he is in fact culturally conditioned to be afraid of the black body. He is so culturally attuned to his fear that a boy with a toy gun transforms into a fully grown, violent adult, who is wielding a deadly weapon.
Loehmann has no time to demand that the “monster” he is confronting act in a civilized manner, he already knows that if he tells it to drop its weapon it is merely going to shoot him instead. Loehmann is doing what he has been trained to do; he is eliminating the threat. In fact Loehmann’s actions proceed very strongly from the non-discursive instinctual side of technoracism. His actions are non-discursive insofar as they are immediate, improvised, and proceed from an unconscious reaction to the situation. Whereas the actions of the Cleveland Police Department are much more calculated and discursive.

This analysis of technoracism as being driven by the discursive and the non-discursive can now be resituated in terms of the educational and the habitual. Indeed, all of the language of discourse can be rephrased in terms of education in order to show that the intentional public discourse around certain events is designed to inform and teach us. I am not born with the technoracist attitude, instead it must be deliberately instilled in me by a rigorous program of instruction and teaching. Also, this education is not enough by itself to reinforce and reinstitute technoracism unless it instills within me certain non-discursive habits. The majority of my active life is driven by habits and practices which have been culturally conditioned.

Tim Loehmann was taught how to use a gun and he was taught how to be a police officer. This must have included practical advice on which kinds of people are dangerous and which kinds are not. Whether or not his formal training including directly racist ideas, the techniques of identifying threat and danger would have become mixed with Loehmann’s own ideas about who in his society was already dangerous. The formal education he received in the police academy was merely layered over the less formal education he received growing up in a society that remains deeply segregated along racial lines. Yet it was not the discursive and rational side of racism which drives Loehmann to think “Today, I will shoot a dark skinned person because
he/she is evil”. Instead, Loehmann shoots Rice from a non-discursive habitual, and reactionary mood. He has been trained to deal with hostile threats through violence. So when he is confronted by a dark skinned figure, who is wearing a hoodie and holding a gun shaped object, Loehmann reacts predictably. He is not firing at the assailant with the gun, so much as he is firing at the body which in his habitual mood is always-already a site of violence and danger. Another way to describe this would be to say that Loehmann is in the habit of shooting armed black men who “threaten” him, or at least persons who appear, in virtue of being Black, to be “threatening” to him. Even though he has never done this before, the habit is fully formed and operational. It is a habit born out of policing practices which continue to reveal the black body as a site of criminality. Loehmann shot Rice because he had been educated and habituated into having the vice of racism, a vice which is all-too common in Western American society. Yet this language of education and habit will be the doorway into an ethics which confronts this cultural attitude. The language of education and habit is the language of virtue ethics. To investigate technoracism through virtue ethics, it is important to begin with an overview of virtue ethics and its articulation in the works of Aristotle.

An ethics based on virtue finds its origins in the works of Aristotle, and so we should begin with Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*. Rather than giving a thorough analysis of the text we need only define a few key concepts from Aristotle’s work. Our brief survey of virtue ethics in Aristotle will explain how happiness is the highest good, how virtue is the only way to secure happiness, the proper definition of virtue, and finally some examples of classic virtues.

In the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle begins by claiming that all activities in life aim at some good, though of course, not all activities achieve that good. The idea of the good here is initially that of a kind of natural goal, a purpose and motivation towards which certain actions
tend. “But the ends [that are sought] appear to differ; some are activities, and others are products apart from the activities. Wherever there are ends apart from the actions, the products are by nature better than the activities.” Some ends are sought because they are final ends, products, and some ends are sought because they are means to other ends, activities. Since the final ends are preferred, Aristotle claims that there should be some highest end of all the activities in life. This highest end, the best good, is sought for itself and all other activities ultimately tend towards it, and it is never sought to advance anything else. The name for this highest good is happiness, and after eliminating the activities in life which will not produce it Aristotle comes up with a definition: “Then why not say that the happy person is the one whose activities accord with complete virtue, with an adequate supply of external goods, not just for any time but for a complete life?” The goal of living is to become happy, and this happiness is a kind of lifelong achievement, rather than a temporary emotional state. Aristotle also implies that happiness is difficult without the external goods of wealth, power, or privilege. A truly happy person, however, needs only to be virtuous in order to attain happiness. This is true at least in part because happiness is a lifelong goal. Momentary misfortunes are not significant when compared to a life spent pursuing happiness by living virtuously. “Since happiness is a certain sort of activity of the soul in accord with complete virtue, we must examine virtue; for that will perhaps also be a way to study happiness better.”

So having defined the goal of life as happiness, Aristotle now gives a thorough definition of the concept of virtue. “Virtue, then, is a state that decides, consisting in a mean, the mean relative to us, which is defined by reference to reason, that is to say, to the reason by reference to which the prudent person would define it. It is a mean between two vices, one of excess and one deficiency.” First, virtue is a “state that decides”. Virtue is a character trait; a defining feature
of a person’s identity which remains constant throughout the various circumstances of life. This state is further defined by Aristotle as the “state that makes a human being good and makes him perform his function well.” Our function is to live well and to achieve our natural goal of happiness, so virtue is a state of our character which enables us to achieve happiness by remaining consistent. Yet this consistency is active since it is arrived at only through deliberate choice. This state of character which decides, or rather enables us to decide, is a habitual way of choosing. Although our state of character is consistent, it lies within our control and always remains our responsibility. Second, virtue is a mean. It is a moderate position between the two extremes of excess or deficiency. Rather than being perfect, following rules, or seeking the good for others, morality is about self-control. This is not to say that the path of virtue is always found in choosing the middle ground between two options, as Aristotle readily admits that some activities are just wrong. For example, he argues that there can be no moral mean in actions like adultery, since the problem with adultery is not moderating our degree of involvement but rather, the problem is that we engage in the activity in the first place. Nonetheless, virtue is the path of moderation and all of the virtues consist in choosing the middle ground between two extremes. Finally, this mean which is a state of character born out of making consistent choices must be understood as subordinate to reason. The guiding principles which move us to make choices that will create a state of character which is moderate and conducive to our lifelong happiness are rational principles. This is the most important part for Aristotle’s virtue ethics since it defines virtue in terms that are ultimately philosophical. To be a good person means being a wise or rational person, and one’s own reason is all the guide one needs to gain the virtues and live a life of happiness. This is not to say that clever and smart people are automatically good, as Aristotle readily admits that the vicious are quite intelligent, but rather that it is impossible to be good
without living a life guided by reason. Furthermore, the vicious person may be intelligent but they are ultimately not as rational as they could be, since the truly rational person sees that the life of virtue is superior to the life of vice.

Some of Aristotle’s classic virtues include courage, temperance, and generosity. Courage, for example, is the mean between the extremes of rashness, where a person has too much confidence and too little fear, and cowardice, where a person has too much fear and too little confidence. The courageous person is one who behaves rationally in the face of fear and danger. Thus they know better than to be afraid when there is no good reason to be, and they know better than to be confident when there is no good reason for that either.

One final element of Aristotle’s virtue ethics needs to be explained, namely the human ideal. Aristotle is quite clear that happiness is the goal of all of our human activities, it is our final good towards which we dedicate all of our actions. Happiness is our reason to exist, and it is the meaning of our lives. Yet this meaning is based on the notion that we as human beings have a function. “Perhaps, then, we shall find this if we first grasp the function of a human being. For just as the good i.e., [doing] well…for whatever has a function and [characteristic] action, seems to depend on its function, the same seems to be true for a human being if a human being has some function.”\(^{13}\) The idea here is that being human means the same thing for everyone because there is one ideal way to be human. That ideal way of being human is fulfilled whenever we accomplish our function, and accomplishing that function is the thing that makes us happy. Aristotle is quite clear that this kind of purposeful activity exists for all the crafts as well as for human life in general.\(^{14}\) Just as the whole purpose of shoemaking is to make perfect shoes, the whole purpose of being human is to be the perfect, or ideal, human. Yet it is only possible to know how to make perfect shoes if one knows what makes shoes perfect, and this kind of
knowledge we possess when we understand the nature of shoes. So also we must understand the human nature in order to become the ideal and best humans we possibly can be. Now we might consider the problem that comes up when a person dedicates themselves to a violent craft like war, assassination, or bomb-making. Yet Aristotle would counter this by arguing that although the craft of bomb-making is indeed aimed at making perfect bombs, that nonetheless the goal of being human is not to be the best bomb maker but to be the best human. Thus a good human might make bombs which are perfectly good for controlled explosions in demolishing old buildings, but refuse to make bombs for an unjust war.

