Duquesne Law Review


Stephen Gorove


The United States as a leading nation in atomic resources and skill has for a long time championed the establishment of internationally administered controls to assure the peaceful utilization of nuclear power. Only for the lack of a generally acceptable agreement on such controls and in view of the early difficulties besetting the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its safeguards system did American policy makers decide to give the green light to the conclusion of a series of U.S. bilateral accords with other nations. While most of these agreements gave the United States certain safeguards rights to assure that the nuclear assistance provided would be used exclusively for peaceful purposes, at the same time, they envisaged the possible transfer of U.S. safeguards functions to the international agency. However, the latter expectation failed to materialize for many years and it was not until some time after the policy recommendations of a special advisory committee were made public in what is known as the "Smyth Report" that the first transfer arrangement between the United States, Japan and the IAEA was actually concluded in 1963. This trilateral accord regarding the application of IAEA safeguards to the United States-Japan Cooperation Agreement 6 has now been followed by many similar agreements involving, for instance, such third countries as Argentina, Austria, Israel, the Philippines, the Republics of China," South Africa and Viet Nam. Others are likely to be concluded when the respective bilaterals come up for renewal, since the United States is expected to throw its full weight of persuasion into the balance to have its bilateral safeguards functions administered by the Agency.

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