Subject and predicate in existential propositions: A survey of frege's problem and its solutions

DOI

10.31577/ORGF.2020.27407

Document Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

1-1-2020

Publication Title

Organon F

Volume

27

Issue

4

First Page

522

Last Page

538

ISSN

13350668

Keywords

Concept, Existence, Existential proposition, Frege, Object

Abstract

Frege argues that considering Socrates as an object in the proposition "Socrates exists" raises two problems. First, this propo-sition would be uninformative. Second, its negation entails a contra-diction. Attempting to solve these problems, Frege claims that Soc-rates is representing the concept of a man whose name is Socrates. Therefore, existence is a second-order concept. This paper surveys the main modern theories about the types of existence, in order to find another response to Frege's problems. For, if Socrates' existence differs from the type that "exists" implies, "Socrates exists" is in-formative and its negation is not a contradiction. At last, this paper argues for an idea, in which "existence" is not a concept or property. Existence is the principle of the objects. So, "Socrates exists" is in fact "the existence is Socrates," and "Socrates does not exist" is "there is no existence that be Socrates." This idea could be an alter-native for responding to Frege's problems.

Open Access

Gold

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