Aristotle argues that we do want happiness for its own sake, but this drive to be happy is simply the natural expression of our human nature. If we were squirrels we would seek our perfect ideal by being the best squirrels and having the most perfected squirrel lives. Yet since we are human we seek our ideal through perfecting our humanity. Aristotle explains it like this: “We have found, then, that the human function is activity of the soul in accord with reason or requiring reason.” Our function as humans is to live, but to live rationally. That we are rational is the defining feature of our nature and thus the ideal human is one who is in every way reasonable. Ultimately, Aristotle argues that our complete happiness is only possible by focusing on our highest and most important virtue, the virtue which is the most perfect expression of our nature. “If Happiness is activity in accord with virtue, it is reasonable for it to accord with the supreme virtue, which will be the virtue of the best thing. The best is understanding…and to understand what is fine and divine…this activity is the activity of study.” The ultimate expression of our human nature is found in being as rational as we possibly can be. Thus we are only ever happy when we are thinking, and when we are being philosophical.
Yet Aristotle’s ethics raises a few problematic issues, issues which should be addressed before proceeding with a virtue ethics approach to technoracism. Virtue ethics could be construed as the moral institution of social norms. That is to say, what a society considers virtuous might be little more than its own selected biases, and a particularly violent society might consider wars of conquest to be quite virtuous activities. In that case then we would say that technoracism has its own set of virtue ethics, and thus virtue ethics is ultimately a morally relativistic approach. Virtue ethics also seems to have a naïve confidence in human reason, and this is especially troubling when you consider that technoracism has been largely driven by so-called “rational” human enterprises. One might also argue that virtue ethics is only possible if we make the move of essentialism and reduce humanity to its nature, to the exclusion of all else. Despite these problems virtue ethics is the best approach to resolving the danger of the cultural attitude of technoracism. Technoracism is not something which can be removed by sheer willpower, force of argument, or by following some set of rules. It is deeply imbedded in every aspect of our society and it can only be undone by a meticulous process. Virtue ethics presents such a process since it works to inculcate a new approach to life by careful practice which includes the social as well as the rational.

So we should begin by responding to the potential criticism that virtue ethics merely reinforces problematic social norms. This is a legitimate concern since, as Alasdair MacIntyre notes, different societies seem to have different sets of virtues: “Homer, Sophocles, Aristotle, the New Testament, and medieval thinkers differ from each other in too many ways. They offer us different and incompatible lists of the virtues; they give a different rank order of importance to different virtues; and they have different and incompatible theories of the virtues.” There is ample historical proof that European and American societies did not merely tolerate race based
slavery but also defended and lauded it. The various sets of virtues we encounter all seem to exist in order to define the ideal human for a particular society. Even Aristotle’s insistence on the human ideal as rational is limited in its scope, since it must compete with the heroic ideal presented in Homer. So virtue ethics seems equipped to tell us how to be the best members of our society, but it simultaneously seems to reinforce the systemic injustices of our society.

Macintyre is concerned about this, and he attempts to resolve it by finding a universal criteria by which he can define virtue for all societies. He explains that the important parts of social life involve engaging in certain practices. A practice is a cooperative human activity with special internal goods that are only achievable by working at a standard of excellence within that practice. Macintyre gives examples of architecture and farming as practices since they are such complex human activities. He then defines the virtues as those traits which enable us to achieve the unique internal goods of practices. Ultimately, the practices which are valued by a society are valued because they help to build a society which is ideal and which allows for the emergence of the human ideal as defined by that society. As we have seen with technoracism the human ideal is a disinterested rational resource gatherer and manipulator. Thus our other problems now come into the light of our inquiry. The problematic thing about virtue ethics is the ideal which defines that ethics. If the ideal is corrupt, as it is in a society driven by technoracism, then that society will likewise be corrupt. Yet how can I claim that the human ideal in our society is corrupt without begging the question? I respond simply by saying this, our ideal is corrupt because it is incomplete and insufficient to actually be a human ideal.

The common theme for systems of virtue ethics, whether they be from Aristotle or Macintyre, is the goal of achieving a virtuous ideal. The practice of the virtues is meant to achieve, in the practitioner, a state of being that is the most desired state which a human can
achieve. In the work of Aristotle this is especially tied to the idea of the purpose, the telos, of a thing. For example, if we can say that non-human animals have virtues then the virtues of the red squirrel exist so that red squirrels can achieve their ideal. Their practices involve fleeing from predators, eating nuts, and burying food for the winter. In all that it does the squirrel is striving to become the best possible squirrel it can be. In other words, its goal is the perfection of its form. A squirrel behaving like a housecat would be a vicious and evil squirrel, since the true nature of any squirrel is a squirrel nature rather than a housecat nature. It is not that the cat is evil, rather it is evil for the squirrel to behave in a way that denies its squirrel-ness. In the most basic sense then, achieving the perfection of one’s form is precisely where Aristotle derives his ideal of the rational human being. Aristotle takes it as a given that to be human is ultimately to be rational. He is also quite clear on the limitations and scope of this rationality. The rational human has both practical and philosophical wisdom. Practical wisdom, or prudence, is the kind of thinking which enables a person to deliberate and choose the best things, those which will lead to happiness, based on experience.\(^21\) Philosophical wisdom is the kind of thinking which combines scientific knowledge, of the kind gained through formal education, with intuitive reasoning, the ability to think well about the most important things.\(^22\) Thus to be the best and most perfect human I can possibly be I need to make supremely rational decisions. In order to be human I must make deliberate and intentional choices, since being human means to be purposeful and proactive. However, Aristotle’s ideal of the human is problematic and flawed, as it fails to take into account all of the various possibilities of being human. What is needed is an ideal which most completely takes into account something more of the diverse nature of being human.

The ideal of the virtue ethics I am proposing is called multiplicity. The ideal way of being human is one that affords, as closely as possible, the form or nature of the human. This is of
course complicated by all the various kinds of social constructions around human identity. Besides if biology is our goal, i.e. we want to have the healthiest and strongest human bodies, then we must come to grips with the impossibility of deriving moral rules from observations of our biological human nature. The picture becomes even more complicated if we consider the possibility that there is no essential human nature, and that to be human is to always be a social construct. The philosophical problems begin to pile up. So, we must deal with them in some kind of order. First in order to define the human ideal of multiplicity I must define the concept of human nature. Then I will demonstrate how the ideal of multiplicity most perfectly harmonizes with that human nature.

Let’s begin with the problem of human nature. To begin, the idea of the human being is itself a kind of historical and social construction which owes most of its being to the scientific and philosophical traditions of Enlightenment Europe. Chapters one, two, and six have already dealt with the problems of how the human being has been traditionally defined and the cultural attitude, technoracism, which is responsible for this definition. Therefore, any attempt to define the human in terms of exact science or in terms of normative behavior has already been determined by technoracism. Now we cannot sidestep past this problem by reaching back into the past or casting about outside of our culture. The human being, and therefore the human nature which is to form the foundation of our new virtuous ideal, must be found within the constructed reality created by technoracism. This is necessary since our entire mode of thinking, reasoning, and knowing are set up and delimited by that cultural attitude. This is precisely the moment when Heidegger’s quoting of Hölderlin begins to make the most sense. “If the essence of technology, Enframing, is the extreme danger, and if there is truth in Hölderlin’s words, then the rule of Enframing cannot exhaust itself solely in blocking all lighting-up of every revealing,
all appearing of truth. Rather, precisely the essence of technology must harbor in itself, the growth of the saving power."²³ The human nature and identity may very well be a social construct, but it is a social construct which has defined the history of our language and society for centuries. Such an idea cannot be abandoned; it must be cultivated. The history of being human has always involved a limiting and a reduction. Human nature has been reduced to reason, biology, behavior, instinct, emotion, relations, productivity, and many other forms in the various writings of the thinkers who have pondered it. Within the deeper social context of technoracism, human identity has been determined to be religious, rational, and independent. However, ultimately that independence swallows up the others when it takes up the form of absolute subjectivism. Yet if we follow Heidegger, and his reading of Hölderlin, then it is within the depths of technoracism that we can find that which saves.²⁴ In this case, that which saves is not one, two, or three things, it is a vast multiplicity.

