Defense Date

4-3-2020

Graduation Date

Spring 5-8-2020

Availability

Immediate Access

Submission Type

dissertation

Degree Name

PhD

Department

Philosophy

School

McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts

Committee Chair

Lanei Rodemeyer

Committee Member

Jay Lampert

Committee Member

Mihai Vlad Niculescu

Keywords

Phenomenology, Husserl, Intersubjectivity, Co-constitution, Inaccessibility, Verification

Abstract

In this work I investigate Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological analyses of the appearance of the other ego in order to elucidate the essential components of the sense of the other ego: co-constitution, inaccessibility, and a unique process of verification. I open with an example illustrating the way in which other egos appear to me as different from ordinary objects in the world. When one looks outside in a storm and sees a branch rapping on the window, it is not an alarming experience. However, were another person to be rapping at the window, the experience would be quite different. This is because there is a difference in the way that animate and inanimate bodies are given to me. Elucidating this difference in givenness is the goal of the dissertation, and I conclude Chapter I by clarifying some phenomenological topics that will be used throughout the rest of the analyses: the lived body, appresentation, and association. In Chapter II, I argue that the other ego appears first and foremost in her co-constitution, which is given to me in two ways: in my experience of the world as co-constituted by others and in my experience of her active engagement in the world. First, Husserl emphasizes the appearance of the world as there for more than just me, as shared. In the appearance of the world as such, the other ego is experienced in her constitutive accomplishment: I experience objects as constituted by more than just me, as given to other constituting activities of consciousness in addition to my own. Second, these other constituting consciousnesses are given as centers of constituting activity. I experience the world as constituted by other egos and oriented around the bodily center of that constitution. In other words, just as the world is oriented around the “here” of my constituting activity, so does the other ego appear as a “there”, which is a “here” for her, around which the world is also organized. In this way, the other ego appears in her co-constituting the world and in the world as co-constituted by her. The clarification of this two-fold sense of co-constitution allows for a description of the transcendental sense of co-constitution at play in my constituting consciousness. Following Zahavi’s analysis of Husserl’s concept of open intersubjectivity, I argue that the sense of the other ego as a co-constitution is operative in my objective constitution of the world. This means that, within my very experience of the world, the other ego’s constitutive contribution is already at work. Thus, in my experience of the objective world, the co-constitution of the other ego appears. In chapter III, I argue that what distinguishes my stream of constitution from the stream of constitution of the other ego, her stream of co-constitution, is accessibility. My experiences, my constituting activity, are given to me as accessible, and the co-constituting of the other ego appears to me as inaccessible. Phenomenologically speaking, accessibility is a special type of originality, which is best understood in relation to Husserl’s distinction between direct and indirect givenness. Husserl says that a phenomenon is given directly to consciousness when it gives itself; in other words, something is given directly to me when its appearance is not mediated. This means that a phenomenon is given indirectly when it is not itself given; rather, an indirectly given phenomenon is given through something else. This is important in the discussion of the appearance of the other ego in her inaccessibility, because Husserl says multiple times that the other ego is directly given. However, he also says that I cannot have a direct perception of the other consciousness. I argue that Husserl’s distinction means that I have a direct experience of the accomplishment of the other ego’s constituting consciousness, but I experience her conscious activity solely as enacted. What is not directly given to me, because it is only indicated, is the enacting of this conscious activity. Thus, the other ego is directly given to me in her co-constitution, but the enacting of this co-constitution is indirectly given to me. That the other ego’s enacting of her constituting consciousness cannot be directly given to me comes down to originality. My consciousness is given to me as original because it has a unified temporal context: my experiences are given such that they belong to me and can be ordered as temporally related within my experience. The consciousness of the other ego, that is, the enacting of her co-constitution, is structurally incapable of being given in such a unified temporal context. Because her experiences have a different temporal context than my own, they are unoriginal. While I do have a direct and original experience of her consciousness, it can only accord with my unified temporal context insofar as it is an experience of her enacted conscious activity. The enacting of her consciousness indicated in my direct experience of her conscious activity cannot be unified with my temporal context. Thus, the other ego appears in her inaccessibility, because if the enacting of her consciousness were directly given to me, or if her experience were given as unified with my temporal context, that is, originally my experience, then her consciousness would simply be a mode of my own consciousness, as is the case for my past and possible future consciousnesses. Thus, the sense of the other ego as a co-constitution must always appear to me as inaccessible. In Chapter IV, I argue that the final component of the sense of the other ego is the unique process of verification through which the inaccessible co-constitution comes to its full givenness. I show that Husserl has a tripartite structure of verification: an empty intention comes to a coincidence with an intuition, which can be fulfilling, disappointing, or somewhere in between. I then demonstrate that this tripartite structure is operative at all levels and in all of the various ways in which the process of verification occurs. For Husserl, the way in which the process of verification plays out depends upon the content being verified and the level of consciousness at which this process occurs. I specifically focus on the unique type of verification that Husserl calls corroboration (Bestätigung), or a secondary verification, because this horizonal verification occurs on the periphery of experience. As I attend to this or that object, my continuing experience is given to me as unified because the horizon of my stream of consciousness is harmonious. Accompanying my experiences, then, are empty intentions aimed at the horizon of my experiences – the background noises, the colors and lighting, the emotions and embodied sensations of living in the world. These empty intentions are largely ignored, such that I do not attend to their strivings. However, were I to suddenly have a change in my horizonal experience, the corroboration of said experience would be broken. The process of verification in corroboration is unique because the corroborating empty intentions need not coincide with fulfilling intuitions proper; rather, the empty intentions of corroboration coincide with empty intentions aimed at the same sort of fulfillment. Thus, the unity of my experience arises in the continuing corroboration of what is strived for in horizonal empty intentions. This same sort of verification is at play in the appearance of the other ego, because the intuitive fulfillment of the other ego cannot arise in the same way as what is strived for in other verifying syntheses, such as judgment verifications. Rather, the inaccessible co-constituting of the other ego is always verified in the continuously harmonious appearance of what can only be intended emptily. In this way, the verification of the other ego is a horizonal corroboration of my intersubjective experience. I cannot verify the appearance of the other ego through an intuitively fulfilling synthesis, which is obvious from the analysis of inaccessibility. But, through continuously harmonious intersubjective experience, the appearance of the other ego becomes verified in the corroboration of the empty intentions aimed at her inaccessibility. These three components, then, give the full sense of the other ego as an inaccessible co-constitution uniquely verified in harmonious syntheses. I end my investigation by asking how this sense arises. Specifically, I aim to clarify whether or not one must have a concrete experience of the other ego’s embodied presence in order to constitute the full sense of the other ego. In order to answer this question, I first look at the static analysis of the sense of the other ego, which shows that, within my own constituting consciousness, there is what I call a “structural sense” of the other ego. Because my own stream of constitution includes the constitutive accomplishment of the other ego, the components of co-constitution and inaccessibility are given within the structure of my experience of the world. However, after exploring Rodemeyer’s genetic analysis of the generation of the sense of the other ego, I argue that this structural sense is insufficient for the constitution of the full sense of the other ego because it lacks the unique process of verification. The verification necessary for the full constitution of the sense of the other ego arises only after my being affected by the inaccessible co-constitution of the other ego in a concrete experience of her lived body. Such an experience cashes in the structural sense of the other ego by unfolding the corroborating intentions that occur in the verification of intersubjective experience. Without this verification, the structural sense of the other ego cannot be fully constituted as such and remains merely a structural component of my own consciousness. Therefore, the constitution of the full sense of the other ego occurs only when a concrete experience of the other ego cashes in the structural sense of the other ego.

