Defense Date
6-26-2020
Graduation Date
Summer 8-8-2020
Availability
Immediate Access
Submission Type
dissertation
Degree Name
PhD
Department
Philosophy
School
McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts
Committee Chair
Ronald Polansky
Committee Member
Patrick Miller
Committee Member
Walter Brogan
Keywords
Aristotle, Plato, Parmenides, Ontology, Not-Being, Being, Potentiality, Falsity, Privation
Abstract
Aristotle is not thought to have a theory of not-being, but, in this project, I show that there are several distinct ways of not-being established in his writings. As being is said according to what is in-itself, what is accidentally, what is true, and what is actualized, so not-being is determined as the privative, the false, or potentiality. In each of these cases, I articulate what it means that it is a way of not-being, and how it is also a way of being. Aristotle’s theory is put in contrast to his predecessors, especially Parmenides and Plato, whose ontologies are centered around either denying not-being any status or making it into a first principle.
Language
English
Recommended Citation
Greenstine, A. (2020). The Ontology of Not-Being in Aristotle and His Predecessors (Doctoral dissertation, Duquesne University). Retrieved from https://dsc.duq.edu/etd/1912