If one were to conduct a phenomenology of the human nature in order to get at the core meaning of what it is to be human, one would find that the core is irrevocably complex. Even Aristotle deals with the problem of why human beings are not perfectly happy when they simply pursue reason alone. “After that, the next topic is friendship; for it is a virtue, or involves virtue. Further it is most necessary for our life. For no one would choose to live without friends even if he had all other goods.”²⁵ Aristotle makes it clear that even if one had all other goods, including the goods of the highest form of philosophical wisdom, the human would be unhappy without friendship. We are not only rational creatures, we are also creatures which need friendship. In fact Aristotle devotes a rather large portion of his ethics to defining the best kinds of friendship, taking care to explain that the friendship of equals is not the same as the relationship of love which exists between family members.²⁶ So besides being rational and friendly, we are also
essentially communal and need both family and society. Beyond what Aristotle has given us we can also add that to be human means being emotional, aesthetic, spiritual, irrational, solitary, playful, careful, biological, instinctual, and productive. There are many more traits besides this which define human nature and those traits are indefinitely many. In our everyday experience of ourselves and other people we never encounter only one thing. We always encounter multiple aspects, multiple traits, multiple appearances, and this points to human nature as a multiplicity.

Multiplicity is the antidote to technoracism since technoracism is constantly seeking to reduce the other to a singular thing. The enframing reduces the entire forest to a raw statistic about the fuel efficiency of burning a set amount of wood. Racism reduces the person walking towards me to a set of predestined behaviors which I am free to ignore or which I am driven to pre-empt. Yet in contrast, when I take the human nature as a multiplicity then I encounter it as constantly opening up to new possibilities. The violence of this reduction in technoracism is based on the assumption that things exist for a singular purpose, for one practical use. The ideal of multiplicity is a stay against that violence since I am always confronted with a person, thing, or place which cannot be destroyed without some great loss. I cannot simply annihilate the thing in front of me to harvest the one valuable resource it has, such annihilation removes too many other things of value. The ideal of multiplicity is a way towards more than mere toleration of difference. Indeed, tolerance is the standard moral position in a technoracist society which has not yet determined the most efficient use of a thing. Instead of this, multiplicity is a way towards being in a world that is more peaceful, more understanding, and desirous of all things different and diverse. Now the goal of a virtue ethics is not the accumulation of a series of rules nor is it some kind of enhanced utilitarian pleasure. The virtue ethics of multiplicity seeks the perfection of the human form, and that perfection is the drive towards multiplicity.
Now in order for multiplicity to be an adequate form of virtue ethics, it must have realizable human virtues which seek to bring about that ideal. Just as the human is never one thing but always multiple, so also there is not one core virtue but many. However, we will focus on the three virtues which stand out in clear contrast to the three defining features of technoracism. Since technoracism is defined by Christian Supremacy, the universality of categorization, and absolute subjectivity then within virtue ethical thinking it is easy to see that these three features are vices. In true Aristotelian form we oppose these vices by a mean which lies between them and other less common vices. The practice of this mean is the virtue which allows for the realization of the ideal of multiplicity. It will also be helpful to recall that vices are either excessive or defective, they involve either going too far or not far enough within a certain sphere of activity. Thus the three spheres of human activity which I will investigate are the sphere of religious belief, the sphere of understanding, and the sphere of intersubjectivity.

The sphere of religious belief is a good place to start, since here the cultural attitude of technoracism has already created the vice of Christian Supremacy. Within the purview of virtue ethics Christian Supremacy is clearly a vice of defect, as opposed to excess. What’s more, it is not the only possible vice of defect here. Though Christian Supremacy is the deficient vice in the sphere of religious belief, within contemporary society that particular vice seems to be primarily constrained to the United States. There is certainly a case to be made for the idea that Christianity is no longer the supreme dominant religion in Europe, and it does not appear to be the most globally dominant religion either. However, the vice of defect that is Christian Supremacy is more appropriately described as the vice of solipsistic belief. This vice can be potentially be found in the practices of those who identify as atheists, Muslims, Jews, Hindus,
Buddhists, Christians, or any of the variations of these systems. This is the vice of having a belief system which is narrow, overly deterministic, and dismissive of all other belief systems.

Now the concept of religious belief need not be restrained only to formally recognized religions, as atheism also fits within this sphere, rather it has to do with the kind of faith which we place in systems. Life is short, the world is complicated, and figuring everything out for ourselves is simply impractical. Thus one of the most basic human intellectual practices is the practice of faith. This faith may be informed or ignorant, haphazard or structured, but it is necessary to our experience of life and the world. In simple terms, religious belief denotes that set of thoughts, attitudes, and actions which involve trust in a system, especially a system which we are unable to completely or thoroughly prove. Thus even the most skeptical of atheists, insofar as they claim to rely on the scientific method, must have at least some faith in the findings of scientists whose area of expertise exceeds the atheist’s own. Indeed, this faith may be quite rational and logical, but it still requires a relinquishing of one’s rational sovereignty to the expertise of another. Yet this relinquishing takes place within a community of other human beings, and so the move of faith is also a social one. If there is an individual who refuses to trust in the social systems in which all of those around her trust, then that individual quickly becomes a social pariah. Although not explored in Aristotle, the virtue of having the right religious belief, of the right amount, at the right time, and in the right things, is an essential feature of our contemporary society.

The vice of excess here is religious indifference, such as one might find in certain forms of agnosticism. Strictly speaking there certainly may exist forms of agnosticism which go towards the defect of solipsistic belief. There may also be forms of agnosticism which tend more towards the mean between the two vices. One of the things which Aristotle mentions is that some
vices are quite rare, though he argues that this is due to our biological nature. Whether or not biology is destiny there do seem to be some vices which are rarer than others. Such a vice is the vice of religious indifference. The vice of religious indifference is the vice of not privileging any particular system of belief in any way. Rather than being extremely closed off to systems of belief outside of one’s favorite system, the excessive person in this sphere accepts all systems of belief as equally meaningless. The indifferent person is not skeptical, per se, rather they cannot be bothered to actually commit to a belief. The opposite of exclusionary paranoid trust is this utter indifference and disinterest. Such individuals may paint themselves as pragmatic, though they commit to no beliefs about pragmatism. Ultimately their problem is that they alienate themselves from their society by trusting in none of its systems. This vice is quite rare, as the cultural attitude of technoracism conditions one to accept solipsistic beliefs and thus indifferent individuals are few in number. This is especially true when you consider that indifferent individuals will neither support, create, nor reinvent social systems of belief.

The virtue of this sphere then is religious diversity, and this is the virtue which best moves the practitioner toward the ideal of multiplicity. This virtue involves having the right beliefs, at the right times, about the right things, and of the right amount. Since multiplicity is the ideal then the person who practices the virtue of religious diversity must constantly choose to believe in a variety of systems. The harmonizing of a diverse group of systems is certainly a lifelong practice which must be engaged in a deliberate and focused manner. Yet in one sense this is merely the process of being a mature member of society. As pluralistic, diverse, and complex beings within a complicated world one must remain open to a wide range of belief systems. Yet this openness is also accompanied by being closed off to certain kinds of belief systems. Systems which are violently exclusionary, that actively promote harm or cruelty, or
continue to perpetuate exclusionary social constructs as though they were natural types are the kinds of systems to which one should remain closed. To be closed does not mean to be ignorant, as certainly one must know what one is rejecting. Rather, to be closed means to not support, not commit to, and not participate in these systems. One should understand these systems, and yet not engage in some kind of active assistance in them. Our nature is multiform and complex, and our happiness relies upon realizing the best possible version of our nature. Therefore, one must eschew systems of belief which contradict that nature. This virtue even includes skepticism as a kind of tool which is used to weed out destructive belief systems. This kind of skepticism is not the radical version that we see in Descartes, but rather it involves a measuring and weighing the relative values of the differences between the various belief systems. The virtue of religious belief is a diversity of beliefs, and this is the virtue which is opposed to the vices of Christian Supremacy, or solipsistic belief, and religious indifference.

