Attending Intending: Meaning and Making Sense in Husserl and Wittgenstein

Defense Date

8-24-2006

Graduation Date

Fall 1-1-2006

Availability

Campus Only

Submission Type

dissertation

Degree Name

PhD

Department

Philosophy

School

McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts

Committee Chair

Lanei Rodemeyer

Committee Member

Eleanore Holveck

Committee Member

Fred Evans

Keywords

Frege, intentionality, picture theory of meaning, reference, representation, semitoics

Abstract

Husserl and the early Wittgenstein, by defining the concepts of Sinn and Bedeutung, try to clarify how logic relates to language and mental experience. While Husserl uses language to navigate phenomenological experience, the later Wittgenstein finally rejects using language toward these ends. First, I examine the historical claim that Husserl influenced Wittgenstein. Next, common elements Husserl and Wittgentein share are attributed to Frege's influence on both thinkers. However, after subtracting the influence of Frege, a remainder of several structural similarities Wittgenstein and Husserl share are left in opposition to Frege. Of particular importance is their employment of presentative experience, serving to map out the world, and the notion of Sinn, which serves a communicative and regulative function that is independent both of actual existence and psychological cognition.

Format

PDF

Language

English

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