Language

English

Additional Citations

In this work I investigate Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological analyses of the appearance of the other ego in order to elucidate the essential components of the sense of the other ego: co-constitution, inaccessibility, and a unique process of verification.

I open with an example illustrating the way in which other egos appear to me as different from ordinary objects in the world. When one looks outside in a storm and sees a branch rapping on the window, it is not an alarming experience. However, were another person to be rapping at the window, the experience would be quite different. This is because there is a difference in the way that animate and inanimate bodies are given to me. Elucidating this difference in givenness is the goal of the dissertation, and I conclude Chapter I by clarifying some phenomenological topics that will be used throughout the rest of the analyses: the lived body, appresentation, and association.

In Chapter II, I argue that the other ego appears first and foremost in her co-constitution, which is given to me in two ways: in my experience of the world as co-constituted by others and in my experience of her active engagement in the world. First, Husserl emphasizes the appearance of the world as there for more than just me, as shared. In the appearance of the world as such, the other ego is experienced in her constitutive accomplishment: I experience objects as constituted by more than just me, as given to other constituting activities of consciousness in addition to my own. Second, these other constituting consciousnesses are given as centers of constituting activity. I experience the world as constituted by other egos and oriented around the bodily center of that constitution. In other words, just as the world is oriented around the “here” of my constituting activity, so does the other ego appear as a “there”, which is a “here” for her, around which the world is also organized. In this way, the other ego appears in her co-constituting the world and in the world as co-constituted by her. The clarification of this two-fold sense of co-constitution allows for a description of the transcendental sense of co-constitution at play in my constituting consciousness. Following Zahavi’s analysis of Husserl’s concept of open intersubjectivity, I argue that the sense of the other ego as a co-constitution is operative in my objective constitution of the world. This means that, within my very experience of the world, the other ego’s constitutive contribution is already at work. Thus, in my experience of the objective world, the co-constitution of the other ego appears.