The second sphere we will investigate is the sphere of understanding, and here the vice of technoracism is the universality of categorization, a vice of excess. The desire to possess knowledge and exert control over the world is a desire which is excessive in technoracism. The push to make all things in the world fit within the categories of exact science is a move that involves both thinking and doing. Let me be clear that the problem is not the work of carrying out the scientific method. Many thinkers are honest about the limitations of science and the things that it cannot or does not prove. The problem steps in when anything which falls outside of the sphere of exact, precise, universal categorization becomes immediately relegated to the unknowable and irrelevant. In one sense this is the vice of intellectual arrogance, and the activity of total classification exists to mark the sites where that arrogance has imposed its dominion. An example of this universal categorization shows up when society demands an explanation for why
persons of color, who are athletes, seem to be superior to athletes who are not persons of color. The question of difference is not the problem, but rather the demand is for an answer that is totalizing and reduces the accomplishments of individuals to their genetic or biological affects. It is the demand for universal categories which determines that certain diseases are racialized. So long as disease remains racialized then the racial categories, and all else that they contain, remain medically relevant to determine other things far outside the scope of those disease studies. Thus the medical justification for race also justifies differential treatment for patients of different races, enhanced psychological scrutiny for patients of different races, and a lack of confidence in certain patients whom the doctors “know” will be trouble. The problem is that the universal categories are presumed to be complete and all-encompassing. Even if these categories were rational or evidence based, we would still be facing the reality that these categories were set up based on troubling racist assumptions.

The sphere of understanding is best demonstrated by investigating Aristotle’s notion of philosophical wisdom. Aristotle determined that it was the most important of all the virtues, and the one which was most essential for happiness. The sphere itself contains all things which are known and unknown, though there is an obvious paradox inherent in knowing that there are unknown things. Of course that paradox may be easily resolved by claiming that most of what is known is known partially and through a process of knowing. The most important thing about this sphere for the virtuous ideal of multiplicity is to realize that understanding is a process rather than an achievement. In one’s own personal experience, the ideas and notions which you have had to know over the course of your life have only ever been partial. Knowledge is not a series of boxes to be checked off, it is a complex net which links up to other points in the universe, but of which you will only ever hold a piece. Even the holding of that piece, the knowledge you
possess, is temporary and changing. Some of the things you now know are receding into your memory and can be accessed again with effort, but some things you might be forgetting and you will never remember that they have been lost. A full and rich realization of what it means to understand must take into account our indebtedness to others who have known or do know things upon which we depend. It must also take into account the fact that our knowledge will change, evolve, get revised, be lost, be supplemented, be recorded, but ultimately be forgotten in the passing of time.

The vice of defect here is also rare, as it is only ever held out by a few philosophers, and that is the vice of total skepticism. The refusal to assent to anything as an object of the understanding appears to be a vice. It is the other extreme version of intellectual arrogance. Although the challenge of this vice renders it almost impossible to actually attain, there are definitely academic attitudes and habits which sometimes tend in this direction. There were classic skeptics who claimed to withhold their assent from any propositions, and without doing them a disservice we may still say that this position is an extreme one. Besides which we may wonder whether any philosopher ever successfully achieved a pure skepticism, as it seems that any skeptic who bothered to write their ideas down or debate them with others at least thought that they knew their skeptical position to be correct. In any case, to actually withhold your assent from propositions, which purport to describe true or real situations, is a difficult thing to practice. Though of course it is easier than refusing to assent to any or all propositions.

The virtue of the sphere of understanding is something I am calling aesthetic mystery. Occasionally, Aristotle remarks that some vices are unnamed, and in the case of small honors even the virtue is unnamed. Yet it will not do for our present inquiry to leave this virtue unnamed, though rightly perhaps it has no adequate name. This is the virtue which requires us to
be knowledgeable but also to accept and seek out the unknown in order to preserve it in its mystery. This is the province of art and creation so it encompasses all of the arts whether they are low or high, fine or broad. A work of art requires knowledge, and the skills of the artist require training and practice. Even an artist who lacks training, but possesses some innate talent, will need to practice and perfect their work over time and thus their work evolves and develops. The experience of art also requires knowledge and understanding of how a work has been influenced, what it has influenced, and where it fits into the cultural and historic traditions which gave it life. Art exists within very particular historical contexts, and even the art of an era which is meant to imitate another era is still deeply tied to the age which originated it. Yet through all of this, the source of art remains mysterious as it attempts to convey and also preserve that mystery and uncertainty. This is the heart of Heidegger’s discussion of how the work of the artist is a work of *poiesis*, and how it brings forth what is hidden into the world.\(^\text{30}\)

The final sphere we will consider is the sphere of inter-subjectivity, and its corresponding vice in technoracism is the vice of absolute subjectivism. This is the deficient vice in this sphere. A person who insists on their own abilities, rights, and privileges at the expense of others in their society shows that they lack either the care or understanding of how they are dependent on the others they exploit. The elevation of your own absolute self-importance can only be achieved by a denial of your reliance on and continuing relation to others. The genius at the top of their field would still be quite foolish if they refused to acknowledge the role that their family, society, and predecessors played in getting them to that place. They would be quite arrogant to suppose that their position of privilege, power, authority, or notoriety was ever sustainable without the constant care and support of other people. There are of course some geniuses who do admit their dependency, but then there are those who are taken up by the vice of absolute subjectivism. It is
this vice which elevates the individual as supreme over the welfare of their society. This is an example of the kind of social sin which Augustine claims causes a person to have complete contempt for social order. Yet the motivation here is not arrogance so much as it is fear and suspicion.

A very interesting case study of a person affected with this vice would be the study of the American institution of the Conspiracy Theorist. In brief, the conspiracy theorist tends to believe and profess certain extremely complex systems and theories which draw connections between historically verified events and impossible to verify facts which are supposed to undergird those events. Yet whether or not their beliefs are true, the psychological research of the conspiracy theorists themselves overwhelmingly presents the same picture. According to Tim Melley, author of *Empire of Conspiracy*, these thinkers all hold strong individualist values but are also experiencing a loss of control in their lives. The culturally imposed individualistic alienation from other members of society creates a situation of ongoing mistrust. In its tamer incarnations absolute subjectivism leads to conspiracy theorists, and in its most extreme cases, it leads to a complete psychological break with society.

The sphere of intersubjectivity is most important since the heart of multiplicity requires our primary focus in life to be on our relationships with others. All of the complex diversity of our lives and identities is only possible through lived and shared experiences with other people. It is people who shape us, mentor us, influence us, love us, support us, and advise us in all of the ways that make us who we are. Even the brilliant and solitary genius cannot get far in life if society thinks that she is mad and that her work is dangerous. The most self-sufficient of individuals in a developed society depends on other people in innumerably complex ways. The myth of the rugged individual is just that, a myth. Even if one is quite capable of surviving alone
and unaided in a hostile environment like a desert or a rainforest, it was not always the case. A survivalist needs training and a support structure that enables them to practice their skills before they take the huge, though well calculated risk, of surviving on their own. All of that relies on the historic and ongoing social contributions made by other people. Besides, even if one is self-made, self-taught, and self-trained it cannot possibly be denied that for at least the first few years of your life you were completely dependent on other people. Even the feral child must depend on the assistance and mercies of animals stronger than itself. This dependence we have on others is also more than a mere resource for our own advancement. Our dependence is mutual since the investment of people in our lives declares our value to them and their ongoing involvement declares our ongoing value.

Yet if other people have value then technoracism might try to extract that value and separate it from the person themselves. This leads us to the vice of excess, the vice of cultural appropriation. This vice involves the all-too common imperial activity of mining the art, language, culture, science, and religion of persons of color in order to derive desirable practices and valuable productions. Whenever the culturally defining dishes of a non-white society become repackaged, often in a significantly altered form, as the food which defines all of the people from a certain part of the world, then you have cultural appropriation. This practice has given rise to the existence of such institutions as Indian food, Chinese food, Sushi, and Lebanese food. Of course any global traveler understands that people from these nations eat more than their culturally appropriated cuisine. However, the kinds of foods that are served in American restaurant chains come to define entire people/groups in a way that is consumable, entertaining, but ultimately trivial. Rather than undergoing the arduous task of traveling, one may consume other parts of the world, and consume them largely for entertainment. There is also the quite
famous appropriation of Jazz and Black Music in order to invent the American cultural
phenomenon of White Pop Music. These appropriations remain ongoing and they stem from a
kind of excessive involvement in the culture of the other. There is an intrusion and an invasion of
the spaces of non-white bodies. All the while the technoracist gaze is merely looking for artifacts
and treasures to return to its world of absolute subjectivism.

