To author an article concerning the constitutional aspects of longarm jurisdiction over non-resident defendants at this point in time requires an apology. The subject has been on the whole well treated by scholars and courts alike and the student can find excellent analytical and comprehensive works to inform him even as to the most subtle nuances of the field. No new decisions of startling import have been thrust upon us in the past year and those of more ancient vintage have been either fawned over or dissected with such fervor that nary a comma or quotation mark in International Shoe, McGee and Hanson v. Denckla remain uncommented upon. My concern is frankly not with the analytical framework which has developed to date but rather with the more startling proposals which have been suggested by noted scholars in the past several years for the further extension of state-court jurisdiction. The first is the thesis expressed by Professors yon Mehren and Trautman in their pervasive article, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis. The second, the approach of Professor David Seidelson in his view of the world that lay Beyond Minimum Contacts and the Long-Arm Statutes. It shall be the purpose of this article to critically examine these proposals and then suggest a rationale for continuing constitutional control of the jurisdictional question.
Aaron D. Twerski,
A Return to Jurisdictional Due Process - The Case for the Vanishing Defendant,
Duq. L. Rev.
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol8/iss2/3