In chapter III, I argue that what distinguishes my stream of constitution from the stream of constitution of the other ego, her stream of co-constitution, is accessibility. My experiences, my constituting activity, are given to me as accessible, and the co-constituting of the other ego appears to me as inaccessible. Phenomenologically speaking, accessibility is a special type of originality, which is best understood in relation to Husserl’s distinction between direct and indirect givenness. Husserl says that a phenomenon is given directly to consciousness when it gives itself; in other words, something is given directly to me when its appearance is not mediated. This means that a phenomenon is given indirectly when it is not itself given; rather, an indirectly given phenomenon is given through something else. This is important in the discussion of the appearance of the other ego in her inaccessibility, because Husserl says multiple times that the other ego is directly given. However, he also says that I cannot have a direct perception of the other consciousness. I argue that Husserl’s distinction means that I have a direct experience of the accomplishment of the other ego’s constituting consciousness, but I experience her conscious activity solely as enacted. What is not directly given to me, because it is only indicated, is the enacting of this conscious activity. Thus, the other ego is directly given to me in her co-constitution, but the enacting of this co-constitution is indirectly given to me. That the other ego’s enacting of her constituting consciousness cannot be directly given to me comes down to originality. My consciousness is given to me as original because it has a unified temporal context: my experiences are given such that they belong to me and can be ordered as temporally related within my experience. The consciousness of the other ego, that is, the enacting of her co-constitution, is structurally incapable of being given in such a unified temporal context. Because her experiences have a different temporal context than my own, they are unoriginal. While I do have a direct and original experience of her consciousness, it can only accord with my unified temporal context insofar as it is an experience of her enacted conscious activity. The enacting of her consciousness indicated in my direct experience of her conscious activity cannot be unified with my temporal context. Thus, the other ego appears in her inaccessibility, because if the enacting of her consciousness were directly given to me, or if her experience were given as unified with my temporal context, that is, originally my experience, then her consciousness would simply be a mode of my own consciousness, as is the case for my past and possible future consciousnesses. Thus, the sense of the other ego as a co-constitution must always appear to me as inaccessible.

In Chapter IV, I argue that the final component of the sense of the other ego is the unique process of verification through which the inaccessible co-constitution comes to its full givenness. I show that Husserl has a tripartite structure of verification: an empty intention comes to a coincidence with an intuition, which can be fulfilling, disappointing, or somewhere in between. I then demonstrate that this tripartite structure is operative at all levels and in all of the various ways in which the process of verification occurs. For Husserl, the way in which the process of verification plays out depends upon the content being verified and the level of consciousness at which this process occurs. I specifically focus on the unique type of verification that Husserl calls corroboration (Bestätigung), or a secondary verification, because this horizonal verification occurs on the periphery of experience. As I attend to this or that object, my continuing experience is given to me as unified because the horizon of my stream of consciousness is harmonious. Accompanying my experiences, then, are empty intentions aimed at the horizon of my experiences – the background noises, the colors and lighting, the emotions and embodied sensations of living in the world. These empty intentions are largely ignored, such that I do not attend to their strivings. However, were I to suddenly have a change in my horizonal experience, the corroboration of said experience would be broken. The process of verification in corroboration is unique because the corroborating empty intentions need not coincide with fulfilling intuitions proper; rather, the empty intentions of corroboration coincide with empty intentions aimed at the same sort of fulfillment. Thus, the unity of my experience arises in the continuing corroboration of what is strived for in horizonal empty intentions. This same sort of verification is at play in the appearance of the other ego, because the intuitive fulfillment of the other ego cannot arise in the same way as what is strived for in other verifying syntheses, such as judgment verifications. Rather, the inaccessible co-constituting of the other ego is always verified in the continuously harmonious appearance of what can only be intended emptily. In this way, the verification of the other ego is a horizonal corroboration of my intersubjective experience. I cannot verify the appearance of the other ego through an intuitively fulfilling synthesis, which is obvious from the analysis of inaccessibility. But, through continuously harmonious intersubjective experience, the appearance of the other ego becomes verified in the corroboration of the empty intentions aimed at her inaccessibility.

These three components, then, give the full sense of the other ego as an inaccessible co-constitution uniquely verified in harmonious syntheses. I end my investigation by asking how this sense arises. Specifically, I aim to clarify whether or not one must have a concrete experience of the other ego’s embodied presence in order to constitute the full sense of the other ego. In order to answer this question, I first look at the static analysis of the sense of the other ego, which shows that, within my own constituting consciousness, there is what I call a “structural sense” of the other ego. Because my own stream of constitution includes the constitutive accomplishment of the other ego, the components of co-constitution and inaccessibility are given within the structure of my experience of the world. However, after exploring Rodemeyer’s genetic analysis of the generation of the sense of the other ego, I argue that this structural sense is insufficient for the constitution of the full sense of the other ego because it lacks the unique process of verification. The verification necessary for the full constitution of the sense of the other ego arises only after my being affected by the inaccessible co-constitution of the other ego in a concrete experience of her lived body. Such an experience cashes in the structural sense of the other ego by unfolding the corroborating intentions that occur in the verification of intersubjective experience. Without this verification, the structural sense of the other ego cannot be fully constituted as such and remains merely a structural component of my own consciousness. Therefore, the constitution of the full sense of the other ego occurs only when a concrete experience of the other ego cashes in the structural sense of the other ego.

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