Finally, the last virtue is the virtue of community. This is the virtue of defining yourself
as a member of a society and knowing yourself within that society. It involves relating to others
in a way that is neither overreaching nor antisocial, but constrained within the bounds of a fair
politeness and a flexible propriety. Furthermore this politeness is not weak subservience but
rather it is born out of having a care for how your actions impact the well-being of those who
share your world. This means respecting the space, bodies, stories, and traditions of those you
encounter. The person who exercises the virtue of community understands and appreciates their
own identity, but they could make no sense of that identity without the broader social and
cultural context in which it falls. At the same time the virtue of community also involves
resistance against those entities which try to set themselves up as supreme. There is a risk, of
course, that community can become insular and even hostile, but it is important to bear a
distinction in mind. The virtue of community is not found in spaces protected by high fences,
redlining, or armed security, since such a space is always suspicious and projects a constant state
of threat. The people living in such a space do not trust each other, let alone anyone outside of
their group. Thus such a space is no community at all, and so the virtue of community is not
found there. The virtue of community is only found in spaces where welcome and hospitality are
lived realities.
However, before we can bring about a virtue ethics of multiplicity in an attempt to counter the cultural attitude of technoracism, we need to accept the limitations of this approach. The work of cultivating the virtues is the work of a lifetime and it is a work of methodical and deliberate change. The problems of race and modern technology have been around for hundreds of years and it is unlikely that they will be swept away in a sudden movement of intellectual furor or an attempt at cultivating new habits and dispositions (*Hexis*). The very nature of cultural attitudes is that they tend to evolve and adapt to changing cultural pressures and situations. I am not presenting a complete and fixed virtue ethics that might involve a permanent list of rules. Instead, I am presenting a virtue ethics that begins with three virtues but that also needs some practical guidance along its way. This way lies along the path of engaging in specific cultural practices and activities, since it is through practice that a virtue is taught and reinforced. So it is towards a virtue ethics of multiplicity that one must act, all the while anticipating and realizing that this ethics is on its way, still arriving. Thus the practices and habits which will guide us along the path of virtue are detachment, tarrying, vigilance, and dialogue.

The first practice we need to engage in comes to us from the work of Heidegger, and it is the practice of detachment. "What Heidegger advocates we do is think…In the first place he does not even mean thinking in the sense of a special mental activity. He is referring to an attitude towards things as a whole, a general way of being in the world. Heidegger names this therapeutic attitude “detachment”, *die Gelassenheit*." This is a practice which is open to all people, and which is not limited by a person’s intellectual prowess or their education. This kind of thinking is less about a specific thought process, and more about a general adoption of a new attitude. Rojcewicz explains the full implications of this letting and how it relates to technology.

Detachment (*Ge-lassen-heit, from lassen, ‘to let’) means letting things go, letting the things of technology go. But it is absolutely essential that this ‘letting go’ be understood...
in a double sense; it means both to let go of technological things and also to let them go on. For Heidegger, detachment is an attitude that both says ‘no’ to technology (lets go of it) and also says ‘yes’ to it (lets technology go on.)

By detaching ourselves from technology, the enframing, we do more than simply try to ignore or forget it. We accept it for what it is, and we do not attribute more to it than that. We let go of our investment in it, and in letting go we find that the enframing cannot sustain itself without our investment, and so it goes on to its end. Applied to technoracism in general, the letting go we find in detachment means the adoption of a new way of approaching people and things of the world. It means that I become aware of how technoracism attempts to determine my thinking and also of the ways in which it succeeds. It also means that in becoming aware of this I no longer blindly submit myself to it. The mood of technoracism is one of fear, panic, and an immediate surrender to a mode of thinking which attacks the world before technoracism can be attacked. Technoracism is pre-emptive and it is always engaged in an aggressive assault on the senses, feelings, and thoughts so that we encounter the world in a heightened state of paranoia. Yet if I practice detachment then I engage in a practice that is almost meditative. I acknowledge the fear and the suspicion to which the calculations of that attitude deliver me. I acknowledge them, but I do not engage with them. In so acknowledging that technoracism is a spirit of fear and self-destruction it becomes less appealing to me. If I begin to let go of my active involvement in reinforcing it then it no longer delivers on its promise of power and supremacy. So, by practicing detachment I shift my personal attitude towards a calm and meditative stance which is no longer obsessed with universal calculations, religious supremacy, and absolute subjectivism.

This shift leads quite naturally to the second practice, the practice of tarrying. In detachment I make the effort to let go of my own investment in technoracism, but in tarrying I make the effort to re-engage technoracism from the perspective of those who are directly hurt by
it. The idea of tarrying comes from the work of George Yancy in *Look a White!* Near the end of that book Yancy describes how he encounters white resistance to the discussion of whiteness, race, and its implications for persons of color. He remarked that there is a reactive tendency to be dismissive of the ways in which racism continues to have a profound, and negative, impact on those who must endure it. “This refusal to tarry with the reality of racism and black pain and suffering is not new…I have noticed that many whites, after I present the elevator effect, immediately ask questions that challenge my epistemic status as a black person (and by extension other black people) and my capacity to know when an act is racist.”35 The tendency to assert one’s absolute subjectivism is the factor which most often overrides the experiences of others. In an effort to control the fear which drives the effort of universal categorization, one must assert one’s own significance as supreme. Yet it is that same anxiety which opens up the possibility of undermining technoracism. “I encourage whites to dwell in spaces that make them deeply uncomfortable, to stay with the multiple forms of agony that black people endure from them… I want them to delay the hypothetical questions, to postpone their reach beyond the present. Reaching too quickly for hope can elide the importance of exposure.”36 That very moment of anxiety which urges one to retreat into the confidence provided by the illusion of technoracist supremacy is a moment which can be prolonged.

If one is already practicing detachment then this is precisely the point at which you should begin to detach. The feeling of anxiety should be the inspiration for letting go of the comfort of technoracism, however briefly. “The unfinished present is where I want whites to tarry (though not to permanently remain), to listen, to recognize the complexity and weight of the current existence of white racism, to attempt to understand the ways in which they perpetuate racism, and to begin to think about the incredible difficulty involved in undoing it.”37 The
Significance of the practice of detachment is that it is the most basic step towards the ethics of multiplicity, precisely because it involves a shift in attitude. That shift is subtle and slight but necessary in order to free us from the dominance of technoracism. Yet the practice of tarrying returns us to technoracism and moves us to confront it, and especially to confront our complicity in it. This confrontation still requires detachment though, since what I must now become detached from even further is my affection for technoracism, or at least my affection for the comfort brought on by its familiarity. Technoracism survives in almost all of its many manifestations by attaching itself to our traditions and customs. Thus it reinforces itself as a natural part of our social world, even while it continues to redefine that world in terms of discord, inferiority, and domination. If technoracism is so persistent, then we must be equally persistent in our efforts to undo it.

This leads us to our next practice, the practice of vigilance. Despite our best efforts to detach ourselves, and despite the invitation which this creates for us to tarry in the space of anxiety, technoracism continues to reinsert itself into the foundations of society. Invariably this will mean that technoracism also reasserts itself in terms of the privileges which it conveys to some at the expense of others. Technoracism is a cultural attitude by which those who are society’s intellectuals, rulers, Christians, whites, males, straights, able-bodied, cisgendered, rich etc., continue to be raised up as “normal” even when a person who perfectly fits into all of those groups is extremely rare. That is, there are certainly members of these groups in power in society, but it is rare to find a person who perfectly fits into every single one of these groups. So the normal person exists as a kind of ideal which is never realized even though people in power try to present themselves as the paragon of that ideal. As much as technoracism does damage to those it fits into its normative groups, it does incalculably more damage to those who fit into its
non-normative groups. This very clearly shows up with race since, as Yancy so powerfully illustrates: “As antiracist whites continue to make mistakes and continue to falter in the face of institutional interpellation and habituated racist reflexes, tomorrow, a Black body will be murdered as it innocently reaches for its wallet.”

Technoracism is a pressing matter and while it exists in the realm of philosophy, it should also exist in the realm of activism. It is not enough to be detached and tarrying, one should also take up the call to vigilance. Those who benefit from technoracism by being members of its normative categories have a great responsibility and an immediate urgency in attacking and undoing technoracism. Yet, at the same time, they must admit and accept their continued benefit from and complicity in the very systems they seek to undo.

Dismantling whiteness is a continuous project…This however is the ambiguous reality of white racism. Antiracist whites must not flee this ambiguity, but continue to undo white racism even as it repositions them as privileged…In other words, while ‘undoing’ whiteness is clearly a performative metaphor, it does not presuppose an ontology of the self that is capable, through a single act of will and intention, of rising above the white discursive streams within which that self is embedded.

Whiteness and all of the manifestations of technoracism are things which must be continuously and intentionally undermined. The practice of vigilance is not one of keeping watch over the so-called enemy, but of keeping watch over ourselves and the cultural attitude which we nurture, even while we try to overcome it. Since it is really we, who are our own enemy in the maintaining and sustaining of technoracism. Vigilance, then, involves an active giving up of those privileges and powers, a relinquishing which is also deeply tied to detachment. “There must be the call, the continuous effort, to disarticulate whiteness from those juridico-political, economic, institutional, aesthetic, and other locations that will resist disarticulation to ensure the maintenance of white power…the white body is tied to the operations of the state as a powerful
site of white hegemony. Yet this most active and directed of all the practices would ultimately be doomed to failure if not for the final practice.

The final practice which is necessary for cultivating a virtue ethics of multiplicity is the practice of dialogue. It is clear enough from the particular manifestations of technoracism that cultural attitudes play favorites. To be classed as white, within a system of white racial supremacy, means that one has the benefit of being in the “normal” state. To be an apt user of advanced technology means that one will be advantaged in a system of modern technology. When it comes to technological expansion, it is necessary to remain cultured in new technological advances in order to remain relevant in society. Now if one wants to work towards a virtue ethics of multiplicity, but one is the recipient of the benefits of technoracism, then that work becomes impossible to do on one’s own. Aside from the fact that it seems completely counterintuitive to seek to dismantle a system from which you greatly benefit, there is the added problem of how that system remains hidden. To those who actively suffer from racism, race is much more apparent than it is to those who actively benefit from white privilege.

This is why it is important that the dynamics of white racism not solely be left in hands of whites to theorize. Whites’ insights must be challenged and corrected by those bodies of color that stand to suffer from the subtle blinkers that inhibit the efforts of antiracist whites. People of color must keep whites cognizant of the limits of their visions, their ‘certainty’ regarding how to tackle whiteness. To be in the position of privilege means that one is uniquely qualified to undermine that system. Yet it also means that one is uniquely inhibited in addressing the shortcomings of any approach towards dismantling those systems of privilege. On the other hand those who suffer from such systems are well qualified to point out and illuminate the failures of those systems. Yet, owing to their lack of social status and privilege, those who suffer from these systems do not always find themselves in positions of power where they are able to effect change. There is no person, or
even persons, who is going to lead us out of technoracism. Rather, this is why it is crucial for people to work together. In any system of virtue ethics, virtue is not something which a person has by nature or which they are capable of acquiring on their own. Aristotle posits that some virtues are taught directly, while other virtues can only be attained through repeated habitual practice. Yet even those virtues we acquire through practice must be directed by good teachers and good guidance. “Further the sources and means that develop each virtue also ruin it, just as they do in a craft…Otherwise no teacher would be needed, but everyone would be born a good or bad craftsman.” To effect the virtues of multiplicity we must cooperate with whatever teachers, persons, events, or otherwise can best guide our practices to a proper cultivation of the virtues. This cooperation can never become a mere acquiescence, however, and must always remain an engaged and active dialogue.

Thus far we have demonstrated that technoracism is a cultural attitude which when morally theorized takes on the character of a moral vice. This allowed us to approach a resolution against technoracism in the form of a virtue ethics of multiplicity. By using the virtue ethical structure of Aristotle’s Ethics we were able to demonstrate the definition of virtue ethics and also investigate the limitations of such a viewpoint. We then found that there were at least three virtues which could counter the particular vices of technoracism. Within the sphere of religious belief the technoracist vice of Christian supremacy can be moderated by the virtue of religious diversity, so long as we do not veer off into the vice of religious indifference. Within the sphere of understanding the technoracist vice of the universality of categorization can be moderated by the virtue of aesthetic mystery, so long as we do not veer off into the vice of complete skepticism. Within the sphere of inter-subjectivity the technoracist vice of absolute subjectivism can be moderated by the virtue of community, so long as we do not veer off into the
vice of cultural appropriation. Finally, we considered the various practices which would be necessary to bring about this virtue ethics. By practicing detached thinking, tarrying, vigilance, and dialogue we get into the right habits to fully cultivate a true virtue of multiplicity.
Conclusion

In this dissertation, I have moved from a critique of whiteness and technology, through the introduction of technoracism, and finally ending in a virtue ethics of multiplicity. Before I conclude this project, it is important to review, though briefly, what this project has accomplished.

In chapter one, I presented a genealogy of race in order to trace the origins of the concept of race back to a fixed historical point. This tracing also uncovered the structures and attitude which informed that genealogy and allowed race to appear as a globally dominant concept. I introduced the three layered structure of the problem of race by investigating how the genealogy of race reveals the everyday problem as the problem of correct classification. It was the problematic structure of race which led to chapter two and the investigation of whiteness. There I investigated the notion of whiteness as the deeper problem of race, and all of the various ways the racial categories are understood as offshoots of an original white standard. The normative gaze of whiteness was revealed through a discussion of white privilege and the process of how whiteness creates other races. This also led to the supreme danger of whiteness insofar as it retains the ability to disappear and go unknown as the supreme normative category while simultaneously still enforcing its structures. The idea that whiteness could somehow even precede the idea of race opened the way towards a discussion of the difference between whiteness as an idea within race, and whiteness as tool for constructing race.

In chapter three, I analyzed that very notion of whiteness as a tool by uncovering the technology of race. This analysis began with the work of Falguni Sheth and her idea that race is a political tool. This became the initial point of contact between the genealogy of race and a phenomenology of technology. Sheth argued that the technology of race is a tool of political
discourse, that it is able to conceal its political nature behind some more official purpose, and 
that it conceals our actual relationship with government behind a supposedly objective morality.
In order to construct a rich phenomenological approach to the subject, I also explored Sheth’s 
analysis by looking at how it was reflected in the arts. I investigated the technology of race 
through the mediums of literature and poetry, as well as looking directly at some political 
discourse on the issue of race. Furthermore, by investigating how Heidegger contributes to 
Sheth’s theory I was able to begin an analysis of the ways in which issues like race resist rational 
discourse as functions of a basic cultural attitude. In order to initially explain the idea of the 
cultural attitude, I looked to the work of Immanuel Kant to establish that the aim of this project 
was to uncover the conditions which make race possible in the first place. Since race is 
technological then a full understanding of it is only possible by investigating the idea of 
technology, and to that end I turned my project to Martin Heidegger’s philosophy of technology.

In the fourth chapter of this dissertation, I engaged in a thorough analysis of Martin 
Heidegger’s philosophy of technology in his essay *The Question Concerning Technology*. I 
began with the distinction between handwork and modern technology. This provided a 
preliminary definition of technology as an instrument and a tool for human work. In ancient, or 
handwork, technology the work of the crafter reveals something hidden and natural in the object. 
This revelation is called *poiesis* and this was the true essence of ancient technology. Yet modern 
technology does not gently reveal, it challenges and forces the natural world to yield up its 
resources. When the human workers of modern technology are driven to yield up the resources 
of the world, then we see that there is a different revelation happening in modern technology. 
That revelation, of the world as merely full of useful materials and resources, is driven by a 
cultural attitude called the enframing. It is in the enframing that we found the great danger posed
by modern technology. The greatest threat of technology is that it will conceal its true nature as a normative gaze under the mask of mere instrument. That supreme danger is the notion that we are set up and forced into one way of seeing the world. While we are the agents who cause the enframing to reveal the world as mere resource, we are at the same time losing our very agency. The threat is that we will only ever encounter technology as a means to our ends, and will never understand that technology is in many ways out of our hands, operating under its own autonomic forces. Even more than this we will forget that technology is merely one way of seeing the world, as our options become absorbed by the normative gaze. The entire world and ourselves as well are threatened and endangered by the normative gaze of technology. This threat has become so overarching that it will now be characterized as a sin.

The fifth chapter brought this project under a stark ethical heading by illuminating the way that the problems we face in race and technology can ultimately be understood as sins. In order to cast these problems in an ethical light which galvanizes us into action it is necessary to view them through the religious language of sin. To that end I engaged in an analysis of religious language. I first illuminated the historical ways in which the development of religion has mirrored the development of race and technology and so also seems to be caught up in the same structures. Since the goal was to see how religious language could explicate technoracism I then turned to the ideas of sin as presented in the works of Augustine. For Augustine, sin is a matter of intention, and what is good or bad has everything to do with the object of our desire. To that end he organizes the things in the world according to a hierarchy of goods with God at the top, followed by intellectual things, and then with physical goods at the bottom. He also distinguishes between sins against God and sins against society. To sin against God would be to commit a sin that is religious in nature by loving the lesser goods of the world more than the great good of
God. To sin against society is to elevate one’s own importance over the importance of maintaining social unity. Having established Augustine’s idea of sin, I then turned to see how well this could be applied to the notions of race and technology. Racism as whiteness can be understood as a sin against society, as a sin against the people it seeks to define. It harms those members of society who are not white, but it also causes psychological harm even to those white members of society. Racism is also a religious sin, as the sin of idolatry. It asserts itself as the supreme category by which all people are to be judged, and in so doing causes a disordered state of values in our intentions. Modern technology can also be understood as a religious sin. Since handwork technology approaches the world with a spirit of respect and reverence and thereby has the character of piety. Yet, for modern technology there is no ethical care for the world and no respect for it, and so it too operates as a kind of idolatry in asserting its supremacy over every other consideration. Modern technology was also understood as a social sin, especially since the supreme danger in it consists in how it closes humans off to every other kind of knowing, thus doing great harm to human society. In the end of this discussion I offer an explanation for the validity of this approach. In the first place I argued that using religious language to explain these concepts creates a kind of moral aesthetic where the value of how something is described is just as important as what is described. Secondly, I claimed that this showed even more intensely how similar were the problems of technology and race, and this prepared the way for the underlying concept of technoracism.

In chapter six, I argued that there exists a cultural attitude, technoracism, which is prior to whiteness and modern technology. I began by defining the idea of a cultural attitude through Heidegger’s notion of *Geschick*, of which the enframing is an example. A cultural attitude contains both discursive and non-discursive elements, so it is both rational and also pre-rational
insofar as it defines its own conditions for rationality. I also investigated the idea of the cultural attitude by looking at how Cornel West and Fred Evans discuss the notions of white supremacy and oracular voices respectively. West emphasizes the rational side of the cultural attitude while hinting at the pre-rational. Evans explained that the pre-rational, non-discursive, aspect of the cultural attitude could be found in how certain emotions or psychological states influence discourse. Yet the cultural attitude exists as both discursive and non-discursive with both aspects reinforcing and undermining each other in turn. Having defined the idea of a cultural attitude I then argued that technoracism is such a cultural attitude and that it is in fact the true cultural attitude which underlies both racism as whiteness and modern technology as the enframing. In order to clearly explore the arguments for this I turned to an investigation of the historical and cultural forces which are found at the origins of technoracism. I argued that technoracism is the cultural attitude which comes to predominate in most aspects of European society at the start of the modern age, roughly the late sixteenth century. Yet the origins of technoracism can be seen best in how its non-discursive aspects justify their discursive counterparts. It is the cultural attitude which is defined by the non-discursive conditions of violent exclusivity, precise particularity, and absolute subjectivism. These in turn gave rise historically to the discourse of a shared Christian European cultural identity, an emphasis on reason and universal categorization, and the assertion of the value of the subject as individual. In my final estimation it seemed that technoracism derived from the emotional condition of fear and paranoia as an attempt to resolve those feelings. In my analysis of the discursive and non-discursive elements of technoracism, I determined that an ethical resolution to this attitude must also involve discourse and non-discourse. This in turn led to a virtue ethics.
The final chapter explored the possibility of an ethical resolution to technoracism by means of a virtue ethics of multiplicity. I rephrased the language of discourse as education, and I rephrased the language of non-discourse as habit. This allowed me to situate all discursive aspects of technoracism in terms of intentional plans to communicate and teach ideas. This also allowed me to resituate the non-discursive aspects of technoracism in terms of habits born out of repeated practices. Thus having transitioned into the language of virtue ethics I gave a brief analysis of virtue ethics from Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*. Aristotle defined virtue as a state of character determined by habits that arise from deliberate choices for moderate goods between the extremes of defect and excess. He also defined happiness as the goal of human life and explained that only virtue could achieve happiness. Ultimately, he was convinced that a life of virtue achieved happiness since it was a life of virtue which would best fulfill the ideal of being human. Although there were some problems with Aristotle’s approach, I determined that the human ideal should be best understood as the ideal of multiplicity. Even though our human identity has been largely constructed by technoracism, nonetheless there is an aspect of that identity which eludes that construction and which informs it. Even in the most rigorously constructed of human identities we find there is a tendency for humans to define themselves in terms of a vast diversity of concepts, entities, beliefs, practices, desires, and relationships. If there is a human ideal to be aspired to then that ideal is multiplicity. Based on the ideal of multiplicity I was able to define three virtues which oppose the three main constituent elements of technoracism. Within the sphere of religious belief, the virtue of religious diversity is raised up as the mean between the vices of religious supremacy and religious indifference. In the sphere of understanding the virtue of aesthetic mystery lies in the mean between the vices of universal categorization and total skepticism. The sphere of inter-subjectivity gives us our final virtue with
community lying in the mean between absolute subjectivism and cultural appropriation. Since virtue is acquired through practice then I also set out and described four different practices which were apt for bringing about the virtues of multiplicity. Through the practice of detachment, we engage in letting things in the world be what they are and we adopt an attitude of cooperation rather than domination. The practice of tarrying moves one to re-engage technoracism by having a care and respect for those who are directly hurt by it. The practice of vigilance is a call to activism which extends beyond mere thinking, but only insofar as this activism is able to realize the ways in which it continues to benefit from the very systems it seeks to undo. The final practice is the work of dialogue and it is only through discussion with others that we can maintain our vigilance and appropriately engage in tarrying and detachment.

Technoracism is a term which is meant to capture the essence of a cultural attitude which is by its nature difficult to articulate. In the obvious sense this term points to some of the more visible manifestations of this attitude by combining the terms technology and racism. To be sure, there are numerous systemic apparitions that are driven by this attitude and no single work could begin to unravel them all. So in closing I want to prepare the way towards future projects. The essence of technoracism is found in its violent exclusivity, precise particularity, and absolute subjectivism. These common themes can also be applied to an investigation of how sexism exists in a different way under the system of technoracism. Although sexism is a very old form of discrimination and oppression, there does seem to be a kind of cultural shift around the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries into a new kind of sexism. This shift is most notable for its move away from a religious model of understanding sex into a scientific one. It is the biological and scientific approach to sex and sexuality which brings ancient notions of gender under new universal headings. For a full investigation into this project, I would need to demonstrate what
makes sexism different in the modern era and what kind of ethical approaches might be raised against it. The same investigation might also be applied to a study of social class. Here things are a bit more nebulous as the class shift which takes place around the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries initially seems to create more freedom for people in society. The rise of the middle class and the weakening of the Aristocracy at first seem to move towards a more egalitarian society. Yet in the rise of capitalism, the rule of the nobility transitions into a rule by the new wealthy class. Marx has already done the major work here in pointing out the dangers of capitalism. However, there may yet be something to discover here if we think of the rise of capitalism proceeding from that same attitude which spawned racism and modern technology. Then it may be possible to understand capitalism proceeding from an absolute subjectivism driven by a reactionary fear of political powers. This may in turn assist us in an ethics of class and economy which is able to step into and beyond the notion of wealth defining power. The goal here would be to rediscover ways in which power could be shared between classes on a way to a complete restructuring of class itself.

In the end, the various manifestations of technoracism are too numerous to count since they are all the institutions and systems of the world in which we grew up and now live. The desire to overcome technoracism is even, in its own strange way, driven by that same attitude, since it is a desire for power and domination over what threatens us. The approach here is philosophical, and there are other approaches that are religious or political, and perhaps also more active. Though philosophy seems to be the slow way, that caution is needed. In seeking to undo the cultural attitude which informs everything about myself and the world I must be careful not to rush ahead and simply take up one manifestation of technoracism to fight another. The work must remain a process and the change must be careful. The virtues of multiplicity must
begin with the practice of detachment, and as we let things be, the way that things are shows up in a brilliant and colorful display.
Notes

Introduction

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
9. Ibid, 43.
11. Ibid, 34.
17. Throughout this dissertation I will make use of William Lovitt’s translations of many of the key terms from Heidegger’s philosophy of technology. This includes such famous terms as “enframing”, “standing reserve”, and “unconcealment”. I use Lovitt’s translation because it is the most widespread and because much of the secondary literature on Heidegger’s philosophy of technology, at least in English, makes use of Lovitt’s terms. However these terms present certain limitations to a full and rich understanding of Heidegger and it should be understood that these terms are perhaps useful, but by no means perfect
20. Ibid, 322.
21. Ibid, 324.
22. Ibid, 332.
Chapter 1 – Genealogy of Race

1. It is important to point out that the inspiration for this chapter, as well as the working out of the method of genealogy owes much to the writings of Cornel West, who articulated his conception of a genealogy of race in his book *Prophesy Deliverance*. My take on a genealogy of race will draw heavily from his work.


4. Ibid.


8. Ibid, 2.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid, 3.


12. Ibid, viii-ix.


15. Ibid, 10.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.


20. Ibid, 12.


22. Ibid, 14.


24. Ibid.


27. Ibid.


29. Ibid.

30. We must remember that for Kant and Bernier the skin color is the defining feature of each race, as it is supposed to be the strongest indicator of the natural kind.

31. Ibid, 10.

32. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
39. Ibid, 75.
40. Ibid, 77.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid, 71.
46. Ibid.
51. Ibid. 55.
52. Ibid, 51.
54. Ibid.
56. Ibid, 56.
57. Ibid, 57.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid, 63.

Chapter 2 – Whiteness
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid, xxii.
5. Ibid, 34.
6. Ibid, 46.
7. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
Chapter 3 – The Technology of Race

1. Throughout this dissertation I will make use of William Lovitt’s translations of many of the key terms from Heidegger’s philosophy of technology. This includes such famous terms as “enframing”, and “standing reserve.” I use Lovitt’s translation because it is the most widespread and because much of the secondary literature on Heidegger’s philosophy of technology, at least in English, makes use of Lovitt’s terms. However these terms present certain limitations to a full and rich understanding of Heidegger and it should be understood that these terms are perhaps useful, but by no means perfect.

2. Sheth, Toward a Political Philosophy of Race, 22.
3. Ibid, 4.
4. Ibid, 111.
5. Ibid, 111-112.


8. Ibid.

9. Sheth, Toward a Political Philosophy of Race, 22.

10. Here I am myself merely deploying the racist rhetoric, not condoning it. However this raises the problem of how far I am able to discuss racism without falling victim to its categorization. In even reiterating the terms of racism in a scholarly work, I nonetheless reconstitute them, and to a limited degree I reinstate cultural stereotypes and categories of oppression and violence. It is clearly not my intent in this dissertation to reinforce racism, but it is also necessary to remind our academic selves of the danger involved in the mere mention rather than the use of words. There are terms, which owing to a history of violence and fear, whose mention are practically inextricable from their use. So while I may attempt to hide my discussion of racist language behind the veneer of academic objectivity, I nonetheless run the risk of reinstating the very language I mean to deconstruct. I do not raise this here as a problem to be avoided, but rather as a bias to be admitted.

11. In conducting a phenomenology I mean to invoke the idea of a looking at from all available sides. I take my cues from the work of Edmund Husserl on this, even though I admit that a complete phenomenology is impossible. Nonetheless, when I bring in considerations of art and literature I gain a different vantage point on how race manifests in other aspects of Western and European culture. This in turn sheds more light on the notion of race itself. So the more diverse are my perspectives the more readily the idea of race comes to light at their center.


13. Ibid, par. 28.


15. Sheth, Toward a Political Philosophy of Race, 22-23.


17. Conrad, Heart of Darkness, Chapter I, par. 29.

18. Sheth, Toward a Political Philosophy of Race, 23.


20. Ibid.


22. Ibid, 273.

23. Sheth, Toward a Political Philosophy of Race, 22.


25. Ibid, 196.
26. The question may also be asked as to whether or not I should confront the racism of Immanuel Kant. Since Kant is rather valuable to the tradition of philosophy then the practice of overlooking Kant’s racism, or at least arguing that it has no bearing on his critical project, is quite common in the philosophical tradition. Yet rather than falling victim to this kind of thinking it should be noted that Kant is being included in this chapter in order to illustrate that the kind of thinking employed by Sheth and Heidegger is situated within a history and a tradition. We are indebted to Kant, and as such cannot ignore his contribution. This does not mean that his contribution to racism is excused, but rather that this current dissertation would suffer from important lacuna without Kant’s negative and positive work in the critical tradition as well as the racist tradition in philosophy.

27. Van Davis, Jeffrey (director). Only a God Can Save Us, DVD (Salem, Germany: Terrance Edward Davis Production, 2009).


Chapter 4 – Heidegger and the Danger of Technology

2. Ibid, 4.
3. Ibid, 5.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
7. Ibid, 16.
8. Ibid, 22.
17. Ibid, 32.
18. Ibid.
22. Ibid, 14.
23. Ibid, 12.

26. Ibid, 5-16.
27. Ibid, 5, 14-15, 17.
36. Ibid, 85.
41. Steiner, *Martin Heidegger*, 139.
47. Ibid, 23.
51. Ibid, 178.
52. Ibid, 182.
54. Ibid, 28.
55. Descartes, *Discourse on Method*, 35
56. Steiner, *Martin Heidegger*, 139.
58. Ibid.

61. Lewis, *The Abolition of Man*, 64.
63. Ibid, 28.
Chapter 5 – Sin and Ethics


5. Ibid.
6. Ibid, 381.
7. Ibid.
10. Ibid, 5.
11. Ibid, 5.
12. Ibid, 8.
15. Augustine, Free Choice, 26,
16. Augustine, Confessions, 46.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid, 47.
23. Ibid.
26. West, Prophesy Deliverance, 55.
27. Herder, "Organization of the Peoples of Africa," 77.
30. Ibid, 10-11.
Chapter 6 – Technoracism


2. During the defense a question was raised as to which was ontologically prior, whiteness or enframing. Although whiteness seems to be chronologically prior to the advent of modern machine technology in the industrial revolution, neither manifestation is ontologically prior to the other. They are simultaneous arisings of that which is truly ontologically prior, the cultural attitude of technoracism.


10. West, Prophesy Deliverance, 47.


12. Ibid.


15. Ibid, 209.


17. Ibid.


22. Whalen, Dominion of God, 2.


24. Ibid, 269.


27. Ibid, 9.

28. Ibid, 12.


30. Whalen, Dominion of God, 6.

32. Hay, Europe: The Emergence of an Idea, 56.
33. Ibid, 56-57.
34. Whalen, Dominion of God, 6.
35. Ibid, 2.
36. West, Prophesey Deliverance, 50
37. Ibid, 27.
38. Ibid.
40. Descartes, Meditations, 35.
41. Troeltsch, The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches, 261.
42. Descartes, Discourse on Method, 35.
44. Ibid, 3.
45. West, Prophesey Deliverance, 28.
48. West, Prophesey Deliverance, 28.
49. Descartes, Discourse on Method, 1-10.

Chapter 7 – The Virtue Ethics of Multiplicity
2. Ibid.
4. Izadi and Holley “Video shows shooting within seconds”.
5. Ibid.
8. Ibid, 14.
9. Ibid, 16.
10. Ibid, 25.
12. Ibid. 25.
13. Ibid. 8.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid, 9.
16. Ibid, 163.
18. Ibid, 186.
22. Ibid, 91.
24. Rojcewicz notes that Hölderlin does not actually use the word “power.” He speaks only of “that which saves.” Thus a better translation for saving power would be “that which saves”, in - Rojcewicz, *The Gods and Technology*.
27. Ibid, 28-29.
28. Ibid, 163.
34. Ibid.
37. Ibid, 158.
40. Ibid, 238.
41. Ibid, 240.
43. Ibid, 19.
Bibliography


Van Davis, Jeffrey (director). 2009. Only a God Can Save Us. Produced by Terrance Edward Davis Production.


